Security

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

Tracking narratives

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

Media policy

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

International response

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol. 

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack. 

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge. 

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.” 

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner. 

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries. 

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny. 

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August. 

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.” 

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

South African officials will likely be relieved by Putin’s decision to skip the summit. For months, they have sought to prevent a potential confrontation with the Kremlin over the issue, with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa even reportedly requesting permission from the International Criminal Court for some form of exemption in order to avoid arresting Putin during the summit. with tensions mounting ahead of the summit, South Africa Deputy President Paul Mashatile admitted in a July 14 interview that the best option would be for Putin to stay away. “The Russians are not happy, though,” he commented. “They want him to come.”

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Moscow’s earlier eagerness for Putin to attend the summit is easy to understand. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s relationship with the Western world has reached its lowest point since the Cold War. The Kremlin has sought to counter perceptions of mounting international isolation by emphasizing continued engagement with non-Western nations such as the BRICS grouping, which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With this in mind, Putin’s attendance of the August summit was seen as an important signal that Russia could not be isolated and remained a major force in global affairs.

With Russian prestige at stake, Kremlin officials reportedly pressed their South African counterparts hard over the issue. Indeed, in a court affidavit made public earlier this week, President Ramaphosa claimed any attempt to detain Putin could lead to war between Russia and South Africa. “I must highlight, for the sake of transparency, that South Africa has obvious problems with executing a request to arrest and surrender President Putin,” he said. “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting president would be a declaration of war.”

Russia’s efforts to pressure South Africa clearly failed, leading to the July 19 announcement that Putin would not be attending. This exercise in damage limitation makes perfect sense. Speculation over Putin’s possible arrest in South Africa was rapidly becoming a PR disaster for the Kremlin, drawing attention to his status as a suspected war criminal and undermining his strongman persona. Meanwhile, headlines claiming Moscow had threatened South Africa with war if the country dared to arrest Putin for war crimes did little to enhance Russia’s reputation as a credible partner. With South African officials unwilling or unable to provide the necessary assurances, the only remaining option was to cancel the visit entirely.

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This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

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As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

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Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

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84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post “Pariah” Putin forced to cancel travel plans over fears of war crimes arrest appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month’s topline events

Putin in Peril. Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the most serious challenge to his authority since taking office, as the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, mounted an insurrection against the Kremlin’s military leadership. With heavily armed mercenaries seizing the city of Rostov and moving within a few hundred miles of Moscow, a looming conflict was averted as Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s chief, agreed to stand down and go into exile in Belarus. But Prigozhin’s whereabouts remained in doubt, as Putin sought to reassert control over the Wagner Group and consolidate his grip on power.

• Shaping the order. The sudden rebellion by Prigozhin, a longtime close ally of Putin, suggests that the war in Ukraine is placing serious strains on Russia’s political leadership. Though Putin appears safe for now, the insurrection could open the door to future challenges to his rule, with the potential to shake the global order. Moscow appears to be struggling to gain control over Wagner, which has provided a crucial source of funding for Russia’s operations in Ukraine and helped the Kremlin expand its influence across the Middle East and Africa.
• Hitting home. The fall of Putin could ultimately lead to a more peaceful Russia, but political instability inside the Kremlin could also pose new risks to US security interests.
• What to do. With Putin forced to shift his focus to domestic challenges, Washington should use this opportunity to accelerate weapons support for Kyiv as Ukrainian forces push forward with their critical counteroffensive.

Blinken in Beijing. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, on a trip intended to “stabilize” relations between the two nations. While China refused a US request to resume military-to-military contacts, both sides appeared to view the talks as productive. But Chinese officials reacted bitterly to President Joe Biden’s subsequent reference to Xi as a “dictator,” calling the comments “extremely absurd and irresponsible.”

• Shaping the order. While it may temporarily help improve the atmospherics surrounding the US-China relationship, Blinken’s visit is unlikely to lead to a shift in the overall trajectory. Tensions will remain high in light of Beijing’s threats against Taiwan and other attempts to undermine the global order, as the US pursues efforts to shift supply chains in critical industries away from China, as part of a new “derisking” strategy.
• Hitting home. Seeking to maintain stable relations with the world’s second largest economy may be beneficial for the American people, but this will also require sustained efforts to defend against potential threats.
• What to do. The Biden administration should continue to coordinate with allies on strategies to counter Beijing’s assault on the global order, even as it tries to establish guardrails in the US-China relationship.

Modi’s State Visit. President Joe Biden hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House, as the administration sought to bolster economic and geopolitical ties with India. Amid media criticism of India’s backsliding on democracy, Modi was given a White House state dinner – only the third of Biden’s presidency – and invited to speak before a joint session of Congress. The two nations agreed to strengthen defense and technology cooperation, including building GE military jet engines in India and launching joint initiatives on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other areas.

• Shaping the order. Washington’s warm welcome for Modi reflects a desire to cultivate a stronger relationship with India in the context of strategic competition with China. While joint concerns over China appear to be propelling the relationship forward, it remains unclear whether the two nations can reach a more meaningful strategic partnership, especially given New Delhi’s refusal to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In addition, Modi’s targeting of religious minorities and crackdown on political dissent have raised questions about the future of the relationship.
• Hitting home. A stronger US relationship with India could generate new business opportunities for US companies seeking to reduce supply chain dependencies on China.
• What to do. While seeking to build on the positive momentum coming out of Modi’s visit, Washington should also make clear that it sees a shared commitment to democratic norms as the foundation for closer ties between the world’s two largest democracies.

Quote of the Month

“Democracies must now rally together around not just our common interests, but also our shared values. Preserving and protecting the freedoms that are essential to peace and prosperity will require vigorous leadership…”
– US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in New Delhi, India, June 5, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• Guatemala’s ruling government sought to overturn the results of the country’s presidential elections after the results indicated that Bernardo Arévalo, a reformist candidate, gained enough votes to qualify for a run-off. The State Department warned that undermining the election results would constitute a “grave threat to democracy.”
• With the support of Pakistan’s ruling government, the country’s military began implementing a broad crackdown against the media and political opposition, in the wake of national protests following the arrest of former prime minister Imran Khan.
• As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a high-profile visit to Washington, US concerns over democratic backsliding in India appeared to take a back seat in an effort to cultivate closer relations between the two nations.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

• Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the paramilitary Wagner Group, mounted an insurrection against Russia’s military leadership, but agreed to stand down after his heavily armed mercenaries came within a few hundred miles of Moscow.
• China and Cuba reached a secret agreement to allow Beijing to establish a surveillance facility on the island targeting the United States, and are in the process of negotiating a deal to establish a new joint military training facility.
• A contingent of leaders from seven African countries, including South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Putin, in a bid to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, though neither side accepted the African proposal.
• In a further indication of Seoul’s tilt toward a harder line on China, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol directly criticized China’s ambassador in Beijing for his comments critical of South Korea’s joining US-led initiatives.
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

• The US and Britain issued the Atlantic Declaration, a new economic framework aimed at enhancing cooperation on critical and emerging technology, supply chains, clean energy, and other issues, as a potential counterpart to the US-EU Trade and Technology Council.
• The US and thirteen other members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework reached an agreement on supply chains – one of the framework’s four core pillars – that will result in several new bodies focused on advancing supply chain resiliency.
• On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons (↑)

• The United Nations adopted the world’s first treaty aimed at protecting the high seas and preserving marine biodiversity in international waters, which constitute over two-thirds of the ocean.
• The US announced plans to rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in an effort to counter China’s growing sway in multilateral fora. After the Trump administration withdrew the US from the organization in 2017, China became one of its largest donors.
• On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

• French President Emmanuel Macron expressed opposition to a proposal by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to open a NATO liaison office in Japan, suggesting that the alliance should stay focused in the North Atlantic region.
• On his first trip to the White House since taking office, British prime minister Rishi Sunak met with Joe Biden, as the two leaders committed to closer cooperation on a range of political and economic issues.
• US-India relations appeared to enter a new chapter as Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined President Joe Biden for an official state visit in Washington.
• On balance, the alliance pillar was unchanged. 

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Lucan Ahmad Way, in Foreign Affairs, contends that revolutionary autocracies have demonstrated remarkable staying power, even in the face of mounting challenges.
• Hal Brands, in Foreign Policy, suggests that Russia, China, Iran, and to some extent North Korea constitute a bloc of adversaries more cohesive and dangerous than anything the United States has faced in decades.
• Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree, in Foreign Affairs, argue that in the face of Chinese aggression, a policy of continued non-alignment will not serve India well.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that Ukraine deserves NATO membership, as well as more robust weapons support.
• John Herbst and Dan Fried, in the Washington Post, suggest that the key to a Ukrainian victory in its war against Russia may lie in a successful advance to retake Crimea.
• Patrick Quirk and Caitlin Dearing Scott, writing for the Atlantic Council, argue for a fully developed foreign aid strategy to help the US succeed in strategic competition with China and Russia.
• Peter Engelke and Emily Weinstein, writing for the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper series, set forth a comprehensive strategy for the US and its allies to retain its technological advantage over China.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing June 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2022, US imports of goods utilizing AGOA (or GSP) benefits was valued at $10.2 billion.  Like overall US imports from Africa, imports from AGOA beneficiaries have changed over time, driven mostly by the value of oil imports from countries like Nigeria and Angola.

Since 2000, the cornerstone of US trade policy for Africa has been the African Growth and Opportunity Act also known as AGOA.

Past work by the Atlantic Council suggests that Africa sits at the nexus of current development, climate, and security challenges. With global competition over resources, technology and influence growing, the strategic importance of establishing a new kind of relationship with Africa has become clear to the United States. With an African market of over 1.3 billion people and a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over $3.4 trillion, expanding US-Africa trade and investment is now a clear strategic priority for both the United States and African countries.

The Atlantic Council’s Africa Center is examining trade between the US and Africa to date and the impact of AGOA, and analyzing the future of AGOA after its potential expiration in 2025.  Our work draws on a survey and interviews conducted with leaders in government, business, international organizations, and civil society. The report identifies key constraints limiting trade expansion and examines emerging challenges and opportunities that will shape its future. Drawing on this analysis, the report provides actionable recommendations for policymakers and other key stakeholders on the future of AGOA.

AGOA has come to define much of United States’ commercial relationship with Africa. With AGOA set to expire in 2025 and the shifting world economy providing new challenges and opportunities, now is the time to decide the future of US-Africa trade. The analysis in this report, as well as the findings from survey responses and interviews, suggest recommendations covering three areas:

1. AGOA itself
2. the future of US-Africa trade more broadly, and
3. the even broader future of US-Africa relations.

How to seize the moment

AGOA has symbolized the shift in US perceptions of Africa, augmenting aid with trade and commercial opportunity. Recognizing that the next ten years will shape economic trajectories for decades to come, the US must build on its narrative investment by embedding greater certainty for US and African investors.

1. AGOA should be renewed by the US Congress for at least a ten-year period as soon as possible. Doing so could allow African economies to capitalize on efforts to diversify supply chains away from China, supporting US strategic interests and a more resilient global economy. 
2. AGOA’s extension should be combined with greater certainty about AGOA eligibility, with fewer short-term eligibility decisions wherever possible. Eligibility is necessary for a country to access AGOA benefits. Doing so will boost investor confidence and support long-term economic development, which is the best way for the US to achieve its broader commercial and political goals. Greater stability in AGOA eligibility will also enhance the United States’ support for African economic integration through the AfCFTA.
3. Existing US efforts, through USAID, USTR and other agencies, should continue and ensure that support through continental level initiatives is sufficiently attuned to local contexts and barriers. Support to countries and firms in Africa is needed to ensure that the benefits of AGOA in fueling long-term development are achieved. There is a need for stronger capacity building to translate AGOA eligibility into utilization and real export capacity. Investing in re-establishing regional trade hubs could do this, while also supporting regional trade integration and direct links between AGOA and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities. USAID should ensure all regions, including Francophone Central Africa, are supported in this work.
4. To realize the benefits of AGOA for long-term development, African governments should rapidly develop and regularly update realistic national AGOA strategies and embed them in their economic planning and public investment.The US Congress should ensure sufficient funding for US agencies to support this process, including dedicated staff to work with African governments to draft the plans, if necessary. Support for these strategies could help set the United States’ interaction with Africa apart from other countries like China and India.Selecting a few countries to support early could make a big difference.  This could include eligible countries that are finding it difficult to meet the criteria such as the Central African Republic, Liberia, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
5. To support greater investment in export-oriented sectors within African countries, the US DFC, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Prosper Africa initiative should align their financing and commercial facilitation with these AGOA strategies too. The future of US-Africa trade should be situated within a broader reorientation of the US-Africa relationship that builds true partnerships that not only yield economic opportunities and expanded trade but also serve longer-term social and political goals. New forms and arenas for collaboration between US and African actors could drive unique solutions in a multipolar world.  Such strategies could also include countries that are important to US-Africa trade but face eligibility constraints such as Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

With so much written about the future of AGOA itself, the future of US-Africa trade more broadly, and the even broader future of US-Africa relations, a thorough examination of AGOA eligibility in 2023 is an opportunity to begin a longer conversation about the future of AGOA and US-Africa trade and investment.

As the United States reorients its international economic policy and African countries build new approaches to economic integration and collaboration, the future of US-Africa trade is ready to be defined. While setting the course for a renewed AGOA is important for maintaining business confidence, many of the challenges that African countries, firms, and individuals face will require deeper structural responses. In the push to achieve inclusive growth across the continent, capacity and investment constraints are particularly clear.

There are also immense opportunities. The rise of digital, financial, and creative products and services will shape African economies going forward. The expansion of economic and political links across the continent will provide more unified markets and supply chains, with greater economies of scale. The resources, ideas, and human capital needed to deliver global public goods and the green energy transition are already making Africa central to the future economy. Taking steps to broaden and deepen US-Africa trade and collaboration in these directions will provide the basis for more inclusive, sustainable growth and serve strategic economic and political goals for both sides.

Like what you read? Check back for our full report, coming soon.

Fellow

Frannie Léautier

Nonresident Senior Fellow

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The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The initiative is rare enough to draw some sarcasm about African presidents who are seeking to stop a European war when they can’t stop wars closer to home. For those critics—who overlook the work done in an effort to end the conflict in Ethiopia last year—it is hard to remember the last time such a delegation of African presidents assembled together to respond to a war on African soil. They point to cases in Khartoum, Sudan, and Goma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where any conflict-resolution efforts were ineffectual.

Other observers see this new delegation of African leaders as an attempt by South Africa to distract people from troubles at home. The announcement of the delegation came just days after US Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety’s allegation that a Russian cargo ship stocked up on ammunition and arms at a port in Cape Town in December 2022.

The recent (albeit cautious) support from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, Washington, and European capitals—along with the varied geopolitical positions of these African countries—lent enough credit to the initiative to give it a chance. In the United Nations General Assembly’s recent vote to condemn Russia over its invasion of Ukraine—held on February 23 this year, around the one-year mark of the full-scale invasion—thirty African countries voted to condemn Russia, twenty-two countries abstained, and two supported Russia. These African leaders, representing both countries who voted to condemn Russia and countries who abstained, form the optimal group to propose a peace plan, as several of them see this as an opportunity to justify their varied positions—including neutrality—and find a diplomatic end to the war.

What does this peace plan say? Frankly, not much—at the moment. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa spoke of vague preparations and of having separate phone calls, but avoided critical details. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said he was looking forward to seeing the delegation’s “concrete initiatives.”

What African leaders are weighing

Russia’s links to the African continent date back to the Cold War and a desire to support communist regimes (in places such as Guinea, Congo, and Ethiopia) and social-democratic or socialist political movements (in places such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe). The Soviet Union deployed forty thousand advisers across Africa between 1970 and 1975, and, over the course of the Cold War, received about sixty thousand African students—notably at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, which drew students from developing countries across the world. Some major African infrastructure projects are products of partnerships with the Soviet Union, Russia, or Russian companies. Those include the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the Capanda hydroelectric dam, and power plants planned in Congo and Nigeria. These are all countries that Putin hopes to rely on in order to find the support he lacks in the Global North.

Yet, while the USSR and, later, Russia have supported Africa in these ways, Africans are unlikely to blindly align themselves with Russia. It is impossible to ignore that previous support was more inspired by a desire to compete against the United States than by a love for freedom or Africa. Today, outside observers and African publics alike cannot ignore the humanitarian cost posed by Russia’s Wagner Group militias in the Sahel, Libya, the Central African Republic, or Mozambique. It is also difficult to see African youth seduced by the Russian way of life rather than the American dream, the latter of which has been able to increase its appeal to African youth via Netflix and Silicon Valley.

In fact, even if the West can’t see what Russians could seriously offer to Africans now, it has not been very difficult for Russia to fuel the very real African resentment towards the West. For Russia and the West, Africa is a coveted asset—one that holds 28 percent of the votes at the United Nations. In the post-Cold War period, Ukraine had neither the resources nor the geopolitical interest to engage in Africa like Russia did. That gave Russian views justifying aggression a hearing in Africa that it otherwise would not have received.

The complicated relations between African countries and also between African countries and global competitors such as Russia, the United States, and others leaves African policymakers in a bind. Those policymakers must carefully balance their economic interests and historical ties.

Further complicating the choice for African policymakers is the overwhelming US and Western support for Ukraine, in contrast to the lack of support and attention for African countries facing conflict. African countries, out of national interest, are looking to diversify their partnerships; they will need to balance their specific needs and local contexts in this geopolitical chaos.

A change in the narrative

The delegation of African presidents aiming to bring an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a unique opportunity for these leaders to be a part of the solution to a global problem and no longer rest on the sidelines of geopolitics as collateral victims.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a considerable increase in the price of grains, worsening food security particularly in the Horn of Africa; at the same time,it has also allowed Africa to step up as an alternative producer of some critical goods. For example in the energy sector, as Europe diversified away from Russian energy supplies, Africa helped fill the void, with Algeria now among the top four exporters of gas to Europe and with Egypt also bolstering its gas-export capacity, according to its Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. Recent hydrocarbon discoveries in Senegal and Mozambique are set to come online in the years ahead. These significant actions show that Africa is playing a leadership role and refusing to sit on the sidelines as a victim of geopolitical fallout.  

Africa has the peace and conflict-resolution experience to put forward in ending Eastern Europe’s geopolitical crisis. Even if African efforts have not always been successful, these efforts are valuable; the leaders behind them still have crucial experience in conflict management. Some might argue that the existence of countless conflict resolution tools, demobilization programs, peace-building mechanisms, and strategic frameworks such as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union indicate that African leaders fail to settle the conflicts and wars happening in their own countries; but in reality, the existence of these initiatives shows that African leaders have created dialogue where there were voids, demobilized fighters so they could return home, and, in some cases, helped societies address the horrors of war and build a lasting peace. Several of the leaders in the African peace delegation have participated in responding to violent conflict or have worked to end conflict. That experience may be usefully applied to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

By bringing the unique peace initiative together, African presidents are attempting to advance their leadership on the global stage. This is an incredible challenge for a continent that has often been applauded for its potential, but which must now deliver.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

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This month’s topline events

G7 Unites on China. At a G7 summit meeting in Hiroshima, Japan, President Joe Biden and other democratic leaders came together on China, pledging to “derisk” without “decoupling” from China’s economy and agreeing on a coordinating mechanism to counter economic coercion and an initiative to diversify supply chains. The G7 also called out Beijing’s militancy in the Indo-Pacific and political interference in democracies, while making clear it was prepared to “build constructive and stable relations” with China. With European allies eager to calm tensions, Biden also indicated he expected a thaw in relations with Beijing, as US officials began a new round of bilateral meetings with their Chinese counterparts.

• Shaping the order. The summit’s success in projecting a common front on China could set the table for meaningful policy coordination between the US and its allies, particularly on economic issues. The prospects of a more unified approach appear to have garnered concern in Beijing, which summoned Japan’s ambassador to rebuke the G7’s effort to “smear and attack China.” But as highlighted by French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to Beijing, the US and its allies still have a ways to go to coordinate efforts on engaging with the world’s second largest economy.
• Hitting home. America’s economy will be more secure over time if the US and its allies are able to reduce dependence on Chinese products in critical industries and limit Beijing’s ability to engage in economic coercion.
• What to do. Building on the momentum generated by the summit, the Biden administration should seek to formulate a common allied strategy for how to deal with China over the longer term.

Ukraine Gets F-16’s. With Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky traveling to Japan to join the G7 leaders summit, President Biden indicated that the US had agreed to allow allies to deliver US-built F-16 fighter planes to Ukraine and will participate in a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots. The move comes as Russian forces appeared to take full control of Bakhmut, ending a monthslong battle for the eastern city and constituting Russia’s first battlefield victory in nearly a year. But the success may be fleeting, as Ukraine prepared for the launch of a major counteroffensive operation.

• Shaping the order. Biden’s decision on F-16’s marks another major shift on weapons support that could substantially bolster the ability of Ukrainian forces to push back Russian forces, though it will be several months before Ukrainian pilots will be able to use the planes in combat. More broadly, Zelensky’s appearance at the G7 summit served as a further demonstration of democratic solidarity and an indicator for how significantly relations with Russia – once a member of the G7 (then the G8) – have deteriorated.
• Hitting home. Americans will be safer if Ukraine succeeds in standing up to Russia’s aggression and flagrant assault on its democratic neighbor.
• What to do. The Biden administration should work with allies to expedite the training of Ukrainian pilots and facilitate the delivery of the F-16’s, while also reconsidering its position on providing ATACMS, the longer range missile system that could also bolster Ukraine’s ability to succeed.

Arab League Welcomes Assad.  After years of diplomatic isolation following his use of chemical weapons and commission of widescale atrocities against civilians to crush a popular uprising, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was warmly received by Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Sultan and other Arab leaders at an Arab League Summit in Jeddah. The move comes as Assad continues to consolidate his grip on power, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states enter a rapprochement with Iran.

• Shaping the order. The Arab League’s normalization of relations with Assad – a murderous dictator responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians – is a demoralizing setback for efforts to advance a rules-based, democratic order. Assad’s resurrection appears to be part of a global trend of welcoming authoritarian leaders back from the cold, as Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro was invited by Brazil to participate in a South American leaders summit, sending the message to autocrats that violent repression ultimately pays dividends.
• Hitting home. The rehabilitation of autocrats like Assad undermines American values and US interests in a stable and prosperous world order.
• What to do. The US and its democratic allies should stand together in opposing Assad’s reintegration into the international community, and maintain sanctions and other efforts to ensure that Assad is ultimately held accountable for his actions.

Quote of the Month

“Russia’s aggression against Ukraine… has shaken the international order… [Japan] has a mission to uphold the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and to demonstrate to the world its determination to fully defend peace and prosperity.”
– Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, speaking at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, May 21, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was given a warm welcome at an Arab League Summit in Jeddah, after years of diplomatic isolation following his use of chemical weapons and commission of widescale atrocities against civilians.
• After facing his biggest election challenge in over two decades, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan won re-election amidst a campaign process marred by pro-government media bias, limits on free speech, and other obstacles on the opposition.
• Venezuela’s authoritarian leader Nicolas Maduro was invited to participate in a summit of South American leaders in Brazil, as Brazilin president Lula de Silva joined Maduro in criticizing US sanctions against Venezuela.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

• President Biden agreed to allow NATO allies to deliver US-built F-16 fighter planes to Ukraine, while pledging US participation in a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots.
• The US signed a new defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea – the largest island nation in the Pacific – that will deepen security ties between the two nations, as Washington seeks to counter China’s rising influence in the region.
• In a show of solidarity, Chinese President Xi Jinping told visiting Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin that Beijing will maintain “firm support” for Moscow’s “core interest.”
• The US accused South Africa of secretly supplying arms to Russia, despite the country’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine – a claim South African leaders initially denied and then promised to investigate.
• Russia and Belarus signed an agreement formalizing the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, a move that appears intended as a warning to the West as it steps up support for Ukraine.
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

• The US and its G7 partners agreed to establish a new coordinating mechanism to counter economic coercion and launch a new initiative to diversify supply chains away from China, while pledging to “derisk” without “decoupling” from China’s economy.
• The US and Taiwan reached a trade and investment agreement in an effort to liberalize and deepen economic ties between the two nations.
• China signed a free trade agreement with Ecuador, as Beijing looks to deepen its economic ties and influence in Latin America.
• G7 leaders agreed to new economic sanctions against Russia for its war in Ukraine, and the US announced a slate of new measures to restrict Russian trade. The UK followed suit, announcing a ban on Russian diamonds.
• On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons ()

• G7 Leaders released a Clean Energy Action Plan, providing commitments across seven specific areas, including promoting clean energy technologies, with goal of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
• A joint report by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme contends that, unless immediate action is taken, acute food insecurity will likely be exacerbated over the next six months.
• The World Health Organization declared an end to the COVID-19 global health emergency, marking an end to one of the most deadly and devastating pandemics in modern history.
• On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

• Meeting in Hiroshima, President Biden and his G7 counterparts reaffirmed their solidarity to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky joined the summit in-person. G7 leaders also came together on China, pledging to counter economic coercion and voicing opposition to Beijing’s militarization of the Indo-Pacific.
• President Biden joined leaders of the Indo-Pacific Quad – US, Australia, India, and Japan – for a summit in Hiroshima, resulting in a joint pledge to cooperate toward a region where “where all countries are free from coercion” – an indirect reference to China.
• US Secretary of State Tony Blinken traveled to Oslo for a NATO foreign ministers meeting to discuss potential security guarantees for Ukraine, including the possibility of NATO membership, though allies remain divided on the issue.
• Overall, the alliance pillar was strengthened. 

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Liza Tobin, in Foreign Policy, argues that US policy toward China should be reoriented to achieve what should be American’s long-term goal of a democratic China.
• Emile Hokeinam, in Foreign Affairs, suggests that Syrian president Assad has turned a weak hand into a winning one, and that the Arab embrace of Assad will only encourage more brutality.
• Soner Cagaptay, in Foreign Affairs, opines that President Erdogan’s victory in the Turkish elections could solidify Turkey’s shift from an illiberal democracy to a Putin-style autocracy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that the drama of US debt ceiling negotiations underscores the enduring promise of America’s global leadership and the growing perils of its decline.
• Dan Fried and Aaron Korewa, in the New Atlanticist, explore the potential for Poland to serve as a leader in Europe amidst the ongoing political turmoil.
• Ash Jain was quoted in Foreign Policy on US efforts to win over countries in dealing with China, by not talking about China.
• Joslyn Brodfueher and Zelma Sergejeva, writing for the Atlantic Council, highlight the potential to fortify NATO’s unified front against Russian aggression as the alliance prepares for its upcoming summit in Vilnius.
• Matthew Kroenig, in Foreign Policy, suggests that even Machiavelli preferred democracy over tyranny, because democracies have stronger political institutions that provide the source for greater national power and influence.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing May 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zambia has 2,800 megawatts (MW) of installed electricity generation capacity, with 85 percent of the electricity mix derived from hydropower, and  31 percent of the population has access to energy—the majority being in urban areas. The global disruptions to expected rainfall patterns, linked to the effects of climate change, has directly affected Zambian hydropower. Zambia’s loadshedding challenges made news this past December as their public utility, ZESCO, announced that consumers would experience up to twelve hours of loadshedding a day because of critically low water levels at the Kariba Dam, on the border of Zambia and Zimbabwe. During this time, the dam on Zambia’s side of the border could not deliver even 40 percent of its 1,080 MW capacity, crippling the country’s ability to deliver energy to consumers.

There are notable low-hanging fruits in the development of Zambia’s electricity mix. While Zambia has the potential to generate 2,300 MW of solar and 3,000 MW of wind, only 76 MW of solar has been installed and no wind power to date. And while 67 percent of the urban population has access to energy, the connection is disrupted frequently due to loadshedding and service disruption caused by aforementioned low water levels in hydropower stations. While the rains in early February assisted in shoring up water levels, climate change will continue to impact rainfall levels and create future problems in energy generation unless the energy mix diversifies.

Attracting low-capital cost investment for new energy projects has, until recently, been a challenge. President Hichilema took office shortly after Zambia became the first African country to default on its sovereign debt in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic and found that his predecessors had accumulated $30 billion in unserviceable debt. Much of Zambia’s borrowing under former President Lungu’s leadership was part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), from which Zambia received $5.23 billion in the energy sector alone. The BRI led to considerable expansion of infrastructure and nearly a two-fold increase in electricity consumption over the previous decade, but left the country unable to balance its payments. 

Recognizing the need to diversify Zambia’s energy grid, the government has been working towards securing private sector investment to deploy solar projects throughout the country to close the energy poverty gap. The government has outlined a plan to achieve universal access to energy for all Zambians by 2030 by bringing additional solar, hydro, geothermal, and thermal energy online.

While developed nations look to decarbonize, countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Zambia, will need significantly more energy to power a high-growth society and achieve development goals. The vast majority of Zambia’s population is comprised of smallholder farmers, producing 80 percent of the country’s agricultural production. That same population is the most vulnerable to climate change impacts, as they rely on rain-fed agriculture. The process of realizing Zambia’s breadbasket potential will require a shift from traditional to modern farming practices, which will require significantly more energy to drive irrigation development and the mechanization of agricultural production. Furthermore, Zambia’s economy has the potential to expand its raw materials sector, and to bolster its GDP by adding value to its products through increased processing and smelting of minerals within Zambia’s borders. Doing this will require more power, and importantly, in continuous supply. 

Positively, Zambia has received a recent wave of investment in its power infrastructure, a result of Hichilema welcoming foreign investors and independent power producers. A few notable investments and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) have been announced by key partners from around the world, positioning Zambia as a high prospect for low-carbon energy investments and unlocking opportunities to deliver investments in 24/7 clean electricity systems necessary to power industrial activity such as minerals processing. A few weeks ago, seven British companies announced an investment commitment of $2 billion in renewable energy projects in Zambia, to produce 1,500 MW of clean energy. Earlier this year, ZESCO and the United Arab Emirates’ Masdar signed an MOU to develop solar projects worth $2 billion, meant to generate 2,000 MW. This investment, labeled a “capital injection” by President Hichilema, will nearly triple Zambia’s electric capacity in combination with the investment from the British coalition. Critically, these investments will bolster the Zambian grid’s ability to generate electricity at times when hydropower generation is low and solar irradiance is high.

Providing commitments to develop Zambia’s energy infrastructure is not a matter of aid or charity. It has the potential to bring Zambia into the fold of the global economy—a process which adds value for Zambians and Zambia’s trade partners—and provide critical inputs to the global energy transition.

Recognizing this, during the US-African Leaders Summit hosted by the Biden Administration this past December, the United States, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Zambia signed an MOU to strengthen cooperation to develop a cross-border integrated electric vehicle (EV) battery value chain. This MOU is a welcome example of the form of partnership which the United States and allies should adopt in their commercial partnerships with African nations. Notably, the MOU expresses a desire to support the DRC and Zambia in developing economic activity within the EV battery value chain from the mine to the assembly line, not solely in the extraction of raw materials. Such a partnership provides an area for the US private sector to share knowledge and provide project development services and enable local industry and capacity to grow while firming global supply for critical materials and technologies for the energy transition, a win for all partners involved. 

Zambia, as well as other countries across the continent, has held recent high-level diplomatic visits to establish a stronger relationship between the United States and Africa. Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen visited Zambia in January, and Vice President Kamala Harris has just begun her tour on the continent which includes a stop in Zambia. The trips to the continent have highlighted the US’s mutual interests in strengthening Africa’s security and economic prosperity, but discussions surrounding energy development, the backbone of a prosperous future in Africa, have remained vague. While the diplomatic engagements are notable, the trips should place a heavier emphasis on opportunities for the United States to further strengthen energy development throughout the continent, a critical missing link in driving economic growth and expanding opportunity for communities in Zambia and elsewhere on the continent.

As debt-burdened African nations expand engagement with higher-income countries beyond aid, Zambia serves as an important case study on opportunities to attract investor interest in energy development. In order to keep momentum up, investment transparency and translating MOUs into action will be critical to accelerate progress on achieving sustainable development goals. Notably, the investor interest that Hichilema’s administration is attracting is a positive signal for neighboring countries by showing the outcomes that are associated with a commitment to good governance.

Maia Sparkman is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

William Tobin is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Meet the authors

Staff

Maia Sparkman

Assistant Director

Global Energy Center

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

Staff

William Tobin

Assistant Director

Global Energy Center

Africa China

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This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. 

The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent.

In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively.

The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). 

Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.

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1. Why are Russia and China teaming up with South Africa?

Teaming up may be a misleading term, as South Africa has longstanding ties with both Russia and China. South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), received significant Soviet support during the anti-apartheid struggle, including both military and financial backing. South Africa became a member of the BRICS consortium of economies in 2014—which also includes Brazil, Russia, India, and China—and has had strong economic engagement with China since the early 2000s. Also, Russia, China, and South Africa have previously conducted bilateral and other multilateral joint training exercises. So defense cooperation among these nations is neither unprecedented nor wholly unanticipated.

In addition to the practical and diplomatic advantages of shared drills with South Africa, its location aligns strategically with Russian and Chinese efforts to project naval power in African waters. Russia has increased its activities in the Indian Ocean in recent years, for example with efforts to secure port access for its navy in Mozambique. China similarly wants to increase its ability to deploy the People’s Liberation Army Navy worldwide, including in the Indian and Atlantic oceans. To support its navy’s push, China must ensure logistics provision and access in ports or basing in countries along these coasts, such as in Kenya, the Seychelles, Tanzania, or Angola. Straddling both these coasts, of course, is South Africa.

—Sarah Daly is a nonresident fellow at the Africa Center.

As with the previous exercise between South Africa, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China in 2019, these trilateral naval exercises are likely to prove to be of limited warfighting value, but are incredibly valuable to the diplomatic interests of each country. As has been true throughout history, a navy that is capable of sustained global operations is a unique element of national strength that contributes heavily to advancing diplomatic efforts. This exercise in naval diplomacy enables South Africa to demonstrate its independent foreign policy, Russia to highlight its continued relations with nations of the Global South, and China to demonstrate the increasing global reach of its navy.  

The United States and like-minded allies and partners also understand the value of naval diplomacy. The US Navy has the USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, an expeditionary sea base (ESB) that is permanently forward deployed to the region with one of its primary missions being to support ongoing diplomatic efforts and engage with countries in Africa. This ESB makes frequent visits to countries throughout the continent for engagement opportunities and most recently visited South Africa in August 2022.  

—LCDR Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views do not represent the US Navy or the Department of Defense.

South Africa is a regional hegemon in southern Africa and economically, diplomatically, and militarily among the giants of the African continent, making it an obvious focus for attention. It also has historically warm relations with China dating back to the struggle against apartheid. Finally, South Africa has an ambivalent relationship with the United States and the rest of the Western “international community.” The move is popular with many South Africans, especially those who align with the ruling ANC. 

—Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center.

2. What is South Africa’s political motivation in aligning with these two militaries?

South Africa has repeatedly emphasized its neutrality vis-à-vis Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has pushed for negotiations in official calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and asserted that he would be willing to mediate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. That said, South Africa is stretching the limits of neutrality. Hosting high-level bilateral meetings, describing relations as “friendly,” and participating in “routine” joint military drills indicate support for, rather than cordiality toward, Russia. South Africa’s friendly and routine relations are antithetical to the West’s aims to isolate, deter, and defeat Russia. In an increasingly polarized diplomatic environment, non-alignment can appear to be de-facto alignment with Russia.   

South Africa’s particular approach to non-alignment in this case contributes to the tension. While South Africa has officially acknowledged the illegality of the invasion, it has resisted pressure to enforce sanctions or cut ties. Its actions increasingly belie its stated desire to remain neutral and independent from ‘great power’ struggles, and some segments of the South African public are questioning the government’s stance.

From a military readiness standpoint, the exercise included joint tactical maneuvers as well as rescue and recovery drills; the latter align with threat risks presented by piracy and illicit activities in the Indian Ocean. These shared drills represent a legitimate training opportunity for the South African Defense Force (SADF). South Africa is not the primary partner or recipient of US naval training exercises in Africa, although SADF participated in Shared Accord last summer and other military-to-military assistance focusing on developing and improving medical capabilities. South Africa has previously participated in US Africa Command’s Indian Ocean drills, which focus on East African nations, although not in the past few years. Other US naval exercises in Africa focus on the Gulf of Guinea and the Mediterranean.

—Sarah Daly

3. What new lessons did we learn from this exercise regarding Russian and Chinese capabilities?

Russia brought a hypersonic missile, apparently for display purposes. This show and tell indicates Russia’s desire to demonstrate its technical strength to the world and prove that it can maintain external commitments despite the strain of its war in Ukraine on its armed forces, economy, and political stability. 

—Sarah Daly

China’s focus on the maritime domain, through a sustained investment in shipbuilding, is a key element of its strategic objective to disrupt the international order and challenge the United States. The exponential growth of China’s maritime forces has already resulted in it being the world’s largest navy with approximately 340 battle force ships, compared to 294 in the US Navy’s current inventory. This trilateral exercise, conducted thousands of miles from its shoreline, is further evidence of its strategic plan to become a global navy. As China’s sustained investment in shipbuilding results in expected growth to 400 warships by 2025 and 440 warships by 2030, policymakers must be aware of China’s intent to use its maritime force for worldwide power projection and expanded naval diplomacy.

—Marek Jestrab

4. What message does it send to have these drills coincide with the one-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine, and with reports of increased Chinese support of Russia in the war?

At the very least, it signals that South Africa is not concerned with Ukraine and not interested in towing the Western line. South Africa would prefer to highlight its independence and its willingness to conduct its international relations as it sees fit. 

—Michael Shurkin

Russia’s recent diplomatic and military push in South Africa signals that it can continue its foreign relations as a bilateral security partner despite the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Conducting drills with Russia and China at such a contentious time seemingly suggests that South Africa condones Russia’s actions in Ukraine—even if its stated stance is one of non-alignment. South Africa’s asserted neutral position is shared by fellow BRICS member India, which has also faced scrutiny for maintaining diplomatic, economic, and military relations with Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. India has continued to purchase Russian oil and participated in Russia’s Vostok 2022 military exercises with China in August. We should be circumspect about assigning greater meaning to the timing or “message” of these drills.

—Sarah Daly

The post What we learned from the Russia-China-South Africa military drills appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This problem is self-perpetuating. When energy infrastructure is weak, there is less signal to invest as individual projects are less viable and are deemed riskier, particularly by the private sector, which has historically provided around 10 percent of infrastructure funding across the continent. Infrastructure, in this sense, should be expanded beyond the state of electricity grids or gas pipelines to include public services such as trained utility workers, water resources, public safety and security forces, and much more.

It is becoming clearer that the paradigm of “aid,” which has underpinned Western countries’ development strategies in the African continent, is increasingly insufficient. Providing aid alone to African nations will not provide the tools and enablers of self-sustaining, endogenous growth. For that, the continent needs investment, not just aid. 

Investment in African nations is not a question of charity. It is increasingly a matter of global economic—as well as ethical—importance. Higher levels of GDP are correlated with greater electricity use, affordability, access, and reliability. The African population is the youngest and fastest-growing of all continents, and thirteen of the world’s largest twenty urban areas are projected to sit in Africa by the end of the century. As occurred in China over the past forty years, Africa’s young and growing population can provide the globe with a capable labor force, along with industrialization for the modern era that can drive job creation and opportunity in African communities while spurring global economic growth.

Placing the chicken before the egg?

Africa’s energy infrastructure is plagued by longstanding underinvestment. In the past decade, the continent received investment of about $41 billion in the energy sector. This number is low in absolute terms, and when compared to the rest of the world, represents only 3 percent of global energy investment. More startling, however, is the fact that 99.5 percent of energy investment on the continent was routed to energy generation. Only the remaining 0.5 percent was routed to transmission and distribution networks. Turning to the World Bank, between 2010-2020, 7.5 percent of the bank’s electricity infrastructure investment went to sub-Saharan Africa, with 98.2 percent going towards generation and 0.3 percent for transmission. 

This underinvestment perpetuates existing problems, including low cost-recoverability and low revenues for utilities, and high project costs for new generation assets. Coupled with sky-high and rising interest rates in African countries such as Ghana, where the benchmark bank rate is 17 percent, poor energy infrastructure makes the risk premium high for new investors.

Untapped potential

The ultimate result is that despite increased focus on the issue of energy poverty facing the continent, infrastructure deficits hinder efforts to increase energy generation and distribution throughout the continent. Fortunately, the continent is rich in both natural gas and renewable resources to power the continent’s industrial revolution, address energy poverty, and spur economic growth, as long as the continent is provided investments at the scale needed to recognize this untapped potential.

Under the IEA’s Sustainable Africa Scenario (SAS), the model assumes that the annual investment in electricity grids more than triples in the 2026-30 timeframe, reaching $40 billion per year on average, with distribution networks accounting for over two-thirds of the total. However, achieving these annual investments is far from simple. Today’s existing financing mechanisms are insufficient for investments in large-scale energy generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure projects. 

This does not bode well for the prospects of reaching the SAS’s $40-billion-per-year target, given that development banks and governments will need to step in to bridge the risk premium inherent in new investment on the continent. Despite the urgent need to invest, investment risk is high. But the only way to resolve this cycle will be to mobilize the capital necessary for the buildout of infrastructure which can sustain growth of more projects and more infrastructure. 

African governments will also need to step in to reform regulatory environments to build investor confidence, committing to both regulatory certainty and transparency in electricity markets. The SAS prioritizes regulatory reform to meet the continent’s energy goals, with a particular focus on cost-of-service electricity pricing reforms. To date, twenty-four countries in Africa have put such reforms in place or are under discussion to implement. Close coordination, collaboration, and transparency between African governments and utility companies will also be crucial to enhance cross-border interconnection.

Expanding engagement

On the matter of roads, ports, and railways, China has been Africa’s largest partner in developing infrastructure by far in the past 20 years. In fact, US influence in the region is waning, and trade between the United States and Africa decreased 55 percent from 2008 to 2021, to a sum of $64 billion. Africa’s trade with China in 2021 stood at $254 billion. As a response, President Biden and other G7 leaders announced the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment to mobilize $600 billion by 2027 for sustainable infrastructure developments in emerging markets, and to take steps to closing the financing gap. One of the four priority pillars included in this MOU is the commitment to build climate-resilient infrastructure, transform energy technologies, and develop clean energy supply chains. 

The US Development Finance Corporation (DFC)—the US government’s main tool to catalyze global infrastructure investments—is primarily designed to mobilize private capital for investment-ready projects, which are in short supply in Africa. The current structure of the DFC is insufficient in meeting the scale of infrastructure investments needed in low-income nations where it is most needed. In recent years, several public investment initiatives have emerged to crowd in, de-risk, and catalyze private investment in Africa. These include the African Development Bank’s New Deal on Energy for Africa and Desert to Power Initiative, USAID’s Power Africa, the Green Climate Fund, and CDC Group’s Gridworks Partners. Utilizing these initiatives to successfully mobilize private investment in energy infrastructure will be crucial in achieving the deployment of enabling infrastructure at scale.

Leveraging newfound attention to benefit African communities

Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine has sent Europeans scrambling to African capitals to identify new energy sources and completely rework European energy flows. In May, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Senegal, where a significant gas deposit has been discovered along Senegal’s border with Mauritania; Italy has signed gas deals with Angola and the Republic of the Congo since the start of the war; and President Andrzej Duda of Poland visited the Ivory Coast to sign a Memorandum of Cooperation on exporting energy supplies from Nigeria to Poland. President Macky Sall of Senegal, the present chair of the African Union, has also hosted delegates from Europe to discuss the bloc’s need for resources.

Europe has expressed more interest than ever before in African energy resources as the bloc weans itself off Russian gas. However, an outstanding question remains: will Europe invest and support downstream infrastructure for Africans to benefit from their own resources, or will Europe’s willingness to invest only go so far as to secure gas exports for Europeans?

Europe’s elevated interest in the region as an energy provider might be a signal that investors have been waiting for to unlock significant investment to build out the needed energy infrastructure throughout the African continent which would allow African communities to use their own resources to expand energy access. Before Russia’s war in Ukraine, there was growing tension between African leaders advocating for the continent’s right to exploit its energy resources to industrialize and develop. Tensions grew stronger as the United States and the European Union (EU) blocked financing opportunities for fossil fuel projects abroad. However, since the war in Ukraine, both the European Union and the United States have eased up on this position, with the United States even including “gas for power” in its “US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa“ released in August 2022, recognizing the role of gas to support Africa’s development efforts.

Aligning with African leadership

African leaders from resource-rich nations have vocally opposed restrictions towards financing gas infrastructure. Speaking on a panel in Dakar in September, H.E. Bruno Jean-Richard Itoua, Minister of Hydrocarbons of the Republic of the Congo, said the following: “For the next 25 years we will see energy demand growing. We cannot face this demand without gas.”  In September, African Ministers of Finance, Economy, and Environment gathered to ensure coherence and prioritize actions in the lead up to COP27. From this convening, the Ministers underscored “the need to avoid approaches that encourage abrupt disinvestments from fossil fuels, as this will, in addition to the impacts of climate change, threaten Africa’s development due to the unintended impact on jobs, the economy, energy, food security, and the ability to mobilize finance.” Transatlantic policymakers must recognize that African nations strongly desire to utilize their resources to achieve development goals.

Whether the buildout of downstream infrastructure is for gas or transmission to carry the electrons produced by renewables, there is strong demand for an increase of investment in all forms of enabling infrastructure to achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 7—access to affordable, reliable, and sustainable modern energy for all—and remain on the path towards a low-carbon future. Given recent developments including the G7 committing to support infrastructure developments in emerging markets, Europe turning to Africa to secure energy resources, and African leaders advocating for a just energy transition, there is significant opportunity for developed nations to invest in usable ”downstream” infrastructure to recognize the African continent’s important role as a respected partner to address climate change and energy security. After all, emerging global actors and competitors, such as China, have long been doing exactly that.

William Tobin is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Maia Sparkman is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

GEC at COP27: Ambitions for All

The Atlantic Council Global Energy Center will be at COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, to work alongside government, industry, civil society, and public stakeholders to devise pragmatic solutions and ideas to achieve net-zero #AmbitionsForAll.

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Meet the authors

Staff

William Tobin

Assistant Director

Global Energy Center

Africa China

Staff

Maia Sparkman

Assistant Director

Global Energy Center

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

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Instead, over decades, an abysmal series of obstacles have repeatedly hindered the country’s development. A poorly managed decolonization process by Belgium, multiple rebellions, and the failure to promote good governance—combined with living in a state of war since 1996, particularly in the east—have resulted in profound setbacks in health, education, the economy, society, and governance.

Those obstacles led to deep and pervasive effects on Congolese society, and they make a good case for massive assistance. There is a model already in place for the United States and other friends of the DRC around the world to follow: the 1948­–1951 European Recovery Program, otherwise known as the Marshall Plan. Advanced by then US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the plan gave countries that were devastated by World War II mostly donations to restore industry, support agriculture, and increase international trade. The United States appropriated $13.3 billion over four years. In the end, the plan helped Western and Southern European countries boost industrial production by 55 percent and average gross national product by 33 percent, laying the foundations for a prosperous Europe. Since then, the expression “Marshall Plan” has been used to refer to massive assistance or economic stimulus programs worldwide, the latest case being the European Recovery Plan.

