In Season 1, Episode 5 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by two guests. She speaks with Cameron Hudson, the former US government expert on Sudan, about the mercenary pedigree of one of the two main belligerent parties, the Rapid Support Forces, and the determinative impact this has had on the current conflict in Sudan. By fighting as mercenaries in Libya, and especially Yemen, the RSF secured a cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army, it forged regional relationships that are now central to its resupply, and it has committed crimes and abuses in the conduct of the war which represent a detached mercenary mindset.

Alia also chats with Professor Munzoul Assal of the University of Khartoum about the danger of two parallel governments emerging in Sudan along the lines of the bifurcation in Libya; the presence of RSF fighters at the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic where the Wagner Group is deeply entrenched; and the clear and alarming possibilities of a regional conflagration.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

Further reading

MENASource Jun 28, 2023

The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?

By Mark N. Katz

The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

MENASource Jun 1, 2023

Is Egypt planning a full-scale invasion of Sudan? 

By Shahira Amin

With the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are that an Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent.

East Africa Middle East

MENASource May 11, 2023

Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here

By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Africa East Africa

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the fighting erupted in mid-April, at least 259,000 people have crossed over from Sudan into neighboring countries—namely Egypt, Chad, Eritrea, and the Central Africa Republic—according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). But Egypt—which shares its southern border with Sudan—is the worst affected.  

A primary destination for people fleeing the violence, Egypt has received more than fifty thousand people from across the border. Hundreds of thousands more are expected to cross into the country in the coming months if the fighting continues. The mass influx not only threatens to aggravate the humanitarian crisis on Egypt’s side of the border, but it also threatens to overstretch the country’s resources at a time when it faces a deepening economic crisis, which risks further disgruntling its disaffected population.   

But the Egyptian government has a lot more to worry about than rising public discontent caused by the immense economic pressure. The possible infiltration of extremist groups into Egypt is currently a prime concern for authorities. It’s a case of once bitten, twice shy.

Over the past decade, the Egyptian army and police have been the target of multiple terrorist attacks by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated jihadists that crossed into Egypt from the shared eastern border with the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, troops have been deployed along Egypt’s Western border with Libya to curb terrorist infiltration and a repeat of similar attacks. The recent release of pro-Muslim Brotherhood figures from a prison in Sudan has heightened Cairo’s fears of the opening of a new front in Egypt’s war on terrorism. 

Another major concern for Egypt is the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) strong ties with Ethiopia. Egypt has sought the backing of Sudan in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the downstream country’s share of Nile waters. This, following the construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), considered by Egypt to be an “existential threat.” Should Egypt decide to use the military option against Ethiopia at any time in the future, it may have to do so unilaterally, as it would no longer have Sudan on its side.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has ruled out any intervention in Sudan, arguing that the Sudanese crisis was an “internal” matter. He has also pledged that Egypt would not take sides in the conflict and has offered to mediate between Sudan’s rival factions. However, skeptics suggest that Egypt is already deeply involved in Khartoum. They affirm that the Egyptian military backs the Sudanese army with which it forged strong ties following the overthrow of the Islamist-leaning former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2019.  

Some analysts argue that the stakes are too high for Cairo to stand idly by and watch as the situation deteriorates.

It is no secret that Cairo has long backed the Sudanese army with the conviction that it is the sole institution that can restore stability in Sudan. Egypt cemented its ties with the Sudanese army by conducting joint military exercises with Sudan after Bashir was deposed by the military in the wake of mass protests in Sudan. Egyptian authorities are looking to Abdel Fattah El-Burhan, Sudan’s de facto military leader, to quash the nascent pro-democracy movement that emerged during Sudan’s 2019 mass uprising and to restore security and stability in Sudan—moves that Cairo perceives as serving its interests. 

The capture of two hundred Egyptian soldiers—the majority of whom were air force personnel—at a military base in the northern Sudanese town of Meroe by the RSF in mid-April, as well as a leaked video showing the soldiers in a state of defeat, were perceived as an act of provocation by Cairo. The humiliating episode also provoked an outcry on social media platforms. 

The RSF believed Egyptian soldiers were siding with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) but later apologized for releasing the video. Meanwhile, in an apparent attempt to save face, Sisi insisted that the Egyptian troops were in Sudan “for training purposes” and gave the RSF a seventy-two-hour ultimatum to return the soldiers home safely. The troops were indeed sent back to Egypt on April 19, but some analysts believe that the incident has not been forgotten and are guessing Cairo may be waiting for the right moment to retaliate.      

There have been unconfirmed reports that Egypt has provided the SAF with military intelligence and tactical support. Sources have also cited unconfirmed bombings of RSF positions by Egyptian fighter jets and say Egypt is contemplating invading Sudan to fight the powerful paramilitary forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, known as Hemetti. 

If the reports are accurate, this will this pit Egypt against the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—Egypt’s longtime ally and principal financial backer—which has thrown its weight behind the RSF. It would also pit Egypt against Libyan warlord General Khalifa Haftar,  another RSF supporter, whose forces control much of eastern Libya and who was backed by Egypt and the RSF during his failed onslaught on Tripoli in 2019.

All of this puts Egypt in a dilemma. On the one hand, it would like to see stability and security restored in Sudan for fear of violence spilling over into its territory. On the other, Sudan’s northern neighbor does not wish to risk ruffling the feathers of the UAE by overtly taking an opposing side in the conflict. Cash-strapped Egypt has been selling government-owned assets to the wealthy Gulf nation to shore up its troubled economy. Agitating the UAE may cause it to halt its investments in Egypt, denying the North African country the cash it badly needs to plug a financing gap of $17 billion over the next four years.  

It is safer for Egypt to continue to support the SAF covertly or indirectly without publicly announcing its anti-RSF position. Still, with the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are rife that a full-scale Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent—assuming the conflict drags on. According to some analysts, invading Sudan would give Egypt an opportunity to reassert its leadership role in the region.

By brokering a truce between rival factions in Sudan, Egypt also stands to win favor with global powers—the United States in particular—which had been pinning their hopes on a  handover of power to a civilian government. A return to civilian rule had been a bone of contention between Burhan and the RSF, with the latter accusing Sudan’s military leaders of clinging to power. 

Helping end the conflict in Sudan would also allow Egypt to align its foreign policy and interests with the United States, reversing a previous trend of having conflicting viewpoints on regional issues. This would pave the way for greater cooperation between the US and its longtime Middle Eastern ally, and would undoubtedly help in defusing tensions over opposing stances on several issues, including Egypt’s backing of Haftar during the civil war in Libya and recently leaked reports of Egypt’s secret plans to supply rockets to Russia.  

Egypt’s strategic relations with Russia have irked the United States the most. It may now be the time for Cairo to show the Biden administration that Egypt’s cooperation with Russia—which has included arms deals and a contract for a civilian nuclear facility—is not an attempt to turn its back on US support, but rather, diversify its sources of support. 

Thus, while there are many complex factors that might dissuade Egypt from intervening overtly in Sudan, the possibility of an invasion cannot be ruled out. The chance to smooth over ties with the US is a juicy incentive, as are the benefits that would arise from bringing stability and security to the surrounding region. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

The post Is Egypt planning a full-scale invasion of Sudan?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we cover:

• New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit.
• How the United States is tackling export controls circumvention and what should improve moving forward.
• The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap.
• The failure of the US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment from 2022 indicated that forty out of fifty-two components recovered from the Iranian Shahed-136 drone that was downed in Ukraine last fall had been manufactured by thirteen different American companies, while the remaining twelve were made in Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Taiwan, and China. The case revealed that it was not enough to impose sanctions and export controls on Russian defense companies. Not only was Iran providing drones to Russia, but also certain entities and individuals in countries such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein have procured materials on Russia’s behalf. This is why the United States released a new sanctions package ahead of the G7 summit, targeting a much wider international network of Russia sanctions and export controls evasion. 

Finland, Switzerland, Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, India, Singapore—these are just a few locations associated with individuals and entities included in the Treasury Department’s newest designations against Russia. Entities and individuals located in these countries have aided Russia’s circumvention efforts or provided materials for Russia’s military procurement. Among the sanctioned individuals are Swiss-Italian businessman Walter Moretti and his colleagues in Germany and India, who have sold advanced technology to Russian state-owned enterprises. Liechtenstein-based Trade Initiative Establishment (TIE) and its network of two companies and four individuals have been procuring semiconductor production equipment for sanctioned Russian entities since 2012. 

Along with the United States, the United Kingdom also imposed sanctions against eighty-six individuals and entities from Russian energy, metals, financial, and military sectors who have been enhancing Russia’s capacity to wage the war. Additionally, the European Union (EU) is developing its eleventh package of sanctions which will reportedly, for the first time, target Chinese entities facilitating Russia’s evasion efforts. Coordinating the designation and enforcing processes among the G7 allies will be key in synchronizing the targeting of Russia’s evasion and procurement networks.

