Corruption - Atlantic Council

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Meanwhile, many in Ukraine expressed anger at the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s international partners. These feelings of frustration were summed up in a powerful post by veteran Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk: “Ukraine needs “strategic patience”. Should I patiently wait until a Russian missile strikes my apartment in Kyiv with my kids inside? Or should I patiently wait for my son to turn eighteen and go to fight in a war against the largest threat to NATO? Delays cost lives!”

Despite the undeniable mood of anti-climax in Ukraine, the country’s famed wartime spirit of resilience was also on display as Ukrainians reacted to news from Lithuania. “Disappointment but not discouragement. Next stop, Washington DC,” posted Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center think tank and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, in reference to next year’s NATO summit, which is scheduled to take place in the US capital.

Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko echoed this sentiment regarding the need to focus on securing a firm membership commitment at the 2024 summit, but warned that further delays could have grave consequences for public opinion in Ukraine. If there is no progress toward joining NATO by this time next year, he wrote, Ukrainians will ask: “So we are good enough to die for democracy and not good enough to live together with other free nations in one alliance?”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Prigozhin had been engaged in a power struggle with the military leadership for some time. Specifically, his attacks have targeted Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The confrontation was exacerbated after last February’s invasion by the increasing relevance that the head mercenary and his followers have gained. Their relative effectiveness compared to the regular Russian army—which collapsed in the early onslaught of the war—brought Wagner into the spotlight inside and outside of Russia. In addition to its military actions, the group’s cruelty went viral on social media, as did its sermons in the courtyards of the prisons Wagner forces toured, recruiting convicted criminals of all kinds.

The mercenary leader’s strong connection with the great leader—a connection forged during the murky stage of the president’s public debut in Saint Petersburg in the 1990s—seemed to give Prigozhin a blank check. He first emerged on the scene as “Putin’s chef,” a nickname earned from managing the catering service of someone well acquainted with the dangers at the table, himself being a master in the use of poison as a political weapon.

Before the insurrection, the outspoken warrior had been making accusations of all kinds of irregularities, misconduct, and mistreatment against his two enemies: that they had claimed credit for Wagner’s victory in Bakhmut, that men were dying so they could “get fat in their mahogany offices,” and that they had denied his fighters necessary ammunition and support. And, most importantly, that they had deceived Putin about the progress of the military campaign.

The speech that kicked off the mutiny goes even further. No one had dared to question Putin’s justification of the invasion based on a victim mentality incessantly fed to the Russian people. The few in Russia who dared to dissent, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, immediately found themselves behind bars.

Thus, Prigozhin’s words should be considered inflammatory: a qualified member of the establishment dared to openly and boldly denounce the falsehood of “the story that there was insane aggression on the part of Ukraine, and they were going to attack [Russia] together with the entire NATO bloc.” Careful not to mention the president by name, he stated that, contrary to Kremlin messaging, the war served “not to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine,” but rather “it was launched for completely different reasons.” He implied that the disaster was orchestrated by high-ranking military officials (driven by economic greed and vanity), in combination with “some oligarchs.”

[The] turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail.

Putin’s response was not long in coming. In his televised address on June 24, he labeled the uprising as “a stab in the back of [the] country and [the] people.” His references to the Russian Empire—a frequent topic of his outdated musings—were to be expected, but his implicit identification with the ill-fated Tsar Nicholas II was surprising.

He equated the situation triggered by Prigozhin to the prelude of the upheaval of 1917, which led to the collapse of the system. Was he seeking, in his association with the tragic figure, a symbolic reincarnation of the tsar—in his case, having made the right decisions to avoid falling into the black hole of violence that characterized those years when “Russians killed Russians, brothers killed brothers”? It was a diatribe made with his citizens in mind, who retain a collective memory of that terrible period and who found their livelihoods crushed during the 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

During the uprising, the lack of response was salient, both from the siloviki (the economic and political elite) and the common people. There was no notable support of—or clear opposition to—Putin, who exploits the fact that people cling to the status quo out of fear of the unknown.

Prigozhin has nonetheless proven to be a torpedo aimed at Putin’s narrative. He punctured the myth of a war of necessity, of an inevitable war for historical justice. He undermined Putin’s explanation of an existential struggle against US aggression disguised as NATO. Furthermore, the turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail. This thesis has justified the countries’ stinginess in sending to Ukraine certain equipment classified as offensive and the West’s delay in accepting stark realities, such as the urgent need for full operational readiness in the air.

The Euro-Atlantic community must move away from the habit of delaying decisions based on speculation about the consequences of its actions for third parties. It needs to look beyond the pipe dream of an immediate peace negotiation based on the stalemate on the front or a Kremlin-asserted “right” to subjugated areas. NATO allies’ opportunity to demonstrate determination when facing Russia will come soon—on July 11 in Vilnius at the NATO Summit.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain (2002-2004) and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

The post Prigozhin was a torpedo to the idea that the West must not humiliate Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The mechanisms of corruption in Iran

Masoud Mostajabi and Britt Gronemeyer — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 20:41:19 +0000

On June 13, the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project hosted a virtual event, “The Mechanisms of Corruption in Iran” to discuss the nature of corruption and sanctions in Iran as well as the social, economic, and political implications of these issues.

The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative Director, Jonathan Panikoff conducted opening remarks, stating that discussions of Iran’s current economic situation must also address the corruption that exists within the country given its rampant nature. This was emphasized by Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow Nadereh Chamlou who served as the moderator for the session.

In order to discuss the complexities of corruption within Iran, it is first important to define corruption. Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Dallas, Ali Dadpay, explained that corruption is the use of a public position for personal gain. Dadpay shared how this phenomenon manifests in situations such as the importation of luxury vehicles into the Islamic Republic. He recalled how foreign made vehicles were banned from Iran, however, members of Parliament were able to import foreign made luxury vehicles due to their positions of power.

Causes of Sanctions and Corruption

The beginning of the conversation included a review of the causes of corruption in Iran and specifically analyzed the role that sanctions play in its prevalence. To initiate the discussion, Chamlou mentioned a study by one of Iran’s top economists that found only 20% of corruption can be traced back to sanctions, whereas 80% is attributed to other factors. This begs the question, what could that something else be?

Entrepreneur Majid Zamani claimed that while sanctions are not the only cause of this corruption, they have created a plethora of opportunities for rent-seeking, which only those who are ideologically connected to the regime have access to.

Within Iran specifically, Zamani discussed the existence of a theocratic system, stating that because people are selected for leadership based on their loyalty to ideology, rather than merit, the political system is poorly organized and thus more susceptible to corruption. Furthermore, Dadpay argued that because Iran has a nationalized economy with extensive regulations, as opposed to a globalized economy, the government benefits from corruption and monopolization. Zamani added that the banking system epitomizes this vulnerability to corruption due to the interest rates, corrupting all loans.

Impact of Corruption & Sanctions

The panel then moved to the discussion of how corruption and sanctions have manifested in Iranian society. Given the US Government’s prioritization of US interests, as opposed to those of the Iranian community, Atlantic Council’s nonresident senior fellow Brian O’Toole and Dadpay both recognized that even though these sanctions are targeted, they will ultimately influence all Iranians, by creating a demand for sanctions evasion and a market that avoids financial responsibility. When asked whether Iranians could avoid corruption in the private sector and still succeed, Zamani claimed that the entire private sector in Iran is impacted by its relationship to the government. However, there is a spectrum of involvement, with one end including those who are loyal to the government and comfortable with the corruption and the other end comprising of individuals trying to avoid engaging in corrupt behaviors but ultimately having to comply at times in order to survive. He also clarified that although they do not make up the majority of the GPD, the Iranian private sector includes small market owners and medical professionals, occupations that comprise the bulk of society.

How to address it

After discussing the causes and effects of corruption in Iranian society, the panelists moved to their recommendations as to how to address it. O’Toole said that it takes time, so patience and persistence are crucial, and tackling corruption begins by addressing root problems. While pursuing flashy cases of corruption may be more alluring, it often only targets a single perpetrator rather than the source. To tackle the wider system would require transparency at every stage, even the more mundane. Dadpay agreed with O’Toole, advocating for a clear and transparent legal framework and stating that accountability in corruption cannot be achieved without an explicit and independent judiciary branch. In order to achieve transparency and accountability, according to Zamani, civil society must demand it from the government, through civil disobedience and outward refusal to engage in a corrupt system of governance. Lastly, moderator Chamlou included her own belief that tackling corruption in Iran would require dismantling networks of patronage and government insiders.

Masoud Mostajabi is a Deputy Director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Britt Gronemeyer is a Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post The mechanisms of corruption in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Guatemala’s voters signal a left turn, great powers are watching closely

María Fernanda Bozmoski, Eva Lardizábal — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 21:09:32 +0000

What does an election reveal if not the winner? Since the end of Guatemala’s Civil War in 1996, no candidate has won a presidential election in the first round. The election on Sunday held to this pattern, although abstention and null votes (a blank ballot or write-in for an ineligible candidate) were the clear winners.

Sandra Torres, a well-known but polarizing figure in her third bid for the presidency, and Bernardo Arevalo, a congressman, first-time presidential hopeful, and former diplomat with a strong anti-graft message, have advanced to the second round, which will be held on August 20. The low voter turnout of 60 percent and high percentage of null votes—four times as high as in the last elections, making up nearly a quarter of all votes—reflect a prevailing sense of apathy among Guatemalan voters and an erosion of confidence in an electoral process that, to date, has been marred by seemingly arbitrary court decisions on candidates’ eligibility to run. For this cycle, political parties brought a record number of legal actions against each other, with at least three presidential candidates and other candidates for congress barred from running.

Nonetheless, Guatemala’s runoff election to replace term-limited Alejandro Giammattei will have far-reaching implications, both for the region and beyond. For one, Guatemala’s next president will be less ideologically conservative than the last three administrations in Central America’s most populous country. The emergence of more left-leaning governments is in line with trends from other recent elections in the region (Honduras, Chile, Colombia, and Brazil, for example).

The next president’s decision to align with China or maintain relations with Taiwan will reverberate beyond Guatemala’s borders. The outcome could determine whether the Biden administration has a reliable partner for its strategy in Central America—which is designed to help quell the surge of migrants on the US-Mexico border and to combat graft and corruption. And the economic challenges facing the country, including poverty, inequality, and fiscal deficits will require comprehensive policy measures and hard reforms from whoever takes office in 2024. That’s a tall order when considering the two candidates for the August runoff.

Geopolitical implications

Guatemala is host to one of the last two Taiwanese embassies in Central America (the other is in Belize), and one of only seven in Latin America and the Caribbean. The outcome of the runoff election has the potential to tip the region’s balance toward China once and for all, thus shaping the future trajectory of not just Guatemala but also the broader interests of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. China has been calling on Guatemala to make the “right choice” and has overtly increased its footprint in the region in the last few months—first through Honduras’ decision to break off ties with Taiwan in March and then with reports of late-stage talks for the establishment of a Chinese military training facility in Cuba. Despite this, leading candidate Torres has vowed to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Arevalo’s position is less clear. He has stated that Guatemala’s sovereignty and interests are most important and that there is no reason to “jump trains.” After all, China is Guatemala’s second-biggest commercial partner, behind the United States.

Closer to home, the runoff election results may determine the extent to which the next Guatemalan government is willing to collaborate with the United States to address matters such as irregular migration, corruption, and transnational crime. As a political insider whose party has been embroiled in several corruption investigations, Torres is seen as unlikely to take strong measures against suspected corruption within the party system. On the other hand, Arevalo is known as the anti-corruption congressman. His party—Movimiento Semilla—is all but a symbol of the 2015 “Guatemalan Spring,” which resulted in the resignation and arrest of then-president Otto Perez Molina. Arevalo announced on Monday that if he were to win the election, he would convene former judges and prosecutors to create a national anti-corruption advisory group. With increasingly unreliable allies across the region, the Biden-Harris administration’s ability to carry out its strategy toward Central America hinges upon the election of a trustworthy and dependable leader in Guatemala.

Economic implications

Guatemala is the largest economy in Central America, but with some of the highest rates of poverty and inequality in the region, as well as the lowest rate of tax collection in Latin America. While Torres would likely continue with a more conservative economic agenda focused on macroeconomic stability, market-oriented reforms, attraction of foreign investment, and fiscal discipline, less is known about Arevalo’s plan. The next president will also have to deal with a growing fiscal deficit and continued social demands. The president will need to work with a split Congress to pass budgets—the country failed to do so in 2020 and 2021, when protestors set the Capitol on fire—to support the population’s needs and continue to improve the country’s basic infrastructure. To address the low rates of tax revenue in relation to the size of the economy, the next administration will also have to undertake important reforms on the fiscal front.

Should Torres win in August, she would likely pursue a robust social domestic agenda—she’s already promised bags of basic food items for the most vulnerable and cuts in taxes on basic foods. Meanwhile, Arevalo has floated the idea of a public hospital for cancer treatment and a state-owned enterprise that would create a network of pharmacies with medicines at “fair prices.” But his economic plan, which will need some refinement over the next six weeks, depends on the creation of “jobs, jobs, jobs”—the lack of which is a main driver of migration in Guatemala. Arevalo has laid out plans to bring Guatemala’s citizens into the formal economy while vowing to eradicate poverty and boost quality education. With increasingly few resources to finance the robust social programs these center-left candidates are proposing, breaking ties with Taiwan in favor of China could just make economic sense. This would be especially attractive if a landmark infrastructure project accompanied the announcement. For example, Costa Rica received a national stadium in 2011. More recently, El Salvador received a stadium and a library in 2019, and, following President Xiomara Castro’s announcement of breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan this year, Honduras received a pledge for Chinese investment in a major hydroelectric dam project.

Guatemala’s voters will likely be most concerned with their pocketbooks when they head to the ballot box in August. Urban centers want a leader who will work to root out corruption—which could give Arevalo an edge. But their choice will reverberate far beyond the country’s borders and could reshape the geopolitical map in the hemisphere.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is the deputy director of programs at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Eva Lardizábal is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post As Guatemala’s voters signal a left turn, great powers are watching closely appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s weakness has been revealed. Here’s how Russia’s neighbors are reacting.

Andrew D’Anieri — Sun, 25 Jun 2023 15:16:54 +0000

Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s Wagner Group rebellion began in Ukraine near Bakhmut, halted on Russia’s M4 highway roughly two hundred kilometers south of Moscow, and ended with Prigozhin reportedly on the way to Belarus. While the insurrection was contained largely to the Russian border cities of Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh, Wagner’s so-called “march for justice” laid bare the weakness of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime—in ways that are likely evident to surrounding, largely post-Soviet countries. This peek behind the Kremlin curtain could have significant ripple effects across Eurasia as Russia’s neighbors react to the crisis.

As Wagner forces turned toward Moscow, Putin called Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to brief him on the situation. Kazakhstan’s readout of the call was brief but called the rebellion “an internal affair of Russia.” This seemingly mundane bit of diplomat-speak carried an outsized amount of geopolitical weight—it implied that Kazakhstan would not help Russia in its “internal affair.” Just eighteen months ago, Tokayev had called the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to help shore up his own mandate when popular protests spun into an armed uprising. Hours later, 2,500 mostly Russian CSTO troops entered Kazakhstan, violently put down the unrest, and exited the country six days later. Now, with Putin facing a similarly fast-moving threat, Tokayev signaled that Kazakhstan wouldn’t be there to help.

Tokayev’s indifference is even more interesting in the context of his Eurasian Economic Union (EEAU) speech on May 24 chiding Putin for his ultra-close relations with Belarus at the expense of the other members of the EEAU, including Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan and Russia share the world’s longest land border, but Tokayev may continue to seek diplomatic space between Astana and Moscow.

Russia’s preeminence in Eurasia was once taken as a given, but the specter of Russian power may now be waning…

Almost 750 kilometers south of Rostov-on-Don, Georgia’s borders remained open even as President Salome Zourabichvili called on Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili to convene the country’s security council and urged authorities to secure its border crossings with Russia. Garibashvili opted not to call the security council together and appeared to take no measures at all to prepare for any potential ripple effects of instability in Rostov-on-Don and beyond. Both the president and prime minister belong to the anti-Western Georgian Dream (GD) party, which has sought closer ties with Moscow as a means of ensuring “stability” for Georgia. The Prigozhin rebellion undermines some of GD’s talking points as it looks to consolidate power ahead of hotly contested parliamentary elections in October 2024.

Putin’s calls to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan yielded relatively neutral readouts, though Pashinyan asked to stay apprised of further developments. While Pashinyan has expressed anger at the fecklessness of the CSTO to support Armenia’s defense against Azerbaijan, Russia remains the nominal guarantor of stability in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia’s key backer. A weaker Russia would further strengthen Azerbaijan’s hand in peace negotiations.

While the mutiny was ongoing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared Ankara’s readiness to play a role ensuring “peace and harmony” in Russia. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson emphasized support for “rule of law.” Both countries already maintain commercial and military ties with Moscow but don’t depend on the Kremlin for legitimacy or as a power backstop. Each could seek to leverage Kremlin weakness and extract further concessions.

The end of the immediate crisis came via Russia’s closest neighbor and ally: Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka won credibility with Putin for brokering the agreement that halted Prigozhin’s march on Moscow. For years, Putin has financially backed Lukashenka’s grip on power with billions of dollars and more recently has moved to integrate Belarus into a “union state” with Russia. The Prigozhin agreement turned the tables on Putin, making the oft-bumbling Lukashenka look competent, decisive, and more useful to the Kremlin—at least for now.

But Lukashenka may soon face his own problems at home. The Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, which currently fights on the side of the Ukrainian army, issued a call to take up arms against the Lukashenka regime. The democratic forces of Belarus, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, also reinvigorated opposition efforts to oust the longstanding dictator.

And the war in next-door Ukraine carried on. There, observers watched with glee as Russian authorities squirmed and flailed to try to maintain order in four Russian regions. Ukrainian memes mocked and cheered on Russian infighting, while Ukraine’s armed forces liberated a village that had been under Moscow’s occupation since 2014.

When Prigozhin agreed to halt Wagner’s advance, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took a more serious tone; he acknowledged the chaos but appealed to the West for more support: “Ukrainian soldiers, Ukrainian guns, Ukrainian tanks, Ukrainian missiles are all that protect Europe from such marches as we see today on Russian territory.” Prigozhin’s march toward Moscow began not over Russia’s maximalist goals in Ukraine, but over the methods by which they should achieve them. Kyiv is gearing up for the war to continue, despite turmoil in Russia. Even amid the confusion, Russian forces fired rockets at civilian apartment blocks in Kyiv, killing three people.

Prigozhin’s Wagner insurrection exposed the brittle nature of the Putin regime and the limits to the power it can project even within Russian borders. Russia’s preeminence in Eurasia was once taken as a given, but the specter of Russian power may now be waning, with major implications for the region. Leaders and elites across Eurasia will now be closely tuned in to Moscow for further signs of weakness. Declining Kremlin power could usher in a new era of more independent foreign policies in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, as countries look to grow relations with the US-led West, China, and Turkey.

Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter at @andrew_danieri.

The post Putin’s weakness has been revealed. Here’s how Russia’s neighbors are reacting. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pavia joins i24NEWS to discuss President Kais Saied’s ongoing crackdown on key opposition figures.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:51:56 +0000

Original Source

The post Pavia joins i24NEWS to discuss President Kais Saied’s ongoing crackdown on key opposition figures. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pavia joins i24NEWS to discuss Europe’s approach towards Tunisia and the concerning democratic backsliding within the country.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:50:34 +0000

Original Source

The post Pavia joins i24NEWS to discuss Europe’s approach towards Tunisia and the concerning democratic backsliding within the country. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death

Wajahat Khan — Wed, 21 Jun 2023 00:54:23 +0000

This article was updated on June 21.

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s former prime minister, has been on the warpath in the streets of Pakistan against the military-led establishment ever since he was voted out by parliament last year. Once seen as the military’s darling and reportedly assisted by the military and its intelligence agencies in the elections that brought him to power in 2018, he has now turned on the army and its chief. In an interview with the Atlantic Council this week, he also claimed that the former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa told him “frequently” that the army was not equipped or prepared for a war with India.

In the interview, conducted June 18, Khan confirmed that there was indeed an opening for peace with India—despite New Delhi’s rescinding of disputed Jammu and Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status in 2019—and the Pakistani army chief favored it. (Bajwa had previously revealed this plan to reporters.) Normalizing trade between the two nuclear-armed countries was reportedly one of the steps that was to be taken before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could visit Pakistan.

Watch the full interview

However, despite successfully deescalating a military standoff in 2019, Khan couldn’t explain why he faltered on trade normalization with New Delhi after India changed its relationship with the disputed territory of Kashmir by removing its special status in the Indian union. Khan responded to India’s Kashmir move by closing the border for trade with India.

“I don’t remember the trade talks,” Khan said. “All I know is that there was supposed to be a quid pro quo. India was supposed to give some concession, give some sort of a roadmap to Kashmir, and I was going to then host Prime Minister Modi in Pakistan. But it never materialized.”

Bajwa’s plan, which included a ceasefire with Indian forces on the Line of Control in Kashmir, was a lost opportunity for establishing long-term peace with Pakistan’s archrival. “I tried everything, but I came across this brick wall,” Khan said. “And I realized it’s something to do with the RSS-BJP [the Modi-aligned ideological movement and political party] mentality where they’ve cashed in on hostility with Pakistan. That’s all.”

Transcript

Jun 20, 2023

Read Imran Khan’s full Atlantic Council interview on failed peace with India, Pakistan’s plight, and his own fate

By Atlantic Council

In an Atlantic Council conversation, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan shared details about a potential peace plan with India and discussed the future economic and political prospects for Pakistan.

Economy & Business Elections

Currently, Khan says he is facing nearly 160 legal cases, ranging from terrorism to corruption to conspiracy against the state—a roster that keeps him busy court-hopping to secure bail or relief. The seventy-year-old former cricket champion-turned-populist firebrand spends his weekdays commuting from city to city in protective gear to attend court hearings. Every evening, he addresses his followers on YouTube from his residence in Lahore, which just last month was surrounded by security forces.

Khan said he fears that he may be incarcerated over the next two weeks but admitted that he’s “prepared for everything,” including the prospect of being assassinated. (Khan was wounded in an assassination attempt last November and claims to have survived another plot in March.)

Reviewing his performance as premier, Khan admitted to political blunders during his tenure, including granting an extension of service to Bajwa, who Khan claims was responsible for engineering his ouster. He did not elaborate on the exact reasons for their break-up.

Khan confessed that he was dependent on the military’s clout to push his reforms through parliament because he had a weak coalition government with a razor-thin majority. But this admission—needing the military to remain in power—runs counter to his claim that he didn’t need or get the military’s support to achieve power in the 2018 general elections.

“If you want a reform program and to take on the big mafias, you cannot do it if you have a coalition with government, with a thin majority, you can’t do it,” Khan said. “So that is the mistake I made. And that’s why I became more and more dependent on the army chief, because he could get a budget passed because they have the clout. It’s exactly what’s happening right now. If the military withdraws support, this coalition would fall apart in days.”

Crucially, Khan also said he sacked the current army chief, General Asim Munir, from his previous position as the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) because he “couldn’t work with him.” He did not explain why. Yet he went on to declare his willingness to talk to the all-powerful chief of army staff now—but not to his civilian counterparts—an unsustainable position in a multi-party parliamentary democracy that he wants to lead again. Claims by former members of Khan’s own party suggest that Khan sacked Munir because he had alleged that Khan’s wife was involved in corruption; Khan has denied these allegations.

While Khan defended his economic and foreign policy record and claimed that his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, or Movement for Justice) is the most popular party in the country’s history, he also claimed that ceding further space to Pakistan’s all-powerful military while he was in power was the right thing to do—until it wasn’t.

But as Pakistan faces the prospect of economic default, and his quest for an immediate election seems to be waning, Khan stands isolated. Over one hundred of his party leaders, including many senior deputies, have left the PTI, through what he claims is coercion by the military. Thousands of party workers face trials over the riots of May 9, when many Pakistanis took to the streets to attack government and military installations while protesting what Khan says was his provocative detention, designed to trigger mass outrage.

“The country is going into a black hole,” he said. “The only policy is to get rid of Imran Khan. That’s no policy. I mean, what is the future of Pakistan?”

Meanwhile, the military-backed regime continues its legal and information crackdown against sections of the press and public who dare to support Khan on mainstream and social media. Also, as the military claims that Khan and the PTI leadership tried to sow dissent in the rank and file of the all-powerful army—treason by definition and law—Khan has denied that he has any active links to senior military leadership.

None of Pakistan’s foreign friends and allies have issued any statements in favor of Khan. The US State Department said last week that it would refrain from comment as Khan is a “private citizen”—a categorization that he shrugged off without expressing regrets about his bashing of the United States following his ouster. Khan continued to blame a senior US official for, as Khan claims, making his removal as prime minister a condition for US assistance and goodwill—a claim that he watered down earlier this year while blaming Bajwa for poisoning the US view of Khan through Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Washington. (Haqqani has rejected Khan’s allegations as baseless and his attorney has issued a cease-and-desist notice to Khan, threatening legal action if Khan keeps on alleging Haqqani’s involvement in the former premier’s ouster. The US State Department has said that “there is not and there has never been a truth to” Khan’s claims that the United States was involved in removing him from power, adding that “we will not let propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation get in the way of any bilateral relationship, including our valued bilateral [partnership] with Pakistan.”)*

Further evidence of Khan’s shifting position is his party’s active support for lobbying efforts inside the United States, including letters from members of the US Congress admonishing the Pakistani military’s crackdown. Furthermore, not a single influential member of the fifty-seven-state Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a grouping that Khan claims to have galvanized, has come out in support of him.

Khan has responded by saying that as long as he has the people of Pakistan behind him, he doesn’t need foreign help. How he will do this now is unclear considering that many of his party’s senior leaders have deserted him after having been arrested and released by the authorities. Khan claims they were coerced and has named new, younger members to replace them. He believes strongly that he is still the most popular political leader in Pakistan and this will help him yet again in the elections that currently are expected to be held in October or November.

Khan said that popularity is the reason why his enemies have tried to kill him. “As long as that reason is there, they could try again,” he said. “So, in that sense, mentally, I mean I have overcome the fear of dying. I feel that I should be prepared for everything.”

Wajahat S. Khan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and an Emmy-nominated journalist and author. He is the former bureau chief in Kabul and Islamabad for NBC News.

This article was updated to include the US State Department’s denials of Khan’s allegations about US involvement in his ouster.

The post Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Western companies are still financing the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Nataliya Popovych — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 11:39:15 +0000

Despite tremendous business interest in Ukraine’s reconstruction and development, a large number of Western companies continue to undermine Kyiv’s efforts by contributing to the Kremlin’s war chest. This ongoing corporate complicity must be stopped if Ukraine’s meaningful recovery is to happen any time soon.

The recent destruction of the Kakhovka dam is one of over 90,000 suspected Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Clearly, no reconstruction of Ukraine can succeed unless Russia is completely deprived of the resources to continue its invasion. The international community cannot have a meaningful conversation on recovery or reconstruction unless international companies that continue to feed Putin’s war chest cease their business operations in Russia entirely.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began in February 2022, some Western businesses demonstrated swift and early exits from the Russian market, putting values over profit. While these often high profile departures generated a lot of media coverage, in reality the majority of Western firms have chosen to remain in Russia.

According to data from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), out of 1,361 Western companies with Russian subsidiaries at the start of the full-scale invasion, only 241 (17%) have completely exited Russia. The remaining Western companies generated $136 billion in revenues during 2022, thus helping the Kremlin to finance the war in Ukraine.

Perhaps even more staggering than these numbers are the excuses used by the leadership of Western multinationals to justify their continued presence in Russia. The most common justifications for persisting with “business as usual” in Putin’s Russia primarily revolve around the provision of essential goods. This argument is widely cited despite the fact that it is rarely supported by the nature of the businesses in question.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

It should be crystal clear by now: All western companies that have not left the Russian market since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost seventeen months ago are complicit in the Putin regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. In a very real sense, Western businesses that refuse to leave Russia are silent enablers of Putin’s invasion. Any meaningful conversation about Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction should start by shedding a bright light on the issue of corporate complicity.

Ukraine’s true recovery can only happen when international businesses realize this is not just a war against Ukraine. They must acknowledge that this is a Russian war against the entire rules-based international order. It is a very deliberate Russian attack on the peace and stability that Western businesses have greatly benefited from over the years.

International efforts to advance Ukraine’s recovery are absolutely vital. Priorities should include rebuilding Ukrainian human capital and upgrading Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to set the country firmly on the path toward a green energy future. International companies have a tremendously important role to play in this process, but actions and values must also align.

By countering Russia, Ukraine is providing an invaluable service to the entire free world. Ukrainians who are risking their lives want to deal with international businesses that are ready to sacrifice part of their profit. We do not want to deal with war profiteers, but with those who understand that there is more at stake than just the bottom line. This is what the new era of corporate social responsibility is all about. In Ukraine, any company’s commitment to corporate social responsibility is measured by its willingness to accept a drop in revenues in order to disable the Russian war machine.

The flooding that resulted from the recent dam destruction in southern Ukraine is flushing down the reputation of companies still doing business with and in Russia. Western businesses carry an important responsibility in places where they operate, especially in conflict-ridden areas. Such companies can no longer afford to sit on two sides of the same fence. Either they are part of Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery efforts, or continue to support the destruction of its physical and human capital by feeding the Kremlin’s war chest.

Nataliya Popovych is a co-founder and steering committee member of B4Ukraine and the founder and president of One Philosophy.

In 1958, public discontent led to the monarchy’s overthrow. During the subsequent republic era, from 1958 to 2003 and under leaders like Saddam Hussein, Iraq witnessed a transition to a presidential republic. Divisions, instability, foreign conflicts, and crippling sanctions revealed the limitations of both systems. Iraq’s journey towards stability and effective governance remains an ongoing struggle.

The US-led invasion in 2003 brought about a new constitution and transformed Iraq’s political system into a federal parliamentary republic. The parliament emerged as the most powerful government branch, with the authority to vote in or out the president and prime minister, pass the budget bill, ratify international conventions, and approve cabinet and ambassadorship positions. The parliament, which is known as the Council of Representatives, is one of the most diverse elected councils in the Middle East; Iraqi groups, particularly women and minorities, are represented proportionally. Despite obstacles and the influence of money and weapons, Iraq has managed to hold national elections regularly every four years. This has resulted in peaceful transitions of power, a significant achievement that was lacking in Iraq prior to 2003.

Recently, in his Foreign Policy article, former Iraqi President Barham Salih called for what is essentially a presidential system. This call harkened back to the message of the Tishreen protest movement, made up of Iraqis taking to the streets in October 2019 to demand political reform. Multiple Shia political figures have also expressed their support for a presidential system.

While some argue that a shift to a presidential system—with a balanced legislative branch and a president elected through popular vote—could help overcome Iraq’s sectarian divide and facilitate reforms, what really matters is the quality of leadership and the resilience of civil society. There is a misperception among the Iraqi youth as well as the elite that only a strongman can fix Iraq’s many problems while the issues are way more complex than that. The current constitution, despite its shortcomings, provides the necessary tools that Iraqi leaders need to establish a stable, prosperous, and democratic country. For example, the Iraqi Political Party Law of 2015 provides legal tools to establish new parties—currently, there are hundreds of new parties registered in Iraq. This may lead to chaos, but it defuses political disagreement among various groups. Additionally, the constitution gave significant executive power to a prime minister to rule the country, while giving the parliament strong oversight.

What Iraq truly needs are democratic leaders who prioritize the nation’s interests over personal gain. For example, Iraq needs leaders that will prioritize job-creation reforms, rather than channeling public wealth to buy votes. Iraq also needs a strong civil society capable of uniting Iraqis on crucial matters. Leaders must be willing to make necessary compromises, embrace diversity, and treat citizens based on democratic principles rather than sectarian or ethnic identities. The achievement of democracy and stability relies on democratic leadership and a vibrant civil society that effectively mobilizes people towards shared national goals.

Unfortunately, Iraq currently lacks a robust civil society capable of nationwide mobilization and unity. Furthermore, the existing political party structure fails to embrace Iraq’s diversity, favoring specific sects, ethnicities, or religious groups. Although the October 2019 demonstrations showed promise in uniting Iraqi youth across ethnic and sectarian lines on economic and justice issues, their aspirations were not fully realized in reshaping the political landscape.

How the international community plays a role

Iraq’s current parliamentary system faces significant obstacles, such as sectarianism, ethnic division, political fragmentation, corruption, weakness in its institutions, security concerns, and socioeconomic and development issues. Tackling these issues requires a concerted effort to strengthen institutions and, in those institutions, promote inclusivity, combat corruption, foster reconciliation, and ensure effective governance. But efforts to take on these challenges shouldn’t focus solely on institutional change—they should also focus on investing in the current and future leaders of the country.

The international community, particularly the United States and Europe, has made significant investments in Iraq’s democratic system. Unfortunately, corruption and sectarianism have undermined these investments over time, highlighting that it’ll take an extensive and holistic strategy to improve democracy in Iraq.

That strategy should first include investments in Iraqi youth, as they will ultimately shape the country’s future. The United States and European Union should specifically prioritize empowering Iraqi youth, developing their leadership abilities, and creating a sense of national unity. By investing in education, creating opportunities for civic participation, and providing platforms for dialogue and cooperation among the diverse communities within Iraq’s borders, international support could foster a new generation of democratic leaders that prioritize all Iraqis’ interests over individual interests.

Additionally, the international community should increase its financial support for civil-society organizations in Iraq, as these play an instrumental role in reconciling ethnic divisions while promoting democratic principles among younger people.

By supporting the development of Iraqi youth and promoting a robust civil society, the international community can help invest in Iraq’s democratic future, unify all Iraqis, and lead the country towards peace, prosperity, and democratic stability.

Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and was a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021.

The post How the international community can help Iraq on a path toward democratic stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Younus in Al Jazeera: Who is Imran Khan?

Atlantic Council — Thu, 15 Jun 2023 14:00:51 +0000

The post Younus in Al Jazeera: Who is Imran Khan? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s failing Ukraine invasion is exposing Putin’s many weaknesses

Anders Åslund — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:29:11 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine is exposing all of his personal weaknesses as a ruler. It is also casting an unforgiving light on the extensive damage he has done to Russia.

In the early 1990s, I encountered Putin several times at international meetings in St. Petersburg, but I never really met him. I talked to the city’s friendly mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, and his first deputy Alexei Kudrin, but Putin, whose background in the KGB was well known, hid on the sidelines and did not really talk to anybody. He was perceived as a secretive nuisance.

Based on this early impression of Putin, I have always been surprised by his remarkable rise to the pinnacle of Russian politics. My view is that he was simply lucky and owed his many promotions to a handful of people close to Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin. Putin’s main benefactors were Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana and last two chiefs of staff, Valentin Yumashev and Alexander Voloshin, along with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who trusted his loyalty while Yeltsin was too sick to rule in 1998-99.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The relaunch of Ukraine’s Supreme Court was one of the initial efforts to reform the country’s widely discredited judiciary in the initial aftermath of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. However, it did not produce the desired results as a number of factors robbed the court of true independence. Unreformed judicial governance bodies were tasked with hiring Supreme Court judges, with civil society offered a superficial role in the selection process and Ukraine’s international partners largely standing aside. As a result, civil society observers assessed that around a quarter of all selected candidates were questionable.

The creation of the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2017-2019 was a more positive experience, with all candidates scrutinized by an independent panel composed of international experts. This paved the way for the cleansing of two judicial governance bodies, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges, with foreign experts once more playing a crucial role.

In January 2023, Ukraine appointed eight new members to the country’s key judicial governance body, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), thereby enabling it to resume its work. On June 1, the HCJ appointed new members to the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), which is another significant step forward. However, it is important to highlight that no agents of change from civil society were appointed, while two of the new members have questionable reputations. The next challenge is for the HQCJ to finish qualification assessments and hire judges to fill more than 2,500 vacancies. In addition, further measures are also expected in order to restore public trust in the Supreme Court.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The next big issue on the path toward rule of law and EU accession is the selection procedure of Constitutional Court judges. EU candidate country status has opened up an historic opportunity to repair the Constitutional Court, which has long wielded effective veto power over any reform efforts in Ukraine. Reforming the Constitutional Court is widely seen as the most politically challenging element of judicial reform for the Ukrainian government to implement.

Additionally, some anti-corruption initiatives that were justifiably put on hold following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion must now be revived. This includes asset declarations for all state officials. The recent bribery charges brought against the head of the Supreme Court underline the urgency of a return to the asset declaration submission and verification process. Concerns regarding this issue have recently been voiced by the International Monetary Fund and EU Ambassador to Ukraine Matti Maasikas.

An independent judiciary and the rule of law have long been recognized as vital pillars for Ukraine’s future success. As the country looks toward the post-war recovery period, these factors are now more important than ever. During the rebuilding process, Ukraine’s partners will demand transparency and security for all state and private sector investments. Additionally, judicial reform has a central role to play in Ukraine’s further EU integration. Crucially, creating a fair legal environment free from corruption is also a key demand of Ukrainian society, including the hundreds of thousands currently defending the country against Russian invasion.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Today, the Diia ecosystem offers the world’s first digital passport and access to 14 other digital documents along with 25 public services. It is used by more than half the Ukrainian adult population. In addition to consumer-oriented functions, the system collects information for the national statistical office and serves as a digital platform for officials. Diia is widely seen as the world’s first next-generation e-government platform, and is credited with implementing what many see as a more human-centric government service model.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

In today’s increasingly digital environment, governments may find that they have a lot of siloed systems in place, with each system based on its own separate data, infrastructure, and even principles. As a result, people typically suffer from additional bureaucracy and need to deal repeatedly with different official organizations. Most e-government initiatives are characterized by the same problems worldwide, such as technical disparity of state systems, inappropriate data security and data protection systems, absence of unified interoperability, and inefficient interaction between different elements. Ukraine is pioneering efforts to identify more human-centric solutions to these common problems.

One of the main challenges on the path to building sustainable e-government is to combine user friendliness with a high level of cyber security. If we look at the corresponding indices such as the Online Services Index and Baseline Cyber Security Index, we see that only a handful of European countries have so far managed to achieve the right balance: Estonia, Denmark, France, Spain, and Lithuania. Beyond Europe, only Singapore and Malaysia currently meet the necessary standards.

Ukraine has a strong record in terms of security. Since the onset of the Russian invasion, the Diia system has repeatedly been attacked by Russian cyber forces and has been able to successfully resist these attacks. This is an indication that the Ukrainian platform has the necessary reserve of cyber security along with a robust and secure digital public infrastructure.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The success of the IT industry in Ukraine over the past decade has already changed international perceptions of the country. Instead of being primarily seen as an exporter of metals and agricultural products, Ukraine is now increasingly viewed as a trusted provider of tech solutions. The Ministry of Digital Transformation is now working to make Diia the global role model for human-centric GovTech. According to Samantha Power, the Ukrainian authorities are interested in sharing their experience with the international community so that others can build digital infrastructure for their citizens based on the same human-centric principles.

USAID has announced a special program to support countries that, inspired by Diia, will develop their own e-government systems on its basis. This initiative will be launched initially in Colombia, Kosovo, and Zambia. Ukraine’s Diia system could soon be serving as a model throughout the transitional world.

As they develop their own e-government systems based on Ukraine’s experience and innovations, participating governments should be able to significantly reduce corruption tied to bureaucratic obstacles. By deploying local versions of Diia, transitional countries will also develop a large number of their own high-level IT specialists with expertise in e-government. This is an important initiative that other global development agencies may also see value in supporting.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

To attract the huge volumes of investment, especially private capital, needed to kick start reconstruction and get the economy back on its feet, Ukraine will need to pivot away from war economy measures toward a strategy of private sector growth. The numerous emergency nationalizations that took place last year were understandable at a time when arms production and energy supply were the most urgent priorities. But in the battles that lie ahead, Ukraine’s survival will be determined as much by its economic strength as by its military prowess.