Comparable assistance focused on improving governance could help the DRC develop while laying a similar foundation for a prosperous African Great Lakes region—and even African continent. Yet, achieving this goal will require focusing the plan more on building strong institutions and less on building infrastructure, the beloved child of many development partners. Then US President Barack Obama emphasized a need for updated partnership programs with Africa in a July 2009 speech in Accra, Ghana, declaring: “The true sign of success is not whether we are a source of perpetual aid that helps people scrape by… It’s whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.”

Decades of development lost

A bit like in the 1960s and 1970s, military conflicts and violence are entrenched in  the DRC. The death toll of near-weekly attacks by the allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an insurgent group with ties to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), practically tripled between 2020 and 2022. Furthermore, the militant March 23 Movement, after a deceptive slumber, has occupied the strategic town of Bunagana since June.

After former President Mobutu Sese Seko’s three-decade single-party rule and former President Joseph Kabila’s tumultuous terms from 2001 to 2019, Congolese people hoped that their political class would mobilize in favor of development. This has not yet fully happened; and far from rallying the much-needed unity required to end the conflict in the east, political parties seem preoccupied with the 2023 presidential election.

Despite recent social and economic progress—notably a solid annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate that has averaged above 5 percent over the last ten years—many long-term per capita indicators have worsened since the 1970s, according to the World Bank: Electricity consumption per capita (159 kilowatt hours in 1972 and 109 kilowatt hours in 2015) and the number of hospital beds per thousand people (3.2 in 1975 against 0.8 in 2006) have dropped. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita remains less than half of values in the 1970s ​​($1,372 in 1974 versus $518 in 2021, in constant 2015 US dollars).

There are several other indicators that raise concerns about the country’s economic and social progress: As of the beginning of this year, twenty-one diseases under surveillance in the DRC had the potential to become epidemics—and in the year before, six had done so, including measles, cholera, and COVID-19. According to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 4.2 million people, including 2.4 million children under five years old, suffer from acute severe malnutrition. Roughly six million people are internally displaced, and 74,000 cases of sexual and gender-based violence were reported over the period, with the majority occurring in the eastern conflict-torn part of the country.

These economic and social indicators are a sign of an unhealthy ecosystem that cannot support development. Contributing factors include political instability, wars, a lack of economic diversification, an overreliance on natural resources, and the consequences of a conflict economy—in which investment is dampened by the uncertainty caused by wartime disruptions to local and national activities, and Congolese don’t benefit from the revenues created by their natural resources. These factors make it difficult to uproot corruption, mismanagement, and state capture, even more than half a century after the DRC’s independence, despite recent efforts, such as reforms within the central bank and the publication of mining contracts.

Thus, the country’s lack of development, caused by its political, social, and economic conditions, is likely to be long-lasting.

The “big push” to prosperity

In his farewell letter, Lumumba was optimistic about the destiny of his country because he believed that the DRC could overcome its afflictions, just as other countries that have experienced war and political instability have done.

Germany experienced such a period of economic and social adversity after World War II: In 1947, industrial output was only one-third and food production was one-half of the country’s 1938 levels. Nearly one-fifth of the country’s housing had been destroyed over the course of the war. Inflation had resulted in a wave of poverty, while the country’s price controls fueled the expansion of the black market.

But today, Germany has become a formidable economic force. The reasons for the German economic miracle, or “Wirtschaftswunder,” are subject to debate among economists, but some credit the Marshall Plan.

The initial Marshall Plan and its variants worldwide are in line with economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan’s “big push” theory that massive reforms and investments are more helpful than gradual actions in overcoming obstacles that preclude development in underdeveloped economies. In other words, a “big push” is required to undo the inertia of a stagnant economy. Such a “big push” would help the DRC get out of its rut, given the country’s numerous and multifaceted economic, social, and security challenges. But the push must address the real issues that Congolese face.

Institutions over infrastructure

Investment plans for African countries often focus on spending in areas like infrastructure and equipment—and ultimately, some costly and not terribly useful “white elephants.” A Marshall Plan for the DRC should avoid falling into those two pitfalls by taking a completely different approach: focusing on institutions rather than infrastructure.

After all, infrastructure projects in the DRC easily mobilize resources from a variety of public and private stakeholders. The Emirati company DP World, for example, is investing hundreds of millions of dollars over decades in the construction and management of the DRC’s first deep-sea port in Banana due to the economic potential there. Beyond that case, the country’s infrastructure potential and needs are so immense that all that the government would have to do is to design bankable projects and abide to the conditions set by international private or public partners.

Conversely, commitment to lasting and in-depth institutional reform is far below what the DRC and other poor nations need because a reformed institution is less immediately visible than a bridge or a school. In addition, reforming or even creating an institution is more time-consuming, more complex, and dependent on combining success factors such as overcoming vested interests and tailoring institutions to sociological realities. It involves mapping and optimizing processes, investing in training, and paying civil servants better—but also limiting abuses vis-à-vis users of public services, who are often not considered as customers but rather as sheep that can be sheared mercilessly.

Overcoming the DRC’s development obstacles will require a substantial investment in the country’s institutions. Strong institutions are the key to turning the DRC’s immense potential into tangible results, enabling the country to fish for itself instead of being offered fish by other countries.

A DRC with strong institutions would see civil servants better paid, unbiased decisions from the courts, vulnerable groups protected by the police, natural resources and projects managed without corruption, better-equipped schools, and a social safety net that protects the most vulnerable.

Preparing for the push

Initial work in designing the Marshall Plan should start with an in-depth inclusive discussion among Congolese and between Congo and its partners about the governance mechanisms of such an initiative.

This initial discussion is essential because of the colossal sums at stake and also the controversies that have plagued Congolese infrastructure projects: In order to avoid problems associated with the DRC’s poor public finance management and to increase the likelihood that the plan succeeds, this discussion should be structured around strengthening its absorptive capacity—the amount of foreign aid that the DRC can use productively. The DRC has faced difficulties in quickly implementing quality investment projects and ensuring that every dollar invested reaches its intended beneficiary. Shaping a new normal will require improvements in three areas.

1. Preparations for the Marshall Plan should include the recruitment and training of motivated and skilled people who can effectively design and manage reform projects in the long term.
2. The DRC must establish a stronger and more efficient control mechanism to ensure good fiduciary management of the plan’s projects in order to avoid misappropriation, collusion, and corruption. Such practices have long bedeviled public contract tenders and public funds management.
3. It will be necessary to meticulously prepare the various projects and investment plans in order to avoid mistakes of the past, including some famous white elephants, and to guarantee adequate social impact. To do this, leaders taking part in the plan should adopt an experimental approach in which they run small-scale test projects to better understand and correct their shortcomings before deploying them throughout the country.

Institution building is a serious matter. It requires time and stability. Besides, institutional quality is sensitive to policy changes that follow shifts in political leadership. Hence the need, as a foundation to the Marshall Plan, to build a clear, accountable, and trans-partisan consensus around institutional reform. If a platform for reform has buy-in from political parties and stakeholders across Congolese society, it would be immune to the negative side effects of changes in government. With new elections slated for 2023, now is an opportune political moment to start that dialogue. Presidential candidates, in particular, should explain how their pledges will contribute to the much-needed institutional transformation. The country’s burgeoning civil society could seize the opportunity to mobilize Congolese across party lines and identify priority sectors for institution building in preparation for the plan.

Such a process would empower the Congolese people, who have often been marginalized in designing development policies even though they’re meant to be the beneficiaries. It would foster crucial local commitment to institutional transformation. Plus, the preparation effort could help establish an equal relationship between the DRC and its financial partners in their mission to propel the country into the twenty-first century.

Doing the Marshall Plan math

How much should an institutional Marshall Plan for the DRC cost? Let’s start with a linear method to evaluate the original.  

From 1948 to 1952, sixteen countries received a total of $13.3 billion, representing roughly $159 billion in 2022. Distributing that among the total 1948 population (approximately 270 million) of the countries that received this aid yields a per capita endowment of $588 in today’s dollars to match the original Marshall Plan.

That would add up to approximately $55 billion for the DRC and its estimated 95.2 million people. The amount is practically the size of the DRC’s GDP and more than ten times what it receives in annual Official Development Assistance. It may seem enormous—but that is not the case considering the scale of the DRC’s weak social indicators and immense needs. The sum is about one-third more than the $40 billion the US Congress committed this year to aid Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and represents roughly three to four years of expenditures for Washington, DC, or Chicago.

The spillovers from the Marshall Plan would also be transformative; those resources would help provide the “big push” that the country needs to fight against the rise of the ADF in eastern DRC, meet its development challenge, rebuild, and, above all, consolidate its governance and move from a cyclical, natural-resource-led growth to a more balanced and sustainable momentum supported by strong institutions.

A Marshall Plan-style investment could quickly transform the DRC, which is projected to become the world’s eighth most populous country by 2050, into one of the globe’s most dynamic markets. The DRC, with its connections to world cobalt battery supply chains, could also become a home for green industries, with jobs available for youth in all sectors of a radically transformed economy.

Ultimately, an institution-centered Marshall Plan would dramatically transform the DRC over the next decades, helping new generations of Congolese achieve Lumumba’s vision of a bright future for the country, the region, and for Africa.

Jean-Paul Mvogo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Africa Center.

The post Here’s what a Marshall Plan for the DRC could look like appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The public sector external debt to be restructured amounts to $17.3 billion, more than half of the total Zambian public debt. According to the Zambian Ministry of Finance (MOF), official bilateral creditors account for 15 percent of public debt, multilateral and plurilateral financial institutions for 11.5 percent, Eurobond investors for 11.7 percent, and non-bonded commercial lenders for 11.4 percent. About $6 billion is owed to Chinese commercial and state-owned lenders alone—constituting the largest creditor group by nationality and giving China significant leverage in Zambia’s ability to restructure its debt. The classification of this amount of debt between official bilateral and private sector lenders has been a contentious issue, contributing to the uncertainty in restructuring process. For example, there had been contention about how to classify debt owed to China Development Bank, as bilateral or private sector debt. Now the Zambian MOF has classified it as debt to private creditors.

Zambia was one of the first countries to apply to restructure its sovereign external debt under the Common Framework for Debt Treatment in early 2021. The Common Framework (CF) was launched by the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in November 2020, to provide a mechanism for low income countries to seek debt restructuring when unavoidable. Under the CF, an Official Creditor Committee for Zambia was formed, co-chaired by China and France. The Zambian OCC pledged to negotiate with Zambia to restructure its public external debt. Its commitment cleared the way for the IMF Board to consider and approve the assistance package for Zambia. These steps taken to restructure Zambia’s debt could form a template for future instances of sovereign debt restructuring under the Common Framework.

In addition to the progress made so far, according to the IMF, Zambia and the OCC aim to sign a legally non-binding memorandum of understanding (MOU) by the end of 2022. The MOU will set out the key parameters of Zambia’s debt restructuring terms regarding: the changes in nominal debt service over the IMF program period, the debt reduction in net present value (NPV) terms, and the extension of the duration of Zambia’s debt.

Zambia will then negotiate bilaterally with each official creditor for a restructuring deal, consistent with the key parameters set out in the MOU. Concurrently, Zambia will negotiate with private sector creditors, seeking comparable treatment as mandated under the Common Framework. The Zambia External Bondholder Committee has been formed, representing 45 percent of the outstanding value of Zambia Eurobonds, and presumably will engage in the negotiations.

The progress so far suggests that the OCC has found a compromise which is acceptable to China—which until now has insisted on bilateral negotiations with debtor countries instead of participating in multilateral restructuring efforts. The MOU will be legally non-binding, and the key parameters on NPV reduction and duration extension are consistent with many solutions containing various scenarios of interest rate cuts and maturity extensions that do not require a nominal reduction of the face value of the debt. Nominal haircut is something China has avoided in its previous bilateral debt restructuring agreements with debtor countries. As well, the actual restructuring deal will be negotiated bilaterally with each official creditor—something China has long insisted on. These features will presumably allow China to move forward with the other two cases under the Common Framework, Chad and Ethiopia. The Zambian case may therefore serve as the template for debt restructuring under the Common Framework.

However, even with such a promising , the current approach to sovereign debt restructuring is still plagued with many deficiencies. The process remains time-consuming and inefficient for the following reasons.

Firstly, the Common Framework is only open to 73 low-income countries. Middle-income countries also in debt distress, such as Sri Lanka, are excluded. Sri Lanka has reached staff-level agreement with the IMF for a $2.9 billion package, not yet approved by the Board. Aporoval of  the package  is contingent on progress in debt restructuring negotiations with Sri Lanka’s creditors. With more than $50 billion of external debt, about 47 percent with private sector creditors and bondholders, and 10 percent each with bilateral creditor China and Japan, Sri Lanka can benefit from the steps set out in the Common Framework to better manage its debt restructuring task. Therefore, the G20 should extend the Common Framework to middle-income emerging countries in debt distress.

Secondly, a way needs to be found to encourage countries in debt difficulties to use the Common Framework. Currently, countries fear being downgraded by credit rating agencies and losing capital market access if they take advantage of it. If the stigma around the Common Framework remains, many countries will avoid it; only three have applied so far (Zambia, Chad, and Ethiopia).

Thirdly, convincing private creditors to participate in debt restructuring on comparable terms with official bilateral creditors will remain difficult. Private creditors complain that the restructuring terms are reached in the OCC without their inputs, and their concerns are not taken into consideration. They do not receive the IMF and World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis, which is the basis for restructuring negotiations in the OCC until it is too late to contribute to the assessment. These concerns must be addressed before one can hope for more participation by private creditors in the debt restructuring process under the Common Framework.

Zambia shows that progress can be made to render the Common Framework more workable to restructure low-income countries’ sovereign debt. However, more needs to be done to refine a comprehensive, efficient, and effective sovereign debt restructuring procedure. The international community  needs change now, with many low income and emerging market countries close to or already in distress, especially following the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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South Africa is the thirteenth largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, relying on coal for 70 percent of its total energy supply. Eskom, South Africa’s debt-ridden public utility, drives this coal consumption due to its vertical monopoly over the nation’s energy system, favoring its coal-fired power plants over private renewable generation. This top-down system drastically reduces the potential profitability of independent clean energy investments and, compounded with Eskom’s inability to fund clean energy projects, hinders South Africa from achieving its emissions reduction targets.

Enter the JETP. The JETP is an agreement between the governments of South Africa, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union to accelerate the decommissioning of South Africa’s coal-fired power plants. In October 2021, in anticipation of the funding commitment, the South African government revised its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to encompass more ambitious climate goals, including lowering its 2030 target emissions range by 32 percent. These revisions paved the way for the official JETP deal during COP26 in November 2021.

At face value, the JETP may appear insufficient to transition South Africa’s energy sector away from coal. Despite the partnership’s $8.5-billion offering, Eskom has estimated that it will require $27 billion to kickstart the shift away from coal-fired generation in coming years. Another analysis from Stellenbosch University predicted that South Africa will need at least $250 billion over the next three decades to expand clean energy infrastructure in line with United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. As such, to understand the significance of the JETP, one must not look at its size, but rather its substance.

As part of the JETP agreement, the South African government and the International Partners Group (IPG) have agreed to develop an investment plan to identify key decarbonization projects. These projects would be funded by an international financing package, likely composed of both concessional and non-concessional loans. But while this investment plan will dictate the allocation of JETP funds, its hidden value lies in the corresponding reforms South Africa must implement to maximize the package’s impact. These reforms, some of which are stated in South Africa six-month update on the JETP, have the potential to elevate the partnership from a one-time injection of infrastructure funding to a sustainable pipeline for private sector investment.

One example of an already successful reform is the liberalization of South Africa’s electricity generation market. In August 2021, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the threshold under which companies can produce their own electricity without a license would be increased from 1 megawatt (MW) to 100 MW. This change, which drastically reduced the obstacles to private clean energy investment, has spurred the development of approximately 4.5 gigawatts (GW) of projects since its adoption, including two 100-MW solar PV projects.

Another reform is a proposal to establish a South African independent system operator. As detailed in parliamentary legislation revealed in February, this plan aims to create a competitive market for electricity generation by transitioning from a single-buyer electricity market to a multi-market structure. While the legislative text has yet to be finalized, if successful, this plan would break up Eskom’s vertical monopoly on the electricity market, thereby ensuring the fair treatment of electricity generators and increasing investor confidence in South Africa’s clean energy sector.

Notably, these JETP reforms would be buttressed by supplementary policies, such as the introduction of a regulated green finance taxonomy, which would provide guidance to investors regarding environmentally sustainable assets and investments. Another policy, the strengthening of a progressive carbon tax, would put added pressure on energy producers to switch to lower-emitting generation sources. Altogether, the intended result would be the creation of a nationwide sustainable finance ecosystem that acts as a force multiplier for JETP funds while attracting investment from private and philanthropic financiers. In this way, the JETP amplifies public sector spending.

Interestingly, while the JETP investment plan will identify key decarbonization projects, it will likely entail differing roles for public and private sector funding. As evidenced by the liberalization of South Africa’s electricity licensing, there is sizable private sector interest in developing certain segments of South Africa’s energy sector, such as renewable power generation. However, there is little private sector interest in other projects that are less profitable, such as transmission and distribution. JETP funds will thus likely be used to finance projects that support South Africa’s overall energy transition but would not otherwise receive private funding.

Furthermore, the JETP financing package also presents an opportunity for multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) to experiment with novel financial mechanisms. Reacting to pressure to take action against climate change, global policymakers, such as US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, have urged MDBs and DFIs to take greater risk in their clean energy investments in emerging economies. Through financial mechanisms such as layered debt structures, these organizations can de-risk clean energy investments and, hopefully, attract developers for necessary transition projects. Nonetheless, MDBs and DFIs are not responsible for changing domestic policies, and these investments are insignificant without corresponding energy sector regulatory reforms.

Of course, the JETP is not without criticism. Despite being a core element of the JETP, the just transition elements of the agreement remain to be described in any significant detail. While the South African government has stated its intent to gain buy-in from all affected parties, it may prove exceedingly difficult to provide economic relief to the nearly 120,000 workers employed in coal mines and aging power plants. Other complaints have centered on the JETP’s lack of transparency and lengthy development period; before South Africa’s released its six-month update in June, there had been essentially no public communication regarding the JETP’s progress. Hopefully, the public will soon see increased communication from JETP leaders as the South African government and IPG release their draft investment plan in the coming weeks.

Policymakers are working to determine if the JETP can shape and influence similar partnerships with other carbon-intensive economies. However, the answer is complicated, as it depends on individual national circumstances. Indonesia, for example, runs a state-run energy monopoly that subsidizes coal-fired power plants and grants the coal industry vast control over mining permits. Indeed, until recently, Indonesia’s energy policy made it difficult for any new renewable energy projects to earn a positive return on investment. India, meanwhile, has a private sector that responds to clean energy initiatives but struggles to keep up with rapid economic growth. Notably, just transition partnerships are also country-driven and rely on individualized consultations between host-nation leaders and partner governments. For these reasons, it is impossible to totally “copy-and-paste” JETP agreements from country to country.

Moving forward, the JETP is slated to enter a critical development period as the partners aim to finalize the investment plan ahead of COP27 in November. This plan will illustrate crucial details about the nature of infrastructure projects and related financing structures. Nonetheless, these measures—and the success of the JETP—are contingent on domestic energy sector reforms that maximize the effect of public spending and induce the flow of private capital.

Christopher Cassidy is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

This work was conducted in cooperation with the Global Energy Transition Politics and Policy Research Group at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies.

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Russia’s imports decreased by 9.7% from February to March 2022, including losses from many of Russia’s top trade partners and politically neutral countries. Shipping container traffic to Russia decreased by 50% in March in St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, and Novorossiysk, Russia’s most highly-trafficked ports. This decrease in exports to Russia is a predictable symptom of war, but there are more factors in play. Initially, impediments to trade began in February and March as the ruble rapidly devalued, causing Russian buyers to become reluctant or unable to complete payments. Suppliers struggled to execute transactions following Russia’s cutoff from the SWIFT system, and international shipping ceased to service goods to Russia. Now, Russia’s maritime sector broadly faces issues with ship certification and insurance coverage. Some companies have inadvertently abandoned or scaled back business with Russia due to disrupted trade routes and a lack of input materials. The Russian economy as a whole has contracted since the invasion, impeding its purchasing and import abilities. 

Some exporters, like Pakistan, Brazil, and Jordan, have not experienced the same drops in trade with Russia as countries like Vietnam or India. The answer to this discrepancy lies in the exports themselves: Brazil’s exports to Russia are driven primarily by soybeans, cow meat, and ground nuts. Another supposed “fence-sitter,” Pakistan, is in a similar situation, with citrus as its top export to Russia. Agricultural products aren’t subject to sanctions, so these exports to Russia may continue unmarred. On the other hand, the majority of India, Vietnam, and China’s exports to Russia are technological products, which are more likely to be caught in the crossfire of Western sanctions. Companies face a choice: comply with sanctions and lose business with Russia, or risk losing business with the US. 

India’s trading relationship with the US is 12 times the size of its relationship with Russia, meaning that it’s in companies’ best interests to prioritize trade with the US. As a result, Indian companies such as Tata Steel have withdrawn or paused business with Russia. Meanwhile, the State Bank of India, the country’s largest lender, has blocked transactions with any entities on EU, US, or UN sanctions lists, irrespective of currency, out of fear that such transactions could lead to sanctions on the bank. Even China, Russia’s supposed economic lifeline, shaved off 30% from its exports to Russia in the past two months, before the worst of its lockdowns hit. The Chinese government, though pushing back against the West politically, has issued subtle warnings to Chinese companies to proceed with caution rather than violate sanctions and get caught in the crossfire between Russia and the West. Chinese banks have suspended business with Russia, and some tech companies including Lenovo Group Ltd. and Xiaomi Corp, SZ DJI Technology Co. have quietly scaled back or paused operations. So while foreign ministers offer even-handed statements, finance ministers are quietly signaling that Russia may become an increasingly risky place to invest.

One risk beyond sanctions involves reputational hazards. Chinese auto company Geely, for example, suspended its operations in Russia in March in order to evaluate potential reputational hazards to the brand. These reputational risks are legitimate, exemplified by Ukrainian vice prime minister Mykhailo Fedorov publicly calling on Chinese company DJI to halt its business in Russia.

Although countries and businesses face a range of reasons to halt business with Russia, the throughline is the West’s economic weight, which, through sanctions, has made transacting with Russia too risky and unwieldy. However, it’s possible that as time goes on, firms may find ways to circumvent the restrictions sanctions impose. Following the SWIFT cut-off, Indian firms were initially unable to purchase oil from Russia, but have since begun using spot deals to buy it at a discount. If that is any indication, workarounds may be possible, and there is a high incentive for their pursuit. But as sanctions lists continue to expand and come into effect, the risks of noncompliance will symmetrically increase. Despite the political statements of many “neutral” countries, the West’s desired outcome to punish Russia economically seems to be achieving global buy-in.

Josh Lipsky is the director of the GeoEconomics Center.
Sophia Busch is a Program Assistant with the GeoEconomics Center.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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What is the opportunity?

In 1956, jazz musician Dizzy Gillespie and his band were traveling across Europe and South Asia, playing concerts on a tour organized by the US Department of State (DoS). The band got a call from an official at DoS, who told them they were needed in Greece. Young Greeks had been protesting at the American Embassy against the decision by the United States to support continued British rule of Cyprus. DoS wanted to try to divert the protestors’ anger by showcasing America’s talented jazz musicians, whose mission was to promote US values.

The band played a sold-out show in Athens to a raucous crowd, which had a similar demographic composition as the crowd protesting outside the embassy. Quincy Jones, then the drummer for Gillespie’s band, recounts thinking that the crowd was going to attack the musicians. Instead, the thousands of young people packed into the venue were engrossed by the music and celebrated Gillespie after the show. The protests against the US Embassy quickly abated—and DoS viewed the use of the Jazz Ambassadors as a triumphant employment of US cultural diplomacy to end a crisis.

The show in Greece would not be the last time a Jazz Ambassador defused a situation. In 1960, during his extensive tour of Africa as a Jazz Ambassador, Louis Armstrong was sent to Leopoldville, Congo, to play a concert amidst the civil war taking place there. The tour had been organized by DoS, and sponsored by Pepsi, in order to leverage Armstrong’s popularity on the continent to promote the beverage. There was debate among DoS officials of whether to continue to brand the concert in Leopoldville with Pepsi, given the precarious political situation there. Ultimately, officials decided to continue to partner with the Pepsi brand in hopes it might not look as explicitly propagandic amidst a war where one side was backed by the United States and the other, the Soviet Union. The organizers hoped for 1,500 fans. More than 10,000 showed up, according to DoS cables. The result of the show, as Armstrong tells it, was a temporary truce between the warring sides as they came together to listen to this American musician from New Orleans.

Today, the United States has an opportunity to harness its globally popular musical superstars for diplomatic gains, building off the legacy of the successful Jazz Ambassadors program. A well-publicized concert series that brings US superstars to locales they would otherwise be unlikely to tour and are of diplomatic importance would be a useful tool for improving views of the United States abroad and spreading US values. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken put it,

America’s arts and culture are a major source of our national strength, our musicians captivate the world. Their work gets people to see each other’s humanity, build a sense of common purpose, change the minds of those who misunderstand us, and tell the American story in a way no policy or speech ever could.

Music—the universal language—can build bridges across cultures, and American music has been doing so for decades. The top of the Billboard Global 200 chart regularly features American artists—and this music has lasting power. As Ukrainians fled from the Russian invasion of their country, a video circulated of one refugee playing “What a Wonderful World” by Armstrong, more than six decades after the Jazz Ambassadors brought their music to European crowds.

The power of music should not be viewed by policymakers as some flimsy hobbyhorse of pacifists. The Eurovision Song Contest, which pits musicians representing countries from Europe (and some other select countries) against one another, has produced superstars like ABBA and Celine Dion, while providing visibility to issues like LGBTQ rights and the unique cultures and traditions of the competing countries. In 2021, 183 million viewers watched the competition, making it one of the most-viewed events globally. The ability to message to such a broad audience makes the competition a potent source of European cultural power.

“America’s arts and culture are a major source of our national strength, our musicians captivate the world.” —Secretary of State Antony Blinken

The United States does not presently have any program that features its superstar musical talent and promotes freedom of expression on a global scale. Although the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) continues to facilitate concerts abroad, they are far smaller than those of the Jazz Ambassador program. The Jazz Ambassador program was renamed the American Music Abroad program in 2005 and no longer features widely known and commercially successful musicians. Instead, they promote smaller groups that represent the rich musical landscape and history of the United States. Although these programs are valuable, they do not provide the visibility and commercial clout that major US artists like the original Jazz Ambassadors did. An independent evaluation of the Jazz Ambassadors program in 2006 assessed that the program was impressively effective. The report concluded:

The JA (Jazz Ambassadors) Program [was] a highly successful vehicle for conveying this uniquely American music—instilled with American cultural heritage and American values—to millions of people, worldwide. Virtually all those who participated in this evaluation, whether they were United States Ambassadors, Post Staff, accomplished American musicians, amateur and professional musicians in third world countries, managers of media outlets and cultural organizations, or young music students, agreed that this remarkable program accomplished far-ranging and important goals for US foreign policy.

Even though the Jazz Ambassadors program was deemed a success, no cultural diplomacy endeavor on the scale of the tours of the 1950s and 1960s has been replicated. Many foreign policy professionals recognize that the power of American culture has waned as a tool of diplomacy. The aphorism goes that politics is downstream of culture, and in the view of former diplomat John Brown, the citizens and leaders of many countries see culture as more important than politics. They perceive the United States to be lacking a rich culture because the US government does not aggressively promote its artists abroad. Brown writes of the paradox in the US approach to cultural diplomacy: “The neglect of arts diplomacy by the US government reflects certain long-term traits of the American national character: it is puritanical, democratic, void of a national culture, yet it influences the world through its mass entertainment.” Although the United States may not have a well-established and unified culture to promote abroad like China, Japan, or France, it does have an advantage in its cutting-edge art that is oriented toward a mass audience, best represented by its commercially popular musicians.

Why now?

While the United States faces increased competition for global influence, it has lost diplomatic clout during the past two decades. Failed wars and hubristic foreign policy have damaged the US image around the world and led many to doubt whether the United States should serve as a model. Although the image of the United States as a global leader is faltering, American artists and other cultural icons have enjoyed significant worldwide popularity. US musicians tour globally with great success, its designers are featured in top fashion shows, and its athletes are global brands.

In contrast with the Trump administration, which called for cuts to DoS, the Biden administration has signaled an interest in expanding nonmilitary forms of global engagement. These efforts mirror the desires of the American public to engage in the world without becoming involved in more conflicts. In recent polling by the Eurasia Group Foundation, almost three times as many Americans wanted to increase, rather than decrease diplomatic engagement with the world, with nonmilitary means of engagement ranked highest as their preferred means for global engagement.

With the American public desiring increased diplomacy, there is an opportunity to redefine how the United States engages with the world and change the perceptions foreign populations have of American values. One of the models of governance that the United States is competing against globally features restrictions on speech and expression; Washington has the ability to demonstrate the creativity and innovation that its more open and tolerant model allows. The Biden administration’s Summit for Democracy included a number of discussions on the importance of freedom of expression and speech; a popularized effort to spread these values would further the administration’s goals of promoting democracy globally.

How to make it happen

1. Create an America’s Best Concert series (ABCs). With relatively little funding appropriated by Congress, the State Department’s ECA could develop a concert series to bring some of the biggest stars from the United States to places where they would otherwise be unlikely to tour. This effort should be modeled on the original Jazz Ambassadors program, with coordination with local authorities managed through in-country embassy staff to ensure cultural sensitivity and an understanding of which artists would have the greatest appeal to local audiences. Rather than soliciting applications like the current American Musicians Abroad program, the ABCs should recruit top talent with competitive contracts, the opportunity to appeal to new audiences, and the chance to represent their country abroad. Costs of booking the artists and paying for the shows would be defrayed through partnerships with US companies, which would have the opportunity to advertise in growing markets where they may lack significant existing market saturation. 

2. Provide musicians full artistic discretion in what they perform and communicate to foreign audiences. Ultimately, artists would be representing the American value of freedom of expression; they should have the ability to criticize their own government and its policies even while representing their country. As Louis Armstrong said of his decision to be a Jazz Ambassador, “I sort of liked the idea of representing America, but I wasn’t going over there to apologize for the racist policies of America.” There is an inherent tension in a concert series meant to promote freedom of expression that also requires artists to avoid diplomatically sensitive subjects. This was an issue cited by Quincy Jones in his autobiography, where Jones said that an official from the American National Theater and Academy, an organization DoS had partnered with to administer the concerts, condescendingly told the musicians to “indulge in your various idiosyncrasies discreetly.” DoS should carefully consider which artists it promotes abroad and where, but ultimately it should emphasize the artists’ freedom to hold and express their own opinions as they engage with foreign audiences.

3. Develop better connections with the artistic community. DoS is limited in its ability to operate domestically, both because of its structure and US laws. This needs to change; the State Department must be deeply immersed in the country it serves. For US cultural power to be leveraged abroad, established relationships and an understanding of American culture need to be strong. Artists need to be able to trust that they are representing their own values and those of the country rather than being used for propaganda. Managers and promoters must trust that the concerts will be well managed and avoid hurting the reputations of artists.

One way to develop this capacity is to further build out the American Arts Incubator (AAI) program. Launched in 2014, AAI is an initiative of ECA that sends American artists abroad to collaborate with local communities. This is a small program that provides relatively modest grants to artists, but it is a proven model for DoS interfacing with the arts world. By scaling up AAI to allow it to develop broad relationships with artistic communities, and expanding into the commercial music industry, AAI could serve as a liaison with the State Department to help identify which artists would have the greatest appeal for ABCs.

4. Identify where diplomatic and commercial interests intersect. The State Department’s Office of Global Partnerships (OGP) aims to develop cross-sector collaboration to advance US foreign policy goals, but it has been limited in its ability to do so. As part of the ABCs, the OGP should be empowered to establish connections with major US companies that have an interest in sponsoring the ABCs. The promotion of American brands by US musicians performing in regions with low saturation of US companies could be an attractive opportunity for US businesses. Sponsorship for the ABCs provided by large US companies would both allow for superstar artists to be contracted, without having to charge money for the concerts to attendees, and would serve to promote US commercial interests abroad. OGP has partnered in the past with major companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon Web Services, mobilizing $3.7 billion in public and private commitments since 2008. This figure could be far higher if OGP was expanded and its mandate widened to focus more on leveraging US commercial power for diplomatic purposes, without neglecting its current focus on directing private funding to international development.

Washington has an opportunity to advance US diplomatic goals and commercial interests by bringing music to the world. What it takes to do that is an empowered DoS that can step into the limelight alongside American superstar musicians.

Photo by Mario Anzuoni. 62nd Grammy Awards – Show – Los Angeles, California, US, January 26, 2020 – Ariana Grande performs. REUTERS

Assumptions Testing Series

The New American Engagement Initiative’s Assumptions Testing series explores some of the foundational beliefs that guide US foreign policy. By questioning the conventional wisdom, and exposing these assumptions to close scrutiny, the series aims to open a new seam in the policy debate and generate a more lively, fruitful, and effective strategic dialogue – one that is capable of producing a sustainable, nonpartisan strategy for US global engagement.

Reality Check Series

The New American Engagement Initiative’s Reality Checks are short briefs dedicated to exploring a particular policy or set of policies, assessing their efficacy, and, where appropriate, proposing alternatives. Reality Checks are published regularly and tied to the news of the day or derive from NAEI’s Assumptions Testing series. All are succinct and straight-to-the-point. The briefs are designed for busy professionals anxious for pragmatic and timely policy options.

Engagement Reframed Series

The New American Engagement Initiative’s Engagement Reframed policy briefs reimagine and reframe the US approach to the world beyond traditional, narrow notions of US military dominance to fashion an achievable and sustainable form of US leadership in a world of many capable actors.

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This is the third in a five-part series of Atlantic Council publications calling for the United States and its allies to revitalize the rules-based international system and establish new institutions to strengthen cooperation among democracies to succeed in an era of strategic competition.

The first, Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System, sets forth an overarching global strategy for the United States and its allies that focuses on the need to strengthen cooperation among democracies, while simultaneously seeking to engage other global powers in areas of common interest.

The second, From the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges, proposes the creation of a new D-10 as a core group of leading democracies to develop joint strategies for addressing today’s most pressing global challenges.

This report makes the case for an Alliance of Democracies and draws on relevant sections from these two publications.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Oct 30, 2019

Present at the re-creation: A global strategy for revitalizing, adapting, and defending a rules-based international system

By Ash Jain, Matthew Kroenig

We need a new strategy—one that is both ambitious and innovative, geared towards meeting the challenges and opportunities that the new decade brings.

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Report Jun 8, 2021

From the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening democratic cooperation for today’s challenges

By Ash Jain, Matthew Kroenig

With the rules-based democratic order under threat, leading democracies need to develop common strategic approaches that pool their collective influence to confront today’s challenges.

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Executive summary

On December 9–10, President Joe Biden will host a Summit for Democracy, a virtual event to which the leaders of more than one hundred democracies worldwide have been invited. The summit is aimed at setting forth an affirmative agenda for “democratic renewal” and tackling “the greatest threats faced by democracies today through collective action.”¹ This will kick off what the administration is calling a “year of action,” which will culminate in a second summit, this time in person, approximately one year later.

The summit convenes at a time when democracy is facing unprecedented challenges. Autocratic powers, particularly China and Russia, have become more assertive in challenging key tenets of the global system, each in their own ways but increasingly aligned, as they engage in coercive tactics to expand their influence.² Meanwhile, democracies are on the defensive as they seek to contend with these global threats. Many nations, including the United States, face deeply polarized electorates and increasing distrust in institutions among their own citizens. As Biden has highlighted, the world is in the midst of a fundamental debate—an inflection point—between “those who argue that autocracy is the best way forward” and “those who understand that democracy is essential to meeting [today’s] challenges.”³

To succeed in this new era, the United States and its democratic allies and partners must strengthen cooperation. Working together, leading democracies retain a preponderance of power over China and other revisionist autocracies that would allow them to decisively shape global outcomes. But they need new institutions, formal and informal, that are fit for purpose, and reflect the evolving global distribution of power and the nature of today’s challenges. While institutions created in the post-World War II era, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have convened democracies for decades, most are segmented by geographic region. But this system of institutions requires adaptation and renewal to address the challenges of today’s world. The United States and its allies need new entities that facilitate cooperation not just in specific regions, but among larger groups of democracies worldwide.⁴

An Alliance of Democracies could play an essential role in this regard. It would serve as a political alliance aimed at forging common threat assessments and coordinating strategies among democracies to position the free world for success in the growing strategic competition with revisionist autocratic powers. The alliance would help foster cooperation to defend against a wide range of threats to democratic countries, counter authoritarianism, and advance shared interests and values.

Support for closer alignments among democracies is building. In hosting the Group of Seven (G7) summit earlier this year, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson sought to advance the idea of a D-10 club of democracies.⁵ Lawmakers in the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada have expressed support for new coalitions of democracies, and the “traffic light coalition” that will form a new government in Germany explicitly referenced support for initiatives such as an “Alliance of Democracies” in a recent policy paper.⁶ In the United States, proposals for closer cooperation among democracies have drawn bipartisan support among lawmakers in Congress.

In addition, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley were joined by distinguished former officials from nineteen democracies worldwide—including former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, and former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi—in endorsing a Declaration of Principles that called for partnerships that bring together likeminded governments, including “a potential new alliance of free nations” to advance a rules-based order.⁷ A call to create such an alliance was also made by signatories to the Copenhagen Charter for an Alliances of Democracies, issued earlier this year, which includes the heads of the National Endowment for Democracy, National Democratic Institute, and International Republican Institute.⁸

Biden’s call for a Summit for Democracy and the underlying rationale for convening such a summit—advancing democratic cooperation in the context of a global struggle between democracy and autocracy—could help propel the idea of an alliance forward. The administration’s plan for a series of summits—one this year and one next—could engender habits of cooperation among democracies, providing the building blocks for a sustainable network of democracies. If these summits continue on an annual basis, they could serve as a de facto alliance, leaving the door open to a more formalized entity down the road.

This report explains why an Alliance of Democracies is needed today, and how the leaders of the free world should act to bring this concept into reality. It describes the strategic context for the creation of such an alliance, its potential mission and organizational structure, and its proposed membership – initially, perhaps thirty or forty consolidated democracies that share concerns about challenges to the free world and are committed to taking action. The report proposes specific areas around which to prioritize alliance action. It addresses concerns that have been raised about an Alliance of Democracies, and contends that the strategic benefits of such an alliance outweigh the costs, including the political and diplomatic capital that would be required to create it. The report describes how an Alliance of Democracies could galvanize meaningful cooperation on global challenges and help restore confidence in the free world.

Lead authors

Former staff

Ash Jain

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post An Alliance of Democracies: From concept to reality in an era of strategic competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this seventy-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Africans represent the largest group, with 28 percent of the votes, ahead of Asia with 27 percent, and well above the Americas at 17 percent, and Western Europe at 15 percent. Yet everyone knows that Africa does not decide anything. The real decision-making body is the Security Council, and its five permanent members are China, Russia, France, Great Britain, and the United States.

The founding of this prestigious council was based on the results of World War II, where global superpowers were defined based on hard power. What about the African people? Weren’t they involved in the victory over Hitler’s Germany? The French launched the Resistance from Brazzaville, and numerous African countries served in the war. They deserve their seat at the victory banquet. 

Besides, the United Nations Security Council still functions on a conventional framework, which was written back in 1945, before the majority of African countries had gained independence from their colonizers—which is another fault to correct.

This gap is all the less bearable because the African continent has dealt with issues threatening peace and security for centuries. Africa even was home to one of the world’s first human-rights charters: the Manden Charter, launched by the great Sundiata Keita, founder of the Mali Empire, long before the English Bill of Rights (1689) and France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), and perhaps even before the Magna Carta (1215).

Capitalizing on culture

The composition of the UN Security Council—let’s call it aristocratic for this argument—does not reflect the current world at all. Today, the notion of power has evolved from hard power, which is forceful and coercive, to a subtle but more influential power. Soft power enables a nation to lead other countries through influence, which allows those countries to lead their own development without coercive interference, which is what the Security Council should note. Afghanistan and the Sahel are proof of the limits of hard power—and Black Panther, the 2018 movie based on a Marvel comic, is the consecration of soft power. That’s right, it’s Wakanda time.

Africa and its powerful creative industries—driven by connected youth amid the biggest digital revolution of the past two decades—shine beyond the borders of Nollywood to influence Hollywood. This growing market expands its influence everywhere: Nigeria’s entertainment and media market doubled from 2014 to 2019 to become the fastest-growing in the world, according to the audit firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). When Nigeria incorporated Nollywood in its gross domestic product in 2013 (in a rebasing of data), it became the largest economy in Africa. From Dior to Louis Vuitton, luxury fashion has been renewed with African inspirations. Ready-to-wear brands such as Sweden’s H&M and Spain’s Zara have joined in as well. African Fashion Weeks from Johannesburg to Lagos have inspired international celebrity entertainers like Beyoncé and Rihanna, who is a fashion designer herself.

Beyoncé’s Disney-produced musical, Black Is King, is a celebration of Africa, dreamed up in line with the global success of Black Panther, which featured award-winning African actors in Hollywood such as Lupita Nyong’o and Daniel Kaluuya. Moreover, Netflix has greatly enriched its platform of African series, targeting African audiences and not just English speakers. In the music industry, Nigerian artists such as Burna Boy, Davido, and Wizkid have signed with major US labels such as Sony and regularly win Grammy awards. Burna Boy’s songs were included on the playlist for US President Joe Biden’s inauguration. Jay-Z, Will Smith, and Jada Pinkett Smith backed a Broadway musical, Fela!, about a Nigerian singer that won three Tony Awards in 2010. Not so long ago, Nigerians were paying dearly for collaborations with American and European stars, but now the opposite is true. Soft power is now the predominant power.

At United Nations Plaza, these changes have not been taken into consideration. It is quite alarming that the ruling procedures for the security council have not been amended since 1982. The Security Council was built on the principle of sovereignty and equality of all nations; therefore, democratization and reformation of this organization are overdue and a reassessment must ensure fairness and justice for the African continent. Fairness should start with demography. Africa is predicted to become the largest population of the world in the next twenty years, and it already is the youngest: Almost one in four world inhabitants will be a sub-Saharan African in 2050.

Three options for the Security Council

Several African candidates merit consideration for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. First, Nigeria is the continent’s most populous nation, at more than 210 million people. In 1963, after its independence in 1960, Nigeria was one of the founding members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now known as the African Union. From 1960 to 1995, Nigeria provided $61 billion in funding for the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. This country also assisted prominent leaders of liberation movements in decision-making against the military government regimes of the time throughout the continent. Nigeria founded the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, when it utilized its soft power to address a civil war in Angola through OAU policy. By nationalizing Barclays Bank and British Petroleum in the late 1970s, Nigeria was able to pressure the British and contribute to Zimbabwe’s independence.

Another contender for a permanent seat is South Africa. Despite recent concerns about xenophobic violence against African migrants, South Africa has a universal audience because of its powerful story of transformation. The iconic struggle and leadership of the late Nelson Mandela, who went from jail to the presidency, is known the world over. After holding its first democratic elections in 1994, one of the most multiracial countries in Africa went on to have one of the most remarkable constitutions in the world through the Convention for a Democratic South Africa talks, where the current president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, was chief negotiator for Mandela’s African National Congress party. Since then, South Africa has diversified its industry and now plays a role in the Southern African Development Community, is a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) nations, and is regarded as one of the “BRICS”—five major emerging economies, alongside Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

Sports has played a role in South Africa’s appealing story. Shortly after its first free elections, South Africa won the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Bafana Bafana, the South African soccer team, was allowed to play international soccer again, after being banned due to nation’s apartheid policy, and went on to win the 1996 African Cup of Nations. These achievements through sports showed that diversity is far more powerful than segregation, and provided a stepping-stone for the country’s influence in Africa and around the globe. In 2010, South Africa was the first African country to host the FIFA World Cup. This year, South Africa assumed the presidency of the Confederation of African Football, the leading voice on sports on the continent and a hub for creative industries.

“Oho! Congo, couched in your forest bed, queen over subdued Africa,

Let the phalli of the mountains bear your pavilion high…”

Right in the middle of Africa’s heart lies the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), heralded above through the words of poet Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first president of Senegal. The DRC is not only a queen—it is mythical Wakanda. It has always been and was so much so that, in a crazy move, the bloodthirsty Belgian King Leopold II decreed Congo as his personal possession. The richness of the resources surfaced in US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s recent remarks at the Atlantic Council. Speaking about Congolese minerals including cobalt, copper, zinc, silver, gold, platinum, and other resources that contribute to the world electronics industry, she said: “Every time I see the movie Wakanda, I think this is DRC. And I know it was an imaginary story, but imagine a DRC where the resources that are available there are being used to build the country, are being used to educate the people, are being used to provide health care and services for the people of DRC, and we would have a Wakanda in the making.” 

Not only is this country rich in terms of its soil, but also in history and culture. With two hundred ethnic groups and two hundred different languages, the DRC is the largest French-speaking country in the world, with more students in school than residents of France. Kinshasa, with its seventeen million inhabitants, is the largest French-speaking city in the world, before Paris. At the UN Security Council, Congo would know how to speak to the three hundred million French-speaking people in the world and the thirty million Lingala-speakers of Africa.

But the most important reason why the DRC should be a permanent member of the Security Council lies less in its strengths than its weaknesses: thirty years of civil wars, political coups, the impotence of the six thousand UN peacekeepers in the eastern DRC (present for two decades), and the distress of 4.5 million displaced people. These are the reasons why the DRC is never quoted among the pretendants to a UN permanent seat. Its tragedy does not even seem to upset the international community, even though a collapse of the DRC, under the pressure of dark forces, would have a tragic, deep, large, and long-term effect on the African continent and beyond.

The reasons why the DRC should join the Security Council are to gain a powerful lever to stop myriad manipulations by its neighbors and the international community, and to help this country’s voice to be heard. The DRC would bring to the Security Council something referred to as “weakness politics”: the effects of fragility causing processes that lead to achievements and the shaping of events. Such a change would be the best and most innovative way to reform and democratize this body. Bring out the new wineskins!

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. 

Further reading

Fast Thinking Sep 21, 2021

FAST THINKING: Biden’s UN reality check

By Atlantic Council

President Biden spoke of “relentless diplomacy” at the UN on Tuesday. But can that relentlessness overcome transatlantic strains, not to mention a still-raging pandemic and climate crisis?

Africa Crisis Management

New Atlanticist Sep 10, 2021

Gregory Meeks: For counterterrorism and economic opportunity, turn toward Africa

By Katherine Walla

After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it has become clear that “terrorism now is global, and we’ve got to work in a multilateral way to combat and fight that,” said US Representative Gregory Meeks.

Afghanistan Africa

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Make way for Wakanda: The UN Security Council needs an African seat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post CBDC Tracker cited in Quartz Africa about South Africa’s test of a digital currency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission since 1999 and billions of dollars in aid—with the United States contributing more than nine hundred million dollars in humanitarian assistance in the past two years alone—today the eastern Congo is reportedly home to more than 120 rebel groups. Those include numerous foreign-backed militias and a local offshoot of the Islamic State. 

