Below, Atlantic Council experts answer four pressing questions about what just happened and what to expect next.

1. Why did Russia pull out of the deal?

Moscow’s notification to the UN, Kyiv, and Ankara that it was suspending participation in the grain deal and would not renew the deal further is part of a negotiating strategy to loosen sanctions and gain more freedom of maneuver. Russian standard practice is to make humanitarian measures conditional upon concessions that serve its military, economic, and political interests—as it has with earlier negotiations on the grain deal and numerous times over relief and aid deliveries in Syria. 

Specific demands in this case include readmitting the Russian agricultural lender Rosselkhozbank back into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) mechanism, allowing Russia to import repair parts for agricultural machinery, and unfreezing other assets. Moscow claims that the deal, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, has not delivered on points that were to benefit Russia, but this round of pressure is certainly about more than the letter of the deal; it is about easing sanctions pressure.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

2. What’s the next move for Ukraine and its Western partners?

In October 2022, Russia left the grain deal, actually suspended its participation, and there were only three parties left: the UN, Turkey, and Ukraine. The grain corridors at that time functioned well, in part because the Russian inspectors had been disrupting the grain deals from inside. The most rational way to react to this withdrawal is to proceed in the trilateral format with the UN, Ukraine, and Turkey. I don’t think Russia has a lot of options now. In the northwestern part of the Black Sea, Russia lacks capacity to inflict any major damage. Since Ukrainian armed forces retook Snake Island last year, the maritime area has been largely controlled by the Ukrainian side. So there is little possibility for a major disruption by Russian vessels in this part of the Black Sea.

Russia could say that continuing the deal in a trilateral format crosses a “red line.” But if Russian forces attack a vessel transporting grain, it could trigger a major reaction that Moscow would not want to face, depending on which country the vessel belongs to, who is the owner, and who the sailors are. I would not be surprised if after a meeting or phone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the next few weeks, Russia rejoins the grain deal.

Meanwhile, messages from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have been very clear that there has been no deal between Ukraine and Russia. The deal is among Ukraine, Turkey, and the UN. What Putin undermines now is his agreement with the UN and Turkey, not with Ukraine. Russia’s halt of its participation in the deal will likely further increase insurance costs, but in June the Ukrainian government approved a maritime compensation scheme so that vessels calling at Ukrainian ports will be compensated if they are damaged due to Russian military activity. So, from the Ukrainian side, there is readiness to proceed with the deal.

While trying to keep the grain corridors functioning, it’s also important to step up efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, a basic principle of international law. Crimea must be de-occupied and should not become a bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow, because Russia will continue to use Crimea to threaten security in the Black Sea and global food markets for as long as it is allowed to do so.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a former foreign-policy adviser to the Ukrainian prime minister. 

In practice, the deal had pretty much collapsed some time ago when ships started to disappear from the horizon off of Odesa’s Black Sea coast. Normally, up to a dozen bulk carriers are waiting to be loaded; in the past couple weeks, one or two at best—indicating things weren’t working well at the joint clearance center in Istanbul. (Ukrainians have blamed Russian inspectors for deliberately slowing down clearance procedures.) 

So what happens next? The UN and Western nations should not succumb to the Kremlin’s blackmailing tactics. Russia should not be given another chance to weaponize food—nor be given sanctions relief in exchange for allowing ships carrying food to sail through international waters.

A global food emergency should be declared and, as I told BBC World News this morning, arrangements made for ships to sail under armed escort through the Black Sea. Of course, such a measure would never get past Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council. So creative diplomacy is required, perhaps with the European Union taking the lead.

In the near term, Ukraine should also be assisted with moving grain transport onto alternative arteries such as the Danube River and onto trains and trucks. Poland can play a key role by alleviating the days-long waits truck drivers currently face entering Poland from Ukraine. 

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center based in Odesa, Ukraine.

3. What are the prospects for getting the deal back, and what could the UN and Turkey do right now?

The deal will likely survive because Ukraine, Turkey, and Europe more broadly, as well as a number of developing nations, benefit from it, which likely makes modest concessions to the Russian position acceptable to the leaders of those countries. Given the disinclination of either the Turks or NATO to directly intervene in the conflict, it is unlikely that there will be direct military escorts for grain ships rather than a negotiated deal. Nor do the Russian forces appear ready for a major naval escalation in the Black Sea, so there is a fair chance they will settle in the end. The reputational and economic costs of a prolonged end to grain shipments will hurt Russia, too, so I do not expect a prolonged or permanent cancellation of the deal.

—Rich Outzen

4. What impact does this have on the developing world?

The threat to global economic landscape and food security—especially in Africa and other developing regions—is hard to overstate. While once soaring food prices amid pandemic supply chain disruptions and Russia’s war had begun to stabilize, thanks in large part to the more than thirty million tons of wheat exported from Ukraine under this deal, the situation remains volatile. Down from its peak of 160 in March of 2022, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Food Price Index was at 122 in June, still a third higher than June 2020, when it was 93. Globally, food price inflation remains higher than 5 percent per year in more than 60 percent of low-income countries and nearly 80 percent of lower-middle-income and high-income countries. Real food inflation is as high as 80 percent in Zimbabwe, 30 percent in Egypt, and 14 percent in Laos. And within countries, women and already vulnerable communities tend to be hardest hit. In just the last two weeks, the World Bank reported that wheat prices had decreased by 3 percent globally—gains Monday’s announcement are all but certain to reverse.

—Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and global head, inclusive economic growth at Abt Associates.

The post Russia just quit a grain deal critical to global food supply. What happens now? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For about ten days, an estimated seven hundred people were stranded in no man’s land between the southeastern Tunisian and Libyan borders, with a further two hundred still stranded in similar circumstances along the western border with Algeria. Tunisian authorities recently resettled most of the migrants stranded on the Libyan border. However, their response remains inadequate, mainly due to the absence of guarantees that this situation will not recur. This is a significant possibility, given local demands for African migrants to be removed from the town of Ben Guerdane, the Tunisian smuggling capital near the Libyan border, where many were resettled, and the aforementioned hundreds that are still stranded at the Algerian border.

Additionally, international organizations remain prohibited from providing crucial humanitarian assistance, and fear dominates the sub-Saharan migrant community. Thus, communication with victims is limited to voice notes and messages from smuggled phones. This means conditions could be even worse—and the numbers of those stranded even greater—than currently reported. And what is known of the conditions is already bad enough; with dwindling food and water and temperatures climbing to over 104 degrees Fahrenheit, victims have reported horrific stories of pregnant women dying in labor and people being driven by thirst to drink seawater.

This catastrophe is brewing against the backdrop of increasing authoritarianism in Tunisia under President Kais Saied and a severely deteriorating economy. Since February, when Saied re-appropriated a local version of the far-right great replacement theory, Tunisia’s president has used Black and migrant communities in Tunisia as a populist scapegoat for the country’s problems. This has stoked mass anti-Black hysteria that is now manifesting as active hostility wherever migrants are settled, as seen with the response in Ben Guerdane.

President Saied has also utilized harsh counter-migration policies to leverage financial support from Europe—specifically Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—creating an incentivization structure and aura of impunity that have fed into the current crackdown.   

The situation on Tunisia’s borders is not only a humanitarian catastrophe that could cause the death of hundreds of innocent people—it could also catalyze political, criminal, and diplomatic issues across the broader region. Mass arbitrary expulsions and violent abuse incited by inflammatory speeches of Tunisia’s president have already boosted the numbers of sub-Saharan refugees fleeing to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea since February. Systematic and abusive government crackdowns will exacerbate this fear and could trigger a panicked, mass exodus as Tunisia becomes palpably unsafe for Black Africans, creating a new migration crisis for Europe.

This development also bolsters the already burgeoning business of human traffickers, helping them to entrench and expand other criminal activities. Additionally, it could strain relationships between Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria, as no country wishes to claim these stranded peoples, and Tunisian authorities continue ejecting them into sensitive border zones.

It’s imperative for Europe, and especially the United States, to act to avert this catastrophe—not only for humanitarian reasons but also to protect regional stability and defend key regional interests. The United States has invested more than $1.4 billion in Tunisia’s democracy since 2011 and is invested in promoting democracies to counter China and Russia’s authoritarian systems. As a result, the United States is financially, ideologically, and diplomatically invested in supporting its European allies to stabilize an issue of extreme importance in the central Mediterranean.

A Western policy response should focus on the short-term imperative of providing protection and assistance to the stranded while stopping further expulsions. Additionally, medium-term policies to build structural safeguards can prevent this from re-occurring and perhaps even result in a healthier ecosystem for migrants and migration diplomacy in Tunisia.  

Short-term solutions

In light of this ongoing crisis, European and US stakeholders have the opportunity to collaborate in preventing further deaths while simultaneously establishing a solid foundation for holistic and enduring resolutions to the migration predicament in Tunisia.

A first response should come through immediate public statements by senior officials that condemn the crackdown, highlighting Tunisia’s contravention of international conventions it has joined, such as the United Nations and African Refugee Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. All of these accords explicitly forbid the practice of refoulement and forcibly returning or expelling individuals to countries where they may be subjected to torture, threats to their lives or freedom, or other severe forms of harm.

Furthermore, Western governments should call on Tunisian authorities to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to aid the stranded.

Given that the aforementioned suggestions are immediately actionable, uncontroversial, and the most direct way to end the humanitarian crisis, they should be prioritized and enacted as soon as possible. For maximum effect, this could take the form of a joint statement made by the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union (EU), which could be supplemented by senior level phone calls between leaders who have a good relationship with President Saied, like French President Emmanuel Macron.

To create an atmosphere of maximum pressure reflecting the dire situation, further statements condemning the developments and proposing steps forward, such as allowing aid to the stranded, could be issued by the US Congress and the European Parliament—particularly committees such as the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI).

The United States and EU can also provide capacity assistance to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to help conduct voluntary resettlement for stranded Africans who had been working or studying in Tunisia and no longer feel safe, as well as those who were hoping to migrate onwards but would now rather return home. In addition, Western countries can support the home countries of these migrants by helping them provide consular assistance. In many cases, their embassies lack the personnel and resources required to respond to a crisis of this size.

The United States and EU have strong relationships with Tunisia’s defense ministry and interior ministry, respectively, and they should be leveraged. Given the difficulties of directly influencing the infamously intransigent President Saied—and that Tunisia’s security services are perhaps the only institutions retaining significant influence over the president and are the main implementers of these policies—capitalizing on these relationships represents the West’s most practical means of influencing the situation.

As a last resort, the US should communicate that by facilitating these crackdowns in violation of international conventions—the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the United Nations (UN) and African Refugee conventions, the Convention against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—that Tunisia’s security services may end up excluding themselves from further funding programs. Meanwhile, Europeans can threaten to revoke the privileges that the Tunisian interior ministry’s officer class enjoys from their close partnership with Europeans to encourage Tunisia’s security services to uphold the law, cease their participation in egregious human rights abuses, and allow humanitarian organizations to tend to the stranded. This could be further communicated in bilateral conversations between European interior ministers who have recently visited Tunisia to meet with their counterparts.

Medium-term solutions

Since February, the African Union (AU) and countries whose citizens have been victimized by the racist crackdowns incited by President Saied have condemned the situation. They also remain better placed to provide diplomatic accountability measures to try and disincentivize Saied’s regime from continuing this course of action.

Alongside the AU’s responses, the EU could provide support to replicate mechanisms trialed elsewhere—such as the EU-AU-UN Tripartite Taskforce on the Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Libya—to develop and oversee sustained policy responses to help ameliorate the worsening situation of migrants and refugees in Tunisia, and build a working relationship with Tunisian authorities that could help avert such scenarios from reoccurring.

On June 11, when announcing the new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Europe and Tunisia, European Council (EC) President Ursula Von der Leyen claimed that the migration part of the comprehensive package would be implemented in full respect of human rights and would become a model for migration deals with other countries. Considering the developments since, there should be clear stipulations added to the MoU to prevent mass arbitrary expulsions and violent abuse from being repeated, including accountability measures.

Alongside making a more focused, robust, and safeguarded migration pact, the European Parliament should more effectively leverage its role in budgetary scrutiny and oversight over EC spending to not only ensure the future deal is effectively implemented, but also look over existing funding packages given to the Tunisian border police. It is rumored that border guards are disgruntled that additional EU funding has yet to reach them in terms of increased salaries or new equipment and accuse the state of simply repurposing that money to its general budget. In this scenario, border guards are more inclined to accept money from traffickers and thereby enable trafficking instead of policing it. Moreover, this dynamic neutralizes any leverage or incentive this financing could provide to ensure that humanitarian standards are upheld. So, it behooves the European parliament to more closely scrutinize how its existing migration funding is being spent.  

The importance of Tunisia’s migration policy—especially given its ability to feed into other delicate issues, such as people smuggling and general regional stability—and its relationship with European migration policy should be routinely highlighted when European and US delegations visit Tunisia. Upcoming visits by European Parliament committees are a prime opportunity to initiate conversations on migration management practices, which can be followed up by identifying robust safeguards to prevent the reoccurrence of such situations.

By implementing these short-term and medium-term policy recommendations, European and US stakeholders can work towards addressing the immediate challenges while laying the groundwork for more comprehensive and sustainable solutions to the migration situation in Tunisia.

Alissa Pavia is associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs’ North Africa Program.

Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

The post After Tunisia expelled 1,200 Black Africans, here’s how the West can help avoid a humanitarian disaster appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite a long-term military counterterrorism effort, Nigeria still ranks as the eighth most-affected country on the Global Terrorism Index. Because of the persistence of the problem, Tinubu will need all the help he can get, including from the United States. Thus—especially at a time when the Sahel and coastal West Africa are embroiled in ever-worsening security crises—it may seem illogical for the US State Department to remove Boko Haram, once considered the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).

However, this action is long overdue. To designate a group as an FTO, the State Department must demonstrate that 1) the group is a foreign organization, 2) the group is engaged in, or retains the capability and intent to engage in, terrorist activity and 3) this activity threatens US citizens, interests, or national security. The US secretary of state must revoke a listing if they find “that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.”

Sure, the circumstances have not changed. But the circumstances never met these criteria to begin with because Boko Haram, one of Africa’s most well-known terrorist organizations, does not exist at all. Ultimately, “unlearning” this term will yield more accurate and valuable insights into the reality of the threat. Revoking the designation will set the United States and its partners on a more productive path toward finally resolving the violence in Nigeria.

The source of the misnomer

Around 2005, a fundamentalist Islamist sect emerged in northern Nigeria under the direction of Mohammed Yusuf. He began preaching a specific interpretation of the Quran, and one of his core arguments was that Nigerian Muslims should reject Western education and schools that had been introduced under British colonial rule. Because of this message, locals began calling him and his followers “Boko Haram,” which translates to “Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language. Outsiders used this phrase as a derisive term to refer to this secretive sect, their followers, and other suspected affiliates.

In 2009, Yusuf’s sect staged an uprising across several northern states following escalating tensions with the state police. Within a matter of days, the movement was essentially eliminated by security services in a brutal crackdown (killing approximately eight hundred members in just a few days) and Yusuf was taken into custody and then executed shortly after. Since then, several movements have emerged in the region. The most active group has been Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Daʿawah wa al-Jihād (JAS), which was founded around 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. His organization is responsible for many of the murders and violent incidents in the country over the last decade. Several factions have split from JAS, including Ansaru in 2012, which later rejoined JAS and then splintered again. In 2016, a third group emerged that called itself Islamic State-West Africa Province. They have all, at various times, been active across the region.

What’s in a name?

“Boko Haram” doesn’t really fit into that history. From the first uses of the term to describe Yusuf’s sect, locals have repurposed the name to describe suspected fundamentalist and Islamist extremism in the region. All these operations and more, including a wide array of non-terrorist criminal and gang activity, have variously been attributed to “Boko Haram” by government officials, state security forces, journalists, and locals who lacked complete information about what they were describing.

In short, the use of the name survived even as the actual insurgent organizations in the region changed affiliations, splintered, or disbanded.

Thus, since the early years of the violence, many observers believed they were witnessing the rise of “Boko Haram,” but this perception did not correspond with the activity on the ground and the constellation of terrorist organizations (none of whom used the name) in the region. The ultimate challenge, therefore, isn’t just the use of the wrong name, but what it signifies: It gives an inaccurate impression that there is a singular operational group with a clear ideology and an organizational history. Researchers and experts have analyzed the activity in the region through this lens, bringing a host of largely unrelated activity under the umbrella of the supposed entity. In late 2013, when the State Department designated “Boko Haram” as an FTO, US decision makers seemed to be influenced by what the British anthropologist Ruben Andersson has called “the Timbuktu syndrome”—the mapping of the West’s jihadist fears onto the world’s less familiar peripheries.

Why delisting matters

The State Department’s FTO designation is essentially targeting a ghost. Delisting the organization would have several tangible benefits.

Most importantly, it would streamline the resources the United States dedicates to countering terrorist activity in northern Nigeria. An FTO designation unlocks new authorities for government agencies to target terrorists, but it also requires agencies to follow through and enforce these designations. Due to the host of violence and petty criminal activity that has mistakenly been attributed to “Boko Haram,” the United States is pouring resources into addressing unaffiliated crime and issues that fall solely under the jurisdiction of the Nigerian government without realizing any stabilizing counterterrorism benefits.

Removing “Boko Haram” and instead correctly listing JAS will also benefit the national research apparatus, including academic institutions, think tanks, and government agencies. Since the early years of the violence, independent researchers have helped shape the US approach toward “Boko Haram” and informed US counterterrorism strategies, including military involvement, intelligence collection, and humanitarian assistance. Researchers and academics have had no reason to question the existence of “Boko Haram” when conducting research on the region, which has allowed for persistent uncertainty to dominate the field. As a result, attempts to analyze the confusing array of activity and operations that have been linked to “Boko Haram” have yielded weak insights and less productive recommendations.

For example in 2021, two of the most influential and long-standing leaders in the region—Shekau and Abu Musab Al-Barnawi—were declared dead. For counterterrorism officials, whom Shekau had eluded for almost a decade, this development marked a welcome shift. With the en masse surrender of fighters formerly associated with JAS, some hoped that they had finally witnessed the end of “Boko Haram.” However, many scholars and experts believe that a fundamental aspect of the “group” is its perpetual adaptability, which in fact is largely driven by the loose application of the term to violent events in Nigeria. Thus media organizations, for example, are still publishing articles on new purported attacks by the “organization.” Absent a rejection of “Boko Haram,” the reliance on the term thus ultimately invites a perpetual motion of resurgence that leaves no real end to the violence in sight.

By delisting “Boko Haram,” the State Department will serve its own interests by setting new analyses and inquiries on the right track to accurately identifying terrorist activities and trends in the region. Without this change, there are two grim yet likely consequences. Counterterrorism research projects and resulting US strategies will continue to operate based on avoidable misconceptions and incomplete information on the violence. And more concerningly, without a real reckoning over the existence of the “group,” every new instance of violence in northern Nigeria risks becoming engulfed in the thickening fog of suspected “Boko Haram” activity.

The responsibility now lies with the global collective, and with these US State Department officials in particular, to consciously and deliberately unlearn the deep-seated belief in the “organization’s” very existence.

Alexandra Gorman is a young global professional with the Africa Center and is a masters’ candidate at Johns Hopkins University in the Global Security Studies program. As an undergraduate at Duke University, she received high honors on her senior thesis, “Nigeria’s Militant Jihadism in the Mirror of the Media: the Creation of ‘Boko Haram.’”

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Introduction

The prominence of West Africa, and Africa as a whole, within the global disinformation ecosystem cannot be ignored. A report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies released in April 2022 identified twenty-three disinformation campaigns targeting African countries dating back to 2014. Of these campaigns, sixteen are linked to Russia.

The listed disinformation campaigns—nine of which were identified by the DFRLab—reveal two key points. First, there has been a marked increase in the number of publicly identified disinformation campaigns in recent years. Whether this is due to an increase in the scrutiny, analytical capacity, or efforts on the part of bad actors is unclear. Second, the characteristics of each of these influence operations are distinct—these operations target a wide variety of issues, such as elections, the war in Ukraine, commercial interests, and domestic and international politics.

Further, relations between France and francophone West Africa have, following years of amicable relations built on the back of military cooperation, seen a marked erosion that was underscored by the exit of the last of the French troops from Mali in August 2022. Anti-France and pro-Russia sentiments have surged contemporaneously, with overlapping narratives positioning Russia as a viable alternative to Western aid. When French forces began their departure from Mali in June 2022, Russian private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group stood ready to fill the void.

This report examines several influence operation case studies from the West African region, with a particular emphasis on Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger. The narratives, actors, and contexts supporting these influence operations are summarized alongside their impact on regional stability. Russian influence plays a significant role in these case studies, an unsurprising fact considering the geopolitical history of this region.

This report also includes case studies from outside the Sahel region, consisting of thematically distinct but strategically noteworthy influence campaigns from elsewhere on the continent. For example, the Nigerian government used social media influencers to suppress citizen participation in the #EndSARS movement. Elsewhere, the Ethiopian diaspora used innovative click-to-tweet campaigns to spread international awareness of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. In South Africa, the rise in violent xenophobic demonstrations was precipitated by a popular social media campaign that normalized prejudice against foreign nationals.

The plethora of actors, targets, strategies, and tactics make a blanket approach to studying African disinformation networks difficult. The depth and breadth of these campaigns shows that Africa is facing the same challenges as the rest of the world insofar as disinformation is concerned. Moreover, the interest shown by foreign governments attests to the region’s geopolitical significance. This combination of geopolitical importance and a vulnerability to influence campaigns makes Africa a notable case study.

Background

Africa’s information environment is not monolithic Analog channels such as radio and film are used in conjunction with digital efforts to reach audiences, but Internet penetration rates and the accompanying reli- ance on analog media differ significantly from country to country For example, as of January 2022, Morocco, the Seychelles, and Egypt maintained Internet penetration rates of higher than 70 percent, nearly ten times the rate of the country with the lowest penetration rate, the Central African Republic (7 percent).

In the countries mentioned in the table above, Facebook and Instagram maintain a leading position insofar as social media penetration is concerned This can be partly ascribed to Facebook’s Free Basics service that “zero-rates” data (including Facebook and Instagram data) on participating mobile networks. These mobile networks can then bundle Facebook and Instagram data into a consumer’s service plan without the consumer having to pay extra for that data use Considering that mobile connections outstrip desktop connections, and that mo- bile data is more expensive than fixed broadband, it is clear why this has been effective to expand Facebook and Instagram’s footprint Meta shuttered the Free Basics program in some regions at the end of 2022 as the program’s spiritual successor – Meta Discover – was being rolled out The impact this will have on the information environment remains to be seen.

Social media and internet penetration rates in some of the African countries referenced in this report

With contributions from

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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The post The disinformation landscape in West Africa and beyond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The summit and recent visits by high-ranking Biden administration officials to Africa were the culmination of an effort led by the White House to strengthen the relationship between the United States and the African continent in a wide variety of aspects.

This approach by the Biden administration is quite different from the one adopted by the Donald Trump administration, which saw the continent as a playground for superpower rivalry between China, Russia, and the United States. As part of this great power competition, the Biden administration seeks to enhance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation to block Chinese and Russian influence in Africa.

However, one area both administrations completely ignore is Iran’s growing influence on the continent and the need to formulate a policy that will work to limit Tehran’s freedom of action in Africa.

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979—and even more so following the heavy political pressure on Tehran—Africa has become an attractive continent for the Islamic Republic. Iran views the African continent as a “battleground” for influence, power, and territory against Saudi Arabia, and has also sought to counter Western influence—particularly that of the United States—within Africa, working with elements that are opposed to colonialism and seeking to chart a more independent course.

Moreover, Iran seeks to utilize their worldwide network of religious and cultural organizations, including universities and charities, to increase its influence over the vast Shia minorities in Africa, using them for political support, fundraising, and even to recruit to terrorist cells.

But Iranian terrorist activities in Africa are not the only problem. Iran is not hesitating to interfere in the internal affairs of many African countries to preserve its interests and protect the individuals who serve its policies. A prominent example is the unprecedented Iranian involvement in 2019 to free Shia cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky from his detention in Nigeria, with Iran using its control on Hausa TV to push for his release.

The Iran-West Africa Economic Summit in Tehran, which was held on March 7, is another indication that Iran is seeking to enhance its relations with African countries and strengthen its foothold, especially in the west of the continent. This is part of President Ebrahim Raisi’s vision regarding relations between West African countries and Iran, which was exemplified in his visit to Guinea-Biassau in August 2021, when he pledged to continue expanding ties between Iran and the continent. In many regards, this activity resembles the policy of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Africa, which sought to improve relations significantly.

Apart from Iran’s traditional interests in Africa, several new ones have emerged that must be considered in the context of preventing Iran from consolidating its interests in the continent.

First and foremost is the campaign that Tehran is waging against US allies in Africa that dared to take part in the normalization efforts with Israel: Sudan and Morocco. In order to achieve this goal, Iran has enhanced its military and diplomatic ties with Algiers and increased military aid to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. The latter contribution has improved the front’s ability to inflict severe damage on the Moroccan army and challenge Moroccan control over the territory. Iran is also working in Mauritania and sees this country as a priority zone for its influence schemes in the Sahara region, which is extremely important for Moroccan security.

In the case of Sudan, Iran’s bid to further its influence in the strategic Horn of Africa suffered after Khartoum joined the Abraham Accords. In order to change this negative trend, Iran is blaming Israel for causing political instability in Sudan’s domestic issues. Furthermore, Iran is still actively trying to spread its Shia doctrine in the country while conspiring to create a political vacuum in Sudan that will weaken the forces who agreed to sign a normalization agreement with Israel.

Through its actions, Tehran is demonstrating that there is a price for joining the Abraham Accords and that it can pose a direct or indirect threat to Sudan and Morocco. Iran is also conducting a powerful political campaign to prevent Israel from enhancing its relations with other African countries and improving its diplomatic presence in various African institutions, such as the African Union.

In addition to the illegal arms smuggling network that Iran managed to build in the Horn of Africa, which allows Tehran to smuggle weapons to the countries of the continent, it also appears to be planning to significantly increase its sales of Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) to the African continent. Evidence of this can be seen in Iran’s involvement in the civil war in Ethiopia and the sale of Mohajer-6 UAVs to the Ethiopian army.

Against the background of Iranian involvement in Ukraine and Tehran’s desire to increase sales of its military equipment in the war in Ukraine, Africa is a natural continent for this desire, and the transfer of these capabilities to the Polisario Front constitutes another indication of that.

Third, there is a need to pay close attention to the plots that were revealed in several African countries after the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020—the foiled plot to assassinate the US ambassador in South Africa, chief among them. During the past year, several plans were discovered in which Iran sought to harm American or Israeli interests in Africa or use its presence in the continent to recruit terrorists.

In order to protect its allies in Africa and preserve its interests in the continent, the Biden administration cannot focus solely on the growing presence of China and Russia. It must also consider Tehran’s deepening foothold in Africa, which is a growing challenge to US policy on the continent. The administration must prepare an orderly work plan with the cooperation of African countries—and possibly Gulf countries—that are very disturbed by Iranian expansion. The goal of this would be to reduce Iranian influence in Africa and prevent Iran from using African countries to achieve its interests.

Looking to the future, Africa will continue to be an attractive target for Iranian policy under Raisi. Without a well-thought-out action plan, the US will have minimal ability to push Tehran out of Africa and prevent it from coordinating with China and Russia, with the latter having engaged in an unprecedented rapprochement with Tehran in recent months. Thus, countering Iran’s influence in Africa must become a priority for the Biden administration sooner rather than later.

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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The situation is, in part, being made worse by climate change, which is increasing temperatures and changing weather patterns, compounding the hardship already caused by droughts. According to the International Monetary Fund, a third of the world’s droughts occur in Sub-Saharan Africa; meanwhile, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Horn of Africa is experiencing the longest and most severe drought on record. These conditions are weakening food systems across Sub-Saharan Africa, an area in which agriculture, forestry, and fishing make up 17.2 percent of the gross domestic product—and substantially more in countries like Sierra Leone and Chad.

But there’s more to this food insecurity trend than climate change; Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused uncertainty in the global food market, disrupting the production and trade of key commodities. Russia and Ukraine are significant suppliers of oil, wheat, and maize, and disruptions to the supply chain, combined with local conflicts in some countries, have caused inflation to soar, with food prices increasing as much as 55.6 percent in the Horn of Africa.

Fighting these rising levels of food insecurity requires a whole-of-nation approach. But countries in these food-insecure regions aren’t doing enough to harness the economic and agricultural potential of half their populations: women. For example, discriminatory laws that hamper women’s access to land and financial services are still in place in some countries. In order to fight food insecurity in full force, these countries must ensure that women are equipped with the exact same resources as men: both land itself and the decision-making power to determine how to use that land in the most productive way possible. Policymakers in these food-insecure countries should take the following actions:

Equalize inheritance rights

Some countries in these food-insecure regions have made significant strides recently in passing reforms that impact women’s lives in some respects—but they have faltered in passing meaningful reforms related to improving access to assets and entrepreneurship opportunities for women.

According to the Center for Global Development, agriculture accounts for 56 percent of employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, and women account for 57 percent of agricultural workers. The informal sector accounts for 50 to 80 percent of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa—activity that includes the sale of food. And like the agricultural sector, the informal sector is a major employer of women: In Africa, 89.7 percent of employed women work in the informal sector. Yet despite the roles that women play in these sectors, only 30 percent of women own land in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The discrepancy in land ownership extends in part from inheritance laws. In some of these food-insecure countries, inheritance plays the primary role in determining land ownership. Some inheritance laws across the region are—or were initially—patriarchal, favoring men in the division of property. There have been some signs of progress in protecting women’s rights to inherit property; for example, in Uganda, lawmakers recently amended the Succession Act to ensure equal inheritance rights between men and women.

However, Uganda’s Succession Act was the first inheritance reform implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa since Mali’s in 2011, according to the World Bank, demonstrating the slow pace of progress. More countries must follow suit by implementing their own amendments or fresh, new laws on inheritance rights.

Support women’s entrepreneurship

Owning land goes hand-in-hand with access to financial services. In countries across these food-insecure regions of Africa, farmers must have land titles in order to access the credit necessary to increase agricultural productivity by hiring workers, purchasing animals or farming equipment, and covering transportation and storage costs of their goods. Credit supports entrepreneurship, which promotes innovation and the accumulation of wealth—both of which are integral to fighting food insecurity in the region. However, just as women’s rights to own land are hindered in some countries, their rights to enterprise are sometimes hindered as well.  

According to the World Bank, 71 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have laws that prohibit financial institutions from discriminating based on gender, and women often face more stringent loan arrangements than men when they do access credit. Furthermore, according to the International Monetary Fund, in Sub-Saharan Africa, just 37 percent of women own bank accounts compared to 48 percent of men. If a woman must rely on a man to open a bank account, take out a loan, or register a business, she cannot fully exercise her rights as an entrepreneur to hire workers or freely determine the agricultural methods she uses with the hopes of increasing output.

All countries in these food-insecure regions of Africa should criminalize gender-based discrimination with regard to credit. Allowing women an equal opportunity to receive loans encourages entrepreneurship, leading to more production and competition in the agricultural market. Benin’s Order No. 2349-5—which was implemented in 2022 and prohibits credit, banking, and decentralized financial systems from using discriminatory practices in granting access to credit—can serve as a model for other countries.

Putting the law into practice

Laws are only part of the solution. Guaranteeing equal access to land and credit requires systemic change. Localities and financial institutions need to make a concerted effort to ensure that women are aware of their rights and encourage them to embrace the opportunities to own land or become entrepreneurs.

Activists and government officials should work with local leaders to hold seminars for women, outlining their rights to own land and offering to process land titles. In the private sector, financial institutions can create campaigns specifically marketed towards women, publishing advertisements in print, social, and broadcast media that encourage women to apply for credit.

By taking concrete steps to ensure that women have equal access to land and entrepreneurship, countries can empower their full populations, bringing major benefits for the economy, agricultural productivity, and food security.

James Storen is the program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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Seventy-eight years after World War II, as facts fade and fewer survivors remain, the Holocaust risks being forgotten. This natural amnesia is compounded by widespread campaigns to revise or repress Holocaust history. International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27 and Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom Hashoah) on April 17 are important annual observances to counter these trends, but much more needs to be done year-round. Surprisingly, the Arab world may soon become a world leader in rejecting denialism to reassert “Never again!”

Present events constantly reshape the perceptions of the past and, indirectly, future outcomes. There are people in every country around the world who claim that the Holocaust never took place. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Holocaust denial is mainly a trend among the younger generation due to a lack of Holocaust education in schools and after-school activities. For decades, the Holocaust has been a taboo subject, politicized and conflated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in official discourse. Historical truth is clouded, if not overshadowed, by key actors in the Arab world who connect Israeli state policies and the Jewish people worldwide—past and present, using them interchangeably, as if they were one. Opposition to Israel becomes resistance to the reality of Jewish suffering and injustice done to Jews in the past.

As a result, the Holocaust was absent from public consciousness until 2009, when Morocco’s King Mohammed VI became the first Arab leader to recognize the Holocaust by addressing the matter in a message addressed to the launch event of the Aladdin Project at UNESCO in Paris.

“Amnesia has no effect on my understanding of the Holocaust, or that of my people,” said the king, adding, “We must together endeavor to reassert reason and the values which underpin the legitimacy of a space of co-existence where the words of dignity, justice, and freedom will express themselves in the same way and will coexist, with the same requirements, regardless of our origins, cultures or spiritual ties. This is our interpretation, in Morocco, of the duty of remembrance dictated by the Shoah.”

Speaking at international conferences and forums devoted to the Holocaust and intercultural dialogue, King Mohammed VI and representatives of the Moroccan government have frequently emphasized the significance of denouncing anti-Semitism, instilling togetherness, and religious coexistence in Moroccan society, learning from the lessons of the Holocaust, and highlighting the crucial role that education plays in this context.

Challenges for Holocaust education in the Arab world

Past efforts at Holocaust education in the Arab world have too often suffered from a lack of context-specific sensitivity. In contrast to the king’s speech, which expresses the values and ideals of the Moroccan tradition as the basis for affirming Holocaust remembrance, others have simply translated Euro-centric Holocaust materials into Arabic, mainly from fear by civil society actors they would be blamed for “normalizing” with Israel if they tried to teach about the Holocaust. To effectively use Holocaust education as a tool for genocide prevention, the content should be tailored to Arab audiences using relevant wording, metaphors, names, and historical events.

In contrast to other areas of the world, World War II battles were fought, and Jews of the MENA region, directly or indirectly, experienced the Holocaust. Employing this little-known history in creating educational content is essential to sparking children’s imagination.

On the other hand, if this would only be a requirement, rather than a shared process of mutual development, educators would not take ownership of these materials and will lack the motivation to use these materials towards the essential goal of developing Holocaust education within the Arab world.

The power of participation

Today, initiatives all over the Middle East and North Africa try to promote Holocaust education through standard education approaches. However, teacher-to-student Holocaust education, while powerful, cannot reach the vast audience in need of this vital information and perspective. There is an increasing need to use state-of-the-art media, including those that allow for online sharing of ideas. While the hateful have exploited the Internet to spread racism, Holocaust denial, and other destructive ideologies, it can also serve as a powerful tool to educate and empower those fighting hate.

In 2011, the Kivunim Institute and Mimouna Association organized the first conference on the Holocaust in the Arab world commemorating the actions of the late King Mohammed V at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. An article in the New York Times praised the event as a “first of its kind in an Arab or Muslim nation, and a sign of historical truth triumphing over conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic dogma.”

The Mimouna Association and United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in 2017 jointly created the first Arabic-language Holocaust curriculum by and for Muslims. The Holocaust education material created was tailored to the specific context of the Arab and Muslim world.

The USHMM, which is celebrating its thirtieth anniversary this month, has prioritized promoting Holocaust education in the Arab world, for example, through Holocaust commemorations in Morocco in 2018 and 2022, and Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022 and 2023. In 2022, the USHMM organized an important Holocaust commemoration in the UAE and Egypt.

In the Emirates, Ahmed Obaid Al Mansoori created in 2021 the first Holocaust memorial exhibition in the Arab world at the Crossroads of Civilization Museum in Dubai. This permanent exhibit is the first of its kind in the Arab world, and offers visitors a setting within which to begin to understand the Holocaust and fight the denial of this dark chapter of human history.

In Morocco this year, the Mimouna Association, in partnership with the Council of Jewish Communities in Morocco, the United Nations Information Centre, and the ASF, provided over 120 students from different Moroccan universities and institutes, Moroccan Muslim activists, and members of the Moroccan Jewish community with an opportunity to engage and learn more about the history of the Holocaust.

In the largest synagogue of Casablanca, 350 guests—including university students, Morocco’s Minister of Education Chakib Benmoussa, diplomats from the United States, Israel, France, Germany, Poland, The Vatican, and Spain, as well as representatives from Moroccan civil society and international organizations—packed the pews to honor King Mohammed V, savior of the Moroccan Jewish community.

Recognizing the deep convictions, moral approach, and brave policy of Sultan Mohammed V, the US ambassador to Morocco, Puneet Talwar, affirmed, “His Majesty King Mohammed V protected Morocco’s Jews from the Nazis. And His Majesty King Mohammed VI has carried on that legacy. He has spoken forcefully against the denial of the Holocaust.”

The Chief Rabbi of Casablanca, Rabbi Joseph Israel, said a customary Moroccan prayer honoring the king and his forefathers. The Muslim students also heard the Chapters of Psalms, Kaddish, Yizkor, and the Kel Malei Rachamim in memory of the Holocaust victims.

On the eve of Yom Hashoah, it is no longer considered taboo in the MENA region to promote Holocaust education and genocide prevention. The region’s youth are far more receptive to discussing the events of one of the darkest chapters of human history, despite the political, religious, and educational challenges shrouding this historic move that has been praised in some nations in the region and criticized in others.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter: @ElBoudra.

N7 Initiative

The N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation, seeks to broaden and deepen normalization between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries. It works with governments to produce actionable recommendations to deliver tangible benefits to their peoples.

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After a decade of ruptured ties and simmering tensions, Egypt and Turkey are inching towards a rapprochement—a move thought unimaginable by some observers a couple of years prior. This thawing of relations was most recently symbolized by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s visit to Cairo on March 18.  

However, the true turning point came during the FIFA World Cup opening ceremony in Qatar in November 2022, where Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan met each other briefly and engaged in a highly publicized handshake. This signaled the end of hostilities between the former rivals. Later in February, Egypt’s top diplomat Sameh Shoukry traveled to the southern Turkish city of Mersin to offer solidarity and support in the wake of massive earthquakes that hit southern and central Turkey and neighboring Syria, wreaking havoc and claiming tens of thousands of lives. These overtures and gestures were necessary to repair the mistrust and animosity that had grown over the years.

Relations between Egypt and Turkey soured in 2013 after the overthrow of Egypt’s former President Mohamed Morsi, who hailed from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement designated as a “terrorist organization” by Cairo that very year. Morsi, a key ideological ally of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), was deposed by military-backed mass protests, later condemned as “a coup” by Turkish politicians. From that point onwards, relations between Cairo and Ankara deteriorated, and the two sides continued to trade recriminations.

Tensions between the two countries escalated in 2020, threatening to blow up into a full-fledged military confrontation after Turkey intervened militarily in Libya’s civil war—a move that drew backlash from President Sisi, who perceived it as a blatant threat to Egypt’s national security. During a visit to a military base in the Western Desert close to the Libyan border on June 22, 2020, Sisi ordered the Egyptian army to “be ready to carry out any mission outside the country”—a clear message to Ankara that he was contemplating the use of military force to defend Egypt’s Western border. Sisi’s threat came after Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries who were fighting alongside forces of the United Nations-recognized Government of National Authority (GNA), succeeded in halting the eastward advance of opposing troops led by Libyan General Khalifa Haftar, whom Cairo backed. 

“Any military intervention in Libya would be a legitimate means of self-defense as Sirte is a red line for Egypt,” Sisi warned in reference to the strategic central Libyan city that serves as a gateway to eastern Libya, a region with vast oil reserves. Gaining control of Sirte, which lies 1,000 km (approximately 621.37 miles) away from the Egyptian border, would have meant access to nearby air bases, posing a direct threat to Egypt’s security.  

Egyptian media has welcomed the new era in Egyptian-Turkish relations but Cairo appears to be less enthusiastic than Ankara about restoring diplomatic ties and is treading cautiously. Thus with Turkish presidential elections slated for mid-May, the Egyptian leadership would rather wait until after the Turkish elections to move forward with normalization.  

The political standoff has not impacted economic and trade ties between Egypt and Turkey, which have remained robust throughout the past decade. Separating their economic exchanges from their political dispute has proved mutually beneficial: Turkish investments in Egypt amounted to an estimated $2.5 billion in 2021, and the volume of trade between the two countries nearly tripled in the period between 2007 and 2020, reaching $11.4 billion in 2020. Turkish companies across a wide range of sectors—such as electronics, textiles, and medical supplies—have continued their operations throughout, unfettered by the diplomatic rift. Nevertheless, expectations are rife that the warming of ties will reflect positively on the two countries’ ailing economies through the further bolstering of trade and investments.

Foreign Minister Shoukry has, meanwhile, conditioned the resumption of relations with Turkey on “real actions showing Turkey’s alignment with Egypt’s principles and goals.”

Cairo would like to see Turkish authorities clamp down on exiled Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters residing in Turkey and extradite fugitives accused of committing acts of violence against the Egyptian state. Additionally, it wants Istanbul-based media channels, fiercely critical of the Egyptian government, shut down.  

From Cairo’s perspective, Ankara has taken steps to show it is serious about rapprochement. In March 2021, Turkish officials urged hostile opposition channels to tone down their criticism of the Egyptian president. Not long afterwards, Mekameleen, a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated channel notorious for its persistent lambasting of Sisi, announced the suspension of its broadcasts from Istanbul, saying it was moving its headquarters “elsewhere.”   

Another pre-condition set by Cairo for normalizing relations is non-interference by Turkey in Libya’s internal affairs. Cairo insists on the withdrawal of Ankara-backed Syrian militias in Libya, which Egypt sees as a threat. While it is highly unlikely that Ankara will acquiesce to this demand—Turkey has turned a deaf ear to earlier calls by French President Emmanuel Macron to remove all foreign troops from Libya, including those financed by Ankara—some kind of compromise may be reached, such as keeping the Turkish military advisors that were sent to Libya at the behest of the previous GNA while withdrawing the Syrian troops which Cairo labels “extremist militia.” 

Egypt’s warming up to the new unity government in Tripoli—after years of siding with opposing forces led by warlord Haftar—may pave the way for future talks with Libya and Turkey to defuse tensions over the foreign troop presence that Cairo finds unsettling.         

There is also a need for multilateral talks to de-escalate inflamed regional tensions over maritime borders: an October 2022 agreement with the unity government in Libya allowing Turkey to explore for oil and gas in an exclusive economic zone off the coast of Libya has drawn protests from Cairo and Athens—as well as other regional governments—which slammed the deal as “illegal.” 

To the chagrin of the Tripoli-based GNU, Egypt took the bold step two months later in December 2022 by unilaterally delineating its maritime border with Libya. Some analysts said the decision was “aimed at protecting Egypt’s economic interests.”   

Enhanced energy cooperation with Egypt—which has ambitions of becoming a regional energy hub and a major gas exporter to Europe and eastern Mediterranean markets—is something Cairo would welcome. Therefore, Turkey would do well to win over regional rivals by joining the East Mediterranean Gas Forum or at least by engaging with its members—a crucial step toward ironing out its differences with Greece and the Greek Cypriots. 

Finally, the Turkish offer to mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam dispute may serve as an olive branch that could speed up Ankara’s reconciliation process with Cairo. Serious commitment to mediation efforts between the two Nile Basin countries may allay Cairo’s concerns over the expansion of Turkish ties with Ethiopia—in particular, the sale of Turkish armed drones to Addis Ababa, which Cairo and the US fear may be used by the Ethiopian government against rebel forces in Tigray.

While the Ethiopian parliament has removed the Tigray National Liberation Front from the country’s terrorism list after the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the leftist ethnic party ruling Ethiopia’s northern region in November 2022, tensions remain high between the government and Oromo Liberation Army, an armed opposition group seeking autonomy for the country’s largest ethnic community in the Oramia region of Ethiopia. 

With all this in mind, Turkey must turn the page on past rivalries and its quest for regional influence. It should instead build on its deep-rooted social and economic ties with Egypt and shared historical heritage to start a new era of fruitful cooperation. This would very much be in the interests of the two countries and the region.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

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Online Event Mon, March 27, 2023 • 1:30 pm ET

Live from the Freedom Online Coalition: How the FOC works for people around the world

The DFRLab hosts the US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman along with civil society and industry experts for a discussion on the Freedom Online Coalition and how the world’s democratic tech alliance advances human rights online.

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Ahead of the Biden administration’s second Summit for Democracy, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman gave a sneak peek at what to expect from the US government on its commitments to protecting online rights and freedoms.

The event, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab on Monday, came on the same day that US President Joe Biden signed an executive order restricting the US government’s use of commercial spyware that may be abused by foreign governments or enable human-rights abuses overseas.

But there’s more in store for this week, Sherman said, as the United States settles into its role as chair of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC)—a democratic tech alliance of thirty-six countries working together to support human rights online. As chair, the United States needs “to reinforce rules of the road for cyberspace that mirror and match the ideals of the rules-based international order,” said Sherman. She broke that down into four top priorities for the FOC:

1. Protecting fundamental freedoms online, especially for often-targeted human-rights defenders
2. Building resilience against digital authoritarians who use technology to achieve their aims
3. Building a consensus on policies designed to limit abuses of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI)
4. Expanding digital inclusion  

“The FOC’s absolutely vital work can feel like a continuous game of catch-up,” said Sherman. But, she added, “we have to set standards that meet this moment… we have to address what we see in front of us and equip ourselves with the building blocks to tackle what we cannot predict.”