The role of the state was already outsized before Russia’s invasion, with more than 3,500 state-owned enterprises accounting for one-tenth of Ukraine’s output and about 18% of employment. The demands of war mobilization have created a public sector that is now far larger than in any existing EU member state. In the banking sector alone, the state’s share has reached nearly 60%, stifling competition to the point where the Ministry of Finance has been forced to acknowledge that there is currently no functioning financial services market.

Although the prewar target of reducing the state’s share to less than a quarter remains, the Ukrainian parliament is now debating a draft law intended to permit the nationalization of even more banks. The law is designed to deal with a single case, the proposed nationalization of the Sens Bank. However, it is drawn so broadly that critics fear it will give the state discretionary powers to take over almost any bank it wishes. This includes not only those banks that have been targeted with official state sanctions, but also those included on the “shame list” of businesses that continue to trade with Russia.

While it is perfectly understandable that Ukraine should wish to penalize businesses that have failed to cut their ties to Russia, the satisfaction of seizing their assets may come at a high cost if market confidence is undermined by the weakening of property rights. Some legal experts have also questioned whether these widely drawn powers are in line with the Ukrainian Constitution, and have argued that only the National Bank of Ukraine is empowered to approve the nationalization of a bank in cases of insolvency. Nationalizations pushed through by the government for political reasons are likely to be challenged successfully in the courts, according to legal observers.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

An additional consideration is that any increase in the state’s control of the economy is likely to fuel concern about corruption, which remains one of the main obstacles on the path to EU accession. The boundaries between political and economic power, which too often remain blurred in the characteristically post-Soviet style, need to be much more sharply delineated. As numerous scandals have shown, state-controlled banks and enterprises create huge opportunities for self-enrichment and abuses of power by those who control them ostensibly on the nation’s behalf, including kickbacks, nepotism, excessive salaries, and favoritism in the awarding of public contracts.

Instead of considering new measures to extend the state’s reach into the economy, the Ukrainian government should be thinking about how the state can divest itself of assets it has already acquired in a way that is fair, transparent, and most likely to foster the economic growth Ukraine badly needs.

If one of the few beneficial effects of the war has been to accelerate Ukraine’s deoligarchization, one of the emerging risks in its aftermath will be the danger of reoligarchization via privatizations that are opaque and marred by favoritism. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy must resist the temptation to use patronage to create a business class loyal to him. That would leave Ukraine looking less like an EU member-in-waiting and more like a miniature version of Putin’s crony capitalism. There would be no victory in such an outcome.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

Universal jurisdiction trials

One of the few accountability tools currently employed for Syria is the framework of universal jurisdiction, which enables domestic courts to try atrocity crimes committed outside of their borders based on the premise that the crime is so grave that it threatens the international community as a whole. Many countries only allow cases to proceed if a suspect is present within their borders, and thus there have been a limited number of cases on Syria. Many of these cases have focused on terrorism charges and only a few have been against Assad regime–linked perpetrators.

With normalization, Assad and his regime’s senior leadership may increasingly travel outside of Syria and the region. Any country wanting to support Syrians’ demands for accountability should ensure they have the laws and resources available to arrest, investigate, and prosecute any suspected war criminal who ends up on their soil.

Most perpetrators will likely avoid traveling to countries in Western Europe that oppose normalization and are known for bringing universal jurisdiction cases, such as Germany and France. However, universal jurisdiction laws extend outside of Western Europe, to Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and even some countries in the Middle East. While most of these countries have rarely or even never used their universal jurisdiction laws, concerted advocacy by civil society in Syria and the relevant country, combined with support or resources from countries with more practice on universal jurisdiction cases, could help change the tide.

Where perpetrators are found in countries that fail to try them under universal jurisdiction frameworks, countries could also follow the example set by Belgium in seeking to prosecute former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. This could include issuing arrest warrants under their universal jurisdiction laws, following up with extradition requests wherever perpetrators are found, and bringing cases at the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals to ultimately ensure trials.

Trials of senior leadership in national courts

While universal jurisdiction trials typically require the presence of a perpetrator, some civil law countries allow for certain trials to proceed in absentia, provided there are sufficient safeguards to protect a defendant’s fair trial rights. For example, France can hold in absentia trials when the victim is a national of that country. French authorities are using these laws to try three architects of the Assad regime’s detention and torture apparatus—Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdel Salam Mahmoud—for their alleged role in arbitrarily detaining, torturing, and killing a father and son who were French-Syrian dual nationals. This trial will not result in the imprisonment of the accused if they are found guilty, at least for now. It will, however, serve as a powerful moment for Syrian victims and lawyers to present evidence against those responsible for designing and ordering atrocity crimes in Syria.

To help close the justice gap for Syria, countries with authority to hold in absentia trials should explore opportunities that may be available and fill strategic gaps in the Syria accountability space. For example, this might include cases against high-level perpetrators who may be less likely to travel to countries with universal jurisdiction trials but whose cases may have significant symbolic importance for victims.

While universal jurisdiction trials are proceeding slowly for Syria, many countries have been eager to bring universal jurisdiction cases related to Ukraine. In the past year, Germany, Canada, and other countries have opened structural investigations to begin building universal jurisdiction cases against Russian perpetrators. These countries should proactively investigate links between the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria to ensure that any future trials related to Ukraine also incorporate relevant links to Syria. For example, a Russian commander responsible for atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have committed those same crimes in Syria. Officials liable for the use of Iranian drones to facilitate atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have done the same in Syria. Or Syrian soldiers reportedly recruited to Ukraine may have committed atrocity crimes in Syria.

Whenever an apprehended perpetrator is suspected of committing crimes in both Ukraine and Syria, both sets of crimes should feature in a universal jurisdiction trial.

Ensuring reparations for Syrian victims

One element of justice, in addition to trials determining legal responsibility for crimes, is reparations for victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, countries have eagerly explored legal avenues to seize Russian assets and use the proceeds to ensure reparations and reconstruction in Ukraine. As recently as May 17, the Council of Europe established a register of damages for Ukraine as a first step toward ensuring compensation for Ukrainian victims. Lest countries want to support selective justice, they should explore the application of these legal tools to ensure that Syrian victims also receive reparations for the harm they have suffered.

Normalization will ensure that individuals connected to the Assad regime have increasing access to global financial markets. These perpetrators could attempt to purchase properties overseas or place their money in foreign banks. This, in turn, would increase legal pathways to seize assets and repurpose them as reparations for Syrian victims.

Countries could also fund reparations for Syrian victims using existing pools of funding obtained as a result of violations in Syria—for example, the $778 million judgment against the French industrial company Lafarge for violations in Syria, or proceeds from sanctions violations, or the assets of Bashar al-Assad’s uncle Rifaat al-Assad, which France seized after finding him guilty of corruption.

Cases at the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is not investigating crimes committed in Syria because Syria is not a member state of the ICC and because Russia and China vetoed a United Nations Security Council referral to the ICC. However, Syria does not fall entirely outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Using the precedent established for Myanmar in 2019, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan could open an investigation into crimes committed in Syria that resulted in forced deportation to Jordan, an ICC member state.

The ICC is a particularly important accountability avenue to activate for Syria. An ICC investigation would, for example, make available additional resources to investigate and build cases. It would also send a message to Assad because the ICC can issue arrest warrants for and try sitting heads of state. National courts do not have this authority under international law. Thus, while Assad is still in power, the ICC is virtually the only avenue to secure his arrest and subsequent trial. And the modern era of accountability has seen relatively high success for ensuring that heads of state or major military forces who are subject to arrest warrants or indictments face accountability.

Khan has received multiple requests to open an investigation into Syria but has thus far failed to do so. A referral of Syria by an ICC member state would significantly increase the likelihood of an investigation. Dozens of countries were motivated last year to refer Ukraine to the ICC and should consider doing the same for Syria.

Cases at the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also can ensure accountability for Syria by hearing a case against the state (in contrast, the ICC tries cases against individual perpetrators). The Netherlands and Canada are preparing to bring the first ICJ case against Syria for violations of the Convention Against Torture.

Countries could bring other cases against Syria at the ICJ, for example, for violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since Syria acceded to the convention in September 2013—a month after carrying out a sarin gas attack near Damascus that reportedly killed 1,300 people—the Assad regime has been accused of hundreds of chemical weapons attacks. Any member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention that wishes to support accountability could bring a case against Syria at the ICJ.

The trend towards normalizing relations with Assad was not inevitable. Normalization is happening now because states have failed to use existing accountability tools to bring Assad and his regime to justice. But the tools are still available, and some opportunities to use them may be increasing. Justice for the horrors experienced by millions of Syrians is long overdue, and more concerted efforts by countries to pursue justice may help counter the trend in normalization.

Elise Baker is a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. Previously, she worked at the United Nations International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria and led Physicians for Human Rights’ Syria Mapping Project, which documented attacks on Syria’s health care system.

The post How to hold the Assad regime accountable, even as countries normalize relations with Syria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career

Roohan Ahmed — Mon, 22 May 2023 14:08:58 +0000

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s populist former prime minister, is facing the biggest test of his political career as he challenges the very same security establishment that accelerated his journey to power in the 2018 elections.

Earlier this month, Khan was arrested by Pakistan’s paramilitary Rangers during a hearing for a corruption case at the Islamabad High Court. This came after the country’s anti-corruption watchdog issued warrants for his arrest related to the case. Moments later, Khan’s supporters took to the streets in protest, setting ablaze public and private property. Amidst their anger, the violent protesters did something that no political party has done in decades: they set ablaze the official residence of a three-star general in the eastern city of Lahore, with some going so far as to enter military headquarters in Rawalpindi to vent their frustration.

Imran Khan and his political party (the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, or PTI) have denied that their supporters were behind the violent protests, instead alleging that it was a conspiracy to squash the party and its followers. The former prime minister—now out on bail by the country’s Supreme Court—claims that General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, is leading a crackdown against Khan and his party.

However, the attacks on military installations brought a perhaps unintended but serious consequence—they gave Khan’s opponents a golden opportunity to dismantle the PTI. The military suggested that those who staged violent protests be tried under the Pakistan Army Act and the Official Secrets Act, a suggestion that has been approved by current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s civilian government.

Thousands of Khan’s party workers have been arrested across Pakistan and over a dozen leaders and former lawmakers have left the party. Those who still remain loyal to the former prime minister are either in jail or on the run. The political turmoil that Pakistan has been going through since last year could further dent the country’s turbulent democracy, and Khan’s opponents are not the only ones behind it.

Imran Khan, unlike other politicians, does not believe in talks with his rivals to settle political disputes. Instead, he stages rallies and calls opponents “thieves” and “looters” in front of thousands of supporters. His arrogance and refusal to engage in political dialogue with rivals has brought Pakistan’s political scene to a point of no return.

As a result, the situation is unlikely to improve anytime soon.

Khan’s main rivals—the parties of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Asif Ali Zardari—have been long active in the country’s politics. They, too, have experienced the wrath of the military establishment currently faced by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf. Their governments were either thrown out of power or weakened because of the establishment’s meddling. In the end, though, their parties still exist and remain key civilian players in Pakistan’s politics. Likewise, attempting to dismantle Khan’s political party will not simply make his support base and influence disappear.

Democracy is about not the politicians, but the voters who send these men and women into the corridors of power. There is no denying that Imran Khan and the PTI have a support base in almost every city of the country. If his party is dismantled, his supporters may lose interest in politics and serve to strengthen undemocratic forces in Pakistan, a trend which has long plagued its political landscape.

Imran Khan, with all his faults, is a popular leader and should face the law as would any other politician. That said, attempts to break his party should not only be opposed by all the political parties, but especially by those who are in the current government. If Khan and his military backers’ undemocratic sidelining of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Shehbaz Sharif’s party before the 2018 elections was indeed wrong, then the same rule must apply to the equally undemocratic crackdown against the PTI.

Democracy remains the only system that can save Pakistan from plunging into darkness. To strengthen it, all political parties need to come together and agree to the earliest date possible to hold countrywide elections in hopes of alleviating the political crisis. This fight is about power. Power comes from the people, and elections remain the only way to have their voice heard in government.

Roohan Ahmed is an independent journalist based in Islamabad covering politics and extremist groups in the region.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource May 10, 2023

Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan

By South Asia Center and other experts

On March 9, 2023, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan was arrested over corruption charges. We asked experts to react to this decision.

Corruption Elections

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

How Pakistani women use technology solutions to overcome barriers to entrepreneurship

By Fatimata Ndiaye, Ishani Srivastava, Estelle Thomas, and Yiran Zha

A field study of women entrepreneurs in urban Pakistan, commissioned by the South Asia Center in conjunction with Johns Hopkins University and the American Pakistan Foundation, revealed how technology solutions can support women to jumpstart their entrepreneurial ventures.

Entrepreneurship Pakistan

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

A conversation with Fawad Chaudhry, senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf

By Fawad Chaudhry and Wajahat Khan

South Asia Center non-resident senior fellow Wajahat Khan interviewed Pakistan’s former Federal Information Minister for Broadcasting and senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf Fawad Chaudhry.

Crisis Management Economy & Business

Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes

sodal — Fri, 19 May 2023 14:06:14 +0000

Nonresident Senior Fellow

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

Failing to address the democratic deficiencies of hybrid regimes sets up the United States for long-term strategic failure and hinders American economic prosperity. To avoid these outcomes, the United States must carve out a new path forward that preserves near-term US interests while also pressing these States to make democratic progress.

Patrick Quirk

Fellow

Patrick Quirk

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

The post Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan

South Asia Center and other experts — Wed, 10 May 2023 22:14:33 +0000

On May 9, 2023, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan was arrested over corruption charges during his court visit in Islamabad. This sparked nationwide protests, leading to internet blockages across the country. The arrest follows longstanding tensions with and attempts to apprehend Khan, adding to Pakistan’s already escalating political and economic crises.

To offer insights about the implications of Khan’s arrest for Pakistan, the Atlantic Council’s Pakistan Initiative asked experts to react to recent developments below.

Shuja Nawaz: Pakistan’s self-created vortex

Kalsoom Lakhani: Pakistan has already been impacted by increasing political and economic instability, which will continue to exacerbate the funding challenges for startups

Ali Hasanain: Pakistan needs to finalize an IMF deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June

Amber Rahim Shamsi: A Pakistani journalist’s guide to survival

To learn more about the arrest, tune in below with Pakistan Initiative Director Uzair Younus.

Pakistan’s self-created vortex

Just when one imagined Pakistan could not sink further into an economic and political morass, its leaders, civil and military, appear to have come up with yet another unnecessary crisis. The use of the military to arrest former Prime Minister Imran Khan in the sacrosanct confines of the Islamabad High Court reflects the inability of Pakistani political leaders to provide a coherent strategy to fight its economic and political woes. It also represents the inability of its military leaders to resist political engineering.

If the ultimate aim is to rid Pakistani politics of Imran Khan, then the storm that appears to have been unleashed may produce unintended and unmanageable consequences. The military’s calculations appear to hinge on expectations of a declining trend of Khan’s popularity and an inflated view of its own ability to ride out street unrest. What it may not have calculated is the cumulative effect of unrest on the national economy, currently gasping for air and heading toward hyperinflation and default, as well on its own rank and file. Will schisms emerge within the military? Or, will the unrest and mayhem serve as an excuse to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the provincial and national elections ordained by the Constitution? Pakistan can ill afford a coup on the Egyptian model. If that were to occur, the country would struggle to survive an extended period of chaos as an economic and political pariah.

A fascinating picture of absences from Pakistan emerged this week. The prime minister had repaired to London for a coronation and extended his stay while Pakistan was burning. He returned to Pakistan and addressed the nation on May 10, 2023. The army chief was in the Gulf, if one could believe the information on FlightAware for his personal aircraft. The caretaker chief minister of the powerful Punjab province was also abroad when the drama unfolded.

Who was in charge? Who took the decision to allow a relatively small rampaging mob to break into and torch the Corps Commander House and the Governor’s House in Lahore? Where did their guards go? And where were the military guards that abandoned the gate leading to the army headquarters in Rawalpindi to the mob? Who allowed the mob to “liberate” the headquarters of the Frontier Corps at the Bala Hissar fort in Peshawar? Some pundits opined that this was a master plan of subterfuge that has yet to unfold. Social media had a field day adding to the confusion with colorful conspiracy theories till the pulling of the plug on the internet slowed their dissemination. But the images shared by hundreds of participants in the rioting created the impression that the military was being challenged with impunity by mobs of youth and angry women. Abandoned military check posts in some military cantonment areas remained a puzzle. Only a day later did the provincial authorities in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa seek military assistance in aid of civil power.

In one fell swoop, Pakistan has managed to hurt its stability more than any enemy action could have achieved. Will its leaders speak out now and take responsibility for the shambolic mess that unfolded on May 9, 2023? The silent majority of Pakistan that is suffering the effects of poor governance and secretive decision making deserves some quick and clear answers. So do Pakistan’s friends abroad, who want it to return to a path of stability and development.

Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow and the founding director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, Washington DC. His latest book is The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood. Website: www.shujanawaz.com. On Twitter: @ShujaNawaz.

Pakistan has already been impacted by increasing political and economic instability, which will continue to exacerbate the funding challenges for startups

In the wake of the recent developments in Pakistan, the suspension of mobile broadband usage “indefinitely” by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority as well as the restriction and blocking of social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube has an immediate and adverse effect on the country’s technology sector and startup ecosystem. Not only are Pakistani startups reliant on these platforms for new user acquisition and growth of their companies, but many Pakistanis are mobile first in how they engage with the digital economy, meaning their ability to leverage technology to access startups solutions for financial services, mobility, food, commerce, and other areas has been hindered and halted. Moreover, given that international perceptions of Pakistan have already been impacted by the country’s increasing political and economic instability, this will continue to drive a negative narrative of the country in the minds of investors globally, which will only exacerbate funding challenges for startups in Pakistan.

Kalsoom Lakhani is a non-resident senior fellow at the South Asia Center and co-founder and general partner of i2i Ventures. On Twitter: @kalsoom82.

Pakistan needs to finalize an IMF deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June

Over the past eighteen months, every major power player in Pakistan has demonstrated a willingness to disregard the rule of law and national interest to strengthen its claim to power. This ugly fight has looked uglier as it has played out in lockstep with an economic meltdown that has led to 40 percent inflation this year. The country is seeing an endemic of personal tragedies played out over and over, triggered by normal citizens descending rapidly and seemingly hopelessly into poverty—from fathers killing children they cannot feed before taking their own lives, to stampedes in food lines.

Pakistan needs to finalize an International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June. For months, it has suffered not only from gross internal mismanagement, but a lack of coordination between its most important creditors—the IMF, the Chinese government, and its allies in the Middle East.

On May 6, 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang put it bluntly while he was in Islamabad: “We sincerely hope the political forces in Pakistan will build consensus, uphold stability, and more effectively address domestic and external challenges so it can focus on growing the economy.”

Two days later, the wildly popular former Prime Minister Imran Khan has been jailed, bringing his followers into direct and physical conflict with Pakistan’s powerful military, which is seen as being behind Khan’s fall from office.

One can only wonder what Pakistan’s creditors in Beijing, Washington, Riyadh, and elsewhere must be thinking about this latest chapter in a sordid tale of economic mismanagement and intemperance in managing the country’s affairs.

Put bluntly, default appears near certain unless unprecedented corrections are embarked on over the next few days.

Ali Hasanain is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. On Twitter: @AliHasanain

A Pakistani journalist’s guide to survival

Spare a thought for the journalist. Not the Whatsapp-as-a-source, vlog-from-the-basement kind of journalist, but the reporters, camerapersons, producers assignment editors, and desk editors who just want a normal country. It’s been a year since politics in Pakistan have been high on amphetamines with a generous sprinkling of LSD. They are exhausted, they are underpaid, and their stories are shaped by everything other than news value.

Just last Sunday, Sindh-based reporters were deployed to cover the local bodies elections. The stakes are high, particularly since these could offer control over Pakistan’s largest and richest city—Karachi—and as a bellwether for general elections. The local body polls have already been subject to intense legal contestation for several months. One reporter told me how his story on irregularities during polling in one station was dropped by his channel because it did not suit that channel’s agenda. Sometimes, reporters are asked to find evidence to fit a pre-determined verdict.

But what is a journalist to do when the biggest story after Khan’s arrest isn’t his first photograph in detention (yes, that’s a scoop, but a transient one), but the protests and riots that have erupted across Pakistan targeting military-owned property? I keep hearing the word “unprecedented” on international channels and social media, but only condemnation rather than nuanced context on local media. More glaringly, the visuals of protestors breaking into General Headquarters or marauding the guest house of the Lahore corps commander (that came to symbolize the post-Khan arrest reaction from his supporters) cannot be broadcasted.

I met a media manager the day after, his phone buzzing with calls from one of his bureau chiefs. “I asked him to divert the calls pressuring him to stop coverage to me,” he said, without naming who, although we both knew who he was referring to. It’s a code that doesn’t need deciphering any more. “We find ways to slip coverage into a show or a bulletin, and then run with it.”

Journalists have gotten really good at finding ways to cover the unnamed and unnameable in the last five years. For example, when one anchor couldn’t play clips of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accusing the former army and intelligence chiefs of political manipulation, he read a carefully curated transcript on his show. Others have found solace, and subsequently legal and physical threats, through social media.

But the pockets of resistance are still small, given that political allegiance is safer and more lucrative than independent reporting. By and large, mainstream television—and to a lesser extent newspapers—have learned their lessons the hard way. On the day the press wing of the armed forces released a statement condemning Imran Khan’s accusation against a serving military officer, I was on a television show with other analysts. Two of the analysts knew their over-the-top sparring in favor of their preferred political parties would be great for ratings, so they kept at it for the bulk of the show. As soon as they were asked to comment on the military’s press statement, there was a pause, and suddenly it was hard to tell the two apart.

Amber Rahim Shamsi is the director of the Centre for Excellence in Journalism at IBA Karachi. On Twitter: @AmberRShamsi

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Nonresident Senior Fellow

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

A conversation with Fawad Chaudhry, senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf

By Fawad Chaudhry and Wajahat Khan

South Asia Center non-resident senior fellow Wajahat Khan interviewed Pakistan’s former Federal Information Minister for Broadcasting and senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf Fawad Chaudhry.

Crisis Management Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Mar 22, 2023

Experts react: Elections postponed in Pakistan’s Punjab province

By South Asia Center and other experts

On March 22, 2023, the Election Commission of Pakistan announced a decision to delay elections in Punjab, the country’s most populous province. We asked experts to react to this decision.

Elections Pakistan

SouthAsiaSource Mar 6, 2023

Amid Pakistan’s political and economic turmoil, risks to curbs on digital freedoms grow

By Uzair Younus

Growing polarization and instability in Pakistan have increased the likelihood that as elections draw near, curbs on speech, largely limited thus far to television channels, may extend to internet platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

Civil Society Elections

Roberts on CNBC

everges — Fri, 14 Apr 2023 15:07:42 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On April 13, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts spoke on a CNBC special report on “Why China’s Billionaires Keep Disappearing.” For the full episode, watch here.

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

The post Roberts on CNBC appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nawaz in Dawn: For Pakistan to prosper, it must invest in its children

Atlantic Council — Thu, 13 Apr 2023 20:40:00 +0000

The post Nawaz in Dawn: For Pakistan to prosper, it must invest in its children appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How to keep Western tech out of Russian weapons

Aleksander Cwalina — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 18:13:20 +0000

One prong of the Western response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been the designation of strong sanctions and export controls to punish Russian aggression and limit the Kremlin’s ability to effectively wage war. However, numerous recent reports have revealed that some Russian weapons continue to utilize components ostensibly coming from Western countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

A joint March 2023 International Partnership for Human Rights and Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) report found Western components critical in the construction and maintenance of drones, missiles, and communications complexes in weapons used by Russia in Ukraine. Also in March, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center convened a panel of experts for a virtual event to discuss how to stem the flow of dual-use technology to Russia. Moderated by Ambassador John Herbst, panelists described how sanctioned Western tech gets to Russia and offered concrete recommendations to better implement and enforce export bans on Moscow.

Panelists noted that companies and manufacturers could simply be unaware their products are entering the Russian market. Though distributors may believe they are selling dual-use components to non-sanctioned consumer markets, many components are resold through secondary markets such as Hong Kong or Turkey and end up in Russia. Urging more due diligence, Olena Tregub, executive director of NAKO, explained, “if a company has a client from Turkey, for example, it should ask if the product is for Russia. They should study the supply chain.”

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

While the West should be lauded for the speed and breadth of sanctions and export controls imposed on Moscow, compliance offices are still catching up. “Western companies and countries still seem to be finding their footing when it comes to compliance, implementation, and maintenance of these restrictions,” said Jack Crawford, research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). According to Crawford, Western governments lack the capacity to effectively monitor and act against Russian sanctions evasion. This results in delays, not only in dealing with sanctions breaches but also in terms of identifying them in the first place.

As for the private sector, Sam Jones, president and co-founder of the Heartland Initiative, noted that investors and companies have increased responsibility when conducting business in respect to conflict-affected areas such as Ukraine. Jones said companies should be more diligent in determining the end use of their products, as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and argued that “companies would be well advised to take the findings in these reports seriously and consider the potential material risk in terms of future investments.”

Western companies and investors also do not always appear to recognize dual-use components as belonging to the same category as other heavily restricted military technology, such as cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines. This puts dual-use components in a sanctions gray area. Jones suggested that future steps could include increased restrictions on dual-use components through conduct-based exclusion, which would target repurposed components in terms of how they are actually used and not through their intended use.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Another key element in efforts to successfully control Russian access to critical Western tech is effective monitoring and enforcement of sanctions. This is an area in which governments can cooperate effectively with civil society, NGOs, and think tanks.

Benjamin Schmitt, senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Department of Physics and Astronomy and Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, noted that Western companies and NGOs “have easily available open-source intelligence tools at their fingertips, whether they’re commodity trading platforms or automatic identification system-based vessel tracking websites.” These tools empower watchdog organizations and risk assessment committees in governmental and non-governmental organizations to monitor malign transfers of products and technologies that would undermine sanctions efficacy.

Panelists pointed out that the implementation of sanctions oversight depends in large part on increased interoperability between business, government, and civil society powered by information exchange, open dialogue, and cooperation with emerging intelligence technology and organizations.

Schmitt cautioned that Western hesitancy toward sanctioning Western-based entities could be a real threat to an effective sanctions regime. He pointed out that Nord Stream AG, the company behind the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany, evaded Western sanctions despite majority ownership by Russian state-owned Gazprom, because the company was based in Switzerland. Considering that Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine aims to fracture Western political and financial stability, it is key that Western countries work in concert and take every step possible to slow the Kremlin’s efforts to control Ukraine and threaten European security.

Tregub put it more bluntly: “War crimes are a Russian strategy. To implement this strategy, Russia needs to build weapons. Without Western components, Russia wouldn’t be able to accomplish its war aims.”

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Disclaimer: The purpose of the International Partnership for Human Rights and NAKO report is to explain and illustrate how Western-made components are used by Russia to commit suspected war crimes in Ukraine. To achieve this, the report identifies several companies and governments who are believed to be involved in the manufacturing of components which have been acquired by the Russian military and are used in their military hardware. For the avoidance of doubt, the authors of the report do not allege any legal wrongdoing on the part of the companies who manufacture the components and do not suggest that they have any involvement in any sanctions evasion-related activity. Furthermore, the authors of the report do not impute that the companies which make the components are involved in directly or indirectly supplying the Russian military and/or Russian military customers in breach of any international (or their own domestic) laws or regulations restricting or prohibiting such action. Where a link is drawn between manufacturers and the weapons being used in suspected war crimes, this is done solely to highlight ethical and moral concerns. The existence of counterfeit components is a recognized global problem. The authors of the report recognize the possibility that components featuring the logos and/or branding of named entities may not have indeed been manufactured by said entities. However, given a) leaked Russian “shopping lists” showing the intent to acquire components manufactured by such companies in order to support its military, and b) the history of Soviet and Russian military procurement efforts targeting leading global technology companies, the authors of the report have worked on the assumption that the components they and third parties have identified are genuine.

As this week’s Summit for Democracy—which the United States is co-hosting with Costa Rica, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Zambia— gets underway, these reports highlight in increasingly urgent terms the regression of democratic governance around the world, including in most of Latin America.

For example, Colombia held three broadly free and fair electoral processes last year, and the rule of law is relatively strong. Many in Bogotá and other big cities have access to judicial, health, law-enforcement, and other state institutions. However, elsewhere in the country, the situation is different: Rural municipalities do not have the resources to provide the same level of education or health care as capital cities, and basic infrastructure is lacking. Public safety is even weaker. With its unequal application of democratic norms and protections, Colombia has been labeled a “flawed democracy” by the Economist Intelligence Unit. It’s not alone: Two-thirds of countries in the region (including Brazil and Mexico) qualify as flawed democracies or “hybrid regimes.” Only three are full democracies and the remaining four of the countries scored are fully authoritarian.

Across Latin America, weak institutions perpetuate corruption, inequality, poverty, and insecurity, and they standardize illicit economies. This provides a breeding ground for populist leaders on both the left and right to turn the situation to their advantage by exacerbating political polarization and popular distrust of the government. Weak rule of law is a constant trait of fragile democracies or hybrid regimes. Populist El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, for example, suspended civil liberties and arrested thousands of suspected gangsters with no due process. In the presence of weak institutions, criminals and corrupt officials can buy their way out of accountability. Gangs can shake down business owners with impunity. A lack of leadership and inclusion, including political parties’ own undemocratic behavior, is also a constant regionwide.

The factors contributing to the region’s democratic decline are well-known. What is less acknowledged is how these democratic deficits undermine the quality of life for millions of citizens and how they hinder government responses to new challenges and crises. From COVID-19 to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, shocks have already tested the region’s governments, and they were found wanting. Three threats in particular have the potential to further destabilize Latin America’s democratic progress:

Climate change and natural disasters have already started to upend economic and social conditions. Much of southern South America has suffered from record heat waves this year, fueling record forest fires in parts of Chile. A heavy rainy season has exacerbated a major Dengue fever outbreak in eastern Bolivia and caused devastating floods in Brazil. Meanwhile, the Paraná River—a major transportation artery and irrigation source—has fallen to such a low level that shipping has struggled; and Uruguay declared a national emergency in October last year due to crop failures caused by drought. Poor environmental governance both contributes to these phenomena and hinders mitigation and adaptation efforts. Governments’ inabilities to respond effectively contribute to poverty, dislocation, and migration across the region. To strengthen their democracies, governments must be able to channel citizen demands more nimbly and mobilize resources to mitigate these environmental or climate shocks .
Latin America and the Caribbean struggle with food insecurity and price shocks. Energy prices and inflation add to severe cost-of-living pressures for many across the region. A new report from the Pan American Health Organization shows that over 22 percent of the Latin American and Caribbean population cannot afford a healthy diet, with rates reaching over 50 percent in the Caribbean. Many governments provide subsidies for certain foodstuffs, fuel, and other critical imports, but high inflation and soaring debt payments will challenge governments’ abilities to keep this up. This can rapidly lead to popular unrest: For example, in 2019, a simple public transportation fare hike triggered massive protests in Chile. A similar increase in gas prices in Panama resulted in over a week of protests over fuel, food, and medicine, and Suriname saw protests this month after the government announced it would cut electricity and fuel subsidies.
Most regional governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean are also under extreme financial stress, which limits their abilities to respond to new crises. The resource boom—fueled by Chinese growth and consumption—that propelled massive social spending and slashed poverty around the region ended years ago. As budgets were tightening, COVID-19 struck the region harder than most others and forced governments to expand deficit spending as economies closed for months at a time. Several states ended the pandemic with bulging debts and lower credit ratings, meaning that they now have less flexibility when it comes to confronting the next shock. And while Latin America’s economy grew nearly 4 percent in 2022, that growth is projected to slow in 2023 as the US Federal Reserve continues to hike interest rates and the value of the dollar continues to rise, with damaging spillover effects for regional economies.

The most effective way to prepare for and mitigate against these external shocks is by strengthening democratic institutions—ensuring greater transparency, democratic participation, and government responsiveness. The United States and other democracies that help the region in dealing with these external shocks have a vital role to play in helping Latin America reverse the trend of democratic decline and prepare for coming challenges that could exacerbate democratic decay. This role extends to the diplomatic, development, and private sectors, which should support partners with best practices and resources that incentivize transparency, civic participation, free trade, and countering the influence of malign foreign actors such as China, Iran, and Russia. As US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power recently wrote, “everywhere they provide assistance, democratic countries must be guided by and seek to promote democratic principles—including human rights, norms that counter corruption, and environmental and social safeguards.”

Voters have delivered major course corrections in Brazil, Colombia, and elsewhere in the past year, with newly installed leaders vowing to tackle inequality. But beyond these democratic processes, there’s more that governments will need to do to fully shore up vulnerable institutions. Investing in initiatives that strengthen civil society, political party systems, and open government will help give citizens a stake in the system, improve the function of institutions, and reduce the space for incursion by would-be autocrats.

Power has rightly called for a development strategy that “addresses the economic grievances that populists have so effectively exploited, that defangs so-called digital authoritarianism, and that reorients traditional democracy assistance to grapple with modern challenges.” As the United States and its partners convene for the Summit for Democracy, creating a vision for strengthening democracy in all US assistance to Latin America should figure among the Biden administration’s highest priorities.

Antonio Garrastazu is the senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the International Republican Institute.

Casey Cagley is a resident program director at the International Republican Institute.

The post How can Latin America halt its democratic backsliding? And how can the US help? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Svetlova in Haaretz: Maidan, Bolotnaya, Tahrir – three things the protest must remember

Atlantic Council — Mon, 27 Mar 2023 17:14:15 +0000

Failed Russian push on Vuhledar results in losses as Moscow increases troops in the area

The post Svetlova in Haaretz: Maidan, Bolotnaya, Tahrir – three things the protest must remember appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gender persecution is happening in Iran. Targeted sanctions would be a step toward accountability.

Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo — Wed, 08 Mar 2023 17:09:19 +0000

This past year, the situation of women in Iran has increasingly come under international scrutiny. In September 2022, Mahsa Amini died from injuries sustained by the regime’s “morality police,” triggering a women-led protest movement that quickly transitioned from protests against compulsory hijab rules to protesting the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. Since then, more than five hundred protesters have been killed and almost twenty thousand arrested, among them many female journalists. Alarming reports of gender-based crimes, including sexual abuse and torture of protesters at the hands of Iranian security forces, have also come to light. As the journalist and activist Masih Alinejad and others have described it, women in Iran live under a severe and systematic form of oppression akin to “gender apartheid.” Now, schoolgirls across the country are falling ill in what many believe are deliberate poisonings to close girls’ schools in retaliation for their participation in the protests.

One of the principal institutions behind this systematic oppression of women is the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR), an unelected body answerable only to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Indeed, it was the SCCR, under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that created the morality police in the first place. Months before Amini’s death, President Ebrahim Raisi, who was himself sanctioned by the United States in 2019 and who now heads the SCCR, ordered the morality police and government agencies across the country to enforce more strictly the compulsory hijab rules, a policy enacted and designed by the SCCR. Despite mounting evidence of abuses in the context of the protests, the SCCR reiterated its support for the compulsory hijab in January. That same month, a new secretary of the SCCR was appointed—one who personally used to fire a slingshot at women who he considered to be wearing their hijab improperly and, more recently, insisted that protesters should be shown “no mercy” and crucified.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to hold the SCCR accountable. It is an unelected body in a country that is beyond the reach of traditional accountability mechanisms such as international courts and routinely refuses to cooperate with specialized human rights mechanisms. The UN Human Rights Council recently established a fact-finding mission on Iran with a mandate to collect, consolidate, and analyze evidence of human rights violations stemming from the protests, but it does not have the power to initiate any legal proceedings itself. Given these limitations, sanctions—and specifically targeted sanctions—offer a way forward to address the ongoing gender persecution.

Governments use targeted sanctions to freeze perpetrators’ assets and ban them from obtaining visas. They are primarily used as a tool to incentivize behavior changes under the theory that perpetrators will abandon the sanctionable activities in order to reclaim their assets and ability to travel.

Targeted sanctions have been used since the 1990s. However, using them to target human rights violations and corruption first began in 2012 in response to the death of Russian whistleblower and tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in 2009. Magnitsky was tortured and died in Russian prison after uncovering an instance of massive Russian corruption. After Magnitsky’s death, his client Bill Browder began advocating for justice on his behalf. While Browder could not find paths for criminal accountability in Russia or overseas, he recognized the link between corruption and human rights abuses, and he noted that many architects of both spent their ill-gotten gains in Western countries. Jurisdictions including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU), and Australia adopted measures, often referred to as Magnitsky-style sanctions, to prevent perpetrators of these crimes from enjoying those luxuries—even if they were otherwise untouchable.

Ideally, the United States, likeminded countries, and regional blocs such as the EU will all designate both the SCCR and its members. While entities often do not have overseas assets and, naturally, cannot receive visas, their members often do have international connections. Designations on entities do not automatically result in designations on members, but the relevant legislation is often worded such that any members would additionally meet the criteria.

Iranian regime officials are known to have considerable overseas wealth, as well as international connections (such as immediate family members living overseas) that would suggest they would want to maintain the ability to spend money and obtain visas in those locations. The children of high-ranking officials, sometimes called “aghazadehs,” are frequently criticized for their luxurious lifestyles, even prompting a hit television series in Iran focused on them. Targeted sanctions would freeze all assets in the officials’ names and would, in general, prevent them from engaging with banking systems based in the sanctioning countries (for example, to send money to family members) or from obtaining a visa (for example, to visit family members). Especially in light of reports of mass resignations among certain regime officials and members of the security forces, sanctions might incentivize SCCR members to resign from government positions, at the least.

Even if executed perfectly, targeted sanctions will not end gender persecution. Despite existing global sanctions (targeted and otherwise), the Iranian regime has not yet meaningfully changed its behavior. Designating an entity like the SCCR without known overseas assets and without designating individual members would have limited material effect. However, as recognized by the Netherlands, the symbolic value cannot be overlooked. The limited benefits are worth the effort—especially when it comes to gender-based crimes. First, it puts the SCCR’s members on notice that the international community is aware of their complicity and is paying attention. Second, it offers support to the victims of the SCCR’s policies—in this instance, women. Such support has been lacking in targeted sanctions to date, and groups such as Human Rights First have analyzed designations and found that in most instances jurisdictions did not recognize the gender of the victims, but when they did, they were more likely to identify men than women.

The United States has designated hundreds of Iranian officials across more than a dozen Iran-focused sanctions regimes. So far, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the EU have imposed targeted sanctions on the morality police and on the security forces—but not yet on the SCCR. While the designations thus far have been a positive and welcome step to address the behaviors stemming from the SCCR’s policies, they fail to acknowledge the specific harms the SCCR has committed in building the architecture of Iran’s gender apartheid.

Experts from the Strategic Litigation Project have previously recommended that authorities designate the SCCR under relevant targeted sanctions regimes and have submitted supporting evidence and legal arguments. As important as designating human-rights-violating institutions such as the morality police has been, designating the SCCR is also critical for identifying and condemning the bodies responsible for facilitating the ongoing gender-related crimes and would add additional weight in support of their many victims. International Women’s Day offers an opportunity for countries and other jurisdictions with human rights sanctions regimes to designate those responsible for upholding regimes that discriminate against women and implement the policies designed to violate women’s rights—including the SCCR and its members.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The Strategic Litigation Project works on accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human rights violations, and corruption offenses around the world.