They control roadways and access to resources, and they often engage in kidnapping schemes to generate ransom revenue. Securing their buy-in to any peace processes is key to ensuring lasting stability. 

In fact, the majority of the world’s conflicts feature armed non-state actors (ANSAs), with some sixty-six million people living on territory under their control. The Taliban’s recent takeover in Afghanistan is a fresh reminder of the power of these groups. But traditional attempts at post-conflict stabilization have sometimes failed to produce lasting peace—in large part because of their inability to engage ANSAs in a constructive manner within the peace-building process.

That’s why Congress in 2019 created the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which lays out an array of tools with which to stabilize post-conflict situations. These range from sanctions and intelligence collection to the Women, Peace, and Security initiative and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 

But the GFA features a major shortcoming: It assumes the state is the primary actor, meaning that the United States will continue to work with sometimes ineffective national governments while ignoring the influence and power ANSAs have in determining stability. 

To maximize the impact of the GFA, the US government will select five countries on which to focus its attention. As it considers those countries, it needs to properly accommodate ANSAs in its strategic calculations. Failing to do so means potentially repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan, where Washington continued supporting an ineffective national government.  

Mapping the next threat

There is no universal definition of an ANSA; it can be characterized as an organization that is not integrated into formalized institutions, operates with some sort of political autonomy, or is willing to use violence to pursue its political objectives. Either way, ANSAs are involved in the majority of the one hundred active armed conflicts around the world—including Afghanistan, where the Taliban is now in charge, and Syria, where a multitude of armed groups control various pieces of territory. 

Similar dynamics have existed in parts of northeastern Nigeria, where Boko Haram has effectively functioned as the government by levying taxes on the populations under its control or providing some semblance of a justice system to settle disputes. While it no longer controls the amount of territory it did in the early 2010s, the group remains a disruptive and destabilizing force. Now, as the much-criticized US strategy in the Sahel has seen limited success and the Nigerian state appears increasingly weak, the potential for increased conflict there is high. 

More than simply controlling territory, ANSAs also serve a critical regional governance function, providing services and either formal or informal governing structures. 

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, ANSAs around the world imposed travel restrictions and implemented health checks in the regions they control. This serves to portray them as legitimate in the eyes of local citizens, which in turn provides them greater political weight and influence over the structure of power-sharing agreements. ANSAs can also be potential spoilers by intentionally undermining the peace process if they believe it threatens their power. 

The foreign aid trap

The GFS calls for humanitarian, development, and security assistance to be provided as a tool to address state fragility, with a focus on working with the local government and civil society. But in regions where ANSAs perform governance functions, providing foreign aid sometimes directly clashes with American counterterrorism priorities. 

In Nigeria, for instance, USAID efforts were hampered by rules limiting engagement with people who had a previous affiliation with Boko Haram. But the definition of “affiliation” is broad and does not specify whether family members of militants are also excluded from aid—putting the onus on aid workers to investigate any potential linkages. That, in turn, stalls the rollout of humanitarian assistance. 

The Boko Haram rule is well-intentioned, as terrorist organizations should indeed be cut off from American aid, but the provision of foreign assistance is a key component in any effective stabilization operation. The United States is currently facing that very dilemma in a newly Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Washington has not announced whether it plans to officially recognize the Taliban, which is still under numerous sanctions, further complicating assistance plans.

But as in Nigeria, delivering aid is central to creating stability. That’s why the State Department and all other implementing agencies will need to find ways to ensure aid is sent to these conflict areas, and that it actually reaches vulnerable populations, without undermining its counterterrorism goals. This could include clarifying what an acceptable affiliation is, or by providing assistance in contested zones through NGOs or other third parties, such as the UN—therefore not undermining US counterterrorism goals.

Trading for stability

Like foreign assistance, commercial trade is another crucial factor in securing sustainable peace—at least when the state maintains control of its territory. The GFA recognizes this, which is why trade, investment, and commercial diplomacy is seen as another tool to ensure stability by investing in low-income states and building a robust free market. 

But when ANSAs are involved, they can limit this free market and thwart the stabilizing potential of these economic relationships.

For example, these groups often exploit natural resources for economic gain, own valuable land, or nurture ties to corrupt officials. They are rent-seekers aiming to maximize their economic profit. This is why stabilization efforts should provide incentives for them to engage in the peace-building process—ideally transforming their informal and illegal economic structures into legitimate economic activities. 

Consider the Philippines: A peace agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2014 created the Bangasmoro, an autonomous political body for the majority Muslim areas in Mindanao. Despite the otherwise successful terms of the peace agreement, which created a power-sharing mechanism, fragile state institutions and corrupt officials meant a deep-seated informal economy took root, compromising the state’s capacity to ensure stability. 

Any tools relating to trade, investment, and commercial diplomacy must fully integrate ANSAs into the free market, preventing their rent-seeking activities while simultaneously squeezing out informal economies. To this end, the United States should develop poverty-reduction and anti-corruption programs that reduce incentives for joining the informal economy. Other actions could include legitimizing illicit sources of income, such as offering incentives for growing legal crops instead of narcotics.

The GFA provides a chance to redefine and reimagine post-conflict stabilization operations. But its tools must better consider the presence of ANSAs to ensure the best chance at success. In its current form, the GFA ignores vital actors in the stabilization process and has not learned from prior operations that failed to integrate and plan for ANSAs, such as in Afghanistan or the Sahel. 

Given the evolving nature of today’s conflicts, a strong ANSA strategy could mean the difference between lasting peace and metastasizing violence. 

Imran Bayoumi is a student at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy and a former young global professional at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 10, 2021

The best defense: Why NATO should invest in resilience

By Jaclyn Levy

Policies emphasizing resilience should minimize damage, restore stability quickly, and generate improved strategies. To this end, there are several steps NATO can take to build a preventive, resilience-based approach to emerging global challenges.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

New Atlanticist Jul 22, 2021

Why ‘human security’ matters for tomorrow’s conflicts

By Sarah Dawn Petrin

NATO leaders are finally focusing on human security, a major step toward a broader vision of crisis management.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Aug 26, 2021

Before the Taliban took Afghanistan, it took the internet

By Emerson T. Brooking

This is how the Afghan Taliban waged—and won—a generation-long information war.

Afghanistan Conflict

The post To build lasting peace, you can’t ignore militant groups appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Nooruddin quoted in laRazón: Election 2019, a shame in Bolivia? If it was one of the best achieved appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the past two decades, the Sub-Saharan Africa region (SSA) has gained significant importance in Chinese state-directed industrial and trade policies, leading to an increasing share of China in SSA’s total trade and vice versa. China’s total merchandise trade (referred to for simplicity here as “trade”) with SSA has increased by a whopping 1,864 percent between 2001 and 2020. As shown in Figure 1, China has been emerging as a major trade partner for SSA in the past two decades, while the commercial ties of the European Union and mostly that of the United States with SSA has been on the decline. Specifically, the share of China in SSA’s total trade – imports and export – has increased from 4 percent in 2001 to 25.6 percent in 2020, while during the same period the share of the EU and the United States in SSA’s total trade declined from 30.3 to 22.3 percent and from 15.5 to 5.6 percent, respectively.

Minerals, metals, agricultural products, and crude oil are the main exports of SSA economies to China. Specifically, in 2019, SSA accounted for more than 16 percent of all crude oil imported by China, and the size of SSA crude exports to China grew by more than 100 percent between 2008 and 2019 – 0.7 million barrels per day in 2008 to 1.5 million barrels per day in 2019. 

It is critical to note here that China overtook the United States as a trading partner of SSA immediately after the 2007-09 global financial crisis (GFC). Less affected by the GFC, the size of China’s trade with SSA continued to increase during GFC, while that of the United States declined sharply and has continued to decline since 2011 (see Figure 2). In this way, there is a stark similarity between SSA and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions as China’s trade with MENA also overtook US-MENA trade immediately after the GFC (see Figure 2). One reason has been diverging trends in energy imports: while there has been growing demand in China for energy imports in the past two decades, US crude and natural gas imports started declining from their peak in 2007 as the United States took serious steps towards energy independence after the GFC through the expansion of shale oil and gas production – justified by the high oil prices through most of the 2007-14 period. Moreover, China’s investment has also been increasing in similar sectors across the two regions in the past decades: energy, metals, real estate, and transportation. The glaring similarity of China’s growing role in investment and trade in SSA and MENA points to a shifting of balance and realignment from West to East in these regions, at least in economic and trade fronts.

Not only has China become an increasingly strategic trade partner for SSA in the past two decades, SSA’s share in China’s total trade has also increased during the same period: from 1.48 percent of China’s total trade in 2001 to 3.18 percent in 2020. At the same time, SSA’s weight in the EU’s total trade stayed relatively the same – 1.3 percent in 2001 and 1.2 percent in 2020 – while it experienced a decline in the United States – 1.5 percent in 2001 to 0.85 percent in 2020 (see Figure 3). In other words, SSA’s weight in China’s total trade increased by more than two-fold in the past two decades, while it remained relatively constant for the EU and declined for the United States.

This is further illustrated by the fact that in 2019, out of the forty-two SSA countries with available trade data, China was the top exports destination and imports origin for thirteen and twenty-six SSA economies, respectively. Moreover, China was among the top three exports destinations and imports origins for twenty-two and thirty-nine SSA economies, respectively. In the same year, China accounted for more than 20 percent of a country’s imports and exports for sixteen SSA economies, while more than 50 percent of imports of eight SSA countries were originated from China (see Figure 4).

Finally, similar to the findings on Chinese investment and construction in SSA, on average, while SSA countries with access to seaports have an advantage over the landlocked ones when it comes to trade with China, the commercial ties of forty-five out of forty-nine SSA economies experienced substantial growth rates ranging from 439 to 184,101 percent in the past two decades (see Figure 5).

The evidence highlighted above suggests that SSA and China view each other as increasingly strategic trading partners, and the commercial ties between SSA and the US and EU has relatively declined in the past two decades. While the EU has negotiated a set of free trade agreements with most of SSA economies, such agreements have done little to slow down the growth of commercial ties between SSA and China, even though the EU has clear advantages over China in terms of geographic proximity and historical ties to the region. Moreover, Brexit has introduced some challenges in the ability of the EU to successfully negotiate as one common market with SSA. In the case of the United States, since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has provided eligible SSA economies with tariff-free access to 1,800 products in the US market. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), thirty-eight countries were eligible for AGOA program in 2020. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, the commercial ties between the US and SSA have deteriorated, and China has been filling up most of this gap.

The increasing presence of China in SSA alongside the relative decline of commercial and economic ties of the United States and EU in this region have increased the risk of supply chain disruptions for the United States and the EU in many strategic commodities, such as Cobalt. At the same time, China’s growing economic activities and investments in SSA has meant greater access in the region, with Beijing eying many SSA countries as potential political and military allies, posing serious geo-security challenges for the United States and the EU in the long run. As a result, the growing strategic importance of SSA for the United States and the EU necessitates a common US-EU front to face China’s expanding commercial, investment, and construction activities in this region. The latest joint action of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the EU to impose sanctions on Chinese entities who are believed to be associated with serious human rights violations in Xinjiang region of China, is an example of US collaborating with its close allies to confront China’s human rights violations. Although, this move has threatened the ratification of China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on both ends, it has sent a clear signal to China, that despite their disagreements, the United States and the EU are once again ready to partner in confronting China’s human rights violations and global ambitions. The recent launch of Build Back Better World (B3W) by President Biden and G7 leaders is an example of a partnership model that could show the commitment of the United States, the EU, and their allies to the development of SSA – and other less developed regions – while also confronting China’s seemingly limitless expansion in SSA and the developing world. Complementing B3W initiatives in SSA with bilateral and multilateral trade agreements could restore dwindling economic ties between the United States and strategic SSA economies. It is true that Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is eight years ahead of B3W and 139 countries – including Italy – are formally affiliated with it, but there remains significant infrastructure gaps in SSA for initiatives such as B3W to address. After all, it is better late than never.

Related content

Blog Post

Jun 10, 2021

Development finance in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Chinese model

By Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou

In recent years Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has outpaced distributions by the World Bank Group by more than $20 billion USD. These investments have been focused in energy, transport, metals, and real estate imply a modern bartering system is at play where developing countries in these regions pay for Chinese investment and construction in their economies through guaranteed long-term supply of hydrocarbons, agriproducts, or minerals.

Africa China

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post China and Sub-Saharan Africa trade: A case of growing interdependence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Africa Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region as well as former US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, moderated the conversation, opening with a discussion on the evolution of Prof. Autesserre’s distinguished career from identifying flaws in international peacebuilding norms and practices to offering an alternative localized solution, noting that her often provocative work has influenced policy discussions at some of the highest levels in international organizations and governments.  

In Prof. Autesserre’s remarks, she highlighted the need to move peacebuilding away from the traditional practices of premature elections and a focus on elite-bargaining, towards a process that is locally led and prioritizes local definitions of peace, democracy, and justice. She also spoke of the growing support for localized peace processes but noted that international organizations often merely “talk the talk” when it comes to supporting genuinely locally driven peace processes.

Prof. Autesserre also engaged on the role of locally led peace processes in Idjwi (DRC), Somaliland, and lessons that can be brought from these contexts to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (​MINUSMA), whose annual mandate renews on June 30 and which Amb. Pham noted, has “found progress difficult to come by” despite the “billions of dollars spent since 2013 and the hundreds of lives lost, making MINUSMA the deadliest ‘peacekeeping’ mission in the world today.”

Further reading

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cook voiced her hope that this reengagement can also translate to US interest outside of just hotspots on the continent, recognizing countries where progress is being made as well as those “middle” countries where engagement has often been lacking. She affirmed that the US interest and role in Africa goes far beyond strategic competition with China, while noting that “There are natural ties between the US and Africa and. . . that by exploiting those opportunities, exploiting those strengths, that we are going to be able to compete with anyone in Africa.”

This starts with leveraging areas of US competitiveness, including ties to the African diaspora, trade and development linkages, ingenuity and innovation, and the creative industries. Admitting to a personal bias, Cook explained that she is most excited by opportunities in the creative industries, reflecting that she has “seen the potential of creative industries to transform economies here in the United States.” For example, the state of Georgia, and more specifically the city of Atlanta, have brought in significant investment and shifted the locus of the US film industry thanks to deliberate public policy decisions that support job creation. To Cook, there is no reason the same cannot be done in markets across Africa, and to African creative industries champion Ms. Laureen Kouassi-Olsson, founder and CEO of Birimian Ventures, the creative industries are also a vehicle to communicate African values, culture, heritage, and history firsthand.

Kouassi-Olsson went further by saying that, “The diaspora has a tremendous role to play in redefining the economic relationship with our continent,” to which Cook agreed. On broader business issues, Cook reiterated the administration’s full support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. “One integrated market makes Africa a much more attractive place to do business,” and the United States is providing targeted technical support, including exchanges and workshops, to contribute to the AfCFTA’s success wherever possible.

Turning to democracy, Cook responded to a question from Senior Fellow Dr. Pierre Englebert on how the Biden administration will approach the erosion of democracy on the continent. She acknowledged that this is both a priority abroad and domestically, saying that “I think you’re going to see in this administration a real emphasis on working with our partners in a way that recognizes the leadership role the United States has played. . . with the humility of understanding that we’ve got our own challenges and we can work in partnership with African countries and countries around the world.” She made specific reference to Nigeria, noting that the recent “Twitter suspension was very concerning and remains a source of concern,” with any signs of the closing of political space or restrictions on free speech being “deeply concerning.”

Making reference to Pride Month and LGBTQI+ rights, she also noted that “human rights are universal, they are not cultural.” On this issue and others, the United States will “continue to stand tall as allies,” insisting that “all human beings have rights that have to be respected.”

Above all, speakers, including Atlantic Council Board Director Amb. Mary Carlin Yates, took the opportunity to echo Amb. Yade’s statement that Africa must be viewed as a land of opportunity and not of risk. Stay tuned for further conversations in this series as the Atlantic Council continues to shape this narrative.

Missed the event? Watch the webcast below and engage us @ACAfricaCenter with any questions, comments, or feedback.  

Further reading:

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post No longer neglected: DAS Cook forecasts more robust engagement with Africa under the Biden administration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In her comments, after having reminded participants of the long and painful history of Zimbabwe despite the promise upon independence, Amb. Yade laid out the tough challenges Zimbabwe faces and how economic and political issues are intrinsically tied. She cited how economic reforms touch on key issues of openness and rule of law and play an important role in supporting prosperity for the country’s citizens.

In his comments to open the panel, Minister Ncube provided an economic update, citing progress on indicators of inflation, debt, and budgetary health. The private sector representatives shared their experiences given their operations and recent investments, with John Deere leading in agriculture and construction; GE in healthcare, power, and aviation; and Old Mutual in providing financial services across sectors.

In the ensuing discussion, panelists shared views on the human impact of inflation, the opportunities and challenges around recruiting Zimbabwean talent, and how tech, innovation, and creativity will be needed to drive growth. Participants further engaged the company representatives on how they approach corporate social responsibility in such an environment, as well as how to manage currency risk, repatriating profits, and taking advantage of innovation in the country’s startup sector.

Further reading

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Zimbabwe: Engaging stakeholders on economic growth and lingering challenges appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Getting greener will require a lot more of everything from solar panels to wind turbines to electric vehicles to large-scale batteries to hand-held devices. This, in turn, will drive demand for various minerals and metals, both commonly well-known and not-so-familiar, on which the clean-energy technologies depend.

African countries are already a major source for some of these elements. For example, cobalt is a key component in rechargeable batteries. Roughly half of the 7.1 million metric tons of total global reserves of cobalt are found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which, moreover, accounts for 70 percent of overall production of the metal, according to the most recent statistics.

In other cases, certain African countries are key to a secure supply chain. Take the case of neodymium, a silvery rare-earth metal that plays an outsized role in renewable energy since there is currently no ready substitute for it in the manufacture of so-called permanent magnets used in both generators (where they convert mechanical energy into electricity) and electric vehicles (where they do the reverse, converting electricity into mechanical energy)—and this is in addition to its longstanding uses in a host of applications ranging from credit cards to speakers to medical equipment. Some 80 percent of the world’s neodymium is currently produced by China, a fact that suggests that the supply of this critical metal will come up in at least two of the reviews mandated by President Biden’s executive order on America’s supply chains, the study of high-capacity battery supplies led by the Secretary of Energy and the review of critical minerals led by the Secretary of Defense. While the reviews are currently underway, the possible alternative sources are already known: the Gakara Mine in Burundi operated by London-listed Rainbow Rare Earths and the Songwe Hill Mine in Malawi operated by Canada’s Mkango Resources. Of course, getting the ore is only part of the challenge; until alternative avenues for offtake are created, these producers will still have to turn to China for processing.

But seemingly esoteric minerals, whether technically rare-earth elements or not, are not the only material inputs needed for the transition to clean energy. A greener economy will also require even greater volumes of some metals that humankind has been exploiting for millennia.

The switch to cleaner, electrically-powered vehicles, for example, will require copper—lots of it. A conventional automobile operating with an internal-combustion engine contains on average about 48 pounds of copper, a hybrid electrical vehicle (HEV) about 88 pounds, and a battery electric vehicle (BEV) about 183 pounds, according to the Copper Development Association, an industry-supported nonprofit research and educational group. HEV and BEV public transportation require upwards of 1,000 pounds of the ductile native metal. Renewable energy infrastructure also requires large amounts of copper. According to the National Mining Association, 4.7 tons of copper go into each typical wind turbine. No wonder that, as enthusiasm for electric vehicles gained momentum, copper prices doubled over the last year to over $9,000 per metric ton in February, the highest level in almost ten years and pretty close to the all-time record price set in 2011, staying ever since at that level. The biggest trader of the metal reportedly expects the price to surge even further to $15,000 a ton this decade “as demand for global decarbonization produces a deep market deficit.”

While increased demand accounts for part of the commodity’s price, there is also a supply-side factor as many existing mines are in the declining phases of their life cycles. In fact, a peer-reviewed study a few years ago suggested that without new reserves being tapped, global copper production may be nearing peak just when demand is set to spike. Thus, projects under development are perhaps even more important than existing production. Moreover, with some potential major producers, like Alaska’s Pebble Mine, facing uncertain futures due to environmental concerns and regulatory issues, the pipeline for new sources is critical. Of the top ten projects currently under development, the biggest by far is Canadian mining company Ivanhoe’s Kamoa-Kakula project in the DRC, which contains 38 million tons of copper, more than twice the amount of the second-placed Pebble Mine—if the latter ever produces.

There is also increased demand anticipated for iron, a metal humankind has worked with for since the Middle Bronze Age. The same wind turbine that contains 4.7 tons of copper, requires 335 tons of steel which, of course, is an iron alloy. While three of the largest iron mines in the world are located in Brazil and, unsurprisingly, operated by the country’s flagship Vale, the Zanaga Mine in the Republic of the Congo is not far behind in scale. And the literal mother lode is in Guinea, where the world’s largest—and, by many estimates, the highest-quality—untapped iron ore deposits are to be found in the hills of the country’s east at Simandou and in nearby blocks. Bringing online this resource will not only transform the global supply chain for the critical ingredient in steel, but it carries the promise of dramatically jumpstarting the development of Guinea and its neighbor Liberia, respectively the 178^th and 175^th placed on the most recent UNDP Human Development Index of 189 countries and territories (exporting the ore through the nearby Liberian port of Buchanan makes far more economic sense than hauling it overland some 400 miles to the Guinean capital of Conakry on a not-yet-built railroad).

With government, industry (witness GM’s announcement of plans to become carbon neutral in its products and operations by 2040), and individuals widely embracing the various aspects of the green economy from major infrastructure to manufacturing to consumer products, the African continent will play an increasingly strategic role by providing critical material inputs to the supply chain. This reality will necessitate both a greater focus on Africa on the part of governments and companies as well as a better coordination between the public and private sectors, but it also provides African countries with an unprecedented opportunity to leverage this new attention to the benefit of their citizens and economies.

Ambassador J. Peter Pham, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, was the first-ever US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region. Previously he served as US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Prior to serving in government, he was Atlantic Council vice president for research and regional initiatives and director of the Africa Center. Follow him on Twitter @DrJPPham.

Further reading

Event Recap Mar 23, 2021

InfraCorp set to attract global investors to Nigerian infrastructure

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, March 23, the Africa Center hosted, in partnership with the US-Nigeria Council, a panel on investing in infrastructure in Nigeria, featuring a launch of the new and innovative Infrastructure Corporation of Nigeria (InfraCorp).

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Mar 24, 2021

Financing post-COVID recovery in Africa: Lessons from the AFC-DFC partnership

By Africa Center

How can African economies recover from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic? Sanjeev Gupta of the Africa Finance Corporation and Danielle Montgomery of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation join Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby to discuss a recent partnership to address Africa’s infrastructure deficit and spur economic growth.

Africa Economy & Business

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

The post Africa’s real strategic import for the green economy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the wake of hurricanes Eta and Iota — both of which struck Nicaragua as Category 4 storms earlier last month — many of these coffee farms now lie in ruins, with uprooted trees, flooded fields and imperiled livelihoods.

As I hear from our Lutheran World relief staff in Central America, the situation is dire. The agricultural damage is catastrophic, and the Red Cross estimates 3 million people have been affected by Eta and Iota, and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. Meanwhile, Covid-19 infections are on the rise. As the extent of the devastation becomes clearer, the US government needs to urgently approve and facilitate the rapid delivery of assistance to both the emergency response and recovery effort on the ground.

Read more about our expert:

Former fellow

Daniel V. Speckhard

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

Future Europe Initiative

Economy & Business English

The post Speckhard in CNN: For Joe Biden, a key challenge in Central America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hopewell Chin’ono is an investigative reporter based in Zimbabwe. Through his freelancing and work with the BBC World Service, Chin’ono won various international awards including the 2008 CNN African Journalist of the Year Award and 2008 Archbishop Desmond Tutu Leadership Award.  

Since the recording this video, authorities arrested Chin’ono for contempt of court charges for publishing a tweet that, according to the Washington Post, “allegedly impaired the dignity of Zimbabwe’s Chief Justice Luke Malaba.” Authorities also arrested Chin’ono earlier this year for supposedly supporting anti-government protests for which he spent 45 days in prison. Chin’ono, despite his fame, is a frequent target of President Emmerson Mnangagwa due to his reporting on corruption and human rights abuses within the government.  

Research Assistant Tessa Knight and Chin’ono discussed his experience reporting in Zimbabwe, the dangers he faced, #ZimbabweanLivesMatter, and what journalists in other repressive regimes can do to fight back. Also his love for Bob Marley’s son’s coffee.

#DFRLabCoffeeBreak is a video series meant to discuss how disinformation and digital change affect industries, policy making, and society with a community of experts, academics, and leaders from around the world. 

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

The post #DFRLabCoffeeBreak with Investigative Journalist Hopewell Chin’ono appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The report “States on the cusp” explores the complex ways in which the illicit trade in otherwise licit goods (including alcohol, pharmaceuticals, luxury goods, cigarettes, electronics, and much more) threatens the stability, security, and prosperity of vulnerable states around the world, especially in the Global South. This groundbreaking study at the nexus of illicit trade, organized crime, and official corruption proposes actionable solutions for combating illicit trade and bringing states back from the cusp of functionality.

Executive summary

Illicit trade is an umbrella term that covers multiple crimes and commodities, including the theft, diversion, adulteration, counterfeiting, and production of substandard goods, all acts which can occur at multiple points along a supply chain. It is initiated, enabled, and protected by a wide range of actors, from unethical corporations and corrupt officials at all levels of government to armed violent groups in conflict zones and organized crime networks operating locally and transnationally. 

As global trade routes increasingly encompass developing economies—as a source, transit, and market for consumer goods—they present unique challenges to creating effective national and, by implication, regional and global regimes against illicit trade. For many states around the world, and especially in the Global South, these challenges threaten to destabilize social, economic, and political structures. These states are the world’s “states on the cusp.” 

The term illicit trade, for the purpose of this report, refers to illegal production, movement, or sale of normally legal goods. Such illegal movement is often carried out to derive profit by avoiding costs such as those imposed by taxes or customs duties. There is a particularly strong incentive for illicit trade in cases where goods are subject to high duties, or where goods are subsidized to be cheaper in one jurisdiction (food, sugar, and flour are examples) but not in another, providing incentives for illegal cross-border trade. The phrase “licit goods traded illicitly” captures this phenomenon neatly. Importantly, however, this definition also includes some goods that are counterfeited to pass off as being licit, and then traded either illicitly (avoiding scrutiny) or, on occasion, in legal markets. 

The trade in counterfeit goods alone has been estimated to be worth between 3 and 7 percent of global GDP. Many forms of illicit trade, including counterfeit medicines, substandard goods, and the falsification or adulteration of food and agricultural commodities, medical equipment, and consumer and industrial goods have serious public health and safety implications. Other forms of illicit trade have huge environmental, social, and economic impacts, not least of which is reduced revenue collection which weakens state institutions, creating a downward spiral of higher illicit trade intertwined with weaker state capacity.

Reversing this trend, therefore, must be a global public good. 

This complex mix of products and commodities being traded illegally raises the important question of whether advances in technology can assist in more effective regulation. At the core of these efforts is ensuring that commodities are both produced and traded legally to protect consumers from harm. Here, “harm” refers to harms to the public (arising from poor quality or counterfeit products) and to the state (such products harms the state’s ability to collect essential revenues and to control markets in accordance with democratic processes).

Global economic trends in international trade and ever more complex supply chains are, however, reducing the role that governments can play in monitoring and regulating trade, creating both greater vulnerabilities and increasing the importance of the private sector as a critical actor. This poses significant new challenges. With an estimated 80 percent of global trade travelling by sea, the trend toward the privatization of ports and other critical infrastructure and the proliferation of free trade zones have created a growing blind spot for governments seeking to understand and regulate supply chains and illicit trade. For some forms of illicit trade, the role of small air shipments through private carriers has had a similar effect, eroding law enforcement’s ability to monitor, predict, and interdict where and how illicitly traded goods will reach the hands of their consumers. Online marketplaces and small package shipping are replacing the physical spaces where illicit transactions used to take place; their market size and reach are expanding while at the same time reducing the stigma of illegality. 

In short, the scope for illegality is growing, just as the capacity for states to respond is weakening. Can advances in technology fill the gap? 

Sophisticated and rapidly evolving technologies are bringing new ways to track, trace, monitor, and maintain records with integrity. They are steadily reinforcing law enforcement’s capacity to identify criminality in the vastness of the surface and dark web. Despite the promise that technology has to offer, some longstanding stumbling blocks need to be overcome. Some of these are particularly acute in developing economies. At the most basic level, for example, no system can provide quality control over data entry when those responsible for entering the primary data are either willfully or through lack of capacity corrupting that content. 

More generally, the lack of global standards and effective and consistent legal frameworks, and, increasingly, questions about jurisdiction caused by cyber-enabled trade and global supply chains, may limit the impact of purely national regimes of oversight and enforcement regimes.  

Lack of capacity, insecurity, and multiple forms and levels of corruption are pertinent features of developing economies that compound the inherent challenges of responding to illicit trade. Evidence from case studies around the world, as well as two commissioned for this report—examining the political economy of illicit tobacco in Southern Africa and of counterfeit medicines in Central America—reveal that political actors and state institutions are complicit in enabling, promoting, and protecting illicit trade at the very highest levels of the state. They also show that it is often the most vulnerable and underserved in society who rely on illicit markets to meet basic needs. 

While there are clear distinctions by commodity and context, the perpetuation of illicit markets and trade within developing economies often can be exacerbated by systematic and serious failures in governance and political will, rather than technical shortcomings that can easily be overcome. Technical solutions also may have unintended consequences for governance and the poor. That does not mean that they should not be used, but rather that a better understanding of the economic, political, and social context in which they are implemented is desirable. Implemented effectively, they hold great promise in taking forward steps to undercut illicit markets and improve citizens’ well-being.

However, the changing landscape for infrastructure, investment, and development assistance also has reduced the leverage of more traditional multilateral institutions to insist upon the governance and policy reforms that would address these issues. These changes have had contradictory outcomes: increasing trade on the one hand but weakening regulatory systems and conditionalities (that had been a growing part of traditional multilateral development bank practices) on the other. Requirements for transparency, broad-based development benefits for the citizenry, or democratic governance have been weakened, although not removed, in the new financing landscape. 

Against this backdrop, private sector innovation for providing technology-based tools to enhance regulatory capacity combined with citizen empowerment is key. Such innovations, however, should be grounded in an understanding of the context into which they are introduced and be governed by effective oversight systems, including effective and transparent public-private partnerships. 

How to address illicit trade in developing economies, therefore, remains unsurprisingly complex. Wins often will be incremental and setbacks frequent. The overall goal simply may be to constrain the enabling environment for illicit trade rather than allowing it to endlessly expand, to target efforts where they have the greatest chance of sustained success, and to prioritize those commodities where the harmful implications are the greatest. 

This is a volatile time in global history, marked by rapid technological and political changesplus a global COVID-19 pandemic. We must develop a better understanding of the political economy of illicit trade and craft an active monitoring capacity for intervenening. In this report, we put forward a commodity- and context-specific political economy approach to achieve this and conclude with some guidance for policy makers from any sector, public or private, to assess when and how to respond to illicit trade, and to work in and with developing economies.  

This study offers five key principles in conclusion:

1. Be commodity specific at the global level

As the nature of illicit trade differs according to commodity, its industry, and the interests of key stakeholders, the solutions required to combat it differ. Some commodities are more suited to coordinated efforts, including those with a humanitarian or moral imperative (the greater the harm, the greater the imperative to act). 

Yet there is considerable divergence on what goods should be prohibited, pronounced differences in quality standards, and issues of property rights and penalties, often occurring as fault lines between developing and developed economies. The harmonization of laws and the coordination of enforcement efforts benefit from a global approach. Segmented approaches do not consider the problem’s interconnectedness nor points of convergence. 

2. Be context specific at the local level

The illicit economy reality from one locality to another can differ sharply. Knowing the local context and finding solutions and innovations that are tailored to that local context and that account for the perceptions, attitudes, and impacts on the local population is important. A clear understanding of the underlying causes, political dimensions, and network structures of illicit trade, as well as the links between national and local power holders, will support the design of effective strategies and programs to counter illicit trade. Citizens’ views on acceptable and intolerable practices matter and must be considered, and perhaps moderated, if interventions are to be achieved.

In many developing economies, the state is unlikely to be a trusted interlocutor. Criminal groups providing the commodities may have a higher degree of legitimacy in some localities than the state. Civil society may be a better spokesperson and communicator than the state.

3. Consider the operational implications

Developing countries have operational challenges, which may undermine illicit trade solutions, ranging from inability to bear financial costs to poor connectivity and infrastructure, and low staff skill sets (e.g., technology familiarity). 

Poorly designed or overly complex solutions may hinder progress. For example, many systems are not set up for consumers and end users, require specialized technology, or produce data that users cannot process in a meaningful way. Although officials can face an overwhelming number of different systems, integrated systems can offer unified platforms for interoperability across scanners, handheld devices, and information systems. Overlapping jurisdictions offer a fundamental challenge: disentangling, simplifying, and coordinating agencies’ use of solutions ought to be prioritized.

4. Plan for independent oversight

Governments need to plan for independent oversight. Although there are several options, effective oversight mechanisms generally need three things:  

• Independence: The ability to operate free from the influence of the parties they are monitoring, as well as from political interference;
• Resources: The financial and human resources to properly perform their function—to visit sites, to investigate, and to issue public reports;
• Power: Some capacity for enforcement, including publication of credible reports to leverage public opinion, plus the support of a criminal justice or financial penalty process to sanction contravention.

5. Target comprehensive reform, not quick fixes

Broad and holistic strategies are required to respond to what is often a global challenge, not just a regional or national one. Solutions are unlikely to be successful in isolation, and fragmented approaches are more easily undermined. Ideally, interventions (including technological interventions) are combined with other economic, social, governmental, and enforcement activities.

Responses need to address: corruption fueled by illicit trade, underworld links between industry and individuals, the broader costs to the state due to illicit practices, and stopping misinformation about illicit trade. 

Policy makers’ agenda should be about coalition-building: step-by-step approaches to overcome one vested interest at a time. Doing so might enable a “state on the cusp” to avoid one possible outcome of big bang comprehensive reform efforts, which is the potential for powerful opponents to coalesce quickly against an overt and aggressive agenda, thereby killing it.

Related content

Issue Brief Jun 14, 2019

Dark pharma: Counterfeit and contraband pharmaceuticals in Central America

By Peter Tinti

This working paper, the second in a series on the global illicit economy, focuses on the “dark pharma” trade in Central America, where no country has been spared the problem of counterfeit and contraband pharmaceuticals making their way to consumers.

Latin America Security & Defense

Issue Brief Mar 1, 2019

The illicit tobacco trade in Zimbabwe and South Africa

By Simone Haysom

This groundbreaking study of the illicit tobacco trade in southern Africa explores how this trade supports organized crime, helps enable official corruption, and erodes state structures.

Non-Traditional Threats South Africa

The post States on the cusp: Overcoming illicit trade’s corrosive effects in developing economies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In her remarks, Ms. Dukhan highlighted some of the major themes from her newly released reports from The Sentry and the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center on Russian and French interference in the country, and how transnational criminal networks are exploiting political and economic opportunities in CAR. Mr. Brownstein spoke to the geopolitical strategy behind Russian involvement. Both Mr. Brownstein and Ms. Dukhan emphasized the need to view Russian involvement as part of a larger, multi-country effort to destabilize fragile countries and use weapons sales to extract profits from natural resource industries. Innovative strategies that address the underlying economic incentives for engagement with the Russians could be considered to further peace.

Upon the conclusion of Ms. Dukhan and Mr. Brownstein’s remarks, attendees engaged them on specific questions related to how US policy towards CAR might change under a Biden or Trump administration, alternative methods to foster peace in CAR, as well as general inquiries about Chinese involvement in the CAR mining sector.

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Roundtable on foreign interference in the Central African Republic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For years, France and the United States maintained a strong presence in the Central African Republic (CAR)—until the end of military operations in 2016 and a withdrawal of forces in 2017. This disengagement turned out to be a major opportunity for Russia, which was seeking to advance its geopolitical and economic interests in the region.

Ever since, the Kremlin has rapidly expanded its influence by propping up CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra with presidential protection, military support, and the creation of a network of political allies to back the embattled leader. In exchange for this support, CAR has surrendered great parts of its sovereignty to pro-Kremlin security emissaries.

Today, the Central African Republic is experiencing serious corruption, a bloody war economy, harmful disinformation, and a judicial system that benefits the powerful at the expense of the broader population. The US and its European partners can target the corrupt entities now thriving in the region, foster a new framework for multilateral negotiations to address drivers of conflict, and more effectively support international bodies dedicated to prosecuting and arresting individuals responsible for the kinds of gross human-rights violations and financial crimes occurring in the Central African region.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Central African Republic: Ground zero for Russian influence in Central Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dell’Osso opened with a brief introduction of the report, outlining the specific findings and broader implications. He noted that North Korean businessmen set up a company in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), opened a US dollar banking account, and won public contracts, in apparent violation of US, European Union, and United Nations sanctions. While this principally implicates the DRC banking sector and the country’s institutional environment, Dell’Osso underscored that the insights from the report are relevant to a more general set of issues related to sanctions evasion, enforcement, and due diligence.

Following Dell’Osso’s overview, the expert panel aimed to contextualize the report’s findings. Dolzikova helpfully provided the viewing audience with an introduction to proliferation finance, explaining how analysts look to connect North Korean business activity to government proliferation efforts. In Africa, most of these efforts relate to revenue generation and given the evidence from the report, according to Dolzikova, it is exceedingly likely that the businessmen implicated were supporting North Korean government objectives.

Englebert added remarks on the political context in the DRC, in what he described as a corrupt institutional environment in which stakeholders rely on securing patronage in order to achieve their objectives. This applies to provincial governors, as well, helping to explain the statue-building activities implicated in the report as potential means to curry favor from Kinshasa. In this constrained political environment, Englebert highlighted that “following UN Sanctions is really a mild priority” when compared to political and financial survival.

For former banker and citizen activist Anzuluni, the report’s findings are unfortunately not surprising and reflect systemic issues of bad governance and corruption. He placed significant onus on the Congolese central bank in matters of financial regulation and suggested that it is a responsibility of civil society to ensure that the recommendations of this report and others are not only heard but acted on. In this way, he closed, the interests of Congolese citizens can be put first.

Missed the event? Watch the webcast, below, and engage us @ACAfricaCenter with any questions, comments, or feedback.

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Expert panel responds to incidents of North Korean sanctions evasion in the DRC appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On this #DFRLabCoffeeBreak, Aisha Abdool Karim, journalist at the Bhekisisa Centre for Health Journalism joins DFRLab Research Assistant Tessa Knight. The two discuss South Africa’s reaction to and plan for dealing with COVID-19 as well as disinformation that can lead average South Africans astray.

South Africa has a history of dealing with pandemics and creating strong social movements around community health. However, a wave of disinformation has hit, fueled by both greed and a desire to end suffering caused by COVID-19. This has left many South Africans vulnerable and made proper treatment for more than just the coronavirus much more difficult.

The #DFRLabCoffeeBreak is a video series meant to discuss how disinformation and digital change affect industries, policy making, and society with a community of experts, academics, and leaders from around the world.

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

The post #DFRLabCoffeeBreak with Bhekisisa Centre for Health Journalism, Aisha Abdool Karim appeared first on Atlantic Council.

South Africa is one of several nations facing an international outcry over increases in COVID-19 related violence against civilians by security forces enforcing quarantine measures. Since South Africa instituted a country-wide lockdown on March 27, the number of violent incidents by police against civilians has reportedly more than doubled, with poor and vulnerable populations most affected. (For reference, conflict data tracking website ACLED reports that in the two months prior to lockdown, approximately twelve “violence against civilians” events were recorded; in the two months following it, the number rose to nearly thirty.)

As restrictions start to ease and the country begins its reopening, the number of COVID-19 cases in South Africa has been lower than many initial projections. During a June 17 press conference, President Ramaphosa announced that there have been 80,412 confirmed coronavirus cases in South Africa. Of these, 44,331 people (around 55 percent) have already recovered, and 1,674 people have died in the developing country of nearly 60 million. This has prompted many to praise the lockdown measures for flattening the country’s curve. However, questions surrounding the steep human rights costs of the lockdown are emerging country-and world-wide.    

Under initial drastic regulations that began March 26 (Level 5 of South Africa’s 5-tiered plan), citizens were under a strict curfew and shelter-in-place orders and were prohibited from leaving their homes for anything other than essential trips to the grocery store, pharmacy, or hospital. Any outdoor exercise, interprovincial travel, and even the sale of alcohol and cigarettes was prohibited countrywide. The enforcement of these stringent policies came with an initial mobilization of nearly 3,000 soldiers, deployed overwhelmingly to informal settlements known as townships. Heavy fines for breaking the law were also implemented. To enforce the quarantine orders, Police Minister Bheki Cele set up more than 190 roadblocks and over 680 vehicle checkpoints across the country, encouraging security forces to “destroy” any stores selling liquor and authorizing the use of force to enforce the ban.

For the millions of poor South Africans working and living in the informal sector, the country’s quarantine mandates have presented an impossible challenge. Faced with persistent food and income insecurity, and dwelling in informal settlements lacking basic hygiene facilities including running water and toilets, millions of under-resourced South African households have been simply unable to heed the government’s COVID-19 regulations. As hunger and despair mounted and promised public aid was not delivered, unrest across the country began escalating.

Within the first seven days of lockdown, security forces had arrested more than 2,000 people for quarantine-related infractions. The first reports of looting and public protests over the lack of service deliveries broke towards the end of April—about a month after the Level 5 lockdown started—and on April 21, President Ramaphosa announced the deployment of an additional 73,180 South African National Defence Force (SANDF) troops to help with enforcement. The move was unprecedented: the “largest deployment of SANDF troops” in post-democratic South Africa, best understood when put into context with 2017 figures that list the total (visible) number of police officers in the country at 102,059.

As of June 1, over 230,000 people had been arrested. Most have been due to minor violations, including being outdoors without a permit or possessing alcohol and/or cigarettes. The deployment of troops has prompted outcries from civil society and the UN, who warned that excessive policing and the potentially deadly risks associated with the enforcement of harsh lockdowns and curfews could “spark a human rights disaster.”

South Africa suffers from deep-seated inequality and is consistently ranked as one of the least safe and most violent countries in the world. In particular, both public and private South African security forces have had long, documented histories of brutality, racially-biased policing, and excessive use of force, in part due to the legacy of the apartheid-era militias. However, when the county’s lockdown measures were implemented, two interesting trends related to violence emerged. The first was an overall decrease in most types of violent activity. March’s murders were down by 72 percent when compared to the previous year; assaults fell by 85 percent; and violent robbery by 70 percent. The country’s ban on alcohol appears also to have had a significant effect on the emptying of hospital beds and decreasing crime overall, 40 percent of which is related to alcohol. However, while violence decreased in general, a specific type of violence escalated dramatically: violence against civilians by security forces.

Within weeks following the lockdown, photos and videos began circulating on social media, depicting various security sector forces (allegedly) using aggressive force and brutality in townships against even minor lockdown infractions. In Alexandra, a township outside Johannesburg, South African Police Services (SAPS) used water cannons and rubber bullets to disperse people peacefully queuing outside food shops. The use of tear gas on protesters and the shooting of rubber bullets into groups of people has been reported across the country. At least ten South Africans (all Black) have already died in police action during the lockdown. As the spotlight is turned on police brutality worldwide, the names and stories of these victims continue to emerge in the South African news media.

One such example is the online and in-person protests over the death of Collins Khosa. Khosa was found to have died from blunt force trauma to the head after SANDF entered his home and violently detained him, suspecting he had cups of alcohol in his front yard. The family’s court filing against the officers—who denied all charges—stated that Khosa was strangled, slammed against a cement wall and a steel gate, and then hit with the butt of a machine gun. Afterwards, the family reported that he could not walk, began to vomit, and lost speech. When his partner tried to wake him a few hours later, he was unconscious.

Township resident Sibusio Amos was another victim of police brutality after he was found drinking in an informal bar, violating government regulations. Police used rubber bullets to remove him and other patrons from the shebeen, then allegedly followed him home and fatally shot him on his veranda. Several children were caught in the crossfire and had to be taken to the hospital. While Khosa’s death and the clearing of the involved SANDF officers are the subject of ongoing investigations into police brutality by the Independent Police Investigation Directorate (IPID), other deaths including Amos’ remain uninvestigated. The South African government has issued a statement condemning the alleged police misconduct.

South Africa is not alone in this alarming trend of heavy-handed pandemic policing in Africa. A Kenyan policing oversight body alleges that police have killed fifteen Kenyans since the government imposed its dusk-to-dawn curfew, part of a wider set of government-imposed coronavirus measures. The Independent Policing Oversight Body (IPOB) states that as of June 5,  it had received eighty-seven complaints against the police, including harassment, assaults, inhumane treatment, sexual assault, shootings, and death. Protests against what some Kenyans feel like is unpunished police brutality broke out on June 1. In Nigeria, security forces are reported to have killed at least twenty-eight civilians, while 873 cases of police brutality had been documented as of April 1.

Longstanding policing challenges in South Africa are being made even more difficult by the current threat of the coronavirus. While the enforcement of aggressive lockdown measures has contributed to limiting the transmission of COVID-19, it has also left at least ten people dead and has criminalized thousands of others. As in Kenya, Nigeria, and even the United States, the threat of police brutality has created a sort of “double pandemic” for poor, predominately Black individuals: that of the virus and of brutality at the hands of the police. As thousands join in on marches and protests from Cape Town to Johannesburg against security sector violence largely targeted at Black communities, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated many deeply rooted structural cleavages and spurred racial tensions. As such, it is likely that post-pandemic South Africa will encounter new trials and tribulations regarding police accountability, transparency, and justice on its long walk to reconciliation.

Katie Trippe is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Questions? Tweet them to our experts @ACAfricaCenter.

For more content, go to our Coronavirus: Africa page.

New Atlanticist Jun 18, 2020

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta says his country needs ‘fiscal space’ amid the COVID-19 crisis

By Larry Luxner

“Coronavirus is mainly a health issue, and our key focus is ensuring that we keep our people safe,” Kenyatta said. “But this is also an economic crisis because it has resulted in some key sectors hugely affected by lockdowns. We were forced to close our airspace, which affected tourism, a very critical part of our economy.”

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Jun 10, 2020

Progress on African free trade: An interview with AfCFTA Secretary General Wamkele Mene

By Aubrey Hruby

Watch Africa Center Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby’s exclusive interview with Mr. Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat, on the status of the agreement and the impact of COVID-19.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Jun 2, 2020

Afreximbank president champions African free trade alongside COVID-19 response

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, June 2, the Africa Center hosted Prof. Benedict Oramah, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), for a discussion on innovative financing amid COVID-19.