Below are more highlights from the event, during which a panel of stakeholders also outlined the FOC’s role in ensuring that the internet and emerging technologies—including AI—adhere to democratic principles.

Deepening fundamental freedoms

• Sherman explained that the FOC will aim to combat government-initiated internet shutdowns and ensure that people can “keep using technology to advance the reach of freedom.”
• Boye Adegoke, senior manager of grants and program strategy at the Paradigm Initiative, recounted how technology was supposed to help improve transparency in Nigeria’s recent elections. But instead, the election results came in inconsistently and after long periods of time. Meanwhile, the government triggered internet shutdowns around the election period. “Bad actors… manipulate technology to make sure that the opinions and the wishes of the people do not matter at the end of the day,” he said.
• “It’s very important to continue to communicate the work that the FOC is doing… so that more and more people become aware” of internet shutdowns and can therefore prepare for the lapses in internet service and in freely flowing, accurate information, Adegoke said.
• On a practical level, once industry partners expose where disruptions are taking place, the FOC offers a mechanism by which democratic “governments can work together to sort of pressure other governments to say these [actions] aren’t acceptable,” Starzak argued.
• The FOC also provides a place for dialogue on human rights in the online space, said Alissa Starzak, vice president and global head of public policy at Cloudfare. Adegoke, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, stressed that “human rights [are] rarely at the center of the issues,” so the FOC offers an opportunity to mainstream that conversation into policymakers’ discussions on technology.

Building resilience against digital authoritarianism

• “Where all of [us FOC countries] may strive to ensure technology delivers for our citizens, autocratic regimes are finding another means of expression,” Sherman explained, adding that those autocratic regimes are using technologies to “divide and disenfranchise; to censor and suppress; to limit freedoms, foment fear, and violate human dignity.” New technologies are essentially “an avenue of control” for authoritarians, she explained.
• At the FOC, “we will focus on building resilience against the rise of digital authoritarianism,” Sherman said, which has “disproportionate and chilling impacts on journalists, activists, women, and LGBTI+ individuals” who are often directly targeted for challenging the government or expressing themselves.
• One of the practices digital authoritarians often abuse is surveillance. Sherman said that as part of the Summit for Democracy, the FOC and other partners will lay out guiding principles for the responsible use of surveillance tech.
• Adegoke recounted how officials in Nigeria justified their use of surveillance tech by saying that the United States also used the technology. “It’s very important to have some sort of guiding principle” from the United States, he said.
• After Biden signed the spyware executive order, Juan Carlos Lara, executive director at Derechos Digitales, said he expects other countries “to follow suit and hopefully to expand the idea of bans on spyware or bans on surveillance technology” that inherently pose risks to human rights.

Addressing artificial intelligence

• “The advent of AI is arriving with a level of speed and sophistication we haven’t witnessed before,” warned Sherman. “Who creates it, who controls it, [and] who manipulates it will help define the next phase of the intersection between technology and democracy.”
• Some governments, Sherman pointed out, have used AI to automate their censorship and suppression practices. “FOC members must build a consensus around policies to limit these abuses,” she argued.
• Speaking from an industry perspective, Starzak acknowledged that sometimes private companies and governments “are in two different lanes” when it comes to figuring out how they should use AI. But setting norms for both good and bad AI use, she explained, could help get industry and the public sector in the same lane, moving toward a world in which AI is used in compliance with democratic principles.
• Lara, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, explained that the FOC has a task force to specifically determine those norms on government use of AI and to identify the ways in which AI contributes to the promise—or peril—of technology in societies worldwide.

Improving digital inclusion

• “The internet should be open and secure for everyone,” said Sherman. That includes “closing the gender gap online” by “expanding digital literacy” and “promoting access to safe online spaces” that make robust civic participation possible for all. Sherman noted that the FOC will specifically focus on digital inclusion for women and girls, LGBTI+ people, and people with disabilities.
• Starzak added that in the global effort to cultivate an internet that “builds prosperity,” access to the free flow of information for all is “good for the economy and good for the people.” Attaining that version of the internet will require a “set of controls” to protect people and their freedoms online, she added.
• Ultimately, there are major benefits to be had from expanded connectivity. According to Sherman, it “can drive economic growth, raise standards of living, create jobs, and fuel innovative solutions” for global challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, and good governance.

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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This evolving discourse provides an ideological framework for Sub-Saharan African migrants subjected to documented instances of racism and expulsion during their stay in North African countries by local inhabitants and authorities. This new narrative transcends the conventional motivation of seeking exile or improved livelihoods in Europe and using these countries as a route to cross the Mediterranean clandestinely. It also supports a grotesque and historically misleading account about the origins of native Amazigh people of the region being inherently non-African because of their light skin color.

Resisting racism with Afrocentrism

In a speech on February 21, Tunisian President Kais Saied claimed that Sub-Saharan migrants “threaten the country’s national identity and must be stopped,” renewing the debate regarding xenophobia and discrimination against black communities in Tunisia. The divisive comments instigated the outrage of human rights activists at the national and international levels as the Maghreb region has been overwhelmed by waves of migrants and asylum seekers looking for dignity and improved living standards for the past two decades, aggravated by the Libyan crisis.

North African countries, already migration departure nations with over 12.3 million migrants internationally, have mixed records in dealing with the Sub-Saharan migration issue ranging from mass repatriations and ghettoization to limited efforts of naturalization and integration. Soaring inflation and unemployment rates in some countries led to a growing sentiment of prejudice and chauvinistic hate speech. It’s impossible to forget the outrageous scenes of stranded migrants left to starve in the open desert between Algeria and Niger over the past few years or others beaten to death as they attempted to climb the fence surrounding the fortified enclave of Melilla.  

Sub-Saharan migrants, infuriated by decades of mistreatment by Europeans and now by North Africans, found refuge in a new Afrocentric discourse to justify their right to exist and stay in the Maghreb facing racism with reversed racism and asking Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, and Libyans to “go back to Asia” where they supposedly originated from. Afrocentric adepts even assert that the real Moorish people were black, and so were the pharaohs, and claim all civilizational glories that took place on African soil as inherently black.

The circulating social media clips and comments call to re-Africanize the Maghreb through mixed marriages and mass immigration. This movement is capitalizing on the Black Lives Matter movement, which reignited a pan-African sentiment and repositioned blackness in the political agendas in the United States and Europe to create the buzz and hide a more complex demographical and discursive phenomenon.

Historical misconceptions and racist legacies

The problem with this approach lies primarily in its erroneous historical accuracy. North Africa has always been the ancestral land of the Amazigh or Imazighen people, as proven by neolithic archeological excavations going back to at least 10,000 BC and known accounts from the antiquity encounters of Greek, Roman, and Phoenician with the Numidian, Mauri, and Libu people. Amazighs are also a distinct group anthropologically with specific genetic make, language, and culture processing ties with all of Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean. Arab settlers from the gulf and Levant colonized the region much later and were faced with fierce resistance by the autochthones led by their queen Al-Kahina in the eighth century.

The Berber and Arab people of the Maghreb have ongoing ethno-nationalistic divergences, as some Amazighs continue to claim to be ostracized by a ruling Arab class. This was exacerbated by French colonial rule, which intentionally distinguished between Arabs and Berbers in education, local government, and laws. Certain groups, like the Kabyles in Algeria, still sustain separatist demands and even have a government in exile. Nevertheless, the truth is that centuries of intermarriages and assimilation have created an amalgamation of both communities and gave birth to today’s North African identity, where it is impossible to proclaim ethnic purity. Black Africans themselves could not be reduced today to one race or culture, and it is utterly reductionist and essentialist to say an Ethiopian is the same as a Congolese or to compare a Sudanese with a South African.

The recent tensions between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa may be explained by the historical ties between the two regions of the continent, where the latter repetitively subjugated the first and annexed them as part of its empires. The Maghreb, additionally, has an undeniable dark heritage legacy of being slave owners and traders. In his book Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam, Arizona University professor Chouki El Hamel revisits this least-known chronicle of the region’s past, where western Africans were captured, emasculated, and used as soldiers or sold off to slave merchants and shipped to the new continent. Domestic slaves had a much grimmer faith, as they were subjected to physical violence, rape, and exploitation.

North Africa undoubtedly faces a serious migration problem that will continue to aggravate if not addressed regarding its social, cultural, and historical dimensions and root causes. The Sahara and the Sahel are already extremely precarious zones, with flourishing mercenaries and extremist groups recruiting migrants and utilizing them to destabilize the entire region. The security approach that Tunisian President Saied is preaching for would not suffice; only a more prosperous and economically integrated West Africa with its northern neighbors could provide a pathway to stabilization.

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs 

The post <strong>Afrocentrism is trending in the Maghreb. It’s because Sub-Saharan migrants are rewriting their narrative.</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It was a close call. Ruling party candidate Bola Tinubu was declared the narrow winner of Nigeria’s presidential election on Wednesday after balloting delays and scattered violence, with his two closest challengers saying they will dispute the results in court. Assuming Tinubu takes office as planned in May, he will lead a nation that is at once making big strides on the world stage and reeling from crises at home. Why was the election so rocky, and what should the new president’s priorities be? Our experts share their insights.

• Constance Berry Newman: Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center, former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and official international observer of Nigeria’s 2023 elections 
• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Senior director of the Africa Center
• Aubrey Hruby (@aubreyhruby): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and co-founder of Tofino Capital

Notes from the ground

• Constance, who monitored the elections as part of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission, says the government did many things right in administering the election, including technological improvements and getting all political parties to commit to using only peaceful, legal means to challenge the results.
• But she says the government made several key mistakes, including long delays in opening polling sites. “This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities,” Constance reports.
• Another failure, she adds, was “a seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.”
• Constance attributes the surprisingly low voter turnout (27 percent) to “a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures.”
• But she comes away most impressed with the enthusiastic young people in a country where around 70 percent of the population is younger than age thirty. “Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country.”

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Tinubu’s agenda

• While Peter Obi, an outsider candidate from the Labour Party, garnered a ton of international press and led in some polls, Rama tells us that Tinubu’s win is “not a surprise.”
• That’s because Tinubu, 70, hails from the ruling All Progressives Congress party, “is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos,” Rama adds.
• But the fact that Tinubu lost Lagos—where he served as governor from 1999 to 2007—“demonstrates the power of the message” from Nigeria’s disaffected youth to their country’s political leaders, Aubrey says. Tinubu spoke directly to their concerns in his victory speech, referring to young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.”
• It won’t be easy for him to deliver: Aubrey points to Nigeria’s 42.5 percent youth unemployment, rampant inflation, soaring debt burden, and plummeting oil production. Tech and entrepreneurship are “a bright spot” in the economy, but amid a brain drain that’s seeing fifty doctors leave per week to work overseas, she adds, “Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide.” 

On the world stage

• Tinubu will be immediately thrust into a leadership role on the continent. “The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands,” Rama tells us.
• And as Africa seeks a larger role in the G20 and Bretton Woods Institutions, “Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue,” Rama adds. “The expectations have never been so high.”

The post What’s in store for Nigeria after a messy election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Constance Berry Newman: The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

Aubrey Hruby: To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

Rama Yade: Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

On the ground, where I served in recent days as an election observer, it is about the Nigerian people—the voters, non-voters, youth, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other government officials, political parties, media, and civil society. Around ninety-three million Nigerians were registered to vote, but only 26 percent of those registered turned out to vote. Those who voted were engaged, standing in lines sometimes for hours, staying for the final counts, saluting each announced winner in their polling site. 

One puzzle not yet solved is: Why did so many more people decide not to vote than in previous elections? It’s probably all the same reasons Nigerians did not vote in the past—a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures. However, the youth are amazing. We saw them at the polling sites, though exact turnout numbers are yet to be verified, and the National Youth Service Corps ran the election at the polling site level. My conversations with many of the youth led to an observation that Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country. There are mixed reviews regarding the role of the media, because there are barriers to media having the freedom to do its job, and parts of the media allow for and even provide misinformation and hate speech. 

With regard to the civil-society participants, many are sophisticated in data collection and analysis, questioning government officials with facts, using media and social media in effective ways. However, neither they nor the government nor the political parties has been effective in getting the citizens to vote in any meaningful numbers. Also, the political parties have a long way to go in terms of improving inclusion for youth, women, persons with disabilities, and internally displaced persons in the political process.

With regard to the government’s role in the administration of the election, one can draw both positive and negative conclusions. On the positive side: 

1. The Electoral Act of 2022 took steps to improve electoral integrity. However, conclusions are yet to be determined about the implementation of those steps across the board. 
2. Preparations for the election started earlier than for previous elections, which should have resulted in improved Election Day activities at the polls and final reporting of the results. 
3. Generally speaking, the technology worked, but it would have worked better had INEC pilot tested the technology on a national level prior to the February election. INEC piloted the key new systems in three off-cycle elections but never conducted a nationwide test.  
4. The government secured signatures from the eighteen political parties to the 2023 Peace Accord. Therefore, each presidential candidate and the candidate’s party committed to accepting the outcome of the elections or seek legitimate means of remedy in the event of divergent viewpoints.

For the various governmental entities charged with playing a role in the election, currency and fuel shortages were a negative. Also, while some may argue that it is unfair to assign blame, the fact is that the government did not stop election violence such as the assassination of the Labour Party senatorial candidate for Enugu East.

Specially for INEC, there were three main negatives: 

1. A lack of transparency, so voters and the general public did not understand why election data was published late, for example. 
2. Very late openings of polling sites because of late transportation of materials, missing materials, and late arrival of staff. This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities. 
3. A seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.

—Constance Berry Newman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs. She is a member of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission to Nigeria’s 2023 presidential and legislative elections.

To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

After one of the closest elections in recent Nigerian history, Tinubu has called for an “era of renewed hope,” asking for peace, patience, and solidarity. He acknowledged the role that the youth have played in the elections and the need to address young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.” The fact that the “godfather of Lagos” lost his home city to Peter Obi demonstrates the power of the message Nigerian youth sent in this election.  

In order to address the concerns of the youth, the septuagenarian Tinubu will need to turn his immediate attention to the economy. Food inflation, at a seventeen-year high, is up 28 percent year on year from 2021 to 2022, official youth unemployment hit 42.5 percent (according to the national bureau of statistics) and oil production has fallen to a forty-year low. Power is still expensive—Nigeria is home to sixty million diesel generators and fuel products are still imported—and the World Bank estimates that over 40 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line. Borrowing on international markets to invest in infrastructure is not really an option for the new Tinubu administration, as Nigerian debt has nearly doubled since 2015 and is now over one hundred billion dollars.  

In the campaign, Tinubu committed to removing the fuel subsidies that cost Nigeria more than ten billion dollars in 2022, but this is not the first time a president tried to take on this beast. Then President Goodluck Jonathan’s efforts to remove the fuel subsidies ended after nationwide protests in 2012. This time around also promises to be politically difficult given the financial hardships faced by Nigerians.

Tinubu will also be asking a lot of Nigerians who are dependent on day-to-day imports should he push for the free float of the naira. The central bank currently restricts access to foreign exchange and rations dollars to prop up the naira, which is now valued at half of what it was when outgoing President Muhammad Buhari was first elected in 2015, resulting in a large spread between the official and street exchange rates. By the time Tinubu officially takes office at the end of May, hopefully the current government will have rationalized the demonetization plan that has caused cash shortages and long lines at ATMs.  

Despite all of these economic challenges, the Nigerian spirit has remained resilient. The informal economy (which, based on my experience doing business in the country for twenty years, is two-to-three times the size of the official economy) continues to absorb newcomers to the labor market, and there is a bright spot within Nigerian tech and entrepreneurship. The country is home to Africa’s largest venture capital and tech hub, and Nigerian companies such as Sabi, SeamlessHr, Moniepoint, and Moove are expanding to other economies in the region. 

But Tinubu will have an uphill battle in renewing young people’s faith in Nigeria. Young Nigerians are leaving the country in record numbers—those going to the United Kingdom to work has quadrupled since 2019—and the Nigerian Medical Association says that at least fifty doctors are leaving every week to work abroad. Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide. 

—Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, a co-founder of Tofino Capital, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

What we can say today is that even if the election was highly disputed, with Bola Tinubu, logic prevailed. Tinubu’s victory is not a surprise. He was running on behalf of the ruling All Progressives Congress. He is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos. If the result is confirmed, the largest African democracy will have passed one of its most important tests since military rule ended in 1999. And it is not over: Beyond the presidential election, Nigerians are also electing their 469 representatives in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Democracy is a tough path.

This election is special, too, because Nigeria is transitioning to a new environment marked by an economic turning point and a changing continental and international context. The expectations have never been so high. Tinubu will lead a country that is expected to become the world’s third most populous by 2050. At the African level, Nigeria is a major actor whose economy represents 70 percent of the West African gross domestic product. The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands. Even as it faces major shifts, it will tremendously impact the rest of the continent. At the global level, the African continent will negotiate its role in international bodies from the Bretton Woods system to the Group of Twenty (G20) nations, and Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post Experts react: As the ruling party’s Tinubu wins a contested election, what’s next for Nigeria? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

If fully implemented, such projects, might act as a catalyst for more investments in hydrogen production and infrastructure in the region and for the process of demand creation that remains at the core of the future of hydrogen development.

Furthermore, the potential in the MENA goes well beyond the region itself and its relationship with Europe. Some Gulf countries are set to export green hydrogen products to Asia and their sovereign funds and renewables companies are looking at hydrogen investments in several African countries.

The implications of the MENA region’s commitment to renewables development and to hydrogen in particular are thus wide-ranging and should be supported at the policy and operational level by, among others, the EU, the multilateral finance development institutions, and other international partners.

Many projects were announced at COP27. Egypt, the host country, was the main protagonist: 9 memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on feasibility studies on production of green hydrogen and green ammonia were signed. Such products would mostly be exported to European and Asian markets. If turned into investment decisions and implemented fully, the nine projects are supposed to be worth around $83 billion and to produce collectively 7.6 million tons of green ammonia and 2.7 million tons of green hydrogen per year, when fully operational. Also at COP27, the Egyptian authorities and a consortium of local and international investors announced the commissioning of the first phase of what is supposed to become the first integrated green hydrogen plant in Africa.

The most noticeable development at a political level in the field of hydrogen development regarded EU-Egypt cooperation, when the President of the European Commission von der Leyen and Egypt’s President al-Sisi issued a Joint Statement on the EU-Egypt Renewable Hydrogen Partnership and the Vice President of the European Commission and its Energy Commissioner signed a MoU, with the Egyptian Ministers of Oil/Petroleum and Electricity/Renewables, to establish a strategic partnership on renewable hydrogen. The two sides agreed to set up an EU-Egypt Hydrogen Coordination Group and to organize an annual meeting of a Business Forum that would include industrial and energy players.

Furthermore, on November 9, Egypt’s President and Belgium’s Prime Minister launched a new international platform on hydrogen, named the “Global Renewable Hydrogen Forum”.

After COP27, seven more MoUs were signed by the relevant Egyptian agencies with various investors to conduct feasibility studies on new projects with a view to setting up facilities to produce green hydrogen and its derivatives.

Egypt is not the only Arab country to move dynamically on this front. Governments, sovereign funds, and industrial players in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Morocco are acting quickly and boldly.

Saudi Arabia, which launched a comprehensive Saudi Green Initiative in 2021, is planning a substantial development of green hydrogen and green ammonia production centered around NEOM, a new city and area to be developed in the northwestern corner of the country. If fully implemented, the project would set up the world’s largest utility green hydrogen facility. The Green Initiative also includes thirteen renewable energy projects, with a combined capacity of 11.3 GW that would help reduce some 20 million tons of carbon emissions per year.

Oman launched recently a new Strategy on Green Hydrogen that foresees $140 billion in investment by 2050, targeting an annual production of 1-1.25 megatons (MT) of green hydrogen by 2030, rising to 3.25-3.75 MT by 2040 and 7.5-8.5 MT by 2050. Oman is also working on a project to establish a green steel plant fed by hydrogen, with an annual production of 5 million tons. Such product would be exported to other Middle Eastern countries as well as to Europe, Japan, and other Asian markets.

The UAE, the host of COP28 in 2023, is also very active through different channels: at COP27 it announced a joint initiative (denominated “PACE”, Partnership to Accelerate Transition to Clean Energy) with the United States, with the aim to “catalyze $100 billion in financing, investment, and other support and to deploy globally 100 gigawatts (GW) of clean energy by 2035 to advance the energy transition and maximize climate benefits.” The UAE is also in the process of developing green hydrogen within its borders and abroad, mainly through Masdar, a key player with plans stretching from Africa to Central Asia.

Qatar has launched a project for establishing the largest blue ammonia facility worldwide and is very active in acquisitions in international renewables companies. Its sovereign fund QIA is also considering support to projects in Egypt, for developing green ammonia and green fuel for navigation.

At a regional level, according to the recently issued IEA report “Renewables 2022”, rapid growth in wind and solar will see renewables capacity across MENA rise faster than expected earlier. Such capacity is indeed set to triple to reach 45 GW in five years, with a significant upward revision from the IEA’s 2021 report (that estimated a capacity of 32 GW to be reached between 2021 and 2026). The IEA expects Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, Oman, Morocco, and Egypt to account for 85 percent of renewable capacity growth in the region between 2022 and 2027.

Underlying most of these efforts is the goal, especially for gas-producing countries, to push ahead with renewables projects with the aim to liberate, in the short-medium term, gas resources for export, in light of the European quest for diversification of gas supplies and of the global energy crunch.

Two trends should thus be monitored over the coming months and years:

• In spite of the harsh debate at COP27 on the role of oil and gas in the transition, including the claims by most fossil fuel-producing (or would-be producing) countries in MENA (and in Africa) on the need to continue to invest in oil and gas, these same countries are already investing to a significant extent in renewables development. This may not be occurring at the pace necessary, without a common strategy and with a number of uncertainties, but nonetheless signifies a rising level of ambition.
• The idea of interconnecting these countries with European and Asian markets for exporting green renewables appears to gradually be taking shape, initially through the export of blue and green ammonia and, at a later stage, green hydrogen through converted or dedicated infrastructure. The initiatives jointly launched by the EU and Egypt at COP27 hopefully will advance this aim.

Giampaolo Cantini is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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In a ceremony to be held at Washington, D.C.’s John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, Rafik Hariri Award recipients will include: Sir Magdi Yacoub, founder of the Magdi Yacoub Global Heart Foundation, Magdi Yacoub Foundation, and Chain of Hope for the Social Impact Award; Fatma Said, award-winning soprano for the Artistic Excellence Award; and Ahmad Abu Ghazaleh, executive vice chairman of Abdali Hospital for the Business Leadership Award.

February 14 also marks the 18^th anniversary of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was a firm believer in unlocking and investing in the economic and human potential of the Middle East and North Africa. Inspired by his legacy, the Hariri Center for the Middle East was founded in 2011 by his son Bahaa Hariri and the Atlantic Council to perpetuate this vision.

“Through this unique celebration, we are delighted to salute the legacy of the late prime minister Rafik Hariri and the groundbreaking efforts of his son Bahaa to empower that legacy to live on,” said Frederick Kempe, president and CEO of the Atlantic Council. “The center’s work will continue to capture his vision for a vibrant and dynamic Middle East and North Africa long into the future. These awards honor that vision, and the tremendous work of the honorees.”

Kempe will join businessman and philanthropist Bahaa Hariri in providing opening remarks. The ceremony will also feature a keynote speech by Brett McGurk, White House coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa.

A Special Tribute Award will be awarded to the late Dame Zaha Hadid for her contribution to global architecture, arts, and design.

“During the past ten years, the Rafik Hariri Center has been instrumental in amplifying voices from the MENA region in Washington with a focus on unique ways to unlock the human potential of the region,” said William F. Wechsler, senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. “Today, we come together to honor those inspiring leaders steering change across the Arab world in their respective fields.”

The evening will conclude with a performance by Fatma Said and Grammy Award-winning pianist Craig Terry, which will feature classic opera and Middle Eastern musical staples.

For more information, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post Atlantic Council’s inaugural Rafik Hariri Awards to honor Arab leaders in business, social entrepreneurship, and arts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the support of European investment, North Africa could become the world’s foremost producer of green hydrogen, capitalizing on vast swaths of uninhabited land, solar radiation intensity, offshore wind capacity, and existing pipeline networks. In October, Morocco hosted the Executive Vice President of the European Commission for the European Green Deal to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the establishment of a Green Partnership between the signatories. The Moroccan MoU preceded an agreement signed in November between the EU and Egypt creating a strategic partnership on green hydrogen.

Developing hydrogen infrastructure at scale will be costly and come with a range of challenges—particularly regarding regional water scarcity—but long-term investments utilizing existing resources could spur clean manufacturing and industrial development for hydrogen producing states while also generating export revenues for decades to come. Already, African states are organizing resources to invest in the requisite technologies. The African Green Hydrogen Alliance—comprised of Morocco, Mauritania, Namibia, Egypt, South Africa, and Kenya—was launched in May, and hopes to expand its membership on the continent. 

Among the alliance’s members, Morocco is well positioned to be a regional leader in a green hydrogen economy, ranking alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia, Australia, and Chile as the five countries most likely to produce cost competitive green hydrogen. In 2019, the Moroccan Ministry of Energy established the National Hydrogen Commission, which released a hydrogen roadmap aiming to mobilize a $10-billion investment for 14 terawatt-hours of new renewable energy capacity required to generate green hydrogen for both domestic consumption and export.

To accommodate a rise in green hydrogen production and support other net-zero goals, Morocco aims to increase renewables’ share of power generation to 52 percent by 2030, 70 percent by 2040, and 80 percent by 2050. The Ministry of Energy projects that an additional 14 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy will be added to the grid by 2027, mainly from solar and wind sources, although interest in nuclear energy has picked up. The Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy is leading the country’s effort to expand domestic solar energy capacity with the multi-stage Noor Solar Project, a massive project expected to invest $2.6 billion by 2030. Noor’s multiple concentrated solar power (CSP) sites—located in the Ouarzazate municipality, which boasts the highest level of solar radiation in the world—include the largest CSP plant currently in operation which produces 500 megawatts (MW) daily and is slated for expansion later this year. The fourth phase of Noor projects is currently under development and is expected to generate 950 MW upon completion. 

While early investment in renewable capacity placed Morocco in the spotlight of North African green hydrogen development, other regional actors share similar potential. Algeria has the largest wind energy potential on the continent—approximately 7,700 GW if fully developed—and released plans to expand renewable energy production to 15 GW by 2035, with an annual growth rate of 1 GW. Mauritania’s combined solar and wind potential exceeds 500 GW if fully developed. 

New renewable energy projects in the region should first and foremost focus on providing access to electricity and non-biomass fuels to the entire population. Fortunately, North African electricity grids are relatively well developed, with 97.6 percent of the population having access to electricity, and recent grid expansions into rural communities have greatly expanded energy access since 2000. 

North Africa should begin to focus on green hydrogen as a driver of industry, transportation, and infrastructure development as energy networks continue to expand. Already, North Africa is a powerful exporting bloc of ammonia and fertilizers, and using green hydrogen to transition away from the capital- and emissions-intensive Haber-Bosch process which uses methane or coal as feedstocks for ammonia production—towards green ammonia could support the region’s export potential and energy storage capacity. Green hydrogen’s use case for transportation is strong, especially as production costs decrease, making North Africa a prime location to scale medium- and light-duty vehicles for automakers like Volkswagen, Hyundai, and Toyota, which already possess manufacturing capability in the region. 

As domestic use cases for green hydrogen develop and attract capital investments, attention should shift to creating the infrastructure needed to transport hydrogen around the continent and overseas. Pipeline infrastructure designed for natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exists across the region with multiple new lines under development including the Trans-Saharan pipeline which would span over 4,000 kilometers connecting Nigeria and Algeria. Early implementation of hydrogen blending could make North African nations global leaders in hydrogen transportation, allowing for increased say in regulatory frameworks moving forward. 

Supporting green hydrogen development in North Africa through targeted investment in renewable energy and infrastructure projects would be of mutual benefit for both sides of the Mediterranean. Recognizing the region’s unique potential for the development of green hydrogen would incentivize North African nations to pursue a pragmatic course of sustainable development and provide Europe with new energy import options that better align with the bloc’s emissions reduction goals. Following COP27 in Egypt, North Africa’s hydrogen future should continue to be encouraged and supported by international capital. As an emerging source of sustainable fuel and electricity generation—with large global demand potential and a myriad of end use cases—hydrogen can act as a catalyst of development in North Africa, an opportunity which should not be overlooked.

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Khémaies Jhinaoui is the founder and president of the Tunisian Council for International Relations, bringing a wealth of experience and knowledge to our team. He served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tunisia from 2016 to 2019, where he led initiatives to support the democratic transition in Tunisia and advance peace in the region. His diplomatic career has spanned over 40 years and has also included serving as Tunisia’s Ambassador to Russia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Ireland. His expertise and insights on regional and international issues will be invaluable to our Center.

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We are excited to have Khémaies Jhinaoui and Markus Jaeger on board and are confident that their knowledge, expertise and insights will contribute to our mission of promoting freedom and prosperity in the world.

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Security

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Tracking narratives

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

International response

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

On January 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed its forces had taken control of Soledar and could encircle Bakhmut, threatening Ukrainian supply lines. In the statement, the MoD praised the efforts of aviation, artillery, and airborne troops, but did not mention the notable role Wagner played in securing Soledar.

Moscow’s announcement highlighted a long-simmering tension between Wagner and the official structure of the Russian MoD. On January 17, an old letter written by Valery Gerasimov, commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, re-circulated online. The letter, dated December 29, 2022, stated that Wagner is not included in the structure of the Russian armed forces. Gerasimov wrote the letter in response to an inquiry to the Russian MoD made by Evgeny Stupin, a lawyer for the Moscow City Duma. On January 15, President Vladimir Putin also attributed the Soledar success to the MoD.

On the day that Russia claimed Soledar, military bloggers affiliated with the Kremlin claimed there was an ongoing conflict between the MoD and Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. On January 15, Prigozhin awarded medals to Wagner soldiers for the capture of Soledar. On January 16, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dispelled reports of an ongoing conflict between Prigozhin and Russian army command, claiming the reports are “products of information manipulation.” Later in the day, when asked about Peskov’s comments, Prigozhin also dispelled the reports, saying, “I see no reason not to trust Peskov.”

On January 19, Prigozhin said that Wagner soldiers were concentrating on taking the suburban city of Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. This information has yet to be confirmed by the Russian MoD.

Elsewhere, on January 14, Ukrainian officials reported that Russia conducted fifty missile and three air strikes against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, and other settlements in West Ukraine. Ukrainian forces said that Russia used S-300 and S-400 systems against ground targets in Kyiv in the morning and later launched high-precision weapons, including twenty-eight cruise missile strikes using Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-59 guided air missiles and the sea-based 3M-14 Kalibr.

In Marinka, the Ukrainian army repelled renewed Russian attacks on January 17 and 18. Russian forces have been storming the settlement since last March, resulting in widespread destruction. The Russian forces also conducted raids in the area of Bilohorivka in Luhansk oblast and Krasna Hora, Bakhmut, Klischiyivka, Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pobieda in Donetsk oblast.

Chechen volunteer forces have become increasingly active in the fight around Bakhmut. There are at least two battalions of Chechens—the Sheikh Mansur Battalion and Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion—fighting for the Ukrainian army on the Bakhmut frontline. On a tactical level, the Chechen battalions are working together in some areas, like in Opytne, where they attacked Russian positions. The Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion also maintains a reconnaissance unit, “Adam,” currently located in Donetsk oblast.

On January 16, a Russian rocket struck a civilian building in Dnipro, killing at least forty-five people, including six children, marking the single deadliest civilian attack since the war began. Ukraine said it does not have air-defense systems that can intercept Russian KH-22 missiles; to ward off future missiles would require Western partners to donate advanced air defenses such as the US MIM-104 Patriot missile system.  

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

On January 18, Russian shelling intensified on the southern frontline in Ukraine, which stretches from Kamianske in the Zaporizhzhia region to Vuhledar in the south of Donetsk oblast. After a night of heavy shelling, videos and photos emerged online showing that the Russian army had used what appears to incendiary ammunition in city of Kherson and nearby Beryslav.

The morning after the strike, videos and photos shared online showed the resulting damage. A local Kherson newspaper reported that a religious youth center had burned down as a result of the shelling. The DFRLab geolocated the youth center and confirmed that it was along the pathway of the airstrike but cannot confirm whether incendiary munitions were involved.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Fragments of a Russian missile targeting Ukraine fell on Moldova territory on January 14 in the town of Larga, Briceni district. According to Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, a warhead fueled with approximately eighty kilograms of explosive material was also discovered among the debris. The next day, authorities reported that specialist teams had carried out controlled detonations of the remaining explosives. The Ministry of Defense noted that the army’s aerial surveillance system did not record a violation of Moldovan airspace, however.

Authorities in Chisinau have strongly condemned the attacks on neighboring Ukraine. “This is the reality of war, imposed by the aggressor, right here in our region,” stressed Moldovan President Maia Sandu. “The missiles reach Moldova as well—the fragments discovered yesterday in the Briceni district testify to this. We strongly condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Attacks on urban infrastructure and the killing of civilians are war crimes; they have no justification.”

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also condemned Russia’s January 14 missile attacks on Ukrainian cities. “There is no political, historical, and even more so moral justification for killing civilians and attacking the infrastructure that ensures the survival of the population,” she said. “I express my deep indignation at the new massive attack on Ukraine. I express my support for the heroic Ukrainian people and our support for the victims of Russia’s barbaric attacks.”

This is the third time missile fragments have landed in Moldova, which is not a member of the European Union or NATO. On December 5, Moldovan border police discovered a missile in an orchard, also in the Briceni district. In October 2022, a Russian missile shot down by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft system fell in the village of Naslavcea, located along the border with Ukraine, shattering windows of several residences as a result of the explosion.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

An animated video showing a Wagner operative helping West African countries defeat zombie French soldiers began circulating on social media and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels this week. While the origin of the video is currently unknown, it appears to have first shown up on Twitter on January 14th, then migrated to alternative video platforms before being shared across pro-Russian Telegram channels.

By depicting Wagner forces as heroes, the video promotes a pro-Russian, anti-French narrative that has spread in recent years across West African social media. The animation depicts Wagner soldiers assisting local militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso in removing French forces, represented in the animation as hordes of zombies and a giant cobra. In Mali, a Wagner operative parachutes into the zombie horde and provides ammunition to a Malian soldier who is subsequently able to defeat the undead, while in Burkina Faso, Wagner provides a rocket-propelled grenade to kill the French cobra.

Russia’s involvement in West Africa does not come in the form of simple weapons deliveries, however. Recent reports indicate that since Russia’s deployment in Mali more than one year ago, violence against civilians has significantly increased, and extremist forces have grown stronger.

The video ends with Wagner forces heading towards Côte d’Ivoire, where French zombies overwhelm an Ivorian soldier. The imagery implies that Wagner aims to send forces to the coastal country.

This is not the first time Wagner has created animated propaganda. In another animation, France was represented as a rat killed by Wagner. And in a comic strip spread in Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner operatives are again depicted fighting zombies, however in the case of CAR the zombies do not represent the French.

Support for France has declined significantly in Francophone Africa, while calls for Russian assistance to fight jihadists has increased.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

On January 18, a helicopter crash in Brovary, near Kyiv, killed sixteen people, including three children, Ukraine’s interior minister, his deputy, and the ministry secretary. The helicopter crashed near a kindergarten. Ukrainian security services investigating the crash are considering three possible scenarios, including a violation of flight rules, a technical malfunction, or intentional sabotage. In the meantime, pro-Kremlin sources are already sharing conflicting narratives about the incident.

One of the first narratives to emerge suggested that Ukraine’s air-defense systems shot down the helicopter. The claim was amplified by pro-Kremlin TV host Olga Skabeyeva on her Telegram channel. Another pro-Kremlin Telegram channel added more details to the claim, saying that “unofficial Ukrainian sources” said the aircraft was shot down by the Stinger or Igla air-defense systems. The claim was also shared on Twitter by a pro-Kremlin account, spreading the narrative to English-speaking audiences. At the time of writing, the English tweet had more than one million views.

Other sources took the claim further. The pro-Kremlin Russian outlet Regnum hypothesized that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was behind the crash, publishing a story with the headline, “The crash of the helicopter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Brovary – executed by Zelenskyy?”

Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin reporter Sasha Kots reported that European countries had suspended the helicopter model, either a Eurocopter EC225 Super Puma or a H225M, after a 2016 crash in Norway. While it is true that the European Aviation Safety Agency grounded both aircraft type after the Norway crash, it allowed flights to resume roughly six months later. Helicopters of this type are used by both military and civilian operators in France, Brazil, Vietnam, and many other countries. Kots also claimed that after the two models were grounded, France sold its supply to Ukraine, implying that France is also responsible for the tragedy.

In December 2021, Romania and Ukraine entered into an agreement to upgrade five of these helicopter models.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

On January 16, the state-controlled TV channel Belarus 1 reported that Belarusian security services had arrested Georgian citizen Giorgi Zirakishvili for allegedly trying to enter Ukraine via Belarus to fight against Russia. Belarus 1 reported that the Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia had advised Zirakishvili to travel from Georgia to Ukraine through Belarus. The broadcaster also claimed that Zirakishvili had planned to meet Igor Kizim, Ukraine’s ambassador to Belarus, upon arrival to receive instructions on how to reach Ukraine and join the Georgian Legion, a paramilitary unit mostly comprised of ethnically Georgian volunteers who fight for Ukraine. Belarus 1 also broadcast an alleged recording of a phone conversation in which Zirakishvili believes he is speaking to representatives from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. However, Belarus 1 reported that Zirakishvili was actually speaking to representatives from Belarusian security services, who discovered Zirakishvili’s alleged intentions and connected with him by impersonating Ukrainian embassy staff. The report also contains a video recording of Zirakishvili’s meeting with representatives from Belarusian security services, who he apparently believed were representatives of the Ukrainian embassy.

Belarus 1 did not provide any concrete evidence that Zirakishvili had communicated with anyone from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. Despite this, the report claims that Kizim is actively recruiting foreign fighters to send to Ukraine. The ambassador responded to the allegations, saying the Belarus 1 story was “nonsense” and “lies, manipulation, and hypocrisy.” He added that the Ukrainian embassy was in contact with the Belarusian foreign affairs ministry regarding the matter.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

A January 17 Telegram post published on Yevgeny Prigozhin’s press channel claimed that Wagner forces tracked down and killed a Ukrainian member of the French Foreign Legion in Donetsk. The channel also shared identity cards belonging to a YevheniiKoulyk, including a Ukrainian driver’s license, a French military card, and a French train card.

The post was reshared by the Telegram channel WarDonbass and the pro-Russian news outlet DonbassInsider. The Russian press agency TASS also reported on the claim. Several Russian-owned media outlets and Telegram channels shared the post, garnering at least 647,000 views at the time of writing.

The story was then picked up by the Russian news outlet Argumenty I fakty (Arguments and facts), which claimed Koulyk was a NATO agent. One VK post suggested Koulyk was a foreign mercenary and accused Ukraine of not disclosing the number of foreign soldiers killed in the war. The author compared Koulyk’s death to that of Hryhorii Tsekhmystrenko, a Ukrainian-born Canadian volunteer reported killed in Ukraine this week.

According to French journalist and military expert Philippe Chapeleau, the French Foreign Legion allowed its Ukrainian-born fighters a period of leave so they could safely resettle their families in neighboring countries. Those who did not return would be considered deserters. According to that same source, Koulyk had been missing since August 2022 and was therefore considered a deserter.

Koulyk’s death was previously reported as early as January 12. As of January 19, there were a total of 189 posts across news outlets and social media discussing Koulyk.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

In a TV interview on January 16, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic criticized Wagner Group for its attempts to recruit Serbian citizens to participate in the Ukraine war. Vucic slammed Wagner, saying, “Why do you do that to Serbia? Why do you, from Wagner, call anyone from Serbia when you know that it is against our regulations?” He also noted that Serbian legislation prohibits its citizens from participating in foreign armed conflicts and denied recent allegations that Wagner has a presence in Serbia. On January 17, Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that there are no Serbian citizens active in Wagner and that Wagner has never been active in Serbia. The DFRLab previously reported on claims made by Wagner that it was establishing a presence in Serbia.

Vucic also condemned a Wagner advertisement published by the newly established Serbian arm of RT. On January 5, RT Balkan reportedly published an article with the headline, “Wagner published an ad for volunteers, the conditions are more than tempting.” The article, which is no longer available on RT Balkan’s website, allegedly said that Wagner was looking for volunteers ages twenty-two to fifty who are not citizens of Ukraine or any EU or NATO member states. Volunteers were required to be physically healthy, interested in learning, patriots, and strong in spirit; in turn, “everything else will be taught by Wagner members.”

A Google search for the original headline, “Vagnerovci objavili oglas za dobrovoljce, uslovi više nego primamljivi,” retrieved an article with the same title, but the original URL now leads to a different article about Russian prisoners who joined Wagner, fought in Ukraine, and peacefully returned to Russia, where all charges against them were dropped.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Ukraine will receive an unspecified number of Archer systems from Sweden, with Swedish media reporting that Kyiv will receive twelve units. Stockholm will also send fifty CV90 vehicles. Latvia will deliver another military aid package to Ukraine that includes Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters, small arms, and drones.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced on January 10 that the country would donate more NASAMS air-defense systems to Ukraine. These systems will enable Ukrainian forces to enhance ground protection around troop deployments and civilian infrastructure. Canada will also transfer another two hundred armored LAV ACSV Super Bison vehicles to Ukraine.

According to the New York Times, the Pentagon is tapping into a stockpile of US ammunition in Israel to help meet Ukraine’s need for artillery shells. The arms and ammunition stockpile is typically reserved for the Pentagon to use in the Middle East. Meanwhile, on January 19, the Pentagon announced a $2.5 billion security package for Ukraine, including for the first time ninety Stryker armored personnel carriers. These mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles could help infantry advance further into the frontlines. Additionally, the US will provide energy equipment to help Ukraine deal with energy shortages. The $125 million support pack would include turbines, backup power banks, and high-voltage transformers.

On January 14, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and announced that the United Kingdom will send Ukraine fourteen Challenger 2 battle tanks and artillery systems. As of 2021, the British army possessed 227 battle tanks. Sending additional tanks is likely to increase pressure on Germany to send its own Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, though Germany’s defense minister said Friday that Berlin has not yet decided on the Leopard 2.

Russian citizens living in Bulgaria donated three pickup trucks to the Ukrainian army. They will be used by the Freedom of Russia Legion, a battalion made up of Russian citizens who defected to fight for Ukraine’s Foreign Legion.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner Group fights French ‘zombies’ in cartoon propaganda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction 
Multifaceted partnerships, intricate interests: India and China in Africa
Chasing opportunities: India and China in Ghana
Coexisting and competing with China in Ghana
Key takeaways
Conclusion

Introduction 

Today, a fragmented Global China¹ operates in African landscapes. The artisanal miners in Kumasi, Ghana, contractors in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, entrepreneurs in Harare, Zimbabwe, managers in Nairobi, Kenya, agroscientists in Lusaka, Zambia, and officials from both provincial and national governments are the face of the “new type of international relations” that President Xi Jinping claimed China and countries in Africa are collectively crafting.²

This is perhaps most evident in the infrastructure sector. The influx of capital vital to meeting Africa’s tremendous infrastructure needs is estimated to be between $130 billion to $170 billion a year, with a current financing gap of $68 billion to $108 billion.³ Today, Africa accounts for almost 25 percent of the global revenues of Chinese construction companies.⁴ To put this in context, in 1990, American and European companies had over 85 percent of the construction contracts in the continent. Now Chinese firms dominate with reports of market shares ranging between 31 percent to 62 percent, and in some cases—such as the Kenya National Highways Authority’s road projects—this number is even higher, with Chinese firms controlling 85 percent of all projects.⁵ 

Chinese construction companies, with their unique advantages characterized by high speed, enormous scale, easy financing, and low costs enjoy a critical edge over other competitors.⁶ Additionally, Chinese-built industrial parks and economic zones in Africa are attracting low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing units that are relocating from China. Chinese tech companies are laying critical telecommunications infrastructure even as, venture capital funds are investing in African fintech firms, and other smaller enterprises are expanding across the region.

Partly due to the lack of alternative options, China is quickly becoming a partner of choice, and several African countries are keen to explore the many possibilities of working together. Some governments, like Zambia, are hiring Chinese citizens in investment promotion agencies to ease processes made complicated by the oft-quoted gaps in communication, with departments conducting road shows in China to attract potential investors.⁷ Others, like Ethiopia, are making policy decisions to offer a slew of incentives to increase Chinese investments with the aim of diversifying the domestic industry, such as the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector.⁸

Beijing also gains tremendously from African countries’ collective political support in multilateral forums. According to late professor and author Ian Taylor,⁹ China was always acutely aware of the collective power of the African states in multilateral organizations: 

• African countries played a crucial role in the debate and final acceptance of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations. The pro-Beijing resolution was supported by 76 votes, with 35 against and 17 abstentions. Over a third of the votes in favour of the PRC were from Africa, including from four countries which still had diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and of the 23 co-sponsors of the “important question,” 11 were African. It is certain that without the African votes, China would not have succeeded in being admitted to the UN at the time.

Contemporary discussions on Chinese great power aspirations, the promise of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the “win-win” concept, are often substantiated by illustrations of how Beijing has changed the status quo in Africa.

Examining China in Africa from India is unique on two main counts. First, African nations, particularly in eastern and southern Africa, have long been traditional partners for India, sharing ideological, political, economic, and sociocultural relations. The immense geopolitical and economic sway Beijing appears to have cultivated, requires New Delhi to reimagine its engagement with the region. This includes stepping up triangular cooperation with other democracies already active in the region, such as Japan and the United States, or practical cooperation through partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad,¹⁰ a grouping of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan that works on a range of issues in the Indo-Pacific region including countries in Africa.¹¹ Development projects already underway, such as the “Feed the Future India Africa Innovation Transfer Platform” where USAID partnered with a US NGO Technoserve to share and transfer innovative Indian soil and water management techniques known as Khadins and Taankas in Kenya and Malawi is a case in point.¹² A reimagination of engagement in the current context calls for a granular examination of Beijing’s instruments and approaches, and a better understanding of its grassroots impact. 