Export controls circumvention: How the US is tackling it and what should improve moving forward

While sanctions aim to cut entities and individuals procuring technology for the Russian military out of the global financial system, export controls are designed to prevent them from physically acquiring components. G7 allies have levied significant export controls on Russia, but enforcing export controls is easier said than done. Third countries from Russia’s close neighborhood have stepped up to fill Russia’s technology shortages caused by other countries complying with export controls. Central Asian and Caucasus countries had a significant uptick in exports of electronic components to Russia, while Turkey, Serbia, and Kazakhstan have been supplying semiconductors to Moscow. Even if exported electronic components are not designed for military application, Russians have been able to extract semiconductors and electronic components for military use even from refrigerators and dishwashers. The sudden boost in electronic equipment exports from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Russia can only be explained by Russia’s efforts of repurposing them for military use. 

In response to Russia’s efforts to obtain technology by all means possible, the US Departments of Commerce and Justice have jointly launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force. The goal of the Strike Force is to prevent Russia and adversarial states such as China and Iran from illicitly getting their hands on advanced US technology. The Strike Force recently announced criminal charges against individuals supplying software and hardware source codes stolen from US tech companies to China. The Strike Force embodies the whole-of-government approach the United States has been taking in investigating sanctions and export controls evasion cases. The prosecutorial and investigative expertise of the Justice Department, coupled with the Treasury’s ability to identify and block the sanctions evaders from the US financial system, will amplify the impact of the Commerce Department’s export controls and enhance their investigations and enforcement.  

The US Department of Commerce has also teamed up with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to publish a joint supplemental alert outliniing red flags for potential Russian export controls evasion that financial institutions should watch out for and report on, consistent with their compliance reporting requirements. The red flags include but are not limited to:

• Payments for dual-use goods to companies located outside of the Global Export Controls Coalition (GECC) countries. 
• A new customer who trades in the nine Harmonized System (HS) codes, is located outside of the GECC countries and was incorporated after February 24, 2022. 
• A consumer who refuses to provide details to banks about end users or company ownership. 

Providing information to the public in the form of alerts and advisories is an effective step to increase awareness, financial institution reporting, and compliance with Western sanctions and exports controls. The Disruptive Technology Strike Force should consider issuing a multilateral advisory on export control evasion with G7 allies to bring in foreign partner perspectives, similar to the multilateral advisory issued in March on sanctions evasion by the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force (REPO)

Regarding third-country intermediaries suspected of supplying Russia with dual-use technology, G7 allies should prioritize capacity building and encouraging political will in these countries to strengthen sanctions and customs enforcement. Building up their capacity to monitor and record what products are being exported to Russia could be the first step towards this goal. For example, Georgian authorities returned goods and vehicles destined for Russia and Belarus in 204 cases. However, registration certificates did not identify the codes of returned goods in fifty cases, and clarified that the goods were sanctioned only in seventy-one cases. Developing a system for identifying controlled goods and making the customs data easily accessible to the public could both salvage Georgia’s reputation and enhance export control enforcement against Russia.

The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap

The US Department of the Treasury recently published a report analyzing the effects of the oil price cap, arguing that the novel tool has achieved its dual objective of reducing revenue for Moscow while keeping global oil prices relatively stable. A recent study by the Kyiv School of Economics Institute backs up this statement with detailed research of the Russian ports and the payments made to Russian sellers. However, Russian crude oil exports to China through the Russian Pacific port of Kozmino might be examples of transactions where the price cap approach does not hold.

In response, the Department of the Treasury warned US ship owners and flagging registries to use maritime intelligence services for detecting when tankers are disguising their port of call in Russia. Meanwhile, commodities brokers and oil traders should invoice shipping, freight, customs, and insurance costs separately, and ensure that the price of Russian oil is below 60 dollars. 

Despite China’s imports of Russian crude oil, the world average price for Russian crude oil in the first quarter of 2023 was 58.62 dollars, which supports the claim about the success of the oil price cap, at least for now. Notably, Russia’s energy revenues dropped by almost 40 percent from December 2022 to January 2023, likely in part due to the price cap combined with lower global energy prices.

Beyond Russia: The failure of US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

While the world has been focused on the G7 summit, the crisis worsened in Sudan. In April 2023, President Biden issued Executive Order 14098 (EO 14098) authorizing future sanctions on foreign persons to address the situation in Sudan and to support a transition to democracy and a civilian transitional government in Sudan. The use of sanctions to support policy goals in Africa is not new. In the case of EO 14098, policymakers seek to use future sanctions on individuals responsible for threatening the peace, security, and stability of Sudan, undermining Sudan’s democratic transition, as well as committing violence against civilians or perpetuating other human rights abuses. 

Much has been written and studied about the effectiveness of sanctions programs in Africa with many programs suffering from being poorly designed, organized, implemented, or enforced. Sudan faced statutory sanctions from its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism from 1993 to 2020 and US Treasury sanctions from 1997 to 2017 both of which produced limited results due to ineffective enforcement and maintenance of the program. A near-total cut-off of Sudan from the US financial system pushed Sudan to develop financial ties beyond the reach of the US dollar.

Sanctions in Sudan can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in these relevant countries. Cutting off those links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply weapons, and pay their soldiers, which could force them back to the negotiating table.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @KDonovan_AC.

Maia Nikoladze is the assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @Mai_Nikoladze.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Castellum.AI partners with the Economic Statecraft Initiative and provides sanctions data for the Global Sanctions Dashboard and Russia Sanctions Database.

Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

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At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post Global Sanctions Dashboard: US and G7 allies target Russia’s evasion and procurement networks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

Fellow

Patrick Quirk

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

The post Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the scope of fighting widens and the number of Sudanese refugees grows, neighboring countries fear the impact on their populations, potentially igniting political turbulence. While there have been diplomatic efforts to coordinate a ceasefire, it’s unclear whether it will hold and what could be done otherwise to stop the fighting.

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Benjamin Mossberg: ‘The United States must continue to prioritize the Sudanese people’

Alia Brahimi: Libya’s Haftar is resupplying the conflict in Sudan

Thomas Warrick: ‘Governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges’

Shahira Amin: Sudanese are fleeing to Egypt while the country’s resources are overstretched

R. Clarke Cooper: The conflict in Sudan will have broad transregional impacts

‘The United States must continue to prioritize the Sudanese people’

The significant policy failure that the United States faces in Sudan cannot be understated. The importance of Sudan’s stability to Africa, Europe, and the Middle East is closely linked to the events inside the country as it faces ongoing fighting, the potential for a significant humanitarian disaster, and human rights abuses. While there is no easy solution to help Sudan exit this period of instability, the international community must act.

There appears to be little popular support for the violence facing the people of Sudan, as a majority of the Sudanese people face significant challenges in securing food, water, electricity, and shelter. Significant pressure must be brought to bear on General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the commander of the RSF, and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the SAF, to encourage a firm cessation of hostilities and a return to negotiations over the civilian-led future of the country.

The announcement of an Executive Order—“Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition”—on May 3 by the United States can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers who do not work on Africa specifically must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in the relevant countries. Cutting off these links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply their arms, and pay their soldiers, which would force them back to the negotiating table. 

The United States must continue prioritizing the Sudanese people and rely on Sudanese leaders that have support and roots in the country. While it is unlikely that either the SAF or RSF can win a decisive military victory, the United States should not abandon the country regardless. Geopolitical competition by China, Russia, and others continues to play out in Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa. It is critical that the United States continue to assert its values, communicate its interests, share its redlines consistently, and avoid the transactional nature of relationships that its geopolitical competitors value.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

Libya’s Haftar is resupplying the conflict in Sudan

Libya is particularly exposed to developments in Sudan. The first point of vulnerability is the heavily partisan role of General Khalifa Haftar, who controls the east of Libya and large parts of the south and is a central node in the alliance between the UAE, Hemedti, and the Wagner Group. External support to the RSF ideally runs through southeastern Libya, a vast area largely in the grip of Haftar proxies. The border between Libya and Sudan, for example, is manned by Subul al-Salam, a Salafist militia in the pay of Haftar’s fourth son, Saddam. Additionally, Haftar’s 128th Brigade controls many of the transit routes in central and southern Libya. It is led by Hassan al-Zadma, who has strong personal links with Darfuri militias and has taken charge of sourcing mercenaries for Haftar from Sudan and Chad.  

Haftar’s role in the resupply of the RSF is more than a detail in this conflict—it is important to the war’s viability. There have already been documented reports of ammunition shipments, missile deliveries, and intelligence sharing. However, fuel is the critical resource for Hemedti’s Darfur-based fighters who must cross great tracts of the desert by truck to reach Khartoum. Thus, Saddam Haftar has personally overseen the effort to divert Libyan fuel towards the RSF, redirecting the refining capacity at the Sarir oil field—ten thousand barrels a day—over the border to Hemedti. 

The second point of danger is Libya’s status as an optimal rear base. Libya is a major black market logistics hub—for weapons, food, fuel, fighters, fresh dollars—and, thus, an ideal base to launch attacks into Sudan or Chad. If Hemedti retreats from Khartoum to Darfur, tribal fighting within the Darfur region and the collapse of the peace deal there threatens to pull Libya into a regional conflagration. 