Africa Coronavirus

The post Pandemic policing: South Africa’s most vulnerable face a sharp increase in police-related brutality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Englebert in Le Monde: Aujourd’hui comme sous Léopold II, le Congo reste la façade institutionnelle d’un voleur érigé en Etat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post McFate in the Washington Post: Venezuela shows how mercenaries have become a global security threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Globally, almost 250 million women and girls between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine suffer physical or sexual violence at the hands of an intimate partner each year. These numbers are set to skyrocket, however, as the health, security, and financial worries caused by the coronavirus outbreak intensify domestic tensions and force families to lock down in what is statistically the most dangerous place a woman can be: her home. Home isolation orders present abusers with increased opportunity to inflict harm on victims who are rendered more vulnerable by reduced access to their support networks and limited options for escape from the home. Governments struggling to respond to the coronavirus epidemic have failed to respond to this spillover effect – and to a similar crisis affecting vulnerable children – with increased services that cater to those at risk. This has left domestic violence response centers overwhelmed by the heightened demands on their services.

The nations of the Global North – such as Canada, Germany, Spain, the UK and the US – suffered early waves of the pandemic and have already reported stark increases in demand for emergency shelters. As the pandemic spreads to Africa, the incidence of domestic assault is increasing there, too. In South Africa, where COVID-19 cases have been concentrated, 148 people have been arrested and charged with crimes relating to gender-based violence (GBV), and over 2,000 complaints of GBV were made to the South African Police Service in first seven days of the lockdown.

With an alarming 4,793 confirmed COVID-19 cases, South Africa has the largest number of COVID-19 infections on the continent, prompting President Cyril Ramaphosa to declare a twenty-one day nationwide lockdown beginning on March 27. Part of this initiative included the deployment of 24,389 security forces responsible for the enforcement of this strict policy. One of the very few countries to enforce exceptionally strict policies, the South African government has also prohibited the sale of cigarettes and alcohol, which have been identified as catalysts for domestic violence as well as immune system suppressants.

While these policies have apparently been effective at slowing the transmission of COVID-19, South Africa has experienced a wave of crime, including an increase in robbery, vandalism and gender-based violence. In an open letter to the South African people, President Ramaphosa condemned these “despicable” actions and reaffirmed his commitment to prioritizing responses to gender-based violence in the national COVID-19 response. He also promised unbroken commitment to the Emergency Response Plan to end violence against women and children that was introduced in 2019. Additionally, the GBV National Command Centre, which operates a national call center facility, has remained fully operational – and reports that it has received 12,000 calls since the implementation of the lockdown.

Prior to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, rates of gender-based violence in South Africa were among the highest in the world. According to government reports, a South African woman is murdered every three hours on average, with many assaulted and raped before their demise. The rate in violence against women had already ignited protests in many parts of South Africa, leading the government in September 2019 to recognize the dire state of women within the country by declaring gender-based violence and femicide a national crisis.

South Africa is not alone. In Kenya, the National Council on Administration of Justice has also reported a spike in sexual offenses, and has identified the primary perpetrators as “close relatives, guardians, and/or persons living with the victims.”

Human Rights Watch has reported that one 16-year-old Kenyan girl was captured and sexually assaulted by a man who reportedly kidnapped her because he “needed female company” in order to get through the lockdown. Fortunately, she was rescued by neighbors and is now in a safe house. But violence is the daily reality for women and girls across Kenya, where 45 percent of women and girls aged fifteen to forty-nine have experienced physical violence and another 14 percent have reported experiencing sexual violence. (The true rate of violence is likely much higher due to the typical under-reporting of sexual crimes.)

Heightened rates of intimate partner violence during the pandemic should not have taken authorities off guard. During the 2014-16 Ebola virus outbreak that ravaged through some West African countries, there was similar evidence confirming that the safeguard measures implemented to prevent the spread of the Ebola virus also rendered women extremely vulnerable to GBV, and particularly increased the risk of sexual violence. Additionally, as resources for reproductive and sexual health were redirected towards the emergency Ebola response, many countries saw accompanying increases in maternal mortality. Should this pattern continue, there will be larger consequences for women and girls, beyond exposure to the virus.

UN Women has advocated loudly for actions to address this “shadow pandemic” of sexual violence. Under the leadership of the Executive Director, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, it has issued a series of recommendations to help governments, international and national civil society organizations, and United Nations (UN) agencies to curb the widespread violence against women and girls across the globe. These recommendations include allocating additional resources to address sexual violence in national COVID-19 response plans; strengthening services for women who experience violence – i.e. expanding capacity of shelters, strengthening hotlines, and ensuring psychosocial support; and placing women at the forefront of policy changes, solutions and recovery strategies. The UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women has also established a COVID-19 Funding Window, which aims to support existing civil society organizations and fund new projects specifically designed to support women and girls who experience violence in the context of the pandemic.

Given that the time for preparation in most countries is already long gone, governments need to take these recommendations as more than friendly suggestions. Women cannot continue fall through the cracks during times of crisis, especially given that many women in Africa become the primary caregivers for their families in times of poor health. Restricting people to their homes is the best way to contain the virus, no doubt, but in doing so it is important to recognize that many for many women, the home is not a safe haven. Too many lives have already been lost to the virus, so governments and civil society must do what they can to protect those women who are now doubly vulnerable. 

Joanne Chukwueke is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Questions? Tweet them to our experts @ACAfricaCenter. 

For more content, go to our Coronavirus: Africa page.

AfricaSource Apr 20, 2020

African private sector mobilizes COVID-19 response

By Aubrey Hruby

In times when neighbors are competing with each other for medical supplies, the private sector is creating partners out of competitors. Across the continent, coalitions are coming together to support public health responses and fight the virus: a private sector response that is even more important in resource-constrained African countries.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Apr 17, 2020

Barriers to mass testing for COVID-19 in Africa

By Bronwyn Bruton and Neil Edwards

Beyond top-line concerns over supply of test kits, other barriers to mass testing for COVID-19 in Africa include logistical constraints surrounding access to rural and densely populated urban areas, limitations on healthcare personnel and facilities, distrust of healthcare workers, and stigma associated with the virus itself.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Apr 2, 2020

Coronavirus deals a blow to Ethiopia’s elections

By Bronwyn Bruton

On March 31, the government of Ethiopia indefinitely postponed historic elections that were scheduled to take place in August. This makes Ethiopia the first African nation, in what is likely to be a wave of countries, forced to set back highly contentious political contests in response to the novel coronavirus pandemic, with significant implications for the outcome.

Africa Coronavirus

The post The “shadow pandemic” of gender-based violence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hruby in the Africa Report: Africa’s innovators vs the virus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite COVID-19’s slow start in Africa and the hope that the continent might remain relatively unscathed, as of April 6, there were 9,867 confirmed cases in 51 out of the 54 countries across the continent. Similar to approaches to the pandemic globally, African government responses have varied, with common themes including border closures, banning public gatherings, and in some cases local and even nationwide lockdowns. But some responses have been more robust than others.

On April 2, Google released statistical breakdowns by country of residents’ mobility to a variety of common locations including retail and recreation spaces, grocery stores, transit stations, places of work, and residences. Each of these metrics (described below) details the percent change of mobility to each location from February 16 to March 29 against an earlier baseline. This data, which spans twenty-seven African countries, is taken from Google users that have their location trackers turned on in their phone. While it may not be representative of a broad range of socio-economic classes (and may have some statistical inaccuracies), it does provide some insight into how well government responses have fared since their implementation.

A compilation of the complete dataset for African countries is at the bottom of this page, while graphs of each of the country’s mobility over time can be viewed via individual Google country reports. Measurements do not track the entire nation, distinguish between urban and rural, and are skewed to the third of African mobile users (250 million) that can afford to buy a smartphone. Nonetheless, the data provides an imperfect framework for understanding the effect of different government responses across the continent.

The twenty-seven countries in the following dataset include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Below is a breakdown of the countries with the highest and lowest percent changes in resident mobility to common locations.

Travel to transit stations:

This metric tracks mobility trends in the visits to public transportation stations including buses and train stations. This metric is vital, especially in Africa, where passengers are routinely crammed into buses, with riders overflowing the seats and aisles—putting them at a higher risk of transmission. The continued use of public transportation could have dire consequences on the number of confirmed cases across the continent. However, some African countries, through imposed travel bans, lockdowns, and restrictions on travel, have severely decreased the use of public transportation. They are listed below:

Beyond these top five countries, ten of the twenty-seven in the dataset have reported at least a 50 percent reduction in the number of people (that were tracked by Google) that have visited public transportation stations. While these numbers are quite promising, they may reflect socio-economic differences. It may be that those who own a smartphone can afford alternative forms of transportation. However, this data is consistent with the intensity of government responses in these respective countries, which have all imposed substantial restrictions to movement by March 29. In Rwanda, for example, only essential movement throughout the country is allowed. Those found driving on the streets are stopped by police and have their cars confiscated—only to have them returned after the lockdown is lifted.

The countries with the lowest percent change recorded less than a 20 percent reduction in visits to transportation stations. In a previous Atlantic Council analysis, I discuss the implications of continued public transportation use in Tanzania, which can be applied more broadly.  

Travel to retail and recreation:

This metric tracks mobility trends in the visitations of places like restaurants, cafes, shopping centers, museums, libraries, and movie theaters. As listed below, eight out of the twenty-seven African countries detail at least a 50 percent reduction in their mobility to retail and recreation spaces—demonstrating the impact of government policies that shut down non-essential businesses.   

In contrast, five countries tracked by Google experienced less than a 20 percent reduction in travel to retail and recreation spaces. They include:

As the data shows, the countries that have the lowest percent change in the daily travel to retail and recreation spaces are also among the countries that have some of the lowest confirmed cases on the continent. For example, Zimbabwe with only nine confirmed cases has only a 2 percent change since February 16—by far the lowest among countries within the Africa dataset. This suggests that those monitored by Google living in Zimbabwe are not avoiding trips to crowded retail and recreation spaces as a preventative measure against COVID-19. This may be evidence that individuals in countries with fewer cases may feel less motivated to change their daily behavior.

Travel to grocery and pharmacy:

This metric tracks mobility trends in the visitations of places like grocery stores, specialty food shops, drug stores, and pharmacies. It is not clear whether or not this metric includes visits to local village markets. The countries with the highest percent changes are listed below:

Six of the twenty-seven countries (tracked by Google) recorded at least a 40 percent reduction in the amount of people visiting grocery stores and pharmacies since February 16.

In contrast, Ghana is the only country in the dataset to endure an increase in the number of people going to grocery stores and pharmacies. However, just days before Google’s data collection concluded, Ghana imposed a lockdown. This latest percentage increase likely reflects people across the country preparing to stay at home and abide by the lockdown order. Previous to the announcement, Ghana had recorded substantial decreases in the number of people going to grocery stores and pharmacies—upward of a 20 percent reduction.

Four other countries: Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique have also endured lower percent changes in the number of people going to the grocery store and the pharmacy compared to the rest of the countries in the dataset.

Travel to places of work:

This metric tracks mobility trends of places of work. This metric may be problematic since work in most African nations occurs in the informal economy which does not necessarily have a physical address. Regardless, this data provides an idea of the extent to which the government lockdowns and policies have impacted normal work activities; or in the case of the bottom ranking countries, how life is business as usual.

Again, the top countries with the highest percentage change in travel to places of work are among countries that took immediate preventive actions against COVID-19. Although the individual countries have endured a wide range of reductions, spanning from 30 to almost 70 percent.

The countries with the lowest percent reductions demonstrate a lack of change to the daily work routines of the individuals that were tracked by Google. Three countries including Ghana, Benin, and Mozambique recorded an increase in the number of people that traveled to a place of work. Meanwhile, the remaining countries on the list either reported no change or a relatively small reduction of 3 percent.

Staying at home:

One of the best metrics provided by Google is the mobility trends for places of residence, representing tracked users staying at home during the outbreak.  

Coinciding with the other findings, as residents of Mauritius, South Africa, Rwanda, Angola, and Cabo Verde reduce their travel to usual destinations, they are increasingly staying at home. Although every African country in the dataset has experienced an increase in the number of their residents that are staying at home, six countries including Tanzania, Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, and Niger have endured less than a 10 percent increase. Tanzania has had the lowest percentage change, with only a 3 percent increase of its tracked residents staying at home, compared to the baseline figures from earlier this year. This may reflect the rhetoric of President Magafuli, who recently encouraged Tanzanians to continue to attend places of worship.  

Conclusion:

The major finding across the Google metrics is the consistency of countries appearing in the top and bottom lists for percent change in mobility to the various common locations. Countries with the highest percent change in metrics across the board—including travel to retail and recreation spaces, grocery stores, transit stations, workplaces, and places of residence—include Angola, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, and South Africa. These numbers most likely reflect the stringent restrictions on travel imposed by the governments of the aforementioned countries. In contrast, the countries with the lowest percent change in mobility to the various common locations include Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe—possibly reflecting unchanged daily behavior and continued travel amongst those tracked.

Thus, as the data supports, these residents were not staying home as compared to the rest of the countries in the dataset. Since people in these countries are not practicing social distancing and staying at home, it is a fair prediction that the number of cases is likely to rise steeply in the coming weeks. These Google metrics, although an imperfect framework, provide valuable data that should continue to be released periodically to help inform governments and policymakers alike of the progress made by lockdowns and travel restrictions.

Neil Edwards is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Want to read more on this data and its implications? See additional visualizations and a summary of key thematic findings here.

Questions? Tweet them to our experts @ACAfricaCenter.

For more content, go to our Coronavirus: Africa page.

AfricaSource Apr 2, 2020

Coronavirus deals a blow to Ethiopia’s elections

By Bronwyn Bruton

On March 31, the government of Ethiopia indefinitely postponed historic elections that were scheduled to take place in August. This makes Ethiopia the first African nation, in what is likely to be a wave of countries, forced to set back highly contentious political contests in response to the novel coronavirus pandemic, with significant implications for the outcome.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 26, 2020

COVID-19 in the DR Congo

By Private: Pierre Englebert

As of March 24, the Democratic Republic of Congo had only forty-eight confirmed cases of coronavirus, with three dead of the disease. But although Congo is only in the very first stages of the pandemic, the contrast between the degree of state capacity and social discipline that it takes to stifle the disease and Congo’s record on these two counts is particularly worrisome.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 30, 2020

Coronavirus comes to Sudan

By

Not yet one year into a historic political transition and in the midst of an economic collapse, Sudan’s future was already hanging in the balance. The addition of a national and global public health crisis now has the potential for a ‘make or break’ impact on the country.

Africa Coronavirus

The post Using Google reports to estimate Africa’s response to COVID-19: A compilation of the data appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Google’s reports utilize anonymized user location data and compare movements against a recent baseline, with reports tracking mobility associated with retail & recreation, transit stations, grocery & pharmacy, parks, work, and residences. Based on the sampling, it is worth noting that in the African context these reports are likely to be most representative of urban areas, especially capitals and principal cities. Thus, the data must be taken with a grain of salt. But at the same time, these urban areas are the locales in which governments are most capable of enforcing social distancing, and thus the information is still relevant.

It is also clear from above that not all countries are included due to minimal data. As updates and additions come in, attempts will be made to update this blog intermittently. For reference, the current data and graphs account for data through March 29. This means that the impact of lockdowns in Botswana and parts of Ghana and Nigeria, among others, will not yet be apparent. As a snapshot from March 29, though, the data still gives some insights into which countries have been most proactive and the extent to which existing lockdowns have been effective. Below are some initial findings:

Lockdowns are having an effect

South Africa stands out on the map as having significantly reduced retail and transit activities, with movements down 79 and 80 percent respectively. Even more interestingly, you can see in the time series graphic below that these drops directly followed the March 26 lockdown orders. Of the other relative standouts (Mauritius, Angola, Cabo Verde, Rwanda, and Nambia), all had already imposed substantial restrictions to movement by March 29. The implication appears to be that sensitization campaigns and the like are no substitute for more stringent measures.

African democracies are proving capable of enforcing lockdowns

There has been talk that authoritarian governments might be best suited to enforce lockdowns and restrict movement, but the initial data from Africa suggests that democracies can do so efficiently too. Of Africa’s top democracies, per the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Mauritius (#1), Cabo Verde (#3), South Africa (#4), and Namibia (#7) are all among the most proactive and effective at social distancing to date. The tiny island nations of Mauritius and Cabo Verde have been especially effective, though surely in large part due to plummeting tourism, with Mauritius reducing retail and transit activities by a stunning 89 percent. As in South Africa, Mauritius’ sharp declines came in conjunction with a mandated lockdown.

Of the other top democracies, Botswana (#2) and Ghana (#5) have imposed more stringent measures in the past days. But as of March 29 had only reduced movements by 10 to 15 percent. For the other side of the coin, Rwanda’s measures have also been effective, reducing transit movements by 75 percent.

Certain countries lag behind

The average reduction in retail movements between the twenty-seven countries with data is about 37 percent, but Zimbabwe has achieved as little as a 2 percent reduction. Other than Ghana and Botswana, Tanzania also stands out, with its reduction of 16 percent supporting previous Africa Center analysis of a mild Tanzanian response. The data on residential movements also back up these trends. The same set of high performers lead the way with increases of around 24 percent staying at home, while Tanzania brings up the absolute rear with an increase of only 3 percent.

As discussed above, though, several of these countries have imposed new restrictions in the past days, and some of these “lagging” countries still have low reported caseloads, partially explaining their tepid responses. Zimbabwe, for example, still sits at less than ten confirmed cases, as of April 6. Accordingly, it will be important to follow this data in the coming weeks as countries adapt. But with uncertainty over the extent to which cases are going untested or unreported, there are concerns that wait-and-see approaches could backfire. Botswana, for example, declared a state of emergency immediately after its index case was confirmed, but having delayed more than a week since neighboring South Africa upped its efforts, only time will tell if restrictions should have been pursued more proactively.

Luke Tyburski is a project assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Looking for a deeper dive into Google’s mobility data? Find a more detailed breakdown here.

Questions? Tweet them to our experts @ACAfricaCenter.

For more content, go to our Coronavirus: Africa page.

AfricaSource Apr 2, 2020

Coronavirus deals a blow to Ethiopia’s elections

By Bronwyn Bruton

On March 31, the government of Ethiopia indefinitely postponed historic elections that were scheduled to take place in August. This makes Ethiopia the first African nation, in what is likely to be a wave of countries, forced to set back highly contentious political contests in response to the novel coronavirus pandemic, with significant implications for the outcome.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 26, 2020

COVID-19 in the DR Congo

By Private: Pierre Englebert

As of March 24, the Democratic Republic of Congo had only forty-eight confirmed cases of coronavirus, with three dead of the disease. But although Congo is only in the very first stages of the pandemic, the contrast between the degree of state capacity and social discipline that it takes to stifle the disease and Congo’s record on these two counts is particularly worrisome.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 30, 2020

Coronavirus comes to Sudan

By

Not yet one year into a historic political transition and in the midst of an economic collapse, Sudan’s future was already hanging in the balance. The addition of a national and global public health crisis now has the potential for a ‘make or break’ impact on the country.

Africa Coronavirus

The post Using Google reports to estimate Africa’s response to COVID-19: Key findings appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Englebert quoted in Voice of America on the effects of COVID-19 on conflict-ridden regions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Lubumbashi, for example, a false alert about two potentially infected individuals who had flown in from Kinshasa led Governor Jacques Kyabula to declare a complete 48-hour lockdown on March 23 until all the plane’s passengers could be found and isolated. But large amounts of people could still be seen milling around in the streets, several neighborhood markets remained open, and the moto-taxis were doing their regular business.

In Kinshasa, too, the government has ordered bars, restaurants, schools, and universities closed, and has banned group gatherings. But many markets remain open and many people, seeking to eke out a living in a country with a 70 percent poverty rate, are out and about. With a population of more than ten million inhabitants and with communes of extreme population density, the very notion of avoiding gatherings is an empirical puzzle.

In the best of times, Congolese governance is chaotic, amateurish, and inefficient. The COVID-19 crisis has so far only heightened the display of these characteristics. There is particular confusion as to who is in charge. (To some extent, this is always the case in a country with an official president and a shadow one, but it matters more now.)

President Félix Tshisekedi announced the formation of a COVID-19 Task Force in his office on March 18, but there is also a coordination cell in the national government. There is some confusion as to whom—either the minister of health or an epidemiologist—is actually in charge of this cell. Moreover, Prime Minister Sylvestre Ilunga’s office has also claimed leadership in the crisis response.

To make matters worse, it’s unclear whether the central government or provincial ones are in charge. The constitution and the decentralization law of 2008 give Congo’s twenty-six provinces jurisdiction over public health, not the central authorities. Indeed, the governor of Haut-Katanga unilaterally put his province on lockdown on March 23. But his decision was challenged by the national minister of health, Eteni Longondo, who claimed his ministry alone has the management of such a health crisis in its prerogatives, based in part on the fact that there is only one epidemiology center and biological laboratory in Congo and it is in Kinshasa. The national minister’s authority appeared to be boosted when he declared on March 24 that the two positive tests identified by Haut-Katanga a few days earlier (based on rapid test kits apparently imported from China) had proven negative upon further analysis.

In the days and weeks ahead, two factors are likely to matter a lot: money and social tensions.

The Congolese government is broke, with a US$5 billion deficit in its 2020 budget, largely due to a so-far failed attempt at making primary education universally free and a bloated civil service. During the Ebola epidemics, the DRC has been able to rely on foreign funding to respond to the crises (and, largely, direct foreign substitution of the state in the delivery of health services). But during a universal catastrophe like the coronavirus pandemic, Congo is unlikely to receive any significant external funding. And the spreading world-wide recession is likely to further deflate the price of its mineral exports on which the budget largely depends.

Congolese politics functions through extensive patronage, much of which is predicated upon the informal redistribution of state resources. So a major question facing the Congo during the pandemic is, if state resources dry up and the necessities of actual public spending rise, how will the political system endure? Joseph Kabila’s Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC) coalition is particularly likely to fray if it cannot be sustained with the usual level of financial transfers and employment opportunities for clients.

If the crisis worsens, community conflicts might well rise too. “Tribalism,” or the reliance on ethnic identity in social, economic, and political relations, is widely prevalent in Congo, and many of the country’s regions have active or latent inter-community conflicts. So whether the health crisis will aggravate social tensions and spark violent conflict is a second big question mark. During the recent lockdown in Haut-Katanga, for example, tensions flared up in some neighborhoods between local “autochthonous” people and the Luba migrants from the Kasai provinces, many of whom are in the moto-taxi business and refused to stop working.

In some ways, the Congolese have lived daily for years with much worse health problems, including Ebola in North Kivu the last few years (which seemed to have finally come to an end earlier this month), recurrent bouts of cholera, widespread tuberculosis, and a resurgence in measles cases (the Congo had 180,000 cases in 2019 alone). Yet, as elsewhere, the potential for rapid contagion and high mortality of COVID-19 is likely to upend life as the Congolese know it.

Dr. Pierre Englebert is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He is also the H. Russell Smith Professor of International Relations at Pomona College.

The author is grateful for information shared by Eric Nonga from the University of Lubumbashi.

Questions? Tweet them to our experts @ACAfricaCenter.

For more content, go to our Coronavirus: Africa page.

AfricaSource Mar 24, 2020

What does the coronavirus mean for Africa?

By Bronwyn Bruton

Will the novel coronavirus prove even more deadly and disruptive in Africa? It depends on the country. Bronwyn Bruton identifies the key questions and sets the stage for the Africa’s Center’s ongoing commentary on the crisis.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 30, 2020

Coronavirus comes to Sudan

By

Not yet one year into a historic political transition and in the midst of an economic collapse, Sudan’s future was already hanging in the balance. The addition of a national and global public health crisis now has the potential for a ‘make or break’ impact on the country.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 26, 2020

A rough road ahead for Nigeria

By Aubrey Hruby

Africa’s giant, Nigeria, is awakening to a new economic and social reality as a result of the coronavirus crisis. The country of two hundred million has already recorded over fifty cases and its first COVID-related death. News of high-profile infectees is starting to drive social change and spur calls for stronger government action.

Africa Coronavirus

The post COVID-19 in the DR Congo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To make matters worse, Angola sends over 60 percent of its oil to China, and shipments have recently had to be offloaded at discounts due to reduced demand. The country also uses oil as collateral for its $25 billion in Chinese debt. For Congo-Brazzaville, as elsewhere, disruptions related to COVID-19 will also likely stall progress on new projects, including a recent, yet dubious, find in the country’s Cuvette region. While the Congolese operator claims the find could quadruple annual production and serve as an economic lifeline, a compelling report by Global Witness casts doubt on the size and viability of the reserves, while voicing further concerns over corruption and risks to the environment. Thus, while COVID-19 may be immaterial in this case, operations and exploration in the country’s other fields may too be affected, as Italian ENI “will consider a strong reduction in [its] capex and expected costs to levels that are consistent with the new price scenario,” according to the company’s Chief Executive Officer.

The shocks will be felt everywhere, though. Despite oil only making up 10 percent of GDP in Nigeria, the government’s budget relies on oil for 57 percent of all revenue. Oil also accounts for 94 percent of exports and a similar percent of foreign exchange earnings. Thus, government coffers will be hit harder than GDP, and as a result, public services in oil producers will be constrained, just as these countries scramble to shore up their health and education sectors in response to the virus.

Note: This article was originally published on March 24. It was updated on March 25 to incorporate recent analysis from Global Witness on the status of Congo’s oil find.

Luke Tyburski is a project assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Questions? Tweet them to our experts @ACAfricaCenter.

For more content, go to our Coronavirus: Africa page.

AfricaSource Apr 2, 2020

Coronavirus deals a blow to Ethiopia’s elections

By Bronwyn Bruton

On March 31, the government of Ethiopia indefinitely postponed historic elections that were scheduled to take place in August. This makes Ethiopia the first African nation, in what is likely to be a wave of countries, forced to set back highly contentious political contests in response to the novel coronavirus pandemic, with significant implications for the outcome.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 26, 2020

A rough road ahead for Nigeria

By Aubrey Hruby

Africa’s giant, Nigeria, is awakening to a new economic and social reality as a result of the coronavirus crisis. The country of two hundred million has already recorded over fifty cases and its first COVID-related death. News of high-profile infectees is starting to drive social change and spur calls for stronger government action.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 30, 2020

Coronavirus comes to Sudan

By

Not yet one year into a historic political transition and in the midst of an economic collapse, Sudan’s future was already hanging in the balance. The addition of a national and global public health crisis now has the potential for a ‘make or break’ impact on the country.

Africa Coronavirus

The post Tough times ahead for African oil producers appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While South Africa’s initial spike in COVID-19 cases all involved those who were wealthier and had been traveling, if the virus is not contained and community transmission intensifies, it could pose a very high risk to lower-income communities who rely on public transportation, do not have savings and must continue working, cannot afford hygiene products, live with large households, and reside in informal settlements. As this jump occurs, the spread of the virus will increase rapidly. Indeed, the number of cases in South Africa has skyrocketed from 150 (March 19) to 554 (March 24) in merely five days.

There could be two very different narratives that result from the coronavirus’s spread in South Africa: that of the isolation of wealthy South Africans—more similar to much of the West’s experience—and that of the sheer destructiveness of the virus to lower-income South African communities.

Though in recent weeks some have speculated that youthful African countries may fare relatively well compared to countries with more aged populations such as Italy and the United States, this is not a full picture of the reality of the situation for several African countries. In South Africa especially, despite the large youth population and smaller elderly population, there is a significant percentage of the population who live with chronic, underlying conditions, such as diabetes and respiratory illness, and these people are likely to be at higher risk of severe symptoms, complications, and death if infected by the coronavirus—especially if their underlying illness is not well-managed through regular medical care. Though the risk posed to individuals with HIV is still unknown, there is a particularly high concern among South African public health professionals and doctors that COVID-19 could cause more severe symptoms in the high number of HIV-positive individuals living in the country. Of those with HIV in South Africa, nearly two-and-a-half million do not regularly take anti-retroviral drugs to manage their condition, rendering them more vulnerable to illnesses and infections. Many also live with or are at a higher risk for tuberculosis, which some fear could compound the respiratory effects of COVID-19.

South Africa is one of Africa’s richer nations and has an atypically-strong public health system. But, like the Western nations, it is still vastly underprepared to handle a high caseload of individuals sick with COVID-19. With fewer than one thousand beds to support a population of fifty-six million, South Africa does not have anywhere near enough Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds to respond to a virus reaching high-risk populations and spreading exponentially. If the health system becomes overwhelmed, drastic measures will need to be taken, and individuals who could otherwise be saved may not survive without proper care. Of course, hospital needs unrelated to COVID-19 may also be neglected as hospital staff must quickly decide how to prioritize cases.

Because of the significant risk posed to its population, South African officials have acted quickly and dramatically to respond to the pandemic and attempt to contain its spread. The government has declared a national state of disaster, closed many land ports and schools across the nation, barred entry to citizens of certain high-risk countries and revoked visas, and criminalized the spread of false information about the coronavirus, hoping to prevent the rampant spread of false rumors such as that black people are immune to the virus or that it can be cured using homemade remedies such as garlic. In wealthier areas, drive-in testing sites have been set up and measures are being planned to try and prevent panic-buying and create specific times for the elderly to shop. Testing, treatment, and quarantine for suspected cases are now legally enforced—even resulting in court action against a family who refused to isolate in Gauteng province. South Africa also limited gatherings to one hundred people, and to fifty people at gatherings where alcohol is present. However, despite these efforts, some people continued to attend events such as church services, seeking hope and comfort during these unprecedented and anxious times—though potentially creating more opportunities for the spread of the virus. On March 23, President Cyril Ramaphosa declared a twenty-one day national lockdown to keep residents at home beginning on March 26.

South Africa faces a large threat from the novel coronavirus pandemic and will need to continue to take drastic measures to reduce the spread of the virus and support its economy (a separate, forthcoming blog will examine the likely impacts of COVID-19 on South Africa’s economy). However, South Africa’s poorest are most at risk, and this crisis will likely highlight and deepen divides and resentment between the country’s richest and poorest as two very different experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic take hold in one of the world’s most dramatically unequal countries.

Alyssa Harvie is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @alyssaharvie.   

Questions? Tweet them to our experts @ACAfricaCenter.

For more content, go to our Coronavirus: Africa page.

AfricaSource Mar 30, 2020

Coronavirus comes to Sudan

By

Not yet one year into a historic political transition and in the midst of an economic collapse, Sudan’s future was already hanging in the balance. The addition of a national and global public health crisis now has the potential for a ‘make or break’ impact on the country.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 26, 2020

COVID-19 in the DR Congo

By Private: Pierre Englebert

As of March 24, the Democratic Republic of Congo had only forty-eight confirmed cases of coronavirus, with three dead of the disease. But although Congo is only in the very first stages of the pandemic, the contrast between the degree of state capacity and social discipline that it takes to stifle the disease and Congo’s record on these two counts is particularly worrisome.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Mar 26, 2020

A rough road ahead for Nigeria

By Aubrey Hruby

Africa’s giant, Nigeria, is awakening to a new economic and social reality as a result of the coronavirus crisis. The country of two hundred million has already recorded over fifty cases and its first COVID-related death. News of high-profile infectees is starting to drive social change and spur calls for stronger government action.

Africa Coronavirus

The post COVID-19 pandemic: In a nation of extreme inequality, South Africa’s poorest are most at risk appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In his remarks, Englebert discussed the complexity of Congolese politics and outlined the state of the country’s political alliances, one year after disputed elections brought Félix Tshisekedi to power. Speaking on Tshisekedi’s record, Englebert noted delays on his initial policy promises, but admitted that the bar for progress remains low in Congo’s stagnated political environment. Englebert added that there remains a perception that the new administration lacks a sense of urgency, but that Tshisekedi has actively pursued efforts at legitimation including international travel, elite renewal, and addressing violence in the east.

Referencing other important actors, Englebert outlined how former president Joseph Kabila’s support remains strong in parliament, the security apparatus, and key ministries, but the transition has forced him to adapt to a smaller share of economic rents. Of all the post-election uncertainties, Englebert highlighted the state of the fractious opposition as central, underscoring rival Moïse Katumbi’s continued popularity in contrast to apparent electoral winner Martin Fayulu’s fading support.

Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies and Deputy Director Ms. Bronwyn Bruton moderated the ensuing discussion, during which participants engaged Englebert on the effectiveness of the various sanctions imposed on the Congo, the status of conflict in the east of the country, progress on internal reforms, and the influence of external actors such as Belgium and the United States. 

The post Dr. Pierre Englebert discusses the current political situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Many Congolese as well as Western chanceries chose to overlook this electoral fraud, arguing that the miscarriage of democratic justice was a worthwhile price to pay in exchange for finally ridding the Congo of the Kabila dynasty (Joseph’s father, Laurent, was president before him).  But, one year later, how much of a transition has there actually been?

Not much. By and large, Kabila appears to have remained in charge. His political coalition, the Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC), controls about 340 of 500 seats in the National Assembly, and about ninety of 109 seats in the Senate (though given the fraudulent results of the presidential election, there is no way of knowing whether these numbers represent the will of the voters). The FCC coalition also controls much of the government architecture under Prime Minister Sylvestre Ilunga, and has the loyalty of twenty-two of Congo’s twenty-six provincial executives. Moreover, the nearly ten thousand-strong Republican Guard remains firmly under Kabila’s thumb. The deposed leader continues to travel through Kinshasa with a security entourage that easily rivals that of the actual president. Adding insult to injury, Kabila is still living in the presidential compound on the banks of the Congo river (when he is not on his private Kingakati farm south of Kinshasa).

Yet, uncertainty is a dominant feature of Congolese politics, and while Kabila retains the upper hand for now, this is uncharted territory, and there are some early signs of engine trouble in the Kabila machine:

First, Tshisekedi has, to his very great credit, been successful in liberalizing Congo’s political climate. Opposition parties are back and organizing freely, political prisoners have been freed, and the dreaded Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR) has curtailed its repressive activities.

Second, the FCC coalition is less monolithic than it appears and some of its members have begun showing signs of indiscipline and independence. In particular, the corruption and rapaciousness of the leading coalition member, the Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD), which has served as Kabila’s inner sanctum, has irked other coalition members.

If these intra-party tensions are allowed to fester, Kabila may find it challenging to keep his coalition in order for another four years. For example, in July 2019, Modeste Bahati Lukwebo, the leader of the second largest party of the coalition (the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques du Congo, AFDC) openly rebelled against Kabila when he was not given the Senate’s presidency. For standing against Kabila’s chosen candidate, he was expelled from the FCC. Most of Bahati’s colleagues sided with Kabila, and remained inside the FCC coalition. But with twenty-four different political groups representing 166 parties in the FCC, other fissures are inevitable. For now, Kabila will use his loyal enforcers—like John Numbi, Inspector General of the police—to intimidate would-be defectors. But with so many members, the spoils of party membership are spread thin, and many on the fringes of the FCC might be tempted to look for other alliances. 

It would take time to build a new majority. Tshisekedi’s coalition (called Cap pour le Changement, or CACH) has a mere forty-eight seats in the National Assembly, and Martin Fayulu’s coalition (called Lamuka), has only 103. More than a hundred people would need to fall out of the FCC to claim a majority of the Assembly’s five hundred seats – and an alliance between CACH and Lamuka seems unlikely, given lingering bad blood over the stolen election. Lamuka may, however, not survive the creation of a new party (Ensemble pour la République) by its most powerful member, Moïse Katumbi, in December 2019, probably in pursuit of his own presidential ambitions. Still, while a new majority may be unlikely, any erosion of the FCC’s majority in parliament could send a contagious signal.

Third, though Tshisekedi’s appointees in the government are outnumbered by Kabila’s (CACH has twenty-three ministerial posts while FCC has forty-two), a number of them have been able to carve out a degree of autonomy. Gilbert Kankonde, the Minister of Interior, has defied the FCC over provincial appointments, and Marie Tumba Nzeza, the Foreign Affairs Minister, has managed to dismiss diplomats who had been appointed by Kabila.

Fourth, after considerable earlier difficulties, Tshisekedi has begun to bring in some government revenue, which might help him emancipate Congo’s budget from Kabila’s financial stranglehold. The former president still controls the heads of most state enterprises that are Congo’s cash cows, but in December, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a $368 million emergency line of credit for Congo, lifting a ban on aid in place since 2011, and agreed to work towards a multi-year program by mid-2020. Tshisekedi will need every penny of this money and more if he is to come through with his ambitious 2020 budget which, with about $10 billion in expenditure, is some $5 billion over expected revenue. But it is a start, and more aid to Congo will roll in if Tshisekedi is able to show some positive results.

Fifth, Tshisekedi has succeeded in warming relations with Brussels, Paris and Washington, giving him some useful international support, as well as aid potential, to boost his legitimacy in Congo. Like Kabila at the beginning of his own rule, Tshisekedi has consciously played the international card to strengthen his hand at home, taking no fewer than thirty-one trips out of the country in 2019. And although Tshisekedi has prudently distanced himself from the expanding raft of Western sanctions against the enablers of Kabila’s regime, he has certainly been helped by them.

Finally, while there has been little to no progress at all on the corruption front—with the presidential cabinet itself rocked by allegations of disappearing funds, and the Observatoire de la Dépense Publique (a watchdog NGO) accusing Tshisekedi’s administration of many corrupt practices that recall the former regime— Tshisekedi has begun to selectively enforce some laws against Kabila’s clan. In December, for example, the head of the mining parastatal and of the Federation of Congolese Enterprises, a Kabila loyalist named Albert Yuma, was accused of diverting $200 million in funds. Though it is unlikely that he will truly be held to account, Yuma was prevented from leaving the country and was forced to appear in person before the Court of Appeals in Kinshasa. If he persists with such prosecutions, Tshisekedi may eventually be able to diminish the spoils available to keep Kabila’s political coalition in line.

Least successful so far have been Tshisekedi’s attempts to curb violence in the east, one of his primary campaign promises. The armed forces are actively engaged in battles with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Ituri and taking substantial losses, but so far with little visible progress. Across Ituri and North Kivu, and also in Tanganyika, violence remains widespread and the state largely helpless to protect its citizens.

Overall, while there has clearly not been any regime transition in Congo, there are faint stirrings of change. It is long shot, but it seems that the Western strategy of embracing Tshisekedi in exchange for Kabila’s removal from office may yet – possibly, hopefully – bear some fruit. It remains to be seen whether the West’s disregard for electoral outcomes will critically undermine the future role of elections in consolidating change.

Pierre Englebert is Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the H. Russell Smith Professor of International Relations and professor of Politics at Pomona College.

Further reading

Program Impact Story Apr 4, 2019

Congolese president discusses strategic partnership with the United States

By Atlantic Council

On April 4, the Africa Center hosted H.E. Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo, president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), during his first official visit to the United States. For an audience of senior US policy makers and non-profit representatives, President Tshisekedi discussed his country’s relationship with the United States. In particular, he hoped to […]

Democratic Republic of the Congo Security Partnerships

AfricaSource Dec 19, 2018

Congo’s election sham

By Pierre Englebert and Georges Kasongo Kalumba

The Congo government’s spurious disqualification of popular opposition candidates and the regime’s increasingly desperate attempts to prevent those remaining from campaigning demonstrate that Kabila not only intends to turn Congo’s elections into a sham.

Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo

AfricaSource Jul 16, 2018

Below the surface, a game changer in Congolese politics

By Pierre Englebert

“Shikata,” or “remain seated” in Swahili, claim the posters on Congolese President Joseph Kabila’s effigy in the streets of Lubumbashi. But while everyone’s attention is focused on the regime’s contortions to stay in power, despite constitutional impediments to doing so and deep domestic discontent, the 2015 break-up of Congo’s existing provinces has upended politics below […]

Africa Corruption

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The post Tyburski in Foreign Policy: Malawi’s election was not stolen with white-out appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the campaign trail for the nation-wide elections scheduled for October 15^th, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi stated that his government would be open to dialogue with members of the insurgent group. Viewed alongside the government’s multiple and recent agreements with Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), the main opposition political party in Mozambique, it seems likely that this assertion is more than an empty campaign promise. Yet with an insurgency that has no identified leadership and elections that may bring forth additional violence, how the government will address the insurgency going forward remains unclear.   

Roots of the Insurgency

The group carrying out attacks in the majority-Muslim Cabo Delgado province is called al Sunna wa Jummah (ASWJ). Despite being referred to as “al-Shabaab” by locals, there are no visible links between the group and the Somali organizations of the same names. At the outset of ASWJ’s first attack against the village of Mocímboa da Praia in October 2017, little was known about its leadership or agenda. Since then, no individual has emerged as a figurehead or spokesperson for the group, nor have any specific demands been made.

ASWJ’s tactics often take the form of grisly beheadings, and thus appear to be heavily influenced by extremist groups such as the Islamic State. In June, the Islamic State for the first time claimed responsibility for an attack against Mozambican security forces in Cabo Delgado, while in August, the group claimed responsibility for two ASWJ attacks against civilians. Though the Islamic State has taken credit for these attacks apparently perpetrated by ASWJ, it remains unclear what amount of support the Islamic State is providing to the insurgents. Many experts believe that claiming responsibility for attacks carried out in Mozambique, even if by an unaffiliated group, is a low-risk way for the Islamic State to project power now that it has lost control of most of its territory in the Middle East. Nonetheless, given the lack of available information, connections between the Islamic State and ASWJ cannot be ruled out.

A study on the insurgency published by the Mozambican Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos in September 2019 identified poverty, unemployment, and low levels of education as the primary forces driving young men to join ASWJ. The authors of the study interviewed a local resident, who said (translated from Portuguese) of the local economic situation that “Mocímboa da Praia has become a district abandoned by successive FRELIMO governments” where young people “live by begging for alms or working in the informal market.” According to the local source, attempts by residents to petition the government for improved economic opportunities have been dismissed and met with claims by the government that the residents are members of RENAMO.

Faced with few employment opportunities and living in desperate conditions, young people are drawn to ASWJ as a means of satisfying their basic economic and social needs, the authors of the study concluded.

Response by the Mozambican Government

The response by the Mozambican government to the attacks has been largely heavy-handed. After the first attacks in October 2017, security forces imposed a lockdown in the area, closed mosques, and engaged in arbitrary detentions. Groups such as Human Rights Watch have alleged that since at least August 2018, security forces have engaged in arbitrary arrests, torture, and summary executions of people suspected of being members of the insurgent group.

The government has also responded to the crisis through media censorship and suppression. Since June 2018, the government has barred various media organizations and correspondents from visiting Cabo Delgado, while the army and police have detained or arrested journalists who managed to travel there. This has contributed to both an unwillingness on the part of Mozambicans to openly discuss the insurgency as well as the general lack of information about it. 

Such brutal tactics on the part of the government and security services risk further alienating a population that already feels abandoned by the government in Maputo. They also do not appear to be particularly effective, with the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project reporting twenty-three attacks by ASWJ in in the period from September 1 through October 9 of 2019 alone.

A History of Dialogue with RENAMO

The ASWJ insurgency should be seen in the context of the Mozambican government’s interactions with the RENAMO opposition party. FRELIMO and RENAMO fought a bloody fifteen-year civil war that ended with a peace agreement in 1992. Nonetheless, hostilities have sporadically continued as FRELIMO candidates have won every subsequent presidential election and RENAMO has continued to feel shut-out of the political system.

A ceasefire agreement was signed between the two parties in August 2014 after more than a year of attacks by RENAMO forces operating out of their base in the remote wilderness of the central Sofala Province. Nonetheless, RENAMO contested the results of that year’s elections, and reinitiated hostilities that resulted in a third peace agreement between the parties, signed in August 2019, in which RENAMO promised to end military hostilities and work towards a peaceful election. In negotiating this most recent peace agreement, President Nyusi repeatedly travelled to RENAMO headquarters in order to speak with the late Afonso Dhlakama, the former leader of RENAMO.

During a September 15^th campaign rally in Cabo Delgado, President Nyusi, a native of the province, admitted for the first time that the government would be open to dialogue with ASWJ – on the condition that members reveal themselves. While campaign promises are a long way from actionable policy, this statement should be taken seriously when evaluated alongside FRELIMO’s demonstrated commitment to engaging in dialogue with RENAMO.

The Unclear Path Forward with ASWJ

How the Mozambican government engages with ASWJ going forward will depend on the insurgency’s leadership revealing itself as well as the outcome of the election. In past dialogue with RENAMO, there has been a leader and a leadership structure with which Nyusi, or the other FRELIMO chief executive, could engage. With no apparent leader after two years, it remains to be seen whether ASWJ will be a partner for the dialogue that Nyusi appears open to. And if dialogue is unlikely with no identified ASWJ leadership, it remains to be seen whether the cycle of repressive government tactics and further ASWJ attacks will be broken.

The elections scheduled for October 15^th will also be a critical factor in determining how the government responds to the crisis. Nyusi is widely expected to win reelection. Yet the results, with Nyusi on the ballot for FRELIMO and Ossufo Momade on the ballot for RENAMO, are expected to be close. Pre-election violence has already occurred, with attacks against supporters and officials of both major political parties being reported. On October 7^th, a leading civil society election observer, Anastacio Matavel, was shot and killed as he was leaving an election training session in the southern Gaza Province.

Cracks also appear to be emerging within RENAMO, with an internal faction refusing to accept Momade’s leadership and continuing to carry out attacks leading up to the election. Should Nyusi win a close election as anticipated, it seems unlikely that the peace agreement with RENAMO will hold, given that tensions are already running high, that RENAMO leadership is currently unable to control all its members, and that previous close elections have driven RENAMO to violence.

Mozambique was hit by two devastating cyclones earlier in 2019 that have left the country budgetarily stretched thin. In the event of post-election violence, the government will likely have to commit a significant amount of security forces to stem the tide of violence. The amount of funds and forces that the government will be able to commit to combating ASWJ will therefore be affected by severity of RENAMO’s post-election violence.

Challenges Ahead

The violent insurgency that has cost over three hundred Mozambicans their lives, and many more their homes and possessions as ASWJ has burned entire villages to the ground, is a grave threat to the citizens of Cabo Delgado. Dialogue with ASWJ seems unlikely despite the government’s willingness to engage in it, and a contentious election environment has left Mozambique primed for post-election violence that could divert government resources from combatting ASWJ. Whichever way the government proceeds, it seems unlikely that a long-term solution to the ASWJ insurgency will be feasible without a concerted effort to simultaneously address the poverty and economic conditions underlying the insurgency in the first place.

James Rogers is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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On Monday, August 19, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center hosted a public discussion with Angolan Foreign Minister H.E. Manuel Domingos Augusto.

Atlantic Council Vice President and Africa Center Director Dr. J. Peter Pham opened the event by welcoming the Minister back to the Council for his second visit since 2017. US-Angola Chamber of Commerce President and CEO Ms. Maria da Cruz then introduced the Minister.

In his remarks, Augusto outlined Angola’s reform agenda under the leadership of President João Lourenço. He emphasized that increasing investment from US entities is a priority of the new National Development Plan (2018-2022), along with expanding domestic production capacities and diversifying the economy. Augusto also underscored his desire to strengthen Angola’s existing strategic partnership agreement with the United States across all fields, with emphasis on the commercial relationship between the two countries. He called attention to efforts undertaken by the Lourenço Administration to increase transparency, develop infrastructure, and enact new legislation to quell investor concerns, encouraging audience members to look to the future of Angola with optimism.

