Nuclear Energy - Atlantic Council

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

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While the Kremlin has denied blowing up the dam and has instead accused Ukraine, initial analysis strongly suggests Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused it to collapse.” Only Russian forces could have carried out such an explosion.

Many have also questioned the credibility of Moscow’s counterclaims suggesting the dam was destroyed by Ukrainian missile or artillery fire. Independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

Russia also has a clear military motive and a long record of attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. At the time of the dam collapse, Russian forces were preparing to face a long anticipated Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. The widespread flooding produced by the disaster effectively ruled out the possibility of Ukrainian troops attempting a river crossing along an entire section of the 1000-kilometer front. Meanwhile, Russia spent much of the winter and spring seasons conducting a methodical nationwide bombing campaign designed to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and freeze the country into submission. While the destruction of a major dam would mark an escalation in this campaign, it would clearly not be unprecedented.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Despite the likelihood that Russia is responsible for the dam collapse, in legal terms it is still too early to hold anyone directly accountable. First, there would need to be incontrovertible proof that this was actually an attack rather than some kind of horrible accident, miscommunication, or mistake made amid the “fog of war.” Then, the issue of attribution would have to be dealt with. This means that Russia’s responsibility for the attack would need to proven beyond doubt.

If it can be established that Russia intentionally carried out an attack on the dam, there are many potential pathways to justice. For example, Ukraine could pursue accountability through its own domestic courts; international actors could establish a regional tribunal; the International Criminal Court could investigate and potentially indict a responsible individual; or countries could choose to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute Russia for its actions.

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to overcome in pursuing accountability through these mechanisms. History has shown that the wheels of justice are excruciatingly slow in international war crimes cases. Prosecutors and Ukrainians alike would have to show extraordinary patience in waiting for these approaches to pay dividends. It would also be difficult to prove who ordered the attack and get that person in the dock, barring unlikely regime change within Russia itself. These are neither fair nor easy circumstances for Ukrainians to accept in the face of such trauma.

Furthermore, there are still huge information gaps. There would need to be a committed fact-finding effort, starting in the immediate present, to fill these gaps for a case that might not be prosecuted for many years or even decades. Ukrainians have shown an unprecedented ability to document abuses in real time throughout the current war. The onus would be on them to identify the individual Russian units and commanders responsible for blowing up the dam.

The challenges are even greater if Ukraine or the international community wants to pursue specific accountability for ecocide. Although there has been a lot of momentum in this direction, ecocide is not yet codified as a crime under international law (although it is under Ukrainian law). Even if this were to be accomplished in the near future and ecocide came to fall under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, there would still be enough ambiguity and lack of legal precedent to potentially deter prosecutors from pursuing the charge of ecocide in the Kakhovka dam case. There would also need to be an extensive investigation, which would not be easy given bureaucratic and financial barriers along with the fact that many affected areas remain under Russian control or are heavily mined.

In light of these obstacles, what can be done in the short-term to help hold Russia accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and its devastating consequences? First, the international community needs to broaden its view of what might constitute justice beyond the courtroom. This means listening to and supporting local civil society in Ukraine. It also means investing in Ukraine not only in the short-term, but in sustainable ways that bolster the country’s longer-term recovery and reconstruction, quite possibly by using frozen Russian assets to finance it. This requires helping the Ukrainian authorities combat corruption and build the capacity of the country’s own judicial system to pursue accountability.

In the pursuit of justice for Ukraine, the most meaningful steps are those that ensure Russia’s decisive defeat. Accountability will be much more difficult to achieve if the conflict becomes protracted or frozen. In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever face prosecution over the destruction of Kakhovka dam. Ultimately, the only way to achieve a just and durable peace is through Ukrainian victory.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly struck the transmission lines that power the plant’s cooling systems, necessitating the use of back-up generators to keep the cooling system operational. Despite regular alarms over the close proximity of combat operations and the deployment of Russian troops at the plant, the risk of a nuclear disaster has been seen as present but never pressing due to numerous residual safety features. For example, the plant can run on its own power for short periods of time if power grid access and generators simultaneously fail. So far, this hasn’t happened.

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The Kakhovka dam collapse has now increased the risk of disaster. In addition to electricity, the plant needs large quantities of water to run its cooling system. The plant was built in the 1980s, decades after the Kakhovka dam was constructed, and features a design that relies on reservoir water for its cooling system. And although the plant’s six reactors have been turned off for more than eight months to reduce the likelihood of wartime nuclear accidents, it will still be a decade before the reactor fuel rods are cool enough to be moved into dry storage.

Water levels in the reservoir have plummeted since the blast on Tuesday morning. At this stage, nobody can say with any certainty how far the water levels will eventually drop before leveling out. The IAEA commented on June 7 that if water levels fall below 12.7 meters, the lowest level at which water can be pumped upstream to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, there are alternative options that can be used to source cooling system water. One day later, this point was reportedly reached. With the Kakhovka dam beyond repair and no clear way to stop it hemorrhaging water from the reservoir, it seems likely that external water sources will be necessary.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

At present, IAEA officials say there is “no immediate risk” to the plant, while officials from Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom have stated that water supplies stored close to the facility are sufficient for the next few months. However, others have noted that summer heat could speed evaporation and exhaust existing reserves far sooner.

The destruction of Kakhovka dam is widely viewed as the latest and most reckless in a series of attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost sixteen months ago. While Moscow has officially denied destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” Meanwhile, independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

In addition to the heightened risk to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the destruction of the dam has also unleashed an ecological disaster throughout the region. Tens of thousands of local residents whose homes have been flooded are in urgent need of care and shelter. Significant quantities of oil and chemicals have poured into the Dnipro River and must be contained, along with munitions. These are the most immediate challenges facing the Ukrainian authorities.

The risks posed to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant by the loss of access to reservoir water must also be addressed without delay before the situation becomes critical. Beyond this pressing logistical issue, the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam is also fueling speculation over whether Russia may be prepared to adopt similarly drastic measures at the Zaporizhzhia plant itself. With this in mind, the international community must send a clear message to Moscow that it will be held accountable for any further attempts to intimidate the world with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Three questions (and expert answers) about the dam collapse in Ukraine

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 21:15:26 +0000

It’s set off a cascade of problems.

Early Tuesday, large sections of the Nova Kakhovka dam and hydroelectric power plant in southern Ukraine gave way. Since 1956, the dam has pinched the Dnipro River, creating a massive reservoir upstream as far as Zaporizhzhia and, downstream, a succession of towns and villages along the river terminating in Kherson, all of which could now be flooded.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused Russian forces of blowing up the dam–a claim US intelligence reportedly appears to support. The Kremlin, which currently controls the area around the dam, has blamed Ukrainian forces.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer our most pressing questions about what the damaged dam means for the ongoing war.

1. If Russia is behind the dam collapse, what would it reveal about Russian strategy and tactics at this stage in the war?

That they have no red lines that can’t be crossed and that they have no regard for human lives or ecology. I’m afraid that if the Russians are capable of blowing up such a large piece of critical infrastructure, they’re also capable of striking at the occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant—the consequences of which would be horrific. There is little left in the West’s toolbox to restrain Russia, but a tightening of the noose of sanctions and providing Kyiv with all the fighting kit it is asking for would be a logical starting point.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a Ukraine-based nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

It would reveal nothing new compared with what we have already known about Vladimir Putin’s Russia and its efforts to destroy the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people. Putin’s regime has already systematically committed crimes against humanity and pursues a policy of genocide, showing total disregard for human lives. Destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam appears to be one more piece of evidence of the dark nature of Putin’s regime—a terrible and extremely dangerous act aimed at inflicting maximum suffering on people and maximum damage on the environment. Putin is still trying to escalate and terrorize Ukraine and its partners. It’s long overdue that we deny him this possibility.

—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States.

2. What are the implications for the environment and other parts of Ukraine such as Kherson and Crimea?

Ukrainian officials are already reporting the deaths of zoo animals near the dam. Some eighty settlements are at risk of substantial flooding and countless hectares of land are in the path of floodwaters. What is more, the flooding could trigger another wave of displaced people or asylum seekers. If people in the West feel they won’t be impacted, they should think again and brace themselves for higher food prices and a fresh wave of refugees.

—Michael Bociurkiw

Since last fall, Ukraine has implored the international community to prevent a Russian terrorist attack on the Nova Kakhovka dam. The immeasurable suffering today should be a wakeup call regarding how Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure must be protected in the future and the importance of trusting Ukraine’s experts on risk assessment and mitigation strategies, in particular regarding nuclear power plants. While there are no evident immediate risks to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which relies on water from the reservoir for cooling and operations, its continued safety is anything but guaranteed. The international community should be treating Russia’s apparent escalation as a ramp-up for broader genocide and ecocide in Ukraine. Western allies, including multilateral bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, cannot entrust Zaporizhzhia’s safety and that of other massive energy installations to the Russians.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

The destruction of Ukraine’s Nova Kakhovka dam will result in short- and long-term environmental, humanitarian, military, and economic consequences. Given the global impacts, especially for Global South food security, Russia, if it was behind the destruction, has cemented its reputation as one of the world’s largest orchestrators of civilian suffering.

Damage is still unfolding, but there are fears that hundreds of thousands among Ukraine’s already-battered civilian population may be left without their homes, water, electricity, or other access to vital infrastructure in the Kherson region, Crimea, and beyond. Known disaster-related flood risks—like mold-caused health impacts and downed power lines in the water—are exacerbated by reports of Russian troops shelling evacuations, floating mines, and more than a hundred tons of engine oil polluting the Dnipro River.

Europe’s largest steppe, Askania Nova, is endangered, along with the native zebras, buffaloes, and wildebeests that call the steppe their home. Untold ecosystem damage may unfold. Springtime births make animal populations and the ecosystems they support especially vulnerable. In light of the economic damage to Ukraine’s agribusiness and metallurgy industries, which require extensive water supplies, Western governments will need to take decisive action to redirect frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s recovery. Concerns about the long-term cooling of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant will rise.

—Kristina Hook is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center specializing in genocide and mass atrocity prevention, emerging technologies, and post-conflict reconstruction.

3. Could the dam destruction constitute a war crime?

As more details are clarified, the legal implications potentially could be vast, with prohibitions of attacks on such facilities inscribed in the Geneva Conventions. Concrete steps on accountability for war crimes are needed, and global humanitarian aid must surge. None of the ecological crimes unfolding over the past sixteen months were inevitable, given Ukraine’s robust environmental management and monitoring prior to 2014. All trace back to Russia’s nearly decade-long war against Ukraine. The ensuing damage to Ukraine and the global economy lies squarely at Russia’s feet.

Given months of Ukrainian and international warnings about the possibility of Russia attacking the dam, global condemnation is not sufficient. Anything less than a tangible response alerts the Kremlin that it can get away with the environmental equivalent of a weapon of mass destruction, encouraging Russia to climb further up an escalation ladder aimed directly at Ukraine’s civilians. This day offers a painful snapshot of Ukrainian life under Russia’s terror: nine months of violent occupation in Kherson, with torture camps, rape, and summary executions, followed by relentless shelling, and now, apparently, flooding—losing everything in a day.

—Kristina Hook

Destruction of the dam absolutely violates the Geneva Conventions and fits the definition of a crime against humanity as described in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. So it should be recognized as such and its perpetrators should be held accountable. We’re seeing a developing humanitarian disaster, primarily due to the massive displacement of the population of flooded areas and a sharp drop in the supply of drinking water. If Russia committed the destruction, it would be one more reason to see Putin and company in The Hague, hopefully in the near future.

—Oleh Shamshur

The post Three questions (and expert answers) about the dam collapse in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The imperative of the Versatile Test Reactor for nuclear innovation

Jackie Toth, Khalil Ryan — Mon, 24 Apr 2023 15:21:32 +0000

In 2018, Congress passed legislation with bipartisan support to investigate the need for a domestic fast neutron irradiation testing capability, based on the argument that the existing test reactors in the United States would be insufficient to meet new demand for materials and fuels testing from the next generation of advanced reactors. However, in 2021, Congress zeroed out the budget for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR), leaving the United States without plans to build a domestic advanced test reactor.

In this report, “The Imperative of the Versatile Test Reactor for Nuclear Innovation,” authors Jackie Toth and Khalil Ryan argue that the United States will lose its competitive edge against adversaries (especially Russia) if it lacks a fully realized nuclear energy innovation ecosystem, of which the VTR is a crucial component.

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Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

The Atlantic Council’s dedicated home for the exploration of nuclear energy’s future.

AUTHORS

Jackie Toth is deputy director of Good Energy Collective, a research organization making the progressive case for nuclear energy to contribute toward a climate-constrained, equitable energy future. A former journalist, from 2015-2019 Jackie reported on federal energy and environmental law and regulations for CQ Roll Call and Morning Consult. Afterward, she led public opinion research and developed policy and communications strategies on nuclear energy and other technologies for the Climate and Energy Program at Third Way, a D.C.-based think tank. Jackie holds a B.A. in international studies and a minor in linguistics from American University.

Khalil Ryan is a policy analyst with the Good Energy Collective, focusing on a project concerning nuclear diplomacy to aid in the gradual decarbonization of global energy sources. Khalil’s main area of work is introducing civil nuclear energy to nations seeking to move away from the traditional carbon-based energy infrastructure through partnerships with the United States civil nuclear export regime. Besides his main focus of work, Khalil is also working on several short papers concerning the global fuel supply chain and the current leading global nuclear export regimes.

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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Nesheiwat in Real Clear Energy: Twelve years after Fukushima, more US nuclear energy is a national security imperative

mzandi — Sun, 12 Mar 2023 18:18:46 +0000

The post Nesheiwat in Real Clear Energy: Twelve years after Fukushima, more US nuclear energy is a national security imperative appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Warrick on the Lawfare Podcast

Atlantic Council — Fri, 27 Jan 2023 20:05:07 +0000

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

On January 19, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Tom Warrick appeared on a panel in the Lawfare Podcast to discuss the history and effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security’s Fusion Centers.

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

The post Warrick on the Lawfare Podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: How to reduce carbon emissions without blocking progress

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 14 Jan 2023 18:01:29 +0000

This article was updated on January 16 to reflect the fact that the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Masdar, where Sultan Al Jaber serves as CEO and chairman, respectively, are sponsors of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum.

If the world gets lucky, this could be the year fossil fuel producers and climate activists bury their hatchets and join hands to reduce emissions and ensure our planet’s future.

If that sounds hopelessly utopian, take that up with the leaders of this resource-rich, renewables-generating Middle Eastern monarchy. The United Arab Emirates is determined to inject specificity, urgency, and pragmatism into a process that often has lacked all three: the twenty-eighth convening of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as COP28, from November 30 to December 12.

To kick off 2023, the oil and gas and climate communities gathered this weekend for the Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum, launching the annual Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week. After decades of mutual mistrust, there is a growing recognition that they can’t live without each other.

Thank Russian President Vladimir Putin’s criminal war in Ukraine, and his ongoing weaponization of energy, for injecting a new dose of hard-headed reality into climate conversations. It’s seldom been so clear that energy security and cleaner energy are indivisible. The guiding principle is “the energy sustainability trilemma,” defined as the need to balance energy reliability, affordability, and sustainability.

What’s contributing to this new pragmatism is a recognition by much of the climate community that the energy transition to renewables can’t be achieved without fossil fuels, so they must be made cleaner. They have come to accept that natural gas, in particular liquified natural gas (LNG), with half the emissions footprint of coal, provides a powerful bridging fuel.

Once derided by green activists, nuclear power is also winning over new fans—particularly when it comes to the small, modular plants where there are fewer concerns over safety and weapons proliferation.

For their part, almost all major oil and gas producers, who once viewed climate activists with disdain, now embrace the reality of climate science and are investing billions of dollars in renewables and efforts to make their fossil fuels cleaner.

“Every serious hydrocarbon producer knows the future, in a world of declining use of fossil fuels, is to be low cost, low risk, and low carbon,” said David Goldwyn, the former State Department special envoy for energy. “The only way to ensure we do this is to have industry at the table.”

Nowhere is this shift among climate activists more evident than in Germany, where Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, the Green Party leader, is serving as the pragmatist-in-chief.

Habeck, who serves as federal minister for economic affairs and climate action, has been the driving force behind extending the life of the country’s three nuclear plants through April and in launching Germany’s first LNG import terminal in December, with as many as five more to follow.

“I am ultimately responsible for the security of the German energy system,” Habeck told Financial Times reporter Guy Chazan in a sweeping profile of the German politician. “So, the buck stops with me. … I became minister to make tough decisions, not to be Germany’s most popular politician.”

Some climate activists were aghast this Thursday when the UAE named Sultan Al Jaber, the CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), as president of this year’s COP28.

“This appointment goes beyond putting the fox in charge of the henhouse,” said Teresa Anderson of ActionAid, a development charity. “Like last year’s summit, we’re increasingly seeing fossil fuel interests taking control of the process and shaping it to meet their own needs.”

What that overlooks is that Al Jaber’s rich background in both renewables and fossil fuels makes him an ideal choice at a time when efforts to address climate change have been far too slow, lacking the inclusivity to produce more transformative results.

Full disclosure: Al Jaber’s companies ADNOC and the clean-energy innovator Masdar (where he was founding CEO in 2005 and is now chairman) are sponsors of the annual Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi, a fact that has given me a close-up look at his years-long commitment to reducing emissions and promoting renewables.

Al Jaber also represents a country that despite its resource riches has become a major nuclear power producer, was the first Middle East country to join the Paris Climate Agreement, and was the first Middle East country to set out a roadmap to net-zero emissions by 2050.

Over the past fifteen years, the UAE has invested forty billion dollars in renewable energy and clean tech globally. In November it signed a partnership with the United States to invest an additional one hundred billion dollars in clean energy. Some 70 percent of the UAE economy is generated outside the oil and gas sector, making it an exception among major producing countries in its diversification.

Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, president of the United Arab Emirates, has explained his country’s approach this way: “There will be a time, fifty years from now, when we load the last barrel of oil aboard the ship. The question is… are we going to feel sad? If our investment today is right, I think—dear brothers and sisters—we will celebrate that moment.”

Al Jaber, speaking to the Global Energy Forum, captured his ambition to drive faster and more transformative results at COP28.

“We are way off track,” said Al Jaber.

“The world is playing catch-up when it comes to the key Paris goal of holding global temperatures down to 1.5 degrees,” he said. “And the hard reality is that in order to achieve this goal, global emissions must fall 43 percent by 2030. To add to that challenge, we must decrease emissions at a time of continued economic uncertainty, heightened geopolitical tensions, and increasing pressure on energy.”

He called for “transformational progress… through game-changing partnerships, solutions, and outcomes.” He said the world must triple renewable energy generation from eight terawatt hours to twenty-three and more than double low-carbon hydrogen production to 180 million tons for industrial sectors, which have the hardest carbon footprint to abate.

“We will work with the energy industry on accelerating the decarbonization, reducing methane, and expanding hydrogen,” said Al Jaber. “Let’s keep our focus on holding back emissions, not progress.”

If that sounds utopian, let’s have more of it.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 A new world energy order is taking shape
Rana Foroohar | FINANCIAL TIMES

In this smart piece, the FT’s Rana Foroohar warns of a China-led energy order and how that could shift the global balance of power.

“What does that mean in practice?” Foroohar asks. “For starters, a lot more oil trade will be done in renminbi. [Chinese leader] Xi [Jinping] announced that, over the next three to five years, China would not only dramatically increase imports from [Gulf] countries, but work towards all-dimensional energy co-operation.”

“This could potentially involve joint exploration and production in places such as the South China Sea, as well as investments in refineries, chemicals, and plastics. Beijing’s hope is that all of it will be paid for in renminbi, on the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, as early as 2025.”

This is something any serious thinker on energy should bear in mind. Read more →

#2 Ships going dark: Russia’s grain smuggling in the Black Sea
ECONOMIST

In this thought-provoking narrative, the Economist highlights the growing economic potential of the North Sea, particularly as a producer of wind power.

While the Economist acknowledges significant hurdles, from the vagaries of weather to the threat of cheaper competition in Southern Europe, it also writes that if “these problems can be overcome, the new North Sea economy’s impact on the continent will be momentous.

“As Europe’s economic epicentre moves north, so will its political one, predicts Frank Peter of Agora Energiewende, a German think-tank. Coastal Bremen, one of Germany’s poorest states, could gain clout at the expense of rich but landlocked Bavaria. At the European level, France and Germany, whose industrial might underpinned the European Coal and Steel Community, the EU’s forebear, may lose some influence to a new bloc led by Denmark, the Netherlands and, outside the EU, Britain and Norway.” Read more →

#3 Time is not on Ukraine’s side
Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates | WASHINGTON POST

Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, two of the most perceptive international strategists out there, deliver a compelling argument for how President Joe Biden’s administration should do more for Ukraine now.

The only way to avoid Russian domination of Ukraine, they write, “is for the United States and its allies to urgently provide Ukraine with a dramatic increase in military supplies and capability — sufficient to deter a renewed Russian offensive and to enable Ukraine to push back Russian forces in the east and south. Congress has provided enough money to pay for such reinforcement; what is needed now are decisions by the United States and its allies to provide the Ukrainians the additional military equipment they need — above all, mobile armor.”

“Because there are serious logistical challenges associated with sending American Abrams heavy tanks, Germany and other allies should fill this need,” they write. “NATO members also should provide the Ukrainians with longer-range missiles, advanced drones, significant ammunition stocks (including artillery shells), more reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and other equipment. These capabilities are needed in weeks, not months.”

One hopes Biden is reading. Read more →

#4 Robert Habeck was Germany’s most popular politician. Then he took office
Guy Chazan | FINANCIAL TIMEs

Don’t miss Guy Chazan’s brilliant, sweeping profile of German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, who oversees his country’s energy and economic policies, and his struggle as a Green politician to diversify resources away from Russia.

“As the energy crisis continued, traits that distinguished Habeck from other politicians came to the fore,” Chazan writes, reporting on Habeck’s willingness to make tough decisions. “On the day of the invasion last February, amid rounds of emergency meetings, he found time to visit Andrij Melnyk, Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin. ‘That was the most important meeting I had since the war began,’ Melnyk told Der Spiegel, ‘because he offered real human sympathy.’ Habeck also spoke openly about the uncertainties the government faced.”

Read this for a profile of the type of leader who, understanding the importance of compromise and pragmatism, will be vital in making the energy transition a success. Read more →

#5 American Democracy is Still In Danger
Erin Baggot Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Larry Diamond | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This week’s must-read is a clarion call on the importance of US democracy and the dangers it faces, from Erin Baggot Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Larry Diamond.

“The health of American democracy,” they write, “is both a domestic and a national security concern. China and Russia—the United States’ principal authoritarian adversaries—have been using (and exacerbating) America’s democratic divisions and travails to gain advantage in the competition for global leadership. To regain the advantage, the United States must both repair its own democracy and reinvigorate its voice for democracy in the global arena. Democracy must go on the offensive.”

To do this, they argue, “Washington must rejoin the battle for global soft power, in a manner that reflects American values. It must transmit the truth, and in ways that engage and persuade global audiences. The goal must be not only to counter disinformation persuasively with the truth but to promote democratic values, ideas, and movements. In order to counter disinformation and report the truth that autocracies suppress, multiple credible streams of information are needed. Furthermore, they must be independent; while the US government may provide material support, these outlets must operate free of editorial control. That way, they will be seen to be independent because they are.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

Global Energy Forum Jan 14, 2023

COP28 president-designate: With the world ‘way off track’ on Paris goals, ‘transformational progress’ is needed

By Daniel Malloy

In his first remarks since being named the incoming president of COP28, Sultan Al Jaber spoke on Saturday morning at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Fast Thinking Jan 9, 2023

How Brazil can respond to its democracy stress test

By Atlantic Council

Now that authorities have cleared the protests and launched an investigation into security failures, our experts break down what’s to come.

Brazil Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Jan 13, 2023

Russian War Report: Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

In December 2022, Wagner Group organized a hackathon that was won by a man wanted by the FBI for his connection to computer malware.

Conflict Cybersecurity

The post Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: How to reduce carbon emissions without blocking progress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nuclear energy in a low-carbon future: Implications for the United States and Japan

Stephen S. Greene — Mon, 28 Nov 2022 18:28:02 +0000

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Nuclear power has received renewed global interest as a secure source of carbon-free energy. In the context of worsening climate change and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and resultant energy market constrictions, many countries are actively pursuing conventional and advanced nuclear development, while others are canceling or postponing scheduled shutdowns. As climate change continues to impact both energy supply and demand, nuclear energy is poised to play a major role in the reliability of the future clean energy mix.

Challenges to nuclear rollout will require solutions. Construction timelines remain extended, as do licensing processes. Social constraints also hinder development prospects. These potential stumbling blocks require steadfast coordination between allies like the United States and Japan, especially as other nuclear energy heavyweights like Russia and China avoid many of those same bottlenecks in their pursuit of domestic buildout and export.

Despite those issues, though, nuclear energy is forecasted to play a major role in the later stages of the energy transition, in which countries look to decarbonize the more difficult parts of their economies. The advent of advanced technologies and the completion of large-scale projects portends the arrival of nuclear energy’s reliability and versatility just as the global energy sector needs it.

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Energy & Environment

EnergySource Oct 12, 2022

Nuclear energy and global energy security in the new tripolar world order

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

As the United States, Russia, and China move into a period of overt confrontation, competition in both the current and next-generation nuclear technology spaces will assume even more importance. Climate concerns only add more urgency to the race to deploy.

China Energy & Environment

EnergySource Aug 31, 2022

Closing nuclear generation amounts to running in place on climate

By Stephen S. Greene

Retiring nuclear plants is the wrong climate move. It jeopardizes energy security, makes grids less reliable, and forces clean energy that could be better used displacing fossil fuel generation to make up for the shortfall.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Aug 10, 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act reinforces nuclear energy’s role as a climate solution

By Stephen S. Greene

The IRA provides much-needed support to the US nuclear energy sector. Its provisions will allow the continued operation of existing reactors along with the development of next-generation projects.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

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The post Nuclear energy in a low-carbon future: Implications for the United States and Japan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Europe must make this the last winter of weaponized Russian energy exports

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Tue, 25 Oct 2022 20:54:29 +0000

Ukrainians are currently preparing for what is likely to be the most difficult winter in the country’s modern history. With Russia losing on the battlefield, the Kremlin has resorted to the tactics of total war and is attempting to destroy Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. Tens of millions face the prospect of prolonged blackouts along with potentially deadly disruption to essential water and heating services.

This is the latest and most extreme escalation in Vladimir Putin’s long-running energy war against the West. For years, the Russian dictator has used energy as a weapon in his efforts to subjugate Ukraine and divide Europe. He now hopes to freeze Ukrainians into submission while also using supply cuts to pressure European leaders into abandoning their support for Ukraine.

The coming months will determine the outcome of Putin’s energy aggression. If he succeeds in his objectives, Ukraine will face the horrors of prolonged Russian occupation while the Kremlin will gain unprecedented political and economic influence over Europe that could last for decades to come. Alternatively, if Russia suffers a decisive defeat, the threat from Moscow will rapidly recede and Europe will be greatly strengthened. Winning the energy war will set the stage for future European security and prosperity.

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Europe’s reliance on Russian energy resources predates Putin and can be traced all the way back to the height of the Cold War. In 1972, Soviet deliveries accounted for around 4% of European gas consumption. By 2021, Russia was providing almost 40% of Europe’s gas. As Moscow’s market share has gradually risen, Russia’s ability to manipulate prices and trigger crises has also increased. Most Europeans now acknowledge that this reliance on Russia represents a major strategic blunder. Thankfully, it is not irreversible.

Ukraine’s experience over the past eight years may offer some valuable pointers. In 2014-16, the Ukrainian authorities achieved considerable success in reducing their country’s energy sector reliance on Moscow. By implementing transparent market tariffs and targeted subsidies, Kyiv was able to support the most vulnerable segments of the population. The Ukrainian government also encouraged energy efficiency by introducing discounted rates on limited volumes and offering funding support for efficiency measures. Within two years, Ukraine was able to reduce consumption by 20%.

Ukraine also ended multi-billion dollar corrupt energy sector practices that had long served to enrich Ukrainian oligarchs with ties to the Kremlin. Prior to the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine had been one of the biggest importers of Russian gas. By November 2015, direct Russian gas imports to Ukraine had ceased entirely. These steps allowed Ukraine to reduce Russian leverage and partially disarm Putin’s energy weapon. Europe must now look to implement similarly sweeping measures.

First and foremost, Europe must put plans in place for possible energy rationing and mutual assistance to address looming energy supply shortfalls. European leaders need to agree on a united response to the short-term energy challenges facing the continent; all EU members should be ready to help each other via reciprocal cross-flows as necessary.

Strategic measures are also called for in order to tackle structural weaknesses. Europe’s Green Energy Transition features one major flaw: it relies too heavily on Russian gas imports. In order to adapt to the present energy sector realities, industrial de-carbonization requirements should be relaxed for the time being with oil, gas, and coal production reopened. This is already happening in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. Others should follow suit.

Tax incentives should be implemented, especially for the development of deep wells. A similar approach allowed Ukraine to significantly increase domestic gas production in 2015-19. The EU will also have to resume operation, at least temporarily, of coal-fired thermal power plants. Austria and Germany stand ready to do so.

Before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, nuclear power stations produced some 55-60% of Ukraine’s electricity. Since 1991, these nuclear plants have operated without incident. The EU needs to recognize that nuclear power is safe, inexpensive, and environmentally friendly. Another key task is the development of renewable energy resources. Here, Germany leads the way with the share of renewable energy in national consumption set to reach 80% before 2030 and with 2% of land resources reserved for solar and wind farms.

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In addition to securing alternative sources of gas, Europe must also enhance energy diversification by increasing the continent’s ability to accommodate liquefied gas deliveries. This process is already well underway and now benefits from additional momentum due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s increasingly open weaponization of gas exports to the EU.

The construction of LNG terminals in Poland has already made it possible for the country to step away from Russian gas. Two LNG terminals will enter operation in Germany this winter. Meanwhile, Spain has six LNG terminals that provide a maximum capacity far in excess of the country’s domestic needs, with negotiations underway for the construction of a possible pipeline to Germany.

Europe’s top energy priority remains preventing an energy collapse in Ukraine and therefore avoiding a range of negative consequences such as a massive influx of refugees. Ukraine needs urgent European help in order to repair the country’s energy infrastructure following Russian airstrikes. This is just as important as the provision of enhanced air defense capabilities and should take place in parallel. It is also crucial that steps are taken to ensure adequate border crossing capacity to accommodate deliveries of coal that cannot pass through Ukraine’s partially blockaded seaports.

This will be a difficult winter for all Europeans, whether they face blackouts and bombs or heating issues and sky-high energy bills. Putin hopes to weaponize winter and force Europe to surrender, but giving in to the Kremlin would be disastrous for both Ukraine and the EU. Instead, Europe must accept the challenge of overhauling its entire energy system. This is the only way to break the continent’s debilitating dependence on Russian energy and make sure Putin’s energy war ends in decisive defeat.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is the former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16). He currently serves as Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum.

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The Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have exacerbated an already precarious fuel and power situation in the war-torn country. Over the course of September, Russian troops shelled the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), bombarded areas close to the Ukraine’s Southern NPP, and struck the Zmiivska TPP. Russia launched 14 rockets on September 10 at the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant, which supplies power to the entire Kakhovka district. Russian forces also attacked the Kharkiv CHPP, Ukraine’s second largest. Other rockets took out multiple high-voltage substations, leaving at least 40 substations without power and several major overhead power lines disconnected.

Ukrainians have responded to these attacks with characteristic resilience. The country’s electrical grid operator, Ukrenergo, reported that repairs would take less than a day or two in most cases. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Ukraine does not currently need to import electricity from Europe. Nevertheless, measures have been introduced to address the looming energy crisis. Ukrenergo has imposed emergency brownouts, the Ministry of Energy has banned power exports in order to ensure adequate power to stabilize the Ukrainian grid, and the government has implored citizens to reduce their electricity usage during peak hours.

The Ukrainian response belies the energy insecurity Ukraine finds itself in as winter approaches. DTEK had to increase generation by 16% in September to prevent grid instability and blackouts nationwide because around 45% of Ukraine’s power generation capacity is offline. Only eight of Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors are operational, with the seven not running accounting for over 25% of the country’s power generation capacity. None of Zaporizhzhia NPP’s six reactors are online due to Russian shelling in August, and only three of Rivne NPP’s four reactors are currently operational. Ukraine’s renewable energy resources, which accounted for approximately 12% of generation before the invasion, are presently offline in Russian-held territory or frontline regions. At least two hydroelectric plants are also offline.

Ukraine has 14 TPPs that run on coal or natural gas. Eight are owned by the country’s largest private power company DTEK, three are owned by state-owned Centrenego, and the remainder are owned by smaller public or private entities. Only one of Centrenergo’s TPPs, Trypilska, is currently operational. Only six DTEK TPPs were operational before October 10. Two were subsequently damaged by Russian airstrikes.

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With so much generation capacity offline, the only reason Ukraine has not suffered a severe grid failure is low demand. Around 20% of Ukrainian territory is still held by Russia, approximately seven million Ukrainians have fled the country, and a huge number of buildings have been reduced to rubble and do not therefore consume electricity. This has collectively reduced power consumption nationwide by about 35%, so the current supply crisis has not yet crippled the grid. However, Russia’s airstrike campaign has further weakened the power sector just as the cold weather is beginning.

The natural gas situation is not much better, with gas serving as Ukraine’s principal fuel for heating. Naftogaz, Ukraine’s state-owned energy giant, says it has just under 14 billion cubic meters (bcm) stored for winter. That is well below the 18-19 bcm needed for a full season of heating, and disastrously short of the 21-22 bcm needed for a particularly cold winter. While the anticipated consumption of gas this winter is down relative to a normal year for the same reasons electricity use is down, gas-fueled municipal heating systems do not allow for individual reductions in use. Municipal heating is citywide and is either on or off, so any consumption decreases are likely to be far less significant than for electricity. Instead of conserving gas now, some parts of Ukraine including Kyiv have already begun the heating season and turned on the furnaces, despite relatively warm weather persisting.

Ukraine urgently needs technical support and financial aid to secure energy sources for the winter. The announced freeze in limited electricity exports to Europe will cost Ukraine $150 million per month, making it harder for Ukraine to repair its systems and continue buying gas to store. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has asked foreign donors for $55 billion to cover the budget deficit, plus another $17 billion to help with energy infrastructure repairs. Ukrainians will need to do their part by reducing consumption, while the Ukrainian government must delay the heating season, turn off or turn down municipal heating, and conserve energy supplies when they start to run low. New energy efficient technologies will need to be deployed as quickly as possible throughout Ukraine.

If Ukraine’s partners wish to prevent Vladimir Putin from freezing the country into surrender, they must provide the technical support and funding that will allow Ukraine to make it through the winter season. Some help is already forthcoming. The European Investment Bank (EIB) gave Ukraine €550 million (currently $535 million) on October 12 specifically to pay for the repair and rebuilding of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. These funds will be used to help Ukraine maintain electrical grid stability, restore power service, and fix some of the recent infrastructure damage. But much more is needed to keep Ukrainians warm in their homes as their army continues to liberate Russian-occupied regions of the country.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. — Wed, 12 Oct 2022 13:30:00 +0000

The Russian invasion of sovereign Ukraine, along with Chinese military buildup and threats against Taiwan, seem to portend the emergence of a new tripolar world order and a shifting paradigm from great power competition to great power confrontation. And despite the apparent concerns raised by President Xi in his recent meeting with President Putin in Uzbekistan over the war in Ukraine, the meeting confirmed the continuing alliance of these authoritarian states against the United States and NATO. It is a dangerous time, and concerns have heightened over not only the potential for escalating military conflict, but also over energy security and the vulnerability and high prices of energy supplies.

On May 2, G7 leaders stated their commitment to: (1) “phase out our dependency on Russian energy”; (2) work with partners to “ensure stable and sustainable global energy supplies and affordable prices for consumers”; and (3) accelerate ”reduction of overall reliance on fossil fuels and our transition to clean energy in accordance with our climate objectives.”

These commitments—informed by high global energy prices, the OPEC+ decision to cut oil production, European concerns over tight energy supplies this winter, the broader energy security environment, and ever-present climate concerns—have underpinned renewed interest in the potential for nuclear energy to help meet them. US leadership in nuclear energy development in close cooperation with Western allies will be essential for enhancing global energy security and meeting international nuclear energy market, and related military and economic, competition from Russia and China.

Energy geopolitics and great power relations

Energy is an important facet of an overall assessment of the resources, capabilities, and international influence of these three nuclear powers. The United States is an energy superpower, having turned around its position from a net importer of oil and gas to a net exporter of oil, gas, and coal. Meanwhile, Russia has massive fossil fuel resources; it was the largest exporter of oil, gas, and coal to Europe, accounting in 2021 for 30 percent and 38 percent of Europe’s crude oil and petroleum product imports, 54 percent of its natural gas imports, and 50 percent of its coal imports.

In sharp contrast to the United States and Russia, China in 2021 was the world’s largest importer of oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and coal. While Europe is reducing its dependence on Russian oil and gas—with EU gas imports from Russia falling to about 7.5 percent of total in October—and has pursued diversification through measures such as increased LNG imports from the United States, China has increased its imports of Russian oil and gas. Russia was the second-largest supplier of oil to China in 2021, right behind Saudi Arabia. Despite its growing dependence on fossil fuel imports, China has continued its drive to develop renewable energy and is the largest generator of solar and wind power. It is also the largest exporter of renewable technologies, with solar PV exports doubling to $25.9 billion in the first half of 2022 and wind turbine exports jumping $2 billion in 2021 to $7.2 billion. This position and the dependency of countries on China, particularly for solar PV and critical minerals, poses its own energy security concerns.

The role of nuclear energy

Russia and China are strongly committed to nuclear energy and are investing in both new plants and research, development, and demonstration of advanced nuclear systems. Nuclear accounts for about 19 percent of Russia’s electricity generation, and Russia, with its substantial state funding, has been the largest exporter of nuclear reactors to the world market, kicking off major projects in Turkey, India, Bangladesh, China, Iran, Egypt, Belarus, and Hungary. How the economic impact of the war in Ukraine will affect both Russia’s ability to finance and implement these projects as well as the receptivity of countries to future nuclear cooperation with Russia remains to be seen.

Nuclear energy’s contribution to electricity generation is smaller in China at 5 percent of the total, but China has overtaken France as the second-largest nuclear generator in absolute terms and has the most plants under construction – twenty. It has built two new Hualong One HPR-1000 units in Pakistan and is planning to finance similar units in Argentina. Security concerns have led Finland to cancel its VVER-1200 project with Russia, and Poland, Czech Republic, and Romania to exclude Russian and Chinese companies from new nuclear project opportunities, even though the Hungarian Nuclear Energy Regular in August 2022 approved the license for the construction of the two Paks 2 units with Russia.

The United States has remained the world’s largest generator of nuclear energy and, despite closures, has been able to increase slightly its total installed capacity to 95,492 megawatts (MW) at the end of 2021. Nuclear power generation provided a critical 18.6 percent of total US electricity output in 2021 and about 48 percent of carbon-free generation. Recent US federal and state changes in policy and legislation; increased Congressional funding (i.e., $36 billion in nuclear production tax and investment tax credits in the Inflation Reduction and Bipartisan Infrastructure Bills); and greater receptivity to nuclear power have helped keep some plants from closing and ramped up support for the development of new advanced reactors.

Heightened international interest in nuclear power is evident in both large third-generation systems (i.e., the US-made AP-1000; the South Korean APR-1400; the European EPR; the Russian VVER-1200; and the Chinese Hualong One HPR-1000) and in small modular (SMR) and micro nuclear reactors (MNR) for both civilian and military applications. These applications include powering submarines and aircraft carriers, remote bases, mini-grids, directed energy weapons, and space vehicles and outposts.

The United States and western allies, Russia, and China are all engaged in developing SMRs of different types. Russia has deployed two icebreaker-designed KLT-40S on a ship moored at Chukotka in the Arctic and is constructing four floating RITM-200M reactors for an Arctic copper mining complex; China has built the first high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) and has a small 100-MW ACP-100 SMR under construction at the Changjiang nuclear power plant on the island of Hainan; and the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom are supporting over a dozen major private efforts, often with partners from Japan and South Korea, to demonstrate advanced SMR light water reactors, HTGRs, molten-salt and sodium-cooled systems, and fast breeder designs. Some of these projects will likely be operational by 2030 and companies are looking to domestic and export markets and developing agreements with both other governments (e.g., Romania’s Nuclearelectrica) and foreign industrial partners (e.g., the Poland mining company KGHM Polska Miedź SA) for initial units.

US nuclear energy leadership and nuclear energy technology competition

In this context of the growing tensions and confrontation among the major powers, the race is on to commercialize the new generation of SMRs and MNRs for civilian and military use. After the Arab oil embargo and oil price shocks in the 1970s, there was a drive to build nuclear plants in the United States and other Western countries. With current energy security and climate concerns and the recent OPEC+ decision to cut oil production, there is an urgency for the United States and its allies to usher in a new wave of nuclear power plant construction and to lead in the competition to build and demonstrate the viability of these new nuclear technologies.

A key challenge is to achieve the economies of scale and competitiveness that have been achieved by solar PV and wind over the last decade and attain broad social acceptance. Another is to maintain US and Western leadership in shaping international regulatory frameworks to accommodate and ensure the safety and security of these new technologies. The United States and its European and Asian allies need to progress rapidly beyond research, development, and demonstration efforts into effective manufacturing, financing, and implementation strategies to lead this global effort and successfully confront the emerging competition from China and Russia.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

The Atlantic Council’s dedicated home for the exploration of nuclear energy’s future.

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Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Nuclear Energy Energy Transitions

EnergySource Aug 31, 2022

Closing nuclear generation amounts to running in place on climate

By Stephen S. Greene

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Aug 10, 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act reinforces nuclear energy’s role as a climate solution

By Stephen S. Greene

The IRA provides much-needed support to the US nuclear energy sector. Its provisions will allow the continued operation of existing reactors along with the development of next-generation projects.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

EnergySource Feb 11, 2022

Building on US advanced reactor demonstration momentum: Federal power purchase agreements

By Matt Bowen

The Tennessee Valley Authority’s recent announcement regarding the Clinch River site adds momentum to the US effort to demonstrate advanced reactors. There is, however, another policy lever at the federal level that could help to support some of these projects and still has not been utilized: federal power purchase agreements.

Energy Transitions Nuclear Energy

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The post Nuclear energy and global energy security in the new tripolar world order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Arslan joins TRT World to discuss the themes of the Atlantic Council’s Regional Clean Energy Outlook Conference

Grady Wilson — Tue, 11 Oct 2022 20:06:00 +0000

The post Arslan joins TRT World to discuss the themes of the Atlantic Council’s Regional Clean Energy Outlook Conference appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to know about fusion

Ameya Hadap — Tue, 04 Oct 2022 15:18:52 +0000

For several decades, fusion has been touted as the paragon of energy. It would provide an essentially unbounded supply of secure, carbon-free power and heat for non-electricity applications, while the lack of long-lived waste and the impossibility of a runaway fusion reaction only add to its value proposition. But though fusion technology has advanced radically since the first lab-based demonstration in 1932, a reaction that produces more energy than it consumes—known as a net energy gain reaction—has remained out of reach.

That could change soon. Over the past several years, fusion has leapt out of the academic domain and into the commercial, with fusion companies pushing towards net energy production, attracting nearly $5 billion in private capital, and prompting the US government to map out a “bold decadal vision” for fusion energy. With more than thirty private fusion businesses making strides towards commercial deployment on a timeline consistent with the demands of the energy transition, the time to get familiar with the industry’s internal variations, multi-sector potential, and policy needs is now.