The third source of vulnerability is a lesson that might be drawn from the descent into war in Sudan. The international community may rightly conclude that the strategy of dealing with warlords—empowering them as legitimate “stakeholders” in democratic transition—has been exposed as deeply flawed by Sudan. Most Libyans would agree. At the same time, Haftar will note that Hemedti was an integral part of the United Nations-approved power-sharing deal and a party to official political agreements. However, his position was ultimately insecure. Haftar and his sons may, therefore, recommit to growing their military power and leveraging their relationship with the Wagner Group to obtain a preponderance of military power in Libya. This would upend the delicate balance in Libya and portend a regional war.  

Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs.

‘Governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges’

I have two memories of Sudan. The first is in 2016, when I was just about to fly out to Khartoum to lead the first high-level US government delegation to Sudan in a decade. My boss called me into his office to give me the benefit of his experience leading such a delegation more than a decade earlier. “The people are warm and friendly towards Americans,” he recalled, “but their government has a history of disappointing them.”

My second memory is of when I was there to discuss rebuilding counterterrorism ties with the Sudanese government. They helicoptered us to an important remote base in the northwest that lay astride one of Africa’s major human smuggling routes from east Africa to southern Europe. As we flew out of Khartoum, a US official with years of experience there pointed out the two bridges over the White Nile: “You do realize that the government’s remit stops at the west end of that bridge?”

Seven years later, and after a brief period of hope, governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges. The popular support for civilian leaders who came to power in 2019 was undercut by generals vying for power, each afraid that “second place” meant “last place.” Yet Sudan remains strategically important to the United States, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East because of its role at a crossroads. During the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) time controlling parts of Syria and Iraq, Sudan was a transit country for ISIS operatives and money transiting in and out of Libya. Human traffickers carried Ethiopians and others toward Libyan ports, taking advantage of false hopes of leaving behind drought and food crises.

Sustained pressure now needs to be brought by the Quad—the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and UAE—and others on the countries supporting the warring generals in order to reach a resolution that will benefit the Sudanese people. They deserve better than another decade of disappointment.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Sudanese are fleeing to Egypt while the country’s resources are overstretched

Concerns are rising in Egypt as the fighting in neighboring Sudan rages on. Since the outbreak of the conflict in mid-April, tens of thousands of Sudanese fleeing the violence have crossed over into Egypt through a shared southern border with Sudan. The mass influx threatens to put an additional strain on Egypt, which is already facing an acute economic crisis.

But the added burden on Egypt’s already-overstretched resources isn’t Cairo’s only concern. Egyptian leadership is even more worried about prospects of a Muslim Brotherhood resurgence next door, which may, subsequently, pave the way for infiltration over the border. This follows the April 26 release of imprisoned, key figures from Sudanese ex-President Omar al-Bashir’s deposed regime. The SAF reportedly ordered the release of members of the former Islamist regime after protests by inmates broke out inside Kober prison, where they had been jailed after Bashir’s overthrow by the military in 2019. 

Egypt’s army is already stretched thin: troops have been deployed on Libya’s western border to guard against foreign infiltrators. Moreover, after more than a decade of battling an insurgency fueled by Islamic State militants—many of whom had allegedly crossed into Northern Sinai from the Gaza Strip by way of underground tunnels—the last thing the Egyptian military wants is a new front in its war on terrorism.  

The ongoing conflict also pits Egypt against its longtime ally, the UAE, which backs the RSF (the powerful paramilitary forces embroiled in a power struggle with the SAF, which is backed by Egypt). Supporting opposing sides may cause tensions between the two countries at a time when Egypt is in dire need of financial backing to shore up its ailing economy. The sale of Egyptian assets to Gulf countries, including the UAE, has provided Egypt with the lifeline it needs to avert economic collapse and a looming debt default (so far, at least).

Egypt has also relied heavily on Sudan’s support in the ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which sources say threatens to exacerbate Egypt’s water shortage challenge. There are growing concerns in Egypt that the instability in Sudan may overshadow or even derail the negotiations with Ethiopia.

While the Egyptian leadership has insisted it is not taking sides in the conflict, Cairo is watching the developments in Sudan with trepidation, as the unfolding crisis may have far-reaching implications for its northern neighbor. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

The conflict in Sudan will have broad transregional impacts

As with previous civil wars in Sudan, the collapse of security and the displacement of the population will have broad transregional impacts beyond immediate neighboring states. Some internally-displaced Sudanese may eventually return home, while others will seek permanent refuge anywhere outside of Sudan—be it on the African continent or further afield in Europe or North America. Exasperating an already fragile security environment, the disruption from the weeks-long conflict is already enabling a more permissive environment for transnational crime and illicit trafficking and terrorism.

Unfortunately, in the multilateral space, there is diminishing capacity to properly address Sudan’s increasingly dire humanitarian and security issues. War in Ukraine, earthquake recovery in Turkey, and flood relief in Pakistan already occupy significant amounts of attention and resources from United Nations agencies, various NGOs, and the national governments of the world. Still, beyond the immediate humanitarian appeal to help the civilian populous of Sudan, this latest iteration of civil conflict also requires global attention in the peacekeeping, security, and conflict resolution space. If ignored, Sudan’s humanitarian and security crisis will manifest itself elsewhere in the world well beyond the Middle East and North Africa.

Absent conflict resolution led by a group of responsible states or a multilateral body, there is an increasing risk that the conflict will become a regional war. Neighboring states have already aligned with either of the two generals and, bizarrely, in some cases, aligned with both sides. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has the affirmed support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The UAE, and General Haftar of Libya, however, support the RSF. As other international actors assess where to align, a united front of regional and Western states is required to stop the march toward greater conflict, and the time for such a united front is now. 

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

The post Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 10, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest column, they discuss the recent leak of sensitive government documents, the ongoing conflict in Sudan, and North Korea’s recent advancements in nuclear weapon capabilities. Specifically, in light of the developments in North Korea, the pair debate the utility and feasibility of nuclear disarmament.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate responses to advancements in North Korean nuclear capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.

Neither the SAF nor RSF is capable of a decisive victory, particularly given Sudan’s size and its fractured political landscape. Barring decisive intervention, the most likely scenario is a long and bloody multisided civil war and a staggering humanitarian disaster, like ones seen in Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. This disaster would not be limited to Sudan; it could also destabilize the greater region and drive tens of millions of Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states, the Middle East, and Europe.

That scenario needs to be prevented in a way that ensures the political and military calculations of Hemedti, Burhan, and their supporters change when serious negotiations to restore a civilian government resume. Simply calling for ceasefires or evenly applying diplomatic pressure is not enough. This would only preserve the rough parity of military power between the RSF and SAF. This is not to suggest that either Hemedti or Burhan is “better.” Both have failed the Sudanese people and should be encouraged to move on from power. However, international partners must aim to immediately stop the fighting, bring back negotiations for a transition to civilian government, and then ensure both generals honor their public pledges to hand over power.

Thus, international and regional leaders must, in coordination, begin to strategically apply pressure by freezing Sudanese bank accounts and temporarily blocking the business activities of Sudanese leaders and their forces. This cutoff in money and revenue will impact those actors’ abilities to pay their soldiers and allies to fight and resupply. More importantly, it will impact their calculations about their willingness to return to serious negotiations and to compromise. Given the RSF is unlikely to prevail against the SAF with its heavy weapons and support from Egypt, the least bad option to stop the fighting is to first apply pressure on Hemedti’s business empire, which funds the RSF—his soldiers are loyal because they are paid better, not for any ideological reason. External actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (where, because of past Western sanctions, most Sudanese have their bank accounts and base their businesses), should freeze known RSF and Hemedti-family bank accounts and business activities until RSF leaders commit to rapidly integrating their troops into the SAF. Some of the most important assets have been identified and others are known by the Emirati and Saudi governments. Similarly, international partners must quickly freeze the assets of known Bashir-regime/Islamist leaders who are inciting violence in an effort to return to power. 

Finally, partners should identify foreign-held SAF assets and business interests for possible freezing and seizure in case the army does not honor its pledge to hand over power—or perpetuates the historic political and economic dominance of elites from Khartoum at the expense of Sudanese people living in the rest of the country. Only in this way is a sustainable ceasefire and peace possible.

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a former senior advisor to the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and former deputy Africa Program director at the International Crisis Group.

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To ensure that Sudan’s transition to democracy succeeds, its leaders must put limits on the power of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). For a successful political transformation, the SAF, led by Burhan, and the paramilitary RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan. Absent meaningful reform to rein in the existing power of the security services, institutional tension between the services could spark a wider conflict that would destabilize the country and threaten the transition to democracy.

Reform of the security services will not be easy, and it is the subject of ongoing debate as the factions try to strike a deal on a transitional government. But there are steps Sudan’s leaders and those who support Sudan’s transition to democracy can take now.

The struggle for reform

Sudan’s military has played a major role in the political landscape of the country since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came into power in a military coup and, following thirty years of autocratic rule, was removed in 2019 by another military coup. Following his ouster, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for fundamental reforms of the security sector, but Sudan continues to struggle with attempts at reform.