The post Gender persecution is happening in Iran. Targeted sanctions would be a step toward accountability. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Shahid in economies in economic crisis: policies, politics & protecting the vulnerable

Atlantic Council — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 18:34:00 +0000

Original source

The post Shahid in economies in economic crisis: policies, politics & protecting the vulnerable appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Failed Russian push on Vuhledar results in losses as Moscow increases troops

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 17 Feb 2023 17:01:19 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Heavy fighting across Luhansk as Ukraine warns of new Russian offensive

International response

Moldova reacts to alleged Russian plot against its pro-Europe government

Kremlin-linked group arranged bribes for European politicians to support the annexation of Crimea

Failed Russian push on Vuhledar results in losses as Moscow increases troops in the area

While Wagner Group soldiers concentrate their efforts around Bakhmut, Mariinka, Ivanivske, and Chasiv Yar, Russian forces have made minimal progress on the southern flank. The town of Vuhledar is viewed as a strategic stronghold lying in between the northern and southern fronts. The Russian army has spent two weeks unsuccessfully attempting to seize the town, likely in an effort to maintain its early offensive successes ahead of the one-year anniversary of the Ukraine invasion on February 24.

The DFRLab analyzed the composition of the Russian brigades leading the assault on Vuhledar. Russia’s strategy appears to be storming the city with infantry backed by artillery fire. The plan has not proven successful, as nearly all soldiers of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade were reportedly either killed or taken prisoner. Footage posted by the Ukrainian Telegram channels НЕ ЖДИ меня из Украины (“Don’t wait for my return from Ukraine”) and Ищи своих (“Look for your own”) provides evidence of the increasing Russian losses and reveals that the Russian army has indeed sent a significant part of its brigades to fight on this front.

OSINT analysis based on Project Owl’s Ukraine Control Map indicates that most of the fifteen brigades engaged in the southern offensive are based out of Russia’s remote Eastern Military District and beyond the Lake Baikal military bases. The Russian infantry groups also include special units like the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, which was originally supposed to focus on counterterrorism.

Russian brigades and regiments currently deployed to Vuhledar. Source: Ukraine Control Map via Project Owl

Other brigades and regiments deployed to the area belong to newer Russian army formations, like the 3rd Army Corps, which includes the Atal battalion from the Republic of Chuvashya and the Alga battalion from Tatarstan. Also present were forces from the 7th Akhmat-North Regiment, located in Chechnya and comprised of soldiers under Ramzan Kadyrov’s supervision. Geographic analysis of Russian brigades located within twenty-five kilometers of Vuhledar reveals that most of the Russian soldiers are coming from Siberia, including Buryatia, Primorsky Krai, and the Pacific fleet.

In a now-deleted February 10 TikTok video preserved in a tweet by Igor Girkin, the DFRLab identified fifteen armored class vehicles, including T-80 tanks, BTR-82 APCs, and KaMAZ military class trucks. One of these, a KamAZ 6350 truck with a registration plate ending with region code 87, suggests technical equipment from the Siberian Military District had deployed more than 5,000 kilometers across Russian territory to back the Vuhledar offensive operation.

Тривожно pic.twitter.com/jtXiwgws4h
— IgorGirkin (@GirkinGirkin) February 9, 2023

Another BMP-80 tank bearing the name of the city of Kazan, Tatarstan, reveals that the Russian General Staff deployed servicemen from the Volga region. Locals from the region are said to belong to the Alga volunteer battalion as part of the 3rd Army Corps, created by the Russian General Staff in June 2022 before the declaration of “partial mobilization” by Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the highest estimates, the Alga battalion amounts to around 500 men.

Chevron of the Alga battalion from Tatarstan, part of the 3rd Army Corps. (Source: Tatar-Inform/archive)

A T-80 armored vehicle with graffiti that reads “Kazan.” (Source: @russian20__03, Tiktok, via @GirkinGirkin, Twitter/archive)

Russia will likely continue its offensive on Vuhledar in the upcoming week. However, with no tactical advantage besides occasional Lancet drone strikes, it does not seem likely that the territory will be overturned soon.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Heavy fighting across Luhansk as Ukraine warns of new Russian offensive

As previously noted, the Russian army continues to place pressure on Bakhmut. On February 16, five people were killed and nine wounded in the shelling of Bakhmut, according to the Ukrainian prosecutor general’s office, which added that it had received reports of shells hitting the residential quarter of the city. Nearby, the Russian army also shelled Spirne, Vyimka, Rozdolivka, Fedorivka, Vasyukivka, Bilohorivka, Paraskoviivka, Klishchiivka, Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Kurdumivka. Due to the intensifying fighting and shelling, civilians are reportedly fleeing Chasiv Yar to escape the Russian attacks. The Russian army is attempting to advance in Hryanykivka, Avdiivka, and Mariinka. Russian attacks were also reported in the direction of Kherson.

Serhiy Haidai, the current head of the Luhansk Regional Military–Civil Administration, reported intense Russian shelling in the crucial towns of Kreminna and Bilohorivka. Ukraine said it had repelled some of these attacks. This comes amid a warning from Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak that Russia’s new large-scale offensive is already under way. The DFRLab is closely following the events and movements on the frontlines related to the offensive, which is taking place despite Russia’s recent losses on the battlefields and significant losses in equipment and armored vehicles.

Due to the heavy fighting, the Ukrainian army will require a secure flow of military equipment and ammunition, which is among the top requests of Ukrainian officials to allied countries. According to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group will continue to support Kyiv. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group is a coalition of fifty-four countries supporting Ukraine’s defense efforts. The Washington Post also reported on February 13 that the US is planning a new aid package for Ukraine. US intelligence has assessed that Ukraine’s army would not be able to simultaneously defend Bakhmut and launch a spring counteroffensive, allies have reportedly urged Ukraine to prioritize the spring counteroffensive over defending Bakhmut.

As fighting continues in eastern Ukraine, new signals are emerging of Iran’s involvement in the war. A recent investigation by The Guardian found that Iran has used boats and a state-owned airline to smuggle advanced long-range armed drones to Russia. Meanwhile, Ukrainian military intelligence reportedly intercepted audio on February 10 of two Shahed drone operators coordinating targets. Ukraine’s military intelligence claimed the operators spoke in a Kurdish dialect mixed with Farsi words, suggesting the operators could be from Iran’s Kurdistan region. Iran has previously deployed forces organized by ethnicity; for example, the Fatemiyoun Division is composed mainly of Hazaras, an ethnic Afghan minority, which fought in Syria under the umbrella of Iran.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Moldova reacts to alleged Russian plot against its pro-Europe government

The Moldovan government was quick to respond after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of planning to destabilize Moldova. The first to react was the Information and Security Service of Moldova (SIS), which confirmed on February 9 that it had received intel from Ukrainian partners identifying subversive activities that aimed “to undermine the Republic of Moldova, destabilize, and violate public order.”

The following day, a missile reportedly launched by Russia over Ukraine entered Moldovan airspace. Hours later, Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita announced her resignation. In her final speech, Gavrilita stated “Moldova is entering a new phase, one in which security is our priority.” Later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu appointed defense and security adviser Dorin Recean as prime minister. While there is no evidence connecting the missile incident with Gavrilita’s resignation, as the government reshuffle has been a topic of discussion since November, security concerns may have accelerated the process.

On Monday, President Sandu organized a press conference in which she provided further details of the alleged plot, accusing Russia of trying to overthrow Moldova’s pro-Europe government. “The operation involved saboteurs with military training posing as civilians to carry out violent acts, assault on government institutions, and hostage-taking,” she said. Sandu added that the intel received from Ukraine included “good documentation of the locations and logistical aspects of the organization of such subversive activities,” and warned that citizens of Russia, Montenegro, Belarus, and Serbia could be among those involved.

These concerns about subversive Russian activity in Moldova are playing out in the sports world as well. On February 14, twelve fans of the Serbian football team Partizan Belgrade were banned from entering Moldova ahead of a match with Sheriff Tiraspol. The Moldovan Football Federation said that authorities decided the Europa League match would be played without spectators. Elsewhere, on February 15, authorities at Chisinau airport stopped a group of boxers from the Budva club in Montenegro and ordered them to leave Moldova. In a Facebook post, the club noted that they were given no explanation from Moldovan authorities.

Russia vehemently denied accusations that it wants to destabilize Moldova, accusing Ukraine of trying to draw Moldova into a confrontation with Russia. “The actual purpose of Kyiv, which disseminated the disinformation, is to drag Chisinau into a tough confrontation with Moscow,” said Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova. Echoing false and misleading narratives previously used to justify the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has claimed that the West is inciting a conflict in Moldova. In early February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Russian media that the West is considering turning Moldova into “another Ukraine.”

Due to its proximity to Ukraine, Moldova faces serious security challenges. Russian rockets regularly breach the country’s airspace. Several days after the February 10 incident, airspace over Moldova was temporarily shut down on February 14 after reports of a balloon-like object flying over the country. On February 16, the Border Police of Moldova discovered the remains of a rocket. This marks the fourth time that missile remnants have fallen on Moldovan territory.

—Victoria Olari, Research Assistant, Moldova

Kremlin-linked group arranged bribes for European politicians to support the annexation of Crimea

Leaked emails released in an investigation on February 3 revealed that a covert organization run from inside Russian parliament interfered with European policies on occupied Crimea by offering cash and benefits to European politicians to propose pro-Russian motions in their local legislatures. The actions also included paying far-right activists to publish pro-Kremlin articles in European media outlets and arranging trips to occupied Crimea for European politicians and businesspeople.

The joint investigation, conducted by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Estonia’s Eesti Ekspress, Italy’s IrpiMedia, Austria’s Profil, and Russia’s iStories, focused on Russian parliamentary staffer Sargis Mirzakhanian, who previously ran the International Agency for Current Policy in the years following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The investigation found that Mirzakhanian was working with several European politicians and activists, including Robert Stelzl, a pro-Russia political activist from Austria; Manuel Ochsenreiter of Germany’s right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party; Mateusz Piskorski, a Polish political activist arrested in 2016 for spying for Russia; and Piskorski’s wife, Marina Klebanovich, who reportedly assisted with the coordination of the agency’s activities in Europe.

Mirzakhanian’s group allegedly drafted pro-Russian resolutions and paid politicians to put them forward in European legislatures. According to the investigation, the group planned for Italian Senator Paolo Tosato and Austrian Member of Parliament Johannes Hübner, both from far-right parties, to put forward resolutions to lift sanctions against Russia. A submitted resolution was valued at 20,000 Euros ($21,000 USD), with a further bonus of 15,000 Euros ($15,900 USD) for “successful voting.” The document in the leaked emails does not specify whether the money was intended to be paid directly to the two politicians or budgeted for the entire project.

Documents detailing the agreement to have pro-Russia resolutions submitted in the parliaments of Austria (top) and Italy (bottom). (Documents made available by OCCRP Aleph)

Hübner and Tosato both presented resolutions against Russian sanctions on their respective parliament floors, but legislators did not adopt them. Both denied receiving money from Russia.

In 2016, a local council in Veneto, Italy, adopted a motion recognizing the Russian annexation of Crimea and calling to suspend European Union sanctions against Russia. Councils in the regions of Liguria and Lombardy followed Veneto’s example; soon after, Cyprus adopted a similar resolution.

The leaked emails reveal how Mirzakhanian worked with Russian politicians to bring European observers to local elections in Russia in 2017, violating the code of conduct for international election observers. The invitations were arranged through an NGO led by Kremlin-aligned politician Leonid Slutsky, and at least 68,000 Euros ($72,000 USD) was spent on the observation project. Politicians with ties to Mirzakhanian’s International Agency for Current Policy observed other Russian elections, and some allegedly sought to monetize their Kremlin connections by organizing promising contacts for business ventures.

Document detailing the European politicians on the list of observers for local Russian elections, with a cost estimate of 68,000 Euros listed at the bottom. (Document made available by OCCRP Aleph)

Despite Mirzakhanyan’s disappearance from the public eye, his group’s European allies continue to make pro-Moscow statements and agitate for Russian interests. AfD’s Markus Frohnmaier criticized Germany for helping Ukraine. Austria’s Stelzl was photographed at a pro-Russian rally in Vienna in November of 2022 wearing a t-shirt with the pro-war Russian “Z” symbol, while Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) member Axel Kassegger demanded in September 2022 that Austria review its position on sanctions against Russia.

—Ani Mejlumyan, Research Assistant, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Failed Russian push on Vuhledar results in losses as Moscow increases troops appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rebuilding Ukraine: Private sector role can help counter corruption concerns

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 20:03:04 +0000

Ukraine has been hit by a series of damaging corruption allegations in recent weeks. So far in 2023, a number of senior government figures including ministers, deputy ministers, and regional governors have all come under scrutiny. Some have resigned or been dismissed. The timing is particularly unfortunate for a besieged country that is currently reliant on foreign aid as it fights for survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Alarm over potential corruption reflects Ukraine’s often troubling prior record, despite the country’s reform progress since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Such scandals sow doubt among Ukraine’s international partners and could help convince some to hesitate before providing desperately needed financial support.

The problem with all of this, of course, is that Ukraine depends heavily on the continued support of Western governments and donors, who understandably tend to look askance at the mere suggestion that their donations could be misappropriated. Even if the current flurry of corruption allegations prove to be entirely or at least partially unfounded, the mere perception of corruption risk could alienate the very entities upon which Ukraine’s future recovery will hinge.

This is not a new problem. Ukraine has long been regarded as one of the world’s more corrupt countries and ranked 122nd of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index. In the present circumstances, Ukraine simply cannot afford to be seen as corrupt and must do everything possible to counter such negative perceptions.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

While confidence remains low in Ukraine’s state institutions, the country’s private sector does not appear to suffer from the same problem. On the contrary, Ukrainian businesses enjoy a growing international reputation as resilient, innovative, and cost-competitive. Many are noted for their skilled, modern, savvy, and hard-working talent. The uniquely challenging circumstances of the Russian invasion have served to highlight these positive characteristics.

Although the Russian invasion is now entering its second year, international companies have continued to look for investment opportunities in Ukraine. Even in the midst of Russia’s late 2022 bombing campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Sergiy Tsivkach of UkraineInvest, the country’s state investment promotion agency, reported that $5 billion of foreign private investment was in the pipeline for Ukraine’s manufacturing sector alone. “There are billions more across other sectors,” he noted. “Private investment in industry is the most important way to restore the Ukrainian economy and create new jobs.”

In a January 17 interview, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi summed up why some foreign companies are excited about Ukraine despite the ongoing invasion. “I’m very optimistic,” he commented. “You really do see the spirit of the Ukrainian people here, the resilience. But even beyond that, you see the entrepreneurial energy here.”

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The contrast could hardly be starker between the global optimism surrounding Ukraine’s private sector and the spectacle of the United States sending inspectors to the country early this year to investigate whether foreign assistance funds are being misused or misplaced. This is a hint, a strong one, about the best way to approach the country’s future reconstruction.

Private companies seeking Western investment have to meet Western standards, requirements, and anti-corruption norms. Major international companies simply won’t invest unless they are comfortable that they are not exposing themselves to unnecessary risk, including the financial, criminal, and reputational risk of corruption scandals. Similarly, Ukrainian companies cannot reliably attract foreign investment unless they can demonstrate that these risks are at a minimum.

Even where there may not be specific legal consequences for corruption, there are certainly reputational and financial risks. This means private companies have obvious incentives to operate cleanly and transparently that are often limited or absent in the public sector.

International confidence in Ukraine’s private sector and its ability to weather the storms of the Russian invasion is pronounced. Ukraine should capitalize on this and seek to minimize concerns about public sector corruption by letting the private sector take the lead on national reconstruction.

This approach would make the West a shareholder in Ukraine’s future. Leaving the private sector to lead the way would also introduce numerous checks on corruption as each individual contract is signed, executed, and monitored with the Western oversight of foreign investors. Even if the government officials in question are doing absolutely nothing wrong, it seems beyond dispute that the international community would sooner trust Ukraine’s private sector than its scandal-plagued public sector. Trust, in turn, begets investment.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Benton Coblentz — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 19:45:24 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has awoken the Western world to the threat posed by Kremlin aggression and Russian weaponization of global institutions. For years, the Kremlin and its proxies have exploited the rules-based global financial system for their personal gain and in service of Moscow’s geopolitical strategy. Following the invasion of Ukraine, there is now a growing impetus in the West to counter such activity.

The Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center is exploring the issue of Russian threats to global financial security, beginning with a virtual event on February 8 moderated by Ambassador John Herbst and featuring Ukrainian Minister of Finance Serhiy Marchenko along with a panel of international experts.

Minister Marchenko began the event by reminding viewers that “for too long, Russia has been allowed to undermine the system from inside.” Ignoring the challenges that Russia’s misuse of the rules-based international order pose will only make this problem worse, he warned.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Since 2014, the West has sanctioned an expanding list of Russian industries and entities in response to violations of international law. Unprecedented additional sanctions were imposed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the available sanctions options are not yet exhausted. “Sanctions are having an impact on the Russian economy,” said panelist Brian O’Toole, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, “but there is still plenty more to be done.”

Russia has created an international network to avoid sanctions and flout the rules governing the global financial sector. This network includes not only Russia’s Wagner Group, which was recently sanctioned as an international criminal organization by the US State Department, but also “the Taliban, Hezbollah, [Syria’s] Assad regime, North Korea, and Iran,” said Marchenko.

“Countless investigations have uncovered Russia’s complicity in money laundering,” reported Marchenko. He noted that Russia’s dependence on illicit financial activity through its network of allies has only increased since the imposition of sanctions.

For Timothy Ash, senior sovereign strategist at Bluebay Asset Management, sanctions are just the beginning of the process of extricating Russian malign influence from global institutions. Moscow is “corrupting [global] systems from within,” while Moscow’s international partners help “regime money exit and then be deployed in Russian state interests,” said Ash.

Eurasia Center events

Yevgeniya Gaber: Watch out for political manipulation of the tragedy

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

John Cusack, founder of the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, noted that “Russia has been gaming the system for more than two decades.” In the case of one global institution, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which was set up to police international money laundering, he claimed Russia’s role has run directly counter to the goals of the institution. Cusack accused the Kremlin of weaponizing its standing in the FATF to “[go] after people they don’t like.”

To respond to Russia’s flagrant violations, FATF has the power to place Russia on a “blacklist” that calls on FATF member countries to apply greater due diligence on financial transactions involving Russia. Russia’s placement on the FATF blacklist would, according to Minister Marchenko, “dramatically increase the cost of doing business with Russia.”

O’Toole noted that sanctions are only one aspect of the overall strategy to counter Kremlin aggression in Ukraine and beyond. “Ukraine’s victory relies on the bravery of the Ukrainian people and military supplies from the West,” he commented. At the same time, O’Toole stressed that sanctions “are a complementary policy” limiting the ability of Russia to fund its aggression.

Olena Halushka, co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory, compared Russian atrocities in Ukraine to the actions of “ISIS, Al Qaeda, or Hezbollah” and called on Western countries to label Russia a terrorist state. Halushka observed that Russia’s blacklisting by the FATF can also help “to close the loophole through which Western-made main components [including] microchips are ending up in Russian or Iranian weapons.” There will be no end to Russian aggression if there is no accountability, warned Halushka.

The global financial system is based on rules, commented Minister Marchenko. “We have powerful mechanisms to enforce these rules,” he noted. “The time has come to use them.”

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The private sector can make a substantial contribution to this rebuilding campaign. There are international infrastructure firms ready to invest in Ukraine’s future. Private companies could offer donors and international institutions valuable project-management expertise learned from their work in other post-disaster and post-conflict zones. Companies can streamline logistics and provide oversight of the operationalization of funds in challenging environments. They can leverage private-sector financing to complement financial and insurance guarantees that we trust governments and international financial institutions will make available. The recent announcement that Kyiv and the US-based investment firm BlackRock will coordinate “potential investors and participants” in reconstruction is a useful first step, if it then connects to the G7 platform and encourages wider private-sector involvement.

There is not yet any engagement mechanism for the private sector that parallels the “Ramstein” effort established in 2022 to produce, procure, and deliver military equipment to Ukraine. Getting the private sector involved now will pay future benefits. It will enable Ukrainian firms to establish partnerships with international companies that can create employment and economic growth, which can then attract more investment. These partnerships can help create a productive, competition-based, and law-abiding economy, which, given Ukraine’s history of corruption, Ukrainians will want and international donors will require.

Mobilizing the private sector is also one antidote to donor fatigue, which has grown as governments have committed more taxpayer money to support Ukraine. A recent poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 40 percent of Americans favor continuing the current level of assistance to Ukraine indefinitely, down from 58 percent in July.

Getting the private sector involved, however, will not be easy. Ukraine remains under fierce Russian attack. No one knows how much rebuilding will really cost or when it can begin at large scale.

These challenges can be met in partnership with the Ukrainian government. Kyiv is focused on securing the seventeen billion dollars that the World Bank has identified as Ukraine’s “first stage, rapid recovery” needs in 2023. While meeting these needs, private-sector donors can put anti-corruption benchmarks into aid contracts, which in turn could serve as a template for future investment agreements through the Donor Coordination Platform and a catalyst for political reform. Zelenskyy’s recent moves against corruption in the government are also a strong signal to Ukrainians and to international investors that Ukraine is a full partner in fighting corruption.

On the donor side, the World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency should finish its work on a preliminary risk insurance framework for firms seeking to operate in Ukraine. This will provide a template for the export credit agencies of individual nations, which should also be authorized to provide full risk insurance (including acts of war) to national firms willing to invest in Ukraine’s recovery.

In Washington, Zelenskyy reminded Americans and the world that today’s fight against aggression is about what life should be like tomorrow. G7 leaders have identified an important coordinating mechanism to help create a brighter future for Ukraine. The sooner systematic planning for the country’s rebuilding begins, and the earlier and more fully those conversations include the private sector, the better placed nations will be to further support Ukrainians in their quest to become a free and prosperous nation.

Marc Grossman is a former US undersecretary of state for political affairs and US ambassador to Turkey. He is a vice chairman of The Cohen Group, which has clients in the architecture and engineering sectors operating globally, including in Ukraine.

Kurt Volker served as US special representative for Ukraine negotiations from 2017 to 2019 and as US ambassador to NATO from 2008 to 2009. He is a distinguished fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Earl Anthony Wayne is a former US ambassador to Argentina and Mexico, and assistant secretary of state for economic and business affairs. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a public policy fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and a distinguished diplomat in residence and professorial lecturer at American University’s School of International Service.

The post How to get the private sector involved in reconstructing Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: How the world should respond to the devastating earthquake in Turkey

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 06 Feb 2023 16:17:52 +0000

This post was updated at 4:40 p.m. ET on Monday.

A 7.8-magnitude earthquake in southeastern Turkey on Monday, followed by a large aftershock, killed thousands and caused widespread devastation in both Turkey and Syria. As locals pick up the pieces and aid groups rush in, how can the international community help? What will the impact be for a region already reeling from a decade-long war and refugee crisis? Our experts on Turkey and the wider region deliver the answers.

Borzou Daragahi: The widespread damage could have been avoided

Rich Outzen: With global help needed to rescue trapped people, regional tensions could ease

Eser Özdil: Aid contributions will help build diplomatic ties

Watch out for political manipulation of the tragedy

The tragedy has mobilized Turkey’s allies to join together in solidarity. More than forty-five countries have already extended their condolences and offered help to Turkey. In Ukraine, where people know well how it feels to wake up to the shouts of those trapped under the rubble of leveled buildings, many have joined a campaign to garner assistance to those affected in the devastating earthquake, while political leadership expressed readiness to send a large group of rescue workers to Turkey to assist in the crisis response. Ukrainians’ hearts and prayers have been with Turkey today.

With so much happening in the region, it is important to make sure that the cost of human lives is not depreciated, people’s deaths do not become mere figures in statistics, and necessary lessons are learned. There is also a risk that the devastating consequences of the earthquake, just months ahead of critical elections, will be used for political manipulations and information operations—both internally and externally. Just hours after the tragedy, Russian Telegram channels and think tanks have published similar messages urging Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to take this opportunity to renew direct talks with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, claiming this would be a good time for a coordinated Turkish-Russian-Syria response. This was followed by a phone conversation between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. At the same time, there are an increasing number of social media posts sharing conspiracy theories on the possible “man-made” character of the catastrophe, allegedly aimed at weakening Turkey after rising tensions with its Western allies. These malign efforts to influence public perception about the tragedy should be taken seriously.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Previously she was a foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister of Ukraine. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

The widespread damage could have been avoided

If just one building collapses in a known earthquake zone, it is a tragedy. If dozens across several major cities collapse, it signals a preventable tragedy. Turkey vowed to implement changes to its building practices following the tragic 1999 Kocaeli province earthquake that left seventeen thousand dead. It instituted new construction rules and implemented mandatory earthquake insurance for all buildings. Architects and urban planners have been warning for years that the rules are not being followed strictly enough. This is an issue that cuts across Turkey’s partisan divide and needs much greater public scrutiny ahead of the May 14 elections.

—Borzou Daragahi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and an Istanbul-based journalist writing for the Independent.

With global help needed to rescue trapped people, regional tensions could ease

These devastating earthquakes have killed at least two thousand people and injured over eight thousand according to Monday’s reporting, with totals likely to rise. Turkey, unfortunately, has experience with severe earthquakes and has sophisticated emergency-response mechanisms. Yet there will be a need for technical assistance from neighbors and allies for time-sensitive tasks such as extricating people trapped under damaged and collapsed buildings. Azerbaijan, Israel, many European countries, and others have offered the rapid deployment of teams for this sort of work. It is worth remembering that millions of Syrian refugees live in southern Turkey, and there is a role for European donors as well as the Turkish government to help Syrians who live alongside Turkish neighbors in the affected area, but also across the border in northern Syria, which has also seen widespread destruction.

Sympathetic and supportive messages from across the region, including Athens, remind us that tragedies can also create a sense of solidarity in times of crisis. There may be some softening of heretofore tense regional relations in the aftermath and during the recovery process.

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Aid contributions will help build diplomatic ties

Turkey is once again faced with the devastating effects of an earthquake, this time epicentered on Kahramanmaraş, in the southeastern region of the country. The earthquake also affected highly populated cities including Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Antakya, Adana, and Malatya. It is cold in the region at the moment, and all kinds of humanitarian aid are needed. Although Turkey has extensive experience in dealing with similar natural disasters, any support from other countries will make a difference in the field. History has shown us many times that a common struggle in natural disasters such as earthquakes can make positive contributions to the development of relations between countries. I think that countries that show solidarity with Turkey will also improve their bilateral relations.

—Eser Özdil is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and the founder and managing director of GLOCAL Group Consulting, Investment, and Trade.

The post Experts react: How the world should respond to the devastating earthquake in Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wartime Ukraine must maintain course from Russian past to European future

Andrew D’Anieri — Tue, 24 Jan 2023 20:18:47 +0000

As Ukraine fights for its survival against invading Russian forces, the struggle for the country’s future is also unfolding far from the front lines. While Ukraine holds off Putin’s troops and endures Moscow’s terror campaign against civilians, efforts to modernize the country continue. By pursuing important reforms even in wartime, Kyiv is paving the way for a Euro-Atlantic future while distancing itself from the Soviet past.

Indications of Ukraine’s European trajectory remain evident despite the horrors of Russia’s ongoing invasion. The tiny state-owned Ust-Dunaisk port complex sits in an inlet in southwestern Ukraine where the Black Sea meets the Danube River, roughly thirty miles northwest of Snake Island. There are no roads traversing the small canals from the nearby village of Vylkove to the port, which serves as a key cargo loading point for transport between seafaring vessels in the Black Sea and river ships on the Danube.

In what was the first seaport privatization of its kind in Ukraine, the State Property Fund recently auctioned off the Ust-Dunaisk port and its Danube River berths in Vylkove and nearby Kiliya for $5.5 million. Ukrainian fertilizer company Elixir won the auction against seven other bidders, more than tripling the price from the $1.6 million opening bid.

The bidding war for Ust-Dunaisk points to a larger trend in Ukraine’s maritime exports. Russian forces currently occupy much of the Ukrainian coastline and have imposed a blockade of Ukrainian ports that has made maritime trade virtually impossible for almost a year. While a grain deal brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in summer 2022 partially opened Odesa’s major ports once again, the Russian Navy continues to harass commercial vessels entering and exiting Ukrainian waters.

As a result, shipping companies are increasingly turning to the Danube River to export Ukrainian grain. In 2022, grain shipments through the Danube grew 42 times year-on-year to 6.1 million tons, while overall cargo nearly tripled to 14.5 million tons, reaching the full capacity of Ukraine’s three Danube ports.

With demand growing rapidly, companies are now racing to build shipping capacity on the Danube. Ukrainian agribusiness company Nibulon, which has traditionally operated mainly out of Black Sea port Mykolaiv, is working to expand its Danube River capacity in the port of Izmail to be able to process 300,000 tons of grain per month. As Ukrainian companies adapt to wartime market conditions, so too have the government’s privatization authorities. Plans are underway to privatize the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy Seaport just up the coast from Ust-Dunaisk by the end of the winter season.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Ukraine’s port privatization push is part of a broader initiative to renew privatization efforts following suspension in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s February 24, 2022 invasion. Rustem Umerov was appointed as the new head of Ukraine’s State Property Fund in September 2022. He has vowed to simplify the privatization process and make it more accessible to foreign investors. If successful, this should help the country to partially offset the catastrophic economic impact of the war while laying the foundations for a revival in the Ukrainian economy once the fighting is finally over.

At the same time, significant concerns remain regarding Ukraine’s commitment to privatization. Since the invasion began, the Ukrainian authorities have invoked wartime laws to nationalize a number of strategically important companies. While these measures reflect the gravity of the situation in the country, they also raise questions over Ukraine’s future economic direction.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Even if the relaunched privatization push proves effective, huge challenges still lie ahead for Ukraine as the country looks to achieve a decisive break from the discredited past. Meaningful judicial reform is only just beginning to take shape and is vital for the country’s future. Encouragingly, President Zelenskyy now appears more willing to listen to calls from Ukraine’s international partners to clean out corrupt courts. With Ukraine heavily reliant on military and financial aid, these calls will certainly be more difficult to ignore in the months ahead. Ukraine’s partners will also be encouraged by the Zelenskyy administration’s response to recent corruption allegations, which led to a flurry of dismissals and resignations.

Post-war Ukraine will need to tackle a range of other major modernization tasks while dramatically reducing the state-owned share in the country’s banking sector. The list of necessary reforms is long and painfully familiar to anyone who has been engaged in Ukraine’s notoriously patchy efforts since the country’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Nevertheless, some veterans of Ukraine’s reform drive believe the incredible sacrifices of the past eleven months have made the prospect of further backsliding intolerable and opened a window of opportunity for once-in-a-lifetime progress. The Ukrainian authorities must not miss this chance.

We may never know exactly why Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine, but fear of the country’s emergence as a fully-fledged European democracy was clearly a factor. Putin has long viewed Ukraine’s successful transformation as an existential threat and a potential catalyst for democratic change inside Russia itself. As Moscow continues its genocidal war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and subjugate the Ukrainian people, it is more important than ever to maintain the commitment to a European future that so many Ukrainians are currently fighting for. This means implementing economic and governmental reforms whenever possible, even in the most trying of wartime circumstances.

Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter @andrew_danieri.

Kleptocratic regimes—kleptocracy means “rule by thieves”—have exploited the lax and uneven regulatory environments of the global financial system to hide their ill-gotten gains and interfere in politics abroad, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. They are aided in this task by a large cast of professional enablers within these jurisdictions. The stronger these forces get, the more they erode the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the international sanctions regime imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine has little hope of long-term success if the global financial system itself continues to weaken.

The West still has a long way to go to rein in the authoritarian kleptocrats who have thrived on the institutional dysfunction, regulatory failure, and bureaucratic weakness of the transatlantic community for far too long. We need to rethink not just how we combat kleptocracy, but also how we define it. Policy makers need to understand that authoritarian regimes that threaten transatlantic security are closely linked to illicit financial systems. As it stands, our thinking about how foreign corruption spreads is too constrained by stereotypes about kleptocratic goals and actions.

Outdated mental images of kleptocracy hobble the West’s response

Most transatlantic policy makers have in mind the first wave of kleptocracy, which primarily flourished in the late twentieth century. Its rise was intertwined with that of transatlantic offshore finance, which prompted a race to the bottom in financial regulation and a rise in baroque forms of corruption across the post-independence “Third World.”

The corrupt autocrats of the Cold War era flaunted the wealth they stole from their own people. These kleptocrats, many of whom are still spending large today, usually did not weaponize their corruption to influence the foreign policies of the United States or its allies. They were content to offshore their ill-gotten gains in US, UK, and EU jurisdictions with lax oversight over these types of transactions.

But this mental image of the kleptocrat is outdated: These kinds of kleptocratic leaders are not extinct, but they are curtailed. It is no longer a simple matter for first-wave kleptocrats to access the global financial system. Many of the regulatory loopholes exploited by these classic kleptocrats have either already been addressed or are in the process of being closed.

The second wave of kleptocracy, which emerged since the 2000s, is more sophisticated, authoritarian, and integrated into the global financial system than its predecessor. Second-wave kleptocrats intend to use the global financial system for strategic gains—either for self-gain and/or to reshape it in their image—instead of just hiding or securing the money they have stolen. Most notably, this evolution accelerated in Russia under President Vladimir Putin before February 2022, with the agendas of oligarchs and kleptocrats being subordinated to and intertwined with the plans of an ambitious state authoritarian.

Alongside this weaponized corruption, there has arisen in the West a coterie of enablers among the policy makers targeted by second-wave kleptocrats.

The second wave of kleptocracy is more sophisticated, more authoritarian—and more dangerous

Though our understanding of the threat posed by illicit finance has grown ever more sophisticated, our conception of a kleptocrat remains frozen in the mid-to-late 2000s: halfway between David Cronenberg’s 2007 London Russian gangster movie Eastern Promises, which depicted ties between the Russian state and overseas mafia groups, and the 2011 case of Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, vice president of Equatorial Guinea, in which the US Justice Department seized a Gulfstream jet, yachts, cars, and Michael Jackson memorabilia. Both depictions—one fictional, one real—describe the world of ten years ago, when the second wave of kleptocracy was still relatively new.

So what does kleptocracy look like today?

The natural resources tycoon

The tycoon is a figure who has “assimilated” into the global financial system and been recognized as a legitimate businessperson because they provide a consistent source of fossil fuels to the United States and its allies. They view the transatlantic world above all as a market, but they cannot deviate too far from loyalty to the regime in the country from which they extract natural resources. As a result, the kleptocrat as natural resources tycoon has a strongly supportive relationship with the regime, which turns a blind eye to their criminal techniques. These tycoons often “donate” parts of their revenue to leadership figures. Several Russian oligarchs would seem to fit this typology, such as Gennady Timchenko, if many of the allegations against him are true.

The private corporation subordinated to authoritarian objectives

Private corporations can be a vector for state-sponsored weaponized corruption, especially if the state is controlled by a one-party authoritarian regime at odds with the United States, its allies, and the liberal international order. US officials remain suspicious of one private corporation’s connections to the Chinese Communist Party. Even though the corporation is officially privately owned, 98.99 percent of this corporation’s stock is officially owned by a trade union committee representing employees (with the remainder held by the corporation’s founder). However, all trade unions in China are required to be part of a CCP-run labor federation. A British parliamentary inquiry into the potential security risks of Chinese technology companies noted that, even if they were not directly led by the CCP, they tended to maintain very strong links, including receiving billions of dollars’ worth of funding from the Chinese government.

The Western enablers

A respected mainstream democratic politician was the leader of a major bloc in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). In this capacity, he led other PACE members to vote down a resolution based on a 2013 Council of Europe report that condemned Azerbaijan’s human rights record. However, it was later revealed that the enabler’s actions had been influenced by extravagant bribes from Ilham Aliyev’s regime in Azerbaijan.

These cases of second-wave kleptocracy show why, despite a decade of transatlantic anti-corruption activism and the sanctions imposed on the Kremlin’s cronies and war chest, the kleptocrats are still winning even as their objectives have evolved.

Chronically underregulated industries fuel the problem

As regulations have caught up to the first wave of kleptocracy, foreign kleptocrats are increasingly switching to different channels for illicit finance.

Changes in US regulations since 2001

Oct ’01

USA PATRIOT Act passes into law and becomes effective. Title III greatly enhances AML regulations.

The Magnitsky Act is signed into law developing a sanctions mechanism against corruption and kleptocracy in Russia.

Dec ’12

Jul ’16

FinCEN implements GTOs for the first time.

The Global Magnitsky Act is signed into law, extending Magnitsky jurisdiction beyond Russia.

Dec ’16

Dec ’17

The Global Magnitsky Act goes into effect.

The 2020 AML Act passes, greatly extending AML regulations across multiple industries, and encompasses the Corporate Transparency Act.

Jan ’21

Dec ’21

The Biden Administration releases its national anticorruption strategy, outlining new defenses it aims to develop against weaponized corruption.

The US Depts of Justice and Treasury form the KleptoCapture unit as part of the G7 and Australia’s REPO task force to enact sanctions against the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Mar ’22

Changes in UK regulations since 2001

Dec ’01

The European Parliament ratifies 2AMLD. Despite coinciding with the USA PATRIOT Act, it aims to strengthen the existing provisions of the 1991 1AMLD.

The European Parliament ratifies 3AMLD. The extension of AML regulations to money services businesses and other industries is part of reforms to the UK and EU’s AML regulatory landscape recommended by FATF.

Oct ’05

Oct ’13

The UK National Crime Agency (NCA) is formed. Economic Crime Command is the NCA branch that deals with financial crime.

The European Parliament ratifies 4AMLD. It introduces new reporting and CDD requirements.

May ’15

Apr ’17

Criminal Finances Act is passed in the UK parliament. It introduces UWOs as a new tool for law enforcement against foreign kleptocrats.

The European Parliament ratifies 5AMLD. Despite its eventual departure from the EU, Britain adopts matching legislation.

Jul ’18

Dec ’19

The Money Laundering (Amendment) is passed in the UK parliament. It extends greater CDD requirements into more industries, such as for crypto exchanges and arts trades.

The Economic Crime Bill passes in the UK parliament and a new kleptocracy cell is established in the NCA. These reforms are meant to assist with global sanctions against the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Mar ’22

Changes in EU regulations since 2001

Dec ’01

The European Parliament ratifies 2AMLD. Despite coinciding with the USA PATRIOT Act, it aims to strengthen the existing provisions of the 1991 1AMLD.

The European Parliament ratifies 3AMLD. The extension of AML regulations to money services businesses and other industries is part of reforms to the UK and EU’s AML regulatory landscape recommended by FATF.

Oct ’05

Jan ’10

EUROPOL is reformed into an EU agency, extending some of its authority in investigating money laundering operations across the EU.

The European Parliament ratifies 4AMLD. It introduces new reporting and CDD requirements.

May ’15

Jul ’18

The European Parliament ratifies 5AMLD. Despite its eventual departure from the EU, Britain adopts matching legislation.

The European Union establishes the EU “freeze and seize” task force. The task force works with the G7 and Australia REPO task force to enact sanctions against the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Mar ’22

Dec ’22

The European Parliament ratifies the European Magnitsky Act, granting the European Commission the power to place sanctions on human rights abusers and kleptocrats.

Central to both the failure of transatlantic regulation and the strategies of second-wave kleptocrats are chronically underregulated financial industries: private investment firms, art dealerships, real estate agents, and luxury goods providers. The global arts trade industry was estimated to be worth $65 billion in 2021, with the United States, the UK, and the EU accounting for at least 70 percent ($45.5 billion) of worldwide sales.