The fusion technology landscape

Fusion involves the nuclei of two light elements overcoming the forces between them under extreme temperatures and pressures and joining, creating the nucleus of a new, heavier atom and releasing massive amounts of energy in the process. It is the phenomenon that powers the stars. In pursuit of the same self-sustaining energy production, fusion organizations are pursuing exceptionally diverse methods to get there.

The most common approach is magnetic confinement fusion, implemented by several private sector organizations along with major international fusion projects like ITER and the Joint European Torus. In fusion, the fuel takes the form of a superheated plasma, too hot to be in direct contact with any materials. Magnetic confinement fusion solves this problem by suspending the electrically conductive plasma in magnetic fields and steering it around a vacuum chamber. In 2021, Commonwealth Fusion Systems successfully demonstrated its high-temperature superconductor (HTS) magnets, setting the stage for magnetic confinement fusion to be conducted in facilities close in size to an average coal- or gas-fired power plant, rather than the gargantuan compounds in which experiments had previously been run.

The other major approach is inertial confinement fusion. This method involves heating a very small fuel “pellet” using a laser or particle beam to compress the pellet so intensely that a fusion reaction occurs, creating a small explosion and generating energy. Inertial confinement fusion follows the same principles as the fusion reactions that take place when thermonuclear weapons are detonated, but on a much smaller, nondestructive scale. In an inertial confinement fusion power plant, a steady series of these explosions would produce consistent energy output.

The biggest names in the inertial confinement space are state-run research facilities including the US-based National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the French Laser Mégajoule, but those facilities have historically been focused on nuclear weapons research. NIF, however, achieved a major milestone last year by reaching a “burning plasma regime,” in which the fusion reactions generate most of the heat in the system rather than the lasers themselves. Companies like Marvel Fusion, Focused Energy, and Xcimer Energy are vying to build off this progress and bring inertial confinement fusion to market as a reliable energy source.

Most other approaches draw from one or both of these core methods but incorporate key innovations. First Light Fusion, for example, also uses a fuel pellet, but instead of reaching critical temperatures using lasers, it fires a projectile at the pellet at an incredible velocity—with a goal of 20 kilometers per second—causing the pellet to implode and undergo fusion. Helion Energy injects and accelerates two plasmas in field-reversed configurations towards each other until they collide and fusion conditions are reached, with the aim of directly capturing the subsequent energy rather than using the heat to drive turbines. General Fusion has opted for magnetized target fusion, which uses a magnetic field to confine and compress a plasma to extreme densities but surrounds it with a liquid metal liner. HB11 Energy’s non-thermal laser-driven fusion process, supported by experimental results, would avoid the need for high temperatures entirely, while Avalanche Energy’s unique “orbitron” configuration would theoretically allow its system to fit in a backpack.

Raw materials and supply chains

In the sun, fusion involves two protons (the nuclei of hydrogen atoms) that go through a complex series of reactions called the proton-proton chain, producing energy, a helium nucleus, and various other subatomic particles along the way. For a number of reasons, though, recreating solar fusion would be infeasible on Earth, so scientists have widened their scope, pursuing fusion with other raw materials.

Most projects rely on the fusion of a deuterium and a tritium atom—isotopes of hydrogen with one and two neutrons, respectively—due to its relative ease of execution and its high experimental energy yields. Others make use of proton-boron fusion, while still others would fuse deuterium and helium-3, an isotope of helium with only one neutron instead of the usual two.

And as with all other energy sources, differences in input materials lead to differences in supply chain considerations. Deuterium makes up just under one in 5,000 hydrogen atoms in the ocean, offering a virtually inexhaustible supply. Tritium is in more limited reserve, with only 25 kilograms stockpiled globally and decaying quickly. There are paltry helium-3 resources on Earth, and attempts to mine the Moon’s natural helium-3 deposits carry doubts. Meanwhile, boron production, though set to surge considerably due to boron’s use in several clean energy applications, is currently highly concentrated, with almost two-thirds of global boron output coming from just four mines in Turkey.

But innovative solutions in varying stages of development could fill in these supply chain gaps. Deuterium-tritium (D-T) power plants are exploring the use of “breeding blankets” that contain lithium and are designed to react with the free neutrons generated by the fusion reaction, producing tritium to sustain the reaction without refueling. Some breeding blankets under development may use enriched lithium to increase reactivity, employing novel methods such as crown-ether enrichment and the ICOMAX process. Various research institutions, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, are running experiments to assess the ability of low- or no-enrichment lithium blankets to breed an adequate supply of tritium, with results expected in 2023.

To meet helium-3 supply needs, one fusion company, Helion Energy, has ventured to keep its helium-3 production planet-side, fusing deuterium atoms in a proprietary process. Those sourcing boron for fusion purposes are looking to piggyback on broader energy sector demand, with emphasis on variety, redundancy, and technological self-sufficiency.

Regulatory frameworks and approaches

Fusion is not explicitly mentioned in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which governs all civilian use of nuclear power and radioactive materials. The act defines atomic energy as “all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.” But in 2009, upon the recommendation of its staff, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) extended its jurisdiction to commercial fusion energy devices.

In the same decision, though, the NRC kicked the regulatory can down the road, choosing instead to wait for fusion technologies to become more mature before settling on a specific approach, or until it was compelled to by Congress. That time came in 2019, when the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act became law and mandated the development of a technology-inclusive regulatory framework for “advanced nuclear reactors”—a category in which the statute included fusion—by the end of 2027.

To that end, the NRC has a few options, which it laid out in a recent white paper. One of them is to regulate fusion energy devices under Parts 30 through 37 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These provisions govern the use of “byproduct material,” which is defined in the code as all radioactive material that is not itself fissile nor fertile (meaning material that can absorb neutrons and decay into fissile material) but is instead created from fission reactions. Given the predominance of tritium in fusion reactions, the NRC has thus far regulated fusion research and development (R&D) projects under the Part 30 regulatory framework. The byproduct material framework has allowed early-stage fusion endeavors to move from milestone to milestone without overly onerous regulation. However, the approach focuses on the material used or produced within a fusion device and whether that fusion device would be considered an accelerator, so there may be some disconnects under this framework between existing regulations and the commercial-scale facilities that emerge. Limited updates or extensions to this framework, which NRC staff have explicitly indicated as their preferred route and would mirror policies currently being rolled into legislation in the United Kingdom, could make it more fit for purpose.

Another approach would be to classify fusion energy devices as “utilization facilities,” which, under the Atomic Energy Act, are facilities that use atomic energy in a way that has a bearing on national security or public wellbeing. Under NRC regulations, a utilization facility is primarily defined to be a fission reactor. Still, as the NRC noted in its 2009 paper, the NRC could expand the definition set forth in its regulations to include fusion within its utilization regulations if the NRC determined that “such devices are of significance to the common defense and security, or could affect the health and safety of the public.” But doing so would subject fusion projects to the same highly stringent set of regulations as fission reactors, which present a completely different risk profile. And it would impose additional requirements for capitalization, licensing and permitting, and workforce development.

The third regulatory option would be to create a hybrid framework, melding aspects of both byproduct material and utilization facility statutes. This would require the identification of decision criteria that could sufficiently separate different fusion designs in order to regulate each of them properly. After assessing designs based on these criteria, the NRC would then move them individually into the byproduct material or utilization facility categories. While this would ostensibly offer a level of tailored control over the regulation of commercial fusion facilities, it could also foment uncertainty among developers and investors, who would be in the dark about the requirements their project must meet until well after significant capital expenditure.

The NRC now has a little over five years to chart a regulatory course, existing or bespoke, that addresses fusion’s safety concerns yet allows the industry to grow at the necessary pace to play a sizable role in decarbonization efforts by 2050. Hearings in the next few months and an expected decision date in 2023 could move that timeline even closer.

Opportunities for policy intervention

In both allies like the United Kingdom and rivals like China, policymakers and planners are putting the pieces in place to enable commercial fusion development. For the United States to keep up, US policymakers will need to play their role in the continued growth of the industry.

One way they can do so is through public-private fusion partnership models, like a newly announced Department of Energy initiative; milestone-based, technology-neutral approaches would drive the entire industry towards maturity without bailing out companies that fail to hit targets. As fusion’s market size and companies’ investment needs grow, these programs will need to scale accordingly.

Consistent support for US national labs, universities, and government-led fusion R&D, with an express directive to assist commercialization efforts, is another key lever for policymakers. This includes ITER, NIF, the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, and Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) projects. Strong levels of annual funding for commercially-oriented projects would enable these institutions to develop a skilled workforce and find solutions to the science and materials problems that commercial fusion companies still face on their way to a net energy gain reaction.

This support should be meted out with the understanding that a net energy gain fusion reaction is not the same as a net energy gain fusion power plant. A fusion power plant will likely need colossal amounts of energy for its magnets, lasers, and other equipment, and heat-to-electricity transfer always entails some energy loss. To that end, smart public support for fusion energy would impel progress towards a deployable net energy gain fusion reaction, but it would also fund R&D for less energy-intensive facilities and more efficient capture of electricity in parallel.

Federal procurement support and coordination with international partners would help secure availability and production capacity for both primary inputs and highly complex end products like HTS magnets and lasers. And legislation strengthening and formally extending the NRC’s statutory authority could eliminate regulatory ambiguity if unforeseen issues arise during the rulemaking process.

Fusion energy could eventually underpin the entire US energy system, but it cannot do so without solid policy backing and regulatory clarity. The private capital-fueled fusion boom and international policy headway proves that the time to engender that support is now. If not, fusion ventures that prove technological maturity and reach net energy gain will run out of runway before they can turn deployable fusion energy from a quixotic idea into a staple on the grid.

Ameya Hadap is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Kroenig on IAEA inspection of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Atlantic Council — Wed, 28 Sep 2022 15:14:45 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On September 1, Scowcroft Center acting director Matthew Kroenig appeared on CNN to comment on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

[The IAEA] want to check the safety of the reactor. They want to make sure its operating appropriately, that it’s not at risk of melting down like we saw at Fukushima ten years ago.

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Kroenig on BBC World News on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Atlantic Council — Wed, 28 Sep 2022 14:53:36 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On August 25, Scowcroft Center acting director Matthew Kroenig appeared on BBC World News to comment on the potential threat posed by the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

[The IAEA] want to check the safety of the reactor. They want to make sure its operating appropriately, that it’s not at risk of melting down like we saw at Fukushima ten years ago.

Matthew Kroenig

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Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig on BBC World News on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The impact of merging climate and trade policy on global demand for nuclear energy

George David Banks — Thu, 15 Sep 2022 19:34:18 +0000

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As countries around the world embrace an increasingly ambitious climate agenda, the importance of trade policy tools that prevent leakage to economies whose climate regulations are less stringent is becoming evident. Mechanisms that charge a fee at the border for more emissions-intensive imports from other countries and thus increase their price in the domestic market have gained traction. These tools, if used by the G7, would likely have enough heft to set a de facto international price on carbon.

Trade policy like this would increase the attractiveness of low-carbon technologies, like nuclear energy, in countries looking to maintain their export competitiveness in a carbon-constrained market. This presents an opportunity for G7 countries to drive investment into these technologies in developing, export-oriented countries as they look for ways to maintain market share. Such policy would also incentivize developed countries that are planning to shut down nuclear reactors to consider the detrimental impact of replacing the ensuing generation shortfall with unabated fossil fuels, and it would push policymakers to assess the risks of new nuclear demand to proliferation standards, particularly if China and Russia continue to build the vast majority of new international nuclear projects.

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By Randolph Bell, Jennifer T. Gordon, Ameya Hadap, and Paul Kielstra (Editors)

The second edition of the Global Energy Agenda provides context for the year that has passed. It features a survey of thought leaders in the energy sector, as well as a series of essays by the leading figures in energy, to set the energy agenda for 2022.

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The post The impact of merging climate and trade policy on global demand for nuclear energy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The complex reality behind Vladimir Putin’s nuclear blackmail in Ukraine

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Wed, 14 Sep 2022 15:27:36 +0000

The decision by Ukrainian state-owned atomic energy agency Energoatom to shut down the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on September 11 averted much of the risk of a nuclear disaster in Ukraine from Russian shelling of the plant, but it also stripped both Russia and Ukraine of a powerful instrument with which to pursue their broader political and strategic goals. The battle of narratives over the Zaporizhzhia NPP, which Russian troops have held since March 4 but which is operated by Energoatom, has been a microcosm of each country’s broader strategy; Russia uses fear and energy to coerce, while Ukraine uses anything it can to call for more support.

On a technical level, the fear of a nuclear disaster that has engulfed much of Europe was always considerably overblown. The Zaporizhzhia NPP is a resolute achievement of engineering, with three-meter concrete walls that already withstood at least one direct rocket hit in March.

Comparisons with the Chornobyl disaster are inapt because what burned for days in 1986 was graphite in the Chornobyl NPP core, whereas the Zaporizhzhia NPP cores are water-filled and thus cannot burn. Nor does the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) September 6 report identify damage to the Zaporizhzhia NPP’s reactor structures, although it does note damage nearby and to new and spent fuel facilities.

A more appropriate comparison is to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, where cooling systems failed due to damage from a tsunami. A complete loss of power to the Zaporizhzhia NPP could have resulted in a similar cooling system failure there, but when Russian strikes severed the plant’s connection to the Ukrainian power grid repeatedly in the last few weeks of shelling, it ran first on diesel generators and then remained powered only by itself. The lone operating reactor number six was used to generate its own electricity to power its own cooling systems, also known as island mode.

This was not a safe situation in the long run. Indeed, the IAEA called it “unsustainable.” But even with the Fukushima disaster, the fallout was fairly localized. Given the strength of the Zaporizhzhia NPP’s nuclear reactor core vessels to contain any release of radioactive material, a similar nuclear cooling system accident there would be unlikely to pose as much of a threat to the Ukrainian civilian population as Russia’s ongoing war crimes.

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The hysteria about a potential meltdown was fueled by more complicated dynamics than the magnitude of the risk itself. As a threshold matter, nuclear accidents remain the apex of fear-inducing nightmares, so even balanced media coverage has tended to ignite worst-case scenario thinking. This natural human reaction makes the Zaporizhzhia NPP a powerful tool for both Russia and Ukraine.

On September 5, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy used his nightly address to proclaim that, regarding the Zaporizhzhia NPP, “Russia is only interested in keeping the situation at its worst for the longest time.” That seems to be true. Leaving Ukraine and Europe in a state of panic over a possible nuclear disaster certainly gave Russia additional leverage in the form of terror with which it could attempt to press its goals.

There is no evidence that this tactic worked. Nevertheless, Russia’s attempts to leverage fears of a possible nuclear catastrophe were part of broader efforts to drive a wedge between Europe and Ukraine, presumably with an eye to getting Europe to help force Ukraine into concessions in exchange for nuclear security. This is why Russia refused to give the IAEA access to the plant immediately and then limited both media coverage of the visit and access during the visit itself.

Ukraine also accused Russia of trying to steal the Zaporizhzhia NPP. The Ukrainian claim was that Russia was trying to divert the electricity from the plant to power Russian-occupied Crimea or the Donbas. This would amount to utilities annexation. Although technically possible, it is in practice a very complex and difficult undertaking. Given Russia’s inability to do much right during its military campaign, it is hard to imagine in the current situation the cloud of ineptitude clearing for such a highly sensitive and technical electrical grid operation.

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It appears most likely that this is another example of Russia using energy as a weapon against Ukraine and Europe. Forcing the Zaporizhzhia NPP offline by shelling the facility removes over 22% of Ukraine’s electricity generation capacity. Coupled with thermal power plants being shelled, the seizure of a hydroelectric plant, the taking offline of Ukraine’s 12% renewables generation, and dozens of strikes on power lines and electrical substations, Russia’s willful recklessness at the Zaporizhzhia NPP appears part of a broader strategy to cut Ukraine off from energy sources.

With Ukrainian consumption down 35% due to wartime population, territory, and infrastructure losses, the country does not yet face a power crisis, but the situation has the potential to become a crisis once reconstruction starts. Furthermore, the loss of over 30% of its baseload generation capacity makes Ukraine’s grid less stable, which could encourage the countries of Europe to delay allowing Ukraine the right to export power commercially to European markets.

Few credible observers take Kremlin claims seriously that Ukrainian troops are themselves shelling the Zaporizhzhia NPP. But Ukraine is not entirely innocent of using the Zaporizhzhia NPP standoff to provoke and entreat. The threat of a nuclear disaster at Russia’s hands has allowed Kyiv to demonstrate the barbarity of Putin and his invading army. It has also given the war an urgency for some countries and international agencies that might otherwise have continued to view the assault on Ukraine as a distant tragedy.

Most importantly, the risk of a nuclear accident at the Zaporizhzhia NPP makes for unparalleled emotional fodder for appeals and fundraising campaigns. Foreign military and financial support for Ukraine has kept the lights on in Kyiv and helped Ukraine hold back and maybe even turn the tide of Russian aggression on the battlefield. However, after more than 200 days of war, signs of Ukraine fatigue are growing. Foreign governments now have mounting domestic economic and energy crises to address. Populations globally are experiencing inflation and high energy costs. They can be forgiven for shifting their focus from the suffering of Ukrainians. Ukrainians can also be forgiven for trying to keep the attention of the world on their country’s plight, using whatever means available.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

A recent Stanford and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study evaluating a possible extension of Diablo Canyon’s operations makes this point concretely. According to that study, continuing operation of the plant from 2025 to 2035 would reduce California power-sector CO₂ emissions by more than 10 percent and reduce natural-gas-generated power by over 20 percent, therefore reducing consumption of natural gas whose attainment has recently become much more competitive. The study concluded that retaining the plant in the generation mix through 2045 would save the power system over $15 billion, a figure that has likely risen since its publications due to the subsequent spike in gas prices.

Other retirements have shown the cost of prematurely shutting down nuclear generation. The Indian Point units in New York were shut down in 2020 and 2021 as the result of a settlement agreement, with a resulting increase in gas-fired generation and GHG emissions.

In 2011, Germany implemented a plan to phase out nuclear power and immediately shut most of its nuclear generation. As a consequence, despite extensive investment in renewable generation, Germany has had to continue to burn lignite, coal, and natural gas. GHG emissions remained relatively flat for most of the following decade despite the enormous investment in renewables. Germany chose to continue with retirements of half its remaining plants at the end of 2021, despite record-high power prices and a looming energy crisis. The remaining three plants are scheduled to be retired at the end of 2022; there has been some discussion of deferring their retirement in light of the current energy crisis, but no agreement.

Several countries have reconsidered the value of existing nuclear generation in light of rapidly increasing energy prices and a greater focus on energy security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Belgium decided to extend the operation of two reactors for another ten years. In Japan, where existing nuclear power plants have struggled to restart since a 2011 tsunami led the failure of the Fukushima nuclear plant, the prime minister is seeking to accelerate reactor restarts before winter hits, and to develop and construct new advanced nuclear plants. South Korea’s new administration has reversed its previous policy, which aimed to exit nuclear power, and is now seeking to increase nuclear generation.

In the US, energy policy has begun to incorporate the value of existing nuclear generation that is carbon-free, has high availability that is independent of weather conditions, and enhances our energy security. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) includes a nuclear power production tax credit to preserve existing nuclear generation and address a wave of retirements that were driven in part by a lack of recognition of the plants’ zero-carbon and other attributes.

Time is short for the decisions regarding Diablo Canyon, and the evaluation required to consider extending operations is complex both technically and in terms of impact. The governor’s proposal would defer the plant’s compliance deadline on the water use issue to 2035, while requiring payment of a “mitigation fee.” That is an environmental consequence that needs to be reasonably weighed against the reduced GHG emissions and improved reliability the extended operations would provide. The practical course may be to take the initial steps to make longer operation possible, including beginning the relicensing process, in parallel with a more detailed evaluation of the costs and challenges associated with extended operation—like maintenance and workforce retention—and the options to address water use.

The principle, however, remains the same: in the context of mitigating climate change and addressing energy security, the world cannot keep running in place. It does not make sense to prematurely shut operating carbon-free nuclear generation, even if the plan is to replace it with renewable generation. Instead, policymakers should keep existing carbon-free generation online and build more, and shut GHG-emitting fossil generation instead.

Stephen S. Greene is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the former chief financial officer of Centrus Energy.

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Energy & Environment

EnergySource Aug 10, 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act reinforces nuclear energy’s role as a climate solution

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The IRA provides much-needed support to the US nuclear energy sector. Its provisions will allow the continued operation of existing reactors along with the development of next-generation projects.

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Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat

The post Closing nuclear generation amounts to running in place on climate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat

Eto Buziashvili, Ruslan Trad, Nika Aleksejeva, Givi Gigitashvili — Fri, 19 Aug 2022 16:06:49 +0000

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Forged Kuleba letter asks Poland to name street after Stepan Bandera

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Russian occupation administration conducts campaign of arrests in Kherson

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Russia and Turkey spar over alleged weapons contract

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Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat

The Russian occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant continues to provoke fear among the international community in light of renewed shelling around the plant. Russian command in the area employs the facility for housing troops and military equipment, effectively using the plant as a shield against any possible Ukrainian attempt to retake the area. Ukraine and Russia have exchanged accusations about who is behind the shelling, both issuing warnings that the opposing side might attack the plant.

Earlier this month, independent Russia-focused publication The Insider published a video in which Russian military trucks enter the territory of the nuclear power plant and unload cargo. The column of trucks reportedly arrived on August 2. According to the video, Russian forces are mining the territory around the nuclear power plant. The Insider also reported that about 500 Russian soldiers are stationed at the Zaporizhzhia plant, alongside military equipment, including armored vehicles, anti-aircraft installations, and equipment for radiochemical detection. New footage also emerged on August 18 showing military trucks inside the plant.

Russia has accused Ukraine of preparing a “provocation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant” during UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s visit to Ukraine this week. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that the Ukrainian 44th Artillery Brigade from Nikopol would strike the Zaporizhzhia plant on August 19. No evidence was provided to support either accusation. Ukraine’s Energoatom, which oversees the country’s nuclear plants, has established a crisis headquarters to handle any possible incidents at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Meanwhile, Ukrainian military intelligence issued a statement on Facebook on August 18 warning against a false-flag operation by Russia on August 19.

Located in the city of Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe. Since March 2022, it has been under the control of Russian troops. The UN has urged Russia to withdraw troops from the nuclear power plant and to establish a safe perimeter. The pro-Russian administration of the Zaporizhzhia region has been silent on the subject.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army continues to attack Russian forces along frontlines and occupied territories. A Russian base was reportedly destroyed in Amvrosiivka, Donetsk region, on August 17. On the same day, a Russian base in Lysychansk was also attacked. The Ukrainian government also admitted that it was behind recent explosions in Crimea. On August 16, reports arose of thick smoke and multiple explosions at Gvardeyskoe airbase in Crimea. On the evening of August 18, Russian air defenses stopped a Ukrainian drone attack in the Kerch area.

In Kherson, the occupying Russian administration the telecommunication company Norma-4, which could signal an attempt to cut off residents of the region from the outside world. After Russian forces took control of Kherson’s internet in May, several service providers went dark as Russia rerouted internet traffic from Kherson through Russian networks.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Forged Kuleba letter asks Poland to name street after Stepan Bandera

On August 16, the Russian Telegram channel Джокер ДНР (“Joker DNR”) published a forged letter falsely attributed to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. In the letter, Kuleba is portrayed as asking Polish authorities to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw, where the Russian Embassy is located, to Stepan Bandera Street, after the controversial far-right leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in World War II. The forged letter claims that changing the street name to Stepan Bandera street would be seen as a gesture of support for Ukrainians. The letter highlights that Russia changed the names of the streets in Moscow where the embassies of the United States and the United Kingdom are located. The letter is not dated, and Dmytro Kuleba’s signature appears to be copied from a publicly available letter signed by him in 2021.

On August 17, the Telegram channel published another forged document, allegedly signed by Marcin Przydacz, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The document contains several orders allegedly issued by Przydacz, including an order for the president of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance to provide a written expert opinion on the possibility of changing the name of the street in Warsaw “to honor the national hero of Ukraine Stepan Bandera.” It also proposes a campaign to increase the popularity of Stepan Bandera among Polish citizens.

Marcin Przydac confirmed on Twitter that the document was a forgery. “The linguistic errors clearly point to the potential authors of this provocation,” he said.

The forged letter on the left was allegedly written by Dmytro Kuleba and the forged document on the right was allegedly issued by Marcin Przydacz. (Source: Telegram/archive, left; Telegram/archive, right)

The Joker DNR Telegram channel also published a post that contained screenshots of Facebook posts from the accounts of Polish nationals Piotr Górka, an expert in the history of the Polish Air Force, and Dariusz Walusiak, a Polish historian and documentarian. Górka has previously written a book that was published by the Institute of National Remembrance, the organization mentioned in Przydacz’s forged document. Górka’s Facebook post claims that he fully supports the Polish government’s decision to change the name of Belwederska Street to Stepan Bandera Street. At the time of writing, Górka’s Facebook account was no longer available.

Dariusz Walusiak shared Górka’s Facebook post on the timeline of more than twenty Facebook users, including Adam Kalita, who works at the Krakow branch of the Institute of National Remembrance; Jan Kasprzyk, head of the Office for War Veterans and Victims of Oppression; and Alicja Kondraciuk, a Polish public figure living in Krakow. He also shared the post on Facebook groups. At the time of writing, Walusiak’s Facebook account was no longer available, but the DFRLab was able to archive Facebook posts before they disappeared.

Screenshot of post published by Piotr Górka’s Facebook account (left), screenshot of post published by Dariush Walusiak’s Facebook account (middle), and screenshots of Walusiak sharing Górka’s post on Facebook timelines. (Source: Facebook)

The Joker DNR Telegram channel frequently publishes documents that it alleges are “leaked.” Some of these documents contain personal information about Ukrainian soldiers. According to cybersecurity firm Mandiant, the Telegram account is a Russia-aligned hacktivist group with connections to another threat actor, Ghostwriter. The tactic of taking over social media accounts to push false or leaked documents is quite similar to Ghostwriter’s tactics. The DFRLab has previously reported on an information operation attributed to Ghostwriter in which social media accounts of Polish nationals were hacked to plant false information.

The possibility exists that the owners of the Joker DNR Telegram account hacked the accounts of Górka and Walusiak, but the DFRLab is unable to confirm this. The selection of people the Walusiak account shared Górka’s post with indicates there may have been an effort to alert people who would have strongly opposed the “plan” to change the street name.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia announces plans to build online system to detect prohibited content

Russian censor Roskomnadzor has allocated 57.7 million rubles (nearly USD $1 million) to launch the Oculus internet surveillance system for detecting “prohibited data” by mid-December, Russian outlet Kommersant.ru reported.

According to the report, the surveillance system will be built on neural networks and will “analyze photos, videos and texts on websites, social networks and messengers for prohibited information, including homosexual propaganda and the manufacture of drugs and weapons,” Kommersant stated.

The system is expected to have a capacity of analyzing 200,000 images per day, meaning that Oculus could be able to analyze two frames per second, Russian outlet RBC reported. Prohibited content that would be a subject to Oculus monitoring includes extremism and terrorism materials, calls for “illegal” mass gatherings, expressions of “clear disrespect” for the state and official symbols, and the “promotion of non-traditional sexual relations.”

An unnamed source from “a large IT company” told Kommersant that the implementation of such a project under the suggested budget and timeline is “almost impossible.”

The development of the Oculus system appears to the next step in Russia’s domestic internet surveillance and censorship toolbox.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian occupation administration conducts campaign of arrests in Kherson

Reports of abuse and arrests are increasing in southern Ukraine territory occupied by Russia. Recently published reports and witness testimonies from the city of Kherson document Russian troops going door-to-door to search belongings, mobile phones, and documents. The Russian occupation administration arrests anyone it suspects of assisting Ukraine against the Russian forces in the region.

Witness testimonies also show that the Russian administration holds civilians and members of the Ukrainian administration in basements, including the mayor of Kherson.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia and Turkey spar over alleged weapons contract

Dmitry Shugaev, head of Russia’s federal service for military-technical cooperation, announced on August 16 that Turkey had signed a new contract to purchase a “second batch” of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. Ismail Demir, president of Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency, which is responsible for procurement, was quick to deny the allegation. “There is no new development. According to the agreement made on the first day, the process continues, ” Demir said. The initial deal between Russia and Turkey was struck in 2017.

An unnamed Turkish defense official also told Reuters that there were no new agreements. “The original contract that was signed with Russia for the purchase of S-400s already included two batches. The purchase of a second batch was included in the original plan and the related contract.”

Kremlin-controlled media outlets such as RIA Novosti, RBC, and Izvestiya reported on August 18 that Russia had started fulfilling the contract with Turkey by delivering the second batch of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems.

One day before Shugaev’s announcement, the Russian Minister of Industry and Trade, Denis Manturov, told Kremlin-controlled news agency Interfax that negotiations about the delivery of a “new batch” of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems were “continuing.”

Turkey, a NATO member state, purchased Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in December 2017. In response, the US prohibited the transfer of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey in 2019. Most recently, the US approved the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, after Turkey dropped objections to Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Kremlin’s media campaign about the “new” S-400 deal with Turkey may be an attempt to sow divisions among NATO member states.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Ukrainians crowdfund Finnish satellite for armed forces

A Ukrainian foundation launched by popular TV host Serhiy Prytula announced on Thursday that it had signed a deal with Finnish satellite company ICEYE to purchase a radar satellite for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

A crowdfunding effort launched by the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation raised USD $20 million in June to buy Bayraktar drones for the Ukrainian military. However, Turkish defense firm Baykar refused to accept the money and donated three military drones to Ukraine instead. Prytula said that after consulting with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, the charity foundation purchased a satellite with the money that had been raised for the Bayraktar drones.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin is running out of excuses as Ukraine expands the war to Crimea

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 11 Aug 2022 01:37:43 +0000

Ukraine appears to have struck deep inside Russian-occupied Crimea for the first time on August 9 with an audacious attack on a heavily defended military base. The explosions at western Crimea’s Saki airbase rattled nerves in Moscow and sparked panic throughout the Russian-occupied Ukrainian peninsula, with traffic jams reported on routes leading to the Crimean Bridge as Russian holidaymakers scrambled to cut short their vacations.

The exact nature of the suspected Ukrainian attack is still unclear. The Washington Post cited unnamed Ukrainian officials calling it a Special Forces operation. Other international media reports confirmed Ukrainian responsibility without providing specific details. In the hours following the blasts, much of the debate among military analysts centered on whether the damage was caused by missiles, airstrikes, or combat drones. Satellite images have since revealed large-scale destruction at the site.

Speaking on Tuesday evening, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stopped short of confirming the involvement of the Ukrainian military. However, in an apparent nod to the airbase attack, he did note that Russia’s war against Ukraine had begun with the occupation of Crimea and would end with its liberation.

In Moscow, the response to the airbase attack was one of characteristic denial. Rather than accusing Ukraine, Russian officials attempted to downplay the incident and insisted instead that the multiple explosions were caused by an accidental detonation of aviation ammunition. This dubious claim is entirely in line with a number of equally implausible excuses presented by Russia over the past six months as the Kremlin has sought to explain away a series of similarly embarrassing setbacks in the country’s faltering invasion of Ukraine.

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Moscow’s record of absurd excuses began in late March, when Kremlin officials attempted to rebrand the Russian retreat from northern Ukraine as a “goodwill gesture” despite the fact that it came in the immediate wake of the country’s defeat in the Battle of Kyiv.

Russia employed the same “goodwill gesture” terminology once again at the end of June to describe the equally ignominious Russian retreat from Snake Island. Unsurprisingly, the entire concept of Russian “goodwill gestures” has now become fodder for social media memes as Ukrainians poke fun at the often farcical alternative reality created by Kremlin propaganda.

When Ukraine sank the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet during the early months of the war, the Kremlin was predictably quick to offer up face-saving excuses. The Mosvka sank in the Black Sea on April 14 after reportedly being struck by two Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. However, according to the version of events promoted by Russia, Putin’s prized flagship actually sank while being towed in stormy seas following an accidental fire onboard. This unconvincing explanation raised eyebrows, not least as weather reports gave little indication of choppy seas at the time of the sinking.

Moscow’s excuse-making has sometimes verged on the surreal. In an apparent bid to explain why the much-vaunted Russian military has so far failed to overcome Ukrainian resistance, members of a Russian parliamentary commission declared in mid-July that Ukraine was using mutant soldiers who had been transformed into superhuman killing machines by American scientists. Commission co-chairs and serving Russian MPs Konstantin Kosachev and Irina Yarovaya were quoted in Russian newspaper Kommersant claiming to have uncovered evidence that Ukrainian servicemen were being transformed into “deadly monsters” in laboratories under US supervision.

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Russia’s reluctance to publicly recognize Ukrainian battlefield successes is hardly unprecedented, of course. Deception has always played a key role in armed conflict and Moscow has long been known as an information warfare innovator. Russia also has a number of very good military reasons to downplay its setbacks in Ukraine. Any public acknowledgement of the Ukrainian military’s ability to strike high-value targets deep inside Kremlin-controlled territory would confirm the ineffectiveness of Russia’s air defense systems and would further undermine fighting spirit within the ranks of an invasion force that is already suffering from demoralization due to high losses.

At the same time, there is something obsessive about Vladimir Putin’s apparent readiness to embrace even the most damaging of disinformation rather than admit Ukrainian victories. The Russian dictator has repeatedly preferred to portray his own troops as incompetent and has invited ridicule over nonsense tales of voluntary withdrawals rather than acknowledge the humiliating truth of defeat at the hands of a country he insists does not exist.

As his invasion approaches the half-year mark, Putin is now fast running out of excuses. Initial expectations of a quick and victorious war have long since given way to the reality of a brutal conflict against a determined and capable foe backed by the might of the democratic world. Despite deploying a large part of the Russian military’s available manpower, his armies have been fought to a virtual standstill while paying a terrible price in both men and machines. This poor performance has proved devastating for Moscow’s superpower pretensions. Indeed, it is safe to say that anyone still referring to Russia as the world’s number two army is almost certainly being sarcastic.

The impact of this collapse in military prestige is already becoming apparent in Moscow’s old imperial backyard. Kazakhstan is now in open confrontation with the Kremlin and Azerbaijan no longer feels constrained by the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the South Caucasus. Tiny Lithuania recently defied Russia for weeks over the transit of goods to Kaliningrad, while even loyal Belarus has so far resisted intense Kremlin pressure to join the invasion of Ukraine.

Unless Russia is able to transform its military fortunes in Ukraine, these negative trends will only intensify. More countries will lose their fear of the toothless Russian bear, while potential allies will begin to question the value of such a geopolitically and militarily compromised partner. Already resigned to an extended period of isolation from the Western world, Russia may find itself increasingly excluded from the top table of world affairs and reduced to a junior role in its unequal partnership with China.

Putin’s perilous predicament means we could now be facing one of the most dangerous periods in modern European history as the Russo-Ukrainian War enters a potentially decisive phase. In the coming months, we should expect everything from desperate offensives and escalating terror tactics to energy cut-offs and nuclear blackmail. Nevertheless, as long as Ukraine’s Western allies can remain united in their support for the country, there is good reason to believe these efforts will ultimately fail. Putin’s criminal invasion has exposed the diminished reality behind the myth of Russian military might. Farcical talk of “goodwill gestures” and “accidental fires” merely serves to underline the point.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Second, the IRA would transition from the current technology-specific tax credits for renewable energy into technology-neutral credits that place advanced nuclear energy on a level playing field with other zero-carbon generation. The credits would be available beginning in 2025 as either production tax credits or investment tax credits. The availability of these tax credits will likely improve access to financing for advanced nuclear projects, in the same way that such credits have for renewable projects. The rapid development of renewable projects, driven in part by tax credits, has helped create dramatic reductions in cost for renewable technologies.

Additional tax incentives are available for projects located in “energy communities,” including those with high employment in fossil fuel extraction, brownfield sites, or where coal mines or coal-fired power plants have closed. Retired coal generation sites, such as the Wyoming site for TerraPower’s Natrium demonstration project, may be particularly suitable for advanced nuclear projects, which are compact enough to locate on the site; in addition, the projects can benefit from existing transmission and water supply infrastructure. However, the tax credits begin to phase out no later than 2032, which will be early in the deployment cycle for advanced nuclear technologies. Policymakers should anticipate extending the phaseout for advanced nuclear energy, given that the technology is just on the cusp of deployment.

Finally, the IRA would fund actions to support the availability of the fuel that will be needed for many advanced reactor designs (high-assay low-enriched uranium, or HALEU). Using HALEU enables advanced reactors to be more compact, to refuel less often, and potentially to produce less waste. But there are currently no commercial-scale facilities capable of producing HALEU outside Russia. Producing this fuel will require capital investments by uranium enrichers, but advanced reactor developers and project sponsors are not yet able to make the long-term, sizeable contract commitments necessary to support those investments. Resolving this stalemate and obtaining access to HALEU has been a key concern of reactor developers for some time. That concern has been exacerbated in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has precluded the procurement of initial supplies from Russia while other sources are being developed.

The Energy Act of 2020 required the Department of Energy to establish a program to make HALEU available, but did not provide funding. The IRA would provide $600 million to fund the HALEU program, for use in acquiring HALEU produced through enrichment or obtaining it by processing enriched uranium in Department of Energy stockpiles (which likely can supply only small quantities at best). It would also provide $100 million to develop suitable transportation capabilities.

The IRA’s support for existing nuclear generators, advanced nuclear energy projects, and development of advanced nuclear fuel will enable nuclear energy to contribute significantly to US climate goals, and in doing so, will establish capabilities that can be exported to enhance climate efforts worldwide.

Stephen S. Greene is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the former chief financial officer of Centrus Energy.

Global Energy Center experts respond to the Inflation Reduction Act

The IRA of 2022 marks the biggest climate investment in US history, and it will likely send reverberations around the world. Our experts offer their thoughts on its provisions and its consequences.

Meet the author

Fellow

Stephen S. Greene

Energy & Environment

EnergySource Aug 10, 2022

Does the Inflation Reduction Act take the right approach to shoring up clean energy supply chains?

By William Tobin, Daniel Helmeci, and Selin Kumbaraci

The IRA houses two distinct approaches to building up domestic and friendly clean energy supply chains. The approach based on incentives is likely to be more effective than the one based on penalties.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Aug 8, 2022

How to build on the Inflation Reduction Act and incentivize truly clean electricity

By Ameya Hadap

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Aug 8, 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act places a big bet on alternative mineral supply chains

By Reed Blakemore, Paddy Ryan

The Inflation Reduction Act’s consumer electric vehicle tax credit will create strong demand for alternative minerals, sourced and processed outside of existing supply chains. The ability for these alternative supplies to meaningfully diversify mineral value chains hinges on further investment and policymaking effort.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

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Bell quoted in Newsweek on Biden’s compromise with Saudi Arabia, Venezuela

lbowen — Tue, 07 Jun 2022 18:00:00 +0000

The post Bell quoted in Newsweek on Biden’s compromise with Saudi Arabia, Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Azodi quoted in Al-Monitor on Iran’s diplomatic options in the case of nuclear talk failure

Atlantic Council — Sat, 14 May 2022 20:53:00 +0000

The post Azodi quoted in Al-Monitor on Iran’s diplomatic options in the case of nuclear talk failure appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slavin quoted in Al Jazeera on the diplomatic implications of US blacklisting of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on US-Iran nuclear talks

Atlantic Council — Fri, 13 May 2022 13:35:00 +0000

The post Slavin quoted in Al Jazeera on the diplomatic implications of US blacklisting of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on US-Iran nuclear talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slavin quoted in Al Monitor on developing Iran-Saudi relations and it’s impact on nuclear talks

Atlantic Council — Tue, 10 May 2022 14:28:42 +0000

The post Slavin quoted in Al Monitor on developing Iran-Saudi relations and it’s impact on nuclear talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bell quoted in Boston Globe on nuclear energy

jgomez — Fri, 22 Apr 2022 18:33:00 +0000

The post Bell quoted in Boston Globe on nuclear energy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sales in Fox News: Iran nuclear talks: Biden shouldn’t turn a blind eye to terrorism to secure deal

Atlantic Council — Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:02:00 +0000

The post Sales in Fox News: Iran nuclear talks: Biden shouldn’t turn a blind eye to terrorism to secure deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Meet the global leaders powering the world’s energy transition

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Mar 2022 04:06:12 +0000

The return of pre-pandemic energy consumption. Threats of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. And a generation-defining war in Europe with global repercussions.

All have dampened hopes for a swift energy transition—but none have discouraged the world’s movers and shakers in the energy industry from finding solutions. The Atlantic Council’s sixth annual Global Energy Forum, which took place March 28 and 29 in Dubai, is where they discussed the tools, policies, and models essential to responding to these and other major trends in the sector.

Here, you’ll find the highlights from the event, which was hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center in partnership with the United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure and in conjunction with the 2022 World Government Summit.

Here’s the latest news from GEF:

Getting off Russian gas: Practical steps for Europe
South, Southeast Asia consider decarbonization
After the war in Ukraine: New energy for a new Europe?
Where does environmental, social, and corporate governance go from here?
Resilience and reliability in the face of evolving threats
Big problems for small island nations
How nuclear energy can power a Just Transition
Is there a future for natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean?
Think ‘transformation,’ not transition
How helpful could hydrogen be?
This is how the United Arab Emirates does it
Don’t count out Iraqi Kurdistan
Meet the Green Builders of Tomorrow
Why natural gas is staying—not going
Will energy security derail the transition? (Part two)
In Europe, ‘the writing has been on the wall’
Leading oil and gas into a net-zero world
Will energy security derail the transition? (Part one)
Urgency and reality collide as GEF kicks off
Pakistan: The next great infrastructure connector
The United States, Canada, and the minerals challenge
Unearthing potential: The value of geothermal energy to US decarbonization
The 2022 Global Energy Agenda
In the wake of the pandemic, new thinking on the way to net zero
Catch up on last year’s Global Energy Forum

MARCH 29, 2022 | 11:37 AM WASHINGTON, 7:37 PM DUBAI

Getting off Russian gas: Practical steps for Europe

The war in Ukraine has sparked serious discussion about how Europe can quit Russian fossil fuels. But what can it do right now to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas?

In a Tuesday GEF panel, Richard Morningstar, founding chairman of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, emphatically argued that the United States must clearly assert the role of natural gas in a decarbonized world. This message must be relayed to Europe, to the finance community, and to the oil and gas industry and exporter companies, he said. But in the near term, Morningstar suggested a strategy that focuses on critical interconnectors around the Balkans and existing pipelines.

Charles Hendry, a professor at the University of Edinburgh, offered a similar view—recommending that Europe carefully review new potential sources of supply, such as Turkmenistan, Kurdistan and others. He also argued for using existing infrastructure to its fullest capacity, and that the EU Commission should consider rapidly approving projects already in consideration to improve the energy security situation quicker.

In the longer term, Michał Kurtyka, the president of COP24, argued that Poland’s efforts to diversify its energy options have shown the way forward, adding that the EU Commission must show leadership in moving away from Russian natural gas even if the near-term economic pain proves significant.

Ana Birchall, special envoy for strategic and international affairs for Nuclearelectricak, argued from the Romanian perspective: that acknowledging the role of natural gas and nuclear energy in the new European Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance is a key step to supporting European energy security.

All agreed that the challenge ahead remains enormous—with a difficult winter likely ahead for Europe, even in an ideal scenario.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 10:51 AM WASHINGTON, 6:51 PM DUBAI

South, Southeast Asia consider decarbonization

The rapidly developing economies of South and Southeast Asia are ripe for decarbonization—but require a nuanced understanding of the region’s unique needs, according to a GEF panel of think tank, government, and private sector experts.

Desiree Tung, deputy director of external relations at the Energy Market Authority of Singapore and Kavita Gandhi, executive director of the Sustainable Energy Association of Singapore, used the island nation as an example of what can be achieved when sound policy design meets robust, clear government signals.