During the transition to democracy since 2019, the SAF and RSF have both cooperated and competed with one another for power in the country. For example, in an October 2021 coup ousting Sudan’s civilian leadership led by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, the SAF and RSF joined forces with an array of Sudan’s armed movements and marginalized groups. At the same time, the RSF and SAF compete with each other behind the scenes to retain as much economic and political power, influence, and control as possible.

Managing the tension between the SAF and RSF will be a paramount concern for Sudan’s leadership as it seeks to avoid future conflict between the security forces that could trigger greater violence. This is a key element to establishing peace, security, and sustainable development in the country while allowing for the development and modernization of Sudan’s security institutions.

Meaningful security sector reform must address the role of the SAF and the professionalization and integration of the RSF into the SAF. It must also place the security services firmly under civilian control and oversight. In the security sector, reforms to Sudan’s legal framework must include formally establishing the role of the security forces and a single national army trusted by local communities across Sudan, especially in the conflict areas of the country.

Another critical step is untangling the military institutions from the economy. This will be very difficult and will require careful planning, as the SAF and RSF currently dominate nearly all facets of political, economic, and media power in Sudan—and work to protect this influence. Civilian authorities should seize the moment and take steps to address the challenges of security sector reform in Sudan during the transition to civilian leadership. The Bashir regime created a vast array of expensive, corrupt, and ineffective security forces accused by critics of operating outside of the law, committing human-rights abuses, and creating an economy that directly benefits the security institutions—preventing more robust economic reform and development. To set the country on a better path, Sudan’s civilian leaders must enact reforms that begin to disentangle the military from the construction, telecommunication, aviation, and banking sectors.

Steps Sudan’s military and civilian leaders should take

In concert with the new civilian leadership, the military must commit to reform that helps modernize and develop the SAF. This includes ensuring that the SAF is tasked with protecting civilians and is accountable to the country’s civilian leadership. The SAF needs to be respected and not feared by those it is assigned to protect.

Civilian and military leaders must adopt legislation that addresses the specific gaps in Sudan’s transitional documents. Using the legal framework, civilian authorities should work with the military leadership to scale down the size of the SAF, find meaningful economic opportunities for former fighters, identify core priorities for its mission, and deploy a military that is able to meet the needs of the country. Sudan’s authorities should also identify funding to create and support a broad disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy that avoids a sole focus on the reintegration of militia fighters and includes appropriate financial oversight.

Outside of these efforts, civilian authorities must look for ways to reform Sudan’s economy that help to disentangle the vast array of companies linked to the security services, create opportunity to improve the business environment, and send the signal to investors, banks, and credit rating agencies that Sudan is open for business. Civilian authorities must take steps to increase transparency and accountability in the illicit gold trade to disrupt illicit financial flows to Sudan’s militias, including the RSF.

As Sudan’s economy faces uncertainty due to elevated food, fuel, and transportation prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank must balance the need for economic reforms in the country with the imperative to not destabilize a new civilian-led government. This government will need to walk a difficult line to implement reforms that address economic mismanagement by the SAF, the rising cost of living, and stubbornly high prices for basic goods that have further complicated efforts to secure international funding and support for the economy.

Steps the United States should take

The United States can help Sudan’s transition to democracy and help facilitate security sector reform. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, elevating Sudan on the foreign policy agenda and sending a signal to Sudan’s new leadership that the United States is ready to support Sudan as it enacts difficult reforms. This law is an effective messaging tool, encourages a coordinated US government response to support the civilian leadership, and can direct public reporting on sensitive issues, support a sanctions regime, and show the private sector that Sudan is not open for business as usual. Policymakers can use this legislation to support Sudan’s economic reforms, stability, and oversight of the security and intelligence services in the short term while seeking to hold human-rights abusers, spoilers to the transition, and those seeking to exploit Sudan’s natural resources accountable for their actions.

Working with other countries, the United States can also play a leading role to encourage international financial institutions to carefully leverage the approval of World Bank projects, consider withholding IMF disbursements, and institute public reporting to ensure that economic and security sector reforms remain on track. The diplomatic community must continue to apply coordinated pressure on Sudan’s authorities to ensure that they follow through on their verbal commitments and work with key external actors—including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—to encourage them to be meaningful contributors to Sudan’s democratic progress.

Sudan’s transition to democratic leadership provides another critical opportunity for security sector reform in the country. As the transitional government moves forward, Sudan’s civilian leadership can show investors, banks, and its people that greater connectedness to the global economy, a modern security apparatus, and a commitment to fighting corruption is in its long-term interest. Doing so would solidify a path toward a peaceful and democratic Sudan.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

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The international community then committed to supporting Sudan’s transition toward democratization, reconstruction, and sweeping reforms across politics, economics, and the security structure to meet the aspirations of the country’s people after the revolution.

Yet the transitional process began to unravel almost immediately after the overthrow of the government of Omar al-Bashir on April 11, 2019, amid turmoil and instability. The Transitional Military Council—the military junta that took power after Bashir’s ouster—and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)—a coalition of civilian and rebel groups—agreed on the Constitutional Charter and on the formation of a Sovereignty Council to lead the country during the transition to democracy through fresh elections. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) between the transitional government and rebel groups in October 2020 appeared to be cementing those gains toward peace and democracy.

On October 25, 2021, however, a military coup upended that progress. Now, as the international community and domestic Sudanese actors, including the military and civilian groups, work toward a restoration of democracy, a number of challenges confront them. How they address them could either make or break the dreams of the young Sudanese behind the 2019 revolution.

A fresh start

The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have helped restart dialogue and have initiated a road map for transition. On December 5, 2022, the army, FFC, other political forces, civil society organizations, and some youth resistance committees signed a framework agreement to establish a civilian government to manage a democratic transition for two years, ending with free and fair elections.

Planning for general elections after a short transitional period must incorporate creative arrangements that account for the multiple political, security, and economic crises that Sudan faces.

The prospects for elections in Sudan must be discussed within the framework of the transition process as a whole. A crucial decision to be made by the political actors is the timing and sequencing of the election in relation to other transitional tasks, including peace-making and implementation or revision of the JPA, transitional justice, dismantling the power structures of the previous regime, economic reform, and constitution-building.

The election dilemma

The relationship between elections and constitution-building is particularly important. If elections are to be held, the question is to what? There must be some body—with a defined constitutional structure, powers, roles, and terms of office—that is being elected, and which once elected can fulfil its mandate.

Holding credible elections means more than the elections themselves being free and fair. It also means that the parameters defining the body to be elected must be broadly accepted and legitimate. Without that, losers of the election will challenge the legitimacy of the elected institutions, while the winners will push their victory to extremes and potentially have no limits in power. It’s an invitation to instability.

There is no scope for elected institutions under the 2019 Constitutional Charter. In August 2022, the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) proposed a new draft constitution as a framework for restoring the democratic path and regulating the procedures of the transitional period. This draft did not provide provisions for holding elections. All its institutions are appointed, not elected. This is because, until now, it has always been assumed that the transition will culminate with elections, rather than elections being part of a broader transitional process. The requirement for elections to be held at the end of the transitional period is specified in Article 13 of the JPA.

This is unusual. Often elections happen at some point in the middle of a transition process. In many cases, transitional institutions—such as a constituent assembly—are elected under a transitional constitution, and a final or permanent constitution is then developed by that elected body.

Elections or Constitution: What comes first?

The requirement that elections will happen only at the end of the transition places a huge burden on unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution before elections can take place.

Holding elections after the transitional period, and not in the middle of it, also means the transitional period has to be relatively short. Elections, which are vital to public legitimacy and to the establishment of normal institutionalized politics, cannot be postponed indefinitely. At some point the people of Sudan must decide on who and how they will be governed.

Yet there is reason to be concerned that there might not be enough time to develop a permanent constitution, based on a sufficient consensus, before the planned end of the transitional period.

There are only three (non-attractive) possible solutions:

1. Amend transitional constitutional documents, to allow for elections to transitional institutions, before the end of the transition process, with a permanent constitution to be developed after the election—although that is against Article 13 of the JPA.
2. Rush permanent constitution-building, to get a constitution in place before the scheduled end of the transition, with necessary compromises on the quality of document and on the extent to which the process can be fully inclusive.
3. Delay elections indefinitely until after the completion of permanent constitution-making, which may result in the ebbing away of the legitimacy of transitional institutions and raise the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention.

Whatever the case, the signatories to the Framework Agreement have begun to hold stakeholder conferences to discuss four fundamental issues necessary for signing the final political agreement: security sector reform, transitional justice issues, the regional case of eastern Sudan, and the issue of amending the JPA.

