Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding - Atlantic Council

Boko Haram is a ghost. The US needs to recognize that.

Alexandra Gorman — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 17:21:53 +0000

As Nigeria’s newly elected President Bola Tinubu takes stock of what lies ahead for him, he faces the challenge of achieving a lasting peace and keeping civilians safe, an issue with which his predecessors significantly struggled. To finally accomplish this task, he’ll need to address the jihadist insurgency that has engulfed the country’s north for the last decade.

Despite a long-term military counterterrorism effort, Nigeria still ranks as the eighth most-affected country on the Global Terrorism Index. Because of the persistence of the problem, Tinubu will need all the help he can get, including from the United States. Thus—especially at a time when the Sahel and coastal West Africa are embroiled in ever-worsening security crises—it may seem illogical for the US State Department to remove Boko Haram, once considered the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).

However, this action is long overdue. To designate a group as an FTO, the State Department must demonstrate that 1) the group is a foreign organization, 2) the group is engaged in, or retains the capability and intent to engage in, terrorist activity and 3) this activity threatens US citizens, interests, or national security. The US secretary of state must revoke a listing if they find “that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.”

Sure, the circumstances have not changed. But the circumstances never met these criteria to begin with because Boko Haram, one of Africa’s most well-known terrorist organizations, does not exist at all. Ultimately, “unlearning” this term will yield more accurate and valuable insights into the reality of the threat. Revoking the designation will set the United States and its partners on a more productive path toward finally resolving the violence in Nigeria.

The source of the misnomer

Around 2005, a fundamentalist Islamist sect emerged in northern Nigeria under the direction of Mohammed Yusuf. He began preaching a specific interpretation of the Quran, and one of his core arguments was that Nigerian Muslims should reject Western education and schools that had been introduced under British colonial rule. Because of this message, locals began calling him and his followers “Boko Haram,” which translates to “Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language. Outsiders used this phrase as a derisive term to refer to this secretive sect, their followers, and other suspected affiliates.

In 2009, Yusuf’s sect staged an uprising across several northern states following escalating tensions with the state police. Within a matter of days, the movement was essentially eliminated by security services in a brutal crackdown (killing approximately eight hundred members in just a few days) and Yusuf was taken into custody and then executed shortly after. Since then, several movements have emerged in the region. The most active group has been Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Daʿawah wa al-Jihād (JAS), which was founded around 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. His organization is responsible for many of the murders and violent incidents in the country over the last decade. Several factions have split from JAS, including Ansaru in 2012, which later rejoined JAS and then splintered again. In 2016, a third group emerged that called itself Islamic State-West Africa Province. They have all, at various times, been active across the region.

What’s in a name?

“Boko Haram” doesn’t really fit into that history. From the first uses of the term to describe Yusuf’s sect, locals have repurposed the name to describe suspected fundamentalist and Islamist extremism in the region. All these operations and more, including a wide array of non-terrorist criminal and gang activity, have variously been attributed to “Boko Haram” by government officials, state security forces, journalists, and locals who lacked complete information about what they were describing.

In short, the use of the name survived even as the actual insurgent organizations in the region changed affiliations, splintered, or disbanded.

Thus, since the early years of the violence, many observers believed they were witnessing the rise of “Boko Haram,” but this perception did not correspond with the activity on the ground and the constellation of terrorist organizations (none of whom used the name) in the region. The ultimate challenge, therefore, isn’t just the use of the wrong name, but what it signifies: It gives an inaccurate impression that there is a singular operational group with a clear ideology and an organizational history. Researchers and experts have analyzed the activity in the region through this lens, bringing a host of largely unrelated activity under the umbrella of the supposed entity. In late 2013, when the State Department designated “Boko Haram” as an FTO, US decision makers seemed to be influenced by what the British anthropologist Ruben Andersson has called “the Timbuktu syndrome”—the mapping of the West’s jihadist fears onto the world’s less familiar peripheries.

Why delisting matters

The State Department’s FTO designation is essentially targeting a ghost. Delisting the organization would have several tangible benefits.

Most importantly, it would streamline the resources the United States dedicates to countering terrorist activity in northern Nigeria. An FTO designation unlocks new authorities for government agencies to target terrorists, but it also requires agencies to follow through and enforce these designations. Due to the host of violence and petty criminal activity that has mistakenly been attributed to “Boko Haram,” the United States is pouring resources into addressing unaffiliated crime and issues that fall solely under the jurisdiction of the Nigerian government without realizing any stabilizing counterterrorism benefits.

Removing “Boko Haram” and instead correctly listing JAS will also benefit the national research apparatus, including academic institutions, think tanks, and government agencies. Since the early years of the violence, independent researchers have helped shape the US approach toward “Boko Haram” and informed US counterterrorism strategies, including military involvement, intelligence collection, and humanitarian assistance. Researchers and academics have had no reason to question the existence of “Boko Haram” when conducting research on the region, which has allowed for persistent uncertainty to dominate the field. As a result, attempts to analyze the confusing array of activity and operations that have been linked to “Boko Haram” have yielded weak insights and less productive recommendations.

For example in 2021, two of the most influential and long-standing leaders in the region—Shekau and Abu Musab Al-Barnawi—were declared dead. For counterterrorism officials, whom Shekau had eluded for almost a decade, this development marked a welcome shift. With the en masse surrender of fighters formerly associated with JAS, some hoped that they had finally witnessed the end of “Boko Haram.” However, many scholars and experts believe that a fundamental aspect of the “group” is its perpetual adaptability, which in fact is largely driven by the loose application of the term to violent events in Nigeria. Thus media organizations, for example, are still publishing articles on new purported attacks by the “organization.” Absent a rejection of “Boko Haram,” the reliance on the term thus ultimately invites a perpetual motion of resurgence that leaves no real end to the violence in sight.

By delisting “Boko Haram,” the State Department will serve its own interests by setting new analyses and inquiries on the right track to accurately identifying terrorist activities and trends in the region. Without this change, there are two grim yet likely consequences. Counterterrorism research projects and resulting US strategies will continue to operate based on avoidable misconceptions and incomplete information on the violence. And more concerningly, without a real reckoning over the existence of the “group,” every new instance of violence in northern Nigeria risks becoming engulfed in the thickening fog of suspected “Boko Haram” activity.

The responsibility now lies with the global collective, and with these US State Department officials in particular, to consciously and deliberately unlearn the deep-seated belief in the “organization’s” very existence.

Alexandra Gorman is a young global professional with the Africa Center and is a masters’ candidate at Johns Hopkins University in the Global Security Studies program. As an undergraduate at Duke University, she received high honors on her senior thesis, “Nigeria’s Militant Jihadism in the Mirror of the Media: the Creation of ‘Boko Haram.’”

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Five steps toward Ukrainian victory and a lasting peace with Russia

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 11:07:48 +0000

A few years ago, against the backdrop of a national pro-democracy uprising in Belarus, I called on European leaders to develop a clear strategy for Eastern Europe. This envisaged EU and NATO membership for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and a free Belarus. Alas, many European politicians preferred to wait and see.

It is admittedly difficult to make historic political decisions, but the price of not doing so is often horrendously high. In this case, the price is obvious: By failing to integrate Ukraine and bring the countries of Eastern Europe out of the geopolitical grey zone, Western leaders set the stage for the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022.

Further mistakes will be just as costly. Thankfully, there is now a growing consensus throughout the West that only Ukrainian victory can end the global security crisis sparked by Russia’s invasion. Nevertheless, there is still a need for greater clarity on what would constitute victory and how Europe can achieve a lasting peace.

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Defeating Russia and securing peace will require a series of interrelated measures that go far beyond the battlefield. I have identified five key elements to a sustainable settlement that will end the current carnage and prevent any repetitions in the years ahead.

The first element is arming Ukraine sufficiently for victory. This process is well underway, but serious issues remain in terms of both quantities and timing. Every single delay in military aid costs Ukrainian lives and emboldens Russia. Ukraine’s Western partners must overcome their misplaced fear of provoking Putin and should instead seek to streamline the delivery of weapons. After all, it is now widely recognized that Russia must be defeated on the battlefield.

The second element is the strategic deterrence of Russia and creation of a new NATO-centered security architecture in Europe. There should now be no illusions: NATO alone can provide Europe with a credible and efficient security system. This means NATO membership for Ukraine. Nothing less will force Moscow to retreat. The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius should conclude by inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. No bilateral guarantees or other compromise measures can hope to replace NATO’s Article Five or stop Russia.

The third element is Ukrainian membership of the European Union and restoration of the Ukrainian economy in close unison with the wider European economy. There has been significant progress toward this objective since the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but overall results remain disappointing and fall far short of the many political statements on the importance of Ukraine’s European integration.

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The fourth key task is undermining Russia’s potential to act aggressively. It is hard to assess how long Russia will remain capable of waging the current war, but financial issues will play an important role in any decision-making process. Last year, official Russian military expenditure amounted to approximately $85 billion. This year, the figure is set to reach at least $108 billion. Unofficially, the total sum spent on the war is likely to be far higher. Clearly, sanctions must continue and need to intensify. Additional steps could include the prevention of dual-purpose goods transit through Russia and the maximum implementation of secondary sanctions.

In parallel, it is also vital to protect and strengthen Ukraine’s economy. Further measures are necessary to facilitate Ukrainian exports. NATO-led naval convoys should break Russia’s Black Sea blockade and enable Ukraine to resume international exports throughout the country’s southern ports. Ukraine’s external debt should undergo restructuring.

The fifth element necessary for a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe is perhaps the most important and at the same time the most intangible. Genuine victory will only be possible when Russian imperialism is no longer a threat to the region.

Once Ukraine is liberated and secure under the collective umbrella of NATO membership, the top priority for the international community will be addressing the imperial ideology that encourages Russians to commit acts of international aggression with impunity and contempt for human life. Russia must bear full legal and financial responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and for the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. The era of Russian impunity for war crimes must end.

Unless the underlying issue of Russian imperialism is addressed at the international level, the liberation of Ukraine will provide little more than temporary relief. Confronting Russia’s imperial identity is the only way to achieve a lasting peace. This would pave the way for a new global security system and the much-needed reform of international bodies such as the UN Security Council. World peace will remain elusive until Russian imperialism is consigned to the dustbin of history.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum and former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16).

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

The Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo have long been the flashpoint in the protracted dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. The escalation earlier this week followed a series of tit-for-tat actions on both sides after the most recent tense standoff over license plate enforcement on the Kosovo-Serbia border in late 2022.

What is different this time is the series of political miscalculations the government in Pristina seems to have made about its US and European allies’ postures. Having invested significant political capital into the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue led by the European Union (EU) for normalizing relations between both sides, Washington and its allies from Brussels to Paris and Berlin warned Pristina not to escalate the situation further. Instead, US and EU partners wanted to focus on progress in the dialogue. The government’s decision to double down on enforcing the outcome of the April local elections, which the Serb majority boycotted and in which less than 3.5 percent of the population in northern Kosovo participated, added fuel to the fire. With this escalation, Kosovo now risks losing part of what used to be largely unqualified US and European support.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council.

The situation in the north of Kosovo reached its current point due to a combination of factors and events. The lack of implementation of the Ohrid agreement to normalize relations and the failure to deliver on the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities created a growing frustration in the international community. One crucial factor is the lack of maturity displayed by leaders involved in the dialogue process and their challenges in engaging and moving forward through strong political will. It appears that the incentives for both sides to adhere to the agreements were not strong enough and therefore progress was hindered.

The catalyst for the situation in the north can be traced back to Kosovo Serbs’ deliberate withdrawal from local institutions, including by mayors and police officers. This helped create a vacuum which Kosovo’s government seized upon—by insisting on holding local elections and enforcing the mayors’ taking office to demonstrate that the north exists as a separate political reality outside Kosovo’s institutional framework.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

2. What could tip this into a more serious conflict?

Even if it seems that all sides are trying to lower the temperature in recent days, a combination of factors could further escalate the situation. Russia has long been an opportunist meddler in the region with significant disinformation tools, especially among Serbian media and audiences. A rally-around-the-flag effect among Kosovo’s majority Albanian population could put government decisionmakers in Pristina on the spot. They repeatedly seem to have chosen standing on principle over politically constructive solutions and have doubled down on symbolic actions, despite warnings by Western allies to avoid escalation. That could make it harder for them to back down. And Serbia has influence over gangs that can inflame the situation if they choose—or are instructed—to.

—Jörn Fleck

There are any number of potential flashpoints, but it is important to focus on the region, to recognize what the citizens of the area see as their grievances, and seek, in good faith, long-term solutions. The recent events are clearly a setback to this process.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center. He spent three decades in the US Foreign Service, where he served as US ambassador to Serbia during the Kosovo independence crisis.

3. What should EU countries and the US do right now?

First of all, the United States and the EU should stop considering the Western Balkans as a peripheral issue, which they have for the last decade. Some progress has been made, but, for example, the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) should not be allowed to simply pretend their actions do not make a difference. They, along with their fellow EU members, should make new efforts to seek resolution and not simply wait for someone else to address the issues.

—Cameron Munter

The current status quo in the north is unsustainable, as it is dominated by parallel structures, as the Kosovo government states. Addressing this issue and stopping the violent elements from the north should not distract from the broader political dialogue, which is brokered by the EU and supported by the United States.

The escalation of events in the north of Kosovo in recent days was an unfortunate distraction for Kosovo and Serbia in their efforts to normalize relations through political dialogue. The situation is back to square one, with the same requests for both sides and the urge for the parties to demonstrate loyalty to their Western allies and show that they can be credible and trustworthy partners in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations—especially for Kosovo, which cannot afford to lose the support of the United States or of key members of the EU.

—Ilva Tare

The United States and Europe should not reward spoilers of the progress made in the normalization process in recent months, following significant US and EU political investment. The current escalation is helping leaders in Pristina and Belgrade avoid executing on some tough steps toward normalization and dealing with domestic political challenges. Europe and the United States should make clear that the only way out of the current situation ultimately runs through the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.

—Jörn Fleck

4. Will new elections defuse this situation?

In order to move toward a resolution, new elections should be held with preconditions such as the involvement of Kosovo Serbs, the establishment of working conditions for Kosovo police and mayors, and the complete withdrawal of special police units of the Kosovo government deployed in the north, which is one of Kosovo Serbs’ stated requirements to take part in local elections. Progress with the Association of Serb Municipalities by mid-November is now a concrete condition with a deadline for the Kosovo government to deliver.

—Ilva Tare

It’s worth discussing. Clearly, new elections would have to be conceived and implemented very carefully, to ensure their result would be recognized by all sides as legitimate. Thus, it’s not a guarantee of solving the problem, but it’s one possible way to address it.

—Cameron Munter

5. Are there any more creative solutions for Serbia and Kosovo to get to more stable relations?

In the current atmosphere of deep-seated distrust and personal animosity between the two political leaders, it is challenging, if not impossible, to envision any innovative solutions. This is a harsh reality that the West still appears hesitant to acknowledge, despite the events unfolding over the past two years involving Prime Minister Albin Kurti of Kosovo and President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. It is becoming increasingly clear that, at some point, the West will need to pause and reconsider its approach, asking itself a crucial question: Are the current political leaders genuinely willing and capable of achieving and ensuring a lasting normalization between the Serb and Albanian populations in Kosovo?

—Maja Piscevic

If the context is right, other initiatives, such as those described in the Berlin Process and discussed as part of Open Balkans, might make a difference. They would open the aperture, so to speak, going beyond the tense immediate points of contention to the larger, more substantive solutions to the local problems. But these more strategic and long-term solutions are hard to develop if the situation on the ground remains as tense as it now is.

—Cameron Munter

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To stop the fighting in Sudan, take away the generals’ money

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn — Mon, 01 May 2023 13:25:35 +0000

International partners are scrambling to limit the humanitarian disaster created by the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan that erupted on April 15 while the last steps of discussions leading to a civilian and democratic transition were expected. Now, it is not enough to simply call for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations because those outcomes could reestablish the fraught balance of power between the SAF and RSF that stymied the eighteen-month-long negotiations for a return to a civilian government—the type of government that most people in Sudan are demanding.

Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.

Neither the SAF nor RSF is capable of a decisive victory, particularly given Sudan’s size and its fractured political landscape. Barring decisive intervention, the most likely scenario is a long and bloody multisided civil war and a staggering humanitarian disaster, like ones seen in Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. This disaster would not be limited to Sudan; it could also destabilize the greater region and drive tens of millions of Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states, the Middle East, and Europe.

That scenario needs to be prevented in a way that ensures the political and military calculations of Hemedti, Burhan, and their supporters change when serious negotiations to restore a civilian government resume. Simply calling for ceasefires or evenly applying diplomatic pressure is not enough. This would only preserve the rough parity of military power between the RSF and SAF. This is not to suggest that either Hemedti or Burhan is “better.” Both have failed the Sudanese people and should be encouraged to move on from power. However, international partners must aim to immediately stop the fighting, bring back negotiations for a transition to civilian government, and then ensure both generals honor their public pledges to hand over power.

Thus, international and regional leaders must, in coordination, begin to strategically apply pressure by freezing Sudanese bank accounts and temporarily blocking the business activities of Sudanese leaders and their forces. This cutoff in money and revenue will impact those actors’ abilities to pay their soldiers and allies to fight and resupply. More importantly, it will impact their calculations about their willingness to return to serious negotiations and to compromise. Given the RSF is unlikely to prevail against the SAF with its heavy weapons and support from Egypt, the least bad option to stop the fighting is to first apply pressure on Hemedti’s business empire, which funds the RSF—his soldiers are loyal because they are paid better, not for any ideological reason. External actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (where, because of past Western sanctions, most Sudanese have their bank accounts and base their businesses), should freeze known RSF and Hemedti-family bank accounts and business activities until RSF leaders commit to rapidly integrating their troops into the SAF. Some of the most important assets have been identified and others are known by the Emirati and Saudi governments. Similarly, international partners must quickly freeze the assets of known Bashir-regime/Islamist leaders who are inciting violence in an effort to return to power.

Finally, partners should identify foreign-held SAF assets and business interests for possible freezing and seizure in case the army does not honor its pledge to hand over power—or perpetuates the historic political and economic dominance of elites from Khartoum at the expense of Sudanese people living in the rest of the country. Only in this way is a sustainable ceasefire and peace possible.

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a former senior advisor to the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and former deputy Africa Program director at the International Crisis Group.

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The stark choice facing the United States in Afghanistan: Leave entirely or finish the job

Davood Moradian — Fri, 28 Apr 2023 19:43:54 +0000

From former US president Jimmy Carter to the current president, Afghanistan has been a key foreign and domestic issue for successive US administrations. President Joseph R. Biden may wish to turn the corner on Afghanistan once and for all, but, the release of the White House’s review of the chaotic 2021 troop withdrawal showed once again that the realities of Afghanistan and US partisan politics take precedence over his desire to permanently disentangle Washington from Afghanistan. The review fails to settle the debates surrounding the United States’ failed Afghanistan policies. One newspaper characterized it as “a schoolboy’s excuses for failing to do his homework.”

The February 2020 Doha Agreement with the Taliban had one essential and one desirable objective. Securing the safe withdrawal of US troops was its essential objective, which was complemented by an unwritten one, replacing Afghanistan’s nascent democratic constitutional order with the Taliban’s version of “pure Islamic government” led by the so-called moderate leader, Mullah Baradar. In other words, it was another case of Washington’s policy of “regime change.” The United States’ refusal to disclose the secret annexes to the Doha Agreement reinforced the prevailing suspicion among many Afghans and observers about the true nature of relations between Washington and the Taliban.

During a lengthy phone call, former US president Donald J. Trump invited Mullah Baradar to Camp David. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Burns reportedly managed to meet Mullah Baradar in Kabul, the first senior US official visiting Taliban-occupied Kabul. That visit has been followed by regular exchanges between CIA senior officials and the Taliban’s notorious GDI, or General Directorate of Intelligence. The relations between the CIA and militant Islamists dates back to 1979, when the Agency initiated Operation Cyclone to covertly support Afghan and later Arab mujahideen against the Afghan government and the Red Army.

Washington’s investment in Mullah Baradar as its savior was consistent with the United States’ decades-old practice in Afghanistan. Earlier saviors included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani, and Zalmay Khalilzad.

The United States’ strategy to convert the Taliban into its new partner is also visible in the diplomatic and economic arenas. By rejecting armed resistance against the Taliban, the United States has been advocating for an “intra-Afghan dialogue” to create an inclusive, representative, and constitutional governance system in Afghanistan. This delusion is supported by the usual peace-industrial complex and Norway and Qatar’s petrodollar diplomacy. For the Taliban, accepting any form of representative, democratic, and developmental governance is tantamount to committing political and ideological suicide, particularly when they are endowed by the sense of victory over the democratic alliance. Since the Taliban occupation, the United States remains the largest donor to Afghanistan. The monthly shipment of US dollars via United Nations (UN) agencies has been the key factor in stabilizing the Taliban-run economy and monetary management. Additionally, individual Taliban commanders are enriching themselves by abundant donor monies. The donor-induced corruption of militia and political actors has been another feature of Western interventions in Afghanistan since the 1980s.

However, as with its previous policies, reality has already exposed the limit of US’ machinations in Afghanistan. Mullah Baradar has been sidelined by the invisible Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Hibatullah, who is converting his base in Kandahar as the actual capital of the Islamic Emirate of Taliban. Even the Taliban’s spokesperson has moved his office from Kabul to Kandahar. The scope of relations between the US officials and the Taliban’s supreme leader is not publicly known.

What is globally understood, however, are the dire consequences of the Taliban’s reign. Afghanistan under the Taliban represents a leading humanitarian crisis, where two-thirds of households struggle to meet basic food and non-foods needs, according to a World Bank survey. Afghanistan is now the only country where the ruling junta have established a functioning gender apartheid system. The Taliban’s reign of terror and oppression is making Afghanistan the North Korea of the region. Former allies of the United States remain key targets for assassination and detention by the Taliban.

Global ramifications of Washington’s abandonment of Afghanistan are also visible. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the neutral stance of key countries such as India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Brazil have been partly shaped by receding trust in the United States’ capacity as a reliable ally and a serious power. Washington’s self-made defeat in Afghanistan has given the militant Islamist bloc a new global victory. Palestinian protesters waved the Taliban flag recently in Jerusalem, showing that Islamists have found an inspiring power in the group. Another major terrorist attack on US and European soils emanating from Afghanistan is no longer a question of if, but when and how.

There are two alternatives to Washington’s decades-old tried and spectacularly failed approaches to Afghanistan: fulfil Biden’s wish to leave in its entirety, or complete what it initially began in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The former entails disbanding all ongoing US intelligence, political, diplomatic, and human and women’s-rights programs and rhetoric. The United States should let Afghans and regional countries fill the vacuum created by its departure.

Neither total disengagement nor the present Taliban-centric strategy is feasible or sustainable without risk of considerable blowback. The tragic events of 9/11 aligned Afghans’ yearning for a dignified life and a constitutional polity with the world’s fear of militant Islamists. The United States’ numerous blunders, Afghanistan’s polarized elites, and the region’s anti-US agendas destroyed both Afghans’ inspiration and also the prospect of victory against the global threat of Islamist militancy.

The two objectives are intertwined, and the Taliban’s entrenched power is an obstacle to both ends; as such, it needs to be dismantled by a global coalition of stakeholders that are threatened by Afghanistan’s descent into Talibanistan. The upcoming UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan in Doha should be seized as an opportunity to charter a meaningful, inclusive, and Afghanistan-centric political path. Such a process should recognize key anti-Taliban constituencies, including Afghan women, democratic voices, progressive Pashtuns, and non-Pashtun communities.

Regional and Western security concerns can only be addressed by a peaceful, inclusive, and constitutional polity in Afghanistan, not by the naïve idea of fighting one terrorist group—Islamic State—with another one—the Taliban. Neither the early US-led nor present Taliban-centric approaches would address Afghanistan’s multiple crises.

Dr. Davood Moradian is director-general of the Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS).

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Afghan and Iranian women continue to be denied their basic human rights, and this shared struggle is built on an overlapping Iranian-Afghan history and civilizational space known as the Iranian plateau.

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The stark choice facing the United States in Afghanistan: Leave entirely or finish the job” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

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Dismantlement of the Taliban regime is the only way forward for Afghanistan

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Ask ten individuals about the Taliban, and you will receive ten different answers—or as one might phrase it, the “Taliban in the eye of the beholder.”

Afghanistan Politics & Diplomacy

Xi calls Zelenskyy but doubts remain over China’s peacemaker credentials

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 01:51:50 +0000

China’s Xi Jinping and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy spoke for over an hour by phone on April 26 in what was the first conversation between the two leaders since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began more than fourteen months ago. The long-awaited call was welcomed in Kyiv and by much of the international community as an indication of Chinese readiness to support diplomatic efforts to end the invasion. At the same time, questions remain over China’s ability to strike a balance between a potential peacemaker role and the country’s strategic ties with Russia.

In a Twitter post, President Zelenskyy described his telephone conversation with Xi as “long and meaningful.” In an expanded statement that appeared to address Xi’s calls for a “political settlement to the crisis,” Zelenskyy stressed Ukraine’s rejection of any land-for-peace compromises with the Kremlin. “No one wants peace more than the Ukrainian people,” wrote Zelenskyy. “Peace must be just and sustainable, based on the principles of international law and respect for the UN Charter. There can be no peace at the expense of territorial compromises.”

According to Chinese state media, Xi sought to assure Zelenskyy that China would refrain from taking sides in the ongoing war, while also offering thinly veiled criticism of US-led Western support for Ukraine. “China is neither the creator nor a party to the Ukraine crisis,” he was quoted as saying. “As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a responsible great power, we will not stand idly by, we will not add fuel to the fire, and above all, we will not seek to profit from the crisis.”

While the call did not produce any major breakthroughs, the two leaders agreed on the appointment of a new Ukrainian Ambassador to China. Xi also committed to dispatching former Chinese Ambassador to Russia Li Hui as a special envoy to Ukraine and other unspecified countries with a brief “to conduct in-depth communication with all parties,” as Beijing seeks to lead peace efforts.

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The timing of Wednesday’s call sparked considerable debate. Zelenskyy has sought to engage directly with Xi for a number of months, publicly expressing his readiness for dialogue in late March following the Chinese leader’s high-profile visit to Moscow. However, in early April, Xi refused to confirm when he planned to call his Ukrainian counterpart, stating instead that the conversation would take place “when the conditions and the time are right.”

It is unclear why Beijing decided that conditions are now suitable for renewed dialogue with Kyiv. The most recent diplomatic development certainly did little to convince doubters that China is a credible peacemaker. Speaking in Paris last Friday, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye questioned Ukraine’s sovereignty and indicated that all former Soviet countries lack “effective status under international law.” His comments sparked a strong diplomatic backlash, with Ukraine branding the Chinese ambassador’s position “absurd” and senior officials in other post-Soviet capitals demanding urgent clarification.

In a bid to defuse tensions, China’s foreign ministry officially distanced itself from Ambassador Lu Shaye’s remarks early this week and confirmed that it respected the independence of all post-Soviet states. Wednesday’s call to Zelenskyy may have been viewed in Beijing as an opportunity to repair the damage caused by the scandal and shift international attention back toward China’s push for progress toward a negotiated peace.

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Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in early 2022, China has sought to portray itself as neutral. At the same time, Beijing has refused to condemn Russia for the war, preferring instead to express cautious understanding for Moscow’s actions while voicing criticism for the alleged role of the West in provoking the conflict. A 12-point plan published in February 2023 was China’s first major intervention, but the vague document failed to gain serious traction.

China’s attempts to position itself as a neutral mediator have inevitably been undermined by the country’s close relations with the Kremlin. Moscow and Beijing have strengthened ties considerably over the past decade, notably in the wake of the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Following Xi’s official visit to Moscow in March 2023, China said the bilateral relationship had now “acquired critical importance for the global landscape and the future of humanity.”

At the same time, other Chinese officials have attempted to downplay the significance of Beijing’s links to the Putin regime. Speaking to the New York Times in early April, Chinese Ambassador to the European Union Fu Cong denied China is on Russia’s side in the war and dismissed earlier official statements about a “friendship without limits” between the two countries as “nothing but rhetoric.” The diplomat also stated that China would not provide arms for Russia to use in Ukraine now or in the future.

While China’s decision to call Kyiv is a welcome gesture, there is little to suggest Beijing is currently in a position to broker a sustainable peace. Both Russia and Ukraine continue to reject talk of a compromise settlement, with Moscow demanding recognition for its claims to around 20% of Ukrainian territory and Ukraine insisting on the complete deoccupation of the country.

Despite these obstacles, Wednesday’s conversation between Zelenskyy and Xi is nevertheless noteworthy. The call was a diplomatic victory for Ukraine and an indication of China’s desire to be seen as a global force for peace rather than a Russian ally. This positioning could take on greater significance in the coming months if battlefield developments create opportunities for serious talks to take place.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Federal agencies such as the departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) have developed implementation plans, outlining their WPS objectives, actions, and goals. But for all lines of effort, cities and states can play a pivotal role that is not sufficiently reflected in US policy.

As the fourth line of effort explains, partnerships are a crucial part of the United States’ WPS strategy. In the realm of city- and state-level diplomacy, mayors and governors are already forming important partnerships with their counterparts across the Americas, which could prove useful in achieving all WPS goals. Those relationships are key because the Western Hemisphere includes the ten most violent cities in the world, and women and girls are disproportionately impacted by such violence. Women and girls across the hemisphere are vulnerable to gang violence, femicide, and sexual harassment in public spaces. A 2022 survey found that 89 percent of women interviewees in Buenos Aires had experienced sexual harassment on public transportation. In Lima, Peru, nine of ten women between the ages of nineteen and twenty-nine have been victims of street harassment. The Mexican municipality of Juárez, Nuevo León registered over twenty femicides and 158 disappeared women and girls in 2022. According to a survey by Stop Street Harassment, 66 percent of women reported experiencing sexual harassment in public spaces across the United States.

The United States has recently made great strides in incorporating local leaders into a whole-of-country foreign-policy strategy, but it has yet to do that with its WPS strategy. The United States already has the structure for doing so; last year, the US State Department launched a new Unit for Subnational Diplomacy led by Special Representative for City and State Diplomacy Nina Hachigian, who was formerly deputy mayor of international affairs for Los Angeles. In her first “dipnote,” she wrote about her office’s aim to create channels for greater connectivity and collaboration between local leaders. That connectivity could provide a channel for achieving the United States’ WPS goals.

Hachigian will be in attendance at the first-ever Cities Summit of the Americas in Denver later this month, which will provide local leaders with an opportunity to share knowledge about the strategies they deploy at home to advance WPS principles. At the convening, the State Department must ensure that conversations about building safer, resilient, and more accessible and sustainable cities include gender-sensitive perspectives that shed light on the experiences of marginalized groups. It should do more than just avoid “manels” to promote gender equity and women’s peace and security: Organizers must also dedicate time to discussing, with all participating mayors, the impacts of migration, climate, and housing specifically on women.

In the near term, the State Department should prioritize gender equality in the new “Cities Forward” initiative, which was announced last year to help cities in the Americas share knowledge about solving various urban issues and will be formally launched this spring. Since this program will direct US government funds to support urban development, it is crucial that the city-level action plans demonstrate a disaggregated impact on women and girls.

In the long term, the United States should embed WPS into its city- and state-level work by ensuring that women meaningfully participate in subnational diplomacy, that women are protected and have freedom in cities, and that cities and states create deep partnerships focused on gender equality:

Ensuring women’s meaningful participation: The United States should ensure that its city and state diplomacy strategy supports current women leaders and helps them learn from each other’s experiences. Despite the growing numbers of local female elected officials in the Western Hemisphere—including Santiago Mayor Irací Hassler, Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass, and Intendant of Montevideo Caroline Cosse—the glass ceiling persists. Within the last year, only 11 percent of Latin American large cities and 26 percent of large cities in the United States have had women mayors. On the sidelines of major urban conferences such as the Cities Summit, the C40 World Mayors Summit, and Urban20, the United States could host off-the-record convenings with women mayors to strengthen international partnership opportunities and identify obstacles to reaching political parity.

The United States should also, through its cities and states, engage civil-society groups that are advocating for women’s rights in cities and thus fostering an environment conducive to female political leadership. Women represent roughly 52 percent of the public-sector workforce in Latin America and the Caribbean and play a crucial role in supporting local governments. Civil-society networks such as La Red Mujer y Hábitat are working to advance women’s rights in urban areas. The Subnational Unit should encourage US mayors to work with these civil-society groups and public-sector leaders when forging partnerships with Latin American and Caribbean cities, particularly those led by male mayors, to ensure that discussions include a gender perspective and create space for women’s participation.

Strengthening women’s protection and freedom in cities: The United States should collaborate with local governments and bolster the capacities of municipal justice systems and security sectors, adopting a gender-sensitive approach, to effectively prevent and respond to gender-based violence. By recognizing the ways in which violence affects female populations, in all their diversity, cities can develop more targeted and effective responses. The United States can learn from other cities’ approaches: Kelowna, Canada, introduced programming between community groups and local police to rebuild trust and accountability after multiple indigenous women were murdered or disappeared. Durango, Mexico, uses real-time data to identify and classify high-risk zones for women, making it possible to deploy awareness and security campaigns tailored to the distinct needs of various populations. The Unit of Subnational Diplomacy should collaborate with the Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues at the US Department of State and the Office of Women, Peace, and Security at the US Department of Defense to analyze these varied city-level approaches and develop blueprints for city-level WPS plans in the United States.

Deepening partnerships to support gender equality: The United States should scale up and coordinate existing efforts that are already supporting women’s equity in cities. The City Hub and Network for Gender Equity (CHANGE)—formed by leaders in Los Angeles, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and four other major global cities—aims to tackle gender disparities in access to government services. The State Department’s subnational unit should assist in an expansion of the CHANGE network and other city-led initiatives to reach a more diverse body of cities across the Americas.

The United States should also amplify and collaborate with existing local grassroots networks—such as the Association of Women Council Members and Mayors of Bolivia or the Network of Women Vice Governors of Peru – to foster regional connections between women leaders and support existing initiatives from the bottom up.

Additionally, the recently announced USAID Network for Gender Inclusive Democracy could offer a platform to support women’s political and civic participation and leadership in cities. The new network aims to promote coordination, knowledge-sharing, and policy advocacy to advance gender equality. The special representative for subnational diplomacy should advocate for the participation of state and city leaders in this new program. Including local leaders in this network can help the Subnational Unit enhance its efforts in championing gender-sensitive strategies, while simultaneously providing a local perspective to national-level discussions on gender and democracy.

The United States’ approach to city and state diplomacy is still in development. The Unit for Subnational Diplomacy is barely six months old, and Hachigian’s team has the opportunity to champion a gender-sensitive security strategy across the hemisphere. By 2050, nine in ten people in the United States as well as Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to live in urban areas. The leaders who run these areas must be empowered to make them safer and more equitable environments for all.

Willow Fortunoff is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Diana Paz García is a conflict resolution graduate from Georgetown University specializing in gender-based violence and nontraditional security threats.

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Pressuring Ukraine into a premature peace would only encourage Putin

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Mon, 03 Apr 2023 18:40:15 +0000

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now in its second year, the international debate continues over where the war is going and how it might end. While nobody would dispute that peace is desperately needed, there are still deep divisions over how this might best be achieved and what a potential future peace could look like.

Over the past year, there has been growing recognition throughout the democratic world that unless Putin is decisively defeated, any peace will be temporary in nature and the threat of further Russian aggression will remain. Nevertheless, many commentators continue to advocate for a compromise with the Kremlin that would allow Moscow to secure certain gains from its invasion of Ukraine in exchange for an end to hostilities.