Tung pointed to the Singapore Green Plan, which set out new targets for decarbonizing the economy; she and Gandhi both highlighted the pivotal role this document played in catalyzing key investments in that country’s clean energy sector. Both also noted the challenges facing Singapore and other countries in this region—particularly around availability of renewable resources and land use constraints (though thoughtful Singaporean leadership has managed these challenges, they said). Regional trading of renewable electricity, for example, is one concept that’s being actively explored.

Another key theme of the panel was the role of natural gas. Robert Fee, vice president of international affairs and commercial development at Cheniere Energy, and Derek Wong, senior director of government and public affairs at Excelerate Energy, highlighted the importance of gas to balance and support a wide expansion of renewable energy in the region while also achieving significant emissions reductions.

More broadly, the panelists all agreed with a key theme of the Global Energy Forum: Strength in energy security lies in energy diversity. They felt confident that the South and Southeast Asia region is very capable of achieving diversity of energy supply while also meeting its climate objectives.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 9:45 AM WASHINGTON, 5:45 PM DUBAI

After the war in Ukraine: New energy for a new Europe?

Despite Russia’s brutal assault against his country, DTEK CEO Maxim Timchenko predicted a brighter energy future for Ukraine, grounded in deeper integration with western Europe. More specifically, he pointed to the existing gas transit infrastructure, the capacity of Ukraine to supply Europe with its own natural gas, as well as the considerable potential for renewable energy—especially wind—as particular assets. Ukraine, he added, could also be at the cutting edge of advanced nuclear energy deployment.

But above all, Timchenko stressed that countries and companies should end their purchases of Russian energy (and other commodities) as soon as possible to help end the violence.

Other panelists focused on steps Europe should take in the eventual aftermath of the war. Paula Dobriansky, senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, said the United States and European Union should build upon a new spirit of collaboration and unity in the face of Russia’s weaponization of energy.

Charles Hendry, a professor at the University of Edinburgh, added that the West should develop a “Marshall Plan” for Ukraine with an emphasis on rebuilding Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

Finally, Ana Palacio, a former Spanish foreign minister, noted that ending Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas is far easier said than done, and the continent has a great deal of work left—particularly on energy storage—to shore up its energy security.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 8:25 AM WASHINGTON, 4:25 PM DUBAI

Where does environmental, social, and corporate governance go from here?

From being just another buzzword around the energy transition to a fundamental component of how all companies operate—that’s where environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) should head next, according to a GEF panel representing corporate voices throughout the financial, investing, and consumer-goods sectors.

Neil Brown, managing director of the KKR Global Institute and KKR Infrastructure, argued that every company can do its part by integrating ESG into its business in meaningful ways—and improve their overall asset performance along the way. In his view, the future of ESG will focus on bringing the principles into high-emissions (or otherwise challenging) sectors that are still essential to the modern economy.

But the panel also highlighted transparency and verifiability as key aspects of making ESG effective in every business environment. Alain Bejjani, chief executive officer at Majid Al Futtaim Holding, noted that transparency is a strength, not a liability, for his company, while Kristen Siemen, chief sustainability officer at General Motors, added that ESG is now so integrated into her company’s culture that it’s part of every employee’s job.

There was also discussion around the importance of a global framework for ESG that would put all companies on a level playing field to reassure investors. Such a component—combined with independent verification of companies’ ESG metrics and achievements—could facilitate a much deeper understanding of ESG by all stakeholders.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 7:31 AM WASHINGTON, 3:31 PM DUBAI

Resilience and reliability in the face of evolving threats

Cyberthreats are among the key challenges to an increasingly digitalized, decentralized, and electrified energy system as the world moves toward a transition from conventional energy, another GEF expert panel agreed Tuesday.

André Pienaar, founder and chief executive officer of C5 Capital, said cybersecurity is increasingly at the heart of a new notion of “collective defense,” while Leo Simonovich, vice president and global head of industrial cyber & digital security at Siemens Energy, agreed. Simonovich added that the billions of new devices coming online in the next few years each represent a critical vulnerability, and argued that climate change and security should go hand in hand. “Very often, security seems to be an afterthought,” he said. “It is not built in—it is bolted on.” That, Simonovich added, prevents users from perceiving risk and being ready to stop it.

He pointed to Siemens’ new partnership with the New York Power Authority to create a school, monitoring center, and lab that would bring new cybertechologies to the market at scale quickly.

Other panelists noted that the flexibility and reliability of the power system are key to security. Abdurrahman Khalidi, chief technology officer at GE Gas Power EMEA, argued that the world must fund and incentivize many options to power the grid—not just renewables—to ensure future grid stability.

Kara Mangone, managing director and global head of climate strategy at Goldman Sachs, added that carbon capture, utilization, and storage, as well as the mining and steel sectors, among others, are “under-owned” sectors. It’s also crucial, Mangone argued, to move beyond the binary idea of “good” and “bad” sectors when considering where to invest.

In sum, the panelists’ remarks suggested that an “all of the above” approach is the key to a truly secure energy system.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 7:02 AM WASHINGTON, 3:02 PM DUBAI

Big problems for small island nations

Dignitaries from small island nations on Tuesday expressed their frustration with the state of the current global action—or lack thereof—on addressing climate change. Moderated by CNN anchor and correspondent Eleni Giokos, the session included Wavel Ramkalawan, president of the Seychelles, Gaston Browne, prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda, and Aminith Shauna, the Maldives’ minister of environment, climate change & technology.

“With all the loud speeches…when you compare [with] the reality, it is a totally different story,” said Ramkalawan. Browne, meanwhile, suggested that many countries make pledges they don’t intend to honor, and Shauna detailed the exhaustion of small island countries watching climate change up close.

Browne called for “an all-of-society approach” and added that the world must commit to prioritizing the lives of islanders over the profits of a fossil-fuels driven economy. Ramkalawan argued that there should be legal liability for the high-energy-emitting large countries that are fueling the crisis the most.

Still, all the panelists agreed that the people of island states will continue to do all they can themselves to prepare for the impacts of climate change.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 6:28 AM WASHINGTON, 2:28 PM DUBAI

How nuclear energy can power a Just Transition

A featured GEF breakout session Tuesday considered whether a shift to nuclear energy can keep people (and their rights) at the forefront of decarbonization.

Christopher Levesque, president and chief executive officer of TerraPower, believes it’s possible—and said his company is doing exactly that right now. He described how TerraPower will build the first of its new reactors in Wyoming on an existing coal-fired plant site while repurposing the facility’s existing 200 workers. Levesque also described his hope for the mountainous region of the western United States to become a “hub for advanced nuclear technology.”

Amy Roma, partner and global energy practice leader with Hogan Lovells, added that there are benefits to working at a brownfield site which allows a developer to dovetail into a preexisting environmental analysis, thereby reducing costs and increasing project certainty. She emphasized that community engagement on the benefits of nuclear energy—especially the socio-economic benefits for those who previously relied on coal-fired power plants for jobs—is essential.

But regulatory and policy support are crucial to the future of advanced and conventional nuclear deployment.

Rumina Velshi, president and chief executive officer of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, noted that an effective regulatory framework must promote certainty and predictability while also minimizing risks. George Agafitei, state counselor of the Romanian government, noted that Eastern Europe carries vast potential for nuclear power, but that, at least in Romania’s case, its infrastructure’s inclusion in the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy is crucial to the country’s plans to implement its own pro-nuclear policies.

Meanwhile, Zbigniew Kubacki, senior policy advisor at the Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment, said his country has similar goals and hopes to pursue a range of nuclear technologies (including large, conventional nuclear, and small modular reactors), but that Just Transition principles must be at the forefront of policy choices.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 3:33 AM WASHINGTON, 11:33 AM DUBAI

Is there a future for natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean?

A Tuesday GEF expert panel believes there is—but only if regional leaders can overcome their governments’ longstanding differences. Political challenges, they said, continue to undermine energy development in the region.

Defne Arslan, senior director of Turkey & Turkey Programs at the Atlantic Council, argued that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has a genuine desire to improve his country’s relationships with its neighbors, notably Cyprus and Greece, with potential benefits for regional natural gas development. But she cautioned that Ankara demands equitable development of the resources it shares with them.

Arslan also added that Washington’s method of resolving the development rights issue, its involvement in the 3+1 scheme, and its equivocating position on the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline, aren’t constructive enough. “It is not realistic to keep Turkey out of the solution in the Eastern Med, whatever it is,” she said.

Meanwhile, the panel pointed to another problem: mixed messaging when it comes to potential natural-gas customers in Europe.

Charles Ellinas, chief executive officer of EC Natural Hydrocarbons, said the Eastern Mediterranean has struggled to adopt a cohesive energy development approach because future demand for natural gas in Europe is utterly unclear. He argued that Europe’s twin messages—that it wants to reduce Russian gas consumption, but will also dramatically slash its overall gas consumption by 2030—makes long-term investment in regional energy infrastructure extremely difficult.

Arslan pointed to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline as an example which demonstrates that key gas infrastructure from the region to Europe can be built if there is clear, concerted political support. She added that the currently uncertain outlook for the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline could improve if Europe clearly signals that it needs the pipeline and its gas.

Ellinas added that Egypt, Lebanon, and others will also become long-term customers if the region can focus on collaboration and effective cooperation.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

Don’t miss the Atlantic Council’s recent report on the issue:

Report

Feb 16, 2022

Energy and geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean

By Charles Ellinas

Fossil fuel development in the Eastern Mediterranean is both laden with promise and fraught with tension. Member states of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) have established joint ventures for exploration and drilling, pipeline building, and LNG export across the region, creating an international web of proposed infrastructure to tap its abundant reserves. But Turkey […]

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

MARCH 28, 2022 | 1:23 PM WASHINGTON, 9:23 PM DUBAI

Think ‘transformation,’ not ‘transition’

How does the world move forward from the energy-supply crisis as a result of the war in Ukraine? That’s what panelists in Monday’s final session grappled with, agreeing that Western policymakers must now adjust their thinking around the energy transition to account for the new reality.

Regina Mayor, KPMG’s global head of energy and natural resources, recommended thinking in terms of energy “transformation” (rather than “transition”) to describe how the global energy system is likely to evolve. Joseph McMonigle, secretary general of the International Energy Forum, lamented that the world has gone from “lower for longer” oil and gas prices to “higher and volatile” in the space of just two short years—suggesting that the role of fossil fuels in the transition has been poorly understood. Both believe low-cost hydrocarbons would play a prominent role in the future.

Meanwhile, former government officials on the panel agreed that a new framework is necessary for navigating the energy transition. Neil Chatterjee, former chairman of the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, recommended that policymakers in the United States focus on managing the twin threats to electricity reliability in extreme weather events (caused by climate change) and growing levels of intermittent renewables on the grid (as a response to climate change).

Likewise, Charles Hendry, former British minister of state for energy, argued that Europe must be more alert to (and prepared for) the dangers of reliance on single suppliers for any fuel or resource. He argued that Europe has belatedly learned that security of supply still matters.

That said, he and other panelists said they’re hopeful for the future of low-carbon innovation at a time of tremendous enthusiasm for climate-positive innovation.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 12:40 PM WASHINGTON, 8:40 PM DUBAI

How helpful could hydrogen be?

Few emerging fuels have generated as much interest—or controversy—as hydrogen in recent years. An expert GEF panel tackled the challenges facing hydrogen economies of scale and explored what a scaling of hydrogen supply and demand would require.

David Livingston, senior advisor to US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, argued that it’s the role of government to “cut the Gordian knot” by both catalyzing the demand signals for low-carbon hydrogen today, and also preparing the regulatory framework to support stable markets for hydrogen in the future. He pointed to the Biden administration’s key initiative, the First Movers Coalition, as an example of government actively working to secure credible demand-side signals for decarbonized hydrogen. Other panelists pointed to the importance of standardization throughout the hydrogen industry, verifiable metrics, and carbon accounting processes.

They also focused on the need to reduce costs for low-carbon hydrogen while also setting the foundations for future hydrogen trading networks. Meg Gentle, executive director of Highly Innovative Fuels USA, pointed to the established global trade of natural gas via pipelines and liquefaction as a model for hydrogen fuels, such as methanol and e-fuels.

For Germany, said Tim Holt, member of the executive board of Siemens Energy AG, hydrogen trade will be crucial for its security of hydrogen supply, arguing that the country “will never be able to produce enough green hydrogen for consumption.” But he added that there are tremendous trading opportunities with potential low-cost green hydrogen producers in Latin America and the Middle East.

Broadly, the panel felt strongly that hydrogen’s moment has finally arrived—but also that numerous pieces of the market puzzle have yet to be solved before the hydrogen economy emerges as a major decarbonizing force.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 12:24 PM WASHINGTON, 8:24 PM DUBAI

This is how the United Arab Emirates does it

In a fireside chat with Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe, Musabbeh Al Kaabi, CEO of UAE investments at the Mubadala Investment Company, highlighted his country’s unique approach to economic diversification and sustainable development, which was crafted through decades of thoughtful, forward-looking investment.

He noted that his company, which is involved in a range of sectors ranging from energy to healthcare, is a prime example of that approach—particularly given both the challenges and opportunities presented to the Middle East by global decarbonization. Al Kaabi emphasized his optimism for the UAE to be a provider of all types of energy: conventional, new, and emerging. He argued, for example, that the UAE’s exceptionally cheap solar power positions it to be a major green-hydrogen supplier, while the country’s robust oil industry is already pursuing blue hydrogen.

When asked about volatility in the region, Al Kaabi pointed to the recent Abraham Accords as an example of what can be achieved by the UAE’s forward-thinking approaches to economic diversification and societal transformation. He cited a new gas hub with UAE investment support, which will supply both Jordan and Israel with natural gas, as part of a trend he hopes will continue.

But he cautioned that the world must not wed itself to one particular energy solution, and that it will need all available technologies—including hydrogen, carbon capture utilization and storage, renewables, natural gas, and more—to make the current 2050 targets possible.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 11:36 AM WASHINGTON, 7:36 PM DUBAI

Don’t count out Iraqi Kurdistan

That was the message delivered by Masrour Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, in a keynote message during a special session moderated by Eithne Treanor, managing director at E. Treanor Media.

He offered an emphatic vision of Kurdistan’s future as a major regional oil and gas supplier—one that is capable of meeting both the needs of its own people and supporting the natural-gas demand of Turkey, and perhaps even Europe. Barzani applauded the efforts of the United States and other countries and private-sector players to invest in the region’s ongoing revitalization of its hydrocarbons industry. He concluded: “A strong, independent Kurdistan is no threat to its neighbors…in fact, it is the opposite.”

An expert panel including several oil and gas industry representatives active in Kurdistan largely agreed. Bill Higgs, chief executive officer of Genel Energy, said his company strongly believes in Kurdistan, while Jon Harris, chief executive officer of Gulf Keystone Petroleum, pointed to his company’s plans to double its current oil production in the region.

Crescent Petroleum CEO Majid Jafar, meanwhile, focused on Kurdistan’s natural-gas potential, saying the “importance of the region is becoming increasingly recognized.”

All expressed strong support for sustainability and the economical usage of natural gas to displace other local fuel sources (especially diesel) by capturing gas to provide electricity to local communities.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 10:34 AM WASHINGTON, 6:34 PM DUBAI

Meet the Green Builders of Tomorrow

Winners of the United Kingdom’s Green Builders of Tomorrow competition—aimed at supporting companies at the intersection of sustainability and entrepreneurship—showcased their innovative approaches to achieving net-zero in a GEF session Monday afternoon. Each chief executive officer presented their company’s unique approach to disrupting a carbon-intensive industry, providing a new option for emissions mitigation, or supporting renewable, clean energy economies.

Taken together, each unique proposal demonstrated the growing and robust market interest in emerging technologies and business opportunities in the clean economy.

Julie Chen, of The Cheeky Panda, explained how her company’s tissue and hygiene products are disrupting deforestation through the use of sustainable bamboo paper products.

Ian Mackenzie, of Trojan Energy, showcased his company’s electric car charging point—which is embedded into the pavement to make EV ownership easier for both drivers and cities.

Ernst Van Orsouw, of Roslin Technologies, discussed his company’s approach to stem cells in the production of cultivated meat, which has the potential to bring nutritious non-farm-based meats to new customers all over the world without the considerable emissions associated with traditional farming.

Jo Parker-Swift, of Solivus, described how her company is using thin-film solar panels on conventional buildings, such as stadiums and shopping malls, which cannot take the weight of solar panels made from conventional materials.

And finally, Ben Turner, of Origen Power Limited, described the potential for his company to disrupt the emissions-intensive lime industry by producing a carbon-neutral lime product.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 9:37 AM WASHINGTON, 5:37 PM DUBAI

Why natural gas is staying—not going

Natural gas—and particularly its role in the transition—stole the show in a GEF panel about oil and gas in a net-zero world. The panelists, who represented a range of private and national oil companies, suggested that much of the narrative around it has lacked nuance, or proven problematic.

Sharif Al Olama, undersecretary for energy and petroleum affairs at the United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, said natural gas is critical in his country’s energy strategy alongside renewables, and that it plans to supply both its domestic population and growing global demand for natural gas.

Dan Brouillette, president of Sempra Infrastructure and a former US secretary of energy, added that transitions usually involve using more—not less—energy, and that dense types of energy (such as fossil fuels) will be used for many years to come as a complement to renewables. He also suggested that an “all of the above” energy policy is a fundamental US one that is unlikely to change soon.

Hunter Hunt, chief executive officer and president of Hunt Consolidated Energy, LLC agreed—adding that some proposals for decarbonization through 2050 are simply not sensible.

Just Transition was also a focus. Mele Kyari, group managing director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, emphasized that the specific energy-access and poverty issues in Sub-Saharan Africa must be carefully considered in transition strategies—and that investments in natural gas and liquid natural gas are crucial to the continent’s future growth and economic success and its ability to support fuel supply to Europe.

Helima Croft, managing director and head of global commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets, similarly noted that the world cannot expect the energy transition to be cost-effective or “geopolitically benign,” and that lessons learned from the current crisis must be applied in order to ensure as minimally volatile a transition as possible.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 8:58 AM WASHINGTON, 4:58 PM DUBAI

Will energy security derail the transition? (Part two)

The new US-EU Task Force for Energy Security is well-positioned to play a key role in US national and international-security policy. That’s what Amos J. Hochstein, US presidential coordinator for Build Back Better World, told moderator Helima Croft, managing director and head of global commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets, during a one-on-one chat about the challenges of the energy transition Monday.

He emphasized that the United States must supply Europe with additional gas supplies immediately and in the future, as well as speed up the transition to reduce dependency on natural-gas supplies in the long term. That’s why Washington is working to ensure that all available liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals in and around Europe are importing at maximum capacity, that piped capacity is full, and that available gas storage is being optimized, he said.

Hochstein also noted that the war in Ukraine has fundamentally transformed the European view on the need to diversify away from Russian oil and gas supplies.

On domestic oil and gas production, Hochstein said “we need to make sure that our system and our economy is well-supplied to sustain growth and avoid inflationary action.” He added that US oil production could rise by 1 million barrels per day this year and suggested that investor and fiscal pressures are the key issue holding back rapid US production growth in the short term. He noted, for example, that the Biden administration has allowed significant oil and gas permitting, particularly in LNG infrastructure. Hochstein also indicated growing European support for more long-term contracts, which will ease financing for US LNG export projects.

In the long-term, he added, the energy-security challenge is as much about finding new fuels and supply chains—such as those around critical minerals—as it is about cutting back on conventional fuels, and that the Biden administration is keenly aware of these issues.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 8:24 AM WASHINGTON, 4:24 PM DUBAI

In Europe, ‘the writing has been on the wall’

In a discussion about Europe’s energy security, Maxim Timchenko, chief executive officer of Ukrainian private energy giant DTEK, was among those who made impassioned pleas for leaders to finally confront the reality of Russia’s weaponization of energy supplies in Europe, and to cut their purchases of Russian hydrocarbons. He painted a grave picture of millions of Ukrainians struggling with no electricity or natural gas for weeks amid the Kremlin’s invasion of that country, and also argued that all money which goes to Russia from its oil and gas sales is converted directly into bullets to murder civilians.

Multiple panelists concurred. Alexander Nikolov, Bulgaria’s energy minister, noted that “the writing has been on the wall” not for months, but for years. He added that a laser focus on “green” energy solutions in Europe—at the expense of natural gas and nuclear power—facilitated this crisis.

Wolfgang Ischinger, president of the Foundation Council of the Munich Security Conference Foundation, said the prevailing view in Germany continues to be that sanctioning Russian oil and gas now takes a crucial tool off the table if Russia chooses to escalate further—a view he believes is short-sighted.

Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe agreed with what he described as Ischinger’s “minority view,” adding that the conflict is increasingly about who is going to shape global order. He concluded that “sanctions have to be toughened” and that strong energy-sector sanctions will need to be ultimately rolled out in Europe. He suggested that the global narrative around this war is changing, and that citizens are becoming increasingly determined to prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from winning the war.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 8:06 AM WASHINGTON, 4:06 PM DUBAI

Leading oil and gas into a net-zero world

The urgency of climate action has clouded the future of oil and gas in the energy transition. Pressure on oil and gas producers to adapt their operations to fit into a net-zero world has grown, from both policymakers and the investment community. But a supply crisis and price spikes have illustrated the danger of moving away from these fuels without a sufficient corresponding uptake of cleaner alternatives. Most models of the energy transition also suggest that continued petrochemical demand and use in transportation will ensure a considerable level of oil and gas demand, even in a net-zero scenario.

Oil and gas will thus continue to play a key role in the energy transition. It will be incumbent on the industry, policymakers, and investors to walk a precarious tightrope, keeping markets stable through sufficient continued oil and gas production while pursuing ambitious decarbonization targets. Technologies like clean hydrogen and carbon capture, utilization, and storage, with the potential to lessen oil and gas’s traditionally emissions-intensive footprint, could help. So could carbon offsetting. But clarity is needed, and without it, supply-demand mismatches could rage on without any meaningful emissions reductions to speak of. For the transition to be both smooth and comprehensive, oil and gas will require both rigorous accountability and support for the practices and technologies that can help make them compatible with a net-zero world.

Report

Mar 27, 2022

Leading oil and gas into a net-zero world

By Alex Dewar, Randolph Bell, Reed Blakemore, and David W. Yellen

Oil and gas may have an important role to play in a net-zero world. This report examines the best ways to use policy and investment levers to set the sector up for success.

Energy & Environment Oil and Gas

MARCH 28, 2022 | 7:06 AM WASHINGTON, 3:06 PM DUBAI

Will energy security derail the transition? (Part one)

A move to clean energy is crucial, but securing today’s supply and investing wisely are also key. That was the conclusion of a GEF panel featuring Tim Holt, member of the executive board at Siemens Energy AG, Anna Shpitsberg, deputy assistant secretary for energy transformation at the US State Department, Majid Jafar, CEO of Crescent Petroleum, and Claudio Descalzi, CEO of Eni.

Holt highlighted how the current moment in energy geopolitics has “accelerate[d] the transition,” and that the world faces a crucial test of reducing natural gas in Europe while pushing harder to achieve the energy transition as quickly as possible. He added that while the world has “a lot of the ingredients, it’s just the implementation” when it comes to following through on the transition. Shpitsberg largely concurred, adding that the United States is pouring billions of dollars into energy diversification through hydrogen and also carbon capture, utilization, and storage. She also argued that compromising on one goal to the detriment of another shouldn’t be an option.

Meanwhile, Jafar and Descalzi agreed—but also argued for a more nuanced perspective, given the level of energy poverty throughout the world (for example, billions still lack access to clean cooking). They viewed the push to divest from oil and gas as deeply problematic and counterproductive; oil, for example, is still used in a wide range of products while natural gas has massive decarbonization potential in various parts of the world still reliant on coal. That’s why underinvestment in conventional energy—especially hydrocarbons—could actually undermine energy security, they said.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 4:15 AM WASHINGTON, 12:15 PM DUBAI

Urgency and reality collide as GEF kicks off

Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, UAE Special Envoy for Climate Change and Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology Sultan Al Jaber (also managing director of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company), and UAE Minister of Energy and Infrastructure Suhail Al Mazrouei opened this year’s Global Energy Forum by acknowledging the urgency of the moment in global energy security—but also the need to balance a long-term transition with immediate, near-term energy security needs.

Kempe noted the challenges of 2022—the ongoing pandemic, inflation and, most recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine—and said energy is central to the global drama. The current crisis in European energy security is clear evidence of this reality, he added, proving that the energy transition “is not a light switch” but will take years to navigate. Rising energy prices are putting the transition at risk by threatening the global cohesion that is necessary to realize a net-zero emissions world. Kempe added that the choice between climate action and energy security is a false one.

Al Jaber (who noted the achievements of Dubai Expo 2020) argued that long-term underinvestment in oil and gas has left markets exposed to these challenges—with those markets tightening amid rising global demand year-on-year. While the world must embrace the transition, he said, policies must be tailored to “real world scenarios,” and that “if we fail to plan, our plan will definitely fail.” Al Jaber also said many in Europe and the United States are beginning to accept that the transition will take time, which has resulted in a belated pivot to reconsider near-term energy security, and added that the United Arab Emirates is taking leadership on both near-term energy security and the long-term energy transition with long-term sustainable economic growth at the forefront of its strategy. He argued for a clear, global roadmap with strong foundations—but without defunding the current energy system before a new one can replace it.

Al Mazrouei argued that the current global crisis was predicted years ago, particularly the need for more investment in hydrocarbons and supply diversity, and emphasized that the geopolitical situation is negatively affecting all aspects of energy and human security. He added that diversifying the global natural gas supply is especially important, and that failure to invest and develop resources in this area will lead to even tighter markets. He noted that the United Arab Emirates will continue to work with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to ensure stable global markets, and will also aim to produce the lowest carbon barrels in the world. Al Mazrouei also discussed his commitment to bringing affordable hydrogen to market—first blue, then green—and highlighted three pillars of a realistic energy strategy: secure, affordable, and sustainable supply.

Speaking with Kempe at the end of the opening session, Al Mazrouei reiterated the importance of OPEC in stabilizing global energy markets and argued that politics around sanctioned countries (such as Russia) must not interfere with the organization’s broader mission. On raising oil and gas production immediately, he noted significant production declines in recent years and that at least 5-8 million barrels need to be replaced each year through investment. He added that pressure on the international oil companies from their shareholders to leave hydrocarbons has, in turn, pressured national oil companies, and he highlighted the need for a viable long-term perspective on energy now. In particular, financial and analytical institutions, such as the International Energy Agency, must adopt realistic perspectives on long-term investment in oil and gas and recognize the needs of global consumers who need affordable energy and commodities.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 3:11 AM WASHINGTON, 11:11 PM DUBAI

Pakistan: The next great infrastructure connector

Pakistan sits at the crossroads of the abundant resources of Central Asia and the Middle East, and the lucrative markets of China and India. It, therefore, has the potential to play a significant connecting role.

But Pakistan’s network, though rapidly advancing, is not yet ready to take on these responsibilities. However, there are considerable opportunities; from energy transportation and roadbuilding to digital connectivity and rail access, if Pakistan pursues significant infrastructure improvements, it has a chance to assume the mantle of the region’s great connector.

Issue Brief

Mar 28, 2022

Pakistan: The next great infrastructure connector

By Ali Jehangir Siddiqui

Pakistan sits at the crossroads of the abundant resources of Central Asia and the Middle East, and the lucrative markets of China and India. It therefore has the potential to play a significant connecting role, one that enables broader regional interdependency while boosting domestic economic prospects.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

MARCH 27, 2022 | 2:00 PM WASHINGTON, 10:00 PM DUBAI

The United States, Canada, and the minerals challenge

An energy mix enabled by clean technologies will be far more mineral-intensive than its hydrocarbon-based predecessor. Demand for minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt is projected to skyrocket over the coming years, with supply chains largely unprepared to scale up accordingly. And procurement of these minerals has been plagued by concerns over environmental impact, human rights violations, and state monopoly over specific parts of the value chain, posing both moral and strategic issues.

The onus now falls on policymakers in the United States and Canada to develop resilient, sustainable, and transparent mineral supply chains. As two of the world’s most advanced economies, the US and Canada have the opportunity to take the lead in preempting the emergence of some of the hazards that characterize the oil and gas-based system. It will not be easy; value chains are full of chokepoints, and mining operations have not always followed best practices. But to both enable a smooth energy transition and ensure that procurement does not negate minerals’ carbon-reducing benefits, the US and Canada must act now.

Report

Mar 27, 2022

The United States, Canada, and the minerals challenge

By Reed Blakemore, Paddy Ryan, Randolph Bell

Americas Energy & Environment

MARCH 17, 2022 | 1:13 PM WASHINGTON, 9:13 PM DUBAI

Unearthing potential: The value of geothermal energy to US decarbonization

Achieving US climate goals requires the development and widespread deployment of all available clean energy solutions. Geothermal energy, while currently only a marginal component of the US energy economy, can contribute significantly to the climate action effort. It has the potential to support deep decarbonization through clean baseload generation, efficient heating and cooling, lithium co-production, and a host of other applications.

However, current policy towards geothermal energy has, thus far, prevented the emergence of a vibrant market that would stimulate sector growth. To realize the potential of geothermal energy, public- and private-sector leaders must support policies that encourage geothermal industries and address regulatory, technical, and economic barriers. This report and accompanying two-pager make several recommendations with the potential to optimize US geothermal policy to set the sector up for a central role in the fight against climate change.

Report

Mar 17, 2022

Unearthing potential: The value of geothermal energy to US decarbonization

By Zachary Strauss

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

JANUARY 19, 2022 | 12:23 AM WASHINGTON, 8:23 PM DUBAI

The 2022 Global Energy Agenda

The year 2021 began with high hopes for climate action, as many members of the international community—including, once again, the US—rededicated themselves to the effort and looked to deploy resources accordingly. But as global economic demand roared back from its pandemic-dampened level in 2020, energy supply failed to keep up, inflating hydrocarbon prices, driving countries back to dirty coal generation, and underscoring the challenges of the “transition” part of the energy transition. It became clear that countries will need to thread the needle between pushing for ambitious emissions reductions and keeping prices down and the lights on in the interim, all against an ever more precarious geopolitical backdrop.

Our experts offer ways forward for the energy transition in the face of hazards like Russian aggression, supply-demand mismatch, and a transition that threatens to leave the global poor behind.

Global Energy Agenda

Jan 19, 2022

The 2022 Global Energy Agenda

By Randolph Bell, Jennifer T. Gordon, Ameya Hadap, and Paul Kielstra (Editors)

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security

JANUARY 18, 2022 | 11:15 AM WASHINGTON, 7:15 PM DUBAI

In the wake of the pandemic, new thinking on the way to net zero

In January, the Global Energy Forum made its way to Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week to address the outcomes of COP26 and discuss opportunities to move forward on climate goals.

Global Energy Forum virtual programming at ADSW

The Atlantic Council Global Energy Center hosted a series of virtual events to complement ADSW programming, bringing together government, civil society, and the private sector to discuss the pathways to net-zero.

Catch up on last year’s Global Energy Forum

Last year our Global Energy Center gathered leaders, officials, and experts to focus on the post-pandemic energy system, net-zero carbon goals, the Middle East’s role in the energy transition, and the Biden administration’s energy priorities.

Top UAE officials assess renewables, peak oil, and the post-COVID energy market

The world is about to embark on a big energy transition. Here’s what it could look like.

What China’s march to net-zero emissions means for the world

Why Iran could top Biden’s Middle East agenda

How climate change can become a bipartisan issue in the Biden era

Online Event Thu, March 17, 2022 • 10:00 am ET

How to design an energy transition that includes everyone—including the most vulnerable

The post Meet the global leaders powering the world’s energy transition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

AC Selects: Ukraine’s energy security and US-Mexico growth opportunities

rcasberg — Fri, 18 Mar 2022 19:30:00 +0000

Week of March 18, 2022

Last week, the Eurasia Center and Latin America Center hosted experts to discuss the consequences of Russia’s war on European energy security, the US-Mexico bilateral relationship, and strategies to sustain green and equitable economic growth across the Americas.

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I think the whole world realized the seriousness of this request (no-fly zone) because it will be a disaster not only for Ukraine but the whole continent if they attacked another nuclear power station.
Maxim Timchenko, Chief Executive Officer, DTEK

The consequences of Russia’s war on energy security

Russia’s war in Ukraine is throwing into question Europe’s entire energy policy, with countries scrambling to find replacements for Russian hydrocarbons.

Geopolitics & Energy Security Nuclear Energy Oil and Gas Russia

There is such great human suffering that’s going on and one person, one dictator can do what is being done… the unity of the world, the Western world is really important.
Ken Salazar, US Ambassador to Mexico

Online Event Thu, March 17, 2022 • 8:15 am ET

Ambassadors Salazar & Moctezuma on US-Mexico priorities: Migration, energy, security & beyond

Where do the United States and Mexico currently stand on consensus around top issues for the bilateral agenda? What are key advancements in priority issues, and what may be new opportunities for working together?

Americas Energy & Environment Latin America Mexico

The toughest challenges that cross borders from immigration, gender equity, and climate change in this pandemic, we have a better shot of addressing those if we don’t wait only for national governments to solve them.
Eric Garcetti, Mayor, Los Angeles, California

Public Event Thu, March 17, 2022 • 12:00 pm ET

Road to the Summit: A green and equitable future for the Americas

A conversation to generate strategies for green and equitable economic growth across the Americas.

Americas Climate Change & Climate Action Economy & Business Inclusive Growth

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Slavin quoted in L’Oreient Le Jour on Iran’s demands regarding sanctions during JCPOA talks

Atlantic Council — Fri, 18 Mar 2022 16:17:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in the Italian Institute for International Political Studies on how JCPOA talks may be impacted by Russian aggression in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Fri, 18 Mar 2022 16:07:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in Tehran Times on potential economic opportunities for Iran through the JCPOA

Atlantic Council — Mon, 14 Mar 2022 17:36:00 +0000

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

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#BritainDebrief – Can Decarbonization Disarm Putin’s War Machine? A Debrief from Laurie Laybourn

Ben Judah — Sat, 12 Mar 2022 19:32:12 +0000

Can decarbonization disarm Putin’s war machine?

As European countries have reluctantly started to announce programs to be less reliant on Russian oil and gas, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviewed Laurie Laybourn, Visiting Fellow at the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator for #BritainDebrief. What have the UK and Europe announced so far in addressing their reliance on Russian oil and gas? How can the UK and Europe face the new “petro-aggression” from Russia? What long-term steps must be taken in encouraging sustainability to prevent more petro-aggression in the future?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

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Slavin joins Voice of America to discuss the status of Iran nuclear talks and Russia’s role in recent drawbacks

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Mar 2022 20:54:00 +0000

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Wald quoted in National Review on an Iran nuclear deal

jgomez — Thu, 03 Mar 2022 18:25:00 +0000

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Building on US advanced reactor demonstration momentum: Federal power purchase agreements

Matt Bowen — Fri, 11 Feb 2022 15:50:37 +0000

The Tennessee Valley Authority’s announcement regarding a possible new build at the Clinch River site added another bit of momentum to the US effort to demonstrate advanced reactors. Specifically, TVA announced that it would be investing $200 million towards a license application to submit to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to potentially deploy a light-water small modular reactor, and that it was in discussions with GE-Hitachi to support their BWRX-300 design.

The TVA announcement brings the number of possible US advanced reactor demonstrations planned for the 2020s to five: (potentially) GE’s BWRX-300 in Tennessee; Kairos Power’s Hermes reactor, also in Tennessee; TerraPower’s Natrium reactor in Wyoming; X-energy’s Xe-100 reactor plant in the state of Washington; and NuScale’s VOYGR reactor plant in Idaho.

Perhaps the table is now largely set at this point for US advanced reactor demonstration efforts over the next decade, though its overall success is by no means assured. To add further support, the federal government could decide to make use of another policy lever: federal power purchase agreements.

The idea has been studied in the past by DOE contractors, including case studies for reactor deployments on or near DOE sites in Idaho and Tennessee. In 2018, DOE had even announced a Memorandum of Understanding that stated an intent to draw on commercial power modules at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site, and an intention to work with the local utility regarding supply of power to INL. Along these lines, in the 117^th Congress, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced the Nuclear Power Purchase Agreements Act, which would require DOE to enter into a power purchase agreement with an advanced reactor project.

The concept could get a boost from a December 2021 Executive Order from the Biden White House that directs the federal government to use its procurement power to achieve “100 percent carbon pollution-free electricity on a net annual basis by 2030, including 50 percent 24/7 carbon pollution-free electricity.” Energy from advanced reactor projects could certainly help to meet this requirement for 24/7 carbon free power, and federal action in this direction would in turn help to support reactor demonstration in time to assist with decarbonization endeavors to mid-century.

The success of the US initiative to demonstrate advanced reactors will depend on a variety of factors, including effective project management of their construction, future state and federal policies focused on reducing US carbon emissions, and other policies to assist with first-of-a-kind deployment of low-carbon technologies, such as small modular reactors (e.g., the bipartisan Energy Sector Innovation Credit). Executive Branch procurement of power from first-of-a-kind reactor projects could be one helpful—and achievable—near-term component of the US effort.

Matt Bowen is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Slavin quoted in Le Point on challenges of US-Iran nuclear negotiations in Vienna

Atlantic Council — Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:35:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in Al Jazeera on US-Iran nuclear talks in Vienna and future negotiations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:32:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in USA Today on US-Iran negotiations amidst Ukraine crisis

Atlantic Council — Mon, 07 Feb 2022 14:44:00 +0000

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Sullivan in Arab News: Nuclear power is needed for net zero and more

jgomez — Thu, 27 Jan 2022 16:57:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) on Biden’s Middle East Policy

Atlantic Council — Thu, 20 Jan 2022 20:06:00 +0000

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Nia quoted in DawnMENA on the fate of the Iranian nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Dec 2021 16:44:00 +0000

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Dagres quoted in DawnMENA on the fate of the Iranian nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Dec 2021 16:42:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in DawnMENA on the fate of the Iranian nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Dec 2021 16:40:00 +0000

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Slavin in The Washington Post: We should work more on ‘Plan A’ with Iran before moving to ‘Plan B’

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Dec 2021 16:34:00 +0000

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Dagres quoted in Monocle on the final round of pre-holiday nuclear talks with Iran in Vienna

Atlantic Council — Mon, 20 Dec 2021 16:15:00 +0000

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Slavin joins i24 to discuss Iran allowing IAEA cameras in nuclear sites

Atlantic Council — Wed, 15 Dec 2021 15:31:00 +0000

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Dagres joins Monocle to discuss the latest on the Iran nuclear talks

Atlantic Council — Thu, 09 Dec 2021 14:47:00 +0000

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Azodi joins BBC Persian to discuss the economic implications of reviving the JCPOA

Atlantic Council — Sun, 05 Dec 2021 21:13:00 +0000

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Azodi quoted in Al Jazeera on the US strategy towards Iran’s revival of nuclear talks in Vienna

Atlantic Council — Thu, 02 Dec 2021 21:26:00 +0000

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Azodi quoted in Al Jazeera on US’ plan B if the Iran nuclear talks in Vienna fail

Atlantic Council — Thu, 02 Dec 2021 21:18:00 +0000

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The EU contributed to its own energy crisis, but diversification can solve it

Ellen Wald — Wed, 24 Nov 2021 14:35:34 +0000

Power shortages and sky-high natural gas prices are raising very real fears that millions of European households could see blackouts or be unable to afford to stay warm this winter. However, the European Union (EU) has concrete measures at its disposal that would help alleviate this crisis and prevent future crises. The EU can and must diversify its fuel sources to ensure that there will always be enough affordable, clean energy available.

The most immediate cause of the energy crisis is a lack of natural gas, which accounted for 22 percent of power generation in the EU in 2019. The EU receives natural gas directly from Russia through the Nord Stream pipeline, but Russia recently decreased shipments, causing prices to soar and stoking fears of shortages. Russia claims the decreased supply is a seasonal change to divert more natural gas into storage caverns to prepare for higher domestic demand during the winter. However, the cut in supply also coincides with the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and Russia’s efforts to bully the EU Commission into supporting the pipeline’s final approval.

EU member states must act to diversify their sources of natural gas, because Russia is clearly not a reliable partner. Even though liquefied natural gas (LNG) is more expensive than natural gas via pipeline, member states should turn to American and Middle Eastern LNG providers to diversify their sources of natural gas. This will help avoid the necessity of turning to higher carbon-emitting sources of power like coal and oil in order to keep electricity flowing.

The EU has been implementing a major transition to renewable energies for two decades, but it has found only minimal success. In 2020, less than 20 percent of the EU’s electricity came from wind and solar, and only 13 percent came from hydropower. Though percentages are rising, there simply is not enough renewable power in the bloc at present, and it is unreliable when available. Solar power shuts down at night; wind power fails when the wind stops blowing. There is an important place for renewables in the energy landscape, but they must be adopted with a realistic view to the current abilities of the technologies. The EU should continue to increase its renewable energy generation, but not as a replacement for stable, reliable sources of clean energy.

Similarly, government regulation and political choices concerning nuclear technology are stymieing solutions for current and future energy crises. After the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel pledged to shut down nuclear plants. As a result, Germany, which is the EU’s largest economy and was once an electricity exporter, has become an importer. Nuclear plants are the epitome of reliable power generation, providing stable electricity at all hours of the day, throughout the year. Nuclear plants are expensive and politically challenging to build, but Britain, France and Germany, in particular, should halt planned closures of nuclear plants and maintain those that are safe and functioning.

Even though some of the EU’s largest economies shunned nuclear power for the past decade, other EU countries are actively pursuing new nuclear power sources. These include traditional light-water reactors and next-generation nuclear technologies. These policies should be encouraged, as adding more nuclear baseload capacity in the EU will help moderate electricity price spikes associated with natural gas availability. France’s recent announcement that it will now support building new nuclear power plants is an encouraging sign, as are recent agreements between the United States and Romania and between the United States and Ukraine.

Beyond nuclear power, alternative energy technologies like biofuels have been insufficient to replace old fuels in the EU market. The Renewable Energy Directive, which governs biofuels in the EU market, is hurting the bloc’s energy security. Specifically, this directive places regulatory barriers on imported biofuels, with the clear intent to push the EU towards homegrown biofuels. The European continent’s moderate climate works for cultivating rapeseed oil and soybeans but not palm oil-based fuel, which presents several environmental advantages. Palm oil requires less than 15 percent of the fertilizer and pesticides than rapeseed and soybeans require, and it produces eleven times more fuel per hectare than soybean oil, ten times more than sunflower oil, and seven times more than rapeseed oil.

The Renewable Energy Directive, though, has imposed a de facto ban on palm oil as a biofuel, to prop up domestic producers. The EU wants to be a responsible participant in protecting the environment while also assisting its own economy. It can do both by revoking the restrictive biofuel provisions of the Renewable Energy Directive and re-committing to the future of biofuels by opening to imports of palm oil, with an eye towards sustainability and responsible stewardship.

Of course, the EU wants to preserve the environment and maintain the lifestyles of its 450 million citizens. To power its economy and the lifestyles of its people, it must diversify its energy sources, not restrict them. Otherwise, this crisis will not be the last.

Ellen Wald is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting.

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Energy & Environment Oil and Gas

EnergySource Nov 18, 2021

Following COP26, cybersecurity must be a central piece of the energy transition

By Leo Simonovich

The backbone of advanced energy systems is increasingly digital. That means that cybersecurity is essential to a secure energy transition. Private and public sector leaders should work to ensure its hardiness.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Oct 25, 2021

IEA World Energy Outlook 2021: All eyes on net zero

By Ameya Hadap

With COP26 rapidly approaching and the challenge of net zero on everyone’s minds, climate negotiators need tools. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2021 is the perfect one.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Oct 23, 2021

Rapid Response: The energy crisis

By Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center experts comment on the energy crisis, energy security, and the future of the transition.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

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The Global Energy Center promotes energy security by working alongside government, industry, civil society, and public stakeholders to devise pragmatic solutions to the geopolitical, sustainability, and economic challenges of the changing global energy landscape.