Second, India-China relations are currently at an all-time low. The border standoff and loss of life from clashes, inherent lack of trust, a steep trade deficit, the BRI’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have resulted in a decline in India-China relations, with many in the strategic community stating that it has reached the lowest point since the 1962 Sino-Indian War.¹³ While the implications of India-China competition if not rivalry—in the Indian Ocean region, South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region—are being studied closely, it is crucial to examine this in Africa: a region where India has tremendous interests and where pursuing them is becoming increasingly complex.

A 2021 report titled India’s Path to Power, crafted by some of the New Delhi’s leading intellectuals, stated that India’s relations with developing countries “have atrophied” and a fraying of ties within the subcontinent is also reflected in India’s relationships with countries in Africa. The authors argue that:¹⁴

• The great powers are facing internal stresses and challenges, having been diminished by the pandemic and the economic crash of 2020. China, which is perhaps an exception, has turned increasingly adversarial and is attempting to mould the multilateral system to its own purposes. We believe that a discombobulated world requires flexibility and broad coalitions, both to produce acceptable outcomes and to avoid conflict. This requires a new outreach by India to our traditional partners in the developing world. They are significant today as the locus of economic opportunities, as sources of support and commodities essential for India, and as necessary allies in reviving those parts of the multilateral system as would be useful in the decade ahead.

For New Delhi to craft “a new outreach” to its traditional partners, especially those in Africa, examining China’s active engagement and increasing footprint in the region will be key. The extent of this footprint can be analyzed by putting together the picture emerging from many growing African countries with significant Chinese presence. Ghana is an interesting case in point, and the focus of this study.

One of the fastest growing economies in West Africa, Ghana has shared deep historical, ideological, economic, and political relations with both Asian powers. The West African country also houses a significant Indian diaspora,¹⁵ and has become a popular destination for Chinese migrants,¹⁶ providing an interesting canvas to evaluate perceptions. 

To learn about the experiences of coexisting and competing with Chinese actors, the extent of backward and forward linkages, and to collect impressions of the growing Chinese community in the country, the methodology followed for this study included two steps: desktop research and key stakeholder interviews. From a list of twenty-three prominent Indian businesses in Ghana received from the High Commission of India in Accra, the researchers were able to interview representatives of twelve companies in Accra as well as in Tema in August 2022. Additionally, they conducted interviews with local Ghanian businesses, academics, tribal chiefs, and trade union representatives. 

In examining Chinese impact, the research team built on the analytical work of Xiaoyang Tang, a professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, on Chinese investments in Ghana from 2000 to 2014,¹⁷ using data from the Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC). The team asked GIPC for information on Chinese investments in Ghana from 2014 to 2021. Of the 261 Chinese companies listed in the data set, the researchers were able to establish contact with eighty-three, and thirty-three companies agreed to a telephonic interview. To fill the gap that this lack of in-person access presented, scholars who have been examining China in Africa and had recently interviewed small and medium-scale Chinese companies in Ghana were interviewed to learn from their findings. 

Multifaceted partnerships, intricate interests: China and India in Africa

A brief overview of China in Africa

China’s engagement with Africa is not of recent origin. Chinese contacts with Africa date back to the early Han dynasty, while it was sea ventures under the command of Admiral Zheng He during the Ming dynasty when relations peaked.¹⁸ In more recent history however—Ethiopia, Egypt, Liberia, and apartheid South Africa were among the few independent African countries —when the PRC was established in 1949.

Today, with a two-way trade of $254 billion and investments exceeding $2.07 billion in the first seven months of 2021 alone,¹⁹ China is the largest trading partner, biggest investor, and creditor for most African countries. Four Chinese lenders—The Export-Import Bank of China, China Development Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the China International Development Cooperation Agency—have participated in debt restructuring, leveraging multilateral institutions like the Group of Twenty’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative, the International Monetary Fund’s Catastrophe Containment Relief Trust, and the debt cancellation programs of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).²⁰

The 2022 African Youth Survey conducted by the Ichikowitz Family Foundation across fifteen countries and based on 4,507 interviews found that: 

• Of all the foreign actors seen to have an influence on the continent, youth see China as having by far the biggest impact, with more than half (54 percent) of African youth saying that China has a lot of influence on their country and almost a further quarter (23 percent) saying it has some influence. The United States is seen as the second most influential foreign power, with four-in-ten (41 percent) youth saying it has a lot of influence on their country and another quarter (26 percent) saying it has some influence.

Respondents who mentioned China’s positive influence pointed to the affordability of Chinese products (44 percent), assistance in developing infrastructure (41 percent), and its creation of employment opportunities (35 percent). Meanwhile, those who viewed it as a negative appear concerned about Chinese companies exporting resources without fair compensation (36 percent), Chinese workers taking job opportunities away from locals (24 percent), and a lack of respect for the country’s values and traditions (21 percent), among others.²¹

Similarly, Afrobarometer, a pan-African, nonpartisan survey research network, found that 63 percent of Africans surveyed in 2019-21 across thirty-four countries “hold positive views of China’s assistance and influence”—attributed largely to China’s projects in infrastructure, development, and investment in Africa. However, the survey also said that: 

• Positive views of China’s influence do not appear to affect Africans’ attitudes toward democracy. China remains second to the United States as the preferred development model for Africans. And majorities of those who are aware of Chinese loans and development assistance to their countries are concerned about being heavily indebted to China.²²

While China’s growing engagement with Africa is said to have had a positive, albeit uneven, effect on Africa’s economic growth, economic diversification, job creation, and connectivity,²³ it also has received sufficient pushback—with allegations of unfair business practices, violation of local laws, and poor compliance with safety and environmental standards.²⁴ The current discourse on China’s engagement in Africa has led to the creation of an entire subfield of study, with writers, journalists, and artists weighing in. 

A brief overview of India in Africa

Historically, it was proximity to African shores and the promise of fortunes to be made that enabled early migration from the Western coast of India to the Eastern coast of Africa. According to the historian Savita Nair, records of these movements of people can be found in travellers’ notes at the time of The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, a first century CE account at a time when Indian traders had agents in areas of East Africa.²⁵ Later,  while many Indians were brought to Africa by the British Government as indentured labourers, others referred to as ‘Passenger Indians’, traders, artisans, teachers and shop assistants, mainly from the western coast, came in search of opportunities.

Today, descendants and members of the Indian diaspora are deeply integrated in many African societies, raising families, running businesses, and often becoming citizens in the host country. Official estimates suggest there are over three million people, spread over forty-six African countries, with the largest concentration in South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique.²⁶ Given the many waves of migrants and entrepreneurs who have reached Africa, presently there are people of Indian origin who have varying degrees of familiarity with the motherland.

African nations are also crucial economic partners for India. Total trade with the region for 2020-21 was valued at $55 billion, and India is the fifth-largest investor in Africa, with cumulative investments of $54 billion. The acquisition of critical assets by Indian SOEs to diversify the energy basket away from West Asia, commercial ventures by Indian corporations looking to expand into untapped markets, and small and medium-scale Indian entrepreneurs operating across countries and sectors, the economic cooperation between these regions takes on multiple forms.

While state-level interactions are driven under the auspices of the India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), there are also a plethora of development cooperation mechanisms that make Delhi a key developmental partner for many countries in the continent. Indian sub-national actors, including civil society and voluntary organizations are also setting up linkages across these geographies, scaling up innovative development solutions and sharing knowledge. From agriculture and health, to education, existing frameworks prioritize individual and institutional capacity building and are driven by priorities set by partner countries in Africa.

What makes this seemingly straightforward geopolitical development – of Asian powers reengaging Africa – complex to document is the fact that many different Indias exist in Africa: i.e., the third-generation, Indian-origin industrialist, the successful first-generation entrepreneur, the contractor of an Indian multinational corporation looking to win bids. They have all have felt the change in status quo brought on by the multitude of Chinas that are operating in these geographies: whether it is the contractor in a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) that seems to have access to virtually unlimited funding, the small-scale manufacturer with an entire supply chain in China, or the artisanal miner working in the gold mines. The range of Indian actors, despite their differences, have all felt the impact and have something to say. Their perspective offers a unique vantage point to examine nuances of the phenomenon that is Global China.

Chasing opportunities: India and China in Ghana

The 1955 Asian-African Conference (also called the Bandung Conference), involving representatives from twenty-nine newly independent nations from the developing world during the Cold War, was a watershed moment that shaped both India’s and China’s early relations with countries on the continent. Their shared ideological fight against colonialism and imperialism strengthened the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity. The foundation of Ghana’s relations with both India and China were laid by the close friendship and political exchanges of Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.

China-Ghana relations

Among the many diverse countries on the African continent, Ghana presents an interesting case study. It is one of the earliest countries in Africa to establish diplomatic ties with China, and it has been central to China’s Africa Policy. Taylor states: “The overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in 1966 was a major setback for Chinese policy in Africa, particularly since it happened when Nkrumah was in Beijing on an official visit. Almost immediately, the new Ghanaian military government ordered the expulsion of Chinese ‘experts.’ The military training camp headed by Chinese instructors was also closed, and its instructors expelled. On 20 October 1966, after Sino-Ghanaian relations had deteriorated further, diplomatic relations were suspended.”²⁷

Today, China is Ghana’s biggest trading partner. Ghana’s imports from China between 1995 and 2020 have increased at an annual rate of 20 percent, $71.3 million to $6.75 billion (and the top import, at $232 million, was coated flat-rolled iron); its exports to China have increased at an annual rate of 26.5 percent, rising from $4.23 million to $1.52 billion (and the top export, at $1.24 billion, was crude petroleum).²⁸ The humongous trade imbalance notwithstanding, the increasing economic incentives and opportunities for social mobility have made Ghana a destination for Chinese migration, housing between ten and thirty thousand Chinese today.²⁹ However, these estimates vary, with the Chinese government placing the number at between thirty thousand and fifty thousand Chinese expats and diaspora in Ghana.³⁰ Conversely, there has also been an uptick in the number of Ghanaian youth choosing to study in China, with over eight hundred students registering in doctoral programmes in China in 2018.³¹ The current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, stated that Ghana is aiming to replicate China’s development model with the industrialisation policy of ‘1-District-1-Factory’, during a FOCAC roundtable in 2018.³² 

According to the latest data received from the Ghana Investment Promotion Center, 261 Chinese firms were registered in eight sectors of the Ghanaian economy. A majority of these firms are wholly owned by Chinese shareholders. The Chinese enterprises operating in Ghana that were interviewed for this study in August 2022 ranged from companies engaged in the production and export of cashew nuts, agrochemicals, roofing sheets, fiber-artificial hair, and security doors; recycling of plastic bottles; traders of electrical appliances; and those engaged in construction and agriculture. A few common threads from their responses include:

• No previous experience in Africa: Several companies interviewed stated that Ghana was the first country in Africa where they had established businesses. Broadly, respondents said that they had two to ten years of experience in Ghana. Three companies had no experience operating in any other part of the continent. Though Ghana was their first foray into Africa, they declined to explain what brought them there. 
• Job creation: It appears that most enterprises employ local staff. Though a crude oil refining company employed 1,600 workers and a company running a mall employed 1,000 people, the number of jobs generated by other companies ranged from four to one hundred. The breakdown of employees by nationality was not available. This notwithstanding, the majority of the Chinese firms claimed to have employed more local staff than Chinese workers.
• Challenging business environment: Respondents described business as “currently very difficult.” This was attributed to a weak cedi/low dollar rate. Several representatives indicated their company was no longer in operation—either “shut down due to large electricity bills” or because they were “temporarily closed.”
• Government as resource: While one enterprise mentioned receiving help from the government, most stated that they did not receive financial assistance from their government- but had its support if they faced any difficulty. 

A comparative analysis of GIPC data sets from 2000 to 2014 and from 2014 to 2021 presents some interesting trends:

• Manufacturing sector leads FDI: Chinese firms injected $2.8 billion into the Ghanaian economy from 2014 to 2021. The manufacturing sector accounted for the largest number of companies (145) and contributed the highest foreign direct investment ($2.3 billion). The tourism industry had the least projects (two) and contributed the least FDI ($184,800).
• Short-lived businesses: While 560 Chinese companies were registered with the GIPC from 2000 to 2014, 261 Chinese companies were registered under GIPC from 2014 to 2021. Of the 261 companies registered from 2014 to 2021, 251 were new entrants (96.17 percent). In essence, only 3.83 percent of the companies registered from 2000 to 2014 continued to exist over the 2014-2021 period. All the companies that remained, operated within their original sectors, and some of them had made slight alterations to their original company names. 
• Decrease in joint ventures: Out of the 560 (30.2 percent) registered from 2000 to 2014, 169 were jointly owned by Ghanaian and Chinese partners, while only 38 out of the 261 (14.5 percent) companies registered from 2014 to 2021 were joint ventures.
• Change in geographical distribution: From 2000 to 2014, Chinese companies operated in nine out of ten regions in Ghana, with the Upper West region recording zero registered Chinese companies. From 2014 to 2021, Chinese companies were operating in seven out of the ten regions (sixteen in 2018), with none operating in the Bono Ahafo, Upper East, and Upper West regions.

India-Ghana relations

India and Ghana, with their postcolonial legacies, have historically enjoyed good bilateral relations and were the founding members of the Non Aligned Movement. India opened its consulate in Accra in 1953 and full-fledged relations were established immediately after Ghana’s independence in 1957. The country also has a traditional Indian diaspora, with official estimates of ten thousand nonresident Indians and persons of Indian origin,³³ and unofficial estimates suggesting close to twenty thousand persons. There have been frequent and regular ministerial exchanges: the Indian president, Pranab Mukherjee, visited Ghana in 2016, and President Afuko-Addo participated in the founding conference of the International Solar Alliance on March 11, 2018, in New Delhi. 

The two countries also are key developmental partners. Since the establishment of relations in the late 1950s until now, India has extended around $450 million for various projects like rural electrification, establishment of the Ghana-India Kofi Annan Centre of Excellence in Information and Communication Technology (ICT), construction of the presidential palace, agriculture mechanization, upgrades to the water supply systems, and establishment of a foreign services training institute.³⁴ During the COVID-19 pandemic, India delivered 650,000 doses of vaccine under the COVAX initiative.³⁵ In the education sector, Ghana is part of the pilot broadband technology project in tele-education and telemedicine (known by the acronym e-VBAB ), and six hundred Ghanian students enrolled in various Indian universities in 2021-22. The 2022 African Youth Survey (cited earlier in the report) stated that 68 percent of respondents viewed India as a positive influence.³⁶

India is among the top trading partners of Ghana, with total trade in 2021-2022 amounting to $2.6 billion, with India exporting $1.1 billion to Ghana in 2020-21 and importing $1.49 billion, with gold accounting for almost 80 percent of all Indian imports, valued at $853 million.³⁷ Ghana also exports cocoa, cashew nuts, and timber, and imports from India include pharmaceuticals, packaging material, rice, electrical equipment, transport vehicles, and agricultural machinery, among others. 

In terms of investments, India’s FDI accounted for 7.61 percent of the total FDI of 1.29 billion in Ghanain 2021. Between 1994 and 2021, Indian wholly-owned companies and Joint Ventures invested $2.2 billion in 870 projects and generated thousands of jobs.³⁸ In 2021, India was the second largest investor by number of projects (25), after China and the third largest by value with FDI aggregating to $98.84 million.³⁹ The major sectors receiving Indian investments were General Trading (170 projects, $149.72 million), Export Trading (126 projects, $49.73 million), Agriculture (45 projects, $377.04 million), Building and Construction (54 projects, $74.18 million). In terms of business activities, manufacturing accounted for the greatest most number of projects with an investment value of $1.1 billion with 275 projects.⁴⁰ Other major business activities receiving Indian investment in Ghana are ICT and Internet infrastructure ($148.6 million), followed by extraction ($98.3 million), business services ($47.7 million), and technical support centers ($17 million).⁴¹

The forces that have drawn the Indian entrepreneur to various geographies in Africa are as diverse as the three million strong Indian diaspora in the region. However, a commonly shared sentiment among Chinese and Indian businesses appears to be belief in the African growth story. 

One respondent of Indian origin stated that his grandfather came to Ghana in 1937 believing “where there’s gold, there’s money” and started a trading business that has now diversified and is run by his descendants. Decades later, drawn to this promise of opportunity was Gopal Vasu, who after graduating from Indore Christian College in 1969, was excited to join his elder brother working in Lagos. Decades later, in 1989, Kingsway Chemist Ghana Ltd., a division of a company now known as Unilever (Ghana) Ltd., decided to halt its pharmaceutical production lines in Ghana and sell its production equipment to a pharmacist who worked for them. The pharmacist then joined forces with a local partner to start M&G Pharmaceuticals. In 1993, Gopal and his associates (under the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act) took over the company and started manufacturing four products. Today, they produce more than eighty generic drugs. This is indicative of the multigenerational Indian business families who have been operating and growing in Ghana, which stands in strong contrast to Chinese businesses, who are not only relatively new entrants to the market, but also wind down their operations comparably faster.

Similarly, in 1988 another interviewee said he was visiting his wife’s family in Accra and was excited about opportunities in the West African country. Two weeks into his holiday, he registered a company; in 1991, he set up his first retail store. Today, his group leads the formal retail space in the country, with fifty-six shops and four more planned.

Managers of Indian corporations share that optimism about the potential of African markets. According to Kaushic Khanna, chief manager of KEC International Limited, a $1.8 billion engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) company headquartered in Mumbai, “the next ten to fifteen years belong to Africa. If Indian companies can work closely with the government of India in identifying and delivering projects in Africa, there are tremendous opportunities for growth.” One of the successful projects KEC executed in Ghana is the 330 kilovolt transmission line built from the Volta region substation in Tema to Tornu, near Dzodze. This roughly $9 million order was secured from the Volta River Authority and completed in twenty months.

Rajesh Nair, regional manager of Shapoorji Pallonji (SP) echoes this sentiment: The market is so big, with several infrastructure opportunities. “While the competition with Chinese firms is rife, there is no need to compete among (sic) Indian companies,” he says. “Ghana is a $72 billion economy, SP’s growth in the last five years, despite increasing Chinese footprint, has been positive.” He adds that SP’s familiarity in Africa, with operations in Ghana for more than sixteen years, helps highlight the fact that “Indian companies can also pull off large scale projects.”

The Tema-Mpakadan line is one of Ghana’s biggest railway projects and a case in point. It is being built by Afcons, a subsidiary of SP, and is funded by the Export-Import Bank of India (EXIM Bank). The 100-kilometer, standard-gauge railway line, costing $447 million, is part of a multimodal transportation network designed to connect Tema port to the country’s northern regions and landlocked countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, and is expected to bring in huge revenues for Ghana.

Coexisting and competing with China in Ghana

Enterprising—but “they don’t contribute to the local economy”

Several Indian entrepreneurs attest to the fact that the work culture of Chinese actors is unique. According to one, “small time traders in groups of ten and twenty, live and work out of warehouses, do everything themselves—from loading the truck, driving it to the market, selling products—operating on absolutely minimum overheads.” Adds another Indian businessman: “They are incredibly enterprising. Most of them do not speak a word of English, but they establish businesses with a local translator. Pretty gutsy, if you ask me.”

A scholar who recently interviewed several Chinese miners working in the gold mines of Kumasi and Obuasi pointed out that for many, Ghana was the first point of arrival. While a few had prior experience in the gold sector in China, others hoped to improve their financial situation and social mobility. Some others had moved due to the competition within China. It’s difficult to say if they have short- or long-term aspirations, according to the scholar; their move is more opportunistic, pragmatic, and there is a lot of pressure to be successful. “You lose face if you don’t send back money.” While there was one respondent who had familial ties to the business, with a father who was a gold miner and a sister with a gold-trading store, most of the interviewees were middle-aged married men who send money earned in Africa back to China.

However, larger Chinese companies entering markets that Indian businesses have dominated are being met with sufficient resistance. An Indian entrepreneur complained that Chinese counterparts often underprice their products, making it difficult for them to compete. Similarly, small-scale traders who sell Chinese wares right outside stores owned by Indian-origin Ghanian traders are also a source of competition “Customers who come to us must walk through a crowd of hawkers, selling cheaper Chinese products, to get in.” While the local authorities routinely act against complaints, there are usually no long-term consequences. Chinese businesses also don’t contribute to the local economy, says another respondent: “The effort is not to develop the economy, but grab small shares.” 

The African agency and the “China option”

The president of Ghana Union of Traders Association (GUTA), Dr. Joseph Obeng, sees the Chinese presence in Ghana as quite worrying and calls for stricter oversight: “Ghana is a conduit for dumping goods manufactured in China.” In the imported goods market, he adds, locals have 15 percent, while the rest is dominated by expats, primarily the Chinese. “While some Indians could also be involved in problematic pursuits, they at least invest money in Ghana, buy houses, settle down, send their kids to school here, and get involved in the community, building health centers and schools.”

Isaac Odoom, an assistant professor of political science at Carleton College in Canada, argues that the Chinese are getting three things right in Africa that bear attention.⁴² First comes a courtship: “Ghanaians and the Africans seem to like Chinese economic courtship. They come to the table with the rhetoric of partnership and win-win for both parties, without necessarily the salvation discourse that comes from the West,” he says. Second, their unique focus has been on infrastructure development, meeting African deficits directly. Third, China is open to very innovative ways of financing projects that are critical to the long-term development of African countries in Ghana. “What these three factors essentially do is present a viable ‘China option,’ where engaging with Beijing offers African countries some leverage in its relations with other foreign actors,” Odoom says.

When asked if there is an African strategy for China, he says “in practice, the Chinese engagement across Africa has been very bilateral. It is very difficult to have all African countries converging in their political and economic objectives, even though they are all interested in reducing poverty and eradicating diseases. But because of [the] historical colonial nature of our countries, there is always a national interest as defined by the elite or history. Any talk of African strategy is bound to suffer these deficiencies or dysfunctions because of the nature of how China engages Africa and because of the makeup of African countries.”

Differences in corporate strategies

According to an Indian executive, “the question is not whether Indian and Chinese companies are competing in Africa. The fact is that the Indian and Chinese governments are vying for influence in the region, and they operate with different philosophies.” For one, information about Indian companies and details about specific projects are readily available; they show a degree of transparency that Chinese companies do not. 

An Indian businessman who gets spare parts manufactured by both Indian and Chinese companies also referred to the differences in corporate approaches between the two. “There is no need to micromanage the Indian producer—we drop our orders and move on. However, with the Chinese, we have to monitor very closely, every step of the way. Although we have worked with the same manufacturer for almost ten years, there is a serious lack of trust as they have the ability to quickly change the terms of engagement.” Another interviewee underlines the fact that not everything Chinese is bad: “Large Chinese companies in the industrial sector, like ceramics, add value to the landscape, but smaller companies tend to flout rules.”

There have been situations when both Chinese and Indian contractors have continued work in the face of nonpayment of bills, which have, in the long run, resulted in generating goodwill. However, this is feasible only for the larger corporations, as the smaller players in the industry would be hard hit. One of the major criticisms facing Indian companies is implementation delays. This was attributed to a combination of factors including bureaucratic bottlenecks, issues with land acquisition, and delayed decision-making. 

Advantage, China: Access to supply chains, finance, and government support

According to several Indian respondents, Chinese companies have demonstrated the ability “to buy companies along the entire supply chain.” In the pharmaceutical-manufacturing sector, this has meant purchasing companies that supply bulk drugs, intermediaries, and fill and finish operations. In infrastructure, it includes buying quarries that supply construction companies.

“We cannot compete with Chinese companies’ pricing or economies of scale. The costs for Indian companies are higher,” says an Indian manager. “Finance is king,” adds another, saying: “Whoever brings the funds gets the projects, and the Chinese are everywhere.” Moreover, he says, “people criticize the quality of Chinese projects, but what matters on the ground is who can execute, and the Chinese are often the fastest.” An Indian contractor explains, “some governments in Africa are closer to the Chinese government than others, and in these countries it’s near impossible to win projects. So, we are forced to explore other underexplored markets.”

According to them, one of the main advantages Chinese businesses enjoy in Ghana vis-à-vis their Indian counterparts is support from their government, which manifests in various forms. “When executives from Chinese companies go to visit [African] government clients, they are sometimes accompanied by someone from their embassy.” In some other instances, when a company runs into trouble or faces backlash, the issue is quickly “taken care of,” they say. “As an Indian business operating in Ghana for decades, I can tell you, they get away with so much,” says one Indian entrepreneur. The Indian government, respondents say, supports the Indian community, but not individual businesses. Indian contractors also pointed out that they are excessively scrutinized at airports, including their documents at ports and customs, in a way that the Chinese are not. “Why don’t they have tax officials regularly visiting their offices? Complaints to the Chinese embassy are quickly taken up at the governmental levels, affording them a degree of protection,” said one. 

Key takeaways

In this context, the following section provides some key recommendations for Indian stakeholders to deepen economic engagement in African markets. 

Need to urgently diversify from Chinese supply chains

Several Indian manufacturers operating in Ghana stated that more than 90 to 95 percent of their raw materials used to be sourced from China. However, the pandemic has forced them to reassess. Today, some procure material from new markets that include India, Brazil, Malaysia, Europe, the United States, and Dubai. A manufacturer that produces plastic injection molding has reduced imports from China and sources plastic pellets from India and countries in Europe instead, but many are still reliant on China for raw materials.

Opportunities in pharmaceutical manufacturing 

There is tremendous potential for Indian companies to enter the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector across African nations.⁴³ This study has identified that an efficient way to do this would be to extend support to and encourage Indian-origin businesses already operating in Ghana. For example, Atlantic Life Sciences, owned by a person of Indian origin, has recently set up the first pharmaceutical manufacturing plant in West Africa. Funded by the Ghana Export-Import Bank, the Standard Chartered PLC, and Pharmanova Ltd., the plant was inaugurated by President Akufo-Addo in 2022 and has partnered with Bosch machines for vaccine manufacturing. According to the founder and CEO, Atlantic Life Sciences has been looking for partners to start the fill and finish business for anti-rabies treatments, tetanus, and snake-bite vaccines, with a capacity to produce 70,000 vials a day, but during the time of interview in August 2022, the company had only been approached by a Chinese firm. While this would be an opportunity for Indian companies to tap into the West African markets, it also presents India an opportunity to work alongside its partners in the Quad to prioritize vaccine manufacturing in Africa.⁴⁴

Fast-tracking bureaucratic processes

An Indian company in the power-transmission sector stated that the firm’s technical acumen, familiarity of dealing with similar challenges in India, and success in finding localized solutions enable it to retain a competitive edge in Ghana. However, the Chinese have systems and institutions in place that allow seamless processes. “China realizes the power of tiny bureaucratic functions,” he says. The task of validating the authenticity of a report in a government-accredited lab in India, for instance, would take him much longer than his Chinese counterpart. It would be helpful if there was a channel through which Indian companies operating in competitive ecosystems abroad could fast-track select bureaucratic processes. 

Encouraging private-sector investors

There appears to be tremendous opportunities for businesses looking for joint ventures or providing services, especially in the technology sector. A leading Indian entrepreneur in the tech space tells us how his company has conducted business with Indian and US firms for years and has recently begun working with a Chinese service provider. Attributing this to quick decision-making and prompt delivery, he says “I didn’t want to do business with the Chinese, but the American companies weren’t delivering on time. They probably have bigger clients to cater to whereas the Chinese persistently followed up with us for business.” 

Creating innovative sources of funding

One of the challenges facing the Indian investor has been gaining access to funds. While nonconcessional funding in the form of a buyer’s credit provided by the Indian EXIM Bank directly pays contractors, the lines of credit it offers often take years to mature. “If an African government requests a power plant in 2015, for instance, the project is sometimes only realized in 2020,” explains an Indian contractor. Not only does the tendering process sometimes takes years to complete, but individual contractors who have identified and convinced potential clients, who then approach the Indian government, have to wait excessive amounts of time for a decision. This has meant that Indian companies that primarily worked on projects funded by the EXIM Bank have had to quickly diversify and find alternate, innovative modes of funding to grow their portfolio. 

Focusing on technology, knowledge, and skills transfer

For investments to be truly sustainable, creating assets that improve livelihoods and develop economies, it is vital to ensure that technology and knowledge are transferred seamlessly. While India already has in place several frameworks of cooperation that focus on building individual and institutional capacity, there is room to expand on this work, with sector-specific courses. While studies have shown that Chinese investors do transfer technology,⁴⁵ cultural factors sometimes impede its efficiency. For instance, an academic who has worked closely with Chinese firms as an interpreter in Accra noted that, despite some Chinese firms’ policy for skills and knowledge transfer, some Chinese managers tend to work on highly technical aspects of a project after working hours, after the Ghanaians have left, which undermines the process of skill transfer.

Creating viable alternatives: Leveraging Indian contractors 

To compete with Chinese firms gaining traction in Africa in the long run, the government of India will need to support its large contractors with decades of experience operating in African markets. The Indian government can work with partners in Africa to identify strategic projects and support the major Indian infrastructure companies—with a track record of delivery and execution—to fulfil the mandates of the host governments. This will not only lead to several intangible benefits, but will work toward providing African governments with alternatives in their efforts to fill the continents’ massive infrastructure gap. 

Enforcing local laws strictly

GUTA President Obeng says that if the aim is to industrialize Ghana, then enforcement of local laws needs to be stronger. “When you give Chinese traders looking to enter Ghana approvals to trade, send them some questions: How many containers will you buy this year? What will be the value of the container? Do you have the money here? If yes, then lodge it with the Bank of Ghana. They can’t come here to drain the forex of Ghana” he says. “We need to reduce dependence on the Chinese—I’m scared, I’m afraid of how things are going now. It’s our own folly. You have to enforce rules, laws, security.”

Conclusion

The broad spectrum of Indian perspectives, ranging from a quasi “insider” to a familiar “outsider” and an outright foreigner to the Ghanian landscape, provides a unique lens to observe China’s growing role in the country in all its complexity. While there are similarities in the approach, drivers, and instruments of these Asian powers, Beijing’s overtures have been distinct. Examining the impact this has had on Ghanian stakeholders and documenting Indian experiences alongside, contributes to the discourse on how other powers engaged in the region can create viable alternatives for African decision makers.

It is, after all, a global marketplace with myriad options for those open to engagement and new approaches. Perhaps Odoom has said it best:⁴⁶

• What the pandemic has taught us is that we still live in a global society, a global village, but the norms that govern that global village are undergoing some disruption. The traditional gatekeepers have had control and dominance for a long time. What we are seeing is an emerging disruption of that structure. And China is a key part of that disruption, and China sees Africa as a companion in that enterprise. So, it will do everything to get African support, whether economically or politically. Engagement from China and India and other southern countries is going to rise. However, this rise does not automatically lead to benefit for the Africans. It boils down to how Africans engage their counterparts.

Lead researcher and writer 

• Veda Vaidyanathan

Contributor, research 

• Arhin Acheampong

Collaborating institutions

• Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), New Delhi, India
• Afro-Sino Centre of International Relations (ASCIR), Accra, Ghana

With sincere thanks to

• Ashok K. Kantha, former director, ICS, New Delhi
• Aubrey Hruby, nonresident senior fellow, Africa Center, Atlantic Council
• Ewedanu Grace Selase Abla, research associate, ASCIR, Accra
• James Hildebrand, former associate director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council
• Mark Kwaku Mensah Obeng, senior lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of Ghana
• Pamela Carslake, director, ASCIR, Accra
• S. Chinpau Ngaihte, first secretary, High Commission of India, Accra
• Shruti Jargad, research assistant, ICS, New Delhi
• Xiaoyang Tang, professor, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University
• Cate Hansberry, Publications Editor, Engagement, Atlantic Council
• Nancy Messieh, Deputy Director, Digital Communications, Engagement, Atlantic Council
• Andrea Ratiu, Digital Production Assistant, Engagement, Atlantic Council

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The single created by multi-Grammy award-winning Moroccan-Swedish producer RedOne embodies the spirit with which the Moroccan team—against all odds—kept knocking out top contenders like Portugal, Spain, and Belgium and advancing through the competition. Thus far, the defeat-free journey of the Moroccan soccer national team, the Atlas Lions, is more than a simple sports score. It is an upheaval in soccer culture—a symbolic capital for Africans, Arabs, and Muslims everywhere and a historical revenge of subaltern dreamers from the global south.

A change in the culture of soccer

Modern soccer was codified in nineteenth-century Britain and soon became a European favorite. The collective sport turned into a global sensation with the creation of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) and organization of the first World Cup in 1930 in Uruguay. Soccer remains a largely euro-centric sport today, supported by professional leagues, media, and capitals in the old continent with outliers in the Americas. Thus, soccer culture is linked to iconic players who built their careers in Spanish, British, Italian, and other European teams. It is also largely associated with ritualistic beer drinking, ultras chanting, and shots of beautiful white models featured on television screens.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar—aside from its questionable human rights records and bribery allegations—has reconfigured the rites of the event and dictated new norms in synchronicity with its Arab and Islamic values despite western uproar and disapproval. Morocco, the North African dark horse-turned-favorite of the competition, also had a few lessons to convey.

Images of players prostrating to pray after each match, the celebration of family solidarity with players embracing their parents, and the waving of the Palestinian flag for every memorial picture are all acts of defiance of an essentially western-centric football culture and signals a more diverse and inclusive set of symbols that are epistemologically different from the usual World Cup glam. Likewise, the team’s fans have elected a new motto inspired by the religious teaching of the Arabic hashtag “trusting in God” (#ديروا_النية), which has been widely used on social media even by the newly appointed US ambassador to Morocco, Ambassador Puneet Talwar.

Shattering colonial complexes

The Moroccan team’s victories are hailed extensively by other global south countries, notably those who see the team’s resilience and combativity as a reflection of their own battle. Supporters across the African continent and the Arab and Muslim worlds spontaneously allied behind the Atlas Lions in defiance of their old Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, French, and British colonizers. Metaphorically, each victory shattered old imperialist complexes that European coaches and teams are inherently superior. For Arab countries particularly, a new pan-Arab sentiment rose and erased decades of defeatist mentality.

For the host country, Morocco’s wins are, by extension, the continuation and channeling of the Qatari dreams in the competition—an avenue for all Arabs to keep dreaming. Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani made sure to showcase his favorite team loud and clear by waving Morocco’s red flag with a green star during its December 10 match with Portugal. As a result of the Atlas Lions’ rise to the semi-final against France on December 14, millions of Arab youth and children are redefining their soccer idols after the surreal sight of Portugal’s Cristiano Ronaldo leaving the pitch crying and finding new heroes in more self-identifiable players like Hakim Ziyech, Achraf Hakimi, and Yassine Bounou. In other words, representation matters.

The tale of Moroccan players is also that of first- and second-generation migrants who had mixed experiences of integration in Europe, where many were born and raised. It points to a larger story of how Europe may have provided the investment that these athletes didn’t find “back home,” but ultimately failed to build a genuine connection to their countries of birth that have often been the source of discrimination and mistreatment to their North African immigrant communities. In the end, fourteen out of twenty-six players chose to represent the red and green colors of their forefathers for the World Cup.

As the world order starts shifting anew towards multipolarity, the Qatar World Cup and the consecutive symbolic triumphs of the Moroccan team can be seen as an illustration of shifting powers and hybrid world narratives. The shifts in the poles of power and crumbling of western hegemony that mostly one-sided western media might have obscured found an auspicious opportunity to unfold before the eyes of world viewers avidly following the competition and pondering the uneasy question: When did the world change so much?

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

The post <strong>Morocco’s World Cup victories are historical revenge for subaltern dreamers from the global south</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The summit comes at a challenging time, characterized by deteriorating security conditions on the continent—reminiscent of the Cold War era—exacerbated by rising geopolitical tensions and the urgency to ramp up the energy transition and combat climate change. There is a risk that the subordination of growth and development objectives to security priorities, which has dominated US engagement with Africa, will persist in today’s highly geopolitically driven world.

The United States’ continuous prioritization of security over development (otherwise known as the securitization of development) in its engagement with Africa could be counterproductive: It could easily undermine the net-zero transition as well as opportunities for maximizing the benefits of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which policymakers hope will alleviate the concentration of global supply chains for greater resilience.

Moving up the value chain

The securitization of development has been costly for both Africa and the United States and has led to the weakening of US-Africa relations. This is especially evident in the trade arena, where the United States has been losing ground at lightning speed. For decades, it was Africa’s largest trading partner, accounting for as much as 26.5 percent of total African trade in 1980 according to data from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). That figure has fallen into the single digits, to around 6 percent of total African trade, with US investment on the continent having declined sharply as well.

Perhaps the most consequential factor behind the collapse of US-Africa trade has been the stickiness of the colonial development model based on resource extraction, under which Africa is relegated to participating in global value chains (GVCs) along forward rather than backward activities, predominantly as a provider of primary commodities and raw materials. Initially this model grossly inflated US-African trade—both on the export and import side of the trade balance sheet—with the United States importing crude oil from Africa and exporting refined petroleum products back to the continent.

In the modern era of global value chains, in which intermediate goods have become the leading drivers of world trade, falling US investment in Africa has blunted the expansion of US-African trade. Moreover, the predominance of natural resources in that trade has always presented a major risk. For example, as the twenty-first-century US shale boom put the country on a path toward energy independence—with advances in fracking technology lowering production costs and raising oil output—US petroleum imports declined dramatically; between 2014 and 2020, the United States cut its oil imports from Africa by around 40 percent, according to Afreximbank.

While many African countries are oil producers, they rely on imports for refined petroleum products. Under that highly carbon-intensive “round-tripping” model, Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil-producing country, for decades exported crude oil to the United States and imported refined petroleum products back to power its economy, at a huge cost in terms of macroeconomic stability, jobs, and environmental degradation.

Besides increasing the carbon footprint of the heavily polluting shipping industry, the costs of the round-tripping model are significant and go beyond dwindling trade numbers. There is a human element: People are being sickened by intense greenhouse gas emissions and wounded—or, in the worst cases, killed—in conflicts fueled by climate change and competition for scarce resources. Africa is on the frontlines of the global climate crisis, despite being the continent contributing the lowest total greenhouse gas emissions. Round-tripping has also exported jobs off of the continent, which is already contending with Great Depression-level unemployment rates, exacerbating poverty and adding to conflict-fueled migration flows.

At the macro level, the conditions created by round-tripping have long undermined the continent’s pursuit of economic stability, with sustained foreign-exchange leakages increasing the frequency of balance-of-payment crises. Africa’s position as an importer of refined petroleum products plays an outsized role in these crises, a vulnerability that leaders across the continent are looking to address. In Nigeria, for example, a new Dangote Group refinery and petrochemical plant that will come on stream early next year could, according to estimates from the Central Bank of Nigeria, save the country up to 40 percent of its foreign exchange earnings.

Ultimately, the securitization of development in US-Africa engagement has delivered neither security nor development. And the predominance of natural resources has underscored the economic and political risk to both parties, with the sharp decline of US-African trade weakening its relevance for Africa’s development in an increasingly competitive geopolitical world.

Next steps for the US and Africa

There are key questions to consider during what could be a history-making summit in Washington: Can the trend be reversed to boost US-African trade and correct the balance between security and development? And why should such a course of action be undertaken?

On the first question, increased manufacturing in Africa can help the continent diversify its exports beyond primary commodities and natural resources and integrate effectively into the global economy. In addition to its strong theoretical foundation for economic development, manufacturing has other positive spillovers including opportunities for economies of scale and productivity growth, technology transfers, integration into GVCs, and capital accumulation. Recent estimates show that this drives 20 percent of US capital investment and 60 percent of US exports.

Across the developing world, manufacturing has offered a path for low-income countries to increase their shares of global trade. One example is Vietnam, which over the course of the past decade has become one of the United States’ ten largest trading partners, leaping ahead of powerful nations such as France and Italy, according to the Africa Export and Import Bank. Vietnam has achieved this by successfully improving its connections to GVCs, including those around technology. More than 40 percent of Samsung cellphones are manufactured in Vietnam, enabling the country to reap the benefits of the frontier technology industries that are propelling global growth.

Most African countries, which possess the raw materials necessary to manufacture these and similar technology products, could achieve the same performance—if it weren’t for the colonial development model of resource extraction. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo, which some call “the Saudi Arabia of cobalt,” could potentially enter electric vehicle GVCs not solely as a resource provider but as provider of lithium batteries and other crucial, manufactured components.

In addition to boosting US-African trade, such involvement across GVCs would mitigate the continent’s vulnerability to adverse commodity terms of trade and improve living standards, as has been the case in Vietnam, where poverty rates have fallen sharply. Simply put, since greater backward participation in GVCs leads to higher gross exports, domestic value added, and employment, manufacturing reduces poverty—and its poverty-reducing effects are even more pronounced in low-income countries.

Turning to the second question, the benefits of increasing manufacturing output and diversifying exports in terms of growth and welfare are textbook trade theory. But there are also two additional benefits with significant geopolitical implications: The diversification of global supply chains for greater resilience and the reduction of the global carbon footprint.

The AfCFTA, which entered into force last year and is expected to catalyze competitive value chains across the continent, provides a new framework for US-Africa engagement. Beyond diversifying Africa’s sources of growth and turning the page on the costly round-tripping model, the agreement has the potential to cut carbon emissions significantly by facilitating the net-zero transition and promoting the diversification of global supply chains. The latter is especially important for building greater resilience in today’s geopolitically tilted world, where trade is increasingly treated as another weapon in superpowers’ arsenals.

There are other reasons for the United States and the world to prioritize Africa in the decentralization of global supply chains. The continent’s young population positions it as a growing consumer market, and shrinking the distance between production and consumption would further alleviate the global carbon footprint during the net-zero transitional period. Simultaneously, economies of scale associated with the AfCFTA will further boost productivity and returns on investments, especially as corporations take advantage of regional integration to spread the risk of investing in smaller markets and, in the process, strengthen investment and trade and lift African exports.

Transcending the colonial development model of resource extraction could position a reforming Africa as the next great frontier market for global investors chasing high yields and resilient supply chains amid today’s rising geopolitical tensions. Earlier this year, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen promoted “friend-shoring” to shift supply chains away from countries that present geopolitical and security risks to supply chains. It is up to the United States to change its ways and make new friends during its second US-Africa Leaders Summit.

Hippolyte Fofack is the chief economist at Afreximbank.

The post US-Africa Leaders Summit could make history—if leaders recalibrate trade relations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The region encompassing the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel is studded with complex and multi-layered conflicts in which local and international dynamics are closely intertwined. While this may sound like a simple truth, it has important implications for conflict management. Across the region, few wars are strictly intra-state conflicts or are internally resolvable. In most cases, like Libya, Mali, and Yemen, local and regional players, foreign actors, and international organizations have become co-conspirators in these crises’ destinies, argues the newly released report, Conflict Management Models in the MENA Region, authored by Karim Mezran, Chiara Lovotti, Alissa Pavia, Gerald M. Feierstein, Stefano Marcuzzi, and Petr Tůma. These actors often have divergent agendas and are guided by other priorities, pursuing different, sometimes opposing, normative models and pathways to peace.

Countries of the region have witnessed countless attempts to deal with, manage, and resolve conflicts by various actors that have registered mixed fortunes. In Mali, for example, the West had sought a long-term military engagement to mitigate the country’s crisis, whereby European intervention in the Sahel became the laboratory for a joint EU military culture before Russia contributed to the erosion of this exercise, explains the report.

On the other hand, the West’s NATO-led campaign in Libya in 2011 was short-lived and without long-term prospects for peacebuilding, leaving the country fragmented and its institutions in shambles. Other countries, like Russia, have prioritized hardline approaches to conflict management to safeguard domestic priorities. Russian interventionism in the MENA and broader Sahel has witnessed significant military deployments. Yemen is a unique case in point, with bottom-up approaches taking center stage. Civil society actors have recently taken essential steps to mediate the conflict, from negotiating local cease-fire agreements to prisoner exchanges.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Program and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council focusing on the processes of change in North Africa.

Chiara Lovotti is an ISPI Research Fellow and Scientific Coordinator of “Rome MED-Mediterranean Dialogues”, ISPI’s and the Italian MoFA’s annual flagship event. 

Report

Nov 18, 2022

Conflict management in the MENA: Different approaches for different actors

By Chiara Lovotti and Alissa Pavia

The region encompassing the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel is studded with complex and multi-layered conflicts in which local and international dynamics interact.

Conflict Middle East

Report

Nov 18, 2022

The EU, NATO and the Libya crisis: Scaling ambitions down?

By Stefano Marcuzzi

In March 2011, a coalition of countries under the United Nations (UN) umbrella led militarily by NATO launched an air campaign in support of a series of revolts against the regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, ostensibly to stop Qaddafi’s reprisals on civilians.

Libya Middle East

Report

Nov 18, 2022

Reviving diplomacy: A new strategy for the Yemen conflict?

By Gerald M. Feierstein

The fundamental challenge in achieving a sustainable resolution of the current conflict in Yemen is that the issues at stake are fundamental to Yemen’s identity and history.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

Report

Nov 18, 2022

Mali: West out, Russia in, and then?

By Petr Tůma

Unlike with violent upheavals and wars that have recently shaken the broader Middle East and North African region, in Mali, the West—specifically Europe led by France—decided to mitigate the crisis through a long-term military engagement, though not as extensive as in Afghanistan or Iraq.

North & West Africa Russia

Report

Nov 18, 2022

“Conflict management” à-la-Russe in the Middle East and Africa

By Chiara Lovotti

Over the past 10 years, much has been said about Russia’s interventions in conflicts in the wide region stretching from the Middle East to central Africa, encompassing North Africa and the Sahel.

Middle East Russia

The post Conflict management models in the MENA region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2012, northern Mali was hit by the rebellion of Tuareg separatists, once again seeking the independence of the Azawad, areas inhabited by this Berber-speaking seminomadic people. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)—better prepared than in the past with an infusion of arms and personnel flowing from destabilized Libya—quickly seized northern parts of the country. However, the rebellion was soon taken over by Islamists, whose aim wasn’t independence but rather sharia law extending throughout Mali.