Arguments in favor of a compromise peace are typically positioned in pragmatic terms as a “realist” approach to resolving the conflict. However, supporters of a negotiated settlement often appear to underestimate the revisionist realities and imperial ambitions underpinning the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

One example of this troubling trend was the recent publication “Avoiding a Long War” by Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe. This important report offered valuable analysis of the debate over how to end the war, but also contained some proposals that illustrate the potential dangers of pursuing a premature peace. In a March 7 letter to the Financial Times, the authors asserted that I had mischaracterized their report and created a false binary between supporting Ukraine’s resistance and engaging in “immediate and unconditional negotiations.” I respectfully disagree.

The authors claim not to argue that Ukraine’s willingness to talk should be made a condition for receiving aid, but the report itself appears fairly unambiguous on this issue. “The United States could decide to condition future military aid on a Ukrainian commitment to negotiations,” it states. “Setting conditions on aid to Ukraine would address a primary source of Kyiv’s optimism that may be prolonging the war: a belief that Western aid will continue indefinitely or grow in quality and quantity.”

The idea of compelling Ukraine to negotiate with Russia by conditioning military aid is problematic. Any such steps would inevitably encourage Russia to continue hostilities and would strengthen the already existing conviction in Moscow that Western support for Ukraine is a temporary phenomenon. Putin’s belief that Russia can ultimately outlast the West is no secret and has been widely commented on. Imposing any kind of limits on military support for Ukraine or linking this aid to negotiations would further convince Putin that he is right to question Western resolve.

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One of the key positions shared by this report and many other arguments in favor of a compromise settlement is the notion that negotiations are inevitable as neither Russia nor Ukraine can realistically achieve a decisive military victory. This seems excessively pessimistic from a Ukrainian perspective, particularly in light of the Ukrainian army’s stellar achievements over the past year and the shocking performance of the Russian military.

Such thinking indicates that the lessons of recent history have not yet been fully digested. On the eve of the Russian invasion, most international analysts dramatically underestimated Ukraine’s military capabilities and expected Kyiv to fall in a matter of days. With the war now in its fourteenth month, Ukraine has already liberated around half the territory seized by Russia since February 24, 2022. Is the idea of further Ukrainian successes really so far-fetched?

Arguments that negotiations are inevitable also overlook Russia’s own apparent intransigence. At this stage, there is nothing to suggest the Kremlin has any genuine interest in reaching a lasting settlement. On the contrary, Moscow continues to insist Ukraine acknowledge the loss of approximately 20% of the country’s territory along with millions of Ukrainian citizens. This is not a serious negotiating position; it is a call for Ukraine’s capitulation. Anyone who suggests Russia’s demands could serve as the basis for a lasting peace is deluding themselves. Anyone arguing for Ukraine to accept such terms is inviting more war.

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Instead of exploring ways to push Ukraine back to the negotiating table, the international debate should be focusing primarily on measures to pressure Russia into ending its invasion. These measures could include expanded military aid for Ukraine, additional sanctions against Russia, and international war crimes litigation.

Compelling the victim to offer concessions may appear the route of least resistance, but this would only bring short-term relief. Russia would be emboldened by any gains in Ukraine and would soon renew its aggressive behavior. This would pose an immediate threat to the rest of Ukraine itself, and to a number of additional countries including Moldova, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus.

Other authoritarian regimes would also note Russia’s success in Ukraine and draw the obvious conclusions for their own foreign policies. A negotiated settlement at Ukraine’s expense would make the world a far less stable and more dangerous place for many years to come.

For Ukraine, continued resistance is not merely an alternative to an unpalatable peace. Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they also recognize that a premature peace would mean abandoning millions of their compatriots to the horrors of permanent Russian occupation while placing the entire existence of Ukraine as an independent state in doubt.

Arguments in favor of peace are certainly welcome and deserve to be heard. However, they risk doing more harm than good if they fail to acknowledge the Putin regime’s commitment to destroying the Ukrainian state, and the grave threats this poses to the future of international security.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and Ukraine’s former minister of defense (2019–2020).

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Policymakers: Keep Ukrainian soldiers front of mind as this war of attrition continues

Justin M. Conelli — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 20:48:08 +0000

Ukraine is succeeding in this conflict; but it’s coming at an extremely high cost in terms of casualties and suffering. Continued Western support is critical to navigating these attritional losses because Ukrainian mettle without Western metal can only go so far. But at this moment of reflection, it is important to not lose sight of the perspective of the soldiers in the field with dirt and blood on their uniforms: They’re more concerned about when they’ll get their next ammunition resupply, hot meal, or break from taking fire than they are interested in contemplating what happens when the war is over. There is no doubt that Ukraine is winning this war, but that does not mean the war has been won.

Russia’s brazen invasion has brought the harsh realities of attritional warfare to Ukraine. This war is being fought by humans—humans engaged in violent armed conflict. At every stage of the war, Ukrainian forces—with strong Western support—have valiantly outperformed the Russian military, not only by defending their homeland but also by executing sizeable offensive operations to retake previously seized areas. Ukrainian successes, coupled with frequent and often incompetent Russian failures, have fueled significant enthusiasm for Kyiv to not only expel Russian invaders from the areas seized since February 2022 but also potentially go further and reclaim Crimea. Social media is rife with content mocking Russian performance or celebrating Ukrainian successes; that can give the appearance of a lopsided war in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine are enduring relatively smaller costs compared to their Russian adversaries—but the costs are, in fact, enormous.

Social media… can give the appearance of a lopsided war in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine are enduring relatively smaller costs compared to their Russian adversaries—but the costs are, in fact, enormous.

On this one-year anniversary, there will be countless articles chock-full of analysis on how this war has played out and predictions on the way forward. Military jargon such as “long-range precision fires” and “combined arms maneuver” will be thrown around, and analysts will speak to the challenges of maintaining ground lines of communication or protecting critical infrastructure and key resources. While this analysis is rich and well-informed, the language sterilizes reality. From my experience in combat, there is no sterilization of battle; language cannot conceal the realities of violent armed conflict. In plain speak, Ukraine is engaged in a brutal battle with Russia, primarily through the exchange of long-range heavy-weapons fire, that is playing out in towns and cities across Ukraine. This is coupled with Russia’s systematic bombardment of Ukrainian civilian power, water, and communications infrastructure in major cities such as Kyiv. Troops on both sides of the conflict are hunkering down in World War I-style trenches and attempting to maneuver on each other—before, during, or after massive volleys of artillery rounds—in increasingly harsh conditions, all the while searching for adequate food, water, medical supplies, or ammunition. The net result is carnage on a massive scale.

The dwindling supplies of ammunition reserves call attention to other devastating effects of artillery warfare. Artillery rounds can be fired from long ranges, often accompanied by a distant, audible boom. But for those on the receiving end, when and where those rounds will impact can be a mystery. Incoming artillery shells produce a sound akin to a whistle, which can only be heard when they overshoot their intended target and the round goes over your head—meaning the rounds that make the desired impact are heard too late. With the massive volume of artillery rounds fired each day, the soldiers on the battlefield are becoming tragically tuned into the pitch of rounds hitting nearby, air burst rounds exploding above, shrapnel scattering in the air, or razor-sharp flechette rounds detonating.

While, according to US officials, Russia’s rate of fire has decreased 75 percent in comparison to its wartime high, this isn’t likely to be overly celebrated by the soldier on the battlefield, given that at least five thousand rounds still fall each day and put soldiers’ lives at risk.

There is much discussion about how the West can provide more ammunition to Ukraine, given how critical artillery has been in this war. Yet that analysis doesn’t always explore how some soldiers are likely to suffer from neurological effects due to repeated blast exposure as they continue to face artillery-fire rates that rival those seen during the Korean War. As one of the thousands of US service members who have endured concussive events in combat, I can attest that the consequences can be difficult to diagnose and often don’t emerge in immediate or obvious ways. That isn’t to say that more ammunition and support are not desperately needed by Ukraine, nor that Western support is not critical. Rather, amid all the defense-speak, officials and experts should look beyond the curtain of sterilized, technical analysis and discuss what attritional warfare means for those executing it on the battlefield.

Amid all the defense-speak, officials and experts should look beyond the curtain of sterilized, technical analysis and discuss what attritional warfare means for those executing it on the battlefield.

Even the term “attritional warfare” itself veils its true meaning. Often described as a military strategy, attritional warfare aims to break an enemy’s will to fight by killing or wounding its soldiers and destroying or damaging the enemy’s materiel to a point that it can no longer sustain the war. Opposing militaries must “reconstitute,” which is officially defined as taking actions “to restore degraded units to combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources.” But in the combat soldier’s lexicon, reconstitution means undertaking the gruesome activity of replacing dead or wounded soldiers and destroyed or broken equipment.

The amount of destruction in this war is enormous. The United States estimated back in November that the Ukrainian military has sustained over one hundred thousand casualties (which includes both dead and wounded). Given the intensity of recent fighting in the Donbas centered around Bakhmut, the casualty count is certainly higher. Put into context, the Ukrainian military has had more casualties in this war than the US military has sustained in the nearly fifty years since the end of the Vietnam War. Reconstituting major portions of the front-line force is an unbelievably challenging task, which probably speaks to Ukraine and Russia’s determination to prevent each other from doing just that. Both sides fear the other will regain strength over the winter by remaining in a defensive posture and then launch major offensive operations in the spring. These tactics may ultimately delay or deny both sides the ability to reconstitute sufficiently.

Then there is the politics of warfare, which is also impacting soldiers on the ground. Much of this is playing out around Bakhmut. The fighting in this area has been furious for months, involving both Ukrainian and Russian regulars along with Wagner Group mercenaries. The civilian population in Bakhmut was estimated to be around seventy thousand at the beginning of the war but is now somewhere around ten thousand. The city and surrounding area have been destroyed by intense artillery exchanges, and gains by Russian forces have been slow and extremely costly, especially since Ukraine began bolstering its defenses with forces moving in from the south after the victory in Kherson. Now the battle for Bakhmut has become a de facto rallying cry on both sides, even though most analysts agree Bakhmut offers little strategic military value. Even Russia’s primary reasons for fighting in Bakhmut appear to be based on internal leadership power dynamics and sunk-cost fallacy; and Ukraine’s own land forces commander stated that “from the military standpoint, Bakhmut doesn’t have strategic significance.” Those realities likely don’t sit well with the soldier fighting for their life in a “land covered in corpses.” I, for one, would not have reacted well had US senior leaders made similar comments about the importance of Uruzgan Province as my team fought the Taliban and lost multiple service members at the height of the surge in Afghanistan.

When it comes to human costs, I do not have any succinct conclusions or prescriptive checklists of what needs to be done. My experiences on the battlefield have shown me that combat is not that clean, and it is not that predictable; that’s the nature of humans and violence. On February 23, some experts believed Russia was not going to invade. When the invasion occurred, some experts believed Kyiv would fall in just days. When Ukraine swept through Kharkiv and pushed into Kherson, some experts believed Russia’s defeat was inevitable. It is nearly impossible to know what will transpire next, save for one inevitability: Soldiers on the battlefield will continue to pay an exceptionally high price in blood, and their loved ones will continue to suffer under Russia’s brutal bombardment.

Combat is not that clean, and it is not that predictable… save for one inevitability: Soldiers on the battlefield will continue to pay an exceptionally high price in blood.

As leaders in the West grapple with strategic challenges such as how to best support Ukraine, manage nuclear escalation with Russia, and ensure long-term resiliency against the pacing threat of China, they must not forget the soldier on the battlefield whose priorities will remain markedly tactical. The soldier in combat is not concerned with the West’s strategies, only for the warriors on their left and right and for the safety of their family at home. It is this courage and sacrifice that must be kept clearly in the minds of Western leaders making difficult decisions because Ukraine’s soldiers are winning, but they have not yet won.

Lieutenant Colonel Justin M. Conelli is the 2022-2023 senior US Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views do not represent the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

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The partition of Ukraine would only encourage Putin’s imperial ambitions

Benton Coblentz — Tue, 20 Dec 2022 19:48:38 +0000

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the ten-month mark, various commentators in the West continue to push the idea that Ukraine should trade territory for peace. However, Russia’s long history of imperial expansion provides a sobering lesson for these advocates of appeasement. Far from guaranteeing peace, any compromise with the Kremlin that allowed Moscow to retain control over parts of Ukraine would position Russia for further acts of international aggression while strengthening Vladimir Putin’s faith in the fundamental weakness of the West.

Supporters of a land-for-peace deal tend to portray themselves as foreign policy realists but the policies they promote amount to an unsustainable partition of Ukraine that would almost certainly lead to more war. Such concessions would also risk empowering Putin’s vision of a return to the eighteenth and nineteenth century diplomacy of Great Power imperialism.

A brief look at the history of Russia’s imperial expansion in Ukraine and the surrounding neighborhood is enough to demonstrate that offering the Kremlin land in exchange for peace is unlikely to work. For hundreds of years, Russia has expanded its territory by waging wars to weaken without necessarily overwhelming or annexing its neighbors. Slowly but surely, these neighbors would be reduced to vassal status or incorporated entirely into the empire.

The eighteenth century Partition of Poland in particular should give pause to those currently advocating a twenty-first century partition of Ukraine. This gradual destruction of the Polish state was achieved in partnership with a number of leading European powers and allowed Russia to significantly expand its presence in Europe.

The Russian Empire’s conquest of Ukraine followed a similar pattern. The territories of modern-day Ukraine were gradually seized from Poland and the Ottoman Empire over a period of many decades. The bulk of Ukrainian lands were annexed between the 1650s and 1790s, but it was not until 1945 that all of today’s Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin makes no secret of the fact that he sees the current invasion of Ukraine as a modern continuation of the wars of imperial expansion waged by Russian rulers Peter the Great and Catherine the Great hundreds of years ago. Indeed, he appears to relish such comparisons. The Kremlin has made this link explicit by resurrecting the Czarist-era name of “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”) for the territories of Ukraine it seeks to incorporate into the Russian Federation.

When he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Putin’s ultimate objective was to return the whole of Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence. However, that does not mean that anything less would be considered a defeat. Indeed, the kind of peace plans currently being proposed by those championing concessions to the Kremlin would be regarded as anything but defeat in Moscow. If Russia is allowed to legitimize its control over even a small part of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, this would be interpreted as a major victory and seen as a green light to push further.

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A compromise peace that ceded land to Russia would vindicate Putin’s policies of imperial aggression in the eyes of the Russian public and among international audiences. It would place Russia in a strong position to plot its next invasion while condemning an entire generation of Ukrainians to live either under Russian occupation or in the shadow of war.

Nor would other countries be safe. If Putin is able to achieve his imperial goals in Ukraine, there is every reason to assume he would then proceed with new campaigns of conquest elsewhere against nations in Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia that were formerly part of the Russian and Soviet empires. A peace deal that allows Putin to position himself as the heir to Peter the Great will certainly not discourage him from such ambitions.

Clearly, all efforts to end the war in Ukraine are welcome. However, talk of compromising with the Kremlin is dangerous because it risks validating Putin’s imperial delusions while encouraging Moscow to believe Western resolve may be faltering. At this critical stage in the war, Ukraine’s international partners must not pressure the country to accept peace on Russian terms. Instead, they should continue to make clear that the decision to enter into negotiations can only be made in Kyiv.

Rather than fueling speculation over possible concessions, Western commentators and policymakers should focus on making sure Ukraine is supplied with all the weapons it needs to defend its territory. A sufficiently armed Ukraine with the unwavering support of a formidable international coalition will be able to negotiate on its own terms from a position of strength. This is the only route to a settlement that will be truly sustainable. In order to secure peace in Europe, Putin must be decisively defeated. Without such a defeat, the centuries-long pattern of malign Russian imperial influence will continue and other European countries will face the fate of Ukraine.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Despite the battlefield setbacks of recent months, the Russian state remains relatively strong. This leads Putin to believe that he can still ultimately achieve his military objectives if he can overwhelm Ukraine and outlast the West. However, his army badly needs time in order to regroup and rearm. Hundreds of thousands of mobilized Russians are undergoing training. New weapons are being sourced and prepared. A ceasefire will provide the Russia army with the breathing space it requires before renewing its assault on the Ukrainian nation.

So far, Ukraine has rejected the idea of negotiations, with Kyiv officials stating that they do not believe Russia is genuinely interested in peace. Nevertheless, Russia’s apparent eagerness for talks has generated considerable international attention and led to a lively debate over the desirability of a diplomatic breakthrough. Many of those currently advocating a return to the negotiating table appear to be guided by a number of false and dangerous assumptions about modern Russia.

The most obviously flawed assumption is that a ceasefire would bring peace and stability. Moscow has a long record of disregarding any agreements as soon as it is convenient to do so and has no credibility whatsoever as a partner in negotiations. Indeed, prominent pundits on Russian TV openly admit that the current push for talks is a ploy to regroup and continue the war in more favorable conditions.

Another common misconception is the idea that pragmatism will prevail. Such thinking ignores the imperialistic values shared by many of the Russian elite. While the country’s oligarch class has ostensibly experienced considerable losses as a result of the war, Russia’s billionaires nevertheless owe their wealth to Putin’s continued patronage. They remain in control of their core assets which may yet regain their previous value. Furthermore, if Russia succeeds in subduing Ukraine, there will be vast opportunities for further enrichment. It is a grave mistake to assume Russian policymakers and economic leaders are guided by the same values as their Western counterparts.

Like its Czarist and Soviet predecessors, Putin’s Russia remains a deeply authoritarian state that rests on a solid foundation of bureaucrats, law enforcement, and military personnel numbering many millions. As long as this core remains intact, Putin has little to fear. There will be no internal revolts, even as he sends wave after wave of poorly trained recruits to die in Ukraine. Those who oppose the war or refuse to participate tend to view protest as futile and prefer to flee the country.

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The war has made most Russians significantly poorer but has also failed to spark any meaningful social unrest. Instead, rising poverty is likely to enhance regime stability and drive more young Russians into the military. A disproportionately high number of the troops currently fighting in Ukraine are from Russia’s poorest regions. Those who do not join the army will likely be too preoccupied with daily struggles to have time for politics. Meanwhile, the lucky ones who continue to receive a generous state salary will remain loyal to the regime.

It is also important to acknowledge the depth of Russian public enthusiasm for the war in Ukraine. The overwhelming majority of Russians saw nothing wrong with the 2014 invasion and occupation of Crimea. Likewise, poll after poll indicates clear majority support for the current invasion. Despite widespread knowledge of the war crimes being committed in Ukraine, there is no anti-war movement to speak of in today’s Russia. The wives and mothers of Russian soldiers readily post videos on social media complaining about the lack of training offered to their mobilized menfolk, but none protest about the war itself.

Such attitudes reflect the effectiveness of the propaganda machine created by the Putin regime. For the past two decades, the Kremlin has slowly but steadily reasserted central control over the entire Russian information space. This control has been used to fuel anti-Western paranoia and rehabilitate the authoritarian past. Ukrainians have been demonized and dehumanized to such an extent that many ordinary Russians no longer question the necessity of destroying the Ukrainian state and extinguishing Ukrainian national identity.

Despite a series of embarrassing defeats and retreats, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is far from over. The Putin regime remains fundamentally secure at home and the Russian army continues to occupy almost 20% of Ukraine. Moscow can theoretically mobilize many millions of Russians to bolster the invasion and can also count on arms deliveries from the likes of Iran, Belarus, and North Korea. On the home front, the Kremlin is actively placing the entire Russian economy on a wartime footing as part of efforts to boost military production and prepare for what promises to be a long war.

There is little reason to believe that the Kremlin’s current peace overtures are sincere. Western politicians and commentators must be careful not to assume Russia is in such poor condition that it is ready to make the kind of deep concessions necessary for a just and durable peace. Ukrainians are adamant that a lasting settlement will be possible only following Russia’s decisive defeat. Anything short of this will be a premature peace leading to more war.

Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor of comparative politics living in Almaty.

A quick look back shows that Moscow and the Taliban initially seemed to envision a partnership that could agree on several issues. For example, the Taliban expected Russia to be the first to recognize them, and Moscow expected that the Taliban would cooperate in combating terrorism and insurgency. However, these expectations have yet to be met by both sides. In addition, the Taliban has failed to meet regional countries’ demands to establish an inclusive government and ensure women’s rights to pursue work and education.

The failings of all parties leave many questions unanswered. How effective was this process in addressing regional security, and did it bring any semblance of political reconciliation as it was meant to do? Processes such as these are essential for the region, as they bring countries together for dialogue and consultation on issues of concern. However, the countries involved in this consultation have yet to address, let alone resolve, fundamental issues related to regional security and a political settlement for Afghanistan.

Fundamental issue #1: All parties interested in Afghanistan and its regional security should be involved in multilateral processes.

The Moscow process intentionally omitted Western countries. This exclusion could create the possibility of a two-bloc approach—with an Eastern bloc dominated by Russia, China, and Iran, and a second bloc dominated by Western powers. While all of these regional countries have stressed and pushed the Taliban to adopt inclusive Afghan governance and adhere to the protection of women’s rights, concerns remain that an Eastern bloc could compromise Afghanistan’s human rights and inclusive governance—something that can bring the country into the middle of a two-bloc crisis. Given that regional countries’ most significant concern are the security risks that Afghanistan under the Taliban presents, this scenario should be seriously considered. The second risk is that a potential other (Western) bloc would engage in constant negotiations for its interests without settling on an explicit agreement or outcome for peace and security.

A successful platform needs to maintain patience, demonstrate inclusivity, and provide a space for all parties to present their ideas and concerns. For example, one common concern of all countries in the region is related to the potential security threat and radicalization that could emerge from Afghanistan. The commonly held perception is that these threats are reduced by simply engaging with the Taliban. However, the group has ideological and tactical relationships with transnational terrorist groups in the region, and the rifts among them are always short-lived. The Taliban’s survival and sustainability depends on their association with their counterparts and insurgent groups with whom they share a common ideology and goal. Therefore, it would not be pragmatic to treat the Taliban as a reliable counterterrorism partner for regional countries or the West.

Fundamental issue #2: The security of the countries in the region is interconnected, and each country’s domestic political and economic conditions will determine the regional security architecture.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran are going through severe political and economic crises domestically. These developments guide their policies of engagement with the world outside, including relationships with others in the region. These countries tend to align with regional and global powers that promise support and assistance in tackling crises. Notable examples are how Iran looks to Russia, or how Pakistan looks to China. Such alignments determine the formation of partnerships and relationships and significantly impact peace and stability in Afghanistan. If the Moscow process claims to address regional security, it must facilitate an intensive regional platform for countries to address and negotiate their interests. The conclusion should move beyond insincere “lip service” and ensure a pragmatic path to conflict resolution.

Fundamental issue #3: It is time to assess the top-bottom multilateral processes.

If Moscow is genuine in seeking and assuring political settlement and stability in Afghanistan, then why is the broader participation and representation of people from Afghanistan missing in this process? Without a recognized government, civil representation could advocate for Afghans’ aspirations and demonstrate a mechanism based on inclusivity, something the countries involved in the Moscow process have expressed interest in.

The time is ripe for the situation in and around Afghanistan to change. The direness of the crisis requires a major shift in how multilateral dialogues on Afghanistan’s peace and reconciliation and regional security issues are formatted. Since security is a shared interest of all countries in the region, it requires an integrative negotiation process that is inclusive of all pertinent actors who can put forward all relevant issues.

Only then can an international consultative process on Afghanistan culminate in clear and mutually beneficial agreements and conclusive solutions.

Dr. Nilofar Sakhi is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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SouthAsiaSource Oct 20, 2022

The lionesses of Kabul & Tehran in Khorasan

By Davood Moradian

Afghanistan Human Rights

Report Sep 27, 2022

Afghanistan under the Taliban: Regional recalibrations, challenges, and ways forward

By Hameed Hakimi

Despite the spectacular and unprecedented events following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the global spotlight steadily shifted away from the country.

Afghanistan Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Sep 26, 2022

To support Afghan women activists, prioritize local knowledge over numbers

By Sophie Mae Berman and Yelena Biberman

Though Afghan women have been included in certain peacebuilding efforts, these experiences were largely tokenist and minimally empowering.

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Sakhi published in Kroc Institute: Afghanistan requires a national and regional dialogue based on the principle of inclusivity

Atlantic Council — Thu, 17 Nov 2022 15:01:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

The post Sakhi published in Kroc Institute: Afghanistan requires a national and regional dialogue based on the principle of inclusivity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To support Afghan women activists, prioritize local knowledge over numbers

Sophie Mae Berman and Yelena Biberman — Mon, 26 Sep 2022 14:20:44 +0000

In July, the US Department of State launched the US-Afghan Consultative Mechanism in partnership with the United States Institute of Peace, Atlantic Council, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, and Sisterhood is Global Institute. As the Taliban continues to strip women and vulnerable groups inside Afghanistan of their human rights, the Mechanism intends to provide international platforms for Afghan women who are scattered around the world, track human rights violations, and identify ways that the international community can support inclusive peace in Afghanistan. Notably, while speaking at the launch, an Afghan woman activist expressed a crucial point that the international community must heed:

“Communities have been working at the local level and know better than anyone what their needs are.”

Research indicates that, over the past two decades, even the well-intentioned among foreign peacebuilders in Afghanistan tended to dismiss such messaging. We conducted interviews in the winter of 2022 with Afghan and foreign peacebuilders who worked in Afghanistan’s government ministries, multilateral agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the military, as well as with humanitarian aid recipients. These interviews suggest two key lessons about supporting women’s rights in peacebuilding. They also demonstrate that, though Afghan women have been included in certain peacebuilding efforts, these experiences were largely tokenist and minimally empowering.

Bribing and lecturing local counterparts doesn’t work

Foreign peacebuilders’ approach of strong-arming and talking down to local counterparts undermined their aims to advance women’s rights. Across diverse sectors of peacebuilding, Afghans described the widespread sentiment that “foreigners think that they know better than you what you need” and “Afghans are seen as numbers, not people.” Consequently, peacebuilding failed to operationalize plans for gender equality.

The all-or-nothing approach of peacebuilding missions and personnel did not allow locals to engage in good faith. For example, at the local level, foreign peacebuilders established community development councils (CDCs), democratically-elected bodies designed to govern villages and allocate funding for small-scale development projects. CDCs were required to be 50 percent female in order to receive funding. However, village elders’ inability or refusal to meet this requirement along with their need for funding resulted in the widespread fabrication of women’s participation.

Similar outcomes emerged in efforts to increase women’s inclusion in the workforce. An interviewee recalled the World Bank pressuring the Ministry of Education to increase the number of female teachers “overnight” in the historically more conservative south and east of Afghanistan. The threat of losing funding led Afghan officials to agree to these unattainable demands.

Even grassroots peacebuilding was compromised. Being lectured about the importance of gender equality for two decades habituated civil society groups to foreign peacebuilders’ preferences. This motivated locals to shape the goals and methods of project proposals to appease donors when they were unrealistic in the short term.

Tokenism burdens and limits women

Research shows that, over the past decade, girls in the Global South have become icons of investment and saviorism. International organizations and donors have argued that investing in girls results in a chain of positive effects, including the deepening of women’s rights, upward trends in national production, more peaceful societies, and “world salvation.”

These arguments were made in Afghanistan where women’s representation in politics and the economy was framed as a panacea—a standalone solution to patriarchal attitudes, violence, and steep socioeconomic challenges. The breadth and depth of demands placed on women’s seats at the table pitted few female representatives against the exclusionary strategies of intervenors, which limited women’s capabilities.

For example, several of our interviewees expressed that donors and foreign peacebuilders pressured Afghan women to make compromises on women’s rights to suit the objectives of US strategy. Following the renewal of US negotiations with the Taliban in 2019, donors told members of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to address women’s rights from an Islamic perspective. This privileged the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam and asked female AIHRC members to sacrifice the rights of women they were expected to represent.

The constraints placed on women peacebuilders were also evident during the prisoner swap, when five thousand Taliban inmates were released, including four-hundred hardline fighters who were involved in large-scale attacks across the country. Members of the AIHRC asked foreign peacebuilders for transparency on behalf of victims, but they were excluded from discussions about the prisoner release. Women representatives could not further gender equality when at the helm of human rights oversight they could not even challenge the release of perpetrators.

How can foreign peacebuilding effectively support women’s rights?

Our research suggests that foreign peacebuilding’s efforts at promoting moral and strategic imperatives without real local input constrains women representatives and impedes steps toward gender equality. Women’s seats at the table have become a consolation prize amid the harmful actions of government agencies, multilateral organizations, foreign aid organizations, and foreign peacebuilders themselves.

As such, Afghan women have been included, but not empowered.

This was in part because Afghans in general were included into their own governance, but ultimately lacked the power to shape their future. Their fates were significantly determined by the choices of foreign and violent actors. This reality was never starker than at the moment when it mattered most: at the US-Taliban negotiations in Doha, Qatar. Not just women representatives, but the entire Afghan government, was excluded. Ultimately, the solution is power, and neither the United States nor the Taliban are willing to give it up when it is not in their interest.

Afghanistan has amplified the need for a course correction. The international community can only support Afghan women if it allows more room for local agency in peacebuilding.

Sophie Mae Berman is currently a member of the project “On Fair Terms: The Ethics of Peace Negotiation and Mediation” at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and a former intern with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Dr. Yelena Biberman is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and an associate professor of political science at Skidmore College in Saratoga Springs, New York. Her book, Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India, was published by Oxford University Press in 2019.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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Issue Brief Sep 9, 2022

Supporting Afghan refugees: A case for cultural sensitivity and humility in resettlement practices

By Halima Ahmadi-Montecalvo, Amanda Terry, Belquis Ahmadi

In recognition of the one-year anniversary of the Taliban retaking control of Afghanistan, the authors of this publication seek to raise awareness of the whole person needs of settled refugees in the United States by highlighting experiences of a number of newly resettled Afghan refugees.

Afghanistan Politics & Diplomacy

SouthAsiaSource Sep 8, 2022

Dismantlement of the Taliban regime is the only way forward for Afghanistan

By Davood Moradian

Ask ten individuals about the Taliban, and you will receive ten different answers—or as one might phrase it, the “Taliban in the eye of the beholder.”

Afghanistan Politics & Diplomacy

SouthAsiaSource Sep 6, 2022

As Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy fails, the Afghan Taliban moves against Islamabad

By Raza Khan Qazi

Islamabad’s long standing objective—to have a dependent government in Kabul—has finally burned to the ground.

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Ukraine’s six key conditions for peace talks with Putin’s Russia

Anders Åslund — Wed, 24 Aug 2022 15:21:42 +0000

A series of audacious recent Ukrainian attacks in occupied Crimea and across the Russian border in Belgorod have signaled a new stage in the war, with Ukraine increasingly seizing the initiative and setting the military agenda. Panic is now slowly spreading among ordinary Russians, with significant numbers reportedly fleeing Crimea and Belgorod.

This shift in the dynamic of the six-month conflict has clearly registered in the Kremlin. The war is still far from over, but with Ukraine visibly growing in boldness and Russian offensive operations rapidly running out of steam, Putin is showing signs of seeking a return to the negotiating table.

While a decisive military victory currently looks to be beyond Russia’s capabilities, it remains unclear if the war will enter a prolonged stalemate or whether Ukraine can force Russia to retreat. Unlike Russia, Ukraine has large reserves of soldiers and does not appear to be facing any imminent recruitment issues. However, the Ukrainian military remains highly dependent on the country’s Western partners for the weapons it requires in order to mount a serious counter-offensive.

Some in Berlin, Paris, and Washington had earlier worried that providing Ukraine with more potent weapons would provoke Putin into a new escalation. Instead, recent weeks have seen Russia partially lift the blockade on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports while expressing a readiness to allow international inspectors to visit the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant in southern Ukraine, which is currently under Russian control. Meanwhile, high-profile Kremlin emissaries such as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder have announced Putin’s readiness to negotiate.

It is possible that Putin realizes he is now in danger of losing and is trying to recover his position via diplomacy. So far, Ukrainian officials have downplayed the prospect of any high-level peace talks. However, as the war drags on with no end in sight, Ukraine is likely to face mounting international pressure in the months ahead to engage in fresh diplomatic initiatives. It is therefore vital to clarify Ukraine’s key conditions in advance.

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The fundamental fear is that Putin will try to secure an early ceasefire and consolidate his gains, as he did with the two Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015. This would merely set the stage for a new war in the coming years once Russia has licked its wounds and regrouped militarily.

As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has rightly insisted, the first and most obvious condition for future peace talks is the recovery of all occupied Ukrainian territory. This means Crimea and the so-called people’s republics of eastern Ukraine as well as regions occupied during the past six months. Re-establishing Ukraine’s territorial integrity is the only way to secure a sustainable peace.

Second, Ukraine needs to receive credible security guarantees. Kyiv can no longer accept “security assurances” as in the flawed December 1994 Budapest Memorandum.

Putin’s disregard for all international agreements shows that the only credible security guarantee is NATO membership plus a strong Ukrainian military. Considering Ukraine’s outstanding performance in the current war, NATO should be proud to offer the country a fast track to membership as Finland and Sweden have just received. If the alliance is unable to reach a consensus on Ukraine, similarly cast-iron security guarantees from individual leading powers will be necessary but may not prove sufficient to allay Kyiv’s justifiable concerns.

Third, Russia must pay war reparations for the devastation it has caused in Ukraine. The Kyiv School of Economics has assembled a database and assessed the direct physical damage during the initial months of the invasion at USD 110 billion, while Ukraine’s GDP is set to fall by at least 35 percent or USD 70 billion in 2022. The final cost in terms of material damage alone is likely to be far higher.

Western governments should facilitate the financing of Ukraine’s post-war rebuilding by confiscating USD 316 billion of currency reserves belonging to the Russian Central Bank and frozen since the first days of the invasion. Other sources of Russian funding should be identified and legal mechanisms put in place to direct this money to Ukraine. Securing Russian reparations should be one of Ukraine’s key requests to the country’s Western partners.

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Fourth, the Russian Black Sea Fleet must permanently evacuate its leased naval base in Crimean port city Sevastopol. The Russian invasion of Ukraine began with the 2014 seizure of Crimea. This operation relied heavily on Russian forces stationed in Sevastopol. Conveniently, the Kremlin has already unilaterally revoked the 2010 Kharkiv Agreement that extended Russia’s lease on Sevastopol until 2042.

Fifth, at least two million Ukrainians have entered Russia since the start of the invasion, with many subjected to forced deportation. All Ukrainians who so desire should receive permission to leave Russia. The thousands of Ukrainian children taken to Russia and subjected to illegal adoption must be returned to Ukraine.

Sixth, Russian soldiers and officials who have committed serious war crimes should be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Fortunately, the Ukrainian authorities have already begun the process of registering and documenting Russian war crimes in great detail.

These six conditions should serve as a basis for any potential peace talks. The West must fully support Ukraine at this critical juncture and overcome their fear of humiliating and provoking Putin. The evidence of the past six months indicates that when faced with resolute opposition, the Russian dictator is more inclined to back down than escalate.

Western leaders should therefore focus on providing Ukraine with the weapons it needs to win the war, while also sending a clear message to Moscow that sanctions will remain in place until Russia has fulfilled all of Ukraine’s conditions. Above all, they must avoid the temptation to offer concessions in exchange for what would likely be little more than a pause in the fighting.

Ukrainians understand the futility of trying to compromise with the Kremlin. They recognize that the war will only end when Russia is defeated. Ukraine’s international partners must also embrace this sentiment and present a united front to Moscow ahead of any future peace talks. Instead of fearing how Putin may react if he loses, they should worry about what he will do if he wins.