As of 2020, the total value of assets under management in the global private investment industry was estimated at $115 trillion, more than $89 trillion of which was in the US, UK, and EU.

In 2020, the global value of residential real estate was an estimated $258.5 trillion, with North America and Europe together composing at least 43 percent of that value (approximately $111.155 trillion).

The cryptocurrency market is the newest. It is also less stable than other financial industries, so its relative size and value fluctuates more dramatically.

Weaponized corruption in action

The 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal was the largest political scandal in Malaysian history and the most publicly known case of kleptocracy in the world before the release of the Panama Papers in 2016.

From 2009 to 2015 as much as $4.5 billion was stolen from Malaysia’s state-owned investment fund—designed to boost the country’s economic growth—into a variety of offshore accounts and shell companies.

The stolen funds were channeled through multiple jurisdictions, including in the British Virgin Islands and the Dutch Caribbean country of Curaçao, before being passed through US-based private investment firms.

The US Department of Justice believes the funds were “allegedly misappropriated by high-level officials of 1MDB and their associates, and Low Taek Jho (aka Jho Low).”

Instead of being used for economic development in Malaysia, the funds were used to buy real estate in California, New York, and London; paintings by Monet and Van Gogh; and stakes in luxury hotel projects in New York and California, as well as laundered into the film industry as funding for the 2013 film The Wolf of Wall Street.

The film’s production further resulted in the exchange of fine art purchased with dark money, such as pieces of art by Pablo Picasso and Jean-Michel Basquiat that were gifted to actor Leonardo DiCaprio because of his starring role in the film. (DiCaprio returned the paintings to US authorities upon learning how they were acquired.)

The scandal implicated Malaysia’s then-prime minister Najib Razak, alleged to have channeled approximately $700 million into his own personal bank accounts, along with several people close to him.

Photos: Reuters

A large amount of the stolen wealth remains in US real estate and fine art, which the Department of Justice is continuing to recover on behalf of Malaysia. As of August 2021, more than $1.2 billion had been recovered. Yet, given the number of private investment firms, real estate traders, film producers, and arts dealers that were involved in the 1MDB-related illicit finance, it is highly likely the stolen funds have been dispersed across a variety of industries. With better financial intelligence sharing between US, UK, and Dutch authorities, these suspicious dark money flows might have been identified before the money was moved across US financial institutions.

What needs to happen to take on the second-wave kleptocrats?

The US, UK, and EU need a more structured relationship to develop anti-corruption policies. We propose a new mechanism for the transatlantic community to harmonize its necessary response: a Transatlantic Anti-Corruption Council to coordinate anti-corruption policies between the United States, the UK, and the EU. It could connect the various US, UK, and EU agencies and directorates that work on corruption and kleptocracy-related issues, and organize them into expert groups focused on illicit finance, tax evasion, acquisition of luxury goods, and more. Recent cases of weaponized corruption have exploited the lack of regulatory coordination and financial intelligence sharing between transatlantic jurisdictions to evade detection and to corrupt transatlantic democratic and financial institutions. The TACC can work on closing these gaps—but it is only the beginning of a larger transatlantic strategy against weaponized corruption.

The anti-corruption policy to-do list

United States

In the United States, much of the problem stems from a lack of legislation enabling more comprehensive law enforcement and regulatory compliance within these underregulated industries. The United States should:

Follow through on the US legislative national anti-corruption strategy. Many of the existing flaws in the US regulatory sphere were correctly identified and should be addressed accordingly. This includes the strategy’s commitment to increasing regulation on the private investment industry, including on firms managing assets totaling less than $100 million.
FinCEN, the US FIU, is chronically understaffed, underbudgeted, and relies on outdated technology. Even if legislative reform was passed and/or executive action taken to extend BSA/AML obligations to more financial institutions, FinCEN would be hard-pressed to fully investigate reports it received and to enforce its authority in cases in which financial crime was present.

United Kingdom

The UK, on the other hand, already has much of the legislation it needs to address anti-money-laundering (AML) deficiencies and sanctions evasion occurring in its jurisdictions. It needs to implement that legislation—and address the close connections between the City of London and British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. The UK should:

Share legalistic principles and good practices of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) with allies. UWOs have already proven to be very effective in bringing more investigative power to bear on to foreign kleptocrats based in the United Kingdom
Reduce regulatory mismatches between the primary UK jurisdictions and the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, especially with beneficial ownership registries and sanctions compliance
Improve verification standards for companies registered in Companies House to identify shell companies
Fully implement and enforce existing transparency and national security laws, especially the National Security and Investment Act

European Union

Much like the UK, many of the EU’s problems stem less from a lack of legislation than from the implementation of those policies. The EU faces additional hurdles in ensuring that all its member states harmonize their AML policies. The EU should:

Increase compliance requirements for private investment firms managing assets totaling less than €100 million
Fully implement the 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (6AMLD) across EU jurisdictions. The establishment of an EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority will be essential for harmonizing regulations across the European Union (EU).

6AMLD measures should also be applied to overseas autonomous territories like Aruba.

Increase enforcement of laws that prohibit the spread of corruption in foreign territories, particularly for cases that involve spreading corruption to fellow EU member states

Transatlantic community

The transatlantic community should:

Work closely with the United States in its national anti-corruption strategy. The strategy’s success will be heavily dependent on the degree of cooperation between US allies and the Biden administration in its implementation.
Match regulatory legislation on both sides of the Atlantic. This will permit better coordination of sanctions between allies and reduce tensions between the United States and its allies when the United States relies on extraterritorial action.
Create channels for financial intelligence units and private sector actors in transatlantic jurisdictions to share information about suspicious clients, transactions, and transfers. The Europol Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership (EFIPPP) may be a good platform for increased intelligence sharing.
Establish the Transatlantic Anti-Corruption Council (TACC). Its main purpose would be to coordinate legislation on improving anti-money laundering/Know Your Customer (AML/KYC) policies, share good governance policies (such as beneficial ownership registries) to harmonize regulations, crack down on sanctions evasion, and share financial intelligence on transnational financial criminals to shut down their operations.

The TACC should also regularly convene expert working groups on, at a minimum:

trade-based illicit finance,
market-based illicit finance,
bribery and other enabling forms of corruption,
acquisition of luxury goods by kleptocrats,
asset returns,
tax evasion,
terrorist financing, and
future threats.

Financial intelligence working groups should similarly cover individual cases of financial crime at the tactical level. At the executive level, primary stakeholders in the TACC should be

the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, and USAID on the US side,
the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO); His Majesty’s Treasury; and the Home Office on the UK side, and
the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs; Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union; and Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers on the EU side

The late United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan once said: “If corruption is a disease, transparency is a central part of its treatment.” Annan spoke in a time before the crisis of weaponized corruption rose to prominence, but his words ring clearer now that foreign kleptocrats are spreading their malign influence by means of the money they stole from their own people. The United States and its allies must choose the partners with which it engages more carefully. Otherwise, it may find that some of its partners are in fact proxies for strategic competitors of the transatlantic community who will undermine the West’s security and the integrity of its democracies from the inside.

DOWNLOAD PDF

New Atlanticist Nov 9, 2021

How to get Biden’s democracy summit right

By Daniel Fried, Rose Jackson

Two of the Council’s democracy experts say the upcoming Summit for Democracy needs to take aim at autocrats’ tools by focusing on anti-corruption and tech standards, and elevating civil society.

Civil Society Corruption

New Atlanticist Apr 5, 2022

How the world’s parliaments can team up against Russian aggression

By Francis Shin and Riho Terras

An interparliamentary alliance against Kremlin aggression would maximize global efforts to coordinate sanctions and keep the pressure on Moscow.

Corruption Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Oct 26, 2022

The West needs a more united approach to sanctioning Putin’s elite

By David Clark

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now in its ninth month, it is time for a coordinated approach to sanctioning Putin’s elite that reflects the seriousness of the threat they pose to global security, writes David Clark.

Conflict Corruption

The post Authoritarian kleptocrats are thriving on the West’s failures. Can they be stopped? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Digitalization and transparency are vital for Ukraine’s reconstruction

Oleksandra Azarkhina — Mon, 02 Jan 2023 18:47:43 +0000

When you have become used to constant power cuts, regular air raid alerts, and the empty evening streets of Kyiv, a business trip to the United States can feel like being transported to another dimension entirely. However, when I visited Washington DC in the final weeks of 2022, I soon found that the situation in Ukraine was high on the local agenda.

During my brief time in the US, I held over 30 meetings with government officials as well as representatives of the defense, financial, and non-profit sectors. All were deeply immersed in the challenges facing Ukraine and were ready to offer genuine support. Topics of discussion included efforts to boost Ukrainian food exports, strengthen the country’s air defense systems, and facilitate the future reconstruction of Ukraine.

Every conversation also featured an anti-corruption component. This is essential in order to build the kind of transparent and effective partnerships that will help Ukraine move forward. Success will depend on a combination of the right systems and suitably qualified personnel.

Digital tools can play a key role in this process. Ukraine’s reputation as a digital innovator is already recognized across the Atlantic. Two years ago, Ukraine became the world’s first country to grant legal status to electronic passports for domestic use. Hundreds of public services for private citizens and businesses can already be accessed online. More recently, Ukraine occupied second place in Europe for data openness in the 2022 Open Data Maturity ranking.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Ukraine’s digital progress can serve as a solid basis for the country’s recovery. While in the US, I had the opportunity to present plans for a Digital Reconstruction Management System (DRMS), which will serve as a comprehensive online platform that will ensure successful simultaneous implementation of multiple projects across Ukraine. The DRMS will make it possible to manage every stage of Ukraine’s reconstruction projects while providing real-time online information including spending data.

The concept is based on the principle of maximum transparency and the publication of open data in accordance with international norms such as the Open Contracting Data Standard. This digital solution will drive the development of an entire ecosystem. It will create opportunities for businesses around the world to participate in procurement tenders for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Additional tools will make it possible to monitor contractors, while NGOs will be able to analyze data and create risk indicators. This approach will make the coming reconstruction of Ukraine a model of open governance and open contracting for the entire world.

Ukraine’s digital reconstruction system is set to be launched in early 2023. This initiative is the result of cooperation between the Ukrainian authorities, civil society, and international institutions. It is being implemented together with RISE Ukraine, a coalition of international and Ukrainian NGOs.

Eurasia Center events

Jason Marczak: Watch for more political uncertainty ahead

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Personnel choices will also play a key role in the further evolution of Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture. Appointing the right people will be critical to this process. In the months and years ahead, Ukraine should look to recruit from within the ranks of the country’s armed forces.

There are currently more people than ever in uniform defending Ukraine. This includes men and women from a variety of professional backgrounds, including many who took up arms following successful careers as civil servants and human rights defenders. According to my friends who are currently serving in the trenches, this experience fundamentally changes a person’s worldview and civic position.

Military veterans will be highly motivated to safeguard Ukraine’s development and the country’s democratic institutions. That is why it is so important for Ukraine to receive support from the US and other international partners for initiatives that will make it possible to integrate veterans into the country’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts.

The provisional idea is to select people with the relevant educational and professional background for training in the most effective approaches to combating corruption. Successful candidates can then join Ukrainian law enforcement and the country’s anti-corruption institutions.

I am confident that by combining digital transparency with a targeted approach to personnel, it will be possible to achieve historic change in Ukraine. This message clearly resonated with our American partners during my recent visit to the United States. Our pursuit of a common goal is a source of inspiration and one more reason to believe Ukraine will win the war.

Oleksandra Azarkhina is Ukraine’s Deputy Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development.

What happened: blame Matovič

The no-confidence vote was called by the liberal conservatives of the Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS) of Richard Sulík. SaS was part of the governing coalition until September when the party left over long-term disputes with Minister of Finance Igor Matovič.

Matovič is a leader of the governing OLANO party and served as prime minister until he was forced to swap positions with party colleague Eduard Heger in March 2021 after coalition partners learned about a secret deal Matovič had struck with Russia to purchase Sputnik COVID-19 vaccines. However, the unpredictable Matovič has continued—as Slovaks call it—to throw political nukes.

When SaS members’ patience ran out, they signaled they would call a no-confidence vote if Matovič did not resign. He first agreed and went to the presidential palace to hand over his resignation letter. Then something awkward happened: He changed his mind when in the presidential palace and pulled his resignation. This was the final straw for SaS. Yet the fall of Heger’s government is no surprise. The ruling coalition was plagued by discord and had been paralyzed for some time.

What will happen: four options

Heger’s cabinet resigned before President Zuzana Čaputová on December 16. What will happen next is an open question. Here are four possibilities:

Čaputová could form a caretaker government that can stay in place until regular elections that are scheduled for the spring of 2024. However, there’s no tradition in Bratislava for this solution. The opposition has already objected, and Čaputová herself has said this is not her preferred choice. Nevertheless, she can still use it as a last resort option or as a threat to get the National Council (Slovak parliament) to explore other options.
Heger’s cabinet-in-demission could govern for a longer period with limited powers. But Slovakia needs strong leadership amid multiple crises (security, energy, health, inflation), and nobody seems to favor this alternative. It would also undermine parliament by effectively overruling the outcome of the vote of no confidence.
Čaputová could call for early elections. Yet not every parliamentarian is eager to see early elections. Some lawmakers are afraid of losing their jobs while political parties could lose vital access to financial resources. (Groups that make it into the National Council are reimbursed on an annual basis.) A bill to call for fresh elections would need the support of 60 percent of lawmakers, which simply isn’t there now.
At the same time, many lawmakers are exploring the option of a reformed center-right coalition without Matovič, as a “sine qua non” condition. Even Sulík—whose SaS party left the coalition—appears now to be on board. They would need a majority in parliament, not an easy task after the no-confidence vote. However, the first important signal that they can succeed in reforming the coalition is the December 22 agreement on Slovakia’s budget for next year. Heger’s government-in-demission reached a deal in cooperation with SaS. The gravity of the situation, where a provisory budget would limit the government’s ability to help people cope with skyrocketing energy prices, motivated them to compromise. Matovič’s removal on December 23 was part of the deal.

If elections were to be held today, the Voice–Social Democracy party led by Peter Pellegrini would likely win. The party split off from SMER–Social Democracy, run by Fico, who is currently polling in second place.

Pellegrini—whose party is sometimes dubbed Fico’s B team by critics—is not eager to work with his former boss. However, if it will be the only way for him to get back into power, Pellegrini could agree. Together with Fico, they’ll need another partner. They could turn to ultranationalist, neo-Nazi groups such as People’s Party Our Slovakia or the breakaway Republika party.

Realistically, a center-right coalition opposed to Fico could come to power if it gets enough votes in an election so that Pellegrini can form the government with them rather than joining Fico.

What to watch: Dark matter

Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once called Slovakia “the black hole of Europe” when in the mid-1990s then Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar—a forerunner of nationalistic populism in the region—did his best to disrupt the country’s move to join NATO and the EU.

Since then, Slovakia has often been praised as the region’s champion of liberal democracy. The 2019 election of Čaputová—a former environmental activist and liberal democrat—as president solidified that reputation. The coalition government that just fell could have added to that growing stature after Fico’s reign, which was marked by the erosion of rule of law and democracy.

Fico was forced to step down after the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak, whose work exposed how deeply Slovak police, the justice system, and some politicians were colluding with criminals, including the Italian mafia. The investigation into those allegations is still ongoing, and critics argue that one of Fico’s motivations for his government’s comeback is to terminate it.

At the moment, when the country is preparing for the thirtieth anniversary of its independence on January 1, the mood among Slovak voters is one of deep frustration and apathy, which creates political space for populists and extremists.

Aside from euroskepticism, a government including Fico could add another challenge to NATO and EU efforts to maintain unity in support of Ukraine. In fact, since Fico was forced into the opposition, he has taken even more pro-Russian positions than Orbán.

In July, Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation (part of the National Security and Defense Council) listed Fico among the politicians spreading Russian propaganda. From his standpoint, what we see in Ukraine is a war between Russia and the United States, where both are to blame. He has repeatedly stated that he wouldn’t send a single bullet to Ukraine.

Unlike Italy’s new Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who transformed her country’s far-right politics by turning against Russian aggression, Slovak politicians are actually fighting for a slice of the country’s pro-Russian electorate. After former Russian intelligence agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned in the British city of Salisbury in 2018, the unwillingness to alienate pro-Russian voters meant that Bratislava was the only EU capital other than Vienna that didn’t expel a single Russian diplomat.

Today, Slovakia hosts a multinational NATO battlegroup put together to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. A significant portion of Fico’s voter base is against the foreign military presence in the country. If he returns to power, Czech, German, Dutch, Polish, and US military contingents currently present in Slovakia could come under scrutiny.

Segments of the Slovak population continue to perceive their country as a victim that suffered under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later within Czechoslovakia. During the 1990s under Mečiar’s rule, anti-American sentiments started to rise. These further intensified after the NATO bombing of Serbia and later with the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pan-Slavism and targeted disinformation campaigns have played a role in strengthening pro-Russian narratives as well.

What should be done: engage Slovaks

Currently, there’s no other country within the EU closer to forming such a hard-line nationalist government than Slovakia, especially if two minor neo-Nazi parties (People’s Party Our Slovakia and Republika) are in. It is important to mobilize efforts to stop such a scenario from unfolding.

Slovakia’s partners, including the United States, should do their best to convince those opposed to Fico to join forces. That is not an easy task given the deep divisions within Slovak politics, but there’s still time to do it.

Friends and allies of Slovakia should also talk to Pellegrini, offering him a mix of carrots and sticks to discourage him from cooperating with Fico and the far-right groups.

Last but not least, it is important for US and EU politicians and diplomats to maintain contact with Fico. As populist, pro-Russian, and mercurial as he has become, he also used to be a great political gambler, an opportunist, a pragmatist similar to Orbán or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan who is capable of U-turns if they worked for him. Fico might have lost that aspect of his political personality, but if it can be revived with efforts to show that working with the West is a better bet than siding with Russia, it is worth a try.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Europe Center and a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations.

The post Slovakia risks becoming another Hungary-style EU spoiler. How should the West respond? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: Peru’s president was removed from office after a failed power grab. Now what?

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 08 Dec 2022 02:33:45 +0000

Peruvian President Pedro Castillo was removed from office by the country’s Congress on Wednesday, after he had announced a plan to dissolve Congress ahead of the impeachment vote. The judiciary, military, and police opposed the unpopular leftist president’s power grab, and Congress sent Castillo packing while elevating Vice President Dina Boluarte to the presidency. Castillo was later arrested.

Did the system succeed against a constitutional crisis? What’s next for the South American nation after the chaotic presidency of an untested political newcomer? Our Latin America experts break it all down.

Jump to an expert reaction

Hugo de Zela: Castillo misspent his energy clashing with Congress—instead of on real policy change

Érika Rodríguez: Peru’s top trends: Political instability and institutional degradation

María Fernanda Bozmoski: An unfortunate new low for Peru

Watch for more political uncertainty ahead

Castillo tried to play his hand today in the longstanding tradition of an autogolpe—a self-coup. His incompetence—seen throughout the chaos of his one and a half years as president—made it clear that he was not going to succeed. The rural teacher turned union leader also could not count on popular support, with an approval rating of just 19 percent in some cities. The ill-thought-out move to attempt to dissolve Congress rather than let Congress consider an impeachment motion against him thankfully backfired—symbolic of his short-lived presidency.

What else was part of the recipe for maintaining democratic order? The military and police vocally warning Castillo not to make his move, ministers resigning in the wake of his announcement, and Congress moving up its impeachment vote (which passed with the support of 101 of 130 legislators). Reaction from the region was tepid. Brazil’s president-elect, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, called the actions today “regrettable,” while Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador blamed Peru’s elite, saying their hostility toward Castillo led resulted in “an environment of confrontation and hostility has been maintained against him.” Colombia’s government said it “condemns any attack against democracy.”

Peru has been embroiled in political chaos for quite some time. It took four presidents to complete the last presidential term (from 2016 to 2021), and Peru is now on to its second president, its first female president, in this current five-year term. The fractious relationship between Congress and the president—and the ease with which Congress can call for impeachment—are some of the factors leading to such political uncertainty. Add to that the need for a revamping of a political structure that has lost the confidence of many Peruvians especially when many of its leaders are seen as corrupt.

What’s next? The new Peruvian president, Boluarte, called immediately for a dialogue among all political actors. That’s easier said than done. Boluarte does not belong to any political party after being expelled from the Perú Libre party last January. The last Peruvian president to not belong to a political party—Martín Vizcarra—was impeached by Congress in 2020, leading to a wave of protests.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Castillo misspent his energy clashing with Congress—instead of on real policy change

The ending of Castillo’s presidency was not totally surprising. His way of governing always gave a sense of improvisation and lack of planning.

Besides the obvious problems of widespread corruption scandals that plagued his government, one of the main issues was a nonworking government apparatus and a total lack of a strategic approach to find solutions to the country’s many problems.

At the same time, Castillo’s everyday confrontations with Congress drained the energy that could have been used to promote initiatives and to advance the policy changes promised during the electoral campaign. The result was an increasing and all-consuming confrontation with the parliamentarians and, in recent days, with the judiciary, the attorney general, and the constitutional court. A byproduct of that: accelerating decline in his popular support, even in the regions more prone to support him in the country’s south.

The recent avalanche of corruption allegations involving the president and his family and the increasing support for the impeachment process in Congress resulted in Castillo’s attempt to take absolute power, close the Congress, and reform the judiciary. But this once again amateurishly improvised attempt failed and resulted with Castillo in jail.

—Hugo de Zela served as Peru’s vice minister of foreign affairs from 2018 to 2019 and as Peru’s ambassador to the United States from 2019 to 2021. He has frequently spoken at the Atlantic Council.

Peru’s top trends: Political instability and institutional degradation

Peru is a dysfunctional democracy in which a coup was, for a short time, a plausible option given the precarious situation of the president who had lost the support of his parliamentary group and was only sheltered by a part of the opposition. However on this occasion, the Congress, a usual source of instability, has managed to save the situation. An impeachment with 101 votes in favor removed Castillo from power, and he was promptly detained. The presidency has been assumed by his vice president, Dina Boluarte.

Castillo’s decision to dissolve Congress, which Boluarte called a coup, is absurd. He was incompetent in filling his role, and his presidency was tainted by high-level corruption scandals. The former president had been investigated by Peru’s attorney general regarding allegations of “influence peddling” and “collusion.” In addition to that, prosecutors opened other criminal investigations against Castillo, including one for possibly “obstructing justice.” The prosecutor’s office had even opened a constitutional complaint in Congress against Castillo to determine whether he committed crimes as president.

By dissolving Congress, instead of allowing the Congress to proceed with a motion to move forward with the impeachment vote, Castillo created the situation that would end up, in a few hours, with him detained by security forces and taken to a police station. He did it alone; no one accompanied him in his most recent anti-democratic drift, not his cabinet, not the army, and not his supporters. For Peru, this is just another episode in a dramatic trend of political instability and institutional degradation. Nine out of the ten Peruvian presidents of the last three decades have ended up accused of corruption. The economy grows, but the country remains socially broken.

—Érika Rodríguez is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, a member of the Center’s Venezuela Working Group, and a special advisor for Latin American affairs to the high representative and vice president of the European Commission.

An unfortunate new low for Peru

After inaugurating four presidents in less than a year, Peru has reached an unfortunate new low in its political and institutional crisis. Castillo’s unilateral move to dissolve Congress received no support—a silver lining in the tragic denouement of Castillo’s short and unpopular sixteen-month administration. The initial reactions and condemnations of today’s actions in Peru from former cabinet members and other key actors is also a good omen for the democratic outlook of the country. Immediately, however, the constitutional crisis that the former president has unleashed will likely exacerbate longstanding political fatigue and social unrest in the country. The hours following are crucial and will determine whether trust in Congress and the country’s institutions will strengthen or erode. These institutions, with the support of the international community—including the business sector—have an important role in helping Boluarte navigate the next chapter of Peru.

—María Fernanda Bozmoski is the deputy director of programs at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

FAST THINKING: A political ‘wake-up call’ for Latin America

By Atlantic Council

Where will Pedro Castillo take Peru? What does his victory mean for the Latin American left and global investors? Our experts break down how the barefoot candidate will govern.

Democratic Transitions Elections

The post Experts react: Peru’s president was removed from office after a failed power grab. Now what? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is fueling an energy crisis in neighboring Moldova

Alexander St. Leger — Mon, 05 Dec 2022 21:38:53 +0000

When Russian airstrikes hit Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in mid November, the lights also went out in Moldova. A subsequent bombardment in early December similarly left parts of Moldova temporarily in the dark. Russia’s infrastructure bombing campaign has escalated an energy crisis in Ukraine’s small neighbor and highlighted structural vulnerabilities. Europe must now move urgently to keep Moldova’s lights on while supporting a long-term track toward greater energy resiliency.

Since gaining independence in 1992, Moldova has been almost completely reliant on electricity generated from Russian gas. Moldova generated about 10% of its electricity needs domestically, while 20% was imported from Ukraine and the remaining 70% was produced by the MGRES Cuciurgan Power Plant in Transnistria, the unrecognized breakaway region of Moldova that has been controlled by Russia since the 1990s.

The Kremlin has used its stranglehold on Moldova’s gas supply to pressure the Moldovan authorities into political concessions. The most notable recent example of this trend was Moscow’s 2021 demand to adjust Moldova’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the European Union in exchange for a new gas contract on more favorable terms.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Moldova’s current energy crisis began in October 2022, when Gazprom cut gas imports to Moldova by 30% in an attempt to squeeze the country’s pro-EU government. The resulting electricity shortage led the Transnistrian authorities to cut power deliveries from the Cuciurgan Power Plant to Moldova by 73%. The effect was immediate. A draft document presented to Western leaders in November showed Moldova experiencing a 200% increase in electricity prices and 34% inflation, forcing the average Moldovan to spend up to 75% of their income on energy utilities.

After Russian missiles began targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on October 10, Ukraine was forced to suspend all electricity exports to Moldova. Romania quickly responded by allowing Moldova to import electricity at a capped price, while Romania itself subsidized the difference between the Romanian spot price. At present, 90% of Moldova’s domestic electricity demand is being met by Romania.

While electricity imports from Romania continue to keep Moldova afloat, the chief vulnerability to Moldova’s electrical system remains connectivity. Moldova possesses one singular high-voltage 400kV line, which runs from the Romanian border town of Isaccea through Transnistria. Any energy imported from Romania must be routed through the separatist region. Local energy experts believe Moldova’s reliance on a singular high-voltage line presents significant risks. Any accident or act of sabotage would leave Moldova exposed to long-term blackouts.

Transnistria itself is not immune to the escalating energy crisis. After Ukraine suspended electricity imports to Moldova, Transnistrian leaders announced their November gas deficit would hit 40%. Two of Transnistria’s largest gas consumers, the Rybnitsa Cement Plant and nearby Metallurgical Plant, were forced to cease operations.

Eurasia Center events

#3 Kevin Rudd on Jiang Zemin, steward of China’s rise

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Moldova has an immediate short-term need for direct financial support from the EU to offset rising energy costs. The European Union recently pledged 250 million euros during European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Chisinau. This financial support will be broken down into 40% grants, 40% loans, and 20% budgetary support.

Such financial backing is welcome, but more is needed. French President Emmanuel Macron’s pledge of 100 million euros announced at November’s Moldova Support Platform in Paris was another positive step, but Moldova will need sustained funding in order to continuously purchase electricity on the European spot market.

While the immediate focus is on addressing the current energy crisis, European policymakers can and should also invest in Moldova’s longer term energy security. This support should include backing for the expedited construction of the 400kV Vulcanesti-Chisinau power line, which would allow electricity imports from Romania to bypass the Cuciurgan Power Plant entirely.

This is now possible due to the synchronization of Ukrainian and Moldovan electrical networks with the Continental European Grid, a step taken earlier this year in an effort to move away from the Soviet-legacy Russian Unified National Electrical Grid. Without power grid synchronization, Moldova would have been forced to construct expensive “back-to-back” electrical transformers to convert imported electricity from the European Union to meet the parameters of the CIS electrical grid.

In the long term, policymakers should prioritize the construction of a high-voltage power line running from the Suceava substation in Romania to Balti in northern Moldova. Former Moldovan President Igor Dodon earlier proposed the project together with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Moldova’s Moldelectrica, and Romania’s Transelectrica, but the initiative has largely stalled. Reviving the Suceava-Balti power line project would indicate the EU’s interest in supporting Moldova’s long-term energy security.

The effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can already be felt beyond Ukraine’s borders. Every missile that falls on Ukraine exacerbates Moldova’s energy crisis and pushes the country closer to the brink. Europe must do everything in its power to help Moldova keep the power on this winter, and should also seek ways to move toward a more resilient state of energy security in the years to come.

Alexander St. Leger is an analyst at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. He was previously a US Fulbright Program grantee in Moldova and Romania. You can follow him on Twitter @AlexStLeger.

But since then, in all three cases—Russia, China, and Iran—autocratic leaders’ errors of commission have deepened their countries’ underlying weaknesses while breeding new difficulties that defy easy solutions.

That’s most dramatically the case with Putin, whose reckless, unprovoked, and illegal war in Ukraine has resulted in 6,490 civilian deaths, per the United Nations’s most recent estimate, and has prompted more than a million Russians to flee his country. International observers point to proof of crimes against humanity.

Beyond that, Putin has set back the Russian economy—some experts believe by as much as a decade—and sanctions are only beginning to bite. He’ll never regain his international reputation, and his military has revealed itself—despite many years of investments—as poorly trained, badly disciplined, and lacking morale.

Xi’s mistakes are less bloody in nature thus far. The excesses of his zero-COVID policy set off large-scale, spontaneous protests that amounted to the most serious challenge of his decade in leadership. Just last month, the Twentieth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party anointed Xi with a third term as China’s leader, but the protests that followed shortly thereafter shattered that aura of invincibility and apparent public support.

“Xi is in a crisis of his own making, with no quick or painless route out,” wrote the Economist this week. “New COVID cases are near record levels. The disease has spread to more than 85 percent of China’s cities. Clamp down even harder to bring it back under control, and the economic costs will rise yet higher, further fueling public anger. Allow it to spread and hundreds of thousands of people will die… China’s leaders appear to be searching for a middle ground, but it is not clear there is any.”

Beyond COVID-19, what is in danger is the unwritten social contract between the Chinese Communist Party of just 96 million members and the total Chinese population of 1.4 billion. Namely, the Chinese people accept restricted freedoms and fealty to the party so long as the party provides economic rewards and social security. A series of policy mistakes has slowed Chinese growth to just 3 percent in 2022, yet Xi continues to prioritize party control over economic freedoms.

Though the global stakes of Iran’s protests are less obvious, the Mideast and world would be far better off with a more moderate and pluralistic Iran that focuses on its public needs, retreats from its regional adventurism, and steps back from the nuclear brink. Here, too, the regime’s problems have been self-created, the protests being a result of excessive regime brutality and endemic corruption.

So, what should be done in 2023 to transform these authoritarian setbacks into a more sustainable advance of the “free world” (helping to reverse a sixteen-year global decline of democracy, as measured by Freedom House’s 2022 report)?

First and most immediately, the United States and its partners should deepen and expand their military and financial support for Ukraine. The Biden administration’s top officials understand this is the defining battle of our post-Cold War era. Without US military and financial support, and without US rallying of allies, all of Kyiv’s remarkable courage and resilience might not be enough.

That said, Biden’s caution and his often-stated fears of setting off World War III have limited the sorts and amounts of armaments Ukraine receives—and the speed at which they reach the battlefield. Faster delivery of more and better air defense could have saved Ukrainian lives.

It’s remains difficult to understand continued limits put on Ukraine’s ability to strike the targets from which they are being hit as Putin murderously pummels more civilian targets and infrastructure.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has rightly accused Putin of weaponizing winter in the hope of freezing Ukraine’s citizens into submission. Perhaps the greater danger is that of Western fatigue in supporting Ukraine and growing external pressure on Kyiv to negotiate, when only further battlefield gains will prompt Putin to withdraw his troops and provide concessions that would allow a secure, sovereign, and democratic Ukraine to emerge.

Even as Russia requires action now, managing the Chinese challenge requires a more patient course, one that will be made easier should Putin be strategically defeated in Ukraine. Biden was right to meet with Xi in Bali, on the margins of the Group of Twenty meeting, to build a floor which can keep the world’s most crucial bilateral relationship from sinking.

Where the United States should step up its efforts in 2023 is in coalescing allies in Europe and Asia around a sustainable, consensus-driven approach to China that recognizes Beijing’s underlying weaknesses and deters its efforts to absorb Taiwan and remake the global order.

There are three potential outcomes at this “inflection point”: a reinvigoration and reinvention of our existing international liberal order, the emergence of a Chinese-led illiberal order, or the breakdown of world order altogether on the model of Putin’s “rule of the jungle.”

As 2022 ends, the failures and costs of those alternative models are clearer than ever.

Therefore, what’s crucial in the year ahead is for democracies to unify in common cause to shape the global future alongside moderate, modern non-democracies that seek a more secure, prosperous, and just world.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 China’s failing COVID strategy leaves Xi with no good options
ECONOMIST

To understand Xi’s dilemma, read this smart Economist essay breaking down the consequences China will face if it abandons Xi’s “zero-COVID” policy—and the consequences it will face if it doesn’t.

One jarring image of Xi’s determination to go all-in on “zero-COVID” is an empty vaccine factory. “The stifling of debate,” the Economist writes, “has had baleful consequences. China has not approved the use of foreign vaccines, including the most effective ones, the mRNA jabs made by Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna.”

What experience shows is “the protection accorded by Chinese shots appears to wane significantly after six months. Worse, the authorities have focused on testing and building quarantine sites this year, while failing to administer third (or even fourth) doses to all, even though these would require no new infrastructure or political messaging.” Read More →

#2 Enough about democracy’s weaknesses. Let’s talk about its strengths.
Fareed Zakaria | WASHINGTON POST

CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, one of the premier strategic thinkers out there, has written a compelling defense of democracy’s virtues in the face of authoritarianism’s setbacks.

“It is astonishing to remember that when America’s Founding Fathers were constructing their experiment in government,” Zakaria writes, “they were virtually alone in a world of monarchies. These politicians were drawing on the writings of Enlightenment intellectuals such as Montesquieu and John Locke, studying historical examples from ancient Greece and Rome, and embracing key elements of English governance and common law. But they were mostly making it up in their heads. They had failures; their first effort, the Articles of Confederation, collapsed. In the end, however, they concocted something stunning: a system that protected individual rights, allowed for regular changes in leadership, prevented religious hegemony, and created a structure flexible enough to adapt to massive changes.” Read More →

Kevin Rudd | INTERPRETER

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, one of the keenest observers of China anywhere, has delivered a brilliant obituary on former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin that provides insight into China’s reformist past and puts in perspective its unfortunate return to Marxism-Leninism under Xi.

His narrative recalls his own experience of Jiang, then mayor of Shanghai, singing O Sole Mio at the Sydney Opera House in 1987. It then tracks how this larger-than-life individual navigated the shoals of Communist Party politics to usher in China’s era of rapid economic growth and private sector expansion.

“Jiang’s death this week at 96,” writes Rudd in the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter, “marks the final, flickering embers of that now-distant reformist age—and the unambiguous beginning of the brave, new world of Xi Jinping.” Read More →

#4 The Russian Billionaire Selling Putin’s War to the Public
Betsy McKay, Thomas Grove, and Rob Barry | WALL STREET JOURNAL

This WSJ investigation is a powerfully reported exposé of Yuri Kovalchuk, also known as “Putin’s banker,” an oligarch and media baron, who has used his banking and media empires to promote Putin’s murderous war in Ukraine.

“A physicist by training,” three WSJ reporters write, “Kovalchuk is motivated more by patriotic ideology than by the trappings of wealth, say people who know him. He doesn’t hold a formal position in the Russian government. Yet he has deep influence over Kremlin policy and personnel, and helps supply dachas and yachts for Putin’s use, and lucrative jobs and stockholdings to the president’s family and friends, according to people familiar with the deals, financial documents and anticorruption groups.”

“Kovalchuk,” the WSJ adds, “controls the US-sanctioned Russian Bank Rossiya. The bank, in turn, built a network of offshore companies that have benefited Putin and his associates, and invests in projects important to the state, according to interviews with former US officials and Kremlin analysts as well as public documents and information revealed in the Panama Papers, a trove of leaked documents detailing offshore financial holdings.” Read More →

#5 Rise in Iranian assassination, kidnapping plots alarms Western officials
Shane Harris, Souad Mekhennet, and Yeganeh Torbati | WASHINGTON POST

This week’s must-read is chilling. In a remarkable narrative, the Washington Post pieces together a large-scale Iranian campaign of kidnapping, intimidation, and assassination against critics and opponents, which has escalated in recent years.

One heartbreaking case is that of the Iranian journalist Ruhollah Zam, who was lured to Iraq where he was arrested and turned over to Iranian authorities. “The IRGC,” the Post writes, referring to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, “publicly boasted of its own deception, portraying Zam’s capture as a triumph for the Iranian security services, which had outfoxed their Western adversaries. Zam was tried and sentenced to death for ‘corruption on Earth.’ He was hanged on Dec. 12, 2020, at the age of 42.”

“Another chilling example is of a failed Iranian plot to kidnap Masih Alinejad, an American citizen. “The plan to kidnap Alinejad from her home in Brooklyn is illustrative of a global effort to intimidate exiled Iranians by showing they aren’t safe anywhere outside Iran,” the Washington Post authors write. “Last year, the Justice Department indicted four alleged Iranian intelligence officials and agents in the plot, saying they targeted Alinejad because she was ‘mobilizing public opinion in Iran and around the world to bring about changes to the regime’s laws and practices.

“The operatives allegedly hired private investigators to photograph and take video recordings of Alinejad and her family and researched how they might use speedboats to secret her out of New York and eventually on to Venezuela, ‘a country whose de facto government has friendly relations with Iran,’ the Justice Department said in a statement.” Read More →

Atlantic Council top reads

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Nov 30, 2022

Preparing for victory: A long-haul strategy to help Ukraine win the war against Russia—and secure the peace

By Stephen J. Hadley, William Taylor, John E. Herbst, Matthew Kroenig, Melinda Haring, and Jeffrey Cimmino

Ukraine’s counteroffensives, backed by expanded and accelerated US and allied support, continue to push Russian forces out of Ukrainian territory, although at a reduced rate. These hard-won successes, however, bring with them possible challenges that also must be addressed.

Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist Dec 2, 2022

What to expect from the new Russian oil price cap

By Reed Blakemore, Charles Lichfield, Brian O’Toole

As the EU comes to an agreement on a $60 price cap, here’s how it will work—and what impacts the world will see on the global and Russian economy.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

TURKEYSource Dec 1, 2022

The risks and rewards of Erdogan’s next military operation

By Rich Outzen

The November 13 bombing in Istanbul, blamed on the PKK, is spurring a planned Turkish offensive against PKK affiliates in Northern Syria, fulfilling a long term goal to better secure the country’s southern border.

Conflict Iraq

The post Autocratic setbacks offer Biden his ‘inflection point’ for democracies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turmoil and transition: Iraq twenty years after the invasion

Madeline Hart and Nour Alhajjeh — Thu, 03 Nov 2022 18:23:24 +0000

WATCH the sessions

The Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative held a two-day conference on “Turmoil and transition: Iraq twenty years after the invasion.” The event took place from Tuesday, October 25, through Wednesday, October 26, 2022. The conference brought together leading experts and senior-level American and Iraqi policymakers to explore Iraq’s past two decades and analyze the key challenges and opportunities confronting future generations in Iraq.