Following the Minister’s remarks, Africa Center Senior Fellow Ms. Aubrey Hruby moderated a discussion with Augusto, US Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary Amb. Matthew T. Harrington, and GE Executive Director of Global Government Affairs and Policy Mr. Del Renigar. Renigar discussed Angola’s reforms through a private sector lens, highlighting recent improvements in visa processing, banking, and the forex market. Harrington spoke on the US-Angola Strategic Dialogue and welcomed Angola’s leadership role in addressing regional security matters such as the recent border dispute between Rwanda and Uganda, which is expected to be resolved with the signing of an accord this Wednesday in Luanda. Augusto used the conversation to underscore that Angola is no longer a country of conflict but rather a land of opportunity, with upside for small and medium-sized enterprises in addition to larger corporations.

An interactive question and answer period followed, during which the audience engaged panelists on a variety of issues, including drought management, regional economic disparities, education policy, and the ease of doing business in Angola.

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On its face, the imagery of an election stolen by white-out is certainly compelling. One imagines election officials using white-out to downgrade the opposition’s vote totals in favor of the incumbent. Yet, upon a review of forms from almost 20 percent of Malawi’s 5,002 polling stations, the use of white-out appears to be more mundane. Of 894 forms carefully reviewed, 142 included white-out (16 percent) but only 18 (2 percent) implicated the votes of the major candidates. Shown in Figure 1 below is a more representative example of a whited-out results sheet: most of the white-out is concentrated away from candidates’ votes or merely revises trailing digits. Many other forms have even less white-out, changing just a few inconsequential digits.  

As you can see, the results sheet is broken into two main parts: an accounting section at the top and the candidates’ vote totals on the bottom. In a random sample of 346 forms, choosing to look at one ward from each of the country’s 28 districts, 66.7 percent of all white-out cases (51 in total) were limited to the top of the form. The votes would have been counted one by one under careful party agent and observer scrutiny, but the accounting section required calculations and may have been less familiar to polling staff. Thus, a concentration of mistakes on the top of the form is reasonable and cannot be readily ascribed to fraud.

When looking at instances of cross outs in pen instead (totaling 179 forms), a comparable 61.5 percent implicated just the top of the form. Figure 2 shows that the distributions across the form are quite similar between white-out and cross outs, suggesting the two may have been functional substitutes. The opposition has not complained about cross outs, to the author’s knowledge, and their appearance to varying degrees on about half of all forms points more to normal human error or functional deficiencies in training than widespread fraud.

Further, there is no obvious regional trend or concentration in white-out use. Notably, data from the districts the opposition has called for recounts in (ten in total) do not appear divergent or anomalous. In fact, within the random sample studied, the prevalence of both white-out and cross outs is marginally higher in the districts not singled out for recount. For additional verification, the author undertook a comprehensive review of each results sheet from four recount districts, two in the north and two in the south. Again, similar summary statistics were returned, allaying concerns that the random sampling failed to pick up clusters of fraud. Finally, it is noteworthy that white-out and cross outs show up as well in the parliamentary and local government results sheets from the same day. This undermines any notion that white-out was targeted only at the presidential results, despite the fact that the court case only implicates the presidential polls.

This analysis is intended not as a validation of Malawi’s election but to shed some light on what the use of white-out in the polls truly suggests. At the very least, it should be clear that white-out is not the sensational smoking gun the opposition and others have implied it to be. Still, a full audit is merited to resolve complaints and to verify that the election commission’s data releases are legitimate. In this context, the opposition should be applauded for pursuing legal channels of dispute, and it is positive that the judiciary has taken the allegations seriously. Above all, a lesson from Malawi is the power and potential of access to transparent data for election administration and monitoring. Data-driven analysis should become the norm and not the exception.

Luke Tyburski is a project assistant with the Africa Center. Follow him on Twitter @TyburskiLuke.

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Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies and Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton introduced Hruby’s paper and welcomed participants.

Hruby summarized the changing nature of Chinese financing in Africa, contrasting the well-documented government-to-government lending model with China’s growing incursions into private equity, venture capital, and other investment mechanisms. She also highlighted many of the gains Chinese companies have made in telecommunications, security technology, and media sectors, advising US investors and policy makers to look beyond China’s traditional dominance in infrastructure to new priority areas. Hruby asserted that the United States must build out its commercial strategy toward Africa, using new tools such as the US International Development Finance Corporation to maintain the upper hand in areas of comparative advantage.

An interactive debate followed during which participants discussed the most effective ways to break down persistent barriers to trade in sub-Saharan Africa through new programs such as the Prosper Africa initiative, and the potential of the new African Continental Free Trade Agreement to facilitate American investment on the continent, particularly by small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Among those in attendance were H.E. Seydou Kaboré, ambassador to the United States of Burkina Faso; H.E. Mahamadou Nimaga, ambassador to the United States of the Republic of Mali; representatives from key US government agencies including the US Department of Commerce, US Department of State, US Department of the Treasury, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Office of the US Trade Representative, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and US Agency for International Development; and members of the intelligence community as well as private equity and advisory firms working in African markets.

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On Tuesday, June 18, the Africa Center hosted a public event on the state of democracy in Africa, occasioned by the launch of the new book Democracy Works: Rewiring Politics to Africa’s Advantage by Brenthurst Foundation Director Dr. Greg Mills, former Zimbabwean Minister of Finance Mr. Tendai Biti, Dr. Jeffrey Herbst, and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo.

Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Cameron Hudson welcomed guests and introduced Mills and Biti, who presented the book.

Mills laid out various challenges to African democracy and argued that the continent’s rapid demographic growth “demands an end to business as usual.” He stressed that democratic governments have historically performed better than their authoritarian counterparts in promoting development, noting that societal openness generally corresponds to lower volatility and higher economic growth. Mills acknowledged that exceptions do exist but maintained that the often-highlighted cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Singapore are not sufficiently prescriptive or replicable in other African states. Commenting on international aid for democracy and governance promotion in Africa, he purported that although international engagement is not a silver bullet, targeted external assistance can make a difference. 

Expounding upon Mills’ remarks, Biti highlighted the threats posed to democracy around the world by burgeoning populist and nationalist movements, as well as the spread of international terrorism. He critiqued the narrative that elections equate to democracy, emphasizing the equal importance of civil and political rights and holding leaders to account. Biti further highlighted strong institutions, constitutionalism, an empowered citizenry, and a free market as critical democratic guideposts. He concluded that democratic progress should not necessarily be measured on election days, but rather during the periods in between.

In the ensuing discussion moderated by Hudson, panelists discussed the best ways for regional and international organizations to approach democracy promotion, the decline in international laws and norms, and the effects of the youth bulge on democratic demands on governments. Members of the audience also engaged the panel on the impact of urbanization, diaspora groups, and migration on the future of democracy in Africa.  

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With that partner, he won an insider’s influence over the strategically placed Central African Republic (CAR) and priority access to its oil, diamonds, gold and uranium resources. At least that’s how one US government official, with years of experience tracking such matters, explains this bargain basement price of geopolitical cunning.

The story goes that President Faustin-Archange Touadera, though elected fairly in 2016, was struggling to exert control over much of the nation’s territory. Soldiers from a United Nations peacekeeping mission were working to stabilize the country amid clashes between rival militias, but inadequately.

That’s when Prigozhin, nicknamed “Putin’s chef” for his catering business, stepped forward with money, training, paramilitary support and other survival help. (That’s the same Prigozhin indicted by Robert Mueller for funding a social media troll factory to influence the 2016 US presidential election.)  Russia also provided CAR’s president his national security advisor, Russian intelligence agent Valery Zakahrov, who serves him to this day.

Welcome to our new era of major power competition, which is playing out globally, sometimes quietly and sometimes this colorfully. What the CAR story provides is yet further evidence that America’s autocratic rivals, both Russia and China, are acting with greater operational creativity and strategic purpose than their counterparts – in this case France and the United States.

In the Central African Republic, Washington had discarded this resource-rich country, poised strategically between Africa’s Muslim north and Christian south, as a place of marginal importance. US officials are now scrambling to frame a response.

Ensuring his escalating African efforts aren’t missed, Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi will convene 50 African leaders at the first-ever Russian-African Summit in Sochi this October. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, a frequent traveler to Africa, says its purpose will be to cement “Russia’s active presence in the region.”

When Moscow sees a vacuum in Africa left by Europe or the United States, it increasingly steps in with trade and business agreements, military sales and cooperation, and political and paramilitary support. What it lacks in China’s means it makes up for with muscle. Putin’s efforts sometimes fail: Russia bet on the wrong horse in Sudan and paid handsomely for a nuclear energy contract in South Africa that looks less likely now that Jacob Zuma has left power.

Russia’s successes, however, are more frequent. And both Russia and China see themselves involved in a long game for position and influence on an African continent that by 2050 will have 25% of the world’s working age population and the greatest store of rare earth materials outside of China. What’s more, its 54 countries make up the most important voting bloc in the United Nations, providing both China and Russia the wherewithal to block Western initiatives.

Though the story of China’s increased influence in Africa is well-known, the competing Russian version has only recently gained more attention.

The Guardian this week, reporting from documents leaked to the Mikhail Khodorkovsky funded Dossier Center, reports that Russia is seeking to bolster its presence in at least 13 African countries – having already signed military deals in 20 states – “by building relations with existing rulers, striking military deals, and grooming a new generation of ‘leaders’ and undercover ‘agents.’”

The documents include a map that assesses the level of cooperation between Prigozhin’s “company” and individual African countries, scoring them at between one to five points on matters of cooperation that include military, political, economic, police training, media and humanitarian projects.

This Russian activity hasn’t gone without notice in Washington. Last December, National Security Advisor John Bolton, in a speech to the Heritage Foundation, laid out what he called “the Trump administration’s new Africa strategy.”

“In short,” said Bolton, “the predatory practices pursued by China and Russia stunt economic growth in Africa; threaten the financial independence of African nations; inhibit opportunities for U.S. investment; interfere with U.S. military operations and pose a significant threat to U.S. national security interests.”

He outlined a three-part response, which included advancing trade and commercial ties, countering radical Islamist terrorism and violent conflict, and ensuring US aid dollars are more effectively deployed.

The United States, however, is playing catch-up and lacks not only the bandwidth but also the focus. It also hasn’t yet fully absorbed the requirements of this new, global struggle for influence, one where the costs of losing may not be apparent until it’s become a fait accompli.

One of the earliest experts to spot this Russian shift of attention to Africa was J. Peter Pham, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Pham isn’t ready to predict a return to the Cold War’s zero-sum competition in Africa, but he does believe the United States and Europe “no longer can ignore Moscow’s resurgent interest” and its reconstituting of a strategic web of access.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War tracks several lines of Russian effort: military basing, security cooperation, capturing the emerging nuclear energy market, gaining access to natural resources, leveraging private military contractors and growing agricultural export markets for its wheat.

One of the most telling recent efforts, reported in a BBC documentary earlier this year, involved a Russian campaign to influence presidential elections in Madagascar. According to the BBC, the Russians worked with six of the 35 presidential candidates. Candidates who received Russian money told the BBC they were instructed to back off and support the front-runner, who Russia was also backing, when it became apparent he would win.

Yet tracking these sorts of Russian activities in Africa can be a perilous game. Last July, three Russian journalists investigating Prigozhin’s paramilitary involvement in CAR were shot dead outside the capital city.

Russia’s price for acquiring influence in the Central African Republic might have been a small one. The price for the United States and Africans alike of neglecting this Russian shift may be far higher.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com. 

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe. Subscribe to his weekly InflectionPoints newsletter. 

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This event was part of the Africa Center’s Congo on the Edge initiative.

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On Wednesday, May 22, the Africa Center partnered with The Sentry at the Enough Project to host a discussion on illicit finance operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), occasioned by the release of the group’s new report: Covert Capital: The Kabila Family’s Secret Investment Bank.

Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, Africa Center director of programs and studies and deputy director, welcomed attendees, and Mr. John Dell’Osso, senior investigator at The Sentry, presented the report.

In his remarks, Dell’Osso detailed the report’s finding that family members and associates of former President Joseph Kabila used a little-known investment firm called Kwanza Capital to attempt to acquire Congolese banks. He described the firm as a vehicle the Kabila family apparently used to launder misappropriated public funds and gain greater leverage over the DRC’s $5 billion banking industry. Though Kwanza Capital’s multiple efforts to wrest control of Congolese banks ultimately failed, Dell’Osso detailed the firm’s systematic attempts to influence the financial sector on behalf of Kabila and his inner circle and offered numerous recommendations to the Congolese, US, and European governments.

After recognizing the report’s importance to combatting corruption in the DRC, Amb. Rama Yade, Africa Center senior fellow, moderated a discussion featuring Dell’Osso, Ms. Lakshmi Kumar, policy director at Global Financial Integrity, and Mr. Mvemba Dizolele, senior advisor at the International Republican Institute.

Kumar praised the report for demonstrating the increased risks when politically exposed persons—those individuals wielding the levers of state power—seek to  gain control over a country’s financial system. In line with The Sentry’s recommendations, she discussed numerous guidelines and enforcement mechanisms to weed out illicit finance and protect the international financial system against money-laundering, highlighting US leadership in these efforts.

Dizolele provided a wider context to the discussion, noting that corrupt activities in the banking sector extend into other industries such as mining. He expressed hope that the international community will assist President Félix Tshisekedi’s fight against corruption by supporting civil society and regulators to flush out bad actors. In particular, he highlighted the sanctioning of Israeli tycoon Dan Gertler for his corrupt mining and oil dealings in the DRC as a particularly effective measure that sent ripples through Congolese society.

In the ensuing discussion, members of the audience engaged the panel on the effectiveness of targeted sanctions on individuals and how to best support Congolese regulators, and civil society improve accountability in the DRC’s government and financial sector.

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Illicit cigarettes have long been associated with conflict, terrorism financing, and organized crime. Yet the flourishing illicit tobacco market in South Africa speaks to a less sensational but equally destabilizing set of risks. At the core of this challenge is the state’s ability to provide effective regulation of an industry that is vulnerable to gray and black markets. As is true in South Africa, many countries around the world must provide this regulation in the midst of high levels of official corruption and a history of accommodating powerful private sector actors rather than bringing them to account. As such the challenge is bound up with the state’s ability to regulate legal markets, not just eradicate illegal ones.

The case study presented in my Atlantic Council working paper on the illicit tobacco trade shows how failures in the South African state from 2013 to 2018 led to an explosion in this activity.

Illicit cigarette trade began to pick up in South Africa around 2002 at a time when there was a rise in the presence of counterfeit products on the market and cross-border smuggling from Zimbabwe. But it wasn’t until 2006, when the modus operandi switched from cross-border smuggling to under-declaration, that the illicit cigarette trade started to flourish. At this point a core group of small tobacco companies set themselves up in competition with big multinational tobacco companies. Some of these independent producers set up factories that employed numerous methods to evade paying taxes on their products: they operated undeclared double shifts, ran their machines at night, and/or hid the true scale of their production by paying off customs officials and using fraudulent paperwork.

As this illicit industry picked up, profits escalated, making the beneficiaries more visible to law enforcement. But in a context conducive to corruption, it also gave them power to buy political protection. Both the South African Revenue Service and the South African police set up dedicated teams to tackle the problem. However, the police’s task team worked closely with individuals linked to Big Tobacco to undertake their investigation, which compromised the effort.

Many people with whom I spoke for this study attributed the considerable influence Big Tobacco has in South Africa to its position as a substantial taxpayer; a sophisticated public relations and lobby presence, funded by corporate coffers; and the private resources that these companies have invested into investigating others in the trade. There is evidence that these private resources have included corporate espionage and money laundering.  The close relationship Big Tobacco had with the police task team may have deflected attention away from their own operations.

In 2014, the South African Revenue Service’s investigations into several illicit trade and financial flow cases collided with corrupt interests and exploded in an ugly scandal involving the small and multinational tobacco companies it had been investigating. Eventually, the South African Revenue Service was restructured, seemingly to protect the interests of political figures, decimating its capacity to investigate the illicit economy. The restructuring also diminished the state’s ability to reign in corporate misbehavior, hampering the investigation of complex illicit financial flows.

This had a terrible knock-on effect for the fight against the illicit economy. A recent Commission of Inquiry into concerns about the decline in the integrity of the South African Revenue Service revealed that, through the restructuring, tremendous damage was done to “the benefit of delinquent taxpayers and the disadvantage of major taxpayers who try to comply.” The tobacco sector was held up as primary example of this problem. “Measures to counter criminality were rendered ineffective,” concluded retired Judge Robert Nugent, “and those who trade illicitly in commodities like cigarettes operate with little constraint.”

There were also consequences for the shadow economy. Before it was restructured, the South African Revenue Service provided imperfect but perceptible enforcement through its investigations and raids. When these declined, it led to unrestrained competition between tobacco smugglers, which fueled tensions between the various players. This tension has been linked to assassinations (successful and failed) and acts of vandalism. Cigarettes have also emerged as a preferred currency in the underworld as their ease of distribution in cash-based markets makes them ideal for money laundering.

While this situation may seem rather bleak there are now signs of a recovery in South Africa. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has pledged to root out corruption. On his watch, protection for players in the tobacco industry has declined and some areas of law enforcement have begun to regain strength. South African Revenue Service disputes with tobacco companies (both small and large), which were mothballed during the administration of Ramaphosa’s predecessor, Jacob Zuma, have been dusted off, and steps have been taken toward litigation and asset seizure.

There is now in South Africa a promising environment for tackling the illicit tobacco trade. Several government departments are acting to curb this illicit trade and reduce smoking-related diseases. There are also a range of non-state actors — from academics providing impartial evidence on the prospects and effects of policies to groups advocating for marginalized constituents and journalists investigating criminal offenders — that can contribute to the response.

A democratic framework has the potential to hold people committing criminal acts to account. There are also key policy and technological interventions, such as track-and-trace technologies, which could reduce the difficulties the state faces with regards to detection and monitoring. The trick lies in implementing an impartial response across the industry with a broad definition of illicit financial flows that captures criminal behavior by small and big players.

It is crucial South Africa gets the regulatory balance right and serves as a positive role model for the region.

Simone Haysom is a senior analyst at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Follow her on Twitter @simonehaysom.

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Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies and Deputy Director Ms. Bronwyn Bruton welcomed guests and highlighted the event’s timeliness given President Félix Tshisekedi’s recent visit to Washington, DC and the Atlantic Council.

In his remarks, Dr. Englebert presented his and Jené’s research on local Congolese politics and the implications of the 2015 découpage policy that split the DRC’s eleven provinces into twenty-six regions. He argued that instead of bolstering local power outside the nexus of corrupt elites in Kinshasa, découpage’s disingenuous implementation reinforced patronage networks, upset longstanding state-society relations, and institutionalized ethnic tensions and grievances in Congo’s provinces.

In the ensuing discussion moderated by Bruton, Englebert and Jené discussed the status of Congolese politics following a flawed election last December that saw Félix Tshisekedi attain the presidency. They noted that despite Tshisekedi’s victory, ex-President Joseph Kabila’s Common Front for Congo party maintains a strong hold on the National Assembly and recently won many of the new provincial governorships. They warned that as long as Kabila loyalists retained these institutional powers, the proposed coalition government between Tshisekedi and Kabila would be largely aspirational. Englebert predicted that Tshisekedi would be on a collision course with Kabila should he pursue an ambitious reform agenda.

Among those in attendance and participating in the discussion were Ambassador Herman Cohen, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs; Ambassador Lange Schermerhorn, former US ambassador to the Republic of Djibouti; and Dr. Vivian Lowery Derryck, former assistant administrator for Africa of the US Agency for International Development.

Please see Englebert and Jené’s research:

• Tangled! Congolese Provincial Elites in a Web of Patronage
• Where Does State Capacity Come From? Conjectures from DRC’s New Provinces
• Provincial Tribalization: The Transformation of Ethnic Representation Under Decentralization in the DR Congo

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“It is easy to see how the defeat of Daesh, the Islamic State, in Syria and Iraq could lead to a situation where these groups are now going to come into Africa and take advantage of the pervasive poverty and also the situation of chaos that we have, for example, in Beni and Butembo, to set up their caliphate,” Tshisekedi said, referring to cities in northeastern DRC which have been gripped by deadly violence.

He blamed the violence in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on “local and foreign” armed groups.

Tshisekedi cited recent military intelligence that he said points to an “Islamic threat” stemming from the ADF, a Ugandan-led militant group based in the DRC.

In November 2018, the US Embassy in Kinshasa closed after receiving intelligence that an ISIS-linked group could carry out attacks against US interests in the DRC. The embassy reopened in December.

In March, US-backed forces in Syria declared victory over ISIS. Days earlier, US President Donald J. Trump declared ISIS would be “gone by tonight.”

Tshisekedi committed the DRC to the global war on terrorism. He said that in his meetings in Washington he has sought military cooperation with the United States to help equip the Congolese army and improve its intelligence capabilities. Such support, he maintained, was also essential to facilitating regional cooperation to address the threat posed by terrorism.

In eastern DRC, deadly violence by militias and Congolese security forces has made it difficult for health workers to treat the worst outbreak of Ebola in the history of the country. Attacks on treatment centers have compelled some international groups to suspend operations.

Since the outbreak of Ebola was detected in August 2018 there have been 993 confirmed and probable cases and 621 deaths in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, according to the World Health Organization (WHO).

Tshisekedi said the prevalence of Ebola was “even more reason why we need the support of our partners, in particular the United States.”

J. Peter Pham, the US special envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, said that in his meeting with Tshisekedi he had discussed the Congolese leader’s commitment to address the Ebola crisis, but also to fight corruption, advance human rights, ensure regional peace and security, and enhance the economic relationship between the United States and the DRC.

Tshisekedi has promised to fight corruption and open up the political space in the country. In March, he pardoned around 700 political prisoners jailed under his predecessor, Joseph Kabila.

Pham, who is also the vice president for research and regional initiatives and director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, said it was “very gratifying” to see the decree Tshisekedi signed on the release of prisoners. Pham also asked Tshisekedi about the return of exiles, acknowledging that the Congolese government had returned opposition figure Moïse Katumbi’s passport.

Tshisekedi, who spoke in French through a translator, said he is also seeking US assistance to “re-establish” the Congolese government, which he said would help ensure rule of law, a strong judicial system, and improve the business climate in the DRC.

“What we’re seeking is a new type of cooperation based on a win-win situation —  a partnership that will be beneficial for both of our countries,” Tshisekedi said.

Tshisekedi’s father, Étienne, was the founder of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, the oldest and largest opposition party of the DRC. Felix took over the party following his father’s death in 2017.

Tshisekedi was sworn in as the president of the DRC on January 24. His inauguration marked the first peaceful transition of power in the history of the DRC and the end of his predecessor Kabila’s term, which lasted eighteen years.

Tshisekedi and Kabila have since agreed to form a coalition government. Tshisekedi was unable to win enough seats in parliament, where Kabila’s Common Front for Congo (FCC), a coalition of several parties, holds an absolute majority.

The December 30, 2018, election, however, was mired in controversy. Martin Fayulu, the leader of the Engagement for Citizenship and Development party, was widely expected to win the election by a huge margin. An observer mission from the DRC’s highly respected Catholic Church’s bishops conference (CENCO) said its partial tallies showed Fayulu winning.

But the DRC’s Independent National Election Commission (CENI) was quick to announce Tshisekedi’s victory citing provisional results.

Following his surprise defeat, Fayulu launched a legal bid for a recount of the votes and proclaimed himself “the only legitimate president.” The Constitutional Court rejected his appeal because he presented no evidence to the tribunal to back his claims and declared Tshisekedi the winner.

After the decision by the Constitutional Court, the US State Department welcomed the first peaceful and democratic transfer of power in the DRC. While the elections represented the will of the Congolese people for a change of regime after eighteen years of rule by Kabila, concerns over the conduct and transparency of the electoral process remained.

On February 22, senior DRC officials, including CENI President Corneille Nangaa, were publicly designated by the State Department for engaging in corruption and undermining the democratic process, by conduct dating back to 2016. The officials, five of whom were identified while the names of others were withheld, were banned from receiving US visas. In a statement from Kinshasa, a senior State Department official indicated that the punitive measures were targeted against specific malign actors, and “supported President Tshisekedi’s commitment to root out corruption, advance human rights, and strengthen the DRC’s democracy.” These public designations were quickly followed by targeted financial sanctions against these individuals by the US Treasury Department on March 21.

Tshisekedi met US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the State Department on April 3. State Department Deputy Spokesperson Robert Palladino said Pompeo “stressed that the United States will continue to promote accountability to advance reform in the DRC.”

Ashish Kumar Sen is deputy director of communications, editorial, at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @AshishSen.

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For an audience of senior US policy makers and non-profit representatives, President Tshisekedi discussed his country’s relationship with the United States. In particular, he hoped to form a strategic partnership with the United States that would promote peace and security, the rule of law, and economic development in the DRC. He also sought US assistance to fight the emerging threat posed by ISIS in his country. Participants had the opportunity to engage the new president on the conditions of his election and his ability to enact his ambitious reform agenda.

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Atlantic Council Vice President and Africa Center Director Dr. J. Peter Pham, who concurrently serves as US special envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, introduced the President and welcomed participants.

In his remarks, President Tshisekedi outlined his hopes to establish a strategic partnership with the United States, building off the strong relationship the two countries have enjoyed for decades and focusing on peace and security, the rule of law, and economic development.

President Tshisekedi, who was inaugurated on January 24, 2019, in the first-ever peaceful transition of power in the history of the DRC, seemed optimistic that the United States would deepen its security cooperation with his country, providing training and equipment to Congolese security and intelligence services to combat the plethora of armed groups and bad actors operating in eastern and northern DRC, singling out Islamic State efforts to establish a cell in the heart of Africa and the growing threat posed by the armed militants of the Allied Democratic Forces, who have been linked to foreign Islamist elements.

The President further expressed hope that his government could count on continued US support as he works to bring stability to the DRC, build stable institutions, and ultimately establish the rule of law. He finally underscored his country’s economic potential and his intentions to create a business-friendly environment and appeal to US investors, particularly in the energy, mining, and agriculture sectors.

A discussion, moderated by Pham, followed the President’s remarks, during which participants engaged the President on his recent electoral victory, his proposed reform agenda, and his plans to combat corruption and human rights abuses.

Among those in attendance were Amb. Michael A. Hammer, US ambassador to the DRC; Ms. Elizabeth Fitzsimmons, deputy assistant secretary of state for Central Africa and public diplomacy; Amb. Paul Wolfowitz, former deputy secretary of defense and president of the World Bank; Amb. Johnnie Carson, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs; and Ms. Constance Berry Newman, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs and Atlantic Council Africa Center senior fellow; as well as representatives from think tanks as well as human rights and humanitarian organizations.

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Focusing on Zimbabwe’s short-term stabilization plan, Ncube presented the progress made on key economic reforms since he was appointed to the finance ministry by President Emmerson Mnangagwa in September 2018. In particular, he highlighted efforts to impose fiscal discipline on the government, which he claimed has reversed a budget deficit that reached 11 percent in 2018. He also discussed monetary sector reforms, including the recent managed float of the Zimbabwean bond note, which was previously pegged one-to-one with the US dollar. Ncube asserted that although inflation would rise in the short term, this measure would ultimately reduce it by November and thus provide relief for Zimbabweans affected by high prices for basic goods.

Ncube also outlined President Mnangagwa’s vision for political reforms in Zimbabwe, including the repeal of controversial legislation such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, which restricts the freedom of the press. Ncube also discussed efforts to streamline regulations for foreign investment; the ongoing negotiations to compensate farmers for land seized under the 2000 Fast-Track Land Reform Program; and his hope that Mnangagwa’s ambitious reform agenda could lead to the repeal of ZIDERA legislation by the US Congress, which has restricted Zimbabwe’s access to international credit.

A discussion, moderated by Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, director of programs and studies and deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, followed Ncube’s remarks. Participants focused on the negative effects of recent reforms on average Zimbabweans, potential new areas for investment in Zimbabwe, and the government’s efforts to clear its arrears with international finance institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Those in attendance and participating in the discussion included LTG William Ward, USA (Ret.), former commander of US Africa Command; Amb. John Campbell, former US Ambassador to Nigeria; and a number of US and non-US government officials and business leaders.

The post Zimbabwe’s finance minister discusses reform agenda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This groundbreaking study of the illicit tobacco trade in southern Africa explores how this trade supports organized crime, helps enable official corruption, and erodes state structures. A major feature of South Africa’s, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe’s, political economy revolves around conflict—overt and covert, violent and non-violent—over who makes the most money from the illicit tobacco trade, who controls that trade, and how the state responds to it. This conflict now takes places in the midst of huge political transitions within the ruling parties of both countries.

The study maps the key dimensions of the illicit cigarette trade in Zimbabwe and South Africa, including the key actors, the pathways of trade and the accompanying ‘modalities’ of criminality, as well as other important dimensions of the illicit cigarette market in southern Africa. It identifies “good-faith actors,” primarily in South Africa, whose positions could be strengthened by policy and technical interventions, explores opportunities for such intervention, and assesses the practical solutions that can be applied to combat illicit trade and tax evasion in the tobacco industry.

The study should be of interest to those policymakers, experts, and the general public who want to expand their awareness of the nexus between this illicit trade in otherwise licit goods, official corruption, and organized criminal networks.

Introduction

This study was conducted to explore how the illicit trade in licit goods supports organized crime, corruption, and erodes state structures. The illicit tobacco trade in southern Africa occupies a prominent place in southern African politics, due to its prominent role in the ‘state capture’ scandals that characterized politics in South Africa between 2013 and 2018. Indeed, the illicit tobacco trade occupies a prominent place in public debate in South Africa, both about crimes that may have been committed in the last five years, and about how the current administration responds to the illicit economy right now. Conflict—overt and covert, violent and non-violent—over who makes the most money from illicit tobacco, who controls it, and how the state responds to it, is a major feature of South Africa’s, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe’s, political economy. This conflict now takes places in the midst of huge political transitions within the ruling parties of both countries. 

This case study maps the key dimensions of the illicit cigarette trade in Zimbabwe and South Africa, including the key actors, the pathways of trade and the accompanying ‘modalities’ of criminality, as well as other important dimensions of the illicit cigarette market in southern Africa. It then identifies ‘good-faith actors,’ primarily in South Africa, whose positions could be strengthened by policy and technical interventions, explores opportunities for such intervention, and assesses the practical solutions that can be applied to combat illicit trade and tax evasion in the tobacco industry. The paper contributes to expanding awareness among policymakers and the public of the nexus between the illicit trade in licit goods, corruption, and organized criminal networks.

Method

To gather evidence for this report, the author and researchers conducted semi-structured interviews in April and May 2018.¹ They conducted eighteen interviews in Beitbridge and Harare in Zimbabwe, plus another sixteen in South Africa in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and, via phone, Port Elizabeth. They spoke to people who work in or close to the tobacco industry, including those who have been accused of smuggling, as well people who have studied, reported, or investigated the tobacco industry. Interview questions varied depending on the position of the respondent, but always included their views on the impact of illicit trade and potential solutions, including regulation and technology. 

Interviewees included current and former smugglers, staff of tobacco companies, lawyers, active and former law enforcement with a range of mandates, industry representatives, academics, journalists, and other people involved in the regulation of the tobacco industry and processing of tobacco products. Researchers conducted a literature review of academic papers, media and industry reports, and court case proceedings related to the illicit trade. 

Regional context

The illicit tobacco market in southern Africa is distinguished by two key facts: first, South Africa provides the largest, most profitable, and therefore most important consumer market and cigarette production hub; second, Zimbabwe is the biggest tobacco producer in the region and indeed the continent.² The trade is regionalized: besides Zimbabwe and South Africa, illicit cigarettes are also sold in and trafficked through neighbouring countries Botswana, Namibia, and Mozambique. Smuggling routes can shift through different countries, depending on the enforcement regime, a feature that complicates policy and enforcement responses. However, because Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, and Mozambique have small populations and lower rates of disposable income, the South African market will remain the focus of cigarette smugglers interested in large profits.   

Presently the illicit cigarette market is dominated by ‘genuine’ contraband (as opposed to counterfeit products, which were predominant in the 2000s). Genuine contraband cigarettes are produced in legally registered factories under registered brands, with the profits coming from tax evasion. The specific taxes evaded are either value added taxes (VAT) or excise tax. However, the nature of ‘illicit’ practices in the tobacco industry must be understood more broadly than as just the sale of untaxed products. A comprehensive understanding of the nature and impact of illicit practices must also take into consideration the avoidance or evasion of corporate income tax, anti-competitive practices, and the contribution of illicit trade to facilitating corruption and accelerating the erosion of state institutions. All of these are marked features of the illicit tobacco trade in southern Africa.

British American Tobacco (BAT) is the largest multinational tobacco company present in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. Precise figures are contested, but the most recent Euromonitor report to which we have access (2016) records that BAT held 74 percent share of the licit market, followed by Japan Tobacco International (JTI, 9 percent) and Philip Morris International (PMI, 8 percent) in South Africa.³ The estimate of BAT market share in Zimbabwe—around 80 percent—comes from industry insiders. This dominance of the tobacco market, combined with the high excise tax on cigarettes, makes BAT one of the largest contributors to the fiscus of any company operating in those territories.⁴ In South Africa, this has given BAT ‘a seat at the table’—and we suggest, arguably more—in determining the enforcement response. BAT lobbies hard against the illicit cigarette trade to protect its market share and engages its own surveillance and enforcement actions. At the same time, the owners of smaller companies producing illicit cigarettes have, in almost all cases, widely known high-level political connections in either Zimbabwe or South Africa, or both. As a result, illicit tobacco (and we argue, licit tobacco too) has become a major feature of the political economy of corruption in the region.

The final feature of the local context, when considering the climate for curbing illicit trade, is that both Zimbabwe and South Africa have recently undergone political transitions, whereby ruling parties remained in control, but different factions took over from long-standing presidents. Both the new presidents, Cyril Ramaphosa of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) in Zimbabwe, have declared that they are backing strong anti-corruption drives. 

1: Political economy of the illicit cigarette trade

Zimbabwe

Context

In Zimbabwe, between 19 and 35 percent of the population of sixteen million smoke.⁵ BAT has a factory producing cigarettes for the Zimbabwean market and neighbouring countries. Other than BAT, there are two main tobacco-product manufacturing companies operating in Zimbabwe, Savanna Tobacco and Gold Leaf. Both of these companies have their main market in South Africa. Recently, a few more tobacco companies have been set up in Zimbabwe, but their ownership and the nature of their products is unclear.

The prices of tax-paid cigarettes within Zimbabwe differ according to the brand; the range is between $1.20 and $1.60 per pack.⁶ The cost of a loose cigarette sold at a retail outlet is about $0.06 to $0.10.⁷ The price of a pack of cigarettes on the black market is a third of the price of a pack for which full taxes have been paid.⁸ There is, therefore, a domestic illicit market in Zimbabwe, but in the words of one informant in South Africa: “[In the past] independent factories in Zim existed [only] in order to smuggle to SA.”⁹

Zimbabwe-produced cigarettes are smuggled into all its neighbouring countries, with the clear majority being smuggled into South Africa. The exact scale and number of cigarettes smuggled is unknown. Nonetheless, interviewees were unanimous in the belief that large amounts of cigarettes are smuggled into South Africa daily.¹⁰ The majority of seizures of illicit cigarettes in South Africa have been of Pacific and Gold Leaf, both brands made by the Savanna Tobacco company.

Fuel tankers and trucks were once used to smuggle cigarettes across the Beitbridge border, making use of the balance of trade discrepancy between the two countries.¹¹ (Beitbridge sits along the Zimbabwe-South Africa border, with the Limpopo River running between the two countries.) This scam made use of the fact that tankers could plausibly claim to be leaving Zimbabwe ‘empty’ after dropping off loads of fuel. (Research conducted by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, a non-profit, on other smuggling economies in southern Africa has shown that many trucking companies also actively seek to defray their costs by filling otherwise empty vehicles with illicit loads.)¹² In fact, according to sources, during the heyday of cross-border cigarette smuggling in the late 1990s and early 2000s, some enterprising individuals even set up routes that brought licit goods to Mozambique where ‘empty’ trucks would be filled with second-hand clothes, which were then smuggled into Zimbabwe and replaced with cigarettes that in turn were smuggled into South Africa.¹³

However, since Zimbabwean authorities introduced vehicle scanners, and barcode scanners were introduced on the South African side at some border crossing points (notably the Beitbridge border crossing), all high-loaded trucks are now scanned. Consequently, the use of fuel tankers for smuggling is mostly non-existent now. All large vehicles are scanned and if scanning images are suspicious the trucks are examined, which entails having their goods physically off-loaded and examined individually.¹⁴ Through the introduction of these measures at the border—notably the use of scanners on trucks—smuggling cigarettes has become high risk for small-scale businessmen who lack political protection.¹⁵

Actors and modalities

The actors involved in the smuggling of cigarettes from Zimbabwe to South Africa can be divided into two groups: organized low-level smuggling operations run by individual entrepreneurs or groups of entrepreneurs, and organised smuggling cartels with political protection who smuggle the largest loads of illicit cigarettes into South Africa.

1: Small-scale smugglers

Several informants described the practices of small entrepreneurs who are in the cigarette smuggling business. These smugglers send men across the Limpopo River at informal border-crossing points in the bush.¹⁶ Small trucks and minibuses are hired for this purpose from Harare. Some of these vehicles have their seats taken out and their windows tinted to prevent people from seeing inside. 

The process of offloading the cigarettes takes very little time. The cigarettes are brought to the various crossing points to get moved across the river by ‘runners.’ The runners are mostly unemployed young men below the age of forty. This is done at night, between midnight and 3:00 a.m., when most people are asleep. The ‘runners’ physically carry the cigarettes in ‘shangani’ (plastic bags) on their backs and cross the Limpopo River to South Africa. The soldiers who guard these crossing points on both sides of the border are bribed to turn the other way. Informants report that it is easy to bribe the soldiers on both sides of the border.¹⁷

The buyers at the South African side are businessmen who will be waiting to fetch the cigarettes from the runners.¹⁸ To get to their destinations, their trucks use small and private roads to avoid tollgates, roadblocks, and ad-hoc searches by law enforcement on main roads¹⁹

‘Malaityas’ (people in the cross-border transportation business) argued that the scanners and other measures at the Beitbridge border crossing have made it risky for truck drivers to be involved in cigarette smuggling.²⁰ Over time this has led to greater use of the informal border crossing by small-scale smugglers. 

For those who continue to use the official border crossing at Beitbridge, buses with hidden compartments are used to smuggle cigarettes, as they are not scanned but only subject to sporadic road checks.²¹ Small cars are also not scanned, but former smugglers say that as they can only carry small volumes, the risks outweigh the potential gain, which means this is not a popular method of smuggling.²²

Drivers pay heavy fines to the South African authorities if caught smuggling and, in most cases, people end up losing their vehicles and hence their livelihoods.²³ However, drivers are sometimes able to bribe their way out of trouble—and they allege that some police officers actively seek out illicit goods in order to extract a bribe. 

While smugglers and transporters accused both South African and Zimbabwean police and army officials of soliciting bribes, the Zimbabwean side of the border is seen as being more permeable and affected by corruption. According to one malaitya interviewed for this study: 

“It’s easier to bribe officials on the Zimbabwe side because they speak the same language, it’s home; everybody understands that life is difficult in Zimbabwe. We all know how everyone is trying to survive. It’s a different story on the South African side. You can even get arrested for trying to bribe an officer.”²⁴

South African police were considered to be periodically effective and harsh. If a smuggler is actually arrested, it is almost always on the South African side of the border, and they are taken to South African courts.²⁵

2: The ‘untouchables’

There are also actors involved in organized cigarette smuggling syndicates who are described by law enforcement as ‘big people’ who are ‘untouchable.’²⁶ A former smuggler claims that one of these cigarette-smuggling cartels involves politicians in the highest levels of government from both Zimbabwe and South Africa, but would not divulge names. This cartel is said to operate a smuggling scheme that runs from Harare to Durban. Huge trucks are used to smuggle the cigarettes from their loading points in Harare through formal border crossing points and onwards to their destination. These trucks are not stopped or searched on the Zimbabwean side of the border. 

The cigarette brands that are most frequently smuggled are Remington Gold and Pacific Blue, both owned by Savanna Tobacco.²⁷ Beitbridge border post is a major point of entry.²⁸ Seizures at this border post accounted for 82 percent of seizures of illicit cigarettes made in South Africa in 2016.²⁹ However, in recent years there have been seizures of Zimbabwean cigarettes, mostly Savanna’s Pacific brand, on the South Africa-Botswana and South Africa-Mozambique borders. 

Savanna Tobacco is owned by Adam Molai, who is married to the niece of former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and appears to have had political protection during Mugabe’s regime.³⁰ His company has previously been implicated in tobacco-smuggling allegations. Cigarettes manufactured by Savanna have been intercepted being smuggled across the border hidden in an array of different vehicles, including oil tankers and mobile horse stables, in which the product was hidden in secret compartments, false floors, and/or stashed amongst other stock.³¹

Since the political transition, Molai’s position may have changed. Interviews with law enforcement in Zimbabwe confirmed that Savanna Tobacco has recently been ordered to pay tax it has failed to pay the state over the years.³² According to a former smuggler in South Africa, “Adam [Molai] has lost political protection, and is also under financial pressure.”³³ For his part, Molai denies all the allegations against him and has shown that he is prepared to sue for libel to protect his reputation.

Another significant figure is Simon Rudland, the owner of Gold Leaf Tobacco Corporation (GLTC), who has cigarette factories in South Africa and a tobacco-processing factory in Zimbabwe. Rudland owns a suite of companies, including farms, mines in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo, a logistics company, and a bus company.³⁴ Rudland has residences in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Our informants claim that he attends Zanu-PF (Zimbabwe’s ruling party) rallies and makes large contributions towards Zanu-PF congresses.³⁵ His South African business partner, Ebrahim Adamjee, also owns around fifty petrol stations across the country and a large amount of property in Linbro Park, Johannesburg.³⁶ As far back as 2006, Rudland and Adamjee were both arrested—but not convicted—for respective charges related to money laundering and cigarette smuggling from Zimbabwe to South Africa.³⁷ Rudland has denied any wrongdoing. 

Law enforcement response

Police and military informants described how cooperation between their agencies, the customs agency, and central intelligence authorities had been successful in the past in cracking down on smugglers by conducting regular raids at known smuggling points and tracking cigarette smuggling vehicles from their loading points in Harare to the border.³⁸ But aside from resource constraints and a reliance on ad-hoc ‘tip offs,’ their activities were largely scuppered by constant interference and stonewalling of investigations by superiors if their investigations touched on politically connected people. Junior officers would also be sanctioned for refusing bribes that were intended to filter upwards to their superiors.³⁹

Interviews suggested that officials within enforcement agencies know which individuals run the major cigarette smuggling cartels but cannot act against them because of their political protection.⁴⁰ Even drivers who had been apprehended at the border would sometimes be released if they were able to communicate with people within these cartels.

While it is evident that current Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa wants to secure greater legitimacy at home and abroad by being seen to be hard-line on corruption, it seems unlikely that he will tackle major sources of party finance.⁴¹ This would appear to be particularly likely where the profits from these illicit trades accrue to networks within the Zimbabwean military, given the key role the military played in Mnangagwa’s rise to the presidency. (We could not verify a link between the military and cigarette smuggling, though the military’s involvement in smuggling Marange diamonds and rhino horn is well documented.)⁴² It is most likely that his anti-corruption drive will target the allies of his predecessor, and other political rivals, as already seems to be the case.⁴³

The current crackdown on Molai suggests something of the political economy of enforcement in Zimbabwe. Molai, who was connected to Mugabe and is alleged to have channelled rents toward him, is now subject to an investigation related to an irregularly appointed government tender.⁴⁴ If this takes the same form as other bad-faith, illicit-economy corruption crackdowns in the region, it will either aim to put Molai out of business, in order to allow for new entrants in the illicit market or the expansion of existing interests, or it will lever his patronage towards the new regime.⁴⁵ As stated, Molai denies all the allegations against him.

South Africa

Context

Prior to 1993, a single company, the Rembrandt Group, held the majority of the legitimate tobacco market in South Africa. Rembrandt was an Afrikaner-owned company and received strong support from the apartheid government, and taxes on tobacco and cigarettes were virtually non-existent.⁴⁶ As the apartheid regime ended and the transition to democracy began, the threat of smoking to public health became a priority. The Tobacco and Related Products Control Act was promulgated in 1993. Since then, stringent controls on smoking in public places have been implemented, as well as higher taxes on cigarettes. The end of apartheid also saw the opening of South Africa’s markets and borders to the rest of the world, ending a lengthy period of isolation. Following the transition, Rembrandt ceded its market share to BAT, handing over what was a near-monopoly share of approximately 93 percent.⁴⁷

Since the passing of the Tobacco and Related Products Control Act, there has been a recorded reduction in the share of smokers and cigarettes smoked in South Africa. This has been credited to increasing taxes on cigarettes and a determined public health policy aimed at curbing smoking in public places and raising awareness of the health hazards posed by smoking.⁴⁸ The share of smokers in the population has been declining slowly in recent years to around 20 percent of the total population in 2017.⁴⁹ Companies now compete for a much more limited pool of consumers in South Africa.⁵⁰

The South African Revenue Service (SARS) should collect R17.85/$1.50 tax (R15.52 in excise duties and R2.33 in VAT) per pack of cigarettes for the 2018/2019 year, based on the national budget. Any pack of cigarettes selling for less than this amount is assumed to be illicit. Illicit cigarettes are cheap, selling for as little as R5 or R10 ($0.40 or $0.85) per pack. These cigarettes can readily be found at street vendors and the average corner store all over the country.⁵¹ The low price and ready availability means that illicit cigarettes are highly accessible and popular with low-income consumers.

Estimates from 2002, when the illicit cigarette trade was picking up pace, indicate that BAT’s market share stood at between 86 percent and 95 percent;⁵² more recent estimates put its market share at around 74 percent (see above), though large multinationals claim to have lost 10 percent of their market to illicit cigarettes in the last year alone.⁵³ Other ‘independent’ tobacco companies make up most of the rest of the market that is not controlled by BAT. Several of these companies have been publicly alleged to have links to the illicit cigarette trade.⁵⁴

Academic and civil society observers of the tobacco market claim that for several years since 2006 the large multinationals deliberately exaggerated the size of the illicit market as a way to lobby against rises in excise duty, which the South African government was pursuing to bring its policy into line with international recommendations and to curb rates of smoking.⁵⁵ An industry group called the Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa (TISA) blamed the purported high and increasing level of illicit trade on the excise tax, which they claimed increased the incentive for criminal actors to enter into the tobacco trade and harmed the market position of multinationals. These claims are not born out by research (see Box: Do ‘sin taxes’ encourage smuggling?) and, in fact, these claims follow a global pattern which has seen multinational tobacco companies use the issue of illicit tobacco to lobby government to lower taxes.⁵⁶

However, the same observers are in agreement that the scale of illicit activity in the cigarette market has escalated substantially over the past three years, believed to be the result of diminished state capacity from corruption, as explained below. Between 2014 and the 2017 tax year, excise revenue from tobacco products fell by 16 percent.⁵⁷ The number of cigarette packs on which tax was paid fell by 27 percent, while the rate of consumption fell only slightly. 