Anders Åslund is a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum. His latest book is “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

All this begs the question: How long can Erdogan continue playing both sides of this bitter conflict?

So we reached out to three of our experts—Rich Outzen and Yevgeniya Gaber, nonresident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program, as well as Brenda Shaffer, a nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center—to make sense of Turkey’s delicate balancing act.

From what we’ve seen so far, how would you rate the success of Ankara’s diplomatic maneuvering?

We can measure the Turkish balancing act along three dimensions: helping Ukraine avoid defeat, avoiding open conflict with Russia while demonstrating solidarity with the West, and increasing Ankara’s regional diplomatic weight. On all three, the Turks have performed reasonably well. Early provision of military aid, especially armed drones, helped blunt the Russian assault on Kyiv. Erdogan’s continued coordination with Russia on trade and Syria strikes some observers as unseemly, but given Turkish economic and regional concerns, it is prudent. As the grain-corridor deal shows, Turkey’s influential—if complicated—role in this war makes it likely that it will also play an influential role in whatever peace follows.

—Rich

With Russia’s war on Ukraine, Turkey has managed to turn the vulnerabilities of its shaky position between Russia and Ukraine (and the West) into diplomatic assets. Ankara has capitalized on its relations with both Kyiv and Moscow, first by offering its mediation services, and then by using its constructive role in the conflict to get a certain “immunity” from the West to develop trade and economic relations with Russian-sanctioned businesses while also militarily supporting Ukraine. The country’s increased geopolitical significance also gave the Turkish leadership additional leverage to renegotiate the Western arms embargo against Ankara; it advocated for renewed cooperation with NATO in the areas of defense and security. Yet six months into the war, this policy has proven to have its own risks and limitations.

—Yevgeniya

In the field of energy, in particular, Turkey has made major contributions to Europe, including the transit of additional natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. This has been especially meaningful for Bulgaria, to which Moscow cut gas supplies, so gas from Azerbaijan via Turkey is now Bulgaria’s only dedicated supply. Ankara is also preparing its gas-supply infrastructure to transit additional gas from Azerbaijan to Europe in both the short and medium terms. Turkey is able to transit more gas (instead of stocking up on supplies) because it prepared its energy market much better than most European states through multiple gas suppliers, extensive storage, and even new gas discoveries through continued exploration of its territorial waters.

—Brenda

What are the various considerations going through Erdogan’s mind as he sustains this delicate balance?

Erdogan faces a geopolitical imperative to preserve an independent Ukraine, because a Russia that absorbs Ukraine poses a far more serious threat to Turkish security. Turkey’s economic difficulties remain top of mind, too: Its pragmatism with Russia is driven by the potentially painful fallout of an open rift. With elections next year, Erdogan is also concerned with burnishing his image as a grand statesman. For him, the Ukraine war is inextricably linked to the war in Syria, because he needs Moscow’s tolerance of the safe zone in northeastern Syria that preserves the anti-Bashar al-Assad opposition and offers hope of resettling some of the four million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey.

—Rich

The complexity of Ankara’s decision-making on the Ukraine-Russia dilemma is rooted in domestic politics, regional security, and Turkey’s relations with the West. Domestically, less than a year ahead of presidential elections, Erdogan’s desire to stabilize the economic situation and financial markets, Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas, the Russian state-owned atomic agency’s work on the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) project, and increasingly anti-American public sentiment make cooperation with Russia a must. Regionally, Turkey needs a green light from Moscow for its operation in Syria against Kurdish fighters it considers “terrorists” (and to resettle some part of the Syrian refugees in Turkey to the safe zone). At the same time, Turkey needs to strike a delicate balance to help ensure Ukraine’s survival as an independent state in its war with Russia and avoid major crises with Western allies.

—Yevgeniya

It’s easy to overlook geographic factors in international relations, such as the limitations on landlocked states in accessing energy and other goods. This factor has a strong impact on how states craft their policies toward Russia. All the states that border Russia or Russian forces—in this case Turkey (across the Black Sea), Azerbaijan, and Israel (which borders Russian forces controlling Syria’s airspace)—need to conduct a successful balancing act. On the one hand, these bordering states, such as Turkey, want to keep Moscow’s expansions in check, since their own security is directly threatened by Moscow’s invasions of Russia’s neighboring states. On the other hand, Russia has many tools in its toolbox to undermine and disrupt the security of neighboring states, which is why its neighbors need to identify a policy to check the expansion while not increasing conflict with Russia. The potential price to pay from miscalculation is much higher than for any state in Western Europe or the United States.

—Brenda

Could there come a point when Ankara will be compelled to more clearly pick a side?

Turkey will avoid picking a side in the sense of a binary, zero-sum outcome to the war. Ukrainian defeat and dismemberment would be an unmitigated disaster for Turkey, but a defeated and potentially unstable Russia would negatively impact Turkish interests in Syria and the Caucasus, as well as its economy. Erdogan has a transactional but positive relationship with Putin. The formulation of supporting Ukraine militarily and politically, but remaining engaged with Russia economically and diplomatically, is an effective hedge—and while neither Kyiv nor Moscow is entirely pleased, there is no dynamic at play to force Ankara into a different position.

—Rich

For Turkey, cooperation with Russia and Ukraine (and the West) has never been a question of either/or. Ankara will try to maintain its relations with all sides, but on different levels: political, diplomatic, and limited military support for Ukraine; a certain level of engagement with NATO, while trying to prevent its allies from getting directly involved in the region (for instance, by avoiding NATO ships in the Black Sea); and cooperation in the trade, economic, energy, and tourism spheres with Russia. The first two factors should help Ankara deter Russian political clout and a military build-up in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, which is crucial for its own national security. The latter is viewed as key to Turkey’s economic interests and domestic stability.

—Yevgeniya

Turkey will benefit most from a situation where security and trade is restored in the Black Sea region, while at the same time Ukraine retains as much as its territory as possible (especially the coastal cities). Ankara has a long history of promoting its security interests vis-à-vis its neighbors without joining the rhetorical rituals that can escalate conflict. We see this in its relations with several neighbors, including Iran and Iraq.

—Brenda

Is there a single geopolitical partner with whom Turkey stands to gain (or lose) more?

The upside (potential gain) is with Ukraine for Turkey, and the downside (potential loss) with Russia. A strong Ukraine that retains a coastline—and potentially regains territories previously lost—promises burgeoning trade, defense, and diplomatic ties. Ukraine and Turkey share exposure to Russia and peripheral status in Europe, making partnership even more vital. Yet Russia is a nuclear power with extensive bilateral trade with Turkey; it also has the ability to hurt Turkey in three or four conflict zones. A split-decision outcome to the war is in Turkey’s interest, whereby Ukraine survives and Russia backs down, but is not itself debilitated.

—Rich

In the short term, cooperation with Russia might seem beneficial. The relocation to Turkey of Russian businesses hit by Western sanctions, Russia’s transfer of billions of dollars toward the Akkuyu NPP, and its introduction of the “Mir” card system in Turkish banks may look like an easy influx of cash and investment without any conditionality. But in the long run, the costs of such deals will largely exceed whatever limited gains they might bring. Turkey’s role in helping Russia bypass Western sanctions is likely to backfire, potentially resulting in the West introducing sanctions against Turkey itself. (Ultimately, $35 billion of trade turnover with Russia versus $178 billion with the European Union says it all.) Turkey’s slide from being a neutral broker between democratic Ukraine and authoritarian Russia toward favoring the latter would definitely damage Ankara’s international image and reputation—while Ankara’s alienation from the West will only boost its dependence on Russia. The balance sheet for Turkey is obvious.

—Yevgeniya

The post How long can Turkey play both sides in the Ukraine war? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Massoud: There is ‘no other option’ but to fight on against the Taliban

Atlantic Council — Fri, 12 Aug 2022 10:00:00 +0000

One year after his country fell to the Taliban, Ahmad Massoud isn’t giving up his fight.

At this time last year, as the militant group swallowed up vast swaths of Afghanistan, the son of famous anti-Soviet resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud pledged during an exclusive Atlantic Council interview that he’d seek talks with the Taliban.

Now, however, Massoud says the group remains uninterested in either dialogue or reforming its backward ways. That’s why his fledgling military alliance, the National Resistance Front (NRF), is pressing on with armed resistance.

“There’s no other option but to resist until [Taliban members] understand and realize they need to also submit—as [do] all of us—to a legitimate process which brings a legitimate government which is accountable to the people of Afghanistan, and also to the world,” he told Kamal Alam, a nonresident senior fellow at the Council’s South Asia Center and a special adviser and representative of the Massoud Foundation (of which Massoud is the president).

Here are some key takeaways from their conversation:

No partner to negotiate with

Immediately after the Taliban takeover of Kabul on August 15, 2021, Massoud recalled, he and his allies—while stationed in the Panjshir Valley—tried to engage the Taliban and make the group understand that “legitimacy in Afghanistan… cannot come though the barrel of a gun” but through the voice of the people.

That didn’t work. Massoud claims the group’s message was clear: “We expect nothing less than surrender” and a pledge of loyalty to the regime. That’s when Massoud and others formed the NRF, which has attacked Taliban forces and weathered counterattacks in recent months. The fight will continue, Massoud said, until “the Taliban realize that the military regime, or a militant group’s rule over a country, is not an option.”

While Massoud said the NRF tried working with regional actors to hammer out some sort of peace with the Taliban, those efforts also failed. “Unfortunately,” he noted, Taliban leaders “have not changed. They are even more radical than before.”

Don’t be fooled

Massoud urged world leaders to avoid considering the group a “Taliban 2.0” that somehow changed for the better after returning to power. “They failed in fighting international terrorism because they share the same ideology” as terrorist groups, he said. “They failed in creating inclusivity because they don’t believe in it.”

Massoud, whose father was assassinated by al-Qaeda just days before the September 11 attacks, pointed to the Taliban’s apparent sheltering of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was killed by a US airstrike last week. The fact that Zawahiri was living in central Kabul is “a clear indication that [Taliban leaders] have completely aligned with such terrorism entities and organizations,” Massoud said.

Other extremist groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, are also finding safe haven in Afghanistan, he added—and by turning a blind eye to this trend, the international community would make “a catastrophic mistake” with wide-ranging consequences.

Help wanted

While the NRF is determined to fight on for a democratic and decentralized government in Afghanistan, its struggle is a lonely one because “no country is supporting us,” Massoud said.

While the Taliban remains officially unrecognized since it seized control of the country last year, several countries in the region continue to station ambassadors in Kabul. Massoud said these diplomatic overtures are rooted in worries that the Taliban’s “incompetent” governance will produce bigger security challenges: “The countries’ engagement with the Taliban [is] solely based on this one factor, which is fear.”

Invoking Western support for Ukraine and Taiwan in their struggles against Russia and China, respectively, he added that Afghans would see “hypocrisy” in the West’s failure to also help the Afghan people fight off their own tyrants. “We are working with our people for the values and for the livelihood which we truly deserve,” he explained.

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Invest in peace

Howard G. Buffett — Tue, 31 May 2022 22:35:39 +0000

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When Colombia signed a peace agreement in 2016 after fifty years of conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), we knew the real work was just beginning. A peace agreement is just a piece of paper until the commitments written on it become a reality.

As chairman and CEO of the Howard G. Buffett Foundation, a private family foundation with an annual grant-making budget of more than $200 million, my job is to deploy the most risk-tolerant capital available—philanthropy—to invest in ideas that improve the lives of some of the most impoverished and marginalized people in the world. Our foundation focuses its funding on improving food security through agriculture, mitigating conflict through development, building capacity to combat human trafficking, and securing the safety of as many people as possible. Although we created our foundation in 1999 with an emphasis on conserving wildlife and habitat, we soon shifted our focus to include people because conservation and sustainability become viable when people have choices beyond simple survival. I can think of no better investment than in people—like the Colombians— who are resilient enough to have survived decades of conflict.

The real question we faced in Colombia was not whether to invest in development but where to start. Colombia’s 200-year relationship with the United States provided a framework for answering that question. Philan-thropy is, in essence, venture capital that measures the return on investment based on the positive impact on people’s lives. Our funding can test new ideas, but we need public sector support to bring those ideas to scale in every part of the country that needs investment. Working with government—locally and nationally—is essential. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States gave us a roadmap for working with Colombia’s government institutions. Within a few months of our initial outreach to the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos, we made the first commitment that eventually would total nearly $45 million to support humanitarian demining operations in rural areas. This foundational investment would redeploy the military to focus on development and secure land for further investments in smallholder agriculture, smaller-scale voluntary coca-crop substitution, and land titling projects.

Afterwards, the foundation worked with the administration of President Iván Duque to develop a holistic approach to security and development, focusing investments on Tibú, a municipality in the Catatumbo region that borders Venezuela. Catatumbo is marked by high levels of violence, poverty, and drugs. About a third of the militants in the National Liberation Army continue to operate in the region as they dispute power with other drug trafficking groups and smaller factions of dissidents. The presence of armed groups has fueled the cultivation of illicit crops in Tibú, which pro- duces more coca—the base ingredient of cocaine—than any other Colombian municipality. Why focus investment in the part of Colombia with the most difficult challenges? Because if we can demonstrate success here, we know success is possible everywhere.

Focusing our efforts in Catatumbo also allowed us to complement Colombia’s investments. A 2018 government strategy, “Sustainable Catatumbo,” has brought more than $175 million in development investments to the region, but health, education, and policing remain underfunded, and agri- cultural assistance requires a multi-pronged approach to remove barriers. As an outside funder, we consider every investment through the lens of how any successes we achieve could be sustained or replicated locally and nation- ally after our funding is completed. That informed an approach that mixes one-time capital investments and pilot projects, which could attract future funding if we demonstrate success.

Roads are vital to providing rural farmers access to markets for alter- native crops to replace coca. They also serve as a deterrent to armed groups and the drug trade because they improve the government’s ability to secure those areas. In September 2020, the foundation signed an agreement to build or improve nearly 50 miles of tertiary and 4.5 miles of regional roads in Catatumbo for $45 million. The National Roads Institute is scheduled to complete the first six regional and tertiary roads by the end of 2022, with follow-on funding for the remainder contingent on performance. These roads will enable market access and security, allowing farmers to get better prices for their production of legal crops, thus reducing the incentive to grow coca.

Land titling is another essential element in providing legal alternatives to coca cultivation for rural farmers. The foundation has provided a $4.5 million grant to Mercy Corps to assist nine hundred farming families in obtaining land titles in Tibú and one thousand families in reducing food insecurity. A separate, parallel grant to the National Coffee Federation is exploring ways these farming families can voluntarily replace their coca production with alternative crops that are legal and profitable, in partner- ship with a private-sector buyer committed to purchasing their products at fair prices. The rural farmers we’ve met want to grow legal crops, but they also need to feed their families. Obtaining land titles allows them to access financing to make this transition and invest in high-value, legal crops like cacao and coffee. Land titles also raise the stakes for growing coca because farmers risk losing their land if they do not make the switch.

Many organizations and donors invest in development only when conflicts end. Often, our foundation’s investment decisions are based on the theory that peace cannot be secured and sustained without investing in development first. Communities need to see what life could be like without conflict to fight for that peace. That is why we complement investment in activities like agriculture that will take years to produce tangible results with investments that could improve lives today. That includes limited human itarian support for internally displaced persons and investments in new health clinics, shelters, schools, and even police stations. These choices are informed by the needs articulated by local communities and governments in partnership with the national government to ensure that the personnel to support this new infrastructure is included in government budgets.

Finally, no investment in post-conflict development is sustainable without addressing the issue of ex-combatants. They need investment too, so they can have viable livelihoods that do not involve conflict, but this investment must be made in a way that is fair to the individuals who never took up arms against the government. The foundation supports the World Food Programme’s work with FARC ex-combatants living in fourteen of the twenty-four reintegration camps across Colombia, including the one in Tibú. The projects provide a way for ex-combatants to gain new skills, earn a living, and make amends with their communi ties, many of which are victims of the armed conflict.

Over the last six years, our work in Colombia has underscored that his- tory will not judge success based on the signing of the peace accords but rather by Colombia’s ability to fulfill its commitments. This requires an enormous investment in development and close coordination among all stakeholders to ensure these commitments meet the needs of the people most affected. The role of outside donors is to listen and support efforts to achieve that objective.

As Colombia and the United States celebrate two hundred years of cooperation, it’s important to recognize that Colombia’s success or failure affects us here at home. Succeeding in Catatumbo will reduce the coca production that ultimately becomes cocaine in US cities. The stability we create in Colombia helps stem the flow of migrants across our borders. The peace and development we demonstrate in Colombia is the beacon of hope we give people living in Venezuela that there is an alternative to poverty, lawless- ness, and autocracy. Colombia is poised to prove to the world that it will be known for the peace it has brokered at home rather than the conflict it has endured for fifty years. That is a future worth investing in.

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Memo to Henry Kissinger: Appeasing Putin means enabling genocide

Stephen Blank — Tue, 31 May 2022 12:35:48 +0000

As the Russo-Ukrainian War enters its fourth month, calls are mounting for Ukraine to trade land for peace and accept a compromise settlement that would allow Vladimir Putin to retain control over at least some of the regions currently under Russian occupation.

The most high-profile advocate of appeasement so far has been former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who garnered global headlines when he argued at the recent World Economic Forum that Ukraine should be prepared to cede territory to Russia in order to end the war. Likewise, French President Emmanuel Macron has called for a compromise solution and warned against “humiliating” Putin, while his German and Italian counterparts have indicated support for similar positions.

Arguments in favor of appeasement have also become increasingly common in the international media. A May 19 New York Times editorial that spoke of the need for Ukraine’s leaders to make “painful territorial decisions” was one of numerous recent high-profile articles calling on Kyiv to accept the Russian annexation of Ukrainian lands in exchange for peace.

These outpourings of solicitude for Putin are an indication of continued international reluctance to accept the reality of an escalating confrontation with the Kremlin. They also reflect widespread ignorance of modern Russia and a failure to grasp the true nature of the current war.

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The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin on February 24 is a classic example of unprovoked international aggression. Crucially, the main objective of the war is to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. This goal has been repeatedly stated by Russian officials including Putin. It is also regularly reinforced by the Kremlin-controlled Russian media, where talk of genocide in Ukraine has become normalized since the beginning of the invasion.

Russian war aims include the elimination of the territorial, political, economic and cultural basis of Ukrainian statehood. Putin himself has often declared that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”) and has argued at length that Ukraine has no right to exist as an independent and sovereign state. In other words, this is a genocidal war in line with the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention. It is being waged with the explicit intention to “completely or partially destroy a group based on its nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion.”

Confirmation of Russia’s genocidal objectives in Ukraine goes far beyond the unhinged public statements of Putin and his propagandists. During the first three months of the war, evidence has emerged of mass murders, widespread torture and sexual violence designed to hinder future childbirth, forced deportations (especially of children), the destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage, and systematic policies of Russification. In areas occupied by the Kremlin, potential opponents of the Russian takeover have been subjected to Soviet-style round-ups and in many cases remain unaccounted for.

These war crimes are not aberrations but rather a revival of traditional Russian imperial policies toward Ukraine. From the 1708 sack of Ukrainian Cossack capital city Baturyn during the reign of Russian Czar Peter the Great, to the genocidal famine engineered by Stalin in early the 1930s, Russian leaders have a long history of ruthlessly eradicating any manifestations of Ukrainian statehood. Today’s war fits seamlessly into this long and bloody history of Russian imperial aggression.

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As any student of WWII will tell you, attempting to appease genocidal tyrants with territorial concessions is not only morally repugnant but also strategically nonsensical. The only response such figures understand is overwhelming force. The only meaningful objective is their total defeat.

Supporters of appeasement must also recognize that a genocidal war of aggression cannot be accommodated within the existing framework of the international order. Indeed, war crimes on this scale are antithetical to any kind of order whatsoever. Failure to defeat those responsible for such crimes merely accelerates the descent of world politics into the jungle and sets a dreadful geopolitical precedent for the decades to come.

As many commentators have written, it makes no sense to pursue a negotiated settlement over Ukraine’s head analogous to the infamous Munich Pact of 1938. President Zelenskyy has already forcefully made this point. Nevertheless, we must constantly remind people that in launching this war, Putin broke at least seven solemn international treaties and accords to which Russia is a full signatory. On what basis can we assume that he and his government would observe any new settlement?

Nor is there any indication that Russia is currently seeking to save face or ready to accept a negotiated settlement. Putin has so far refused every “off-ramp” or offer of negotiation because he thinks he can ratchet up the pressure on what he considers to be a decadent West until it gives him everything he wants. Like a mob boss, Putin uses the threat of violence to intimidate his Western opponents. He knows they fundamentally fear a military confrontation and sees each successive appeal for appeasement as proof that his bully-boy tactics are working.

Those clamoring to dismember Ukraine in order to continue doing business with Moscow need to explain why we should be so afraid of Russia when it is Russia that faces an infinitely stronger alliance. Instead of seeking to negotiate at Ukraine’s expense, the West should focus its energies on making sure Ukraine wins and Russia loses. This is obviously the correct approach for Ukraine itself and for the democratic world in general. It would also ultimately be in Russia’s interest if the country is to finally emerge from its authoritarian prison and follow the path of postwar Germany.

Appeasing Russia will not end the war or secure peace in our time. On the contrary, it will embolden Putin, prolong Ukraine’s pain, weaken the West, and destabilize the wider world. The entire notion that the current war can be resolved via compromise is a dangerous illusion. Until Russia is decisively defeated, any pause in the fighting will be temporary. Territorial concessions will only whet Putin’s appetite for further conquests while exposing millions more Ukrainians to the Kremlin’s genocidal agenda.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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Understanding Putin is the key to forming effective Western policies toward Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainians tend to understand Putin very well but surprisingly few Westerners do. A number of common misconceptions need to be addressed and debunked if the West wishes to get Russia right.

One key problem when dealing with Putin is the Western fear of escalation. The Russian dictator is well aware of this and always escalates until he has won or been defeated. The West must therefore not seek to avoid escalation, but should demonstrate a readiness to escalate more and faster. This is the only way to ensure that Putin fails and Ukraine wins.

Western fears of “provoking Putin” are particularly unhelpful. For this reason, US President Barack Obama refused to deliver lethal weapons to Ukraine. Members of the current US administration appear to embrace the same flawed idea. Meanwhile, similar arguments dominate the debate in Europe and fuel a mood of excessive caution that only serves to embolden Putin.

It is difficult to see any logic in these concerns. Putin has started an unprovoked and unjustified war, but it is the West that must not provoke him? Such thinking is essentially a call to allow a Russian victory and accept Ukrainian defeat. Instead, the word “provocation” should be retired from the Western discussion about Putin.

A similarly gentlemanly idea is the notion that the West must allow Putin to save face. Really? Putin is no gentleman. He wages wars of aggression and ruthlessly orders the destruction of entire cities. The West cannot compromise over crimes against humanity on this scale. On the contrary, Putin must be defeated. The only language he understands is the language of overwhelming strength.

Many misguided Western politicians and commentators continue to call on Ukraine to negotiate with Putin. The problem with this position is that Putin himself has consistently refused to meet, negotiate, or even speak on the phone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Putin has also demonstrated conclusively that his word has no value and he feels under no obligation to keep any of his promises. For decades, Putin has routinely violated international agreement after agreement while publicly defending his conduct with bare-faced lies and obviously implausible denials. Why bother to conclude another worthless agreement with this lawless character?

Western calls for Ukrainian neutrality are similarly futile. Ukraine has been neutral throughout its thirty years of independence and has never had any serious prospects of joining NATO. Far from fearing Ukraine’s NATO integration, Putin invaded the country precisely because it was not a NATO member and had not received sufficient military support from the alliance.

NATO membership remains the only credible security guarantee for Ukraine. Finland and Sweden have drawn the obvious conclusion from Russia’s invasion and have now abandoned decades of neutrality. Ruling out closer ties between NATO and Ukraine will only encourage further Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere.

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When advocates of appeasement run out of other arguments, they tend to call for an immediate ceasefire. While seemingly sensible, these appeals ignore Russia’s long record of treating ceasefire agreements as opportunities to regroup and prepare for new attacks.

This trend was particularly prominent during the seven years of simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine following the signing of the second Minsk Accords in February 2015. Russia refused to adhere to the ceasefire terms agreed in Minsk and regularly launched localized escalations to suit Moscow’s interests.

Peaceniks often declare that the West must avoid painting Putin into a corner. Similarly, they warn against destabilizing Russia, but it is entirely irrational to position Putin as a source of stability when he is clearly the main destabilizing factor in both Europe and Russia itself. Where would Europe be today if this twisted logic had been applied to Adolf Hitler?

Russia’s war against Ukraine is the biggest geopolitical crisis for a generation. It is entirely understandable that many international observers are desperate to end the slaughter and believe a negotiated peace is the best way to secure peace. However, such hopes are shortsighted and fail to appreciate the character of the Putin regime.

The only way to end the war conclusively is via a decisive Ukrainian victory that forces Russia to acknowledge its defeat and sees Ukraine regain all the land it has lost since 2014. If a compromise peace allows Putin to hold on to his latest territorial gains in Ukraine, he will use any pause in hostilities to prepare for the next stage in his campaign to subjugate the rest of the country. If he wins the war, Russian aggression will inevitably expand beyond the borders of Ukraine.

Years of Western wishful thinking and concessions to the Kremlin have failed to prevent Putin’s emergence as the greatest threat to world peace. It is now time to recognize the reality of modern Russia and belatedly abandon the path of appeasement.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

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‘Blessing in Movement’ – Private Roundtable with Esawi Frej

Salwa Balla — Fri, 29 Apr 2022 12:43:30 +0000

On March 31, the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs hosted a private roundtable with Esawi Frej, Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation. This event was moderated by William Wechsler, senior director of Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, and attended by a number of think tank experts, US government officials and diplomats, and civil society representatives, all of whom are committed to preserving peace and stability in the region.

Opening Remarks

Minister Frej emphasized that the region is at a critical inflection point, and that the Abraham Accords have created sweeping winds of change toward tolerance and people-to-people understanding. After two years of divisions in Israel given the political impasse to form a government, the development of an ideologically diverse coalition has allowed for greater internal and regional cooperation. Moreover, the Abraham Accords have created the foundations for greater cooperation between other countries in the region and Israel and have the potential to create partnership between Israelis and Palestinians. Minister Frej focused on the benefits of the Abraham Accords, and how the Palestinian people can leverage the opportunities created by them.

Abraham Accords

The Minister stressed the importance of people-to-people activities as a way to ensure the Abraham Accords are sustainable. He also underlined that the Accords could grow further understanding between the people of the region. With this government, Israel has witnessed a visible shift toward greater people-to-people understanding and regional coordination in both economic and political terms. According to Minister Frej, prioritizing regional cooperation is the best way to create sustainable peace. However, peace cannot be achieved without the support of officials from the Palestinian territories. Describing the growing wave of regional activity inspired by the Accords, Minister Frej stressed the need for Palestinians to take advantage of the benefits presented by the new post-Accords reality in the Middle East.

He also emphasized that continued cooperation between governments is essential to achieving substantive change in the region, and specifically highlighted the support of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian governments for future agreements involving the Palestinian territories. Minister Frej cited the N7 Conference, hosted by the Atlantic Council and the Jeffery M. Talpins Foundation last October, as a great example of the multilateral coordination and dialogue necessary to develop a foundation for governmental cooperation.

Furthermore, Minister Frej underscored the importance of using the word ‘normalization’ in a positive light. The term is often villainized in Arab media, and the narrative around the Abraham Accords and normalization efforts is largely negative. However, there can be no peace without normalization. The Abraham Accords are intended to drive momentum for peace, stability, and people-to-people understanding, which reflects his mission as Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation. In this momentum, the role of Arab Israeli citizens who share the same culture and language as the Arabs in the region is a true asset to the state of Israel.

Q&A Session

Addressing the recent wave of terrorist attacks in Israel, the government’s response and implications of the attacks on both the peace process and normalization efforts, Minister Frej offered a frank assessment. While it can be assumed that these attacks will continue to occur, they must be faced together and not allowed to succeed in dividing the country. These periods of instability are a wake-up call and reinforce the fact that the people are reliant on one another to survive and build sustainable relations to inhibit violence. To that end, Palestinian security must work alongside Israeli security forces to combat terrorist activity in the country.

Speaking on the path forward for Palestinians and other Arab countries to join the Abraham Accords, Minister Frej referred to Israel’s new coalition government. This coalition comprises individuals across the political spectrum and includes an Arab party. Though there is diversity in ideology, the ruling elite shares support for the Abraham Accords, as well as for greater economic development and education, as important values in their agenda. These values can be empowered by uplifting Palestinian civil society; if these civil societies are supported through a top-down structure, they can back people-to-people understanding, and aid in the growth of the Palestinian economy.

When asked if annexation of the West Bank was on the agenda in response to rising tensions and violence, Minister Frej emphasized that annexation goes against his beliefs. Keeping democracy strong is important, and differences in opinion are a product of democracy. For this coalition, annexation is off the table. He reminded the group that Israel’s democracy is still young and therefore fragile, and that this coalition was created to first and foremost protect democracy.

In building off questions regarding reactions in the Arab world to the Abraham Accords and mechanisms by which to build relationships with critical countries, such as Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, Minister Frej offered a regional approach to peacebuilding. The more countries that are involved in normalization, the more effective and sustainable the peace process will be. The Accords are now at a critical juncture, and what it takes for more countries in the Arab world to join is the genuine support of the Palestinians. He reminded the panel that there are Palestinian refugees across the Arab world, where public opinion is greatly influenced by the fate of these refugees.

Finally, he asserted that all dealings between countries must be transparent, and that having the courage to work together publicly is the first step in developing long term relationships for a peaceful transition and creating the foundation for people-to-people understanding.

Salwa Balla, is a Young Global Professional with the Rafik Hariri and Middle East Programs.

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Putin’s Ukraine War: Belarus dictator switches from arsonist to firefighter

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 13 Apr 2022 22:05:33 +0000

When Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka met at a space launch facility in the Russian Far East on April 12, the carefully choreographed press conference was full of the predictable agitprop, lies, and disinformation.

The Belarusian dictator claimed that the atrocities committed by Russian forces in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha were actually faked as part of “a psychological operation staged by Englishmen.” For his part, the Kremlin autocrat declared that the Russian war against Ukraine was proceeding as planned and insisted Moscow’s “goals are absolutely clear and noble.”

But the gaslighting and falsehoods masked an important truth about why Putin and Lukashenka were meeting now. As Russia shifts its tactics, abandoning for the time being its efforts to take Kyiv in favor of an assault on eastern and southern Ukraine, Belarus’s role in the war is also undergoing a transformation.

In the run-up to the meeting, Lukashenka, who has allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a staging ground for its assault on Ukraine, complained bitterly about being labeled “an accomplice of the aggressor.” He also repeatedly demanded that Belarus be a party to any talks to resolve the war. Meanwhile, Belarus recently published a list of unfriendly countries that pointedly did not include Ukraine.

The Kremlin is also playing along with these apparent attempts to reframe the Belarusian role in the war. In recent days, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested, apparently with a straight face, that Belarus should be one of the “neutral” countries that could provide security guarantees to Ukraine in the event that Kyiv declares its neutrality.

According to an unpublished confidential report by the Minsk-based Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, Lukashenka has recently been promoting a change in the Belarusian position toward the war. Belarus will remain Russia’s ally and will not criticize the war, but Lukashenka does not want to be viewed as a co-aggressor in the conflict. Toward this end, Belarus will intensify diplomatic efforts to end the war and will insist on participating in any peace negotiations.

In other words, after assisting and enabling an arsonist, Lukashenka now apparently wants to pretend he is a firefighter.

Lukashenka’s efforts to shift perceptions of Belarus’s involvement in the war are being largely driven by domestic politics. According to a recent poll by Chatham House, just three percent of Belarusians support the idea of Belarus participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine. At the same time, 67 percent oppose Russia shelling Ukrainian cities from Belarusian territory and 52 percent oppose allowing Moscow to use Belarusian territory as a staging ground for the war.

Moreover, Belarusian railway workers have engaged in a campaign of sabotage to prevent Russian troops and military hardware from reaching Ukraine via Belarus. The Cyber Partisans hacking group has also launched attacks to disrupt the Belarusian railways. And hundreds of Belarusian citizens have joined volunteer battalions to fight on the Ukrainian side of the conflict.

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For its part, Russia appears to find this Belarusian attempt to reorient its role in the war somewhat useful, at least for the moment.

According to the Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies report, “the Kremlin hopes to use the position of Belarus in the negotiation process and include the country among the guarantors of Ukraine’s security for its own interests. This is simply to prolong the negotiations because Moscow wants to approach the final phase of talks in a strong position, meaning after military victories.”

Lukashenka may be dreaming about reviving the role he played following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in the Donbas. At the time, he was able to position himself as an honest broker and host of the Minsk peace talks. But that horse has clearly left the barn.

Lukashenka’s status in 2014 was bolstered by his refusal to recognize the annexation of Crimea, his ridiculing of Putin’s notion of a “Russian world,” and his pledge not to allow Belarusian territory to be used to attack Ukraine. In recent months, however, he has gone all in with Russia’s imperial designs. This makes any attempt to backtrack virtually impossible.

Moreover, Putin is clearly prepared to exploit Lukashenka’s posing and posturing as a peacemaker for his own cynical purposes.

This is Lukashenka’s war too. Ukrainian cities have been shelled from Belarus. Russian troops invaded Ukraine from Belarus and are now regrouping and resupplying in Belarus. Despite his protestations, Lukashenka has turned his country into a belligerent. You can’t become a firefighter after being an arsonist’s apprentice.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

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Russia’s veto makes a mockery of the United Nations Security Council

Shelby Magid, Yulia Shalomov — Tue, 15 Mar 2022 10:55:47 +0000

“This is an extraordinary moment,” declared US ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield during a recent UN General Assembly (UNGA) emergency special session on Ukraine. “Now, at more than any other point in recent history, the United Nations is being challenged. If the United Nations has any purpose, it is to prevent war, it is to condemn war, to stop war.”

With this purpose in mind, in a sweeping show of international unity, 141 countries voted in favor of an UNGA resolution demanding an immediate end to the Russian offensive in Ukraine. While non-binding and largely symbolic, this overwhelming show of global support for Ukraine came at a time when it was doubly needed, both for Ukraine itself and for the sake of the UN.

Only four countries joined Russia in voting against the resolution. To the surprise of nobody, the list included Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria. Thirty-five nations abstained.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy applauded the outcome, declaring “Destructive results of the vote in the UN for the aggressor convincingly show that a global anti-Putin coalition has been formed and is functioning. The world is with us.”

Yet while Zelenskyy’s description of a global anti-Putin coalition may ring true for the UNGA, a meaningful multilateral response is still being blunted by Russia’s veto power in the UN Security Council (UNSC).

While the UNGA vote showed overwhelming global support for Ukraine, just a few days earlier the UN’s most powerful body sent a very different message. Despite the support of 11 Council members, the UNSC failed to adopt a resolution necessitating the immediate cessation and withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine following a single “no” vote from Russia. This once again highlighted the privileged and troubling role the five permanent members (P5) enjoy within the international body’s most powerful organ.

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Under the UN Charter, the Security Council is imbued with both primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the capacity to pass binding resolutions. Such decisions, however, are to be made with “the concurring votes of the permanent members,” thus requiring unanimous support (or abstention in lieu of) from the P5 nations.

While the UN Charter endeavors to restrict member states party to a conflict from blocking UNSC action, the provision has rarely been enforced by members reluctant to see similar caps placed on their own powers. As a result, no member state has moved to forestall or challenge Russia’s veto of the resolution.