The conference presented a series of panel discussions, fireside chats, and keynote speeches. These explored questions on Iraq’s security landscape, its regional role in mediation and foreign policy in general, Iraq’s hydrocarbons sector and efforts to manage climate change and the challenges it has faced in its democratic transition.

DAY ONE

Highlights from Keynote Speech – Jennifer Gavito, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq, Iran, and Public Diplomacy, US Department of State

Gavito discussed President Biden’s efforts to seek a more integrated Middle East by accelerating support to regional partners, including Iraq.
She also discussed the fruitful US-Iraqi partnership and emphasized that Iraq has faced and overcome many challenges, but now faces new challenges, including unemployment and lack of electricity. She stressed that the onus is on the new government to enact policies that improve lives of citizens and decrease corruption.
Gavito emphasized that Iraq’s youth are its most valuable resource, as an estimated 60 percent of the population is under the age of twenty-five.

Iraq’s Armed Forces, Security, and Counterterrorism

Gen. Abdel-Wahab Al-Saadi, Head of Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, Republic of Iraq stressed that Iraq’s security challenges are at the heart of all of Iraq’s problems, particularly since 2003, although he noted that the US has helped build the capabilities of the Iraqi Army. Gen. Al-Saadi said that the Army still needs significant improvements and is attempting to do so with the help of the Ministry of Interior and other governmental institutions.
Gen. Michael D. Barbero, US Army Lieutenant General (Ret.), United States of America, emphasized the importance of continuing US aid and assistance to Iraq that is conditioned on solving corruption and the malign influence of Iran, as well as continuing US intelligence on the ground to fight counterterrorism in the country. Gen. Barbero stressed Iraq must restrict and remove corruption in security institutions in Kurdistan Regional Government.

Fireside Chat – Mohamed Ali Al-Hakim, Former Foreign Minister, Republic of Iraq

Al-Hakim emphasized the importance of the Strategic Framework Agreement (FSA) between the US and Iraq, calling it the groundwork of Iraq and America’s bilateral relationship.
He mentioned Iraq’s need to balance its relationships with both Iran and the United States.
He recommended that Iraq bring in more private sector companies into the country, which will increase not only political dialogue with the US, but also develop the economy and security situation in Iraq.
Al-Hakim also stressed the importance of increasing renewable energy similar to Egypt, citing Iraq’s abundance of sun for solar energy.

Iraq in the Region

Abbas Kadhim, Director, Iraq Initiative, Atlantic Council discussed the legacy of former Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Kadhimi. Kadhim also stressed that internal weakness opens the door for foreign influence and meddling, and recommended that Iraq heal internally, focusing on healing civic divides, particularly on ethno-sectarian lines.
Manal Radwan, Counsellor, Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia mentioned that Iraq has regained trust in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, although Iranian proxies in Iraq are still a major issue that threatens regional and international peace and security. Radwan also discussed the need to strengthen Iraq’s institutions and said that Saudi Arabia should work with Iraqis and other international partners to strengthen Iraq.
Aydın Selcen, Former Consul General of Turkey in Erbil, Republic of Turkey mentioned the close relationship between Turkey and Iraq, particularly in terms of trade, and commented that Turkey is the way for all Iraqis to bridge toward the West.
Sanam Vakil, Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House stated that Iran had a thirteen year head start on creating relationships with Iraq, and for that reason, Iran is the most important foreign player in Iraq today. Vakil emphasized that this relationship has heavily damaged Iraq’s internal stability, as Iran has used Iraq to assert its broader regional ambitions.

DAY TWO

Highlights from Welcoming Remarks – Olin Wethington, Board Director, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Asia Security Initiative, Atlantic Council; Chairman, Wethington International LLC

Wethington discussed Iraq’s unstable status and evolution, including past failures with possible solutions for various challenges such as employing constitutional reform.
He also emphasized that despite Iraq being an oil-dependent country, structural challenges remain present, adding entrepreneurship is still elusive, and opportunities in the private sector continue to be limited.
He suggested because of the widespread protests there will be public grievance and impatience, particularly among the youth and highlighted the country’s political fragility due to the inability to form a new government over a year since the last election.
He highlighted that the young generation in Iraq will shape the future of the country, stating “shaping the future is our primary collective task, hence the priority of this conference.”
Wethington stated, “the United States remains committed to a strategic partnership with the Iraqi people and their government and seeks to support a stable, prosperous, democratic, and unified Iraq.”

Energy, Economy, and the Environment

Majid Jafar, Chief Executive Officer, Crescent Petroleum, argued that the oil issue didn’t occur after the Ukraine war, or the pandemic, however, there has been a “structural chronic deficit in oil.” He added that because of the shortage of gas supply, Iraq must play a key role in supplying global markets after addressing its own needs.
Luay Al-Khateeb, Former Minister of Electricity, Republic of Iraq, examined the electrical interconnectivity, explaining that even though it provides a stable national grid and creates a competitive utility market within the MENA region, it will not resolve the electricity crisis in Iraq.
Sara Vakhshouri, Founder, SVB Energy International and SVB Green Access, said Iraq could have energy independence and decarbonization, stressing the importance of extracting its own natural gas and expanding oil production. She discussed that lack of investments in fossil fuels is a major reason for high energy prices and shortage in energy supplies. Further, she emphasized that energy production and security issues remain present due to problems with investment regulation which prevents Iraq from advancing domestically and globally.

Highlights from Keynote Speech – H.E. Hassan Nadhem, Minister of Culture, Republic of Iraq

His excellency highlighted Iraq’s cultural, educational, and technology, focusing on discussing the non-security centered issues.
His excellency mentioned that Iraq is determined to rebuild and renovate despite the existing challenges.
The minister stressed that Iraq has become a hub for agreement whereas in the past, it was for conflicts. Adding there has been change in the international and diplomatic relations but to see more effective transformation, this progress needs to be constant.
His excellency also emphasized Iraq’s clear improved relationship with United States regardless of the past and current challenges.

Iraq’s Democratic Experience

Feisal Al-Istrabadi, Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East; McRobbie Professor in Global Strategic Studies, Indiana University, stressed the most difficult but important task for the new government in Iraq is to engender a sense of confidence in the Iraqi people and government. He also emphasized that corruption in Iraq would continue, and there will not be a significant reform.
Laith Kubba, Independent Advisor on Iraq, mentioned the previous protest movements and the impact they had on the Iraqi government. He emphasized the dysfunctional system failing to reform itself internally in Iraq. However, young individuals there are forcing an alliteration to this system.
Sarkawt Shamsuddin, Former Member of Iraqi Parliament, Republic of Iraq, emphasized that the political system in Iraq has a number of independent but inexperienced individual’s, which create inaccuracy in the process of decision-making in parliament. He added that the parliament is still truly controlled by the big political parties or “main players.” Highlighting the previous prime minister’s failure in conducting serious reforms including investments in securing the border, and his success in continuing mediation efforts with Gulf countries and Iran.
Shamiran Mako, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, emphasized finding ways for the government to revive confidence by providing necessary institutional reforms and engaging in more conciliatory politics, even when there are many strategic alliances. Professor Mako also stressed that Iraq was not a functioning democracy, it was always an elite game in terms of how government operates.

Nour Alhajjeh and Madeline Hart are Young Global Professionals with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Recap the 2022 event

Public Event Tue, October 25, 2022 • 9:00 am ET

Turmoil and transition: Iraq twenty years after the invasion

A conference exploring Iraq’s past two decades of change and upheaval and the key challenges and opportunities confronting future generations in Iraq.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment Iraq Middle East

The post Turmoil and transition: Iraq twenty years after the invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The West needs a more united approach to sanctioning Putin’s elite

David Clark — Wed, 26 Oct 2022 17:01:31 +0000

Ukraine’s Western allies adopted a new round of sanctions earlier this month in response to Russia’s recent move to officially annex four partially occupied Ukrainian regions. These latest sanctions measures included expanding the list of individuals and entities subject to asset freezes, travel bans, and other restrictions.

The targeting of Russian officials and influential figures linked to the Putin regime has become a major plank of Western strategy. Yet even now, more than eight months after the start of Russia’s invasion, Western sanctions still contain significant anomalies and gaps in coverage according to a new report by the Ukrainian think tank, the International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS). This is also reflected in the Atlantic Council’s Russia Sanctions Database.

The US, EU, UK, and Canada have each sanctioned more than a thousand individuals along with hundreds of entities, but have not done so according to a common list. For example, Russian steel magnate Vladimir Potanin has been sanctioned by the UK but not the EU or US, despite being named by the US Treasury in 2018 as a member of Putin’s inner circle. Roman Abramovich has been sanctioned in the UK and the EU but not the US. Viktor Vekselberg, another oligarch reputedly close to the Kremlin, has been sanctioned in the US since 2018 and more recently by the UK, but not the EU.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Special pleading and political considerations seem to have played a part in creating some of these discrepancies. The ICPS report sees a political motive behind the UK’s failure to sanction Alexander Lebedev, a former KGB officer who has owned media and other assets in the UK and Russia. Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson is reportedly a personal friend of Lebedev’s son, Evgeny, and even nominated him for a seat in the House of Lords in 2020 despite concerns from the British security services, according to media reports. Sanctioning his father would have created obvious embarrassment.

None of this prevented the Canadian government from putting Lebedev on its sanctions list in May 2022. Lebedev was sanctioned for having “directly enabled Vladimir Putin’s senseless war in Ukraine,” according to the Canadian government. For now, at least, the US and EU have stuck with the UK position on Lebedev.

The ICPS report has found that of the 100 richest Russians listed by Forbes magazine, more than two-thirds have not been sanctioned at all (32 have been sanctioned by the UK, 26 by the EU, and only 16 by the US). Among the top 10, exactly half are currently sanctions-free.

The report also names Dmitry Rybolovlev, the Russian fertilizer magnate, now resident in Monaco, where he has reportedly cultivated considerable local influence. Rybolovlev has avoided sanctions despite being among 96 oligarchs listed by the US Treasury in 2018 for their “closeness to the Russian regime.”

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

These gaps need to be plugged, not least because a robust sanctions regime will almost certainly be necessary for the foreseeable future. Even though Russia currently appears to be losing its war in Ukraine, the Putin regime will remain an aggressive disrupter, hostile to Western interests and a threat to its neighbors, for as long as it survives. It will need to be contained and deterred.

The current ad hoc Western sanctions arrangements need to be replaced by a more coordinated approach to the task of targeting the Kremlin and its enablers. Greater coordination could involve joint analytical reports and sanctions recommendations to be adopted on a common basis.

If exceptions are to be made allowing for the removal of names from the list, these should be debated separately and transparently according to clear criteria. The conditions for removal should necessarily be tough: a complete break with the Putin regime, including all business and personal contact; unconditional public statements condemning the war and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, including over Crimea; and a willingness to support Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction financially.

The incremental approach that has guided Western sanctions policy since 2014 is not adequate to the task of confronting the threat posed by Putin’s Russia. The Western world is dealing with a system, not with an individual. With this in mind, the message should be that culpability for the Putin regime’s crimes is shared by everyone who has supported it, benefited from it, or acquiesced in it. It’s time for the severity of Western sanctions to match the seriousness of the challenge.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

It is hard to overestimate the negative impact Putin has had on Russia and the wider international community. He has unleashed a series of unjustified wars and suppressed personal freedoms inside Russia itself; he has fostered a culture of xenophobia and cut Russians off from the developed world; he has stalled the Russian economy and ended the country’s modernization; and he has spread an information epidemic of fakes and falsehoods around the globe.

For Russians who dream of a return to imperial greatness, Putin’s biggest crime is his inept invasion of Ukraine. Russia is no stranger to humiliating military losses. In the past two centuries, four defeats stand out as particularly significant: the Crimean War (1853-56), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), World War I (1914-17), and the Afghanistan War (1979-88).

Encouragingly, all four defeats were followed by periods of liberalization. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, Czar Alexander II abolished serfdom throughout the Russian Empire. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War led to the creation of the Duma, while Russia’s premature exit from World War I heralded the country’s first reasonably democratic elections. Meanwhile, the failure in Afghanistan was a significant factor in the collapse of the USSR. While pessimists predict that Putin will be followed by an even worse tyrant, the historical record suggests that military defeat is likely to lead to a relaxation of Russia’s authoritarian instincts.

It is difficult to see Putin surviving the war in Ukraine. The invasion he so recklessly ordered has devastated the Russian military and made his country a global pariah without achieving anything in return. The war has also led to a sharp deterioration on the domestic front. Echoing the worst excesses of Stalin and Hitler, Putin has normalized the genocide of Ukrainians and made it an everyday topic of discussion on Russian television. Meanwhile, as the excellent investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan have pointed out, his FSB security service has increasingly come to resemble the dreaded Soviet era NKVD.

Putin has had a highly negative impact on Russia’s international relations that goes far beyond the fallout from the invasion of Ukraine. His long record of broken promises and shameless dishonesty has made other world leaders increasingly wary of engaging. Some have persevered longer than others, but even the patient leaders of France and Germany appear to have now reached the conclusion that Putin’s words carry little weight.

The Russian ruler’s diminished status on the international stage was on display in Uzbekistan at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Putin was once notorious for keeping many of the world’s most prominent statesmen waiting. However, in Tashkent he was made to wait by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. The only politicians who appear genuinely comfortable in his company are representatives of fellow pariah regimes such as Iran and North Korea.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Putin’s reign has also been bad for the Russian economy. During his first two presidential terms, lingering Gaidar-Yeltsin reforms and high energy prices created the false impression of sound economic management. This was an illusion. The Russian economy has stagnated since 2014 and is now sinking, with optimistic official forecasts predicting a six percent decline in 2022 and no recovery for a decade.

Russia’s unrivaled resource base is enough to make it the richest country on the planet. Instead, Putin has blocked modernization and left Russia completely dependent on the export of its natural resources. Even based on official figures, Russian real disposal income fell by ten percent between 2014 and 2020.

Rather than opening up the country and diversifying the economy, Putin has isolated Russia and scared away foreign businesses with his wars and his repressive domestic policies. This has led to a brain drain of Russia’s best minds, with official figures showing over 400,000 people leaving the country in the first half of 2022 alone. Many of those who vote with their feet are from the well-educated and entrepreneurial segments of society.

The only economic issue that seems to genuinely interest Putin is the wealth of his cronies and his family. He has made no effort to curb massive capital outflows from Russia, possibly because much of this outflow is linked to him or his allies. While salaries for ordinary Russians stagnate, members of Putin’s inner circle have acquired immense wealth. Although no official records exist, it has long been speculated that Putin himself is one of the world’s richest men.

The catastrophic consequences of Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine have helped cast an unforgiving light on the rest of his reign. He has caused enormous damage to the Russia while drastically undermining the country’s credibility in international affairs. Russia today is noticeably more isolated and less free than at the beginning of his rule over twenty years ago. It is a society trapped in a toxic vision of the past and openly hostile to much of the modern world. This is Putin’s legacy.

The one area where Putin has genuinely excelled is in the creation of a world-class propaganda machine. However, even this cannot disguise his shortcomings forever. If the war in Ukraine is indeed lost, it will only be a matter of time before the Russian public demands an end to the discredited Putin era.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

This reaction speaks volumes about the dysfunctional leadership culture within the Russian military, where fear of failure has been the dominant instinct since Soviet times and can arguably be traced all the way back to the czarist era. With the hunt now underway for guilty parties, nobody will want to take responsibility for decisions that could lead to further defeats. Instead, officers at every level will seek to act as loyal cogs in the system while forcing those higher up the chain of command to issue orders.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The inefficiency and lack of accountability at the heart of the Russian military help to explain its poor performance in Ukraine. While the Ukrainian military has undergone a radical transformation away from Soviet traditions in recent years and has embraced NATO-style reforms that hand the initiative to individual units and commanders in the field, the Russian army remains a rigid fighting machine hamstrung by top-down decision-making and totally unsuited to the rigors of modern warfare. Today’s Russian commanders continue to seek inspiration primarily from the military achievements of the Red Army during World War II. It is therefore no surprise that they find themselves being consistently outmaneuvered by a far more mobile and quick-witted enemy.

Recent events in Ukraine have revealed the underwhelming truth behind the many exaggerations that had previously led international experts to rank Russia as the world’s number two military. In a peacetime environment, such misconceptions were perhaps understandable. According to official figures, Russia had the world’s third-largest annual defense budget, at more than sixty billion dollars. Moscow was expert at staging impressive training exercises, while the Kremlin also invested heavily in prestige events that reinforced the impression of a mighty military.

It is now clear that Western observers made the mistake of confusing quantity for quality. While most analysis focused on the number of troops, tanks, missiles, and planes, these figures were misleading and offered no real indication of combat readiness. Nor was Russian data entirely accurate. Thousands of Russian tanks turned out to be partially stripped and incapacitated, while hundreds of missiles have fallen short of their targets since the start of the Ukraine invasion. Corrupt practices appear to have artificially inflated the size of the Russian military while drastically undermining its fighting potential.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The Russian military’s difficulties in Ukraine have also served to highlight the limitations of Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule. The invasion force assembled in early 2022 was woefully inadequate for the task at hand, but Putin’s personal obsession with the destruction of Ukraine meant that nobody dared to warn him of the dangers. Instead, Putin’s blind faith in the invincibility of the Russian army and his unhinged insistence on Ukraine’s illegitimacy were allowed to prevail over more sober military judgments. After all, how can a superpower lose to a country that does not exist? Like so many dictators before him, Putin fell victim to his own propaganda. His commanders were simply too scared to contradict him.

As Putin’s fantasy vision collided with reality, Russia plunged further and further into denial. The Russian withdrawal from northern Ukraine in April 2022 following defeat in the Battle for Kyiv and the subsequent retreat from Snake Island were both laughably portrayed as “goodwill gestures.” Likewise, when Ukraine sank the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, this was attributed to an accidental onboard fire. Unsurprisingly, Russian propagandists have attempted to spin the recent retreat from Kharkiv as a “planned regrouping.” These absurd excuses convince nobody and merely serve to underline Russia’s inability to admit defeat.

As the true state of the Russian military becomes impossible to deny, international faith in a Ukrainian victory is growing visibly. The Kharkiv offensive has proved beyond doubt that Ukraine is capable of staging large-scale offensive operations and reclaiming land that Russia has held for extended periods. While the war is far from over, most observers now recognize that the initiative has passed to Ukraine.

In the coming months, much will depend on the continued flow of weapons to Ukraine. The country’s leaders are requesting tanks and fighter jets as well as more artillery, ammunition, and armored transports in order to force Russia out of Ukraine entirely. This support cannot be taken for granted, but at present it looks likely that arms deliveries will continue to expand, both in terms of the types and quantities of weapons being delivered. With the myth of Russia’s military superpower status now shattered, the way is open for the democratic world to arm Ukraine for a decisive victory that will secure peace in Europe and bring Putin’s imperial ambitions to an end.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and Ukraine’s former minister of defense (2019–2020).

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Nord Stream never fulfilled any need. The European Union has never imported more than 150 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Russia in a single year, and ample pipeline capacity has long been available to cover existing volumes. The Ukrainian transit pipeline can easily deliver 120 bcm a year, and probably 160 bcm a year, as Ukraine claims. The Yamal pipe through Belarus and Poland has steadily transported 33 bcm annually.

Nobody had any need for Nord Stream 1 or the equally large Nord Stream 2 pipelines. In recent years, Gazprom also added Turkstream to its pipeline portfolio with an additional annual capacity of 31.5 bcm. Overall, Gazprom planned for a doubling of its pipeline capacity to Europe, while at the same time Russian gas exports remained largely stagnant. The true purpose of Russia’s pipeline expansion efforts was to eliminate Ukraine as a transit country and set the stage for a full-scale military invasion, which was hampered by the Kremlin’s reliance on Ukraine’s gas pipeline network.

While Nord Stream 1 was already a strategic blunder from a European point of view, Nord Stream 2 made the problem far worse and implied that up to three-quarters of all Russian gas exports to Europe would pass through the Nord Stream system. In this fashion, the German government undermined Europe’s energy security.

Over the past decade or so, most European countries built LNG terminals to obtain alternative supplies and improve their national energy security, but Germany did not. Instead, Berlin deepened its dependence on Russian gas and increased Putin’s leverage over the EU as a whole.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Germany’s support for Nord Stream 2 was always controversial. On October 28, 2015, Germany’s Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy, Sigmar Gabriel, met with Putin in the Kremlin and praised Nord Stream 2 as being in Germany’s interests while labeling the pipeline “a very interesting project even beyond Germany’s borders.” Gabriel, who belongs to the Social Democratic party along with Schröder and is closely linked to the former German Chancellor, went on to hold many more meetings with Putin promoting Nord Stream 2.

This German policy of strengthening bilateral energy ties with Russia went against Berlin’s longstanding position as a champion of EU interests. Traditionally, Germany had been a key advocate of European solidarity and defender of the former Eastern Bloc EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. Gabriel effectively disregarded the interests of other EU members in order to forge a close Russian-German alliance that Moscow saw as a tool to use against Europe. He did so after Putin had annexed Crimea and sparked a war in eastern Ukraine. Indeed, the Nord Stream 2 agreement was signed while Germany was engaged in the Minsk mediation process between Russia and Ukraine.

Nord Stream 2 violated the principles of the EU’s 2009 Third Energy Package. It did not involve any unbundling of Gazprom’s various activities. Rather than worrying about these shortcomings, the German government and the companies involved pursued intense lobbying efforts in Brussels. As a result, Germany perverted EU energy and anti-monopoly policies in spite of resistance from most EU members. Today, the whole of the EU is suffering from Germany’s pro-Russian energy policy.

The European Union clearly needs to form an entirely new energy security strategy. It is now obvious that the Russian state and Russian state-owned companies must no longer be allowed to own energy infrastructure or energy companies within the EU. Instead, Brussels must force Gazprom to sell all its pipelines in the EU, as the insightful Baltic states have already done. Likewise, Gazprom must sell its gas storage facilities in the EU or have them nationalized. Similarly, Rosneft should be forced to sell its oil refineries in the EU. The EU should prohibit Gazprom and Rosneft from doing business with European banks to escape their money laundering. The European energy union also needs to be reinforced with more storage, converters, and alternative energy supplies. After years of hybrid energy hostilities against Europe, Putin has now openly declared war. He must be defeated.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The SBU is one of Ukraine’s most bloated state institutions. The service maintains a staff of roughly 30,000 employees, nearly as many as its American equivalent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The sprawling size of the SBU reflects its sweeping mandate. The service combines counterintelligence, investigative, and anti-corruption roles that often overlap with the responsibilities of other state organs.

A combination of size, access to sensitive information, and lack of institutional oversight help to make the SBU ripe for corruption and infiltration by pro-Russian operatives. The threat of Kremlin agents is particularly high as many senior SBU officials began their careers in the Soviet era and are graduates of elite Moscow institutions.

The service’s wide mandate has also made it hard to rein in. Draft laws to reform the SBU have run into roadblocks in the Ukrainian parliament in part because so much needs to be changed that lawmakers cannot agree on how best to do it.

Bakanov’s lack of law enforcement experience made it even more difficult to reform the SBU. A childhood friend of President Zelenskyy’s, he was a TV studio executive before his appointment as SBU head in 2019. While loyal to the president, whispers of pro-Russian sentiments at the SBU ran rampant throughout his tenure. The day before Bakanov’s sacking, authorities arrested the former head of the SBU in Crimea, Oleh Kulinich, on suspicion of treason. Zelenskyy himself said dozens of SBU apparatchiks in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine are working “against our state.”

Zelenskyy likewise called out pro-Russian forces within the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO), which has also been dogged by allegations of corruption. In 2020, Venediktova’s deputy Oleksiy Symonenko effectively blocked a corruption case against deputy head of the presidential administration Oleh Tatarov by transferring it to the SBU, which critics say then buried the investigation. Anti-corruption activists have since accused Venediktova of being too close to the Office of the President.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Allegations of corruption and Russian infiltration provide skeptics of Western support for Ukraine with an excuse to push back against the military and humanitarian aid that Kyiv so desperately needs to continue the war effort. In this sense, the Zelenskyy administration’s unwillingness to undertake real reform in the SBU and PGO poses a clear threat to Ukraine’s image in Western capitals.

At the same time, the war with Russia has also shown that reform carries tangible benefits of its own. The Armed Forces of Ukraine were thinly outfitted and poorly trained when Russia first began its military aggression in 2014. During the following eight years, Ukraine reformed its military in line with modern Western standards, introducing a decentralized command structure, civilian defense command, and NATO training methods. Military analysts agree that these reforms have contributed to the exceptional performance of the Ukrainian army over the past five months of the Russian invasion.

State energy grid operator Ukrenergo also underwent significant post-Maidan changes that have paid dividends in the uniquely challenging wartime conditions since February 2022. In the first days of the invasion, Ukrenergo actually completed a key “isolation test” that allowed the Ukrainian electricity system to disconnect from the Russian network and fully integrate with the European grid.

This remarkable success did not happen overnight. Ukrenergo officials and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development worked together for years to improve operational and procurement transparency. These added efficiencies allowed Ukrenergo to reorient Ukraine’s electrical grid to European standards and keep the power on after the February 24 invasion.

The war has made clear that reform is a national security imperative. Ukraine today faces two major threats: Kremlin aggression and domestic corruption. Defending Ukrainian territory is obviously Kyiv’s most pressing priority, but combating corruption and treason on the home front are also vital aspects of the overall war effort.

Firing officials and arresting suspected traitors, as Ukraine did last week, treat the symptoms of unreformed state institutions but do not address their root causes. With an 88% approval rating, Zelenskyy has a popular mandate and a legislative majority in parliament necessary to push ahead with major law enforcement reform. He must now do so. In 2021, a draft law that would have cut the SBU’s mandate was introduced but never voted on. It should now be updated and fast-tracked to the Ukrainian parliament.

Reforming the SBU and PGO will reinforce Ukrainian national security and buttress the country’s reputation abroad. Cohesive, efficient government administration and strong support from the West are essential as Ukraine seeks to fight off Russian aggression. Institutional reform advances these objectives and prepares Ukraine for its Euro-Atlantic future.

Andrew D’Anieri is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on Twitter @andrew_danieri.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Widely suspected of having blown up the Moscow apartments in 1999, Putin is also closely linked to at least two more suspected black flag operations, the Moscow Theatre Siege of 2002 where around 170 people were killed, and the Beslan siege of 2004, which claimed 333 lives, many of them children. Common to all three mass killings inside Russia was a total lack of transparency about the investigations into what took place. Numerous journalists and politicians who asked difficult questions were poisoned or shot.

Yuri Shchekochikhin was a Russian MP and journalist investigating these mass killings. He had courage, tremendous energy, a nose for a story and, I’ve been told, a fondness for Armenian brandy. In January 2003, he told a friend, “For the first time in my life I feel frightened.”

In an interview in early 2003 he described Putin’s Russia in a nutshell: “The mafia has put on uniform. The gangsters are boy scouts compared to our security services. Today it is precisely the people who are supposed to be fighting crime who are corrupt. This has not bypassed the secret police. The protection that they provide, the enormous amounts of money that they receive, the control that they exercise.”

Such an independent spirit could not be allowed to exist. In 2003, Shchekochikhin was still asking questions about the Moscow apartment bombings on behalf of a Russian-American woman whose mother had been killed in one of the blasts. But then he started feeling unwell. He went ahead anyway with his trip to Ryazan but grew feverish and felt as though his head was on fire. When he returned to Moscow, he became dizzy and his throat burned. His blood pressure dropped, his skin turned red. The next day his skin began to peel off and his hair started to fall out. He was rushed to the Central Clinical Hospital, known by its nickname “the Kremlinka” because it looks after the power elite and, sometimes, those who cross them. The doctors diagnosed “toxic agents of an unknown origin.”

Shchekochikhin’s girlfriend Alyona Gromova recalled: “On the day he was taken to hospital, he felt very weak. After he had a shower, his hair was a mess. I went to stroke it and great handfuls of hair came out in my hand. The symptoms were confusing. First, it seemed like a cold but his face was very red, as if he had sunburn, then lumps of his skin started to flake off.”

A friend wrote: “Yuri’s condition worsened by the hour. His temperature rose continuously. His mucous membranes were swollen and his kidneys were failing. Then the worst began. His skin began to peel off as though he had suffered severe burns. Even a layman could see what was happening: it was either due to radiation or to some unknown poisons.”

The official verdict was Lyell’s Syndrome or a severe allergic reaction. Shchekochikhin died on June 3, 2003. By then, he had practically no skin left on his body. A friend wrote: “The word poison was never pronounced, although everyone took it for granted. Fear kept people quiet.”

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Alyona went to say goodbye to her lover in the morgue. “It was a big place, a huge hall. There were bodies on slabs due to be buried the next day. I looked around. There were about 20 people but I couldn’t find Yuri. I went up to the supervisor and explained that I might be in the wrong place as I couldn’t find him. Through the corner of my eye I saw a dear old lady lying on a slab. The strangest thing, she reminded me of my grandma who passed away a long time ago. The curious resemblance of the two old ladies hit me. In my worst nightmares, I could never, ever have imagined that the dear old lady was in fact Yuri.”

Her lover was so unrecognisable that Alyona could not find him in the morgue until the supervisor pointed out his name tag to her. This was in 2003. The poisonings and the shootings had only just begun. Investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya? Poisoned, later shot. Human rights activist Natasha Estemirova? Shot. Politician Boris Nemtsov? Shot. Opposition leader Alexey Navalny? Poisoned, now in jail.

Navalny is still alive. Why so? Because Putin fears an uprising if he has him killed. The master of the Kremlin is far weaker than his propaganda suggests. For similar reasons, he dare not call his war a war. The phrase “special military operation” is a signal that he is afraid of telling Russians the truth about the war in Ukraine. The lack of universal conscription shows this fear; the lack of soldiers from Moscow and Saint Petersburg underlines it. I do not believe that Putin would dare press the nuclear button. He is morbidly afraid of his own death. If he tries, I believe the Kremlin’s machinery would not function.

If you study Putin’s career, you realise that we are dealing with a hyper-aggressive psychopath whose word cannot be relied upon. He is a man who identifies compromise as weakness; who sows dissent and mistrust in the West; who likes killing. The idea that we can negotiate with Putin is foolish. Nobody in the West will be safe until he and his killing machine are stopped. Period.

John Sweeney is a British investigative journalist and writer. His new book “Killer In The Kremlin” is published by Transworld Books on July 21.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

At this stage, Ukraine’s top reform priorities remain judicial reform and the fight against corruption. In order to repair the colossal material damage caused by Putin’s war, Ukraine will require huge amounts of international investment. An effective court system and rule of law safeguards are essential if Ukraine is to attract the necessary levels of investment to finance this vast reconstruction process.

Ukraine’s most immediate reform priorities include appointing new heads of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and National Anti-Corruption Bureau. Fundamental reform is also necessary at the Constitutional Court, Supreme Council of Justice, and the High Qualification Commission of Judges.

As it approaches these reform challenges, Ukraine should take note of positive and negative case studies elsewhere in Europe. Bulgaria and Romania, which became EU members in 2007, were both able to overcome reputations for corruption and introduce judicial reforms with the help of civil society. Meanwhile, Montenegro has achieved significant success in terms of implementing EU security and economic policy but remains far from membership due to a lack of progress toward the rule of law.

Ukraine’s efforts to reduce oligarch influence are crucial for the country’s European integration but must be undertaken within the framework of constitutional and European norms. The Ukrainian authorities should also continue to pursue economic reforms. Trade with the EU must be further liberalized, while the harmful practice of constantly revising tax regulations needs to be abandoned. Crucially, investors must receive guarantees in order to generate the kind of investments necessary to rebuild post-war Ukraine.

In addition to judicial and economic reforms, Ukraine’s European integration also means building a truly inclusive society. The recent ratification of the Istanbul Convention was an important step in the right direction for the country, but Ukraine still needs to develop additional tools that will help monitor and combat all forms of discrimination.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The potential future benefits of Ukraine’s EU reform agenda are obvious. Indeed, the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic region all adopted similar reforms and have since experienced dramatic improvements in average quality of life. At the same time, countries like Serbia and Bosnia where resistance to reform has been strongest have experienced limited economic and social progress while remaining firmly outside the EU.

Ukrainians are currently locked in a fight for national survival. They know that without victory over Russia, their country will cease to exist. At the same time, EU candidate status offers Ukrainians something clear and specific to aim for. Crucially, the prospect of potential future EU membership gives added meaning to the country’s war effort. It provides Ukrainians with a road map toward European integration and the chance to live a better life. While Russia fights for the authoritarian past, Ukraine fights for a European future.

There may never be a better chance to achieve fundamental change in Ukraine. The unprecedented trauma and turbulence unleashed by Putin’s war have created the momentum to finally move Ukraine away from the chronic corruption of the post-Soviet era. The authorities must now seize the moment while also involving civil society in the reform process.

Ukraine’s war effort remains the absolute priority for the entire country. At the same time, building a better Ukraine is also essential in the long struggle to escape the Kremlin orbit. Ever since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Ukrainians have viewed European integration as a civilizational choice that would lead the country away from the authoritarianism of the imperial past. Russia has responded to Ukraine’s European choice by unleashing years of unprovoked aggression culminating in the current full-scale invasion. Despite the horrors of Putin’s war, Ukraine’s dream of a European future lives on.

The bravery of Ukraine’s soldiers and the courage of the Ukrainian people have enabled the country to remain firmly on the path of European integration. Their sacrifices must not be betrayed. Instead, the authorities must pursue an ambitious wartime reform agenda that reflects the scale of Ukraine’s European ambitions. EU membership may still be a long way off, but the transformation of Ukraine is already underway and must continue.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party, member of the Ukrainian parliament, and Vice President of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

It is typically illegal to smash someone’s window or to break down someone’s door, but there is an important exception. The fire brigade has legal authority to intentionally break any windows or doors as may be needed in a crisis situation in order to help save lives and to extinguish a blaze.

Ukraine’s legal system has been a smoldering crisis situation since independence. When the time comes to begin Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction, Ukraine will need to establish a “legal fire brigade” that will have the authority and the resources to implement the kind of thoroughgoing change and reform of the entire legal system that will be required in order to significantly improve Ukraine’s rule of law and facilitate a successful physical reconstruction, as has been pledged at the Lugano Conference. The very real chance of progress toward EU accession provides further additional motivation.

In most Western countries, rule of law principles developed over a period of centuries. Given Ukraine’s comparatively brief three decades of independence, it should not come as a surprise that efforts to establish the rule of law have been a challenge. This is particularly so given that Ukraine emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union and inherited what was a fundamentally debased legal system.

Legal reform efforts since independence have met with some localized successes. The Prosecution Service has undergone partial reform and is no longer quite the monster it was during the early post-Soviet period. New laws have modified the government’s police powers, while some new institutions such as NABU (the National Anti-Corruption Bureau) have been created with Western support. Unfortunately, some reform efforts themselves are now in need of reform.

The judiciary remains a mess. Western insistence on judicial independence did not foresee that such increased independence in the post-Soviet period would produce segments of the judiciary that happily felt independent in the sense of being completely unaccountable. The result has been brazen judicial corruption. Meanwhile, some agencies involved in law enforcement such as the SBU have evaded review and reform altogether.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Previous legal reform efforts have faced various hurdles. These have included the absence of political will along with numerous legal or institutional barriers to reform.

What might a “legal fire brigade” look like and what might its authorities be? Ideally, it should consist of three components: an Executive Committee; a support staff for the Executive Committee; and an Advisory Council to the Executive Committee that would consist of 10-15 Ukrainian lawyers with at least 10 years of experience in different areas of practice. This Council would be expected to help identify the chief barriers to reform and to serve as an ongoing sounding board for all proposed changes and reforms being formulated by the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee should consist of at least two highly-placed representatives of the Executive Branch, one from the Office of the President and one from the Cabinet of Ministers, and two members of the Ukrainian Parliament. The rest of the Executive Committee should consist of a mix of persons with training and experience relevant to this project, some from Western countries who also have experience in Ukraine or in other post-Soviet countries and a parallel set of Ukrainians with experience in analogous professions or agencies.

More specifically, it would be valuable to have three experienced judges from the West, two from countries with Anglo-American common law legal systems and one from a country with a EU civil law system, and two Ukrainian judges, one a trial court judge and one with appellate, Supreme or Constitutional Court experience.

The Executive Committee, with the help of support staff and the Advisory Council, would be charged with producing a holistic plan of reforms that included drafts of proposed parliamentary legislation, proposed administrative rules and regulations, proposals for improved legal education, and proposals for creating, reorganizing or dismantling units within ministries, agencies or other institutional structures.

The project’s operational goals would include significantly reducing corruption, increasing overall legal system effectiveness, and avoiding harmful unintended consequences that arise when proposed changes are not well thought out.

The entire project would need to be funded by a consortium of countries and international organizations that will be investing in Ukraine’s reconstruction. The time frame would be three years with an additional year if required to complete some portion of the project. In order to make sense, the project would require a specific and public commitment in principle by both the executive and legislative branches of Ukraine’s government to adopt the reforms being proposed and generated by the Executive Committee.

Year to year funding for the project by Western supporters should be contingent on the Ukrainian government’s living up to its part of the bargain. This kind of systemic innovation is the only way to radically transform Ukraine’s broken legal system and provide the country with the rule of law foundations it requires in order to build a better future.

Bohdan Vitvitsky is a former Resident Legal Advisor at the US Embassy in Ukraine and Special Advisor to Ukraine’s Prosecutor General.

Atlantic Council — Wed, 29 Jun 2022 14:42:30 +0000

Original Source

The post Brahimi in Diwan: Jordan’s Women in the Ranks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

EU candidate status for Ukraine is the ideal response to Russian aggression

Diane Francis — Sun, 19 Jun 2022 16:12:52 +0000

European Union leaders must decide this week whether to grant Ukraine official EU candidate nation status. This is a critically important moment for Ukrainians that will also shape the future direction of the entire continent.

Granting EU candidacy would signify European solidarity with Ukraine in its bloody struggle against Russian aggression. It would also mean that Ukraine must adopt EU reforms that will finally eradicate systemic corruption and dismantle the country’s rotten oligarchy.

Oligarch-driven corruption has impeded Ukraine’s progress ever since the country first regained independence in 1991. This has led to two people power revolutions and paved the way for the 2019 presidential election victory of political outsider Volodymyr Zelenskyy with a mandate to clean up the country.

The prospect of a reformed Ukraine integrating with the EU is viewed as an existential threat by Moscow and was one of the key factors behind the decision to launch a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Come what may, Vladimir Putin is determined to prevent the Europeanization of Ukraine.

On June 18, an important step was taken when the European Council officially recommended that Ukraine receive candidate status. “Ukrainians are ready to die for the European perspective,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said when announcing the decision. “We want them to live the European dream with us.”

Ukraine’s candidacy was also endorsed by the leaders of Germany, France, Italy and Romania during a recent visit to Kyiv. The next step is to receive unanimous approval for candidate status from all 27 members of the European Union. This looks likely to happen as even Hungary, which is widely seen as the most pro-Kremlin EU member state, has declared its backing for Ukraine’s candidate bid.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Despite this optimistic outlook, it will probably still be many years before Ukraine can expect full-fledged EU membership. Candidates must embrace EU standards on democratic principles and incorporate 80,000 pages of rules governing judicial systems and trade.

Nor is Ukraine the only nation looking to deepen ties with the European Union. There are currently a number of other countries also attempting to make the transition from candidacy to EU membership. Turkey first applied in 1987 and received candidate status in 1999 but talks have since stagnated. Meanwhile, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania have all had candidate status for a number of years and remain ahead of Ukraine in the EU queue.