As Islamist insurgents were quickly advancing toward central Mali, a military coup in Bamako further weakened the government’s ability to respond. France—upon Mali’s request—decided to intervene. Its counterterrorism operation Serval, building on the successes of earlier French intervention in neighboring Mauretania, managed to stop insurgents’ advance within a few first months of 2013.

In 2014, Serval was transformed into Barkhane operation with a much broader territorial scope, covering the whole Sahel region and headquartered in N’Djamena (Chad). French ambitions went beyond Serval not only territorially, but also in terms of goals and partnership. The counterterrorism focus was progressively paired with state-building elements. At the same time, European countries were gradually stepping in alongside France. There was a “joining” momentum, especially with the 2020 establishment of the counterterrorism Takuba task force, a platform for European special forces to advise and accompany Malians on the battlefield. Europeans also were present in greater numbers within the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the EU Training Mission.

European momentum in Mali

At the same time, there was growing awareness that there won’t be a sustainable solution without local ownership. Sahel countries, supported by the international community, created the G5 Sahel Joint Force, involving Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. On the other hand, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) assumed a leading political role, especially when dealing with the 2020 and 2021 Mali military coups.

Mali became quite crowded and by 2020 the Sahel region contained the largest European military deployment abroad, with around eight thousand troops. Proper coordination among Europeans and other external players became a serious challenge, especially in the field of humanitarian and development aid. The challenge was smaller in the military realm, where there were established coordination formats.

Issues

After Serval’s 2013 successes, when Islamist insurgents were quickly pushed out of urban centers and the French forces were celebrated as liberators, Paris started to face difficulties. Jihadists hid in the mountains or bushes, turned to a hit-and-run approach, and things started to become ugly. This may sound familiar to those who followed US interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Ill-equipped local forces, a UN peacekeeping mission with extremely restrictive rules of engagement, and only a few thousand forces within Barkhane didn’t match with the evolving insurgency, an enemy moving fast over a territory comparable in size to Western Europe.

Malians expected most of the country’s issues to be solved by Europe. The government in Bamako often didn’t cooperate enough, thus becoming part of the problem; sometimes, the government played Europeans and other donors against one another. Europeans had much less leverage on Bamako compared to, say, Americans on the government in Baghdad. The French were not able to make Bamako understand that Barkhane is about stabilization or conflict management, and that the main job should be done by Malians themselves. The result: frustrations on both sides.

French-led efforts to build a European and local coalition of forces seemed to pick up and bring some results, beginning around 2020 with the establishment of the Takuba task force, a reform of the UN MINUSMA mandate, formation of G5 forces, and an enhanced EU training mission.

It was too little, too late. Mali hurt itself with two successive military coups in August 2020 and May 2021. When the junta led by Colonel Assimi Goïta rejected the demands of the international community to stick to the political transition timetable, the relationship with France soured to the point of upending Barkhane’s presence in Mali. There’s a debate as to whether Paris could have behaved a bit more diplomatically in the aftermath of a second coup, handling putschists’ egos and offering them an appropriate off-ramp.

Russian surprise

I had a chance to visit Bamako a few weeks after the second coup in 2021. When asking Western diplomats and local officials about the Russian presence in the country during the last years, they all pointed to Moscow’s rather low profile, compared to Russia’s activities in some other African countries. And yet within a few weeks, Russia suddenly emerged as a major player, exploiting tensions between the new leadership in Bamako and the French (with their European and regional allies). Feeling the pressure from the country’s long-standing partners as they pushed for a political transition, Colonel Goïta opted to remain in power and chose Russia as a partner. In the face of a European intervention that had dragged on for years, was it naive to hope that swapping horses could bring more security? The country’s geopolitical shift added to a sense of the West’s weakening stances in developing nations—parallel to a gradual return of Moscow to the forefront of Middle East and African theaters.

If Russian military intervention in Syria was premeditated, aiming to shore up against a risk of the Assad regime crumbling, Moscow’s coup de main in Bamako was more of a coincidence. As I already hinted in an Atlantic Council blog, even Russia was probably surprised by how easily the deeply rooted French and European influence in the country evaporated by seizing local frustrations, building on European missteps, and introducing disinformation into the mix. Moreover, it all happened at a very low cost, without any major military, economic, or political engagement.

In Mali, Russians reused the playbook from several other African countries (e.g., Central African Republic, Sudan, Mozambique). It just worked better in Mali, due to the circumstances. They prepared the ground through a disinformation campaign; when the opportunity arose (earlier than expected), Moscow offered an alternative to cooperation with the West that was tempting for leaders under pressure. The Russian package typically doesn’t include much economic support: no investments are to be expected. It provides some diplomatic backing, but the core is the protection of the regime, including limited arms supplies/sales, military advisers, and training. Yet, it’s not for free: African leaders are supposed to pay, often through the country’s mineral wealth.

Western sources on the ground told me about a few things Malians seem to appreciate, compared to cooperation with Europeans. Wagner mercenaries, for instance, often accompany local forces (even though Takuba task force troops had tried to do the same). Russians also appear to share more of the actionable information—including drone data on jihadists’ positions—enabling Malians to better operate. Malians and some Europeans complained that the French too often kept military information for themselves. Moscow brought in some arms: even if they were often outdated, the move worked and Malian forces may have felt a bit more confident. On the other hand, Russians often use Malian soldiers as cannon fodder.

Still, Moscow’s priority isn’t the stabilization of the country. Russia is mainly driven by an effort to boost its geopolitical positions, which here means weakening the Europeans. Russia doesn’t even bother coming up with a commensurable substitute to Western state-building projects, whereas China would offer an alternative authoritarian business model. In Mali, Russia appears as an almost pure disrupter. In Syria, Moscow may have interests in stabilizing the country to get its investments back, but Mali isn’t an attractive business project for Russians. It is a landlocked country, with only a few natural resources that are readily exploited. To date, the Wagner Group has been struggling to use concessions for the extraction of minerals. The most lucrative is gold. Yet, there’s too much light around the shining metal and attracting everybody, including Western companies. Shadowy mercenaries thus may be pushed to look for other options such as lithium. Apart from mineral-extraction concessions, the Wagner Group is also supposed to be paid for its services. The Pentagon once estimated that this could be up to $10 million a month. Bamako allegedly already transferred some money, but the greater part is still owed, a European diplomat told me.

The group’s merciless “gloves-off” approach—not caring about civilian damages and sometimes exploring local ethnic grievances—could have brought isolated short-term results. Russians also may have sought to find a modus vivendi with some of the insurgent groups. When you don’t have enough troops on the ground, you should look for a negotiated solution. But that didn’t happen: Russians are simply not up to the challenge. What Islamists really feared were French airstrikes. With those now gone, insurgents are fearlessly rolling on again. US Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland recently estimated that violence in Mali increased by around 30 percent during the last six months.

Further fragmentation of the country is at risk. As Russians lack the capacity to protect much more than Bamako and mines in the south, Tuaregs may seize control of the north and Islamists expand their rule in the center. So far, Wagner forces are still operating in the center (mainly in the Segou and Mopti regions) and continue to prevent UN peacekeepers from entering some of these areas.

On the way forward to Niger

With about one thousand Wagner mercenaries present on the ground, Moscow cannot succeed where Europe, which had more than eight thousand troops engaged in the region, could not manage even with heavy aerial support. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, which gobbles up military resources, has made containing the insurgency very unlikely. Any drawdown by Wagner in its forces in Mali may not yet be obvious, but it’s believed that the group has significantly decreased recruiting for operations in the Middle East and Africa to better focus on the European battlefield.

As France and its partners withdrew their contingents from Mali, they didn’t give up the fight against the further spread of violence in the Sahel region. Two successive military coups made broader engagement in Burkina Faso a less appealing option, even if the possibility of replaying Mali’s Wagner scenario there now seems rather low. The best harbor appeared to be Niger, where the government is interested in hosting European forces and Moscow has no traditional bearings. Negotiations are already underway between Paris and Niamey on concrete modalities of French and European military presence.

There are lessons that should be learned from Mali. French-led intervention suffered from several flaws, which are addressed in this piece I co-authored. If Paris was driven by the conviction that the solution should be regional and can’t be limited to a counterterrorist operation, then in practice it remained very much French and military centered.

For Niger, this would mean better communication outside and coordination inside. It also would be on the ground, accentuating preventive operations ahead of the proper fight or even more of the responsibility for local partners, once properly trained and equipped. Looking toward Niger, it’s important to underscore that France didn’t lose in Mali against Islamists, but rather because of local politics, its own colonial legacy, and a Russian-led disinformation campaign.

As for Mali, people have to understand what it feels like to be dependent on Russia. And it partly applies to the whole Sahel and Africa, where atrocities that Russia is committing in Ukraine may resonate way less than we, in the West, tend to think. This may take some time. Being a disrupter is easier than building stability. But it’s not a sustainable strategy. It’ll blow out one day.

Within the Malian population and the military, there’s not much opposition against the current leadership and the direction it is steering the country. Major fires have been extinguished. This can change over time once security and economic flaws become more obvious. Still, the first glimpses of such a reckoning may pop up soon as Bamako will have to decide whether to renew the Wagner contract. Since Russia is not delivering, the outcome is not a given.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East and transatlantic relations. 

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The post Mali: West out, Russia in, and then? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Conflict-management practices vary in form and structure, depending on the stakes involved and interests that differing parties to the conflict harbor. While, in some cases, conflict management will attempt to account for long-term stability with the involvement of international institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations (Mali), in other cases it will be short lived and with few to no long-term prospects for stability (Libya). Some actors may view the practice of managing conflicts as a way to enable local actors to take ownership over post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation (Yemen), while others view the practice as a way to extend their military footprint in the region (Russia).

In Mali, for example, the West has sought a long-term military engagement to mitigate the country’s crisis, which erupted in 2012 after the Tuareg-led separatist rebellion. The French-led counterterrorism operation’s primary goal was to oust the insurgents, while also paving the way for a long-term state-building process to help Mali rebuild after the conflict. European countries and the United Nations also stepped in to provide support and help the French-led intervention. Conflict management was about “stabilization” and, over time, handing over the state-building process to Bamako.

The NATO-led campaign in Libya from 2011, in contrast, had few to no long-term perspectives for stabilization and institution building. Still involved in Afghanistan, NATO member states were keen to avoid a full-fledged military operation in Libya consisting of a strong post-conflict transition and supported by disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes. As a result, local Libyan authorities faced the daunting challenge of contrasting the myriad armed groups that emerged because of the war, leaving Libya in shambles and without a centralized government.

Russian interventionism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the wider Sahel region saw the implementation of a conflict-management strategy that prioritized hard-power approaches over diplomatic, soft-power ones. While Russia narratives have framed its interventions as “peacekeeping missions,” few to no diplomatic efforts have been implemented. The use of widespread force—through military deployments in Syria, Libya, Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic—is a case in point of how Russian hard-power strategies prevailed.

Yemen’s crisis witnessed a rather unique management of its conflict, with local women and tribal-led groups taking center stage in the country’s reconstruction plan. By negotiating local ceasefire agreements and prisoner exchanges, civil-society organizations have become protagonists in Yemen’s ongoing civil war. These have provided temporary containment measures to mitigate the consequences of the conflict. However, the process of recovery cannot begin in the absence of a clear path toward ending the conflict and agreeing on a political horizon.

This Atlantic Council-ISPI Dossier focuses on a selected number of conflict case studies (Libya, Yemen, Mali, and Russia) with a view to surface types of mechanisms for dealing with them that have been used by actors including the United Nations, European Union (EU), NATO, and Russia.

Chiara Lovotti is an ISPI Research Fellow and Scientific Coordinator of “Rome MED-Mediterranean Dialogues.”

Alissa Pavia is the Associate Director for the North Africa Program within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

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Dubbed the “African COP,” this year’s conference was expected to see Global South countries rally together to press rich countries on their role in driving climate change. For the first time, global leaders promised to set up a “loss and damage” reparations fund, paid for by wealthy countries, to help low-income countries pay for the consequences of the climate crisis.

COP27 took place after a season of extreme weather events and natural disasters that saw catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, droughts across Africa, and more. And as the conference unfolded, leaders kept their eyes on the global energy crisis spurred by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has pushed energy security to the fore—sometimes at the expense of the climate.

Have countries heeded this year’s wake-up calls with bold commitments at COP27? Our experts—many of whom were in Sharm el Sheikh—dispatched their insights and recommendations for world leaders throughout the course of this critical conference. This post was continuously updated as their reactions streamed in.

Check out all our work on COP27 here.

The latest analysis from Sharm el Sheikh

• COP27 readout: The good and the bad as COP27 concludes
• The big success and bigger failure of COP27
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

COP27 readout: The good and the bad as COP27 concludes

Requiring an additional thirty-six hours of negotiation, official delegates finally reached a settlement and final communique early Sunday morning. The deal is underpinned by the landmark agreement to create a fund for climate compensation, bringing a nearly three-decade journey for “loss and damage” closer to the finish line. Even if details are sparse regarding contributions to the fund and the criteria for disbursement to vulnerable or impacted nations, bringing forth a commitment from two hundred participating countries is representative of the amount of influence the Global South has wielded throughout the past two weeks.

The disappointing absence of increased emissions reduction targets in the communique is an indicator of how the needs of the developing world have underpinned this COP. Ambitions for economic development amidst a global energy crisis have given enough influence to global oil and gas producing states that room for a significant push to reduce the role of oil and gas in the energy mix has been significantly limited.

Read more

EnergySource

Nov 23, 2022

COP27 readout: The good and the bad as COP27 concludes

By Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center experts take stock of two weeks of COP developments in Sharm el Sheikh.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

The big success and bigger failure of COP27

The Global South won, but did the climate? Negotiators at the UN climate-change conference known as COP27 extended their stay in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt to hammer out a final agreement that will create a loss and damage fund to compensate developing countries harmed by climate change. But the deal barely addresses other urgent topics such as reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, even as the consequences of climate change become clearer by the day. Have negotiators done enough to help save the planet and the people on it? What other surprises cropped up at COP? Our experts, who were on the ground in Sharm el Sheikh, are here to weigh in.

Read their takeaways

Fast Thinking

Nov 21, 2022

The big success and bigger failure of COP27

By Atlantic Council

What other surprises cropped up at the conference? Our experts, who were on the ground in Sharm el Sheikh, are here to weigh in.

Brazil China

Stepping up ahead of negotiations

• Solutions for achieving net-zero emissions and improving energy access for all
• How climate change affects peace and security across the world
• Insurance for a climate-safe future
• Dispatch from the Resilience Hub: Why countries can’t give up on the 1.5 degree Celsius cap on warming
• Will countries step up on loss and damage?
• Saudi Arabia’s take on aligning energy security needs and decarbonization goals
• How Freetown is addressing extreme heat
• Addressing Africa’s rapidly rising energy demand
• Why now is the best time to address energy security and climate change in tandem
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

Solutions for achieving net-zero emissions and improving energy access for all

Our Global Energy Center pulled to the side top thinkers, leaders, and innovators on climate solutions at COP27 to talk about their ideas for achieving net-zero ambitions while ensuring energy access for all.

Watch the full playlist

How climate change affects peace and security across the world

By Lama El Hatow

As climate change impacts intensify—fueling migration and competition over scarce resources—so does the risk that conflict that may emerge. That risk has only been exacerbated by recent economic shocks, energy-supply disruptions, and increasing food insecurity.

While climate-linked migration and displacement (or “human mobility”) are discussed extensively at COP27, they are not officially on the agenda. The US Center, as well as several other pavilions at COP27 like the Climate Mobility Pavilion, have hosted series of events discussing the connections between climate change, conflict, peace, and security. At these events, speakers explained how, with assessments by officials from the US Departments of State and Defense, the United States is looking at hotspot zones around the world that are at risk from severe climate impacts—including how fragile and conflict-affected countries are negatively affected by these impacts. The United States is conducting these assessments in an attempt to provide an early warning about which regions are most at risk from climate change.

One of the most concerning ways that climate change will impact these regions is by contributing to increasing food insecurity. According to a report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme, up to 205 million people across forty-five countries are expected to face acute food insecurity, while up to 45 million people across thirty-seven countries are projected to face severe malnourishment that may result in starvation or death. The report also explains that more than 70 percent of people facing acute food security over the last year were living in conflict-affected countries; and in several countries and regions, climate change and extreme weather events are driving increases in food insecurity. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has only added to the crisis by elevating prices for food and energy, the latter key to distributing food worldwide.

The report also identified nineteen hotspots—seventeen countries and two regional clusters—that are most at risk of worsening food insecurity over the next few months due to climate change effects, increasing conflict, economic shocks, and more. The 970,000 people who are projected to face the most severe conditions are located in five countries—Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen.

With the number of climate refugees increasing, countries are beginning to assess how to manage this new movement of people, which will likely have spillover effects across regions. Although climate change is impacting the world all over, some countries have more capacity and resilience to manage the crisis than others; hence, migration flows in the Global South are steering toward countries with better resilience. Many at COP27 have argued that developed countries have a moral and ethical responsibility towards the migrants from the Global South, since they are coming from countries that didn’t contribute as much to the world’s emissions problem. Historically, however, there has been a pervasive anti-immigration sentiment that fuels restrictive policies and a general reluctance to provide legal protection to people fleeing their home countries due to conflict or climate change. Additionally, there has not yet been an established finance arrangement or action protocol on climate-linked mobility at the global level. Extensive work with significant cooperation still needs to be done to address this worsening crisis.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

Insurance for a climate-safe future

With COP27’s focus on climate change adaptation, in addition to mitigation, the insurance sector now has an “absolutely integral role to play” in helping people manage disasters after—and even before— they happen, said Francis Bouchard, Marsh McLennan’s managing director of climate.

In conversation with Jorge Gastelumendi, director of global policy at the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, Bouchard explained that insurance still has a very “traditional” role in terms of signaling to people the risks they may be acquiring in a new venture and paying claims after events unfold.

But there’s a new way that the insurance sector is helping send those risk signals earlier: Anticipatory finance, in which some companies offer a way to pay before a disaster strikes. “So if you statistically know that at some point [an] event is going to turn into something that would’ve been insured, you can actually put money in peoples’ hands before the event,” Bouchard explained. “They can spend that money to protect their families, their businesses, their cattle, their farms, whatever it is; but they can take steps before.”

Bouchard warned, however, that the idea hasn’t been scaled yet, as companies undergo a “mindset shift” from paying a claim after an event to making a claim never happen. Yet, he added, with momentum sparked by the global focus on risk reduction, which has resulted in new initiatives like the Group of Seven’s Global Shield, “the time is now for the insurance industry to lead.”

Watch more

Dispatch from the Resilience Hub: Why countries can’t give up on the 1.5 degree Celsius cap on warming

Will countries step up on loss and damage?

By Lama El Hatow

While loss and damage is near the top of the agenda at COP27, it has been a sticky point for many countries as they debate how to finance the loss and damage payments.

Climate mitigation looks to avert climate change through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the development of zero-emission solutions; climate adaptation aims to minimize the chance that climate change impacts a given community. But loss and damage addresses the harms and costs induced by climate change, which is already happening.

In Pakistan, for example, the recent disastrous floods, which put one-third of the country under water, damaged over a million homes, and killed over a thousand people. The damage has been estimated to cost more than thirty billion dollars and it displaced more thirty million people from their homes, raising an immediate need for loss and damage compensation. Overall, while some countries like Belgium and Scotland have been willing to pledge funding for loss and damage, other leading economies, including the United States, showed resistance.

At the same time, climate finance has traditionally been in the form of loans to developing countries. So essentially, developing countries are borrowing money from developed countries for a problem they mostly haven’t caused—and are being asked to pay it back with interest. Additionally, when climate disasters cause significant damage, they bring significant costs for the impacted country and, for developing countries, wipe out their financial resources, so the net outcome of the loan is almost nil.  This essentially is why Pakistan has called for debt restructuring and debt relief after the flooding, to change this unfair setup.

At the institutional level, the Vulnerable Twenty Group (V20), a “cooperation initiative” of finance ministers from the countries most vulnerable to climate change, was formed in 2015 to present a unified voice on climate action. V20 members are also members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, a non-treaty organization of fifty-five member countries which are estimated to have collectively lost $525 billion from 2000 to 2019 due to climate change. These two forums are actively pushing to promote a loss and damage payments mechanism.

While reaching a consensus on loss and damage has been challenging, some developed countries proposed alternative funding mechanisms for vulnerable countries. For example, the Group of Seven-led Global Shield announced at COP27 provides immediate financial support to V20 countries when climate-change-related disasters strike. With Germany’s contribution of $175 million, and with additional contributions from France, Austria, Denmark and Ireland, the total financial coverage of the Global Shield is about $207 million. But the V20 countries also warned earlier this year that they could stop paying their debt service (estimated at about $685 billion) if lenders are not willing to restructure these debts and deduct the climate induced costs. In the words of Ghanaian Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta, by leaving nations at the mercy of climate catastrophe, “you could be triggering a global economic meltdown.”

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

Saudi Arabia’s take on aligning energy security needs and decarbonization goals

Global Energy Center Senior Director sat down with Khalid M. Abuleif, chief negotiator for the climate agreements for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to talk about Saudi Arabia’s latest plans to meet its commitments in the Paris Climate Accords and the world’s needs for energy security.

The Paris Agreement has the potential to “be very costly for Saudi Arabia,” Abuleif explained. “The countries that will be most impacted… [are] going to be oil producers, developing countries; the reasoning is because their economies are not fully diversified and they rely heavily on limited sectors.”

But now is still the time for global climate action, Abuleif said. So as Saudi Arabia moves forward, it is working on making the country more resilient “to any kind of measures that could be taken,” Abuleif explained.

Watch the full interview to hear about Saudi Arabia’s latest initiatives geared toward improving energy security, boosting the country’s economy, and meeting its climate obligations.

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How Freetown is addressing extreme heat

Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr, mayor of Freetown, Sierra Leone, caught up with Kathy Baughman McLeod at the Resilience Hub and explained how her city is using an affordable and “simple solution” to protect women from extreme heat at markets across the city.

Watch the full conversation

Addressing Africa’s rapidly rising energy demand

The African Development Bank Group’s Kevin Kariuki joined Global Energy Center Deputy Director Reed Blakemore at COP27 to talk about sustainable development and energy access across Africa.

“Africa has endemic energy poverty which must be addressed,” Kariuki said, “and at the same time, we must address the issues of the climate crisis.”

To do that, Kariuki explained that he hopes leaders at COP27 realize that “what is actually required today is synergizing growth in energy demand with climate action.” He said that would help “[meet] the needs of Africa.”

“But we must also be realistic,” Kariuki added, “that renewable energy on its own will probably not be able to provide the security of supply and affordable power that is required to be able to underpin Africa’s social economic development.”

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Why now is the best time to address energy security and climate change in tandem

Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz joined the National Grid’s Rhian Kelly at COP27 to talk about addressing energy security in tandem with the energy transition.

“I think in many ways they’re more aligned than they’ve ever been because if we want to get ourselves off Russian gas, the cheapest form of self-reliant energies are renewables,” Kelly explained. She added that because global politics have changed, she thinks it’s “the best time to be thinking about energy security and climate change together.”

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A strategy for the Global South

• How cities in the Global South are adapting to climate change
• The first global ambassador for heat action lays out his top priorities
• Dispatch from the Resilience Hub: How women are impacted by climate change
• How to inhabit an uninhabitable region
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

How cities in the Global South are adapting to climate change

At the Thailand Pavilion, Mauricio Rodas talked about urban resilience and climate adaptation in cities across the Global South. “Extreme heat is the climate hazard that [effects] more people than any other, and it is particularly severe in cities,” he explained. He pointed out the innovations that are addressing extreme heat, such as the Cool Capital Stack investment portfolio recently launched by the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center and its partners.

See the highlights

The first global ambassador for heat action lays out his top priorities

Newly appointed Global Ambassador for Heat Action Felipe Calderón outlined his agenda for tackling extreme heat in conversation with Mauricio Rodas, the senior advisor for heat and city diplomacy at the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center.

“The first thing we need to do is gather information… [and] second, to transmit that information to the right people,” Calderón said.

He said that he believes “the main problem is the lack of awareness about the importance of the problem, about the magnitude of the problem.” But, he added, getting information out to leaders, the media, and other stakeholders can help boost the urgency among leaders to address heat.

Afterall, Calderón explained, “the most cost effective way to avoid human deaths… [is] preventing or taking action on heat waves.”

He also stressed the importance of nature-based solutions like planting trees in cities. That, he said, is an effective one because it “combines an adaptation solution with a mitigation solution.”

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Dispatch from the Resilience Hub: How women are impacted by climate change

How to inhabit an uninhabitable region

By Lama El Hatow

The latest analysis from the United Nations (UN) indicates that we are still nowhere near limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius—the target set by the Paris Accords—and are actually headed towards 2.8 degrees. That means we may see regions around the globe become completely uninhabitable. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, about six hundred million people across the Middle East and North Africa will face heat waves that go beyond the human survivability threshold by 2100. The Middle East North Africa (MENA) region is already a hot arid climate, and it will get hotter and drier with the impacts of climate change—with summertime temperatures that make it dangerous to be outdoors.

In this respect, we are heading toward an uninhabitable world and need to consider how best to adapt to it, particularly during the summer months. The immediate impact will be for people to spend more time indoors with the safety of air conditioning, which increases the demand for energy even further—bringing greater urgency to the search for clean renewable energy to power a smooth green transition. Additionally, within this year’s COP there have been many discussions about the possibilities of heat resilience within cities, including urban reforestation that can create cooler micro climates, shaded areas above bicycle lanes, and holistic urban planning with an eye toward resilience.

Consider the way many cities in Canada and the far north have adjusted to their harsh winters by creating underground infrastructure to minimize outdoor exposure, including public transportation, tunnel systems, and connections to buildings. Similarly, countries in MENA such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are already working to enhance their infrastructure to limit outdoor exposure by connecting their metro lines through tunnels to buildings, along with tailoring cultural attractions to the climate from the world’s largest indoor ski slope in Dubai to indoor stadiums and indoor golf courses. The MENA region is already building its cities to adapt to an uninhabitable world. The biggest risk, however, does not lie in wealthier countries that have the capacity to do this, but in the most vulnerable communities that will suffer tremendously in an environment made uninhabitable by climate change.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

The future of climate adaptation

• Water Day comes to COP27
• Delivering on UPS’s emissions-reductions commitments
• Here’s what to know heading into week two of negotiations
• Dispatch from virtual reality: How games are informing decision makers on climate adaptation
• What to make of USAID’s new adaptation and resilience plan
• The United States is finally stepping up—but it there are also other climate leaders to watch
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

Water Day comes to COP27

By Lama El Hatow

Monday was Water Day at COP27; it was a reminder that putting water in the center of the climate debate is imperative, necessary for crucial action, and long overdue.

Water access is still a challenge for many local communities. While the world leaders are striving to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 6 (clean water and sanitation for all), they are in many ways moving backwards.

For example, in many parts of the world, the privatization of water has shifted communities away from bodies of fresh water hat sustain their livelihoods. Water is a public good, and commodifying water takes away very basic human rights. Private companies have bought the rights to use bodies of water for profits, while poor and marginalized communities struggle to pay the higher prices on water. In many cases, private companies are not only limiting access to this public good but also polluting it further with industrial processes. 

Several groups at COP27 have discussed how vital it is to preserve water as a public good. With the impacts of climate change, the world is seeing water scarcity in some regions (such as the Middle East and North Africa), and floods and extreme rainfall in others. The COP27 president and the World Meteorological Organization launched the Action for Water Adaptation and Resilience initiative to focus on the climate and water nexus and on water adaptation.

Climate adaptation and covering loss and damage will require more climate financing, and much of that money needs to go toward water—specifically, toward efforts supporting water security for vulnerable communities. During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the New Orleans area lacked sufficient access to clean water for days. Similarly, the floods in Pakistan left millions without access to clean water as some of the infrastructure needed to provide it was severely destroyed. Drought-stricken countries are banding together to share their technologies and expertise to manage water scarcity. For example, a group of countries led by Spain and Senegal launched the International Drought Resilience Alliance  at COP27 to “shift drought management from emergency response to resilience against climate change impacts.” Spain is committing five million euros to start it off.

As countries continue to partner with one another on water action, it will be crucial to ensure that there is appropriate focus on action for adaptation and resilience.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

Delivering on UPS’s emissions-reductions commitments

Laura Lane, executive vice president and chief corporate affairs and sustainability officer of the United Parcel Service (UPS), sat down with Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz at COP27 to talk about UPS’s emissions-reductions goals.

Lane hopes that COP27 ultimately helps foster a “greater sense of collaboration between government, the private sector, and the NGO community. If they all come together, they “can solve a lot of the challenges that lie ahead for companies like [UPS],” that, Lane explained, are part of “one of the… hardest to abate industry sectors.”

She pointed out that while UPS has a goal to be carbon neutral by 2050, global tensions and supply chain shortages are making it difficult to hit key checkpoints. For example, the global shortage of microchips is making it more difficult to electrify their ground fleet.

“And so we are trying to find other ways to be able to get the emissions out of our… operations,” Lane explained. She said that UPS is searching for alternative fuels for its ground fleet and is working with other companies to incentivize the production of sustainable aviation fuel to power its operations in the air.

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Here’s what to know heading into week two of negotiations

By the Global Energy Center

As COP27 reaches its midway point, technical discussions are set to gain speed in week two. The twin realities of an energy security crisis and the sweeping impacts of climate change on the developing world remain at the forefront of discussions throughout Sharm el Sheikh. The multi-stakeholder drive to surmount both challenges is drawing stronger linkages between climate action and energy security, opening new avenues for collaboration between governments, civil society, and industry.

After week one, a few things are clear:

US climate leadership is achieving legitimacy through action. Midterm elections at the start of COP27 served only to further energize a US delegation already operating with confidence following passage of the Inflation Reduction Act. President Biden, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, the Director of the National Economic Council Brian Deese, and many others arrived in Egypt emphasizing an optimistic outlook for the energy transition in the United States, while underscoring the need to unlock “trillions” in private financing to replicate US momentum in the developing world. The steadfast presence of US congressional delegations from both sides of the aisle further reinforced the United States’ commitment to addressing the climate crisis.

Next, the narrative at COP27 is no longer Western-led. The introduction of “loss and damage” to the COP agenda illustrates how the global south has successfully used the conversation in Europe and the West around energy security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to underscore the need for access to sustainable energy resources that enable economic growth.

And finally, the hard conversations which have often been missed or dodged at prior COPs are now front-and-center.

Overall, the twin realities of a global energy security crisis and a developing world at the forefront of a majority of the worst impacts of climate change have created an opportunity to better integrate the policy spheres of climate action and energy security.

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EnergySource

Nov 13, 2022

COP27 readout: Week 1 comes to a close

By Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center react to the first week of COP27 proceedings.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Dispatch from virtual reality: How games are informing decision makers on climate adaptation

What to make of USAID’s new adaptation and resilience plan

Experts praise the United States for finally stepping up—but there are also other climate leaders to watch

Global Energy Center Deputy Director Reed Blakemore sat down with the World Resources Institute’s Dan Lashof to talk about the countries taking the lead on climate action.

Lashof explained that while this is the twenty-seventh COP, “it’s COP1 for the United States being able to show up with a transformative climate law in place domestically.” He thinks “that gives President Biden much more credibility,” but he added that the world will be watching whether Congress will be able to sustain the momentum on climate action.

Lashof explained that, while people still pay a lot of attention to how politics in the United States impact the country’s climate leadership, the world is “no longer unipolar.”

“People are also looking to the EU and to China,” he said. So I think those three major players are pushing the wall forward, sometimes together, sometimes not so much. But as long as they’re moving and accelerating action, then we’re seeing progress.”

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Public-private partnerships

• COP’s focuses on implementation, emerging economies, and public-private partnerships raise hopes
• At the “corporate COP,” a new focus on private-sector solutions
• Partnerships to benefit the planet—and the private sector
• Gaming and social tech can reorient the world toward a climate-resilient future
• Quick take: The attendance at COPs has transformed. Here’s what that means for the energy transition.
• Improving clean-energy access for everyone
• The energy crisis shows the need to accelerate the energy transition
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

COP’s focuses on implementation, emerging economies, and public-private partnerships raise hopes

By Roger Martella

In this pivotal moment for global action on climate change, I’m in the full optimist camp regarding COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh—not only for Egypt, but for the precedent Egypt is setting for the future.

Two main reasons drive this enthusiasm. First, COP27 is focused on implementation—putting climate promises into action. Second, the event is committed to highlighting the needs and challenges of emerging economies. This will place a global spotlight on the unique opportunities for countries where most of the 750 million people without reliable access to electricity live.

Another reason to be optimistic about COP27 is the rapidly growing role of public-private partnerships between policymakers and corporate stakeholders. The growing role of companies to be part of the solution and partner with governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other companies in industrialized and emerging markets is leading to unprecedented collaborations, some already having an impact.

The pursuit of public-private partnerships is perhaps the top undercurrent at COP27, as many collaborators and odd bedfellows alike come together for bold pronouncements of projects and initiatives together. These examples demonstrate how emerging economies, through public-private partnerships and tangible proof points, are addressing the energy transition by blending different approaches, technologies, and perspectives. Additionally, they illustrate how emerging economies are positioning strategically to build climate resilient infrastructure that grows access to energy at the same time. The lessons learned from each will help inform the many ongoing discussions and negotiations in Sharm el Sheikh.

Roger Martella is the chief sustainability officer of GE. GE is a presenting partner of GEC at COP27: Ambitions for All.

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EnergySource

Nov 11, 2022

Partner perspectives: In emerging markets, partnerships and proof points are key to driving the energy transition

By Roger Martella

COP27 is an opportunity for emerging economies to lead the energy transition. Public-private partnerships can help drive progress towards their goals.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

At the “corporate COP,” a new focus on private-sector solutions

By Lama El Hatow

The private sector has an immense presence at COP27 in all the various zones within Sharm El Sheikh, earning this conference the label of the “corporate COP.” The business role comes in several forms.

First, there is a growing recognition that the private sector will have to close the gap in the unfulfilled one hundred billion dollar per year climate finance promise made by developed countries. We already know that one hundred billion is insufficient, with reports now claiming that two trillion dollars per year is what’s needed for the Global South. UN Climate Change High-Level Champion for Egypt Mahmoud Mohieldin and US climate envoy John Kerry have argued that various modes of blended finance (using development funds to leverage private capital), as well as regulations on the private sector, are the only way to meet the one hundred billion dollar pledge and move toward the two trillion dollar goal. Kerry even announced that the US Energy Transition Accelerator would be carried out in partnership with Bezos’ Earth Fund and the Rockefeller Fund, solidifying the role of the private sector in implementation.

Second, fossil-fuel and high-polluting companies are frightened and lobbying quite strongly. During decarbonization day today, their viewpoints were expressed in various sessions discussing how they are shifting their practices to renewable energy and phasing out fossil fuels. However, they are concerned, as Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Mottley and other island state leaders opened COP27 by stating that fossil fuel companies should pay a global carbon tax on profits to fund loss and damage for the Global South. The massive third quarter profits recently reported by Saudi Aramco ($42.4 billion), Exxon ($20 billion), and Chevron ($11.2 billion) alone show why this could be an attractive option for policymakers seeking loss and damage funds.

Third, businesses along with banks are under new pressure from investors to meet environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals, and they are trying to catch up and understand what needs to be done. The Net Zero Banking Alliance, which is one of the four pillars of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero that emerged at the last COP, has been convening to see how to enable as well as enforce banks to transition to net zero. CEOs of top commercial and investment banks including Blackrock, Citibank, and Standard Chartered are skipping the summit as they focus more on issues such as the fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine, energy crises, rising inflation, and the threat of recession. It is no secret that many large-scale corporations produce more greenhouse gas emissions than many countries. The argument is that these companies should be liable for compensation, not only to their consumers and board of directors, but also to the Global South and the world’s most vulnerable people.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

Partnerships to benefit the planet—and the private sector

Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz hosted Dorothy McAuliffe, the US State Department’s special representative for global partnerships, to talk about how governments can work with the private sector to develop climate solutions.

“Governments can’t tackle this challenge alone,” McAuliffe explained. “We have to be in this all together.”

While there are major benefits for the planet to be reaped from this partnership, McAuliffe explained that there are benefits for the private sector too: “There are jobs and opportunities that come along with this clean energy transformation… and finding these solutions.”

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Gaming and social tech can reorient the world toward a climate-resilient future

By increasing awareness of climate adaptation measures, gaming and social technologies are creating impact on the ground in many countries.

On Friday, the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center hosted an event at the COP27 Resilience Hub that brought together gaming and technology experts to talk about innovative solutions to build resilient communities.

For example, games like Garden Story help users acquire the knowledge and skills they need to take climate action in their communities. Similarly, Meta aims to help users understand the types of climate-adaptation tools that are available to prevent future damage and loss.

See top moments from the event

Quick take: The attendance at COPs has transformed. Here’s what that means for the energy transition.

Improving clean-energy access for everyone

As the energy transition gets underway, experts are searching for ways to bring clean energies to everyone—and particularly low-income and developing countries.

Doing so will require focuses like improving financing, making the energy supply chain more efficient, and turning toward cooling solutions, said panelists at an Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center event at the Resilience Hub.

“We need to make sure that access to energy is resilient,” said Lavinia Bauerochse, global head of ESG at Deutsche Bank. “Climate change-induced weather extremes like floods and heat must be factored in. Without a resilient infrastructure, our efforts will be short lived.”

See top moments from the event

The energy crisis shows the need to accelerate the energy transition

Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz sat down with HIF Global’s Meg Gentle to talk about decarbonization ambitions at COP27.

“There are so many incredible ideas here in Egypt this year, and we can show that eFuels, this synthetic fuel, this is happening now,” Gentle explained. HIF Global produces eFuels in countries like Chile and Australia.

EFuels, which are fuels created by renewable energies and carbon capturing from the air, have potential now, added Gentle. “These are fuels that can be used immediately; this is a solution for today.”

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The innovative solutions at play

• Gaming and virtual reality set out to change how decision makers tackle climate change
• Investments in climate technologies must begin with software
• Nancy Pelosi and Kathy Castor at COP27: The US won’t abandon its climate leadership, regardless of who controls Congress
• Energy security and the energy transition are “mutually reinforcing,” says US official
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

Gaming and virtual reality set out to change how decisionmakers tackle climate change

By Lama El Hatow

As climate change becomes the world’s reality, groups are using technology to bring it to virtual reality as well.

With the evolution of technologies over the years and the emergence of the gaming industry, there has been an increase in the number of innovative ways through which people can see how climate change impacts the world and, by association, how to deal with it. The COP27 Resilience Hub, run in part by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, has created a VR experience that allows each user to click on various places around the globe to see what would happen in a +2 degree Celsius or +4 degree Celsius world. Based on the Paris Agreement and the science, we need to remain underneath 1.5 degree Celsius of warming to avoid catastrophic climate impacts. In this VR experience, one can see that the city of Miami, for instance, would be completely submerged underwater from flooding. Experiencing this submersion is quite difficult to process.

Additionally in this experience, the user has the option to select from various adaptation measures that can help the city of Miami avoid these catastrophic changes. For instance, after selecting “reforestation,” a nature-based solution, the user can see how Miami is able to withstand floodwaters. Alternatively, users can choose measures that may not be as effective, such as breakwaters in the case of Miami; from that, users can understand that decisions on adaptation must be designed for the particular contexts of each city. This technology allows policymakers to decide what kind of Miami they’d like to plan for in the future based on climate impacts.

Similarly, the video game “Eco” allows users to explore the “tragedy of the commons”—a situation in which users competing over environmental resources act in their own interest and ultimately deplete the resources entirely. Other games show how people’s physical conditions change in response to increased temperatures and heatwaves in certain settings—for example in poorly serviced areas versus in areas with resilient infrastructure. This game can be useful to help users understand how workers who are exposed to the outdoors for long periods of time are impacted by a world that is continuously heating.

The gaming industry and VR have opened up ways to envision the world in the future and how best to live in it. Ultimately, this technology and innovation is important in that it can help decisionmakers decide which adaptation measures to employ.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

Investments in climate technologies must begin with software

By Scott Reese

The annual United Nations Conference of Parties is underway in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, with delegates from around the world gathering to address one of the most urgent of global imperatives: climate change and the energy transition. Central to the conversation is tackling carbon emissions, the leading contributor to planet-wide warming.

During last year’s conference, leaders reinforced the sense of urgency to take action. Since then, important moves have been made to drive progress. Notably, the United States, currently the world’s second-largest carbon emitter, took its biggest step yet in combating climate change with a $369 billion investment via the Inflation Reduction Act that will reduce US carbon emissions to an estimated 40 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. This is in addition to steps to fund a modernized grid and breakthrough technologies in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. These two landmark climate change laws not only aim to reduce climate emissions, but they also advance US investments in both energy security and grid resiliency as well as critical breakthrough technologies.

Yet a problem so daunting can leave us all wondering, how does the world move faster?

While it’s critical to invest in long-term, high-impact levers like renewable energy, hydrogen, and carbon capture and sequestration technologies, software is an investment that can pay dividends today and accelerate our ability to embrace electrification and decarbonization tactics. 

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EnergySource

Nov 10, 2022

Partner perspectives: The next unlock: Why software is key to the energy transition

By Scott Reese

The energy transition requires scale, but it also requires speed. Through the marriage of human ingenuity with data and computing power, software integration can enable the acceleration of electrification and decarbonization, moving the world closer to loftier climate ambitions.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

Nancy Pelosi and Kathy Castor at COP27: The US won’t abandon its climate leadership, regardless of who controls Congress

By Katherine Walla

The United States is officially back “in the game,” leading the fight against climate change, said US Representative Kathy Castor, chair of the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis. “And we’re not leaving the playing field ever again.”

Castor and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi spoke on Thursday about how the United States is addressing the climate crisis at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center at the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP27) in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt.

While the United States—which withdrew from the Paris Climate Accords in 2019 but rejoined the agreement in 2021—has seen its climate leadership questioned, Castor said the country now has the tools to meet its emissions reduction goals. Those tools, she explained, include the bipartisan infrastructure law and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the latter of which she deemed the “most important climate bill” in US history.

At COP27, Pelosi hopes that US and global leaders will “find common ground” to address climate change, especially because of how pervasive the effects will be on health, economies, and even security globally. “The competition for habitat and resources can cause conflict,” Pelosi noted. “We have to avoid that.”

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COP

Nov 10, 2022

Nancy Pelosi and Kathy Castor at COP27: The US won’t abandon its climate leadership, regardless of who controls Congress

By Katherine Walla

The US House speaker and the chair of the climate committee appeared at an Atlantic Council Front Page event in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Energy security and the energy transition are “mutually reinforcing,” says US official

On Thursday, Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz sat down with US Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt to talk about global energy security.

“Energy is at the white hot center of international affairs in a way that it has not been in a long time,” Pyatt said. But despite countries scrambling for cheaper and more destructive energy sources like coal amid global gas shortages, Pyatt argued that energy security and the energy transition “are not in conflict with each other; in fact, they’re mutually reinforcing.”

“We need to continue to work… to build an energy system internationally which helps our allies and partners to advance their economies [and] to deliver results for their citizens,” he said. “But we also need to keep working on the energy transition.”

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Protecting the planet—and people

• For COP outcomes that benefit the groups most vulnerable to climate change, representation must improve
• Reasons to be optimistic about the “implementation COP”
• The health sector’s role in climate change and ambitions
• The newest advocate of heat resilience: The world’s first global ambassador for heat action
  Cash for cooling
• How cities are taking the lead on heat action
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

For COP outcomes that benefit the groups most vulnerable to climate change, representation must improve

By Lama El Hatow

Looking around to see who is present at COP27, there’s a lot of diversity and an array of ethnicities, cultures, and backgrounds across groups that aim to represent their communities and share their stories about how climate change impacts them. But not everyone has the privilege to be able to attend this COP and convene in an effort to inform policymakers of the realities on the ground. In fact, the most vulnerable and impacted communities around the world are often the ones that face the most hurdles in attending these conferences. Hence, these communities’ stories oftentimes never make it to the ears of the decision makers in the negotiating rooms deciding the world’s fate.

It thus becomes the international community’s responsibility to inform those decision makers for the sake of those not present at COP27. Within Egypt, minority groups such as the Nubian communities in Aswan and the Bedouins of Sinai will not be present at this COP. In November 2021, a severe storm hit the city of Aswan, destroying homes, flooding small islands, and decimating the already limited agriculture—and the community there is still healing from this disaster today. They report that such a storm has not hit Aswan in the last forty years. As these communities rely on the Nile River for their daily livelihood, the impacts of climate change, including lower water levels in rivers, are acute and detrimental for them. There are other examples of detrimental impact worldwide, most recently with floods in Pakistan destroying over a million homes and killing over a thousand people.

As leaders discuss the financial mechanisms for loss and damage payments in the negotiating rooms, it is important to know how and where these losses and damages are taking place across the globe. The Global Stocktake launched at COP26 requires countries to report on local- and community-level participation in nationally determined contributions, thus making the participation more feasible but still far from what is needed. That is why representation matters; and having local communities, tribes, indigenous peoples, and minority groups present at such a convening as COP is not only necessary but vital so that any outcomes of negotiations are holistic and take into consideration the needs of those most vulnerable to climate change. To ensure the inclusion of these groups, they must be allowed access to funding as well as partnerships with local and international civil-society organizations.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

Reasons to be optimistic about the “implementation COP”

COP27 has, to date, been scarce on tangible results, with the majority of action occurring outside of the negotiating room as a diverse coalition of industry and nongovernmental organizations descends on Sharm el Sheikh.