It is important to make use of these ongoing consultations to discuss extending the transitional period to accommodate institutional and legislative reforms and the necessary logistical preparations for elections. The international community, including UNITAMS, can help transfer technical expertise, international experiences, lessons learned, and resources to assist a democratic transition and plan elections, and to support sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

Aside from the constitution, Articles 12 and 13 of the JPA establish other preconditions for the holding of credible elections. They include:

• arrangements for international monitoring
• implementation of the agreed-upon plan for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees
• the conduct of the population census, “in an effective and transparent manner before the end of the transitional period, with international support and oversight”
• the enactment of a Political Parties Law
• the formation of the Electoral Commission

Similar preconditions are also specified in the draft constitution presented by the SBA. Additionally, it is necessary to conduct a campaign to make voters aware of the new constitution and of the electoral system.

This is a lot to do, and Sudan is starting from a low baseline. If the transition period is to be just two years, Sudan will require considerable technical support, and investment of resources, to meet the requirements of the JPA and the SBA’s draft transitional constitution.

Role of the international community

Since the formation of the transitional government in August 2019, a broad international campaign has been launched to support the democratic transition in Sudan. My organization, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), has joined this effort by providing technical support to the transitional government, especially in supporting the formation of the Electoral Commission and the Constitution Making Commission, and in enacting laws related to these commissions. This support from international institutions must continue and be consistent with the political changes that occur.

There is a mandate for such support. Security Council Resolution 2425 of 2020, establishing UNITAMS, gave the UN mission in Sudan a mandate to provide assistance related to the transition and peace. Given the scale of the task and tight deadline, such financial and programmatic support must be provided urgently. Much of the preparatory work, both on elections and on the constitution, can be started now, for example the formation of working groups and technical committees.

There is also precedent for this support. The Electoral Assistance Mission in Iraq was formed within the larger Iraq mission, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2576 (2021), to provide advice, support, and technical assistance to Iraq in planning, preparing, and conducting elections and referendums. Similarly, the European Union delegation assisted Jordan (2016) and Lebanon (2022). The African Union deployed, in May 2019, a team of observers and a team of technical experts ahead of the elections in Malawi.

The threats that may result from holding elections amid challenging security conditions—including the weaknesses and divisions within the state’s security institutions—cannot be overlooked. In addition to financial and logistical assistance, an international assistance mission should provide a qualified, trained, and experienced security force.

No time to waste

It is necessary to start soon and move fast to help build political consensus around the design of the process and the sequencing of the transition.

Failure to reach a political agreement on the electoral processes, on the constitutional structures that give rise to elections, and on legal rules regulating elections, may cause political tension, which could disrupt the elections and undermine the democratic transition.

The opportunities currently available to the Sudanese people to discuss issues of democratization, including the issue of organizing free and credible elections, with the help of the international community, might not last forever.

The international community needs to provide substantial support for the coming elections in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. This is vital for security, peace, and political stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Failure to do so would create security, political, and social risks that are difficult to count—or predict.

Sami A. Saeed is the head of the Sudan program at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. He previously served at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan from 2006–2020.

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The initiative has been applauded by domestic groups, stakeholders, and the international community. It demonstrates the importance of professional institutions and trade unions in bringing political organizations together and restoring the democratic transformation process. The draft constitution provides that the new transitional government be entirely civilian, thereby avoiding one of the mistakes of the 2019 Constitutional Charter, which established a civilian-military partnership. However, there are key issues that require further discussion and inclusion in the draft constitution.

The transitional constitution, by definition, is intended to govern the transitional period, during which the government should embark on a proper comprehensive, inclusive, transparent, and participatory constitution-making process to construct a permanent and democratic constitution. The current SBA constitution-production process does not, in any event, substitute the proper democratic constitution-making process that the transitional government should organize.

The most important point that the constitution drafters and reviewers should consider is that any re-established transitional period should not be a conventional transitional period. Rather, it is a foundational transitional period that should address as many fundamental problems of Sudan as possible. Historically speaking, during transitional periods, caretaker governments have only been empowered to organize elections and run the country in the interim, before handing power over to the party or parties that won the elections. Similarly, the discussion of the fundamental problems of the Sudanese state, such as the relationship between state and religion, language policies, and the constitutional relationship between the central government and the peripheries, has been pushed back to the post-transitional period.

However, experiences of other African nations—such as Ethiopia and South Africa—demonstrate that addressing these issues during the transition contributes to laying the foundations for democracy, peace, and stability. Learning from their experiences, conventional Sudanese political organizations, which tend to be politically conservative, should, therefore, not be allowed to make Sudan’s next transitional period another failure in the political and constitutional history of the country.

What a draft constitution must entail

Another equally important point is the need for the draft constitution to reasonably address and rectify the shortcomings of the previous transitional period, which had partially resulted from the deficiencies of the 2019 Constitutional Charter. A clear example was the charter’s silence on the powers of the state or regional governments and their relationship with the central government; this proved to be extremely problematic, as neither level had clear limitations on the powers they exercised, creating confusion and tensions between them.

It seems that the SBA draft constitution has not learned from the 2019 charter in this regard, as it also fails to mention this significant distribution of powers. This exclusion is particularly perplexing given that the SBA explicitly establishes a federal state in which the exclusive and concurrent powers of the federal and state or regional units should be expressly set out.

The draft constitution should contain a detailed article on citizenship, which is the indispensable foundation of any modern democratic state. For a nation that has been destabilized and embroiled in civil wars because of ethnic and religious dichotomies, enshrining universal citizenship principles and rules in the transitional constitution would be a necessary indication that the ethnic, religious, cultural, and regional policies that have fragmented the Sudanese nation and caused the deterioration of the state have no place in Sudan.

Relatedly, the article on the nature of the state should provide for establishing an impartial state that does not adopt a religious, ethnic, cultural, or regional identity. The drafters and reviewers of the new transitional constitution should consider the historical demands of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, led by Abdulaziz Alhilu, calling for the separation of state and religion. In this regard, the progress made during the transitional period, namely, the signing of a declaration of principles that separated the state from religion, should be reflected in and reaffirmed by the draft constitution.

Finally, the draft constitution should not overlook the linguistic diversity of the country—both ensuring that ethnic groups have the right to use their vernacular languages and dedicating a separate foundational article that conspicuously recognizes the right of state and regional governments to adopt a vernacular language as a working or official language. It should recognize the right of any state or region to adopt such a language as the language of instruction in its local schools.

In this regard, Sudan should learn from the Malaysian experiment, where the use of vernacular languages is constitutionally recognized, while at the same time promoting English and Malay as linguae francas and mediums of instruction in higher education institutions. To support these efforts, the draft constitution should establish a board, similar to that established by the South Africa Constitution, to ensure the continuous promotion of the use of vernacular languages as well as its development.

Technocratic government

The experience of the second government (February 2021-October 2021) during the previous transitional period (August 2019-October 2021) indicated that the participation of political parties in the government would spark unnecessary, paralyzing political differences and conflicts. It is, therefore, important that the draft constitution unequivocally provide that the transitional government be technocratic. That is the only way to avoid the repetition of the political differences and conflicts that the transitional governments witnessed in the months that preceded the October 25, 2021 coup, which would have probably been impossible had those differences and conflicts not existed.

The SBA draft constitution provides that political forces sign the political declaration, according to which the draft constitution shall be adopted, and nominate individuals for the senior positions of prime minister, Sovereignty Council member, and cabinet roles, among others. The draft constitution, surprisingly, goes as far as enabling those forces to nominate and appoint the members of the independent commissions, chief justice, president, members of the Constitutional Court, and judges of the Supreme Court.

Vesting the power to nominate the prime minister and members of the Sovereignty Council in the political forces that sign the political declaration will, undoubtedly, ignite deep and irreconcilable political differences that might make the establishment of the transitional government impossible. Furthermore, the nomination of the members of the independent commissions, the chief justice, the president and members of the Constitutional Court, and the judges of the Supreme Court is obviously incompatible with the principles of democracy, as well as the independence of these institutions and positions.

To avoid political differences or impossibility of agreement between the Central Committee of the Forces for Freedom and Change and other political groups, and to ensure the independence of the institutions that should be independent in a democratic and open society, the draft constitution should consider creating independent and impartial mechanisms, such as a committee or council of wise persons, that will have the power to select the prime minister and nominate individuals for the other high constitutional positions. 

More significantly, providing for a federal system without constitutionally enshrining the detailed exclusive and concurrent powers of each level or unit of the federal union undermines the very idea of federalism. It is, therefore, extremely important that the draft constitution contain three comprehensive lists of exclusive and concurrent powers of the federal and regional or state governments: one for the federal government (exclusive federal powers); a second for the state or regional governments (exclusive state or regional powers); and a third for both levels of government (concurrent powers).

Finally, the Bill of Rights of the draft transitional constitution, which is, in fact, taken almost verbatim from the 2005 Interim Constitution and the 2019 Constitutional Charter, should be more elaborate and comprehensive, explicitly providing for the procedures and principles that ensure the actual protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms by state institutions, especially the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court. It should also empower lower courts across the country to admit and decide human rights cases in some specific situations, as is the case in the United States.

In this regard, an alternative comprehensive and detailed new bill of rights, ideally based on and adapted from the 2010 Kenyan Constitution Bill of Rights, should seriously be considered by the Sudanese Bar Association or the reviewers of its draft constitution. The Kenyan Constitution’s Bill of Rights is one of the most comprehensive and elaborate bills of rights on the African continent.