The quantity of taxed cigarettes legally sold and consumed has decreased significantly in the past two years. In the 2017-2018 financial year, the number of taxed cigarette packs amounted to about 763 million. After a relatively stable market size during 2010-2015, there was a steep drop in the legal quantities of cigarettes of 26 percent in the last two years. This steep decrease cannot be explained by standard factors such as the evolution of cigarette price, disposable income, population dynamics, and tobacco control legislation. A possible explanation could be a significant increase in illicit cigarette trade. At the same time, reports by SARS of seizures of illicit cigarettes do not point to an increase in seizures. As SARS has not released consistent figures⁵⁸ on its illicit cigarette seizures over the years, its Annual Report suggests that the tax year 2014-2015 seems to have been the highwater mark for seizures, with 204 million individual cigarette sticks seized and almost 1500 interventions against illicit trade by the revenue service. The rate of seizure almost halved in 2015-2016 to 133 million sticks, and in the years between 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 they were 17.5 million and 61.4 million sticks seized, respectively.⁵⁹ As stated above and in the rest of this paper, this correlates with a serious diminishment of the state’s capacity to investigate the illicit economy in general. 

A recent study released by IPSOS, and funded by TISA, concluded South Africa loses R7 billion ($590 million) per annum to the illicit cigarette trade and that of the total cigarette market around 20 percent of trade was illicit.⁶⁰ However, the figure does not count losses to transfer pricing and tax-base erosion or take into consideration that rates of smoking would fall were there to be fewer low-cost products on the market. The calculation of the size of the illicit market is also complicated by the fact that most measures will only count a pack selling below the tax threshold as being illicit – but, where brands are not competing for the bottom of the market, there is nothing to stop ‘untaxed’ cigarettes being sold for prices above the tax threshold. 

Actors, routes and modalities

The public debate, state response and industry dynamics of the cigarette trade are highly bifurcated by a line that divides the largest multinationals, including BAT, Philip Morris International and Japan Tobacco International, from around five of the so-called ‘independent’ producers, who have locally or regionally registered brands and are alleged to play the largest role in producing illicit cigarettes.

The multinational tobacco companies are represented by TISA, an organization that the independent producers deride as BAT’s ‘mouthpiece’ and claim exists only to give more credibility to, and suggest a broader range of beneficiaries for, BAT’s lobbying.⁶¹ A separate industry platform, the Fair Trade Independent Tobacco Association (FITA), was created in 2012 to protect the interests of small tobacco companies in a region dominated by big multinationals, though it is likewise considered to be a propaganda and lobbying tool for members that are allegedly under-declaring. Several of FITA’s members have been accused of smuggling (often in the form of under-declaring).  Both TISA and FITA deny that their members are involved in illegal activity and have pledged to take action against any of their members found to be contravening the tax, customs, and excise laws of the country. 

Several of the owners of FITA’s ‘independent’ companies are Zimbabwean citizens (including: Hardy Cronje, owner of Home of Cut Rag; David Prioleau, owner of Protobac; and Simon Rudland, co-owner of Gold Leaf Tobacco Corporation, or GLTC). Many of them use distributors who come from Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi networks, with a strong presence in the retail sector catering to low-income markets, particularly supermarkets and bulk wholesalers (such a market is typically referred to as a “cash and carry”).⁶²

BAT has a large factory in Heidelberg that supplies South Africa and the broader southern African region (and is BAT’s eighth biggest factory globally). It produces cigarettes branded by its global trademarks. A mid-range brand such as rival PMI’s Marlboro sells for around R40 ($3.40) in 2018. BAT distributes across the entire country. 

FITA’s members have more localized distribution networks and markets. Most FITA members have their factories in Gauteng, typically in Johannesburg CBD or industrial areas such as Kempton or Linbro Park. Amalgamated Tobacco Manufacturers’ (ATM) factory is in Pietermaritzburg in Kwa-Zulu Natal, and Home of Cut Rag is located near Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape.⁶³ In terms of market control, there is territorial division. ATM is said to control KZN, Carnilinx controls Gauteng, and Gold Leaf distributes in Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. No company has dominance or control over the Western Cape market, which is considered to be the most lucrative. 

Illicit cigarettes are typically found for sale in small, owner-staffed general dealers called ‘spaza shops,’ found in townships, or set up as street stalls. According to the BAT-funded IPSOS study, out of the top ten brands found being sold below the tax threshold, six of them are produced by GLTC, owned by Simon Rudland.⁶⁴ GLTC cigarettes are estimated to account for between 70 percent and 80 percent of the illicit cigarette trade.⁶⁵ GLTC has denied claims that it is engaged in illegal activities.

Modalities

Our typology of the smuggling of cigarettes in South Africa distinguishes between what we term ‘internal smuggling,’ which involves various methods for evading paying tax on the sale of goods, and cross-border smuggling, both the conventional variety involving material goods and more intangible financial crimes. 

Internal smuggling

the simple yet effective practice of under-declaring production to the revenue service. The undeclared surplus is then sold, tax-free, typically on the black market. This technique has been utilized by tobacco manufacturers globally for years. Factories in South Africa operate double shifts, running their machines at night, and/or they hide the true scale of their production by paying off customs officials and using fraudulent paperwork. They make use of all the available gaps in SARS’s monitoring of their ‘bond’ warehouses, for example reusing invoices for one hundred cases of cigarettes for multiple deliveries of one hundred cases each time.⁶⁶ Or they obscure the quantity of their production and avoid paying excise through round-tripping and ghost exports—claiming that stock has been exported, when in fact it has been sold in the domestic market.⁶⁷

Many of the companies that are undeclaring and using round-tripping have a business model that blends licit and illicit—often they have entire brands that are produced and accounted for entirely legally, though these account for a minority of their business.⁶⁸ Academic research has found this combination of licit and illicit production and/or sale to be a feature of illicit cigarette markets in jurisdictions across the world.⁶⁹

Counterfeiting

When cigarettes are counterfeited they are packaged in identical or near-identical branding to popular cigarette brands (typically the premium brands made by multinationals). In addition to this fraud, tax is not paid on these products. Counterfeiting was prevalent in the 1990s, but its incidence was eclipsed, though not entirely eliminated, by under-declaration in the 2000s. Counterfeit cigarettes also can be smuggled across borders.

Cross border modalities

Cross-border smuggling

As described above, a large proportion of illicit cigarette seizures are of Zimbabwe-manufactured cigarettes that have been smuggled over the border. Cigarettes have also been smuggled across the Namibian, Botswanan, and Mozambican borders (though they were not necessarily produced in these adjacent countries). The police’s Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (also known as the Hawks)  list cigarettes manufactured in Botswana (Sasha and Caspian brands, produced by Benson Craig) and Mozambique (Pall Mall and Safari brands, produced by BAT) as “commonly smuggled.”⁷⁰ Smuggled cigarettes also have been seized at sea ports, though these all represent a minority of both recorded seizures and alleged illegal activity. 

‘Losing’ stock in transit

Surplus stock destined for a cross-border market is sometimes ‘lost’ while in transit, though in fact it has been smuggled into the market where it disappeared or into an adjacent market (as such, it can be internal or cross-border). For a cross-border example, this method was alleged to be have been used in a recent case before the Namibian Supreme Court involving Benson Craig.⁷¹ Namibian authorities impounded a shipment of cigarettes, apparently bound for Namibia. Benson Craig claimed that the shipment had ‘mistakenly’ been marked as bound for Namibia but instead was in transit to another destination, and therefore not subject to tax and had been unlawfully impounded. Benson Craig’s arguments were upheld; the company won the case. Nevertheless, although Benson Craig was vindicated, the alleged methodology has been deployed by others in the past, so that cigarettes could be smuggled into either the Namibian or South African market and sold cheaply on the black market. 

Grey Areas

Cross-border financial methods

its profits in the South African tobacco industry. The boundary between tax avoidance and evasion is not always clear, but the revenue service may lack the expertise to pursue these cases and states also tend to be cautious about litigating on these issues as they run the risk—if they lose the case—of creating entirely legal routes to evade tax. 

BAT has been accused of both profit shifting and transfer pricing. Profit shifting is a tax planning strategy used by multinational corporations to shift profits from higher-tax locations to lower-tax locations. The result is two-fold. First, the corporation makes a larger profit due to lower tax rates, and second, higher-tax locations see a decrease in tax revenue. Transfer pricing⁷² involves setting a price for goods and services sold between related legal entities within an enterprise, typically between a parent and subsidiary company. This relates to tax-base erosion in that goods and services could be traded between parent and subsidiary companies that exist in different tax locations across borders. By their nature, profit shifting and transfer pricing are modalities that can only be exploited by multinational corporations. 

Law enforcement

The fate of law-enforcement efforts against the illicit tobacco trade show that tobacco companies’ political connections have been influential in allowing illicit trade to flourish. Despite being declared a national priority several years ago, the industry has grown with relative impunity since. While the state does make seizures of illicit cigarettes, these are mostly of the Pacific brand, which is produced by Zimbabwean company Savanna and may not fall under South African political protection. 

While the state response stretches back to the early 2000s, the past four years are most illustrative of the power that actors in the tobacco industry have amassed, and of the consequent erosion of state capacity. 

In 2014, the illicit cigarette trade was made a priority and an interagency task team—the Illicit Tobacco Task Team (ITTT)—was established to investigate and prosecute individuals associated with the industry. This involved a number of enforcement agencies, including the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the Hawks and its Crime Intelligence division, as well as the State Security Agency (SSA). 

However, the ITTT effort did not include SARS. At the same time, SARS was running its own investigation, named Project Honey Badger. This investigation was conducted, in part, by the High-Risk Investigations Unit (HRIU) at SARS, an elite investigative unit dedicated to cases involving the illicit economy. There was little collaboration between the two state investigations, as SARS officials considered the ITTT to be compromised and instructed staff not to share information with it. The HRIU was later disbanded under a cloud of scandal. Many believe it was disbanded because it targeted people in the illicit cigarette industry (and other illicit trades) who were important to the president’s patronage network.⁷³

Yusuf Kajee of ATM and Adriano Mazzotti of Carnilinx have been most prominently associated with the illicit trade and were under investigation as part of Project Honey Badger. Both have denied that they have engaged in illicit trade and are not tax compliant.  ATM has been linked to the Zuma family. Edward Zuma, son of the former South African president, was once director of the company and later became a ‘silent partner.’⁷⁴ Carnilinx owner, Adriano Mazzotti, has admitted to smuggling and other illegal activity relating to his business though he has subsequently retracted these statements. Mazzotti donated R200,000 to the opposition political party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013, and Mazzotti’s partner at Carnilinx, Kyle Phillips, provided R1 million to the EFF’s firebrand opposition-party leader Julius Malema to settle debts that would have prevented Malema from becoming a member of parliament. Journalists claim they have proof that Mazzotti also provided funding for the ANC presidential campaign of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in 2017.  In addition to covering part of the costs of Dlamini-Zuma’s campaign, he also used his clothing company to produce T-shirts and caps for her campaign.⁷⁵ Mazzotti and Dlamini-Zuma have both denied the claims or that they have any relationship, despite photographic evidence of them together meeting on more than one occasion.  In late 2018 it was also revealed that Malema was living in a house in an upmarket suburb of Johannesburg that is owned by Mazzotti. Mazzotti and Malema claim this is a straightforward rental agreement and is not untoward.

BAT may have been complicit in illegal practices. British American Tobacco has also allegedly sought to maintain its near monopoly share of the market for tobacco in South Africa through anti-competitive practices and corrupt relationships with the state. BAT funded Forensic Security Services (FSS) in a corporate espionage campaign against independent manufacturers and has been accused of bribery.⁷⁶ These claims have been detailed in a signed affidavit by Francois van der Westhuizen, who had worked for FSS, which alleged BAT had bribed police and tax officials to turn a blind eye to “BAT’s tax evasion and money laundering.” BAT instituted an inquiry led by law firm Norton Rose Fullbright to investigate these claims, but has not yet released the findings, even though media reports the inquiry is complete.⁷⁷ Another key strategy has been to acquire influence in state agencies and promote action against independent manufacturers that threaten BAT’s majority. BAT’s status as one of the largest single contributors to the national fiscus gives it leverage to gain proximity to state structures and allows it to frame the debate about loss of revenue in a narrow way that hones in on excises loss, rather than tax along the full value chain, which would bring Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) losses into view. 

The Illicit Tobacco Task Team provides a good example of this: it was not investigating the tobacco industry at large, rather it allowed TISA to be a member of the team. Media sources in South Africa have suggested that being part of the ITTT and having influence in the State Security Agency may have allowed TISA’s members a say in who was investigated, while also deflecting scrutiny from their own actions. In 2016, when a whistle blower at FSS released confidential documents, it emerged that, in addition to paying people employed by their competitors to spy for them, BAT also had police officers and advocate Belinda Walters, who was FITA’s chairperson, on their payroll.⁷⁸

The Walters case is perhaps the most notorious example of the tobacco industry’s overreach into state institutions.⁷⁹ According to leaked documents and media reports, Walters was a triple agent who spied for BAT while also in the employ of the State Security Agency, before turning on BAT to spy on behalf of Carnilinx (the company she was hired to spy on). BAT paid Walter £30,500 to spy for them, disbursed from their London office through Travelex cards, which may have broken anti-money laundering laws.⁸⁰ It was Walter who set in motion the series of events that gave Tom Moyane the pretext to fire the HRIU’s lead investigator and later disband the unit. While BAT ordered an independent inquiry into its involvement in corporate espionage and bribery, it has never released the findings of this inquiry.

Shortly before the SARS High-Risk Investigations Unit was shut down, SARS had launched a case against BAT for a huge shortfall in tax payments, and it is believed to relate to profit-shifting and transfer-pricing practices. According to financial journalist Rob Rose, 

“BAT’s recent annual report lists a ‘contingent liability’ for a dispute it has with SARS dating back to 2011, when the tax authority challenged the ‘debt financing’ of BAT SA between 2006 and 2010. Essentially, this implies that SARS must have believed BAT put in place artificial structures designed to shift profits offshore and reduce the tax it pays. The upshot: SARS hit BAT with a tax bill for R2.01 billion for ‘tax and interest’ it should have paid.”⁸¹

This debt is the single biggest dispute between the Revenue Service and any single taxpayer. BAT has subsequently downplayed the significance of this debt, saying that it covers a twelve-year period in which the company paid over R100 billion in taxes, and R14 billion in 2017 alone. However, the investigation into BAT’s tax affairs appears to have halted at the beginning of the inquiry and sources with knowledge of complex disputes with high-value tax payers say that initial calculations of BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) disputes are usually the “tip of the iceberg.” BAT subsidiaries have been fined or investigated for tax evasion or fraud charges in Australia, Korea, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Russia. 

After the appointment of Tom Moyane, an ally of then-President Zuma, as head of SARS, many of the staff involved in investigations against illicit trade ground to a halt. The events surrounding the decimation of SARS’ investigative capacity were highly controversial at the time and have continued to generate embarrassment for the ruling party. Early in 2018, President Ramaphosa ordered a Commission of Inquiry into tax administration and governance at SARS headed by Judge Robert Nugent (hereafter, the Nugent Inquiry). In its report, the Nugent Inquiry has concluded that under Moyane’s leadership the organisational structure of the institution had been remodelled to “the benefit of delinquent taxpayers and the disadvantage of major taxpayers who try to comply.” In detail, Nugent spells the various deleterious effects of Moyane’s decisions:

“The Large Business Centre (LBC)⁸² as it had existed was eviscerated to the detriment both of governance and revenue collection. The restructuring of the organisation displaced some 200 managerial employees from their jobs, many of whom ended up in positions that had no content or even job description, and in exasperation skilled professionals left. Others remain in supernumerary posts with their skills and experience going to waste. Customs was adversely affected…. Measures to counter criminality were rendered ineffective and those who trade illicitly in commodities like cigarettes operate with little constraint.”⁸³

These findings support the analysis that political influence in SARS and law enforcement services, such as the Hawks, have played a crucial role in staying investigations into players alleged to be in the illicit trade. For example, the case against Adriano Mazzotti, which was dropped in 2014, was likely due to the political influence he had in his dealings with the Zuma family. The damage to the Large Business Centre likewise affected the Revenue Service’s ability to curtail corporate tax evasion.

Testimony at this inquiry has revealed the impact on the response to illicit tobacco in particular. Staff at the Revenue Service testified that once it focused on curbing the illicit cigarette trade, the collection of excise on tobacco rose, and once the High-Risk Unit was disbanded this progress was lost, the trend reversed.⁸⁴

Revenue is, however, not the only indicator of the decline of the state response: the other is the lack of prosecution for a number of actors who have been publicly linked, through press exposés, to criminal activity and prima facie evidence of corruption. 

Even more disheartening, recent analysis suggests that in the gap created by the destruction of SARS capacity, the big multinationals have also become involved in smuggling practices, either under-declaring or leveraging their relationship with subsidiaries in neighbouring countries to smuggle. Under this view, the illicit cigarette market has grown to a size that the ‘independent’ companies do not have the production capacity to meet and their role is being exaggerated by the multinationals. A leading expert on the illicit tobacco trade in South Africa has been quoted in the press saying, “SARS has been weakened to the extent that people are taking chances. I’m confident big industry has become more complicit in the illegal trade.”⁸⁵ TISA denies that their members are involved smuggling, stating that members “declare every single cigarette they produce in or import into South Africa to the South African Revenue Service” and pass regular audits. TISA also argues that sales of members’ product without tax paid can be attributed to the sale of stolen stock or cross-border smuggling. It denies that FITA members do not have production capacity to meet the size of the illicit market and recommends SARS conduct a national audit of total capacity and total production to clarify this issue. 

As BAT’s putative debt to the revenue service, and as the practices that led to the dispute are likely to have continued between 2010 and 2018, if BAT is forced to settle its arrears with SARS the liability will now be much higher. While BAT attributes the destruction of SARS capacity to ‘state capture’ by the smaller illicit manufacturers, it has also benefited from revenue service’s decline.  Furthermore, multinationals have a motivation to exaggerate the size of the illicit market in order to fight ‘sin’ tax increases, which they argue encourage smuggling and under-declaring (see Box on sin taxes). This tactic has had moderate success. The WHO recommends that tobacco tax incidence be pegged to at least 70 percent of the retail selling price of tobacco price. Since 1994, South Africa has followed a targeted tax incidence approach which pegged the tax incidence at 52 percent in 2015.⁸⁶ South Africa’s increases in excise on cigarettes have been modest in recent years.⁸⁷

Both the ‘independent’ illicit companies and BAT use the media to propagandize stories that obscure their role, legitimize their activities, and seek to harm their competitors. These stories have ideological veils with strong emotive appeals to issues of key national importance and these are effective in shaping public attitudes about the form the state’s response should take. In the case of TISA, their narrative is that they are upholding the rule of law, creating jobs, and making huge contributions to the fiscus in the face of rampant corruption in the state and criminality on the part of independent manufacturers—they are, in other words, holding the line for South Africa’s progress towards development according to existing policies. This narrative has been pushed with renewed vigour in 2018 in the form of an advertising campaign encompassing prime media advertisements which exhorted South Africans to “#takebackthetax”: these advertisements claim that revenue lost to the illicit trade could be put to use employing ‘corruption investigators’ and could have prevented recent fuel price hikes. The independent manufacturers, as represented by FITA, take the position that they have been unfairly maligned by an unscrupulous, criminal multinational, that the illicit market is driven by counterfeiters based in other countries, and that they are being punished for supporting racial transformation of business and ‘radical economic transformation’ of the entire economy. These positions blatantly borrow the language of highly fractious national debates about how South Africa should address inequality and discrimination in order to distract attention from allegedly illegal or unethical practices. 

Impact of illicit trade?

Integration with other criminal networks

Since SARS enforcement and investigative capacity was curtailed, there has been a large escalation in competition between the ‘independent’ companies. This has taken the form of a price war, verbal threats, private legal action by one company to force the closure of a competitor’s factory in Lesotho, attempted and successful assassinations, and the vandalism of the machinery of a factory as part of a dispute between two independent companies.⁸⁸ This escalation is driving severe tensions and, according to one smuggler, “It will only stop when someone dies in the industry. Someone is going to get killed. Because the big players are flexing their muscles.”⁸⁹

This violence is, for the most part, contained within the industry, but has also spilled out as two players compete for greater access to the Western Cape market, something that has driven them into business arrangements with Cape gang and underworld figures.⁹⁰ It appears these arrangements arose initially when a controversial Cape nightclub owner bought debt attached to a prominent independent cigarette manufacturer, who agreed to pay him off partially in cigarette stock, which the Cape nightclub owner then sold through his gang-related distribution networks.⁹¹ This then led to an overture by different underworld networks in Johannesburg to enter the Western Cape market through providing cheap stock to rival gangs in the Western Cape. This had fed into violent destabilization of the Cape underworld and flooded poor Cape Town neighbourhoods with cheap, illicit stock. 

In Gauteng, one figure has also allegedly drawn on gang networks in Ryger Park to carry out a (failed) assassination of Luis Pestana, in which his bodyguard, Gerard Strydom, himself the boss of a bouncer security network that controls most of the nightclubs on the East Rand of Johannesburg, was shot.⁹² Other hits have also been linked to the illicit cigarette trade.⁹³

The illicit trade is also feeding other criminal markets, albeit indirectly. According to people within the tobacco industry, there has been a steep increase in the hijacking of trucks containing cigarettes.⁹⁴ No one has accused industry players of being behind these hijackings, but informants say that the independent companies buy the stolen stock from the hijackers (as they have the accounting practices to absorb this cheap influx of stock). The ease of moving the stolen goods through the illicit tobacco sector may be fuelling the hijacking phenomenon. 

Revenue loss (and public health)

As quoted above, figures from TISA suggest that between 2010 and 2016, R27 billion ($2.2 billion) in revenue has been lost to the illicit cigarette trade. These figures are disputed, on the basis that TISA methodology for measuring lost excise is flawed and because it does not take account of all tax revenue that can be lost through illegal behaviour. Nevertheless, the loss of revenue to the country could be close to or higher than TISA’s estimate and therefore represents a significant loss to the fiscus. 

The impact of revenue loss from excise taxes is twofold. Obviously, this deprives the government of money for its general budget, but the ‘sin taxes’ from which most of this revenue should derive are also supposed to offset the costs of treating citizens who have smoking-related diseases such as lung cancer. Currently, 20 percent of the population age fifteen or older are smokers. The World Health Organisation (WHO) suggests a benchmark for a successful transition to the smoking ‘end game’ is to reduce smoking to 5 percent or less of the population. In South Africa, the low cost of illicit cigarettes is believed to be a major driver of continued smoking. According to Hana Ross, principal researcher of the Economics of Tobacco Control Project at the University of Cape Town, “if South Africa starts to control the illicit market, we would see a huge change in behaviour with many people trying to quit (and some succeeding), many smokers reducing the number of cigarettes they smoke in a day, and many young people not starting to smoke.”⁹⁵

Corruption

Arguably the most severe impact of the illicit trade has been how it has fuelled the corruption of individuals within the state and how this, in turn, has contributed to the destruction of state capacity to investigate the illicit economy or prosecute serious commercial crimes. Many within the industry maintain that high-level corruption was not necessary to conduct business. According to one former cigarette smuggler, “you don’t need high-level corruption” for smuggling. “You just need the people looking at production sheets, and tip-offs about raids.”⁹⁶ However, as players in the industry amassed large amounts of wealth, the scrutiny from the state increased, as did their ability to corrupt people at high levels within the government. As both these phenomena increased—the visibility of the industry and the scrutiny of the state—more laws needed to be broken and investigations had to be halted. 

For example, Yusuf Kajee is said to have involved Edward Zuma in ATM, because Kajee has a conviction for tax evasion (related to his involvement in Delta tobacco, before ATM was set up) and so was ineligible for a state license to manufacture cigarettes.⁹⁷ Kajee reportedly made regular payments to a private account, the proceeds from which were used for upgrades to Jacob Zuma’s private homestead in Nkandla.⁹⁸ Kajee denies that he made any payments to Jacob Zuma or that his relationship to Edward Zuma was improper. Additionally, at the time that the SARS HRIU was destroyed, it was investigating the industry and was set to take away fifteen licences (more than the number of ‘independent’ companies, so it is likely that one or more of the multinational tobacco companies also would have been threatened with a licence revocation).⁹⁹ Since then, none of these companies have had their licences threatened and no progress has been made in the cases of tax evasion launched by SARS against BAT and the ‘independent’ companies. 

This corruption does not only affect the response to illicit tobacco but has also weakened state capacity to deal with any illicit trade. 

2: Identifying and supporting ‘virtuous’ and reform-minded actors

This paper is intended to address the question of how ‘virtuous’ or reform-minded actors can respond to the illicit trade in tobacco in South Africa and Zimbabwe. As a starting point, we need to carefully assess what exactly requires a response. The mainstream narrative in South Africa about the illicit trade focuses almost exclusively on the loss of excise tax to the fiscus because of under-declaration. But we argue that the response should also address: the corruption that allows and is also fuelled by illicit trade; the underworld links between the tobacco industry and individuals suspected to be running extortion rackets or trafficking in narcotics; and the broader range of costs to the state due to illicit practices in the tobacco trade, including cross-border tax dodging. An additional discrete objective could be stopping misinformation about the illicit tobacco trade, which obscures the public health consequences of smoking and distorts debates about how to best achieve the twin (and sometimes contradictory) aims of reducing the number of smokers in South Africa and maximising the economic benefits of the tobacco industry to the country. A holistic reform effort would consider all of these aspects of the trade’s harmful impact. 

One should also ask whether the bulk of reform efforts should be focused on South Africa, because without the South African market, the incentives for illicit cigarette production and smuggling in the region fall drastically. In our opinion, this should be the case. This calculation might also be different if there was a political opening in Zimbabwe which provided a tailwind to reform efforts—currently the opposite situation pertains. 

Indications are that, since South Africa’s change of president, the government wants to be seen to be cracking down on illicit tobacco. The National Treasury, in its annual budget speech, outlined three key measures it would be moving towards: maintaining increases in the so-called ‘sin tax’, mandating plain packaging for cigarette packs, and implementing a ‘track and trace system.’ The acting head of SARS, Mark Kingon, has made several strong statements in the press about reviving a strong focus on the illicit economy, with a particular emphasis on illicit cigarettes.J¹⁰⁰ In May 2018, the scale and impact of the illicit cigarette trade was discussed in Parliament. Public statements issued in 2018 on the illicit cigarette trade indicated a renewed push from law enforcement to tackle the issue. Industry players also confirmed this impression. According to one tobacco industry representative, “my impression is that they [the government] are sweeping the floor clean and it is going to be harder to buy protection.”¹⁰¹

The National Treasury and the Revenue Service are crucial actors. National Treasury sets the excise level for tobacco products and plays a powerful role in shaping how government will balance the need to reduce smoking while also ensuring maximum tax compliance. The crimes at the heart of this trade also fall directly under the mandate of the South African Revenue Service, which must dedicate skills and resources to both improve the integrity of the customs system and investigate complex financial arrangements like transfer pricing and tax-base erosion. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has argued that BEPS offences constitute a grave problem for developing countries and that they should be considered as part of the broader agenda against illicit financial flows. They are, however, very difficult for developing countries to tackle: 

“[While] the schemes involved are similar to those used in criminal activities…what prevents some of their activities being exposed as tax evasion is mainly because multinational companies can back up what they do with opinions from tax advisers that make it difficult to establish the intent necessary for a criminal offence. Given that the base erosion and profit shifting schemes are often very complex, involving convoluted circumventions of complex tax provisions in various jurisdictions that are often shrouded in tax haven jurisdiction, it becomes difficult for revenue authorities to challenge their legality in a court.”¹⁰²

For South Africa to pursue such cases will require a large and long-term investments of skills and time. 

While many key staff left the revenue service under Moyane’s rule, an independent inquiry is now investigating a wide range of governance issues in the organization, in what is seen as a step towards repairing it.¹⁰³ Indeed, there appears to be high-level political support for other law enforcement bodies to act against the people who were linked to high-profile corruption scandals during the Zuma era, which will also involve the National Prosecution Agency and Police Service in curbing illicit activities. 

Some of the figures linked to the illicit cigarette trade—like Adriano Mazzotti and Yusuf Kajee—are prominent in the roll call for the post-Zuma clean up. According to recent media reports, SARS has obtained warrants to seize Mazzotti’s assets for alleged underpayment of tax debts.¹⁰⁴ There is high public appetite for conviction and the seizure of assets, an appetite that can best be summarized as a thirst for retribution after the years of waste and decline under the Zuma administration. There are obvious opportunities with this kind of political tailwind, and as mentioned, the state appears to be moving on them already.¹⁰⁵ However, a strong note of caution should be issued. While these motives currently align with public interest in many cases, they do not represent a careful and holistic assessment of where intervention should lie. For example, the directors of GLTC, Simon Rudland and Ebrahim Adamjee, the figures who are widely alleged to be most prolific and powerful in the illicit cigarette trade, have never been linked to Zuma, and until recently enjoyed a very low public profile. Since TISA’s renewed advocacy on the illicit trade, GLTC has been more prominent in the debate, but again in a fashion that represents the interests of ‘Big Tobacco’ and not a strategic assessment of where most revenue is lost, or damage is done to state institutions. 

Likewise, multinational players such as BAT need to be treated with the same scrutiny as smaller players who have been more tainted by Zuma-era scandals. According to one former law enforcement official: “If you want to look at the industry, look at it as a whole. You need to put equal pressure on the industry, otherwise it’s like a water bed, and if you push down on one side, it will balloon on the other.”¹⁰⁶ Current interventions do not tackle complex cross-border financial crimes allegedly committed by multinationals. In addition, the state seems to be moving into the same relationship with BAT that led to co-option of the ITTT team and the abuse of state resources preceding the scandal around the alleged corporate espionage by BAT against its competitors. The symptoms of this lie in TISA’s prominent role in the parliamentary hearings on illicit tobacco, supported by comments made by interviewees for this study.¹⁰⁷ Worryingly, the tobacco industry still appears to exert a particular and substantial influence on the South African state. There has been strong industry pushback, from all quarters, on the new legislation.

If one sets aside more informal forms of influence in South Africa, the legal and political basis for an effective response appears to be good. South Africa is a signatory to the leading international protocol on regulating the cigarette industry—the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products—which is published by the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.  The aim of the protocol is to:

“secure the supply chain of tobacco products, through licensing, due diligence and record keeping, and requires the establishment of a global tracking and tracing regime that will allow Governments to effectively follow up tobacco products from the point of production to the first point of sale. In order for it to be effective, the Protocol provides for intensive international cooperation including on information sharing, technical and law enforcement, cooperation, mutual legal and administrative assistance, and extradition.”¹⁰⁸

However, the government has not ratified this protocol.¹⁰⁹ South Africa has, however, made progressive moves to adhere to the WHO guidelines on tobacco control, the most recent being those announced by Treasury in the 2018 budget speech. 

Looking outside of law enforcement and political action on corruption and organized crime, we also need to consider the role of civil society. There are actors outside the state who have important roles to play, such as academia, the health department and public health advocates, and industry platforms with an interest in limiting the illicit economy.

Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi has made a strong stand against the tobacco industry, promising stricter legislation to reduce the number of smokers, including of e-cigarettes.¹¹⁰

A draft Tobacco Bill is out for comment, which will include regulation on e-cigarettes, a 100 percent restriction on smoking indoors and further restrictions on outdoor smoking, and the removal of advertising at place of sale and of vending machines. The Department of Health has set up a Tobacco Task Team with includes representative from Basic and Higher Education, labour organisations, and civil society associations which advocate around health problems such as cancer, heart disease and diabetes which are linked to smoking. 

Academic institutions can provide an objective and independent view of what is happening in the market and introduce perspectives that may be neglected by government or commercial actors, such as how tax or price changes impact the poor at the household level, or scientific evidence of the links between proposed or actual policy changes and behaviour change. Advocacy groups like the National Council Against Smoking also try to raise the profile of the public health harm caused by tobacco in the debate. 

Lastly, the actions taken by neighbouring countries are still important. An obvious consequence of greater enforcement in South Africa (and so the elimination of the opportunities for under-declaration there) is that factories will relocate to outside of the country’s borders. (According to our sources, prior to around 2002 foreign countries were the predominant sources of illicit cigarettes sold in South Africa.) Zimbabwe will remain the best location for illicit production, due to the proximity to tobacco supply chains and because the major players in the illicit cigarette trade are already embedded there, with the political connections and logistical systems they need to be successful.  

3: Identifying tools for response: legal, policy and technological instruments to combat the illicit economy

A key objective of this paper is to assess the opportunities for improving the response to illicit trade and diminishing its negative impacts on the economies of South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the functioning of their state institutions. 

In Zimbabwe, it is notable that scanners on its side of the border, plus barcode readers and sniffer dogs on the South African side of the border, have been effective at discouraging truck drivers in Zimbabwe from small- and medium-scale smuggling by changing their risk calculation. Zimbabwe also has legislation to address the illicit tobacco trade: the Finance Act (Chapter 23:04), Customs and Excise Act (Chapter 23:02), and Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (Chapter 9:3).¹¹¹ However, the political situation in Zimbabwe is currently unfavourable for supporting an effective and fair anti-corruption drive, which would be a necessary pre-condition to tackling the highly organized, politically connected cartels that undertake large-scale smuggling, even if there was a clear technological gap. But given the primacy of South Africa to the cigarette market, the question of fronting a comprehensive legal, political, and technologically adequate response is considered primarily for this jurisdiction. 

The WHO outlines several tax administration measures that can be implemented to better monitor and ensure compliance with tax law in the tobacco industry.¹¹² We consider the prospects for each measure in South Africa: 

The use of licenses: South Africa already requires companies to seek licenses to produce tobacco products. The effectiveness of the license system appears to rest on the integrity of the vetting system. As described above, Yusuf Kajee’s co-option of Edward Zuma into his tobacco company appears to have removed a legitimate obstacle to him being awarded a production license (which Kajee denies). As this gambit was successful, the problem does not appear to be whether licenses are required but whether they are awarded and withdrawn impartially. 

Physical Controls inside factories: For ensuring compliance around domestic production, some countries place emphasis on conducting physical controls, which often involve the stationing, full time, of a tax official at factories. It is already SARS practice to visit factories and to physically check for compliance. The tobacco industry is pushing for this approach to be renewed and is a major thrust of the state’s strategy to curb illicit production. It is easy to see why, as it has been hugely unsuccessful in the past. Measures for mitigation notwithstanding (such as frequent rotation and surprise visits), the degree of contact between officials and business owners gives rise to many opportunities for fraud and corruption and requires a robust solution which can withstand such opportunities. 

Audits and other checks on individual and corporate tax compliance: SARS has units in place to pursue non-compliant tax payers through audits and other measures, as well as public commitments to address the growth of the illicit economy through its tax and customs mandate. This was part of the work the enforcement capacity in SARS was pursuing against figures in the tobacco trade, and formed part of the investigations which had led to them threatening fifteen companies with license revocations as well as large bills for unpaid tax. These tools are undoubtedly effective when pursued rigorously and independently. 

Requiring tax stamps: Since the 1970s the South Africa state has required a mark (referred to as a ‘diamond stamp,’ since it is a diamond-shaped embossed mark obtained through mechanical pressure on the cigarette pack) to be affixed to every pack of cigarettes to indicate excise has been paid. This system is widely considered to be ineffective by a wide range of people in the tobacco industry, as the stamp can be easily counterfeited and SARS does not have good control over their issue. More sophisticated stamping technologies could be used, accompanied with more sophisticated monitoring technology in place at production facilities, such as banderol-based stamps. 

Such stamps carry multi-level security features as a protection against counterfeiting and carry unique codes to enable traceability. These require producers and importers to place orders for stamps via a secure connection to a government authority, who verifies and then approves the order. Such systems enable traceability across the distribution chain. 

In its 2017 Budget Review, the National Treasury announced that secure track and trace solutions should be introduced for tobacco products. Accordingly, Article 17 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act (2016) has been modified to mandate the marking, tracking, and tracing of domestic and imported tobacco products. 

Among experts interviewed for this study, track and trace systems received the broadest acceptance from actors within the tobacco industry and those who regulate or study it. These systems were seen as technical measures that could improve compliance. The implementation of a track and trace system, if it were impossible to tamper with, would guarantee that everything manufactured in South Africa would be automatically reported to a central database for full and accurate accounting. This would improve upon current dysfunctional systems because track and trace systems remove human intervention. “You can’t bribe computers,” as one informant put it. With a good and tobacco-industry independent track and trace system, “there would be no direct contact between people looking at numbers and people generating them.”  

There is also evidence that track and trace systems have been effective in curbing illicit tobacco trade in other countries.  When Brazil introduced a track and trace system (secure banderol-based stamps), it led to a rise in excise tax collection of $100 million in 2008. (In a telling development, the illicit market in Brazil has not disappeared as smuggled illicit cigarettes from Paraguay have filled the place of domestic illicit production. In Paraguay, a prominent political figure is profiting from the illicit cigarette trade). In California, a mixture of the implementation of a banderol-based tax stamp using track and trace technology and other measures to increase compliance led to a drop in tax evasion of 37 percent. In Africa, Kenya also provides an example of a country where these measures have helped to curb illicit trade. 

Several informants felt it was important that industry not be involved in the choice of technology for the track and trace system. This is the approach required by the WHO which argues against all self-control systems and instructs contact with the Tobacco industry to be limited to that strictly necessary for implementation. Both TISA and FITA are, however, lobbying for close consultation on the form that track and trace systems take. Likewise, implicit in the success of a track and trace system is the restitution of SARS. Having a track and trace system operated by a decimated tax administration would not work. Hiring new tax officials and strengthening the capacity and ethics inside SARS are important administrative measures, without which any accounting system would be compromised.

In the same vein, high-level political support for cigarette manufacturers will also need to be withdrawn. The crucial policies and laws to ensure this lie in different direction: combating corruption and ensuring the separation of personal interests from the exercise of public office. This means strengthening the performance of the Financial Intelligence Centre, the Public Protector’s Office, and the use of the Public Financial Management Act. This infrastructure is in place and has been effective in the past—the test will lie in the Ramaphosa government’s willingness to use it. 

The assessment of the opportunities to address the illicit trade is, therefore, in the greater scheme of things favourable. There are a range of state and non-state actors in South Africa that can contribute to the response. A democratic framework has the potential to hold people committing criminal acts to account, while there are key policy and technological interventions which could reduce the difficulties the state faces regarding detection and monitoring. The key ingredient will be the political will to prioritize this issue and enact a full and impartial response. The political arena, unfortunately, also is where prospects for success may sour. 

With credit to Mafaro Kasipo and Michael McLaggan for research inputs, and Marco Magrin for research assistance

Such stamps carry multi-level security features as a protection against counterfeiting and carry unique codes to enable traceability. These require producers and importers to place orders for stamps via a secure connection to a government authority, who verifies and then approves the order. Such systems enable traceability across the distribution chain. 

In its 2017 Budget Review, the National Treasury announced that secure track and trace solutions should be introduced for tobacco products. Accordingly, Article 17 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act (2016) has been modified to mandate the marking, tracking, and tracing of domestic and imported tobacco products. 

Among experts interviewed for this study, track and trace systems received the broadest acceptance from actors within the tobacco industry and those who regulate or study it. These systems were seen as technical measures that could improve compliance. The implementation of a track and trace system, if it were impossible to tamper with, would guarantee that everything manufactured in South Africa would be automatically reported to a central database for full and accurate accounting. This would improve upon current dysfunctional systems because track and trace systems remove human intervention. “You can’t bribe computers,” as one informant put it. With a good and tobacco-industry independent track and trace system, “there would be no direct contact between people looking at numbers and people generating them.”¹¹³

There is also evidence that track and trace systems have been effective in curbing illicit tobacco trade in other countries.  When Brazil introduced a track and trace system (secure banderol-based stamps), it led to a rise in excise tax collection of $100 million in 2008. (In a telling development, the illicit market in Brazil has not disappeared as smuggled illicit cigarettes from Paraguay have filled the place of domestic illicit production. In Paraguay, a prominent political figure is profiting from the illicit cigarette trade). In California, a mixture of the implementation of a banderol-based tax stamp using track and trace technology and other measures to increase compliance led to a drop in tax evasion of 37 percent.¹¹⁴ In Africa, Kenya also provides an example of a country where these measures have helped to curb illicit trade. 

Several informants felt it was important that industry not be involved in the choice of technology for the track and trace system. This is the approach required by the WHO which argues against all self-control systems and instructs contact with the Tobacco industry to be limited to that strictly necessary for implementation. Both TISA and FITA are, however, lobbying for close consultation on the form that track and trace systems take. Likewise, implicit in the success of a track and trace system is the restitution of SARS. Having a track and trace system operated by a decimated tax administration would not work. Hiring new tax officials and strengthening the capacity and ethics inside SARS are important administrative measures, without which any accounting system would be compromised.

In the same vein, high-level political support for cigarette manufacturers will also need to be withdrawn. The crucial policies and laws to ensure this lie in different direction: combating corruption and ensuring the separation of personal interests from the exercise of public office. This means strengthening the performance of the Financial Intelligence Centre, the Public Protector’s Office, and the use of the Public Financial Management Act. This infrastructure is in place and has been effective in the past—the test will lie in the Ramaphosa government’s willingness to use it. 

The assessment of the opportunities to address the illicit trade is, therefore, in the greater scheme of things favourable. There are a range of state and non-state actors in South Africa that can contribute to the response. A democratic framework has the potential to hold people committing criminal acts to account, while there are key policy and technological interventions which could reduce the difficulties the state faces regarding detection and monitoring. The key ingredient will be the political will to prioritize this issue and enact a full and impartial response. The political arena, unfortunately, also is where prospects for success may sour. 

With credit to Mafaro Kasipo and Michael McLaggan for research inputs, and Marco Magrin for research assistance

This working paper was supported through a grant from SICPA SA.

The post The illicit tobacco trade in Zimbabwe and South Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introducing the distinguished guest, Atlantic Council Vice President and Africa Center Director J. Peter Pham highlighted the magnitude of Mukwege’s work over the years, treating more than 85,000 women and girls since 1999 – 50,000 of whom have been survivors of sexualized violence – and doing so with a unique combination of medical treatment, psycho-social support, community reintegration, legal assistance to pursue justice, and advocacy.

In his remarks, Mukwege discussed the magnitude of gender-based violence in the DRC, touching on the two decades of work by the Panzi Hospital, a 450-bed facility in Bukavu, South Kivu, in the eastern part of the Congo, to combat the problem. He argued that wartime sexual violence should be banned under conventions similar to those regulating weapons of mass destruction and anti-personnel mines, with prescribed punitive measures against violators. He stated that pressure and action from the international community, including the imposition of targeted sanctions when appropriate, working in conjunction with those affected, was the only way to end the culture of impunity that facilitates gender-based violence in conflict areas and continues to destabilize the DRC.

Touching on the recent presidential, legislative, and provincial elections in the DRC, Mukwege expressed the hope that newly-inaugurated President Félix Tshisekedi would reverse the longstanding stance of denial that the previous regime took towards sexual violence and grant international aid workers necessary access to victims and clinics. He also called on the new president to combat corruption and prosecute the elites, corporations, and foreign powers whose predations have impoverished the Congolese people and stirred instability for too long.

A discussion followed his remarks in which participants engaged Mukwege on the recent elections, measures to combat impunity for sexual violence crimes, and the role of religious institutions and the international community as well as local stakeholders in the fight to end gender-based violence in conflict.

Among those in attendance and participating in the discussion were several high-level current and former US government officials as well as representatives of other think tanks as well as advocacy organizations.

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Reaction was swift. Civil society observers, among them the Catholic Church, and some foreign chanceries, made it clear that they considered the official vote count untrustworthy. Mathematics is on their side: statistical analysis of pre-election polling data shows a less-than 0.0000 percent chance that Tshisekedi could have performed as well as CENI says.

The sheer improbability of the election results lend credence to rumors of a political bargain struck between Kabila’s Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC) and Tshisekedi’s Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) to prevent a Fayulu victory.

The outlines of the alleged bargain between Kabila and Tshisekedi are grim:  in exchange for handing Tshisekedi the presidency, Kabila would agree to surrender the title but would not cede power to the opposition. (Kabila has even announced that he intends to continue living in the presidential palace, demoting the new president to the prime minister’s residence.) The promotion of an opposition candidate to the presidency—albeit through vote rigging —is also likely to divide the opposition, mute the outrage of the Catholic Church and international community, and weaken the legitimacy of Tshisekedi himself.

Tshisekedi cannot even take his own confirmation for granted—some in the ruling party have hinted that they might appeal the election results with the Constitutional Court, and Fayulu’s party announced it will do so. Tshisekedi is vulnerable on several counts: he did not fairly win the elections and more careful inspection of the data could further weaken the legitimacy of his victory. Belgian media also appear to have confirmed that Tshisekedi’s college diploma (a constitutional requirement to run for president) is a forgery. Even if Tshisekedi’s presidency survives these court challenges, he will be compromised beyond repair and reliant on Kabila, whose patronage network controls most of the country’s levers of power, including the security forces. This would be transition in name only.

Although the situation is likely to remain fluid for a while, it is already possible to draw some important lessons from these elections and use them to inform some scenarios for the future.

1. 1. Pressure works (sort of)

Kabila has once again made the best of a weak hand. But it is undoubtedly not the outcome that he wanted. He was forced to surrender to pressure. First, the Congolese street and civil society forced him into keeping the constitution. Second, the Western powers and Angola (which fears instability at its border), forced him to not to run for elections. Then Kabila himself blundered, in selecting the loyal but unelectable Shadary as his candidate. It was this combination of events that finally pushed Kabila out of the presidency, and the victory should be credited to the vibrancy of Congo’s democracy activists and to Western diplomacy.

2. 2. Kabila is likely to retain significant control (at least for now)

Even if confirmed in office, it is unlikely that Tshisekedi will be able to wrest control of the state from Kabila and his patronage networks. Provincial election results show that the ruling party performed well at the legislative level and will be strongly represented in the provincial assemblies. These provincial assemblies are key levers of power—they elect the members of the Senate, which is thus very likely to end up with an FCC majority. Moreover, because former presidents are senators for life, an FCC majority could well decide to elect Kabila as Senate president, making him the country’s “number two,” in an innovative reprise of the Putin-Medvedev model.

Kabila will probably also continue to control the presidential guard, the intelligence agency, and much of the police. The rest of the military is highly fragmented, but its elites are also in patronage relations with the Kabila regime. How could Tshisekedi wrestle control of these institutions away from Kabila?  He will have no real political authority over them and fewer resources to share with them than Kabila. As a result, he is more likely to be their hostage than their commander.

 That is not to say that Tshisekedi would not make some changes, on the margins. (We should expect greater civil liberties and lesser harassment of opponents, for example.) But Tshisekedi’s base in the Kasais will expect him to pursue the same patronage practices, and the dubious manner of his election will make him an unlikely purveyor of improvements in the rule of law and governance.