Meeting EU membership criteria will be a demanding process. While Ukraine is considerably freer than Russia, Ukrainians remain prisoners of a deeply flawed system inherited from the Soviet era.

During the early years of independence, Ukrainian politicians and bureaucrats gave away the country’s resources and major assets to family members, cronies and crooks. This helped create a small number of oligarchic clans that were able to control Ukraine’s political and economic agenda while impeding attempts to establish the rule of law.

EU candidacy would force Ukraine to establish rule of law and an independent judiciary. Ukraine will have to adopt anti-trust laws to break up monopolies and gigantic conglomerates. It must undertake postponed plans to privatize thousands of state-owned enterprises by selling them at market prices to legitimate buyers. Many of Ukraine’s public enterprises remain sources of corruption. Selling them will eliminate bribery and influence-peddling while providing opportunities for entrepreneurial innovation.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Granting EU candidate status to Ukraine would serve as recognition that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is also a declaration of war against Europe and its values. Putin has not yet invaded any European Union member states but he will do so if he is not stopped in Ukraine.

EU member states are already feeling the effects of Russian aggression in a number of ways including weaponized energy supplies and the floods of Ukrainian refugees who have entered the EU since the invasion began on February 24. Putin’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports now threatens to spark a global food crisis and fuel a new wave of migration towards the EU. “How many millions of refugees will there be in Europe if Russian policy causes famine in African and Asian countries?” President Zelenskyy warned recently.

These hostile acts are nothing new. In reality, Putin has been waging hybrid warfare against Europe for years. His agents and oligarchs operate in the shadows of European politics. They own luxury real estate, sports teams, newspapers, and often enjoy official prestige. The Russian dictator has co-opted influential Western politicians and Russia has meddled in democratic processes ranging from presidential elections in the United States and France to the UK’s 2016 Brexit referendum. Through disinformation and other forms of skulduggery, Moscow has succeeded in destabilizing and dividing societies throughout the Western world.

Now Putin is conducting a vicious “hot war” that targets the whole of Europe, Zelenskyy said during a recent speech. “Ukrainian cities destroyed by the Russian army; millions of migrants; hundreds of thousands of people deported by the Russian military; and tens of thousands of Ukrainians killed. These are all blatant manifestations of Russia’s anti-European policy. By starting this war against Ukraine, Russia tried to create a springboard for an attack on other nations of Europe. That is why our defense in this war and our future victory are fundamentally important for the security of everyone in Europe.”

Putin is the greatest single threat to global security and must be stopped. Europe has risen to the challenge by housing Ukrainian refugees while providing humanitarian aid and supplying weapons, but accepting Ukraine as an EU candidate is a game-changer. It represents a historical strengthening of Europe “and a complete dismantling of Russia’s ability to beat us one by one,” according to Zelenskyy.

Candidate status will impede Putin’s imperial ambitions and embolden Ukrainians as they struggle to survive. Ultimately, the prospect of EU membership can transform Europe’s largest country, Ukraine, into a democracy with the rule of law and free enterprise.

Diane Francis is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

For many in the skeptic camp, one of the most powerful arguments against granting Ukraine candidate status is the suggestion that it would be seen as provocative by Russian President Vladimir Putin. They claim it could further complicate efforts to end the war sparked by Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine. This fear of provoking Putin represents a dangerous misreading of the geopolitical situation that plays directly into Russian hands.

In reality, there is nothing more likely to encourage further Russian aggression than decisions driven by a desire to avoid provoking Putin. Today’s uncertainty about Ukraine’s future is a key factor allowing Putin to dream about reoccupying the country. It emboldens the Russian dictator and encourages him to continue the war while believing he can end Ukrainian hopes of European integration and force the country back into the Russian orbit.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Ukraine has learned from bitter experience that efforts to avoid provoking Putin have a tendency to backfire disastrously. When Volodymyr Zelenskyy won the Ukrainian presidency in spring 2019, he initially went out of his way to avoid anything that might have been construed as provocative as he sought to end the simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine.

During his first eighteen months as president, Zelenskyy studiously avoided direct references to Russian aggression or occupation. He also made a number of practical concessions to the Kremlin including unilateral troop withdrawals. Far from responding in kind, Moscow began the mass distribution of Russian passports in occupied eastern Ukraine while strengthening its military grip over the region.

More recently, the Ukrainian delegation attending peace talks with Russia in Istanbul in late March 2022 announced its readiness to abandon Ukraine’s strategic objective of NATO membership. Russia responded to this key concession by launching a major new offensive in eastern Ukraine and declaring its intention to incorporate entire occupied regions of southern Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Once again, Putin made clear that he views any efforts to be unprovocative as signs of weakness.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Europe’s own experience should be sufficient to dispel any myths over the alleged benefits of appeasing Putin. In 2008, European leaders were instrumental in denying Ukraine and Georgia NATO Membership Action Plans for fear of angering Putin. Within months, Russia invaded Georgia. Fourteen years later, around 20% of the country remains under Russian occupation.

When Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in spring 2014, Europe once against hesitated. Rather than imposing tough sanctions that might have forced Moscow to rethink its position, European leaders favored policies of compromise while warning about the possibility of further escalations. This directly paved the way for the full-scale invasion of February 2022 and the largest European conflict since WWII.

There is no excuse for continuing to repeat these mistakes. It is time to recognize that only clear and resolute support for Ukraine’s European integration can deter Russia from pursuing a revisionist and expansionist foreign policy.

Giving Ukraine candidate status would send a powerful signal to Moscow that Ukraine is not alone. It would demonstrate that the desire of the Ukrainian people for a European future is matched by the members of the European Union itself. The European public is particularly supportive of this step. According to recent polling data, there is strong backing in France, Germany, and the Netherlands for candidate status “as soon as possible”. Among those who have made up their mind, the idea enjoys support from more that 60% in all three states.

Conversely, rejecting Ukraine’s bid would be an historic mistake that would only increase Russia’s appetite for further military aggression. Any EU compromise would be a powerful propaganda victory for the Kremlin. It would be used to demoralize the Ukrainian population and strengthen Putin’s claims that Ukraine’s natural place is within the Russian sphere of influence. This would also weaken the European Union as a whole by creating the impression that Moscow enjoys an unofficial veto over important EU decisions.

It is now clear that policies driven by a misguided fear of provoking Putin have in fact provoked Europe’s biggest war since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Continuing along the path of appeasement and compromise will only make the problem worse. Instead, Europe must demonstrate the kind of strength that Russia understands and respects. Granting Ukraine EU candidate status without any preconditions would be a major step in the right direction.

Alyona Getmanchuk is director of New Europe Center think tank and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ashford in The New Arab: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates

Atlantic Council — Wed, 15 Jun 2022 07:14:00 +0000

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 15, Emma Ashford’s new book, Oil, the State and War, was reviewed in The New Arab.

The reviewer wrote, “Oil, the State, and War is a book that helps understand the times we live in. It will be a great addition to the library of both the general reader interested in global affairs and the political scientist. Ashford’s book combines, in a difficult feat, expertise with an accessible style.”

More about our expert

Former staff

Emma Ashford

Conflict Economic Sanctions

The post Ashford in The New Arab: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Vladimir Putin’s dark journey from economic reformer to war criminal

Anders Åslund — Mon, 13 Jun 2022 17:53:02 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s 22-year reign has been marked by a steady decline in the goals he has set for himself and his country. He initially embraced progressive notions of domestic reform and international integration, but has since led Russia deeper and deeper into authoritarian isolation. His recent comments comparing himself to Peter the Great and boasting of plans to seize Ukrainian lands represent a new low in this depressing journey from would-be reformer to war criminal.

It is tempting to assume that Putin was always an unapologetic authoritarian and an enthusiastic imperialist but during the early years of his reign, he often championed sensible reforms while promoting initiatives to modernize and diversify the Russian economy.

Soon after he was first appointed president in 2000, Putin published an essay claiming that he wanted Russia to reach Portugal’s level of GDP per capita by the end of his two terms in office. This was a realistic and pragmatic economic target, as Portugal was then the poorest EU member state. However, two decades later in 2021, Portugal’s GDP per capita in current USD was twice as high as Russia’s.

Despite the damage suffered by Portugal during the 2010 euro crisis, Russia has actually fallen further behind the Portuguese economy. This should come as no surprise. The Russian economy has stagnated since 2014 when the West imposed its first round of sanctions following the invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. After almost a decade in the doldrums, Putin now appears to have given up entirely on Russia’s economic development. He is not even planning for any growth until 2030.

Until the end of his first presidential term in 2004, Putin spoke extensively about the need for the rule of law and other systemic reforms. In 2002, Russia adopted far-reaching judicial reforms along with a new civil code and a liberal tax code, while also allowing private ownership of agricultural land. In effect, Putin completed the progressive economic reforms begun by the Yeltsin administration during the 1990s.

These policies paid dividends. Russia enjoyed a period of uniquely strong economic expansion during the early years of the Putin era, with annual growth rates of around seven percent from 1999 to 2008. In truth, Putin had arrived at a laid table with prepared reforms, while his economic success also owed much to a sustained commodity boom. Nevertheless, it was still possible to argue that Putin was steering Russia toward a future governed by the rule of law.

During this early period, Putin also called for far-reaching international integration, making Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organization a key goal. However, he gradually lost interest in this initiative. Despite strong Western support, Russia did not join the WTO until 2012. By that point, Putin had already begun embracing isolationist policies protectionism and import substitution.

When did the turning point come? Some say it was Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which poisoned Putin against the West. Others argue that Putin’s early flirtation with a more reformist agenda was merely political pragmatism as he consolidated his position at home and abroad. With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears obvious that Putin’s background as a KGB officer and his alleged ties to organized crime were decisive in shaping his reign. During the second half of the 2000s, this toxic baggage increasingly took over.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

In truth, the warning signs of a return to authoritarianism were there from the very beginning. The first indication was Putin’s suppression of independent Russian television in 2000, which saw the Kremlin take over Vladimir Gusinsky’s NTV and Boris Berezovsky’s ORT. In May 2001, he established direct control of Gazprom, Russia’s wealthiest state company.

With the arrest of leading Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky in October 2003, Putin initiated the renationalization of Russia’s most successful private companies. This revival of state dominance was mirrored throughout the Russian economy, with the security services and Putin’s personal favorites often the beneficiaries.

Despite the changing political climate in Russia, for many years Putin continued to publicly advocate for academic openness and innovation. This is no longer the case. Instead, the Kremlin now promotes ideas of isolation and orthodoxy. Meanwhile, the language of scientific and technological development has become increasingly reminiscent of the Brezhnev era Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, many of Russia’s leading scientists and entrepreneurs have chosen to leave the country and pursue their careers in freer environments.

With any sense of optimism about the future gradually fading from view, Putin has become dependent on the propaganda power of an idealized past. He has rehabilitated the Soviet era and transformed the Red Army role in the defeat of Hitler into a victory cult that now serves as an unofficial state religion. Most of all, he has sought to justify his increasingly dictatorial rule by identifying enemies and waging wars of aggression.

Eurasia Center events

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Putin has used various excuses to justify his aggressive foreign policies. On different occasions, he has claimed to be protecting Russian citizens in Georgia, preventing NATO expansion, defending Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and liberating Ukraine from Nazis. While these narratives may have worked inside Russia, they have had limited success in convincing outside audiences.

The current invasion in Ukraine has exposed the limitations of Putin’s expensively assembled disinformation apparatus. With Moscow now struggling to shape international perceptions of Putin’s wars, he appears to have switched to open intimidation. Since the invasion began in February 2022, Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have frequently issued thinly-veiled threats of nuclear war.

Meanwhile, Putin himself has abandoned his earlier denials and embraced the archaic rhetoric of imperial expansion. Speaking at a recent Moscow event to mark the three hundred and fiftieth birthday of Russian Czar Peter the Great, Putin eulogized Peter’s conquests in the Great Northern War and praised him for “returning” historically Russian lands. “It seems that it has fallen to us, too, to return (Russian lands),” Putin commented in a clear reference to the current war in Ukraine.

Putin’s reliance on nuclear blackmail and his absurd search for legitimacy in the imperial past reflect his failure to build an attractive modern state. After more than two decades in power, he is unable to deliver a coherent vision of a brighter future. Instead, Putin’s earlier talk of reform and innovation has been completely eclipsed by the repressive logic of his authoritarian kleptocracy. All that remains is imperialism.

Many Western leaders fear what might come after Putin. They worry about the possible break-up of the Russian state or the rise of an even less predictable dictator in his place. However, few scenarios are more alarming than a continuation of Russia’s current descent into full-scale fascism under an increasingly isolated and unhinged Putin. He is already the greatest single threat to global security and will likely remain so until he loses power. The West should not be afraid of pursuing this objective.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Not all petrostates have the same characteristics or capabilities. To help us conceptualize these differences, Ashford creates an original classification of three types of petrostates: oil-dependent states (those weakened by the resource curse), oil-wealthy states (those made rich by oil exports), and super-producer states (those that form the backbone of the global oil market). Through a combination of case studies and analysis, she illustrates how oil shapes petrostates’ behavior, filling a major gap in our understanding of the international implications of oil wealth. Experts have too often treated oil-rich states as passive objects, subject to the energy security needs of Western importing states. Instead, this book highlights the agency and power enjoyed by petrostates.

As the oil market undergoes a period of rapid change, Oil, the State, and War sheds light on the diversity of petrostates and how they shape international affairs.

More about our expert

Former staff

Emma Ashford

Conflict Economic Sanctions

The post Ashford publishes book Oil, the State and War: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Do countries need freedom to achieve prosperity?

Dan Negrea, Joseph Lemoine, Matthew Kroenig, Joel Kesselbrenner — Wed, 01 Jun 2022 17:36:54 +0000

Do countries need freedom to achieve prosperity?

Introducing the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

By the Freedom and Prosperity Center

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Freedom and Prosperity around the world

See how scores have changed over time

Explore the data

downloaD data set

Executive Summary

The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries—and to explore the nature
of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

To aid in this task, this report introduces the new Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes.

The Freedom Index measures economic, political, and legal freedoms for nearly every country in the world, using the latest available data when the index was constructed at the end of 2021. The Prosperity Index measures economic wellbeing and human flourishing for the same countries and time period. In addition, we collected historical data to allow us to track and analyze change over time. We constructed the same indexes going back in five-year increments for the years 2006, 2011, and 2016; 2006 is the earliest date for which data on our indicators are available.

To be sure, there are limits to any data-collection effort. The world changes quickly, and the data we collected at the end of 2021 may not still represent current realities in every case. Russia, for example, is less free today than when we collected the data, due to Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and his related crackdowns at home. In addition, we needed to choose indicators that could be applied across all countries and over time, but these generalized measures may not always fit neatly with the unique circumstances in every country. Still, despite these limitations, we believe that these indexes provide new and valuable information on global freedom and prosperity.

Going forward, we plan to update the indexes annually. The methodology to produce the indexes is straightforward and transparent, and is described in detail in the appendix.

We have built on the work of several comparable country indexes. Many of these measure one aspect or another of freedom or prosperity. Some combine freedom and prosperity indicators and produce a single index. Our approach in designing the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes was different in a few ways.

We defined freedom comprehensively. Many existing indexes measure economic, political, and legal freedoms separately, whereas we combine all three in our Freedom Index.
We defined prosperity comprehensively. We also take a broad view of what constitutes a prosperous country. We go beyond material measurements like income per capita and healthcare. We argue that a truly prosperous country should also score well on the quality of the environment, its treatment of minorities, and the general happiness of the population.
We constructed separate indexes for freedom and prosperity. By creating two distinct indexes, we hope to give researchers a better opportunity to analyze the relationship between freedom and prosperity. We also offer policymakers and other thought leaders clearer benchmarks for reforms and tracking results over time.

The indexes demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between freedom and prosperity. This report draws on the trajectory of the results over time, and other historical evidence, to argue that freedom tends to result in prosperity. In other words, freer countries tend to be more prosperous, and we have reason to believe that improvements in freedom will, over time, lead to greater and more durable prosperity.

The report also shows that autocracies generally do not deliver prosperity for their people. All countries rated Prosperous in our index (except for Singapore and Israel) also rank as Free. All countries in our Free category fall in either the Prosperous category or in the upper half of the Mostly Prosperous category. Both China and Russia rank lower in the Prosperity Index than Free countries do.

These findings lead us to recommend that governments, international organizations, private-sector companies, philanthropic organizations, and others concerned with prosperity promote economic, political, and legal freedoms.

The center will use the indexes and supporting data for its own research, and will also make them available for other researchers. All the research and resources used to produce the indexes and this report are publicly available. The Freedom and Prosperity datasets are accessible on the center’s website. The indexes will be updated annually, allowing thinkers and doers to track progress over time. Through our work and the work of others, we hope to make the world freer and more prosperous.

Summary and key takeaways

We hope that scholars and practitioners can use these data to conduct a wide range of analyses and to forge practical recommendations. In this section, we present some of our own preliminary analysis to explore the central question of this project: what is the relationship between freedom and prosperity? To be sure, this has been the subject of enormous scholarly debate, and we will not be able to resolve this question in a single report. Still, this analysis brings new data to bear on this question. The data and analysis in this report indicate that freedom and prosperity are correlated, and provide further support for the thesis that freedom contributes to prosperity.

Prosperity is highly correlated with freedom

A central finding of this report is that prosperity and freedom are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient between the indexes is 0.81. High values of Freedom are associated with high values of Prosperity, and low values of Freedom are associated with low values of Prosperity. The R² statistic shows that 66 percent of the variation in prosperity around the world can be explained by freedom (Table 5).

The strong relationship between freedom and prosperity can also be seen in simple descriptive statistics. With the exception of Israel and Singapore, every country in the Prosperous category is also in the Free category. Israel and Singapore (due to the latter’s high levels of economic freedom) occupy the two highest positions in the Mostly Free category (Table 4).

Moreover, no Free countries in 2021 are Mostly Unprosperous or Unprosperous; they are either Prosperous or Mostly Prosperous. The forty-one countries that comprise the top category of the Freedom Index also all rank in the top fifty for the Prosperity Index, except for Romania (fifty-one in the Prosperity Index) and Cabo Verde (eighty-one).

In addition, all Unfree countries in our Freedom Index rank in the Mostly Unprosperous or Unprosperous categories in our Prosperity Index—except for Cuba, which scores above fifty on Minority Rights and Health.

Continuing with the descriptive statistics, we find that citizens in Free countries are five times richer in per capita income ($36,142) than citizens in Mostly Free countries ($7,246) (Table 3). They are six times richer than citizens in Mostly Unfree societies ($5,791).

Table 3: Descriptive statistics across Freedom Index categories

Category	Country counts	Freedom Index			Population covered			GNI per Capita (US$)			Health Score
Category	Country counts			Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
Global	174	56.7	55.7	7,686	100%	13,312	5,070	62.2	67.2
Free	41	83.2	82.3	1,131	15%	36.142	32,290	87.5	89.9
Mostly free	67	60.8	59.7	2,824	37%	7,246	7,246	60.6	65.9
Mostly unfree	55	39.7	40.5	3,570	46%	5,791	5,791	49.1	47.1
Unfree	11	18.3	18.9	157	2%	2,775	2,775	43.7	42

Table 3 Continued: Simple statistics across Freedom Index categories

Category	Country counts	Environment Score			Happiness Score			Minority Rights Score			Prosperity Index
Category	Country counts			Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
Global	174	45.4	46.1	62.2	56.1	79.1	87.6	51.2	49
Free	41	80.7	89.2	79.4	78.4	94.6	95.9	76.9	79.1
Mostly free	67	38.7	41.6	52.1	52.4	85.3	88.9	48.2	47.7
Mostly unfree	55	30.4	27.1	47.0	45.3	66.7	70.0	40.0	38.3
Unfree	11	29.4	29.5	27.5	22.6	47.6	45.6	30.5	31.3

The quality of life is also different in Free and Unfree societies. As can be seen in Table 3, Health, Environment, Happiness, and Minority Rights improve as a country moves toward greater freedom. The average Health score jumps from 60.6 to 87.5 when moving from the Mostly Free to the Free category. The average Environment score drops by more than 50 percent when moving from the Free group to the Mostly Free group. People in Free countries are almost three times happier than people in Unfree countries. For Minority Rights, the gap is smaller between the Mostly Free and Free groups (nine points), but the score drops significantly as freedom decreases, with gaps of almost twenty points between Mostly Free and Mostly Unfree, and again between Mostly Unfree and Unfree. These results suggest that more freedom is associated with a better life for the average person.

Table 4: Overlap between freedom and prosperity categories

This table shows the percentage of countries in each overlapping category. Shown in parentheses is the number of countries.

Evidence suggests that freedom contributes to prosperity

In this section, we examine whether freer countries tend to become more prosperous over time. Scholars have long debated the direction of the relationship between freedom and prosperity. The insight that freedom promotes prosperity goes back at least to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, which argues that laws and institutions that protect the liberty of individuals to pursue their own interests result in greater prosperity for the larger society.

Others argue the relationship goes in the opposite direction. Barrington Moore, for example, argues that a country cannot sustain democracy without a thriving middle class. People acquire property and material wealth first, and then demand a voice in government, including the freedoms to protect their wealth. This hypothesis goes all the way back to Aristotle, who posited that a large, prosperous middle class may mediate between rich and poor, creating the legal foundation upon which political freedom may function. A century ago, Max Weber extended this line of thought, proposing that the middle class defends its economic power by enshrining it in laws and institutions.

A third possibility is that there is a positive feedback loop; freedom begets prosperity, which, in turn, begets more freedom.

The idea that institutions are the key to long-run economic growth is well established in contemporary economic theory. Institutions provide the rules of the game. Rules that incentivize entrepreneurship, hard work, long-term planning, and broad access to economic opportunities tend to produce wealthier societies. Rules that stifle innovation, discriminate against certain segments of society, and do not guarantee that individuals will be able to enjoy the fruits of their labors and creations tend to produce poorer societies.

In theory, both democratic and autocratic countries could put in place sound economic institutions to produce long-run growth. But, in practice, democracies are much more likely to do so. Dictators often establish rules that maximize their political control and benefit themselves and their supporters, to the detriment of broader segments of society. On the other hand, because democratic leaders are drawn from, and represent, broader cross sections of society, they tend to put in place institutions that benefit wider swaths of that society.

We will not be able to definitively resolve this complex debate in a single report, but we do bring new data to bear on these questions. We believe that our data and associated analysis provide evidence that freer countries tend to become more prosperous.

In an effort to disentangle this relationship, we examined the strength of the correlations between freedom and prosperity over time. Using the same methodology, we re-created the 2021 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes for 2016, 2011, and 2006. We examined whether measures for freedom in prior years are associated with levels of prosperity in subsequent years. After all, changes in prosperity do not happen overnight. If freedom drives subsequent prosperity, then we should see the correlations between freedom in prior years more strongly associated with levels of prosperity in subsequent years.

This is what we found. Indeed, as one can see in Table 5 and Figure 6, the longer the time lapses between our measures of Freedom and Prosperity, the stronger the association. A country’s level of Prosperity today is better explained by its level of Freedom in 2006 than by its current Freedom. In this analysis we are concerned with the general trend over time, not the absolute differences from year to year. The correlation and R2 statistics are higher the further one goes back in time, indicating a stronger fit between past Freedom and future Prosperity. The 2006 Freedom Index, the earliest measure of Freedom calculated for this report, is most strongly associated with levels of Prosperity in 2021. While the relative differences may seem small, they are in a consistent direction. This rough test does not provide definitive proof that advances in freedom produce subsequent prosperity, but it is suggestive of such a dynamic and worthy of further investigation.

Table 5: Historical correlations

Prosperity 2021
Freedom Index Year	R2	Slope	Simple Correlation
2021	0.656	0.762	0.810
2016	0.662	0.771	0.814
2011	0.673	0.809	0.821
2006	0.677	0.834	0.823

Note: The table is based on the results of simple ordinary least squares regression, in which Prosperity Index 2021 is the dependent variable and time series of the Freedom Index are the explanatory variables.

We also tested the alternative hypothesis. Are past levels of Prosperity more strongly associated with current levels of Freedom? While there is a relationship, it is weaker than the link between Freedom and subsequent Prosperity. For example, the R2 statistic between Prosperity in 2006 and Freedom in 2021 is 0.613, while the same statistic for Freedom in 2006 and Prosperity in 2021 is 0.677. Freedom in a given year is more strongly associated with subsequent prosperity than the reverse. This simple test suggests that the relationship is driven more by a country’s level of freedom shaping its subsequent level of prosperity than by the reverse.

As we plan to update the data annually, we look forward to conducting further analysis on the direction and magnitude of the relationship between freedom and prosperity, and we encourage others to do the same.

We also analyzed the countries with the biggest score changes in the Freedom Index between 2006 and 2021. If our hypothesis is correct, we should expect big shifts in the independent variable (Freedom) to be associated with meaningful changes in Prosperity.

Two countries stand out for big changes in freedom over this period, and we found that their prosperity levels changed in the same direction.

Bhutan had the biggest jump in Freedom of any country between 2006 and 2021, and also showed an increase in Prosperity. In 2008, Bhutan experienced a transition from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, including the establishment of an elected legislature. Bhutan’s Freedom Index score reflects these changes, with a 74-percent increase in Legal Freedom and a whopping 166-percent increase in Political Freedom between 2006 and 2021. Bhutan’s income score increased by 91 percent, and there was a 35-percent increase in its Environment score.

Venezuela, by contrast, is the country that lost the most freedom and prosperity between 2006 and 2021—a result with roots in Hugo Chávez’s increasing political repression and embrace of socialist and populist economic policies as he consolidated power. The country dropped more than 42 percent in its overall Freedom score. The fall in its Political Freedom score was most pronounced—a 68-percent drop. On the Prosperity Index, Venezuela’s score plummeted 24 percent from 2006 to 2021. The country was once among the wealthiest and most developed in Latin America, but now scores poorly on Health, Income, and Happiness.

Divergent development paths for formerly communist countries in Eastern Europe

As our next test, we look to the divergent paths of countries’ political and economic transitions after the end of the Cold War. The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1989–1990 period can be viewed as a kind of natural experiment. Before the fall, these countries had similar levels of freedom and prosperity. Some countries, like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania, chose democracy and free markets. Others, such as Belarus and Russia, came to be ruled by autocratic regimes over the following years. What was the result of these choices on the trajectories of their subsequent economic development?

These six countries had divergent economic paths between 1995 (the first year for which all countries had comparable data) and 2020. As we can see in Table 6, the countries that chose freedom are between seven and nine times wealthier today, while the countries that remained autocratic are only between three and five times richer.

Table 6: Increase of GDP per capita in selected former communist countries (1995–2020)

	GDP per capita (current US$)
	1995	2020	Multiplier
Estonia	3,134	23,027	7.3
Latvia	2,330	17,726	7.6
Lithuania	2,168	20,234	9.3
Romania	1,650	12,896	7.8
Belarus	1,323	6,424	4.9
Russia	2,666	10,127	3.8

The data from our Freedom and Prosperity Indexes show similar results, as can be seen in Table 7. Russia (ranked eighty-eighth) and Belarus (ranked eighty-second) underperform in the Prosperity Index relative to their freer neighbors.

Divergent development paths for people living under communist and democratic governments

Table 7: Scores of selected former communist countries

	Freedom 2021		Prosperity 2021
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Estonia	87.2	14	65.6	36
Latvia	81.7	25	62.6	42
Lithuania	81.8	24	63.9	39
Romania	76.3	36	59.8	51
Belarus	39.4	139	50.0	82
Russia	41.2	135	49.0	88

We can draw similar conclusions by looking at World War II as the starting point for a new development period. For decades after World War II, China, Germany, and Korea were divided. Some people lived in communist countries, while others lived in countries with free markets and with political regimes that either were democratic from the beginning (West Germany), evolved into a democracy (South Korea and Taiwan), or had a wide range of freedoms (Hong Kong).

This provides us with another natural experiment. Did people living in freedom become more prosperous over time?

We begin with Germany. According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data, democratic West Germany’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 1950 was only about 1.5 times larger than that of communist East Germany ($4,280 vs. $2,796). But, by the reunification of Germany in 1990, West Germany’s per capita income had grown to be 3.6 times larger ($19,441 vs. $5,403) than that of East Germany.

Let us now turn our attention to the Korean Peninsula. North and South Korea were both exceptionally poor in 1950. While both countries lacked political freedom from the end of the Korean War until 1980, they selected very different paths regarding economic freedom. South Korea’s dictators chose capitalism and secure property rights, while North Korea’s leaders selected a state-planned communist economy. By 1980, South Korea’s per capita income ($1,589) was more than double that of North Korea ($768).

Starting in the 1980s, South Korea transformed itself into a democracy, while North Korea remains a dictatorship. The addition of political freedoms in South Korea resulted in an even larger divergence in the economic paths of these two nations. United Nations data for 2021 show GDP per capita of $31,947 for South Korea and $639 for North Korea. Today, people living in the free South Korea are fifty times wealthier than those living in the unfree North Korea.

North Korea is not ranked in our indexes because it does not provide sufficient data. South Korea ranks thirty-fifth and Free in our Freedom Index and twenty-fifth and Prosperous in our Prosperity Index.

How does this story look when examining Chinese people living under different political and economic systems? The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1949. China has never had political freedom, although it started instituting liberalizing economic reforms in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping. Until its takeover by the PRC in 2020, Hong Kong was either under British control or an autonomous PRC region, enjoyed some democratic freedoms, and ranked among the freest markets in the world. Taiwan was established as a dictatorship at the end of World War II, but adopted free markets. It started transitioning to democracy after 1975. What were the results of these institutional choices?

The PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were all poor in 1961, with GNI per capita of $76, $163, and $437, respectively. But, their different levels of freedom resulted in different levels of prosperity by 2020. Free Taiwan and Hong Kong were able to break out of the middle-income trap, while unfree China, at least to date, has not. The middle-income trap, a measure created by the World Bank in 2006, refers to a situation in which a developing country moves from the poor to the middle-income category, but gets stuck below the high-income threshold—currently calculated by the World Bank as $12,695 GNI per capita. In 2020, per capita income in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong was $10,055, $25,055, and $46,324, respectively. These differences are also clear in our indexes. Taiwan ranks Free and Mostly Prosperous, while China ranks Mostly Unfree and Mostly Unprosperous. We have chosen not to rank Hong Kong because it is now under the control of the PRC.

Autocracies are generally not prosperous

Some might think that an autocratic ruler can guarantee stability and push through needed economic reforms. They might point to Singapore as an example of a prosperous non-democracy. But, such examples are few and far between.

Authoritarian leaders like to centralize power, and dislike strong economic institutions that may check their power. While authoritarian leaders may sometimes make good economic decisions, they frequently make catastrophically bad ones. For example, the collectivization of agriculture led to mass famine in Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union, in Mao Zedong’s China, and in Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea. More recently, and less dramatically, bad financial decisions by Turkey’s leaders led to high inflation and currency collapse, while in Kazakhstan the long-lasting kleptocracy of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his family led to social unrest. Even if a country has a wise authoritarian leader who makes consistently good decisions, like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, there is no guarantee that his successor will be equally wise. Moreover, a model that might work for a small city-state like Singapore does not easily apply to larger countries.

Autocracies are also subject to rapid and dramatic reversals along the path toward greater prosperity. Venezuela, for example, a country rich in natural resources and with a democratic tradition, adopted authoritarian and socialist policies in the early 2000s. As a result, Venezuela lost two-thirds of its GDP from 2014 to 2019. This is comparable to the 60-percent drop in GDP Syria experienced during its civil war. Bad authoritarian leaders curtailing freedoms can devastate a country as much as a civil war.

Unfree societies do not depend on rules and institutions but, rather, on authoritarian decisions. These decisions may, at times, redirect capital and people toward more productive outlets and have a positive impact in the short term. But, over the long term, if these decisions are not accompanied by greater freedoms, these autocrats are likely to undermine any progress they achieve.

Likewise, the authoritarian tendency to accumulate power makes leaders reluctant to allow free markets, which, when properly regulated, reflect the decisions of numerous economic agents and are a sounder path to economic development than the decisions of an autocrat or central bureaucracy.

Figure 7: Comparative rankings in the components of the Prosperity Index

Note: We use the rankings of China and Russia and the average rankings of all countries included in the Free category. The five axes represent the five indicators forming the Prosperity Index. The center point represents a rank of one hundred and seventy-four, the worst possible performance. The outer line represents a rank of one, the best possible performance on each indicator.

China

China is often cited as a model of successful economic development, but our indexes do not bear this out. After seventy-three years of Communist Party leadership, China ranks one hundred and fortieth in the Freedom Index and one hundred and fourteenth in the Prosperity Index.

To be sure, China’s economic growth has been impressive in many ways, but it is still far from achieving broad-based prosperity. Looking at the components of the Prosperity Index, China ranks only fifty-seventh on the Income score, with a GNI per capita just over $10,000. This puts it squarely in the middle-income range, well below other Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. While elites in China’s coastal cities are wealthy and there are far fewer Chinese living in poverty than in the past, the country’s interior remains largely poor.

China’s low position on the Prosperity Index is also explained by its Minority Rights rank of one hundred and sixty-seven out of one hundred and seventy-four (Figure 7). This score, part of our comprehensive view of prosperity, reflects China’s brutal policies in Tibet and genocide in Xinjiang.

There are also real questions about whether China’s state-led capitalist model can continue to deliver income growth. Xi Jinping prioritizes political control over economic growth, and has been backtracking on liberalizing reforms, as seen in his crackdowns on the Chinese tech sector. Moreover, China’s past path to growth was driven largely by exporting cheap manufactured goods and major infrastructure investments by the CCP.

To break out of the middle-income trap, however, China will need to become a true innovation leader and develop a consumer-based market. It is unclear whether it can make that transition without more freedom.

Furthermore, China has many other structural deficiencies, including high levels of pollution, massive corruption, a shrinking of the working-age population as a result of the failed one-child policy, excessively harsh yet ineffective COVID-fighting policies, and an international community that is becoming more fearful of economic dependence on China. The CCP announced in March 2022 that China’s GDP growth target for the year was “around 5.5 percent,” the lowest in thirty years. But, just a month later, the International Monetary Fund projected a 4.4 percent growth rate and some economists predict growth rates of under 4 percent. Even Xi Jinping has admitted that slow growth in China is “the new normal.”

Russia

Russia is a prototypical example of a Mostly Unfree and Mostly Unprosperous country. It ranks one hundred and thirty-fifth on the Freedom Index and eighty-eighth on the Prosperity Index. This is the result of more than seven decades of communism and two decades of authoritarianism after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 (with a brief period of experimentation with freer markets and political pluralism in the 1990s).

Russia enjoyed strong economic growth in the early years of the 2000s, thanks largely to high oil prices and more open markets. Russia, like China, is a middle-income country with a GNI per capita of approximately $10,000. Russia is similar to China on many metrics of Prosperity, with the exception of Minority Rights (one hundred and forty for Russia), where China ranks even worse. The data for our analysis were collected before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Vladimir Putin clamps down on Russian society during the war, we expect Russia’s freedom and prosperity to decline further in the coming years.

Oil-extracting autocracies

The major exception to our finding that autocracies cannot produce prosperity comes from oil-rich states, like the Gulf monarchies. Oil revenues have allowed these autocracies to provide their citizens with some of the highest per capita incomes in the world.

Gulf monarchies

The Gulf monarchies, with the exception of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), all fall into the Mostly Unfree category.

Due to their ability to generate large revenues from oil extraction, however, these countries rank highly in one of the key prosperity indicators, GNI per capita. Their scores on our Prosperity Index, however, suffer because they rank poorly in other prosperity indicators like Environment and Minority Rights.

While Gulf monarchies have seen record income from high oil prices over the preceding decades, the world may be moving away from fossil fuels and toward cleaner forms of energy. To succeed in such an environment, oil-producing states will need to liberalize their economies and allow their people more freedoms.

Some Gulf monarchies are already taking limited steps in this direction. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the government has recently granted women greater rights and further opened to foreign investment.

United Arab Emirates

The UAE has been leading the way toward more freedom in the Gulf region. It outperforms all the other Gulf monarchies in both freedom and prosperity. While its Political Freedom measures are quite low, it does allow a wide range of Economic and Legal Freedoms. Indeed, taken together, these freedoms are sufficient to move the UAE into the Mostly Free category—the only country in the Gulf to receive this distinction. These greater freedoms have also resulted in superior economic performance. The UAE bests its neighbors to rank as the thirty-fourth most prosperous country globally in our index.

Singapore

Singapore is often mentioned as the leading example of how autocratic systems can provide economic prosperity. Our Freedom Index reveals, however, that the secret to Singapore’s success is quite straightforward. While Singapore ranks poorly on Political Freedom, it has among the highest levels of Economic and Legal Freedoms. Indeed, Singapore ranks as a Mostly Free country, and barely falls short of our threshold for fully Free.

Singapore demonstrates, therefore, that this model can work, but its example may be sui generis: Singapore is a small city-state. Indeed, there is much evidence that small countries open to international trade can prosper. But, it would not be easy to run a larger country in such a centralized manner.

In addition, Singapore has been governed, so far, by fairly wise autocrats who have continually prioritized economic and legal freedoms. Given that political power in the country is concentrated, however, there is always the risk that future leaders would choose to rein in these freedoms. While it may seem foolish to kill the goose that laid the golden egg, there are many examples of autocratic leaders doing just that if they feel that it is necessary to protect their political power. Allowing more political freedom in Singapore would provide guardrails against arbitrary changes to Singapore’s successful economic model, and better ensure its future prosperity.

Methodology and FAQ

2021 methodology

In depth Methodology

FAQs

Frequently Asked Questions

1. What are the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes?
The Freedom Index measures economic, political, and legal freedoms for nearly every country in the world. The Prosperity Index measures economic wellbeing and human flourishing for the same countries. The indexes can be used to inform policymakers about real-world reform opportunities in developing countries.

2. What time period does the report cover?
The 2021 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes use the most recent data available. Most of these data are from 2021. Where data from 2021 are not available, data from the most recent year available are used instead.

In addition, we collected historical data to construct the indexes for the years 2006, 2011, and 2016. This allows us to track national trajectories over time, even in the first year of the indexes. Going forward, we plan to update the indexes annually.

3. How are the data collected?
The Freedom Index and the Prosperity Index are constructed on a diversified data and analytical basis, comprising different databases produced by the American Economic Journal, the Center for Economic and Policy Research, the Credendo Group, the Fraser Institute, Freedom House, the Fund for Peace, the Heritage Foundation, NASA, Transparency International, the United Nations, the V-Dem Institute, the World Bank, and the World Justice Project.

4. What do the scores capture?
The Freedom Index and Prosperity Index are two separate indexes that rank 174 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. The Freedom Index measures Economic Freedom, Political Freedom, and Legal Freedoms. The Prosperity Index measures Income, Environment, Health, Minority Rights, and Happiness.

For more details on the construction of the indexes, please refer to the Methodology section.

5. How does the scoring system work?
All measurements in the indexes are weighted equally and the score for each index is the simple average of its parts. Scores range between zero and one-hundred, with higher values indicating more freedom or prosperity. Where appropriate, raw data are converted to a 0-100 scale.

6. What are the different scoring categories?
Countries on the Freedom Index are divided into four categories based on their overall score: those above a 75-point score (Free), those with scores between 50 and 74.9 (Mostly Free), those with scores between 25 and 49.9 (Mostly Unfree), and those with score from 0 to 24.9 (Unfree).

The same categorization is used for the Prosperity Index: those above a 75-point score (Prosperous), those with scores between 50 and 74.9 (Mostly Prosperous), those with score between 25 and 49.9 (Mostly Unprosperous), and those with scores from 0 to 24.9 (Unprosperous).