The post The EU contributed to its own energy crisis, but diversification can solve it appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nasr with NPR Capradio News: Iran and U.S. are trying to renegotiate nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Sun, 21 Nov 2021 00:42:00 +0000

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Nasr with NPR Illinois FM 91.9: Iran and U.S. are trying to renegotiate nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Sun, 21 Nov 2021 00:35:00 +0000

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Gordon quoted in Reuters on VTR and the US Budget

jbekenstein — Fri, 19 Nov 2021 20:55:45 +0000

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COP26 is coming to a close. Here are the wins and losses.

Dan Peleschuk — Fri, 12 Nov 2021 19:01:21 +0000

The United Nations Conference of the Parties (COP26) concluded Saturday in Glasgow, Scotland, as nearly two hundred nations signed on to a deal that called on governments to enact stricter emissions reductions and for wealthy nations to double funding to protect countries most at risk—though the language about coal was watered down at the last minute.

Throughout the twelve-day event, our team on the ground at COP26 and elsewhere kept tabs on the range of relevant issues—from nuclear energy to climate finance—as they developed, while also bringing together high-level figures to hash out solutions.

The progress and pitfalls went far beyond Saturday’s carefully negotiated final agreement. Here’s a selection of our experts’ commentary that dug deeper to explain what really mattered at COP26 (and what didn’t):

What the energy transition still needs: a price on carbon

Global Energy Center Deputy Director Reed Blakemore weighed in with his big takeaways as the summit wrapped up.

“COP26 observers will leave Glasgow with a number of positive (and tangible!) takeaways from the past two weeks—a global methane pledge, an apparent opportunity for the United States and China to more directly collaborate on climate action, and a resounding commitment from private finance to put a huge sum of money on the table in the pursuit of climate action, just to name a few.

Though looking beyond the headlines, here are a few interesting threads emerging out of COP26 that will be worth watching in the coming year, based on my observations of the discourse, speeches, meetings, and pull-asides:

In completely separate discussions about mineral supply chains, sustainable aviation fuels, and small modular nuclear reactors, business leaders all concluded that a price on carbon is key to taking their business to the next level. That shows us that continued inaction from policymakers to establish a market for carbon is becoming the biggest obstacle to unlocking the next phase of energy transition.
There’s fast-growing interest from NGOs, policymakers, and business leaders alike in stimulating behavioral change by energy consumers to reduce their consumption. This isn’t necessarily a new idea, but it now has an angle that’s similar to an oft-referenced challenge from the fossil-fuel industry: Forcing production of undesired energy sources out of the energy mix without corresponding changes in demand will just shift management of those fossil-fuel assets to other, possibly less accountable parties, rather than eliminate it outright.
The current energy crisis has forced a reckoning as to the role of oil and gas in the energy transition, though there is still significant daylight between the clean-energy and oil-and-gas policy camps as to what that role looks like, particularly in relation to the role of climate finance in cleaning up emissions from existing oil and gas infrastructure.
Not nearly enough attention is being paid by clean-energy technologists to clean-energy supply chains—especially regarding the scale of minerals and materials that will be required to meet clean-energy deployment goals. If not taken seriously by business leaders and policymakers alike, insufficient supplies of transition minerals such as lithium, copper, and rare-earth elements will foment the next crisis in the energy transition.”

The United States got more serious about nuclear power….

Jennifer T. Gordon, managing editor and senior fellow at the Council’s Global Energy Center, broke down why the US Nuclear Futures Initiative, which was announced in Glasgow on November 3, is so important:

“The US Department of State’s announcement of the $25 million Nuclear Futures Package—aimed at helping a wide array of countries acquire nuclear energy technologies—at COP26 … was a major milestone, and an implicit argument for the role of nuclear energy as a necessary tool in the fight against climate change. The coordination on this issue of several US government entities—including State and the Departments of Commerce and Energy, among others—also shows the importance of a whole-of-government approach to civil nuclear exports.

That the Nuclear Futures Package was announced by Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, demonstrates the intrinsic relationship between US civil nuclear export leadership and global safety and nonproliferation. Countries interested in purchasing nuclear energy technologies from the United States must adhere to the highest standards of safety and nonproliferation.

The funding is intended to build capacity for nuclear energy programs around the world, but not the reactors themselves. It will cover areas such as equipment, feasibility studies, and technical collaboration. While the eventual reactors will almost certainly carry much larger price tags, financing questions can be solved as long as the foundations of civil nuclear cooperation are built—which is exactly what this new initiative will do.”

…but it also gave up moral ground.

Matthew Bryza, a nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center, believes the United States was wrong in failing to join the multinational pledge to move off coal, which included dozens of countries:

“Underlying the fundamental goal of COP26—to implement the Paris Climate Accord—is a moral argument: Because we all share this planet, all countries are obligated to make national sacrifices to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Persuading the Global South to ditch the carbon-rich energy on which the Global North grew wealthy requires strong moral leadership.

COP26 provides the United States a crucial chance to help move the world from parochialism to collective self-preservation—but it risks squandering this monumental opportunity.

Given President Joe Biden’s goal of a carbon-free electricity system in the United States by 2035, it seemed natural the United States would join this week’s multinational pledge to move away from coal. Instead, it joined China and other heavy coal users, such as India and Australia, in refusing to join the agreement.

The timing seems politically suspicious, coinciding with final deliberations in the Congress on Biden’s historic spending packages for infrastructure and economic recovery. Perhaps understandably, the president’s team wants to avoid risking the crucial vote of Democratic Sen. Joe Manchin—who hails from West Virginia, where coal is king. Without Manchin’s vote, Biden’s historic spending packages will be doomed (maybe along with his presidency).

Succumbing to parochial interests is the opposite of moral leadership. The US browbeating of developing countries such as South Africa to ditch the coal on which its economic future heavily depends will now ring hollow. Similarly, pressing other countries of the Global South to sign on to the landmark agreement to fight deforestation (which may be COP 26’s biggest achievement so far) will seem selfish and unfair. That may be why Indonesia appears set to back out of that agreement.

Refreshingly, Biden ‘talked the talk’ when he claimed during his first presidential visit to Europe in June that “America is back.” Now, at COP 26, it’s essential to ‘walk the walk.'”

Why that coal pledge is complicated…

Ellen Wald, a nonresident fellow at the Council’s Global Energy Center, wasn’t exactly celebrating the agreement:

“These commitments are being hailed as historic—but how meaningful can we expect them to be?

A quick look at what’s happening today with coal suggests they won’t make much of an impact in reducing global emissions. In the United Kingdom, for instance, power generators have now been forced to fire up dormant coal plants as the amount of electricity being generated from wind fell to very low levels during periods of peak demand. In China, meanwhile, the government has been pressing coal mines to boost production because the high cost of natural gas has recently caused widespread power cuts. (China’s daily coal production hit 11.2 million tons yesterday— an increase of 1 million from early October.)

And in the United States, coal consumption has declined significantly over the past fifteen years as natural gas replaced coal as a key fossil fuel for electricity generation. But the country is now facing an unprecedented dislocation in energy prices, with the potential for consumers across the country to face record high prices this winter. The culprit is likely natural gas, which is more expensive now than it has been for years, and in much greater demand than ever before, because of this turn away from coal. According to the Energy Information Agency, US coal production rose during the second quarter of 2021, while exports increased by 6.9 percent in the second quarter of 2021. This is not a true pivot away from coal.

Notably, neither China nor the United States nor India—all major coal producers and consumers—signed on. Without these nations, this week’s pledges lack enforcement measures. Given how quickly nations have stepped up coal production to meet electricity demand which is unmet by natural gas, and to relieve high electricity prices, it doesn’t seem like coal is going away anytime soon. It cannot be the alternative when the wind doesn’t blow, the sun isn’t shining, and when natural gas supplies are disrupted.”

…and what the methane agreement means.

George Frampton, a distinguished senior fellow and the director of the Transatlantic Climate Policy Initiative at the Global Energy Center, weighs in on the pledge by world leaders on November 2 to cut methane emissions 30 percent by 2030:

“First announced in September, the Global Methane Pledge now includes almost ninety countries—sixty of which have signed up in just the past few weeks—which comprise half of the world’s top thirty methane emitters. They account for two-thirds of the global economy. Brazil, a top-five emitter, just joined this week. So the Kerry team has been doing a lot of successful work on this issue.

The less interesting thing about the announcement is that Biden had already made a commitment to reduce methane, and the Environmental Protection Agency is effectively just reinstating—and slightly expanding—a rule it released at the end of the Obama administration, developed as a joint pledge with Canada to reduce methane 30 percent by 2030. (The Obama rule was cancelled by Congress through the Congressional Review Act during the Trump administration.)

More interesting is not only the large number of countries that signed on to methane reduction targets at COP26, but also those that didn’t—some of the world’s largest producers. For the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and others that don’t generate much methane, developing policy is about slowly limiting, or disfavoring, gas and oil from countries that don’t do a good job in reducing methane leakage.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were among those who signed up, although they are not (as some might suspect) among the very biggest emitters because their oil and gas systems are relatively modern and control leaks. But some of the biggest emitters who do not do such a good job—including Russia, China, and India—are not yet ready to make the commitment.”

Women are central to a climate solution.

During a Global Environment Facility panel on adaptation innovation on November 8, Jorge Gastelumendi, director of global policy for the Council’s Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, explained the critical role of women in boosting climate resilience:

“Women and children are way more affected than men by climate change, and we need women working in [climate] finance and micro-finance. We need them—not because it’s a nice thing to have, but without social resilience, without social justice, it’s impossible to have climate resilience and climate justice.”

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Nuclear power and the energy transition in non-OECD countries

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. — Wed, 10 Nov 2021 16:38:56 +0000

As the COP26 participants in Glasgow discuss emissions reduction commitments, financing requirements, and the pathways to achieving net zero carbon, the challenge of the energy transition in non-OECD countries is of central importance. There are at least four reasons for a focus on these countries: (1) they accounted for about 60 percent of global primary energy and electricity consumption in 2020; (2) with their high dependence on fossil fuels (86 percent) and consumption of 82 percent of the world’s coal, they produced about two-thirds of global energy-related CO₂ emissions; (3) their energy requirements are expected to grow faster than those in OECD countries over the next 30 years due to increases in population, incomes, and urbanization, thus increasing further their share of global primary energy and greenhouse gas emissions; (4) these countries need financing and technical support from OECD countries, which pledged in Paris to provide $100 billion per year to support developing countries in their climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. Though a consensus has solidified on the importance of investment in renewables, nuclear power’s place in the menu of zero-emission options is more uncertain but potentially quite significant. In non-OECD countries, the long development timelines and high costs associated with large reactor construction will prevent nuclear power from increasing its share of electricity production (currently 5 percent of electricity generation and 16 percent of carbon-free electricity). But the emerging generation of small modular reactors (SMRs) and other advanced nuclear technology may increase its viability as a more important source of clean power in the 2030-to-2050 timeframe.

At the G20 meeting preceding COP26, leaders agreed to end overseas financing of coal power plants by the end of the year. Another pledge followed soon after at COP26, with 23 countries—including key non-OECD coal consumers Indonesia and Vietnam—pledging to phase out coal. These policies will push some non-OECD countries, especially in coal-intensive South and Southeast Asia, to look to other sources of energy to meet their growing power needs. They have already begun to diversify away from coal towards natural gas and imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) as well as renewables and, in some cases, nuclear.

Nuclear power plants are currently operating in fifteen non-OECD countries and provide a firm, zero-emission, and baseload substitute for coal. It does not appear, however, that nuclear power—outside of China, India, Russia, and UAE, four countries actively engaged in new nuclear projects at home—will make much of a contribution by 2030 in the major non-OECD emitters given the status of plans and the long lead times involved in completing conventional, large nuclear units. Even in China and India, which have made new pledges to reach net zero by 2060 and 2070 respectively and are currently building 25 of the 35 nuclear units under construction in non-OECD countries, nuclear power’s role in reducing coal generation will be modest by 2030, comprising under 6% of total generation.

In the post-2030 timeframe, the story may be quite different given the accelerating innovation in the nuclear sector and the advent of SMR technologies that are now entering the demonstration phase in the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom, in some instances in cooperation with Japanese and South Korean companies. China has also started construction of a SMR demonstration project for a 125 megawatt (MW) land-based pressurized water reactor, and Russia is working on a modification of a 50MW icebreaker reactor for remote sites. SMRs of 300MWs or less create new opportunities for nuclear power deployment in non-OECD countries, including those with smaller electricity systems and without the resources to pay for $5-to-10 billion large, third-generation reactors. These modular systems can be built more quickly and can provide grid flexibility to complement intermittent renewables. They can also provide heat for industry and communities, energy for desalination plants, and hydrogen to replace natural gas and petroleum in various sectors. It will require sufficient economies of scale and cash injections from a variety of sources—private, public, and multilateral—to get SMRs on their feet, but their potential to make clean energy stable and affordable should not be ignored.

The International Energy Agency, in its Roadmap to Net Zero by 2050, stressed the importance of innovation and development of technologies not yet in commercial operation. COP26 provides an opportunity to highlight the emergence of new nuclear technologies that could substantially contribute to the clean energy transition in non-OECD countries in the 2030-to-2050 period. The announcement by the US State Department at COP26 of a $25 million “Nuclear Futures Package” to work with partner countries, such as Poland, Kenya, Ukraine, Brazil, Romania, and Indonesia, on a range of technical and capacity building projects, is a good first step. However, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—currently leading in SMR innovation—along with France, Japan, South Korea, and other OECD countries, should continue to pursue additional efforts to work with non-OECD countries to prepare for SMR commercialization and help ensure that these technologies will be safely, securely, and economically adopted and operated.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Nuclear Energy Energy Transitions

EnergySource Sep 28, 2021

The VTR will play a key role in the nuclear energy innovation ecosystem

By Suzanne Baker, Jennifer T. Gordon, Judi Greenwald, and Jackie Toth

Next-generation nuclear technologies hold the potential to bring US-led zero-carbon energy to international markets. But their development will be stymied without government support for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR), whose budget was recently zeroed out. Congress still has opportunities to provide sufficient funding, and it must act on them.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Jul 22, 2021

Expanding nuclear energy to the Arctic: The potential of small modular reactors

By Julia Nesheiwat

As Arctic communities look to reduce reliance on diesel generators for electricity production, small modular reactors are becoming an increasingly attractive option. Collaboration between governments, private companies, and civil society organizations is crucial to ensure the successful development and deployment of safe, transportable, microreactors for remote areas.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Jun 28, 2021

Climate change, energy security, and international nuclear energy: Competition in the Czech Republic

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Recent reports of Russian intelligence operations in the Czech Republic in 2014 have escalated tensions between the two countries, directly affecting the Czech government’s plans for the future development of its nuclear sector. In light of this changing dynamic, President Biden should work to support Czech energy security and act to weaken Russia’s position in Central and Eastern European nuclear power markets.

Central Europe Energy & Environment

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

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Slavin quoted in BNR on Chinas growing influence on Iran

Atlantic Council — Sat, 16 Oct 2021 18:46:00 +0000

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Slavin joins Sky News to discuss the future of the JCPOA negotiations

Atlantic Council — Fri, 15 Oct 2021 14:42:00 +0000

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Azodi joins Aljazeera to discuss latest developments regarding JCPOA

Atlantic Council — Wed, 13 Oct 2021 14:16:00 +0000

Online Event Thu, June 10, 2021 • 8:00 am ET

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The VTR will play a key role in the nuclear energy innovation ecosystem

Suzanne Baker, Jennifer T. Gordon, Judi Greenwald, and Jackie Toth — Tue, 28 Sep 2021 21:23:08 +0000

The next generation of civil nuclear technologies holds the promise of bringing zero-carbon energy to an expanding international market. However, in order for the US nuclear energy industry to take the lead in manufacturing advanced nuclear energy technologies, the US government must support a broad nuclear innovation ecosystem, which rests on three pillars: the demonstration and commercialization of new reactor designs; funding for high assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel, which will power most of the advanced reactors; and the building of the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR). Although the VTR has a crucial role to play in our ability to test the fuels and materials that will be used in the next generation of reactors, its funding was recently zeroed out by appropriators in both the House and the Senate. This exclusion is a grave error that will have far-reaching ramifications for US nuclear energy leadership. However, there are upcoming legislative opportunities to rectify this error.

The VTR will enable researchers—in the US or from allied countries with nuclear research programs—to simulate the conditions of different types of commercial reactors. It will accelerate the testing of radiation impacts on fuels and materials; one year of testing reactor materials in the VTR will show the equivalent amount of radiation damage as ten years in a commercial reactor. The VTR will also be able to test accident-tolerant fuels, which can help modernize the existing nuclear reactor fleet by making it more impervious to accidents and by lowering the cost of electricity. Existing reactors (and their fuel types) are worth the investment, since they currently provide the US with 20 percent of its total electricity generation and more than half of its carbon-free electricity.

The advanced reactor designs slated for demonstration in the next several years and the advanced fuel that will power those designs require a testing facility so that they can continue to innovate. At the moment, Russia is the only country that has a test reactor with comparable capabilities. However, geopolitical tensions between the US and Russia have made it increasingly difficult for US companies to test their nuclear fuel and materials in Russia. Russia’s test reactor gives its state-owned nuclear enterprises an edge over the US nuclear energy industry. If the US is to compete effectively with Russian nuclear energy technologies in the years ahead, then the US needs its own testing facility.

Domestically, the VTR would also benefit the US economy by enabling the continued development of new nuclear power plant projects. Nuclear construction projects will employ US workers, creating union jobs and restoring the domestic nuclear supply chain, a necessity for the rapid deployment of advanced reactors for climate mitigation.

While some detractors have argued that Congress should no longer fund the program due to its cost, the estimated price tag (between $3 billion and $6 billion over several years) pales in comparison to the DOE’s annual budget. For the current fiscal year alone, lawmakers have appropriated over $39 billion to the DOE. Expert predictions of the annual cost of climate change and the failure to decarbonize the global further dwarf the estimated cost of the VTR. In addition, opportunities exist to defray the VTR’s costs, most notably through international cooperation and funding from civil nuclear allies who wish to test their own nuclear fuel and materials. Although some US advanced nuclear reactors may be demonstrated before the VTR is completed, the VTR will enable nearly all nuclear energy technologies to innovate well into the future.

Congress still has opportunities to support the VTR, especially through the reconciliation process and—looking ahead—through Fiscal Year 2022 spending. As part of reconciliation, the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology has proposed $95 million for the VTR. The VTR should be recognized as a crucial tool for the widespread deployment of advanced nuclear energy technologies, and it should be supported by climate and innovation advocates alike.

Each of the three requisites of US nuclear innovation—the demonstration of new reactors, support for new fuels, and a domestic testing capacity—plays a different role in the nuclear ecosystem. All three support the development of the next generation of nuclear energy technologies. The VTR will ensure that advanced nuclear technologies can continue to adapt to a changing world and meet the growing global demand for clean electricity. Without the VTR, the next generation of nuclear energy technologies in the US could be its last.

Suzanne Baker is the co-founder of Good Energy Collective.

Jennifer T. Gordon is the managing editor and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Judi Greenwald is the executive director of the Nuclear Innovation Alliance.

Jackie Toth is the senior advocacy director of Good Energy Collective.

EnergySource Jul 22, 2021

Expanding nuclear energy to the Arctic: The potential of small modular reactors

By Julia Nesheiwat

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Jun 28, 2021

Climate change, energy security, and international nuclear energy: Competition in the Czech Republic

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Recent reports of Russian intelligence operations in the Czech Republic in 2014 have escalated tensions between the two countries, directly affecting the Czech government’s plans for the future development of its nuclear sector. In light of this changing dynamic, President Biden should work to support Czech energy security and act to weaken Russia’s position in Central and Eastern European nuclear power markets.

Central Europe Energy & Environment

EnergySource Feb 19, 2021

How a HALEU bank could work

By Stephen S. Greene

Lack of a long-term, reliable source of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel represents a critical risk to the deployment of advanced reactors, which could be a key source of carbon-free electricity in the future. However, a HALEU fuel bank could resolve the conundrum facing advanced reactor developers and potential HALEU fuel suppliers by supporting the production of HALEU for advanced reactors and resolving the uncertainty faced by reactor developers and their potential customers and sources of financing.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

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The Raisi administration must answer the IAEA enquires. Otherwise, Vienna talks risk derailment.

Kelsey Davenport — Mon, 16 Aug 2021 10:11:50 +0000

All eyes will be on newly inaugurated Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s negotiating team when they return to Vienna to resume talks on restoring the 2015 nuclear deal. However, Raisi faces another challenge in Vienna—the country’s increasingly tenuous relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Tehran’s failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation into past possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities risks derailing progress on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) restoration and undermining confidence that Iran’s current nuclear program is peaceful.

Along with the Vienna talks, Raisi inherited the IAEA’s ongoing investigation into Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear program—an investigation that Tehran has stalled and drawn out over the past three years to the growing frustration of the nuclear watchdog. While Raisi has indicated that Tehran will return to talks on restoring the 2015 nuclear deal, he has not given any hint as to whether he will also prioritize cooperating with the IAEA. Momentum in the Vienna talks may spur Iran to address the IAEA’s questions, but progress during the first six rounds of negotiations earlier this year did not lead to greater cooperation with the agency. If Iran continues in this vein and stonewalls the IAEA’s inquiries, the investigation could disrupt the process to restore and sustain the deal.

While Iran’s failure to provide full and timely cooperation with the IAEA’s investigation is troubling and must be addressed, there is no indication in the IAEA’s public reports that the agency suspects such pre-2003 activities to be ongoing. Furthermore, the past work does not pose a near-term proliferation risk. Iran, however, as a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is legally obligated to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to provide assurance that its nuclear program is peaceful, irrespective of the JCPOA’s status.

The evidence presented by the IAEA to date suggests that Tehran failed to declare certain nuclear materials and activities from its pre-2003 program to the agency, as required by its safeguards agreement. Specifically, the IAEA identified four locations not part of Iran’s declared nuclear program where inspectors have evidence of uranium activities. After significant delays and initial denials, Iran granted inspectors access to one site in 2019 and three others in 2020. Environmental samples from three of the sites indicated the presence of processed uranium. The agency’s questions to Iran about the locations and uranium in 2020 and 2021 have gone unanswered since or deemed “not technically credible” by the agency, according to its most recent report on the investigation in May. The presence of uranium and Tehran’s failure to account for it makes it highly likely that Iran violated its safeguards obligations.

Tehran has argued that the IAEA’s investigation into its pre-2003 nuclear program was closed as part of the JCPOA and that the current line of questioning is politically motivated. Then Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in August 2020 after meeting with the IAEA that the inquiry was driven by those who want to “torpedo” Iran’s transparency by reopening “closed matters.”

Zarif was likely referring to one of the sources of the IAEA’s evidence, documents that Israeli intelligence agency Mossad stole from Iran in 2018. But this line of argument—that the IAEA cannot revisit Iran’s past activities and that its current efforts are politically motivated—does not hold water.

Under the JCPOA, Tehran was required to respond to IAEA inquiries about the illicit nuclear activities that violated its safeguards and NPT commitment to a peaceful nuclear program. The agency published a report in December 2015 concluding that Tehran had an organized nuclear weapons program through 2003 and that some activities continued until 2009, but that there was no evidence of nuclear weapons work since that time.

The 2015 report closed the IAEA’s open investigation, but the agency is still required to follow up on information suggesting that a country is not in compliance with its safeguards agreement. New information made available to the IAEA—partly from the stolen documents—pointed to the existence of nuclear materials that Tehran should have declared to the agency. The IAEA is obligated to evaluate that information and, if the evidence is credible, investigate whether Iran’s nuclear materials are accounted for and for peaceful purposes. This is also necessary to preserve the integrity of the safeguards system. Failure to follow up would have cast doubt on the agency’s ability to do its job. It is also in Iran’s interest for the IAEA to investigate. Stonewalling the agency only fuels speculation that Tehran has something to hide.

While this investigation is about past activities that ended long before the JCPOA was negotiated, it could still threaten efforts to restore the nuclear deal. The IAEA is clearly growing impatient with Tehran’s continued refusal to provide adequate answers to the agency’s investigation. IAEA Director General Rafeal Mariano Grossi warned at the last agency board meeting in June that the lack of progress toward resolving these issues “seriously affects the ability of the agency to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.”

Grossi’s concern over the stalled process may spur IAEA member states to act at the agency’s upcoming Board of Governors meeting in September and push forth a resolution calling on Tehran to cooperate with the agency’s investigation. The thirty-five-member board, which comprises of IAEA member states, took similar action last year and appeared to produce results. In June 2020, the Board of Governors passed a resolution calling on Iran to “fully cooperate” with the IAEA “without any further delay” by providing access to locations specified by the agency. Two months later, Iran and the IAEA negotiated access to the three locations mentioned above so that inspectors could test for traces of uranium.

Earlier this year, ahead of the February Board of Governors meeting, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom considered introducing another resolution on Iran that included language calling on Tehran to cooperate with the agency’s investigation fully. They ultimately decided not to pursue a resolution to preserve space for talks restoring the JCPOA, but voiced concern over Iran’s failure to fully cooperate.

The Board of Governors may hold off on such a resolution at the September board meeting to give Raisi’s new administration time to engage with the IAEA, but time is not on Tehran’s side. If there is no progress, it would not be surprising if the states press forward with a resolution calling on Iran to cooperate before the end of the year. If a resolution does not produce results, the board could refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as it did in 2006 when Tehran repeatedly refused to comply with IAEA requests for information about undeclared nuclear activities.

It is unclear whether the UNSC would act in the event of a board referral. When the IAEA reported Iran to the UNSC in 2006, it ultimately led to resolutions requiring Tehran to halt nuclear activities and imposed sanctions on the country. However, a single veto would block any Security Council action and Russia and China may be unwilling to subject Tehran to sanctions at this point. However, other states may reconsider sanctions against Iran and, politically, restoration of the JCPOA may be more challenging if Tehran was referred to the UNSC for failing to comply with its NPT safeguards obligations.

These implications for the JCPOA and the importance of preserving the broader integrity of the safeguards regime demonstrate the critical importance of Iran’s timely and full cooperation with the IAEA’s investigation. If the Raisi government can get off on the right foot and make progress with the IAEA, it could also help garner momentum in talks to restoring the JCPOA and quell speculation that Tehran is hiding something. It behooves the newly inaugurated Raisi government to prioritize setting a date to resume talks with the IAEA over the agency’s investigation. Agreeing on a timeframe to fully respond to the IAEA’s questions and following through in a timely fashion will send a message to the IAEA, the United States, and P4+1—Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia—negotiators that Tehran is serious is about meeting its international nuclear obligations.

If the issue is not resolved bilaterally between the IAEA and Iran, the US, P4+1, and Tehran should consider folding a timeframe for Iran to address the agency’s questions into any plan to restore the JCPOA. If the deal is restored without the IAEA’s investigation being addressed and Iran continues to stymie the agency’s inquiries, it risks undermining the accord and fueling speculation about the nature of Tehran’s nuclear program.

Kelsey Davenport is the director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association. Follow her on Twitter: @KelseyDav.

IranSource Dec 8, 2020

A history of continuity in Iran’s long nuclear program

By Sina Azodi

Iran’s interest in developing a nuclear deterrent is often attributed to the Islamic Republic. However, in reality, this interest predates the 1979 revolution and reflects a deep-seated desire for national prestige and development, as well as a need to deter regional rivals.

Iran Middle East

IranSource Apr 23, 2021

‘Poison pill sanctions’ are hard for Vienna negotiators to swallow

By Brian O’Toole

“Poison pill sanctions,” a large list of sanctions that would have been allowed under the 2015 nuclear accord, are clearly the sticking point in the ongoing negotiations and the focus of the technical working groups in Vienna.

Economic Sanctions Iran

Blog Post Jun 22, 2020

IAEA mildly reprimands Iran over suspect nuclear sites

By Mark Fitzpatrick

The board on June 19 issued a mild rebuke, echoing IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s expression of “serious concern” that Iran has not provided access to two locations where unreported nuclear activity allegedly took place nearly two decades ago.

Politics & Diplomacy

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Expanding nuclear energy to the Arctic: The potential of small modular reactors

Julia Nesheiwat — Thu, 22 Jul 2021 15:02:59 +0000

With increased emphasis on achieving political and technological solutions to climate change, many experts in the global community are turning their focus to the virtually emissions-free power produced by nuclear reactors. The continued development of small modular reactors (SMRs) offers a potential opportunity to overcome many of the hindrances presented by larger nuclear power plants, including high costs, complex supply chains, large physical infrastructure, and unsuitability in harsh environments, such as the Arctic. The Biden Administration and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson have both signaled that SMRs have a key role in combatting carbon emissions and meeting increased energy demand. More recently, several Canadian provincial governments have joined forces with private corporations to conduct feasibility studies for the deployment of SMRs in the far north. SMRs present a vital opportunity for energy production in the Arctic, where energy needs are more demanding and difficult to meet due to the region’s low temperatures, low population density, and inaccessibility. While other energy sources such as natural gas and oil are abundant in the Arctic, their exploitation is not sustainable and often comes at a high cost to local communities and the environment. While nuclear energy is not a new technology, recent advancements like SMRs present a promising solution to challenges associated with traditional nuclear power and fossil fuels, as well as along with high-polluting diesel generators used in the Arctic.

Arctic nations have explored the viability of nuclear energy production in the region for years. Despite high electricity production capabilities, traditional nuclear power plants entail complicated waste disposal operations and have more recently come under increased scrutiny over safety concerns and broader public perception issues, especially in Europe. In contrast, SMRs are smaller, easily deployed in almost any environment, and feature extensive passive safety features. They also use a set design framework and have extended fuel cycles, which reduces challenges associated with spent nuclear fuel and lowers the likelihood of radiation escaping containment.

The Arctic currently suffers from a dearth of renewable electricity generation, despite copious opportunities. Roughly half of the Arctic’s populations live in remote locations, requiring off-grid systems; consequently, approximately 80 percent of Arctic communities depend exclusively on diesel generators for electricity. Despite the region’s abundance of natural resources, most diesel fuel is imported, threatening energy security with both increased costs and the likelihood of shortages. While wind, solar, and hydropower are also viable green alternatives to fossil fuels, each comes with its own disadvantages in comparison to SMRs. Wind turbines are not yet adapted to the harsh Arctic conditions with persistent temperatures below – forty degrees Celsius. They likewise carry an environmental impact related to land use and interference with wildlife, especially migratory birds. Solar energy systems also require extensive land to reach higher levels of production, and their effectiveness is limited in the Arctic winter. Hydropower requires large initial investments and may have severe environmental impacts, especially if a large storage lake is necessary. SMRs can overcome all these challenges given their low start-up costs, use of uranium (which is abundant in the Arctic), and minor environmental footprint.

Nevertheless, installing SMRs in the Arctic comes with its own set of unique challenges. SMRs for commercial use are currently restricted by regulatory regimes that are far more accustomed to licensing conventional nuclear power plants. SMRs also generate less power than conventional nuclear plants and require a connection to the electrical grid to transport electricity from the reactor to the end-user. However, they can be deployed on the sites of retiring coal or diesel-fired power plants. For example, in the Canadian North, diesel plants serve many communities in Nunavut. Yet thirteen out of seventeen are at the end of their usable lives. Closing these plants and installing SMRs that can take advantage of existing switchyards and turbines have the potential to reduce initial costs, which could in turn be used to expand the electrical grid to more remote settlements.

As a result of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Pentagon initiated Project Pele which commissioned two companies to design SMRs for its remote operating bases. The research and development project required the companies design and build a one to five megawatt reactor that can last at least three years and be rapidly redeployed and removed. The project—under which BWXT Advanced Technologies and X-Energy will develop prototypes to be evaluated by the Pentagon—has the potential to pave the way toward the adoption of transportable microreactors critical to supplying clean, affordable power to remote communities with limited access to an electrical grid. The Pentagon plans to make a full evaluation in 2022 to determine whether to proceed to limited production.

While SMR technology is still in the early stages of development, increased attention to future advances in this area of nuclear technology is expected to result in a viable, functioning, and deployed SMR before the end of the decade. Expanding research in the nuclear domain will have many positive knock-on effects as well, especially in combatting climate change. The Arctic is the most suitable location for SMR pilot tests due to its remoteness and high-energy needs. To ensure the development and successful long-term deployment of SMRs in the region, governments, private companies, and civil society organizations need to continue to fund, pursue, and encourage further investment in nuclear energy production technologies, with a particular focus on SMRs and their viability in the far north.

Dr. Julia Nesheiwat is a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, and since December 2020, has served as Commissioner on the US Arctic Research Commission reporting to the White House and Congress on domestic and international Arctic issues.

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Climate change, energy security, and international nuclear energy: Competition in the Czech Republic

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. — Mon, 28 Jun 2021 15:41:15 +0000

Recent reports of Russian intelligence operations in the Czech Republic in 2014 have escalated tensions between the two countries, directly affecting the Czech government’s plans for the future development of its nuclear sector. After previously announcing the inclusion of Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom on its short list of potential bidders for a new nuclear unit at its Dukovany site, the Czech government, on April 19, issued a resolution removing Rosatom and prohibiting it and Russian contractors from participating in consortia. With the earlier exclusion of China General Nuclear (CGN) from the pre-qualification list, the remaining suppliers include EDF of France, KHNP of South Korea, and Westinghouse of the United States.

This significant action by the Czech government can be seen within the broader geopolitical context of new, threatening Russian military action towards Ukraine and increasing cybersecurity threats, new US sanctions on Russia, Congressional opposition to Gazprom’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline, growing competition between the West and Russian and Chinese state-owned nuclear companies, and ongoing debate in the European Union (EU) over the future of nuclear power in the European Green Deal climate program and sustainable finance taxonomy.

The Czech Republic is one of eight EU countries that obtains over 30 percent of its electricity from nuclear power generation, and the Czech government foresees nuclear increasing to as much as 50 percent of the country’s electricity by 2050. The Czech republic has four Soviet-designed VVER-440-v213 reactors at Dukovany and two VVER-1000-v320 units at Temelin, which are operated by utility CEZ (70 percent owned by the Czech government). Although the Czech electricity system disconnected from the Soviet IPS/UPS system in 1993 and is now integrated with the Continental ENTSO-E system, it still depends on nuclear fuel from Russia as well as Russian-piped natural gas under long-term contracts with Gazprom for a considerable portion of its 8.3 billion cubic meter (bcm) domestic gas consumption.

For several years, there has been a debate over the costs and benefits of building new reactors at both Dukovany and Temelin. With tightening EU emissions policies and domestic environmental protests, the Czech government has been under pressure to close its lignite and hard coal plants, which provide 50 percent of the country’s electricity. A National Coal Commission recommended phasing out coal by 2038 but no political agreement has been reached on a date. But in this context, a decision to construct a new nuclear plant has gained increasing urgency as the government, under its 2020 National Energy and Climate Plan, also moves to increase renewables and energy efficiency to achieve its target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent by 2030 compared to 2005.

The Czech government gave preliminary approval to build a new unit at Dukovany in 2019, and in May 2020, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš indicated that the government would provide a loan to CEZ covering 70 percent of the estimated €6 billion per-unit cost, with CEZ to finance the remaining 30 percent. On March 8, 2021, the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety approved the site license for up to two new reactors at the Dukovany site. The removal of both Rosatom and CGN from the pre-qualification process is significant, given that both Russia and China have considerable experience operating third generation reactors and are vying for markets in Europe. Rosatom has been operating its third generation VVER-1200 design since 2017, is building several reactors of this type overseas in Finland, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Hungary, and has long-standing business and technical relationships with CEZ.

Having first been an importer of nuclear energy technologies from EDF and Westinghouse, China is now seeking to build its own Hualong One (HPR1000) reactor at Bradwell, England in a venture with EDF. The Hualong One has been certified by the European Utility Requirements Organization, and it has also undergone a Generic Design Assessment conducted by the UK Nuclear Regulator, which is now in the final stage of evaluation. The first Hualong One reactor went into commercial operation in Fuqing, China on January 31, 2021, and others are being built in China and Pakistan. EPR and AP1000 units in France (Flamanville), Finland (Olkiluoto), and the United States (Vogtle) have suffered major delays but appear close to commissioning. Westinghouse also has a history of cooperation with CEZ, having supplied—with funding from the US Export-Import Bank—the instrumentation and control technology for upgrading the Temelin plant in 2000. South Korea’s KHNP is a significant competitor as well. It operates two third generation APR1400 units in South Korea, and the first of four South Korean APR1400 units recently began generating power at the Barakah plant in the United Arab Emirates.

The tender for the Czech Dukovany unit is not expected until 2022 or 2023, after the October 2021 national elections. These elections could possibly change the current policy on excluding Rosatom from the tender, although the longer-term ramifications of such exclusion for relations with Russia remain uncertain at this point. The Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade previously announced a timetable calling for finalization of a contract with the selected supplier by 2024, start of construction by 2029, and commissioning of the unit by 2039. Dukovany plant management sent a letter to EDF, Westinghouse, and KHNP on June 21 initiating “a security assessment” process, a report of which is expected to be submitted to the government by the end of November 2021.

From an EU perspective, nuclear power was not included in the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities released on April 21, 2021, although a complementary Delegated Act on nuclear energy will be prepared following further analysis. In December 2020, the EU submitted its updated and enhanced National Determined Contribution (NDC) for the November 2021 Glasgow Climate Summit. The submission confirms the EU target of “a net domestic reduction of at least 55 percent in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990.” Although nuclear energy is being phased out in several EU countries, there is growing recognition that nuclear, which provides 40 percent of the EU’s carbon-free electricity generation, will continue to be an important component of a 2050 net-zero strategy.

The previous US administration, in its Restoring America’s Competitive Nuclear Advantage report, called for strong US efforts to facilitate nuclear energy technology exports and financing to restore US nuclear energy leadership vis-à-vis Russia and China. President Biden should continue this policy, support Czech energy security, and work to weaken Russia’s position in Central and Eastern European nuclear power markets. The competitive nuclear challenge in the Czech Republic will be a test of the Biden-Harris administration’s will and capacity to work with allies on climate change and clean energy transition, and to develop concrete commercial support packages to integrate these interests into the administration’s national security strategy.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

The 6th Annual Central and Eastern European Energy Security Conference

For the sixth edition of the conference, government and private sector leaders discuss transatlantic cooperation on Central and Eastern European energy transition and post COVID-19 economic recovery, with a special focus on regional energy security.

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Why the Arctic matters

Julia Nesheiwat — Fri, 18 Jun 2021 03:07:30 +0000

Recently, panic struck the southeastern United States as the Colonial Pipeline, the country’s largest fuel pipeline network, shut down after a cyberattack. With 2.5 million barrels per day of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel suddenly gone, mass panic buying ensued, sending prices into a spiral of volatility. The incident reminded the nation of its continuing vast dependency on a steady supply of fossil fuels despite significant gains in recent years towards a more diverse energy supply. Given this stark reminder, it should be no surprise that the Arctic region is increasingly coveted for its natural resources and strategic location. The melting of the Arctic ice cover has made the area more accessible to shipping as well as oil and gas extraction, making it increasingly sought after by bordering and distant countries, including China. It is no secret Russia has made the development of the region’s natural resources a priority, while Norway estimates that the Barents Sea holds more than 60 percent of the country’s untapped oil reserves.

Leading edge of climate change

The Arctic is on the frontlines of a changing climate and is fundamentally essential to the regulation of the Earth’s fragile ecosystem. It even provides researchers with the means to almost predict the effects of climate change through polar amplification—the phenomenon where changes to our climate tend to produce more extensive changes near the poles than the planetary average—showing what the future will hold. The increased melting of Arctic sea ice and snow allows the darker ocean and land surface to be increasingly exposed, making it less reflective of the sun’s light, causing the Earth to warm further and faster. The continued loss of ice from Arctic landmasses compounds sea level rise and could affect the currents of the oceans and atmosphere on a global scale, with potentially devastating consequences, even to populations living far away from the Arctic.

Significant reserves of oil and gas

With the continued loss of sea ice and the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, the Arctic is also becoming more accessible, allowing states to reach the abundance of natural resources in the region, including large deposits of valuable minerals and fossil fuels, the mining and use of which could further contribute to global warming. The Arctic presents the world’s new “El Dorado” of still attainable natural resources, with an estimated 90 billion barrels of oil (16 percent of global total), 1,669 trillion cubic feet of gas (30 percent), and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (38 percent). But the Arctic’s importance goes beyond just a pool of natural resources creating intense global competition between Arctic powers and near-Arctic powers to have access to these resources.

New frontier for renewables

In addition to new sources of fossil fuels, the Arctic matters because it is a new energy frontier, for clean energy. From wind, solar, and marine turbines, to advances in battery efficiency, the Arctic is the perfect incubator for clean energy. In the fight against climate change, the international community should take every advantage it can to make progress on clean energy technology, and this also includes nuclear. With increasing energy demand, small modular reactors could be deployed in the Arctic. If it can work in the Arctic, powering remote communities in harsh conditions, why not expand it to the rest of the world?

New shipping routes

The effects of climate change are also exposing new shipping routes, such as the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, previously almost impassable due to Arctic ice. The new routes can cause seismic shifts in the global economy due to reduced shipping times and radically altered routes that no longer depend on global choke points such as the Suez and Panama Canals. Protecting, and potentially controlling, these routes and the resources beneath them has led Arctic nations to solidify their presence and secure their territorial claims in the region. Minimizing international competition through the Arctic Council is crucial to safely accessing the opportunities within the Arctic and to preserving regional stability, given the many competing claims and policies in the region. These may lead to conflict both within and beyond the area if not resolved through the acceptance and rule of international law or by diplomatic means.

Threatened Indigenous Peoples and ecosystems

The Arctic is also home to many different cultures and peoples across the region, many of whom have lived there for millennia. From the Chukchi people along the Bering Sea’s Russian shores to the Sami across Northern Scandinavia, circumpolar populations represent a wide array of human cultures, languages, histories, and religions. The high north also supports hundreds of thousands of species, many of which are endemic to the region, and several are near extinction. The value of this diversity to humanity is inherent in its existence as a part of its common past, present, and future. However, people, plants, and animals are all threatened by the loss of their natural habitats and drastically diminished hunting ranges as sea ice continues to recede at alarming rates.

While the Arctic might seem a faraway place with little significance to most societies, its safety and security are vital to the entire planet. Its unique yet fragile ecosystem, abundance of resources and opportunities, and wealth of human history and cultures make it essential.

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Nasr in New York Times: The clock is ticking for Biden on Iran

Atlantic Council — Wed, 21 Apr 2021 18:42:58 +0000

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EPRI Vice President and CNO Rita Baranwal joins the Atlantic Council Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition

Nicole Meir — Thu, 01 Apr 2021 13:53:29 +0000

Former Assistant Secretary for the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy brings deep public and private sector experience on nuclear policy and technology

WASHINGTON, DC – April 1, 2021 – The Atlantic Council announced today that Dr. Rita Baranwal, vice president of nuclear and chief nuclear officer at Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), has joined the Atlantic Council Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition. Baranwal, who previously served as assistant secretary for the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, brings a wealth of public and private sector experience advancing nuclear policy and technology in the United States and abroad.

“We are delighted that Dr. Rita Baranwal is joining the Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition,” said Jennifer Gordon, managing editor and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. “Dr. Baranwal has transformed the state of US nuclear energy policy, and we look forward to working together to advance awareness of the link between nuclear energy and national security.”

Dr. Baranwal has transformed the state of US nuclear energy policy, and we look forward to working together to advance awareness of the link between nuclear energy and national security.