3. 3. Congo’s politics is transactional

The distinction between regime opponents and insiders has always been fluid in Congo. Kabila and the FCC are always willing to bend agendas and cut deals with rivals to expand their coalition and their power. Tshisekedi might have different policy goals, but he practices this same kind of politics. He happily betrayed his initial alliance with Moïse Katumbi and Fayulu in pursuit of the presidency, and his new alliance with Kabila is splintering the opposition. Sadly, the “Lamuka coalition” beween Fayulu, Katumbi and Jean-Pierre Bemba is also likely to fall pray to self-interest in the months ahead. They will no doubt remain in the opposition, but many of their lesser colleagues are likely to defect to the new regime in search of plunder.

4. 4. The credibility of the democracy-promotion agenda is at risk

International reactions to the election results have been subdued. Some western powers have expressed concern over the accuracy of the results but others have been more circumspect.  Most have “taken note” of the results while urging all parties to follow due process. The African Union recognized that there may be issues with the “verdict of the ballot boxes,” but also called for due judicial process.

Foreign officials are rightfully rejoicing that all hell hasn’t broken lose in the Congo—so far. (They should perhaps remember that the Kenyan people did not take to the streets when questionable election results were announced in 2007, either—they took to the streets days and days later, when it became clear that the international community and Kenyan institutions didn’t plan to challenge them.) They are hamstrung by fear that challenging Tshisekedi’s victory might give Kabila an excuse for staying on. That would be the worse of two evils: but it would not justify a decision by the Western powers to legitimate an electoral fraud.

Pierre Englebert is professor of African politics at Pomona College and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Lessons from Congo’s 2018 election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

African presidents have too often extended their elected terms time and again through dubious means, and many of us have come to believe that an incumbent-free election is the key to securing democratic consolidation in Africa. When Kabila announced he would not run for a third (and unconstitutional) term last August, there were sighs of relief across the country and abroad. Although he made short shrift of internal party democracy by unilaterally designating his successor, Kabila’s stepping down was seen as an unmistakable sign of progress and his choice of Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, an unimpressive former Interior Minister, left many hopeful that the opposition might finally have a shot at the presidency. (No election has ever been won by the opposition in Congo).

But the Congo government’s spurious disqualification of popular opposition candidates and the regime’s increasingly desperate attempts to prevent those remaining from campaigning – including by shooting at some of them – demonstrate that Kabila not only intends to retain as much power as possible, but that he intends to turn Congo’s elections into a sham. The fact that his regime’s anti-democratic exactions have received only mild condemnation from Western chanceries is further cause for concern. 

Shadary cuts a paltry figure, and it is undoubtedly this weakness, coupled with his proven loyalty, that endears him to Kabila. Although Shadary has been a sometimes-feared enforcer of the regime (for which the European Union put him under sanctions), he has no popular political base of his own, and is unlikely to wrestle free from Kabila’s shadow. An ethnic Bangubangu from Maniema province, he is junior in the tribal structure to Kabila (whose mother is Bangubangu), and is also less popular in his own province than another local son, former Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo. The Western sanctions on Shadary would also make it hard for him to play Kabila’s old game of pitting the international community against his benefactor once he comes to power.

Kabila also seems determined to stay in control of the ten thousand-strong presidential guard, most of whom are from his father’s Katanga region, and are more likely to keep Shadary hostage than to protect him. Kabila also recently consolidated his power by appointing allies to high-ranking military posts, and many in Congo suspect that his brother and sister, both of whom are members of parliament, might end up with strategic ministerial portfolios. All evidence indicates that Kabila wants to remain the ultimate arbiter of the political game, as suggested by his rather ironic official designation as “moral authority” of the majority. Recent declarations he has made to some Western media also point to his ambition to come back to the presidency before too long.

Kabila’s plan has only one huge drawback: Shadary is almost certain to lose a free and fair election. Not only does he barely draw 16 percent of support across the country in polls, but he is even unpopular among many members of the presidential majority – a largely transactional coalition of elites and parties that the regime maintains through massive patronage and corruption. Shadary’s campaign appearances draw smaller crowds than his opponents’, despite the state machinery at his disposal, his financial hand-outs to participants, and the near monopoly of state media in his favor. Recently he had to cancel an appearance in Tshikapa, Kasai province, as protests got out of control.

Two of Shadary’s most credible opponents, Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Equateur region and Moïse Katumbi of Katanga, have been banned from running by the regime-controlled electoral commission and superior court. But they have agreed with a few other luminaries to support the lesser-known candidacy of Martin Fayulu. A man of political integrity and courage, Fayulu hails from the swing province of Kwilu and had the support of only 8 percent of Congo’s voters before the opposition unified behind him. But he may now be able to add Bemba and Katumbi’s probable 40 percent of the electorate to his own.

In fact, the government seems to have greatly underestimated Fayulu, whose campaign has taken on unexpected momentum. Belatedly, Kabila’s regime seems to have realized its error, and is now doing all it can to sabotage his campaign and the integrity of the broader election process. Most recently, the government ordered the suspension of all political campaign events in Kinshasa on security grounds, just hours before a scheduled rally by Fayulu in Sainte-Therese Square. The government has also refused to authorize South African aircraft leased by Fayulu’s campaign to enter Congolese airspace, citing safety reasons (a newfound concern, given Congo’s dismal aviation safety record). The government has also repeatedly prevented Fayulu from landing in towns where he was scheduled to hold campaign meetings. Last week, security forces repeatedly fired to prevent Fayulu’s campaign procession from reaching a rally, forcing him to lie on the floor of his car for two hours and allegedly killing two of his supporters. The regime is also trying to pin blame on Fayulu for a warehouse fire in Kinshasa that destroyed a large number of voting machines. (It has not explained why Fayulu would wish to deflate the vote in the capital, which is a hotbed of the opposition.) Only Fayulu’s confusing message about electronic voting—which he first opposed and then acceded to this past week—could deflate his support on election day. 

The rivalry between Kabila and Bemba-Katumbi through their designated candidates has somewhat eclipsed the campaign of Felix Tshisekedi of Kasai. Tshisekedi had initially supported the united opposition front, but bailed from the agreement after discovering that he would not be its candidate. Tshisekedi has the backing of the formidable machinery of the UDPS opposition party founded by his father Etienne, but he does not have the late man’s popularity or his firm hand over the party itself. Tshisekedi might garner 20 percent of the vote on his own, and might pick up another 10 percent from the supporters of Vital Kamerhe of South Kivu, a former Kabila ally who switched to the opposition in 2009 and has now thrown his support to Tshisekedi. This splitting of the opposition vote has made an opposition victory less certain – but it does not appear to have stopped Fayulu’s momentum.

It now only remains to be seen whether the elections will actually take place on December 23. Despite the regime’s reassurances that the election will proceed, the electoral commission seems woefully unprepared and the voting equipment is still a long way from being fully deployed across Congo’s territory. Moreover, the alleged warehouse arson, which destroyed some 8,000 voting machines in Kinshasa last week, does not help, and raises the worrying possibility that the government may cancel the elections on technical grounds – a possibility that becomes more likely if Shadary were to slip further and further behind in the polls, making it less and less possible for the government to credibly rig the vote.

If the government does cancel the elections, or if it dares to declare an improbable victory by Shadary, mob violence is likely. The regime seems to be banking on its ability to repress this violence – but it could be wrong. Indeed, four days before the poll, widespread disorder appears to be the most-likely outcome of Congo’s election.

But what is the best-case scenario?

It is true that many (though not all) of Congo’s opposition politicians are no better than the incumbents, and most are liable to collaborate with the regime at any moment for jobs and resources. From the point of view of Congo’s voters, the opposition is unlikely to provide the break of corruption and patronage that they have longed to see. From the point of view of democratic consolidation, however, a peaceful transition of political power at the ballot box holds real value. It could set the precedent that will determine Congo’s future.

Kabila’s desperate efforts to stop the European Union from renewing its sanctions against Shadary, and his regime’s irate reaction to their passage, shows how hungrily Congo’s government craves legitimacy and approval, despite all its posturing about sovereignty. Even as the elections devolve into a charade, we believe there is room for further pressure. After exploiting Congo for so long, the international community owes the Congolese people a more fulsome demonstration of support.

Pierre Englebert is H. Russell Smith Professor of International Relations at Pomona College and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

George Kasongo Kalumba is Assistant Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Lubumbashi. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Congo’s election sham appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The world’s most ubiquitous symbol of wealth is fueling the decades-long conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, policy experts said at the Atlantic Council in Washington on October 24. Militias and warlords are selling gold to fund their military activities and political control in eastern Congo and their illicit trade is not just flowing to the black market, but “may be coming here to the United States as well as Europe,” Sasha Lezhnev, deputy director of policy for the Enough Project, explained.

“Gold has always been a bit challenging” to protect against illicit trade, Hillary Amster, senior program manager for the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA), said. “Gold is easy to smuggle, easy to exchange, can be used as currency, and is really malleable—you can melt gold in your kitchen.” Importantly for smugglers, “it is very east to portray gold that might be mine gold (from militias) as just scrap gold” to smelters and refiners, according to Amster.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a vast country in south-central Africa with more than eighty million inhabitants, has been embroiled in conflict since the ouster of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. After a six-year civil war involving most of the DRC’s neighbors, the eastern regions of the country have remained in perpetual conflict.

According to Lezhnev, the DRC’s vast mineral and gold wealth “are not the reasons the conflict began, but they are a significant contributor to fueling the conflicts and allowing them to continue,” by providing sanctioned militia and government leaders with financing. Lezhnev cited data from the International Peace Information Service estimating that more than seventy percent of gold miners in eastern Congo “work in gold mines under the control of armed groups.”

Gold not only benefits rebel and militia leaders but is part of “a deliberate strategy on behalf of certain individuals in the government—we call this strategy the violent kleptocracy system—which allows military commanders to become wealthy and for corrupt officials to profit as part of that,” Lezhnev said.

Lezhnev, who spoke at an Atlantic Council event launching a report by Enough’s partner The Sentry, called “The Golden Laundromat,” claimed that hundreds of US companies could have possibly received Congolese gold mined in conflict areas within their supply chains in 2017.

The focus of The Sentry’s report is a “specific corporate network,” Lezhnev explained, which sources gold from eastern Congo to Uganda and then transfers it to a company in Dubai that is an apparent affiliate of a major refinery in Europe. The gold may then be sold to companies in Europe, the United States, and around the world, according to 2018 corporate filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Amster argued that smelters and refiners are the crucial “linchpin” for addressing the illicit gold trade. There are only 330 smelters and refiners worldwide for tin, tantalum, and gold, Amster argued, making it easier to monitor these entities. Amster added that “this is where in the supply chain the materials become indistinguishable” from other source material, making it the last point in the production process where illicit gold can be accurately identified.

Amster’s Responsible Business Alliance is one of a collection of industry groups that helps businesses monitor due diligence compliance among smelters and refiners to ensure that their products do not contain illicit gold. Substantial progress has been made, Amster argued, as 101 of the world’s 156 identified gold refiners have undergone an assessment with RBA or another industry group. Growing awareness amongst industries, especially in the jewelry business, is also pushing these companies to better limit their exposure to conflict gold, Amster said, without passing on the cost to consumers.

Many of these companies, according to Amster, recognize that avoiding illicit gold “is the cost of doing business.”

Bronwyn Bruton, the Atlantic Council’s director of programs and studies and deputy director at the Africa Center who moderated the event, contrasted attempts to spread awareness of illicit gold smuggling to the high-profile campaign on Africa’s “blood diamonds” in the early 2000s, questioning the potential of illicit gold to garner the kind of awareness that conflict diamonds have generated.

Lezhnev nevertheless stated these positive steps represent a “total 180-degree difference from where we were ten years ago,” but cautioned that more must be done. “There need to be network sanctions against both the companies and the beneficial owners and directors of these companies” who knowingly accept and smelt or refine illicit gold, Lezhnev said.

On the bright side, “there are now sixty gold mines in eastern Congo that are certified as conflict-free,” Lezhnev said, and “that number is growing.” But these gold mines suffer from “one of the highest gold tax rates in the world,” and from a lack of legal title to the mines they operate in. These government policies severely hamper legitimate business as “you can just put [gold] in your pocket, cross the border, and you are going to pay zero tax,” Lezhnev said.

J. Peter Pham, vice president for research and regional initiatives and director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, noted that the DRC is “at a critical moment” with crucial elections two months away. Without stopping the support for the illicit gold trade, the incentives for various Congolese actors to support peace and stability will be few and far between.

The world must do more to stop its indirect support for the conflict in Congo, Enough’s Managing Director Brad Brooks-Rubin said, “so that the Congolese people will no longer be the losers for having such a robust amount of resources, especially gold, within their borders.”

David A. Wemer is assistant director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

The post ‘Conflict gold’ fueling war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Atlantic Council Vice President and Africa Center Director Dr. J. Peter Pham welcomed guests and stressed the event’s timeliness, just two months before the country’s long-overdue elections. Enough Project Managing Director Brad Brooks-Rubin outlined the scale and scope of the gold trade and the numerous approaches that have been developed to stem the flow of conflict gold. In particular, he underscored how the international community has changed its approach to conflict minerals in recent years, shifting from policies and regulations aimed at banning trade in goods financing conflict entirely to due diligence and risk-based approaches. Brooks-Rubin argued that information and political will are key to the success of these new approaches, and while a lot has been done to clean up the gold trade, far too many armed groups continue to profit from it.

A discussion, moderated by Africa Center Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton, followed Brooks-Rubin’s remarks and featured Enough Project Deputy Director of Policy Sasha Lezhnev and Responsible Business Alliance Senior Program Manager Hillary W. Amster.

Lezhnev provided an overview of the report, highlighting a specific corporate network and the ways in which it appears to have refined illegally-smuggled conflict gold from eastern DRC at the African Gold Refinery in Uganda. He further outlined the many ways in which this corporate network appears to be noncompliant with international due diligence and anti-money laundering (AML) frameworks, raising several AML red flags outlined by the Financial Action Task Force, and offered recommendations to governments, companies, and consumers. In particular, Lezhnev recommended:

1.       Network sanctions against companies involved in the conflict gold trade, their corporate networks, and their beneficial owners. He noted that both the new trading network and the rival one that immediate proceeded is important, otherwise one may simply replace the other, and the important point is to build up the legitimate, conflict-free trade;

2.       Anti-money laundering measures, including advisories, to identify conflict gold from the Great Lakes region and/or from certain traders as a class of transactions that would be of primary money laundering concern;

3.       Enhanced scrutiny from banks and other gold purchasing companies when dealing with gold refining and trading companies.

Amster spoke about the Responsible Minerals Initiative within the Responsible Business Alliance and its work to provide tools and resources to companies that support due diligence and responsible sourcing of gold and other minerals from conflict areas. She noted that the processing, smelting, and refining process is often the pinch point in the gold supply chain as the materials become largely indistinguishable when purified gold is produced. Amster further acknowledged that the companies involved in the refining process are often the most difficult to audit and do not necessarily feel the same consumer pressure that a jewelry company might as they sit higher up in the supply chain.

In the discussion that followed, panelists discussed ways to incentivize responsible gold sourcing and the role of consumers in applying pressure on actors operating in the upstream and the downstream of the global gold trade.

Among those in attendance were H.E. Mull Sebujja Katende, Ambassador of the Republic of Uganda, Lieutenant General William Ward, former commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), and a number of US and non-US government officials, business leaders, and civil society representatives.

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While CAR’s military, the Forces Armées Centrafricains, or FACA, is retrained by a European Union (EU) force known as EUTM RCA, MINUSCA acts as CAR’s primary guarantor of security in a country overrun by competing rebel groups.  Unfortunately, these cuts could not come at a worse time. Faced with increasing religious violence, the mission has come under critical strain in recent months according to UN Special Representative Parfait Onanga-Anyanga. 

Despite impending budget shortfalls, MINUSCA, along with EUTM RCA, still remains the best hope for restoring peace, order, and state control in CAR. The alternative of continued conflict and unrest, increasingly offered by Russia, will likely perpetuate cycles of exploitation and violence that have plagued CAR since its independence from France in 1960. To retain influence and trust, MINUSCA and the European community are in dire need of a new strategy to deter violence and bolster security capabilities to protect civilians.       

CAR’s current status as arguably one of the world’s most-forgotten crises has roots in its history. After France colonized the country in the 1890s, private companies were offered concessions to quickly exploit CAR’s mineral resources for profit. Independence did little to change CAR for the better.  Since 1960, the country has seen no less than five military coups and long suffered under brutal dictators, many of whom kept up the same exploitative practices to fund lavish lifestyles and ceremonies. At the same time, the largely underequipped and underfunded FACA was left unchecked to commit gross violations against CAR citizens while the country’s Muslim minority population, concentrated in its mineral-rich northeast, was increasingly marginalized by Bangui.           

Persistent cycles of exploitation and violence thus created the conditions for CAR’s current crisis in 2013. That year, Muslim-dominated rebel groups from northeastern CAR, collectively known as the Séléka, seized the capital of Bangui and ousted President François Bozizé. While the uprising was initially based on political disputes, the conflict soon took on religious and sectarian undertones. Without effective leadership, Séléka fighters looted and committed atrocities, often targeting the majority Christian population. As Christian militias known as the Anti-Balaka formed in response, the country descended into civil war with both sides taking advantage of internal mineral trade profits to commit atrocities against civilians. 

Rather than see another humanitarian catastrophe on the scale of Rwanda, France and the African Union (AU) led separate UN-authorized military interventions to stabilize CAR’s fragile security situation. By July 2014, they were largely successful, with leaders of the Séléka and Anti-Balaka agreeing to a tentative ceasefire. However, a hastily-assembled interim government under the leadership of Catherine Samba-Panza remained ineffective and unable to project power outside of Bangui without international assistance. As if to underscore CAR’s sorry state of affairs, some former military officers were even able to gain ministerial appointments after forming their own rebel movements against Samba-Panza’s transitional government. 

On top of these challenges, AU and French forces were plagued by allegations of human rights and sexual abuse, damaging their credibility with the very civilians they were deployed to protect. 

When the UN assumed peacekeeping responsibilities from the AU in 2014, some positives were seen. Peacekeepers undoubtedly helped save lives during an outbreak of violence in Bangui in September 2015. Additionally, much to the surprise of outside observers, UN troops helped see peaceful elections held in December 2016. 

MINUSCA, however, has not been without setbacks. Blue helmets have been accused of sexual abuse, bias in favor of Muslim rebel groups, and failing to adequately protect civilians. The withdrawal of French forces in 2016 has undoubtedly left the mission overextended. MINUSCA today has fewer peacekeepers than were once deployed to Liberia to execute a similar mandate, yet is responsible for a territory over five times as large. Meanwhile, armed groups currently control over 80 percent of CAR’s territory while government power remains concentrated practically only in Bangui.    

MINUSCA’s struggles are a microcosm of CAR’s history of foreign interventions. Since 1997 CAR has hosted nearly a dozen military missions, even being named the world champion of peacekeeping by AFP in 2014. A common theme in the country’s various interventions has been a focus on short-term goals for exit and avoiding over-commitment. France’s recent Operation Sangaris is emblematic of this trend, with the mission being named after a short-lifespan African butterfly to symbolize the temporary nature of Paris’ involvement. Naming conventions aside, such a myopic focus in military operations leads to inaction among peacekeeping troops and persists with MINUSCA today. 

Nevertheless, MINUSCA and EUTM RCA are the best option for helping CAR reassert state authority and improving its security sector. The mere presence of combat-ready peacekeepers has been repeatedly shown to better-protect civilian lives, with interventions often reducing both the intensity and duration of conflicts. Moreover, EUTM RCA’s training program has seen FACA elements slowly redeployed to help bolster UN forces in key areas of CAR.

But regardless of the positives MINUSCA and EUTM RCA bring to CAR, both require a more robust character in order to regain credibility and better-protect CAR’s civilians. In the absence of serious doctrinal change, countries with questionable intentions and human rights records like Russia are stepping in to fill the security void. Although CAR’s government has been willing to accept any and all foreign support, Russia’s goal of trading security, arms, and military training for mineral exploitation rights will only see CAR again become plagued by cycles of violence and exploitation. Likewise, as armed groups threaten CAR’s ongoing justice and peace process, Russian engagement with rebel groups to share mining revenue will only see peace delayed and violence against civilians continue.

Drawing upon lessons learned from past peace operations in Africa, MINUSCA must employ a robust doctrine and force posture to rebuild credibility. Given the importance of minerals in fueling violence throughout CAR’s history, MINUSCA can best achieve desired political effects on the ground by targeting armed groups’ control of mineral mines and illicit trade. While the UN has previously attempted to sanction the trade of CAR’s minerals, these efforts have largely been unsuccessful. Armed groups still derive a large profit from the internal mineral trade.  From just one mine, rebels have been able to control the production of over 2,500 grams of gold per day. Through patrolling and policing major mining sites, MINUSCA can chip away at CAR’s war economy, handicapping the capacity of militants to hurt civilians. 

Employing MINUSCA’s blue helmets in this fashion would not be without precedent. MINUSCA forces have used attack helicopters to disperse militia fighters outside of Bambari to preemptively stop attacks against civilians in the past. Such an action would also adhere to recommendations that UN forces should not shy away from tactical offensive operations to put potential spoilers to political peace processes on notice.

However, as recent fighting around Bambari and Bangui has shown, MINUSCA cannot yet go it alone and still requires the support of international partners. In this regard, the extension of EUTM RCA’s mandate is positive as it shows CAR’s internal security is still of interest to Europe. By utilizing the leverage gained from the extension of EUTM’s mandate, combined with recent EU commitments to bolster African security in Mali, MINUSCA and EUTM RCA can push for new, much-needed support. This should include a request for much-needed strategic airlift, resupply, and aeromedical evacuation support that could be coordinated by the European Air Transport Command to assist in the deployment and sustained operations of peacekeepers outside of Bangui.

Of course, MINUSCA cannot rely solely on the hope of EU assistance, nor the UN to grant a broader offensive mandate. The European community has differing priorities, and expanded peacekeeping mandates are politically contentious and face many hurdles in being approved. 

What MINUSCA can do in the interim, however, is focus on generating new capabilities using key, well-equipped contingents to coerce spoilers to CAR’s peace process to cease illicit activities and harming civilians. MINUSCA can, and must, maintain faithful to the core tenets of peacekeeping while acting decisively and persuasively to address the growing threat of actors actively looking to undermine peace and disarmament efforts in CAR. Absent reforms in doctrine, strategy, and force-multiplying capabilities, CAR’s troubling history of violence and manipulation could be set to continue, only this time under the banners of competing militant groups and Russia.

Andrew Carroll is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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In the early hours of August 3, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission announced that current president Emmerson Mnangagwa won the election with 50.8% of the vote, avoiding a potential run-off. The election was the first one not featuring former president Robert Mugabe in more than four decades.

Mnangagwa’s party, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union – Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) also won more than two-thirds of the seats in the country’s parliament. Mnangagwa was a long time political ally of former President Mugabe, but was part of the effort to oust him last November and then took over as interim president.

Mnangagwa’s primary challenger, Nelson Chamisa of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance has refused to acknowledge the result of the presidential contest and his party allies have alleged that they cannot verify the accuracy of the announced totals. Zimbabwe’s capital of Harare was rocked by protests and street action from Chamisa’s supporters, and police and military reaction resulted in the death of at least six people.

Dr. J Peter Pham discussed the election results and the unrest in Zimbabwe in an interview with the New Atlanticist’s David Wemer. Here are excerpts from the interview.

Q: President Mnangagwa was able to successfully avoid a run-off in the presidential election. Was this expected?

Pham: There was always a question of whether he would avoid the run-off, and what the effect of the almost two dozen candidates running in the race would be. I don’t think anyone had any doubts – except perhaps Nelson Chamisa – that Emmerson Mnangagwa would come out on top of the poll. In addition to the advantages of incumbency – never to be underestimated, especially in Africa – Mnangagwa benefited from Zanu-PF’s long-established patronage networks which were mobilized for the campaign as well as its consistent base among rural people who make up two-thirds of the population. The opposition MDC Alliance’s best chance in this election  was if the incumbent failed to clear the 50 percent threshold, thus triggering  a run-off in which  everyone would then unite against the candidate of Zanu-PF, the ruling party for the last almost four decades. But that didn’t come to pass according to the  announced results. There is no need for run-off because,  if the numbers given by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission are to be believed, there is a fairly wide margin – more than 300,000 votes –  separating President Mnangagwa and the closest challenger, Mr. Chamisa.

Q: The four-day delay by the Electoral Commission in announcing results has raised questions about the election’s legitimacy. Was this a fair election?

Pham: The delay, and certainly the lack of any consistent and credible explanation for it, fed all sorts of speculation  among opposition supporters on what might be happening – and this was quite understandable given the already-high level of mistrust in the system after decades of authoritarian rule under former president Robert Mugabe. Although this was probably the most open election Zimbabwe has seen in decades, the state media – which is about the only media left in Zimbabwe after years of repression as well as economic stagnation – covered Mr. Mnangagwa overwhelmingly, leaving at best 10 percent of its coverage to his challengers. So there was an imbalance in media coverage and arguably an imbalance in resources available to conduct campaigns.  So one could argue that while perhaps procedurally the conduct of the poll was more open than it has been in a long time in Zimbabwe, there were some structural issues that certainly were to the advantage of the incumbent and the disadvantage of the twenty-two challengers vying to unseat him. That being said, however, one has to also acknowledge, the opposition did not help itself by splintering.

Q: Why did the opposition splinter? What effect did this have on the results?

Pham: Nelson Chamisa jumped over several people who were more senior to him within the MDC to take over the leadership of the party after the death of longtime leader Morgan Tsvangirai. That – and the fact that he was maneuvering for the position while Mr. Tsvangirai was battling the colorectal cancer that he eventually succumbed to earlier this year – didn’t sit well with a number of longtime party leaders, including Dr. Thokozani Khupe who was the vice president of the party and a former deputy prime minister [during the 2009-2013 Zanu-PF and MDC unity government]. She ran on her own ticket as the “MDC-T” party – the T stood for “Tsvangirai” – and that siphoned off votes from Chamisa in a number of constituencies.

We saw this play out in the parliamentary vote too where – due to the firstpast-the-post system where you don’t need 50 percent – in some cases the opposition parties cancelled each other out. For example, in Bulawayo South, where the opposition usually dominates, two opposition candidates – one aligned with Mr. Chamisa, while the other running on Dr. Khupe’s ticket – cancelled each other out and the Zanu-PF candidate, Raj Mod, made it was elected to parliament. In Goromonzi West, the colorfully-named Zanu-PF candidate Energy Mutodi beat out opposition candidates from various MDC factions who split the opposition vote among themselves. The MDC Alliance was so dysfunctional that in four different constituencies Mr. Chamisa’s ticket didn’t run one but two people for the same seat; not surprisingly, these candidates cancelled each other out.

Q: Reports say at least six people have died during clashes between police and opposition supporters. What caused these oppositon demonstrations to turn violent?

Pham: The loss of life, the injury, the harshness with which the protestors were dealt with by not only the police but also the military, is very serious and raises some really worrisome indicators. It certainly doesn’t project the image President Mnangagwa wants as he tries to lead Zimbabwe into a new chapter. Certainly the government must be held responsible for failing to restrain its forces. On the other hand, I think the opposition was behaving irresponsibly as well. One day after the election – even before the election commission had an opportunity to begin tabulating the results – Nelson Chamisa was already declaring himself the winner of the election. That got his supporters excited and out into the streets celebrating and [then] when there was a delay in announcing the results, these people became convinced that the election was being stolen. There may or may not have been legitimate reasons for this delay, but the electoral commission didn’t explain it well enough, so it left people to fear the worst.

The opposition [then] had people not only protesting, but by most accounts from independent observers, it was the opposition mobs that turned violent first,  throwing rocks and other objects at the headquarters of the Zanu-PF in Harare. Now, the [police and military] response may have been disproportionate, but it was the protestors who started it by stoning the building while their political opponents were inside. So in many respects I think the opposition leadership has more than a bit of responsibility for inciting people and must bear at least part of the onus the resulting consequences.

Q: What role did Nelson Chamisa play in the opposition’s defeat?

Pham: Nelson Chamisa is a very complex character. His calling of voters into the streets, and proclaiming himself the winner when all ballots hadn’t even been counted yet, much less tabulated – that was just the latest of his many very eccentric statements during the course of this campaign. In January, he made an outlandish claim that he had met with President Trump and that the United States was prepared to invest $15 billion in Zimbabwe if [Chamisa] was elected president. The US embassy had to come out with a clarification that Chamisa had never met President Trump and there was no US investment commitment.

During the campaign he also got into a social media tussle with Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, who is the current chairman of the African Union. Mr. Chamisa claimed that when he was minister of technology in the unity government, he gave Mr. Kagame the idea of a digital economy, which the Rwandan president has implemented with some success in his country. That was hyperbolic to put it mildly. Some of his campaign promises were also clearly over the top. He promised that if he were elected the Olympics would come to Zimbabwe and that he was going to build a bullet train across the country. Of course, one might expect such a sense of personal grandeur from someone who uses the hashtag #Godisinit for his political campaign.

If President Mnangagwa has a checkered past, Chamisa had his own faults as well and these didn’t help in this election.

Q: Before this election, many observers thought this election would provide an opportunity for Zimbabwe to rejoin the international community after years of isolation. Will the protests and violence put this in jeopardy?

Pham: Everyone has got to take a deep breath after all of this. The Election Commission has announced results and people need to check the results against observer tallies. This is of course the first election in years that Zimbabwe has not only allowed but invited international observers, from the Commonwealth, the United States, the European Union, and the African Union, among other delegations. The observers will need to compare their notes of what they saw with the published tallies, which I urge the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to publish as soon as possible. A lot will depend on that process of review and how President Mnangagwa deals with what I would call the provocations in the coming days from the protestors and others. It will also depend on a bit of statesman-like behavior, or lack there of, on the part of the opposition.

Q: What will President Mnangagwa need to focus on first as he begins his next term?

Pham: He first and foremost must in the time between now and his inauguration – the date of which is not set – act like the president of the entire country, and try his best to heal some of the rifts that have opened up and, both literally and figuratively, put out some of the fires that have been stoked in recent days. On the other hand he has to avoid the temptation of – and the international community should avoid the silliness of insisting on – a unity government. The fact is that unity governments – the co-habitation of winner and loser – have not delivered very good results, as evidenced not only with Zimbabwe’s prior attempt at it as well as the experience of other places like Kenya. So-called unity governments may buy a little time and lower the political temperature temporarily by distributing spoils, but they also incentivize people to behave badly when they lose. They may think by shouting the loudest, threatening the most,  they can get through third-party mediation  what they didn’t get at the ballot box.

Also for Mr. Mnangagwa, it is incumbent on him to really show in more than just words that he is no longer Mugabe’s right hand man. This is someone who stood by Mugabe’s side for decades and in fact is still under US sanctions for his role in cracking down on the opposition in the early 2000s quite brutally, by commanding mobs that beat up on opposition supporters and intimidated voters. There must be a clear break with that past, not a slow return to it.

David A. Wemer is assistant director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

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Mugabe stepped down in the face of pressure from the military, his party, and the Zimbabwean people on November 21, 2017, even as impeachment proceedings got underway in parliament.

Zimbabwe, which Mugabe transformed from southern Africa’s bread basket to a basket case, now stands at a critical inflection point.

Mugabe’s successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), is in a close race with Nelson Chamisa of the Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance (MDC-Alliance). In all, twenty-three candidates are running for the presidency.

J. Peter Pham, vice president for research and regional initiatives and director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, discussed in an interview with the New Atlanticist’s Ashish Kumar Sen why this election is so important. Here are excerpts from our interview.

Q: This is the first election in Zimbabwe in more than three decades in which Robert Mugabe is not on the ballot. Is Mugabe at all a factor in this election?

Pham: Although he is not on the ballot, Mugabe’s absence looms large over the election. This is both because the voters have the opportunity now to move beyond the dictator who made their lives such a nightmare and because some parts of the international community are willing to accept any reasonable outcome—since it will not be Mugabe—as long as this election beats the rather low bar of previous Zimbabwean elections.

Q: What opportunities await Zimbabwe if this election is free, fair, and credible?

Pham: Thanks to Mugabe’s poor governance and his appalling human rights record, Zimbabwe has fallen over the years progressively farther and farther behind where it was at the moment of its independence. This is a country that, as many people have said, has gone from being the bread basket of southern Africa to a basket case.

Farmers have been driven off their land, which has been given to cronies who know nothing about farming. In the process, white farmers and rural Zimbabweans who worked on these lands have both been impoverished, while the country and the region that depended on it went hungry.

The United Nations estimates conservatively that almost 30 percent of Zimbabwe’s population faces food insecurity. That number is going to rise during the season, which will come next January to March, before the next harvest.

Also, because of its behavior, the government of Zimbabwe has fallen progressively under sanctions—not just Mugabe himself, but also many of his close collaborators, including [Zimbabwean President] Emmerson Mnangagwa who has been on the US sanctions list since the George W. Bush administration for his role at that time in supporting Mugabe’s hold on power. As a result, we are unable to deal and engage with many of the officials in the government. The lifting of sanctions on the country and on individuals is predicated on a free and fair election. Until that happens, the sanctions remain in place and Zimbabwe will be unable to get debt relief or even clear its arrears to International Financial Institutions, which makes it difficult—if not altogether impossible—for the country to access credit markets to finance much-needed infrastructure without which an economic recovery is difficult to imagine.

Q: Has the international community dangled the prospect of lifting sanctions if Zimbabwe holds a free and fair election?

Pham: There is broad consensus that if the elections are free and fair, the international community will look to bring Zimbabwe in from the cold—lifting sanctions, trying to reintegrate it into the global political and economic order, giving it a soft landing.

The question is going to be: what is the standard for a free and fair election? On this there is going to be a discussion now and after the election. There are some who can be anticipated to endorse any election they have ever been to—here I speak of the African Union that rarely, if ever, criticizes an election it observes; even some of the worst polls get the stamp of approval. In 2008, when Mugabe lost the first round of the presidential election and used brute force to force his opponent to withdraw ahead of the second round, the AU literally welcomed him just days afterward to its summit.

Then there are countries that are, for various reasons, so desperate to lift sanctions there is a legitimate fear that they will accept as “free and fair” anything that doesn’t look like Zimbabwe 2013 or Zimbabwe 2008, which is a pretty low bar. Here I speak specifically of the British, for example, who have already pretty much tipped their hand. The United States and the European Union would do the Zimbabwean people a service by holding firm and insisting on a poll that, even if not perfect in every respect, at least can be said to reflect the will of the people.

Q: When we last discussed Zimbabwe you noted that Mugabe’s exit marked the beginning of a new chapter for Zimbabwe. How have things worked out for Zimbabwe and Emmerson Mnangagwa over the past eight months?

Pham: The climate in Zimbabwe clearly has changed. One has seen an election campaign—the first in almost two decades—that has been largely free of violence. That is a step forward and people’s expectations are very high.

But there are also some very troubling signs. There is the question of whether the military leadership, having carried out what was effectively a coup [to oust Mugabe in 2017], is willing  to cede power to others should the side it favors lose the election. There have also been worrisome indicators emerging about the electoral process itself. For example, instructions that went out to local authorities just days ago seem to have instructed  local election officials to turn polling booths turned around so people vote in full sight of everyone. There have also been questions about the cleanup of electoral rolls. The election commission has purged several hundred thousand people from the electoral rolls and adopted a biometric system to prevent people from registering and voting more than once. The actual rolls, however, have not been published and there are suspicions among some opposition leaders that there are still ghost voters on the rolls. Then there are accusations that local authorities are using food as a weapon to incentivize or threaten voters in rural areas.  There are also concerns about the placement of candidates’ names on the ballot—Mnangagwa notably appears at the top of the second of two unequal columns. People see this as the sign of a plot. I am not saying that it is necessarily the case, but one should err on the side of greater transparency to show that this election is truly free and fair.

The Zimbabwean constitution also mandates that all major candidates and parties be given equal access to state media, which is the dominant media in Zimbabwe these days because most of the free media was run off—or worse—by the Mugabe regime. Coverage to date, however, has been largely focused on the incumbent president with very little time given to the opposition candidates.

Q: What has Mugabe’s resignation meant for public support for his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)?

Pham: It is difficult to gauge. ZANU-PF clearly dominates the airwaves and print media because of the state control of these outlets. Furthermore, ZANU-PF, while it was the political arm of a dictatorship, was also a widespread and well-organized party. To what extent is its network delivering, one doesn’t know.

The fact that there are twenty-two candidates running against Mnangagwa does also split the opposition to a great extent, although in theory they could all rally around one person if in fact this goes to a runoff.

Q: What impact is the split in the ZANU-PF between the Generation 40, which supported Mugabe’s wife, Grace, for the role of party and state president and Lacoste, which supported Mnangagwa, likely to have on Mnangagwa’s election prospects?

Pham: As an incumbent, Mnangagwa has largely maintained control of the party apparatus. He clearly has the benefits of incumbency. In many respects, it is his election to lose.

For the opposition, longtime opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai died earlier this year. He was a figure who united the opposition. Most people acknowledge that he was cheated out of the presidency in 2008. After his death, the MDC itself splintered so badly that there were even scuffles at his funeral between supporters of different factions of the MDC.

Q: Mnangagwa and Nelson Chamisa of the MDC-Alliance appear to be running neck and neck. What are the prospects of a unity government?

Pham: I am very skeptical of unity governments. They are nice in theory, but the fact is that in most developed countries we would never accept or ask for them. And yet, we insist on forcing these untenable cohabitations on African and other developing countries as a quick way of defusing post-electoral crises so that we can “move on.” I think that’s a mistake.

Zimbabwe 2008 proved that about the only thing good that came out of the unity government was [opposition politician] Tendai Biti as finance minister: he succeeded in taming of the country’s hyperinflation by dollarizing the economy. Other than that, the unity government actually weakened Tsvangirai and the MDC because they became complicit in a  government that they did not completely control. The result was that the voters turned on them in the following election and, to be frank, they have yet to recover from that cohabitation with the devil. 

Kenya 2007—exact same issue; under international pressure, a unity government was created that didn’t work so well—except for the politicians who filled up the bloated cabinet.

What is much more important would be a free, fair election; the results accepted by most people as legitimate; and Zimbabweans moving on in whatever way they choose. Whether that happens next week remains to be seen.

Ashish Kumar Sen is deputy director of communications, editorial, at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @AshishSen.

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That very same day, some 9,000 kilometers to the south, in the small village of Umtata, in the remote eastern part of the Cape Province of what was then the Union of South Africa, a baby boy was born among the local Thembu people. The child was given the name Rolihlahla, which in the Xhosa colloquial meant “troublemaker”; in later years, the man would be affectionally known by his clan name, Madiba (it was only when he was seven and sent to a nearby Methodist mission school that his teachers would have him christened with the English name of “Nelson” and register the name of his grandfather as his surname). Who would have predicted that the child would not just survive, but, overcoming his rather modest beginnings (his father died when he was not even ten years old, leaving behind four wives, four sons, and nine daughters) as well as the many vicissitudes of his long life, cause a great deal of “trouble” for some of the great and powerful of this world—all without recourse to arms?

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela—Madiba—is rightly remembered as one of the great figures of the century that was virtually coterminous with his life. The dignity and magnanimity with which he led his beloved country’s transition from a racialist dictatorship to a democratic state alone would have secured his place in history, but it is the example of his broad vision and pragmatic approach that should perhaps constitute his most fitting legacy to those who will follow in the next hundred years.

At the trial in 1964 that saw him sentenced to life in prison, rather than trying to plead his case before a tribunal already rigged against him, he used what might well have been his last public speech to appeal instead to the court of international public opinion: “During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” And all through the ensuing twenty-seven years when he was kept isolated on a desolate island prison, he somehow remained steadfast in his conviction that, as he wrote in a prison memoir, “one day… all men, the exalted and the wretched of the earth, can live as equals.”

Mandela’s life underscored, however, that it is not enough to be a visionary: to make dreams a reality requires pragmatism. While still imprisoned, in 1988, he secretly offered to open negotiations with the apartheid regime and when, a year later, F.W. de Klerk took over from the hardline Afrikaner nationalist P.W. Botha, he found a negotiating partner with whom he could engage. In 1993, the two men shared the Nobel Peace Prize, and, in May 1994, Mandela was inaugurated as president of the new South Africa with de Klerk as one of his deputy presidents.

Even the much-admired Truth and Reconciliation Commission that Mandela’s government established and entrusted to Archbishop Desmond Tutu had a political expediency as well as a moral purpose. As the commission’s report concluded, while the apartheid regime was “the primary perpetrator of gross violations of human rights in South Africa,” the African National Congress (ANC) and its organs also “committed gross violations of human rights in the course of their political activities and armed struggles, for which they are morally and politically accountable.” The commission even concluded damningly that the ANC’s armed wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe, “ended up killing fewer security force members than civilians.” It was, therefore, useful that South Africans of all races be given an opportunity for memorialize the past without giving rise to mass prosecutions and the recriminations that would follow them.

In the quarter of a century since Mandela became president, respect for the rule of law and the protection of private property rights on the main have spared South Africa the trauma of neighboring Zimbabwe’s wholesale descent into basket-case status under the yoke, until late last year, of Robert Mugabe, a liberation-era leader definitely not endowed with either Mandela’s depth of humanity or his broadness of mind.

And, although Mandela could probably have been reelected indefinitely, his graceful exit in 1999 after serving just a single term in office helped to consolidate the young democracy—a lesson on good governance that was, alas, lost on his two immediate successors, both of whom were removed from office before they finished their second terms (although the fact that South Africa’s constitutional structures managed both transitions peacefully and relatively smoothly is yet another debt his country owes Mandela).

The accomplishments of post-apartheid South Africa are significant, not only in terms of the maintenance of constitutional order and democratic practice, but in the improvements to the day-to-day lives of millions whom the old regime had systematically marginalized. The lifting of sanctions imposed because of apartheid quickly doubled South Africa’s per capita gross domestic product, resulting in many black South Africans moving into the middle class. Up until the global recession in 2008, the country consistently posted positive (albeit all-too-modest) economic growth—a feat not many African countries north of South Africa could boast of two decades after their own independence. Yet, much remains to be done as the effects of the decades of institutional racism cannot be erased easily. Even as many blacks ascended to the commanding heights of the economy—current President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa, for example, rose from union organizer to be one of the richest individuals in South Africa—there persists high levels of unemployment and underemployment. Youth unemployment, especially in rural black communities, approaches 50 percent. Even more worrisome indicator is the persistently high and, indeed, increasing inequality: whether one prefers to measure the Gini coefficient or the Palma ratio, South Africa still comes in at the top of the charts for having the starkest income inequality in the world.

On the eve of the centenary, in Johannesburg’s Bidvest Wanderers Stadium, former US President Barack Obama delivered the annual Nelson Mandela Lecture to mark the occasion. He chose as his theme “Renewing the Mandela Legacy and Promoting Active Citizenship in a Changing World.” Later this year, Beyoncé, Jay-Z, and other A-list performers will join African artists like Femi Kuti and D’banj on stage in the same city to pay tribute to the legacy with a “Mandela 100” concert under the banner of “Be the Generation.” In addition to a recently-released anthology of 255 of Mandela’s inspiring (and hitherto mostly-unpublished) prison letters, enough other books about him have been published this year to deplete a small forest.

The tributes are, of course, quite fitting. However, Mandela’s grandeur consisted not of political posturing or virtue signaling, but in matching a greatness of soul capable of dreaming big with a wisdom of mind directed by political realism. That is a rare combination, one which his would-be heirs—both in South Africa and elsewhere—would do well to emulate.

J. Peter Pham is vice president of the Atlantic Council and director of its Africa Center.  

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One of the reasons for the increase from eleven to twenty-six provinces was to break up Katanga and deprive its governor, key Kabila opponent Moïse Katumbi, of his provincial base. Beyond such political expediency, however, this policy’s main effect has been to create ethnically homogeneous provinces. As Alma Bezares Calderon, Lisa Jené, and I write in a recent report for the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, up to eleven of Congo’s provinces are made up primarily of a single ethnic group. This is an increase from three provinces with a single ethnic group prior to this policy.

According to our estimates, the Ngbandi (the ethnic group of late dictator Mobutu Sese Seko) are now 59 percent of Nord-Ubangi’s population; well-known opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Ngbaka are 54 percent of Sud-Ubangi; the Tetela of independence hero Patrice Lumumba (and of current government spokesman Lambert Mendé) are 76 percent of Sankuru; the Yaka are 77 percent of Kwango; Kabila’s Lubakat (by his paternal grandfather) are 80 percent of Haut-Lomami, Felix Tshisekedi’s Luba are 82 percent of Kasai-Oriental, and the Mongo are 92 percent of Tshuapa.

None of these groups formed a majority in their previous provinces. For Congo as whole, the largest provincial groups now average 46 percent of their province’s population. This evolution has turned politics on its head. At the national level, heterogeneity dominates and no single group reaches 8 percent of the population.

Although “tribalism” has a bad name, this new trend is not necessarily a problem.  “Owning” a province might give local elites the incentive to develop it, and ethnic homogeneity can facilitate collective action. For many provinces, indeed, conditions cannot be worse than they have been.

A trip last month along 280 miles of “National Route #1” from Likasi to Kamina, in Haut-Lomami, took us twenty-two hours of continuous driving with a sturdy all-terrain vehicle, at an average of 13 miles an hour. Thank God it was the dry season! We saw more broken bridges and deep ditches than we could count, overturned and abandoned truck carcasses, and village after village of wretched poverty. Kabila’s “Revolution of Modernity,” a much vaunted development program that promised modern infrastructure, is but an empty slogan here. At the least, the Lubakat, who control 100 percent of the provincial government, have a shot at making things better for themselves.

Provincial tribalization also has its advantages for the regime. Inheriting power in their own province might make it more tolerable for some local elites not to have any in Kinshasa. And for citizens at the grassroots level, control of local institutions by their ethnic kin stands to legitimate the state. In a country where the voting instructions of local patrons carry weight, there will be electoral returns for the regime from the provincial break-up.

Yet, the new landscape also spells political danger. First, it creates significant instability in many provinces, as Kinshasa and provincial assemblies joust to control the selection of governors, who are crucial elements in Kinshasa’s strategy of local domination and resource extraction. Since 2015, there have been seventeen no-confidence votes against governors. These were sometimes orchestrated by Kinshasa to undermine exceedingly autonomous individuals, and sometimes by the provincial assemblies to push back against Kinshasa’s candidates. Either way, these motions consume local politics and leave little time for true governance. Most provinces have yet to pass any legislation.

The break-up of Congo’s provinces has also heightened the politics of exclusion. It has changed the nature of ethnic politics from a game of representation to a quest for monopoly. Historically, Congolese national and provincial governments have sought balance among ethnic groups. Even if your party was in the opposition, you could count on some ethnic kin being in a position of authority with access to resources. In a system where redistribution of resources along ethnic lines is a powerful norm, this system mattered.

Now, the elites of dominant ethnic groups are more likely to take over local institutions and keep others out. In every province that has an ethnic majority, the governor is now from that group. And in the former Katanga provinces where we did our field work, the representation of dominant groups in provincial institutions exceeds by far their demographic weight, implying that they squeezed others out of governance altogether. Thus, an increasing number of Congolese find themselves ethnically unrepresented in government, compounding their already deficient electoral representation.