In essence, the initiative undertaken by the Sudanese Bar Association and its production of a draft constitution has created robust political momentum. Additionally, it has created real possibility for uniting pro-democracy forces at a critical point in history—something that would put the pro-democracy civilian camp in a strong position to establish an entirely civilian government.

For this draft constitution to be a solid foundation for a new democratic transformation process, its provisions should be based on an important assumption that the transitional period is a foundational period and not merely conventional transitional period, where a caretaker government runs the state and organizes elections within a year or so. The resolution of some of Sudan’s historical problems—such as the relationship between state and religion, addressing its diversity management issues, and rectifying the deficiencies and shortcomings of the previous transitional period and those of the 2019 Constitutional Charter—should be genuinely considered as much as possible by the SBA draft constitution. 

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is Sudan’s former justice minister.

Mutasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wellenberg Center for Human Rights, based in Washington, DC.

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Sudan’s transitional government, formed in 2019 following the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir, was like an airplane that after a rocky takeoff, was just about to level off when it was shot down. Under former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the transitional government struggled to address a variety of deep security and economic challenges, such as tribal conflicts, multiple armies, the involvement of the military in non-military industries, poor governance and rule of law, and an inefficient economic regulatory regime. The Sudanese people, who had taken to the streets in bold defiance of a brutal thirty-year dictatorship, expected an immediate improvement in their economic situation after the collapse of al-Bashir’s regime. However, economic conditions, aggravated by extensive smuggling of fuel and other commodities and instability in the local currency, continued to deteriorate. The Sudanese pound depreciated further, and national fuel shortages remained as dire as they had been under al-Bashir’s regime.

After Hamdok’s government unified the exchange rate in March 2021 and lifted subsidies that June, the situation changed significantly. Fuel queues disappeared and for seven continuous months from March to October 2021, the Sudanese pound stabilized and maintained its strength in the face of the US dollar—for the first time since South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011.

Encouraged by these domestic reforms, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States, and the European Union started providing financial support. It was expected that the country would receive more than four billion dollars in assistance by the end of the 2022 fiscal year. This economic and political stability would have encouraged private sector investment in the country. The government’s constitutional reform and transitional justice efforts, as well as infrastructure plans to end chronic power outages and increase oil production, were in advanced stages.

The military coup on October 25, 2021, upended the progress Sudan was slowly making. So why did the military risk international censure and isolation by overthrowing the transitional government? The coup leaders might have thought that they would be supported by Middle Eastern countries with whom, it is believed, they have close ties—namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, and Egypt. The role of these countries is, therefore, pivotal as far as the undermining or restoration of Sudan’s democratic transitional process is concerned.

The two most important Middle Eastern countries in this regard, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have thus far taken positions that have certainly disappointed the military. Neither country has provided any public financial assistance to compensate for the withdrawal of aid from international financial institutions and Western partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe.

Rather, both countries joined the United States and United Kingdom in affirming on November 1, 2021, the four “countries’ stance with the people of Sudan and emphasiz[ing] the importance of supporting their aspirations for a democratic and peaceful nation.” The statement called for “the full and immediate restoration of… civilian-led transitional government and institutions.” Saudi Arabia also joined the United States in facilitating a meeting between the leaders of the coup and the Central Committee of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a political coalition of the political and civil society organizations and groups that led the protests leading to al-Bashir’s ouster. The FFC had previously refused to join the so-called Tripartite Mechanism talks mediated by the United Nations, African Union, and Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD), due to the participation of political forces previously part of al-Bashir’s government, which undermined the credibility of the talks, but not that of the whole process.

Still, the international community must keep its eyes on the Middle Eastern nations that the coup leaders might have expected help from. It was reported on June 20 that the UAE, in collaboration with a Sudanese businessman, would invest six billion dollars to build a port in Sudan and provide a three-hundred-million-dollar deposit to the Central Bank of Sudan, which would help to slightly ease the economic pressure faced by coup leaders. The Abu Dhabi Port Company denied that it signed any agreements to build a port, but stated that preliminary discussions are taking place with Sudanese authorities. The existence of such discussions is worrisome, as they, if successful, would embolden the military in any negotiations with the civilian forces.

More ambiguous still is Israel’s stance vis-a-vis the coup, as pro-democracy forces in Sudan interpreted Israel’s failure to condemn the coup as tacit support for the military government and a sign of its intention to proceed with normalization efforts, started under the transitional government in 2020. While Israel is thought to have remained in contact with Sudanese military leaders, there is no indication that it is actively working on finalizing the normalization process under the current circumstances. This is in line with the US position, which has urged for the process to be halted until Sudan returns to a democratic transformation process under the leadership of a civilian government.

Egypt’s position meanwhile remains quite unclear, although its support is unlikely to make a huge difference as it is itself embroiled in an unprecedented economic crisis and is not in a position to offer the Sudanese military financial support. In addition, Egypt’s geopolitical influence has declined vis-a-vis the rise of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey, which are now increasingly playing bigger regional roles.

Against this backdrop, it is extremely important that the Troika of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway—which has consistently supported democratic civilian rule in Sudan—jointly coordinate its efforts with these states. The Troika should involve both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in efforts to help restore the transition process. It should encourage Israel, which maintains communications with Sudan’s military leaders, despite not having diplomatic relations, to reinforce the messages of the international community that the undermining of Sudan’s democracy is unacceptable and that practical steps must be taken to establish a purely civilian, popularly supported government.

This coordination between the Troika and these three states should focus on what shouldn’t be done, as well as on what should be done to help the Sudanese people restart the democratic transition process. The UAE should refrain from engaging in any potential investment discussions with a de facto government that is continuously and persistently resisted by the vast majority of the Sudanese people. It should halt discussions with Sudanese authorities to build a port in Sudan. Instead, the UAE should join the United States and Saudi Arabia in their efforts to end the current political crisis, an important step for the stability and development of Sudan, as well as for the creation of a suitable environment for sustainable foreign investments.

Efforts by the Troika, joined by Saudi Arabia and possibly the UAE, should also be undertaken to revive and strengthen the Tripartite Mechanism by fostering greater involvement by the special envoys and representatives of these countries. Alternatively, there should be a new international initiative to facilitate negotiations between the Sudanese parties. As for Israel, the decision to not finalize the normalization of relations with Sudan is also one that should be applauded and strongly encouraged.

The revival and strengthening of the Tripartite Mechanism or establishment of an alternative one is profoundly important following the recent announcement by the military leadership that it won’t be a part of any dialogue with civilians and that it would hand over power to civilians only if they reach a consensus. The aim of this position is to undermine regional and international endeavors to facilitate negotiations between the pro-democracy forces that struggle for political freedom and civilian rule, on the one hand, and the military that upended the transition, on the other. It indicates that the military does not intend to give up power, as reaching a consensus under the current circumstances is impossible. The military will most likely use this impossibility as a justification for establishing a government that it can control. It might, in anonther likely scenario, hold elections for which the country is not ready, which is a common practice to legitimize the status quo.    

The history of Sudan demonstrates that the people have always won the battle for freedom and democracy against dictators. The Middle Eastern countries that are interested in establishing political relations with Sudan, such as Israel, and those that are interested in investing, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, should therefore stand on the side of pro-democracy civilian forces. At the very least, they should not hinder the continued struggle of the Sudanese people to defeat the coup and return to a democratic transition.

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Mustasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wellenberg Center for Human Rights, based in Washington, DC.

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Today, the country is on a knife’s edge. 

The promised road to reform is now fully blocked by security forces bent on what they claim is an effort to “save” the country from civilian leaders. But as these forces hold ever tighter to power, they are squeezing the life out of the country: Since their October 25 coup that effectively brushed aside the civilian transition and reignited a popular revolution, the economy has gone into a death spiral. Inflation is rising above 250 percent, the value of the country’s currency has plummeted against the dollar, and the price of key imported commodities in Sudan, such as wheat and fuel, have risen by more than 30 percent. 

In other words, a loaf of bread that cost two Sudanese pounds when civilians assumed office two years ago now costs more than fifty. The United Nations World Food Program projects that 40 percent of the country’s population will face “acute food insecurity” later this year if nothing changes, leading donors to begin planning for a new humanitarian emergency in the country’s urban areas.

As Sudan’s supporters watch this calamitous economic situation unfold, they are desperately searching for any defensible reason to restart lending and debt-relief programs to help avoid the coming financial collapse and humanitarian emergency. But, here too, the military has given no reason to show any leniency: Since the October coup d’état, dozens of leading political figures and protest leaders have been targeted for disappearance or arrest, while ninety-three pro-democracy demonstrators have been killed by security forces (which continue to use a nationwide state of emergency as justification for their brutality).

Last week, the country’s military leader, General Abdallah Fattah al-Burhan, even threatened to expel the head of the country’s UN peace-support mission for “lying publicly” and failing to report to the UN Security Council the supposed progress under the junta’s rule.