Jennifer Gordon, managing editor and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

As the assistant secretary of DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Baranwal advanced research and development on existing and advanced nuclear technologies, enabled the deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems, and enhanced US global commercial nuclear energy competitiveness. She has held a number of public and private sector positions focused on nuclear energy, including director of the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear initiative at Idaho National Laboratory, director of technology development and application at Westinghouse, and manager in materials technology at Bechtel Bettis, Inc.

“I look forward to furthering awareness of and learning from the Coalition through the lens of EPRI’s global perspective,” said Rita Baranwal. “My career experience and ongoing engagement with the Atlantic Council lead me to believe that there is much to contribute from my new role in the areas of robust operation of the existing fleet, R&D, and innovating advanced technologies.”

The Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition, housed within the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, works to address challenges present at the intersection of nuclear energy, national security, and climate change. The coalition and its members support bipartisan programming to increase awareness, interest, and thought leadership around the maintenance of the current nuclear fleet, US nuclear exports abroad, and research and development into advanced reactor and fuel technology.

For media inquiries, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

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Nasr joins the Quincy Institute to discuss if time is running out for the JCPOA?

Atlantic Council — Thu, 25 Mar 2021 18:20:27 +0000

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Gordon and Greene in The National Interest: Why the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Partnership Matters

jbekenstein — Fri, 05 Mar 2021 21:16:00 +0000

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Shaffer in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Armenia’s nuclear power plant is dangerous. Time to close it.

jbekenstein — Fri, 05 Mar 2021 19:58:00 +0000

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Nasr in Foreign Affairs: Biden’s narrow window of opportunity on Iran

Atlantic Council — Thu, 04 Mar 2021 19:25:38 +0000

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Advancing US-ROK cooperation on nuclear energy

Stephen S. Greene — Tue, 02 Mar 2021 05:41:56 +0000

The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are longstanding civil nuclear partners. Although nuclear power is a key component of each country’s electricity generation, the nuclear energy industries in both countries are struggling. The new Atlantic Council report, Advancing US-ROK Cooperation on Nuclear Energy, by Stephen S. Greene, examines how both countries can work together to revitalize the nuclear energy industry in each country. A robust domestic nuclear industry and civil nuclear export program are each crucial elements of the fight against climate change and in international diplomacy. This new report argues that research and development, bilateral trade, and the sale of nuclear energy technologies to third countries represent opportunities for bilateral cooperation that will strengthen each country’s nuclear energy industry.

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Nuclear Energy

Globally, increasing demand for low-carbon electricity sources and diverse generation portfolios have made nuclear energy an attractive and reliable baseload power source. Amidst a declining US nuclear industry, new nuclear energy stakeholders, including China, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are pursuing robust nuclear energy programs to improve energy security, meet environmental goals, and demonstrate international leadership. New nuclear technologies promise to transform the energy landscape, but require regulatory updates and global cooperation to reach their potential.

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How a HALEU bank could work

Stephen S. Greene — Fri, 19 Feb 2021 18:40:23 +0000

Advanced nuclear power generation technologies that focus on modular construction, factory fabrication, shorter construction times, and passive safety could work in concert with renewable energy to deliver carbon-free electricity that will help meet energy demand while addressing the risk of climate change. There are currently over seventy projects to develop advanced nuclear technologies being pursued in the United States and Canada.

Most of these new nuclear technologies are designed to use a more energy-dense fuel than that used by traditional light-water reactors, enabling them to deliver energy out of a smaller facility and operate for longer times between refueling. However, there are no existing facilities to produce this fuel, called high-assay low-enriched uranium or HALEU, in the quantities required to support advanced reactor deployment, which is expected to triple by the middle of this century. The lack of a reliable, long-term source of HALEU is the top concern of advanced reactor developers, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 requires the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to support HALEU availability.

The conundrum

To make sales, reactor developers need to be able to show potential buyers that they will have access to a reliable source of fuel for the life of a new power plant. In addition, building a new plant will require capital to finance construction, and the lack of a demonstrated fuel supply makes the path to adequate financing almost impossible.

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has funded an initial demonstration of HALEU production, but that project will only last until 2022 and will produce only a tiny quantity of the fuel. There is no market yet to support the buildout of HALEU production sufficient to fuel even a small number of commercially deployed advanced reactors.

Potential producers of HALEU need firm offtake commitments to raise the capital required to support the construction and operation of new, specialized production capacity. Individual reactor developers are, at best, in the early stages of deploying demonstration or first-of-a-kind units, and are limited in the commitments they can make to potential HALEU producers. In any case, those commitments would be in question, because the prospects for any particular reactor developer are uncertain, even if the prospects for the class of advanced reactors is promising. Furthermore, the initial commitments of one or a handful of reactor developers would likely not reach the volume that would facilitate an economically attractive buildout of fuel production capacity.

Although reactor developers are desperate to point to an assured supply of HALEU, potential producers do not have an assured source of demand that would enable them to raise capital and deploy it with acceptable risk, a conundrum that threatens the future of advanced nuclear power.

How a HALEU bank could resolve the conundrum

A HALEU reserve—or, more accurately, a HALEU bank—could provide a mechanism to meet the needs of reactor developers for an assured source of fuel, while addressing the needs of potential fuel producers for a commitment sufficient to support capital investment in production. A bank could commit to purchase a quantity of HALEU over time that would be targeted to meet reasonable potential requirements of an advanced reactor fleet and adequate to satisfy the economics of a HALEU supply chain. The commitments could be made on the basis of a request for proposal—or other solicitation process—designed to provide price discipline to the acquisition. Payments to the HALEU producers would be made on delivery of the output to the bank—limiting the bank’s exposure to cost and operational risks the producers should control—but allowing producers to be paid based on their production timeline and reducing their exposure to timing risk associated with the uncertain deployment of new reactor technologies.

Once the volume and price targets are known, the bank could offer subscriptions for the available HALEU to reactor developers, which would provide the assurance of fuel availability at a known price to support potential reactor sales and financing. The bank would likely want a deposit and purchase commitment, or some form of security, to ensure that developers and their customers have a reasonable degree of confidence in their volume and timing requirements; however, full payment for the HALEU fuel would occur at the time of delivery, avoiding further demands on the financial resources of reactor projects. The bank, with a low cost of capital, would manage the timing differences between production and the delivery to operating reactors.

The bank could be designed to self-extinguish after its initial quantities are sold off, or it could remain in operation for a designated period of time to preserve liquidity in the HALEU supply. In either case, the funds used for the initial capitalization of the bank would ultimately be returned to the US government.

The public interest would be protected

It is likely that a HALEU bank would need to be funded initially by the US government, perhaps through the Department of Energy, to catalyze the production of HALEU and support the development of advanced reactors. Such funding would be consistent with DOE’s other support for advanced nuclear energy technologies, including the Advanced Reactor Development Program. But the government’s risks associated with capitalizing the bank would be limited.

Funding for the bank would not be in the form of a grant. The bank’s funds would not be committed until fuel was delivered, limiting the risk of acquisition. The initial outlay would be recovered through future sales of HALEU. While some of the subscriptions ultimately might not convert into purchases by reactor operators, the bank would be reasonably protected from being left with HALEU that it could be unable to sell.

First, even if the specific developers entering into initial subscriptions do not make purchases, the bank would have the flexibility to sell the unclaimed quantities to any advanced reactor operators. There are many developers pursuing designs that require HALEU, so even if a small number are ultimately successful, it is likely there will be plenty of demand for fuel that the bank would own. At government costs of capital, the additional cost of selling the HALEU on a longer-than-planned schedule is low, and some contingency for extended timing could be factored into the purchase price.

Second, there is ongoing demand for HALEU to fuel research reactors. That demand is currently being satisfied by short-term solutions, but there is not an existing long-term solution. Even if demand from advanced reactors never develops—which would be a surprising scenario—the HALEU in the bank could be used for research reactor requirements over time.

Conclusion

Lack of a long-term, reliable source of HALEU fuel represents a critical risk to the deployment of advanced reactors, which could be a key source of carbon-free electricity in the future. However, a HALEU fuel bank could resolve the conundrum facing advanced reactor developers and potential HALEU fuel suppliers by supporting the production of HALEU for advanced reactors and resolving the uncertainty faced by reactor developers and their potential customers and sources of financing. A bank would require initial capitalization, likely from the US government, but would ultimately return the funds. The risk to the initial capital would be limited since demand for the fuel would develop if any of the relevant reactor technologies is successful, and even if none of them comes to fruition, demand for HALEU could be supported by future requirements from research reactors. Such a bank merits serious consideration as part of the Department of Energy’s overall effort to support the development of advanced nuclear power.

Stephen S. Greene is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the former Chief Financial Officer at Centrus Energy.

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As the United States develops advanced reactors, a new fuel supply chain is critical to national security

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. and Admiral Richard Mies — Fri, 12 Feb 2021 20:13:49 +0000

Over the past five years, the United States has made meaningful progress in the development of advanced nuclear reactor designs critical to keeping the country on the cutting edge of nuclear technology. The latest step is the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) selection of TerraPower and X-Energy to each receive $80 million in the initial year, for a total of $160 million in initial funding as part of its new Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP), the first installment of a seven-year, cost-shared partnership to deploy the first two commercial-scale advanced reactors. These positive trends signal a growing need for DOE to address a key challenge that many reactor developers face as they move toward deployment: the lack of a reliable source of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for fuel.

Light-water reactors currently comprise the entirety of the commercial nuclear fleet in the United States. These reactors are fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU), or uranium enriched to contain approximately 5 percent of the uranium-235 (U-235) isotope, which is readily available from nuclear fuel producers in the United States, Europe, and Russia. Advanced reactors like those being developed by X-Energy and TerraPower, however, will require HALEU, or uranium enriched to up to 19.75 percent U-235. The use of HALEU fuel unlocks the benefits of advanced reactors, including more compact designs, lower capital costs, longer runtimes between refueling outages—in some cases a single reactor core can last for decades—and potentially reduced amounts of used nuclear fuel. Higher uranium enrichments in HALEU fuel also offer more flexible and efficient operations for advanced reactors, and they provide for HALEU nuclear fuel designs that could improve the efficiency of existing large light-water nuclear reactors.

However, unlike LEU, there is no current domestic commercial production infrastructure for HALEU. DOE has taken an important first step by supporting a demonstration project by Centrus Energy to establish a small HALEU production line in Ohio using a domestic centrifuge technology. DOE selected a US-origin enrichment technology for the demonstration because it could produce HALEU not only for commercial advanced reactors, but also for “defense reactors that require the use of HALEU produced using US- origin technology.”

A second effort under way at DOE’s Idaho National Laboratory (INL) will reprocess previously used highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to produce small amounts of HALEU for reactor demonstrations. However, the fuel contains impurities that may make it unsuitable for use in many reactor designs, and the available quantity is too small to provide an assured, long-term fuel supply. In addition, INL currently restricts the reprocessed fuel from leaving its campus.

The need to establish a long-term supply solution has been echoed by legislators and led to provisions addressing HALEU concerns in the Energy Act of 2020, which was ultimately incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021. The legislation, “requires the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to support the availability of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for civilian domestic research, development, demonstration, and commercial use.” The availability of HALEU is the most challenging issue facing advanced nuclear developers, and the number one concern that keeps them up at night, according to the US Nuclear Industry Council, based on its March 2020 member survey.

In an attempt to move forward on a long-term solution, TerraPower—in fulfilment of their ARDP obligation to identify a plan by which to obtain fuel—has announced its intent to partner with Centrus to establish a domestic, commercial-scale HALEU production facility. But the success of any reactor developer will depend on its ability to design a reactor that can be successfully licensed and sign commercial contracts for the sale of that design to future customers. Yet, as the initial commercial contracts for advanced reactors have not yet been inked, this uncertainty is a major roadblock preventing any potential HALEU producer from raising capital to fund the infrastructure needed for HALEU production. The lack of a fuel supply, in turn, also makes it harder for reactor developers to sell their reactors, creating a classic “chicken vs. egg” problem.

While the government has addressed part of this problem through the ARDP, in order to address the issue of fuel uncertainty, the US government must step in to ensure a supply of HALEU is secured for current and future advanced reactors. There are three potential avenues by which the US government could ensure this supply. The first is the depletion and down-blending of HEU, an option that would likely be expensive and unsustainable, since the United States ended HEU production in 1992. While a small quantity of excess HEU for weapons has been set aside for isotope production and existing research reactors, the US National Nuclear Security Administration expects this inventory to dry up around 2030. The US Navy, which has a larger inventory of HEU set aside for its use, would be unlikely to support using a portion of its supply (needed for the naval reactor program) for these purposes.

A second option could potentially be procurement from Russia. However, this option is not likely palatable to the US government. Further complicating any potential imports from Russia is the recently extended Russian Suspension Agreement, which over time will limit, albeit with certain exemptions, Russian uranium imports to 15 percent of US reactor enrichment needs.

A third option—the establishment of a US HALEU reserve—presents the most tenable approach to solving the US HALEU deficit. A reserve would commit the US government to purchasing HALEU produced by commercial fuel companies in the United States, thereby providing demand certainty that would enable them to raise capital. Likewise, a reserve—and more importantly, the commercial HALEU production it would catalyze—would build confidence among advanced reactor developers and their customers that fuel would be readily available after the successful demonstration of their designs. In addition to coordinating the development of a domestic reserve, DOE should work with industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to establish a framework for transporting HALEU, which may require the development of new containers due to its higher assay of U-235. The need to develop transportation packages and certifications for HALEU is also called out in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021.

The goal of a US HALEU reserve should be to support and incentivize domestic commercial HALEU production by providing a guaranteed customer for HALEU enrichment. This solves the chicken vs. egg problem by giving utilities confidence that they can purchase an advanced reactor knowing that the fuel production capacity exists to support that reactor for the long term. A HALEU reserve filled with down-blended or reprocessed stocks does not solve the chicken vs. egg problem, and indeed, might actually be counterproductive because it would compete against, and likely displace, any nascent commercial production capacity.

Advanced reactors hold the promise of generating safe, secure, emissions-free electricity for Americans while positioning the United States as a key exporter of nuclear technology. But in order for this vision to become a reality, these reactor companies and their customers must secure access to HALEU without increasing US reliance on Russia. By working with industry to put in place the purchase commitments that support a commercial-scale US HALEU enrichment facility, the US government can serve as a bulwark against risk and sustain a new fuel supply chain for the advanced reactor market through mid-century and beyond.

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. is Executive Chairman of the Board of Lightbridge Corporation. Admiral Richard Mies is President and Chief Executive Officer of Mies Group, Ltd. Ambassador Graham and Admiral Mies are the Co-Chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition.

Learn more about the Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition

Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition

The Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition (NENSC) works to address the challenges present at the intersection between nuclear energy and national security, serve as a clearing house for information and analysis on the topic, and support programming to increase awareness and interest.

The post As the United States develops advanced reactors, a new fuel supply chain is critical to national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How climate change can become a bipartisan issue in the Biden era

Larry Luxner — Mon, 25 Jan 2021 22:54:01 +0000

Fighting climate change should not become a partisan issue, said US Senator Chris Coons, a Democrat from Delaware who co-chairs the fourteen-member Bipartisan Senate Climate Solutions Caucus.

Coons was speaking at the Atlantic Council’s virtual “Common Ground on Climate Bipartisan Summit,” which took place as part of the Council’s 2021 Global Energy Forum. The event was moderated by CNN political commentator Van Jones and former Senator Kelly Ayotte, a Republican who previously represented the state of New Hampshire.

“If you’re a conservative, you should be for conserving everything, including our most important [asset]—our environment—no matter what your background is,” said Ayotte, now senior advisor for the nonprofit group Citizens for Responsible Energy Solutions.

The January 22 session also featured three members of the US House of Representatives: John Curtis (R-UT 3^rd district), Darin LaHood (R-IL 18^th district), and Donald McEachin (D-VA 4^th district).

Despite political polarization over the issue in recent years, climate change has also united Americans of various backgrounds, Coons pointed out.

“It’s exciting to me to see the broad coalition of folks from across our country—young and old, rural and urban, conservative and progressive, black, brown, white, gay, straight, Latino, of every background—seeing folks come together around finding solutions,” said Coons, who co-chairs the climate caucus with Senator Mike Braun (R-IN).

The realities of climate change are making new believers

“The biggest existential threat we face as a nation—and the world—is climate change,” said Coons, noting that Delaware in particular has the lowest average elevation of any US state. “We are really flat, and the piece of rock that Delaware sits on is sliding into the ocean, so sea-level rise has an impact all along our coastline.”

Among other things, he said, saltwater intrusion is plaguing the state’s rural areas, and ever-more powerful storms have had a major impact on agriculture there.

Noting that US President Joe Biden, his longtime friend and fellow Delawarean, has made climate change one of the top priorities of his new administration, Coons said he’s confident Democrats and Republicans can work together to confront this enormous challenge.

“The practical evidence is right in front of us. Despite years of climate denial, a well-funded, well-orchestrated, and profoundly maligned effort over decades to question, challenge, and undermine the scientific analysis that has led to a near-uniform conclusion in the scientific community that our climate is changing—and changing dramatically because of human activity,” he said. “That debate here in Congress has been overrun by facts on the ground.”

Citing studies showing that 2020 was the hottest year on record, Coons said “it doesn’t matter where you live in our country or the world. You’re seeing the impacts of climate—on our forests, on sea life like the lobsters of New England, on when spring comes, [and on] how mild winter is. Whether it’s talking to farmers or talking to folks living in low-lying areas in Delaware, the reality of climate change has made believers of the people in my state.”

Watch the full event

Surprising sources of hope

Coons reported that he’s “hearing from folks who haven’t been a part of this conversation before, like the American Farm Bureau,” which recently came out in support of the Growing Climate Solutions Act of 2020. That proposal aims to encourage nature-based greenhouse-gas reductions in agriculture by connecting the private sector, which has ample capital and technical knowledge, with farmers, ranchers, and forest owners who want to participate in carbon markets.

“Why is this the time?” Coons asked. “Both because it’s getting hotter than anyone had imagined, and because we’re seeing players come to the table who previously had been resisting accepting the reality of climate change.”

Recalling his disappointment at past opposition to the Paris climate accord by some Republican members of Congress, Coons said he’s encouraged by Biden’s recent executive order to re-enter into the agreement. Along with caucus co-chair Braun, Coons hopes to lead a bipartisan delegation to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) climate summit in Glasgow, Scotland this November.

“It’s past time for the United States to regain its global leadership position in developing and deploying clean-energy technologies and taking advantage of the dramatically expanding world market for electric vehicles, for carbon capture and sequestration technology, [and] for advanced modular nuclear technology,” he said.

One notable success story, Coons said, is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cooperative effort among eleven northeastern US states that has reduced power-sector emissions by 45 percent since 2008. Another is the Energy Act of 2020—co-sponsored by Senators Lisa Murkowski (R-AL) and Joe Manchin (D-WV)—that, among other things, will assist low-income households with energy retrofits, make federal buildings more energy-efficient, and provide $1.5 billion for new solar technologies.

But Democrats and Republicans still don’t always see eye-to-eye

LaHood said his GOP colleagues distrust the Paris agreement because it is difficult to keep other countries to their promises when it comes to slashing greenhouse gases. “Obviously, President Biden rejoined the Paris climate agreement, but how do we hold countries like China, India, and Pakistan accountable? I don’t think we’ve seen good progress on that, and that’s frustrating to a lot of Republicans,” he said. “We’re doing all these things and we’re abiding by [US commitments], but they continue to violate the rules. There’s no accountability. They haven’t had a good track record. If we can show there is an enforcement mechanism… that will satisfy many of the critics.”

Curtis, whose Utah congressional district includes coal-mining Carbon County, said he’s “worried that there’s too much shaming” in conversations between Democrats and Republicans on climate change.

“When somebody’s started on their path being better to the environment, we always tell them it’s not enough instead of [saying] ‘thank you’ for getting involved,” he said. “They want to engage, they want to have these discussions, but they quickly get uncomfortable and don’t feel like there’s any place for them at the table.”

Where to find common ground

One way to potentially create thousands of jobs is carbon capture, said McEachin. Another is rehabilitating buildings and putting electric vehicles on the road.

“We should be looking at every aspect of infrastructure, with an eye toward a green economy,” said the Virginia Democrat. “That’s going to create millions of jobs… and help bring us together to make sure we’re working in a bipartisan way.”

Yet he insisted that nuclear energy—which is opposed by many on the left—must be part of the energy mix because it is low-carbon and can be deployed rapidly on a large scale as the world reduces its dependence on fossil fuels.

“We have, as Democrats, chided our Republican colleagues by saying ‘you have to follow the science.’ Well, we have to look ourselves in the mirror sometimes and say the same thing,” said McEachin. “And the science I’ve heard and seen suggests that nuclear has to be a part of our future.”

LaHood added that lawmakers should also “be careful about how far we go” on climate change, noting that policies that are too far to the left—or too far to the right—have virtually no chance of passage. “So how do we find a reasonable approach—that common ground in the middle to find solutions on climate?” LaHood asked. The answer is focusing on market-based solutions such as technological innovation, he argued. “If there’s dialogue and discussion—not necessarily on the [Green New Deal]—but more in the middle, I think that’s the approach that will help get it to where we need to go.”

Larry Luxner is a Tel Aviv-based freelance journalist and photographer who covers the Middle East, Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. Follow him on Twitter @LLuxner.

The many new ways energy and national security are intersecting

By Larry Luxner

Oil and gas will still play a crucial role in the world’s economy even as clean-energy “electrostates” rise in prominence, and Biden will prioritize the threat of climate change like no president has before him.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

Global Energy Forum Jan 20, 2021

Why Iran could top Biden’s Middle East agenda

By Larry Luxner

Each crisis represents a major US foreign-policy challenge, but all may receive less attention from the new American administration than another pressing issue in the region: Iran’s recent nuclear advances.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

New Atlanticist Jan 20, 2021

What China’s march to net-zero emissions means for the world

By Larry Luxner

Chinese President Xi Jinping made a pledge to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Can China live up to the promises?

China Energy & Environment

The post How climate change can become a bipartisan issue in the Biden era appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Iran could top Biden’s Middle East agenda

Larry Luxner — Thu, 21 Jan 2021 00:27:30 +0000

^{This piece was updated on January 21.}

Syria’s decade-long civil war. A humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Ongoing hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians. The rising death toll from COVID-19 throughout the Middle East.

Each crisis represents a major US foreign-policy challenge, but all will likely receive less attention from the new American administration than another pressing issue in the region: Iran’s recent nuclear advances. That was the consensus of five Arab, Israeli, and American experts gathered for a virtual discussion on January 20 that coincided with Joe Biden’s inauguration as the 46th president of the United States.

The panel—moderated by Kirsten Fontenrose, the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative—was part of the Council’s 2021 Global Energy Forum.

“Iran has been increasing its imports of enriched uranium. This demands attention immediately, and Biden will make that a critical priority of his,” said Carlos Pascual, a senior vice president for global energy at IHS Markit and a former US ambassador to Mexico and Ukraine.

“Iran is trying to kick the United States from the region and bring China and Russia to fill that void,” warned Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, the president of the Emirates Policy Center in Abu Dhabi. “This will be the greatest threat [if] the US is going to lower its footprint in the region.”

Watch the full event

The backdrop: America’s future role in the Middle East

Looming over these issues is the widespread perception that the United States has given up on the region, warned William Wechsler, the director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Middle East Programs.

“The most important thing for the Biden administration to do out of the gate is come to an internal agreement about what the remaining US interests are in the region, what our strategic ends are. Too many US administrations have started off with actions but without internal cohesion,” said Wechsler, a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense. “Biden, once in office, will have to decide whether or not he’s going to arrest those perceptions or allow them to continue.”

The view from Israel

Israel sees Iran as an existential threat that must be dealt with immediately. “The Biden administration will have a lot on its plate—COVID-19, [the] economy, racial tensions, China, Russia, North Korea. The Middle East will not be in the top ten priorities,” observed Amos Yadlin, the executive director of Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies. “However, Iran is forcing a crisis [by] breaching the agreement and going forward with nuclear violations.”

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to which Yadlin referred was established in 2015. It placed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of US and European sanctions against Tehran. Trump, with the support of most Republican lawmakers, unilaterally withdrew from the controversial deal in 2018, though Biden has pledged to return to the agreement if Iran resumes compliance with the pact’s provisions.

“The Democrats are committed to the JCPOA. It’s also an election promise” of Biden’s, said Yadlin, who spent over forty years in the Israel Defense Forces and served as the IDF’s chief of intelligence from 2006 to 2010. “On the other hand, if you going back to the problematic agreement that even Democrats understand has a lot of loopholes, you are giving up [US] leverage vis-à-vis Iran.”

‘Joe knows Bibi, and Bibi knows Joe’

When it comes to Biden’s relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, who’s held power since 2009, “Joe knows Bibi, and Bibi knows Joe. We can skip that part,” quipped Wechsler, referring to Netanyahu by his Hebrew nickname. “There will be a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian challenge, but I don’t think that focus will take the same form we’ve seen previously. The last four presidents in very different ways have sought holistic, comprehensive solutions, and have all failed. A fifth attempt is probably not likely to have a different outcome.”

One of Trump’s notable successes in foreign policy was the Abraham Accords, under which Israel has established diplomatic relations with four Arab nations—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—independent of any progress on the Palestinian issue.

Whether additional countries, led by Saudi Arabia, will join the accords remains unclear. Even so, Wechsler expects Biden to show far more interest than Trump did in alleviating Palestinian suffering “and ensuring that neither side takes any steps that will preclude the potential for a two-state solution. Although the potential for such a holistic solution right now might not be very high, it will be again in the future.”

What to expect from renewed Iran oil exports

If a nuclear deal were renegotiated, the Biden administration might allow Iran to resume oil sales. As for how such a development would affect regional geopolitics, Yadlin said he didn’t think it would “be a game-changer in the energy market.”

“We don’t know exactly how much oil Iran is exporting as we speak,” he noted. “The number on the low side is 700,000 barrels a day,” he calculated, but it could be more than a million barrels given suspicion that Iran is sending oil to China that goes unrecorded–and it could go up by another million if the US removes limits on exports.*

However, Brenda Shaffer, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, said that she expected Iran to release more oil to the market even before any negotiations on a new nuclear deal, given Tehran’s “sense that the [Biden] administration isn’t going to clamp down hard on violations of the current sanctions.”

Added Pascual: “We don’t know how much oil would return to the market. But in the context of a global market of ninety-three million barrels a day, it’s relatively small. Once vaccines start to become available, demand will recover.” IHS Markit projects that demand could reach ninety-nine million barrels a day by the end of 2021.

Larry Luxner is a Tel Aviv-based freelance journalist and photographer who covers the Middle East, Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. Follow him on Twitter @LLuxner.

Correction: This article originally attributed this quote by Amos Yadlin to another panelist. We regret the error.

What China’s march to net-zero emissions means for the world

By Larry Luxner

Chinese President Xi Jinping made a pledge to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Can China live up to the promises?

China Energy & Environment

New Atlanticist Jan 19, 2021

Top UAE officials assess renewables, peak oil, and the post-COVID energy market

By Larry Luxner

Dr. Sultan Al Jaber, UAE’s minister of industry and advanced technology, joined Suhail Al Mazrouei, the UAE minister of energy and infrastructure, and Musabbeh Al Kaabi, the CEO of UAE investments at the Mubadala Investment Company.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

New Atlanticist Jan 19, 2021

The world is about to embark on a big energy transition. Here’s what it could look like.

By Katherine Walla

“Real friends say the bitter truth,” said Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency, at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum. And “the bitter truth is that real energy transitions are coming, and they are coming fast.”

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

The post Why Iran could top Biden’s Middle East agenda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Transcript: A global view of Joe Biden’s inauguration

Atlantic Council — Wed, 20 Jan 2021 23:31:59 +0000

Read the highlights

Fast Thinking

Jan 20, 2021

FAST THINKING: Five big takeaways from Joe Biden’s inaugural address

By Atlantic Council

Joe Biden’s inaugural address was a call for unity—and also resilience. What did the speech signal about where his presidency is headed? Here’s key takeaways from five leading experts on international affairs.

Coronavirus Elections

Event transcript

A conversation with

Prime Minister Carl Bildt
Former Prime Minister, Kingdom of Sweden

Stephen Hadley
Executive Vice Chair, Atlantic Council
Former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Secretary Ernest Moniz
President and CEO, Energy Futures Initiative
Former US Secretary of Energy

Minister Ana Palacio
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Spain

Lord George Robertson
Member, International Advisory Board, Atlantic Council;
Former Secretary General, NATO

Moderated by

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: It is terrific that we’ve got this lineup of experts and—to do some fast thinking about what they just heard and then put it into context.

I’m going to start. The Atlantic Council is about working together with friends and allies to shape the future, and so you’re going to hear that with a British, a Swedish, and a Spanish colleague. And I’m going to start with our international partners and then go to our American friends.

And maybe I’ll start with you, Ana Palacio, former foreign minister of Spain and member of the Atlantic Council Board. What did you hear in that that is meaningful to you, and then meaningful to Europe and to Spaniards?

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: Well, I think it’s meaningful to all of us because it was a domestic speech, but the speech of the city on a hill, there is light in the—in the hill. And in the end it spoke about unity, about truth, about civic responsibility, and this is our common challenge for all democracies all over the world. So it was a speech for all of us in this idea that United States has to lead by example.

And again, this idea of exemplarity, we need it. We need it badly. We need it from Europe.

But as I say, for me it was a very domestic speech that was extremely universal for all of us that believe in democracy, that fight for democracy, and that have this idea of a shining city on a hill about the United States. It’s back. It’s not America back; it’s this America that is back.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that, Ana.

And for those who are listening in, you can pose questions through the app, the Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum app, which I know most of you have. For those of you who would rather do it over Twitter, you can send it to my own Twitter feed at @FredKempe and we’ll get your questions, and then say to whom you—who you are and to whom you’d like to pose your question.

Just a real quick follow up on that, Ana, and then we’ll move on, is: What are you going to look for in the first days, the first weeks of the Biden administration? What is going to be most important for you to see?

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: Well, honestly, signs that America is healing itself. I think that this is the message. And by the way, it was truth—I mean, it was—it rang genuine when he says with emotion that they will remember us as the heal broken land. This is what is important. This—because without healing, America cannot lead. And America needs to lead in order to lead—needs to heal—excuse me. Needs to heal in order to lead.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that, Ana.

And let me pass next to Lord Robertson. Where are you sitting? Are you in London or are you in Scottish climes?

LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON: I’m in Scotland. England is underwater with floods and tonight Scotland is going to be under two or three feet of snow. So that’s where I am, watching what’s happening in America.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Well, as former NATO secretary general, but also the former—an existing politician in the UK, you know a lot about domestic divisions. But you also know a lot about international challenges of alliances. Tell me how you consumed this inaugural speech and what you were hearing.

LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON: Well, I said to myself: Glory be, America is back. American leadership is back. You know, for four years even the critics of America felt the vacuum that had been created by the fact that America was not exercising the leadership that the world at the moment needs. There are so many problems facing the world—whether it’s migration and climate change, international terrorism, the competing between great powers—all of that needs American leadership. And having known Joe Biden for ages, you know, I just was so comforted today that although he was addressing a domestic audience, with some domestic messages, the fact is that the world was listening. The world was wanting American leadership.

And I think the world was reassured that America was now going to rebuild alliances that had been damaged. It’s going to recreate relationships so important in the world and so important for America’s own security and safety. And I think that was the message that came out of it. I wrote down a phrase from Amanda Gorman, the young woman poet who spoke where she talked about America being bruised but whole. And I think, you know, that is a message that I think will resonate beyond America’s shores.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that. And then just quickly, on the NATO front, you know, there was a lot of handwringing, “NATO’s going to be destroyed by President Trump.” Well, none of that came to pass. In some ways, in terms of troops in Europe and troops particularly forward based in Eastern Europe, some would say it’s even stronger. What are you going to be looking for from President Biden as former NATO secretary general?

LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON: Well, I want—I want President Biden to reassure allies that America is still the principal leader within NATO, it’s still robust, still believing that alliances are the best form of defense for the United States of America and making that message clear. But I also expect, and indeed I want him, to tell the Europeans and NATO that they’re going to have to do much more for themselves. They’re going to have to do much more in the interest of the whole alliance, and that they cannot simply ride along on the coattails of American expenditure. I think they got a fright during the Trump administration. They’re spending more. But they need to be told that America has got other priorities in the world and that they therefore have to do much more to help America, but also to help themselves.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Lord Robertson, also a member of our International Advisory Board.

Now turning to another member of our International Advisory Board, Carl Bildt. Former prime minister of Sweden, foreign minister of Sweden. You know, with what sort of ear were you hearing this inaugural speech? What did you hear? And what are you looking for going forward?

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: Well, I think it was a rather unique inaugural speech, in that the focus was almost—it was uniquely domestic. It was healing the nation, repairing the rifts in the fabric of American politics. I mean, he had a phrase here, he said: “end this uncivil war.” Another way of saying that the United States is [at] uncivil war. And his number-one priority—one, two, three, which is necessary also from the point of view of the outside world, is to repair that. And that’s not going to be entirely—it was a good speech. It was a good start. But I think everyone who follows the political affairs of the US knows that it’s an uphill battle and a lot needs to be done.

The world was fairly absent. I mean, I think he had two passing references to the climate challenge and he mentioned a need to repair relationship with allies. But otherwise, if you were to prepare—or compare these speeches over the decades, I think this was probably the one that was the most focused on solely domestic affairs and healing the nation, which is understandable, necessary, and also a precondition for America taking a stronger role in the world.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And it’s very interesting, not only was President Trump not mentioned any time in the speech—

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: No, but he was—

FREDERICK KEMPE: —neither was China, neither was Russia, neither was NATO. There wasn’t any of that. And so—

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: No, but it was—it was—Fred, it was an anti-Trump speech, every single sentence, without mentioning the name.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Exactly. But in terms of—and then I’m going to turn to our two American speakers—but in the opening months, maybe one hundred days, six months of this administration, what is the international issue you want to watch most? What is—what is most important from a European and from your Swedish point of view?

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: Well, I think, first, he’s going to reach out to allies and, you know, sort of symbolically say we think that you’re important and initiate a dialogue on different issues. Then the climate issues are imperative. We have the COP26 coming up in Glasgow in November. That’s practically tomorrow. We have all of the vaccine and the vaccine nationalist issues that need to be addressed. We are not safe from this pandemic until all of the world is safe. And then I think there is a slight urgency to sorting out how to handle JCPOA in order to prevent a new crisis in that part of the world.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you so much.

So President Biden plans to sign fifteen executive orders today, the—undoing the Muslim travel ban; you know, the Paris Climate Agreement, coming back into it; national mask mandate; and others. Let me turn to—let me turn to Secretary Moniz. And so Prime Minister Bildt, Minister Palacio, Lord Robertson, thank you so much for this.

Secretary Moniz, can you give us what you heard? Everyone listens to this speech with a different set of ears. You’ve, obviously, served—you’ve served in the Obama administration. How would you compare this to Obama inaugural speeches? And what did you hear in this that resonates with you?

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: Well, Fred, first of all, I certainly endorse what our colleagues have said about this being a domestically focused speech of international implications. But I’d like to just add that it is comforting to hear our colleagues from Europe and the UK talk about restoration of American leadership, and that will obviously require some blocking and tackling like restoring alliances, restoring trade relationships, restoring international financial institutions, and the like.

But I guess I’m going to add a qualifier to their statements, and that is that while I think President Biden is almost the ideal person for this rebuilding task—his longstanding relationships and skill at coalition-building will be very important—but I guess I’d like to hear perhaps more from our international colleagues about whether they really believe there will be full trust in the United States until, frankly, we’ve gone through at least one or two more presidential election cycles, frankly, in which the normalcy of our politics can be—can be reinforced. So I think that’s very important.

Secondly, in terms of the executive orders that you mentioned, Fred, the comity will immediately be challenged by some of those, for example the immigration—the immigration statements, et cetera. You know, I think of the—of the president as having a critical role as the chief risk officer to ameliorate catastrophic risk to Americans and to our global partners. And I think—you know, I would list among those catastrophic risks climate; the pandemic, clearly; cyber; a variety of nuclear issues, including, as was mentioned by Carl, Iran—North Korea should be in there as well. And I think on some of those I’m optimistic about more—a more bipartisan approach, like on the pandemic, like on cyber. I’m not optimistic about that being—that bipartisanship being easily won in the nuclear arena, those cases that I just mentioned.

And on climate, I think it’ll be a mixed bag in terms of bipartisanship. For example, we’ve seen even in these four years the innovation agenda for clean energy has actually garnered quite strong bipartisan support, and I think that’s a door ready to be swung open even wider. Whereas when it comes to comprehensive climate policy, where even with a Democratic majority in the Senate—the very slim majority—it’s going to be difficult to get coherent policy.

So I think that’s—those are some of the challenges now that I see that will hopefully be helped by his unifying message, but are going to be challenged as soon as we start getting into some of these policy specifics. And as he said, it would be wonderful if we could have civil discussions about those differences of policy.

FREDERICK KEMPE: One quick question for you before I turn to Steve Hadley. And then also among this group, as we get going, please intervene on each other. Let’s make this a live discussion. I’ll also throw in questions from others so you can respond to what others have said. But so much of—it wasn’t much discussed in the speech, but so much of what has been planned for the administration places clean energy, climate action, as well as international cooperation on all of this at the heart of a post-pandemic future. What do you think in concrete terms you’re going to see earliest, most different from a Biden administration? Obviously, Secretary Kerry, who you served with, is going to be the climate czar, so to speak.

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: Well, John Kerry’s appointment as the international envoy clearly was a major signal, including his Cabinet-level appointment, et cetera. But in terms of the czardom, we have to remember that there’s also a major contingent in the White House: Gina McCarthy and Brian Deese and many others. So I think, for one thing—and I think this is where remote working challenges things more than the opportunity to really sit together routinely—it’s going to require real teamwork on this group of John Kerry, the White House, but also to remember that almost every Cabinet appointment across the government has been emphasized as one that will reinforce climate—for example, Janet Yellen at Treasury being a major advocate for charging for carbon emissions.

So I think today we will have executive actions that roll back some of the Trump rollbacks on efficiency standards and methane emissions and the like. We will also have new ground, like emphasizing a social cost of carbon in cost-benefit analyses, like having corporate risk disclosures for climate become paramount. The Gary Gensler appointment at the SEC highlights that. But again, when it comes to getting nationwide climate policy, this is going to be a real coalition-building exercise and a tough one, because I don’t think we are there yet in a—in a bipartisan way.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you so much.

So, Steve, national security adviser. You’ve been through transitions. You heard the inaugural. What are your own takeaways from what you’ve experienced today?

STEPHEN HADLEY: Well, I thought it was a terrific inaugural address. I thought the president said exactly what needed to be said.

You know, I think the country’s had a bit of a crisis of confidence. It’s been a tough four years. January 6 and the disruption in the Capitol really, I think, shook the country. And I think what the president set for himself was to reassure Americans that we can have faith in our democratic principles, in our democratic institutions. We can have faith in our values and that if we pull together and are true to those values, as he said, there’s no problem we cannot solve.

Now, I suppose some people will say that’s rather hyperbolic. But I think the essence of what he was trying to say—and he’s right about it—was he made—he had a phrase that democracy is fragile but resilient. And we saw the fragility of democracy with the challenges to our most recent election, culminating in the demonstrations January 6 at the Capitol. I think the story that people are beginning to write is the resilience of our democracy, that in the midst of a pandemic when rules of how to vote had been radically changed—(laughs)—the American people figured out how to cast their votes.

We had the highest turnout since 1900—120 years. And it was a free and fair election. And we saw in all the challenges people at local levels, local state attorney generals, a lot of them young, a lot of them women, running a terrific—what turned out to be a very free and fair election. And then resisting both legal challenges—which were rejected by Republican judges, Democratic judges, some judges even appointed by President Trump—and then the political pressures. And we stood up—they stood up to those. The institutions worked. The electoral structure worked. We have a new president.

And I think, again, he captured it right. It’s fragile, but it’s resilient. And I think in some sense what the president wanted to do was to rally the American people behind those institutions, behind our democratic principles and say: We can succeed against the challenges we’ve got. And I think he accomplished that. Yes, it’s only one speech. Yes, we’re going to have to see what he does. But tone is important. And I think he set the right tone, and I think he had the right message for the American people.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So a follow up for you, Steve, and then I’ll watch in front of me all of you to see when you want to jump in, and I’ll throw in some questions as well. One question that I got is: I know Jake Sullivan’s the new national security advisor. Work starts, I assume, right away. How does—how are the first hours conducted in a new presidency? Obviously, this is a little bit different because vice—or, President Biden has been Vice President Biden, so he’s been through a lot of this before. But what are the—what are the crucial issues?

And then maybe a second, related—thinly related question. You just talked about the resilience of our institutions, democracy. That speech would suggest that our international obligations at the moment either have to take a little bit of a backseat to what we need to get done domestically or are one and the same. And I’d love to have you talk about that.

By the way, for those of you listening in, Steve Hadley is not only former national security advisor, he’s the executive vice chair of the Atlantic Council Board. So he is responsible from the board position of helping us think through strategy, both for the institution and how we want to address strategic issues as an Atlantic Council in terms of the global picture.

STEPHEN HADLEY: I thought Ana Palacio had it right. While it was, as Carl Bildt said, it was a speech directed at a domestic audience, the content of it was really a message, I think, for democratic-loving people around the world. And you know, America will not be successful leading in partnership with our friends and allies in the world if we do not have a firm foundation at home—economically and politically.

So in some sense I think it was a message to our foreign partners and friends and allies that America is emphasizing and returning to those democratic principles which we’ve stood for in the world and which have been such an important part of our leadership. So I would say while the message was domestically focused, it actually was one that was sending a very strong message to the world that, as President Biden said, America wants not to be an example of power but to show the power of its example. And I think that message is going to be well received.

In terms of what they’re starting to do now, every new president comes in, increasingly there is a list of executive orders which kind of clears some of the debris. But one of the things that the chief of staff, and the national security advisor, and the folks have been doing, I’m sure, is scripting what the first day of the president’s life is going to be, what the first week is going to be, what the first month is going to be, and then what are the first one hundred days. And there’s a lot of talk in those opening days about what does—what does the president want to do, what do the American people need to see the president doing, and what does the international community need to see. Who does the president call, in what order, and what is the message.

So there’s a lot of scripting that goes on to get the new president launched, and I think that’s probably what you’re going to see unfolding in the next day and week or two ahead.

FREDERICK KEMPE: OK.

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: Fred, may I jump in?

FREDERICK KEMPE: Go ahead, Ana.

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: You asked me what do we expect from the United States, and I said signs that the United States is healing because without healing United States cannot lead. But the other aspect that we expect is signals that the leadership of the United States has changed, that it is really an inclusive leadership.

I mean, I don’t have and I think none of us from the other side of the pond have to prove our Atlanticist credentials. Nevertheless, honestly, when you have been in office with an American administration, many times you took for granted your allies. What I think that is, is this new inclusive leadership is really—there’s leadership, because the leadership, I think we understand that it has to be America. And I hope that—I don’t want to touch upon this because Carl Bildt wrote a fantastic piece at the Project Syndicate explaining the mistrust that there is, and not just in Europe.

So I won’t touch on this. But I think that we expect twenty-first-century leadership of the United States that has to be inclusive. It’s not a hegemonic leadership, taking your allies for granted. It has to be different. And I think that the message of this—of this first speech, and I hope that it will be followed by executive orders, by moves that will prove that this America that just will lead by example, but will lead by example in an inclusive way.

STEPHEN HADLEY: Fred, if I could just add—

MR. KEMPE: Please.