But there are clear signs emerging that should offer optimism as technical groups dominate the balance of the next two weeks:

• Finance remains center stage. Financing both energy transition​s and climate adaptation has, at least thus far, remained front-of-mind for policy leaders over the past two days. Commitments from a handful of European countries seeking to accelerate international climate adaptation finance are one such bright spot, despite the relative lack of optimism for progress leading up to the COP this year. Yet this box is still largely unchecked.
• Private sector participation. COP’s transition from a largely technocratic convening to an increasingly multifaceted climate convention filled with corporations and civil society continues. Observers should be encouraged that the dialogue is moving past simple greenwashing, in favor of efforts to establish a widespread coalition of parties engaged in the climate conversation.
• Implementation is in limbo. Though COP is meant to focus on acting on the pledges laid out in COP26 and the Bonn intersessional, homing in on details that expose the current tension between energy security and climate ambitions is proving to be more difficult than gaining commitments from governments for these pledges in the first place.

Significant work remains to be done in the coming days.

Read more

EnergySource

Nov 9, 2022

COP27 readout: Days 1 and 2

By Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center experts are on the ground at COP27. Here’s what they observed over the first two days.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

The health sector’s role in climate change and ambitions

Global Energy Center Deputy Director Reed Blakemore sat down with John Balbus, acting director of the Office of Climate Change and Heath Equity at the US Department of Health and Human Services to talk about health equity and decarbonizing the health sector.

“Health is often mentioned as a reason to be acting on climate change, but the health community isn’t present,” Balbus explained. But over the last year, he added, “the health sector has mobilized in a way that it has not over the last twenty-six COPs.”

“So what we’re hoping is that by mobilizing the health sector,” Balbus said, the sector can provide health information to national leaders that convinces them to increase the urgency to tackle climate change.

According to Balbus, the health sector is responsible for about 5 percent of global carbon emissions, but no countries focus on the decarbonization of the health sector. He said they should include the health sector in both reducing emissions and adapting to climate change.

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The newest advocate of heat resilience: The world’s first global ambassador for heat action

On Wednesday, the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center unveiled a new leader in climate adaptation. At COP27, Felipe Calderón, former president of Mexico, took the reins as the first-ever global ambassador for heat action with a mandate to raise the issue of extreme heat among the world’s leaders to protect people, jobs, and the economy.

Watch the unveiling

Cash for cooling

As the temperature goes up, it’ll be vital to protect people, communities, and local economies from extreme heat and its effects.

The Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center and partners including the Rockefeller Foundation, JP Morgan Chase & Co, ClimateWorks, Marsh McLennan, and IFC, gathered together at COP27 to launch the Cool Capital Stack, the first investment portfolio dedicated to supporting cooling solutions for the world’s most vulnerable.

Watch top moments from the launch

How cities are taking the lead on heat action

On Wednesday, Luis Donaldo Colosio Riojas, mayor of Monterrey, Mexico, recounted watching his city’s temperature rise ten degrees over the last thirty years. “We are ill-prepared for this silent killer and people are facing the consequences,” he said.

The mayor gave his thoughts at an Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center event focused on what cities are doing to take the lead on heat action. Earlier this year, the city of Monterrey appointed a chief heat officer committed to reducing the threat of extreme urban heat for vulnerable people.

Global Chief Heat Officer Eleni Myrivili explained that the way cities are built makes them “death traps” of heat for people. It is important to listen to cities, she added, as they know “where the problem is and what they really need to do to respond to it.”

Watch top moments from the event

Takeaways as negotiations get underway

• Dispatch from the World Leaders Summit: The most fundamental plan for adaptation in a decade
• Some MENA countries are under-represented at COP27. Here’s what that means for the negotiations.
• Public capital is key to funding solutions to the “energy trilemma”
• Ensuring both a just energy transition and access to affordable energy
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

Dispatch from the World Leaders Summit: The most fundamental plan for adaptation in a decade

Some MENA countries are under-represented at COP27. Here’s what that means for the negotiations.

By Lama El Hatow

The delegates at COP27 face the challenging and daunting dilemma of tackling the world’s climate crisis in the midst of a series of global political and economic crises.

The world is still feeling the brunt of the COVID-19 pandemic with supply chain stalls from China and insufficient resources elsewhere. Add to that Russia’s war in Ukraine has pulled a plug on global gas flows—raising Europe’s worries about staying warm this winter—and has also generated concern about wheat-supply shortages and food insecurity globally.

The compounded effect of all of these issues has led to broadening global inflation. So not only are the least developed countries becoming more vulnerable to the worsening global economic outlook, but even some of the wealthier countries have difficulties staying afloat. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), several countries face their own economic and political turmoil with Syria still at war, Sudan reeling from political instability after a coup last year, and Lebanon facing the worst economic crisis in its history with power outages and bank closures that put the Lebanese people in unforeseen circumstances.

Without ignoring political and economic turbulences like these, how will the delegations at COP27 deal with global crises while also asking the world to commit to more ambitious pledges and enforce the execution of them? The limited representation of many delegations from MENA countries at COP, including some of the most water-scarce countries in the region, raises concerns about the outcomes of the negotiations. Since the conflict-affected MENA countries are very consumed with their local economic and political challenges, the capabilities of these countries to address the climate crisis at COP27 are certainly going to be limited.

While some countries are being represented by delegations made up of several dozens of negotiators and experts, conflict-afflicted countries from the MENA region only have a few delegates to cover an agenda with so many key topics. They’ll likely, therefore, have less negotiating power to tackle and influence the outcomes of the more controversial topics on the agenda, including climate financing and loss and damage.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

Public capital is key to funding solutions to the “energy trilemma”

By Susan Flanagan

It is abundantly clear that achieving net-zero carbon emissions by mid-century is necessary to avoid the worst climate outcomes. However, the path to decarbonizing the energy sector is not “one-size-fits-all” between developed and developing markets. Given the historical tensions between developed economies, which modernized with fossil fuels, and developing economies, now being asked to forgo this route, it is evident that sustainable, long-term global cooperation will require addressing the ”energy trilemma”—the need for the people to have access to sustainable, reliable, and affordable energy.

Sustainability is more urgent for countries hardest hit by climate change and often exposed to greater environmental risks. Reliability remains an elusive goal in many countries still working to bring basic electricity to their citizens in a secure and dependable way. Many of these developing economies also face roadblocks to electricity affordability due to weak government finances and credit, and the corresponding higher cost of capital for infrastructure development.

To drive global decarbonization and increase electrification in developing countries, policymakers and financial institutions must partner with project sponsors to tailor capital solutions that best fit each region and country.

Susan Flanagan is the president and chief executive officer of GE Energy Financial Services. GE is a supporter of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Read more

EnergySource

Nov 8, 2022

Partner perspectives: With COP27 underway, there’s no time to waste—public capital is a key conduit to a just energy transition

By Susan Flanagan

The sheer scale of needed investments to enact the energy transition will require an unprecedented mobilization of capital. Given its unique capabilities, public capital must play a significant part in this effort.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

Ensuring both a just energy transition and access to affordable energy

Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz sat down with General Electric’s Roger Martella to talk about ensuring a just energy transition and decarbonization while ensuring access to reliable, affordable, and sustainable power for everyone.

“We want to help countries, particularly in emerging economies achieve these goals by focusing on bespoke solutions for each country. There’s no one-size-fits-all approach here,” Martella said. He explained that while solutions may be different in each country, they’ll all need to have the “same tools in the toolbox”: a combination of renewable energy, gas, and grid.

General Electric is a presenting partner for the Global Energy Center’s Ambitions for All project, which you can read about here.

Analysis as leaders assembled

• What’s happening beyond official negotiations?
• The private sector holds a lot of the cards at COP27
• Dispatch from the Singapore Pavilion: How to build cities resilient to heat
• Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

What’s happening beyond official negotiations?

The private sector holds a lot of the cards at COP27

By Lama El Hatow

As COP27 gets underway, various platforms of engagement are taking place.

In the blue zone, countries’ official delegations are coming together to meet and negotiate on the agenda items put forth and agreed upon with the support of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Glasgow, the COP26 host. These agenda items include increasing ambition on pledges for greenhouse gas emission reductions by all countries to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, making progress on climate adaptation and ways to propel it forward, boosting climate finance and pushing developed countries to meet their financing commitments of $100 billion per year, and discussing a mechanism for loss and damage payments. The delegations agreed on Saturday to include the loss and damage fund as part of the agenda; it’s considered a huge win for the Global South that is most vulnerable to and at risk from climate change impacts.

Meanwhile, the green zone is designated for civil-society pavilions, where various ministries from Egypt elsewhere can showcase their work; it is also a culture and arts hub for participants to network and have side events outside the negotiation rooms.

Additionally, there is a third zone this year: The Climate Action Innovation Zone, which has been set up as a private-sector hub for companies and corporations from around the world to showcase their work through exhibitions, side events, and networking sessions. Many of the region’s largest players including Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power and Neom, the United Arab Emirates’ IRENA, and Egypt’s TAQA Arabia are all present on the sidelines of COP27 to discuss technology and innovation that sets the stage for a smoother green transition. Adjacent to the climate innovation zone is the Saudi Green Initiative, which also has its own designated area to showcase its work.

While the world focuses on the blue zone with government pledges and commitments, it appears the private sector holds a lot of the cards in this convening. As UN Climate Change High-Level Champion for COP27, Mahmoud Mohieldin reiterated that nonstate actors need to lead the way with regard to climate finance. It appears the role of the private sector and the deals happening on the outskirts of the COP may help set the stage for advancement in climate technology, innovation, and even financing. 

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

Dispatch from the Singapore Pavilion: How to build cities resilient to heat

Kurt Shickman, director of Extreme Heat Initiatives at our Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, shared his readout from an event with the Mayor of Monterrey, Mexico, Luis Donaldo Colosio and Athens Chief Heat Officer Eleni Myrivili about the best solutions for managing extreme heat in cities.

Watch more

Gearing up for COP27

• How a lack of energy security will impact the speed and impact of the energy transition
• The new partnership financing a just energy transition in emerging economies
• The West must rethink its development strategy to help electrify the African continent
• What leaders at COP27 should take away from the World Energy Outlook
• How Europe can reclaim international climate leadership at COP27
• Will the West’s competition with China get in the way of a clean-energy future?
• Cairo’s next steps forward on climate adaptation and human rights at COP27
• What Egypt’s COP presidency means for how this conference may play out

How a lack of energy security will impact the speed and impact of the energy transition

As today’s energy crisis intensifies, Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz points out that a lack of energy security will slow the energy transition and spell trouble for ensuring affordable energy is accessible for all. “The world is short energy,” he writes, “now and over the next decade.” That calls for investment across the board—in zero-carbon energy sources and also oil and gas, he argues.

Read the thread

The new partnership financing a just energy transition in emerging economies

By Christopher Cassidy, Rainer Quitzow, and Maia Sparkman

As the global community convenes for COP27, Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) are poised to play an expanded role in financing the energy transitions of emerging economies. Conceived as multi-donor agreements to accelerate the phase-out of coal-fired power plants, JETPs first gained attention at COP26 with the announcement of the Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa, an $8.5-billion venture between the governments of South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union. Since then, several other countries have expressed interest in their own JETPs, presenting an opportunity to drastically reduce global coal emissions. Nonetheless, while JETPs may represent an avenue for increased climate engagement with high-emitting emerging economies, they also face several key challenges moving forward.

Despite those challenges, JETPs bear the potential to represent a turning point in the climate finance agenda. By combining funding from several major Group of Seven (G7) donor countries, they not only offer substantial financial support to partner countries, but they also send an important political signal. To be sure, the sums under discussion only represent a fraction of the capital needed to reach the needed scale of investment to place these countries on a pathway that is compatible with the 1.5 degree Celsius target. Nevertheless, the hope is that they can lend additional momentum to ongoing reform efforts. 

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EnergySource

Nov 4, 2022

Just Energy Transition Partnerships: Will COP27 deliver for emerging economies?

By Christopher Cassidy, Rainer Quitzow, and Maia Sparkman

The JETP model is poised to deliver results in South Africa. Now, at COP27 and beyond, the true test will be translating the model to other country contexts.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

The West must rethink its development strategy to help electrify the African continent

By William Tobin and Maia Sparkman

Electricity access in Africa is in a dire state, and progress is being reversed. Outside of North Africa, around half of the population is electrified, and the electrification rate has decreased by 4 percent since 2019. 

This problem is self-perpetuating. When energy infrastructure is weak, there is less signal to invest as individual projects are less viable and are deemed riskier, particularly by the private sector, which has historically provided around 10 percent of infrastructure funding across the continent. Infrastructure, in this sense, should be expanded beyond the state of electricity grids or gas pipelines to include public services such as trained utility workers, water resources, public safety and security forces, and much more.

It is becoming clearer that the paradigm of “aid,” which has underpinned Western countries’ development strategies in the African continent, is increasingly insufficient. Providing aid alone to African nations will not provide the tools and enablers of self-sustaining, endogenous growth. For that, the continent needs investment, not just aid. 

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EnergySource

Nov 4, 2022

To meet energy security and climate goals, Africa needs investment in infrastructure

By William Tobin, Maia Sparkman

To this point, Western engagement in Africa has primarily taken the form of aid. For the continent to achieve widespread electrification and form the foundation for robust economic growth, that engagement will need to morph into investment and partnership.

Africa Energy & Environment

What leaders at COP27 should take away from the World Energy Outlook

By Emily Burlinghaus

The International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook (WEO), released last week, is historic in its first-ever presentation of a scenario where fossil fuels peak or plateau based on prevailing policy settings. But despite the cause to celebrate, the global transition to net-zero carbon emissions remains precarious. Developing countries are most vulnerable to the effects of both climate change and capital and resource restrictions. Meanwhile, global conflict and supply chain disruptions threaten national efforts to ensure food security, meet energy demand, and deploy resilience and adaptation measures. The WEO serves as a roadmap for where and how countries can allocate money at COP27 to maximize impact and ensure that no country is left behind.

EnergySource

Nov 3, 2022

The IEA World Energy Outlook 2022 highlights climate finance needs ahead of COP27

By Emily Burlinghaus

The new IEA World Energy Outlook 2022 should be used as a roadmap at COP27 for the allocation of climate-oriented resources. Doing so would better enable developing nations to ride the wave of interest in clean technologies amid the global energy crisis and share in the benefits of the transition.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

How Europe can reclaim international climate leadership at COP27

By Michał Kurtyka and Paddy Ryan

COP27 will be uncomfortable for Europe. The continent’s energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended the lofty objectives set at COP26. In Glasgow, the European Investment Bank and over a dozen European states pledged to cease financing fossil fuel projects abroad. Now, Europe is scouring the globe for new gas supply, pricing out poorer nations while maintaining opposition towards their development of reserves for domestic use. Europeans stand accused of climate hypocrisy, charges likely to be echoed at a COP notable for taking place in Africa.

Europe needs gas, and will for some time. The continent must reconcile short-term efforts to source new imports with long-term climate ambitions. Through more constructive gas diplomacy with the developing world and by accelerating domestic decarbonization, Europe can begin to repair its damaged climate credibility in Sharm el Sheikh. Doing so, Europe can reclaim international climate leadership by advancing low-carbon, energy-secure growth with partners in Africa and the developing world.

EnergySource

Nov 1, 2022

How Europe can salvage its climate credibility at COP27

By Michał Kurtyka and Paddy Ryan

Europe’s recent energy policies have begotten accusations of climate hypocrisy, as the continent blocks access to financing for gas projects in developing countries yet scours those countries for gas supplies for its own use. At COP27, Europe can—and should—responsibly reconcile those contradictions.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Will the West’s competition with China get in the way of a clean-energy future?

By Joseph Webster and William Tobin

China uneasily straddles both sides of the energy transition. On the one hand, China is indisputably a world leader in numerous clean energy technologies, including electric vehicles, renewable generation, and supply chains. On the other hand, it is also the world’s largest carbon emitter and coal producer, and is constructing over half of the world’s new coal-powered electricity plants. With Western-China tensions rising and Beijing increasingly focused on energy security, there is a shrinking scope for climate cooperation. Perversely, however, US-China political competition could deliver climate benefits, as both sides will face pressure to provide clean energy leadership at COP27 and beyond.

At COP27, Western leaders will need to grapple with the emerging reality that two competing climate camps may be forming, one led by the West and another by China.

Not only will this dynamic unfold as a competition between economies in China and the West, but as a paradigm of global engagement and investment on climate mitigation and adaptation, particularly with respect to engagement with the developing world. For instance, in Africa, China’s trade volumes exceeded the United States’ by a factor of four. Moreover, China has not shied away from financing fossil fuel projects that rank high on the priority list of less developed countries with limited energy access. This has been welcomed by many African nations, as 43 percent of all people on the continent do not have access to modern energy services.

As the developing and developed world seek to resolve key issues on the agenda at COP27 such as loss and damages, closing the climate finance gap, and financing for natural gas projects in Africa, Western leaders will need to keep in mind that competition with China is likely to become a more prominent feature of climate negotiations.  

Read more

EnergySource

Nov 1, 2022

China’s energy security realities and COP27 ambitions

By Joseph Webster, William Tobin

China will enter COP27 firmly playing both sides of the energy transition. The country is a global leader in clean technologies, but it is also pouring money into new coal plants and production. Beijing may have to choose between its climate aspirations and its coal realities to compete successfully with the West.

China Energy & Environment

Cairo’s next steps forward on climate adaptation and human rights at COP27

By Shahira Amin

Skeptics are questioning Egypt’s leadership of COP27, citing human rights concerns and unideal environmental policies. Others are doubtful about the choice of Sharm el Sheikh as the host city. They argue that the holiday resort may not be the most suitable venue for a global conference of this magnitude and scale, given the logistical, organizational, and managerial challenges of hosting such a gathering. 

Nevertheless, the opportunity to host COP27 has incentivized Cairo to take steps forward in regard to climate adaptation and human rights, even if a lot more needs to be done to show that authorities are serious about political and environmental reforms. Meanwhile, continued financial and moral support from the United States and other development partners—and further scrutiny of human rights violations committed—would ensure there’s no backtracking on the country’s progress in the past year. 

Cairo needs to keep the momentum going and show that it is actually committed to continuing the progress made so far. To do this, it needs to speed up its green transition, taking steady and concrete steps to lower its emissions and shift towards renewables. Moreover, Cairo needs to free all political detainees, many of whom are imprisoned for nothing more than exercising their right to free speech and free expression. By doing so, it can expect to reap the rewards of its serious efforts: greater support from the international community and prosperity and stability for Egypt and all Egyptians.

Read more

MENASource

Oct 13, 2022

Egypt has made some progress on human rights and the environment in preparation for COP27. But there’s still more to be done.

By Shahira Amin

Skeptics are questioning Egypt’s leadership of the climate talks, citing human rights concerns and unideal environmental policies.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

What Egypt’s COP presidency means for how this conference may play out

By Lama El Hatow

Egypt has a huge role to play during its presidency of COP27, as all eyes will be geared towards how the country can lead by example. To put things in perspective, with 1.3 percent of the world’s population, Egypt accounts for only 0.6 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and ranks twenty-eighth on the global list of polluters. This number appears to be relatively small from a global perspective. Regionally, however, Egypt contributes 31 percent of the overall GHG emissions from North Africa and 13 percent of the overall GHG emissions from the entire African continent. Thus, Egypt has a great responsibility to establish a pathway towards a green energy transition.

This year, Egypt’s presidency for COP27 is very important as a middle-income, African, and Middle Eastern country hosting this event. Egypt may, therefore, be able to influence the agenda items and bring more focus to Africa’s increasing needs for adaptation and mitigation financing.

There are four main items at the top of the agenda: climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage, and increased ambition. Egypt has a significant role to play in all of them.

Read more

MENASource

Sep 22, 2022

Egypt is hosting COP27. What are the expectations?

By Lama El Hatow

As the host country for the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference, Egypt has a huge role to play during its presidency of the event, as all eyes will be geared towards how the country can lead by example.

Energy & Environment Middle East

The post Live updates from COP27 as leaders battle climate change amid global crises appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Kurtyka, Ryan quoted in Clean Energy Wire on the European presence at COP27 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post CBDC Tracker cited by CoinTelegraph on the low adoption rate of Nigeria’s eNaira CBDC. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

However, the EU faces the challenge of establishing a new model of energy security, stable over the longer term and in line with its ambitious climate goals, as detailed in the EU Green Deal and in Fit for 55.

Even before the COVID and Ukraine crises, the idea of forging a new model of energy interdependence between the EU and North Africa was in the works, whereby the latter would be well suited to produce and export renewable energy, including green hydrogen. Vice President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans has consistently been a staunch advocate of such a vision.

For their part, several MENA countries have supported substantial growth over the last few years in the development of renewables, blue and green ammonia, and blue and green hydrogen in particular.

COP27 will likely provide additional impetus for renewed debates and initiatives in this field, with a view to promoting further investments in renewable energy in the MENA region as well as in interconnections with European markets.

Some exports of low-carbon products are already taking place by ship, as in the case of ammonia, a hydrogen-rich molecule that is often used in fertilizer but can also serve as a carbon-free fuel. Another way to transport hydrogen would be through existing gas pipelines, either blended with gas or on its own after conversion and refitting. North Africa and Europe are currently connected through a few gas pipelines, from Algeria and Libya to Italy and Spain.

There are also proposals, among some regional and international investors, on future development of dedicated hydrogen pipelines. According to some visions, even Saudi Arabia could be connected to Europe through this channel.

Another tactic for further strengthening EU-MENA energy cooperation would rely on interconnectors that convey renewable electricity. Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece have been working on such a project for some time, as have Italy and Tunisia.

Such models are not mutually exclusive, as diversification among them would bolster energy security.

There are, however, hurdles on the path toward such a new pattern of interdependence, especially in terms of the structure of expected demand for green hydrogen, the costs of production, and the scale of the investments required.

A recent report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and other agencies highlights that to achieve a Paris-aligned pathway on a global scale, the supply of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen would need to increase from less than 1 million tons per year in 2020 to 140-155 million tons per year in 2030. This implies that production capacity would need to double every year from 2023 to 2030. In parallel, the production cost of renewable hydrogen would need to fall by 40-55 percent over the course of this decade, to almost $1 per kilogram in the most favorable locations.

According to the same source, the scale of investments required globally is equally enormous: “Hydrogen deployment consistent with a 1.5ºC-aligned pathway will require an annual investment of around USD 60-130 billion through to 2030, relative to the less than USD 1 billion invested annually, on average, over the last decade.”

However, the vicious circle of demand creation might be broken, on a regional scale, by the EU itself, as implied most recently by the REPowerEU plan. The proposal includes a production target of 10 million tons of green hydrogen by 2030 within the EU and the import of an additional 10 million tons through three corridors, one of which would run through the Mediterranean.

The scale of investments required globally is huge indeed: some sources estimate $7-8 trillion across the hydrogen value chain will be needed through 2050. This figure, however, would be comparable to investments of $5.7 trillion made in upstream oil and gas in the past decade.

Research and innovation in technology would most likely lead to a reduction in the costs of production, especially for electrolyzers. Several scenarios have been propounded on the possible evolution, throughout the current decade, of electrolyzer cost and of hydrogen transport. Under certain conditions that would lead to a decrease in costs, importing renewable hydrogen from North Africa by 2030 could become an economically attractive option for Europe.

Transport of renewable hydrogen (as complementary to onsite production) is a key factor in its future potential. Much will depend on renewable electricity generation cost differences and on the volume of investments required for developing adequate infrastructure (repurposing of pipelines, compressors, storage capacity, etc.). According to some analyses, for distances up to 3,000 kilometers, compressed hydrogen gas appears to be the cheapest option, particularly in the case of pipelines.

The plans underway throughout the MENA region are encouraging, even in light of continued insistence by some countries in the region to sustain new investments in oil and gas.

In the end, North African countries would have much to gain from a new energy interrelationship with Europe, with the possibility of retaining part of the production for their own markets and of benefiting from job creation, skills development, know-how, and a transition to a low-carbon economy.

The time has come for the governments of the wider Mediterranean, besides the EU institutions, to play a more active role, by developing an appropriate regulatory framework, optimizing public and private resources, and designing a long-term strategy of energy partnership with the aim of achieving broader goals of stability, growth, and transition to carbon neutrality by mid-century.

COP27 should provide the appropriate context for further advancing the development of renewable energy in all its aspects, including research, infrastructure, and transport modalities, as well as production. Climate goals can only be achieved on the basis of concrete plans and investment decisions, which should be be made as early as possible.

Giampaolo Cantini is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

GEC at COP27: Ambitions for All

The Atlantic Council Global Energy Center will be at COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, to work alongside government, industry, civil society, and public stakeholders to devise pragmatic solutions and ideas to achieve net-zero #AmbitionsForAll.

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Giampaolo Cantini

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global Energy Center

Energy Transitions English

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Security

Ukraine recaptures territory as Russia uses Iranian drone near Kyiv

Russian-occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia announces call for military service

Media policy

Russian court fines TikTok for ‘LGBT propaganda,’ Twitch for ‘fakes’

War crimes and human rights abuses

Mass grave uncovered in Lyman as rocket attack hits Zaporizhzha

International response

Russian Telegram channels praise “pro-Russian” coup in Burkina Faso

Ukrainian recaptures territory as Russia uses Iranian drone near Kyiv

The Ukrainian offensive continues to pressure Russian forces in southern and eastern Ukraine. On October 5, Ukrainian forces captured Hrekivka and Makiivka in Luhansk Oblast, approximately twenty kilometers southwest of Svatove. Fighting also continues in Kharkiv Oblast, where the Ukrainian military recently recaptured Hlushkivka. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command confirmed on October 4 that it had liberated Lyubimivka, Khreshchenivka, Zolta Balka, Bilyaivka, Ukrainka, Velyka Oleksandrivka, Mala Oleksandrivka, and Davydiv Brid. It appears that withdrawing Russian forces are destroying their own weapons reserves, likely to prevent Ukrainian forces from capturing equipment as they advance.  

On October 5, the Russian army conducted another strike with an Iranian-made Shahed-136 drone in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast; this is the first strike in the Kyiv area since June. The strike resulted in the destruction of civilian buildings. This indicates that Russian forces are using advanced weaponry to target areas far from the active combat zones. The tactic of striking civilian infrastructure away from the frontlines has previously been used by Russia, presumably to add pressure on the civilian population and the Ukrainian administration. Ukrainian Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov said that Russian forces have used a total of eighty-six Iranian Shahed-136 drones, of which, Ukraine has destroyed 60 percent; this has not been independently confirmed. In addition, for the first time since August, Russian Tu-22 M3 bombers reportedly launched Kh-22 missiles from Belarusian airspace against the Khmelnytskyi region.  

This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree transferring control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) to the Russian state-controlled company Rosenergoatom. The Ukrainian army reported that Russian officials are coercing plant workers into obtaining Russian passports and signing employment contracts with Rosenergoatom.  

In addition, Putin deferred mobilization for all students in Russia, including part-time and masters’ students. Putin’s motivations are not clear, but this could be the result of increasing domestic resistance to the mobilization. Putin criticized the defense ministry for difficulties with the mobilization’s roll-out.   

Meanwhile, police in Russia’s major cities appear to be using surveillance software to search for men who have failed to report for military service. According to Astra Press, run by independent Russian journalists, on October 3 and 4, at least ten men suspected of “evading mobilization” were captured by surveillance cameras in Moscow. Four of them were detained by the police and sent to a military enlistment office.   

Further, according to the United Nations, the humanitarian situation in Izium and Kupiansk “is extremely concerning following months of intense hostilities that have left behind a path of destruction.” In Izium, essential services have been decimated, leaving as many as 9,000 people in the town completely dependent on humanitarian aid. In Kupiansk, shelling and hostilities have forced more than 4,000 people to spend most of their time in bunkers and basements, with extremely limited access to vital items.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian-occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia announces call for military service

Following Putin’s recent announcement of a partial mobilization in Russia, citizens of the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia questioned whether they would be included in the mobilization order. On October 3, Aslan Bzhania, the de facto president of Abkhazia, signed a conscription decree approving urgent military service for citizens aged eighteen to twenty-seven. 

On September 21, the day of Putin’s mobilization announcement, a statement quoting Russian Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov circulated in Abkhazian Telegram channels. It claimed that Abkhazia wouldn’t be able to avoid the mobilization. The Abkhazia Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the statement was “fake” and a “provocation” to harm Abkhazia-Russia relations. On September 24, independent media outlet Meduza cited a “source close to the Russian president’s administration” to report that the Kremlin was considering the mobilization of citizens from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  

In South Ossetia, the de facto defense ministry denied reports circulating on Telegram that claimed servicemen of the 4th Russian military base, stationed in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, were handing out draft mobilization notices. 

On September 29, the South Ossetian defense ministry recommended that its staff, both military servicemen and civilian personnel, cross the Russian border using their South Ossetian passports. “Most citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia are also citizens of the Russian Federation. Thus, those registered on the territory of the Russian Federation, are subject to the partial mobilization and draft notices will be handed to them,” the statement said.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian court fines TikTok for ‘LGBT propaganda,’ Twitch for ‘fakes

A Russian court on Tuesday fined TikTok for not removing “LGBT propaganda” that violated Russian laws.  

Kremlin-owned media outlet RIA reported that a court in Moscow fined TikTok three million rubles (USD $50,000) “for refusing to remove LGBT propaganda.” Russia’s internet censor Roskomnadzor also accused TikTok of “promoting non-traditional values, LGBT, feminism, and a distorted representation of traditional sexual values.” 

Meanwhile, the livestreaming platform Twitch faces fines for publishing content about the war in Ukraine that Russia deems “fake.” 

On October 18, the same court will examine two cases against Twitch, which is owned by Amazon. According to RIA, Twitch is accused of refusing to remove “fakes about the Russian army during a special operation in Ukraine.” The cases were initiated after Twitch hosted an interview with Oleksiy Arestovych, a military reporter and adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  

The latest legal actions are a continuation of Russia’s assault on Western technology companies. In July, a Russian court fined Google 22 billion rubles (USD $360 million) for failing to remove unfavorable content about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington, DC

Mass grave uncovered in Lyman as rocket attack hits Zaporizhzhia

A new mass grave was uncovered in the city of Lyman after it was recently liberated by Ukrainian forces. According to Ukrainian reports, the bodies have not all been identified, as they may have been left on the streets for a long period of time before burial.  

In Zaporizhzhia, several people were killed in a rocket attack launched by the Russian army on October 6. Rescue operations continued throughout the day as people were believed to be buried under the wreckage.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian Telegram channels praise “pro-Russian” coup in Burkina Faso

For the second time in eight months, Burkina Faso was the scene of a military coup d’état. On September 30, Captain Ibrahim Traoré overthrew Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who himself ousted the country’s democratically elected president in January after urging the then-president to hire Wagner Group to fight Islamist insurgents. 

Celebrations of the coup saw Burkinabe citizens holding Russian flags and chanting “to hell with France.” Sergei Markov, a pro-government analyst in Moscow, said “our people” had assisted the coup. Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin also warmly congratulated Captain Traore. Prigozhin expressed similar sentiments following the January coup.  

Social media sites in Burkina Faso saw an uptick in pro-Russian messaging before both the most recent coup and the January coup. 

On Telegram, Kremlin propaganda channels with hundreds of thousands of followers praised the “joining of Ibrahim Traore and the country of honest people to the anti-colonial alliance with Russia.” These Telegram channels also claimed that Russia had effectively taken control of three West African countries – Mali, the Central African Republic and now Burkina Faso – from the “French neocolonial empire.” Following the coup, protesters, some waving Russian flags, attacked the French embassy in Burkina Faso and vandalized a French cultural center.  

Notably, many Telegram channels stated that “Niger and its uranium mines are next in line.” On September 19, a protest in the capital of Niger saw Nigerien citizens calling for France’s removal while carrying Russian flags.

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate

The post Russian War Report: Ukraine recaptures territory as Russia uses Iranian drone near Kyiv appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Neutralizing even one of these crises can be confounding and perilous. Some countries, unfortunately, face them all at once, fighting on multiple fronts. That usually keeps them from attending to the longer-term task of giving people the knowledge, skills, access to health care, and opportunities they need to live out their full productive potential. Investing in resilient, shock-responsive systems is critical to protect human-capital gains and improve resilience to future shocks.

Niger is an example of a country that faces many complex and interconnected challenges. Shocks and crises are increasingly frequent and overlapping in Niger, disrupting efforts to sustain broad-based growth, build human capital, and reduce poverty. Regional instability has led to the displacement of families and the closure of schools, threatening social stability and increasing insecurity; that, in turn, complicated Niger’s efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and worsened the food insecurity that is now affecting more than 4.4 million of the country’s people. Climate shocks have triggered localized flooding, while steady rises in temperatures threaten the more than 80 percent of Niger’s citizens who depend on agriculture for their nourishment and livelihoods.

The government of Niger is determined not to lose any ground in its steady climb to protect and invest in all its citizens by pressing ahead with programs and reforms that are having transformational impact on people’s lives. A great example of this is the Wadata Talaka safety-net program, a partnership between Niger and the World Bank that focuses on poverty reduction, resilience building, and women’s empowerment. The program provides monthly cash transfers to extremely poor households to smooth their consumption expenditures and improve their ability to cope with shocks. It also provides “economic inclusion” support—life and micro-entrepreneurship skills training, coaching, and support to village savings groups—and helps poor children get essential mental stimulation in their early years. Such programs can respond quickly to help poor and vulnerable families prepare for, cope with, and adapt to shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic: As the virus spread, the program expanded to four hundred thousand households to protect them from the pandemic’s adverse economic consequences. The program is well-placed to assist poor households with rising food insecurity and climate shocks.

A successful response will need to include supporting women and innovation. Because women are the primary beneficiaries of Wadata Talaka, the program is an important vehicle for their empowerment. Evaluations of the economic inclusion program show that in the eighteen months since it began, it improved household consumption and food security. The total income of women beneficiaries has increased (by 60 to 100 percent, much of it from non-farm businesses), and there is strong evidence of gains in their mental health and social wellbeing.

To develop such systems reaching the poorest and most vulnerable, countries will need strong social registries and good enrollment, delivery, and payment systems, often leveraging technology. The government of Niger is fully committed to these efforts. For example, responding to climate change, Wadata Talaka was the first program of its kind in West Africa to use satellite data to quickly anticipate drought hotspots and provide emergency funds more quickly than usual (three months ahead of the traditional response) to help people before they entered the lean season. Research is currently underway to measure the impact of that speed.

At a time when countries are forced to contend with the ebb and flow of shocks like climate change, pandemics, conflict, or food price increases, investments in social protection systems are more critical than ever. Niger’s programs serve as an example of just how impactful such adaptive systems can be.

Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou is the prime minister of Niger.

Mamta Murthi is vice president for human development at the World Bank.

The post How Niger’s safety net helps its most vulnerable citizens thrive amid crises appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Political analysts often look with envy at historians due to their ability to analyze events long after they have occurred, with the luxury of distance and hindsight. To analyze human history and the political and economic developments in numerous states or regions over the period of 2011 to mid-2022 would surely benefit from ten or twenty years of distance and hindsight. Yet for those dealing with events occurring in the geographical dimension of North Africa there is an overwhelming perception of a continuous, often abrupt and contradictory, but increasingly faster evolution of relations between actors—whether small or big, global or regional. 

In fact, North African countries (namely Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco) have witnessed an array of political, economic and social transformations which have all influenced geopolitical dynamics in the region. Egypt and Turkey, for example, have been at odds for the past decade due to rivaling political agendas, and in 2013 broke all diplomatic ties by calling back their respective ambassadors. Libya is entering its 11th year of civil war with rival factions contending power over the oil-rich nation through political maneuverings and violent clashes. Morocco and Algeria are still in open conflict over border disputes, opposing geopolitical alliances and an ever-growing arms race. Because of the Algeria-Morocco conflict, the Maghreb was never able to create an economic union trade agreement which would undoubtedly benefit all countries of the region. 

The purpose of this report is to identify a potential role for Italy and its diplomacy to play in North Africa, in full agreement and collaboration with the United States and the other main European actors, in resolving some of the thorniest crises in the area and fostering a climate of collaboration around the transatlantic alliance that could help it face the expanding ambitions of rival global powers.

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US President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s upcoming visit to the Middle East provides an opportunity to assess what role the United States will play in the Middle East and North Africa in the future. With the war in Ukraine further diverting US attention from the region, the big question is whether the region is entering a ‘post-US’ era.

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Middle East North Africa

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Security

Ukraine uses HIMARS effectively to hit Russian ammo dumps

Tracking Narratives

Kremlin outlets amplify footage of Lysychansk residents greeting Russian troops

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels amplify fake Bild video claiming self-propelled German howitzer captured

Kremlin media “predicts” disintegration of NATO and EU despite plans of expansion

Polish right-wing political party launches campaign targeting Roma people from Ukraine

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channel linked to inauthentic Facebook assets from Côte d’Ivoire

Ukraine uses HIMARS effectively to hit Russian ammo dumps

At the beginning of the month, the Biden administration announced it was sending a small batch of M142 HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. This decision was long awaited on the Ukrainian side, which lacked precision artillery systems that are able to hit Russian targets deep behind the frontlines. The first videos of HIMARS on the battle front appeared online as early as July 4.  

Despite the limited numbers of HIMARS currently available to Ukraine, the impact on the field can already be felt. At the moment, Ukraine operates nine HIMARS; upon receiving the systems, Ukrainian military started systematically targeting Russian ammunition storage facilities behind the frontlines.  

During the past week, a number of ammunition dumps were reported to be on fire all over the occupied Ukrainian territory. On July 4, Ukrainian diplomat Olexander Scherba claimed the system was already making an impact. Three days later, videos of a bombardment of the Donetsk Kamaz truck center started appearing online. Allegedly, this was the location where Russian troops were keeping their ammunition supplies in Donetsk. 

DFRLab analysis of recent satellite imagery concludes that the Kamaz truck center was indeed damaged between July 2 and July 4. Due to a lack of visible damage among surrounding buildings, this was likely a precision weapon attack, such as newly acquired HIMARS.

Equipment that was believed to have been used in parades organized by the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic was also destroyed, according to the recently surfaced photos. Another hit on an alleged ammunition storage facility in Donetsk was reported on July 5 and July 7; at the time of publishing, satellite imagery to verify these claims is unavailable. 

Additional reports of targeted Russian ammunition dumps include July 2 in Popasna, July 4 in Snizhne and Yakovlivka, July 5 in Kadiivka, July 6 in Makiivka, as well as other locations.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, DFRLab Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin outlets amplify footage of Lysychansk residents greeting Russian troops

Kremlin propaganda media outlets and social media accounts published numerous videos showing residents of Lysychansk greeting Russian armed forces upon upon entry into the city on July 3. The official Telegram and VK accounts of Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechen Republic, published videos with people hugging Kadyrov’s soldiers and thanking them for humanitarian aid and “liberating” them. Yuri Podolyaka, a pro-Kremlin Ukrainian blogger, amplified videos by both Kremlin-controlled media outlets like RIA Novosti, and independent western media outlets like France 24 showing some residents of Lysychansk happy with Russian troops entering the city and condemning Ukrainian troops. Other VK accounts that used pro-Kremlin letter Z as their avatar image or in their name also posted videos with elderly women from Lysychansk blessing Russian military and hugging them after coming up from a basement. Another popular video posted by the Operativnye Svodki Telegram channel showed a girl showing her pro-Kremlin drawings of Russia’s flag and the letters ZOV saying “she knew that [Russian troops] will come.” 

While the footage is legitimate, the sentiment can be found among the small fraction of Lysychansk residents who chose to stay behind and not evacuate the city. There were 93,340 residents in Lysychansk as of January 1, 2022, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Economics. On June 29, Unian.net, a Ukrainian news agency, cited Sergey Gaidai, chairman of the Luhansk Regional Military Administration, saying that 15,000 still people remained in the city. On July 5, BBC Russian service reported that only 10,000 people remained in now-occupied Lysychansk; he same number of Lysychansk residents was mentioned by the Kremlin-controlled MK.ru on July 2.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels amplify fake Bild video claiming self-propelled German howitzer captured

Multiple pro-Kremlin media claimed that Russians knocked out a Germany-provided PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzer and captured it for further study. All the articles referenced German media Bild as the source, but failed to provide a direct link to the material. The story was debunked by the Ukrainian fact-checking organization StopFake after it determined that Bild had not reported anything on the claim and had only published material on how Ukrainians started using those systems. StopFake also cited a German journalist who tried to find any confirmation but concluded it was Russian disinformation. To date, no evidence of a captured PzH 2000 has been provided by any verifiable source. 

However, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel MediaKiller published a short clip with German subtitles claiming that a Bild video confirmed the system’s capture. While the footage mixes random clips of various military munitions with German subtitles on top of it, it does not provide any evidence of a PzH 2000 being captured. The DFRLab searched for videos published by Bild and could not find anything corresponding to Russia’s claims. Furthermore, the video amplified on Telegram does not follow Bild’s visual style and is far shorter than Bild’s usual social media videos. Finally, the text on the video contains mistakes, like the usage of the German definitive article ‘die’ twice in a row, which is a highly unlikely mistake for German news outlet.  

The video was amplified by multiple pro–Kremlin channels, some of which claimed that it signals that the West is tired of “pointless” support of Ukraine. One of those channels is a personal channel of Alexey Pushkov, a former Russian senator of the Perm region.

It is not the first time MediaKiller has published faked video posing as reputable media. Previously, the channel promoted a fabricated BBC video that blamed Ukraine for shelling the Kramatorsk train station. 

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Kremlin media “predicts” disintegration of NATO and EU despite plans of expansion

Kremlin-owned media outlets attempt to sow division among NATO and EU member countries by claiming that some members are willing to leave the alliances, and that the organizations are planning to remove them. These narratives come after both organizations have initiated plans to expand: NATO allies have signed accession protocols for Sweden and Finland, while the EU has granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and recognized Georgia’s “European Perspective.” 

The Kremlin media outlets reported that in Turkey, the Vatan political party has launched a campaign to leave NATO. The outlets cited the Turkish newspaper Aydınlık, a well-known pro-Russian platform in the country. Vatan is a fringe pro-Russian party that has been calling on the Turkish government to recognize Crimea as Russian territory.  

According to Kremlin media, Vatan launched a large-scale campaign in major cities of Turkey on withdrawing the country from NATO. The articles claimed that an anti-NATO stance is important for the economic future of Turkey, and added that “citizens are actively signing the appeal.” In 2017, the DFRLab investigated how the Vatan party, bots, and Kremlin media were promoting #LetsLeaveNATO hashtag on Twitter that was trending on Turkish Twitter at the time. While Lenta.ru published the same article on the possibility of Turkish exit, the outlet also published a separate article claiming that NATO itself wants to force Turkey out the alliance. According to the second piece, NATO would want to remove the country because of Ankara’s “overly independent and categorical policy” and because “Turkey can destroy NATO from within.” 

Russian websites predicted the disintegration of European Union along with NATO. Additional Kremlin-owned outlets also claimed that France might leave the European Union soon. According to the outlets, President Emmanuel Marcon’s “failure in parliamentary elections” increases the chances of holding the referendum in France on leaving the EU.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Polish right-wing political party launches campaign targeting Roma people from Ukraine

On June 24, Przemyśl city councilmember Marcin Kowalski posted on his Facebook page that “hordes of Ukrainian Roma” had started to arrive in the city, allegedly brought to Poland on purpose in order to obtain a Polish identification number and receive financial aid from Poland as Ukrainian refugees. His post asserted that most of the Roma coming to Poland were women with small children; after filling out formal documents in Poland, he said, they planned to return to Ukraine and wait there to receive Polish state aid in their Polish bank accounts. In his post, Kowalski asked the Polish government whether they considered the potential for fraud while adopting a law for providing assistance to Ukrainian refugees in March, 2022. He alleged that he had been helping Ukrainian people ever since the war erupted, but he cannot indifferently watch how people used loopholes in this law.  

Kowalski’s post was featured in articles published by far-right and regional local online media outlets, including Kresy.pl, wkraju24.pl, Dzieje się na Podkarpaciu, Ziemia-Przemyska and Lega Artis law firm. Posts about “hordes of Roma people from Ukraine” was shared in thirty Facebook groups and pages on June 24 and 25, garnering more than 900 interactions.  

On June 27, the far-right National Movement party which currently has five members in Poland’s parliament, launched a campaign on Facebook claiming that Roma people were extorting social benefits intended for Ukrainian refugees. According to the campaign, “The government’s refugee aid policy turned into an immigration policy,” and its incompetence has allowed unentitled people to receive aid. The Facebook posts also contained banners with text repeating messages from Marcin Kowalski’s original Facebook post and asserted that Poland’s current immigration policy must be stopped.  The DFRLab found that banner was posted on forty Facebook pages and public groups, garnering 880 interactions between June 27 and July 7.

On June 30, Marcin Kowalski posted on Facebook that his previous post about Roma people reached almost 100,000 users, and that he had received messages and calls from many sources, including reporters from TVN TV. But he wrote with disappointment that Polish lawmakers did not pay enough attention to this story and only Paweł Szramka, member of Polish parliament from the Polish People’s Party, had taken it into consideration. Kowalski published a screenshot of a request sent by Paweł Szramka to the Polish Ministry of Family and Social Policy. The request quoted Kowalski’s Facebook post and asked whether the ministry intended to tighten existing legislation in order to curb misuse of state refugee benefits.  

Despite his claims, Kowalski’s post does not provide any evidence that Roma people are returning to Ukraine after registering for Polish government aid. A spokesperson for Poland’s social insurance agency ZUS stated that ZUS verifies the legal stay of Ukrainian citizens in Poland, both at the stage of granting benefits and during the period when they receive social aid. Moreover, ZUS has access to various state registers, including a special register of Ukrainian citizens made by the Border Guard, to verify the status of refugees. If people from Ukraine with refugee status leave Poland for longer than one month, they lose benefits offered by Polish state. Thus it is unlikely that anyone, Roma or otherwise, would continue to receive aid from Poland if they returned to Ukraine. The Central Council of Roma People in Poland wrote on Facebook that Kowalski’s post nurtures stereotypes against Roma and the organization would take legal steps in response to his post. 

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland.  