7. How is the ranking constructed?
We rank Freedom and Prosperity separately, and countries are ranked according to their score. Scores range between zero and one-hundred, with higher values indicating more freedom or prosperity.

8. Where can I view past years’ scores?
All the data are accessible on this website and can be downloaded.

9. Is there a link between Freedom and Prosperity?
We find that freedom and prosperity are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient between the indexes is 0.81. High values of Freedom are associated with high values of Prosperity, and low values of Freedom are associated with low values of Prosperity.

We find that the strength of this relationship increases the further one goes back in time. A country’s level of Prosperity today is better explained by its level of Freedom in 2006 than by its current Freedom, suggesting a relationship that is worthy of further investigation.

10. What makes the indexes different from other existing indexes?
There are several existing indexes that measure freedom and prosperity around the world, and our research built on these efforts. But the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes are unique.

We define freedom comprehensively. Existing indexes measure economic freedom, political freedom, and legal freedoms separately, but no other index combines those measures to offer a comprehensive measure of freedom. It is our belief, supported by scholarship and historical evidence, that countries with all three types of freedom, working together in a manner that is mutually reinforcing, are best able to secure durable development.

We define prosperity comprehensively. We go beyond material measurements like income per capita and healthcare. We argue that a truly prosperous country should also score well on environmental performance, treatment of minorities, and the general happiness of the population.

We constructed separate indexes for freedom and prosperity. By creating two distinct indexes, we hope to give researchers a better opportunity to analyze the relationship between freedom and prosperity. We also offer policymakers and other thought leaders clearer benchmarks for implementing reforms and tracking results over time.

11. How do you prevent political bias?
The methodology used to produce the indexes is straightforward and transparent. We provide all the information to replicate them.

We did our best to collect the most reliable information available. The objective of these indexes is to provide standardized measures that can be applied to every country. One might argue that the methodology or the data collected is irrelevant to certain types of political situations or specific countries. That might be the case in some instances, but rarely so. Moreover, there is an inherent tension between generalizable and specific knowledge. We self-consciously opted for the former. We would encourage other researchers to explain how our indexes illuminate or obscure country-specific dynamics.

12. What are the limitations of the indexes?
Ensuring comparability of the data across a global set of countries was a central consideration. When selecting sources to be included in the indexes, coverage was the determining factor. In the rare case of missing data for a certain year, we have replaced the missing data with data from the closest available year. All these instances are described in the dataset.

Data were collected over the past year, using the most recent information available. They might not reflect the latest political or economic developments. These indexes should not necessarily be taken as an accurate reflection of the most recent current events. We will, however, update the indexes over time to capture real-world changes on an annual basis.

Authors

Staff

Dan Negrea

Senior Director

China Economy & Business

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

Technical Advisers

Staff

Joseph Lemoine

Deputy Director

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Africa Economy & Business

Former staff

Joel Kesselbrenner

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Economy & Business Inclusive Growth

The post Do countries need freedom to achieve prosperity? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Katz quoted in Arab News on overlapping interests between Russia and authoritarian leaders in the Middle East

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 May 2022 18:03:00 +0000

The post Katz quoted in Arab News on overlapping interests between Russia and authoritarian leaders in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Khoury joins CGTN to discuss the political impacts of Lebanon’s election results and Hezbollah losses

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 May 2022 17:50:00 +0000

The post Khoury joins CGTN to discuss the political impacts of Lebanon’s election results and Hezbollah losses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Shapiro quoted in Jewish Insider on the impacts of President Biden’s nomination of US-Saudi ambassador

Atlantic Council — Fri, 13 May 2022 13:46:00 +0000

The post Shapiro quoted in Jewish Insider on the impacts of President Biden’s nomination of US-Saudi ambassador appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Blanford quoted in France24 on the implications of expat Lebanese votes for parliamentary elections

Atlantic Council — Mon, 09 May 2022 21:07:00 +0000

The post Blanford quoted in France24 on the implications of expat Lebanese votes for parliamentary elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Countering the Kremlin: America must not wait for European unity

Olexander Scherba — Fri, 06 May 2022 15:06:15 +0000

The notion that America and Europe should move forward in unison when dealing with Russia would make perfect sense in an ideal world. Unfortunately, today’s world is far from ideal. Furthermore, with the invasion of Ukraine now in its third month and millions of lives at risk, time is of the essence.

The geopolitical challenges of countering the Kremlin are complicated by the Putin regime’s success in penetrating national elites throughout Europe. It has taken a little over two decades for Vladimir Putin to evolve from international anonymity as an accidental president to today’s role as a global menace who wages war on his neighbors while threatening the wider world with nuclear apocalypse.

One of the keys to Putin’s success has been his ability to weaponize corruption. This has proven equally effective at home and abroad, with the Russian dictator and his cronies growing strong thanks to the greed, gullibility, and unscrupulous conduct of many highly-placed individuals and institutions within Western society.

The bitter fruits of this elite capture have been evident since the 2000s, with Putin crossing one red line after another only to offered repeated resets by the leaders of the democratic world. Rather than seeking to punish Russia or at least limit Putin’s influence, Europeans have queued up to do business with Moscow. This trend was perhaps most immediately apparent with the two Nord Stream gas pipelines, which were built specifically to bypass Ukraine and punish the country for its European choice.

The US desire to act in unison with Europe helped make Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II possible. More recently, this thinking has kept some Russian banks off the sanctions list despite their role in financing Putin’s military operation. Many observers believe the emphasis on consensus between America and Europe is one of the key reasons why sanctions are not currently tight enough and are failing to force a change in Russian policy.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

During wartime, attempting to work in unison across a broad coalition of Western nations means leaving any coordinated response vulnerable to the weakest link. This plays directly into Putin’s hands. Instead, strength and decisiveness are desperately needed.

The current invasion of Ukraine marks the culmination of Russia’s long campaign to corrupt Europe. The EU condemns the war while at the same time sponsoring it. Russian soldiers are committing war crimes in Ukraine and Europe is sending Russia around one billion euros every day to finance Putin’s war machine. Meanwhile, European leaders protest that they cannot simply quit their Russian gas habit overnight as this would cause a recession.

The problem is not just Europe’s inability to take big steps but rather its unwillingness to consider smaller measures. These could include shutting down the Nord Stream I pipeline to make Russia dependent on the Ukrainian transit system for its gas exports to Europe. Similarly, the imposition of a special duty on Russian gas would help Ukraine. Germany could also put its decision to quit nuclear energy on hold. None of this is happening.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Europeans understand the necessity of difficult decisions in the energy sector but lack the political courage to take them. This is why American leadership in the current situation is so vital.

The US has already imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia but can still go much further. Efforts to coordinate sanctions with Europe risk hampering this process. Instead, America could take a lead by targeting more Russian banks and seizing assets belonging to the Russian Federation. Tougher sanctions measures must be accompanied by clear messaging that there will be no return to business as usual until Russia not only ends the war but also fully compensates Ukraine for the destruction it has caused.

This last point is particularly important as many in Europe still seem to think the war in Ukraine will somehow eventually resolve itself. They appear to believe that Russia will achieve some of its goals and will propose a settlement that Ukraine will have to accept. At that point, everything will go back to normal and all the companies who left the Russian market will return.

It is up to the United States to leave both Russia and Europe in no doubt that this is not going to happen. Ukraine will not be forced to accept any peace deals against its will and there will be no business as usual with Vladimir Putin.

We are currently engulfed in the worst crisis since the end of the Cold War with the entire international security order under threat. Millions of lives hang in the balance. The outcome of the war in Ukraine will define the geopolitical climate for many years to come. This calls for the kind of leadership that only America is currently capable of providing.

Working with Europe where possible is clearly advantageous, but a desire to move in unison must not be allowed to slow down the historic steps that are so desperately needed. Instead, America should continue to lead and Europe will follow.

Olexander Scherba is Chief Advisor to the CEO of Naftogaz Ukraine. He is a former Ukrainian diplomat who served as Ukrainian Ambassador to Austria (2014-2021).

Such gifts were considered part of routine state etiquette towards parting diplomats in Europe. However, the United States, just ten years old at the time and seeking to rid itself of what it saw as European decadence and moral stagnation, created an explicit rule in the Articles of Confederation, the predecessor document to the US Constitution, against such gifts. This lives on today as the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which states that “no Person holding any (government office) shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept (any gift) whatsoever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”

As deposed Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan’s toshakhana (official gifts repository) scandal continues, one can do worse than to think about a young United States’ concerns about public gifts and corruption.

Corruption is often defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, but one reason that debate about corruption never ends is that the term corruption means different things to different people. Some people consider only the breaking of law by public office holders as corruption. In this narrow, legalistic sense, Khan does not appear to have been in the wrong: he is said to have declared the gifts he received from foreign governments to authorities, and paid the mandated (and heavily discounted) amount office holders are obliged to pay in order to convert gifts received in their public capacities into private property. It is from this perspective that Khan could dismiss the scandal as he did, claiming “mera taufa, meri marzi” (“my gift, my will”).

Others consider corruption beyond this narrow, transactional sense of the word, to encompass activities in which public office holders behave selfishly against the broader public interest. This perspective looks beyond whether the official followed the letter of the law to ask if he or she followed the spirit of public service. Taking this view, we must ask: did Khan act in the public interest by claiming these gifts at a discount? And was his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government’s stance on toshakhana policies keeping with its self-proclaimed stance against corruption?

There are two major concerns when setting toshakhana policies: first, they must be supportive of healthy relations between Pakistan and countries with whom Pakistani diplomats and national leaders interact; second, as with any other government’s function, any accruing benefits should flow to the most deserving Pakistanis. The PTI’s record was problematic on both counts.

First, Khan’s government had adopted the stance that official gifts from other countries must be kept classified in order to protect our relations with them from excessive media scrutiny and debate. This is strange, if not downright absurd. If Pakistan took a page from the United States’ Founding Fathers’ playbook, it would frame gifts as flowing to the nation by making them public and subject to parliamentary oversight. The nation would thus have no reason to suspect that these gifts are the currency of murky external influence over national leaders: making gift receipts public would glorify, rather than embarrass, the benefactor nation.

Second, by raising the amount leaders have to pay to claim ownership over an official gift to 50 percent, Khan had moved in the right direction compared to previous governments. But why stop at 50 percent? Why were public officials still allowed to benefit privately from holding office?

Imran Khan has historically discussed corruption in broad and moralistic terms: material corruption is preceded by moral corruption. Anti-corruption is the fight between haq (righteousness) and batil (evil). And so without the acceptance of blatant bribes or theft from the public, there can be no corruption. This narrative has resonated deeply with a nation ground down by decades of blatant corruption. Indeed, top members of the present coalition government have previously been indicted for the illegal retention of foreign gifts themselves.

Yet for Pakistan to move forward, Khan’s supporters and critics alike have to recognize that anti-corruption is not simply about enforcing the law and chasing money trails, but about creating rules and laws that bind rulers’ hands before the fact and stop poor behavior from occurring in the first place.

In fifty or one hundred years, whether Imran Khan dipped into the toshakhana more than he should have will be a footnote in Pakistan’s history. What will matter instead is whether, like the United States’ Founding Fathers more than two centuries ago, Pakistan is able to put a governance architecture in place that compels future leaders to hold the interests of the average Pakistani supreme in their actions in office.

Dr. Ali Hasanain is the Head of the Economics Department at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

SouthAsiaSource Apr 14, 2022

Back to the future in Pakistan?

By Shuja Nawaz

The populist Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan, who promised a “Naya (New) Pakistan” Pakistan, has been removed from office by a vote of no confidence in parliament, the first ever in Pakistan’s fraught political history.

Elections Pakistan

Experts react Apr 12, 2022

Experts react: A new leader emerges from Pakistan’s political turmoil. Now what?

By Atlantic Council experts

We reached out to several Pakistan-based experts for their thoughts on new Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and what comes next in the pivotal South Asian nation.

Civil Society Democratic Transitions

SouthAsiaSource Mar 24, 2022

As no-confidence vote looms, Pakistan’s democracy faces key stress test

By Fahd Humayun

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan faces a no-confidence motion in the country’s National Assembly (the lower house of its Parliament).

Elections Pakistan

Finally! German MPs back heavy weapons for Ukraine in historic vote

Vitaly Sych — Sun, 01 May 2022 17:30:12 +0000

The German parliament on April 28 finally agreed to supply heavy weapons to Ukraine. Moreover, the decision was supported by an overwhelming majority of parliamentary deputies, with 586 voting for and just 100 against. We may now be witnessing the emergence of a different Germany that has set aside its geopolitical fears and is ready to take the lead on the international stage.

In Ukraine, the Bundestag’s decision was hailed as the “last nail in the coffin of Putin’s lobbyism in Europe,” according to presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak. Personally, I am not so sure it is really the last nail or if we can even speak of a coffin at this stage, but the vote was definitely an important development for all Ukrainians and for Europe as a whole.

Ever since the start of the Russian invasion two months ago, Germany has been viewed in Ukraine as one of the least supportive European nations. Whenever my radio station has hosted discussions on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and Western military aid for Kyiv, the two countries consistently cited as the biggest obstacles are Germany and Hungary. I can see why Hungary’s increasingly authoritarian leader Viktor Orban might view Russian support as a source of legitimacy, but it is difficult for me to understand why a free and economically powerful Germany would compromise itself in order to cultivate close ties with the Kremlin.

When it comes to downplaying conflict with Putin, the new German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has honed his skills to perfection. He zigzags between Russia, the German public, German industrialists, and the wider Western world with a message that while he opposes the war, any meaningful support for Ukraine would be a dangerous escalation. To me, the logic of this position is akin to depriving a domestic abuse victim of support for fear of offending the abuser. This also conveniently allows Germany to remain in its current comfort zone.

Berlin’s attempts to avoid even the slightest confrontation with Moscow have contrasted sharply with the outpouring of German public support for Ukraine since the war began. I was moved almost to tears when I saw crowds of more than 100,000 on the streets of the German capital expressing solidarity with Ukraine. I have also heard numerous reports of refugees from Ukraine receiving a warm welcome in towns and cities across Germany.

My colleagues from the German media have offered words of support and, to my surprise, have backed this up with generous financial assistance from their own pockets. Off the record, some have told me they are ashamed of the position adopted by their government. In an authoritarian country like Russia or Iran, it would not have surprised me to encounter such a striking divergence between public opinion and government policy. But in Germany, it has come as quite a shock.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

As a journalist, I have long been curious about the German phenomenon of the “Putinversteher” or “Putin Understanders,” and have frequently discussed this topic during trips to Berlin. I’ve come across three common arguments that help to explain why so many members of Germany’s business and political elites are eager to make excuses for Putin and build ties with Russia at the expense of European values and the interests of neighbors such as Ukraine.

The most commonly cited reason is Germany’s sense of guilt toward Russia due to the crimes of WWII. This argument has always baffled me because it directly equates modern Russia with the Soviet Union while completely ignoring the wartime suffering of other Soviet republics. In reality, Ukraine and Belarus both experienced much worse destruction and lost comparatively far more people than Russia during the Nazi invasion of the USSR.

My grandfather, Efrem Grygorovych Sych, was conscripted into the Red Army in early 1945. I don’t suppose he had much choice in the matter. My father was born soon afterwards but he never actually met my grandfather, who was killed in spring 1945 somewhere near Berlin. I still have the brief official letter from the Red Army announcing his death.

I have not personally taken any interest in Soviet propaganda since I was very young. As a consequence, I have never regarded Germany as a threat, either to my family directly or to modern civilization as a whole. The same cannot be said for Russia, unfortunately. As both a business traveler and a tourist, I have been lucky enough to visit many regions of Germany. Meanwhile, for the past decade or so I have been unable to even transit through Russia for fear that I might be detained and jailed in connection with my work as a journalist in Ukraine. I am sure my grandfather would have been amazed to see things turn out this way.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The second common justification for the “Putinversteher” culture in today’s Germany is the strength of anti-American feeling. I can understand why some Germans might resent US influence, but I struggle to see why this resentment should translate into support for Russia. How can disagreements between fellow democracies lead to increased sympathy for a tyrannical one-party state?

The third argument I often hear is financial. It is simply good business for Germany to foster strong ties with Russia, whatever the nature of the Putin regime. This requires no further explanation but I feel obliged to make one observation. As someone who comes from a country with a long history of battling dirty politicians, it seems obvious to me that numerous German politicians are receiving hefty compensation from the Kremlin in exchange for their support. It appears equally apparent that these politicians have heavily influenced German foreign policy for many years.

The pervasiveness of “Putinversteher” sentiment within the German establishment makes the recent Bundestag vote on arming Ukraine even more symbolic and, I hope, historic. This vote may help my country defend itself against Russia and could allow my family to return home to Kyiv in the not-too-distant future. It also represents a major milestone in Germany’s return to a position of moral leadership that matches the country’s status.

Today’s Germany should be a global leader but this means adhering to a clear set of national values, even when they come at a cost. The German public has already demonstrated that it is ready to pay the price of leadership. The Bundestag has now done likewise. This is the Germany the world needs.

Vitaly Sych is Chief Editor of NV media house which includes a weekly magazine, national talk radio station, and news site (NV.ua). A version of this article was originally published in the German language by Die Zeit newspaper.

Atlantic Council — Mon, 18 Apr 2022 17:54:00 +0000

The post Nia joins WNYC Studios to discuss international law and Russian war crimes in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pavia in TRT World: Tunisia’s economic woes hang over Saied’s quest to consolidate power

Atlantic Council — Thu, 14 Apr 2022 13:35:00 +0000

The post Pavia in TRT World: Tunisia’s economic woes hang over Saied’s quest to consolidate power appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Melcangi quoted in the Italian Institute for International Political Studies on the rapidly deteriorating condition of Tunisia’s democracy

Atlantic Council — Thu, 07 Apr 2022 13:15:00 +0000

The post Melcangi quoted in the Italian Institute for International Political Studies on the rapidly deteriorating condition of Tunisia’s democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How the world’s parliaments can team up against Russian aggression

Francis Shin and Riho Terras — Tue, 05 Apr 2022 20:05:46 +0000

As the sound of gunfire echoes across a surrounded Mariupol and horrific Russian attacks continue across Ukraine, the international community has united in condemning Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion and punishing him and his cronies. But there’s more to be done, and one way to maximize the impact of these global efforts would be an interparliamentary alliance against Kremlin aggression (IPAKA).

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has forced the Group of Seven (G7), NATO members, and their major partners into soul searching about how they could have turned a blind eye to the Russian leader’s authoritarian and kleptocratic tendencies. Some of these countries, for example, accommodated the Kremlin’s and oligarchs’ offshoring of wealth into their jurisdictions despite indications that this wealth had been stolen from the Russian public.

But now, the United States and its allies are scrambling for more economic measures to drain Putin’s war chest, employing coordinated sanctions aimed at the economic foundations of Russia’s invasion. These allies’ coordination on sanctions has been impressive so far, especially compared to their disjointed responses against Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014. The G7 members and Australia even launched a multilateral anti-oligarch task force to mount further pressure on the Kremlin.

But to keep up this momentum, legislative bodies across G7 countries, NATO members, and major partners should coordinate sanctions. That is because a lack of coordination in 2014 allowed the Kremlin to maintain offshoring networks in some jurisdictions and actively contributed to Russian aggression today by not imposing sufficiently strong economic deterrence measures. For example, Britain and the European Union only solidified the legal basis for imposing sanctions on authoritarian regimes guilty of systemic human-rights abuses (modeled after the US Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act) in 2018 and 2020 respectively; the absence of that legal basis was a factor in preventing comprehensive transatlantic sanctions coordination in response to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the Donbas. Now that an international anti-invasion coalition is forming, there is a clear desire for sanctions coordination in legislatures around the world.

Coordinating legislation that authorizes sanctions against Russia would help circumvent delays like the ones seen in 2014 and would intensify pressure on Russia. It would also help develop a medium-to-long-term strategy to address Putin’s aggression. Legislators staying in contact with each other would also ensure that democratic countries that are against the invasion can encourage each other to maintain sanctions, rather than breaking ranks and lifting sanctions on the Kremlin earlier than other countries.

The key to coordinating that legislation is an IPAKA. Modeled on the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), an IPAKA would help the G7, NATO members, and their major partners develop similar sanctions regimes in their respective jurisdictions so that there is a legal basis for continued economic action against Russian aggression. Otherwise, there is a risk of uneven enforcement across jurisdictions that could open loopholes for sanctioned targets to exploit while those sanctions designations remain in effect. An IPAKA would ensure that internationally coordinated sanctions against Russian aggression could have greater impact, both in terms of geographic and economic reach, and in keeping the timing consistent among countries’ responses. An IPAKA would likewise keep legislative discussions on Russia politically consistent within and between jurisdictions, such as by providing new studies on Russia that legislators from around the world could access.

This group would reach far beyond the usual suspects in the West. Membership in IPAKA should be extended to legislators from the Group of Twenty (G20) like Mexico and Indonesia, as well as from less-developed countries like Kenya which have strongly condemned Russian aggression.

Additionally, an IPAKA would further enable greater sanctions coordination on Belarus for supporting the Russian military’s invasion of Ukraine. There is already precedent for this, as Belarusian state companies and senior government officials were sanctioned by the G7 for their support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Miriam Lexmann, a member of the European Parliament and a founder and co-chair of IPAC, also voiced interest in supporting a similar legislative alliance on Russia during an event hosted by the Atlantic Council. IPAC provides a valuable example of success. For example, Australian members of IPAC were part of the push for Magnitsky-style legislation in their country after IPAC members across the world committed to passing similar legislation in their own countries. IPAC members consult with each other and share studies on engagement with China, which further shapes consensus among democratic countries on how to develop China policies.

As the situation grows increasingly dire in Ukraine and most democratic countries continue to target Putin’s war chest, the need for an IPAKA is clearer than ever. To grind Russia’s war machine to a halt, legislators will need to take coordinated steps to support their governments’ abilities to react swiftly to Russian aggression.

Francis Shin is a research assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Previously he was a research assistant at the Future of Financial Intelligence Sharing program, a research partnership with the Royal United Services Institute’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies.

Riho Terras is a member of the European Parliament and head of the European People’s Party Group National Delegation for Estonia. He is also a former chief of defense of Estonia.

The post How the world’s parliaments can team up against Russian aggression appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Friedlander quoted in Quartz on the unprecedented nature of the sanctions imposed on Russia

naladekoba — Mon, 28 Mar 2022 13:42:00 +0000

The post Friedlander quoted in Quartz on the unprecedented nature of the sanctions imposed on Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Friedlander quoted in Yahoo Finance on the global implications of reduced Russian and Ukraine grains

naladekoba — Sat, 26 Mar 2022 10:00:00 +0000

The post Friedlander quoted in Yahoo Finance on the global implications of reduced Russian and Ukraine grains appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Friedlander quoted in the NOS on Russian oligarchs’ role in Putin’s war in Ukraine

sbusch — Mon, 21 Mar 2022 20:22:00 +0000

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

The post Friedlander quoted in the NOS on Russian oligarchs’ role in Putin’s war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#BritainDebrief – How can Britain fix its corruption problem? A Debrief from Margaret Hodge MP

Ben Judah — Sun, 20 Mar 2022 20:18:03 +0000

How can Britain fix its corruption problem?

With the passing of the Economic Crime Bill in the UK, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviews Margaret Hodge MP, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Anti-Corruption and Responsible Tax, to discuss what Britain’s next steps are in tackling Russian corruption overseas. What exactly does the Economic Crime Bill do? What reforms are needed for British law enforcement to go after economic crime?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

subscribe to #BritainDebrief

listen to #britaindebrief as a podcast

MEET THE #BRITAINDEBRIEF HOST

Fellow

Ben Judah

Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business European Union

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BritainDebrief – How can Britain fix its corruption problem? A Debrief from Margaret Hodge MP appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Qaddour quoted Politics Today on Syria’s collaboration with Russia during Ukraine crisis

Atlantic Council — Sat, 19 Mar 2022 15:15:00 +0000

The post Qaddour quoted Politics Today on Syria’s collaboration with Russia during Ukraine crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Qaddour quoted in the Middle East Eye on humanitarian access obstacles for Syrian civilians

Atlantic Council — Thu, 17 Mar 2022 16:11:00 +0000

The post Qaddour quoted in the Middle East Eye on humanitarian access obstacles for Syrian civilians appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Qaddour quoted in Al-Monitor on Ukraine war’s effects on Syrian humanitarian aid access

Atlantic Council — Mon, 14 Mar 2022 17:41:00 +0000

The post Qaddour quoted in Al-Monitor on Ukraine war’s effects on Syrian humanitarian aid access appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nia quoted in Jerusalem Post on global campaign to save kidnapped Iranian dissidents

Atlantic Council — Tue, 08 Mar 2022 15:37:00 +0000

The post Nia quoted in Jerusalem Post on global campaign to save kidnapped Iranian dissidents appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Farrand in Democracy for the Arab World Now: Russia’s War in Ukraine Will Relieve the Pressure on Algeria’s Leaders—for Now

Atlantic Council — Fri, 04 Mar 2022 15:48:00 +0000

The post Farrand in Democracy for the Arab World Now: Russia’s War in Ukraine Will Relieve the Pressure on Algeria’s Leaders—for Now appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Khoury in the Arab Center Washington DC: Yemen: The Failure of International Diplomacy

Atlantic Council — Thu, 03 Mar 2022 20:48:00 +0000

The post Khoury in the Arab Center Washington DC: Yemen: The Failure of International Diplomacy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Melcangi quoted in International Policy Digest on Egypt’s relations with Libya and domestic policy challenges

Atlantic Council — Sat, 26 Feb 2022 22:25:00 +0000

The post Melcangi quoted in International Policy Digest on Egypt’s relations with Libya and domestic policy challenges appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Friedlander quoted in Miami Herald on Russian illicit finance

sbusch — Thu, 24 Feb 2022 23:41:00 +0000

The post Friedlander quoted in Miami Herald on Russian illicit finance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nia quoted in the Middle East Eye on accountability efforts for Syrian civil war and Iran’s contribution to war crimes

Atlantic Council — Thu, 17 Feb 2022 14:59:00 +0000

The post Nia quoted in the Middle East Eye on accountability efforts for Syrian civil war and Iran’s contribution to war crimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Asat joins PBS to discuss Uyghur human rights amidst China’s Beijing Olympics

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:51:00 +0000

The post Asat joins PBS to discuss Uyghur human rights amidst China’s Beijing Olympics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With Putin poised to invade, Zelenskyy must prioritize Ukrainian unity

Kira Rudik — Tue, 08 Feb 2022 23:06:58 +0000

For the past three months, Ukraine has been in the global spotlight amid mounting fears that Vladimir Putin is preparing to launch a dramatic escalation in his eight-year undeclared war against the country. Russia has encircled Ukraine to the north, east, and south with over 120,000 troops while demanding guarantees that the West block Kyiv’s NATO membership bid and effectively condemn the country to the geopolitical wilderness.

With Putin’s thinly-veiled threats raising the prospect of Europe’s largest conflict since WWII, the international community has responded by engaging the Kremlin in an intense diplomatic dialogue while providing Ukraine with urgent deliveries of defensive weapons. Meanwhile, journalists from around the world have flooded into Kyiv as Ukraine has become the leading international news story.

It would be reasonable to assume that Ukraine’s own domestic political agenda has also recently been dominated by the looming threat of a full-scale Russian invasion. However, this is not the case. Instead of mobilizing the country’s many different political forces to unite in confronting the Kremlin, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has spent much of the past few months pursuing divisive policies that risk weakening the country while strengthening his own grip on power.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

One area of concern is the failure to make meaningful progress in much-needed judicial reform. Despite multiple public commitments to advance this key reform, Zelenskyy has been unable to move the long-stalled process forward. The most recent setback came in early February with a third consecutive failed attempt to approve a new anti-corruption prosecutor despite the fact that all the requisite procedural steps were finalized months ago. Critics blame this lack of progress firmly on the Office of the President.

President Zelenskyy’s anti-oligarch law is another indication of a power consolidation that threatens to undermine political competition by granting the president-controlled National Security and Defense Council powers to determine exactly who is an oligarch. Aspects of the law relating to media ownership have grave implications for freedom of speech. Once its comes into force in May 2022, the legislation will potentially allow Zelenskyy to muzzle the Ukrainian media.

There are already alarming signs of unwelcome interference in the information sector. While efforts to combat Russian disinformation are broadly recognized both within Ukraine and by the international community as necessary, there have also been attempts to target individual journalists following criticism of Zelenskyy. Criminal cases against a number of TV channels have also raised eyebrows.

By far the most dangerous development in recent months has been the growing political tension between the current authorities and the country’s opposition forces. In January 2022, former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko was charged with treason in relation to the trade in coal from Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine during his time in office.

Poroshenko is Zelenskyy’s main political rival and is widely tipped to run against him in 2024. While specific details of the charges against Poroshenko have yet to be made public, the prosecution of a key competitor for the presidency has been widely condemned as politically motivated.

Other politicians have also been targeted by the authorities. The State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) recently questioned members of the parliamentary grouping tied to former parliamentary speaker and Zelenskyy critic Dmytro Razumkov. Following criticism of Zelenskyy by Holos party, I was recently summoned for questioning by the SBI over party-related activities dating back to 2020.

Eurasia Center events

Global Sanctions Dashboard

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The timing of these developments is particularly concerning. Why would the president of a nation under siege from a military superpower turn on his domestic opponents? Whatever the motivations behind President Zelenskyy’s policies, his recent actions undermine national security at what is a critical moment for Ukraine.

By taking steps that bring his commitment to Ukraine’s democratic development into question, Zelenskyy also risks weakening the international community’s resolve to support the country against Russian aggression. Ukraine’s international partners have always maintained that their continued backing reflects support for the historic democratic transformation underway in the country. In this moment of acute danger, it is more crucial than ever to demonstrate the credibility of Ukraine’s democratic credentials.

I believe now is the time for all political forces in Ukraine to unite against the threat of a full-scale Russian invasion. We must put aside political squabbles and personal rivalries while we face the challenge presented by Putin and his ultimatums. The national interest must come before any individual agendas.

Unless we are united, Ukraine will not be strong enough to defend itself. Every Ukrainian politician must ask themselves two key questions before making any decisions: Will this unite or divide Ukrainian society? Will this strengthen or weaken the country?

Ukraine has made historic nation-building progress in recent years, but this journey is far from over. Russia is clearly determined to reverse Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic choice and is seeking to intimidate the international community with the threat of a major European war.

For Ukraine and the wider democratic world, the stakes in the current confrontation could hardly be higher. With the country’s survival as an independent state under threat, Ukraine urgently needs national unity.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Holos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Julia Friedlander, Michael Albanese, Maia Nikoladze and Castellum.AI — Sun, 06 Feb 2022 17:00:00 +0000

In our previous edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we discussed the growing anti-kleptocracy movement in the United States and dug into designations across Africa. For this month’s Groundhog Edition—as Russia keeps us all in suspense in and around Ukraine—we will review current sanctions against Russia and the potential consequences the Kremlin may face should it decide to invade (again). We will also look at Iran’s sanctions (yes, Iran sanctions too) ahead of negotiations in Vienna. In this little world, it does feel like history is repeating itself, so it’s fitting that the little guy saw his shadow last week.

Last year, in one map

Looking at this visual summary from last year, something should stand out to you, notably delistings in parts of the world we haven’t discussed in a while. OFAC’s largest sanctions program, Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficking Kingpin (otherwise known as ‘SDNTK’), undergoes periodic batches of large designations and delistings. Last year, OFAC delisted 494 Colombian designees, primarily from its SDNTK list. The largest batch followed the State Department’s November 2021 announcement revoking the terrorism designation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Some FARC designees were relisted under OFAC’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list for continued engagement in terrorist activities. In case you missed it, the FARC ceased to be a military organization in 2017.

Throughout the course of last year, the United Nations began delistings for Resolution 1518, which in 2003 authorized sanctions targeting the assets of Saddam Hussein. These delistings were made in several tranches, totaling 60 targets. If you take away one lesson here from all of this, it’s that once you’re designated for terrorism, it’s very hard to prove a negative.

Old is new in the New Year

In January, OFAC designated seven individuals and one entity responsible for advancing North Korea’s ballistic missile programs, notably the DPRK’s testing of six missiles since September 2021. More listings are likely to come as North Korea continues its program in violation of multiple UN resolutions. DPRK is a dead heat with Syria as the most sanctioned jurisdiction in the world, but with backing from China and Russia, respectively, neither shows any prospect of changing course.

Onto the Balkans. In early January, OFAC re-sanctioned Milorad Dodik and his media company, Alternativna Televizija, for corruption and efforts to undermine the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina under an updated Balkans executive order. Milorad Dodik is the Serb member of the three-person presidential body governing Bosnia, and has been sanctioned by OFAC since 2017 for his efforts to destabilize the country. Dodik continues to bellow nationalist rhetoric to gain support for secession while handinvg out government contracts to close associates throughout the Republika Srpska.

Moscow’s gambling dice

Russia has been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States for its occupation of Ukrainian territory since 2014. The concept was new then–sanctioning a major global economy, and using novel instruments such as limiting the maturity of debt and equity. Things are different now. As the Putin-decoding continues, Western policymakers are debating actions that were off the table eight years ago. Instead of “altering the calculus” of the Russian inner circle, the US and its partners vow to punish the broader Russian economy, spurring capital flight and weakening the ruble.

Options include sanctions on oligarchs, oil and gas, mining sector, and major Russian banks (including Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, The Russian Direct Investment Fund). The administration may even invoke the Foreign Direct Product Rule to restrict exports of technical components that are key to Russia’s conventional weapons systems (such as the Elbrus-8CB microprocessor chip), a measure that could have major consequences for governments and firms (remember Huawei?). A signature measure would be to halt the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Biden has even signaled his willingness to sanction Putin himself. UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss stated that her government would unveil legislation that would allow Britain to sanction “oligarchs close to the Kremlin,” expanding authorities tied to Russia’s actions on the ground.

Congress too is back in the game. The Defending Ukraine Sovereignty Act of 2022 would enact a slew of mandatory and discretionary measures, including prohibiting transactions on primary and secondary Russian sovereign debt. The draft bill also calls for public disclosure of Putin’s assets and financial practices—an acknowledgement that illicit finance bears direct national security implications for the United States.

Among all of these conversations, if the Russians downplay the threat of sanctions by saying they’ve seen a lot of this before, they’re stating a fact. Spend some time with this graphic where we have compiled sanctions on Russia from around the world. Yes, even Indonesia has Russia sanctions. From terrorism, to cyberattacks, chemical weapons, human rights violations, and supporting the Asad regime, Maduro and Belarus’ Lukashenko, countries have found a way to express their displeasure with the Kremlin. To us, the data gives some credence to Russia’s perception of sanctions inflation.

Back in Moscow, sanctions continue to mean something different than Western countries think they mean. Russia’s main sanctioning authority—Rosfinmonitoring—designated Alexei Navalny under its ‘Terrorists and Extremists’ list, along with five of his closest aides. One week earlier, Navalny aides Leonid Volkov and Ivan Zhdanov were added to the same list as part of the Kremlin’s attack on those it fears. This is a far cry from the legal basis for Western sanctions. We say rule of law, they say “rule of law”. Our takeaway? Perceptions and misperceptions by Russia, shown here through data, will determine the Biden administration’s success in using sanctions as the cornerstone of its deterrence policy.

Iran’s balancing act

As nuclear talks in Vienna enter their final stage, negotiators are holding out hopes of reviving the 2015 agreement with both Iran and the United States as signatories. Any deal acceptable to Tehran would provide sanctions relief and open up international markets, and the US has begun to reinstate certain waiver provisions. But while much of the attention has been focused on multilateral sanctions against Iran, almost no attention goes to Iran’s own use of sanctions, now part of our database. On the two-year anniversary of the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, Tehran sanctioned 51 Americans it suspects were involved. After the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure campaign” failed to bring Iran back to negotiations, Tehran’s political leadership has offered a face-saving response to Soleimani’s assassination, decrying the US military and Trump’s team, while agreeing to negotiate once again with America’s new leadership.

On the radar

Last week, the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference concluded its 18-month long inquiry into how the European Union can protect itself against foreign interference, with a main focus on Russia and China. One of the chief findings of the report was that the EU should consider sanctions. The United States has sanctioned various targets for spreading disinformation under Executive Order 13848, which was created to counter election interference efforts, but does not have a statutory application to general disinformation operations. Good luck to the European Parliament defining sanctionable disinformation.

Last but certainly not least: Chinese military sanctions. The US Treasury continues to add Chinese entities to its non-SDN list of companies linked to China’s military-industrial complex, which forbids named firms from listing in US stock markets. The use of this authority is likely to expand and become increasingly complicated as the debate heats up around the role US investment plays in the advancement of Chinese technology. Both Congress and the Executive Branch are tabling options to restrict US outbound investment in sensitive sectors, including through capital markets. Navigating this issue promises a complicated intersection of law, financial regulation, and national security prerogative.

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

Explore Here

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

The post Global Sanctions Dashboard: Groundhog edition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Can Honduras’ new leader spark hope for the troubled Northern Triangle?

dpeleschuk — Wed, 26 Jan 2022 17:47:45 +0000

Hobbled by widespread corruption and a pervasive drug trade that fuels a seemingly endless cycle of violence, Honduras will swear in its first female head of state on Thursday.

But President-elect Xiomara Castro, who has pledged to clean up her country, won’t be the only powerful woman drawing attention that day: She’ll take office as US Vice President Kamala Harris—the White House point person for the Northern Triangle—looks on.

Both face the daunting challenge of helping to reverse the root causes of outward migration from the region of around thirty-three million people. Jason Marczak, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, weighs in on how they plan to tackle that task—and whether they’ll succeed.

How did Castro pledge to reform Honduras, and what expectations does she face?

Castro enters office following a campaign in which improving transparency and combating corruption were her top priorities. She has already committed to reaching out to the United Nations for help setting up an anti-corruption commission. Success here is fundamental to the country’s future, since Honduras ranks among the world’s most corrupt countries—on par with Iraq and Zimbabwe—according to Transparency International. Corruption is pervasive across government, with pandemic procurement offering further opportunities for crooked officials. The outgoing president, Juan Orlando Hernández, even faces possible extradition to the United States for drug trafficking. Hopes are high that she will make inroads, but a political feud in congress may present roadblocks for her agenda.

What role has Honduras played in contributing to broader regional instability—and how much will Castro feel pressured to reverse those dynamics?

The greatest threat to stability in Central America is currently in Nicaragua, just south of Honduras. There, President Daniel Ortega—who fraudulently assumed another term in office this month—is systematically dismantling democratic freedoms and civil liberties. Nicaraguans are fleeing, partly through Honduras, in hope of reaching the United States. US action beyond individual sanctions is needed to quell the crisis there and to provide additional financial and technical assistance to help ease the migration pressures on both Honduras and Costa Rica (which is south of Nicaragua). But providing economic opportunity and greater security in Honduras will also directly alleviate pressure at the US southern border: Last year, more Hondurans arrived there than from any of the three northern Central America countries. Honduras is also a stop along the migrant journey for many Haitians, Cubans, and others.

Harris has been designated as Biden’s point person in the region. How can she leverage that role to help tackle the root causes of migration?

This has been a priority for the Biden-Harris administration from the outset—but it’s not a short-term fix. The problems are entrenched in societies like Honduras. But US partnership has the potential to put willing countries on the right track: Harris is using her role to lead a US government-wide strategy to address economic insecurity, corruption, and criminal violence, as well as to advance efforts to improve human rights and gender-based violence. For example, her Call to Action for private-sector investment in the region, announced last May, has yielded $1.2 billion in commitments. What Harris now needs is more willing partners in the region; Castro has the opportunity to be one.