STEPHEN HADLEY: —a foot stop on what Ana said, I think it’s very important. I’ve talked to people about how America has to lead in a different way because the context has now changed, not just the last four years but more broadly. And so when we talk about—Americans tend to talk about American leadership and return to leadership.

For some people, that sounds like the soft hegemony of American power, and I would like to see our leaders talk more about engagement and partnership and inclusion, as Ana did, so that it recognizes we want to lead in a very inclusive way where we’re going to listen to our partners as we come together with our own policies so that we can work these issues together because, in some sense, the issues are sufficiently daunting and the agenda is so robust and the challenges are so great that if we cannot find a way to do it together, the United States with our friends and allies, we’re not going to succeed. It’s as simple as that.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thanks—thanks, Steve, for that point.

LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON: Strongly—can I just strongly agree with what Steve has just said? Because, you know, the president went on about democracy today and there is a crisis of democracy in the world, you know, not just in the United States. I heard Megyn Kelly last night being interviewed on British television, you know, and say, can he unite the country, and she said no, not easily, I mean, because Trump was a symptom, not the cause, of the problem of the division inside the United States.

But across the world the rise of authoritarianism is something that bothers me and should bother a lot of people as well. So America has got to lead by example but it’s got to do it in a muscular sense as well. We’re going to have to establish those democratic principles of the rule of law and the separation of church and state and private property and mixed economy. These are things that are now, I fear, going out of fashion, but which he’s going to have to take a lead on. And I think he articulated that today, and I think it resonates in the world community as well.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So let me turn next to—I’m going to—for simplicity’s sake, I’m going to go with first names here. But let me turn to Ernie and then I have a question for the international group and a question for the American group.

But Ernie?

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: No, I just wanted to comment that I strongly agree with the three perspectives we just heard. But I do want to add, to be explicit, frankly, the issue of taking allies for granted also has the flip side in the past of allies taking the United States for granted—

FREDERICK KEMPE: Right.

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: —and so I think we really do have a joint effort called for in that context and, certainly, in the context that George just referred to in terms of the challenges to democracy, unfortunately, throughout the democratic world.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that. So for Carl, Ana, and George, and this is related questions on your view of the United States, how deep is distrust right now for the United States is essentially the question, and Ernie pointed to this as well, and what is it going to take.

Is it going to take a couple of presidencies or can this inauguration and six months do a lot of good, or have things shifted among our partners and allies? And I wonder if—the second part of this is what impact, because there’s going to be a lot of emphasis in the Biden administration of social justice and equity, does that have an impact internationally in how you look at the United States as a partner or a leader?

So why don’t I start with you, Carl, and then go to Ana and George, and then I’ll come back to Steve and Ernie with a question for our Americans.

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: Well, things have shifted. As Steve indicated, it’s a different world today, so it requires a different way of handling that, certainly from the US side, also from the European side. No question about that. But I think the conditions for doing that are much better now.

I mean, the big shift, if I see it from the European side, is that we’ll have a perfectly normal person in the White House that you can have perfectly normal conversations with, and even if our focus now is on Joe Biden as president, we should not forget that he has an extremely experienced, well known, good foreign policy team that one can connect with.

Then the question—I wouldn’t say mistrust, but I would definitely say nervousness. Europe is nervous. Europe is nervous when they see an America in crisis. I mean, to take the Joe Biden phrase “uncivil war,” January 6 was a shock to Europeans. We trust the relationship across the Atlantic. We are dependent upon it, perhaps over dependent on it, as was pointed out, and when this America is in such a profound crisis we get nervous.

And there was also the reflection on, of course, the election result. I mean, Donald Trump had a very impressive election result. No question about that. He had the highest result for any sitting president, I understand. Joe Biden was, of course, even more. But it’s not over until it’s over, and you can see in the European media and debate discussion whether—when history is written, is it going to be Trump or Biden that is the parenthesis in the long run. And, of course, that introduces an element of nervousness at the same time as there is a sort of an intense hope that the president succeeds, that the healing works, and that we can work together constructively on all of the issues.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you.

Ana, do you agree with that?

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: Yeah, absolutely. Absolutely. And again, just pointing to something that Ernest Moniz said, I think that the negotiation of the Paris Agreement is just an example of inclusiveness. And he played—I mean, Ernest played a key role, and this is the kind of expectation that Europeans have. And it was not easy. We wanted a legally binding instrument, and we were convinced by—I mean, in great part by your team and by you yourself.

Having said that, you know what, Ernest? The leadership entails some other responsibilities. So you are absolutely right. And I think that we Europeans—and George Robertson said it—in NATO, we have to take our part of the burden and we have to be there, and we have to make the balance. Our speech about strategic autonomy, which is now one of these buzz expressions that circulate in Brussels, each one puts in it what—the wishes or the non-wishes. Nobody knows exactly what this means and nobody wants to have it defined, but it’s a fantastic buzzword. But we need to be realistic about this strategic autonomy, realistic in delivering on the one hand side and then on our dependence in security terms.

And our goal to the United States, you have mentioned the COVID. This morning, Ursula von der Leyen, so the secretary of the Commission, went to the European Parliament and made a speech about the inauguration, which is—you know, it’s kind of exceptional. We have a communication on bilateral relations from December, but she went there and she insisted on this idea of having the government of the United States participating in the COVAX, which is this—precisely this—I mean, this initiative, and highlighting—because I think that we also have to highlight all what United States is doing and has been doing beyond the Trump administration. And she was highlighting private actors and other actors, and we—one of the things that we learned during the Trump years is that there was much more about the United States internationally than the White House; that there were states and governors and private people and companies and mayors and a bunch of people—judges—that were there.

So, again, I—you are right. We need to clarify ourselves, and this is—I mean, this is our challenge. Of course, I always say that we have gone a long way—a long way. And in some issues, for instance in Brexit, we proved that we can stand together when we think that this is systemic, existential. I think that now the European Union has to get a realistic, systemic, existential dialogue with the United States that will encompass COVID, will encompass of course climate change, because for us climate change is in our hearts. We consider that we are the standard bearers of the climate change initiative, and we need to establish—but not just on climate change; on technologies. And I think that one issue which is—it’s not strategy, it’s tactics, but it’s important—is to establish concrete channels.

We have this bilateral council on energy. We need to have something similar on technologies, on COVID, on all the challenges that we are pointed.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Ana.

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: Last but not least, just one sentence on the justice. I think that for us Europeans, you know, there are things that—there are people without health insurance or without health. This is something that we cannot understand, as simple as that. So, yes, we very much welcome that there are signs there that you go a bit European. Don’t go European in other areas, but on this one, yes. (Laughter.)

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Ana.

So President Biden’s departing right now to Arlington Cemetery to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier with his—with the first lady.

George, just very quickly, on the issue that came up, but particularly in relation to the US as a trusted and reliable ally, has that—to what degree has that suffered? And what does it take—or not? And what—you know, how—what impact does this inauguration have on the first weeks/months of the Trump—or the Biden administration? Again, to the question from the—from the audience of can one just overnight say black is white and white is black, or is there going to be a real gray area for a long time?

LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON: Well, Carl was right when he said that the rest of the world is still nervous. People look at seventy-four million people voting for Donald Trump in this election. And that nervousness will continue because America is bitterly split.

But you know, we don’t really have any right to be judgmental. You know, these splits exist elsewhere. Populism is not confined to the United States. Look at Hungary. Look at—look at Poland. Look at what happened in my country with Brexit and our leaving the European Union. You know, these sentiments around that Joe Biden identified today in our societies. You know, when he talked about facts that are manipulated or even manufactured, I mean these are serious challenges that we, democratic politicians, have got to face up to. And it’s not just in the United States.

So there is a collective effort going to be required to build back the trust and the engagement that is going to be required. How do we face up to the challenge of China? Not just the trade issues that have polarized American and China at the moment, but the Belt and Road policy? The mischief-making by a resurgent Russia? You know, the assertion by people in the world against the world order? These are big challenges we’ll have to take place. But the recovery has started today because Biden has made it absolutely clear that America is back in the leadership chair.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And let me now turn to—thank you for that. And let me turn to—

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: Fred, could I just?

FREDERICK KEMPE: Go ahead.

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: OK, Fred, well, I just want to add on that point this question of the—because I raised earlier this issue of the process maybe taking a while to settle down. But I believe, and I think Steve would probably align with this statement that I think it’s going to be very difficult to truly rebuild the trust until we return to some greater degree of bipartisanship on international issues. Certainly if I were a non-American looking at America and seeing what’s happened, I would be very, very, very, very nervous in terms of committing without seeing an administration, congressional, Republic, Democratic improvement in communication and convergence towards some common positions.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Ernie, thank you for that.

Steve, that’s a good segue, and this will be for both of you, and that is: What foreign policy issues will President Biden have the toughest time on working across the aisle, and what will be the areas where he can find bipartisanship the fastest? Let me just leave it at that. I mean, we’ve seen some of the testimony yesterday from the new Secretary of State Tony Blinken on China. But I’ll come back to a follow-up question. But just let’s use that question. Where is he going to have the toughest time working across the aisle on foreign policy issues, and where can he find bipartisanship the fastest? Steve, why don’t we start with you?

STEPHEN HADLEY: So I think there’s a lot of consensus about the need to use friends and allies. I think there’s a lot of consensus that if you’re going to deal with China it is going to take the combined diplomatic and political influence—and, quite frankly, the combined GDPs—of the United States and friends and allies to have enough leverage to change—to have any chance of changing some of China’s behavior. So I think this working with allies, particularly on the issue of China, I think there’ll be a lot of resonance. I think there’s a lot of consensus on China policy. I think there will be some turning down of the rhetoric, probably some narrowing of the executive orders the Trump administration has issued. But I think there’s a lot of bipartisan consensus in the American public and in the Capitol Hill on China. So I think that will be a good one.

I think there—I think Iran is going to be one of the more divisive issues. And my worry is that the Biden administration will kind of put the needle down at where they were in 2016-2017, when they left office. And Ernie can speak to this, but I think there are problems in the agreement that were recognized. Ernie would say there’s some limitations to the agreement. Because it’s now six years after the agreement was put in place some of the limits are expiring. So the question of how you get back into the agreement is a question.

And I hope that the Biden administration would recognize that while the nuclear issue is important that—two things. One, our allies from the region need to be participants this time in the way they were not. And secondly, that at the same time we work the nuclear issue we have to also address what Iran is doing with its ballistic missiles and its regional area—and in the regional disruption. If I think the Biden administration takes that broader view, there’s a chance of bringing some Republicans along. But I think it’s going to be a real challenge to manage it. And I think Ernie’s going to have an important role.

A lot will depend on how the president does in his opening rounds with the Congress. I think he can get bipartisan support for more aggressive action against the coronavirus. I think he can get bipartisan support for an economic relief package to help the country get through the coronavirus. I would think there’s a good chance he can get bipartisan cooperation on an infrastructure bill, particularly digital infrastructure, particularly broadband for rural areas, things like that. And if he can deliver on those, I think it sends a message, to Ernie’s point, that there is—and to the world—that there is a possibility of Republican and Democratic cooperation.

In that respect, I put one footnote. I was a little surprised to hear that people are saying that President Biden is going to lead very quickly with an immigration reform package. And that is tricky. I mean, President Bush had an immigration reform. We thought we would get it. We did not. There was then the 2017, I think, effort—maybe I’ve got the date wrong—that Senator McCain was involved in. Maybe it was 2013. That failed. Immigration post-Trump is still a very divisive issue. And I think one of the things that the administration needs to do is really think about that. Their view may be that it has to be addressed and that their leverage is greatest having just come into office. But if—but if the president is defeated on immigration reform, I think that’s a real blow.

FREDERICK KEMPE: OK. Thank you for that, Stephen. Ernie obviously, not to address the entire issue, but you were so deeply involved in the negotiation of JCPOA. I’d particularly like to hear your response on that.

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: Yeah. I’ll come to that, Fred. Let me just make one point on what Steve just raised on the immigration, because I actually raised the issue of the executive order that I understand will come out today on path to citizenship. Just as a footnote, I believed there was a window where the immigration reform could have been successfully pursued. And that was in the 2009-2010 timeframe. The stars were kind of aligned briefly. But the president—President Obama—chose to make the health care issue the lead one. Another controversial issue. And I think that moment passed, shall we say, on the immigration. Whether it’s back, well, we’re going to find out soon.

I think on the original question, Fred, first—I’ll comment on Iran—but first to use as the example what’s been discussed about China, where clearly there are national security issues, there are trade issues, there are climate issues. And I think that—I agree with the statement that this is a place—and, Steve, with the combined GDP I strongly agree that we are not, frankly, using our market power collectively in terms of those discussions.

But that’s where, going back to what Ana said is troubling, to be perfectly honest, I’m not criticizing the action but the fact of Europe and China doing a trade deal just before Biden came in does not sound to me like optimum timing to have a joint strategy put together. So we got to get our act together collectively. And that includes in addition, of course, our Asian friends, Japan and Korea and the like. So we got some work to do. And it’s all of us in that—in that context.

Now, on Iran, I certainly agree with most of what Steve has said. And we’ll be comparing notes later. (Laughs.) But I think it’s very important to start not with a “Mother May I.” That is, I think there is no doubt the president has said: He is going to rejoin diplomacy on Iran. Not a mother may I, but really serious discussions first with both sides of the aisle and Congress, with our European allies, and with our Middle East allies. Again, it’s not mother may I. It’s how are we going to constructively go to a JCPOA+. And I think to do that the president and his team are going to have to be prepared right from the beginning to emphasize, yeah, we see JCPOA as a potential steppingstone towards JCPOA+.

But the question is, how are we going to maintain the leverage to make sure that negotiation is going to be seriously enjoined? I mean, I have my own ideas on that, but I think the main thing is we got to have a plan about leverage to go beyond JCPOA.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Yeah. I think that’s interesting. And the other—on the China issue, it’s interesting that Secretary Pompeo went out, with the State Department branding, what’s happening to the Uighurs is genocide. But then interesting that Tony Blinken in his confirmation hearings said, yes, I agree with that. So a point where you might see, you know, that this is being imposed on us.

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: And, Fred, could I just add just one last point on it? Is I mentioned security, and trade, and climate. Yet, together we have got to find a way—even as we have some tough stuff with China to deal with—let’s say on security—but we got to find a way to get back to what we had going into Paris, which was working together with China on climate.

STEPHEN HADLEY: Fred, that I think is the real challenge. Not to basically downplay all the other issues we have with China in the name of the cooperation for the dealing with the climate issue. We’ve got to figure out and we’ve got to be very tough-minded about this, to say: Cooperation on China is not a favor China is doing for us. It’s something China needs done, and that its population is demanding. And therefore we can, at the same time, cooperate with China on climate change but still address these other aspects of Chinese behavior that really we—our friends—United States and friends and allies—have a common interest in getting addressed.

FREDERICK KEMPE: OK. Thank you for that.

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: Can I answer that? Say, on the China—China is undoubtably a very big issue for Europe as well. I mean, what’s been happening now this year is quite remarkable in the sense that China is now a bigger trading partner for Europe than the United States. And the fact that we have the Chinese economy growing, and trade with China growing while both the US or the North American or the Western European economies are declining, it’s a shift that is happening in the world. And I talked to some economists the other day that pointed out that the Chinese consumer market is going to be—is going to be what drives the global economy in the next few years. That’s sort of the reality.

On the agreement that was mentioned, the EU-China investment agreement, that had been negotiated with seven years without much of a progress. Some of it is sort of catching up with what the US already had. But in the beginning of last year it was made clear that it’s make it or break it, we said to the Chinese. If we don’t finish it this year, skip it. So it was essentially an ultimatum from the beginning of this year that either you do something that is decent, or we skip the entire thing. And the Chinese folded, which was good from our point of view. And to some extent just catching up with what the US got, but some other things as well.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Carl, that’s a really interesting point.

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: Can I—

FREDERICK KEMPE: Just one second, Ana, and I’ll pass you. That’s a really interesting point because the Chinese folded after the election of Biden. So they wanted to close this deal and they really pushed it forward after the election. So that’s—it also shows that Xi Jinping is seizing an opportunity as quickly—

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: Yeah, true. Absolutely, they saw the strategic need to do this. They’re doing another thing which I think we should note. They are—they are saying—let’s see if it happens—that they would join the CPTPP. And I can see the strategic imperative—

FREDERICK KEMPE: Could you—not all of our listeners will know what that acronym stands for.

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: It’s old TPP, that for Canadian domestic consumption they had to call “progressive” in order to get it through. But it’s the TPP that sort of Trump went out of. That’s a much more ambitious trade agreement than the RCEP, which they already signed. And I have my doubts whether they will be able to live up to the commitments in the TPP. But if they do, that is a game changer. And if they move in that direction, there’s clearly going to be pressure on the Europeans to do the same. By the way, the Brits are intending to do it. And tremendous pressure on the US

FREDERICK KEMPE: Ana, you wanted to jump in?

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: Yeah. Well, we don’t have time, but I think that the angle that Carl presented on the bilateral agreement is—stands, but there are other aspects. And frankly, we cannot forget that this was done the last day of the German presidency, and there are other aspects.

But for me, what is important here is the ambivalence, the many Europeans sitting on the fence. And Carl, again, very diplomatically has said it’s nervousness. No, it’s mistrust. This is what at least our surveys say, that 60 percent of the Europeans think that the American system is broken. And therefore, they sit on the fence thinking that because of our need to find a future, we can find some kind of arrangement with China—forgetting, because what has not been said—and I hope that the Biden administration will be extremely tough—is that we have—the language of the agreement is that China will make its best efforts to ratify the—for instance, the forced work labor—treaties of the International Labor Organization. I mean, honestly, we cannot stand and say that we stand by liberal democracy and by human rights and accept this language in a treaty. We all have been obliged to negotiate, and negotiation is tough, and especially with China today because of the aggressiveness of their foreign policy, but there are things that you cannot sign as a European—for instance, this language.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So—

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: And the problem is that there is public opinion in all our member states that just thinks, OK, well, you know, if we have to make a living with China, let’s go for it.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we’re the Atlantic Council. We’re down to four, maximum five minutes left here. What I think I’m hearing from the Americans is there’s a chance for bipartisan consensus on China, but across the Atlantic there is a chance that we may disagree and not be able to get our act together on China. It’s very hard to imagine a Biden administration, with the way the Democratic Party has felt about trade agreements, being forward leaning there.

The other question that’s come out is: Can pandemic recovery serve to strengthen existing relationships? So maybe for this last round just each of you, what is the transatlantic issue you think is the most promising? If you wanted to—you know, the EU reached out quickly, even before the administration came in. But what are the points one could put on the board in the first three, six months transatlantically from what you’ve heard today and what in general? And maybe just thirty seconds to a minute for each of you, and go in whatever order you jump in, and we’ll get through everybody.

LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON: Can I just say about—on behalf of the outgoing administration, one of the things that they managed to do was to break the logjam in the Middle East. And the UAE-Bahrain-Israel accord is something I think that can be built on. I think it’ll be—it’ll be an area—because the Middle East is still in turmoil with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia. You know, this is still a massively dangerous area for all of us. So I think that’s an area where I think he can find some common ground and where the Europeans will be very much onside there again.

But again, it comes back to this whole question about allies and relationships and rebuilding the trust. A lot of these relationships were damaged; they were not broken. And I think, therefore, if they reach out, rebuild them, I think there are—there’s a lot of promise in a post-pandemic world where we could all work together to make the world a bit safer than it is just now.

FREDERICK KEMPE: You see, I think the Abraham Accords is a place where you could get transatlantic agreement, even though Europe—

LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON: Yeah.

FREDERICK KEMPE: —hasn’t been as enthusiastic about them.

Ernie?

SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ: OK. All right. And then I’ll jump in on your pandemic question.

I think an area—I mean, clearly, there are many things about COVID, and I agree with the earlier comment about, you know, addressing developing countries, et cetera. However, my focus instead will be transatlantic—others, as well—but transatlantic leadership in addressing the issue of avoiding future pandemics.

The reality is we all talk about this COVID as being the pandemic of the century. I have no understanding why one would reach that conclusion. We have already had six pandemics—only one at COVID-scale, obviously—in this century. This is the third COVID epidemic of this century, twenty years. We got a big, big problem. And so I think that—and frankly, my—one of my organizations, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, we very work very closely with the World Economic Forum, with a very, very strong European base, of course, working with business, et cetera, trying to establish issues like international screening mechanisms for DNA synthesis. International, we need a U.N.—probably U.N.-based international normative entity for advanced biology, if you like, et cetera.

So I think this is a fantastic area where, pooling our resources, we could make a big difference in terms of truly making COVID a once-in-a-century pandemic and not—and not the every-five-years pandemic that I fear is possible.

FREDERICK KEMPE: That’s terrific. And then let’s—

STEPHEN HADLEY: Fred, let me just—let me just add to that, quickly.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Steve, follow, and then Ana. Steve.

STEPHEN HADLEY: I agree. I think cooperation on pandemics between the United States and Europe is terrific, and I think if we can come to some consensus there we can actually provide leadership more globally and may even eventually get China to play in such a regime.

I think, in addition, this new administration I hope will join the COVAX effort, which is an effort to get vaccines to the developing world. I think if the United States and Europe were to come together and really put resources and support behind that effort, it would be a terrific message not only of US-European cooperation, but a terrific message by the new administration to the developing world that we understand and we care about what happens to them in managing this terrible disease.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Public health as a way of coming together.

Carl, and then Ana to close us.

PRIME MINISTER CARL BILDT: COVAX, obviously. Reform and augmentation of the World Health Organization. And hopefully, it’s sort of the Atlantic world can take the lead, but we need the Africans, we need the Indians, we need the Chinese. I mean, otherwise it’s not going to work. So that’s important.

Diplomacy and everything working up to COP26. There are a couple of difficult issues. The carbon border-adjustment mechanism, it sounds awful and highly technocratic, but it could be sort of explosive if we don’t handle that right in the Atlantic world.

And then there are a set of digital issues that require urgent attention. The privacy shield arrangement for free data flows across the Atlantic has been put aside by the European Court. We need to have a new arrangement. There are a couple of things on digital taxes that are boiling. That needs to be handled fairly fast. And overall, on the digital issues long term, it is—if we don’t get our act together across the Atlantic, the Chinese will have us for lunch in thirty years.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that, Carl. And we don’t want to be lunch.

Ana.

MINISTER ANA PALACIO: Well, you know, I mean, I fully agree. I could have said any of the above, plus climate change. We are—we are waiting for United States on climate change. We Europeans, we care about this. And I think that in innovation, for instance, United States has a lot to bring to the table, from carbon capture and usage to nuclear modular to—on this.

But I will take my cue, you know, multilateralism. I mean, it’s—I know that there is a lot of words around this, but we need a different attitude that is shown in the WTO, in practical issues, and we really expect that this administration will make a U-turn on multilateralism.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So thank you for that closing. Secretary Madeleine Albright likes to say that Americans don’t like multilateralism because it has too many syllables and it ends with -ism, so. (Laughter.) So I love it.

This was a great closing round of just a remarkable group of people. What a—what an incredible panel. I hope we can reassemble you at various times over the year. I like the way we ended because it’s really now what can we grab that’s positive.

This is an opportunity. We think there is a chance for a transformative presidency here, but it’s not a transformative presidency if you don’t have a transformed transatlantic relationship, our view. And so it’s interesting, Abraham Accords is a good positive. Iran, we have to deal with it—have to deal with it, but the Abraham Accords is something that’s happening positively. I like that.

We’ve been arguing on behalf of a pandemic prevention board. And starting across the Atlantic would be a great thing, also including the private sector.

The digital issues, Carl, that you brought to bear also, as I joked, we don’t want to be lunch, but the fact of the matter is we would have the biggest digital—free digital space if we could—in the world if we could get our act together. So these are all just terrific ideas.

On behalf of this audience, which spans time zones across the world, the Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum, thanks to all of you for participating. Thanks, as well, for the roles that you’re playing on the Atlantic Council Board and International Advisory Board.

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Transcript: Fatih Birol on what’s next for the energy system post-pandemic

Atlantic Council — Wed, 20 Jan 2021 18:48:15 +0000

Read the highlights

New Atlanticist

Jan 19, 2021

The world is about to embark on a big energy transition. Here’s what it could look like.

By Katherine Walla

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Event transcript

Opening remarks by

Frederick Kempe,
President and CEO,
Atlantic Council

Presentation by

Fatih Birol,
Executive Director,
International Energy Agency

FREDERICK KEMPE: But now we’ll move to a twenty-thousand-foot view of the energy system for the coming year, one in which it will simultaneously begin the steady recovery from COVID-19 at the same time policymakers around the world aim to seize this moment in the pursuit of climate action. For that, it is my pleasure to welcome Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency and an Atlantic Council International Advisory Board member.

Fatih, your sessions have always been among the most popular and well-attended of any at any of our forums, because you provide what policymakers and the industry most need with your scene setters—factual, real-world insights into the present and into the future. I’m also proud that you contributed an essay to our inaugural The Global Energy Agenda report, which we’ll be launching right after your talk. And I hope people will stay on for the panel that follows your scene setter, Fatih, because you’ll be on that panel with Indian Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas Dharmendra Pradhan, OPEC Secretary General Mohammed Barkindo—who we always love hearing—Pulitzer Prize-winning author Dan Yergin, and the former chair of the California Air Resources Board Mary Nichols. That’s a great, all-star cast.

But, Fatih, why don’t you kick us off? We’re really looking forward to hearing your remarks. And good to see you in Paris.

FATIH BIROL: Thank you very much, Fred. And dear colleagues, greetings to all of you from IEA headquarters in Paris. My congratulations to Fred and the Atlantic Council, despite all the circumstances to bring us together from different parts of the world in this very important meeting, and with such an ambitious agenda and with so many high-level speakers. Very much appreciate it.

Now, what I would like to do in the next few minutes is first to talk about the impact of COVID-19 on oil and producer economies especially, but also to give some highlights—the expectations for 2021 and what the IEA is going to do this year. Now, COVID-19 is a major, unprecedented impact on energy, as we all know. Just to—all of us to understand how big the impact is in total energy, this—our report shows that in 2020 global energy demand declined about 5 percent—5 percent.

And what does it mean, 5 percent decline? Is it big or small? It is very big. To understand it better, we all remember—it’s still fresh in our memories—the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Global energy demand declined after that crisis as well. But the 2020 decline is seven times deeper than the decline we hit after the financial crisis. It had a major impact for all energy sources. But oil got the biggest hit. Some of you may remember the April—the month of April when oil demand started to decline sharply. And some of you may recall, [in the] beginning of April I said: April—this 2020 April—may well go in the history of the oil industry as black April.

Indeed, a couple of weeks later we have seen for the first time negative oil prices. And oil, leaving aside the critical importance in energy supply, is a key parameter for the global financial system, gave some alarming signals which would have devastating impacts for the global economy. So it is the reason IEA has pressed the Saudi G-20 presidency to organize an extraordinary meeting of the energy ministers. And I believe ministers coming together under the presidency of Saudi Arabia… gave a strong signal, and provided the oil markets and financial markets much-needed stability… And I would like to here thank Minister Mazrouei for his positive contributions that came out of this G-20 presidency.

Now, one big debate in the oil market starting from April [and] May: whether or not we have seen the peak oil demand in 2020 and oil demand will never come back to those levels and will not rebound again. Many thought leaders, including the leaders of several major oil companies, said we have reached the peak oil demand. But again, the International Energy Agency said that we don’t think so. If the governments will not take measures—political measures in terms of the oil consumption—transportation sector, petrochemical sector, and others—once the economy rebounds, so will the global oil demands, because some people thought teleworking, changing some habits, changing some parts of our daily lives would lead to structural decline of oil demand.

Indeed, once again, the IEA was right—IEA and people who thought like this—and we are seeing the rebound of oil demand. Of course, it is too early to say when we will come to the levels of 2019, but there are some very pertinent data points. One example is China. China was the first country [where] we have seen COVID-19 impacts in terms of health. China was the first country [where] we saw the economic impacts, energy impacts. And China is the first country where we see an economic rebound and pandemic being under control. And today, as we speak now, Chinese oil demand is higher than the numbers we had last year and even close to 2019 levels.

So the other countries where we see pandemic gets under control, and the economy starts to rebound—and we expect the global economy will rebound significantly this year—we may well see the oil demand rebounds strongly, together with other energy sources, again in the absence of major government policies put in place. So this is one issue to put things in context. Peak oil demand will need much more than teleworking, changing some of our daily habits. It needs changes in the technologies, structural policy interventions from governments.

Having said that, this year, decline in the oil demand cost many producer countries a lot. Our numbers show that in 2020 the consumers, they spent $1 trillion less than the year before, which means many of the producing countries face additional challenges because of the lower demand and lower oil prices. And this is something we need to see. And only in the Middle East—Middle East countries’ revenues from oil is halved compared to [the] year before, 2019.

Looking a bit further, just a heads-up from our point of view, we think that the oil demand will not—even in the absence of major policy changes in the government—will not grow as much as we have seen in the past. We rather expect around five or six years of time after this rebound after the crisis, oil demand being rather flat. And this once again, as we said several times, brings an urgent message to many governments around the world—namely, diversification of their economies. And this is as urgent as before, if not more, mainly as a result of the points I’m going to make in a moment, a result of the clean energy transitions which is coming very, very strongly.

Now, oil—similar to oil, gas, and coal demand declined substantially. Only one energy source we have seen was immune to the impacts of COVID-19 last year. What was that? It was renewables. Renewables did increase in terms of the absolute values in the year 2020, both solar and wind, as a result of, again, government policies and as a result of being very cheap. And solar especially is growing very strong. And I have—when I release our renewable market report I look at the numbers of the electricity generation around the world—new capacity coming into office.

I told my colleagues: We can now crown solar as the new king of global electricity markets because only last year half of the power plants installed in the world was solar. Other half, everything else put together—coal, plus gas, plus nuclear, plus wind, hydro—50 percent. Solar alone, 50 percent. And of course, we all know that the Middle East is one of the fortunate regions which enjoys good quality of solar, which can be a wonderful source of electricity generation and other energy uses.

So emissions last year also declined substantially about 7 percent. And again, there was a hope—and people were happy that it declined 7 percent. But this decline—7 percent decline of emissions that everybody wants to see in the world, emissions decline—for us it was not a result of policy changes, putting new technologies in place. It was mainly because of the economic downturn and pandemic. If you wanted to see a structural decline, again, new policies are needed. And going back to China example, again as we speak now Chinese emissions are rebounding and they are significantly higher than the year 2019. So why [am I] talking about China? Because it’s the first country that’s rebounding in terms of economy, in terms of having the pandemic under control.

2020, we will hopefully see the world—thanks to the vaccines, thanks to the many governments’ great efforts around the world—will be under control, [the] global economy will rebound, and [the] energy sector will be again standing on its feet. But I believe the scars the COVID-19 pandemic left will be with the energy industry for many years to come. This is 2020. I wanted to share some thoughts.

2021, it is a pivotal year for the energy sector and for our fight against climate change. There are many reasons for that, but I want to highlight only one.

Many governments around the world—the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Korea, Canada, Brazil, and soon I believe United States—they are making commitments, together with China: net-zero emissions by 2050. And this will have huge implications for the energy sector. In fact, [the] climate challenge is essentially an energy challenge because more than 80 percent of the emissions causing climate change comes from the energy sector. Those pledges and the policies governments will put in place to reach their targets, to reach their commitments, will have substantial implications for the global energy markets, and in a rapid way.

Many governments I said came up with this 2050 target. And as I have announced last week, the International Energy Agency, at the request of COP presidency, President of COP Mr. Alok Sharma, is preparing a major study, the first in the world, to see what is the world’s roadmap to reach net zero for 2050, and what kind of implications it will have for the energy markets. What does it mean for [the] oil industry? What does it mean for the investment flows? What does it mean for renewables? And this is a serious issue, and I believe no country, no government—oil-producing government, gas-producing government—companies, nobody will be unaffected from the clean energy transitions.

We like it or not, it will affect everybody around the world as a result of the effects of the division of clean energy technologies, financial measures governments will take, including the clean energy emphasis on many trillion-dollar value of stimulus packages. It is the reason we wanted to bring this roadmap—we are going to publish it on 18th of May—to work to see—energy work to see what are the implications of the governments around the world who are committing themselves for 2050? I say 2050, but of course we will look at the next year—2030, 2040. All the years, what are the implications there.

And here, since we are not able to, unfortunately, be in person in Abu Dhabi, one of the key centers in Middle East, I wanted to say that it will have huge implications on the economies and the social life of the countries in that region. Many governments I know, including the Emirates, are taking measures in order to diversify their economies. Not only Emirates, but Saudi Arabia, Oman, many, many countries are doing this. But the question is whether or not the pace that they are diversifying their economies are aligned with the pace of the governments pushing clean energy transitions.

Finally, I would like to say that, to sum up, climate change is a huge challenge for all of us. And I expect, as Fred just said, tomorrow is the inauguration of the new US administration, with the new administration taking climate change as a centerpiece of many economic and policy decisions they are going to have will give enormous momentum—additional momentum to this very issue. Middle East countries, oil producers, are all distinguished members of the international community. And climate change is one of the top challenges for the international community.

And to fight against climate change, to be on the right side—position those countries and governments in a timely manner on the right place—is not only an issue of reputation, is not only a moral obligation, but I believe if we don’t do so it is a major economic or commercial risk for oil producers around the world. Thank you very much, Fred, for giving me this opportunity. And I am very much looking forward to joining my distinguished panel members to elaborate these issues further. Thank you.

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The American Nuclear Infrastructure Act provides bipartisan support for nuclear innovation in the United States

Amy C. Roma — Wed, 09 Dec 2020 22:27:00 +0000

The United States has been the global leader in nuclear power technology since the 1950s, when the “Atoms for Peace” program supported the development of the peaceful use of nuclear technology as part of US geopolitical strategy. Nuclear power continues to have significant and strategic geopolitical importance, which only grows as new-to-nuclear countries seek to build nuclear power plants, and as nations pursue new and innovative uses for carbon-free nuclear power. Nuclear power has the ability to raise the global standard of living by providing reliable energy to billions of people around the world, while also providing much needed carbon-free power to combat the existential threat of climate change.

The advanced nuclear power technologies currently under development are very different from the large-scale, light-water reactors that dominate the world today. This new generation of reactors are often small, scalable, and flexible. They can pair with renewables, power remote communities, desalinate water, and revolutionize sea and space travel. Unfortunately, the current nuclear regulatory framework in this country—which was designed for large nuclear power plants—was not meant to encompass the wide range of technologies and intended uses planned by the next generation of nuclear developers. But Congress has stepped in to help address this gap and support these emerging technologies.

A bipartisan group of US senators—John Barrasso (R-WY), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Mike Crapo (R-ID), and Cory Booker (D-NJ)—introduced the American Nuclear Infrastructure Act (ANIA) on November 16, 2020 (a section-by-section analysis is available here). The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW) held a hearing on the discussion draft version of ANIA in August. This bill is out of Committee and currently before the full Senate for a vote.

ANIA is in good company, as there is solid recent precedent for bipartisan support of nuclear legislation. For example, in the past few years, Congress passed two staple nuclear bills—the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act and the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act—with champions on both sides of the congressional aisle. It appears that both Republican and Democratic members are eager to support zero-carbon emission electricity in an industry that promises tens of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in foreign trade opportunities.

Nuclear energy provides about 55 percent of carbon-free power in the United States and has effectively prevented around 506 million metric tons of CO₂ emissions. Despite these benefits, the current nuclear reactor fleet is struggling. ANIA provides a safeguard for the current fleet—which has supplied the United States with 20 percent of its electricity since 1990. In order to support the current fleet, ANIA would authorize a targeted credit program to preserve plants at risk of prematurely shutting down and revitalize the US supply chain infrastructure, including the development of advanced fuels and the use of modern manufacturing techniques for new nuclear construction.

ANIA also enables the United States to compete on the international nuclear stage, especially by encouraging the development of advanced nuclear technology, which has encountered a number of regulatory barriers. Most importantly, ANIA proposes pathways to make the licensing process for advanced nuclear more predictable and efficient; create multiple prizes to incentivize the successful licensing process of next generation nuclear technologies; and require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to identify and update regulatory barriers to enable advanced nuclear technologies to reduce industrial emissions.

Finally, ANIA contains provisions that support nuclear energy more broadly. These include enabling the NRC to coordinate the international establishment of certain technical standards, efforts to build nuclear regulatory organizations and legal frameworks, and exchange programs and training with other countries. ANIA also would revise the Atomic Energy Act’s outdated foreign ownership, control, or domination (FOCD) restriction to facilitate investments in US nuclear projects by US allies.

Through the provisions discussed above, ANIA bolsters the current fleet of nuclear plants, potentially saving an upwards of a half a million jobs. It also promotes the development a new generation of nuclear reactors and rebuilds our high-technology manufacturing and export economy. The nuclear field fosters highly skilled professions and supports competitive salaries, and every $1 billion of nuclear market exports is estimated to create ten thousand domestic jobs.

With ANIA’s key provisions that support the current nuclear fleet and advanced nuclear technology, this forward-looking legislation is an encouraging step towards greater US nuclear competitiveness. This legislation, having garnered support from both Democrats and Republicans, aligns with the incoming Biden-Harris Administration’s climate policy goals to revitalize the domestic energy sector and ensure a 100 percent clean energy, net-zero emission economy by 2050.

Amy C. Roma is a partner at Hogan Lovells and a founding member of the Atlantic Council’s Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition (NENSC).

EnergySource Nov 7, 2020

Nuclear energy policy represents a bipartisan path forward on climate for the Biden Administration

By Jennifer T. Gordon

With former Vice President Joe Biden now the President-elect of the United States, enthusiasm on the left is tempered by the likelihood that Republicans will keep the Senate. However, while the full scope of Democratic policies may not be realized by the next Congress, legislation that encourages the rapid deployment of nuclear energy technology represents an area where Democrats and Republicans can continue to work together—as they have over the last four years—on advancing technologies with the potential to decarbonize power systems at home and abroad.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Oct 7, 2020

Strengthening cooperation with allies could help the United States lead in exporting carbon-free nuclear energy

By Matt Bowen, Jennifer T. Gordon, Jackie (Kempfer) Siebens

Driven in part by concerns over climate change, nuclear energy is receiving renewed attention. In order for the United States to meet growing international demand for nuclear reactors—rather than ceding the mantle of global exports to Russia and China—the United States will need to increase coordination with its allies in commercializing advanced reactors and streamlining relevant interagency processes.

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security

EnergySource Aug 31, 2020

Nuclear cooperation can bolster US-Slovenia ties

By Olga Khakova

Energy Transitions Europe & Eurasia

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center

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Khakova quoted in Delo on US-Slovenian nuclear cooperation

jbekenstein — Mon, 07 Dec 2020 20:17:00 +0000

The post Khakova quoted in Delo on US-Slovenian nuclear cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gordon quoted in Forbes on Biden nuclear agenda

jbekenstein — Tue, 01 Dec 2020 20:19:00 +0000

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Japan’s nuclear reactor fleet: The geopolitical and climate implications of accelerated decommissioning

Phyllis Yoshida — Mon, 30 Nov 2020 19:40:19 +0000

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Fact Sheet

As Japan approaches the ten-year anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, nuclear energy accounts for approximately 7.5 percent of Japan’s electricity generation, whereas prior to the accident, it had produced 30 percent of Japan’s electricity. In the Atlantic Council’s new report, Japan’s nuclear reactor fleet: The geopolitical and climate implications of accelerated decommissioning, Dr. Phyllis Yoshida argues that Japan has suffered unintended consequences as it has sought to make up for its loss of nuclear energy. First, Japan has increased its dependence on energy imports, especially imported fossil fuels. Secondly, as Japan’s domestic reactor fleet has faltered, Japan’s civil nuclear export program has also struggled. Finally, without more nuclear energy, Japan will face challenges as it works to keep its increasingly ambitious climate commitments, especially its recently announced goal of achieving net-zero by 2050.

About the author

Dr. Phyllis Yoshida is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and an expert on Japanese and international science, technology, and energy issues. She was formerly the senior fellow for energy and technology at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA and deputy assistant secretary for Asia, Europe, and the Americas at the US Department of Energy. Her career has spanned the US House of Representatives, the Japan Economic Institute, George Mason University, and the US Department of Commerce, among other institutions.

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

Learn more about the Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum

The Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum is the go-to conference on the geopolitics of the energy transformation, where energy and foreign policy leaders come together to set the energy agenda for the year and examine the longer-term geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the changing energy system.

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Nuclear energy policy represents a bipartisan path forward on climate for the Biden Administration

Jennifer T. Gordon — Sat, 07 Nov 2020 18:27:08 +0000

With former Vice President Joe Biden now the President-elect of the United States, enthusiasm on the left is tempered by the likelihood that Republicans will keep the Senate. Climate policy is one of a few key areas in which Democrats hope to implement sweeping change by introducing federal policies to cut carbon emissions aggressively and invest significantly in infrastructure and technologies to speed decarbonization. However, while the full scope of Democratic policies may not be realized by the next Congress, legislation that encourages the rapid deployment of nuclear energy technology represents an area where Democrats and Republicans can continue to work together—as they have over the last four years—on advancing technologies with the potential to decarbonize power systems at home and abroad.

Although the United States formally withdrew from the Paris Agreement on November 4^th, Biden has committed to rejoining the accord on the first day of his presidency, an action that he can accomplish with a stroke of the pen and without congressional approval. Under the Paris Agreement, the United States has pledged to reduce carbon emissions by 26 percent over 2005 levels, by 2025, but as of today, the United States is only on track to reduce emissions by 17 percent within that same timeframe. Federal policy will be crucial to making up the gap and putting the United States on a faster path to decarbonization; however, many policies that could aid decarbonization and require congressional approval (such as placing a price on carbon or renewing investment tax credits for renewable energy sources) may not make progress under a Republican-led Senate. However, nuclear energy—a low-carbon source of reliable power—has champions on both sides of the aisle and should receive attention from a Democratic administration looking to pass climate legislation.

With bipartisan support, Congress passed the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (NEICA), which was signed into law in 2018. Congress passed the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) in December 2018, and it was signed into law in 2019. NEICA helps establish public-private partnerships through the US Department of Energy’s Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program in order to speed the development of the next generation of nuclear reactors. Although advanced reactors are unlikely to be commercialized by 2025, their success can make a difference for US and global climate targets within the next decade. Similarly, NEIMA—which modernizes the regulatory process for nuclear reactors—was introduced by Senator John Barrasso (R-WY) and co-sponsored by ten Republican and eight Democratic senators.

Strong bipartisan congressional support for nuclear reactors—both the existing fleet and also the next generation of advanced reactors—is in line with the emphasis in Biden’s climate and energy plans on the importance of the domestic nuclear fleet as a source of low-carbon energy as well as the next generation of nuclear energy technologies. The current fleet—which accounts for 20 percent of total US electricity generation and more than half of low-carbon electricity generation in the United States—is integral to limiting carbon emissions, while commercializing and exporting advanced nuclear reactors is critical for US national security and global security and safeguards. As a statesman and national security expert, Biden should continue to support initiatives that will ensure that the United States can commercialize and export the next generation of nuclear technologies.

There are still more opportunities for bipartisan cooperation on nuclear energy policy. In July, the Nuclear Energy Leadership Act (NELA) was passed in the Senate as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 with bipartisan support, but it was not included in the House version of the bill. Both chambers will have to agree on a final version of NELA before the new president can sign it into law. Support for NELA, which focuses on advanced reactor demonstration and developing advanced reactor fuel, would send a powerful signal from the Biden Administration. This also holds true for the Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act (NERDA), which was introduced in the House by Rep. Conor Lamb (D-PA-17) earlier this year.

The Biden Administration will need to identify energy policy areas that advance its climate policy goals and that are palatable on both sides of the aisle. Since congressional Republicans and Democrats have shown their support for a robust domestic reactor fleet and for a strong civil nuclear export program, nuclear energy offers an opportunity for Biden to pass bipartisan legislation while achieving his climate goals.