The P5 have frequently wielded their veto power to torpedo resolutions incongruent with their national and foreign policy interests. Such machinations have been at the root of repeated Council inaction on Syria, Israel, and perhaps most memorably, Ukraine following the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia.

Unilateral obstruction in the Council has over time fed into growing criticism of the UN’s alleged irrelevance on the international stage. Established to foster global cooperation for the common good and consensual laws governing international behavior to preempt and mitigate interstate conflicts, today the UN is becoming increasingly captive to geopolitical rivalry and indecision. Russia is using its perch on the Security Council to distort international norms and sow discord in the pursuit of national interests.

In a series of perturbing televised addresses on February 21 and 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin evoked terms of international law in an undisguised bid to cloak Russian military aggression behind the guise of self-defense against alleged abuses and genocide perpetrated by Ukraine against Russians and Russian-speaking minorities in the Donbas, and the existential threat posed to “the very existence of [the Russian] state and to its sovereignty” by the West. The utter absurdity of these statements belies the extent of Russia’s exceptional interpretations and weaponization of normative frameworks governing national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the use of force.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents the largest conventional military attack since World War II. Over 2.8 million Ukrainian refugees have fled the country since the start of the assault as the civilian death toll continues to rise. Global outrage over the invasion has been powerful and the collective response has been surprisingly united, swift, and increasingly bruising.

Russia has faced a multifaceted international backlash with repercussions for its war on Ukraine hitting the nation in all parts of its economy and society. As British foreign minister Liz Truss said, Russia is becoming a “global pariah” and facing deserved isolation on the global stage.

A major part of such isolation has come through enactment of massive sanctions targeting Russian commerce and banking systems. Societal backlash has also been extensive, as a slew of multinational corporations from Apple to Boeing have suspended operations in the country.

Furthering its ostracization on the global arena is a growing movement to boycott Russian sports and cultural engagement. Perhaps most noteworthy is the galvanization of dramatic reversals in European foreign and security policy away from engagement with Russia.

Yet whereas much of the global response has been decisive in its freeze out of Russia, the UN remains a disappointing if not surprising holdout. The failure to mount more than symbolic condemnation for an attack perpetrated by a member of the P5 is irresponsible at best and evidence of a system fundamentally unable to live up to its mission.

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The magnitude and sheer audacity of Russian actions must represent an urgent wake-up call for the global community. This includes a pressing need to reevaluate the very institutions that enable the perversion of international laws and permit totalitarianism to flourish with no retribution.

Such reevaluations must include the United Nations. As the premier intergovernmental organization with the aim of maintaining peace and security, the United Nations has a unique responsibility to question how it moves forward.

Addressing the UN General Assembly, the Austrian ambassador to the UN warned, “The Security Council cannot remain silent when basic principles of our international rules-based order are trampled by military boots and squashed by tanks.” Anything less than a resolute response to Russia’s systemic cooption and undermining of UN values puts the institution at risk of losing its moral grounding and irrevocably shattering public faith in the multilateral system.

Since the start of Putin’s invasion, numerous countries have joined calls for more punishing consequences for Russia in the UN Security Council. A gamut of responses, ranging from the pragmatic to the sobering, continue to be discussed. These include a mandated convening of the General Assembly after any use of veto power in the UNSC.

Some have also questioned the legitimacy of Russian succession to the USSR’s UNSC seat. This issue was raised most vocally by the Ukrainian ambassador to the UN. Given the gravity of the situation, there have also been demands for Russia’s removal from the UNSC, including in a recent US Congressional resolution. Others have advocated ending veto power entirely.

Change will not come easily. Security Council reform has been on the Assembly’s agenda for more than two decades to little avail.

However, Russia’s latest actions have given renewed impetus to reform discussions. At no point in time has a member of the P5 so blithely abandoned international law to launch an unsanctioned assault on another country and used their position in the Security Council to shield itself from punishment.

Perfunctory warnings about the futility or infeasibility of censuring Russian actions threaten to make a mockery of the multilateral system. Recent reports of the UN’s internal guidance to avoid usage of the words “war” or “invasion” in reference to the Russian assault on Ukraine further underscore this point.

Putin’s war has fundamentally transformed the geopolitical landscape. This new reality must be reflected in the way the United Nations functions. If not now, when?

Shelby Magid is Associate Director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Yulia Shalomov is Assistant Director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Natiq Malikzada — Tue, 01 Mar 2022 21:26:42 +0000

Introduction

In August 2021, the Taliban took Afghanistan by force for the second time in their history. This event coupled with the hasty US withdrawal ended the bloodiest and longest war of the United States. Amid the withdrawal of foreign troops, the lingering issue of ethnic discord once again is rearing its ugly head across Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, unlike many other nation states, is an ethnically diverse country that has many ethnicities in sizable populations. It is a country of minorities, with no ethnic group representing a majority of the population. Of these ethnicities, the four major groups are Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. There are also other sub-nationalities and ethnicities like Turkmens, Nuristanis, Aimaq, Baloch, and others. The Pashtuns, which comprise up to 40 percent of the population, have managed to rule the country for the last one and a half-centuries with the exception of three periods in the twentieth century.

Rewinding back to the late nineteenth century, Afghanistan was created as a “buffer zone” between the British Raj in India and the Tsarist Empire in Russia, which took over Central Asia. It was thus under the suzerainty of the British, making Afghanistan’s foreign policy dependent on Calcutta, the seat of the Raj. The British and their indirect rulers in Afghanistan, the Pashtun elites, were well aware of the ethnolinguistic diversity of the country. They therefore developed a highly centralized political order right from the outset. Mastermind of this centralized political order was Amir Abd Ur Rahman, who was installed by the British and received annual cash payments and ammunition to pacify the population and establish a centralized monarchy. This political order not only favored Pashtuns but also sowed the seeds of ethnic discord in Afghanistan. Such ethnic discord has now transformed into an existential threat to the country.

Fast forward to 1996, and the Taliban—a group dominated by Pashtuns—marginalized the other ethnic communities of Afghanistan during their stint in power. Now, the Taliban is once again at the helm of political affairs and as such the group has already repeated its history despite its claim of forming an inclusive national government. This time, however, Afghanistan’s other ethnic communities will not tolerate a centralized, Pashtun-exclusive government. Consequently, the uncompromising attitude of the militant group will likely only lead to another bloody civil war or the permanent geographical disintegration of Afghanistan.

The birth of a monster: Ethnic discord in Afghanistan

Globally, there have been two major models of nation state formation: multicultural and homogenous. In Afghanistan, the Pashtun political elite have historically carried out the attempted homogenization of society in order to suppress revolts by hostile groups or nationalities. Homogenization also can involve the process of relocating members of one ethnic community to the lands of other nationalities or communities.

In the colonial period, this homogenization of society was common and frequently used by colonial powers for controlling their colonies. For instance, after conquering Central Asia, Tsarist Russia followed the policy of homogenization of conquered lands and as a consequence, one can now see a sizable chunk of Russian population and culture in the independent Central Asian states. The Pashtun kings of Afghanistan followed the same policy of homogenization for diluting other ethnic populations in their lands. Amir Abd Ur Rahman—famous among Pashtuns as the “Iron Amir” of the late nineteenth century—followed such a policy. Rahman learned the homogenization technique from Tsarist Russia while he was living in exile in Central Asia.

Rahman pursued the policy in 1885 and relocated many Pashtun tribes from the south and southeast parts of Afghanistan to the north, northeast, northwest, and central parts of the country. Traditionally, Pashtuns were predominantly in the south and southeast of the country while the north, northeast, west, and central parts of the country belong to Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and other ethnic communities. Until 1885, Pashtun tribes were relocated to the north and central parts of the country as a punishment. After 1885, however, Rahman persuaded Pashtun tribes to migrate towards northern and central parts of the country through economic and other incentives. At that time, the government reimbursed travel expenses of the migrating Pashtun tribes, granted them cultivable lands seized from other communities, and exempted them from taxes for three years. In return, no one from other ethnic groups from the northern and central parts of Afghanistan were allowed to move to eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan where Pashtuns had previously dominated.

In consequence, not only were a huge number of Pashtun tribes relocated into the lands of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and the Baloch, but many of the tribes of the latter ethnicities were forced to leave their lands. Mass migration of the Hazaras, Nuristanis, and Baloch tribes into neighboring Persia and then-India are examples of this cruel and biased policy of Amir Abd Ur Rahman. This policy continued in subsequent governments until King Amanullah Khan institutionalized it by issuing The Settlers to Qataghan Act of 1923. King Amanullah’s successors maintained it just the same until 1973 and the end of monarchy in Afghanistan. Today it continues under the Taliban and has even intensified.

It was also an attempt to subdue the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks through “Pashtunization” of the north, west, and center of Afghanistan. As the northern territories of the kingdom were not under the control of Pashtun dynasties until the late nineteenth century, the aim was to bend the Tajik and Turk population of the north.

The reason for this homogenization policy was to disconnect Tajiks and Uzbeks from their fellow community members in Afghanistan and the other side of the northern border. This move was to secure the northern border from the threats and infiltration of Russians. In addition, it was an attempt to subdue the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks through Pashtunization of the north, west and center of Afghanistan. The Pashtun rulers wanted to effectively control the northern parts of the country which, due to its many marginalized non-Pashtun populations, were at odds with the central government. The Pashtun elite also wanted to benefit from the fertile lands in the north. With these factors in mind, starting in 1885 the seeds of ethnic discord were sowed in Afghanistan and would have a lasting impact that can still be felt today.

From 1885 until today, this movement of Pashtun tribes from the south and southeast of Afghanistan (and other side of the Durand Line) to the northern and central parts of the country continued at a different pace and consequently the Pashtun population in the north and center steadily increased. Not only did the population of Pashtuns increase in the northern areas, but the developmental projects in these parts were executed to favor the Pashtun settlements. This further fueled ethnic discord and members of other ethnicities felt that they were only second-class citizens of the country.

After the Soviet invasion in 1979, President Babrak Karmal rose to power and for the first time in history, Pashtun political dominance came to an end. Unfortunately, with the defeat of the Soviets and the conquest of the Taliban in 1996 Pashtuns once again, emerged as the dominant political and military group in the country. After capturing Kabul in 1996, the Taliban continued their Pashtun-centric policies and marginalized other ethnic communities. Throughout their rule, the Taliban were fiercely opposed by the United Front, a loose military conglomerate of Tajiks and other ethnicities led by Ahmad Shah Massoud.

The United Front played a key role in dislodging the Taliban from Kabul. Their stronghold, the Panjshir Valley, was used as a launching pad for ground operations by the United States and allies in the 2001 invasion. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, an interim government was established in the country. This US-backed constitutional and democratic political order, however, had a cardinal sin: it revived the same highly centralized political and administrative system through the 2004 constitution.

Consequently, the shortcomings of old resurfaced yet again in an overly centralized political order backed by powerful western sponsors. As Afghanistan entered this new period in 2001, ethnic discord would continue to sow turbulence and instability across the country.

The current state of affairs

In August 2021, the Taliban insurgency finally prevailed and the group is in control of the capital once again. The new Taliban government is predominantly composed of Pashtun Taliban members and less than ten percent of the key posts and ministries are allocated to other ethnic groups, with no women represented. Even the less than ten percent of non-Pashtun individuals in the government are allocated to those who nevertheless subscribe to Taliban views and are active Taliban members.

Even after announcing a general amnesty for the population of Afghanistan and former government officials in particular, the Taliban has arrested and tortured employees and army members from the previous government. They not only evict people from their lands but also burn down their homes. According to Human Rights Watch, “in early October 2021, the Taliban and associated militias forcibly evicted hundreds of Hazara families from the southern Helmand province and the northern Balkh province. These evictions followed earlier evictions from Kunduz, Daikundi, Uruzgan, and Kandahar provinces.” The lands of these non-Pashtun families are then redistributed to Pashtuns and Taliban sympathizers.

Similarly, the Taliban also arbitrarily arrests individuals that criticize their atrocities and draconian rule. For instance, the Taliban arrested University Professor Faizullah Jalal when he publicly criticized the militant group in a live TV show. Though they later released him, this was not an isolated incident. According to media reports, the Taliban have imprisoned scores of individuals including women for mere expression of their opinions. Such discriminatory policies and practices of the Taliban this time are only reinforcing the narrative of other marginalized ethnic groups that they have few rights in the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This time, this barbaric and centralized rule of the militant group is not acceptable to the members of other ethnicities.

For instance, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan—an anti-Taliban movement based in northern Afghanistan—is campaigning for a decentralized political order in Afghanistan. The movement stressed this aim through dialogue directly with their arch enemy, the Taliban. At a three-day meeting between the Taliban and the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan hosted by Iran in January of this year, representatives of the movement presented the proposal for a decentralized political order to the Taliban representatives chaired by Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, which was rejected by the Taliban.

Sibghatullah Ahmadi, spokesman for the National Resistance front, said in an interview with BBC Farsi after the talks, “on the third day of the meeting, the Taliban angrily left the talks and rejected our demands for a decentralized government with the presence of women, respect for women’s rights, citizens’ rights, and respect for freedom of speech and expression. He added, “the issue of women’s rights, children’s rights, establishing a lawful government through a fair election, eliminating tyranny, freedom of expression, and changing the system to decentralized are our red lines and we will never cross these red lines.”

Several factors have led to the realization of other ethnicities that they must be included in the political order of the country. The first of these factors is the role of Babrak Karmal. The Babrak Karmal era empowered marginalized ethnic groups for the first time in Afghanistan. The second significant factor was the formation of the United Front. The United Front successfully defended their stronghold in the northeast against the Soviets and then against the Taliban in the late 1990s. Also, the United Front played a key role in defeating the militant group in 2001 along with foreign troops. The third factor of their empowerment is the experience of a US-backed constitutional and democratic political order in which they had a considerable say in governmental affairs, at least until former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani used his presidential powers to marginalize them.

Ghani, during his eight years in office, had a very hostile relationship with non-Pashtun political leaders, and always sought to marginalize them. For example, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, who belongs to the Uzbek ethnic group of Afghanistan and has large influence among Uzbeks, was Ghani’s running mate in the 2014 presidential election. Once the election was over and Ghani won the votes of Uzbeks, he increasingly excluded Dostum from Afghanistan political affairs. He even spent the last two years of his vice presidency in exile in Istanbul. Likewise, he had a very controversial relationship with the leaders of other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, specifically the Tajiks and the Hazaras.

Ghani, who himself is a Pashtun, during the eight years of his rule implemented many ethnic policies that favored a particular ethnic group (Pashtuns). During his eight year presidency, he made several controversial decisions that fueled political tensions among the country’s ethnic groups. For example, he repealed a law passed in parliament that would have allowed each citizen to choose what ethnicity they belong to. Instead, he issued a law that classified everyone as “Afghan.” Many non-Pashtuns do not consider themselves to be “Afghan,” a term that many in the country consider to refer to the Pashtun tribes.

In addition, the eight-year government of President Ghani was always accused of systemic ethnic favoritism to Pashtuns. In September 2017, the daily newspaper Etilaat Roz published the details of a leaked memo in the Administrative Office of the President showing that jobs were awarded with an eye to keeping control in the hands of Pashtuns while giving the appearance of diversity. Similarly, in November 2017, another leaked memo published in the Afghanistan’s press showed that Ghani’s administration implemented the same policies in security sectors.

Finally, the availability of social media and rising education access over the past twenty years also shaped youth perspectives on the state and society. This enthusiastic youth is demanding a just political order in which every individual has the right to govern through democratic means.

Because of these factors, strong political opposition and a robust civil society developed in the country since 2001. For instance, Fawzia Koofi, a prominent leader of the Movement of Change in Afghanistan and a member of the Afghanistan delegation that negotiated with the Taliban in Doha, stated in an exclusive interview, “in Afghanistan, the political structure has always been such that one person is the decision-maker, and politically there has been an oral agreement that the main power should belong to a particular ethnic group and the speaker of a particular ethnic group (Pashtun). And this had always led to being in a way that political power must be in the hands of Pashtuns, administrative power in the hands of Tajiks, service works usually to Hazaras, and commercial and land-related work to the Uzbeks.”

Similarly, in another exclusive interview, Dr. Latif Pedram, the founder and leader of the Afghanistan National Congress Party, maintained that “with the withdrawal of foreign troops, another war has begun in Afghanistan which is caused by ethnic injustices.” These political and civil society leaders have changed the people’s perspective about the government in the country and now the common person in Afghanistan demands a just political order that is responsive to the needs of every ethnic group rather than favoring the Pashtun elite.

This time around, the Taliban will need to deal with a hostile population across the northern, central, and western parts of the country. In addition, the Taliban has also to face the armed forces of the National Resistance Front. Neither will compromise on their right to self-govern. On the other hand, the Taliban had made it clear that the group will rule via an excessively centralized political order where only the Pashtun elite will hold power. Given these factors, Afghanistan will likely head either towards a bloody civil war akin to the 1990s or to geographical disintegration. Still, there is a third likelihood, and this is that the country may transform into a functioning state. For this to occur, it will require a decentralized and just political order.

The way out

As discussed, Afghanistan is on the verge of yet another catastrophe, be it civil war or geographical disintegration. That said, it is not too late. The marginalized ethnic communities of Afghanistan are a formidable force for the Taliban to reckon with, but they can still coexist if a decentralized and just political order is established.

Prominent figures from Afghanistan’s opposition and civil society are demanding the establishment of a decentralized government in the country. In the same interview, Fawzia Koofi also argued that “the issue of Afghanistan is ethnic. And to prevent ethnic wars and solve Afghanistan’s problems, and to prevent further destabilization of Afghanistan, power must be properly decentralized.”

Similarly, Dr. Latif Pedram also argued that Taliban rule is unacceptable and due to the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate, the country is headed towards disintegration. In his words, “Afghanistan is collapsing due to ethnic injustice, class strife, oppression, and ethnic supremacy. At present, if the framework of such a country is to be maintained and rebuilt, a new social contract needs agreed upon, and this new social contract must be a federal government to maintain the framework. Otherwise, disintegration is the only solution.”

In an interview with National Resistance Front leader Ahmad Massoud and Stefanie Glinski, Massoud argued that decentralization is the only solution to the Afghanistan dilemma. In April 2020, he published an op-ed in The New York Times announcing this demand. The united ethnic groups will put up stiff resistance to the centralized and unjust Taliban government which may ultimately lead to another bloody civil war or geographical disintegration. If the Taliban want peace to prevail in the country then they must tread the path of decentralization and the establishment of a just political order in Afghanistan.

Decentralization means that political and administrative systems must be transmitted to the grassroots level. This objective can be achieved by several political arrangements. The first political arrangement is a federalist system like in neighboring Pakistan. But the problem of a federal state is that it requires a strong central government that has considerable say in the affairs of federating units. So, federalism is not for Afghanistan as in federalism, political power will likely once again become concentrated in the hands of one ethnic group.

The next model of decentralization is a confederate state. In a confederate state, all the participating states form a loose coalition while retaining strong local governments. An example of decentralization of this type is in Switzerland. Though Afghanistan can’t achieve the level of decentralization that exists in Switzerland, it can learn from Switzerland’s model. There may be other forms of political decentralization that can solve Afghanistan’s dilemma as well.

These forms of decentralization can be studied and then tailored to the needs of the country, but what is required now of all stakeholders and particularly of the Taliban is to discuss and agree on a new social contract and political order for the country. This new social contract and political order must be based on the principles of decentralization and social justice if the country wants to remain peaceful, intact, and sovereign.

Natiq Malikzada is a freelance journalist and holds a master’s degree in International Relations and Middle Eastern Affairs. He tweets @natiqmalikzada.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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SouthAsiaSource Feb 28, 2022

An aid-trade corridor is key to the Afghan economy’s revival

By Gul Maqsood Sabit

Humanitarian assistance is a temporary solution to a long-term problem in Afghanistan. To reduce aid dependency and give hope to a suffering population, it is essential that the economy remains somewhat functional and the Afghan currency holds some value.

Afghanistan Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Feb 16, 2022

Experts react: Biden administration decision to split frozen Afghan funds

By Atlantic Council Experts

On February 11, 2022, US President Joe Biden issued an executive order paving the way for the splitting of $7 billion in frozen funds controlled by the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This move has caused significant controversy.

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New Atlanticist Feb 15, 2022

On Afghanistan’s $7B question, Biden gets it right

By Brian O’Toole

The administration has been playing kabuki to ensure at least some cash makes it to the Afghan people.

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Ukraine desperately needs help

Andrey Stavnitser — Thu, 24 Feb 2022 15:08:01 +0000

This is for everybody who reads me abroad: in the United States, in Europe, all around the globe. We, Ukrainians, are now a human shield between you and the Soviet Union. Between human values, democracy, passion for development and growth—and a military regime, where human lives are only necessary to be sacrificed for the sake of Empire.

We are strong and we will fight until the last.

But we need your support now, today, at this very moment.

It is high time to take this personally—this war is no longer a “Ukrainian crisis,” it threatens the global order.

If you have seen Putin’s address to his nation last night, you know what I mean. It was a hate-speech, and not about Ukraine—about USA, EU, about anybody in the world who is free, open minded, peaceful. The leader of a huge country in the middle of the globe simply hates everything, which is alive, and openly speaks about it. That’s even more scary than waking up at night because of the military sirens.

Please, stand for Ukraine in any way you can.

We need many times more military support from you, urgently.

We need more lethal weapons. We need more strict sanctions. We need more informational pressure. More videos of what war looks like in twenty-first century!

We need the sky to be closed, and we need navies in the Black and Azov Seas.

We need rallies all over the world in front of Russian Embassies.

We need Russian assets abroad to be blocked, to force Russians to take action if not for us, then for themselves.

We need visas cancelled and travel bans for Russians.

It’s time to save our world together.

Andrey Stavnitser is co-owner of TiS in Yuzhny, Ukraine.

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Sahel: Moving beyond military containment policy report

Pierre Englebert, Rida Lyammouri — Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:56:16 +0000

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The Sahel is at a significant turning-point. The region’s evolving security situation has been marked by the military coups across the region and the French announcement to reshape Barkhane. The recent expulsion of the French Ambassador from Mali shows how much the relations between Mali and France have been deteriorating since the military seized power in August 2020 while the Russian parastatal Wagner Group is suspected to augment local forces in the region.

It has been almost ten years since the beginning of the security crisis in the Sahel. In the throes of multiple insurgencies, Sahelian countries and their foreign allies seem to be aware of the limits of military containment. While the international community is working on a new military roadmap, the publication of the report, “Sahel: Moving Beyond Military Containment” offers the opportunity to focus on development issues, too often undermined in the international agenda.

The Sahel is an African region stretching from Mauritania on the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea. Due to its arid climate, the region often suffers from droughts and is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world to climate change.

In December 2021, the launch of the report offered the opportunity to raise the development challenges in this area. Atlantic Council hosted the ministers of economy and/or development of the G5 Sahel (Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger-Burkina-Faso’s government was dissolved the day before) and the United Nations Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel to share their vision of the future of their region, from an economic sustainability, community development and human point of view. Donors can help by moving away from anti-terror kinetic operations towards civilian protection and social projects that better embed the state in local social relations and strengthen local communities in the face of difficult natural conditions.

Authors

Pierre Englebert is a senior fellow at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council.

Rida Lyammouri is a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South.

Report Nov 4, 2021

What future for the Western Sahel?

By Richard Cincotta and Stephen Smith

The Western Sahel is in a demographic impasse. To work their way out of this dilemma, Sahelian governments must shift a significant part of their development focus and funding to policies and programs aimed at preventing adolescent marriages and childbearing, promoting girls’ education, securing women’s participation in public- and private-sector workplaces, and achieving small, healthy, well-educated families.

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In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.

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Growing green: Catalyzing climate finance in African markets

By Emilie Bel

While African countries are the most impacted by the effects of climate change, the continent is home to an abundance of natural resources and vibrant economic prospects. To face the climate emergency, overcome the economic shock of COVID-19, and ensure that African economic development is sustainable, growth can only be green. However, tapping into Africa’s vast potential will require mobilizing billions in investment for infrastructure.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

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The post Sahel: Moving beyond military containment policy report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How Kazakhstan could shift Putin’s calculus on Ukraine

John E. Herbst — Thu, 06 Jan 2022 16:00:59 +0000

^{This post was updated on January 6.}

Thirty years ago, the Soviet Union collapsed in a largely bloodless way. But events in recent years have proved that bloodlessness to be only temporary. Russia’s war against Ukraine—with fourteen thousand Ukrainian fatalities thus far (and more in the offing if Moscow sends an invasion force of one hundred thousand into the country)—is the major proof. Its brief 2008 conflict in Georgia, meanwhile, caused hundreds of deaths.*

Sadly, the unrest in Kazakhstan may provide additional evidence. As of Thursday, dozens have been reported dead as clashes between protesters and police intensified.

The crisis in the Central Asian former Soviet republic fuses geopolitical issues across Eurasia, from Moscow’s efforts to cow the West and subjugate Ukraine to its delicate relationship with China—and the implications are enormous. It’s a happy surprise that this region has been largely stable since the end of the Tajik civil war in the late 1990s. It has proved to be a buffer for major players Russia, China, and India, as well as lesser but still important powers such as Pakistan and Iran. But the instability in Kazakhstan offers opportunities for these states to enhance their position in Central Asia, and they are seizing them.

Besieged Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has asked the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian-led military alliance, to help restore order. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who is the rotating head of the group, has announced it will send troops. This is significant for two reasons. First, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal of restoring Russian influence in the post-Soviet space is not limited to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova; Tokayev’s invitation gives Moscow the chance to do just that in Central Asia’s richest country. Second, Tokayev had another option: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), led by China but which also includes Russia. Despite growing cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in opposing US policies globally, the two are competitors in Central Asia.

Putin infamously said at Lake Seliger in 2014 that Kazakhstan was an artificial country created by its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and its population understands the importance of close relations with Russia. Ethnic Russians comprise 18 percent of the country’s population, and they—along with more than 60 percent of Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon resources—are concentrated in the north, not far from the Russian border. Since Putin’s remark, Kremlin allies have called for the “return” of northern Kazakhstan to Russia. Meanwhile, China has its own territorial pretensions on the country.

It’s safe to assume that the CSTO decision was in fact Putin’s decision. This means that he considered it more important to strengthen Moscow’s position in Kazakhstan than to accommodate China. While this is not likely to have an immediate, visible impact on Russia’s relations with China, it’s a message to Beijing that there are limits to Moscow’s acceptance of junior-partner status in their bilateral relationship. Over time, this will shape the relationship.

And this brings us to Moscow’s current buildup of approximately one hundred thousand troops on and near Ukraine’s border, as well as its efforts to squeeze concessions out of the United States, NATO, the European Union, and Ukraine with the threat of a major conventional offensive. He is threatening this invasion because his nearly eight-year hybrid war against Ukraine has failed to achieve its objective: to prevent the country’s westward drift. But Putin’s current focus on Ukraine is not meant to come at the expense of his other geopolitical objectives in Eurasia. To the extent possible, he would like to restore Kremlin influence across the territory of the former Soviet Union. In some places—Crimea, and perhaps northern Kazakhstan—that means Moscow seizing and annexing territory. In other places, it means ensuring national-security and economic policies consistent with Kremlin interests.

The unrest in Kazakhstan poses a question for Putin: Should he continue his intimidation campaign on his western flank, or should he address the dangers to his south? Or can he do both? At the moment, Putin is trying to have his cake and eat it too. Maybe the CSTO can impose order and restore Tokayev’s government without significantly reducing Russian forces on Ukraine’s border. That is certainly the Kremlin preference, because its long military buildup and threats to Ukraine have produced talks with the United States, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe that might achieve some concessions on issues such as limiting NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s activities in Eastern Europe, or the Minsk talks on ending Moscow’s war in the Donbas region of Ukraine. He would prefer not to reduce the pressure.

Yet if the initial CSTO deployment fails, Putin may face a dilemma. Moscow’s pre-buildup situation in Ukraine was a stalemate; in Kazakhstan, Moscow’s position in Central Asia would deteriorate if a popular revolt produces a reform-minded government, or if Tokayev calls on China and the SCO for help to stay in power. The question then becomes: Would Putin pull troops from Ukraine’s border to deal with disorder in Kazakhstan and enhance Russia’s standing in Central Asia? Doing so certainly entails less risk than launching a major conventional military offensive in Ukraine. Putin could easily explain standing down temporarily in the west to secure a new trophy in the south. And that still would not preclude a third buildup of Russian forces on Ukraine’s border.

The stakes for Putin are large in both Kazakhstan and Ukraine—but it may prove difficult for the arch opportunist to successfully attend to both at the same time.

John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

^{An earlier version of this article incorrectly stated the number of deaths in the 2008 Russian war in Georgia. The war caused hundreds of deaths.}

The post How Kazakhstan could shift Putin’s calculus on Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Spotlight: Latin America and the Caribbean – Ten questions for 2022

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center — Tue, 04 Jan 2022 13:00:00 +0000

The year 2022 will be one of change across the Western Hemisphere. So, what might or might not be on the horizon?

The year 2022 will be one of change across the Western Hemisphere. From presidential elections in Brazil and Colombia to newly elected presidents taking office in Chile and Honduras, regional leaders will be looking at new ways to rebuild economies from the COVID-19 pandemic while balancing mounting social pressures. So, what might or might not be on the horizon in 2022?

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we look at some of the key questions that may shape the year ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean, then take our signature annual poll and see how your opinions shape up against our predictions.

How might key presidential elections shake out? Will regional economies recover to pre-pandemic growth rates? What might be the outcome of the US-hosted Summit of the Americas, and will Caribbean voices play a larger role than in previous gatherings? Will the region expand its ties with China?

Take our ten-question poll in less than five minutes!

Question #1: Caribbean – Will Vice President Kamala Harris make her first trip to the Caribbean in 2022?

Yes

Question #2: Central America – Will the United States have confirmed ambassadors in all three northern Central American countries (currently only Guatemala) by year-end 2022?

Yes

Question #3: Chile – Will the new Chilean constitution be approved when put to a referendum?

Yes

Question #4: China and Latin America – Considering Nicaragua’s newly established China ties, will the three other Central American countries that currently recognize Taiwan—Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras—also switch recognition to China?

Yes

Question #5: Colombia – Will Colombia’s presidential election go to a second round?

Yes

Question 6: Economy – Can the region recover pre-pandemic growth rates in 2022?

Yes

Question #7: Mexico – Will Mexico remain the United States’ top trading partner throughout the next year?

Yes

Question #8: Bitcoin – Following in El Salvador’s footsteps, will support for Bitcoin tender grow in the region?

Yes

Question #9: Venezuela – Will Nicolas Maduro return to the negotiating table in Mexico City?

Yes

Question #10: Brazil – Will President Jair Bolsonaro win another term this year?

Yes

Bonus Question: Will Latin America and the Caribbean be represented in the final of the World Cup?

Yes

Our answer to question #1: YES

In 2022, the Biden-Harris administration will look for big wins and opportunities to expand its leadership in the Americas. This is achievable in the Caribbean with a high-profile visit, which would optimally be accompanied by a major policy announcement from Vice President Harris. President Joe Biden was the last vice president to visit the region, where he focused his time discussing the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative.

The stage is set for a similar visit to occur with Vice President Harris. Economic recovery is slow, vaccine hesitancy is increasing, and other actors, such as China, are playing a more active role in the Caribbean. Regional leaders often note that US attention is inconsistent, and that few high-profile US officials travel to the Caribbean. A visit and subsequent policy announcement that aids the Caribbean in its time of need would build on recent conversations between the Vice President and Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Keith Rowley (virtual) and Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Mottley (in person).

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Our answer to question #2: NO

Given President Nayib Bukele’s recent personal attacks against President Biden and other US government officials, including Ambassador Jean Manes and current Charge d’Affaires Brendan O’Brien, it is unlikely that the United States will confirm all ambassadors to the Northern Triangle countries. President Bukele’s attacks were a response to the Biden administration’s decision to add Osiris Luna Meza, the chief of the Salvadoran penal system and vice minister of justice and public security, and Carlos Marroquin, chairman of the Social Fabric Reconstruction Unit, to the Specially Designated Citizens and Blocked Persons List. Both Salvadoran officials are accused of having a direct relationship with gangs, including MS-13. In Honduras, however, a new administration under President-elect Xiomara Castro provides a renewed sense of cooperation between the United States and the Central American country.

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Our answer to question #3: YES

Once the constitutional draft is finalized by summer 2022, the Constitutional Convention will vote to approve or reject the new legal charter. If the body rejects the new constitution, Chile will keep its current one. However, if it is approved, the group will present the document to the newly elected head of state, who, in turn, will issue a call for a national referendum in which Chileans will vote to approve or reject the new constitution. Voting will be mandatory, and the new constitution will move forward only if an absolute majority is achieved.

While 78.3 percent of voters cast their ballot in favor of a new constitution in 2020, rising polarization and inefficiencies within the Constitutional Convention have left thousands of Chileans disenchanted with the reform process. However, the desire for fundamental changes remains high. If the new legal charter is approved by Chilean voters, it will be put into effect shortly after the vote through a formal ceremony. However, if Chile votes to reject, the 1980 Constitution written under Augusto Pinochet will remain in place. With just one opportunity to get the new constitution approved, the convention will attempt to generate a moderate bill that will stimulate consensus among the political left and right.

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Our answer to question #4: NO

It is unlikely that all three of Taiwan’s Central American allies will switch recognition to China in 2022. But, considerations of international benefits, domestic political agency, or both may prompt a change in at least one of the countries. Internationally, US COVID-19 vaccine donations far outstripped those of China, sending a reassuring message to Taiwanese allies in the region.

But, Chinese vaccine diplomacy—including early, well-publicized vaccine sales and shipments—and broader medical, humanitarian, and economic assistance could still prove alluring for countries in need. Despite running with a pro-China message, Honduran President-elect Xiomara Castro recently declined to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Absent any external shocks, Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras will likely attempt to maintain the status quo for as long as possible, favoring Taiwan while leaving the door open for closer ties with China. This delicate balancing act has served to remind larger countries not to take their allegiances for granted and will continue to do so. But, it will be increasingly tested, as seen with Nicaragua, in the critical and uncertain year ahead.

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Our answer to question #5: YES

There has yet to be an election in Colombia’s history in which a president is elected in the first round. Senator Gustavo Petro, who served as mayor of Bogotá (2012–2014), leads the left-wing political party Colombia Humana, and was the runner-up in the 2018 presidential election against incumbent President Ivan Duque. With nearly 42 percent of the vote, Petro has positioned himself as the candidate with the greatest support from Colombian voters.

However, Petro currently polls at 25.4 percent, which is not enough for an absolute majority that will grant him the presidency in the first round. Petro will most likely go to a second-round vote against a center-right or center-left candidate, potentially former Mayor of Bucaramanga Rodolfo Hernández or former Governor of Antioquia Sergio Fajardo. To date, Hernández polls at 11 percent and Fajardo at 7 percent. As recommended by the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, co-chaired by Senators Roy Blunt and Ben Cardin, strengthening the alliance between Colombia and the United States ahead of 2022 presidential elections is paramount to safeguard Colombia’s gains in terms of development, rule of law, and democracy. Regardless of election results, the United States should continue to position itself as Colombia’s strongest ally, advancing stability and prosperity at home and abroad.

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Our answer to question #6: YES

Led by its five major economies, regional gross domestic product (GDP) is on track to return to pre-pandemic levels in 2022, though per-capita income will likely not recover until 2023. Key uncertainties may alter this outlook: the extent of success in vaccination and pandemic management, stimulus trade-off between continued support and fiscal discipline, labor markets (currently experiencing slower recovery than GDP), inflation, electoral outcomes, and external conditions including evolving investor appetite and commodity prices.