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channel linked to inauthentic Facebook assets from Côte d’Ivoire

A new investigation by the DFRLab has determined that a Facebook user in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire created a network of sockpuppets and duplicate profiles used to operate Facebook pages and at least one private group with over 62,000 followers to spread anti-Ukraine content and promote pro-Kremlin narratives in French. 

One inauthentic profile was called “Igor Kadyrov” and used a picture of Chechen General Magomed Tushayev as its profile picture. Another shared content from Sputnik and encourage followers to subscribe to RT France. 

Notably the Facebook assets were also used to promote a Telegram channel entitled “Marigo News – Opération ZOV.” The channel, which has gained over 11,600 followers in less than three months, appeared to be copying content directly from another channel called “Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны” (“Operation Z: War Reporters of the Russian Spring”) and auto-translating it from Russian into French. Although it is not the official channel of the pro-Kremlin propaganda website RusVesna, “Operation Z” contains links to RusVesna in the channel description, and the official RusVesna Telegram channel frequently shares content from it. 

The French version of RusVesna content was spread across Facebook and to Twitter accounts that have subsequently been suspended. 

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

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• The Overview of the Digital Silk Road Initiative of China
• The Role of Huawei in the Digital Silk Road Initiative of China in North Africa
• How Huawei is perceived by other countries as not being solely a commercial company
• Deep Chinese presence in North African countries
• What the North Africans think of China and its presence in the region
• Significant projects of Huawei and other Chinese tech giants in the region
• Thoughts about the relationship between China and North Africa

Timestamps

[00:00] Introduction

[02:17] An Overview of the Digital Silk Road Initiative

[05:32] How Does Huawei fit in the DSRI of China

[08:37] Other Countries See Huawei as not a Commercial Company

[15:43] Deep Chinese Presence in Countries of North Africa

[18:44] What the North Africans thought of China

[24:31] Significant Projects of Huawei in the North Africa Region

[30:13] Some Tech Projects by Chinese Tech Giants in The Region

[35:04] North Africans Appetite in Cooperation with China

[38:58] Thoughts about the Relationship between China-North Africa

[41:16] Conclusion

Dr. Tin Hinane El Kadi
Associate Fellow
Chatham House
Co-founder and co-director
Institute for Social Science Research on Algeria (ISSRA) 

Tin Hinane El Kadi is the co-founder and co-director of ISSRA. She is a political economy researcher, currently writing a PhD thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), looking at China’s Digital Silk Road in North Africa. She is also an associate fellow in the MENA department at Chatham House. Her research interests include information, communications technology (ICT) and development, China’s presence in Africa and the Middle East, and contemporary Algerian politics.

China has been expanding its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) around the world, while also working on a new version of BRI that utilizes the digital space. The initiative was dubbed the Digital Silk Road Initiative, or DSRI, which is already in motion across the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in North Africa. Big Chinese tech companies like Huawei have been assisting North African countries in digitizing their economies to compete with First World countries. These can also lead to wonderful opportunities for North Africans since DSRI promises regional economic growth.

In this episode, we are joined by Tin Hinane El Kadi, a political economy researcher, currently writing a Ph.D. thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), looking at China’s Digital Silk Road in North Africa. Dr. El Kadi’s research includes How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns.

Host Jonathan Fulton and Dr. El Kadi discuss China’s Digital Silk Road Initiative and Huawei’s role in setting it into action. They also discussed the impression of the Chinese in North Africa, as China begins to establish a political role in the region. Moreover, they discuss Chinese ventures that focus on leveraging the digital domain. Data Centers, AI or Machine Learning, Cloud Computing, and 5G Technologies are all examples. Finally, they discuss the future connection between China and North Africa.

Fellow

Jonathan Fulton

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

China Chinese

The China-MENA podcast features conversations with academics, think-tankers, and regional specialists on Chinese Influence in the Middle East and informs US and MENA audiences in the policy and business communities about the nature of China’s outreach to the region.

At a time when China’s global footprint is getting deeper and deeper, it has never been more important to understand its foreign policy and the Middle East is one of the world’s most consequential regions: home to major religions, diverse cultural and social heritage, central to global energy markets, and of course, geopolitics, linking people and markets in Asia, Africa and Europe.  This show will help you understand what China is doing in the region, and how the region is engaging with China as an increasingly important external power.

Podcast series

Listen to the latest episode of the China-MENA podcast, featuring conversations with academics, government leaders, and the policy community on China’s role in the Middle East.

Listen

Report Mar 16, 2022

Great power projection in the Middle East: The China-Russia relationship as a force multiplier

By Jonathan Fulton and Li-Chen Sim

The conflict is also likely to provide states in the MENA region, especially oil producing states, with greater leverage over the US and Western allies. The US designation of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally in January 2022 could be seen from this perspective

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MENASource Feb 23, 2022

China and Russia are proposing a new authoritarian playbook. MENA leaders are watching closely.

By Ahmed Aboudouh

It’s on major Western democracies to make democracy appealing again by aggressively filling the gaps China and Russia exploit to make the world more accommodating to their political models and the new trend of rising authoritarianism.

China East Asia

MENASource Jun 8, 2022

Trade trumps strategic competition in the Middle East

By Jonathan Fulton

Washington would do well to understand that many outside the US have a different view of China, and very few are interested in being a theater of strategic competition. 

China Economy & Business

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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This podcast was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

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On June 15, Emma Ashford’s new book, Oil, the State and War, was reviewed in The New Arab.

The reviewer wrote, “Oil, the State, and War is a book that helps understand the times we live in. It will be a great addition to the library of both the general reader interested in global affairs and the political scientist. Ashford’s book combines, in a difficult feat, expertise with an accessible style.”

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But now France and its partners are pulling the cord on Barkhane and the Takuba Task Force, claiming that “the political, operational and legal conditions are no longer met,” referring to the deteriorating relationship with the government in Bamako. The Malian junta itself is now pushing for a quicker end to French involvement, terminating the bilateral Defense Cooperation Treaty and the framework for hosting the two operations. France claims it’s leaving in accordance with the previously established plan and will evacuate its last military base in the eastern city of Gao sometime in August. 

Whatever the case, Russia—by deploying the notorious Wagner Group mercenary force and leading a vast disinformation campaign—is gaining a strategic foothold against European interests at a critical time for Moscow. While all eyes are on the European theater, the competition with Russia is also playing out in the Sahel region—and now Europeans, in close coordination with local governments, need to find the right formula to adapt their presence and avoid leaving a vacuum that could be exploited even more.

Influence undone

The European withdrawal, announced in mid-February, wasn’t unexpected: After a May 2021 military revolt (Mali’s second coup in just ten months), Bamako’s relations with its neighbors, Paris, and other international partners gradually soured. Tensions peaked in early February of this year when the European Union (EU)—following sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—leveled similar punishment against five prominent individuals it said were hampering the political transition in Mali. 

That’s when Moscow, which had not been very visible in Bamako in recent years, stepped in to exploit this gulf between Mali and its European and regional partners. Facing increasing pressure from the international community, coup leader Colonel Assimi Goïta turned to Wagner to effectively help preserve his grasp on power. These contractors, widely seen as a shadowy force serving the Kremlin’s interests abroad, have been present in Mali since the end of last year, although in smaller numbers and deploying so far only in areas where European forces are absent or no longer engaged. 

Even Russia may have been caught by surprise at how easily the deeply rooted French and European influence in the country crumbled: Simply by seizing local frustrations, building on European missteps, and introducing disinformation into the mix, it was able to harm European interests—and for cheap, without any major military, economic, or political engagement. 

Now, Russia’s low-cost engagement with the junta opens it up to potential concessions for the extraction of Malian mineral wealth and the supply of military gear such as helicopters, both of which would weaken Western influence. Despite—or actually because of—the Russian military’s difficulties in Ukraine, we should expect a strengthening of Russia’s partnership with Mali. A quick succession of visits by the Malian defense and foreign ministers to Moscow in March and May, respectively, underline this. The visits also demonstrate that Moscow is not as isolated as the West would like it to be, and that it’s capable of harming Western interests at a limited cost.

Shattered ambitions, deteriorating security

The European military deployments were multifaceted and included direct support to Barkhane: the 1,100-troop European Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali and the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation MINUSMA, which included 1,600 troops from twenty-three EU countries. Takuba, with its 800 troops (40 percent of them French), became an unprecedented coalition of European special forces whose mission was to advise, assist, and accompany Malian armed forces in counterterrorism missions.

But the end of Barkhane and Takuba, together with the uncertain futures of EUTM-Mali and European engagement within MINUSMA, underscore that Europe is losing ground in a region of key strategic importance. Bamako’s abstention from the UN’s vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine offers further proof—and is a direct result of Mali’s shifting political and security loyalties.

This end of an era in the Sahel could also close the door on the emerging model of joint European intervention, or the “European art of the coalition.” Europeans have deployed together in the past, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, though seldom in such a demanding environment as the Sahel and typically with the Americans leading. Barkhane and Takuba may have offered some lessons, but they probably didn’t last long enough. 

For Mali itself, further destabilization awaits. While the military junta and its Russian protectors will do their best to push out a positive narrative, the reality is already far more bleak. True, the Malian Armed Forces are better trained and equipped compared to a few years ago; but Wagner mercenaries do little to avoid civilian casualties, and ethnic minorities are already suffering from indiscriminate targeting. According to the latest MINUSMA report, the number of human-rights violations and abuses by the Malian defense and security forces grew from thirty-one in the last quarter of 2021 to 320 in the first quarter of 2022. Human Rights Watch claims that the late March killing of three hundred civilian men in the central Mali town of Moura by the country’s armed forces (and associated foreign soldiers “identified by several sources as Russians,” the group said) was the “worst single atrocity reported in Mali’s decade-long armed conflict.” 

Wagner’s interest is not the stability of any particular country, but that of the country’s regime—which is why the security situation has deteriorated in most African countries that have let the group in. That’s why political trouble could also become a factor: Hiring Wagner, a drain on taxpayer funds, at a time when the Malian regime is under severe sanctions, may feed discontent from the Malian population. This is especially the case when those mercenaries are committing atrocities alongside the military.

Yet while the negative implications of Wagner’s costly involvement are clear, actually demonstrating this isn’t easy, given the power of the Russian-engineered disinformation campaign. 

In February, our colleagues from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab revealed how a network of Facebook pages promoted pro-Russian and anti-French and -UN narratives, drumming up support for the postponement of elections after the May 2021 coup and for the mercenary group itself. Some of those campaigns were directly linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin who is considered to control Wagner. The Russians are also franchising the content to local creators, further complicating efforts to tackle it, while Facebook is only one of the many tools used by Russians for disinformation campaigns spotted throughout the region. 

More recently, France denounced what it claimed was a false-flag operation by Wagner, whose troops allegedly buried bodies near a base in Gossi—recently handed to the Malian military by the French—in an attempt to discredit the European forces by implicating them in atrocities. 

Fighting this kind of disinformation will likely become increasingly difficult without a military presence, and amid the junta’s attacks against press freedoms (which have included the suspension of France 24 and Radio France Internationale, and increasingly difficult accreditation procedures for foreign journalists). In its most recent index, Reporters Without Borders ranks Mali 111th out of 180 countries; last year, it was 99th.

Meanwhile, if Russia gets bogged down in Ukraine, a weakened Kremlin might look for an opportunity to destabilize European nations as revenge for their support for Ukraine. In the past, Moscow instrumentalized the war in Syria by sending refugees streaming into Europe; it might seek to do the same by building upon the instability in Mali. This would amount to a blow against Europe without engaging militarily. 

Given the murky outlook, it can’t be completely ruled out that Bamako will turn to Europe again someday, especially if there is a change in leadership. But it took a lot for France to get its European allies into Mali, and here, history is unlikely to repeat itself.

The challenges ahead

While Barkhane might be over, European involvement isn’t quite yet.

For one, the ongoing withdrawal isn’t expected to be completed until the end of summer. During the coming weeks and months, European troops may be targeted by terrorist attacks. Dozens of heavy armored vehicles leaving Gao—likely the last base to be closed—might need to navigate improvised explosive devices. Meanwhile, Wagner mercenaries could deploy closer to European troops, adding extra risk to the process. 

In the February joint statement announcing the withdrawal, the European signatories vowed “to remain committed in the region.” Since Takuba repeatedly proved its ability to deliver alongside local armed forces, setting an important precedent for future cooperation, this may be appealing for other security-compromised countries such as Niger and Burkina Faso. Yet the redeployment of European special forces in neighboring countries may drag on for political reasons. 

For a Takuba-like task force to be set up somewhere else, it would require three elements: the host government’s invitation and a status-of-forces agreement (in April, Niger’s Parliament approved the deployment of more Europeans); convincing potentially reluctant local populations and getting civil society on board; and legislative measures back home allowing for Takuba members to legally operate outside of Mali. The latter might seem especially unattractive to European lawmakers when a war is raging in their own backyard.

Meanwhile, Europe’s continuous involvement through EUTM-Mali and the UN’s MINUSMA mission is also uncertain. The former had trained more than fifteen thousand Malian troops and also offers support to the G5 Sahel joint force—which Bamako recently left—while the latter’s mandate focuses on supporting the political process and helping stabilize Mali. But for both missions, it is becoming increasingly difficult to operate under the current circumstances, which besides the disinformation campaign and the presence of Wagner include new restrictions by the junta on the areas of operation and a potential lack of security guarantees after the Barkhane withdrawal.

MINUSMA was reportedly targeted by a Malian army rocket strike in April and saw its access to local airspace blocked. Bamako also imposed limitations on the mission’s movements on the ground, and peacemakers have been prevented from investigating the site of the Moura massacre. In this context, it is unclear how long Europeans will maintain their commitments to MINUSMA: While German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock recently confirmed her country would stay on, Sweden—which has a particularly strong tradition of participating in peacekeeping missions—announced that it will pull its approximately two hundred soldiers out of the mission by June 2023.

As for EUTM-Mali, the situation is even less clear. After several months of uncertainty, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell announced in April that the bloc will halt all military training missions, since the Malian authorities failed to provide sufficient guarantees that the EU-trained Malian soldiers would not be involved in operations with Wagner. There is reason for concern, given the recent past: A leaked European External Action Service report found that EU-trained troops in the Central African Republic had been cooperating with Russian mercenaries before the EU suspended its training mission in response several months ago.

Even if European military trainers remain in the country and the Czechs (who will assume leadership of the mission in July) appear ready for the challenge, the future of EUTM-Mali is anything but straightforward. Although the mission is not canceled, the EU is decreasing its presence so much that the mission is now a mere shell of what it used to be. Ultimately, the Europeans might prefer to withdraw their forces from EUTM-Mali or MINUSMA, or both, if they’re not confident that security is guaranteed.

What Europe should do now

Much remains to be discussed among the Europeans themselves, regional partners, and the Malian junta. Meanwhile, there are several points to bear in mind.

First, it will be critical for France to maintain, and further enhance, close coordination with its European partners (including the United Kingdom) over any major upcoming moves. Paris pushed for their growing involvement—and now it must take into account their concerns and priorities. Future decisions shouldn’t come as a surprise to any of France’s partners.

Second, having stated their “willingness to actively consider their support to neighboring countries in the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa,” the Europeans are considering extending EUTM missions to these areas. While the future of EUTM-Mali might be compromised, the EU could offer new training missions to countries that show interest. In May, Borrell said the bloc will reallocate its military resources to neighboring countries.

Third, while Takuba is unlikely to be fully replicated, the framework has been clearly gaining momentum, with more countries considering joining (and actually doing so). It marked a strategic shift especially for the Central and Eastern Europeans, who engaged more actively in the southern flank. Preserving this dynamic, which reinforces interoperability among the Europeans, will not be an easy task but is worth a try. It would demonstrate Europe’s ongoing commitment in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, which—as Senegalese President Macky Sall recently put it—“cannot be the business of African countries alone.” 

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, France and its European partners must closely study what went wrong, including in its communication with the local population. Russian-fueled disinformation nurtured Malian resentment toward the French armed forces, and experts believe Paris failed to engage public opinion effectively. French officials would do well to more closely analyze the weaknesses that Russia successfully exploited.

It is in Europe’s interest to continue supporting other countries in the Sahel. Indeed, the new EU Strategic Compass considers the future of the region to be of utmost importance, given Africa’s economic and demographic growth. But there are many problems to address. And while Ukraine has rightfully become the utmost security priority for the EU, it would be a mistake to forget about its major challenge in the Sahel. 

Marie Jourdain is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and previously worked for the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Europe Center and a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations.

The post As Europe withdraws from Mali, Russia gets the upper hand appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 1, Emma Ashford’s book Oil, the State and War: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates was published by Georgetown University Press. The book challenges prevailing understandings of the international implications of oil wealth and shows why it can create bad actors.

In a world where oil-rich states are more likely to start war than their oil-dependent counterparts, it’s surprising how little attention is still paid to these so-called petrostates. These states’ wealth props up the global arms trade, provides diplomatic leverage, and allows them to support violent and nonviolent proxies. In Oil, the State, and War, Emma Ashford explores the many potential links between domestic oil production and foreign policy behavior and how oil production influences global politics.

Not all petrostates have the same characteristics or capabilities. To help us conceptualize these differences, Ashford creates an original classification of three types of petrostates: oil-dependent states (those weakened by the resource curse), oil-wealthy states (those made rich by oil exports), and super-producer states (those that form the backbone of the global oil market). Through a combination of case studies and analysis, she illustrates how oil shapes petrostates’ behavior, filling a major gap in our understanding of the international implications of oil wealth. Experts have too often treated oil-rich states as passive objects, subject to the energy security needs of Western importing states. Instead, this book highlights the agency and power enjoyed by petrostates.

As the oil market undergoes a period of rapid change, Oil, the State, and War sheds light on the diversity of petrostates and how they shape international affairs.

More about our expert

Former staff

Emma Ashford

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Economic Sanctions

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The post Fergizer mentioned in Jewish Insider on Israeli CEOs flying to Casablanca, Morocco to offer advice on startup culture appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) pose a thorny policy dilemma for US and European officials trying to stabilize fragile states.¹ NSAGs are far from homogenous in their motivations, tactics, and structure, resulting in highly varied roles in either perpetrating or mitigating violence, with many playing a part in both. On one side, NSAGs can create instability by using violence to advance a range of interests, from political influence and financial gain to challenging a central government’s legitimacy or territorial control. Many NSAGs are directly responsible for civilian harm, including perpetrating targeted violence, persecuting, killing and committing brutal abuses against citizens.² There is no shortage of examples of NSAGs that fit this mold. From Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria to Katibat Macina in Mali, armed groups have wreaked havoc on the lives of civilians as well as US and European security interests.

In other contexts, however, the picture is not as clear-cut. Some armed groups play a role in maintaining security and protecting citizens from other violent actors, including the state. NSAGs can also provide services, collect taxes, resolve disputes, and establish governance systems in areas where they exercise control. The pandemic has shed light on how the governing authority of NSAGs can be utilized to manage the spread of COVID-19: for example, in Myanmar, non-state armed groups established health checks and restricted travel.³ Depending on the various roles they play in a community, such actors may be viewed as locally legitimate in the eyes of the population. NSAGs, even those with a history of using coercive power, can fill a governance gap and might be the only viable partner for the government and its international supporters trying to stabilize a conflict-affected area.

The dual nature of NSAGs poses the problem of whether, and how, the host government, the United States, and European powers should cooperate with NSAGs as part of a broader stabilization strategy. Critically, NSAGs proliferate in contexts where the social contract between the state and its citizens is broken (or nonexistent). Yet, many stabilization strategies are predicated on the assumption that NSAGs will ultimately be incorporated into political structures, which, by nature, may be corrupt and captured by elites who are more interested in holding power rather than moving toward a democratic system. This presents particular challenges for stakeholders aiming to promote sustainable peace and stability.

This policy conundrum is particularly pronounced in the Sahel.⁴ Across this conflict-ridden region, a range of NSAGs—from armed groups holding political motivations and self-defense militias to violent extremist organizations (VEOs)—operate with wide license to advance their interests and have caused conflict rates to skyrocket. In 2021, the Sahel experienced a 70 percent increase in violent incidents carried out by militant Islamist groups (from 1,180 to 2,005 events), just one type of NSAG common to the region, over the previous year.⁵

But NSAGs are not a conflict-producing scourge everywhere in the Sahel. In some locales where the government—nationally or locally—is weak, corrupt, perceived as illegitimate, or all three, NSAGs often fill a governance void or, at minimum, provide essential services. Witness the Koglweogo in Burkina Faso, which enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of local populations. These “Guardians of the Bush” formed to offset the central government’s inability to quell violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and in some areas provide forms of judicial governance. To the north, in Mali, self-defense groups are common in large swathes of the country. And in Niger, the Izala movement provides security and other forms of governance. These groups are not without their problems. However, the Sahel often offers no easy options for engagement. Solutions will come with difficult trade-offs. Any stabilization approach must account for the legitimacy these groups hold and explore means for engagement, if not outright collaboration or support.

Recognizing this challenge, policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic have augmented efforts to understand how NSAGs operate and develop evidence-based approaches to mitigate risks stemming from them. They have done so to confront the NSAG problem generally and for the Sahel specifically. Despite this more concerted focus, however, Washington and its transatlantic allies must do more to enhance their approaches—alone and together. 

This policy brief examines how transatlantic cooperation regarding NSAGs can be strengthened. It begins by describing the proliferation of NSAGs generally and the threat they pose to stability in the Sahel specifically. It then explores US and European policies toward engaging NSAGs, highlighting how these frameworks remain underdeveloped on both sides of the Atlantic—and pointing to opportunities for greater coordination. With this overview of the challenge in place, the brief pivots to outlining a three-part solution. The first is a set of criteria the United States and Europe can use to determine which groups are acceptable to engage—generally and as partners in stabilization specifically. This is a thorny policy dilemma but a thicket allies must work through if they are to stabilize key areas of the Sahel. The second is an approach for burden-sharing by establishing a set of common objectives for transatlantic cooperation. The third includes practical options for policy development and parameters for dealing with NSAGs generally and in the Sahel specifically.

The framework is rooted in the principles of the “strategic empowerment” approach to stabilization, which involves supporting local actors that exercise governing authority in a citizen-centric manner and align with U.S. values and standards. ⁶

Fragile states offer no optimal solutions, but strategic empowerment is the best available option and well suited for the increasingly contested nature of stabilization. “Contested stabilization” is defined as “situations where international actors pursue their own contradictory strategic objectives in a fragile or conflict-affected state. It is the stabilization corollary to a proxy war: Actors engage in stabilization activities—diplomacy and other assistance, to empower local actors and systems they can influence—with the aim of improving their own core interests, gaining access to emerging markets or resources, antagonizing adversaries, and expanding their perceived sphere of influence.” ⁷

Fellow

Patrick Quirk

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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Why ‘human security’ matters for tomorrow’s conflicts

By Sarah Dawn Petrin

NATO leaders are finally focusing on human security, a major step toward a broader vision of crisis management.

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Efforts to stabilize conflict-ridden countries sometimes fail in large part because of their inability to constructively engage armed non-state groups.

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The post Toward a framework for transatlantic cooperation on non-state armed groups appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 22, Aude Darnal participated in a panel discussion on the future of the Sahel and Western military assistance in Africa. She advocated for reforming US security sector assistance, a redirection of funding from DoD to DoS, and greater emphasis on supporting locally-led long-term security sector governance and civilian-led initiatives aiming to prevent violent conflict.

“If we go back to the past two years or past decades, there are a number of coup leaders that had been trained by US military forces. This is not to say that military assistance directly favors coups, but because of the body of evidence and literature, it deserves more scrutiny when assessing the efficiency and adequacy of the security sector programs.” Darnal argued that multiple coup leaders were trained via the United States, despite US security sector assistance programs claiming to promote human rights and civilian oversight of military institutions, showing the severe limitations of military assistance.

More about our expert

Former staff

Emma Ashford

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Economic Sanctions

The post Darnal at the Chicago Council: The Sahel and Western military assistance in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Fri, March 4, 2022 • 10:00 am ET

Sports Business Forum

The Sports Business Forum is a major part of the Africa Creative Industries Program led by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and co-organized with SEED project in partnership with the Agence Sénégalaise de promotion touristique (ASPT). Our goal is to bring investors to support the emergence of a local sports industry in Africa, providing optimism that African talent will no longer have to seek earnings abroad and keeping more added value within African markets.

Africa Economy & Business Future of Work Inclusive Growth

March Madness won’t be the only hoops highlight this month; the Basketball Africa League’s second season officially tipped off, attracting viewers globally.

“The world will see the quality of professional basketball that is being played here” in Africa, said Mark Tatum, deputy commissioner and chief operating officer of the National Basketball Association. Tatum was speaking at the Atlantic Council Africa Center’s March 4 Sports Business Forum, held in Dakar, Senegal, and cohosted by the SEED Project. “There is a tremendous opportunity to continue to invest in this game, in this sport, [and] in this league to drive economic opportunity” across Africa, he said. 

Amadou Gallo Fall, president of the Basketball Africa League and founder of the SEED Project, called Africa the “center of the Earth” for talent in sports and creative industries. Sports can serve as “an economic growth engine” for the continent, he said. Senegalese Sports Minister Matar Ba praised sport as an “economic tool” that boosts the economy, but also benefits other sectors including “health/well-being, education, social inclusion, and youth and women’s empowerment.” Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley—whose country boasts a large population of African descent and has seen economic benefits from promoting cricket—hailed Africa’s athletic and economic potential, saying that the continent has “the ability to create opportunities for so many” through excellence in sport.

The event also gathered leaders in Africa’s sports and tourism industries such as NBA legend Dikembe Mutombo; Pape Mahawa Diouf, chief executive officer of the Senegalese Agency of Tourism Promotion; Samba Bathily, chief executive officer and founder of the ADS Group; and Victor Williams, chief executive officer of NBA Africa. The gathering was sponsored by Orange, the Attorney General Alliance (AGA), the Senegalese Agency of Tourism Promotion, and the SEED Project.

Here are other highlights, covering everything from optimizing talent to fostering inclusion, from the Sports Business Forum:

Investment to fuel a generation

• Fall pointed to African-born Hall of Famers Mutombo and Hakeem Olajuwon as pillars of success but noted that they came to basketball almost by accident—Mutombo after going to Georgetown University intending to become a doctor and Olajuwon after excelling in soccer and handball. Through the SEED Project, an organization that mentors student-athletes and hosts a basketball academy for young people, Fall hopes to be “more intentional in creating a pathway for young people to not just stumble into sport.” But in the meantime, he asked, “how much talent are we missing?”
• Mutombo agreed that there is a need for a pathway into sports excellence in Africa, adding that, with basketball growing across the continent, he thinks “young people [in Africa] have a bright future—if we can work very hard to keep them here.”
• Tatum noted that even with programs to make basketball more accessible across Africa, “we believe that we’re just scratching the surface right now of the impact that the game can have on the world’s youngest and fastest-growing populations.”
• Investing in young people is important, as “youth [are] our biggest asset” as drivers of development, Fall said. Mottley pointed out that youth “can create opportunities for their families for economic pursuit.” And by staying on the continent, Mottley said, athletes can expand opportunities well beyond their families, for professions that are necessary for the sports ecosystem to thrive, like nutritionists and personal trainers.
• To boost that investment, Ba urged the private sector to get involved in funding the effort to grow Africa’s sports industry. He explained how Senegal is not only encouraging athletes, but also setting up the infrastructure needed to support a sports industry, which will require cultivating the tourism and creative industries.
• Diouf highlighted how governments across Africa have drawn in public and private investments by creating supportive policies and institutions. He noted that developments in the tourism industry, like the range of hotels and public transportation options, have played a part developing the sports industry, helping to attract major investments—such as those behind Senegal’s new fifty-thousand-seat Abdoulaye Wade Stadium—and attention from global sports brands. Diouf said that these two industries coming together is key to Senegal’s hopes for a transformation to become a “great nation of sport, culture, and tourism.”
• Markus Green, who is a board member of the AGA—which trains lawyers, judges, and prosecutors globally—said it is critical for nations to also build their legal framework in order to host thriving sports businesses. “In order for an entity like the NBA to come into a country like Senegal, you have to have a working system of laws, a working system of regulations, and a justice system that works. So that if there is a dispute, that entity can feel comfortable knowing they can get a reliable outcome. All of those things are tied to sport, the business of sport.”

Growing future leaders

• Green encouraged the audience to think about the growth of sports business as more than a reflection of Africa’s changing economics, but also its changing culture. “It’s about using the voice of sport and the platform of sport to push ideas and to push change,” he said. “We saw this in the US with Black Lives Matter. You saw the athletes and their impact on social change—that’s sustainability. Think about sport beyond only the game. Think about how it can be used as a vehicle of change.”
• Sports could serve as a vehicle “to build bridges between Africa and the Caribbean,” Mottley said, adding that she’d like to see young people across the Atlantic “engage with one another, play with one another, and make those bonds that will make lifelong friends.”
• Sports are “also an incredible tool to speak to young people,” Fall said. Mottley agreed, saying that the greatest athletes and artists are “global citizens” who “inspire all, irrespective of race, class, and age.”
• Mutombo credited basketball with forming powerful and influential athletes, saying that basketball players “have a chance and the power to change our community, to touch our people, in the way other athletes cannot,” because of their global fame. “Each one of us, we have a moral duty to do something” to keep youth on track in their education and growth, he said.

Breaking the gender barrier

• Fall said that it will be important to not only improve accessibility to sports like basketball, but to make sure that “young boys and girls who have a passion for the sport [have] an opportunity to participate.” Spotlighting top female athletes, managers, and coaches—like Australian Liz Mills, the first woman to coach a team in the Basketball Africa League—will help in “showing the next generation that it’s possible,” he said. 
• Mottley, too, noted the “disparity between the conditions of pay and conditions of service for men and women” in sport, citing the example of Barbados’s globally renowned cricket teams. She referred to the difference in quality of television broadcasting coverage between women’s and men’s sports. “The disparity is too great…” she said, “and I hope that as we go forward, that disparity will be removed from the exercise of sports.”

Watch the full event

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To read the English version of this report, click here.
Un enregistrement du lancement de rapport est disponible ici.

La donne démographique dans la région et ses retombées à l’horizon de 2045 2045

Le Sahel – soit, dans le cadre de cette étude, la région au sud du Sahara qui s’étend du Sénégal au Tchad en y incluant les douze états septentrionaux de la Fédération nigériane appliquant la charia — est dans une impasse démographique. Loin de produire un « dividende », la croissance rapide d’une population dont le profil d’âge est très jeune et dont le taux de fécondité reste très élevé submerge la capacité des états à produire des biens publics en quantité nécessaire. Cette donne démographique ralentit, voire bloque la croissance économique ; elle limite le progrès social et obère l’urbanisation par l’extension des bidonvilles. Au fil des décennies, ces conditions, qui se renforcent mutuellement, ont sapé la légitimité des gouvernements centraux et rendu les états de la région vulnérables à la propagation d’un populisme islamique radical et, plus généralement, à l’instabilité.

La période 2040-2045 est l’horizon temps de cette étude. D’ici à là, du fait du profil d’âge très jeune de leurs populations (quatre sur dix Sahéliens ont moins de quinze ans), les états de la région devront se doter de nouvelles infrastructures, augmenter la productivité agricole et élargir le marché du travail de façon à pouvoir répondre aux besoins pressants de cohortes de jeunes adultes toujours plus nombreuses qui, d’année en année, rivaliseront pour des emplois rémunérateurs au sein d’une main d’œuvre déjà largement sous-employée. En même temps, les gouvernements devront maintenir la sécurité collective. Leurs efforts pour y parvenir, quand bien même ils seraient sous-tendus par la meilleure volonté et une parfaite expertise, ne pourront s’approcher de leurs objectifs qu’à condition de s’attaquer en priorité à l’entrave majeure au développement, à savoir les taux de fertilité persistant à des niveaux très élevés.

S’ils veulent sortir de l’impasse actuelle, les gouvernements sahéliens devront réorienter une partie importante de leurs efforts de développement et moyens financiers vers des politiques et programmes visant à améliorer la condition féminine : en prévenant les mariages et grossesses précoces chez les adolescentes, en promouvant l’éducation des filles et en garantissant la pleine participation des femmes dans tous les secteurs publics et privés, à commencer par les lieux de travail. Car l’amélioration tous azimuts de la condition féminine est la condition sine qua non pour l’avènement de familles de taille plus réduite et aux membres mieux instruits. Or, l’insurrection djihadiste dans la région complique la mise en œuvre, en toute sécurité, de programmes promouvant les femmes, du moins en dehors des grandes villes sous le contrôle des gouvernements ; elle comporte aussi le risque que les bailleurs de fonds extérieurs du développement, notamment l’Union européenne et les États-Unis, se désengagent de la région pour ne plus chercher qu’à contenir de l’extérieur — à l’instar de ce qu’ils font déjà en Somalie — la menace djihadiste et la pression migratoire montante au Sahel.

Un forum de débat associé : perspectives politiques et projets régionaux

Pour prolonger Bette étude et ouvrir le débat à d’autres expertises, initiatives et projets menés dans le Sahel, le Conseil Atlantique a demandé à l’ONG américaine Organizing to Advance Solutions in the Sahel (OASIS), dédiée à l’accélération de la transition démographique dans la région, d’inviter à collaborer des experts ouest-africains en santé publique et en éducation. Dans une série de débats organisés à cette fin, ces professionnels ont confronté leurs idées quant aux mérites des approches politiques actuelles et des projets en cours dans la région, ainsi que des obstacles rencontrés et de leurs recommandations en la matière. Sous le titre « Accélérer la transition démographique », le synopsis de ces consultations est accessible ici. Par ailleurs, une note d’accompagnement d’OASIS dresse le tableau de l’aide internationale en matière de santé reproductive et pour l’éducation des filles dans le Sahel. La version intégrale de cette note, dont les principales informations ont été intégrées dans la présente étude, peut être consultée via le lien que voici.

Les résultats en un coup d’œil

Le profil d’âge d’une population et la « fenêtre démographique ». Pris dans leur ensemble, les pays du Sahel abritent parmi les populations les plus jeunes du monde. Qui plus est, selon la projection moyenne de fécondité de la Division de la population des Nations Unies (ONU), aucun pays sahélien ne devrait atteindre au cours des vingt à vingt-cinq années à venir — soit la période couverte par le présent rapport — la « fenêtre démographique », c’est-à-dire une période propice à la croissance économique et au développement du fait d’un profil d’âge favorable de la population (on parle à ce propos aussi de « dividende démographique »). Au cours des soixante-dix dernières années, c’est dans cette « fenêtre » — qui s’ouvre à partir d’un âge médian d’une population entre 25 et 26 ans — que d’autres pays ont généralement atteint des niveaux de développement moyens supérieurs (correspondant à cette catégorie de revenus, telle que définie par la Banque mondiale, et les niveaux plus élevés d’éducation et de survie des enfants qui y sont associés). D’ici à 2045, seuls la Mauritanie et le Sénégal s’approcheront de cette « fenêtre démographique », à en croire la projection actuelle de l’ONU à faible taux de fécondité — le scénario le plus optimiste de la série standard de la Division de la Population.

La croissance démographique. Les démographes de l’ONU estiment que la population totale des six états du Sahel est passée de près de 21 millions d’habitants, en 1960, à environ 103 millions en 2020, soit presque un quintuplement en soixante ans. Pour le nord du Nigéria, leurs estimations aboutissent à une trajectoire de croissance similaire, avec près de 78 millions d’habitants en 2020. Les populations combinées des six pays du Sahel et du nord du Nigéria devraient ainsi passer de l’estimation actuelle — 181 millions d’habitants — à une fourchette comprise entre 370 millions et 415 millions d’habitants en 2045. Une grande partie de cette croissance sera le résultat de l’actuel profil d’âge très jeune de ces populations et de l’élan démographique qui en résulte (en anglais, on parle à ce propos de age-structural momentum ou population momentum).

La baisse de la fécondité. Les taux globaux de fécondité de la région varient actuellement entre 4,6 enfants par femme au Sénégal et en Mauritanie et des taux de pré-transition démographique — plus de 6,5 enfants par femme — au Niger et dans les douze états du nord du Nigéria. Dans tout le Sahel, les taux de procréation chez les adolescentes restent extrêmement élevés, et la taille de la famille perçue comme étant « idéale » est généralement égale ou supérieure à la fécondité réalisée. Dans le passé, jusqu’aux séries de données de l’ONU en 2010, les projections de baisse de fécondité de la Division de la Population pour les pays du Sahel se sont toujours avérées trop optimistes. Cependant, des enquêtes locales plus récentes indiquent que la version actuelle de sa projection de fécondité moyenne n’est pas hors de portée. Ce scénario prédit qu’entre 2040 et 2045 la fécondité diminuera pour atteindre entre 4 et 3,4 enfants par femme dans la plupart des états du Sahel, et près de 4,7 au Niger. Il y a déjà des écarts significatifs dans l’utilisation de contraceptifs modernes et entre les modèles de procréation chez les femmes rurales au Sahel et les femmes urbaines plus instruites. Mais ces différences ne sont pas encore aussi prononcées qu’en Afrique de l’Est ou en Afrique australe, où la baisse de la fécondité est plus avancée et se poursuit à un rythme plus rapide.

La santé maternelle et infantile, ainsi que l’éducation des filles. Alors que la mortalité infantile a constamment diminué au Sahel, un enfant sur dix meurt encore avant l’âge de cinq ans au Mali et au Tchad. Par ailleurs, selon des estimations récentes de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), plus de 40 pour cent des enfants de moins de cinq ans présentent un retard de croissance au Niger et au Tchad. Toujours selon l’OMS, le taux de mortalité maternelle au Tchad est le deuxième plus élevé du monde, tandis que la Mauritanie, le Mali et le Niger figurent parmi les vingt pays de la planète où la grossesse et l’accouchement sont les plus dangereux. Au Tchad et au Niger, seule une fille sur cinq en âge de l’être est en réalité inscrite dans un établissement d’enseignement secondaire ; ailleurs dans la région, le taux net de scolarisation des filles ne dépasse pas 40 pour cent dans le secondaire. Partout, les mariages d’adolescentes restent le principal obstacle à l’augmentation de leur niveau d’éducation.

L’autonomie et les droits des femmes. En dépit des conseils prodigués par des professionnels locaux de la santé et les exhortations des agences de l’ONU, les gouvernements sahéliens successifs n’ont, jusqu’à présent, pris aucune disposition effective pour faire appliquer les lois déjà existantes qui permettraient de réduire les mariages d’adolescentes, d’éliminer l’excision, de protéger les femmes contre les mariages forcés, de restreindre la polygamie ou, encore, de donner aux femmes des droits égaux de succession et la garde de leurs enfants en cas de séparation conjugale ou de veuvage. Alors que les défenseurs des droits des femmes considèrent que ces mesures sont indispensables pour faire évoluer les préférences vers des familles plus restreintes et mieux éduquées, les dirigeants craignent un retour de flamme politique. L’ampleur de la résistance organisée — comme, par exemple, lors des manifestations d’organisations islamiques au Mali en 2009, qui ont fait reculer les droits des femmes — a même convaincu certains professionnels du développement que, dans plusieurs états du Sahel, la seule voie de changement actuellement ouverte passe, à moyen terme, par un soutien financier accru à l’éducation des filles, aux réseaux des soins de santé pour les femmes et aux organisations de la société civile qui luttent pour l’égalité des femmes.

L’agriculture. Malgré le changement climatique, la hausse des températures locales et le récent ralentissement de l’expansion des terres cultivées, la croissance de la production céréalière a, depuis 1990, dépassé le rythme de la croissance démographique dans la région, qui est de l’ordre de 3 pour cent par an. Cependant, en raison de récoltes erratiques sur des terres exploitées de façon peu productive, de conflits armés et d’un grand nombre de personnes déplacées, les états de la région sont restés tributaires d’une aide alimentaire importante. Alors que l’irrigation par les eaux souterraines est susceptible de prendre de l’ampleur, les effets combinés de la croissance démographique future, du réchauffement climatique continu, de l’insurrection persistante et de la sécheresse périodique dans le Sahel rendent l’autosuffisance alimentaire très improbable dans un avenir prévisible.

Le pastoralisme. Après trois décennies d’augmentation relativement régulière des précipitations dans certaines parties de la région, le nombre de têtes de bétail (ajusté en fonction des différences de taille des espèces) a considérablement augmenté depuis les années 1990. Pourtant, les zones de pâturage les plus productives ont diminué parce qu’elles ont aussi été mises à contribution par des populations croissantes d’agriculteurs dans les zones plus arides. En même temps, le nombre des détenteurs de droits de pâturage a été multiplié et la végétation des zones convoitées s’est sensiblement dégradée, au point où la moins bonne qualité du fourrage a précipité le passage des bovins aux moutons et aux chèvres. Dans tout le Sahel, les agro-écologistes ont noté l’émergence de ce qu’ils appellent des systèmes de production « néo-pastoraux », lesquels se caractérisent par de riches propriétaires de grands troupeaux absents du terrain, la prolifération d’armes légères mais sophistiquées et, sur place, une sous-classe pastorale paupérisée et politiquement marginalisée qui est de plus en plus vulnérable à la radicalisation.

La sécurité. Depuis 2009, le Sahel fait face à des insurrections islamistes en pleine expansion. Cette tendance est susceptible de s’aggraver étant donné qu’aucun état de la région ne devrait atteindre, d’ici à 2045, la « fenêtre démographique » qui, selon les modèles fondés sur l’analyse du profil d’âge d’une population, inaugure une baisse substantielle du risque de conflits non-territoriaux (ou révolutionnaires) persistants. D’après ces modèles, les conflits en cours au Mali, Burkina Faso et Niger, ainsi qu’au Tchad et dans le nord du Nigéria sont ainsi statistiquement susceptibles de se poursuivre, à un certain niveau, pendant les vingt-cinq années à venir. Ce qui retardera d’autant l’amélioration de la condition féminine dans la mesure où, contrairement aux insurrections d’inspiration marxiste dans l’Asie du Sud-Est et en Amérique latine au cours de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, la présence djihadiste dans les zones rurales du Sahel limite les progrès de l’éducation des femmes, leur autonomie et la fourniture de services de planification familiale..

L’urbanisation. Dans les six pays francophones du Sahel, la population urbaine — en croissance rapide — représente actuellement environ un tiers de la population et devrait s’approcher de la moitié d’ici à 2045. Les investissements dans le logement ont permis de réduire sensiblement la proportion des personnes vivant dans des bidonvilles, mais ces efforts ont été dépassés par une croissance urbaine telle qu’en chiffres absolus, la population des bidonvilles dans la région a presque doublé depuis 1990. À mesure que les opportunités génératrices de revenus se font rares dans les secteurs de l’agriculture et de l’élevage, les espoirs des hommes jeunes reposent sur le marché du travail urbain et les possibilités d’éducation susceptibles de les rendre aptes à l’emploi. Toutefois, l’emploi dans le secteur formel de l’économie demeurera l’exception rare dans la région, et l’urbanisation rapide continue ne manquera pas de poser de nouveaux problèmes de logement, d’accès à l’eau potable et à l’énergie, d’assainissement, de santé publique et de sécurité. Pour relever ces défis, les gouvernements locaux et les bailleurs de fonds étrangers devraient investir massivement dans l’aménagement urbain afin de stimuler les transitions vers une plus grande autonomie des femmes et vers des familles plus réduites, mieux nourries et mieux éduquées. Ce faisant, ils ouvriraient aussi de meilleures perspectives pour trouver un emploi en ville.

La migration. Entre 1990 et 2015, plus de 80 pour cent des flux migratoires à partir des six pays francophones du Sahel ont abouti au-delà des frontières de la région. Au cours de cette période, six migrants sur dix ayant quitté le Sahel se sont installés ailleurs en Afrique, alors que les quatre autres sont partis en Europe, en Amérique du Nord ou vers d’autres destinations. Le Sénégal et le Nigéria ont été les principales portes de sortie vers l’Europe et l’Amérique du Nord. À ces flux migratoires se sont ajoutés, dans la période 2015-2020, d’importants flux de réfugiés du fait de l’escalade des conflits dans le bassin du lac Tchad ainsi qu’au Mali, Niger et Burkina Faso. Pour les jeunes Sahéliens réduits à la précarité aussi bien dans les zones rurales pratiquant l’agriculture de subsistance que dans des bidonvilles, la sécheresse épisodique, les conflits persistants et les difficultés économiques durables représentent des facteurs d’incitation au départ. Dans cette partie aride et peu développée du monde, la taille de la population est importante au regard des ressources disponibles — d’où une pénurie de facteurs d’attraction pour rester sur place. La croissance démographique ne cesse de grossir les rangs des personnes dont les moyens de subsistance sont marginaux et qui pourraient être poussées à partir en cas de désastres naturels ou politiques pour aller chercher de meilleures opportunités ailleurs.

Modèles d’une transition accélérée

Ce rapport met en exergue les voices empruntées par trois états qui, par des politiques et programmes non-coercitifs, ont réussi à accélérer leur transition démographique en baissant leur taux de fécondité et en transformant le profil d’âge de leurs populations: la Tunisie, le Botswana et le Bangladesh. Bien que ces pays diffèrent géographiquement, culturellement et économiquement des pays sahéliens, les points de départ démographiques étaient similaires et sont comparables avec la situation actuelle dans les pays sahéliens. En effet, dans les trois états cités en exemple, l’âge médian de la population était inférieur à vingt ans (ce qui correspond à une pyramide d’âge très élargie à la base) et l’indicateur synthétique de fécondité se situait entre six et sept enfants par femme. Par ailleurs, mention est également faite des politiques et programmes en cours pour changer la donne démographique en Éthiopie, au Rwanda, au Kenya et au Malawi.

La Tunisie. Dans ce pays d’Afrique du Nord, la sortie accélérée de la transition démographique doit beau- coup au leadership inspiré de Habib Bourguiba, le pre- mier président de la Tunisie. Il a fait passer un ensemble de réformes favorables aux femmes, notamment des lois obligeant les parents à envoyer leurs filles à l’école, relevant l’âge légal du mariage, interdisant le port du voile et la polygamie, réduisant le pouvoir des imams locaux, autorisant les femmes à travailler en dehors de leur foyer, leur donnant plein droit à l’héritage, faisant du divorce un processus judiciaire et mettant en place dans tout le pays des centres de planification familiale volontaire.