Jennifer T. Gordon is the managing editor and senior fellow for nuclear energy at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Strengthening cooperation with allies could help the United States lead in exporting carbon-free nuclear energy

Matt Bowen, Jennifer T. Gordon, Jackie (Kempfer) Siebens — Wed, 07 Oct 2020 15:47:14 +0000

Driven in part by concerns over climate change, nuclear energy is receiving renewed attention. Although nuclear energy only accounts for 10 percent of global electricity generation, it provides 30 percent of global low-carbon electricity, indicating that nuclear energy could be poised for substantial growth as climate concerns increase. A recent study by Third Way, a US think tank, estimated that the global market for nuclear power could triple by 2050. US companies are designing the next generation of nuclear reactors, which are generally smaller in size and in megawatts than traditional light-water reactors and with generally improved safety and security features. These new nuclear projects could potentially earn a large share of the growing global nuclear market and, in the process, generate US jobs at home through exports, while helping to limit greenhouse gas emissions abroad.

However, in order for the United States to meet growing international demand for nuclear reactors—rather than ceding the mantle of global exports to Russia and China—the United States will need to increase coordination with its allies in commercializing advanced reactors and in offering competitive financing packages to third-party countries. In order to cooperate effectively with allies, the US government must streamline its interagency processes that facilitate exports and reform laws that govern foreign investment in US nuclear energy programs. These changes are worthwhile, especially if they can help the United States strengthen its domestic fleet and its nuclear export program, which will contribute to global climate goals and ensure that new nuclear builds are held to the highest safety and nonproliferation standards.

While the United States was once the undisputed leader in developing new nuclear energy technologies, that leadership has since atrophied. The only two reactors currently under construction in the United States are well over budget and schedule, with two other reactor projects cancelled in 2017 due to similar cost overruns. Russia, on the other hand, has become the leading supplier of reactors to other countries in recent decades. China, with the largest domestic build of reactors currently underway, is well on the path to becoming a global force in the international nuclear energy market. Ceding leadership in this energy space to the Chinese and Russians would have negative geopolitical implications for the United States.

But the future is potentially much brighter for US nuclear. There are over sixty advanced reactor designs under development in the United States, and the recently launched Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program housed within the US Department of Energy (DOE) is planning to construct and operate two reactors in the United States before 2027.

There are a series of policies the US government can pursue that would give American nuclear energy products the competitive edge needed to compete with Russia and China, and to export the security and safety standards that accompany US technologies.

First, the federal government should establish a more comprehensive and coordinated interagency system focused on the development and deployment of civilian nuclear technologies, which would support bringing advanced nuclear power to the global market. This would involve establishing a collaborative network of nuclear-specific staff positions embedded in the collection of government agencies that play a meaningful role in safely and securely developing, deploying, and exporting US energy technologies.

Similar to the “Team USA” whole-of-government approach first initiated under the Obama Administration, a network of nuclear-specific staff positions could be located across different US agencies including: the Department of Energy, Department of State, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Security Council (NSC), Department of Commerce, and any future Climate Office. While the Obama Administration created an NSC role to coordinate interagency nuclear policy, and the DOE report released earlier this year, Restoring America’s Competitive Nuclear Advantage, recommended reinstating that role, there is currently no high-level mechanism for interagency coordination on US nuclear exports. And, since it is difficult to export a product that lacks a domestic market, continued policy support for constructing advanced reactors here in the United States is imperative.

Second, the United States should work more closely with its allies on reactor development to help counter the geopolitical challenges posed by China and Russia. In the past year, a variety of reports—including papers from the Atlantic Council, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, and the Global America Business Institute—have suggested strategies for better collaboration on nuclear power among allies. For example, the United States could pursue a cohesive government strategy for interfacing with foreign governments and international lending institutions on co-financing reactor projects.

The United States can also collaborate with allies more at home. The US domestic reactor fleet, which provides half of clean power electricity generation in the United States and plays an integral role in the national security apparatus, is strengthened by investments from foreign allies. However, the domestic nuclear energy industry is hampered by outdated policies enacted in 1954 that govern foreign civil nuclear investments, policies in need of reform by the United States Congress. In 1954, and for most of the twentieth century, the United States was the dominant force in the global civilian nuclear trade.

Today, the international nuclear energy marketplace has changed dramatically as the supply chain has become globalized. In July of this year, a bipartisan group of former NRC commissioners sent a letter to Congress (displayed below) urging them along these lines to modernize the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) to better enable the United States to work with its allies on nuclear energy projects. The letter urges Congress to lift the foreign ownership, control, or domination (FOCD) restriction in sections 103d and 104d of the AEA, which has inhibited investment from allies in domestic reactors in the past. Since domestic power plants in the United States today rely on cooperation with foreign suppliers of power plant components, the FOCD restriction presents an anachronistic problem for US nuclear power plant projects. The law, as it currently stands, does not take into account the extent to which corporations have become multinational in the last few decades; this is just one example of an area of nuclear policy in need of an update.

Given the extent to which nuclear energy is a key tool in the fight against climate change, and given the importance of US leadership on civil nuclear exports for maintaining global safety and nonproliferation standards, it is critical that the US government improve its interagency coordination processes to craft a coherent export policy. At the same time, the United States is unlikely to realize its full potential in the nuclear energy sector without international cooperation with allies, especially since most nuclear energy companies are multinational. A robust domestic nuclear reactor fleet and an effective civil nuclear export program are inextricably linked to one another; both are necessary for US leadership on climate, safety, and nonproliferation, and both will be strengthened by US cooperation with allies.

Matt Bowen is a research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University School of International Public Affairs and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. Jackie (Kempfer) Siebens is a senior policy adviser for the energy and climate program at Third Way and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. Jennifer T. Gordon is the managing editor and senior fellow for nuclear energy at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Innovation in Nuclear Energy Technologies: Implications for US National Defense

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. and Dr. Jennifer T. Gordon — Mon, 14 Sep 2020 18:47:23 +0000

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As the next generation of nuclear reactors is being developed, the US Department of Defense (DOD) has the potential to play a significant role in providing the funding required to bring these new reactors to demonstration and, ultimately, commercialization. Possible US military applications of advanced reactors—especially micro nuclear reactors (MNRs)—include deployment to remote bases that are challenging to supply with fuel; power systems for directed-energy weapons; and nuclear energy systems for space flight and off-world bases.

In the new Atlantic Council issue brief, “Innovation in Nuclear Energy Technologies: Implications for US National Defense,” Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. and Dr. Jennifer T. Gordon explore the challenges and opportunities inherent in DOD’s procurement of MNRs. These issues include federal funding, regulatory approval, advanced fuels, and ensuring international security and safeguards. This issue brief argues that the impact of DOD procurement of MNRs may be most significant in bringing advanced reactors to commercialization, thereby giving the US a competitive edge in exporting new nuclear technologies.

About the authors

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He served for nearly forty years in the US government advancing US international energy policy and programs. He retired in January 2016 from the US Department of State, where he served as deputy assistant secretary for energy transformation in the Energy Resources Bureau from 2011 to 2015.

Dr. Jennifer T. Gordon is managing editor and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, where she has oversight of the center’s research and publications and manages the center’s nuclear energy policy portfolio. From 2016-2018, Jennifer was a senior energy policy analyst at National Journal’s Network Science Initiative. Jennifer has served as a CIA political analyst and has also worked as a freelance writer and TV commentator.

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Nuclear cooperation can bolster US-Slovenia ties

Olga Khakova — Mon, 31 Aug 2020 16:22:00 +0000

This month, the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, outlined opportunities for closer cooperation between the United States and Slovenia as part of his weeklong trip to Central Europe. Nuclear energy was at the top of the agenda, as Slovenia’s national, economic, and political security are all closely tied to the country’s energy security. Slovenia is in the midst of shaping its nuclear energy strategy, and US engagement in these efforts will be mutually beneficial, since Slovenia—as a member of Euratom, which has a Section 123 agreement with the United States—has to adhere to US safety and nonproliferation standards as it continues to build its nuclear energy program. Nuclear energy development is crucial to Slovenia’s pursuit of energy security and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. For Slovenia to fully realize its nuclear potential, the country must extend the life of its existing nuclear fleet and bring new nuclear power plants online, including traditional and advanced nuclear reactors.

It is important to note the role of nuclear energy in the Slovenian energy mix. Nuclear provides a significant portion of the country’s low-carbon energy, and Slovenia is ripe for future nuclear development, including advanced nuclear reactors. Roughly 24 percent of Slovenia’s energy supply currently comes from nuclear energy generated by the Krško nuclear power plant, which is jointly owned by Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenia and Croatia cooperate closely in the areas of energy, transport, and trade, despite unresolved border disputes, and most recently, disagreements over COVID-19 guidelines. Slovenia’s heavy reliance on oil and natural gas imports underscores the importance of clean and safe domestic nuclear energy generation. Because the Krško nuclear power plant will soon require a lifetime extension, new investment in nuclear energy will be necessary to strengthen the country’s energy security and reduce carbon emissions.

In addition to providing reliable and low-carbon baseload power, nuclear development presents a unique opportunity to create international ties with nuclear suppliers, as nuclear export agreements can result in diplomatic relationships that last for decades. Slovenia should build off of its valuable nuclear expertise and established international ties with governments and the private sector. The time to forge Slovenia’s nuclear energy strategy is now, as Slovenia and Croatia consider building a new nuclear power plant and work on extending the life of the Krško nuclear power plant by twenty years. The country’s low-carbon future and energy security will depend on the nuclear suppliers Slovenia selects to partner with for future nuclear development.

Multilateral cooperation and bilateral partnerships will be essential for nuclear investments in Slovenia, especially in the absence of European Union (EU)-wide nuclear strategy. It is up to the individual EU Member States to develop their nuclear strategies and secure partnerships for nuclear development initiatives. The United States and Slovenia are well-positioned for future cooperation, given that Slovenia’s existing Krško reactor is based on US technology and that the existing Section 123 agreement between the two countries will streamline export authorizations for US companies and cut down on approval time.

One way in which the United States can engage in nuclear development in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and specifically in Slovenia, is through the US Export-Import Bank, a federal agency that provides financing and guarantees for US businesses seeking to export. Additionally, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) can be another avenue for supporting US nuclear energy investments in the region. The DFC has recently updated its Environmental and Social Policy and Procedures to allow for support of nuclear power projects. Slovenia is categorized as a “high-income” country by the World Bank, which technically makes it ineligible for DFC financing because of the DFC’s focus on projects in developing countries and emerging markets. However, in the beginning of 2020, Secretary Pompeo pledged $1 billion in financing through the DFC for energy infrastructure in CEE countries that are part of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). The DFC will now be able to leverage $1 billion in financing products to partner with the private sector on developing nuclear projects in the CEE region.

Regional initiatives like the 3SI could be especially helpful in driving these efforts. The 3SI aims to catalyze rapid development and boost connectivity amongst twelve EU Member States located in the region stretching across the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas, with a special focus on infrastructure, energy, and digital interconnectivity. Slovenia has been actively involved in the 3SI and hosted the 2019 3SI Summit in Ljubljana. The 3SI countries should include nuclear on their list of priority projects in order to take advantage of DFC financing.

Nuclear energy will be essential to meeting Slovenia’s climate neutrality goals and strengthening the country’s energy self-sufficiency. Increased US-Slovenia cooperation on nuclear development will bolster transatlantic ties and ensure safe and transparent nuclear plant operations. US Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit to Slovenia underscores the commitment of the United States to pursuing such collaboration.

Olga Khakova is the associate director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Cohen in Forbes: ITER, The World’s Largest Nuclear Fusion Project: A Big Step Forward

adecamps — Fri, 07 Aug 2020 15:53:00 +0000

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Azodi quoted in The New York Times on Iran’s foreign policy

cmunns — Sat, 01 Aug 2020 18:27:45 +0000

Founding Chairman, Global Energy Center

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Searching for the missing link: Options for firm zero-carbon power

Stephen S. Greene — Fri, 24 Jul 2020 15:08:06 +0000

Governments and electric utilities are rapidly embracing the imperative to decarbonize energy use. In the context of this effort, they have made substantial commitments to renewable energy generation and battery-based electricity storage through renewable portfolio standards and contractual commitments. But while the costs of renewable energy generation have rapidly decreased, and their performance has improved, renewable generation is intermittent, and electric-system operators continue to rely on existing thermal resources, particularly natural gas generation, to fill in the gaps when renewable generation is not available. Battery-based electricity storage is part of the solution, but storage timeframes are currently only on the order of hours. In addition, the ability to draw on renewable resources varies dramatically by geography.

“Firm” zero-carbon generation resources, which are not necessarily intended to run all the time, but can be available at any time, will be needed to complement renewable resources in the future, without emitting the CO₂ produced by today’s fossil energy system. These resources might include, for example, fossil-fuel power plants with carbon capture, nuclear power plants with improved dispatchability, geothermal power, and bio-fueled generators. But the path to developing, and certainly deploying, such resources has been slower and more fraught than for renewables; these “firm” electricity generation resources represent a missing link in the path towards a decarbonized electricity grid.

Several new technologies—including Allam-cycle plants, combined hydrogen production and combustion, and advanced nuclear technologies—represent potentially promising approaches to providing firm zero-carbon energy that complements renewables and battery storage. But as with any energy technology, there are challenges and potential consequences associated with their deployment.

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage

An Allam cycle gas-fired power plant emits a stream of pure CO₂ that can be entirely captured and reused or sequestered, without having to be separated from other emissions as would occur with add-on carbon-capture technology. NET Power has been operating a demonstration Allam-cycle plant since 2018, and intends to deploy a commercial-scale 300 megawatt (MW) plant by 2022.

For broad deployment, Allam cycle plants have the benefit of using natural gas—a well-known and readily available fuel source—capturing 100 percent of CO₂ emissions without add-on equipment, and having a cost and efficiency comparable to existing natural gas combined cycle generation. Furthermore, the technology has already been deployed, at least at demonstration scale. But the Allam cycle faces challenges similar to those of conventional power plants with carbon capture.

Projects involving carbon capture, utilization, and storage benefit from tax credits under section 45Q. Although the credits are available at different rates depending on whether the CO₂ is used or sequestered, the prevailing approach so far seeks to use the CO₂ in enhanced oil recovery (EOR). That opportunity will erode over time if goals for decarbonizing transportation are met and may already be complicated by the recent glut in oil supply. While there is plenty of capacity to sequester CO₂, the infrastructure to transport the gas from power plants to storage sinks is very limited, and today exists only in the Southwestern United States; as such, deploying the technology broadly will involve additional costs. Furthermore, using natural gas will be challenging in a carbon-constrained future unless methane leaks from production, transport, and storage can be controlled to a much greater degree than they have been so far.

Hydrogen

A project sponsored by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power seeks to use hydrogen storage paired with hydrogen combustion as a means of delivering zero-carbon firm power generation. Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems (MHPS) will be replacing the coal-fired Intermountain Power Plant with a hydrogen-capable 840 MW gas power plant. The plant will be paired with a project that will produce hydrogen through electrolysis and store it in an underground salt dome (Advanced Clean Energy Storage, or ACES).

This project will use excess renewable generation to power hydrogen production and modifications of existing technologies to produce hydrogen through electrolysis. The success of the Utah project and any replications will obviously depend on MHPS meeting its cost objectives, particularly for the reduction in electrolyzer costs through increased scale. Furthermore, the type of salt cavern storage used for the ACES project may be geographically limited, and tank storage would make the economics more challenging. To the extent that hydrogen production, storage, and use need to occur in different locations, the existing hydrogen transport network is very limited throughout the world. In the United States, there are 1,600 miles of hydrogen pipelines compared to about 3 million miles of natural gas pipelines. Constructing new hydrogen pipelines is expensive, and the prospects for converting existing natural gas pipelines are still at the conceptual stage.

Advanced nuclear

There are two advanced nuclear project demonstrations in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing process that are expected to be built in the Idaho National Lab complex, one of which would provide commercial power to Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems. The US Department of Defense recently announced contracts with three developers to build a potential mobile nuclear reactor, and the US Department of Energy will co-fund two additional demonstrations with the intent of bringing them online within the next five to seven years.

Power plants based on advanced nuclear technology will be much smaller than traditional large-scale nuclear plants and use new approaches to process design. The developers behind these technologies expect that they will be able to deliver lower costs through manufacturing more of the facility rather than building it on site, and from designs incorporating inherent safety, rather than supplemental safety systems that add cost. Advanced nuclear technologies have the advantage of being geographically independent: they do not require pipelines or geological reservoirs and could be sited where the electricity infrastructure already exists, such as on land set aside for additional units at existing nuclear sites, or at retired coal power plants. Because they are much smaller than traditional nuclear facilities and designed to be built in modules as power requirements grow, next generation reactors may be attractive to economies without existing nuclear infrastructure or operating in remote or island locations. Interest in advanced nuclear has come from locations as varied as Ukraine, South Africa, and Puerto Rico, and analysts suggest advanced nuclear deployment could have broad potential.

Although greatly anticipated, the first advanced nuclear demonstration projects will not be operational for at least the next several years, and reaching a level of deployment sufficient to determine whether the economics will be competitive will be years beyond that. Most designs require a more power-dense fuel than that used at existing nuclear plants, and the infrastructure to produce that fuel also needs to be commercialized. Additionally, any expansion of nuclear power will need to address the public’s perception of risk—despite advanced reactor developers’ focus on inherent safety—and the lack of commitment to an approach on spent fuel disposal.

Aspects of three potential firm energy options

	Opportunity	Challenges
Natural gas Allam Cycle	Well-known fuel source; Captures 100 percent of carbon emissions; Cost and efficiency comparable to existing natural gas combined-cycle technology	Economics as EOR declines; Logistics of CO₂ transport and storage; Methane from natural gas production, transport, and storage
Long-term storage through green hydrogen	Original energy source is renewable energy; Hydrogen production and power generation based on established technologies	Achieving cost target for hydrogen production; Economic storage may be geographically limited; Minimal existing transport network
Advanced nuclear	Extensive interest and multiple, diverse development efforts; Potential for cost improvements through manufacturing; Inherent safety; Geographic flexibility	Earliest demonstrations are still years away; Cost challenge could be significant; Public reception

Other methods of firm electricity generation

Other technologies could also address the need for firm low-carbon energy. Electricity generation from biomass could be a pathway to negative carbon emissions if paired with carbon capture, use, and storage, but the issues associated with using biomass are complex. Geothermal energy could make a valuable contribution but it is geographically limited. Existing natural gas combined-cycle technologies could be used with added carbon capture, but that increases their capital cost and decreases their efficiency; it may be useful as an interim option. Finally, there are a number of companies developing approaches to long-term energy storage; Form Energy, one of the most visible, recently announced a pilot project to be tested through 2023.

There is no perfect or universally applicable technology that can “solve” the transition to a decarbonized electric grid. Renewables have made great progress in the last several years on both cost and performance, but they will always be intermittent, and their applicability will vary by geography. Many approaches show promise to complement renewables and support a transition to a fully decarbonized grid, but each has its challenges. These options for firm low-carbon energy are certainly not mutually exclusive and many may be used in tandem depending on their advantages in certain markets and geographies. Ultimately which are used, and where, will come down not only to whether the developers can meet their cost and performance objectives, but perhaps as much or more to how their challenges are addressed, and what residual impacts are most acceptable.

It is encouraging to see the dedication of effort and resources to a wide range of potential solutions for a key missing link in the quest for power sector decarbonization. These efforts have been and should continue to be supported through government policy. The dramatic results achieved so far in reducing the carbon intensity of power generation would not have occurred without the tax credits and state policies encouraging renewable energy research, development, and deployment. Similarly, the push for firm low-carbon energy generation will continue to need policy support through a combination of research and development initiatives; government preference for low-carbon options to balance the energy mix beyond renewables; and—ultimately—a means of putting a price on carbon, whether explicit or implicit.

Furthermore, it is important to cast the net wide, to continue to support a range of approaches, and to avoid tunnel vision and the tyranny of assumptions regarding acceptable options. There will inevitably be potholes and dead ends on the journey toward workable solutions, and the more options that are considered and tested, the more likely that feasible solutions will be found in the limited time available to achieve climate objectives.

Stephen Greene is principal at Green Acres Advisory and the former chief financial officer and senior vice president at Centrus Energy

Innovation can break the gridlock on nuclear waste

Michelle Brechtelsbauer — Wed, 17 Jun 2020 22:20:28 +0000

Innovation has always been a key tenet of the nuclear power industry. With scientific consensus building that nuclear power must play a significant role in mitigating climate change, there has been renewed focus on fuel design and fuel cycle research to support the next generation of nuclear technology. This attention also creates an opportunity to reinvigorate innovation on back-end technologies that may prove to be the key to circumventing the longtime political impasse on nuclear waste.

In recent years, the US government has increased investment to support fuel cycle research, development, and deployment (RD&D) for existing as well as advanced nuclear reactors. Key facilities at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) national laboratories, such as the Transient Reactor Test Facility and the now Versatile Test Reactor, provide testing capabilities to accelerate the development of new fuel concepts and reactor designs. DOE’s Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) Initiative is connecting private sector innovators with national lab resources to bring new fuel cycle technologies to commercial readiness. And on the horizon, congressional legislation—most notably the Nuclear Energy Leadership Act (NELA) and the Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act (NERDA)—further supports fuel cycle research and innovation.

These are much-needed investments focused on the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, which comprises the stages leading up to power production in a nuclear reactor, from uranium mining to fuel fabrication. In contrast, the back-end of the fuel cycle—the management, reuse, or recycling of spent nuclear fuel—has been largely ignored as a focal point for innovation in the industry.

At a hearing last summer on NELA, Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska pointed out this imbalance:

“We’re effectively in the same place when it comes to the back-end of the fuel cycle as when we introduced that legislation six years ago. But in that time, we have seen tremendous progress in the area of nuclear with our advanced nuclear reactors… but without a solution on nuclear waste, I believe that we are less likely to realize our full potential there.”

In the United States, the historical politics of nuclear waste can be summarized by seemingly entrenched patterns: strong, centralized federal control; narrowing of options over time; and ultimately, vacillation of political will.

In 1954, when nuclear power was commercialized in the United States, it was conceived to have a closed fuel cycle. In short, spent fuel could be reprocessed; the unburned uranium and plutonium would be recycled to fuel breeder reactors, thus significantly limiting the remaining fission products, or “waste,” that required disposal. But as concerns over perceived proliferation risks grew in the 1970s, plans to develop a national reprocessing capability were “indefinitely” deferred by the Carter Administration. This policy has since expired and has not been renewed, but it set a non-legally binding precedent that the implicit policy of the United States is to not reprocess spent fuel.

The modern approach to spent fuel management in the United States began with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, which further centralized federal control and narrowed back-end technology options. The law mandated that DOE take ownership and management responsibility for all commercial spent nuclear fuel, and effectively foreclosed all solutions other than geologic storage. In the years since Congress designated Yucca Mountain the sole repository site, nuclear waste has become a toxic political issue. In 2013, President Obama’s Blue Ribbon Commission provided an opportunity to clean the slate and inspire new innovative solutions. Instead, the commission reinforced calls for centralized management and storage.

Political vacillation on nuclear waste dates almost from the dawn of the atomic age, when Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the ensuing nuclear arms race clouded any optimism towards radioactive materials with a glimpse of the devastating potential of uncontrolled technology. Scientific bodies and governments began to treat all radioactive materials with additional caution and control, irrespective of real risk. This led to a public perception that all sources of radiation are unusually dangerous, which resulted in a positive feedback loop where perception reinforced the political drive to characterize it as such.

Nuclear waste, in particular, has become entrenched under layers of bureaucratic malaise because it lacks any perceived societal value. Today, after half a century of debate, nuclear waste is still stored where it is generated—a temporary solution that poses no risk to the environment or human health. There is still no meaningful incentive for the private sector to take any action other than to wait for the government to fulfill its end of the bargain.

In simplest terms, there has been a failure to appreciate the enormous, untapped value of this material. Nuclear waste is not waste because it is unusable; it is simply unused. However, three intrinsic properties make spent nuclear fuel quite valuable: it is still nuclear fuel, which can be recycled to power advanced reactors designs; it releases enormous amounts of thermal energy over sustained periods of time, which can be captured and used for purposes like heat or batteries; and it has unique energy signatures that make it ideal for applications in medicine, tracking, tracing, civil engineering, and other disciplines. There is an enormous opportunity to innovate and ultimately reframe the narrative around so-called nuclear waste.

Fortunately, an emerging generation of entrepreneurs and innovators is taking on this challenge. Zeno Power Systems, a start-up founded by a trio of Vanderbilt students in 2018, is developing a next-generation radioisotope power system that converts the heat from recycled nuclear waste into electricity. Earlier this year, a prize competition held at the University of Michigan challenged students to develop marketable applications for nuclear waste. The winning team, SustainiUM, proposed a system that would transform spent nuclear fuel casks into municipal sludge dryers to generate fertilizer—creating two product streams out of two waste streams.

This kind of creativity is not only good for business—it is good for the planet. To meet climate goals, the world will depend on a major expansion of nuclear power in the years ahead. Changing how we collectively see nuclear waste—not as a liability, but as an asset—is critical for the continued viability of nuclear energy, and an enabling condition for orders of new nuclear plants across the world.

As companies develop new products and services that utilize nuclear waste, the back-end of the fuel cycle can be decoupled from electricity production, spawning a new industry with its own business objectives. Imagine if steel producers were also responsible for designing and manufacturing cars. Imagine if television manufacturers also had to be responsible for the quality of TV content. This is effectively the approach we have taken with nuclear waste. It simply makes greater sense to decentralize the supply chain to allow innovation to flourish.

But to create a thriving market, many more start-ups in the innovation pipeline are necessary. Consider the time it takes most new ventures to put together a sustainable business model with adequate capital and resources. Furthermore, nuclear technology start-ups have to navigate the complex politics and regulations surrounding the nuclear industry. This is a daunting task for just a handful of entrepreneurs.

Building this kind of innovation ecosystem requires triggers and incentives, and the federal government must lead the way by rethinking our approach to nuclear waste. It can do so by prioritizing three initiatives. First, DOE programs focused on nuclear energy innovation should explicitly support RD&D efforts from companies proposing new techniques for managing or utilizing nuclear waste. Second, policymakers should consider new pathways to creating a sustainable nuclear fuel cycle, including recycling and reprocessing. Third, the centralized approach to waste management and siting should be reevaluated, and government actors should realign incentives by shifting some responsibility to commercial industry.

In short, innovative thinking is needed to break the deadlock, rewrite the narrative, and set the stage for real progress. Now is the time to start a dialogue on what it possible, encourage political leadership, and marshal the will to act.

Michelle Brechtelsbauer is a Women Leaders in Energy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and is the director of stakeholder relations at the Energy Impact Center, based in Washington, DC. She has studied nuclear energy policy throughout her career, which includes work at the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STPI) and the White House Office of Science Technology Policy (OSTP). You can follow her on Twitter @msbrech.

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US nuclear energy leadership: The way forward

Amb. Thomas Graham Jr. — Wed, 03 Jun 2020 17:08:54 +0000

The recently released report, Restoring America’s Competitive Nuclear Energy Advantage, commissioned by the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Nuclear Fuel Working Group, is an important step forward for US national security, the battle against climate change, and the health of the US economy. It also represents an important turning point for the United States.

Although the United States began the atomic age as the global leader in nuclear energy, the US government stopped its domestic reactor program at 102 reactors following the 1979 Three Mile Island Accident.

The US nuclear energy industry was cut off in its prime, ceding primacy to fossil fuel production. After decades of misguided policy, the DOE’s report puts the United States back on track in leading a worldwide nuclear energy system that is effective, reliable, and carbon free. To meet these goals, the recommendations in this report must be implemented as quickly as possible.

Global energy demand has risen steadily, and it will soon be augmented by the need to support an electricity-powered transportation sector as well as large seawater desalination plants as desertification intensifies as result of climate change. The US government has always insisted that strong nonproliferation standards be applied to international nuclear reactors. A strong, reliable, and capable US nuclear energy industry, both at home and abroad, that provides baseload, safeguarded, and carbon-free energy everywhere is much needed. This initiative is vital for US national security.

As the DOE report recommends, domestic nuclear power infrastructure should be expanded and significantly more power generators should be built—along the lines of what was envisaged in the past, most notably under the Atoms for Peace program. US global leadership in nuclear energy can be reestablished by funding the development of advanced nuclear fuels, investing in the national test reactor program, and supporting research and development of US advanced nuclear reactor technology, especially Generation IV reactors, of which there are several promising candidates. Furthermore, the US government can help bring small modular reactors and micro nuclear reactors to demonstration and use these technologies to power military facilities. Ultimately, the United States can take steps to strengthen its civil nuclear export program to reach additional foreign markets.

Second, the United States must level the playing field against its foreign competitors. Russia and China will be building two-thirds of the 107 currently planned nuclear power reactors around the world between now and 2030. Of course, many more reactors will have to be built in order to avoid the truly catastrophic effects of climate change while meeting increased global energy demand.

Through their state-owned nuclear enterprises, Russia and China are able to offer seemingly attractive financing packages to new-to-nuclear countries. Russia and China are likely also using the sale of their nuclear technologies to exert geopolitical pressure, and purchasing countries may ultimately find themselves entangled in disadvantageous debt relationship with the exporting states. Conversely, countries that enter into civil nuclear agreements with the United States and its allies stand to reap the intangible benefits of those agreements, such as closer political and economic relationships. Thus, it is imperative that the United States empowers, through government funding, its financial institutions to enable US nuclear companies to offer competitive financing. If the United States can leverage the full weight of its export financing institutions, it will not be long before it is back in a global leadership position. US civil nuclear technology is the best on the market, and the United States remains far more trusted on safety and nonproliferation standards than Russia or China. Interested third countries will buy US reactors if the United States can coordinate its institutions—from the Export-Import Bank and US International Development Finance Corporation to the Departments of State and Commerce—and offer American-made technology. The DOE Nuclear Fuel Working Group report is the first step in regaining US nuclear leadership.

Currently, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused much suffering around the world and has significantly depressed economies. However, it will pass, and when it does, the American economy will be back with all its strength, vitality, and capability to innovate. The United States must then be prepared to seize the day for nuclear power exports, with the DOE continuing to lead the way.

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., is the Executive Chairman of Lightbridge Corporation and Co-Chairman of the Atlantic Council’s Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition (NENSC). Follow NENSC on Twitter at @NENSCoalition

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Jan 30, 2020

Energy and the threat

By Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr.

Nuclear energy is our greatest asset in the fight against climate change. In my view, success in the struggle against climate change likely is simply not possible without a robust and immediate commitment to nuclear power.

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Atlantic Council announces membership in Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy network

Nicole Meir — Mon, 01 Jun 2020 13:58:58 +0000

WASHINGTON, DC—June 1, 2020—On behalf of the Atlantic Council, President and CEO Frederick Kempe has announced his membership in Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy (GCNP), a leadership network that brings together heads of organizations working in nuclear policy who are committed to breaking down gender barriers and making gender equality a working reality within their spheres of influence.

Gender Champions include presidents, directors and other institutional heads of organizations that work on nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear disarmament, nuclear security, nuclear deterrence, nuclear energy and other related topics.

“The goals of Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy align with the Atlantic Council’s commitment to the idea that policy must be crafted by and for a diverse array of voices. Our work is more effective and compelling when it reflects our community. For several years, the Council has been committed to ensuring woman appear in all of our public panels and has required all staff to participate in respectful workplace training,” said Frederick Kempe.

Kempe added, “I am pleased to expand the Atlantic Council’s policies by joining others in this new network to commit to three specific pledges, in which the Atlantic Council will elevate women experts on our panels and publications and ensure that the Atlantic Council is a welcoming workplace for all.”

As a member of GCNP, the Atlantic Council commits to three Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Timely (SMART) pledges. The Atlantic Council will:

Strive to include at least one female expert on each panel, particularly in non-moderator roles, and collect metrics on gender parity on Atlantic Council panels;
Strive for gender parity in compendium and expert blogs on the New Atlanticist, as well as on media tip sheets;
Require that Atlantic Council staff complete annual respectful workplace behavior training.

For questions or more information about Atlantic Council’s GCNP membership and work on issues related to nuclear energy policy, please contact JGordon@AtlanticCouncil.org.

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European energy security and the critical role of transatlantic energy cooperation

Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, Jennifer T. Gordon — Tue, 26 May 2020 20:10:43 +0000

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Transatlantic cooperation is essential to European energy security, which is and should remain a key national security priority for the United States. European energy security is crucial for the maintenance of a strong European economy and for European political stability, both of which are in the best interests of the United States. The new report from the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, European Energy Security and the Critical Role of Transatlantic Energy Cooperation: Final Report and Recommendations, by Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, and Jennifer T. Gordon, provides insights into how the United States and European Union (EU) can work together to strengthen European energy security.

The Global Energy Center’s new report recommends that the United States and the EU focus their energy cooperation in several areas that will benefit the EU’s efforts to meet climate targets and that, at the same time, will also bolster energy security. These areas include: the development of competitive and transparent energy markets; the identification of alternative energy sources and routes; collaboration on new energy technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; and coordination of a transatlantic financing strategy. Additionally, new energy infrastructure, interconnected grids, the European Green Deal, and broader geopolitical challenges also represent areas of opportunity for cooperation between the United States and the EU.

Report authors

Staff

Richard L. Morningstar

Geopolitics & Energy Security Oil and Gas

Fellow

András Simonyi

Deputy Director, European Energy Security

Energy & Environment Europe & Eurasia

Staff

Olga Khakova

Director, Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

Geopolitics & Energy Security Europe & Eurasia

Staff

Jennifer T. Gordon

Nuclear Energy Renewables & Advanced Energy

Global Energy Forum Jan 9, 2020

European energy diversification: How alternative sources, routes, and clean technologies can bolster energy security and decarbonization

By Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, Irina Markina

The European Union’s efforts to achieve a carbon-neutral economy present a unique and timely opportunity to strengthen European energy security. What is the EU currently doing to meet its decarbonization goals, address the role of natural gas in Europe’s low-carbon future, and explain the potential for new gas sources, alternative gas routes, and clean energy technologies to reduce carbon emissions? And how can this be done while simultaneously increasing European energy security and opportunities for transatlantic cooperation?

Energy Markets & Governance Energy Transitions

European Energy Security Jun 24, 2019

European energy security and transatlantic cooperation

By Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, Irina Markina

Transatlantic cooperation with a focus on energy security will be essential to addressing global challenges and should be prioritized by US and EU leadership, since energy security translates into national, political, and economic security on both sides of the Atlantic.

Energy & Environment Europe & Eurasia

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center

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ENEC’s Mohamed Al Hammadi: COVID-19 won’t delay Barakah nuclear plant

Larry Luxner — Wed, 06 May 2020 20:36:49 +0000

Construction of the Barakah nuclear energy plant in the United Arab Emirates—the first commercial nuclear power station in the Middle East—won’t be significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the economic upheaval it has unleashed upon the world.

That’s the word from Mohamed Al Hammadi, CEO of Emirates Nuclear Energy Corp. (ENEC), which is building the $24 billion complex at a sprawling coastal site in the desert west of Abu Dhabi.

Al Hammadi spoke on May 6 with Atlantic Council CEO Fred Kempe during an online “fireside chat” that focused on how coronavirus is upending global energy demand.

“COVID-19 is the deepest financial and economic shock that’s hit the world in the last 100 years,” he said. “From a business point of view, being in the driver’s seat of managing this enterprise, it created uncertainty. I’ve had many sleepless nights. It’s a multifaceted crisis.”

From the get-go, said Al Hammadi, senior management assessed the situation and made the safety of ENEC’s 600 or so workers its top priority.

“We stopped all non-essential work. We demobilized non-critical resources, locked down the site, and worked to keep people safe, and to keep COVID-19 out of Barakah,” he said. “Anybody who leaves Barakah is not allowed to come back. We meet every morning from 9 am to 10 am, making decisions on the spot to get things done. And the good news is, we don’t have a single positive case of coronavirus at the construction site.”

In addition, said Al Hammadi, “we’ve installed disinfection terminals and have recently begun treating wastewater to see if there’s any presence of coronavirus. We’re doing whatever we can to make sure our facilities are safe from this pandemic.”

The UAE already boasts the world’s highest per-capita testing rate for COVID-19, with only 157 deaths in a population of about 9.5 million. This has helped ENEC avoid costly delays.

“We are planning to go critical very soon—in a month or so—and we’re targeting to get the units operational before year’s end. I don’t see any supply-chain challenges so far,” Al Hammadi said. “When you build four units, you have three redundancies, so if we need to, we have three other units we can cannibalize.”

Al Hammadi has headed ENEC for the past ten years. Construction of the first unit at Barakah, which will have a total capacity of 5,600 MW, began in July 2012; work began on Unit 2 in May 2013.

Fuel has already been loaded into Unit 1, with Units 2, 3, and 4 in various stages of completion. Once all four units are online, he said, Barakah will generate about 25 percent of the country’s energy needs—a “major shift” for the UAE.

“Nuclear will provide a clean, secure, and sustainable source of energy. That will avoid the emission of around 21 million tons of CO2 annually,” he said. “To put this into perspective, that’s equivalent to taking 3.2 million cars off the road. These are major trends that’ll put the UAE in the forefront as a clean energy producer, and will also create very high-paying jobs.”

In the short term, while businesses and factories have closed down in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas, billions of people are staying home—and consuming electricity.

“Globally, power demand dropped from 10 percent to 20 percent in many countries, and as much as 25 percent in places like Italy and Spain, but then it gradually went up again,” Al Hammadi said.

“The good news is that electricity is the backbone for the world to continue working. Oil demand went up and down, but we didn’t see any blackouts anywhere in the world,” he said. “Also, when people stay at home, there’s more per-capita consumption. I have six kids at home, and each one has their own tablets and iPhones. My router is always overheating.”

In addition, subscriptions to Netflix have exploded as hundreds of millions of people remain in lockdown, driving up electricity demand at energy-hungry data centers, which consume about 400 watts per square meter.

“The world is consuming 8.9 gigawatts of electricity because of higher use of computing,” he said. “These trends will continue when we go back to normal. Long story short, the electricity sector is resilient, and it’s designed in a way to continually provide power. That’s why people don’t know it exists, because it’s always there.”

Al Hammadi noted that fossil fuel has been the key driver of the world economy for many years, thanks to its energy density and transportability.

“We have the option to switch between renewables, nuclear, and fossil fuel because we have all of them in our basket—and we’ll be using them for decades to come,” he said, adding he’s not particularly concerned that rapidly dropping fossil fuel prices will make clean energy less competitive in the long run.

“From our perspective, we’ve done our energy plans for the next fifteen or twenty years. When you invest in the electricity sector, you invest for decades-plus,” he said. “I do foresee some shift maybe globally, but for the UAE, we are very focused on creating clean and secure sources of electricity, and we will bear the fruit of that investment very soon.”

He added: “Any nation that wants to develop a sustainable nuclear policy is welcome to work with the UAE. We’ve definitely made mistakes along the way, but I think we’ve paved the way for others to do this more efficiently.”

Asked what kind of legacy he’d like to leave his country, Al Hammadi said: “I would be proud to look back and say we avoided 21 million tons of carbon emissions a year. To be able to make a small dent in our environmental footprint is a massive achievement.”

Larry Luxner is a Tel Aviv-based freelance journalist and photographer who covers the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Follow him on Twitter @LLuxner.

Here’s how the U.S. could lead energy rethink post-COVID-19

By Frederick Kempe

U.S. role as the world’s leading oil and gas producer doesn’t feel as empowering as it recently did, with oil prices heading into negative territory for the first time ever this week. Yet there is an opportunity in the oil industry’s unprecedented crisis – and in the further months of market volatility that will come with it. This period presents a chance for the United States to forge a better and more sustainable path to global energy leadership than can be found even within the vast riches of U.S. shale.

Energy Transitions International Markets

EnergySource Apr 21, 2020

In the wake of a pandemic: Coronavirus impacts on clean energy and climate action

By Zachary Strauss

Amid the haze of uncertainty wrought from coronavirus and oil market fallout, clean energy actors will not take a backseat as the world evolves. As the status quo dissolves before a global crisis, and fossil energy markets grow increasingly volatile, renewables and clean tech have an opportunity to chart a new path forward amid the recovery.

Coronavirus Energy & Environment

New Atlanticist Apr 21, 2020

As US crude prices crumble, a difficult hand for the United States

By Reed Blakemore and John Soughan

As the market digests the final surge of oil from a Saudi-Russian price war prior to the implementation of production cuts on May 1, it may be that the tail end of a brutal supply glut has arrived and corresponding price stabilization—albeit at a very low price—will be soon to follow. But with oil demand projections reaching multi-decade lows, and US inventories continuing to build by record levels, the madness on April 20 suggests that US markets are far from out of the woods, putting policymakers and regulators in a tough position.

Energy Markets & Governance Oil and Gas

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A new energy strategy for the Western Hemisphere

David L. Goldwyn — Fri, 06 Mar 2020 05:01:00 +0000

In 2019, the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center began an effort in partnership with the United States Department of Energy to consider a fresh approach to energy in the Americas that is comprehensive in nature and targeted in its approach. Following a year-long period of engagements alongside six representative stakeholder countries participating, the resulting report: “A New US Energy Strategy for the Western Hemisphere,” was launched in March 2020 and will serve as the launch point for additional work by the Atlantic Council on energy and sustainability issues across the hemisphere.

Introduction
The global context
US interests
The needs of the hemisphere
A new US energy strategy for the Western Hemisphere

Conclusion

About the author

Acknowledgments

Foreword

As Secretary of Energy, I have a strong appreciation for the strategic importance of the Western Hemisphere to US prosperity, energy, and national security. As our closest neighbors and strongest trading partners, the energy and economic security of the hemisphere is critically linked to our own.

The Americas are full of potential. With the leadership of the US Department of Energy (DOE) in partnership with our interagency colleagues, the US private sector, and our regional partners, we can galvanize the Western Hemisphere into an energy powerhouse. Achieving the full potential of our hemisphere’s energy resources will boost the economy of the United States and our neighbors while also serving as a counterweight to foreign adversaries.

To help achieve this vision, DOE commissioned the Atlantic Council to conduct independent analysis and develop recommendations on how the Department can most effectively catalyze the development and expansion of energy projects across North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.

The resulting report, A New Energy Strategy for the Western Hemisphere, will inform DOE’s approach to energy engagements in the Western Hemisphere in 2020 and beyond.

I am thankful for Atlantic Council and the thought leaders they consulted for their contributions to this report. I look forward to working with them and others as DOE continues to strengthen the energy security and prosperity of the Western Hemisphere.

Sincerely,

Dan Brouillette
Secretary
US Department of Energy

I. Introduction

The Western Hemisphere has a unique advantage in global energy markets. It is rich in natural resources, from conventional fuels such as oil and natural gas, to critical minerals such as lithium for batteries. The region is also poised to become a leader in newer and emerging energy resources. It has, for example, abundant potential for solar and wind energy and other advanced energy technologies, such as nuclear energy. It enjoys high and rapidly growing levels of renewable energy, especially in power generation, largely based on significant levels of legacy, utility-scale hydropower.¹ Many of the Americas’ subregions share cross-border electric power or liquid fuel interconnections. The vast majority of its nations share common values, including a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and shared prosperity. The countries of the Americas are bound together through market-based trade, mutual investment, and deep cultural and security ties. Moreover, the hemisphere is indispensable to US energy security. The United States derives the majority of its imports of oil, gas, and electricity from its neighbors and there is considerable potential for trade in increasingly high-value minerals.