The region as a whole is not expected to return to pre-pandemic growth trajectories in the coming years, signaling permanent output losses due to COVID-19. In a divergent recovery, smaller and vulnerable states, such as those in the tourism-dependent Caribbean, are experiencing an even slower return to normal. Lastly, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) should set an ambitious agenda beyond “recovery”—given unimpressive pre-pandemic growth rates and patterns—and, rather, seek ways to accelerate development and build forward in a more inclusive, productive, and sustainable way.

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Our answer to question #7: YES

It is likely that Mexico will remain the United States’ top trading partner throughout 2022. Mexico currently holds the top position—overtaking China in February 2021—with Canada in the second spot, lagging behind by $2.9 billion in total trade. COVID-19 significantly hindered US-Mexico trade—which largely relies on land trade via trucks and railcars—due to the pandemic-induced land-border closures to “non-essential” traffic. As of November 8, 2021, however, the United States reopened its borders to non-essential traffic and booming commerce is expected along the border. Moreover, US-Mexico trade topped $545 billion through October 2021 (the most recent data available), an increase of over 24 percent from one year earlier. Given the highly integrated nature of US-Mexico trade in the automotive and energy sectors, coupled with the efforts in border cities and ports to increase capacity and efficiency, trade is likely to continue to grow between the United States and Mexico.

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Our answer to question #8: YES

Bitcoin presents an attractive option for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, yet those countries will not replicate El Salvador’s approach. The government of El Salvador claimed that adopting Bitcoin would reduce financial exclusion and high remittance fees. These issues also affect the entire region. The World Bank predicted that remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean rose 21.6 percent in 2021, costing roughly $6.9 billion in remittance fees. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), financial inclusion in the region falls below global averages, and is exacerbated in the Caribbean due to the de-risking of correspondent banks. The worsening effects of climate change will also likely generate support for a decentralized virtual currency, as remittances typically increase following natural disasters, alongside decreased access to financial institutions.

Despite Bitcoin’s allure, its implementation in El Salvador has been marred by technological unreliability, weak financial regulations, and high price volatility. Politicians in Paraguay, Mexico, and Panama have already introduced legislation to regulate Bitcoin’s use as legal tender, and more will follow in 2022. As support for Bitcoin rises, so will debates on its social and environmental risks. Countries across the region will chart their own paths instead of following El Salvador’s playbook.

Back to questions

Our answer to question #9: YES

Although, the latest round of negotiations in Mexico has been suspended since October 2021, a combination of long-term incentives will likely propel Maduro to negotiate with the Venezuelan Unitary Platform—the umbrella organization encompassing the main political opposition parties in the country. Maduro seeks access to capital, legitimacy, guarantees against prosecution, and division within factions of domestic opponents—all of which he can accomplish through negotiations.

However, these factors are not the only ones at play in determining Maduro’s negotiation participation. After the highly visible diverging strategies within the opposition during the recent regional elections—and Julio Borges’ recent resignation and call for the interim government’s dissolution—Maduro might decide to simply wait out further erosion of opposition unity, instead of engaging with it directly. The success of such a strategy, if taken, would enhance the regime’s monopoly on power.

Back to questions

Our answer to question #10: Too early to call.

The odds are not in his favor, but it’s too early to say. Recent polls suggest that President Bolsonaro and former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will face each other in a second round of elections, repeating the 2018 Bolsonaro versus Workers’ Party (PT) duel. However, this time around, former President Lula, as the PT candidate, is leading the way in early polling. Both candidates have a strong support base, but former President Lula’s history with corruption and President Bolsonaro’s mismanagement of the pandemic and current economic hurdles also give them significantly high rejection rates.

Third-way candidates, such as President Bolsonaro’s former minister of justice, Sergio Moro—famous for leading the Car Wash Operation that put President Lula in jail—is running on an anticorruption, center-right platform. Those Brazilians who in 2018 voted for President Bolsonaro as a “vote against corruption” might be more inclined to seek other alternatives. Current high inflation and unemployment rates might also play against President Bolsonaro’s reelection. Having said that, it will likely be a close race, and there is still a long way to go until elections in October 2022.

Back to questions

BONUS QUESTION ANSWER: YES

Brazil and Argentina are the only Latin American counties that have already qualified for the 2022 World Cup. In the Caribbean, Jamaica seems to be the only country with a chance of qualifying. While it is impossible to know who will be in the final (RIP Paul the Octopus), Brazil and Argentina are always strong contenders.

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The post Spotlight: Latin America and the Caribbean – Ten questions for 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Biden and Putin hold virtual Ukraine summit amid Russian invasion fears

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 08 Dec 2021 19:08:11 +0000

US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin spoke via video link for around two hours on December 7 in a hastily arranged virtual summit to address international concerns over a major Russian military build-up along the country’s border with Ukraine.

Russia has been waging an undeclared war against Ukraine since 2014 in a bid to derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and currently occupies the Crimean peninsula along with parts of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

With Kyiv proving unwilling to accept Moscow’s interpretation of a 2015 peace agreement and instead moving further out of the Kremlin orbit, Putin has recently concentrated around 100,000 Russian troops and armor close to the Ukrainian border, leading to fears that the simmering conflict could erupt into a major European war.

The December 7 video call produced no major surprises. President Biden used the occasion to outline a range of new and enhanced sanctions measures that Russia will face if the invasion of Ukraine proceeds, while also emphasizing Western unity in support of Ukrainian sovereignty.

In response, Putin sought to downplay the significance of Russia’s military build-up while accusing NATO of fueling the confrontation over Ukraine. Both leaders agreed to continue talks.

The Atlantic Council invited a range of experts to share their views of what the Biden-Putin video call means for the regional security situation and asked whether the talks had succeeded in reducing the threat of a major escalation in Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Atlantic Council: The Biden-Putin call was important. Dialogue that helps clarify each country’s position can help to avoid misunderstanding. Critically, President Biden’s clear three-pronged deterrence threat appears to be both credible and potentially effective for convincing Russia that an invasion in any shape or form would not be worth the US and NATO/EU response.

The three elements of the US deterrence posture include ramped-up economic sanctions on Russia. Over the years, these measures do not appear to have had any effect, but they are required for US-European unity.

Biden also raised the prospect of increased defense assistance to Ukraine. This could be highly effective for deterring Russia. If the US makes crystal clear that Russian forces would pay a heavy, sustained price if they invaded in the form of supporting Ukrainian resistance with massive numbers of IEDs, more anti-tank weapons, armed drones, air defenses and more, Putin may rethink the operation. The more details relayed to Russia on this point, the better.

The third factor is an increased NATO presence on the eastern flank. This leg of the deterrent could also help convince Putin that whatever he thinks he might gain from invading Ukraine, ultimately this would lead to a less favorable balance of forces for Russia. Moscow would surely not welcome substantially more NATO military capabilities in Poland, the Baltics, and Romania.

Equally important was what transpired both before and after the call. President Biden consulted extensively with key European allied leaders, helping him to present a united position to Putin.

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Melinda Haring, Deputy Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council: Nothing really changed as a result of the call between Presidents Biden and Putin. The situation remains acute and could easily escalate.

The statements emerging from the White House and Kremlin could not be more different. Washington and Moscow have reached an impasse over Ukraine and the future of the liberal international order.

To zoom in on the call, Biden pledged that the US and its allies would enact a fierce package of sanctions, send more defensive materiel, and fortify the NATO alliance on the eastern flank if Russia invades Ukraine again. But why wait until Russia strikes? The eastern flank should be fortified now.

I take Dr. T. X. Hammes’ prescriptions seriously: the US probably cannot get enough weapons systems to Kyiv in time for a potential January/February 2022 invasion. Thus, the US should help the Ukrainians prepare for a guerrilla war and get Kyiv the drones and any other equipment it may need now. The US could lean on the Israelis to lift their ban on drone sales to Ukraine as well.

Ian Brzezinski, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: The message President Biden communicated to Russian President Vladimir Putin in their December 7 video call was welcome but must be followed by further steps. The current situation is a crisis that warrants a forceful response from the transatlantic community, not just in terms of rhetoric but also actions.

Much is at stake. This includes Ukraine’s sovereignty and future as an independent, democratic, European state. Putin’s actions also pose a direct threat to the international security order that has been the basis of peace and stability in Europe for decades. The transatlantic community must now demonstrate their commitment to the defining values of sovereignty, democracy, and the rule of law.

This means articulating with specificity a forceful set of systemic sanctions that will be imposed on Russia in the event of further aggression against Ukraine, including shutting down Russian oil and gas exports, cutting the country’s access to financial markets, and removing Russia from the SWIFT banking system.

America and its allies need to strengthen their military presence in front line NATO states and increase their weapons transfers and engagement with Ukraine. Such actions are necessary to make clear to Putin that the costs of an invasion will be devastating for Russia and will far outweigh anything he hopes to gain by attacking Ukraine a second time.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Steven Pifer, William Perry Fellow, Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation: Russia’s massing of military power near Ukraine was certain to dominate the December 7 video conference between Presidents Biden and Putin. A Russian assault would turn into a bloody affair (for Russians and Ukrainians alike) and plunge relations between Russia and the West deeper into crisis. Is Putin prepared to take that step? Perhaps even he has not yet decided.

By all appearances, Biden did what he had to do. He spelled out for Putin the costs that would ensue if Russia attacked. These include more painful Western economic sanctions, more military assistance for Ukraine, and a bolstering of NATO’s military presence in the Baltic states and Poland. Moreover, he strengthened his hand by consulting the day before with the leaders of Britain, Germany, France and Italy. That meant he could talk to Putin on the basis of a consolidated Western position.

Biden also described a way out of the crisis: de-escalation and dialogue, or dialogues, to address the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Donbas and broader European security questions. Neither of those discussions will prove easy. For example, NATO will not, and should not, accede to the Kremlin’s demand that the alliance renounce its “open door” policy on enlargement. But diplomacy is all about finding ways to defuse such difficult problems.

Did Biden succeed? That remains to be seen. One thing to watch is whether Moscow’s recent over-the-top rhetoric moderates. Of course, the more important signal would come from the movement of Russian troops away from Ukraine and back to their regular garrisons.

Danylo Lubkivsky, Director, Kyiv Security Forum: The video call between President Biden and President Putin allows us to draw a number of conclusions. For Ukraine, the single most important outcome was confirmation that our country does not stand alone against Russian aggression.

It was also striking to see the United States take on a position of international leadership in efforts to deter a fresh Russian invasion. Biden used the dangerous Russian military build-up on the Ukrainian border to consolidate partnership with other Western leaders in Europe.

Another prominent feature of the video call was the emphasis on Western unity that underpinned the clearly articulated list of sanctions and other measures Russia will face if it proceeds with the threatened offensive against Ukraine. This left Putin in no doubt over the consequences of such a decision.

Based on the available information, it appears that none of Ukraine’s core positions were compromised during the video call. This includes Ukraine’s future NATO membership or the broader enlargement of the alliance. Nevertheless, the threat of a Russian escalation remains and the situation will continue to require extreme vigilance and determination from the international community.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 14 Oct 2021 14:23:00 +0000

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Atlantic Council mentioned in Washington Post on the N7 conference in the United Arab Emirates

Atlantic Council — Wed, 13 Oct 2021 14:21:00 +0000

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Atwell in War on the Rocks on US cooperation with Afghan forces

Atlantic Council — Tue, 12 Oct 2021 01:31:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On October 11, War on the Rocks published an article titled “Wanna fight? Pushing partners aside in Afghanistan” co-authored by Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Kyle Atwell. In the article, Atwell argues that US troops in Afghanistan exhibited a clear preference for unilateral combat operations at the expense of building Afghan capability.

“…small and tailored units of advisors with substantive enabling packages should support partner forces without crowding them out from ownership of security operations.”

Kyle Atwell and Paul Bailey

Fellow

Kyle Atwell

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Colombia

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

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How a misguided Vietnam analogy sealed the Afghanistan disaster

Paul D. Miller — Tue, 05 Oct 2021 17:38:08 +0000

The scenes of a helicopter evacuating diplomats from the US embassy in Kabul and of Afghan civilians desperately clinging to a US Air Force C-17 as it took off from Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport in August triggered irresistible comparisons to the US evacuation from Saigon in 1975.

It wasn’t the first time those kinds of flashbacks emerged. Long before the Taliban’s recent takeover, some policymakers, scholars, and journalists have looked at Afghanistan and seen Vietnam. Given how the war ended, were those analogies prescient? In fact, a review of the analogy’s influence on decision-making suggests the opposite. Policymakers wielding the analogy failed to recognize the dangers it posed to their strategy-building: Not only was it historically inaccurate, but it was a self-fulfilling prophecy that helped bring about, rather than avoid, a catastrophic end to the war in Afghanistan.

How the analogy landed on Biden’s desk

The Vietnam analogy said less about the similarities and differences between the wars and more about the state of mind of those using it—a state of mind that ultimately led policymakers to make decisions based on a faulty view of the war.

In 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell worried as war plans shaped up that they looked too much like war plans from Vietnam. Bob Woodward later wrote in his 2002 book Bush at War that as the National Security Council met eighteen days after September 11, “they were developing a response, an action, but not a strategy. It was Powell’s worst nightmare—bomb and hope. Vietnam kept flooding back.” Later, they debated pausing the bombing to invite the Taliban to negotiate. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld adamantly refused. Woodward wrote that Rumsfeld thought the “bombing pauses smacked of Vietnam. No way.” The Vietnam analogy ultimately colored President George W. Bush’s approach to his duties as commander in chief. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice later recounted in her book No Higher Honor that Bush “had read many histories of Vietnam, and he did not want to be Lyndon Johnson, picking targets from the basement of the White House.”

The media also picked up on the complex situation and the Vietnam analogy. In September 2001, the Associated Press reported: “Now it may be the United States’ turn to try a foray into the Afghan quagmire.” On October 14 of that year, Newsweek headlined a story “The Quagmire that Awaits.” On October 31, weeks into the US bombing campaign, the New York Times ran a prominent news analysis by R.W. Apple Jr. entitled “A Military Quagmire Remembered: Afghanistan as Vietnam.” In it, Apple asked “Could Afghanistan become another Vietnam? Is the United States facing another stalemate on the other side of the world? Premature the questions may be, three weeks after the fighting began. Unreasonable they are not… For all the differences between the two conflicts, and there are many, echoes of Vietnam are unavoidable.”

The Vietnam analogy said less about the similarities and differences between the wars and more about the state of mind of those using it—a state of mind that ultimately led policymakers to make decisions based on a faulty view of the war.

The Vietnam analogy returned in 2009 with the change of administrations and a review of US policy and strategy in Afghanistan. Woodward wrote in his 2010 book Obama’s Wars that as the Obama administration debated options, then Vice President Joe Biden was “more convinced than ever that Afghanistan was a version of Vietnam,” and as President Barack Obama was about to order more troops, Biden warned that the United States might get “locked into Vietnam.” Woodward also wrote that, similarly, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg told Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that “he was worried they were on the path to another Vietnam.” Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told the president that forty-four years earlier, Johnson debated the same issues surrounding troop deployment for Vietnam with his advisers. “History should not be forgotten,” Woodward quoted Holbrooke as saying. When Holbrooke warned that the United States had a moral responsibility to the Afghans who had worked with US troops as translators and spies and that the United States could not abandon them, Biden disagreed. Holbrooke, in George Packer’s 2019 book Our Man, reported that Biden said “F— that, we don’t have to worry about that. We did it in Vietnam, [President Richard] Nixon and [National Security Advisor Henry] Kissinger got away with it,” illustrating again that Biden saw the war in Afghanistan through the lens of Vietnam.

As before, scholars, pundits, and the media echoed policymakers’ concerns. In April 2009, Andrew Bacevich—a retired US Army colonel, Vietnam War veteran, and prominent scholar of US military history—testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He argued that the central lesson of the Vietnam War was that the United States should never “embark on an open-ended war lacking clearly defined and achievable objectives.” Nonetheless, he claimed, that is exactly what the United States had done. Quoting General Bruce Palmer’s 1984 book The 25 Year War, Bacevich said that “we once again find ourselves mired in a ‘protracted war of an indeterminate nature with no foreseeable end to the US commitment,’” later adding, “We are in our own day repeating [Johnson]’s errors.” Bacevich concluded: “Just as in the 1960s we possessed neither the wisdom nor the means needed to determine the fate of Southeast Asia, so too today we possess neither the wisdom nor the means necessary to determine the fate of the Greater Middle East.”

Similarly, in 2010, Neil Sheehan, a Pulitzer-Prize winning author and former Vietnam War correspondent, wrote in a review of Woodward’s Obama’s Wars that “a new president may well have embroiled himself in a war that could poison his presidency—just as his predecessor, George W. Bush, destroyed his with a foolhardy war in Iraq and Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were ruined by the war in Vietnam.” In 2012, Sheehan drew the parallel again, arguing “what the Obama administration is attempting to do in Afghanistan bears a striking resemblance to what the United States attempted in Vietnam.”

Why the analogy can’t stand up—and why it lets policymakers down

Was the war in Afghanistan similar to the one in Vietnam? There is a superficial similarity: In both cases, the United States waged a counterinsurgency campaign against a foreign nonstate actor on behalf of a corrupt and incompetent local government. Both wars involved foreign internal defense and security assistance alongside reconstruction and development to support US war efforts. The similarities might suggest that the United States could learn useful lessons about how to wage counterinsurgency and conduct state-building in Afghanistan by examining its performance in Vietnam (and also in Iraq, which shared those similarities). Some scholars and policymakers, especially in the Department of Defense, attempted that comparison.

But saying Afghanistan is like Vietnam because both involved counterinsurgency is as insightful as saying the US Civil War was like Rome’s Second Punic War because both were conventional wars. Almost nothing else about the two wars was similar. In 2004, a Strategic Studies Institute report employed the Vietnam analogy in the case of Iraq: “There is simply no comparison between the strategic environment, the scale of military operations, the scale of losses incurred, the quality of enemy resistance, the role of enemy allies, and the duration of combat.” The same could be said of Afghanistan and Vietnam.

The wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam were fought in different strategic environments. Like the Soviet-Afghan War, Vietnam was a proxy war between two superpowers overlaid on top of a national liberation movement. As a consequence, the North Vietnamese had the almost limitless resources and public support of the Soviet Union and China behind them, and the risk of escalation was a very real danger. US intervention in Vietnam was unilateral and lacked broad international legitimacy. In contrast, the conflict in Afghanistan was an international counterterrorism operation mixed up in a tribal civil war. The Taliban had comparatively few resources and there was no risk of escalation with a sponsoring superpower.

The wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam also took place in different operational and tactical environments. The North Vietnamese fielded a conventional army with tanks, artillery, and air power as their main effort. The unconventional Viet Cong insurgency was a supporting effort that faded away or was defeated after 1968; Saigon fell in 1975 to the North Vietnamese Army, not the Viet Cong. In Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency never fielded a conventional force and won through bribery, intimidation, and negotiations with local Afghan commanders who refused to fight after the withdrawal of US and international assistance, not through combat.

The wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam took place in different ideological environments. The Vietnam War was a civil war between two rival nationalist visions (a communist version and a nationalist version), both seeking unity and independence. Both claims were marred by autocracy. The communists’ claim was also marred by their brutality, while the South Vietnamese’s claim was also marred by their corruption. The Taliban, in contrast, was a minority sect that was unpopular and scarcely perceived to be legitimate, even when it governed Afghanistan, because of the group’s extremism and incompetence. It advocated Deobandi Islamism—which differs from the Hanafi school of Islam prevalent across Afghanistan—persecuted and excluded all non-Pashtun ethnic groups, and presided over the complete collapse of most state institutions. The various anti-Taliban factions, parties, and militias included almost all of Afghanistan’s major ethnic, religious, and regional groups, including Pashtuns and political Islamist groups. The government in Kabul had a much stronger claim to legitimacy and broad-based representation than did the military government in Saigon.

And finally, the wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam were fought on vastly different scales. Vietnam was one of the largest wars in American history, after the world wars and the Civil War. The United States deployed over a half-million troops; over 58,000 were killed, and over 300,000 were wounded. The North and South Vietnamese fielded armies of several hundred thousand each, and more than two million Vietnamese were killed. Compared to Vietnam, Afghanistan was a minor conflict. Taliban fighters, according to some estimates, numbered in the tens of thousands. And even at its peak, the US military deployment was only one-fifth the size of the deployment in Vietnam. About 3,500 coalition troops perished, which is one of the smallest figures of any major war in US history—that is not to make light of the loss of life but to highlight that there is no comparison to Vietnam. From December 2014 until the evacuation from Kabul, just seventy-nine US service members were killed in action; fewer troops were killed over the final six-and-a-half years in Afghanistan than were lost every two days in Vietnam in 1968, on average.

Some of the most important factors that led to the United States’ defeat in Vietnam—the scale of US casualties, the presence of a large and vocal anti-war movement in the United States, the existence of a well-armed conventional opponent, and the Cold War dynamic—were not present in Afghanistan. Likewise, some of the causes of the United States’ loss in Afghanistan—the Taliban’s access to money from the drug trade and the support from a global network of jihadist groups—were largely unique to that conflict and not shared with the one in Vietnam. Afghanistan did not resemble Vietnam in its strategic, operational, tactical, or ideological environments. It did not resemble Vietnam in why or how the war was fought, the type and number of enemies, or even the role of US allies and rivals. Frankly, it did not resemble Vietnam in any other respect. That means reflecting on Vietnam yields little insight applicable to the conflict in Afghanistan—aside from highlighting counterinsurgency best practices.

Invoking the shadow of Vietnam to inform the debate over Afghanistan is a sure way of paying more attention to the image of the war than the reality of it. Policymakers who reason by historical analogy are almost always wrong in doing so. Jeffrey Record’s study of the use of Vietnam as a historical analogy in US foreign policy decisions concluded that it has rarely served policymakers well. Using the Vietnam experience as a warning against replicating its errors is redundant: As Record noted (years before the fall of Kabul), “The very experience of the Vietnam War remains the greatest obstacle to its repetition.” Moreover, the international environment has changed. The end of the Cold War has diminished the stakes for US national-security interests in peripheral theaters around the world, and at the same time, it deprived would-be US adversaries of the funding and armaments they would need to mount a challenge of the scale of the North Vietnamese. US involvement in another foreign war that combines conventional warfare against a superpower-backed enemy state with counterinsurgency warfare against a resilient rural insurgency is extremely unlikely. “There are probably no more Vietnams… lying in wait for the United States,” Record wrote. Using Vietnam as a cautionary tale, therefore, only cautions against something that is unlikely to happen anyway.

Invoking the shadow of Vietnam to inform the debate over Afghanistan is a sure way of paying more attention to the image of the war than the reality of it.

Indeed, the Vietnam metaphor can be outright harmful to sound military planning. It can encourage excessive, even unrealistic, concern for minimizing casualties. It can create an unrealistic expectation that policymakers determine beforehand what their exit strategy will be (for a war whose course they cannot, in reality, predict or control). It can artificially separate force from diplomacy and even prompt calls for deploying overwhelming force in every situation, even when small, tailored deployments might be more appropriate. Record further warned that the “Vietnam War analogy is an unreliable, even dangerous, guide to using force in the post-Cold War era.” While it might have served a useful purpose in helping military planners learn best practices for counterinsurgency, it seems more often to have served as a largely groundless cautionary tale about the perils of unconventional warfare.

Where the analogy had merit: The aftershocks

And yet, regardless of how inappropriate the analogy was in describing the course of the war, it seems to describe almost too perfectly how the wars ended. Does that suggest there was merit to the analogy all along?

The fall of Kabul seems likely to have similar political, diplomatic, and psychological effects as the fall of Saigon. Both evacuations were international public humiliations for the United States, regarded as demonstrative of the limits of American power and resolve. To use the language of chess, in Vietnam the United States lost a tempo to the Soviet Union; the latter gained the initiative and confidence to act with more stridency on the international stage for the several years that followed. In the twenty-first century, the free world is again in a contest with rising authoritarianism around the world and again lost a tempo. To that extent, the Saigon analogy, unfortunately, has merit.

But if so, it was merit created by the very policymakers who invoked the analogy as a cautionary tale. Earlier, the Obama administration tried to negotiate with the Taliban while unilaterally withdrawing US forces—motivated in part by their fear that Afghanistan would turn into another Vietnam. But in doing so, they replicated the dynamic of the Paris Peace talks with North Vietnam. In both cases, US adversaries understood that they would achieve their principal aims by waiting and thus had no need to concede anything through negotiation. Obama administration officials, who feared Afghanistan would turn into another Vietnam, ensured it would do so through their insistence on withdrawal timetables.

Later, invoking the analogy in 2021, Biden engineered the Vietnam-like scenario he had wanted to avoid as vice president by appealing to the past war in justifying his decision to withdraw all remaining US forces. “I wasn’t going to ask [US troops] to continue to risk their lives in a military action that should have ended long ago,” he said the day after Kabul fell. “Our leaders did that in Vietnam when I got here as a young man. I will not do it in Afghanistan.” Biden, fearing another Vietnam, withdrew US forces before the Afghan army was ready for independent operations—the decision most directly responsible for Kabul’s collapse and the ignominious, Vietnam-like end to the United States’ war in Afghanistan.

Biden believed that wars like Vietnam are unwinnable and, if the United States finds itself in a Vietnam-like war, the administration should end it as quickly as possible. Biden believed this despite the dramatic differences between the North Vietnamese Army and the Taliban, between the Cold War and the war against jihadist terrorism, and between a war that killed 2,500 Americans every two months at its peak and a war that killed 2,500 Americans in twenty years. Even more surprisingly, Biden believed the war in Afghanistan was unwinnable despite the military progress of Obama’s 2009-2010 surge, when Biden was vice president, and the slow progress building a new Afghan army.

It is clear that Biden concluded the United States never should have fought the war; rather, he thought the United States should have invaded to kill and capture as many al-Qaeda leaders as possible, but then it should have withdrawn to avoid getting bogged down in Vietnam-like counterinsurgency and reconstruction. He appears to have concluded this despite the obvious probability that al-Qaeda would return upon the United States’ departure if Afghanistan remained under Taliban control, as is happening now.

The Vietnam analogy is a tempting one, and in using it, Biden’s decision to withdraw US troops catalyzed the collapse of the Afghan army, the Taliban’s victory, and the Saigon-like images of evacuation at the US embassy and the Kabul airport. The Vietnam analogy proved to be the self-fulfilling prophecy the international community feared; it would be policymakers’ gravest mistake to allow the analogy to wield that power again. In the end, the Vietnam analogy was deeply unhelpful for assessing the war in Afghanistan on its own terms or charting a way toward victory, but it did vindicate itself as a roadmap to defeat.

Paul D. Miller is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council and a professor of the practice of international affairs at Georgetown University. His most recent book is Just War and Ordered Liberty, from Cambridge University Press. Follow him on Twitter @PaulDMiller2.

Portions of this piece first appeared in the 2016 Journal of Strategic Studies article “Graveyard of Analogies: The Use and Abuse of History for the War in Afghanistan” by Paul D. Miller. Reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd.

Experts react: The US withdrawal from Afghanistan is complete. What’s next?

By Atlantic Council experts

What’s next for Afghanistan? How will evacuations proceed without the US military controlling Kabul airport? What’s next for the counterterrorism mission? How will other regional and global powers shape the country the United States leaves behind?

Afghanistan Conflict

New Atlanticist Aug 17, 2021

Vietnam’s lessons for the Afghanistan failure: Don’t count out US leadership just yet

By Daniel Fried

What will the debacle in Afghanistan mean for US strategy in the world and for its friends and allies who are watching all of this with dismay? For that question, the answer may lie in the consequences of US failure in Vietnam.

Afghanistan Conflict

Report Feb 6, 2020

Withdrawal deadlines in war: Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan

By Paul D. Miller

Withdrawal timetables do not achieve the political benefits that policymakers desire, but they do incur the risks policymakers rightly fear.

Afghanistan Conflict

The post How a misguided Vietnam analogy sealed the Afghanistan disaster appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How to ensure Afghanistan isn’t the graveyard of European defense

Federica Fazio and Nicolas Adams — Fri, 01 Oct 2021 17:57:22 +0000

Criticism and finger-pointing have poured in from European leaders following the rushed withdrawal from Afghanistan that put an end to two decades of an American and NATO military presence there. But is Europe’s frustration with the Biden administration justified?

This could have been a moment for Europe to shine. In the 1990s, the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) dramatically failed its first test in the Western Balkans. During the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU proved incapable of speaking with one voice and exerting political pressure on the parties to the conflict—forcing the United States and NATO to broker settlements. This prompted the EU to realize that diplomacy without military might is of no use and led to the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which was later replaced by the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

Almost thirty years and plenty of security and defense initiatives later, the bloc could have used the situation in Afghanistan to redeem itself. Yet when US President Joe Biden consulted European allies about the withdrawal, they all favored the move. They could have questioned Biden’s decision or voiced their concern in an April NATO meeting, but apparently no one did. Remaining without the Americans was simply unfeasible; once the United States completed its own withdrawal, the Europeans weren’t even able to protect the Kabul airport for a few more days to finalize the evacuation.

That’s because Europe still lacks the capacity to project hard power. On paper, multinational battalion-sized forces called EU Battlegroups, which allow the bloc to rapidly engage in autonomous military operations, could be on the ground as soon as ten days after a decision to launch them. But in reality it is much more complicated, with bureaucratic and funding-related hurdles having so far prevented their deployment.

If the European Union is to ensure a robust defense capability, it must commit to necessary investment in technology and capacity-building, as well as deepen coordination and expand cooperation with NATO and craft a strategy that sets clear, immediate, and enduring goals to face the threats of the twenty-first century.

Less talk, more action

Some member states are pushing for a new rapid-response force that would allow them to deploy troops in the name of the EU as long as a qualified majority (at least 55 percent of member states representing no less than 65 percent of the bloc’s population) votes in favor. But this would amount to a duplication of both the current EU Battlegroups, which have been fully operational since 2007, and the NATO Response Force (NRF). Both consist of highly capable, rapidly deployable forces to achieve immediate effects against a variety of security challenges.

It might be wiser for the EU to develop something it still lacks, and which would greatly benefit the NATO Alliance as well: a common threats perception and strategic culture. EU member states are already working on this by organizing workshops on all four pillars of its Strategic Compass—crisis management, resilience, capabilities, and partnerships—and involving EU institutions and outside experts. Bringing in NATO representatives at a time when the Alliance is also developing its own Strategic Concept could help ensure coherence between the two forthcoming strategies.

The EU should also move forward from simply discussing strategic autonomy and focus on setting real goals—both short- and long-term—that would allow it to become a better and more reliable partner. The EU and NATO are two sides of the same coin: They share the same values, interests, challenges, and (given that they have twenty-one common members) resources. They have far more to gain from complementing each other than from simply not competing with one another.

It’s becoming increasingly clear that China’s posturing will force both entities to work in concert to confront this and other threats—from transnational terrorist groups and migration along NATO’s southern flank to an increasingly provocative Russia. Growing cyber capabilities, sophisticated space and hypersonic weapons, and perfected “gray zone” activities below the threshold of armed conflict make NATO’s adversaries as formidable as anything the alliance has faced since its inception.

As NATO aims to complete its new Strategic Concept by the middle of next year, its leadership would be wise to keep these dynamics in mind.

Why cooperation is key

The world is trending toward strategic competition as advances in technology shake up international norms and behaviors, meaning the NATO Alliance must adapt to not only face modern threats but also to define and shape the world in which it operates. It must embrace its transatlantic nature and engage globally. This includes divesting from obsolete platforms, such as the Panavia Tornado combat jet, while also investing in cutting-edge technologies, such as autonomous systems and quantum communications, and ensuring through clear political will that great-power adversaries are effectively deterred through strength.

NATO should also ensure that the strengths of its individual members are amplified across the Alliance—whether it’s Estonian aptitude in cyberspace, German engineering, or American power projection.

Luckily, initiatives such as the EU-led Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) can serve both the needs of NATO and the EU’s goal of strategic autonomy. With twenty-five of the twenty-seven EU member states and projects focused on everything from training and support functions to the application of military force across all domains of warfare, PESCO can significantly boost the EU’s power projection while simultaneously enhancing NATO’s operational capabilities across the continent and beyond. Among these projects, military mobility remains crucial to deploying troops and materiel in a timely manner.

In an excellent example of transatlantic cooperation between EU and NATO partners, the United States, Canada, and Norway are reportedly set to join a Dutch-led military mobility project within the PESCO framework, with significant benefits for both NATO and the EU. This move would make good on a 2018 Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, which called for swift and demonstrable progress in military mobility, among other areas.

Such projects will improve interoperability and coordination, as well as sharpen the edge of the capabilities needed to deter, fight, and defeat the emerging threats of the twenty-first century.

As President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen noted in her 2021 State of the Union address, there are troubling questions within NATO that need to be addressed, but “there is simply no security and defense issue where less cooperation is the answer.” In this context, the lessons of Afghanistan must be learned and applied in the future. Stronger cooperation, interoperability, and a renewed push for solidarity across NATO and the EU will serve to strengthen not only Europe and the United States, but their allies and partners across the globe.

Federica Fazio is a visiting fellow at the University of South Wales and has worked on European security and defense for EU institutions and agencies. Follow her on Twitter: @fedefaziof

Nicolas Adams is a former US Army intelligence officer who completed several deployments to Afghanistan and currently works on national security policy on Capitol Hill.

Italy shows how defense partnership is done

By Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo

The country may be among the United States’ most reliable allies in Europe—which is why it should help lead NATO.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Sep 23, 2021

The US can’t fix Afghanistan, but it can still fix NATO

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Now is not the time for Europe to raise its defense spending or for NATO to extend its reach beyond Europe—especially into the Indo-Pacific region. Rather, it’s time to get back to the core focus of NATO.

Afghanistan Crisis Management

New Atlanticist Sep 27, 2021

The military, intel, and law enforcement must collaborate in this new counterterrorism era

By R. Clarke Cooper

Addressing emerging threats means adopting an interagency and international approach to fighting them.

Afghanistan Conflict

The post How to ensure Afghanistan isn’t the graveyard of European defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slavin quoted in France24 on nuclear deal talks

Atlantic Council — Thu, 23 Sep 2021 20:13:00 +0000

Original Source

The post Slavin quoted in France24 on nuclear deal talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US can’t fix Afghanistan, but it can still fix NATO

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Thu, 23 Sep 2021 15:41:30 +0000

Across a twenty-year war in Afghanistan, the United States’ NATO Allies contributed billions in funding and tens of thousands of soldiers, suffering more than 1,100 fatalities along the way. Even as heavy domestic opposition in NATO member countries boiled, the Alliance sustained its support to the mission. Now, Allies will face a wave of fallout that will affect the Alliance’s cohesion looking forward. It’s an American problem that will require US leadership to fix.