Botswana. D’emblée, le professionnalisme des soins mis à disposition et leur coût abordable ont été les éléments-clés de l’effort de ce pays en matière de santé reproductive. Proposés gratuitement depuis 1970, les services de planification familiale ont été intégrés aux soins de santé maternelle et infantile dans tous les établissements de santé primaire locaux. En outre, le Botswana est l’un des rares pays d’Afrique subsaharienne où le taux de scolarisation des filles dans l’enseignement secondaire dépasse celui des garçons. Le Botswana a partagé avec les pays du Sahel le défi initial des taux élevés de mariages et de grossesses précoces. Mais sa bonne gouvernance et son utilisation judicieuse de ses rentes minières (diamantifère, notamment) le distingue de la plupart des pays du continent.

Le Bangladesh. La remarquable transformation démographique de ce pays est due à une administration sanitaire dévouée. Celle-ci a su mobiliser des dizaines de milliers d’agents de santé communautaires et de bénévoles en faisant équipe avec une organisation non-gouvernementale locale, le Comité pour le Progrès Rural au Bangladesh (BRAC). Elle a également utilisé à bon escient les fonds d’aide et les produits de santé apportés par les donateurs étrangers. Lancée en 1975, cette approche, soutenue par une campagne de communication en matière de santé publique à l’échelle du pays, a contribué à déclencher la demande de nouvelles méthodes de contraception à long terme (par exemple, des injectables et des implants), l’élargissement au niveau national du programme des travailleurs de village et la mise en place d’une chaîne d’approvisionnement en matière de santé publique.

Programmes ailleurs en Afrique. Forts du soutien de leurs dirigeants politiques et en s’inspirant des expériences en Asie et en Amérique latine, les programmes de santé reproductive en Éthiopie, au Rwanda, au Kenya et au Malawi ont gagné une grande visibilité et des soutiens importants de la part des bailleurs de fonds étrangers. Au cours des trois dernières décennies, une meilleure attention prêtée à l’éducation des filles, les efforts organisés pour accroître les droits des femmes en matière de procréation et leur participation politique, de même qu’une communication efficace en matière de santé publique, ont amélioré l’efficacité de ces programmes ciblant, à la fois, la santé maternelle et infantile ainsi que la planification familiale. Toutefois, d’importants problèmes de prestation de services et d’acceptation des contraceptifs modernes subsistent dans chacun de ces pays où les taux d’abandon de la contraception sont élevés et les écarts dans l’utilisation des contraceptifs restent grands entre les ménages ruraux à faible revenu et les familles urbaines plus riches.

Scénarios

Dans des situations de crise et d’incertitude, bâtir des scénarios d’avenir aide à réduire le champ des possibles et à déceler des éventualités peu visibles qui pourraient prendre les décideurs au dépourvu. Ces futurs fictifs permettent aux analystes de s’écarter des trajectoires d’événements les plus attendus et d’explorer d’autres possibilités sans avoir à imaginer des discontinuités ou à expliquer des enchaînements d’événements complexes qui, au cours de l’histoire, ont parfois conduit à des surprises. Dans un souci didactique de concision, notre étude présentera les trois scénarios suivants sous la forme de dépêches d’agence de presse (évidemment fictives mais plausibles), des coups de projecteur sur la situation du Sahel au début des années 2040

Du pareil au même. Lors d’un sommet interrégional tenu en 2043, l’Union Européenne (UE) et l’organisation des états sahéliens conviennent d’une nouvelle convention quinquennale sur la migration. L’accord contrôle et limite les flux de migrants en provenance et à travers le Sahel en échange d’une forte augmentation de l’aide financière de l’UE à la région. Ce scénario repose sur l’hypothèse que les inscriptions des filles à l’école ont continué à augmenter dans le Sahel et que l’utilisation de contraceptifs modernes y a lentement progressé en s’étendant des zones urbaines en plein essor aux villes de province, puis dans les villages. Cependant, les gouvernements n’ont guère mené d’actions soutenues pour renforcer les droits des femmes ou atténuer l’ordre patriarcal, qui tolère, entre autres, les mariages et grossesses précoces. En même temps, au nom d’une gouvernance islamique, les états du Sahel ont institué des compléments de revenu en espèces pour les mères à la maison, à la fois pour maintenir les femmes au foyer et pour leur offrir une relative indépendance financière. Par ailleurs, ces états ont mis en commun leurs ressources militaires afin de mieux contenir les groupes djihadistes, qui sont restés actifs, notamment, dans les zones rurales du Sahel.

La percée. Également en 2043, un sommet des états sahéliens regroupés au sein du G7 Sahel débat, sur la base d’un rapport parrainé par l’ONU, du retour- nement de situation en matière de santé reproductive dans plusieurs de ses pays membres et des progrès significatifs enregistrés dans d’autres. Un représentant local du Fonds des Nations Unies pour la Population (UNFPA) présente les résultats d’une grande enquête démographique et sanitaire. Il en ressort qu’au Sénégal et au Burkina Faso, l’indicateur synthétique de fécondité est passé sous la barre des trois enfants par femme, et que même le Niger semble emboîter le pas à la région dans sa marche vers une baisse de la fécondité. Des enquêtes locales menées dans plusieurs grandes villes du Sahel révèlent que la fécondité y est déjà proche du seuil de remplacement de deux enfants par femme et que l’afflux dans les maternités, ainsi que la taille des classes d’école, ont considérablement diminué. Mais, du fait de l’accroissement continu de la population (dû à l’élan démographique qui résulte de son profil d’âge très jeune), de la hausse des températures, de mauvaises récoltes périodiques et de la violence sporadique des djihadistes, les importations de céréales et l’aide alimentaire restent des éléments essentiels pour la sécurité alimentaire au Sahel.

Le décrochage. Lors d’une session du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU en 2043, le Représentant spécial pour le Sahel du Secrétaire général appelle à une action internationale d’urgence pour faire face à une crise multiforme dans la région. Il décrit la faillite de plusieurs états sahéliens et les luttes territoriales entre seigneurs de la guerre. Il cite notamment la détérioration des conditions de sécurité dans le pays haoussa tant au Nigéria qu’au Niger, où des groupes djihadistes prophétiques ont proliféré et, dans certains cas, assis leur autorité politique. Il relève également que les aérodromes dans le Sahel sont devenus des plaques tournantes pour toutes sortes de trafics, y compris d’êtres humains. Il interpelle le Conseil de sécurité au sujet du Niger en proie à une famine d’une ampleur comparable à celle, catastrophique, du début des années 1980. Or, cette fois, ce pays doit nourrir une population de près de soixante millions d’habitants, au lieu des 7 millions à l’époque. Ce défi est d’autant plus grand que la porte d’entrée régionale qu’est le Sénégal pour l’aide alimentaire et d’autres formes d’assistance humanitaire est tout juste entr’ouverte, le gouvernement sénégalais n’étant guère coopératif, pas plus pour l’acheminement de secours que dans la lutte contre la migration illégale vers l’Europe.

Recommandations

Pour les donators d’aide internationale au Sahel, cette étude contient une recommandation d’ordre général: au cours des vingt à vingt-cinq années à venir, les transitions démographiques dans la région devraient comporter au moins une ou deux réussites exemplaires pouvant servir de réservoir d’expertise locale et de modèles pour la mobilisation communautaire susceptibles de se propager ailleurs. Le Sénégal semble être le meilleur candidat à l’accueil d’un tel effort concerté. Parmi les pays enclavés du Sahel, c’est peut-être encore le cas du Burkina Faso, à condition que ses zones rurales retrouvent paix et sécurité. Au Niger, au Mali et au Tchad, les interventions les plus efficaces seront sans doute celles qui améliorent la situation des femmes, développent à grande échelle les infrastructures dans les villes et forment des agents de santé suffisamment dévoués pour qu’ils acceptent de travailler dans les périphéries urbaines et les camps de réfugiés où les demandes d’éducation, de planification familiale et d’autres services de santé reproductive sont généralement élevées. Voici aussi les recommandations plus spécifiques de notre étude:

Mettre à profit l’urbanisation. Les gouvernements de la région devront redoubler d’efforts pour améliorer le niveau d’éduca- tion des filles et, avec le concours des bailleurs de fonds étrangers, augmenter considérablement les dépenses consacrées à la planning familial et aux autres services de santé reproductive. Ils devront par ailleurs élever le statut administratif de la planification familiale au rang de responsabilité ministérielle et renforcer sa visibil- ité par des campagnes d’information. De surcroît, les administrations chargées de l’éducation nationale et Dans ces villes en expansion, il sera également impératif que l’éducation des filles et la planification familiale sur une base volontaire, ainsi que des services de santé maternelle et infantile, se mettent en place, et que les femmes y aient un accès de plein droit aux emplois, tant dans le secteur privé que public.

Renforcer l’éducation des filles et la planification familiale. Les gouvernements de la région devront redoubler d’efforts pour améliorer le niveau d’éduca- tion des filles et, avec le concours des bailleurs de fonds étrangers, augmenter considérablement les dépenses consacrées à la planning familial et aux autres services de santé reproductive. Ils devront par ailleurs élever le statut administratif de la planification familiale au rang de responsabilité ministérielle et renforcer sa visibil- ité par des campagnes d’information. De surcroît, les administrations chargées de l’éducation nationale et de la santé publique devraient éliminer les obstacles bureaucratiques, traditionnels et religieux à la scolarisa- tion des filles et permettre un accès facile et abordable aux services de planification familiale aux personnes mariées aussi bien que célibataires. La mise à dispo- sition de ces services devrait être décentralisée pour être accessible dans les quartiers urbains comme dans les foyers ruraux ; à ce titre, des agents de santé villa- geois et des cliniques mobiles paraissent particulière- ment bien adaptés aux conditions sahéliennes. Il serait également utile que des organisations professionnelles de la santé créent une bibliothèque en ligne pour ren- dre accessibles des exemples de réussite locales dans les domaines de l’éducation des filles — leur éducation sexuelle et en matière de santé reproductive — et du planning familial.

Travailler avec des chefs religieux et politiques, ainsi que d’autres personnalités publiques; impliquer et informer les hommes. L’utilisation plus générale de contraceptifs modernes est souvent liée à des prises de position publiques de la part de chefs religieux, qui jugent le planning familial compatible avec la foi. Par ailleurs, des études récentes accréditent l’idée que les programmes qui informent et impliquent les hommes et s’appuient sur le soutien de dirigeants locaux ont les plus grandes chances de réussite dans le Sahel. Enfin, depuis des décennies, les communicants de la santé y travaillent déjà avec des producteurs de télévision et de radio, ainsi qu’avec des artistes — en particulier des acteurs connus de feuilletons ou talk-shows populaires — pour mieux diffuser des messages de service public concernant la santé maternelle et infantile, la nutrition, l’éducation sexuelle, le VIH/Sida, les droits des femmes ou le planning familial.

Renforcer les droits des femmes. Dans le Sahel, de grands progrès peuvent être accomplis en protégeant les filles et les femmes contre de multiples formes de discrimination et de violence, et en renforçant leurs droits dans le cadre du mariage. Cet effort commence par l’application des lois nationales déjà existantes, qui interdisent l’excision, les mariages forcés et le mariage précoce, avant l’âge de dix-huit ans. Une fois mariées, les femmes devraient avoir le droit d’obtenir un recours contre la violence conjugale, de demander le divorce et de se voir confier la garde des enfants en cas de séparation, de divorce ou de décès du conjoint. Les femmes devraient aussi jouir d’un plein droit de recours en justice et d’un traitement égal devant les tribunaux aux affaires familiales gérés par l’État ; elles ne devraient pas rester tributaires des jugements rendus par des tribunaux religieux et traditionnels, qui n’ont généralement pas su les protéger, pas plus que leurs enfants, contre des préjudices physiques, psychologiques et économiques. Là où la résistance politique a fait reculer les efforts législatifs visant à accroître les droits des femmes (comme, par exemple, au Mali, comme déjà indiqué), le soutien qui est leur apporté par des coopératives ou des organisations professionnelles ou éducatives peut ouvrir des voies alternatives aux femmes sahéliennes pour accéder à une plus grande autonomie et à des fonctions dirigeantes.

Apporter des services aux minorités marginalisées. Les ministères de la santé et de l’édu- cation devraient veiller à ce que les minorités marginalisées, quel que soit leur isolement géo- graphique ou culturel, bénéficient de leurs pro- grammes de planning familial ou en faveur d’une meilleure éducation des filles et du renforce- ment des droits des femmes. Les expériences antérieures dans d’autres parties du monde portent à croire que les disparités régionales, socio-économiques, ethniques ou de caste en matière de fécondité tendent à se solidifier en des inégalités difficiles à effacer et génératrices d’animosités et de tensions politiques.

Promouvoir des efforts au bénéfice des femmes dans tous les projets de développement ou d’équipement. Qu’ils soient gouvernementaux, privés ou financés par des bail- leurs de fonds étrangers, tous les projets de développement ou d’équipement au Sahel, dans le domaine agricole ou d’autres secteurs économiques, devraient contenir des clauses pour promouvoir une meilleure instruction des filles et des femmes, pour leur aménager un accès plus facile aux services de santé reproductive et pour renforcer leurs droits et leur indépendance financière. Aucun projet soutenu par des donateurs internationaux ne devrait permettre aux pouvoirs publics, partis politiques ou chefs religieux ou traditionnels d’entraver l’émancipation des femmes.

Gérer les tensions autour du partage des res- sources entre agriculteurs et pasteurs. Dans une région aride de plus en plus peuplée, l’avenir des moyens de subsistance agricoles et pastoraux dépendra du développement de l’irrigation, de l’intensification de l’agropastoralisme (soit une intégration plus poussée des utilisations agricoles et pastorales des terres) et de l’accès aux marchés urbains. En vue de ce futur plus peuplé, les gouvernements sahéliens devraient limiter le nombre des grands propriétaires de troupeaux de bétail ne résidant pas sur leurs terres de pâturage, protéger les pâturages de l’empiètement par des agriculteurs et aider les éleveurs à lutter contre le vol de bétail. En parallèle, les pouvoirs publics devraient favoriser l’industrie agro-alimentaire de transformation génératrice de valeur ajoutée, promouvoir la coopération entre agriculteurs et éleveurs et améliorer les moyens de transport et voies d’accès aux marchés urbains.

Protéger les acquis du développement par des investissements dans la sécurité locale. Des groupes djihadistes tendent à se multiplier dans le Sahel et à étendre leur emprise. De ce fait, les poches géographiques où des responsables locaux et une majorité de la population soutiennent l’éducation des filles et le renforcement des droits des femmes deviennent les cibles de choix des militants armés. Aussi, ces communautés locales et leurs dirigeants devraient-ils bénéficier d’une protection spéciale par la police ou les unités antiterroristes.

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Report

Nov 4, 2021

What future for the Western Sahel?

By Richard Cincotta and Stephen Smith

The Western Sahel is in a demographic impasse. To work their way out of this dilemma, Sahelian governments must shift a significant part of their development focus and funding to policies and programs aimed at preventing adolescent marriages and childbearing, promoting girls’ education, securing women’s participation in public- and private-sector workplaces, and achieving small, healthy, well-educated families.

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The Sahel is at a significant turning-point. The region’s evolving security situation has been marked by the military coups across the region and the French announcement to reshape Barkhane. The recent expulsion of the French Ambassador from Mali shows how much the relations between Mali and France have been deteriorating since the military seized power in August 2020 while the Russian parastatal Wagner Group is suspected to augment local forces in the region.

It has been almost ten years since the beginning of the security crisis in the Sahel. In the throes of multiple insurgencies, Sahelian countries and their foreign allies seem to be aware of the limits of military containment. While the international community is working on a new military roadmap, the publication of the report, “Sahel: Moving Beyond Military Containment” offers the opportunity to focus on development issues, too often undermined in the international agenda.

The Sahel is an African region stretching from Mauritania on the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea. Due to its arid climate, the region often suffers from droughts and is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world to climate change.

In December 2021, the launch of the report offered the opportunity to raise the development challenges in this area. Atlantic Council hosted the ministers of economy and/or development of the G5 Sahel (Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger-Burkina-Faso’s government was dissolved the day before) and the United Nations Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel to share their vision of the future of their region, from an economic sustainability, community development and human point of view. Donors can help by moving away from anti-terror kinetic operations towards civilian protection and social projects that better embed the state in local social relations and strengthen local communities in the face of difficult natural conditions.

Authors

Pierre Englebert is a senior fellow at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. 

Rida Lyammouri is a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South. 

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On October 25, 2021, Nigeria launched its central bank digital currency (CBDC) — the eNaira. Development began in 2017 with the identification of possible functions. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) then partnered with Bitt, a fintech company based in Barbados, to develop eNaira. The main objectives for developing eNaira were to improve the availability and access to central bank money, support a resilient payments system, encourage financial inclusion, and reduce the cost of processing cash. Furthermore, eNaira aims to enable direct welfare disbursement to Nigerian citizens, increase the government’s revenue and tax collections, facilitate diaspora remittances, and reduce the cost of cross-border payments.

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How it Works

The current version of eNaira focuses on person-to-person (P2P) and person-to-business (P2B) transactions through the Speed and the Merchant Wallets respectively. Central Bank Governor Godwin Emefiele announced in October that 500 million eNaira, an equivalent of $1.21 million, had already been minted and a total of 200 million eNaira had been issued to banks.

To set up a Speed Wallet, eNaira currently requires users to enter their phone number, email, and Bank Verification Number (BVN). This means that only those with bank accounts are currently able to use the eNaira. After an email verification, users are able to use the wallet in tandem with online banking apps. To load the wallet with eNaira, users log on to their personal banking app and transfer the desired amount to their wallet. Users are then able to send eNaira to anyone with an eNaira wallet by scanning the recipient’s QR code. 

As a young global professional at the GeoEconomics Center, my research has focused on the evolution of central bank digital currencies. In November, I traveled to Nigeria, where I had the opportunity to see eNaira in action. In my experience, using eNaira’s Speed Wallet was fairly simple. Once I obtained the necessary information from my personal bank, I was easily able to register for the Speed Wallet, and did not experience any of the issues that were reported during the initial launch of the CBDC, such as technical bugs for new users trying to register. 

The CBN announced in December of 2021, it has recorded 583,000 personal wallets and 83,000 Merchant Wallets with total transactions amounting to N188 million, or $500,000. The central bank could do more to increase the adoption of eNaira in a country with over 200 million people and an annual GDP of nearly $500 billion; particularly if President Mohammadu Buhari hopes to use eNaira to increase Nigeria’s GDP by $29 billion over the next 10 years. 

The government should continue to work with private banks to encourage their customers to transition from a mobile payment transfer system to an eNaira wallet. In addition, the Speed Wallet needs to be further developed to facilitate diaspora remittances. The ability to send money directly from foreign to Nigerian bank accounts would encourage more Nigerians to use eNaira. The central bank should also focus on integrating the Speed Wallet and personal banking, so that users could load their Speed Wallet with eNaira without accessing their personal banking app. Having to switch between two apps is the most tedious part of using eNaira so fixing this would make the app more user friendly.

Financial Inclusion 

The Central Bank of Nigeria adopted the National Financial Inclusion Strategy in 2012, with the primary goal of increasing Nigerians’ access to financial services from 36% in 2012, to 80% in 2020. However, Nigeria fell short of this goal. The EFinA’s Access to Financial Services in Nigeria 2020 Survey indicated that the country had reached a financial inclusion rate of 64% by the end of 2020. The remaining 36% — equivalent to over 38 million adults —  still do not have access to banking services. CBN’s Annual Financial Inclusion Strategy Report identified “women, youth, rural dwellers Micro-, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) and Northern Nigeria” as the most disproportionately excluded demographics. Widespread use of the eNaira could promote financial inclusion in Nigeria by making banking services easily accessible to these excluded groups. Recently, the CBN reported that northern states, primarily Borno, Sokoto, and Gombe, are leading in CBDC adoption ahead of Lagos, a center for economic activity in Nigeria. If this continues, Nigeria’s CBDC could aid in closing the country’s regional gap in access to financial services.

Cash remains the dominant form of transaction in Nigeria, especially for financially excluded groups who are less likely to have access to banking services. However in recent years the payment landscape in Nigeria has evolved and continues to do so. In 2019, digital payments were valued at close to 109 trillion naira, up from only 4 trillion in 2012, when the National Financial Inclusion Strategy was announced. The next phase of eNaira will allow people to register for the Speed Wallet with just their National Identification Number (NIN), thereby facilitating financial inclusion where the current digital payments infrastructure falls short. Therefore, Nigerians without bank accounts and a Bank Verification Number (BVN) would be able to send and receive eNaira.

The CBN hopes to achieve this, along with offline use for eNaira, through the use of Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) short codes, which would allow users without a strong internet connection and smartphones to use the CBDC. The CBN is also considering making eNaira a payment gateway, technology used by merchants to accept customers’ debit or credit card payments, in order to facilitate wider adoption of the CBDC. If the central bank is able to implement the changes that it has outlined, it could dramatically change the outlook of Nigeria’s financial inclusion strategy.

Naomi Aladekoba is a project assistant with the GeoEconomics Center focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese foreign policy, and international development.

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Pour lire la version française de ce rapport, cliquez ici.
A recording of the official launch event is available here.

The region’s demography and its implications by 2045

The Western Sahel—a region stretching from Senegal and Mauritania to Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, and including the twelve sharia law states of northern Nigeria—is in a demographic impasse. Rather than yielding an economic dividend, the conditions spawned by the region’s persistently youthful, rapidly growing, high-fertility populations overwhelm the capabilities of state-run services, generate extensive urban slum conditions, slow if not stall economic and social progress, and aggravate ethnic tensions. Decades of exposure to these mutually reinforcing conditions have undermined the legitimacy of central governments and rendered the region’s states vulnerable to the spread of Islamic populism and regime instability.

Due to the growth momentum of their youthful age structures, from now through the 2040-to-2045 period (the time horizon of this study), the region’s states will be driven to respond to the urgent needs to build infrastructure, increase agricultural productivity, maintain security, and generate jobs in their attempt to employ and politically pacify young-adult cohorts of unprecedented size who, each year, vie to enter the already underemployed Sahelian workforce. Yet these well-intentioned development efforts can never be sufficient unless the region’s governments prioritize policies and programs that address a key underlying impediment to development: sustained high fertility.

To work their way out of this dilemma, Sahelian governments must shift a significant part of their development focus and funding to policies and programs aimed at preventing adolescent marriages and childbearing, promoting girls’ education, securing women’s participation in public- and private-sector workplaces, and achieving small, healthy, well-educated families. However, the region’s persistent jihadist insurgency raises questions as to how far women-centered programs can be safely and successfully extended beyond the edges of the Western Sahel’s inland cities. Absent serious progress on these coupled crises, policy makers in the EU, the United States, and their non-European allies may eventually disengage (as they already have from Somalia today), concluding that containing the Western Sahel’s jihadist insurgency and out-migration at the region’s frontiers is a more viable option than continued development assistance.

Adjoining discussion paper: Regional policy and program perspectives

To gain further insights and cover policy and program issues that extend beyond the authors’ expertise, the Atlantic Council’s Foresight, Strategy, and Risk Initiative commissioned Organizing to Advance Solutions in the Sahel (OASIS), a reproductive health policy organization based in Berkeley, California, to convene a series of consultative discussions among West African public health and education professionals. These professionals discussed the merits of current policy and programmatic approaches in the Sahelian states, identified the major obstacles encountered, and recommended areas for additional effort and investment. A synopsis of these consultations appear in the OASIS discussion paper titled “Accelerating a Demographic Transition”. An additional analysis of international assistance to the Sahel for reproductive health and girls’ education is available in an accompanying OASIS brief. Several of their key points are discussed and cited in this report.

Key findings

Age structure and the demographic window. As a group, the Western Sahelian countries remain among the world’s most youthful populations. Moreover, within the 20-to-25-year period of this report, none of the Western Sahelian countries are projected by the United Nations (UN) Population Division’s medium-fertility projection to reach the demographic window, namely a period of socioeconomically and fiscally favorable age structures (the so-called demographic dividend). Over the past seventy years, it has been within this window—beginning at a median age of around 25 or 26 years—that countries generally have reached upper-middle levels of development (e.g., the World Bank’s upper-middle income category and associated levels of educational attainment and child survival). Notably, Mauritania and Senegal will approach this demographic window by 2045 in the current UN’s low-fertility projection—the most optimistic scenario in the Population Division’s standard series.

Population growth. UN demographers estimate that the overall population of the six states of the Western Sahel has grown from nearly 21 million inhabitants in 1960 to about 103 million in 2020—an almost five-fold increase over sixty years. For the twelve states of northern Nigeria, the authors’ modeled estimates suggest that the population trajectory has been comparably steep, reaching nearly 78 million in 2020. Those sources expect the combined populations of the six Western Sahelian countries and northern Nigeria to grow from today’s estimate of about 181 million to somewhere between a projected high, in 2045, of about 415 million, and a projected low of about 370 million people. Much of this growth is produced by age-structural momentum, a largely unavoidable consequence of the region’s extremely youthful age distribution.

Fertility decline. The region’s total fertility rates currently range between about 4.6 children per woman in Senegal and Mauritania, to pretransition rates—above 6.5 children per woman—in Niger and the twelve sharia law states of northern Nigeria. Throughout the Western Sahel, rates of adolescent childbearing remain extremely high, and ideal family size generally equals or exceeds realized fertility. Even in the recent past—up to and including the UN’s 2010 data series—the Population Division’s medium-fertility projections for the countries of the Western Sahel have proved overly optimistic. Yet, recent local surveys in the region indicate that the current version of its medium-fertility projection is not out of reach. That scenario assumes that, between 2040 and 2045, fertility will decline to between 3.4 and 4.0 children per woman in most of the Western Sahel’s states, and near 4.7 in Niger. Significant differences in modern contraceptive use and patterns of childbearing are already evident between rural women and more educated urban women, but the differences are not yet as pronounced as in East or southern Africa, where fertility decline is proceeding at a faster pace.

Maternal and child health, as well as girls’ education. Whereas childhood mortality has steadily declined in the Western Sahel, still one in ten children die before the age of five in Mali and Chad. Recent World Health Organization (WHO) estimates indicate that in Niger and Chad, more than 40 percent of children below age five exhibit stunting. According to the WHO, Chad’s maternal mortality rate is the world’s second highest, while Mauritania, Mali, and Niger are also among the twenty countries in which pregnancy and childbirth are the most dangerous. In Chad and Niger, just one in five eligible girls are enrolled in secondary school, and net secondary enrollment has yet to rise above 40 percent elsewhere in the region. Adolescent marriages remain the region’s most serious deterrent to increasing girls’ educational attainment.

Women’s autonomy and rights. Despite the advice of regional health professionals and the criticisms of UN agencies, successive governments have, so far, done little to enforce already existing laws that would reduce adolescent marriages, eliminate female genital cutting, protect women from forced marriages, restrict polygamy, and give women inheritance rights and custody of their own children in case of marital separation or widowhood. While women’s advocates see these as key to a shift in preferences to smaller, healthier, and better-educated families, current Sahelian political leadership fears political blowback. High levels of organized resistance—such as the large demonstrations by Islamic organizations in Mali, in 2009, that turned back women’s rights—have convinced some development professionals that for several states in the Western Sahel, the only route to change currently available may be through intensive investments in girls’ education and financial support for women’s health care networks, as well as progressive legal, professional, educational, and cooperative societies.

Farming. Despite rising temperatures and the recent slowdown of cropland expansion, the growth of grain production has, since 1990, exceeded the pace of the region’s roughly three percent per year rate of population growth. However, due to erratic harvests on mar- ginally productive croplands, armed conflict, and the presence of displaced populations, the region’s states are regular recipients of substantial food aid. Whereas ground-water irrigation is likely to become a more important input in the future, the combined effects of future population growth, continued climatic warming, persistent insurgency, and periodic drought in the Western Sahel make food self-sufficiency highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Pastoralism. After three decades of relatively steady increases in rainfall in parts of the region, livestock numbers (adjusted for species body-size differences) have grown significantly since the 1990s. Yet the most productive pastoral rangelands, put under the plow by growing populations of dryland farmers, have dwindled in surface area. Meanwhile, the numbers of grazing-rights holders have proliferated and vegetation on the remaining rangelands have dramatically deteriorated in form and forage quality, precipitating shifts from cattle to sheep and goats. Across the Sahel, agro-ecologists have noted the emergence of what they call neopastoral production systems that feature wealthy absentee owners of large herds, the proliferation of light but sophisticated weaponry, and a growing impoverished and politically marginalized pastoral underclass that is increasingly vulnerable to radicalization.

Security. The region is in the throes of rapidly growing Islamic insurgencies. Whereas demographic models of persistent non-territorial (revolutionary) conflict predict substantial declines in the risk of such conflict during the demographic window, none of the region’s states are currently projected by the UN Population Division to reach that window during the period of this report. Thus, the authors’ models suggest that ongoing conflicts in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and northern Nigeria are statistically likely to continue, at some level, through the 2040-2045 period. Unlike the Marxist-inspired insurgencies that ignited across Southeast Asia and Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century, the jihadist presence in the rural portions of the Western Sahel restricts the educational progress of women, their autonomy, and delivery of the family planning services that could facilitate fertility decline and improve reproductive health and nutrition.

Urbanization. The rapidly growing urban population of the six countries of the Western Sahel currently comprises about one-third of the region’s population and is projected to approach half by 2045. Despite laudable investments in housing that have dramatically reduced the proportion of slum dwellers in the urban population in several states, these efforts have been outpaced by rapid urban growth. Consequently, the region’s slum-resident population has nearly doubled since 1990. As income-generating opportunities evaporate in the agricultural and livestock sectors, the hopes of young men will rest on the urban job market and the educational opportunities that make them fit for employment. Yet employment in the formal sector of the economy will remain elusive throughout the region, and rapid urbanization is bound to present new housing, fresh water, energy, health, sanitation, and security challenges. Still, if governments and donors heavily invest, urban transformation could stimulate transitions to greater female autonomy and smaller, better educated, more well-nourished families with skills and prospects for urban employment in the region.

Migration. Between 1990 and 2015, more than 80 percent of migrant flows that originated in the six Western Sahelian countries ended beyond the region’s borders. During this period, slightly more than 60 percent of the net outward flows were added to populations in other African countries, whereas nearly 40 percent were added to populations in Europe, North America, and destinations elsewhere. Senegal and Nigeria in particular, represent significant migrant gateways to Europe and North America. This analysis does not even account for substantial refugee flows during the 2015-2020 period, which are associated with escalating conflict in the Lake Chad Basin, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. For young Sahelians surviving on marginal rural livelihoods and in urban slums, episodic drought, looming conflict, and sustained economic hardship represent weighty “push factors” that readily tip personal decision-making toward migration. In this arid and poorly developed part of the world, the region’s population size is clearly important. It adds to the ranks of those in marginal livelihoods who might be pressured to leave during episodic disasters and seek greater opportunities elsewhere, while creating few “pull factors” encouraging potential migrants to stay.

Models of demographic progress

The report also highlights the pathways taken by three countries that politically, programmatically, and without coercion, facilitated relatively rapid fertility transitions and age-structural transformations: Tunisia, Botswana, and Bangladesh. While these states differ geographically, culturally, and economically from the Western Sahelian states, their demographic starting points were similar. Initially, each experienced a broadly pyramidal profile with a median age under twenty years and, in each, the total fertility rate was estimated at between six and seven children per woman. To these, the paper adds a discussion of ongoing programmatic efforts that are influencing the patterns of reproduction in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Rwanda.

Tunisia. This North African country’s rapid journey out of the age-structural transition’s youthful phase was the product of the vision and leadership of Habib Bourguiba, the country’s first president. His Neo-Destour political party legislated a package of pro-women reforms, including laws that compelled parents to send their daughters to school, raised the legal age of marriage, prohibited polygamy, gave women full inheritance rights, made divorce a judicial process, provided decentralized centers of voluntary family planning, mandated that women could work outside the home, opposed the veil, and curtailed the power of local imams.

Botswana. From its inception, professional care and affordability have been key elements of this country’s reproductive health effort. Family planning services, provided free of charge since 1970, were directly integrated into maternal and child health care at all local primary health facilities. Moreover, the country is one of the few in the sub-Saharan region where girls’ secondary-school enrollment rates—now above 90 percent—exceed boys’ rates. While Botswana shared the initial challenge of high rates of adolescent pregnancy and early marriage with Sahelian countries, its history of effective governance and wise use of mineral rents sets Botswana apart from most countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Bangladesh. This country’s remarkable demographic turnaround was brought about by a dedicated health administration that mobilized tens of thousands of community-based health workers and volunteers, teamed up with a local non-governmental organization called Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and used an infusion of health commodities and funds from foreign donors. Begun in 1975, Bangladesh’s successful donor-funded approach and its country-wide public-health communications program helped trigger demand for other long-term contraception methods (e.g., injectables and implants), countrywide expansion of the village worker program, and formalization of Bangladesh’s public health supply chain.

Programs in East Africa. Applying lessons learned from Asia and Latin America, reproductive health programs in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, and Rwanda have attained strong support from national leaders, achieved high public profiles, and obtained strong financial commitments from foreign donors. Over the past three decades, greater attention to girls’ educational attainment, organized efforts to augment women’s reproductive rights and increase political participation, and effective public health communications have improved the effectiveness of donor-funded programs for maternal and child health as well as family planning. Significant service delivery and contraceptive acceptance challenges remain in each of these eastern African countries, including high contraceptive-discontinuation rates, and wide gaps in contraceptive use between the lowest-income households and wealthier, urban families.

Scenarios

In situations of crisis and uncertainty, scenarios help reduce the scope of options and unveil poorly visible possibilities that could, in the future, catch policy makers unaware. These fictitious futures allow analysts to depart from the most obvious event trajectories and explore other possibilities without having to imagine discontinuities or explain complex chains of events that, throughout history, have led to surprises. For the sake of didactic brevity, we present the following three scenarios under the guise of news dispatches, which shine a light on the situation in the Western Sahel in the early 2040s.

“More of the Same.” In an interregional summit, held in 2043, the European Union (EU) and an organization of Sahelian states agree to a fourth five-year multilateral Migration Convention. The agreement limits and controls the flow of migrants from and through the Sahel in return for a generous increase in the EU’s regional aid package. Girls’ school enrollments continue to rise in the region, and modern contraceptive use increases slowly, spreading from the burgeoning urban areas into smaller cities and towns. However, governments make little serious effort to expand women’s rights or to perturb the patriarchal system that condones adolescent marriages and childbearing. Meanwhile, some Western Sahelian states have instituted cash income supplements for stay-at-home mothers, offering an alternative to women competing in the region’s crowded job market. Meanwhile, Sahelian states continue to pool military resources to contain jihadist groups that remain active across the rural Sahel.

“Breakthrough.” A summit of the expanded group known as G7/Sahel, held in 2043, opens with the rollout of a UN-sponsored report highlighting a reproductive turnaround in several member states in the region and outlines significant progress in others. A local representative of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) reports on the results of demographic and health surveys indicating that, in both Senegal and Burkina Faso, countrywide total fertility rates have fallen below three children per woman, and that Niger appears to be following on a similar path. Local surveys in several Sahelian cities provide evidence that fertility is near the two-child-per-woman replacement level and that maternal and childhood clinical caseloads as well as school class sizes have dramatically declined. Despite a slowdown in the region’s rate of population increase, ongoing growth due to momentum, increasing temperatures, periodic crop failures, and sporadic jihadist violence, grain imports and food aid remain critical elements of the food-security equation in the Sahel.

“Downward Spiral.” In a UN Security Council session convened in 2043, the Sahel’s special representative calls for international action to address a multifaceted crisis unfolding across the Western Sahel. He describes Somalia-like state failures and territorial infighting among warlords in Mali and Chad, and further outlines deteriorating security conditions across the Hausa-speaking regions of northern Nigeria and Niger, where loosely affiliated jihadist groups have proliferated and, in some cases, gained political control. He also notes that airfields in the Sahel have become the interregional hub for moving contraband, including human trafficking. In his report, the Sahel’s special representative calls the Security Council’s attention to Niger, currently in the throes of a famine on a scale that occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century. This time, Niamey, the capital, is faced with feeding a population nearing sixty million, rather than the 5.2 million of the mid-1970s. Senegal, the region’s only gateway for food aid and other humanitarian assistance, is also the jumping-off place for illegal migration to Europe.

Recommendations

For international aid donors, the report offers a general recommendation: Successful demographic turnarounds over the coming twenty to twenty-five years would feature at least one, and hopefully two, countrywide programmatic success stories, providing exemplars of best practices, a pool of local expertise, and models of community participation that might spread elsewhere. Senegal may be the best candidate to host such a model program. Another focused effort should be launched in an inland state—perhaps Burkina Faso, if its rural areas are pacified. In Niger, Mali, and Chad, the most effective interventions will likely be those that vastly improve urban services and expand a trained cadre of dedicated health workers to deploy in urban peripheries and refugee camps, where demands for education, family planning, and other reproductive services are typically high. In addition to the more general take-aways, the report’s specific recommendations are as follows:

Gain from urbanization. By 2045, nearly half of the region’s growing population is projected to live in urban areas. If services can be mobilized and funded, it will be in these urban centers that young Sahelians receive the vocational and professional education and attain the income-generating employment that could keep many of them from slipping into the illegal or extremist margins of their societies. It is imperative that girls’ education and voluntary family planning—along with other reproductive, maternal, and child health services—are also in place in these expanding cities and towns, and that women gain access to both the private- and public-sector workforce.

Ramp up girls’ education and family planning. Governments in the region should reinvigorate their commitments to increasing levels of girls’ educational attainment and, with the assistance of international donors, vastly increase levels of spending on family planning and other reproductive health services. States should elevate the administrative profile of family planning to a ministerial responsibility and augment its public profile through information campaigns. Education and health administrations should eliminate bureaucratic, traditional, and religious barriers to girls’ school attendance and facilitate easy and affordable access to family planning services for both married as well as single individuals. Methods of delivery that directly bring basic reproductive health services to people in their urban neighborhoods and rural homes—including village health workers and mobile clinics—may prove most effective in Sahelian conditions. At this stage of development, it would be helpful if Sahelian professional societies develop an online library of local success stories that cover girls’ education, family planning, as well as sexual and reproductive health.

Work with respected religious and political leaders, and other public figures; involve and inform men. Exposure to supportive messages from religious leaders who address questions of religious acceptability is generally associated with higher levels of modern contraceptive use. Moreover, recent studies indicate that local programs that inform and involve men and seek the support of local leaders may be the most likely to succeed in the Western Sahel. For decades, health communicators have worked with television and radio producers as well as entertainers, particularly those involved in popular daytime dramas (i.e., soap operas) and talk shows to impart public service messaging concerning maternal and child health, nutrition, HIV/AIDS, family planning, women’s rights, and sexual relationships.

Augment women’s rights. In the Western Sahel, much can be accomplished by protecting girls and women from multiple forms of discrimination and violence, and by expanding their rights in marriage. This effort begins by enforcing current national laws that already prohibit all forms of female genital cutting, that outlaw forced marriages, and prohibit marriage before the age of eighteen years. Once married, the region’s women should deserve the rights to initiate divorce, obtain recourse against violence, and secure custodianship over their children in case of marital separation, divorce, or the death of their spouse. Women should have the right to legal recourse and equal treatment in state-run family courts of law, rather than being limited to the judgments of religious and traditional courts, which have generally failed to protect women and children from physical, psychological, and economic harm. Where political resistance has rolled back legislative efforts to augment women’s rights (as it has been the case in Mali), government support and endorsement of women’s legal, professional, cooperative, and educational societies may offer alternative routes for many Sahelian women to achieve greater autonomy and attain leadership positions.

Bring services to marginalized minorities. Health and education ministries should ensure that significant programmatic efforts in girls’ education, voluntary family planning, and women’s rights be distributed, in some form, among marginalized minorities—no matter how geographically or culturally isolated these minorities might be. Prior experiences in other regions suggest that regional, socioeconomic, ethnic, or caste fertility disparities later develop into hard-to-overcome social and economic inequalities that generate political tensions and exacerbate animosities.

Promote women-centered efforts in all agricultural, economic, and infrastructural development projects. All government, private, and donor-supported projects should contain components that facilitate extending girls’ educational attainment and/or quality of education, improve access to reproductive health services, and promote women’s rights and their economic autonomy. No donor-supported project should facilitate the efforts of governments, political parties, or traditional and religious leaders to impede women’s progress in any sector of development.

Manage resource-related tensions between farming and pastoralism. In a more-populous Western Sahel, the future of agricultural and pastoral livelihoods will depend on the development of groundwater irrigation and intensified agropastoralism (a more deliberate integration of agricultural and grazing uses of land), as well as their relation to urban markets. In this more-populous future, the region’s governments should consider enforcing schemes that restrict absentee rangeland users, protect rangelands from further agricultural encroachment, and help pastoralists deter cattle rustling. Meanwhile, governments in the Western Sahel should continue to develop industries that add value to agricultural and livestock products, promote cooperation between farmers and pastoralists, and develop more efficient transport to urban markets.

Protect development gains with investments in local security. In an environment of rapidly spreading jihadist conflict, geographic pockets of progressive local leadership and popular support for girls’ education and other women-centered programs could become primary targets of militants. Affected communities and their leaders deserve special protection provided by police or anti-terrorist units.

Watch the official launch event

Public Event Tue, March 22, 2022 • 11:30 am ET

Report launch | Demographic trends in the Western Sahel

Official launch event of the Scowcroft Center report, “What Future for the Western Sahel? The Region’s Demography and Its Implications by 2045,” in which the authors argue that unless the Sahelian states focus on reversing the underlying conditions that sustain high fertility, they are unlikely to dislodge the mutually reinforcing crises of instability, forced migration, and food insecurity in the foreseeable future.

Africa Energy & Environment Human Rights Politics & Diplomacy

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Report

Mar 7, 2022

Quel avenir pour le Sahel?

By Richard Cincotta and Stephen Smith

Le Sahel est dans une impasse démographique. S’ils veulent sortir de l’impasse actuelle, les gouvernements sahéliens devront réorienter une partie importante de leurs efforts de développement et moyens financiers vers des politiques et programmes visant à améliorer la condition féminine : en prévenant les mariages et grossesses précoces chez les adolescentes, en promouvant l’éducation des filles et en garantissant la pleine participation des femmes dans tous les secteurs publics et privés, à commencer par les lieux de travail.

Africa Energy & Environment

The Foresight, Strategy, and Risks Initiative (FSR) provides actionable foresight and innovative strategies to a global community of policymakers, business leaders, and citizens. 

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The year 2020 marked a turning point for this sad chapter of history. On August 13, 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords, officially recognizing the State of Israel. Other Arab and Muslim-majority countries soon followed suit. Months later, on December 10, 2020, Morocco signed a normalization agreement with Israel, becoming the second North African country—after Egypt in 1978 with the Camp David Accords—to recognize the Jewish State. Israel also signed an agreement with Sudan on October 23, 2020 as part of the accords.

While the Abraham Accords brought some Arab countries closer to the West and Israel, it undoubtedly created chasms with others. The agreement between Israel and Morocco sparked a series of chain events in neighboring North African countries that will likely have lasting consequences on the economic, security, and socio-political relations in the region.

Israel and Morocco: more than just a cordial relationship

Relations between Morocco and Israel have always been more than just cordial. Although Morocco did not formally recognize Israel until the Abraham Accords, it maintained informal ties with the Jewish State and, unlike many other Arab countries, allowed Israelis to visit the country. In 2020 alone, around seventy thousand Israelis visited Morocco.

Morocco is one of four Arab League countries to normalize relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Rabat allegedly did so on the premise that the United States would recognize the country’s claims over Western Sahara, a disputed territory which both Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front have contended to be theirs since 1975, when Spain withdrew from the territory.

The relationship between Morocco and Israel has strong historical roots. Morocco was home to the largest Jewish community in the Arab world, most of whom came from Spain after the 1491 expulsion by the Spanish Catholic monarchy. After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, many Moroccan Jews were forced to emigrate to the country as a consequence of rising antisemitism in local cities across Morocco. Today, Israel is home to some one million Moroccan Jews and is strongly interconnected with the Kingdom.

As mentioned before, Israel and Morocco made their longstanding—albeit concealed—friendship official in December 2020 when they signed a normalization agreement that ensured “full diplomatic, peaceful, and friendly relations” under US patronage. While Morocco attempted to minimize the agreements back home, claiming that a full normalization with Israel was off the table, the international community perceived the signing of the accords as otherwise. It was clear from the beginning that the two countries had undergone a diplomatic rapprochement, strengthening bilateral ties and cooperation in the fields of trade, tourism, and defense. Even direct official flights between Tel Aviv and Marrakesh have commenced. In July, the two countries signed a formal cybersecurity agreement to share information, research, and development on cyber warfare. On August 11, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid visited Morocco, signaling that his government is placing its relationship with Morocco high on its agenda.

Moroccan-Israeli ties and what they mean for North Africa

Reactions to Morocco’s normalization with Israel were mixed amongst other North African countries. Algeria wasted no time instrumenting the Abraham Accords by using aggressive, anti-Israel rhetoric to justify its disputes with Morocco. In December 2020, Algerian Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djera decried the agreement as a move to bring “the Zionist entity” closer to Algeria’s border. Algiers has also used the agreement as a scapegoat to explain the recent wildfires that have devastated the country, insisting Israel is behind them. On August 25, Algeria announced its decision to cut all diplomatic ties with Morocco in an effort to “totally eradicate” the Movement for Self-determination of Kabylie, which is a terrorist movement that “receives the support and aid of foreign parties…Morocco and the Zionist entity,” according to Algiers.  