As the junta hunkers down internally, its emissaries are on a globetrotting tour of friendly capitals, from Moscow to Abu Dhabi, seeking political backing and a financial rescue. So far, no one has been willing to wager on the military or against the will of the Sudanese people, whose demands for democratic change have not abated.

But that could soon change. A series of recent meetings in Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi suggest that Sudan’s longtime friends are rapidly losing patience with the political deadlock and impending economic collapse, and are searching for a way to create a soft landing (even if it comes at the expense of the Sudanese population’s democratic aspirations).

For Gulf partners, who bought up Khartoum real estate and commercial holdings at fire-sale prices in the waning days of the Omar al-Bashir regime (and since his ouster), Sudan’s unraveling would spell disaster for their investments. Egypt, which continues to view Sudan as its vassal, fears a mass exodus of Sudanese northward and political chaos on its southern border. Khartoum’s ability to stay in political lockstep with Cairo in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam negotiations with Ethiopia—Egypt’s single biggest foreign-policy priority—is also a major question.

Considering Sudan’s political history, the time appears ripe for another notorious elite deal, with regional buy-in, that walks the country back from the financial brink—but, in the process, short-circuits any hope that the bottom-up political movement will lead to genuine civilian rule and democracy.

Washington needs to get serious

For weeks, Khartoum has been awash in rumors that the hapless former prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, seen as capable of putting financial markets at ease, could return. The re-establishment of a civilian and technocratic—but compliant—cabinet, which puts a more acceptable face on the regime, might also follow. But most concerning is the discussion of the establishment of a new Security and Defense Council that would ensure security interests remain firmly in the military’s hands and separate from civilian-led ministries. This would leave the military with ultimate executive authority. 

Such a set-up would pave the way for quick elections, which the military and its political allies would surely dominate, and thereby provide new surface-level legitimacy for unreformed security interests and their foreign backers. As they likely see it, the only real losers under such a deal are the 44 million Sudanese not in the military or associated with the previous regime, who will once again see their aspirations for a peaceful, democratic future dashed by political expediency and regional stability.

Sudan’s dedicated pro-democracy movement would categorically reject any deal engineered with outside backing and did not emerge from a process they were fully a part of—but that doesn’t mean that the military and their allies might not still try. Importantly, it is not too late to prevent this scenario. But it requires the United States and partners to step up and demonstrate a strategic focus on long-term change and a return to core principles that bring it into greater alignment and allegiance with Washington’s true partners: the Sudanese people.

First, the international community must remind itself that Sudan’s revolution was never merely about overthrowing a dictator or dismantling his party; it was about undoing the corrupt, racist, and authoritarian power structures that have governed Sudan since independence. 

Western calls for the military to enact “confidence-building measures” only plays into the existing discriminatory power dynamics in the country and elevate the security services as an equal, if not legitimate, part of Sudan’s political future (and therefore undermines a core tenet of the revolution). Instead, the military should be getting constant reminders that their days are numbered and a return to the pre-coup, pre-revolution status quo is both impossible and unacceptable.

Second, Washington needs to improve its public messaging in the face of the military’s political double-dealing. It is no longer enough for the United States to say it’s “on the side of the protesters.” If it were, it would call out every single abuse and death suffered by pro-democracy activists at the hands of the security services, as well as demand an investigation of crimes committed under the coup government. Instead, Washington’s numbness to the sustained deluge of crimes normalizes the deaths of innocent people and reinforces the military’s hold on power.

Third, the United States needs to start listening to the demands of the people and let them inform its public statements. Calling for a “return to civilian-led transitional government” or the “full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement,” as recent US and Troika statements have, reflects deafness to popular calls for a new way forward, tells allies on the ground that stability is more important than transformation, and suggests that Washington would rather save face by salvaging formulas it once endorsed rather than seeing the writing on the wall and changing tack.

Lastly, it is well past time that the United States rebalance the negotiating table by imposing targeted sanctions on the individuals directing these abuses and profiting from the current stalemate. Since the military’s coup, those most responsible for the disruption of the transition and human-rights abuses have suffered no direct consequences for their actions. While symbolic, the recent sanctioning of Sudan’s Central Reserve Police by the US Treasury was short on impact and rang hollow with both the victims and the perpetrators: With no dollar-denominated bank holdings or large physical presence outside of Sudan, the sanctions have little to no practical effect. And by targeting an institution with far less responsibility for Sudan’s failing state than the military, even the symbolism of the action was lost on most. 

Instead, Washington continues to betray a lack of real understanding of what is happening on the ground, who is responsible, and how to impact the calculations of the principal belligerents. But it is not too late to correct the course. Making clear the conditions required to restart lending and avoiding sanctions, conceived in consultation with its democratic allies on the streets, could help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact and demonstrate that Washington is giving real weight to the popular will.

In the long run, this is what is required to achieve actual stability—not the cheap imitation Sudan has always known.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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Exploitation of social platforms

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance  

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops

Documenting dissent

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine 

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires  

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

Security

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire 

Regional reactions

Ugandan general tweets support for Russia

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context 

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance  

Google, Meta, and Twitter are taking action against Russian state-owned media accounts to limit the spread of harmful information online. At the request of the European Union, Meta will restrict access to Kremlin-owned outlets RT and Sputnik across the EU. Earlier, Meta announced it would also restrict access to several Russian state media accounts in Ukraine at the government’s request. In addition, the company has demonetized the accounts of Russian state-owned media organizations and prohibited them from posting ads on Facebook and Instagram.  

In a similar move, Google has blocked RT and Sputnik’s YouTube channels across Europe. It will also prevent RT and other relevant outlets from receiving funding from ads on their websites and apps.  

Meanwhile, Twitter announced actions to reduce the spread of articles from Russian state-affiliated media. Links to Kremlin media will now include a “stay informed” label. Since the start of the invasion, there has been an uptick in the sharing of Kremlin media articles on Twitter, with more than 45,000 tweets a day directing users to state-affiliated outlets. 

Twitter also said that advertisements in Ukraine and Russia are on pause to ensure that critical public safety information is “elevated.” To this end, users in the two countries will no longer see tweet recommendations from accounts they don’t follow. 

Responding to social media companies’ increased moderation efforts, the Russian government ordered companies to comply with a new law that mandates social media platforms operating in Russia must set up local offices and register with Russia’s media watchdog, Roskomnadzor.  Under this legislation, local representatives could be held liable if Russia feels platforms are not abiding by local laws. These actions have been widely condemned by digital rights experts, as the law could be used as justification to intimidate employees with the threat of arrest and pressure companies to engage in censorship. 

Both Russian independent news outlets and Tik Tok have already fielded requests from the government to take down content related to the war in Ukraine. In response to what Russia claims is “censorship” by social media companies, Roskomnadzor announced restrictions on access to Facebook, and access to Twitter appears to be limited as of February 26. 

Over the weekend, Facebook and Twitter removed two covert influence operations targeting Ukrainians. One operation was tied to Russia, and another had connections to Belarus. Facebook also said the pro-Belarus hacking group Ghostwriter was targeting Ukrainians, including the military.

—Jacqueline Malaret, Assistant Director, Washington, DC

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington, DC

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops 

Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, approved a proposal by the Security and Anti-Corruption Committee to draft a law introducing criminal liability for sharing “fake” content related to Russia’s armed forces. Members of the ruling United Russia party previously proposed introducing such a bill, citing “a lot of disinformation” on social media.  The bill passed its first reading on March 2 and is expected to be presented for its second reading in several days.

The draft law states that the punishment for sharing fake content about Russian troops would be fifteen years in prison. The move could be a reaction to the increasing amount of footage showing Russia targeting civilian areas in Ukraine, which Russia denies. The law might intimidate Russian internet users and discourage them from sharing or saving such footage, particularly anything documenting war crimes. Meanwhile, Karim Khan, a prosecutor with the International Criminal Court, announced that he would investigate Russia for possible war crimes or crimes against humanity in Ukraine. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

On March 1, Wikipedia shared a notice they received from Russia’s Roskomnadzor information agency threatening to block the crowdsourced platform due to its Russian-language article on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The notice cited the inclusion of information about Russian military personnel casualties and Ukrainian civilian victims. In response, Wikipedia shared workarounds for users if Wikipedia does become blocked in Russia. 

That same day, Russian users found themselves unable to access the websites for the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and the independent broadcaster TV Rain. Around the same time, the Russian Prosecutor General’s office released a statement on Telegram saying they had submitted demands to Roskomnadzor to restrict access to both channels. The statement accused the outlets of calling for extremism and violence, spreading “false information” regarding Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, and calling for “mass public events.” 

The Prosecutor General’s office stated that the restrictions could legally be put in place due to Article 15.3 Federal Law No. 149-FZ Paragraph 1, “On Information, Information Technologies and Data Protection,” which covers the restriction of access to information inciting mass riots, extremist activities, and participation in mass public events. According to Article 15.3, the Russian government must first notify the online publication hosting the problematic content and request that it be removed; if the content is not immediately removed, they may then proceed with restricting access to the online publication.