NATO Allies and partners are understandably smarting from the short- and long-term fallout of the Afghanistan experience. They feel bruised by these recent events and are wary of US promises. The United States will now need to commit to deeds, not words, to reassure its allies. It should closely cooperate with Allies in the event that Afghanistan once again becomes a haven for international terrorism, especially after the attack at Kabul’s airport by the Islamic State’s Afghan affiliate, ISIS-K. Now is not the time to pressure Europeans to raise defense spending higher—they already outspend Russia nearly four times over. Nor is it time to extend NATO’s reach beyond Europe. NATO already has plenty to watch, including an opportunistic and aggressive Russia. More American pressure on our European Allies to commit beyond the core focus of NATO, for example in the Indo-Pacific region, is clearly counterproductive

Here, the context is important. For some years, NATO has struggled to cope with a multitude of stressors. US pounding over defense spending, US-European Union estrangement, massive refugee flows, trade wars, withdrawal from the Paris climate accords and the Iranian nuclear deal, the pandemic and continued Russian aggression have all buffeted the Alliance. During his tenure, former US President Donald Trump’s actions seriously eroded trust and confidence between the United States and its NATO Allies. But the current crisis in Afghanistan is a heavy blow that is particularly needless. It should not be followed up with further US initiatives that disregard the national priorities of close allies or that dramatically reorient the Alliance’s focus without due consultation in NATO.

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The prevailing narrative in Washington framed two paths for the United States and its involvement in Afghanistan: a “forever war” or a complete and abrupt withdrawal. In reality, there was a clear middle ground. From mid-2020 to just before US President Joe Biden announced the United States’ withdrawal, NATO coalition casualties were very low, Afghan forces were successfully fending off Taliban attacks, and NATO seemed well able to afford the mission’s financial burden. Domestic constituencies largely accepted a low-level coalition presence in Afghanistan composed of advisers, logistics contractors, a small footprint of special forces, and intelligence and air-power assets. This approach was the third path, the one ignored by Washington.

To be sure, the campaign was never pristine or ideal. Epic corruption sapped the vitality of Afghan institutions, while the determination to make a western-style Afghan military was always problematic. But it denied terror a safe haven for a generation and, with continued, low-level coalition presence, could have done so for much longer, while providing time for children to get educations, women’s rights to gain a firmer foothold, political institutions to mature, and civil society to continue to move along the path toward genuine democracy.

But Washington didn’t see the alternatives, and as Biden’s August 31 withdrawal deadline came and went, a crisis ensued. A prudent approach would have prioritized evacuating civilians, nongovernmental organizations, and Afghans who had worked closely with the NATO coalition. Remaining US and NATO military contingents could have then fallen back into regional hubs or to Kabul for final evacuation, supported by NATO air power. Instead, military forces left first, prompting an immediate—and predictable—collapse of the Afghan security forces. The result was little short of chaos, likely leading to severe and lasting aftereffects.

While not opposed to a careful and deliberate withdrawal, many NATO members had supported the campaign for years and expected to be consulted early and in detail. That did not happen. The resulting debacle placed citizens of many NATO countries and Afghan partners on the ground at grave risk, damaged the credibility of the Alliance, encouraged dangerous adversaries like China and Russia, and further eroded NATO cohesion. Key Allies faced a storm of political unrest at home. While none of this may have been intentional, flawed White House assumptions about the durability of stand-alone Afghan institutions and a largely unilateral US approach to disengagement created a crisis that has spread not only regionally but globally.

What now follows could be ugly and tragic. Confidence that the Taliban will keep to its commitments is low, while retribution against Afghans who supported the coalition will probably be swift and ruthless. The prospect of US and allied citizens being held hostage is a nightmare scenario that will defy effective solutions. Most of this was avoidable.

Some commentators have blamed Allies for the sins committed in planning and executing the mission in Afghanistan. National caveats, indecision, changes in government and bouts of parliamentary opposition across NATO members, and many other factors played a role. And while much of the time, US leaders were frustrated by the unwillingness of allied leaders to align completely with US preferences and perspectives, that expectation was unreasonable. While sympathetic to the tragedy of 9/11, and in most cases willing to contribute in Afghanistan, Allies were not direct targets. Indeed, some wound up paying a heavy price for joining the fight against terrorism, enduring costly attacks at home and suffering hundreds of casualties in the field. The crisis in Kabul today cannot be laid at their feet. This is principally an American problem, arising from American choices.

The United States must lead in mending fractured relationships between Allies on the basis of mutual respect and understanding. Closer coordination and due consideration for national interests and political constraints is a good start. Beyond ingraining these aspects into US interactions with our allies, the United States must stop its controversial advocacy for defense-spending increases and its push for NATO to commit forces outside of the European theater. NATO—a pillar of US-led national security and of global stability for seven decades—has been through a lot and cannot withstand many more such blows. The US approach to NATO must change if the Alliance is to endure and succeed.

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as special assistant to the president and senior director for Europe and Russia on the US National Security Council. He also served as dean of the NATO Defense College.

This piece is a part of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Speaker and Research Series. This Series focuses on strengthening the transatlantic alliance and shaping policy debates through timely analysis and events focused on key transatlantic security and defense issues.

Confronting the disaster left behind in Afghanistan

By Mir Sadat

The United States screwed up the endgame in Afghanistan once again, but working with allies and private rescue efforts, there’s time to make things right.

Afghanistan Conflict

New Atlanticist Sep 3, 2021

American security cooperation needs an ‘integrity check’

By R. Clarke Cooper

Washington must prove why choosing the United States as a security partner remains the best option.

Afghanistan Conflict

Inflection Points Aug 29, 2021

Biden can still salvage his legacy and US credibility. It won’t be easy.

By Frederick Kempe

Here’s how President Joe Biden can correct course with allies and partners over Afghanistan—and beyond.

Afghanistan Conflict

The post The US can’t fix Afghanistan, but it can still fix NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Beyond the peninsula: Prospects for US-ROK regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Miyeon Oh — Fri, 17 Sep 2021 16:39:59 +0000

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As the transformation of the Indo-Pacific continues to shape the global geopolitical and economic landscape, US engagement with allies and partners in the region is crucial. Southeast Asia in particular is becoming a region of strategic importance to the United States; it is an engine of world economic growth facing increasing Chinese political and economic influence. As rapid industrialization, urbanization, and digitization continue to transform the region, the United States is striving to strengthen its partnerships, working with its allies such as Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) by accelerating and expanding existing engagement efforts. Advancing peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific remains a top priority for the Joseph Biden administration, as it was for the Donald Trump administration under the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Biden administration has a strong commitment to resisting challenges to the free and open rules-based regional order, through collectively responding to challenges working together with its allies and partners that are free and democratic nations, including South Korea.

This report provides an interim evaluation of US-ROK cooperative efforts in the Indo-Pacific. First, it assesses where priorities converge and diverge between the Moon administration’s NSP and the Trump administration’s Indo- Pacific Strategy (IPS), as this has policy implications for the US-ROK collaboration under the Biden administration in terms of the joint regional engagement. It examines how the NSP’s pillars of prosperity, security, and people map onto those of the IPS, in order to explore how the Republic of Korea and the United States have approached cooperative efforts to date and to what extent those efforts have achieved their stated objectives or require further development. In pursuing this analysis, the report finds that the progress seen across a range of broad US-ROK cooperative efforts, outlined in joint government fact sheets released in 2019 and 2020, reflects a series of unique opportunities and challenges the two countries face in the region.

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Miyeon Oh

Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Economy & Business

Asia Security Initiative

The Asia Security Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, fosters a trans-Atlantic-Pacific Community with a dual analytical approach grounded in key traditional and non-traditional security issues in order to develop new strategies and policies for the United States, its allies, and its partners.

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The post Beyond the peninsula: Prospects for US-ROK regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pakistan and the Taliban 2.0: The good, the bad, and the ugly

Rabia Akhtar — Fri, 03 Sep 2021 14:52:28 +0000

The Taliban’s 11-day Blitzkrieg has left the entire world stunned. With almost no resistance, one provincial capital after another fell like a house of cards, making way for the Taliban to claim Kabul. The Afghan army, trained by the United States, was nowhere to be seen as the Taliban entered Kabul. Perhaps they chose what was, in their view, the lesser of the two evils: one who trained them (Washington, an occupational force), versus the Taliban, one of their own from Afghan soil. Since 2001, the United States has spent $83 billion to train Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) including the military, elite forces, and national police. Had the Taliban not taken over Kabul, Washington previously allocated $3.3 billion for 2022, with a pledge of increasing it to $4 billion until 2024. The structural collapse of the 300,000 strong ANDSF forces has been analyzed with some rigor. However, here we are, in 2021, with a lack of collective imagination on how the Afghan national army will take shape under the new Afghan government, be it pluralistic or Taliban-led. As the new government takes shape in Afghanistan, there are some good, some bad, and some ugly realities confronting the region, primarily Pakistan.

The good:

The first good thing for Pakistan is that the war in Afghanistan is over. US forces have left the country and with that, twenty years of bloodshed in Afghanistan and by proxy in Pakistan has come to an end. Pakistan realizes that the decision it took in 2001 to join the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was shortsighted, the consequences of which the country had to suffer in blood where 83,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives.

The second good thing for Pakistan is that its efforts in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table with the United States and shaping the Afghan peace process in its initial stages are not lost now that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan is complete. Pakistan’s good offices helped the Taliban understand the importance of connecting with the international community and reclaiming their political space even if it comes at the cost of power-sharing. Pakistan’s interactions with the Taliban throughout the Doha process also helped the Taliban realize their own evolutionary process, enabling them to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of imagining an Afghanistan post-US withdrawal. And, the Taliban that we are seeing on our screens today—holding press conferences and engaging with the international community as proactive citizens of Afghanistan, casting a shadow over their militant persona—is a win-win for all since the fall of Kabul. None of this would have happened without Pakistan’s consistent engagement with the Taliban, the United States, and other regional partners, making all parties understand the other’s positions, stakes, and vulnerabilities.

The third good thing for Pakistan is China’s positive outlook on the future of Afghanistan under a Taliban-led government. China’s impact on regional stability is not to be underestimated and while Beijing would like to fill the political vacuum created by the US retreat, it is also poised to assume a leadership role in bringing its current and prospective Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) member countries in the region together on one platform to realize its South Asian economic ambitions. Afghanistan’s immediate neighborhood, consisting of Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, and the Central Asian countries, shares a robust vision of regional connectivity. Through an integrated approach led by China, these regional partnerships inclusive of Afghanistan have the potential to strengthen regional security and trade. If realized, that too will be a win-win for all.

The bad:

The bad for Pakistan emanates primarily from Taliban’s recognition dynamics as efforts take shape to form a government in Afghanistan. Going forward, one thing can happen which will push Pakistan to make a unilateral decision with respect to recognition of the Taliban. The consensus that Pakistan is hoping for, in good faith and with respect to the Taliban’s recognition by the international community, could fall apart. It still remains to be seen if the Taliban 2.0 will be anything different from their earlier version since they have nothing to show for it. If the negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan political elite and other tribal factions do not soon mature into a power-sharing structure to the Taliban’s liking, then the group is in a position to shun the whole process and unilaterally declare themselves to be autocrats of their Islamic Emirate. Such a move would invite sanctions from the G7 and other countries, pushing Pakistan to once again choose a side. For this scenario, Pakistan must have a strategy in place.

The ugly:

Now that the US withdrawal is complete and the evolving intra-Afghan process for a power-sharing model is on autopilot, what incentives do the Taliban have to hold their end of the bargain? With the United States freezing former Afghan government foreign reserves and the meagre prospects of the Taliban accepting the Afghan constitution as the system of governance, the original conditions of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement stand diluted. The condition of abandoning al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is also questionable since there have been reports of the Taliban maintaining close ties with al-Qaeda despite promises to Washington. Given the absence of any influence by the US-led G7 over the Taliban in this new environment, Pakistan needs to reassess its leverage over the Taliban to rein in the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other terrorist factions who, with the blessings of al-Qaeda, are using Afghan soil to launch terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. Since their takeover of Kabul, the Taliban have made several statements about the TTP which do not reflect their commitment to deliver TTP terrorists to Pakistan for trial or exercise absolute control over this entity. Instead, there are statements by the Taliban showing their discontent over the fencing of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. If Pakistan is unable to get a solid commitment from the Taliban over stopping, punishing, and handing over TTP militants, or if the Taliban continues to see the fencing of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as detrimental to their vision of secure borders without barriers between the two countries based on “trust,” then the relationship between Taliban-led Afghanistan and Pakistan will start off on the wrong footing.

Afghanistan’s uncertain future poses serious challenges for Pakistan. Under absolutely no conditions should Pakistan compromise on its counter-terrorism strategy of which eliminating the TTP is an integral component, and the realization of which depends on the fencing of the international border between the two countries.

Dr Rabia Akhtar is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Policy Research at the University of Lahore.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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SouthAsiaSource Sep 2, 2021

The US-Pakistan relationship in a new Afghanistan

By Hashim Pasha

Now that the American venture into Afghanistan is coming to be seen by some as a serious strategic failure, there is a strong temptation for US policymakers to find something, or someone, to blame.

Afghanistan Conflict

SouthAsiaSource Aug 30, 2021

A moral consideration of the Taliban’s legitimacy

By Nilofar Sakhi

After the collapse of Ashraf Ghani’s government and the return of Taliban, the country faces multiple challenges including humanitarian crisis and Taliban legitimacy. The international community should use aid as a leverage to pressure Taliban to form an inclusive government and address humanitarian issues.

Afghanistan Conflict

SouthAsiaSource Aug 20, 2021

Four scenarios of Afghanistan under the Taliban

By Ali Riaz

After capturing Kabul at lightning speed—surprising analysts and security experts alike—the Taliban are now poised to assume leadership once again in Afghanistan. In lieu of these developments, four potential trajectories warrant attention in the near to medium term.

Afghanistan Conflict

All on pakistan

Southasiasource blog

all on afghanistan

The post Pakistan and the Taliban 2.0: The good, the bad, and the ugly appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Garlauskas featured in NK News podcast on intelligence failure to anticipate Communist Chinese military intervention

Sanghyun Han — Mon, 23 Aug 2021 16:53:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On August 23, Markus Garlauskas was featured in NK News podcast, along with the Korea Society’s Jonathan Corrado in an expert discussion on the failure of the United States to anticipate and prepare for Communist China’s military intervention in the Korean War. Garlauskas and Corrado argued that cognitive biases along with dysfunctional inter-personal and inter-organizational relationships played key roles in this failure, which holds lessons for dealing with China today.

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

The post Garlauskas featured in NK News podcast on intelligence failure to anticipate Communist Chinese military intervention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Manning in The Hill: After hubris and humiliation in Afghanistan, will humility follow?

Atlantic Council — Wed, 18 Aug 2021 13:41:00 +0000

original source

On August 18, Robert Manning published an op-ed in The Hill entitled “After hubris and humiliation in Afghanistan, will humility follow?”

Manning highlighted that, for the United States, there are “a surfeit of lessons to be learned — lessons about misjudging basic requirements of counter-insurgency; about the perils of mission creep and imposing US notions of nation-building ill-fitting to Afghan culture, history and politics; about using military approaches to what ultimately are political problems; about self-deception fueled by bureaucratic inertia; and not least, about the hubris involved in not understanding the limits of U.S. power.”

More about our expert

Former staff

Aude Darnal

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Africa Conflict

The post Manning in The Hill: After hubris and humiliation in Afghanistan, will humility follow? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nasr in Politico: Can America Still Help Afghanistan? 8 Former Officials on What’s Next

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 Aug 2021 17:28:00 +0000

original source

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Vietnam’s lessons for the Afghanistan failure: Don’t count out US leadership just yet

Daniel Fried — Tue, 17 Aug 2021 15:47:13 +0000

The August 15 images of helicopters lifting fleeing diplomats from the US embassy in Kabul—like those of a similar calamity in Saigon in April 1975—will weigh on the United States. US President Joe Biden had dismissed the possibility of such a scenario just weeks ago, which suggests that neither he nor his administration understood the situation on the ground. Although the decision to pull out of Afghanistan was defensible (though questionable), the United States executed that decision poorly, making the worst outcomes more likely. We’re now faced with a humanitarian disaster for those Afghans who trusted the United States, embraced our values, or even worked with us and our allies over the past twenty years.

In Vietnam, as in Afghanistan, the United States understood neither the nature of its enemy nor the weaknesses of its friends. In both cases, the United States covered up stalemate with over-optimistic assessments and then, out of frustration and in response to public weariness, cut and ran. Then US President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger did a better job than the Trump and Biden administrations by disguising their retreat for a time, but the result was the same as in Afghanistan: catastrophic defeat for those the United States backed, a disaster for those who trusted in the United States, and a blow to US strategy.

The US failure in Vietnam occurred amid an American crisis of confidence and contributed to it. Then as now, the United States was polarized socially and politically, shaken by racial strife, urban riots, rising violent crime, and profound political tensions, the latter caused by a president who had tested the US constitutional order.

In these circumstances, Americans generalized the Vietnam debacle. To many, defeat seemed like proof that the US Cold War strategy and even US leadership in the world had failed. What had worked so well for the United States in post-World War II Europe, Japan, and South Korea—building alliances, providing military security against communist adversaries, and helping countries emerging from the ruin of war integrate into a US-led liberal international system—did not work in Southeast Asia. Even more, by the mid-1970s many Americans believed that the United States, by virtue of its failings at home and in Vietnam, had no business attempting international leadership at all.

Many Americans concluded that the United States had to pull back in the world and concentrate on challenges at home; that America’s grand strategy, articulated in the 1941 Atlantic Charter between then US President Franklin Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, of seeking to advance a rules-based, liberal world order was a waste of blood and treasure. After the fall of Saigon, this view was espoused by many on the left and those of the realist school of thought who drew lessons, often wise, about overreach and overconfidence. A sense of inevitable US decline infused many of those arguments.

As a demoralized United States retreated from Vietnam in chaos, the Soviet Union believed that its time had come. It increased aggression abroad, culminating, ironically, with its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Many Americans and much of the foreign-policy establishment, demoralized by defeat in Vietnam, concluded that the Soviet Union was winning the Cold War, a view that lasted well into the 1980s.

And yet.

Less than fifteen years after the fall of Saigon, the Berlin Wall fell, and the Soviet Union fell apart shortly thereafter. Former US President Ronald Reagan helped turn around the national mood and pushed back against the Soviets. But the critical actors in the final chapter of the Cold War were determined democracy activists in Central and Eastern Europe who linked up with mass social movements, especially in Poland and the Baltic countries. They were inspired by the vision of a democratic and freedom-supporting United States, undeterred by American pessimism, and committed to achieving freedom for their nations: patriotism in democratic form. They enjoyed some help from the United States but mainly achieved success by themselves as communism decayed. Those activists believed in the United States more than many Americans believed in themselves. And they won.

As it turns out, US strategy during the Cold War—supporting freedom and resisting Soviet communism—succeeded, even in the face of Washington’s blunders in Vietnam and elsewhere. We must have been on to something about the attractive power of freedom and about the resilience of the US-led liberal international system—and the United States itself.

The lessons of defeat in Vietnam, understood properly, may help inform Americans as they grapple with the lessons of defeat in Afghanistan.

One big lesson is that no strategy, even a good one, can protect against stupid. American grand strategy for generations has sought to advance democracy, free markets, and the rule of law because it ultimately serves US interests. That strategy may be the right one. But being right in general doesn’t mean that strategy will work in every country and at any given time. Lessons from the Vietnam debacle about attention to local conditions, realities on the ground, and the limits of American patience and resources have been proven valid with respect to Afghanistan. Americans’ expectations about what the United States can achieve in any particular country need to be tempered. And the bar for military action in far-flung, less organized countries, particularly long-term ground operations, will go up, as it should.

However, even this reasonable lesson could prove complicated in practice. The United States helped topple the Taliban after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and for good reason. Several relatively calm years followed, a golden period that perhaps lent itself to creating better outcomes for Afghanistan, but the United States turned toward Iraq. Could greater concentration on Afghanistan have achieved a better result? Although the best outcome in Afghanistan—a peaceful, modernizing society and burgeoning democracy—might not have been achievable, much was achieved in the past twenty years. Reflecting today, could the United States have preserved that progress through an extended commitment of its relatively modest force presence? Would such a muddling, frustrating solution have been better than what the United States may now face in and from Afghanistan? I suspect the answers are yes, though Biden in his August 16 remarks to the nation argued otherwise and made a strong case. Fights over those questions could be bitter and inconclusive.

A firmer lesson is that while the United States should not attempt too much under unfavorable conditions, it must guard against doing little to support its friends and values. China and Russia are crowing about US failure in Afghanistan and may try to test the United States with new aggression. I’ve heard from anxious friends from Poland, Baltic nations, Ukraine, and others among Europe’s more exposed countries worried about the steadiness of the United States, in which they have put so much trust and thanks to which they have achieved a great deal.

Biden has argued to the nation that the now-defunct Afghan government was unwilling to fight for its country. The Biden administration needs to follow defeat in Afghanistan with steadiness toward worried friends who are willing and able to defend themselves. Ukraine, for all its shortcomings, is one such democracy. Biden can make clear when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits Washington in late August that there is no green light for Putin to attack in direct or hybrid form. The administration should make early efforts—through NATO and bilaterally—to convey to worried allies that it is reliable and that the United States will not turn inward—and that the administration means it. Washington should develop options to counter Putin’s possible avenues of cyber, energy, or hybrid aggression. The administration should also meaningfully convey that same message to allies in Asia such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian countries (ironically including Vietnam) that see the United States as balancing power with respect to China and are also willing to defend themselves.

The Biden administration needs to move hard and fast to protect those Afghans who trusted the United States and its values, to contain Afghanistan under the Taliban, to give no opportunity to authoritarians seeking to take advantage of this bad moment, and to show worried allies that the United States they thought was “back” truly has returned. American foreign policy will have to find that elusive balance of operational realism sorely lacking in Afghanistan as in Vietnam, without throwing out the best principles of its grand strategy—to advance values and interests together with allies—that achieved so much over the past three generations.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was the coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration, assistant secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia during the Bush administration, and senior director at the National Security Council for the Clinton and Bush administrations. He also served as ambassador to Poland during the Clinton administration. Follow him on Twitter @AmbDanFried.

Experts react: The Taliban has taken Kabul. Now what?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts, many of whom have spent many years in the trenches on Afghanistan policy, weigh in on the fall of Kabul.

Afghanistan Conflict

Fast Thinking Aug 15, 2021

FAST THINKING: What you need to know about the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan

By Atlantic Council

What can the United States possibly do now to manage the fallout? How will all this reshape America’s global standing? Our experts penetrate the fog of war.

Afghanistan Conflict

New Atlanticist Aug 15, 2021

How the Taliban did it: Inside the ‘operational art’ of its military victory

By Benjamin Jensen

The Taliban of 2021 is not the same as the Taliban of the 1990s. This Taliban is now adept at integrating military and non-military instruments of power in pursuit of its political objectives.

Afghanistan Conflict

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Alam’s interview with Ahmad Massoud in Republic World: Afghan Ex-VP Saleh Pledges New Fight

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 Aug 2021 13:08:00 +0000

Original source

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Alam’s interview with Ahmad Massoud in Free Press Journal: Here’s the story of Ahmad Shah Massoud and his bastion Panjshir

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 Aug 2021 09:37:00 +0000

Original source

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Samad joins BBC News Persia to discuss how Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s speech was the first step towards a bigger decision

aatique — Mon, 16 Aug 2021 19:14:12 +0000

Original source

The post Samad joins BBC News Persia to discuss how Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s speech was the first step towards a bigger decision appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wechsler quoted in ABC 6 on the challenges of rebuilding Afghanistan

Atlantic Council — Mon, 16 Aug 2021 15:17:00 +0000

Original Source

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Alam’s interview with Ahmad Massoud in Dnevno: “I am ready to negotiate with the Taliban” states Ahmad Massoud

Atlantic Council — Mon, 16 Aug 2021 12:38:00 +0000

Original source

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Samad quoted in DW: Taliban begins to enter Kabul and minister speaks of “peaceful transfer of power”

Atlantic Council — Sun, 15 Aug 2021 14:38:00 +0000

original source

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Alam’s interview with Ahmad Massoud in The Week: As militants close in on Kabul, son of ‘Lion of Panjshir’ says he is open to talks with Taliban

Atlantic Council — Sat, 14 Aug 2021 13:54:00 +0000

Original source

The post Alam’s interview with Ahmad Massoud in The Week: As militants close in on Kabul, son of ‘Lion of Panjshir’ says he is open to talks with Taliban appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wechsler quoted in Axios on the Biden administration’s approach to evacuation in Afghanistan

Atlantic Council — Fri, 13 Aug 2021 16:37:00 +0000

Original Source

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Garlauskas participates in Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center workshop report on “A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea”

Sanghyun Han — Thu, 12 Aug 2021 16:50:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On August 12, Markus Garlauskas presented remarks and answered questions at a panel discussion hosted virtually by Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The event was organized to launch a new Belfer workshop report to which Garlauskas contributed, “A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea: A Principled and Pragmatic Approach to Promote Human Rights and Pursue Denuclearization.” In his presentation, Garlauskas argued that North Korea’s nuclear program is both motivated and enabled by the Kim regime’s human rights abuses meaning that pursuing North Korean denuclearization is inseparable with pursuing North Korean human rights reforms.

You can also check the full version report here.

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

The post Garlauskas participates in Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center workshop report on “A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ahmad Massoud: Look to local leaders to save Afghanistan

Kamal Alam — Wed, 11 Aug 2021 10:02:29 +0000

Just weeks before US troops fully withdraw from Afghanistan—and as Taliban fighters conquer more territory across the country—Ahmad Massoud says he is open to negotiations with the militants.

“I am willing and ready to forgive the blood of my father for the sake of peace in Afghanistan and security and stability in Afghanistan,” said Massoud, son of the anti-Soviet resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, in an interview with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. Massoud’s father was assassinated by al-Qaeda days before the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

But he and other Afghans are not willing to “give in to the will of terrorism,” added Massoud, who is based in the government-controlled Panjshir province in northeastern Afghanistan. “We are ready to create an inclusive government with the Taliban” through political negotiations, he explained, but what’s unacceptable is an Afghan government marked by “extremism and fundamentalism” that would pose a grave threat not just to Afghanistan but to the region and the wider world.

Yet the Taliban’s sweeping military offensive in recent weeks suggests that the group is in no mood for talks. Its forces have seized provincial capitals, stoking fears among Western leaders and locals alike that the Taliban’s brutal reign could soon return. On Tuesday, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and fellow political leaders reportedly agreed to arm civilian forces to resist the Taliban’s advances.

Massoud reflected on what brought Afghanistan to this perilous point and outlined the way forward for a peace process he believes has failed. The 32-year-old is among the prominent voices pushing for the resurrection of a coalition of anti-Taliban ethnic militias akin to the Northern Alliance of the late 1990s.

Here are some key takeaways from our interview:

The case for decentralization

As a result of the corruption and misrule stemming from the country’s heavily centralized system of governance and security, Massoud argued, the Afghan government has failed to win the population’s backing. As the Taliban goes on the offensive, he said, “people do not trust that the system will be able to save them.” A diverse, multiethnic society like Afghanistan’s needs a decentralized political system and armed forces, he contended.

Effectively fighting extremism requires empowering local anti-Taliban militias, Massoud argued, noting that the Afghan army, which he characterized as “one of the biggest achievements of the past two decades,” is at risk of being exhausted in its struggle with the Taliban. In fact, he added, reform-minded local military and political leaders resisting the militant group are “actually the backbone of the government right now.”

How to get the Taliban to negotiate

Massoud believes the only way the Taliban can play a role in Afghanistan’s future is if its members cease fighting—a message he says regional powers must help deliver. “It is [the Taliban] who are spreading the fire, not us,” he stated.

That, however, is a daunting task. Massoud explained that today’s Taliban fighters have become “even more radicalized than their fathers who fought in the 90s” thanks to their links with modern jihadist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. “The Taliban have not been reformed,” he asserted.

While he said he respects the US decision to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan, Massoud blamed Afghanistan’s current plight in part on the timing and sequencing of the February 2020 agreement between the US government and the Taliban, which he argued should have come after the Afghan government and the Taliban had reached their own political settlements. As a result, and given the Taliban’s current “momentum,” he said, the talks in Doha between the Taliban and Afghan government are effectively “over” for now.

The most effective way to pressure the Taliban to talk is through deterrence. Once the group’s leaders realize they can’t achieve their goals militarily in Afghanistan, they’ll likely be more open to political dialogue, Massoud maintained. The strongest incentive to dangle before the group, he added, is “regional and international recognition,” which he argued other countries should only grant to the Taliban if they come to power through peace talks or elections rather than war.

Watch the full interview

Kamal Alam is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a special adviser and representative of the Massoud Foundation, of which Ahmad Massoud is the president.

An interview with Afghanistan human rights defender Horia Mosadiq

By South Asia Center

Afghanistan human rights defender Horia Mosadiq provides an analysis of the current situation for human rights defenders and other civil society actors on the ground.

Afghanistan Human Rights

New Atlanticist Aug 6, 2021

Don’t lose Afghanistan

By James Cunningham, Hugo Llorens, Ronald Neumann, Richard Olson, and Earl Anthony Wayne

Given the Taliban’s behavior lately, US President Joe Biden’s decision to rapidly withdraw US forces from Afghanistan appears increasingly questionable. It’s time for a course correction involving redoubled efforts to support the Afghan security forces—particularly through airpower, which is immediately critical.

Afghanistan Conflict

SouthAsiaSource Aug 3, 2021

On the frontline: Protecting Afghanistan’s human rights defenders

By Atlantic Council

Despite being on the receiving end of threats, harassment, intimidation, violence, and assassinations, Afghanistan’s human rights defenders continue to fight for the rights of Afghans. Join the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center for a discussion with some of Afghanistan’s leading human rights defenders and experts to explore what lies ahead for the activists who put their lives on the line to fight violence, impunity, and militancy.

Afghanistan Civil Society

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Learn more

all on Afghanistan

SouthAsiaSource Blog

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Alam quoted in TRT World: Why is the Taliban looking unstoppable in Afghanistan?

aatique — Wed, 11 Aug 2021 01:56:55 +0000

Original source

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Samad joins Al Jazeera to discuss the Taliban’s gain/balance of power in Afghanistan

aatique — Tue, 10 Aug 2021 19:55:11 +0000

Original source

The post Samad joins Al Jazeera to discuss the Taliban’s gain/balance of power in Afghanistan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

An interview with Afghanistan human rights defender Horia Mosadiq

South Asia Center — Mon, 09 Aug 2021 17:47:29 +0000

Horia Mosadiq is an Afghan human rights activist, political analyst and journalist. She has faced personal threats for her work as an activist and journalist. Horia is currently working with the Afghan Women’s Network in Afghanistan mobilising women across the country to respond to the peace negotiations and was previously with Amnesty International for almost ten years. You can follow her work on Twitter at @Hmosadiq.

The conversation was moderated by Harris Samad, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW

HS: Can you give us a quick appraisal of the situation for human rights defenders and other civil society actors on the ground?

HM: The immediate situation for human rights defenders and civil society activists is quite grim because of the ongoing Taliban insurgency across Afghanistan and their control over various towns and townships. They have made advances in several provinces where they have created blockades, so many people are stuck, including many human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society activists.

The number of deliberate and targeted attacks against human rights defenders and civil society activists have also increased significantly since the US-Taliban peace agreement was signed in February 2020. In 2019 and 2018 we had 4 causalities per year. In 2020, 18 activists and human rights defenders were killed along with 3 of their family members. And these are only the cases that we know about and have documented. 2021 has so far been worse than 2020, with the number of deliberate, targeted attacks against women rights defenders, human rights defenders, journalists, and other media–particularly by shooting or magnetic or sticky bombs–increasing significantly.

HS: Are there any other groups being targeted who perhaps the media does not cover as much?

HM: The attacks that happen the big cities, for example in Kabul, in Kandahar, in Nangahar, in Mazar-i-Sharif, always at least make the local news, even if they don’t make international headlines. But there are so many other provinces, places like Uruzgan, Badghis, Faryab, Sar-e Pol, Kunar, Nuristan, where it is very hard to know if and when such attacks are happening because they are not being reported.

HS: What has been the impact of the wave of assassinations? What are the long-term consequences of silencing HRD’s and other activists?

HM: The immediate impact has been a wave of fear because we suddenly saw that we were being targeted and killed, one after the other. This has also led to some level of censorship and to some people having to flee Afghanistan. What has made these attacks particularly horrifying for many of us is that they are being carried out with total impunity. There have not been any investigations by the Afghan government, nor have any of the perpetrators been prosecuted by the government or by the judiciary. And worst of all, the Taliban has kept denying their involvement in these attacks, even though the reality on the ground is very different from what they are trying to project.

HS: Much of the discourse in the international arena over the last two years has focused on peace and the compromises everyone is making, or perhaps needs to make. How do you see this in relation to what is currently happening on the ground?

HM: It has been really disappointing for us that some Westerners, including some former diplomats, have essentially turned into a public relations team for the Taliban. They are trying to sell this idea that the Taliban have changed and that they are “like-minded Taliban” who are not the same as the ones from the 1990s. We are really struggling to understand how they have come to these conclusions, because what we are seeing on tells a very different story.

There are several issues that I think the international community is either ignoring or over simplifying in this effort to rebrand the Taliban. While it is true that the Taliban have changed, they have actually changed for the worse. This new generation of the Taliban is far more ruthless and cruel than their predecessors back in the 1990s. The older generation had at least seen some peace and stability in Afghanistan before the violence started. Unfortunately, this new generation–the majority of them are under the age of 30–have seen nothing but war and atrocities. They have been brought up in Pakistani madrassas, and they were trained and studied the worst and the harshest form of Sharia.

We’re also concerned that many Westerners are over simplifying this war, claiming that it is just the Kabul elites or the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras who don’t like the Taliban. “Why don’t the Pashtuns have problems with the Taliban?” they ask. However, the Pashtuns are actually paying a much heavier price to the Taliban than many others. In the past 20 years, many Pashtuns— including tribal leaders—have been killed by the Taliban. Pashtun children have been deprived of education, and Pashtun families have been deprived of access to fundamental services such as health care, drinking water, and other humanitarian services. A few weeks ago, we saw the massacre that happened in Spin Boldak. In this incident, the Taliban didn’t show any mercy for a poor comedian who had nothing to do with the international invasion, who had nothing to do with the Afghan government, who didn’t speak out on human rights or democracy or do anything of that sort. He was just a simple comedian. And yet, they brutally tortured and killed him. These types of actions clearly show that it is not just Tajiks, Uzbeks, or Hazaras that have a problem. Pashtuns are also suffering and, in many ways, they are being punished simply because they live in areas that are controlled by the Taliban.

Finally, the international community is also ignoring the role that countries like Pakistan are playing with their proxy war in Afghanistan and with their continued sponsoring of radical and violent extremist groups, which they then export to Afghanistan and across the region

HS: There’s a common comparison between the deteriorating security conditions on the ground today with the way the conflict evolved in the 1990’s. How accurate is this, particularly in relation to HRDs and activists?

HM: I would not say the situations are similar. I was also a journalist and a human rights activist working in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The biggest difference was that back then human rights defenders were not targeted specifically because they were human rights defenders. We did have some cases of attacks against journalists, including Mirwais Jalil, who was killed by Hizb-e-Islami Hekmatyar, but in no way were those attacks comparable to what is happening now. Back then it was a generalized insecurity and generalized human rights violations happening at a very large scale. What is happening today is that people are being categorized and they are being specifically targeted based on those categories. Human rights defenders, civil society activists, and journalists are the first groups being targeted because we are the ones who are speaking out, we are the ones who are connected with the outside world, we are the ones who are raising awareness about the atrocities that are happening inside Afghanistan.