As a result, Algeria has also strengthened its alignment with China and Russia. Algeria shares close bilateral relations with Russia, particularly in defense cooperation, and the two countries meet regularly through a joint economic commission to discuss partnership options. Algeria and China also share close ties, evidenced by the national development plans it signed with China under the Belt and Road Initiative to boost industrialization in the country, among other things. It comes as no surprise they were signed only six months after Morocco formalized the accords with Israel. In the coming years, Algeria will likely pursue closer bilateral ties with both Beijing and Moscow to counter what it perceives to be a Western-led, pro-Moroccan plot over Western Sahara via the Abraham Accords.

Egypt unsurprisingly responded positively to the normalization of ties between Morocco and Israel, having already a lukewarm relationship with the Jewish State. However, it is hard to predict where Cairo will turn to next. Egypt and Algeria have traditionally maintained good relations dating back to Egypt’s support of Algeria’s National Liberation Front during its war of independence against France between 1954 and 1962. Egypt is deeply interested in the events in neighboring Libya given its hope to see General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army prevail in the conflict, and has recently found common ground with Algeria on the Libya crisis over achieving greater “stability and security” in the country. Cairo’s agreement with Algiers over Libya may motivate Egypt to pit itself against Morocco in an effort to showcase its support to Algeria, thus, strengthening their alliance, given that Egypt has already backed the Polisario Front over the disputed Western Sahara. Cairo’s eagerness to have a stake in Libya’s future could pivot Egypt towards distancing itself from the US’s recognition of Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara.

Tunisia, like Libya, is too busy dealing with its domestic problems to focus its attention on the Abraham Accords. Tunisia is facing a potential constitutional crisis after President Kais Saied announced the indefinite freezing of parliament in late August and is attempting to centralize powers in his hands. In August, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi supported Saied’s actions, signaling an alignment between the two North African nations. It’s worth noting that Tunisia has never hidden its disapproval of the accords. Therefore, an anti-Morocco front consisting of Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt is not out of the question.

Morocco-Israel ties: What’s next?

The ongoing strengthening of ties between Israel and Morocco sheds light, once more, over just how tense the balance in North Africa really is. While the move to recognize Israel was part of a larger US-led strategy, with the potential to unite several Arab countries under a common front, the reality is far more complex. Morocco is set to strengthen its ties with Israel as demonstrated by its August announcement to open an embassy in Israel, but will also face the daunting task of explaining to the Palestinians that Morocco still supports their cause. Regardless, it is clear that Morocco is intent on increasing its strategic importance on the world stage, particularly in North Africa, and the Abraham Accords are the perfect place to start.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is assistant director for the North Africa Initiative within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

MENASource Aug 13, 2021

It’s been one year since the Abraham Accords. Gulf-Israel ties are still far from normal.

By Jonathan H. Ferziger

One year after former President Donald Trump coaxed the United Arab Emirates and Israel to normalize relations, ties between the two countries and other signatories to the Abraham Accords have a distance to go before they can be considered an enduring success.

Israel Middle East

MENASource Apr 6, 2021

The Abraham Accords hold the key to Biden’s East Med policy

By Matthew Zais

While motivated by the potential for a new Iran nuclear deal under the Biden administration, the Abraham Accords represent an unprecedented regional unification that was inconceivable just a few years ago. But it also represents an opportunity to continue America’s positive international energy diplomacy, and leadership in the East Med would be an ideal place to pick up the baton.

Middle East North Africa

MENASource Aug 31, 2021

Biden and Bennett turned the page on US-Israel ties. But not many were paying attention.

By Jonathan H. Ferziger

Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s first visit to the White House on August 27 occurred just as President Joe Biden was absorbing the horror of the Kabul airport suicide bombing, lending poignancy to their efforts at resetting relations between the United States and its closest Middle East ally.

Israel Middle East

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The post China Pathfinder report cited in South China Morning Post on the implications of decreased liberalization in China, for other market economies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Mezran quoted in Arab News on the challenges of the UN peace efforts in Libya appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this seventy-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Africans represent the largest group, with 28 percent of the votes, ahead of Asia with 27 percent, and well above the Americas at 17 percent, and Western Europe at 15 percent. Yet everyone knows that Africa does not decide anything. The real decision-making body is the Security Council, and its five permanent members are China, Russia, France, Great Britain, and the United States.

The founding of this prestigious council was based on the results of World War II, where global superpowers were defined based on hard power. What about the African people? Weren’t they involved in the victory over Hitler’s Germany? The French launched the Resistance from Brazzaville, and numerous African countries served in the war. They deserve their seat at the victory banquet. 

Besides, the United Nations Security Council still functions on a conventional framework, which was written back in 1945, before the majority of African countries had gained independence from their colonizers—which is another fault to correct.

This gap is all the less bearable because the African continent has dealt with issues threatening peace and security for centuries. Africa even was home to one of the world’s first human-rights charters: the Manden Charter, launched by the great Sundiata Keita, founder of the Mali Empire, long before the English Bill of Rights (1689) and France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), and perhaps even before the Magna Carta (1215).

Capitalizing on culture

The composition of the UN Security Council—let’s call it aristocratic for this argument—does not reflect the current world at all. Today, the notion of power has evolved from hard power, which is forceful and coercive, to a subtle but more influential power. Soft power enables a nation to lead other countries through influence, which allows those countries to lead their own development without coercive interference, which is what the Security Council should note. Afghanistan and the Sahel are proof of the limits of hard power—and Black Panther, the 2018 movie based on a Marvel comic, is the consecration of soft power. That’s right, it’s Wakanda time.

Africa and its powerful creative industries—driven by connected youth amid the biggest digital revolution of the past two decades—shine beyond the borders of Nollywood to influence Hollywood. This growing market expands its influence everywhere: Nigeria’s entertainment and media market doubled from 2014 to 2019 to become the fastest-growing in the world, according to the audit firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). When Nigeria incorporated Nollywood in its gross domestic product in 2013 (in a rebasing of data), it became the largest economy in Africa. From Dior to Louis Vuitton, luxury fashion has been renewed with African inspirations. Ready-to-wear brands such as Sweden’s H&M and Spain’s Zara have joined in as well. African Fashion Weeks from Johannesburg to Lagos have inspired international celebrity entertainers like Beyoncé and Rihanna, who is a fashion designer herself.

Beyoncé’s Disney-produced musical, Black Is King, is a celebration of Africa, dreamed up in line with the global success of Black Panther, which featured award-winning African actors in Hollywood such as Lupita Nyong’o and Daniel Kaluuya. Moreover, Netflix has greatly enriched its platform of African series, targeting African audiences and not just English speakers. In the music industry, Nigerian artists such as Burna Boy, Davido, and Wizkid have signed with major US labels such as Sony and regularly win Grammy awards. Burna Boy’s songs were included on the playlist for US President Joe Biden’s inauguration. Jay-Z, Will Smith, and Jada Pinkett Smith backed a Broadway musical, Fela!, about a Nigerian singer that won three Tony Awards in 2010. Not so long ago, Nigerians were paying dearly for collaborations with American and European stars, but now the opposite is true. Soft power is now the predominant power.

At United Nations Plaza, these changes have not been taken into consideration. It is quite alarming that the ruling procedures for the security council have not been amended since 1982. The Security Council was built on the principle of sovereignty and equality of all nations; therefore, democratization and reformation of this organization are overdue and a reassessment must ensure fairness and justice for the African continent. Fairness should start with demography. Africa is predicted to become the largest population of the world in the next twenty years, and it already is the youngest: Almost one in four world inhabitants will be a sub-Saharan African in 2050.

Three options for the Security Council

Several African candidates merit consideration for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. First, Nigeria is the continent’s most populous nation, at more than 210 million people. In 1963, after its independence in 1960, Nigeria was one of the founding members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now known as the African Union. From 1960 to 1995, Nigeria provided $61 billion in funding for the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. This country also assisted prominent leaders of liberation movements in decision-making against the military government regimes of the time throughout the continent. Nigeria founded the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, when it utilized its soft power to address a civil war in Angola through OAU policy. By nationalizing Barclays Bank and British Petroleum in the late 1970s, Nigeria was able to pressure the British and contribute to Zimbabwe’s independence.

Another contender for a permanent seat is South Africa. Despite recent concerns about xenophobic violence against African migrants, South Africa has a universal audience because of its powerful story of transformation. The iconic struggle and leadership of the late Nelson Mandela, who went from jail to the presidency, is known the world over. After holding its first democratic elections in 1994, one of the most multiracial countries in Africa went on to have one of the most remarkable constitutions in the world through the Convention for a Democratic South Africa talks, where the current president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, was chief negotiator for Mandela’s African National Congress party. Since then, South Africa has diversified its industry and now plays a role in the Southern African Development Community, is a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) nations, and is regarded as one of the “BRICS”—five major emerging economies, alongside Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

Sports has played a role in South Africa’s appealing story. Shortly after its first free elections, South Africa won the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Bafana Bafana, the South African soccer team, was allowed to play international soccer again, after being banned due to nation’s apartheid policy, and went on to win the 1996 African Cup of Nations. These achievements through sports showed that diversity is far more powerful than segregation, and provided a stepping-stone for the country’s influence in Africa and around the globe. In 2010, South Africa was the first African country to host the FIFA World Cup. This year, South Africa assumed the presidency of the Confederation of African Football, the leading voice on sports on the continent and a hub for creative industries.

“Oho! Congo, couched in your forest bed, queen over subdued Africa,

Let the phalli of the mountains bear your pavilion high…”

Right in the middle of Africa’s heart lies the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), heralded above through the words of poet Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first president of Senegal. The DRC is not only a queen—it is mythical Wakanda. It has always been and was so much so that, in a crazy move, the bloodthirsty Belgian King Leopold II decreed Congo as his personal possession. The richness of the resources surfaced in US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s recent remarks at the Atlantic Council. Speaking about Congolese minerals including cobalt, copper, zinc, silver, gold, platinum, and other resources that contribute to the world electronics industry, she said: “Every time I see the movie Wakanda, I think this is DRC. And I know it was an imaginary story, but imagine a DRC where the resources that are available there are being used to build the country, are being used to educate the people, are being used to provide health care and services for the people of DRC, and we would have a Wakanda in the making.” 

Not only is this country rich in terms of its soil, but also in history and culture. With two hundred ethnic groups and two hundred different languages, the DRC is the largest French-speaking country in the world, with more students in school than residents of France. Kinshasa, with its seventeen million inhabitants, is the largest French-speaking city in the world, before Paris. At the UN Security Council, Congo would know how to speak to the three hundred million French-speaking people in the world and the thirty million Lingala-speakers of Africa.

But the most important reason why the DRC should be a permanent member of the Security Council lies less in its strengths than its weaknesses: thirty years of civil wars, political coups, the impotence of the six thousand UN peacekeepers in the eastern DRC (present for two decades), and the distress of 4.5 million displaced people. These are the reasons why the DRC is never quoted among the pretendants to a UN permanent seat. Its tragedy does not even seem to upset the international community, even though a collapse of the DRC, under the pressure of dark forces, would have a tragic, deep, large, and long-term effect on the African continent and beyond.

The reasons why the DRC should join the Security Council are to gain a powerful lever to stop myriad manipulations by its neighbors and the international community, and to help this country’s voice to be heard. The DRC would bring to the Security Council something referred to as “weakness politics”: the effects of fragility causing processes that lead to achievements and the shaping of events. Such a change would be the best and most innovative way to reform and democratize this body. Bring out the new wineskins!

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. 

Further reading

Fast Thinking Sep 21, 2021

FAST THINKING: Biden’s UN reality check

By Atlantic Council

President Biden spoke of “relentless diplomacy” at the UN on Tuesday. But can that relentlessness overcome transatlantic strains, not to mention a still-raging pandemic and climate crisis?

Africa Crisis Management

New Atlanticist Sep 10, 2021

Gregory Meeks: For counterterrorism and economic opportunity, turn toward Africa

By Katherine Walla

After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it has become clear that “terrorism now is global, and we’ve got to work in a multilateral way to combat and fight that,” said US Representative Gregory Meeks.

Afghanistan Africa

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Make way for Wakanda: The UN Security Council needs an African seat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post CBDC Tracker cited in Yahoo News on central bank digital currencies in Nigeria and Ghana appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission since 1999 and billions of dollars in aid—with the United States contributing more than nine hundred million dollars in humanitarian assistance in the past two years alone—today the eastern Congo is reportedly home to more than 120 rebel groups. Those include numerous foreign-backed militias and a local offshoot of the Islamic State. 

They control roadways and access to resources, and they often engage in kidnapping schemes to generate ransom revenue. Securing their buy-in to any peace processes is key to ensuring lasting stability. 

In fact, the majority of the world’s conflicts feature armed non-state actors (ANSAs), with some sixty-six million people living on territory under their control. The Taliban’s recent takeover in Afghanistan is a fresh reminder of the power of these groups. But traditional attempts at post-conflict stabilization have sometimes failed to produce lasting peace—in large part because of their inability to engage ANSAs in a constructive manner within the peace-building process.

That’s why Congress in 2019 created the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which lays out an array of tools with which to stabilize post-conflict situations. These range from sanctions and intelligence collection to the Women, Peace, and Security initiative and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 

But the GFA features a major shortcoming: It assumes the state is the primary actor, meaning that the United States will continue to work with sometimes ineffective national governments while ignoring the influence and power ANSAs have in determining stability. 

To maximize the impact of the GFA, the US government will select five countries on which to focus its attention. As it considers those countries, it needs to properly accommodate ANSAs in its strategic calculations. Failing to do so means potentially repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan, where Washington continued supporting an ineffective national government.  

Mapping the next threat

There is no universal definition of an ANSA; it can be characterized as an organization that is not integrated into formalized institutions, operates with some sort of political autonomy, or is willing to use violence to pursue its political objectives. Either way, ANSAs are involved in the majority of the one hundred active armed conflicts around the world—including Afghanistan, where the Taliban is now in charge, and Syria, where a multitude of armed groups control various pieces of territory. 

Similar dynamics have existed in parts of northeastern Nigeria, where Boko Haram has effectively functioned as the government by levying taxes on the populations under its control or providing some semblance of a justice system to settle disputes. While it no longer controls the amount of territory it did in the early 2010s, the group remains a disruptive and destabilizing force. Now, as the much-criticized US strategy in the Sahel has seen limited success and the Nigerian state appears increasingly weak, the potential for increased conflict there is high. 

More than simply controlling territory, ANSAs also serve a critical regional governance function, providing services and either formal or informal governing structures. 

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, ANSAs around the world imposed travel restrictions and implemented health checks in the regions they control. This serves to portray them as legitimate in the eyes of local citizens, which in turn provides them greater political weight and influence over the structure of power-sharing agreements. ANSAs can also be potential spoilers by intentionally undermining the peace process if they believe it threatens their power. 

The foreign aid trap

The GFS calls for humanitarian, development, and security assistance to be provided as a tool to address state fragility, with a focus on working with the local government and civil society. But in regions where ANSAs perform governance functions, providing foreign aid sometimes directly clashes with American counterterrorism priorities. 

In Nigeria, for instance, USAID efforts were hampered by rules limiting engagement with people who had a previous affiliation with Boko Haram. But the definition of “affiliation” is broad and does not specify whether family members of militants are also excluded from aid—putting the onus on aid workers to investigate any potential linkages. That, in turn, stalls the rollout of humanitarian assistance. 

The Boko Haram rule is well-intentioned, as terrorist organizations should indeed be cut off from American aid, but the provision of foreign assistance is a key component in any effective stabilization operation. The United States is currently facing that very dilemma in a newly Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Washington has not announced whether it plans to officially recognize the Taliban, which is still under numerous sanctions, further complicating assistance plans.

But as in Nigeria, delivering aid is central to creating stability. That’s why the State Department and all other implementing agencies will need to find ways to ensure aid is sent to these conflict areas, and that it actually reaches vulnerable populations, without undermining its counterterrorism goals. This could include clarifying what an acceptable affiliation is, or by providing assistance in contested zones through NGOs or other third parties, such as the UN—therefore not undermining US counterterrorism goals.

Trading for stability

Like foreign assistance, commercial trade is another crucial factor in securing sustainable peace—at least when the state maintains control of its territory. The GFA recognizes this, which is why trade, investment, and commercial diplomacy is seen as another tool to ensure stability by investing in low-income states and building a robust free market. 

But when ANSAs are involved, they can limit this free market and thwart the stabilizing potential of these economic relationships.

For example, these groups often exploit natural resources for economic gain, own valuable land, or nurture ties to corrupt officials. They are rent-seekers aiming to maximize their economic profit. This is why stabilization efforts should provide incentives for them to engage in the peace-building process—ideally transforming their informal and illegal economic structures into legitimate economic activities. 

Consider the Philippines: A peace agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2014 created the Bangasmoro, an autonomous political body for the majority Muslim areas in Mindanao. Despite the otherwise successful terms of the peace agreement, which created a power-sharing mechanism, fragile state institutions and corrupt officials meant a deep-seated informal economy took root, compromising the state’s capacity to ensure stability. 

Any tools relating to trade, investment, and commercial diplomacy must fully integrate ANSAs into the free market, preventing their rent-seeking activities while simultaneously squeezing out informal economies. To this end, the United States should develop poverty-reduction and anti-corruption programs that reduce incentives for joining the informal economy. Other actions could include legitimizing illicit sources of income, such as offering incentives for growing legal crops instead of narcotics.

The GFA provides a chance to redefine and reimagine post-conflict stabilization operations. But its tools must better consider the presence of ANSAs to ensure the best chance at success. In its current form, the GFA ignores vital actors in the stabilization process and has not learned from prior operations that failed to integrate and plan for ANSAs, such as in Afghanistan or the Sahel. 

Given the evolving nature of today’s conflicts, a strong ANSA strategy could mean the difference between lasting peace and metastasizing violence. 

Imran Bayoumi is a student at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy and a former young global professional at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 10, 2021

The best defense: Why NATO should invest in resilience

By Jaclyn Levy

Policies emphasizing resilience should minimize damage, restore stability quickly, and generate improved strategies. To this end, there are several steps NATO can take to build a preventive, resilience-based approach to emerging global challenges.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

New Atlanticist Jul 22, 2021

Why ‘human security’ matters for tomorrow’s conflicts

By Sarah Dawn Petrin

NATO leaders are finally focusing on human security, a major step toward a broader vision of crisis management.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Aug 26, 2021

Before the Taliban took Afghanistan, it took the internet

By Emerson T. Brooking

This is how the Afghan Taliban waged—and won—a generation-long information war.

Afghanistan Conflict

The post To build lasting peace, you can’t ignore militant groups appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Date:
From:
To:
Cable from Mali:
Classification:

8/27/2021
Olivier-Rémy Bel and Petr Tůma
European and American policymakers
Last chance to bring the Sahel back from the brink
Unclassified

This summer, fellows with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center conducted a study trip to Mali as part of an ongoing project exploring European involvement in the Sahel region. They cabled their thoughts back to the home office for the first edition of the Atlantic Council’s “Cable from.”

Summary: While our interlocutors in Mali were split, focusing either on areas showing progress or those that are deteriorating, they did agree on one thing: The country is at an inflection point. Against the backdrop of two coups, interethnic and terrorist violence moving south toward Bamako, and France shifting its posture in the Sahel, this could be the last chance to stabilize Mali. Doing so will require fostering greater Malian ownership of the political, security, and development processes, both by understanding local dynamics and by asking for greater accountability from national authorities. It will also require improving coordination among Europeans—now contributing to stabilization efforts in ever greater numbers—and thereby creating a “European art of the coalition.”

Sitting along the banks of the Niger River, which was starting to swell as the rainy season picked up, we listened to our host, a seasoned European diplomat, describe the complexities of his job. As the patches of water hyacinths drifted away, carried by the swirls and eddies of the current, the situation seemed as murky as the waters. 

With its billion-dollar stabilization effort, counterterrorism operations, and attempts at state-building, Mali invites a comparison with Afghanistan. Substitute the Americans for the French and the towering heights of the Pamirs with the endless expanses of the Sahara, and this is Europe’s Afghanistan.

While lessons can be drawn from Afghanistan—particularly in terms of empowering local partners, shifting towards a lighter footprint without generating a collapse, sustaining public support for intervention, and managing a coalition—Mali is a country that must be understood in its own right. For instance, terrorists in the Sahel do not have the equipment and experience of the Taliban, there are no neighboring countries providing shelter and support, and the ethnic and political dynamics are unique.

A former French colony, the butterfly-shaped country stretches along the Niger River, which flows from the greener south to the more arid north. Its banks are home to many ethnic groups, from the Bambara majority in the south to the Bozo fishermen, Fulani herders, and Dogon farmers in the center, and the Tuaregs in the north.

In 2012, as the crumbling state faced Tuareg separatists and jihadists moving south, it turned to France for help. The French-run Operation Serval stopped the advance before being transformed into a regional counterterrorism operation called Barkhane. The international community, especially Europeans, has been present in greater numbers, notably through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM). Regional actors have attempted to organize themselves by creating the G5 Sahel and its joint force, while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is also stepping up, playing an important political role in the aftermath of the 2020 and 2021 coups. 

Today, the jihadist threat mostly emanates from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda franchise. While the situation in northern Mali, the Tuareg heartland, is now more stable, violence is moving south. 

Clashes with the ISGS mostly take place in the tri-border region where Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso meet. But international efforts in the area—particularly the G5 Sahel joint force and Task Force Takuba, a newly stood-up European special forces operation—have so far been able to contain and degrade the jihadists. Central Mali, however, is seeing a larger JNIM presence, which feeds off a cycle of interethnic violence mostly between the Dogon and Fulani communities. 

This movement south of both interethnic and terrorist violence is spilling over into neighboring countries, notably Burkina Faso, and could threaten the coastal states, such as Côte d’Ivoire.

1. Is this Mali’s last chance?

As we moved from interview to interview, critical questions were on everyone’s mind: Are the international community and Malian authorities actually making progress? Or have we already lost the war? Could Mali go the way of Afghanistan?

It’s difficult to find consensus on even that basic assessment. 

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) are better trained and equipped than they were a few years ago. The sort of deadly attacks seen in 2018-2019, when entire military camps were overrun by terrorists, are repelled. Present in a greater part of the country’s territory, Malian forces conduct more complex operations, including alongside French troops, and are beginning to develop air power by relying on Brazilian-made Super Tucano planes. Multiple senior terrorist leaders have been killed, and the north enjoys an uneasy peace—or at least a form of tacit stability.

At the same time, terrorist attacks are occurring closer to the capital than ever before. The central part of the country is continuing its downward spiral of interethnic violence, catching in its wake neighboring Burkina Faso and possibly Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, along Mali’s southern border. At the political level, the 2015 Algiers Agreement, aimed at restoring peace in Mali through a process of political reconciliation and decentralization, is still not fully implemented. Moreover, the country has experienced two coups within one year, signaling severe institutional fragility.

In Bamako, as well as in European capitals where we also conducted interviews, frustration is palpable among Europeans. Everybody agrees that the only solution for stabilizing Mali is a political one—though with an important military component due to terrorists’ advances—and it can only be Malian. But are the country’s elites ready and eager enough to move boldly and implement the necessary political and administrative reforms? 

This may be the last chance to do so for three reasons:

a. After the coup last summer, which ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta following contested elections, army colonels led by Assimi Goïta seized power. The resulting civilian transitional government grew increasingly autonomous. After the government kicked out two key figures in the August 2020 coup without properly coordinating with Goïta, the colonels could feel power slipping from their hands. They conducted a second coup in May 2021, ousting transitional President Bah N’daw. If the ongoing process of political transition isn’t successful, there is serious potential for further destabilization. The two coups have, to some extent, served as a wake-up call for Europeans.

b. Interethnic violence and terrorism are moving south toward the demographic and economic heart of the country. While the Bambara majority and elites may have been reluctant to invest politically and militarily in the north—where Bamako traditionally had only limited control and applied a divide-and-rule approach—this more immediate threat is becoming increasingly existential and might spur the government toward more responsible behavior. The government should convince people of its reliability and gain their trust. Otherwise, Malians won’t be ready to defend it, and the country risks falling into a tailspin as happened in Afghanistan immediately after the withdrawal of foreign support. Europe is able to train enough Malian soldiers, as the coalition managed to do in Afghanistan. The problem lies in the meaningful deployment of these troops when the government is not working properly or is perceived as such. 

c. France is adopting a new approach in the Sahel. President Emmanuel Macron recently announced the end of Operation Barkhane in its current form, with a drawdown from 5,100 troops to as low as around 2,500 in 2022. While this could be compared to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the transformation of the French presence is less about numbers and more about doing things differently—a shift toward a support-and-accompany model. This is a move in the right direction, but will it be enough to empower Malian forces?

We also spoke with Malian civil-society and religious leaders, who stressed the need for Europeans to engage more on the local level rather than just with Bamako and to be more responsive to local contexts. That’s something that is occasionally difficult even for Malian officials themselves, who often come from the south, which can lead to mutual mistrust. Development projects that have been implemented outside Bamako and other urban areas have had only limited impact and sustainability, as they were missing a sense of ownership and trust from the local population. Local civic representatives often pointed to the communication deficit of Malian officials and the Malian army in rural areas where people may be afraid of their operations and plans, which creates yet another obstacle for state-building efforts.   

As the international community talks about “the return of the Malian state”—and we heard a lot about “PSDG,” the acronym standing for security, development, and governance hubs—the big question is: Which state is returning? In some areas, the Malian state was never fully present to begin with. In others, sending civil servants from the south might not always be the best solution. What matters is the ability to provide concrete public services.

2. Creating a “European art of the coalition”

Bamako is an interesting place to meet Europeans. Today, the Sahel hosts the largest deployment of European military forces worldwide, with around eight thousand personnel. It has also been a key focus of diplomatic efforts and international development assistance; Europe alone has spent nearly ten billion dollars on the region since 2014.

Paris led the response to the Malian government’s 2012 call for assistance and is still an indispensable player, owing to its deep historical ties with Mali and relatively large military and diplomatic presence in the country. Yet European troops have been accompanying their French counterparts from the outset. Operation Serval was enabled by British and Spanish airlift capabilities. Sweden took a leading role early on through the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) in Mali.

The European military presence in Mali has grown in recent years. Countries are sending ever larger contingents (German troops number almost one thousand, for example) or contributing in new formats—such as Czech special forces accompanying Malians in combat as part of counterterrorism-focused Task Force Takuba. Some, mostly in southern Europe, fear potential migration and other spillover effects if the “neighbors of their neighbors” were to be destabilized. For others, it’s about deepening the relationship with France or demonstrating their commitment to European solidarity.

In fact, Europeans and other players have been entering the Malian theater to such an extent that it has created a traffic jam. Coordination among the various military forces—the FAMa, the EUTM, Barkhane, MINUSMA, the G5 Sahel Joint Force—is a complex challenge. However, the introduction of Instance de coordination militaire au Mali, a platform for regular meetings among all force commanders, appears to have helped. 

On the development side, coordination among Europeans, Americans, and other major multilateral donors needs improvement. The same challenge already exists among European countries, since each has its own national agenda, timeline, and procedures. Representatives of several local NGOs complained to us that European development projects often overlap, periodically focusing on the same sectors, when their help may really be needed elsewhere. In this crowded landscape, the EU delegation seems to have emerged as an important place for Europeans to synchronize their actions. Still, it is far from what is needed, as it lacks a mandate strong enough to overcome EU nations’ bilateral interests.

More broadly, this is all an exercise in creating a “European art of the coalition.” So far, European forces have mostly deployed and worked together in coalitions that required a US backbone, as in Afghanistan. When they have deployed alone, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Chad, they have rarely had to operate in such a difficult and complex environment, or handle so much civilian-military coordination, as they have in Mali. 

This applies particularly to the relationship between France and other European nations. While the French have a more extensive historical background in Mali and are clearly the leading European actor there, Paris will have to adapt its leadership to account for the growing influence of other European players. It is not in the position to play the same role the United States played in Afghanistan, and must instead strive to find its own way to compel Europeans to work together.

The Sahel is often described as a laboratory for strategic autonomy, where Europeans learn how to work together and hone their political, diplomatic and military instruments. This kind of European coalition-building may be one of the most potent experiments.

3. Learning to speak the language of power

Sometimes Europeans are shy about translating their preeminent presence and investment into political power. The COVID-19 crisis has shown them to be less proactive—or less unashamedly self-promoting—than, say, the Chinese. For instance, Chinese officials did well in convincing Malians that China was responsible for most of the COVID-related help that Mali received from abroad, even though that was not the case. Russia is also making some advances in Mali, notably agitating pro-Russian demonstrations, exploring yet another opportunity to make life more difficult for the West. 

If Europe wants Malians to truly own the stabilization process, it must avoid creating a dependency or establishing a presence there that only benefits the elite. This was indeed one of the problems in Afghanistan, leading to the abysmal failure of its government and army. As soon as the United States departed, people were unprepared to fight for a government they didn’t trust.

If the EU and its member states are to provide such substantial assistance to Mali, they should be able to attach more conditions to the provision of those resources. One oft-cited example is the Malian army’s lack of a digital human-resources management system, which means it cannot know the precise number or whereabouts of its soldiers. Given that half of the FAMa have been trained by the EUTM, Europe should be in a position to more forcefully ask for this type of reform. The Malian government seems less responsive to European requests than governments in other areas of major European engagement abroad, such as Iraq. 

The European diplomats we met in Mali viewed this hazard as one of the major risks that could undermine the success of European engagement there. It is also understood, at least on paper, by Brussels: April’s EU Integrated Strategy in the Sahel emphasizes the concept of “mutual accountability,” while the European Council in May opened the door to sanctions on Malian politicians and military leaders. 

These lessons learned in Mali are part of a broader ongoing EU adaptation to a more challenging strategic environment. From the ambitions of a “geopolitical Commission” to chief diplomat Josep Borrell’s chaotic Moscow trip to the EU’s tough retaliation against Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s hijacking of a Ryanair flight, Europe is not only searching for its place in a more dangerous world but also learning to respond to such a world. Far from simply learning to speak the language of power, it is experimenting with wielding it.

Lessons for the future

Mali and Afghanistan are indeed very different theaters for intervening forces. 

There isn’t a single organization in Mali as popular as the Taliban, uniting opposition to the government. Rebel groups are often fighting one another; even the Tuaregs in the north can’t aspire to the level of prominence enjoyed by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Still, that doesn’t preclude the risk that the outcome may one day appear similar if the proper lessons aren’t learned. The fall of Kabul is a major development for Europe, which must be in a position to react to a crisis even when the United States is unwilling to intervene. 

After years of talking about strategic autonomy, Europe must get serious about it. This is what’s at stake in Mali.

Expert

Olivier-Rémy Bel

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Fellow

Petr Tůma

Visiting Fellow

Europe Center

Arabic Central Europe

Further reading

Experts react Aug 18, 2021

Experts react: What the fall of Afghanistan means for Europe

By Atlantic Council experts

As policymakers in Washington grapple with the stark reality of losing Afghanistan, their counterparts across Europe are no less flummoxed over what happens next. Will Brussels be as ready to support future American foreign policy initiatives?

Afghanistan Conflict

New Atlanticist Jun 14, 2021

Misunderstanding and underestimating Europe

By Olivier-Rémy Bel

Europe has changed. It has started—though only started—transforming into a global geopolitical player. The urgent task before Europe is to finish that transition.

China European Union

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

The post A cable from Mali: How to bring Bamako back from the brink appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Africa Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region as well as former US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, moderated the conversation, opening with a discussion on the evolution of Prof. Autesserre’s distinguished career from identifying flaws in international peacebuilding norms and practices to offering an alternative localized solution, noting that her often provocative work has influenced policy discussions at some of the highest levels in international organizations and governments.  

In Prof. Autesserre’s remarks, she highlighted the need to move peacebuilding away from the traditional practices of premature elections and a focus on elite-bargaining, towards a process that is locally led and prioritizes local definitions of peace, democracy, and justice. She also spoke of the growing support for localized peace processes but noted that international organizations often merely “talk the talk” when it comes to supporting genuinely locally driven peace processes.

Prof. Autesserre also engaged on the role of locally led peace processes in Idjwi (DRC), Somaliland, and lessons that can be brought from these contexts to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (​MINUSMA), whose annual mandate renews on June 30 and which Amb. Pham noted, has “found progress difficult to come by” despite the “billions of dollars spent since 2013 and the hundreds of lives lost, making MINUSMA the deadliest ‘peacekeeping’ mission in the world today.”

Further reading

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Banks told the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, Ambassador Rama Yade, that “Instability in Mali leads to greater instability in the Sahel. I think this makes the case for why we have to work together with like-minded partners in the region to ensure that stability is maintained.”

Banks highlighted Africa’s place in Biden administration foreign policy amid a broader strategy of global reengagement and relations rooted in mutual respect. She said that Africa’s importance goes well beyond strategic competition with China, and instead put forth a vision of “Africa not as a continent or as a problem to be solved, but rather a partner engaging in mutual respect.”

When asked about the pandemic and debt relief, Banks said “When you talk about economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, we stand ready to partner with African countries to ensure that they are rebuilding their economies through various methods. One tool that we have in our toolbox is Prosper Africa,” referring to the United States’ existing flagship commercial policy. She went on to say that the administration is finding ways to give Prosper Africa “the teeth” it needs to succeed, while hinting at forthcoming US programs in support of Africa’s digital economy and the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Ambassador of the African Union to the United States Hilda Suka-Mafudze sounded similar notes of collaboration in her remarks, pointing to the US government’s strong bipartisan support for Africa. “I strongly believe that all the stars are aligned today to take US-Africa relations to a higher and strategic level of engagement for the best interests of both sides,” she said. Suka-Mafudze highlighted the African Union’s 2021 theme of “Arts, Culture, and Heritage,” affirming the creative industries’ ability to support sustainable job creation and social inclusion.  

Banks, too, underlined how “culture has always been a wonderful way to connect” and that cultural connections “will continue and have always been one of the bedrocks of our engagement with Africa.”

Atlantic Council Executive Chairman Emeritus Gen. James L. Jones Jr. opened the session by saying Africa Day—which commemorates the founding of the African Union’s predecessor in 1963—represents a moment of optimism as well as reflection. He added that, “We are reminded of the importance of multilateral institutions and the important role that the African Union has played in the continent’s political and economic development and its global relationships.” Also joining the conversation with Banks were Africa Center fellows Didier Acouetey, Abdoul Salam Bello, Cameron Hudson, and Aubrey Hruby, as well as Africa Center partner Admassu Tadesse, the group managing director and CEO of the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank.

The session closed with Yade bringing the conversation back to Banks’ personal ties to the continent, for a discussion of building bridges between cultures and diasporas. Reflecting on her connection and fascination with the continent, Banks said “I know that there are many other African Americans who feel the same and that’s who we would like to work with, the diaspora, to get them to become more engaged economically as well as culturally with the continent because it makes for stronger policy.”

Missed the event? Watch the webcast below and engage us @ACAfricaCenter with any questions, comments, or feedback.  

Further reading:

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

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By Katherine Walla

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Africa Crisis Management

The post Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister appeared first on Atlantic Council.

During the discussion, panelists laid out the current situation in Chad, reflecting on the poor condition of the army, the potential for further armed rebellions to form, and the implications for political bargaining in a country where many institutions are organized on ethnic lines. Natolban gave a clear warning that if Chad continues on its current course of repressive rule, there is a potential for mass atrocities to be committed. He emphasized the Chadian people’s desire for peace, freedom, and democracy, to be produced by a civilian transition free from external interference.

The discussion brought forth a variety of options for engagement. Strictly military solutions were ruled out, along with acceding to a purely military transition as currently configured. Pressure will have to be put on the transitional military council to see what concessions can be extracted, and international actors will also have to hold each other accountable as, for example, many questioned the role of France.   

Natolban closed with a reminder that any action must take into account the reality for Chadians, echoing Amb. Yade’s comment that it should be Chadians that define their country’s future. At present, Chadians view the actions of FACT rebels as helping to unseat the vestiges of the previous regime, but all agreed that some type of National Dialogue was essential for charting a way of out rebellion and laying the foundations for national reconciliation and a more democratic transition. The Atlantic Council is proud to convene on the subject of Chad and the broader Sahel region, and will continue to be a platform for commentary and analysis in the coming months.  

Further reading:

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Charting a course in Chad: Implications and analysis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While perhaps of little thought to most Americans, Chad, three times the size of the state of California, sits at the crossroads of most major conflicts in Africa where the United States currently has a security interest, if not an actual operational presence.

To Chad’s east, the United States has invested heavily over the last decade in the political and humanitarian response in Darfur and more recently as part of the national transition effort in Sudan; to the north, the United States has played a leading role in ending the Libyan civil war and attempting to return a measure of stability a decade after Gaddafi’s death plunged the region into conflict; to the south, the fight against Boko Haram is the central preoccupation; while the United States has been perhaps most involved in responding to manifold threats from jihadist groups in the Sahel region to Chad‘s west, including through the establishment of a drone base, support to United Nations peacekeeping, and the deployment of special forces combat troops. 

From the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea and from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, all roads on these security axes run through Chad and for the past decade or more depended in no small part on the military prowess of its fallen leader, Idriss Déby.

Déby’s unique ability to respond to, manage, and in many ways shape these conflicts was a testament to both his strategic vision and his battlefield acumen. In life, and now in death, it earned him the admiration and respect of his neighbors and global powers, as reflected in the outpouring of genuine praise and mourning at his passing.

Mali, perhaps most rife with instability and dependent upon Chad’s security involvement, declared three days of national mourning for Déby, while Nigeria’s Foreign Minister cautioned that, “His demise could lead to vacuums that could implode in these subregions.” But no expression of grief was as personal and as heartfelt as from France’s President Emmanuel Macron, who said, “Chad is losing a great soldier and a President who has worked tirelessly for the security of the country and the stability of the region for three decades. France loses a courageous friend.”

Less fondly remembered is the way he managed his own country: brutally, corruptly, and vengefully; an old school African strongman who as recently as the campaign last month for his sixth term as president harassed, intimidated, jailed, and even killed his opposition opponents and their family members. He was a killer who brought order and discipline to an unstable region, but imposed fear, poverty, and misery on his own people. In his wake, he leaves a legacy of ashes, at home and across the region; and among his opponents, both real and imagined.

But his greatest personal achievement—glossed over in all the homilies and testimonials—his ability to cling to power for thirty years, was in retrospect pyrrhic for the nation he leaves behind. Chad today is little more than a collection of fractious tribal fiefdoms and hollowed out institutions, underpinned by abject poverty and a corrupt patronage system of tribal elites, all of which are exacerbated by a diffuse network of simmering rebellions that could well tear apart the meager remnants of what he left behind.

These painful facts have been known to all of Déby’s security partners across the region and beyond for years. But for so long it was easier to turn a blind eye to his domestic autocratic realities which were accepted as being in service to his significant regional security contributions. But in his death that strategy is no longer tenable, as much as some may still like it to be. And the international community’s forbearance and ignorance of the country’s unravelling is now its own to manage if it hopes to maintain any semblance of the regional order that Déby helped to impose.

France, the former colonial power, and the country whose security relations and bonhomie with Déby are in fact the most externally responsible for the country’s deleterious state, has not missed the opportunity to once again intervene, if not militarily, then behind the scenes to ensure a soft-landing for its interests. In his eulogy, speaking as Deby’s “loyal friend and ally,” President Macron warned the FACT rebels and other armed opponents that, “France will not let anybody put into question or threaten today or tomorrow Chad’s stability and integrity.”

But unlike in decades past, where Washington was content to view Chad as ‘a French problem,’ Washington’s regional security interests are today equally as bound to what unfolds in Chad. The massive US political and financial support to neighboring Sudan’s transition could easily be upended from an implosion in Chad. So too could all US efforts in rolling back the spread of jihadism from the Sahel to the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. Washington’s blood and treasure extend across the region and it can neither afford to sit out the conversation on what comes next in Chad nor subcontract its involvement to other powers with presumably more at stake. France’s parachuting in to N’Djamena last week and its early endorsement of the military transition should not constrain Washington from finding its own voice and using what influence it has to help lay the foundations for more than just a soft landing.

Indeed, in the midst of the fast-moving changes there is an opportunity to not only ensure that long-term security interests in the region are met, but to also take immediate steps to begin to address the kinds of massive democracy and development deficits that have left Chad so enervated today. It is a view that has already been espoused by the incoming Biden administration.

As Washington contemplates its next steps, there are a few actions it should prioritize:

Listen to Chadians. Under Déby, Chadian civil society was kept intentionally weak, divided, and fearful, and so observers should not expect to see the kind of organized, popular uprising that swept neighboring despot Omar al-Bashir from power in Sudan two years ago to emerge in Chad. But that does not mean Chadians lack a vision of their own future and a voice to express it. 

Indeed, late last week a collection of more than five dozen Chadian political and civil society organizations released a joint statement calling for, “Respect for the constitution and the immediate establishment of a civilian transition; demand from the military a return to the constitutional order; the suspension of hostilities between the Chadian armed forces and armed groups; and the immediate opening of a national consultation with all political forces, civil society, armed groups and institutions of the Republic to initiate inclusive institutional and political reforms with a view to ensuring the stability, peace and development of Chad.”

These legitimate demands should serve as the guiding political framework for moving forward. The fact that Chad’s new military government has already rejected talk of a ceasefire and political dialogue, and is maintaining and extending Idriss Déby’s public ban on public protests, suggests that the marginal political space is about to close even further. As such, Washington’s explicit endorsement of civilian demands would not only lend legitimacy to this nascent collection of civil society actors seeking to gain their footing, but would begin to reorient years of US engagement away from Chad’s security apparatus towards an emerging civilian dispensation.  

Engage the African Union. It should go without saying that in the year 2021, the former colonial power should not be picking winners and losers nor deciding the fate of the population for another generation of Chadians. There is no greater or more substantial voice that should be leading the international response to the now-coup and crisis in Chad than the principal regional organization. But while the international response should have an African face, it has been complicated in Chad by the African Union (AU) Commission’s own Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat. 

A Chadian and former prime minister and foreign minister under the late Chadian leader, Faki made a “private visit” to his home capital, N’Djamena, the day after Déby’s death and the installation of Déby’s son as commander of the extra-constitutional Transitional Military Council. Even in his private capacity, Faki’s presence signaled to Chadians an acknowledgment and tacit support for the illegal transfer of power in his country. For this reason, Washington ought to push privately to see him recuse himself from further direct involvement in the crisis.

Fortunately, soon after Faki’s visit, the AU’s Peace and Security Commission stepped in with a roadmap of its own, calling for Chad, “to respect the constitutional order. . . quickly engage in a process of restoration of the constitutional order and the transfer of political power to civil authorities.” The statement also alluded to the potential coercive power of AU membership suspension and economic sanctions if the constitutional order is not promptly restored. Adding to the African-led effort, the presidents of Niger and Mauritania, coalition members of the G5 Sahel Initiative, have also seemed to step into a mediating role when late last week in consultations with Chad’s political opposition they cited, “the need for a dialogue to set up transitional institutions that will be responsible for drafting a new constitution and organizing elections.” At the same time, Niger has also been asked, and agreed, to work with Chad’s new junta to hunt down and arrest fleeing FACT fighters who may be seeking refuge in Niger, further complicating the regional role to ultimately support a transition to civilian rule.

African mediators have now floated the model of the kind of civil-military power-sharing arrangement seen most recently in Mali after its latest coup and in Sudan after the popular uprising there, both of which Washington endorsed previously and worked to ensure were implemented. Endorsing this approach and committing to its success would give Washington a seat at the table and help position it on the right side of the history being written in Chad.

Put “loafers on the ground.”  While statements from Washington have their place, there is no alternative to on-the-ground diplomatic engagement. Here, Washington is at a severe disadvantage compared to virtually everyone else with a stake in the outcome in Chad. One of the Trump administration’s most neglectful legacies was keeping US embassies understaffed and nowhere is this omission felt today more than in N’Djamena where the United States has been without an ambassador for nearly three years, resulting in a disadvantaged position in its use of influence to engage civilians, politicians, rebels, and military leaders alike. Even prior to this moment, so absent was US diplomacy that in the past three months of the country’s flawed presidential campaign, the US embassy did not issue a single statement of concern over its conduct or in solidarity with the beleaguered opposition as they were harassed and intimidated into submission. US credibility with and access to those negotiating for power is now no doubt severely constrained as a result of overall diplomatic absence. 

But Washington can begin to make up for this neglect through the immediate reappointment of a US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region of Africa. This position, created under Trump and ably filled by my colleague Ambassador J. Peter Pham, should not only serve as a point person in ensuring that US security partners across the region are consulted and coordinated, but the envoy must now also serve as the country’s diplomatic point person inside of Chad, representing a broader set of US objectives in support of a peaceful, democratic transition. Reappointing a special envoy would reinvigorate a sclerotic diplomatic approach at the very moment it is needed most.

Act immediately; think strategically. Lastly, while the United States must move quickly to help define a framework that will avoid new violence and create the conditions for a stable transition, it would be a mistake and a missed opportunity to view developments in Chad in a vacuum. Washington should instead recognize the voluminous criticism being leveled at its ‘whack-a-mole’ securitized approach to engagement across the Sahel region to rethink and reset its agenda across the wider region. The recent successful democratic transition in neighboring Niger is a starting point. So too is recent helpful research from the likes of colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Chatham House, among many others, all of whom argue for, inter alia, investments in human security, improved governance, a focus on state-building and service delivery, and more intentional engagement with local actors versus political and military elites. All of these are in desperate need in Chad today.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading

Fast Thinking Apr 20, 2021

FAST THINKING: After the death of its president, Chad is on the brink

By Atlantic Council

After three decades in power, Chadian President Idriss Déby was killed following clashes with insurgents, state media announced Tuesday. What’s next for the country after the fall of its long-ruling autocrat?

Africa Crisis Management

Report Apr 19, 2021

Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

By Aubrey Hruby

This new decade has created a unique moment for the Biden administration to reset US-Africa policy. A more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 23, 2021

Climate change will not be fixed without Africa

By Rama Yade

When Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi spoke at the virtual Leaders Summit on Climate this week, he had the force of the continent behind him. And his message was that developed countries must do more. As the summit comes to a close, the world still has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action