Making things worse, the provincial reconfiguration has led to a rise in ethnic xenophobia. People who belong to ethnic groups that are deemed to be originally from a province (“sons of the soil”) increasingly claim that others do not have the same rights to local jobs and resources. Whatever the historical validity of such a determination, which derives from a mix of Belgian colonial practice and customary connection to the land, its practice tends to be highly arbitrary.

By our calculations, the provincial break-up has increased the number of Congolese who reside outside their province of “origin” by almost four million—for a total of about 20 percent of the population, who face increased vulnerability and exclusion from political representation and resource allocation. Similar autochthony demands have led to local conflict in Nigeria and caused full-fledged civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. Unless these preferences can be subdued by provincial authorities, they also threaten to have explosive consequences in Congo where violence already largely derives from exclusion and misery.

Pierre Englebert is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, and H. Russell Smith Professor of International Relations at Pomona College.

The post Below the surface, a game changer in Congolese politics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On Friday, July 13, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center hosted a conversation with Minister of Trade and Industry of the Republic of South Africa the Hon. Rob Davies.

In his prepared remarks, Davies discussed ways in which South Africa is looking to accelerate economic growth, trade, and investment on the African continent. He highlighted South Africa’s recent signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) at the African Union Summit in Mauritania as the first step in a larger drive to help African countries play a greater role in the global economy, uniting states with a combined GDP of more than two trillion dollars. Davies also emphasized South Africa’s desire to modernize its economy and education systems to effectively address future challenges, closing the skills gap to prepare for the the digital revolution and the rapid automation of labor. He concluded by reiterating South Africa’s desire to deepen its relations with American companies and strengthen a mutually beneficial economic relationship with the United States.  

A discussion, moderated by Atlantic Council Vice President and Africa Center Director Dr. J. Peter Pham, followed Davies’ remarks, which centered on the economic benefits of further regional integration, the need to modernize South Africa’s education system to improve economic empowerment, and the development of South Africa’s energy sector.

The South African delegation also included South African Ambassador to the United States H.E. Mninwa J. Mahlangu; Department of Trade and Industry Deputy Director-General Ms. Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter; and Departmental Spokesperson Mr. Sidwell Medupe. Also in attendance and participating in the discussion were Zimbabwean Ambassador to the United States H.E. Ammon Mutembwa, former US Ambassador to Niger Eunice Reddick, and a number of US and non-US government officials, business leaders, and civil society actors.

The post South African trade minister advocates for Africa’s greater role in the global economy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

CAR has suffered from waves of sectarian violence since 2013, after a collection of armed groups known as the Séléka seized control of the capital Bangui and overthrew the ruling government led by Francois Bozizé. Since that time, multiple peacekeeping missions and political dialogue efforts have attempted to restore stability to the country, but to little avail. Dukhan presented her research on the worsening of the crisis, the numerous armed factions and criminal enterprises operating in the country, their motivations, and the risks they pose to justice and peace efforts. She also discussed the emergence of new international actors in CAR, particularly Russia, and their attempts to garner influence in CAR and elsewhere in Central Africa through economic and defense cooperation.

The discussion, moderated by Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, Africa Center director of programs and studies and deputy director, followed Ms. Dukhan’s remarks and focused on coordination among armed groups, as well as policy instruments that could be used to restore institutions and the rule of law in the country.

The post Update on the security situation in the Central African Republic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

James Wholley was a program assistant with the Africa Center. Follow him on Twitter at @JamesWholley.

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Issues of minority recognition in Cameroon are rooted in the country’s post-colonial unification and long-standing tradition of sidelining the English-speaking minority’s language and customs. When the movement’s current manifestation emerged in late 2016, it did so through peaceful protests calling for a return to Anglophone-Francophone federalism. However, because of the government’s violent reaction to such demonstrations, the movement morphed into its present form. It is now more mainstream in reach, but more extreme in strategy.  

The shift in the movement’s ultimate goal—from power-sharing to secession—has subsequently changed its methodology. Now, life in the Northwest and Southwest Regions of Cameroon is characterized by fear as protests, curfews, security patrols, arrests, abductions, and killings occur daily. While the rebels’ strategy has become increasingly violent, the central government is equally  responsible for the many deaths and disappearances reported over the past six months.

Violence around Cameroon’s May National Day celebrations is a microcosm of the larger conflict. Expectedly, hostility stained the commemoration of the 46th anniversary of the country’s transition from a federal system—which equalized the French and English language, legal, and educational systems—to the Francophone-based unitary state system, approved by national referendum in 1972. While Francophones celebrated the May 20 holiday in Yaoundé with a parade and speeches, Anglophone secessionists boycotted festivities, kidnapped local leaders, and murdered several police officers. Then, later in the week, several dozen so-called “terrorists” were killed by security forces in the Northwest Region. This retaliation not only added to the number of casualties, but also signaled that the government is willing to strike back.

Reports since October 2017 indicate that a high number of civilians and secessionists—allegedly over one hundred— have died in clashes with government troops, in addition to the hundreds arrested. Meanwhile, rebels have reportedly killed at least forty government personnel, and have abducted, held, and tortured scores of local leaders, teachers, government supporters, and security agents.

The fighting has also led to substantial displacement. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, more than 160,000 people have been displaced within Cameroon since 2016. At the end of March, the United Nations Refugee Agency reported that over 20,000 refugees have fled into neighboring Nigeria, with more than half arriving in 2018 alone.

The use of violent tactics by marginalized populations agitating for political rights and representation showcases a systemic problem within authoritarian countries. While many similar movements begin peacefully, brutal governmental reactions often follow. In many cases, governmental overreaction signals that peaceful mobilization will be fruitless and provides an opening for a movement’s more radical members.

In Cameroon, peaceful protests in late 2016 were met with repression, resulting in the existing situation and placing responsibility for the violence squarely on the shoulders of the central government. The government’s violent reaction—coupled with its unwillingness to negotiate with Anglophone leaders or compromise its current policies—forced a subset of the Anglophone movement to conclude that no recourse was available except violence of their own. While it is unclear how representative these violent groups are of the larger Anglophone movement, it is dangerous for anyone in an opposition movement to resort to violence; such a strategy ultimately provides repressive governments an opening to label the entire movement as “terrorists” or “dissidents” and to ignore those peacefully advocating for their rights. 

As a result, while there are many Anglophones who sympathize with the movement’s original intent, the violence has created a situation in which citizens are forced to choose: support the Cameroonian state and continue to be marginalized, or support the “Ambazonians” and risk being deemed a terrorist. The high levels of displacement suggest that picking sides is more dangerous than fleeing.

Whether it evolves into a full scale civil war and humanitarian disaster or not, the current conflict triggers questions regarding the legitimacy of the Anglophone movement. Before the movement resorted to violence, the Francophone government’s crackdown on Anglophone protesters was viewed as authoritarian repression against innocent civilians seeking a break from long-standing marginalization. Although peaceful methods did not help them to accomplish their goals, the Anglophone movement’s acceptance of—and explicit call for—violence as a tactic in their struggle against the state may delegitimize their objectives as it displaces and harms innocent civilians.  Furthermore, the group’s indiscriminate violence may concurrently provide security forces with an excuse to use similar tactics and legitimize the state’s classification of the secessionists as terrorists.

Despite the Anglophone crisis’ steady intensification over the past eight months, the international community has mostly ignored the growing violence and the government’s role perpetuating the situation. While this may be due, in part, to the myriad humanitarian crises and conflicts in the region,  the fact that Cameroon—which has been hailed as one of Central Africa’s beacons of stability despite its authoritarian government and is an important partner in the regional war on terror—is facing growing instability as the Anglophone crisis continues to escalate, is not one that many international partners are ready to acknowledge.

However, in recent weeks, the United States has stepped up, calling for an end to the violence. Following the US Department of State’s Human Rights report’s criticism of abuses in Cameroon, the US Embassy has been more vocal. Prior to Cameroon’s National Day celebrations, US Ambassador Peter Barlerin met with President Paul Biya and explicitly condemned the actions of both sides. While Barlerin denounced the “murders of gendarmes, kidnapping of government officials, and burning of schools” by Anglophone secessionists, he also publicly accused the government of “targeted killings, detentions without access to legal support, family, or the Red Cross, and burning and looting of villages”—an important step in persuading Biya to consider the Anglophone case and reminding the international community that the Cameroonian government is ultimately at fault for the ongoing violence.

Again calling for a dialogue, Barlerin noted that Biya has an opportunity to cement his legacy prior to the upcoming October 2018 elections by re-establishing peace in the country. While the outcome is near certain—Biya will again extend his thirty-five-year hold on power—the elections, which will occur just over a year after “Ambazonia’s” declaration of independence, offer an opportunity for international partners to pressure the government and the secessionists to negotiate peace. In using the leverage gained by supporting regional security efforts, including the fight against Boko Haram, Cameroon’s international partners can persuade the government to end the violence against Anglophones and to seek a long-term solution to their marginalization. Further, the elections provide a national and international platform for the Anglophone movement to amplify its voice and concerns, and to seek the recognition and representation it desires through non-violent means.

Alexandra Fairbend was a project assistant with the Africa Center.

The post Cameroon’s anglophone crisis intensifies: Why the central government is ultimately responsible for perpetuating the escalating violence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Katumbi, former governor of Katanga province and president of the coalition of former regime insiders Together for Change, would be the frontrunner if elections were held today (polling 24 percent as of March, according to a BERCI/Congo Research Group poll).  Tshisekedi (13 percent) recently took over the leadership of his late father’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). In contrast, only 6 percent of BERCI respondents said they would vote for Kabila, who has already exceeded the end of his term by eighteen months and is constitutionally banned from running for a third term, yet seems nonetheless gung-ho on finding a way to stay in power.

The two opponents, who participated in a May 23 roundtable at the Atlantic Council, made for an interesting study in contrast.  Asked about their programmatic goals, Katumbi generously evoked his record as governor of Katanga from 2007 to 2015, a time when the province’s economy surged and where his government made significant inroads in infrastructure development and resource mobilization. Devoid of any government experience, Tshisekedi astutely cloaked himself in the shroud of his late father and committed to working towards effective rule of law, democracy, administration, and justice. Tshisekedi’s father, Etienne, who died in 2017, had been the main opposition politician in Congo since his launch of UDPS in 1983 under the regime of former president Mobutu Sese Seko. Although he had a paltry record for his brief moments in office and can hardly be said to have practiced democracy within his own party, he is widely revered as a symbol of the Congolese struggle for democracy.

That the two politicians traveled and appeared together was already an achievement in the factious world of Congolese opposition.  They stressed at the Atlantic Council that their union was strong and stable and that their unity extended to Vital Kamerhe (9 percent in the BERCI poll) of the Congolese National Union (UNC) and Eve Bazaiba (3 percent) of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), the party of Jean-Pierre Bemba (10 percent), who is still in detention in The Hague following his condemnation by the International Criminal Court. Altogether, the opposition polls at a cumulative 59 percent.

However, while such a united front (the two opponents repeatedly referred to each other as “brothers”) would represent a formidable force were elections to be free and fair, there is no formal agreement as of now as to which one of them would run. And if past experience is any indication, any such agreement is unlikely to happen or to last.  In 2011, for example, the opposition had to share its 51 percent of votes among ten candidates, while Kabila won with a (likely inflated) 49 percent. Moreover, the merging of the two campaigns appears so far only limited to their respective electoral experts (who recently met jointly with the International Organisation of La Francophonie team that audited the voter registry).

The issue of who might run is compounded by Katumbi’s legal problems—including a verdict of real estate fraud and an indictment for recruitment of mercenaries—which most serious observers deem fabrications by the regime.  The Congolese Episcopal Conference, which had been officially tasked with investigating these charges as part of the December 2016 power-sharing Saint-Sylvestre agreement, has judged them to be without merit and demanded that they be dropped to allow for peaceful elections.

To maintain such pressure on the regime and be allowed to return to Congo is a significant motivation behind Katumbi’s lobbying in the United States and his insistence that the Saint-Sylvestre accord, which the government has repeatedly flaunted or corrupted, be implemented. Yet, until it is (and it might never be), Katumbi is unlikely to return. As Katumbi said himself at the Atlantic Council, for him to go home might open repressive opportunities for the regime against his supporters. Most observers would also probably agree that it would physically endanger Katumbi himself.

Despite their current alliance, Tshisekedi would objectively benefit from Katumbi’s absence and the question of a unity candidate for the opposition would suffer little plausible alternative to him. It is doubtful, however, that the alliance would survive such an outcome, which is likely part of the regime’s calculations.

However, whether Katumbi returns and runs or not, the two opponents’ willingness to go to the polls is worth a challenge.  Why agree to elections that are already marred by an opaque voter registry, a controversial electronic voting machine, an electoral commission whose chair attends meetings of the presidential majority, and a supreme court recently stacked with regime loyalists?  Even if, somehow, Kabila ended up not running, what are the odds of an opposition victory in such a skewed environment?

In light of past Congolese opposition practices, including by Tshisekedi’s father under Mobutu, one could wonder whether a full-fledged political crisis in the wake of a deeply flawed election might create the conditions for some sort of national-unity government, which someone like Tshisekedi could lead. Such an arrangement (not unlike the Kibaki-Odinga deal in Kenya in the wake of the violent 2008 elections) could contrast with the current collaboration of UDPS defectors like Prime Minister Bruno Tshibala, who garners negligible popular support, and offer a more legitimate avenue to power for the opponent than would a similar role in the pre-election period. 

The United States has repeatedly condemned the Kabila regime’s actions to stall and undermine peace and security in Congo and to delay the electoral process. A series of sanctions against designated individuals, most recently expanded in February, also exist. All indications point that the US administration may be willing to go further.

In the hopelessly muddled environment of Congolese politics, it can be hard for outsiders who care for the Congolese to know where to stand.  A strong commitment to enforcing the country’s own constitution, massively embraced by the Congolese in 2006 after five years of dialogue and thirty-two years of often nightmarish rule, should not be controversial, however.  Whether any successor can do better than Kabila is beside the point—it is, at bottom, the precedents of a genuinely fair election and alternation in the highest office that matter.

Dr. Pierre Englebert is the H. Russell Smith Professor of International Relations and Professor of Politics at Pomona College and is the author of “Congo Blues: Scoring Kabila’s Rule.”

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In their remarks, Katumbi and Tshisekedi announced that the Congolese opposition would field a unified candidate in the presidential election scheduled for December 23, 2018. Incumbent Joseph Kabila, whose constitutionally-mandated two-term limit expired over eighteen months ago, has twice delayed elections. Katumbi stressed that the Congolese opposition is united and working together for a brighter future, citing his joint visit to the United States with Tshisekedi as an example of their cooperation. Both candidates warned participants that Kabila was resurgent and reintroducing his stranglehold on the country, noting that it is “a very dark time for the electoral process [in DRC].” “We’re here to sound the alarm,” said Tshisekedi, “Tomorrow when the catastrophe arrives, you cannot say you didn’t know.”

The two also recounted how electoral experts from their respective political formations were working together, including a recent joint meet with the technical team from the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie.

A discussion, moderated by Dr. J. Peter Pham, Atlantic Council vice president and Africa Center director, followed Katumbi and Tshisekedi’s remarks, focusing on the role that the international community could play in ensuring that credible elections take place this December as well as how to ensure the country gets the humanitarian aid it urgently needs for the more than five million displaced persons and the estimated thirteen million facing starvation – crises both speakers blamed on the poor governance of the incumbent regime.

Also in attendance and participating in the discussion was Ambassador Larry Wohlers, senior coordinator for the Great Lakes region of Africa at the US Department of State; Ambassador William Garvelink, former US Ambassador to the DRC; and three former US assistant secretaries of state for African affairs: Ambassador Herman Cohen, Ambassador Jendayi Frazer, and the Honorable Constance Berry Newman (the latter two are also, respectively, an Atlantic Council board director and a senior fellow in the Africa Center). Also at the event were a large number of US and non-US government officials, business leaders, and civil society representatives.

Before the event, Africa Center director J. Peter Pham interviewed Katumbi and Tshisekedi on Facebook Live (in French):

The post Discussion with the Congolese opposition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The vote takes place amid a fragile domestic situation, and it is likely to deepen Burundi’s existing climate of fear, raise the likelihood of mass atrocities, and further accelerate regional democratic backsliding.

In 2015, Nkurunziza triggered a serious political crisis and attempted coup when he announced his intention to run for a third presidential term, which he promised was his last. Controversy centered around the constitution’s stipulation that a president may serve only two elected terms; when Nkurunziza’s legislative efforts to alter term limits failed, he argued that because he was selected by parliament following the end of Burundi’s twelve-year civil war, he was first “elected” by the people in 2010 and thus eligible to run in 2015.

The violence that followed Nkurunziza’s 2015 announcement and subsequent third term win killed more than a thousand people and led hundreds of thousands to flee into nearby Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Tanzania. While the daily demonstrations that accompanied that period have since died down, a delicate truce is regularly punctuated by suspicious killings and disappearances. An International Criminal Court investigation into suspected war crimes perpetrated by presidential loyalists began last year.

In 2015, there was enough legal ambiguity to allow Nkurunziza to successfully pressure the country’s constitutional court into affirming his right to a third term. Nevertheless, that term will expire in 2020, at which point Nkurunziza is term-limited.

If approved, the referendum’s proposals would further entrench Nkurunziza and the ruling party’s power. Changes include lengthening the presidential term from five to seven years; adding a prime minister from the ruling party; and eliminating the two vice president positions—designed to enshrine ethnic and political diversity in the executive branch—in favor of one largely ceremonial role. The referendum also puts forward modifications to the constitution that would strengthen the ruling party’s legislative position by lowering the threshold for passing laws from two-thirds to a simple majority, among other proposed changes.

Nkurunziza’s pursuit of a third term ran counter to the spirit of the Arusha Accords, the peace and reconciliation agreement that ended the country’s civil war and underpins the current constitution. If passed, the current constitutional amendments more directly target the purposeful power-sharing system enshrined in the accords.

Since 2015, Nkurunziza’s rule has been marred by continued instability and sporadic violence, much of which has taken place under especially murky circumstances. Human rights groups estimate that thousands of people were imprisoned, more than a thousand killed, and hundreds of thousands forced to flee in the unrest since 2015.

While some Burundians support the proposed constitutional changes, the government’s conduct, including claims of forced voter registration and widespread voter intimidation, has eroded confidence in the prospect of a clean referendum. Opponents say that the ruling party has engaged in a “campaign of terror” to win. And the ruling party’s youth wing, the imbonerakure (“those who see far” in Kirundi), which is regularly accused of harassing, torturing, and killing real and perceived opponents, is also active. Last year, the United Nations condemned the imbonerakure for its disturbing calls to rape and murder opposition members.

Meanwhile, the Burundian government has tightened restrictions on civil society and the press, including banning Voice of America and the BBC and issuing warnings to Radio France Internationale and online Burundian news site Iwacu. Local journalists face license revocation, arbitrary arrest, and the threat of disappearance, causing hundreds to flee into exile since 2015. At least one prominent Burundian journalist has been missing for more than a year.

Earlier this month, the United States expressed concern over the Burundian referendum, citing its lack of transparency and incompatibility with the Arusha Accords. The European Union, which has sanctioned four Burundian officials since October 2015 for their roles in undermining peace, has also condemned the exercise. But other than periodic denunciations, the international community has generally failed to engage early or often enough to head off much of the current tension.

The widespread use of hate speech, not unlike that which galvanized killing in Rwanda’s genocide, has been a particularly concerning development in Burundi, especially given the fundamentally political—not ethnic—nature of grievances. While one ruling party official was tried and sentenced to three years in prison for comments that incited violence, the majority of politically charged speech goes unpunished and could play a role in inciting violence.

Burundi’s increasing authoritarianism does not take place in a vacuum, but it instead contributes to broader regional democratic backsliding. In neighboring DRC, Joseph Kabila’s presidential term expired in December 2016, though he continues to delay elections as unrest in the country’s east builds. In 2015, a whopping 98 percent of Rwandans voters affirmed constitutional changes that could allow President Paul Kagame to run for re-election in 2024 and 2029. In December 2017, the Ugandan parliament removed presidential age limits, paving the way for President Yoweri Museveni to run for a sixth term in 2021. And in Tanzania, President John Magufuli has restricted the country’s political opposition, civil society, and free press.

All signs indicate that Burundi’s constitutional referendum will be deeply flawed, not inclusive, and marred by serious irregularities. The potential for violence in its aftermath is very real—and history suggests that neither the violence nor its knock-on humanitarian effects will stay confined to Burundi. Given the inter-connected nature and the fragility of the African Great Lakes region, this prospect should be ringing alarm bells across the continent and in the West.

Kelsey Lilley was associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter at @KelseyDegen.

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Disruptive technologies—such as the Internet of Things, robotics, and three-dimensional (3D) printing—have been heralded as the future of the global manufacturing sector. However, in Africa, they could hinder industrialization and result in fewer entry points into global supply chains. While it may be possible for African nations to “leapfrog” directly to newer technologies, it is more likely that developing the relevant worker know-how, infrastructure, and corporate capabilities necessary to leverage the potential value of these technologies will be a very gradual process. African policy makers must therefore pursue multipronged strategies to ensure relevance as 3D printing and other disruptive technologies move into the mainstream.

A new issue brief by Africa Center Senior Fellow Dr. Aleksandra Gadzala, 3D Printing: Shaping Africa’s Future catalogues the experiences of other countries facing the challenges of widespread 3D printing adoption.

Gadzala argues that, at its core, 3D printing is just another manufacturing process. Yet, over time it could significantly reshape how and where things are made, with far-reaching consequences for economies that rely on low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing. African countries are not alone; observing how other countries anticipate and prepare for the coming changes may provide valuable lessons. Smart governments are supporting skills training and innovation and diversifying their industries and markets. They are now making the decisions that will later determine their role in a world of 3D printing and automation. In the near term, Africa does not have much to gain from 3D printing, but if its governments do not start to make such decisions now, the continent will have much to lose.

The post 3D Printing: Shaping Africa’s Future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Disruptive technologies—such as the Internet of Things, robotics, and three-dimensional (3D) printing—have been heralded as the future of the global manufacturing sector. However, in Africa, they could hinder industrialization and result in fewer entry points into global supply chains. While it may be possible for African nations to “leapfrog” directly to newer technologies, it is more likely that developing the relevant worker know-how, infrastructure, and corporate capabilities necessary to leverage the potential value of these technologies will be a very gradual process. African policy makers must therefore pursue multipronged strategies to ensure relevance as 3D printing and other disruptive technologies move into the mainstream.

A new issue brief by Africa Center Senior Fellow Dr. Aleksandra Gadzala, 3D Printing: Shaping Africa’s Future catalogues the experiences of other countries facing the challenges of widespread 3D printing adoption.

Gadzala argues that, at its core, 3D printing is just another manufacturing process. Yet, over time it could significantly reshape how and where things are made, with far-reaching consequences for economies that rely on low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing. African countries are not alone; observing how other countries anticipate and prepare for the coming changes may provide valuable lessons. Smart governments are supporting skills training and innovation and diversifying their industries and markets. They are now making the decisions that will later determine their role in a world of 3D printing and automation. In the near term, Africa does not have much to gain from 3D printing, but if its governments do not start to make such decisions now, the continent will have much to lose.

Introduction

According to the global consulting firm McKinsey & Company, one out of four workers worldwide may be African by 2030.¹

The global center of gravity of labor-intensive manufacturing is expected to shift to poorer economies with lower labor costs—including those in sub-Saharan Africa—and the African region could emerge as “the next factory of the world.”² Yet, this is not certain. The adoption of technologies associated with “Industry 4.0”—the Internet of Things (IoT), robotics, and three-dimensional (3D) printing— in China and high-income economies in Europe and the United States is reducing the importance of low labor costs in determining overall production location and may, in the long term, lead to a reshoring of global supply chains.

For African economies, this may mean fewer entry points into global supply chains and may make industrialization more difficult to achieve. Because most African countries generally lack essential technology and industry skills, there is no near-term scenario under which they would be able to leverage technologies like 3D printing and automation to compete globally in manufacturing. While there are opportunities to “leapfrog” to new technologies, developing the relevant worker knowhow, infrastructure, and corporate capabilities are likely to be a gradual process. African policy makers must therefore pursue disparate strategies to ensure relevance as 3D printing and automation move into the mainstream. The experiences of other countries facing similar challenges may provide valuable lessons. This brief explores how the approaches pursued by India, Cambodia, and South Africa might inform African development strategies.

The muddled promise of 3D printing in Africa

3D printing—also known as additive manufacturing—is attracting more attention as it steadily matures and moves into the mainstream. In 2016, total global revenues from 3D printing systems totaled more than $6 billion, representing a 17.4 percent expansion of the industry.³ In emerging markets, 3D printing is expected to become a $4.5 billion industry by 2020, as the range of printable materials expands beyond its currently limited array.^{4 5} Commonly referred to as a “disruptive technology,” additive manufacturing often conjures up images of a future that is utopian or dystopian, depending on one’s outlook. At its core, however, 3D printing is just another manufacturing process. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 3D printing is “the process of joining materials to make objects from three-dimensional (3D) models layer by layer as opposed to subtractive methods that remove materials.”⁶While traditional manufacturing creates forms by removing layers of material, 3D printing processes create objects by adding material; much like how a pastry chef might assemble a layer cake, the materials are shaped into designs to fulfill specific functions.

3D printing offers several advantages over traditional manufacturing processes. Among them is the ability to create objects with complex geometries and internal cavities. Using sunglasses as an example, wherein a manufacturer would normally produce the sunglass pieces separately and then assemble them, 3D printing allows for sunglasses to be produced as a whole with the material varying in different areas of the frame; the earpieces are soft and flexible, while the rims supporting the lenses are hard. This has applications ranging from jet engine components to hearing aids. GE Aviation produces fuel nozzles for its next-generation turbofan engines using 3D printing. Ninety-eight percent of hearing aids worldwide are manufactured through 3D printing processes, each being custom-made to fit the user’s unique ear shape.⁷Because each printed object is produced independently, it can be easily modified to meet particular needs or to accommodate updates.

The ability to create highly customized or differentiated products in small batches further sets 3D printing apart from traditional manufacturing. While 3D printing does not have the advantage of economies of scale, making it unsuitable for high-volume manufacturing, it does allow for rapid prototyping, shortening the time it takes to move a product from design to production. This may, for instance, allow entrepreneurs to more swiftly manufacture products that address locally entrenched challenges from the ground up. For example, a consortium of Canadian organizations in partnership with the Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services (hospital) in Kisubi, Uganda, is trialing 3D printing of prosthetic limbs for amputees. Rather than being casted with plaster, the damaged limbs are digitally scanned and the prostheses are digitally modeled before being sent for production. This method has produced better-fitting limbs at a quarter of the usual production time.⁸In Togo, a 3D printer built from electronic waste has been used to print prototypes of designs by local entrepreneurs—items like anti-theft products for motorcycles, for example, which are often stolen.⁹

Another challenge for Africa’s industrialization

To the extent that there is enthusiasm for 3D printing and Industry 4.0 in Africa, it is rooted in the hope that it will enable economies to leapfrog industrialization to development. Many African countries have been able to overcome decrepit telecommunications infrastructure to develop advanced mobile technology capabilities and, as the thinking goes, they should be able to do the same in manufacturing. However, it is not that easy to replicate and build sophisticated 3D printers or to develop the specialized skills needed to know how to produce durable and reliable products. Many 3D-printed products often require a number of postproduction steps and tests, which require their own specialized knowledge, machinery, and infrastructure.¹⁰Small-scale personal printers may address distinct local challenges but are unlikely to contribute to Africa’s industrialization en masse. The potential gains from 3D printing in Africa are likely to be limited.

Currently, the United States, Germany, Korea, and Japan lead in 3D printing.¹¹ Among emerging economies, the biggest growth is expected to come from China and India. In China, the government is aggressively pushing technologies associated with Industry 4.0. In 2015, China unveiled its “Made in China 2025” initiative to foster advanced technologies, emphasizing 3D printing as a key enabler. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology then released the “National 3D Printing Industry Promotion Plan (2015–2016),” which has since been complemented by a new “Additive Manufacturing Action Plan (2017–2020).” In 2017, Chinese institutions spent $1.1 billion on 3D printing.¹²

Beijing expects its 3D printing industry to reach annual sales revenues of more than $3 billion by 2020, with an average annual growth rate of 30 percent or higher.¹³ This is part of China’s overarching shift toward automation, as it aims to move its companies up the manufacturing value chain to remain competitive.

As China and other developed economies retool their factories with the latest technologies, Africa’s core competitive advantage—its large and inexpensive labor force—risks being eroded. Not that long ago, African countries were encouraged to integrate into global value chains (GVCs) as corporations turned to offshoring to boost efficiency. Integration into GVCs—first as a source of primary inputs and later as potential production hubs—was seen as a means of improving African countries’ industrial capabilities, employment, and social structures.¹⁴ In Ethiopia, Chinese footwear, pharmaceutical, and other light manufacturing factories employ thousands of Ethiopian workers engaged primarily in product assembly. But labor-saving technologies like 3D printing are making these low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing roles increasingly redundant, leaving African countries with fewer entry points into GVCs. 3D printing is also likely to repatriate some production activities that were earlier offshored.¹⁵ 3D printing has few production stages, and the flexibility to build products at the point of consumption reduces global transportation costs and vulnerability to risk factors like political unrest and natural disasters common to some African countries. It can also improve time-to-market responsiveness and hasten responses to changes in demand. According to the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford, 85 percent of Ethiopian jobs are at risk of being replaced by 3D printing and automation, 67 percent in South Africa, and 65 percent in Nigeria.¹⁶ Such massive job loss may undermine industrialization and may increase the likelihood of social unrest as Africa’s young population—an estimated 830 million individuals by 2050

¹⁷—enters the job market with limited opportunity.

3D printing in comparative perspective

African economies are not the only ones facing this challenge. In Vietnam, globalization has allowed for the creation of some 250,000 hardware manufacturing jobs.¹⁸ By inserting itself into downstream activities in GVCs, Bangladesh was similarly able to generate millions of jobs in the textile and garment sectors. However, 86 percent of jobs in Vietnam¹⁹ and more than 70 percent of jobs in Bangladesh²⁰ are at risk of being replaced by 3D printing and other disruptive technologies.

Governments and private-sector entities in potentially affected economies are working to soften the effects. Upgrading skills and retraining staff are obvious initiatives. The United Arab Emirates has established a “Fourth Industrial Revolution Council,” creating a knowledge-sharing system of think tanks for new technologies. In 2016, the Singaporean government launched two statutory boards—SkillsFuture Singapore and Workforce Singapore—which, together with its educational institutions, are working to strengthen adult training in technology. It is essential for countries to have an educated and skilled workforce to be able to actively participate in an increasingly digitized global economy and to meet what will likely be changed quality and productivity benchmarks. On its own, however, a skilled workforce is not enough. Many governments are aware that 3D printing will affect industries unevenly and are pursuing Industry 4.0 strategies that build on their competitive advantages, with some possible lessons for African leaders and industries.

India

India risks losing nearly 69 percent of jobs because of 3D printing and automation.²¹ At particular risk are the food and beverage, pharmaceutical, and automotive industries; today, robot makers in India mostly supply the country’s automotive sector, with more than 2,100 industrial robots being sold in 2014.²² Additionally, most of the 3D printers are sold to the automotive and aerospace industries. The trend threatens to undermine the government’s “Make in India” initiative, which was intended to attract investment and boost employment in labor-intensive manufacturing sectors. India suffers from an overhang of more than 17 million unemployed workers.²³

The government is taking steps to prepare its industries, and it has identified IoT as one of the most important disruptive technologies for the country. IoT—a network in which smart devices communicate with each other to send and receive data—relies on information technology (IT) capabilities and allows India to capitalize on its 3.9-million strong and skilled IT workforce to innovate around the edges of 3D printing. 3D printers can be integrated with IoT technologies to optimize manufacturing supply chains and reduce costs. In “smart factories,” for example, the integration of 3D printing and IoT capabilities allows production and logistics systems to organize themselves without human intervention. India’s first smart factory is being developed in Bangalore. Set up at the Indian Institute of Science’s Center for Product Design and Manufacturing, with seed funding from the Boeing Company, it allows data to be continuously collected and monitored to provide real-time insights into every movement and process taking place on the factory floor. The data generated are fed back into a responsive, network-enabled framework that allows the factory to function truly autonomously.²⁴ Indian companies Mahindra & Mahindra, Tata, Godrej, and Welspun are adopting smart-factory principles. The Indian state of Andhra Pradesh aims to be an IoT hub by 2020.²⁵

IoT is expected to eliminate nearly 94,000 low-skilled IT jobs in India.²⁶ In the long term, however, it is also expected to create more than 100,000 medium-skilled jobs that complement other disruptive technologies, such as data security, data science, communications, technology support, and technology services.²⁷ Global demand for traded goods and services has diverged in recent years. As technology reshapes manufacturing processes, demand for GVC trade in services is likely to remain high and is likely to benefit populous, lowskilled, English-speaking economies like India.²⁸ Indian companies DhruvSoft, OnGraph, and Altiux have already entered the IoT services space. Others, like 75F, are developing IoT platforms for building automation and other applications that also rely on 3D printing.

Cambodia

One of the fallacies surrounding 3D printing is that monumental change is imminent. In reality, 3D printing is still underdeveloped. It currently does not scale well; even as the range of printable materials is expanding, it remains limited. Generally, 3D printers do a poor job of handling soft, flexible materials, for instance, which is why the automotive and aerospace industries that use hard materials are among its earliest adopters. For a country like Cambodia, where garment and footwear manufacturing contributes 16 percent to the total gross domestic product and accounts for more than 80 percent of all exports,²⁹ this may be good news—for now.

Third after Ethiopia and Nepal, Cambodia is among the countries most susceptible to the effects of automation.³⁰ Nearly 90 percent of garment workers are at risk of being replaced by what the International Labour Association calls “sewbots.”³¹ These sewbots are unlikely to appear in Cambodian factories, but they are being installed in Europe and the United States, where Cambodian exports are heavily concentrated.³² The footwear manufacturer Adidas already uses 3D printing at its “Speedfactory” in Ansbach, Germany, and at its US location in Atlanta, Georgia. The factory pairs a small human workforce of around 160 people with 3D printing, robotic arms, and computerized knitting to produce 500,000 pairs of shoes per year for the European market.³³ This is a modest figure compared with the nearly 300 million pairs of shoes that it sources annually,³⁴ suggesting that mass production of 3D-printed footwear may be on the way, but it is not fast approaching.

Similarly, 3D-printed garments are not yet within reach. Because 3D printers build objects by depositing layers of material one on top of the other, the layers fuse together in a way that is wholly unlike how fibers become fabric. 3D-printed clothing so far is rigid and unwearable.³⁵ Even when this problem is solved, it is likely that 3D-printed garments will have to undergo finishing processes to improve their aesthetics. Detailed or even whole pieces for higher-end fashion labels will likely still have to be sewn by hand.³⁶

Cambodia has begun to diversify away from garment and footwear manufacturing and from US and European markets. While garment manufacturing continues to dominate, Cambodian exports have expanded to include primary commodities like rice and rubber, as well as light manufactured goods, including automobiles and electronic components.³⁷Cambodia’s proximity to Thailand is one of the factors driving this diversification, as the country is a major producer of trucks, cars, and electronic components; Cambodian exports to Thailand surged 46 percent in 2016.³⁸ In Thailand and in neighboring Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) markets, low-quality, low-priced goods are still in demand, even as technological advancement facilitates more sophisticated production. This mirrors the experiences of China and India, where highly traded manufacturing sectors segmented the markets. This holds notable promise in Africa; many local manufacturing industries have seen increases in their intra-African trade shares over the last decade.³⁹

3D printing in Africa: South Africa leads the way

Manufacturing is not monolithic in terms of the extent of 3D printing. The adoption varies across subsectors, with some industries more affected than others. Those less affected are likely to continue to facilitate potential entry points into GVCs for less industrialized economies. Along with the services sector, this includes a range of commodity-based manufacturers, such as wood and paper products and food processing, which are traded less and are therefore less susceptible to international competition. Additionally, countries that feed GVCs with raw materials may assume more powerful roles as 3D printing is more widely adopted; more players will need to be supplied with small batches of input materials for printing.⁴⁰ With an abundance of mineral reserves—including titanium, which is of special interest for the aerospace and defense industries because of advantages it has in weight and chemical resistance—South Africa is positioning itself as a global supplier of metal inputs and metal 3D-printed parts for the medical and aerospace markets. It currently leads the continent in 3D printing. In the long term, the government aims to export more than fifty tons of 3D-printed titanium parts per year.⁴¹ In 2017, the Aeroswift project, a South African-built titanium powder 3D printer, successfully produced aircraft parts, including a throttle lever, a condition lever grip, and a fuel tank pylon bracket, with the first commercial applications expected in 2019. The project is a collaboration between Aerosud, South Africa’s largest private aerospace manufacturing company, and the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Among its likely clients are Airbus and Boeing.⁴²

South Africa benefits from established educational institutes that have advanced research and design capabilities, as well as vibrant innovation hubs. Examples of the former include Vaal University of Technology’s (VUT) Southern Gauteng Science and Technology Park and the Centre for Rapid Prototyping and Manufacturing at the Central University of Technology, which provides services in 3D printing for medical, prototyping, and rapid tooling purposes. “Makerspaces” additionally help entrepreneurs realize their product ideations for which 3D printing is a key tool. The global “maker movement,” a technology-based extension of the “do-it-yourself” culture, has given rise to a number of makerspaces, or “fab labs,” around the world. There are more than one hundred such makerspaces in Africa today.⁴³ In 2011, VUT launched the “Idea 2 Product” lab series with twenty personal 3D printers. Since then, the labs have expanded to multiple South African universities, science centers, and schools, including township schools,⁴⁴ and globally to New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States. Labs are typically furnished with 3D printers, laser cutters, and even sewing machines. They allow entrepreneurs to experiment, collaborate, and learn the skills necessary to remain relevant in the coming era of manufacturing.

Preparing Africa for the 3D printing revolution

The trend toward 3D printing narrows the path for less-developed economies to industrialize. In Africa, the expected inward migration of labor-intensive manufacturing activities—especially from China—may not happen. Countries outside of Africa also face the prospect of “premature deindustrialization,”⁴⁵ with governments and private-sector players scrambling to mitigate the risk. The experiences of India, Cambodia, and South Africa offer possible lessons learned and ways forward for African economies.

Focus on GVCs in the services sector

India’s strategy to leverage its IT capabilities and innovate around the edges of 3D printing—particularly in services—reflects broader patterns in global trade. Mostly, countries trade in manufactured products. However, when manufacturing GVCs are broken down, services play a significant role and now account for nearly onehalf of world trade.⁴⁶ This trend reflects the importance of software in smart finished products (such as connected cars using 3D printing and IoT), as well as the growing role of services in managing supply chains.

Many African economies have opened up to trade and investment in manufacturing, but they have not done so in services. This is a futile approach. Poorer African economies with lower labor costs risk losing entry points into GVCs for manufactured goods, and they are unlikely to develop sufficiently advanced 3D printing and robotics capabilities to compete with their more developed counterparts. Specializing in upstream activities, such as research and development and design, and in downstream activities like marketing, finance, communications, and distribution of finished goods, can facilitate new entry points. Many African economies are already competitive in these areas and can become even more competitive over time. Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa have vibrant information and communications technology (ICT)-based services sectors. Nigeria has sophisticated capabilities in banking services; Ghana has capabilities in transportation, storage, and public administration. As GVCs become more digitized, financial technology (fintech) services are also likely to elevate countries like Kenya with advanced fintech capabilities.

All of these services require careful regulation, and if properly managed, they could be effective means for integrating African economies into GVCs as 3D printing and automation advance.

Capture 3D material segments

The availability of materials and material science knowhow will be one of the key enablers for the widespread adoption of 3D printing. The players at the front of the value chain who supply materials for 3D printing will hold significant influence, as they will likely define the properties and production costs of the components. South Africa is taking advantage of its significant titanium reserves to position itself as a supplier of metal inputs and metal 3D-printed parts across industries. While plastics have garnered the most attention as a 3D printing material, it is metals that have been the fastest growing 3D printing category since 2012.⁴⁷ The range of printable materials is further expanding to include ceramics, cement, and glass.⁴⁸

For African countries rich in natural resources, a significant opportunity may lie in supplying and producing metals for metal 3D printing systems. Common metals used include stainless steels, aluminum, nickel, cobalt-chrome, and titanium, which are usually applied in powder form.⁴⁹

Mineral-rich countries, such as Tanzania, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, can differentiate themselves by dominating particular material segments. This may position them to exert influence over the market and the value chain. If not part of a wider economic strategy, however, this approach risks further entrenching African dependence on commodity exports. Resource-rich countries should leverage their competitive advantage in 3D printing materials in tandem with a policy of market and industry diversification and a focus on skills training.

Strengthen intra-African trade

Over time, 3D printing is likely to curb trade in manufactured goods to developed economies. Some manufacturing segments will be reshored, and goods will be produced domestically and for domestic markets. Like Adidas, for example, the footwear manufacturer Nike is embracing 3D printing to move production closer to its key consumer markets.⁵⁰ According to the Dutch banking company, ING, 3D printing could eliminate one-quarter of world trade by 2060, leaving export-oriented countries with severe trade deficits.⁵¹

In anticipation of such shifts, Cambodia has started to reorient its trade to neighboring ASEAN countries, as well as to its domestic market. For less industrialized countries, low-quality, low-priced goods produced and consumed domestically or regionally are likely to remain in demand. As China’s economy developed, for example, it consisted of a small upper segment served by foreign companies and a large, low-end segment served by local firms offering low-quality, low-priced products at the bottom.⁵² The Indian textile manufacturer Arvind Mills was able to take an ostensibly global product—blue jeans—and fashion it to suit local needs. In Africa, regional markets for such goods hold considerable promise. Intraregional trade has the potential to expand production, generate jobs, and reduce dependence on developed markets for exports.

In March 2018, leaders of forty-four African nations signed the Continental Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), establishing the largest single market for goods and services since the World Trade Organization.⁵³ The CFTA will go into effect once twenty-two countries have ratified it in their national parliaments; as more states ratify the agreement, its implementation will proceed automatically in those countries. The hope is that the agreement will trigger a cycle of more intra-African trade, which will in turn drive the structural transformation of their economies. Currently, only 16 percent of Africa’s trade is intraregional, owing to high trade costs in the region.⁵⁴ The CFTA has the potential to increase this by an estimated 52 percent by 2022, providing all countries complete negotiations and ratify in a timely fashion.⁵⁵

African countries already trade more value-added products among themselves, unlike their exports to the rest of the world, which are mainly commodities. For example, many African manufacturing industries have seen significant increases in their intra-African trade shares between 2000 and 2014.⁵⁶ In 2014, manufactured goods accounted for 41.9 percent of intra-African exports compared with a 14.8 percent share of exports outside of the continent.⁵⁷ For members of the East African Community (EAC), a regional organization of six countries, bilateral trade is highest among neighboring states. In 2011, EAC-member bilateral trade was 213 percent higher than before the common market was established in 2010.⁵⁸ Commodities are among the most commonly traded goods, followed by manufactured goods such as cement, textiles, sugar, beer, and salt.

Intraregional trade provides a unique opportunity for African countries to build on their competitive advantages and develop more robust trade platforms. Combined with appropriate domestic industrial policies, as well as improvements in logistics and infrastructure, intraregional trade may significantly offset some of the losses likely to be caused by 3D printing.

Continue to foster technology innovation hubs

Intra-African trade may hold promise for 3D printing across the continent. In the absence of an adequately trained workforce, African countries are unlikely to be globally competitive in 3D-printed products and parts, with few exceptions. However, less sophisticated production may meet local demand. In Nigeria, the start-up ElePhab produces 3D-printed replacement parts for the Nigerian market. In Rwanda, the solar energy provider Great Lakes Energy uses 3D printing to develop packaging and storage solutions for its solar products.⁵⁹

Technology ecosystems like fab labs and makerspaces are vital to such ventures, as they allow entrepreneurs to develop skills, collaborate, and innovate around local challenges and solutions. Today, there are more than one hundred such hubs in Africa spurred by government, academic, or private-sector support, or some combination of the three. For example kLab (knowledge Lab), a Kigali-based co-working space for IT entrepreneurs housed within the government-sponsored “ICT Park,” attracts young software developers, offering them a place to gain practical experience and training in digital design and production. The Rwandan government heavily supported kLab’s ecosystem as part of its National ICT Plan.

⁶⁰ kLab also maintains ties with the Kigali Institute of Technology and the National University of Rwanda, through which it gains access to potential clientele.

Other models also exist. The Nigerian incubator program, 400.NG, for example, has partnered with the venture capital firm L5Lab in Lagos, as well as local tech hubs in an effort to bridge the gap between talent-picking and skills development.⁶¹ Nairobi’s wellknown technology hub, iHub, prides itself on having emerged in spite of, rather than because of, government support. Johannesburg’s Braamfontein neighborhood houses technology firms, including Impact Hub, Black Girls Code, TechinBraam, and the Branson Centre for Entrepreneurship. Like kLab, its success points to the important role that multiple stakeholders have played in supporting Africa’s technology ecosystems and to the likely and varied local applications of 3D printing.

Leverage global partnerships

Fab labs and similar technology innovation hubs are good examples of how partnerships with international stakeholders can help African countries hone their competitive advantages in the coming era of manufacturing. Virtual connections to labs worldwide can facilitate knowledge exchange. Partnerships with global venture capital funds and other sources of start-up funding are also important. A significant portion of the $560 million in venture capital funding to Africa’s tech hubs comes from US and European investors.⁶²

Leveraging the know-how of international partners is pivotal for the development of 3D printing in Africa and in regions currently lacking such knowledge. For example, a 2017 pilot project between Siemens, the Emirati aerospace manufacturer Strata, and Etihad Airways successfully designed, certified, and manufactured the first aircraft interior part to be created with 3D printing technology in the Middle East.⁶³ As a leader in the industry, Siemens consulted on the selection of materials, testing, and the development of the manufacturing processes; Etihad was responsible for the design and certification of the part for use in aviation; and Strata 3D-printed the part with support from local collaborators. The project is an example of 3D printing’s potential when the right global and local expertise is leveraged. Similar collaborations could benefit African airline companies, including the continent’s biggest airline, Ethiopian Airlines, to diversify their operations. In 2016 Ethiopian Airlines signed a memorandum of understanding with South Africa’s Aerosud to explore the potential of 3D manufactured aircraft parts in Ethiopia.⁶⁴

At its core, 3D printing is just another manufacturing process. Yet, over time it will significantly reshape how and where things are made, with far-reaching consequences for economies that rely on low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing. In this, African countries are not alone; observing how other countries anticipate and prepare for the coming changes may provide valuable lessons. Smart governments are supporting skills training and innovation, developing complementary competencies, and diversifying their industries and markets. They are now making the decisions that will later determine their role in a world of 3D printing and automation. In the near term, Africa does not have much to gain from 3D printing, but if its governments do not start to make such decisions now, the continent will have even more to lose.

Aleksandra Gadzala is a senior fellow in the Africa Center and a geopolitical risk consultant focused on emerging and frontier markets. She is the editor of Africa and China: How Africans and Their Governments are Shaping Relations with China, and her writings have appeared in numerous publications, including The National Interest and China Review, and have been cited in US congressional testimony. She holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Oxford.