Another difference is that in the 1990s people were fed up with the civil war and the lack of law and order when the Taliban rose up. We wanted someone to come and the Taliban at that time had popular support because they promised that they would disarm the factions, end the fighting, and pave the way for an interim government, a jirga, and for Afghans to elect their own government. They came with a white flag, telling people that we are the messengers of peace. There was almost no resistance. But now the situation has changed. During the 1990s people saw first had that Taliban rule did not peace or disarmament. They were a vicious group with the single objective of destroying and killing whoever stood against them and by the end of the 1990s we all knew that the Taliban are also a gender apartheid regime. There was no space for women in their government or in the society. They simply wiped us out. We didn’t exist for them. We also saw the level of violence that they inflicted on other ethnic and religious groups. The way that they have massacred Hazaras and the way that they discriminated against Hindus and punished them for their religious beliefs, forcing them to put yellow flags on their homes. All of this made people realize that contrary to what the Taliban were claiming, they are not trustworthy.

Today, have a government in Afghanistan. People are enjoying their rights under Afghanistan’s new constitution. People are not being whipped on the streets because they are wearing certain types of clothes, or because they are not going to the mosque five times a day or not growing a beard. People aren’t being whipped on the streets for listening to music, or being amputated in broad daylight in a stadium for stealing a piece of bread. People are not being stoned to death. We have some degree of rights and freedoms, we have free media, and we are enjoying many services that are provided by the government.

HS: What can the international community do to put in place more robust protection measures and mechanisms for the country’s HRDS, journalists, and civil society actors?

HM: There are several things that the international community can do. One of the immediate steps that need to happen is for the international community to put more pressure on the Taliban and on Pakistan. They should hold the Taliban to account for the assassinations and targeted killings of human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society activists. And if the Taliban continue to claim that they are not behind these attacks, they should be forced to publicly state that these acts are unacceptable under any circumstances. Because they have never done that publicly and instead have legitimized those attacks.

The international community also needs to put pressure on the Afghan government to increase accountability for the crimes that are committed against journalists, civil society activists, and human rights defenders. At the end the day, the Afghan government, as our legitimate government, has an obligation and a responsibility to protect the people. The Afghan government did launch a strategy back in 2020 and formed a joint commission for the protection of human rights defenders. The international community needs to ask about what this commission has achieved and what policies and strategies have been implemented. They put pressure on so that we get state protection and that when crimes are committed, they are investigated and the perpetrators are brought to justice.

I also think that the international community has so far failed to allocate enough resources for the protection of human rights defenders and journalists. As soon as the peace talks with the Taliban were sorted, much of the focus went into the efforts around peacebuilding. They automatically forgot about human rights, democratic values and the protection of human rights defenders. This needs to be brought back to the top of the agenda, with the international community providing not only financial but also political support. Things like granting of emergency visas for those who are at risk. As someone who is working on a daily basis with journalists and human rights defenders on the ground, I can assure you that most people don’t want to leave Afghanistan and seek asylum. But it is really important that there at least be some guarantees in place that if and when the situation gets worse, when someone is at immediate and imminent risk, they should have the option to leave Afghanistan and go somewhere safe until the threat is mitigated.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Learn more

New Atlanticist Aug 6, 2021

Don’t lose Afghanistan

By James Cunningham, Hugo Llorens, Ronald Neumann, Richard Olson, and Earl Anthony Wayne

Afghanistan Conflict

Interview Aug 5, 2021

Interview with Monera Yousufzada, former Afghan deputy minister of defense

By Fariba Pajooh

Munira Yousefzada, former Afghan deputy minister of defense, joins Fariba Pajooh for an interview about the ongoing situation in Afghanistan and the peace process.

Afghanistan Human Rights

Feature Apr 22, 2021

A transatlantic charter for peace and security in Afghanistan

By South Asia Center

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center presents the exclusive launch of the Transatlantic Charter on Afghanistan as part of the Strategic Dialogues on and with Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

all on afghanistan

southasiasource blog

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Nooruddin joins Ankasam to discuss the Kashmir issue

Atlantic Council — Mon, 02 Aug 2021 13:56:28 +0000

original source

The post Nooruddin joins Ankasam to discuss the Kashmir issue appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fontenrose quoted in The Manoment Current on the withdrawal of US troops in Iraq

Atlantic Council — Wed, 28 Jul 2021 20:14:00 +0000

Original Source

The post Fontenrose quoted in The Manoment Current on the withdrawal of US troops in Iraq appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Garlauskas participates in Korea Economic Institute of America webinar: When is the right moment for an end of war declaration?

Sanghyun Han — Tue, 27 Jul 2021 18:10:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On July 27, Markus Garlauskas participated in a webinar held by the Korea Economic Institute of America titled, “When is the Right Moment for an End of War Declaration?” as a panelist in a discussion on what an official end of war declaration between the ROK and DPRK would mean for the peninsula as well as the the Indo-Pacific region, and to elaborate on the theories underlying the proposal and its prospective ramifications.

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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Slavin quoted in VOA Russia on the withdrawal of American troops in Iraq

Atlantic Council — Tue, 27 Jul 2021 17:26:00 +0000

Original Source

The post Slavin quoted in VOA Russia on the withdrawal of American troops in Iraq appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Garlauskas joins ROK-US Alliance Peace Conference co-hosted by Korean Defense Veterans Association and Korea-US Alliance Foundation

Sanghyun Han — Sat, 24 Jul 2021 16:41:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On July 28, Markus Garlauskas spoke on a panel in the ROK-U.S. Alliance Peace Conference hosted by the Korea Defense Veterans Association (KDVA) and the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation (KUSAF) at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC. Garlauskas emphasized that strengthening deterrence against coercion by North Korea and China is a critical task for the ROK-US alliance and is vital for maintaining peace and security in the region.

A recording of the event can be accessed here.

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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Infrastructure cooperation could hold the key to Armenia’s future security

Ani Yeghiazaryan — Tue, 20 Jul 2021 19:58:36 +0000

As the South Caucasus looks to move on following last year’s Nagorno-Karabakh War, shared infrastructure projects could help foster greater regional stability and improve the chances for a sustainable peace. In particular, Armenia could benefit from participation in the ambitious Middle Corridor international railway infrastructure initiative, which envisages a transit route stretching from China to Europe via Turkey.

The almost 9,000 kilometer proposed route of the Middle Corridor includes stretches in Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is hoping to convince Beijing that the corridor can serve as one of the main routes for China’s One Belt, One Road drive. This would strengthen the Turkish position as a regional energy, trade, and economic hub while deepening the country’s ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia regions, which Ankara regards as areas of vital national interest.

According to Turkish officials, as well as potentially helping to establish Turkey as one of the world’s top ten economies, the Middle Corridor initiative could also significantly reduce transit time between China and European markets. The corridor offers the possibility of a 12-day freight time frame. This compares favorably to the 20-day travel time via Russia or more than 30 days via existing maritime options. The Middle Corridor would also benefit from modern infrastructure and relatively favorable terrain.

Turkey argues that the route has significant geopolitical advantages over alternative corridors passing through Russia and Iran, which both currently have tense relations with the Western world. Concerns exist that a future worsening of these ties could have a negative impact on the transit of freight through either country to the West. Erdogan also sees the Middle Corridor initiative as a way of promoting the delivery of Central Asian gas to Turkey and Europe.

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Given the importance of the Middle Corridor initiative for Turkey, it is no surprise that Erdogan is interested in establishing a lasting peace in the South Caucasus region following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. This is vital for his ongoing efforts to persuade the Chinese that the South Caucasus is the most profitable transit route to Europe.

In order to strengthen his argument, Erdogan is reportedly now trying to initiate a new branch of the Middile Corridor in the South Caucasus. In addition to the envisaged Georgian Corridor, the Turkish leader seeks to add an alternative Armenian Corridor (Syunik Corridor), which would have transport and energy components. During a recent visit to Azerbaijan, Erdogan spoke about the need to create a Six-Country Regional Cooperation Platform featuring Armenia, Iran, Georgia, Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan. He also noted that tensions between Georgia and Russia are problematic.

The Turkish leader appears to be concerned over the potential for a serious crisis in Georgian-Russian relations and the threat this would pose to existing oil, gas, and rail infrastructure running through Georgia. This is one of the reasons why there is now active discussion over the need for an additional Armenian Corridor.

It is preferable for Turkey that any future railway and gas pipeline from China and Central Asia pass through south Armenia rather than the north of the country, despite the fact that the southern route is longer. This would help to integrate Azerbaijan’s isolated Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic into the infrastructure of the wider region, while also not requiring the full normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations.

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Armenian involvement in the Middle Corridor initiative would strengthen Turkish claims that the South Caucasus region is a reliable transit route. Prior to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Turkey had struggled to overcome Chinese concerns regarding the possibility of a fresh conflict in the South Caucasus. The post-war environment now creates opportunities to develop the Middle Corridor with renewed vigor.

Turkey’s geopolitical interest in the stability of the South Caucasus represents a trump card for Armenia as the country seeks stability and security after war. It creates the basis for pragmatic dialog with Turkey towards mutually benefitial cooperation.

The potential advantages for Armenia of participation in the Middle Corridor are considerable. It would generate welcome additional revenues for the country while also creating trade opportunities and helping with the diversification of energy supplies. Crucially, the corridor would also increase Armenia’s regional and geopolitical role while dramatically boosting interdependence between the countries of the region, thereby decreasing the likelihood of a return to open conflict.

This makes it hard to argue with recent Turkish statements that Armenia and the Armenian people will have the most to benefit from deeper international cooperation in the South Caucasus. International infrastructure initiatives such as the Middle Corridor and Persian Gulf–Black Sea International Transport and Transit Corridor offer Armenia a viable route towards greater security and prosperity.

Ani Yeghiazaryan is a doctoral candidate at the Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena, Germany.

Former fellow

M. Lyla Kohistany

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Nusairat quoted in the Middle East Eye on Jordan’s economic situation

Atlantic Council — Mon, 19 Jul 2021 15:37:00 +0000

Original Source

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Alam quoted in TRT World: What are Afghanistan’s political scenarios as the Taliban makes new gains?

Atlantic Council — Thu, 15 Jul 2021 20:00:00 +0000

Original source

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Event recap: The importance of inclusivity in the Afghan peace process

Fahim Ahmad — Mon, 12 Jul 2021 13:21:47 +0000

On June 24, 2021, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Afghanistan’s Mechanism for Inclusive Peace (AMIP) hosted a discussion on the importance of inclusivity in the Afghan peace process. This distinguished panel included Masood Karokhail, Director and Co-Founder of The Liason Office and Co-Director of AMIP; Mariam Safi, Founding Director of the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS) and Co-Director of AMIP; Sayed Hussain Anosh, Executive Director of Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN) and Member of the Steering Committee of AMIP; Lema Anwari, Core Member of Women’s Regional Network and Member of the Steering Committee of AMIP, and Dr Antje Herrberg, Senior Mediation Advisor at the European External Action Service. The discussion was moderated by Marika Theros, Senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Ms Mariam Safi described the work of Afghanistan Mechanism for Inclusive Peace (AMIP) in detail stating that the organization is an independent entity which began its work in the Spring of 2019. It was created by a consortium of Afghan Civil Society Organizations spearheaded by a steering committee of Civil Society actors, both from Kabul and other city centers, and aimed to fill the gap of making sure that critical analysis on important issues was shared with the peace negotiation parties including the Afghanistan government and the Taliban. AMIP also holds talks with both the Taliban and the Afghan government related to the role and representation of the civil society in the Afghan Peace talks to make sure that ordinary Afghan voices are heard at the negotiation table.

Through joint action plans, draft agreements, position papers, summaries of consultations, and expert witnesses, AMIP, the general assembly, and local presence make sure that they reach every part of Afghanistan including areas under Taliban control in order to streamline civil society perspectives into track 1. AMIP also works with various partner organizations including civil society and the media to facilitate and organize events that gather women, youth, minorities, religion scholars, and victims of war crimes to share their voices and get an inclusive representation at the negotiation table. As articulated by one of the participants from AMIP events, “A peace in which Afghans do not see their own reflection is one that will not be sustainable.”

Challenges facing the peace process

Mr Masood Karokhail further mentioned that the stalemate with the peace talks and the rising insecurity and violence in Afghanistan–including targeted assassinations–posed a great challenge for civil societies to come together and work in a constructive manner to channel local voices. While Mr Karokhail is hesitantly optimistic that the peace talks will resume in Doha as both the Taliban and the Afghan government have agreed on the basic agenda for the talks, the imminent US withdrawal in September and the lack of a negotiated political settlement on the ground make the future look grim and uncertain. He pointed out that military operations on the ground directly impact negotiation in Doha.

Karokhail further iterated that the continuation of violence on the ground, regardless of who is committing it, is diminishing local hopes for a sustainable peace settlement and that there is an urgent need for a long-term ceasefire that would eventually pave the way for a political settlement.

The role of youth and women in the peace process

Lema Anwari then pointed out that despite Afghan women being the most affected in Afghanistan, they lack proper representation and are systematically excluded from the peace talks with only four women representatives included in the negotiation team.. She emphasized that it is not only the Taliban who disregard Afghan women in mainstream political and social decisions, but also the male-dominated political and social system that have sidelined Afghan women. As Afghan women represent half of the Afghan population, Ms Anwari believes that they should be meaningfully included in the peace and decision making process. In the last twenty years, Afghan women have built strong grassroot activism and movements with access to a large portion of the population, thereby equipping them with leverage to effectively contribute to and facilitate the peace process.

How does AMIP reach out to communities under Taliban control

Sayed Hussain Anosh described that there exists a big rural-urban gap and the lack of proper government institutions in the rural areas make it difficult for marginalized communities to access various services including education. Not having access to information is yet another challenge facing rural communities. This coupled with the lack of government presence in rural areas leave those communities with no choice but to live under Taliban control. He believes that the Taliban is effectively utilizing this vacuum to gain control over rural areas. According to the AMIP surveys conducted among local minorities, more than fifty percent do not feel they are represented in the process. Minority groups are being targeted indiscriminately as evidenced by the recent attack on Afghans girls school. Hence, Mr Anosh underscores that peace is only viable when conflicting parties listen to the public and include them in the proces.

Global perspective on inclusivity and the design for inclusive outcome

In the case of Afghanistan, Dr Herrberg urges us to first identify whether the current process is really a peace process. She maintains that the peace mediation teams cannot practically ensure that every voice is heard, however, external independent mechanisms and structures like AMIP can ensure that voices are heard. First, structure and expert design ensures that inclucisity is part of the overall strategy. Second, empowerment which appreciates and gives opportunity for voices to be heard including bringing testimonies and not just criticizing. Third, giving legitimacy and a mandate to an organization that facilitates the negotiation process such as AMIP. Four, giving value and proper recognition within the structure. The last aspect is the provision of funding and resources that will help execute these efforts more effectively.

Amid the uncertainties facing the peace process in Afghanistan, organizations like AMIP play a crucial role in ensuring that the voices of those most affected–including women, youth, and minorities–are properly channelled and heard at the negotiation table.

Fahim Ahmad is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on greater South Asia as well as its relations between these countries, the neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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The Afghanistan Mechanism for Inclusive Peace (AMIP) is an open, accessible, Afghan-driven mechanism that will provide a structured, neutral and non-partisan way for the Afghan public to play an active and central role in building a significantly more inclusive peace process and peace.

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Webinar: The importance of inclusivity in the Afghan peace process

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Afghanistan Mechanism for Inclusive Peace (AMIP) host a conversation on the importance of an inclusive peace process in Afghanistan that truly reflects the people whom it represents.

SouthAsiaSource Apr 14, 2021

“Expediting” the peace process degrades the conceptual integrity of peace

By Muska Dastageer

The United States must realize that securing a peace as just as the Afghan war has been unjust will require time. Degrading the conceptual integrity of peace has meant a dilution of the moral force behind the peace process.

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

SouthAsiaSource Mar 8, 2021

The war on Afghanistan’s journalists

By *Popal

In recent months, Afghan journalists and media workers have been subjected to unprecedented levels of attacks. In just four months, twelve journalists have been killed and many more have been targeted. The chilling effect of this violence is the creation of a kind of fear that we have never felt before.

Afghanistan Human Rights

SouthAsiaSource Feb 25, 2021

Afghans’ views on the Doha peace process and the Biden administration’s review of the US-Taliban peace agreement

By Makhfi Azizi

Over the last two years, many experts in Afghanistan and the international community have increasingly viewed the 2020 US-Taliban peace deal to be largely skewed to advantage the Taliban. The Biden administration’s step to review the agreement has thus been welcomed by many. In this blog, five Afghans who have lived under the increased threats and violence of the past year share their perspectives.

Afghanistan Human Rights

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SOUTHASIASOURCE BLOG

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Letter in support of the Afghan people by friends of Afghanistan: As US and NATO forces withdraw, we must not abandon the Afghan people and their democratic republic

ksarkar — Wed, 30 Jun 2021 15:11:49 +0000

Download the PDF

This letter is organized by a coalition of Afghan women and friends of Afghanistan. The Afghan Women’s Network together with a larger coalition of Our Voices – Our Future and Together Stronger work to achieve peace and demand an end to the conflict and an equal representation of women across fields in Afghanistan. We believe in inclusive, just, practical, and sustainable peace in which women are equal citizens of Afghanistan.

We are facing unprecedented times and this past year has been difficult for citizens globally. Today, no matter where we are in the world, we can all relate to feelings of loss, uncertainty and isolation. The pandemic has demonstrated irrefutably that we are all interconnected and that certain challenges can only be addressed if all allies collaborate and act jointly. During his recent visit to Europe, President Biden reaffirmed America’s commitment to NATO and stressed the importance of the trans-Atlantic alliance and capacities of democracies to meet new challenges and threats. Urgent support for our Afghan allies, who are fighting threats against human rights and democratic principles on multiple fronts, must remain a key priority.

Biden’s commitment to NATO comes at a pivotal moment. As US and NATO forces prepare to leave Afghanistan, it is the obligation of all NATO and European countries to continue to strongly stand by our Afghan partners. Our Afghan allies are standing against an emboldened Taliban and militant networks who are using violence to silence and oppress the Afghan people. They are assassinating school girls, women leaders, journalists, judges, doctors, charity workers, teachers, government officials, minorities and even religious scholars. The killing and destruction of the people and institutions that uphold our shared values is not only a threat to the Afghan people who have been our allies for twenty years, but also to our core principles, legitimacy and global security. The Afghan people, just as our other allies, deserve peace, justice, liberty and dignity. We must not abandon the Afghan people and their democratic republic at this critical moment.

EU and NATO countries must come together to demonstrate that we remain steadfast in our commitment to human rights and democracy in Afghanistan, including for Afghan women and minorities and that we will continue to support he Afghan National Security Forces (ANDSF) who are fighting to protect Afghan lives from terrorists as well as work towards our shared security interests. Together, we must:

Re-affirm robust financial support to ANDSF which is the most popular and respected institution in Afghanistan. Technical and financial support, intelligence-sharing, and training and assistance programs are essential for ANDSF to effectively combat terrorism and defend their country. To address concerns around corruption, the international community must immediately develop a joint plan with the ANDSF on a framework that can mitigate corruption and ensure continued support as they work to fill the security vacuum catalysed by the withdrawal.
Continue development assistance to key institutions that deliver basic services. With an emboldened Taliban and their affiliates threatening crucial institutions and civic spaces, it is imperative to support education, health, and community programmes.
Reaffirm support for civil society and human rights. Women and human rights defenders, journalists and media workers, as well as civil society activists, are facing deadly violence daily. Increasing support for these actors is essential.
Continue humanitarian assistance given through international organisations must include a human rights component as a condition. We must ensure that the rights of women, monitories and other vulnerable groups are upheld and protected at all times.
Develop a transatlantic approach to a regional framework at the highest levels of leadership. This will allow for utilizing the full range of levers and bilateral relationships across allies to push regional countries to end ‘spoiler’ actions and influence their proxies.
Support a strong UN role in the Intra-Afghan peace talks to ensure that the peace talks do not fail and will result in a sustainable, just, and inclusive outcome for the Afghan people. To achieve this, a strong and neutral mediator is critical. While the appointment of the personal envoy of the UNSG has been positive, it is paramount that the UN has more power to support the progress of the talks among the two parties in Doha.

The withdrawal of US and NATO troops is not only a defining moment for Afghanistan, it is a test for what our democracies are prepared to champion and can achieve together. Let us fulfill our obligations by preventing further chaos and violence and by making a powerful contribution to peace in Afghanistan and ultimately to our global community. We must keep our promise to the Afghan people and stand with them, shoulder to shoulder, and face what lies ahead together.

Algeria

Hafida Benchehida, Founding member, Mediterranean women mediators network; Founding member, Arab Women Parliamentarians Network for Equity

Argentina

Susana Malcorra, Former Foreign Minister of Argentina & Chief of Staff at the UN Secretary General

Australia/Global

Dr Emma Leslie,Executive Director, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies

Canada

Ambassador William (Bill) Crosbie, Former Ambassador to Afghanistan

Denmark

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs

France

Guissou Jahangiri, Vice President, International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), Executive director of OPEN ASIA | Armanshahr Foundation

Germany

Dr Antje Herrberg, Senior Mediation Advisor, European Union

Italy

Federica Mogherini, Former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice President of the European Commission
Prof. Nathalie Tocci, Director, Instituto Affari Internazionali

Lithuania

Ambassador Vygaudas Usackas, Former Foreign Minister of Lithuania, Ambassador to USA and St. Court of James’s as well as EU ambassador to Afghanistan and Russia

Maldives

Dr Mariyam Shakeela, Chairperson of Addu Women’s Association (AWA); Former Cabinet Minister, Government of the Maldives

Netherlands

Bert Koenders, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

Philippines

Amina Rasul Bernardo, Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID)

Poland

Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland 1995 – 2005

United Kingdom

Ahmad Masood Amer, Executive Director, Centre for Afghanistan Policy Studies
Lieutenant General Sir James Benjamin Dutton, Royal Marines Officer, former Governor of Gibraltar
Lieutenant General Sir James Jeffrey Corfield Bucknall, KCB, CBE, Retired British Army officer and former Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
Baroness Mary Goudie, Member of the House of Lords
The Rt Hon Baroness Frances D’Souza, Member of the House of Lords
The Rt Hon Baroness Fiona Hodgson OF Abinger, Member of the House of Lords
Sahar Halaimzai, Time4Real Peace; Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
The Rt Hon Baroness Arminka Helic, Member of the House of Lords
Zainab Homam, CEO of Afghan Action U.K.
Prof. Mary Kaldor, Director, Conflict and Civil Society Research Programme, LSE
Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Cameron Maxwell Lamb KBE, CMG, DSO, Former Commander of the Field Army at Land Command
General Sir John Chalmers McColl, KCB, CBE, DSO, KStJ, Senior British Army officer, former Lieutenant Governor of Jersey. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 2007-2011
Homa Hoodfar, Interim International Director, Women living under Muslim Laws
The Rt Hon John Montague, 11th Earl of Sandwich, Member of the House of Lords
General Sir Nicholas Ralph Parker, KCB, CBE, Former Commander of Land Armies
Sir William Patey KCMG, Former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Sudan
General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, Former Chief of the Defence Staff
Major General Andy Salmon, CMG, OBE, Retired Royal Marines officer, former Commandant General Royal Marines
Marika Theros, Policy Fellow, LSE Ideas; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Tom Tugendhat, Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee
Dr Rim Turkmani, Research Director, Conflict Research Programme – Syria, LSE IDEAS
Rahela Sidiqi, Founder & Director, Rahela Trust

United States

Sanam Anderlini, Women Alliance for Security Leadership
Arash Azizzada, Afghans For A Better Tomorrow
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Former US ambassador to Afghanistan
Ambassador James Cunningham, Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Israel, and the United Nations
Rose Gottemoeller, Deputy Secretary General, NATO
Tanya Henderson, Executive Director, Mina’s List
Ambassador Hugo Llorens, US Spécial Chargé D’Affaires Afghanistan 2016-17, and Assistant Chief of Mission in Kabul (2012-13)
Ambassador P. Michael McKinley, Former US ambassador to Afghanistan
Ambassador Ron Neumann, Former US ambassador to Afghanistan
Annie Pforzheimer, Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Afghanistan
David Sedney, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, U.S. Department of Defense
Ellie Smeal, President, Feminist Majority Foundation
Ambassador Melanne Verveer, Executive director, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security
Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne, Formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, Ambassador to Argentina, Mexico, and Deputy Ambassador to Afghanistan

Global/Organizations

Afghan American Women Association (A-AWA)
Afghan American Foundation
Afghan Women’s Organization Refugee and Immigrant Services
Alliance in Support of the Afghan People
Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan
Global Alliance of Regional Women Mediators networks
International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN)
The Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL)
Women for Peace and Participation, UK
United Women for Peace members, Network of women peacebuilders in the Diaspora and countries
Women Mediators Across the Commonwealth (WMC) Network
Women’s Regional Network, Rukshanda Naz, President (Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan)

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Learn more

A transatlantic charter for peace and security on Afghanistan

Supporting peace, security, and sovereignty in Afghanistan The participants of the Atlantic Council / Rockefeller Brothers Fund Strategic Dialogues have been working for the past eight months to develop a long-term strategic outlook to promote stability in Afghanistan consistent with Afghan, US, and European interests and values. This group of distinguished European, American, and Afghan diplomats, military officers, scholars, and analysts brought to our deliberations a deep understanding of the context both on the ground and among the allies. We explored a diplomatic-security framework based on the minimal conditions and variables necessary to realize a long-term vision of a sovereign, unified, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous Afghanistan and generated recommendations to support this vision.

All on Afghanistan

Strategic Dialogues on afghanistan

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Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding

Africa Center — Wed, 30 Jun 2021 03:53:00 +0000

On Tuesday, June 29, the Africa Center convened a private event with award-winning author and Barnard College, Columbia University Professor Séverine Autesserre. The discussion centered around her recently published book The Frontlines of Peace, which examines the well-intentioned, but inherently flawed, top-down nature of international peacebuilding (referred to by the author as ‘Peace Inc.’) and posits that peace is actually achieved and maintained through grassroots efforts created, managed, and led by local actors. The Africa Center conversation focused on examples of localized and international peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somaliland.

Africa Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region as well as former US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, moderated the conversation, opening with a discussion on the evolution of Prof. Autesserre’s distinguished career from identifying flaws in international peacebuilding norms and practices to offering an alternative localized solution, noting that her often provocative work has influenced policy discussions at some of the highest levels in international organizations and governments.

In Prof. Autesserre’s remarks, she highlighted the need to move peacebuilding away from the traditional practices of premature elections and a focus on elite-bargaining, towards a process that is locally led and prioritizes local definitions of peace, democracy, and justice. She also spoke of the growing support for localized peace processes but noted that international organizations often merely “talk the talk” when it comes to supporting genuinely locally driven peace processes.

Prof. Autesserre also engaged on the role of locally led peace processes in Idjwi (DRC), Somaliland, and lessons that can be brought from these contexts to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), whose annual mandate renews on June 30 and which Amb. Pham noted, has “found progress difficult to come by” despite the “billions of dollars spent since 2013 and the hundreds of lives lost, making MINUSMA the deadliest ‘peacekeeping’ mission in the world today.”

Samad joins CGTN America to discuss Afghanistan-US ties

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:51:14 +0000

original source

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Nawaz joins the Hudson Institute to discuss US-Pakistan relations after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:09:14 +0000

original source

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Schultz in War on the Rocks reviewing new memoir on the plight of US interpreters in Iraq

Atlantic Council — Fri, 25 Jun 2021 20:12:48 +0000

Original Source

On June 25, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Tammy S. Schultz published a book review with Noah Ramsey in War on the Rocks titled “Interpreters on the run: Baghdad underground railroad.” Schultz, the Director of National Security and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Marine Corps War College, reviews Steve Miska’s book, Baghdad Underground Railroad, a memoir about the connection developed between US units and their translators, and discusses the violence perpetrated against Iraqis who worked as US interpreters during the Iraq war since US forces withdrew from the country, a fate now facing similar translators in Afghanistan.

I was proud as an Afghan to hear [a Kabul elder] say, ‘We have a responsibility as Afghans to do something.’ But then I also felt really proud as an American, especially as an American woman, to hear that man say, look at these women!

Lyla Kohistany

Former fellow

M. Lyla Kohistany

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Intelligence

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How Russia, China, and Iran will shape Afghanistan’s future

Nilofar Sakhi — Fri, 18 Jun 2021 16:44:16 +0000

A new phase of regional cooperation is in bloom following US President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw all US troops from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, revitalizing efforts to develop consensus around common security challenges. Officials from Islamabad, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are meeting or plan to meet with the leadership of the Taliban and Afghan government, in addition to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s consultations with Afghan and Pakistani leaders and the March conferences in Moscow and Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

There can be no sustained solution to the Afghan war without a national consensus on a political roadmap for the country. Still, these regional efforts are a parallel and crucial phase of the political peace process because the conflict in Afghanistan is multidimensional. Each country in the region has specific interests that influence its engagement in Afghanistan’s future, and the relations of regional powers demonstrate the realpolitik at play.

In particular, Russia, China, and Iran have much to gain (or lose) from Afghanistan’s peace process. In recent years, they have been directly involved in Afghan politics: both formally, through state-to-state diplomatic relationships, and informally, through support to various political factions. Russia and Iran have become more proactive regional players in Afghan affairs since the start of the Afghan peace process in 2018. Additionally, China’s partnerships with these countries will further define the Afghanistan that emerges after the US military withdrawal.

Russia and China: hegemonic allies and rivals

In the context of great-power politics, Russia has consistently expanded its influence in Central Asia. The US troop withdrawal has further motivated Russia to expand its military presence in the region. Moscow’s engagement in the Afghan peace process and its involvement in regional platforms—particularly through the Troika-plus grouping of the United States, Russia, China, and Pakistan—has more to do with the threats it faces from Afghanistan’s insecurity, religious extremism, drug production, and drug trafficking. At this point, the primary concern of Russia and Central Asian countries is their own security; they want to be sure that Afghanistan’s post-US withdrawal insurgency or political instability will not cross their borders. Russia will likely find ways to work with the Taliban, which many expect to hold power (either formally or informally) in the new Afghanistan.

The US withdrawal and potential power vacuum that results in the region will allow Russia to establish a geopolitical foothold in Afghanistan. For this purpose, it has already started building relationships with Afghan political factions. Russia still sees itself as a regional hegemon and views the US departure as an opportunity to revitalize its role and expand its power by building alliances in the region, particularly with China.

Beijing’s major interest of securing economic gains can be achieved by using Afghanistan’s position as a regional connector in either the Belt and Road Initiative or China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In addition, since 2007 China has been seeking ways to extract Afghanistan’s vast mineral wealth, which requires security and transportation infrastructure. None of this is possible without a stable Afghanistan, so China is still assessing the political landscape in Afghanistan and what it can gain from a peace deal.

Following the rule of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” both Beijing and Moscow are eager to undermine Washington. China and Russia are now more aligned than they’ve been since the mid-1950s. With a commitment to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, these countries will expand their political outreach to the region through bilateral and trilateral agreements, well aware that, historically, romances among global powers do not last for long. For now, both Beijing and Moscow will maintain a presence in Afghanistan to prevent the potential threats that instability in the country could pose to their security.

Though neither country wants an Islamic Emirate nearby, they may still agree to such a system if it serves their interests. That requires maintaining a relationship with the Taliban.

Iran: the power player

Like Russia, Iran, one of the most influential regional actors in Afghanistan, has always seen Afghanistan as a threat to its security but also as an opportunity to expand trade and accessibility to Afghan and Central Asian markets. Iran never wanted a long-term US presence in Afghanistan and has targeted the United States with both soft and hard power. Iran opposed the Bilateral Security Agreement negotiated between Afghanistan and the United States, while also supporting anti-US insurgents. Tehran has substantial security interests in Afghanistan and has fought Islamic State Khorasan Province there by sending its Fatemiyoun Brigade, which has recruited Afghan Shia fighters in the past. Iran will strive to maintain its access to the Afghan market, promote Shia ideology there, and address transnational threats such as militancy, drug trafficking, and insurgency. It tends to work quietly in the country, using soft power to spread its influence.

Despite their shared views about US troops, Russia doesn’t want a powerful Iran countering its own regional influence. Another concern for Russia is US-Iran rapprochement, which could undermine and marginalize Russia’s influence.

With the US troop withdrawal, Iran will have more direct influence in Afghanistan and will aim to protect its interests by building alliances with regional powers, particularly China and Russia. A deal signed between Iran and China promising $400 billion in Chinese investment is the second Chinese partnership in the region after China’s collaboration with Russia. Though the China-Iran relationship is growing, Beijing will be careful to not allow that partnership to risk its relationships with oil-rich Gulf Arab states.

Though deals between the regional powers might not have a direct impact on Afghanistan in the near future, in the long term they will influence Afghan power dynamics, especially considering that the China-Iran agreement includes deepening military cooperation through intelligence-sharing. In addition, these deals, if sustained, will strengthen cooperation between China and Iran, which, in principle, oppose US dominance in the region.

What’s next?

The China-Iran bilateral agreement and China-Russia comprehensive partnership create the conditions for a triangular partnership among all three countries, which could determine the security architecture of the region. China, Russia, and Iran likely would never invade Afghanistan, but they will use it as a battlefield for their strategic competition with the United States. Additionally, knowing that Afghanistan will face long-term instability, these countries fear that the US withdrawal will destabilize the region and present them with transnational threats.

In such a context, a continued US partnership with Afghanistan through development and diplomacy, intelligence-sharing, and other forms of cooperation would prevent Afghanistan from becoming a harbor for terrorists and allow Washington to maintain a base in the region to counter its regional rivals. To maintain regional order, multilateral diplomacy should proceed with US engagement—not abandonment—of the region.

In addition, the peace process should include Iran, Russia, and China so that they can negotiate their interests with Afghan political factions and offer their resources to advance Afghanistan’s peace and stability. This will ultimately serve the economic and security interests of everyone.

Nilofar Sakhi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the director of policy and diplomacy at McColm & Company.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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Biden’s Europe trip can help secure Afghanistan’s future. Here’s how.

By Earl Anthony Wayne, James B. Cunningham

The democracies meeting this week in Europe should signal continued concrete support for Afghans who do not share the Taliban’s worldview and who seek a peace without a Taliban-imposed regime.

Afghanistan Conflict

New Atlanticist May 18, 2021

An Afghanistan at peace could connect South and Central Asia

By Emily Carll

Afghanistan’s potential as a contributor to development and prosperity in Asia has gone unrealized. If it were a stable neighbor, as the current Afghan peace process is meant to make it, Afghanistan could harness its potential as the “heart of Asia” and connect the South and Central Asian regions.

Afghanistan Central Asia

New Atlanticist May 11, 2021

Afghanistan: What now to avoid disaster?

By James Cunningham, Hugo Llorens, Ronald E. Neumann, Richard Olson, and Earl Anthony Wayne

Avoiding complete defeat for US goals after the military withdrawal will require swift, coordinated action from Washington. Five former top US diplomats to Afghanistan reveal how to do it.

Afghanistan Conflict

All on Afghanistan

The post How Russia, China, and Iran will shape Afghanistan’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The importance of inclusivity in the Afghan peace process

Atlantic Council — Mon, 14 Jun 2021 18:49:48 +0000

Following the appointment of US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad as well as a readiness to negotiate an agreement with the Taliban in 2018, the Afghan peace process gained considerable speed. This political momentum led to the mobilization of civil society organizations – in particular, women networks and activists, who welcomed the start of the talks but also remained cautious of what this peace could mean for Afghan society and its inclusion in the peace process.

Inclusivity is a difficult concept to deconstruct. First, every voice is important and must be heard, but not everyone can sit at the table. Second, in a peace process, local voices tend to be politicized by the parties and stakeholders involved, where each takes into consideration those views that support their mandate while rejecting the rest as un-representative.