The region’s energy profile is heterogeneous, both in terms of resource endowment, national needs, and energy challenges. The region has been an incredible laboratory for experimentation in the clean energy transition. For example, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico have pioneered reverse auctions with great success. Five countries have employed some form of carbon pricing or emissions trading schemes to incentivize investment in new and lower-emission power generation.² Argentina, Canada, and the United States have seen tremendous success in unconventional hydrocarbon exploration and production, while Brazil and Guyana have seen major successes in offshore exploration. This diversity of experience shows that the countries in the region have much to learn from each other.

The region also has many common challenges. In a global economy that is currently enduring weak economic growth, uncertain energy demand, and stiff competition for investment, nations face serious challenges as they compete for new investment in electricity, energy transportation, and energy services, notably in the oil and gas sectors. Many of the region’s economies have frameworks laboring under macroeconomic distortions such as federal budget imbalances or persistent external current account deficit, as well as microeconomic distortions such as subsidized power or product prices, and a lack of competition in the energy markets.

The United States, led by the Department of Energy (DOE), can be a leader in gathering partners around the hemisphere. It can bring to bear a wide range of US government tools in an effort to dramatically enhance energy investment in the hemisphere and thereby expand energy access, affordable power, energy security, and national prosperity. By sharing best practices and lessons learned, enabling informed conversations and promoting cooperative engagement on overcoming investment barriers, highlighting investment opportunities, and supporting its neighbors and friends with technical assistance, capacity building training, and mustering the many programs that can support energy development, the United States can help raise the global competitiveness of the hemisphere, advance its shared prosperity, and improve US national and energy security as a result.

This report recommends a new US energy strategy for the Western Hemisphere to achieve these ends. The report itself is the product of an extensive hemispheric collaboration. We held strategy sessions, roundtables, and one-on-one meetings with government leaders from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Guyana, and Mexico, as well as private sector investors, financiers, and civil society members from these countries and the United States. This spirit of partnership is deeply embedded in the report, as we hope it will be in the partnership ahead.

II. The global context

The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the world invested $1.8 trillion in the energy sector and related projects in 2018.³ Its baseline projections anticipate average annual investment in energy of $2.2 trillion through 2025, and considerably more in its decarbonization scenarios.⁴/. The competition for that capital, in terms of fuel source, technology end use, and even regional destination, will be intense. The highest energy demand is in Asia, led by China and India, and accordingly, much investment is targeted at those rapidly growing markets. Moreover, the global economy is entering a phase of slower growth. In the Western Hemisphere, growth is modest or flat. Expectations for levels of global hydrocarbon demand are uncertain. The success in improving the productivity of unconventional oil and gas development, added to expectations of softening oil prices, makes the threshold for new investment in oil and gas competitive, especially when long-term commitments are required. In this environment, the competition for project investment is intense.

To its advantage, the hemisphere is well positioned to overcome these headwinds and attract international capital, if it chooses to compete. The nations of the hemisphere are engaged in a major energy transition. They are increasingly seeking to modernize and decarbonize all aspects of their energy systems, develop their native natural resources, and expand their energy transportation networks. Many of these nations seek to extend reliable, affordable, and industrial-scale power access to support economic and human development throughout rural and remote areas in a bid to enhance local prosperity and narrow the rural-urban divide. In the electricity space, improvements in solar and wind technology have made these fuel sources more attractive to governments and utilities.

The development of “mini” grids is making distributed electricity more accessible. Floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) have lowered the cost of entry for new or small-scale natural gas consumers and accelerated the ability of countries to transition away from higher carbon fuels, such as diesel. Compared to other regions, the countries in the Western Hemisphere are relatively politically stable, respect the rule of law, and generally enjoy peaceful relations with their neighbors. There are significant interconnections between many of the major economies, as well as the long-standing, close trilateral relationship among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. But in recent years, we have seen a cooling of investment in the electricity, energy transportation, and oil and gas sectors in many countries undergoing political transitions due to investor uncertainty about the direction and stability of macroeconomic and legal frameworks. Similarly, in many countries, a company’s social license to operate (SLO) is increasingly challenged over land use, fear of detrimental impacts of development, and questions about whether the impacts of infrastructure siting are just in light of broader environmental concerns (such as land, air, and water quality). Canada and Mexico are seeking to build new relationships with their indigenous peoples and that is changing how energy projects must engage with these communities and respect their rights. In order to attract the levels of investment sought by countries’ leaders (and their stakeholders) for electric power and critical mineral and hydrocarbon development, the nations of the hemisphere must become more attractive and competitive than they are today.

III. US interests

The United States has powerful national interests in helping the nations of the hemisphere achieve energy security and in enhancing regional prosperity. Canada and Mexico are the United States’ largest trading partners and the United States has extensive trading relationships throughout the rest of the region as well. Canada, in particular, is the largest foreign supplier of energy to the United States, providing one in five barrels of oil consumed in the United States and sharing one of the most highly integrated electricity grids in the world. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) notes that, as of 2018, the United States’ total goods and services trade within the Western Hemisphere was $1.9 trillion.⁵ The United States’ national security is enhanced by ensuring that its neighbors, nearly all democracies, enjoy new opportunities for prosperity. In a world where illiberal and anti-competitive market practices are on the rise, the United States can support fellow market economies by helping them enhance self-sufficiency and development. By promoting economic development through energy development, particularly in Central America, the United States can also help ameliorate some of the root causes of migration from the region.

View of the Ecopetrol oil refinery in Barrancabermeja, Colombia, March 1, 2017. REUTERS/Jaime Saldarriaga

Finally, US energy security, or rather the ability to access the energy the United States needs at affordable prices, has long depended on successful and reliable energy trade. The United States has depended on Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and (prior to US sanctions) Venezuela for heavy crude imports, and previously relied on Canada for natural gas. Many US states, particularly in the Northeast, are considering expanding low-carbon electricity imports from Canada. Many countries in the region, particularly Canada, also offer important access to critical raw minerals. On a global level, the contributions of the hemisphere (increasingly led by the United States as an energy producer) are indispensable to energy security.

IV. The needs of the hemisphere

Just as the histories, geographies, and economic power of the countries of the Western Hemisphere vary considerably, their energy needs and respective challenges are also highly varied. Some countries are historically robust conventional energy producers, while others have had tremendous success managing their energy needs using high levels of legacy renewables (specifically hydropower) and integrating more recent additions of variable renewables. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and the United States are significant producers of oil and/or natural gas. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico have held highly successful renewable energy auctions and taken strides to add newer unconventional fuels (e.g., biofuels such as ethanol) into their energy mixes. Nevertheless, some serious endemic problems persist. The nations of Central America and the Caribbean endure (to varying degrees) high levels of energy insecurity. They suffer from high energy costs, reliance on expensive and often highly polluting fuel resources, high electricity prices, and modest local resource hydrocarbon endowments. In addition to these endemic challenges, many of these countries are very small in geographic size and population, making the challenge of generating economies of scale for energy all the more difficult.

As a sample of the hemisphere’s nations, we consulted with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Guyana, and Mexico to understand their immediate concerns, their perspectives on regional cooperation, and their views on the benefits of deeper partnership with the United States. We describe their concerns as an illustration, albeit not an exhaustive one, of the needs of the hemisphere at large and to draw inferences as to the key areas on which a new US energy strategy for the Americas should focus.

An aerial view of a shale oil drilling rig SAI-310 in the Patagonian province of Neuquén. The Patagonia landscape, which was transformed through the discovery of big deposits of hydrocarbons in the 1970s, could experience another energy revolution due to forecasts indicating that it could contain the third largest reservoir of unconventional natural gas in the world. October 14, 2011. REUTERS/Enrique Marcarian

Argentina

Argentina is enjoying marked success attracting investment to its potentially massive Vaca Muerta hydrocarbon project, as well as in offshore oil exploration. It is already a major destination for US foreign investment. However, Argentina presently lacks appropriate energy transportation infrastructure to move hydrocarbons from the Neuquén Basin (Vaca Muerta Formation), where shale gas is being developed, to its demand centers and export facilities. A new transmission pipeline is being tendered, but the awarding process has been postponed due to the change of administration in the country. Natural gas demand is highly variable by season. Argentina would benefit from developing energy storage, but financing and siting that storage is a challenge, as is the development of appropriate and adequate price signals.

In the electricity space, Argentina has been a pioneer in attracting renewable energy investment through its RenovAr program, as well as a growing nuclear energy program. While generation capacity is adequate to meet the current internal demand, Argentina needs new transmission capacity to receive and distribute these new sources of generation with minimal losses or needs to increase its generation capacity to reach exportable surplus. An additional challenge is regulatory design, specifically devising ways to balance the energy mix in Buenos Aires so that intermittent renewable energy is complemented with flexible power to ensure greater reliability. Argentina is seeking ways to increase the utilization of the natural gas it will eventually produce, possibly by developing new and lucrative petrochemical and fertilizer industries, as well as expanding the use of natural gas for transportation (such as a second wave of compressed natural gas (CNG) conversions and the construction of blue highways for trucks using mini liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants). Argentina has also resumed gas exports to Chile and seeks to increase exports to Brazil, and recognizes the need to overcome historical concerns about the security of its supply. More broadly, Argentina faces the challenge of managing tensions among proper pricing of energy, addressing subsidies without overburdening low-income stakeholders, inflation, and currency depreciation—often resulting in limited financing options and high costs where options exist despite the clear need for greater investment.

Brazil

Brazil has a diverse and robust energy economy. It enjoys high levels of hydropower supply, new investment in a range of forms of renewable energy, and possesses extensive experience as a major oil producer. It is a major destination for US investment, as well as a partner in multiple aspects of regional security, including energy security and defense. Its major priorities for collaboration are in oil and gas, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, and biomass. Brazil is on a campaign to further develop its native energy resources and significantly reduce the role of state-owned Petrobras in the production of oil and gas and the ownership of pipeline infrastructure. While Brazil will see major increases in natural gas production, this production is in some cases hard to deliver to its major demand centers in the southeast or underserved areas, such as the northeast. Designing a framework to increase investment in pipeline infrastructure (currently half the size of Argentina’s) is also a major priority.

Canada

Canada is a major global energy producer with highly diversified energy resources. It serves as the world’s second-largest producer of hydroelectricity and uranium, the fourth-largest producer of crude oil and natural gas, and holds the world’s third-largest oil reserves. Canada’s electricity generation is currently 80 percent non-emitting, one of the cleanest in the Group of Twenty (G20). Canada’s domestic priorities include achieving net zero emissions by 2050, while continuing to expand markets for energy resources and technologies. This strategy includes innovating to continue to reduce emissions from the petroleum sector, an approach that has led per barrel emissions from Canada’s oil sands to fall 32 percent since 1990.⁶

The US and Canadian energy systems are closely integrated. In 2018, the United States accounted for 89 percent of Canadian energy exports, which represented 24 percent of US uranium consumption, 21 percent of oil consumption, 11 percent of natural gas consumption, and 2 percent of electricity consumption.⁷ Canada and the United States promote free trade in all forms of energy, including through provisions included in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the associated Canada-US Side Letter on Energy.

Expanding the network of thirty-four oil and gas pipelines and seventy-four electricity transmission lines that cross the Canada-US border will strengthen regional energy security by facilitating flows of oil, gas, and low-carbon electricity between Canada and the United States, allies who share market-based approaches to energy development. Given the high levels of investment in government research and development in energy in the United States and Canada, there is great opportunity to coordinate, collaborate, and harmonize these projects and optimize efforts. Strong bilateral cooperation is already underway in the area of carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS); hydrogen; advanced materials for clean energy; and next generation nuclear, such as small modular reactors. Canada also works closely with partners throughout the Americas, both through multilateral fora like the Clean Energy Ministerial and bilateral agreements with Chile, Colombia, Guyana, and Mexico.

Colombia

Colombia is a long-standing destination for US investment and a major security partner for the United States. Colombia’s energy priorities are attracting private sector investment to revive its declining oil and gas production, increasing the share of renewables in its power generation mix, and expanding access to electricity to achieve 100 percent coverage, especially in remote areas. Given its history of subsidized electricity, Colombia is focused on providing a new framework that will secure financing for new power generation. Despite some challenges at auctions earlier in 2019, Colombia awarded 1.3 gigawatts (GW) of solar and winds contracts in its inaugural October 2019 renewable energy auctions.⁸ Colombia has also launched an Energy Transformation Task Force to propose strategies to bring energy to remote areas, facilitate more competitive market structures, define a role for natural gas in Colombia’s energy transition, use advanced digital technology to manage energy demand, and update its energy regulatory frameworks.

Key areas of potential cooperation include understanding best practices in unconventional resource development and more effective engagement with stakeholders in areas where the country seeks to develop unconventional oil and gas deposits, and also understanding best practices to include new technologies in the power market. Colombia has also asserted regional leadership on decarbonization and the energy transition. In September 2019, Colombia announced its cornerstone role in a new Latin American initiative featuring a collective target for 70 percent of energy to be generated from renewable sources by 2030.⁹

Guyana

Guyana is on the verge of a dramatic increase in energy production following one of the most prolific oil reserve finds in recent history and probable associated gas in the country’s offshore. For these reasons, Guyana is now a major destination for US investment. With a population of fewer than 800,000, this small nation expects to see its native oil production rise from zero to nearly 750,000 barrels per day by 2025.¹⁰The country’s government estimates that national income from the new oil and gas industry will accelerate from $300 million in 2020 to nearly $5 billion a year in 2025.¹¹ By then, Guyana could see its gross domestic product (GDP) swell by 1,000 percent and boast the highest per capita wealth in the hemisphere.¹²

With no prior experience in the management of energy development at this scale, Guyana’s priorities include assistance to establish a robust framework to ensure good governance and a safety protocol and regulation of the petroleum industry, receiving technical advice and assistance on how and whether to develop refining capacity, and guidance on how to leverage national income to create a long-term transition to renewable energy. Guyana will need particular support to integrate advanced oil and gas industry technologies (such as new artificial intelligence functions) into its upstream development and management, to learn how to leverage technology to complement emerging human capacity, and to enable the enforcement of robust standards of operation. Guyana also seeks to rapidly scale up the use of associated gas in the country’s energy mix, particularly as it aims to extend reliable power access and modernize its energy systems in line with an energy transition. Associated gas could potentially have numerous applications in the country’s energy system. Notably, existing power generation is at low levels, is dominated by high-emission diesel generation, and does not provide energy access to significant parts of the population that are not connected to the grid. As with other countries in the region, ensuring access to affordable and sustainable fuel sources is a high priority and critical to Guyana’s overarching energy security in spite of the country’s recent substantial oil discoveries.

In addition, Guyana seeks to use new income generated by oil production to modernize roads, bridges, ports, and other forms of transportation infrastructure. It is seeking support to build its national capacity to manage these tasks and advice on avoiding the numerous pitfalls other nations, including its own neighbors, have endured when faced with lucrative natural resource development. Guyana seeks to play a broader regional role as well, potentially supporting greater Caribbean energy integration and designing cross-border power and rail projects with Brazil.

Mexico

Mexico is a major US trading partner. The two nations enjoy significant trade in crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, and (increasingly) electricity. Mexico’s national priorities include expanding energy access to the southern part of the country and expanding grid access in Baja California in the west. Long dependent on diesel and fuel oil, Mexico is meeting its national clean energy targets by transitioning to natural gas and increasing the share of renewable energy in its energy mix. Mexico plans to expand its domestic refining capacity. It continues to seek investments in electricity transmission and gas transportation, both of which are commissioned by special government corporations created as a result of the 2013 Mexico Energy Reform to facilitate greater regulatory transparency and independence, include external directors, and enhance competition.¹³

After undertaking a major transformation in its energy framework in a prior administration, Mexico will hopefully communicate early in 2020 its priorities for new investment. Clear signals to the investment community on the areas in which it seeks investment and the conditions for creating that investment will be a tremendous opportunity for Mexico. For now, the investment community, as well as the energy industries, sees contradictory and confusing signals as to the desirability of additional private investment in the oil and gas upstream in the fuel and power sectors. Volatility in the development of the pipeline system also heightens the level of risk for previously enthused investors. The government seeks to significantly increase oil and gas production as well as strengthen the capacity of Pemex, the national oil company. Nuclear energy has held high-level support in the past, but would need more concrete signals of support to encourage further industry development.¹⁴ Mexico has strong regional ambitions as well. It is interested in providing natural gas and electricity to Central America in support of greater economic prosperity and grid stability in that region. Mexico may also benefit from a concerted effort to increase cross-border pipeline infrastructure across the US-Mexico border, which would support Mexican industrial development and economic security and increase the availability of affordable natural gas supplies. Cross-border electricity interconnections between Mexico and the United States would also be beneficial to Mexico, especially as greater shares of renewable-based electricity generation will be integrated into its electricity mix.

V. A new US energy strategy for the Western Hemisphere

Given the shared desire to promote prosperity, energy security, democracy, and integration in the hemisphere, and the diverse needs of its friends and neighbors, the United States should consider a fresh approach to energy in the Americas that is comprehensive in nature and targeted in its approach. With its broad and diverse experience with energy development; its national interests in energy development in North America, South America, Central America, and the Caribbean; and its own experience in energy integration, the United States is a natural convener to create a new platform to further the development of hemispheric energy resources, expand energy access, and deepen energy integration.

A general view of the Centenario deep-water oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Veracruz, Mexico, January 17, 2014. REUTERS/Henry Romero

From the broadest perspective, this strategy seeks to promote a common commitment to both energy security and sustainability, which prioritizes raising standards across the region. While there are subregional differences, our goal is a highly competitive energy community of the Americas, with cooperative and harmonized regulatory frameworks, the development of efficient and better integrated electricity and gas markets, diversified and resilient energy supplies, universal energy access and improved delivery systems, and sustainable resource research, development, and deployment. An effective, mutually beneficial strategy will recognize the heterogeneity among the key regions of Latin America (South America, Central America, and the Caribbean), particularly in terms of resources and respective needs, and tailor the US approach accordingly.

A new US energy strategy should be based on five core principles:

It should welcome all democratic nations that wish to partner with the United States on a bilateral basis or in collaboration with others (e.g., multilateral organizations and development banks) when appropriate to facilitate the development of energy resources and deepen regional integration.

It should create, strengthen, and complement existing platforms¹⁵ for all participating nations to enhance cooperation and share best practices, identify key targets for energy investment in the hemisphere and obstacles to that investment, and link private sector investors to investment opportunities across the energy value chain.

It should use the deep technical expertise of the DOE, its national laboratories, and its US government agency partners to foster fact-based informed conversations on critical issues and provide technical expertise.

It should measure its effectiveness by the following criteria: modernization of energy frameworks, cooperation in energy innovation, deployment of advanced energy technologies, increased levels of financing and sharing of best governance practices to facilitate closer interconnections among neighbors, increased prosperity in the hemisphere, and greater energy security.

It should adopt a whole-of-government approach. The leadership of the secretary of energy will be indispensable to focusing and optimizing the robust programs and efforts of the many other US departments and agencies already committed to promoting hemispheric energy development, as well as securing the support of relevant federal, state, and regional regulators.¹⁶

The strategy should be implemented through the following three core structural elements:

Leadership. The first building block in a new energy strategy should be the continued commitment of the secretary of energy to lead in this area and mobilize other US departments and agencies to support this effort.

Energy summit. This new energy strategy should be launched at an energy summit in 2020. All of the eligible regional energy ministers, leading regional state-owned enterprises, and energy sector investors should be invited to a conference focused on the key energy priorities of the hemisphere.

The summit, which could be convened on a biannual basis, should focus on enhancing regional investments, trade, and integration opportunities in the energy sector.

At its launch, the inaugural summit should consider a political declaration committing all of the nations to seek zero tariffs and support for free trade in energy commodities, electricity, and services, as well as a commitment to establish frameworks to provide a secure environment for investment, good faith resolution of disputes, greater common standards, and the implementation of best practices in procurement.

The DOE should strongly consider the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and other development institutions as summit partners to leverage existing investment promotion and financing facilities and maximize private sector development. The summit could also be a complement to existing platforms and meetings already being convened on a regular basis through these other institutions.

Regional cooperation forum. In addition to a summit, the DOE should organize multilateral and bilateral platforms for collaboration on the key issues of concern for hemispheric partners. These forums might take the form of multilateral meetings on issues of broad concern or tailored collaborations on areas of a narrower concern. Based on our consultations, and the work of the Atlantic Council in the hemisphere, we see fifteen immediate and urgent areas of collaboration. We list these in greater detail below. These areas of collaboration are grouped into four overarching themes: energy governance, supporting access to diverse fuel resources, finance and private sector engagement, and modernization and advanced technologies.

A. Energy governance

Capacity building: Unconventional fuels. Countries that are experienced in conventional oil and gas development now face major new challenges when beginning unconventional development, particularly in regulating air quality, water quality, and geologic concerns (specifically, seismicity). These issues have led to tensions in some countries over social license to operate (SLO) for unconventional development (especially hydraulic fracturing) and have made stakeholder management increasingly challenging. In other countries, notably Argentina, access to financing in support of unconventionals is limited. The DOE can gather US federal and state regulators and convene existing and prospective producers of unconventional energy (Argentina, Canada, Colombia, and Mexico) to share best technological, stakeholder management, and regulatory practices.

Capacity building: Power sector operation and regulation. Nations introducing significant levels of new energy resources, particularly variable renewables, face political and technical challenges in easing the burden of adjustment on existing generators. Energy regulators, even in developed economies, are challenged to design tariffs to provide fair rates of return for investors, reasonable prices for consumers, and high levels of reliability. For its part, the DOE can gather state-level regulators, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), regional transmission authorities, independent system operators, and electricity reliability experts to share knowledge, experience, and technical expertise on these issues. The US State Department, notably, has experience with convening regulatory workshops which bring overseas partners together with US Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs). These experts can also share new information on best practices in system resiliency and cybersecurity.

Developing targeted energy subsidies. The question of energy subsidies, particularly for fossil fuel-based energy, is a serious and unresolved dilemma throughout Latin America that is at the crux of energy and economic development challenges. In the Americas, as in other parts of the world, recent efforts to reform pricing for energy (especially for end-use consumption, such as residential electricity) have resulted in unintended economic burdens that often disproportionately affect low-income groups. Energy prices and appropriate compensation (for a variety of fuel types and throughout their value chains) can be difficult to get right, but there is growing expertise, especially among the major international financial institutions, on how governments can achieve a proper and mutually beneficial balance. Reforming subsidy and pricing mechanisms merits its own workshop where the United States could convene international financial experts with private sector investors and partners to develop better paths forward for governments trying to better target subsidies and improve their fiscal frameworks. The DOE should also seek interagency partners with deep expertise in finance and commodity pricing to support this aspect of the strategy; the US Department of the Treasury, for example, is especially well-equipped to partner on this front.

Energy governance and transparency. Guyana is in a special category in needing to establish the capacity—human, technical, and otherwise—to regulate dramatically increased levels of production in a short period of time. It is receiving advice from the IDB, the US government, and other sources. Many countries in the hemisphere face similar challenges with revenue management, adapting framework terms to changing conditions, and building capacity. The DOE could convene a unique peer-to-peer workshop (with the first time directly led by the United States), including development partners and other agencies, to share best practices and build on previous preparatory work done by international financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations.

Stakeholder management and social license. Many nations, including Brazil, Canada, Colombia, and the United States, are facing challenges siting new infrastructure, from pipelines and power plants to infrastructure in support of exploration and production. Governments and companies are all striving to learn better ways to conduct stakeholder engagement, especially with indigenous communities. The DOE should convene all interested countries, companies, and community engagement experts to understand common challenges, best practices, and new approaches. Other multilateral fora already engaged on this aspect of resource development, such as the IDB, would be excellent partners in this aspect of the strategy.

B. Supporting access to diverse fuel resources

Nuclear power. Argentina, Brazil, and Canada all seek to expand the use of nuclear power and advance the use of next generation and emerging nuclear technologies. Mexico has lately signaled a willingness to expand capacity at the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant, its sole nuclear power generation facility, which is located on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The United States, likewise, has a national interest in sustaining a civil nuclear industry. Nations seeking to diversify their energy mix have an interest in learning about access to small modular and other appropriately sized reactors. The DOE, led by its Office of Nuclear Energy and its national laboratories, could convene national nuclear regulators, technology providers, and experts to harmonize safety rules, establish trade standards, and devise strategies to advance the deployment of new generations of nuclear reactors.

Building regional gas markets in the Southern Cone. In the Southern Cone of South America, Argentina and Brazil are both major gas producers and consumers. Brazil, in particular, relies on natural gas to balance hydropower, which can vary in its adequacy on a seasonal basis and depending on the weather. All of these nations—including Chile, as mentioned above—can often benefit from selling surplus energy to each other. The region has an uneven history in natural gas and electricity trade and no common rules for regional energy markets. The DOE could convene regional producers in the Southern Cone and LNG operators to address ways to aggregate markets and harmonize trading rules.

Maximizing internal value of production. One key component of developing resilient, well-resourced energy markets is having sufficient, reliable, and predictable demand for fuels. Growing markets with clear demand needs are lower risk and more easily investable. Latin America is, in many respects, an industrializing region. Its future economic growth may hinge on industry and manufacturing. Support for industrial development in the region, especially through the creation of aggregate demand via high-priority energy corridors (e.g., among Mexico and the Central American nations), will support economies of scale for fuel and electricity demand. Support for industrial development thus produces a virtuous circle resulting in greater supply and energy security. This particular area is ripe for whole-of-government and interagency engagement, as the DOE can partner with the State Department, the US Department of Commerce, the US International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) , and others to support industrial development in the region.

C. Finance and private sector engagement

Power sector financing, framework, and investment. As the world’s nations grapple with the dual challenge of meeting energy security while protecting the environment, the dominant trend is towards greater electrification. In each of the six nations we consulted, we heard of the need for investment in power generation and transmission, advice and capacity building related to grid stability and the integration of renewables, and pricing and incentivizing reliability to support the anticipated growth in demand for energy through power. One key piece of this puzzle for Latin America is developing proper regulatory frameworks that will undergird modern, high-capacity power grid infrastructure. Similarly, promoting investment in the power sector can be challenging in several respects. First, national and local power grids are often regulated by the government. Rates of return are fixed and can be in the range of 3 to 7 percent, compared to 15 percent return on investment for the hydrocarbon sector. Unlike other natural resources, which can be sold at low prices into global markets, electricity depends on creditworthy purchasers who must sign power purchase agreements (PPAs) with generators in order to attract project financing. Transmission tends to be expensive, provide a fixed rate of return, and is most often commissioned by the government. In places where electricity prices are subsidized, or there are high levels of non-transmission losses, transmission systems can be inadequate or be in high degrees of disrepair. This can be a major impediment to securing investment in new power generation. For this reason, most nations need advice and assistance in designing frameworks that will be attractive to investors. The DOE might convene electricity experts, utility professionals, investors, and interested nations to review key legal and regulatory factors for attracting power sector investment. The DOE can likewise convene regulators, utilities, and investors to discuss how to set electricity tariffs, how to prepare PPAs that meet investment standards, and ways to design auctions to attract investors who will provide competitive prices to consumers. Likewise, in light of the considerable breadth of experience with successful auctions now present in the region, there is an opportunity for cooperation among all participants and sharing of lessons learned.

General view of the Pickering Nuclear Power Generating Station near Toronto, Ontario, Canada, April 17, 2019. REUTERS/Carlos Osorio

Framework and financing for natural resources. The most common concern in the hemisphere, from the Southern Cone to the Caribbean, is the need to attract financing for natural resource development and adjacent infrastructure—particularly where resource development connects to power systems. Some nations, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, have weak credit positions and face significant competition for investment. Other nations have historical experiences where they have interrupted supplies to neighboring nations during times of national crisis, or imposed capital controls or new levels of taxation. Private sector participants attest that the key factor in making investment decisions and pricing risk in a given country is the legal and fiscal framework. The DOE can convene investors, countries, development institutions, and risk insurers to have a guided conversation on creating competitive frameworks. Several countries in the hemisphere are focused on using private capital to finance the expansion of oil and gas transportation. These projects can be challenging to finance, depending on the host country’s market structure and the legal framework for siting and obtaining environmental permits for pipelines. The DOE might convene a meeting, in part utilizing the new National Petroleum Council report on energy transportation infrastructure, to address these challenges. Stakeholders would include interested countries, pipeline and other investors, relevant federal and state-level regulators, and risk insurers.¹⁷

US financing support. The United States has many tools with which it can support energy development in the hemisphere. As the United States ramps up its support, it can be helpful to enhance awareness among investors and host countries about the full suite of US government tools that can be brought to bear, and about how investors and countries can access these tools. A financing workshop could, in particular, describe and clarify categories of support and any conditions attached to US government support for regional partners. The US International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) , the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) can bring their expertise and resources to bear in support of financing opportunities.

D. Modernization and advanced technologies

Advanced battery storage. Many Latin American countries experience high seasonal variations in power and natural gas consumption that complicate the economics of natural gas and power supply. The region has highly limited underground gas storage options. Multiple nations want advice on siting, pricing, and financing both gas and power storage. Moreover, battery storage (chemical, hydrogen fuel cell, and other types) is seeing rapid technological advancements and cost reductions elsewhere in the world. Many Latin American countries with significant dispersed rural populations could benefit tremendously from access to these new forms of battery storage. The DOE can convene technology providers, storage experts, gas developers, and national regulators to review effective models to incentivize energy storage. Other US government agencies, including the USTDA, may also be well positioned to support pilot programs to test these in Latin American contexts. EXIM and the IDFC can provide valuable financing support for emerging technology and potentially higher-risk storage projects.

Innovation and advanced energy technologies. The Americas are already a locus of technological innovation in energy beyond battery storage solutions. The reliable and sustainable energy systems of the future, in the Americas and worldwide, will demand innovative solutions throughout midstream and end use infrastructure—some of which are only just emerging or in the earliest stages of scalability. Latin America offers unique opportunities to test new and emerging technologies, especially in power generation and grids. Off-grid and mini-grid options are ideal for rural and island communities, and the rapid uptake of electric vehicles (a priority in multiple Latin American countries’ emissions reduction plans) is an opportunity to study vehicle-to-grid as a new decentralized energy storage option. Another area of rapid innovation is in hydrogen, not only as a storage solution, but potentially as a vehicle and generation fuel with similar advantages as natural gas (and conveniently suited to existing pipeline infrastructure). The development of new biofuels (e.g., algae), low and zero-carbon fuel resources (e.g., renewable gas), and the toolsets necessary to scale and maintain energy systems that use them are all areas where US leadership and ability to garner private sector engagement and resources can be both constructive and transformative; for example, countries and companies can share the key elements that create an innovation friendly culture, from regulatory flexibility to competition policy.

Expanding energy access. Even developed nations face the challenge of providing energy access to remote areas. In some cases, there is a need to provide electricity to residential populations. In other cases, especially in Brazil and Colombia, there are opportunities for mineral development that can only be economically viable if there is also access to electricity. The DOE can lead a conversation with development experts, distributed energy experts, and regulators to focus on the best learning on the use of distributed energy systems, from mini-grids to gas and battery-powered combinations.¹⁸

Development of critical minerals. In a world that is rapidly electrifying, critical minerals are of great and accelerating importance. The sourcing, separation, and processing of these minerals raises challenging geographic, environmental, and geopolitical questions. Substantial deposits of gold, copper, lithium, manganese, bauxite, phosphates, and other critical minerals are found throughout Latin America; indeed, the US Geological Survey has partnered on cooperative mineral development projects throughout the region, including in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.¹⁹ Canada represents one of the most secure and resilient sources of minerals and metals imports to the United States and is currently an important supplier of thirteen of the thirty-five minerals²⁰ deemed critical by the United States, with the potential to supply many more. Canada and the United States are already working to strengthen regional critical mineral supply chains through the US-Canada Critical Minerals Action Plan, which was finalized in December 2019 by US President Donald J. Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.²¹ Lithium, abundant throughout the Americas, is in extremely high and growing demand worldwide for its applications in battery storage, and demand is expected to grow further on the back of accelerating vehicle electrification.

Utilizing these raw minerals introduces difficult questions, particularly around management of local stakeholder engagement and promoting safe, sustainable development. Some countries in the hemisphere, such as Chile, are already experienced mineral producers. This is an area where the DOE and the Departments of State and the Interior can offer technical and regulatory assistance on starting or expanding development for interested countries, and where regional partners may be able to assist one another. The State Department has taken leadership on this front through the recently developed Energy Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI), which Canada joined in late 2019.²² Outside of ongoing efforts at State, there may be other opportunities for the DOE to work with like-minded partners in the region to accelerate development, production, and commercialization of technologies to increase downstream value-add processing.

VI. Conclusion

There are multiple imperative energy security needs throughout the Americas where the DOE is well-positioned to support regional partners, convene partner countries to share learnings and models, and enhance US political and security objectives. The United States has a number of important tools at its disposal and a wealth of knowledge, expertise, and resources that can be brought to bear through the interagency process in support of an overarching hemispheric strategy.

There are significant, diverse needs throughout the region, including improving the mining and production of critical materials and discovering novel ways for oil and gas exploration. Our close examination of six key countries, however, revealed important areas of overlap—notably on conventional and unconventional development, governance and standards, finance and investment, and management of new and sustainable energy resources. Leadership from the DOE on these fronts will come not a moment too soon for Latin America.

About the author

Fellow

David L. Goldwyn

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Global Energy Center

Caribbean Climate Change & Climate Action

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Andrea Clabough of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC for her extensive and outstanding research and editorial support.

The author would also like to acknowledge Reed Blakemore and Felipe Zarama Salazar for their efforts in spearheading this project, and in particular their facilitation of the many consultations that guided the findings of this report.

Special recognition to Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Director Jason Marczak and Global Energy Center Director and Richard Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security Randolph Bell for their guidance and leadership.

The author is also grateful to Jennifer Gordon and Becca Hunziker for their editorial support.

Learn more

Global Energy Center

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center expands awareness of the new Latin America across diverse communities of influence by positioning the region as a core partner in the transatlantic community.

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1 Sergey Paltsev, Michael Mehling, Niven Winchester, Jennifer Morris, and Kirby Ledvina, Pathways to Paris: Latin America, MIT Joint Program Special Report, 2018, https://globalchange.mit.edu/sites/default/files/P2P-LAM-Report.pdf.

2 Specifically, countries with some form of national level carbon pricing in the region include Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina. “Carbon Pricing Dashboard,” the World Bank, accessed November 17, 2019, https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org.

3 World Energy Investment 2019, International Energy Agency, May 14, 2019, https://www.iea.org/wei2019/.

4 Ibid; World Energy Outlook 2018, International Energy Agency, November 13, 2018, https://www.iea.org/weo2018

5 “Western Hemisphere,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed November 18, 2019,
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas.

6 “7 facts on the oil sands and the environment,” Natural Resources Canada, accessed February 6, 2020, https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/energy-sources-distribution/crude-oil/7-facts-oil-sands-and-environment/18091.

7 Energy Fact Book 2019-2020, Natural Resources Canada, 2019, https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/pdf/Energy%20
Fact%20Book_2019_2020_web-resolution.pdf.

8 Tom Kenning, “Colombia awards 1.3GW of solar and wind in ‘historic’ first auction,” PV Tech, October 23, 2019, https://www.pv-tech.org/news/colombia-awards-2.2gw-of-solar-and-wind-in-historic-first-auction.

9 Valerie Volcovici, “Latin America pledges 70% renewable energy, surpassing EU: Colombia minister,” Reuters, September 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-un-colombia/latin-america-pledges-70-renewable-energy-surpassing-eu-colombia-minister-idUSKBN1WA26Y.

10 US International Trade Administration, “Guyana—Oil and Gas,” July 9, 2019, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Guyana-Oil-and-Gas.

11 Kevin Crowley, “Guyana may not be ready for its pending oil riches, but ExxonMobil is,” World Oil, August 13, 2019, https://www.worldoil.com/news/2019/8/13/guyana-may-not-be-ready-for-its-pending-oil-riches-but-exxonmobil-is.

12 “Latest oil finds suggest Guyana will become richest nation per capita in hemisphere,” The Caribbean Council, September 16, 2019, https://www.caribbean-council.org/latest-oil-finds-suggest-guyana-will-become-richest-nation-per-capita-in-hemisphere/.

13 These corporations include, for example, the National Energy Control Center (CENACE) and the National Center for
Natural Gas Control (CENAGAS) and a reformed Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE). See also: David L. Goldwyn, Neil R. Brown, and Megan Reilly Cayten, Mexico’s Energy Reform: Ready to Launch, Atlantic Council, 2014, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/MexEnRefReadytoLaunch_FINAL_8.25._1230pm_launch.pdf.

14 “Nuclear Power in Mexico,” World Nuclear Association, September 2017, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/mexico.aspx.

15 Importantly, and for various reasons, this US-led strategy may be better suited to complementing some existing platforms more so than others and duplicative efforts should be avoided. The Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA), for example, may be particularly well suited to support or facilitate some meetings, platforms, and workshops within these focus areas.

16 By way of illustration, the Department of State supports the visits of foreign officials to the United States and the travel of US experts to host countries, and provides technical support in power sector development and energy governance. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) provides extensive support in power sector development. The Department of Commerce supports trade missions. The US government’s América Crece initiative seeks to overcome trade barriers and improve frameworks across the hemisphere. US trade and development finance agencies, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM), US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC), and the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) provide indispensable support in project development, risk insurance, and financial support. The Department of the Treasury can provide technical assistance and its role in international financial institutions can support a focused effort.

17 “Dynamic Delivery America’s Evolving Oil and Natural Gas Transportation Infrastructure,” National Petroleum Council, 2019, https://dynamicdelivery.npc.org.

18 The Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center (GEC) has done extensive on-the-ground research focused on resiliency and adaptation in Puerto Rico in the wake of recent devastating hurricanes that impacted the US territory’s grid system. See: Joe Bryan, “The time is right for energy transformation in Puerto Rico,” EnergySource, January 16, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/the-time-is-right-for-energy-transformation-in-puerto-rico/.

19 Michael S. Baker, Spencer D. Buteyn, Philip A. Freeman, Michael H. Trippi, and Loyd M. Trimmer III, Compilation of geospatial data for the mineral industries and related infrastructure of Latin America and the Caribbean: Open-File Report 2017–1079, US Geological Survey, US Department of the Interior, and Inter-American Development Bank, https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20171079.

20 These include: antimony, barite, bismuth, cesium, cobalt, graphite, indium, lithium, niobium, platinum group metals, potash, tellurium, and uranium. “Annual Statistics of Mineral Production,” Natural Resources Canada, accessed February 6, 2020, https://sead.nrcan-rncan.gc.ca/prod-prod/ann-ann-eng.aspx.

21 United States and Canada Finalize Action Plan on Critical Minerals Cooperation, US Department of State, press release, January 9, 2020, https://www.state.gov/united-states-and-canada-finalize-action-plan-on-critical-minerals-cooperation/.

22 Energy Resource Governance Initiative, US Department of State, June 11, 2019, https://www.state.gov/energy-resource-governance-initiative/.

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The trade war we want China to win: China’s nuclear exports can challenge Russian dominance

David Yellen — Wed, 26 Feb 2020 21:15:55 +0000

As the US-China trade war cools, China remains on the verge of dominating the nuclear industry, which is of great strategic importance both diplomatically and in combatting climate change. The Trump Administration has thus far viewed China as an adversary, a perception that no doubt extends to China’s nuclear export drive, with calls for Washington to revive the US nuclear industry to compete abroad and prevent Russia and China from cornering the market. But grouping Russia and China together misses the point: Russia and China are competing for market share, not working together to dominate, and no other competitor will rise to challenge Russia any time soon. China’s rise gives Russia a real competitor in nuclear energy, and that is good for the United States—and the United States has an opportunity to help shape those exports to ensure safety and protection for countries purchasing Chinese nuclear.Russia accounts for 60 percent of reactor sales worldwide, a position it has solidified by offering generous export packages to interested countries. Its cheaper nuclear designs and financing options, development organizations’ bans on financing nuclear, and cheap natural gas have crippled the competition. But while Russia has dominated, its neighbor to the south has developed an industry primed to battle for market share. Though China’s nuclear industry is relatively young, it produced the third most nuclear energy domestically in 2018, and plans to add “as much as 300 [gigawatts (GW)] of nuclear capacity” over the next ten to twenty years. China’s domestic market for nuclear is of unrivalled scale, and scale has always been China’s path to dominance.

But China’s ambitions do not stop at its own borders—the Chinese government has created incentives to encourage nuclear power exports and drive its nuclear industry into foreign markets, including laws that financially and technologically support nuclear exports. China’s nuclear industry benefits from the same advantage that launched Russia to dominance: state ownership to help weather funding issues, reduce public impact of disasters, and provide security and diplomatic support. China has also adopted the financing option that has driven Russian nuclear exports: the build, own, operate (BOO) model, under which the exporting nation handles everything, from financing and operation of the plant to nuclear waste management—at the cost of prolonged dependence.

Since 2013, China has reached more than ten construction agreements—exports have been concentrated in Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which focuses on nuclear exports to Pakistan, where China has completed multiple plants and is constructing more, as well as to Turkey, where there are plans for plant construction. All told, China’s largest nuclear company plans at least thirty BRI nuclear reactors by 2030. Chinese nuclear has also made inroads into developing markets around the world, with plans or memoranda of understanding in with several African nations, including Kenya, Sudan, Egypt, and South Africa, as well as a deal with Argentina to finance new reactor projects and import Chinese technology.

Importantly, China has also made a move toward exporting nuclear to the United Kingdom (UK): it partnered with a British power company to build the Hinkley Point C nuclear project, which is expected to supply 7 percent of Britain’s electricity demand. The approval of Chinese technology in the stringent European market would be an endorsement, especially of safety, that could launch China to become the international standard of nuclear technology.

China’s nuclear exports hold implications for client states’ safety, security, and diplomatic standing. Though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gave Chinese nuclear plants high marks for safety, a commissioner at a French regulator said that Chinese regulators “lack means. They are overwhelmed.” Any domestic safety issues would be a disaster for the industry as a whole—China needs to ensure that its regulatory bodies are equipped to deal with their already massive and expanding workload. Security and diplomacy will also be significant roadblocks for Chinese exports, particularly in Europe. Allowing a foreign company—and in the case of Russia and China, a foreign government—to build and operate a dangerous piece of energy infrastructure is risky. The foreign government could exert diplomatic pressure by implicitly threatening to turn off the lights, make a case for sending troops to protect their investment, or even weaponize the resource in the case of war.

With Russia and China as the least-cost and most reliable suppliers in actually completing a project, this may be China’s biggest advantage: Russia has a demonstrated history as the aggressive landlord (see Ukraine), repeatedly leveraging other countries’ reliance to exert diplomatic pressure, and views energy exports and nuclear exports in particular “as a vehicle for expanding and enhancing its influence.”

China will export nuclear with or without the United States’ approval. Instead of opposing it outright, the United States should instead work with China and its “overwhelmed” regulators to enforce safety regulations to prevent disasters and work with purchasing states to reinforce their security. Many developing countries desperately need energy and using nuclear instead of coal where possible is important from a climate change mitigation perspective, and for them to import from China instead of Russia is preferable geopolitically. China may aim at the same influence that Russia has flexed, but it lacks Russia’s history of energy weaponization—and the United States has the chance to assuage that concern through collaboration. None of this is to say that Western countries should abandon their own nuclear industries—nuclear is an important piece of the energy transition, and more market competition is better to ensure no country has outsized power. But conflating Russia and China as enemies of the United States in the nuclear market is dangerous at best and self-fulfilling at worst. Better to work with China to ensure safety in nuclear energy than to reject its rise and drive more countries into the arms of the bear.

David Yellen is a project assistant at the Atlantic Global Energy Center. You can follow him on Twitter @david_yellen

The post The trade war we want China to win: China’s nuclear exports can challenge Russian dominance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cohen in Forbes: Rolls-Royce reignites the race to build mini-nuclear power plants

Atlantic Council — Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:58:16 +0000