To what extent can any single country (whether Honduras or others) lead the charge in addressing the collective ills of the Northern Triangle?

The challenges of northern Central America cannot be resolved by any one country. Each country has its own history and set of challenges—as well as an opportunity to address them. But while domestic political circumstances require a country-by-country approach, the region does share overarching challenges that require sustained, committed US support and partnership. Seismic political differences in the region mean that leaders rarely come together to talk; investment is also more attractive from a regional vantage point. In the past, the United States has found opportunities to cajole Central American countries to find common ground when otherwise not possible. But that will be an uphill battle: Besides dealing with stubborn autocrats such as El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, Washington must also contend with an increasingly assertive China in Central America.

The post Can Honduras’ new leader spark hope for the troubled Northern Triangle? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s threatened invasion is already hitting the Ukrainian economy hard

Anders Åslund — Tue, 25 Jan 2022 01:41:45 +0000

While the world waits to see if Vladimir Putin will proceed with his threatened invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s menacing military posture is already hitting the Ukrainian economy hard.

As fears over the Russian troop build-up on the Ukrainian border mounted on January 14, yields on Ukrainian sovereign Eurobonds in US dollars suddenly shot up to 11-14 percent. They have since risen even higher. As a consequence, Ukraine has effectively lost access to the international financial market.

This sudden financial shock might appear surprising given the relatively solid status of the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine has accumulated international currency reserves of USD 31 billion, more than it has had at any time since 2011. In 2015, Ukraine’s reserves reached a low of just USD 5 billion.

Thanks to high food and iron ore prices, Ukraine’s hryvnia currency actually appreciated last year. The government has maintained a limited budget deficit, even smaller than the International Monetary Fund permitted, and public debt is moderate at 51 percent of GDP.

The main concern is high inflation at 10.2 percent, but the National Bank of Ukraine has wisely hiked its interest rate to 10 percent in response to this challenge. Ukraine also received a new IMF tranche in late November 2021.

Ukraine’s emerging economic problems are entirely due to the shadow cast by the threat of a dramatic escalation in Russian military aggression.

The hryvnia exchange rate has fallen by a few percentage points in recent weeks. International investors now consider Ukraine an excessive risk and are not prepared to lend money to the Ukrainian government or Ukrainian companies at any price. This places severe restrictions on Ukraine’s economy and is likely to cause economic growth to fall below the already rather modest IMF forecast of 3.6 percent in 2022.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

While Russia is the cause of Ukraine’s economic pain, it is currently suffering fewer negative consequences than Ukraine because its economy is far bigger and its reserves are twenty times larger. The Russian ruble has fallen by about as much as the hryvnia, but Russian bond yields are much lower than Ukraine’s in spite of halfhearted Western sanctions.

So far, the Russian stock market has taken the biggest hit, falling by 27 percent in US dollars since the end of October. However, the impact of the tumbling RTS stock index should not be overestimated. At the time of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and subsequent months, the RTS index slumped by no less than 80 percent, but Putin appeared unconcerned.

Needless to say, the economic damage will be far greater for both countries if full-scale warfare begins in the weeks ahead.

Ukraine has lost access to international finance before. The last time this happened was in 2011. Viktor Yanukovych had become president the previous year with ample reserves at his disposal but things do not go according to plan.

Yanukovych thought he could manage without IMF support, but bond yields rose above 10 percent and nobody dared to lend him any more money. Desperately, he opted for Russian financing in December 2013, but this did not save him, nor did it open up the international market.

It took several years for the subsequent Ukrainian government led by PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk to convince the world to provide Ukraine with new funding. This time frame was quite typical. After the financial market closes, it usually stays closed for a few years. With this in mind, the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian companies should abandon hopes for bond issues until the markets have reopened. This will require major efforts on Ukraine’s part.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The Ukrainian government now needs to adopt an anti-crisis program. Existing monetary policy is already reasonably strict and the fiscal deficit is small, though it might have to be trimmed.

The authorities need to undertake long-delayed structural reforms. Priority tasks should be to reform the judiciary, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and the prosecutor general’s office in order to put an end to blatant corporate raiding by these institutions.

Secondly, the Office of the President needs to restore some stability to the ministries and endow the cabinet of ministers with the same powers over economic policy enjoyed prior to the Zelenskyy presidency.

Third, the government must put prices and payments in the energy sector into order, since its malfunctioning in the energy sector has scared away foreign investors. Finally, the government should restore and strengthen corporate governance at Ukraine’s big state-owned enterprises to improve efficiency and avert corruption.

All these measures should be tied to international support programs. Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili carried out a highly successful anti-crisis program in Georgia after Russia’s 2008 invasion. Ukraine can follow the same script.

Even with the right reforms, Ukraine will struggle without access to international finance. When private financing dries up, international financial institutions and governments need to come to the rescue.

As soon as the situation with Russia has become clearer, Ukraine should call on the IMF, the World Bank, the United States, the European Union, the EBRD, European investment banks, and bilateral donors to provide emergency financing to Ukraine. Such financing is typically coordinated by the World Bank through a donor meeting in Paris. It is too early to say how much funding Ukraine will need, but it will presumably require many billions of dollars.

The severity of Ukraine’s financial conundrum must not be understated, but with support from its Western partners, the Ukrainian government can resolve its problems as in 2014-15 through austerity, reforms, and international financial support.

Anders Åslund is a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum.

Alexander Motyl — Sun, 16 Jan 2022 14:40:23 +0000

Over seventy German academics and foreign policy experts published an open letter on January 14 demanding that Germany’s Russia policy be fundamentally changed from tacit encouragement to open resistance of Vladimir Putin’s expansionist designs.

Many German intellectuals have consistently criticized Berlin for its willingness to pursue normal relations with an increasingly authoritarian Russian regime that wholeheartedly rejects the values and behaviors Germany and its European allies claim are at the heart of the European project. This new statement is different: not only does it offer a sustained critique and insist on radical change; it has also been signed by some of Germany’s and Austria’s leading East Europeanists.

The letter begins with a damning overview of the Putin regime’s domestic brutalities and acts of foreign aggression. The authors then proceed to skewer Germany’s tolerance of Russian misbehavior. “As the largest European economic power, Germany has viewed these goings-on for more than three decades critically, but mostly passively.”

Germany’s reaction to Russia’s “many revanchist adventures” hasn’t been “appropriate,” the open letter notes. Indeed, the experts say, Berlin’s policies have actually contributed to weakening East European non-nuclear states and to strengthening an “increasingly expansionist atomic superpower.”

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The authors of the open letter provide a number of specific examples. For instance, they claim that the Nord Stream I pipeline “prepared the way for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” in 2014. That attack was the “logical consequence” of Germany’s 20 years of “policy passivity with respect to Russian neo-imperialism.” As a result, argue the signatories, Germany needs to abandon its “East European special path” or “Sonderweg,” a loaded term linked to past German experience of imperialism and authoritarianism.

The authors of the letter clearly state that Nazi Germany’s WWII-era crimes in Russia do not justify Berlin’s reluctance to respond to the Putin regime’s “revanchism” and “nihilism” with respect to international law. This is all the more true as a fresh Russian invasion of Ukraine would target a nation that also suffered catastrophically as a victim of Hitler’s Germany.

“The Federal Republic’s Russia policy must be corrected fundamentally,” conclude the experts. Continued inaction will only induce Russia to engage in “further escapades.” As a “key land” in the EU, NATO, and Western community of values, Germany must close the “gap between its public rhetoric and real practice” by adopting a variety of “parallel and concrete political, legal, diplomatic, and civil society-oriented technical and economic measures.”

In sum, the letter stresses that Germany needs to do much more with respect to “containing and sanctioning Russia” as well as “supporting those states that have been dismembered and oppressed by Moscow.”

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

This is sensible and welcome language, though the absence concrete policy suggestions is unfortunate, even if understandable in an open letter. Meanwhile, the purposeful non-inclusion of military measures is striking, though also not surprising.

Will Berlin heed their call? It should. The experts who put their names to this open appeal are absolutely right to suggest that Germany has no right to promote Russian aggression and imperialism, especially in countries, such as Ukraine, that were devastated by German aggression during the Second World War.

And yet, Germany’s political and business elites appear oblivious to this obvious point. Gerhard Schroeder surely knew that he was acting hypocritically, if not criminally, in agreeing to work for Gazprom. Angela Merkel, too, cannot plead ignorance of the nature of Putin’s regime. Needless to say, German business wholeheartedly supports the Nord Stream II pipeline project.

Why this apparent blindness to Russian imperialism? For starters, there’s Germany’s long history of friendship with Russian autocrats. Otto von Bismarck pursued close political and cultural relations with imperial Russia. Weimar Germany signed the treaty of Rapallo with the Bolsheviks in 1922.

Notoriously, Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression pact with Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1939, paving the way for the joint invasion of Poland and the outbreak of WWII.

In more recent years, German political parties have continued this tradition. Both the Socialists and Christian Democrats have tolerated and encouraged Putin’s adventurism, revanchism, and neo-imperialism. The Socialists have done so because their commitment to peace blinds them to the threat of war, while the Christian Democrats have been guided by their close ties to German business.

Not everyone in Germany agrees with this approach to Russia. The recently published open letter demonstrates, yet again, that a large portion of Germany’s intellectual leaders have abandoned the immoral opportunism of the country’s political and economic elites. Their appeal will not put a stop to the Kremlin’s neo-imperialism, and it may not immediately convince Berlin to act, but it certainly highlights the need for a major debate within German society over the country’s controversial approach to Putin’s Russia.

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

From the outright criminality of Luca Volontè, a former Italian deputy and member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, who was sentenced last January to four years in jail for taking bribes from Azerbaijani officials, to the large-scale laundering of Russian and other kleptocratic cash in the City of London, something has gone deeply wrong in Europe’s economic defenses.

These are not isolated cases, but products of a strategy by kleptocratic regimes in Russia and beyond to peel off well-connected European elites, businesses, and entire sectors into their service. Instead of serving their countries, European elites with extensive networks are now serving interests that fuel authoritarian forces seeking to undermine the West. The scale of this kleptocratic entanglement is vast: Shortly before Kazakhstan’s leadership issued a shoot-to-kill order against protesters, Chatham House identified more than $720 million in property purchased by the country’s elite in the United Kingdom.

We in Europe must recognize that the erosion of our economic integrity is undermining our resolve and our national security. This invasion of our elites needs to be seen for what it is: a threat to our interests and a betrayal of our values. Putin and his allies are seeking to not only paralyze and confuse our decision-making, but also discredit democratic politics by making its practitioners look just as cynical as those around the Kremlin.

In the United Kingdom, the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which I chair, will soon launch a new investigation into Russian and kleptocratic money laundering, building on our work in 2018. But a wider conversation needs to take place: Western allies should establish a common set of ethical standards for former politicians to stop this “Schroederization” by restricting them from working for the state companies of hostile authoritarian states and associated firms. Across Europe, we—Western elites—should be taken off the market for kleptocrats.

European governments need to go after structures in addition to individual behavior. Time and again, the weakness of our anti-money laundering efforts has been documented as a national-security threat—such as in the Danske Bank scandal, which revealed that members of Putin’s family and Russia’s Federal Security Service, as well as Azerbaijani elites, had used British companies to funnel cash into the Estonian branch of the Danish bank. What better message could we send to these authoritarians than to revive proposals for a Global Kleptocracy Initiative to provide teeth and structure to the fight against illicit finance?

During its Summit for Democracy in December, the Biden administration began a positive process of seeking to bring allies together on the issues of democracy protection and anti-corruption. Europe’s democracies need to demonstrate that they take this process just as seriously as the US government does. If we don’t defend democracy vigorously at home, our ability to defend it abroad will only grow weaker—with consequences none of us in the free world can afford.

Tom Tugendhat MP is the chairman of the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee.

The post Russia’s other European invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

From Kazakhstan to Belarus, aftershocks of Soviet collapse continue

Alesia Rudnik — Sun, 09 Jan 2022 11:51:35 +0000

The dramatic recent events in Kazakhstan caught the international community by surprise and left analysts grasping for context. Confronted by the spectacle of mass protests against an authoritarian post-Soviet regime followed by a Kremlin-backed hard line response, many commentators inevitably made comparisons between the Kazakhstan crisis and the 2020 pro-democracy uprising in Belarus.

There are good reasons for arguing that the Belarus and Kazakhstan scenarios are not as similar as they might initially appear. At the same time, events in both countries reflect broader geopolitical currents that were set in motion by the collapse of the USSR three decades ago.

Among the first people to note the similarities between the drama in Kazakhstan and the Belarus protest movement were the Belarusians themselves. Footage from Kazakhstan sparked a lively debate within Belarusian circles, with some taking inspiration from the eruption of nationwide protests in the Central Asian country and reflecting on what lessons could be learned from Kazakhstan.

It remains far too early to draw any definitive conclusions regarding events in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, with a Russian-led military intervention currently underway, the crisis has now taken on an overtly international dimension that will further complicate any consequences. However, even at this early stage, it is possible to identity differences that make direct comparisons between Kazakhstan and Belarus problematic.

Whereas public anger in Kazakhstan erupted suddenly in early January, the protest movement in Belarus gathered momentum relatively slowly in the run-up to the country’s August 2020 presidential election. During the months prior to the vote, evidence of public opposition began to mount as the Belarusian authorities jailed leading independent candidates and forced others into exile. Much of the early opposition in Belarus took the form of digital activism and flash mobs, stopping short of the traditional threshold for anti-regime agitation. This made it possible for the protest mood to take root.

The immediate cause of the protests in Kazakhstan was economic, with high energy prices sparking widespread public anger. In contrast, the Belarus protest movement was political from the beginning, with demands for free and fair elections reflecting a broader democratization agenda.

This difference is particularly significant. Traditionally, economically-triggered protest movements tend to be far more attractive to ordinary citizens than movements driven by exclusively political or human rights demands.

As a result, the protests in Kazakhstan appear to have attracted a different core demographic compared to Belarus. While members of the working classes seem to have been the driving force behind the initial wave of anti-regime rallies in Kazakhstan, the dominant groups during the early days in Belarus were often drawn from the middle classes and civil society.

The speed and ferocity of Kazakhstan’s protest movement caught everyone off-guard, including the country’s authorities. This was not the case in Belarus, where a gradual build-up of pressure prior to the August 2020 presidential election afforded the regime an opportunity to plan a strategic response to likely protest actions. This led to preventative measures against potential protest leaders and efforts to strengthen the security apparatus.

The initial response of the Kazakhstani authorities to nationwide protests also differed from the early reaction in Minsk. While the Kazakhstan leadership made significant concessions on energy prices and attempted to shift public anger towards particular politicians by dismissing the government, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka adopted an uncompromising approach that actively sought to polarize society into pro- and anti-regime camps.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Perhaps the most striking and controversial difference between the movements in Belarus and Kazakhstan is the approach to physical confrontation. The 2020 pro-democracy uprising in Belarus has been praised and criticized for its unwavering commitment to peaceful protest. Advocates have always maintained that this stance was essential in order to secure domestic and international support, while critics have argued that the refusal to occupy buildings or fight back against heavy-handed police tactics was unrealistic when faced by the grim realities of a ruthless dictatorship.

There is considerable debate over the origins of the violent clashes that rapidly came to characterize the protest movement in Kazakhstan, with widespread allegations of government provocateur involvement or political intrigues. However, it seems clear that a significant number of protesters were ready to confront law enforcement if necessary, and sought to establish a physical presence rather than simply expressing their displeasure and returning home.

This has reignited the debate among Belarusians over the wisdom of the country’s strictly nonviolent approach. Would the movement have had a better chance of success if a permanent protest camp had been established and government buildings occupied in Minsk? We will never know. What we can say is that the approaches adopted in Belarus and Kazakhstan and the specific circumstances leading up to the protests have relatively little in common.

Despite the many differences between the two protest movements, comparisons remain tempting. In both cases, we see an authoritarian post-Soviet ruler being propped up by the Kremlin while employing overwhelming force against populations who are seeking more human rights and a greater say in government. In this sense, events in Kazakhstan and Belarus are both part of the same unfinished Soviet collapse.

Thirty years since the USSR ceased to exist, the aftershocks of empire continue to shape the geopolitical landscape from Minsk to Almaty. Events in Kazakhstan are a reminder to Belarusians of their own thwarted democratic aspirations and a symbol of the hunger for change that bubbles just below the surface across much of the former Soviet Union.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University (Sweden) and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

The SAPO is tasked with leading investigations and acting as prosecutors in court. The head of SAPO has a crucial role to play in guaranteeing the political independence and impartiality of prosecutors. Without SAPO, Ukraine’s other anti-corruption institutions are unable to perform. In other words, unless an impartial candidate is appointed as SAPO head, the entire anti-corruption reform agenda risks being derailed.

The SAPO has been without an appointed leader since August 2020. Currently, it is under the control of Ukraine’s Prosecutor General, Iryna Venediktova, who is seen as being politically close to President Zelenskyy and his Servant of the People party. While Venediktova has been in charge, several important SAPO investigations into oligarchs and senior politicians have stalled.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Legislation governing the appointment of the SAPO head sets out a transparent selection procedure overseen by an independent selection panel. This panel consists of 11 experts, seven delegated by the Ukrainian parliament and four selected by the Council of Prosecutors.

Civil society observers have been critical of the panel members appointed by parliament, who are seen as politically controlled by the Office of the President. They stand accused of attempting to manipulate the work of the selection panel in order to secure the appointment of their preferred candidate as the new SAPO head.

The selection process has been subject to all manner of delays. In normal circumstances, it should have taken between two and three months to complete, whereas it has now dragged on for 15 months. This has led to widespread accusations of deliberate stalling tactics and sabotage.

One of the latest blows to the process came on December 20, when the Kyiv District Administrative Court, which is notorious for involvement in allegedly corrupt and politically motivated rulings, voided the entire work of the SAPO Selection Commission. This decision has not yet entered into force, but if it is supported by the appellate court, the selection process will have to begin again from scratch.

At the moment, it would appear that the process has already reached a dead end. Most observers expect to see endless further delays orchestrated by members of the selection panel or a relaunch that will be designed to reflect President Zelenskyy’s political interests.

Eurasia Center events

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The current SAPO situation causes considerable damage to Ukraine’s fight against corruption and has sparked alarm within civil society as well as among the country’s international partners.

The G7 Ambassadors Support Group issued a harsh statement criticizing efforts to block the appointment of a new SAPO head and reminding the Ukrainian leadership of their declared commitment to back anti-corruption reforms and appoint a chief anti-corruption prosecutor.

With the threat of a full-scale Russian invasion currently hanging over Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities could not have chosen a worse moment to lose the confidence of the international community. However, there is still hope that President Zelenskyy will recognize the strategic importance of the SAPO issue and move to unblock the appointment process.

Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts are central to the national transformation that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers are currently defending with their lives. At a time when Ukraine is calling on the West to stand with the country against Russian aggression, it is vital to demonstrate that Ukraine’s own leaders remains committed to creating a fairer and more accountable society.

Tetiana Shevchuk is legal counsel at AntAC.

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

subscribe to #BritainDebrief

listen to #britaindebrief as a podcast

MEET THE #BRITAINDEBRIEF HOST

Fellow

Ben Judah

Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business European Union

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BritainDebrief – Is corruption threatening Britain? A debrief from Helena Wood appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Global Sanctions Dashboard: Holiday edition

Julia Friedlander, Michael Albanese, Maia Nikoladze and Castellum.AI — Thu, 16 Dec 2021 15:55:24 +0000

In our previous edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we covered the US Treasury Department’s targeting of criminal cryptocurrency exchanges and what the Pandora Papers say about the efficacy of sanctions. For this month’s ‘holiday edition,’ we zoom in on coordinated actions against Belarus, global human rights abusers, and examine targets in Africa across multiple regimes. But our story would not be complete without the greatest gift of all—anti-kleptocracy reform.

Last week, the White House unveiled the first-ever United States Strategy on Countering Corruption, which outlines a plan to curb abuse of US jurisdiction for illicit financial purposes. The announcement from the White House came just days before the Summit for Democracy on December 9th, giving political legs to overdue regulatory reform, such as tightening reporting requirements for the real estate sector, a notorious loophole to stash ill-gotten cash or to launder criminal proceeds. Real estate reporting requirements dovetails with ongoing efforts to implement the beneficial ownership legislation that came out of the 2021 defense authorization.

Preventative measures go hand in hand with sanctions enforcement. US authorities have had little ability to track whether sanctioned actors move money within the US despite best efforts by commercial banks. This is a question of government priorities. In focusing on punitive measures versus prevention, the US has effectively operated as if the hard work is issuing the sanction itself when in reality, that is the easy part. Implementation and compliance are actually where the success of any policy hangs in the balance, as well as the ability and willingness of the private sector to cooperate.

Democracy Summit

The Summit pledged a hefty $424 million in anti-corruption assistance last week, while Treasury rolled out a series of high-profile designations against nationals from Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. On the same day, the State Department—pursuant to its Section 7031(c) visa restriction authority—designated nine individuals over similar corruption charges. Amongst State’s designees were Isabel dos Santos, daughter of former Angolan dictator José Eduardo dos Santos and formerly the richest woman in Africa, and Oleksandr Tupytskyi, the former Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

In recognition of the annual global Human Rights Day, OFAC designated fifteen individuals and ten entities from Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia over their involvement in widespread human rights abuses. Notably, these designations included two officials linked to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau—the entity responsible for facilitating the ongoing genocide in China’s westernmost province. OFAC released Global Magnitsky sanctions every single day last week, underscoring that financial corruption erodes the validity of democratic governance and civil society.

Focus Africa

As the crisis in Tigray worsened in September, President Biden issued Executive Order 14046, authorizing sanctions on those responsible for the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Last month, OFAC sanctioned four entities and two individuals for undermining the stability and integrity of the Ethiopian state, including the Eritrean Defense Force and Eritrea’s ruling political party—the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, criticized EU member states for not following suit. But the EU did introduce a new Mali sanctioning authority as French troops withdrew from the region after eight years, implicitly replacing military involvement with the spectre of financial remediation.

The EU has also sanctioned eight individuals and three entities linked to the Russian private military contractor, Wagner Group (including a sanction against the group itself). The organization, led by Vladimir Putin’s close associate Yevgeny Prigozhin, recently expanded its operations to conflict zones in Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and the Central African Republic. According to EU officials, three of the Wagner mercenaries sanctioned were designated for their activities in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions were welcomed by Washington, where Wagner and its affiliated individuals have been sanctioned since 2017. But it was the Group’s expansion into Africa that in the end triggered the EU designation.

Sanctions on African state or semi-state actors can be very impactful because many countries maintain limited access to Western financing, particularly through correspondent banking relationships. Sanctions by the US and Europe can sever financial systems overnight, but they also risk exacerbating humanitarian crises and incentivize banks to de-risk from countries or entire regions because they see greater liability than profit. Our projection map shows a complicated web of sanctions by a wide array of global actors.

Belarus

After flying in over 8,000 migrants in an effort to force them into the Schengen area through Poland, the US, EU, and UK took coordinated action against those responsible in Minsk. In a remarkably quick response, the EU also agreed to impose sanctions on Belavia, the airline primarily responsible for flying the migrants in from the Middle East. OFAC joined its European partners with sanctions against 20 individuals, 12 entities, and three aircraft. After over a decade of Western sanctions and pause in IMF assistance, the US has relatively little leverage over Belarus and must decide carefully when to pull the levers it does have. US prohibitions on debt and equity in secondary markets and on the potash sector shows that a fabricated migration crisis was reason enough.

More crypto sanctions…

In coordination with both Latvian and Estonian authorities, Treasury designated another virtual currency exchange. The designation against the Latvia-based Chatex follows an inaugural round against Russia-based Suex. According to Treasury, the two exchanges have direct ties with each other, and Chatex has been “using Suex’s function as a nested exchange to conduct transactions.” Both exchanges have been used to launder the proceeds of ransomware by cyber criminals.

These actions are part of the Biden administration’s broader efforts to counter a number of recent ransomware attacks. As part of this package, OFAC also designated Ukrainian national Yaroslav Vasinskyi and Russian national Yevgeniy Polyanin, both of whom perpetuated recent ransomware attacks carried out by REvil—the group responsible for the attack against the IT firm Kaseya Limited in July of this year. These actions are further examples of sanctions used as tools of law enforcement.

On the radar

As fears swell regarding a second possible incursion by Russian military forces in Ukraine, the United States and its partners are finalizing a slate of punitive measures they hope will deter the Kremlin from following through. Much analysis has been written over the past weeks that many of our readers are surely following. The most impactful is likely to be potential restrictions on Russian debt on the secondary market, which would inhibit the ability to clear dollar-denominated transactions. As touched upon previously in our Dashboard, sanctions against Russian oligarchs are also an untapped resource given their ties to Russian state assets. The US and EU partners are projecting a more decisive response now than in 2014– but escalation options are tricky to work out if the Kremlin doesn’t choose war, but something in between. And none of these options come without repercussions. Western investors see a downside risk now that they have re-entered Russian markets. As the US ramped up pressure on Iran, Venezuela and China over the past five years, investors came to view Russia as a relatively stable emerging market. In fact, US markets may be even more exposed to financial market restrictions than they were before little green men touched the Donbas the first time.

Global Sanctions Dashboard

Explore Here

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

The post Global Sanctions Dashboard: Holiday edition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Learning the lessons from Ukraine’s post-Maidan reform experience

Anton Yashchenko — Wed, 15 Dec 2021 20:36:57 +0000

Ukraine marked three decades of independence this year, but the country’s efforts to undertake genuine reforms only really began following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity.

In 2017, Ukraine established the Reforms Delivery Office (RDO) to help the government in the planning, implementation, and communication of reforms. The RDO remains at the heart of Ukraine’s reforms architecture, which is backed by the European Union and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development with funding from 13 partner countries led by the EU.

Based on the experience of working with three different Ukrainian governments over the past five years, the RDO team has identified ten key insights that can help the country move closer to realizing the dream of transformation that brought millions of Ukrainians onto Maidan during the historic winter of 2013-14.

1. Successful change requires the right foundations. Reforms do not just happen. In order to make meaningful progress, you must begin by assembling the right people. In Ukraine’s case, the foundation of all successful reform initiatives has been public administration reform. Thanks to RDO support, more than 1,000 professionals from the business and civil society sectors have joined Ukraine’s civil service via a modern, transparent, and merit-based recruitment process involving a single web portal of civil service vacancies.

2. Star names do not necessarily make for a star team. Achieving real change is a marathon that requires constant adjustments, close focus on strategic objectives, and solid teamwork. In this respect, it is often more important to have strong values and motivation than a high public profile. Stand-alone reform stars may be initially attractive candidates but they are also prone to running out of steam and becoming frustrated with mundane, day-to-day challenges.

3. There is no one-size-fits-all recipe for success. Every time you approach new reforms, you must be prepared to identify new solutions. In one context, you may need an advanced IT tool, as was the case with e-services or online submissions for civil service job applications. Other tasks require the right legislation. This was true in the case of land reform, for example.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

4. Nationwide changes require nationwide dialogue. A decision adopted by a narrow circle of senior government officials in Kyiv is a sure path to fierce resistance and ultimate meltdown. It is essential to reach out to those who implement reforms throughout government while also engaging members of the wider public. Without such outreach, Ukraine’s decentralization reform would not have become one of the most successful initiatives of the post-Maidan period.

5. In most cases, success depends on difficult compromises. If you seek to achieve change in real life and not just on paper, you must be prepared to identify all stakeholders, enter into dialogue, and work together towards a shared goal. The ability to find a common denominator for all stakeholders is often the key to meaningful change.

6. Delays can kill off reform momentum. When something does not work, time should not be wasted on perfunctory solutions. Instead, you must look for the root cause of the problem and pour resources into addressing it. Unquestionable transparency of processes, sticking to what has been agreed, compliance with procedures, and collaboration with external experts can all help reboot the faulty mechanism and restore confidence as soon as possible.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

7. Plans are nothing, planning is everything. The principles of reform tell us that we should plan, monitor implementation, draw conclusions, adjust course, and move forward rapidly. Monitoring is all about manageability, transparency, fact-based decision-making, and the successful achievement of goals.

8. Use simple language to express complicated ideas. People should understand what you are doing and, more importantly, why you are doing it, as well as what it could potentially mean for them. This will allow you to actively involve members of the public in the reform process.

9. Reforms do not deliver quick fixes. The impact of major reforms is often not immediately tangible. Sometimes it can take years before people will see any effect. In order to succeed in what is a long-term effort, reformers must embrace effective communication, political dialogue, and an ongoing search for consensus.

10. International cooperation can enhance reforms. Some of Ukraine’s most effective reforms have been implemented with support from the country’s international partners. The most effective cooperation usually involves a combination of expert, financial, and political support from partner countries. Productive cooperation can help to reduce the vulnerability of the reform process and achieve sustainable change.

Anton Yashchenko is Executive Director of the Ukrainian Prime Minister’s Reforms Delivery Office.

Ben Judah — Thu, 09 Dec 2021 13:26:48 +0000

Summitry has not been the forte of the Biden administration. European diplomats have commented privately to me that the United States did insufficient prep work before both the Group of Seven (G7) in June and the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) last month, and it clearly was not on top of its own political machinery to come up with the kinds of solutions that can make a difference.

That’s why it would be tempting to dismiss this week’s Summit for Democracy—which has been relegated due to COVID-19 from a flagship gathering of world leaders to a virtual conference with few expected deliverables. But that would be wrong: The event offers a critical new approach to fighting corruption by focusing on democracy protection, rather than democracy promotion, taking the approach of fixing your own house first.

Fighting corruption is one of the three priorities of the summit (the other two being defending against authoritarianism and promoting respect for human rights). This time, the United States is bringing a genuine policy document to the table: The United States Strategy on Countering Corruption, published this week, is the administration’s most impressive strategy document to date, as it focuses particularly on multilateralism and reforming existing US anti-money-laundering regulations. It was widely praised by the anti-corruption community in Washington: Paul Massaro, a senior policy advisor for Congress’ bipartisan Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (aka the Helsinki Committee), summed up the mood when he tweeted that the strategy is “exactly what we’ve been waiting for.” The United States is not coming empty-handed to the Summit for Democracy.

The document places a special emphasis on multilateralism. The United States Treasury has promised to work internationally against tax evasion and to make the US and global systems of taxation more equitable. It has also acknowledged that it must step up the fight against the proceeds of foreign government corruption being held at US financial institutions. Cooperation with existing multilateral organizations and the use of new programs as platforms for anti-corruption and countering kleptocracy are highlighted as well. This includes NATO’s Building Integrity Program and USAID’s new Global Accountability Program (GAP), the latter of which is meant to increase asset recovery from kleptocrats and will be presented in greater detail at the summit. Providing more backing to international legal standards against corruption, such as the United Nations’ Convention against Corruption, is also referenced several times.

Given the emphasis on allied coordination, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) should respond accordingly by matching the US commitment to fighting corruption. The level of buy-in is already considerable, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen chairing one of the panels at the summit, but EU and UK leaders should also commit to a range of steps. Those include:

The EU and UK should join forces with GAP and the US State Department-led Democracies Against Safe Havens initiative outlined in the report, which is designed to increase the effectiveness of sanctions against kleptocrats and other corrupt actors.
They should commit to producing their own strategies, updated to sync with the strategy the Biden administration has just published.
They should propose to match the US efforts in increasing scrutiny over historically less-regulated financial sectors such as real estate, private investment, and legal services, and passing similar legislation to tighten their regulatory regimes. They should coordinate efforts at the G7, Group of Twenty (G20), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other international forums.
The EU should propose that the United States, EU, and UK create a Transatlantic Anti-Corruption Council, modeled on the success of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, to coordinate their policies, regulations, and diplomatic initiatives in a more systematic manner on corruption.

There is, in fact, a grand strategy in this push for regulatory coordination. Faced with pressure from the growing global might of China and a world in which threats criss-cross the traditional divisions between “home” and “abroad,” the answers to foreign policy are now often found in domestic tools. The transatlantic alliance needs to evolve a new tissue where this kind of cross-cutting regulatory coordination takes place. Let a thousand councils bloom.

It’s worth remembering that the strengths and weaknesses of the democratic and authoritarian models expose themselves cyclically. Democracies, as is now the case in much of Western Europe, may face rapid turnover among their leaders, but autocracies can see their leadership sink into decrepitude, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping showing no signs of leaving the stage. Democracies may be dysfunctional, like the United States is now, but systemic corruption can paralyze and unsettle autocracies, like what happened in the build-up to the Arab Spring.

The Helsinki Accords, for instance, were scorned when they were first signed, since Western democracy seemed to be in decline following the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and the energy crises of the 1970s. Yet within a decade, the Helsinki Accords empowered anti-authoritarian sentiment throughout the Eastern Bloc, which paved the way for its eventual demise. If the work done at the Summit for Democracy can contribute to protecting democracy, it can be well-placed for the next challenges the authoritarian states will inevitably face.

Ben Judah is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Biden’s democracy summit should produce a transatlantic anti-corruption strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How anti-reform messages are replacing pro-Russian rhetoric on Ukrainian TV

Oleksandr Yermakov, Olena Halushka — Sat, 04 Dec 2021 16:38:51 +0000

With Russian aggression against Ukraine currently in its eighth year, openly pro-Kremlin positions have become toxic in the Ukrainian information space. Instead, those who wish to prevent Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration now tend to focus their attention on anti-Western narratives.

This trend has been gaining pace for the past few years and appears designed to undermine public faith in Ukraine’s reform agenda while fueling feelings of distrust and suspicion towards the wider democratic world.

In order to gain a better idea of how anti-Western messaging is being used in the Ukrainian media, the Anticorruption Action Centre (AntAC) monitored the 2021 summer season of political show “Hard with Vlashchenko” on Rinat Akhmetov’s Ukrayina 24 TV channel.

Hosted by journalist Natalia Vlashchenko, “Hard with Vlashchenko” has faced numerous accusations of promoting anti-reform and anti-Western narratives. During their analysis of the summer season, AntAC researchers found that messages of this nature were voiced at least once by either a guest or Vlashchenko in 30 of 40 episodes.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

For Ukrainian politicians and commentators looking to reverse the Kremlin’s declining influence in Ukraine, anti-Western messaging is a much smarter option than pro-Russian propaganda. It undermines Ukrainian trust in the country’s democratization and significantly weakens the advocacy potential of key international partners such as the EU, IMF, and G7 countries. Such narratives also implicitly promote a return to the Kremlin orbit.

According to AntAC analysis, many of the key themes featured in “Hard with Vlashchenko” during summer 2021 closely mirrored popular Kremlin narratives. The idea of Ukraine being governed externally featured in 11 episodes, while the alleged Western exploitation of Ukraine was discussed in six shows. There were also regular attacks on anti-corruption institutions, the National Bank of Ukraine, and the supervisory boards of state-owned enterprises, along with conspiracy theories revolving around the supposed role of financier George Soros.

The list of guests appearing on “Hard with Vlashchenko” pointed to an editorial bias, with many of those featured on the show during summer 2021 being best known to the Ukrainian public for their anti-Western positions. Yevheniy Murayev was one frequent guest. A former MP for the pro-Kremlin Party of Regions and Opposition Bloc and the current owner of Moscow-friendly Ukrainian TV channel Nash, Murayev used his appearances to attack Western involvement in Ukraine. Another most popular guest was Dmytro Spivak. Media watchdog Detector Media argues that his frequent appearances are hard to justify as he has no qualifications other than a reputation for promoting anti-reform narratives.

The summer 2021 run of “Hard with Vlashchenko” also featured examples of the favored Soviet-era propaganda technique known as “whataboutery,” meaning attempts to discredit an opponent’s position by charging hypocrisy without directly refuting or disproving the argument. In one show, host Vlashchenko noted the existence of corruption in the West and suggested that in fighting corruption “it would be nice if everyone minded their own business.”

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The criticisms of Ukraine’s relationship with the country’s Western partners that form the basis of today’s anti-Western narratives are easily refuted. For example, international experts have an important role to play in areas such as the selection of future members of judicial governance bodies, but the Ukrainian authorities continue to have the final say over who actually takes up key positions in the judicial reform process.

Far from signalling foreign control over the Ukrainian government, the engagement of international experts is a proven pathway to transparency that should bolster rather than undermine public trust in the reform agenda. The same is equally true in terms of other popular targets of criticism such as the supervisory boards of major Ukrainian state-owned enterprises.

The problem of anti-Western messaging in the Ukrainian media goes far beyond the “Hard with Vlashchenko” show. For example, Ukrayina 24 has hired a number of journalists who previously worked for Murayev’s Nash channel or channels linked to pro-Russian Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk which were sanctioned and shuttered in early 2021. According to Detector Media, many are using their new platform to attack the West.

Today’s Ukraine is undergoing an unprecedented democratic transition while simultaneously waging a defensive information war against a global superpower. While it is essential to provide mainstream media platforms for a broad spectrum of opinion, Ukraine must also guard against the weaponization of disinformation that aims to demoralize and destabilize the country.

Recent research by AntAC and media watchdogs has highlighted how one of the most widely viewed Ukrainian channels contributes to undermining people’s trust in the country’s landmark reforms. The weight given to such opinions is disproportionate and appears to be out of step with broad public support for change, suggesting a coordinated attempt to undermine the reform agenda. Why does Akhmetov allow his channel to serve as a platform for anti-Western messaging despite his strong personal and professional ties to the West?

Olena Halushka is a Board Member at AntAC. Oleksandr Yermakov is AntAC communications manager.

This cycle of hope followed by frustration and disillusionment is in danger of being repeated once again under President Zelenskyy. When he was elected as a political outsider in 2019, Zelenskyy seemed to offer the prospect of a decisive break with the past. In office, however, he has begun to look much like his predecessors.

Reformist intentions have too easily given way to a centralizing instinct that weakens institutions and allows state capture to continue. Independent-minded officials have been removed from office. Laws have been announced promising greater accountability and an end to corruption, but which fall short on closer inspection.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Does President Zelenskyy want to achieve genuine change or just the appearance of change?

The current draft bill on reform of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), which is meant to end its jurisdiction to investigate economic crimes, in fact gives it the power to continue doing so under the heading of national security. This leaves ample scope for corruption to continue, including the ability of predatory interests to commission cases against legitimate businesses.

The new anti-oligarch bill similarly gives too much discretion to the executive to decide who is and who is not an oligarch. Oligarchy as a system of power will therefore survive even if one or two out of favor oligarchs find life a little less comfortable; especially if they end up replaced by new oligarchs more acceptable to Zelenskyy and his entourage.

Another problem is the endless recycling into positions of influence of officials steeped in the bureaucratic malpractices of the past.

For example, significant concern has been expressed about the recent appointment of Andriy Naumov to the Prosecutor General’s Office. Naumov was dismissed as head of the SBU’s internal security department earlier this year following allegations that he used his position to facilitate smuggling and put pressure on businesses. Previously he served in the Prosecutor General’s Office for twelve years, including during the worst excesses of the Yanukovych era. His return will again give him jurisdiction over economic crimes.

Zelenskyy’s appointment of Oleh Tatarov as his Deputy Chief of Staff last year has also raised eyebrows. Tatarov was a senior official in the Ministry of the Interior under Yanukovych and has been accused of trying to cover up police brutality against protesters during the Euromaidan Revolution. From his office at the heart of the Zelenskyy administration, he once more wields authority over sensitive areas of policy including law enforcement, anti-corruption, human rights, and relations with the Prosecutor General’s Office.

There are also concerns over the awarding of broadcasting licences. In recent weeks, one of two FM radio licences allocated in the Kyiv area was granted to Nikolay Bagrayev, a former Party of the Regions parliamentarian who voted for Yanukovych’s notorious “dictatorship laws” in 2014.

Eurasia Center events