The subsequent US-Taliban agreement illuminated a gap amidst the ongoing and impressive efforts of civil society actors. That gap was the absence of a technical mechanism that could act as an interface to bridge the track I negotiations with civil society, grassroots actors, and the rest of the Afghan population in a structured, systematic, and non-partisan manner. Calls for inclusion led to the creation of Afghanistan Mechanism for Inclusive Peace (AMIP).

This webinar was hosted together by the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Afghanistan Mechanism for Inclusive Peace (AMIP) on Thursday, June 24 at 10:00 AM US ET / 6:30 PM KBT for a conversation on the importance of an inclusive peace process in Afghanistan that truly reflects the people whom it represents.

Featuring

Masood Karokhail
Director and Co-Founder
The Liaison Office (TLO)

Mariam Safi
Founding Director
Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS)

Sayed Hussain Anosh
Executive Director
Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN)

Lema Anwari
Core Member
Women’s Regional Network

Antje Herrberg
Senior Mediation Advisor
European External Action Service

Moderated by

Marika Theros
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Learn more

explore AMIP

Online Event Thu, April 1, 2021 • 9:00 am ET

Whose voices count on Afghanistan? The politics of knowledge production

A discussion on the politics of knowledge production in Afghanistan and how we can make the policy space more representative and reflective of the peoples, histories, and realities on the ground.

Afghanistan South Asia

SouthAsiaSource Apr 14, 2021

“Expediting” the peace process degrades the conceptual integrity of peace

By Muska Dastageer

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

SouthAsiaSource Mar 8, 2021

The war on Afghanistan’s journalists

By *Popal

Afghanistan Human Rights

SouthAsiaSource Feb 25, 2021

Afghans’ views on the Doha peace process and the Biden administration’s review of the US-Taliban peace agreement

By Makhfi Azizi

Afghanistan Human Rights

All on afghanistan

southasiasource blog

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Wechsler quoted in Inside Arabia on the Abraham Accords

Atlantic Council — Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:14:00 +0000

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RESISTANCE 2.0 – A military framework to deter a Taliban military takeover and engage the United States and the region on counter-terrorism and peace for Afghanistan

Tamim Asey — Thu, 10 Jun 2021 15:03:52 +0000

If the past four decades of fighting have taught us anything, it is that there is no military solution to the current Afghan conflict. For a diverse and pluralistic country, the only way to achieve peace and stability is through a political settlement.

And yet, in the wake of the US military’s departure, Afghans are already mobilizing and re-arming themselves, preparing in case peace talks fail and the Taliban pursue victory through a military strategy. Strongmen are re-emerging and the militia-making industry is back in business with full force. Already, the country is awash with weapons and ammunition, enough to meet the requirements of a prolonged war. Additionally, given that the conflict has deep foreign drivers on top of internal facilitators, a re-eruption of violence would no doubt lead regional sponsors to step in to secure their borders and geopolitical interests by sponsoring and arming proxy groups.

There is precedence in modern Afghan history for such a defense strategy against the Taliban. In 1996, anti-Taliban figures and groups, with the help of the region and specifically the axis of Russia – Iran – India, put up a national resistance against the Taliban in northern, central and western Afghanistan. Since then, many of these strongmen have been part of the establishment and political order of post 9/11 Afghanistan. Many of them also believe that the Taliban only understand the language of power and that it is time for Afghans to unite against the group. They are now organizing and mobilizing to stage what they call a “second national resistance” in partnership with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The untimely withdrawal of US and NATO forces has induced former political rivals to join forces and form a united front.

In this context, the Taliban have a choice: make peace or face a prolonged civil war akin to Syria and Libya. The departure of US-NATO troops has emboldened them, leading them to believe that they can topple the government in Kabul. However, if history is any guide, this is a strategic miscalculation that would plunge Afghanistan into a civil war with regional and global spillover effects.

As Afghans mobilize, Western intelligence agencies are also recalibrating their approach and programs towards Afghanistan. Importantly, they are preparing for the reality of having no eyes and ears on the ground to assist them with counter-terrorism and other regional geopolitical rivalries. They share with Afghanistan’s neighbors an interest in preventing Afghanistan’s descent into chaos and the return of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate, which could re-ignite the fires of jihad across all across Central and South Asia. Indeed, US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has recently expressed that there is a global and regional consensus against a military takeover by the Taliban, and that the return of an Islamic Emirate is unacceptable both to the region and the world

Meanwhile, as the Pentagon and US Department of State figure out the shape and size of their upcoming over the horizon (OTH) counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan, many military experts and strategists are asking key questions. First, what will this new military strategy look like and what will its core objectives be? Second, what will this strategy cost and how will Afghans support themselves? And finally, who will be the sponsor(s) of this new war and what will it mean for the broader region and the world?

Elements of a deterrence-based military strategy to fend off a Taliban military takeover

The Afghan Taliban need to be deterred militarily from pursuing war in the hope of a victory after the US withdrawal. This requires a holistic and comprehensive military deterrence strategy. Right now, two options are at hand. The first is a state-centric, Bashar al-Assad style resistance of fighting to the last man, which would lead to an ANDSF centric and united military sector pushing back against the Taliban. The other is a series of anti-Taliban groups forming a national military alliance to oppose a Taliban military takeover and preserve the state.

Unlike the Syrian state-centric resistance model, the Afghan model should have the support of a global alliance to deter the Taliban and force them to accept a political settlement. This military deterrence strategy should have four pillars: ground forces provided by the ANDSF and Afghan militias; offshore US air cover and logistical supply chain support; mobilization of Afghan groups in support of ANDSF and the state under the protection and support of regional players; and a robust intelligence apparatus for peace and counter-terrorism.

In addition, the Afghan defense strategy should consist of a three-layered defense system. At its core would be a resized, restructured, more mobile, and offensive ANDSF supported by the United States and NATO (given its years of NATO training and gear). Next would be various anti-Taliban militias who are either supported by the Afghan state or regional players who oppose the return of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. The third layer consists of special operation forces (SOF) which would carry out targeted counter-terrorism operations against foreign fighters who operate under the umbrella of the Taliban. This Afghan defense strategy is inevitable given the military circumstances on the ground but is also effective and would converge US and regional security interests against the revival of terrorism in Afghanistan.

We saw this model play out in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when, in October 2001, the United States allied itself with the former Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces. In that context, the US provided air cover and logistical support while Afghans provided the ground forces and the region mobilized their proxies in support of a single goal – to topple the Taliban’s Emirate. In less than two months, the Taliban regime was gone.

In addition to being cheap, this strategy would preserve the gains of the last two decades and force the Taliban to come to a negotiated settlement when they see that a military victory is not possible and that prolonged war is not in their best interest.

Many Afghans term mounting such a front against a Taliban military takeover as a sacred defense and national resistance whose sole objective is to prevent a total military victory by the group and pave the way for a negotiated settlement.

An over the horizon counter-terrorism mission – The role of the United States and NATO

By leaving Afghanistan before a political settlement has been reached, the United States has damaged its credibility and global standing with allies and friends around the world. Some in Afghanistan draw comparisons between US-NATO military engagement with Afghanistan and the Russia-Iran partnership with Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Whereas the Russians and Iranians managed–albeit with brutal and inhumane tactics–to secure a strategic victory, the United States and its allies failed in Afghanistan.

While these comparisons are unavoidable, the Taliban and regional foes of the United States taunt Afghan officials about the unreliability of Washington and its military. That said, the United States could rectify this through a meaningful and effective engagement that shores up the Afghan government and ANDSF, preventing a Taliban military takeover and the return of their extremist Islamic Emirate. The key question is, how it can be done?

As the United States is designing and shaping its OTH counter-mission for Afghanistan, at least four elements would play a key role in restoring the United States’ standing with its Afghan allies: building up the Afghan state’s intelligence apparatus to partner on counter-terrorism; providing long-range close air support to the ANDSF; providing backend logistical and financial assistance, such as remote training, salaries, maintenance, and equipment to Afghan forces; and providing economic and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan state so that it can demonstrate its legitimacy over the Taliban after the United States departs.

The cost of spillover effects and the role of the region

Despite their differences, the United States and its allies share with the region a strong interest in preventing Afghanistan from descending into chaos that would allow al-Qaeda and other terror networks to rebuild safe havens.

Afghanistan’s neighbors can no longer afford to sit idly and rely on the security guarantees provided to them by extra-regional security providers. They also can no longer bank on proxies in Afghanistan to be security providers nor rely on buffer zones across borders with the expectation that the fire in Afghanistan will not engulf them. Indeed, the region will be the first to feel the impacts of an Afghan civil war and the revival of terror networks.

Countries surrounding Afghanistan, near and far, need to roll up their sleeves and contribute to the security and stability of the country via three channels: directing their proxies to augment and serve as an auxiliary force to ANDSF; leveraging political influence for a political settlement against various groups that enjoy their protection and support; and, once a political settlement is reached, ceasing to support and disbanding their proxy groups while committing to a neutral Afghanistan.

An unstable Afghanistan will directly impact the security of Islamabad, Tehran, Moscow, Tashkent, Dushanbe, and Afghanistan’s other neighbors. History has proven that the policy of “managed chaos” in Kabul–in pursuit of geopolitical objectives–is a recipe for disaster with direct security and humanitarian spillover effects on the region.

The way forward – Hard choices for the Taliban and the region

The Afghan government, the region, and the United States can bring together their security assistance programs as elements of a single strategy with the ultimate objective of preventing a Taliban military victory and avoiding civil war in Afghanistan.

In pursuit of this goal, the United States and its NATO allies can continue to provide financial, logistical, and technical-military support to Afghan security forces as well as financial assistance to the Afghan state. The region can mobilize proxy forces in support of the Afghan state with the aim of forcing the conflicting parties to a political settlement. And, finally, the Afghan government can provide the manpower and ground forces needed to fight terrorism and force the Taliban to give up the idea of a military victory.

This is a historic opportunity for the region, the United States, and its NATO allies to engage a set of common objectives and pool their resources under a single strategy to achieve peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region.

Tamim Asey is the founder and executive chairman of the Institute of War and Peace Studies in Kabul, Afghanistan, the former Afghan deputy minister of defense, and an expert adviser on the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Dialogues on Afghanistan.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Learn more

Online Event Fri, April 23, 2021 • 9:00 am ET

The future of the transatlantic partnership with Afghanistan

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – The exclusive launch of the Transatlantic Charter on Afghanistan as part of the Strategic Dialogues on and with Afghanistan, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist Jun 9, 2021

Biden’s Europe trip can help secure Afghanistan’s future. Here’s how.

By Earl Anthony Wayne, James B. Cunningham

The democracies meeting this week in Europe should signal continued concrete support for Afghans who do not share the Taliban’s worldview and who seek a peace without a Taliban-imposed regime.

Afghanistan Conflict

New Atlanticist May 18, 2021

An Afghanistan at peace could connect South and Central Asia

By Emily Carll

Afghanistan Central Asia

SouthAsiaSource Apr 29, 2021

Rebooting neutrality in Afghan foreign policy – A framework for global and regional engagement on Afghanistan post-US and NATO withdrawal

By Tamim Asey

Afghanistan is caught between a rock and a hard place, trapped between a turbulent global and regional environment and uncertain domestic politics resulting from the departure of American troops. In this context, the Afghan foreign policy and national security establishment should declare Afghanistan as a neutral zone through the adoption of a neutral foreign policy.

Afghanistan Politics & Diplomacy

All on Afghanistan

SouthAsiaSource Blog

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Sakhi to join Tillotoma Foundation to discuss violence in Afghanistan and the regional impact of US withdrawal

Atlantic Council — Mon, 07 Jun 2021 18:03:30 +0000

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Arbit quoted in Roll Call on the US Democratic Party’s Israel relations

Atlantic Council — Fri, 04 Jun 2021 18:20:00 +0000

Original Source

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Event recap: “Kabul and a peace process divided”

Atlantic Council — Thu, 03 Jun 2021 22:14:25 +0000

On June 1, 2021, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosted former Afghan Minister of the Economy and current Special Representative & Senior Advisor at the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR) Dr M. Mustafa Mastoor and South Asia Center non-resident senior fellows Ambassador Omar Samad and Dr Nilofar Sakhi for a substantive conversation on developments in Kabul related to the ongoing peace process.

Intra-Afghan dialogues: The current landscape

The current lack of consensus among Afghanistan’s political factions highlights the country’s fragmented political landscape and calls for a deeper understanding of the current dynamics that undermine negotiations and prospects for a peaceful, prosperous post-settlement landscape. Though Dr Mastoor welcomes the different views expressed by all parties, Kabul’s political disconnect, along with the US withdrawal and an increase in violence, leaves the Afghan government with less and less room to successfully negotiate and satisfy regional, international, and factional interests. Considering the Istanbul meeting postponement and, what Dr Mastoor deems, were slow talks in Doha: “we need to fast-track the process,” he says. Discussions thus far have stagnated at the contact group level without touching on real negotiations; what compromises, trade-offs, and gains will be made have yet to be anticipated.

A new High Council?

The establishment of a High Council of State is set to materialize in the near future, its 51 members constituting the two vice presidents, the national security advisor, various ministers, and various senior advisors to President Ghani. Though the formation of another government committee has increased anxieties surrounding decision making within negotiations—notably whether or not it will create confusion and further political fragmentation among stakeholders—the new Council’s purpose, says Dr Mastoor, is not to duplicate the HCNR but to complement ongoing efforts of the peace process, to discuss issues beyond it, and to promote greater inclusivity at the decision making levels. Further, while certain analyses have predicted the High Council of State is set to transition into an interim government, doing so would fail to consider both sides of the negotiating table. Rather, a successful process requires the Afghan government and the Taliban to discuss the general framework of a peace agreement, decide the end state, and subsequently agree on an interim government.

Achieving a political settlement

With forty years of conflict weighing on their shoulders, the Afghan people seem to increasingly abandon the idea of peace, or so it seems to Ambassador Samad. Discussions of a second resistance, creating local or regional militias, and shoring up forces for defensive reasons have circulated Kabul and indicate a disconnect between domestic and international expectations: survival for the former, and a political settlement for the latter. However, Dr Mastoor offers reassurance that many Afghans stand behind an inclusive political settlement, as do the Taliban. Continuing the war would prove futile given it requires high-level financing and the group would likely lose international assistance. Achieving a political settlement, therefore, is in the best interests of all involved—the Afghan government, the Taliban, regional actors, and the international community.

Nonetheless, many questions remain to be answered amid the peace process and in the post-settlement climate, notably whether or not the Afghan Republic is strong enough to withstand what is to come, as Dr Sakhi observes. Dr Mastoor believes in the capabilities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and Afghanistan’s future political prospects, emphasizing the importance of moral support to boost confidence and trust, yet holds reservations on the expertise of various Security Ministers, noting his belief that many come from irrelevant backgrounds. The President’s top priority should, in his opinion, be to replace those Ministers with more qualified individuals and fill all vacant positions. Of benefit to Afghanistan, however, is the United States, NATO, and other allies’ commitment to continue providing contractors that support the ANDSF. Overall, preserving the gains of the past two decades and achieving peace remain the Afghan government’s primary goals.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Learn more

SouthAsiaSource May 12, 2021

Webinar: Understanding Russian and Iranian perspectives on the Afghan peace process

By Atlantic Council

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Eurasia Center, in partnership with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, host a conversation about Russian and Iranian perspectives on the Afghan peace process.

Afghanistan Democratic Transitions

SouthAsiaSource Apr 16, 2021

Dignity and fair negotiations is what we Afghans want

By Ejaz Ahmad Malikzada

When the United States and its allies entered Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks, it did not merely sign up to bring human rights to the Afghan people or to fight a local insurgent group. Indeed, the intervention was driven just as much by the US-led global war on terror, a fight in which we, the people of Afghanistan, have bled and sacrificed thousands of military and civilian lives alongside our US and NATO partners.

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

SouthAsiaSource Apr 15, 2021

Khuda hafez Afghanistan and maybe Pakistan!

By Shuja Nawaz

20 years after invading Afghanistan to punish the Taliban for harboring Osama bin Laden, President Joe Biden is saying goodbye to Afghanistan. Regardless of the main reason why President Biden is extracting the US military and hence NATO from Afghanistan, the people of Afghanistan may end up being sacrificed and left to the depredations of the Taliban and Islamic State.

Afghanistan Pakistan

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The post Event recap: “Kabul and a peace process divided” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kabul and a peace process divided

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 May 2021 17:23:35 +0000

In a testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 27, Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad said, “I personally believe that the statements that [Afghan] forces will disintegrate and the Talibs will take over in short order are mistaken.” While this statement offers a breath of much-needed optimism, a fracturing Afghan leadership threatens to undermine President Ghani’s government at the negotiating table and in a post-peace settlement Afghanistan.

Outwardly, political players in Kabul present a united front and show support for a transitional government, yet internal dynamics paint a different picture: over half a dozen peace plans with different visions are circulating and a bitter rivalry between President Ghani and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Dr Abdullah Abdullah may jeopardize Afghan interests. As the Taliban continue to expand influence and challenge the government’s authority, achieving unity is critical to ensure peace post-US withdrawal.

This event was hosted by the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center on Tuesday, June 1 at 10:00 AM EST / 6:30 PM AFT for a conversation about developments in Kabul related to the ongoing peace process. The program was joined by former Afghan Minister of the Economy and current Special Representative & Senior Advisor at the High Council for National Reconciliation Dr M. Mustafa Mastoor as well as South Asia Center non-resident senior fellows Ambassador Omar Samad and Dr Nilofar Sakhi.

Featuring

Dr M. Mustafa Mastoor
Special Representative and Senior Advisor, High Council for National Reconciliation;
Former Minister of Economy
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Ambassador Omar Samad
Non-resident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

Dr Nilofar Sakhi
Non-resident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Learn more

SouthAsiaSource

May 12, 2021

Webinar: Understanding Russian and Iranian perspectives on the Afghan peace process

By Atlantic Council

Afghanistan Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist May 18, 2021

An Afghanistan at peace could connect South and Central Asia

By Emily Carll

Afghanistan Central Asia

SouthAsiaSource Apr 29, 2021

Rebooting neutrality in Afghan foreign policy – A framework for global and regional engagement on Afghanistan post-US and NATO withdrawal

By Tamim Asey

Afghanistan Politics & Diplomacy

Feature Apr 22, 2021

A transatlantic charter for peace and security in Afghanistan

By South Asia Center

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center presents the exclusive launch of the Transatlantic Charter on Afghanistan as part of the Strategic Dialogues on and with Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

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Samad joins Ankara Centre for Crisis and Policy Research to discuss the rise of Asian geopolitics and terrorism

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 May 2021 16:22:18 +0000

original source

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Lipner joins CNBC to discuss the Israel-Hamas cease-fire

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 May 2021 21:12:00 +0000

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Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

Katherine Walla — Tue, 25 May 2021 21:58:36 +0000

Although Africa continues to face challenges like the pandemic, terrorism, and poverty, the Biden administration understands that “we need to focus on the opportunities” in working with the continent, said US Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield.

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission. She added that while Africa hosts many of the world’s fastest-growing economies, COVID-19 has caused an alarming crisis.

“In order for those countries to come back, they need to diversify their economies, they need to rebuild their capacity, and they need to harness the extraordinary opportunity that their youth provide for them,” Thomas-Greenfield said. It will be important to encourage that young population, she added, as they can help “build this continent into a place that we can all be proud of being a part of.”

So where should US foreign policy on Africa begin? Here are key takeaways from the conversation.

Where there’s success—and where there’s concern

Thomas-Greenfield singled out Liberia for its transformation after civil wars that, together, lasted from 1989 to 2003 and killed up to 250,000 people: “Liberia eventually came out of that war electing the first woman ever to be elected a president on the continent of Africa… and she came with a firm commitment to helping Liberia become normal again and helping children find a future that was not marred by the sound of gunfire.” Thomas-Greenfield, who served as US ambassador to Liberia from 2008 to 2012, recalled her experience working with then-Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf on that rebuilding effort.

Ethiopia had been considered “on the rise” under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, which makes the crisis in Tigray “extraordinarily disappointing,” Thomas-Greenfield said. She maintained that the United States has “been engaged diplomatically—and aggressively diplomatically” in Ethiopia, including by sending Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) to secure commitments from Abiy to address the crisis in March. She noted that while “some of those commitments were honored; others were not,” like one requiring Eritrean troops who had committed atrocities to leave Tigray. Those troops entered the region in November after Abiy sent Ethiopian forces there. The US State Department also recently announced restrictions on US economic and security assistance to Ethiopia, plus visa restrictions for some Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials and security-force members.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), beset by violence, displacement, disease, and poverty, is an overlooked humanitarian crisis, Thomas-Greenfield said. In May, the Allied Democratic Forces militia attacked the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, killing one Malawian peacekeeper. She added that the United States will need “to impress upon [DRC leaders] the importance of how they should address the needs of the people of the DRC.”

Reaching across the Atlantic

Marking the anniversary of the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police, Thomas-Greenfield said the event “was traumatizing” to African Americans and even resonated across the Atlantic Ocean. “For the first time, I actually heard African countries and African leaders issue statements on” what happened to Floyd, after she had previously wondered “where were the voices of Africans when events taking place in the United States were affecting their descendants in this country.”

But US strife can also serve as a model of resilience, Thomas-Greenfield said. The January 6 riots at the US Capitol “showed our imperfections for the entire world to see” but also proved that the United States’ “strong institutions can stand against any attack.” While Africans have already “affirmed that democracy is the best way forward for the continent,” Thomas-Greenfield noted that leadership is lacking. “Leadership that is committed to the people: That’s something that is a work in progress across the continent.”

Thomas-Greenfield said that there is a missed opportunity between the African diaspora community and those who live in Africa “to really harness our relationships [and] to empower each other.” She added that there are African Americans who feel a close emotional connection to Africa, but they don’t always feel as though Africans share that connection. “I think the next step… is for the African continent to fully embrace their relatives in the United States,” she advised.

Katherine Walla is assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it?

By Rama Yade

Biden can further build ties with Africa: He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations, but also because they offer innovative solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 6, 2021

Keys to African recovery: Vaccines, debt, and commodities

By Rabah Arezki

In the wake of COVID-19, African markets are consumed by uncertainty about the economic recovery. Because of its large population—1.2 billion people—developments in Africa will weigh heavily on the world. The recovery from COVID-19 in Africa will depend on three factors—vaccines, debt, and commodities.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 3, 2021

The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan

Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies.

Africa Conflict

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Melcangi quoted in Elwatan News on how Egypt succeeded in the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas

Atlantic Council — Sat, 22 May 2021 14:57:00 +0000

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Melcangi quoted in Elzman News on how Egypt brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas

Atlantic Council — Sat, 22 May 2021 14:50:00 +0000

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Lipner joins CNBC TV18 to discuss the ceasefire

Atlantic Council — Fri, 21 May 2021 18:19:00 +0000

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Melcangi in Formiche: “How Egypt mediated between Israel and Hamas”

Atlantic Council — Fri, 21 May 2021 18:14:00 +0000

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Lipner joins BBC Newshour to discuss Gaza ceasefire

Atlantic Council — Fri, 21 May 2021 18:11:00 +0000

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Arbit quoted in The Week on the Democrats’ stance on Israel

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 May 2021 19:04:00 +0000

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An Afghanistan at peace could connect South and Central Asia

Emily Carll — Tue, 18 May 2021 17:36:55 +0000

Over the past forty years of conflicts, Afghanistan’s potential as a contributor to development and prosperity in Asia has gone unrealized. If it were a stable neighbor, as the current Afghan peace process is meant to make it, Afghanistan could harness its potential as the “heart of Asia” and connect the South and Central Asian regions.

The five Central Asian countries have been isolated to the south by war-torn Afghanistan, to the east by rough terrain with nearly impassable mountains, and to the west by Iran, making engagement with South Asia both implausible and difficult. And though connecting the regions completely would be a lengthy process requiring the expansion and improvement of infrastructure across Afghanistan, achieving it would unlock opportunities for all: for Afghanistan, building infrastructure to integrate the regions would stimulate the country’s fragile economy; and for South and Central Asia countries, doing so would not only increase regional engagement but also serve their economic interests and open up access to new markets. Such infrastructure would increase trade and the flow of people and ideas between both regions—and the additional flow would stimulate innovation, job creation, and economic growth. Regional connectivity is also crucial to harnessing the economic potential of South and Central Asia’s youth bulge; the median age in both regions is 27.6 years old. Given these potential benefits, South and Central Asian countries have a strong incentive to partner in support of a stable, peaceful, and democratic Afghanistan.

Energy infrastructure projects are already underway to connect the regions: The Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission Project will send surplus hydropower in Central Asia to communities in South Asia, while the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Power Interconnection Project will help support power trade among the parties and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline will run gas throughout the participating countries. A more comprehensive project, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, brought together eleven countries across Central, South, and East Asia to promote development. But new road and railway infrastructure will be essential to open corridors and maximize the benefits of regional connectivity.

All five Central Asian countries are landlocked and, in a geographical sense, partially surrounded by two major powers: Russia and China. Economically, too, Central Asia is surrounded: Russia and China tend to dominate the region’s imports and exports. Creating land corridors through Afghanistan would give the Central Asian countries access to Iran in one direction and to Pakistan, India, and the greater Indo-Pacific region in another. Doing so would also provide Central Asia with alternatives to its inefficient and expensive routes through China to access the global market and overcome both its isolation and its dependence on Russia and China.

Regional connectivity would also help restart Afghanistan’s fragile economy, most notably by connecting Afghanistan to the region’s largest market in India. Improved infrastructure would offer countries the opportunity to trade an array of goods via land routes that are more cost efficient than existing air routes. The economic links that come with new infrastructure would also encourage South and Central Asian countries to engage with Afghanistan through both the public and private sectors. Private-sector engagement could increase investment in Afghanistan, while public-sector engagement could encourage governments to incorporate Afghanistan into regional programming and multilateral initiatives such as the US-Central Asia platform C5+1.

Pakistan, too, would benefit from a peaceful Afghanistan. A direct land route to Central Asia through Afghanistan would provide Pakistan a more efficient and convenient alternative to its current routes through Iran or China. With this connection, Pakistan would be able to access new markets for its goods and strengthen ties with its Muslim-majority neighbors—two opportunities that are key to fulfilling a pillar of its 2025 vision, which aims to modernize transportation infrastructure and greater regional connectivity, along with the country’s goal of refocusing its foreign policy around geoeconomics. Pakistan could, for instance, leverage its strong agriculture sector to provide short-term food relief to Turkmenistan, where the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated an existing food crisis. This exchange would lay the foundations for a long-term partnership.

Afghanistan can leverage its strategic geopolitical position to not only begin to rebuild its economy but also to help the region achieve greater prosperity. Yet that only underscores the need for countries in the region to prioritize the task of crafting consensus for peace in Afghanistan, a necessary condition to harness this untapped potential.

Emily Carll is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. She is a 2020 graduate of Stony Brook University and has previously participated in the US Foreign Service Internship Program at the US Department of State, working in Washington DC and at the US embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic. In the fall of 2021, she will participate in a Fulbright grant to Serbia.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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Sakhi in the Heart of Asia Society: In search of peace for Afghanistan

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 May 2021 21:50:11 +0000

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Event recap: “Understanding Russian and Iranian perspectives on the Afghan peace process”

Emily Carll — Mon, 17 May 2021 21:08:30 +0000

On May 28, 2021, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, the Eurasia Center, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty hosted an event to discuss Russian and Iranian perspectives on the Afghan Peace Process. The panelists included: Fatemeh Aman, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute; Irina Lagunina, Special Projects Editor for the Russian Service at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and Ambassador Omar Samad, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. Qadir Habib, Director of the Afghan Service for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, moderated the event.

Key takeaways from the event

In order to create a lasting peace in Afghanistan, one must not exclude important regional actors, namely Russia and Iran, without whom peace will be impossible. Both Russia and Iran have played similar roles in post-9/11 Afghanistan by supporting the US-led operation and reforming the Afghan government after the collapse of the Taliban until being dissuaded that forging stronger relationships with the Taliban would be in their greater self-interest. US troop withdrawal in September presents an opportunity for renewed involvement of both Russia and Iran in the Afghan peace process. While the Russian and Iranian perspectives on Afghanistan may vary, their interests converge on key topics related to peace and security; and both countries possess leverage with the Taliban, which if given the chance could be used by both states/actors to play a positive role in the political solution to peace.

Russian perspective on Afghanistan

According to the Kremlin and Russian media, the US Troop withdrawal is seen as defeat and failure, leaving Afghanistan in chaos. Irina Lagunina highlighted that Russian and US visions for the future Afghanistan differ due to the fact that women’s rights, democracy, and human rights are not essential pillars of peace in the eyes of the Kremlin. Instead, Russia’s primary objective in creating peace in Afghanistan is to foster a state that is not a threat to Russia or Russia’s neighbors, thereby making its renewed interests in Afghanistan geopolitics and security-oriented. If Russia helps to bring an end to the hostility in Afghanistan, it can credit itself as a “deliverer of peace,” an unusual title for President Putin. In terms of security, by supporting peace in Afghanistan, Russia can minimize threats of ISIS’ influence and the spread of terrorism and drug trafficking within its own borders. Radicalization of terrorists from Afghanistan bleeding into Central Asia often penetrates Russian borders through the Central Asian migrant workers in Russia, and thus, by supporting a peaceful Afghanistan and protecting the Central Asian states from ISIS influence, Russia would be protecting itself.

Iranian perspective on Afghanistan

Similar to Russia, Iran is also concerned about the security implications surrounding the future of Afghanistan. Iran’s primary concern is the potential influx of insurgent groups that would fill the vacuum as US and foreign troops leave Afghanistan. Given Iran’s close proximity to Afghanistan, Iran is likely to feel the impact if the country slips into civil war, and fears the likely refugee spillover into Iran as a result. Although currently excluded from the Afghan peace process, Fatemeh Aman predicts that Iran will likely become more involved as the US withdraws its troops by September. Ms Aman underscored the importance of Iran, stating that “Iran does have a mediation skill; they can be destructive, but they can use this skill to bring parties together.” While the US may not be too keen on involving Iran, it is a reality that it needs to accept in order to ensure Afghanistan the best chance of a durable peace.

Russian and Iranian support for the Taliban

Despite fearing the spread of extremism, both Russia and Iran have continued to forge relationships with the Taliban, which in turn have adversely affected their relationships with the US. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which the US starkly disapproved of, Russia and the Taliban began arms deals that grew into increased partnership and support. After being designated as part of the “Axis of Evil,” and having the US blatantly ignore an Iraninan offer for Iran to train Afghan troops, Iran turned to support the Taliban. Both Russia and Iran saw the importance of the Taliban as it re-emerged and became increasingly empowered over the past 10-20 years. With ISIS on the rise, Iran realized the Afghan government’s inability to fight off insurgent groups, and the Russians quickly came to the realization that without including the Taliban in negotiations, peace was not attainable.

Russian support for the Taliban has been a “win-win,” claims Irina Lagunina citing countering deteriorating relations with the US, making a profit from arms sales, and establishing relations with a group that is becoming continuously more important in the peace process benefits that have come from the relationship. Neither Russia nor Iran classifies the Taliban as an extremist group. Russia specifically views the Taliban as a fundamental group, deserving of a place at the negotiating table when talking about peace in Afghanistan. Russia has also supported the Taliban on the international stage at the United Nations Security Council, stating it would support a resolution to redefine the status of the currently blacklisted Taliban. While all of the choices moving forward are not ideal, those involved need to make the most optimal decisions with their current realities, or “aim for a solution that is bad, not worse,” according to Ambassador Omar Samad. The Taliban is a necessary component of the peace process and Russia and Iran’s relationships with the Taliban need to be leveraged moving forward to make progress towards a tangible peace.

Creating a peaceful Afghanistan, together

When asked if Washington and Moscow can productively work together on Afghanistan, Irina cited Troika as a stepping stone to Russian and US cooperation that is underway. In terms of collaboration on Afghanistan as a whole, Lagunina stated, “Russia and the United States have mutual interests and have all the possibilities to be working together.”

Throughout the conversation, Afghan Ambassador Omar Samad highlighted the Afghan perspective and discussed the way forward in Afghanistan through a political settlement that “rebalances politics, economics, integration and access to rights” in Afghanistan. Ambassador Omar Samad and Ms Fatemeh Aman also stressed the importance of the regional component of the Afghan peace process. Ms Aman expressed the importance of not excluding Iran, and Ambassador Samad discussed how “A regional component is the only solution left for Afghanistan short of chaos and civil war” and how if achieved, the ideal outcome would lead to Afghanistan serving as the heart of regional connectivity between South and Central Asia. If a regional component to the Afghan peace process comes to fruition, Russia and Iran should be recognized as key actors who have the ability to play a positive role by leveraging their relationships with the Taliban and neighboring countries, specifically Russia’s relationship with Pakistan.

Emily Carll is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a 2020 graduate of Stony Brook University. In the fall of 2021, she will participate in a Fulbright grant to Serbia and has previously participated in the US Foreign Service Internship Program at the US Department of State working in Washington D.C. and at the US embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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Fontenrose quoted in Foreign Policy on Biden’s struggles in the Israeli-Palestinian flare-up

Atlantic Council — Fri, 14 May 2021 15:38:00 +0000

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Webinar: Understanding Russian and Iranian perspectives on the Afghan peace process

Atlantic Council — Wed, 12 May 2021 16:23:28 +0000

Russia and Iran have complex historical relationships with Afghanistan. Though the current Afghan peace process–centered by the talks in Doha as well as the February 2020 US-Taliban agreement–is strongly Western backed, regional powers still have significant stakes in the conflict.

One may argue that regional powers such as Iran or Russia have different strategic goals in South Asia and the Middle East than Washington and its allies. That said, Afghanistan’s (in)stability has both positive and negative ramifications on their respective domestic affairs, such as trade access and connectivity into South Asia, drug trafficking, cross-border terrorism, refugee flows, and illicit financial networks, to name a few. It is thus crucial to ensure that ongoing discussions of peace in Afghanistan include Russian and Iranian perspectives to obtain critical regional buy-in for a prosperous, democratic Afghanistan.

Join the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, Eurasia Center, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on Thursday, May 13 at 10:00 AM EST for a conversation about Russian and Iranian perspectives on the Afghan peace process.

Featuring

Fatemeh Aman
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Middle East Institute

Irina Lagunina
Special Projects Editor, Russian Service
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Ambassador Omar Samad
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

Moderated by

Qadir Habib
Director, Afghan Service
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Opening remarks by

Ambassador John E. Herbst
Director
Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

Welcome remarks by

Harris Samad
Assistant Director
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

Closing remarks by

Andres Ilves
Near East Regional Director
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

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Atlantic Council — Mon, 10 May 2021 21:00:14 +0000

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Iranian women in the year 1400: The struggle for equal rights continues

Mehrangiz Kar and Azadeh Pourzand — Thu, 29 Apr 2021 15:21:03 +0000

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Iranian Women in the Year 1400: The Struggle for Equal Rights Continues – Co-authored by Mehrangiz Kar, an Iranian human rights lawyer, and Azadeh Pourzand, co-founder and director of the Siamak Pourzand Foundation, the paper outlines an image of women’s struggles for equality to help US policymakers better understand the intricacies of Iranian society and to design policies that support—but do not supplant or undermine—the women’s movement. Understanding this struggle can help policy makers look beyond simplistic solutions that see disempowered Iranian women as requiring saving from the outside or that use women’s achievements as a justification to legitimize IRI rule.

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Atlantic Council — Wed, 28 Apr 2021 18:52:21 +0000

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