TV Rain posted on Telegram that the Prosecutor General’s office did not identify specific materials on their website that violated Russian laws. It also said it strictly followed legal standards and used trusted sources when covering events in Ukraine.

Both Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain began trending on Twitter in Russia as these events unfolded. 

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington DC 

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets  

On February 24, Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor stated that Russian media outlets were “obliged” to rely on information received from Russian official sources while covering Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine. The statement also argued that Roskomnadzor would block all attempts of disseminating “knowingly false information” on the internet. Considering the fact that Russia has generally avoided disclosing information about the exact number of casualties and military loss in Ukraine, Roskomnadzor’s announcement might be an attempt to prevent independent media from reporting casualty statistics. Having said that, Kremlin outlet RBK reported on March 2 that Russia had experienced a total of 498 deaths and 1,597 injuries since the invasion, according to the Ministry of Defense.

On February 28, Roskomnadzor claimed that it found instances of Google Ads being used to spread “unreliable socially significant information” about Russian and Ukrainian casualties. Consequently, Roskomnadzor demanded that Google restrict access to such materials, and warned Russian Internet sites against distributing such ads to avoid administrative fines or website bans. Roskomnadzor did not specify what false information it had found, but its statement suggests it wishes to prevent the distribution of any kind of information about Russian casualties to prevent public outrage. 

Russian authorities have already taken actions against multiple independent media outlets. On February 28, Roskomnadzor blocked to access to Current Time and Krym.Realii, both projects of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as the New Times. Following the ban, Current Times wrote that they were accused of “spreading unreliable socially significant information about the Russian military allegedly killed and captured within the territory of Ukraine.” RFE/RL President Jamie Fly assessed the Kremlin’s move as “an attempt to hide the terrible truth about the human price of Putin’s criminal war against Ukraine.”  

On top of blocking internet resources, journalists at independent media outlets also face physical threats. On February 24, Interfax journalist Dmitry Gavrilov was arrested during an anti-war rally in Saint Petersburg while he was taking a photograph of an anti-war banner. Gavrilov showed his press credentials to police but was nonetheless detained.  The following day, Russian police arrested three RFE/RL journalists covering anti-war protests in Moscow, even though they too had all the necessary credentials to work during mass protests.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland  

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine

Videos of a February 27 protest in Belarus have surfaced on social media. The protests were in response to several recent developments in the country, including Belarus joining the war against Ukraine, serving as a transit point for Russian weapons, and Belarus revoking its non-nuclear status after a February 27 constitutional referendum. Crowds gathered near the defense ministry chanting “Glory to Ukraine!” and “Long live Belarus.” The Belarusian government responded aggressively, sending in riot police to detain protesters.   

Meanwhile, Belarusians living in Vilnius, Lithuania climbed over the fence of the Belarusian embassy and replaced the official state flag hanging outside the building’s entrance with the opposition nationalist flag and a Ukrainian flag.  

Lastly, a video of Belarusian lieutenant colonel Sakhashchik Valery Stepanovich discouraging soldiers from joining the war in Ukraine went viral online. “This is not our war,” he said. “Find a way not to follow criminal orders. Sometimes saying ‘no’ takes the most courage.”

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the cyber activist collective Anonymous announced their “war against the Kremlin.” Over the next several days they took credit for successful attacks on public services and state-controlled media in Russia and Belarus. As there is no official Anonymous account on Twitter, the collective used hashtags #OpRussia and #OpKremlin to share news and updates about the cyber-attack campaign.

On February 26, Anonymous claimed they had hacked Kremlin-owned TV channels, which suddenly started showing footage from Ukraine that contradicted the official Kremlin narrative. Many anonymous Twitter accounts reported on the hack.

The following day, Anonymous took credit for taking down a long list of Russian government websites, including the Russian pension fund, the State Service, the presidential administration, customs, the national government site, Moscow’s mayor, and the Chechnya Republic. As of March 2, many of these sites – Mos.ru, government.ru, customs.gov.ru, kremlin.ru, gosuslugi.ru, and pfr.gov.ru – remained offline. Chechnya.gov.ru had been restored, but now required users to demonstrate they were not automated bots using “captcha” tests before being allowed to proceed to the site.

On February 28, Anonymous claimed they had downed Russian propaganda websites, three Belarusian banks, and multiple Belarusian government sites, including the Information Ministry, Military Industry Authority, and Defense Ministry. While one Belarusian bank, Belinvestbank.by, has been restored, belarusbank.by and priorbank.by remained compromised at the time of writing, alongside the government sites mil.by, vpk.gov.by, and mpt.gov.by.

In additional to shutting down websites, Anonymous also took credit for leaking information from Russia’s Ministry of Defense and the Russian Nuclear Institute. 

Anonymous is not the only cyber activist collective attacking Russian and Belarusian infrastructure. The DFRLab previously reporting about the Belarusian Cyber Partisans hacking the Belarus Railway company, while the IT Army of Ukraine is also engaging in cyber activism.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia 

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

On March 1, a large rally in Tbilisi demanded the Georgian government’s resignation and snap elections. The latest protest took place in solidarity with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after he announced that Ukraine was recalling its ambassador to Georgia due to the government’s “immoral position” on sanctions and barring Georgian volunteers from flying to Ukraine.

Georgia has seen four consecutive days of protests, as thousands take to the street to express their solidarity with Ukraine and condemn the Georgian government’s position on Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky expressed support for the protesters when he tweeted on February 26, “Incredible Georgian people who understand that friends must be supported! Grateful to everyone in Tbilisi and other cities who came out in support of Ukraine and against the war. Indeed, there are times when citizens are not the government, but better than the government.”  

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Multiple Russian TikTok users published now-deleted videos with the hashtag #давайзамир (#letsgoforpeace), in which they included near-identical phrases such as “All are blaming Russia, but close their eyes that Donbas has been under fire for eight years,” and “Please check all the news, we’re fighting for peace.” Notably, the text in many of these videos was also extremely similar, and on some occasions identical, strongly suggesting either coordination or the distribution of talking points for Russian video creators. Indeed, some Russian TikTok users pushed back publishing messages claiming they were offered payment to post peace symbols and express the message that Russia is stopping the war rather than starting it, and that the world has ignored the Donbas for eight years.

The scope of the narrative operation caught the eye of other TikTok users, who compiled videos of TikTokers voicing similar statements, then shamed them for being corrupt. Some of these TikTokers muted comments to avoid criticism, while others ultimately deleted their videos.

Not long after this first wave of similar narratives, a second wave appeared, when multiple users published videos featuring the lines, “In 2015, a new memorial named Alley of Angels was built in Donetsk” and “Russia wants to bring peace.” These videos were available at the time of publishing but may soon be deleted as well.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires

Georgian far-left groups are promoting the narrative that the war in Ukraine is a battle between two empires over Ukrainian resources. The narrative portrays the US and Russia as equal threats to Ukraine. On February 24, Politicano, a Facebook page known for Soviet Union nostalgia and affiliated with the Kremlin-linked News Front Georgia, posted that Ukraine has become a battleground for Western and Russian empires. Another Facebook page, “ნაპერწკალი“ (“Spark”), which describes itself as an “independent Marxist collective initiative,” posted that the war in Ukraine is a conflict between Russian and Western imperialists, fighting over spheres of influence and resources. 

The narrative that Ukraine is stuck between the imperial interests of the West and Russia aligns with messaging coming from far-right Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin. On February 27, Dugin posted, “This is not a war with Ukraine. This is a confrontation with globalization…on all levels, including geopolitical and ideological.” According to him, Russia is creating a global resistance zone. “When we win, everybody benefits from it,” he said.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

On February 28, the KGB of South Ossetia issued a statement claiming that there is raise of neo-Nazi and nationalistic sentiments in Georgia. The claim refers to Georgians willing to join Ukraine’s international legion of territorial defence, that allows foreign volunteers to support Ukraine’s defense efforts. The South Ossetia KGB described Georgian volunteers as “aggressive Georgian volunteers from the ranks of [former President] Mikheil Saakashvili’s radical followers.” It continued, “Instead of recognising its responsibility for crimes committed against humanity from 1920s till 2008, the Tbilisi regime expresses support for Ukrainian Banderovtsi [followers of the 20^th century Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera] who in turn are nurturing their own revanchist goals.”

That same day,  South Ossetia’s information agency published a story with the headline, “South Ossetia and Russia unite against Nazism.” The article claimed that citizens of South Ossetia launched a flash mob on social networks with the hashtag #Мирбезнацизма (“World without Nazism”). As of March 2, the DFRLab could not find a single public post on either Facebook or Twitter featuring the hashtag during the alleged time span of the flash mob.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire

On the morning of February 28, the Kyiv Independent reported that the first Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft was expected to deploy Belarusian paratroopers into Ukraine. Meanwhile, reports of ballistic missiles launched from Belarus into Ukraine continue to surface, with some reports suggesting the use of Iskander missiles. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka later confirmed missiles were launched from Belarus on February 27.  

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Ugandan General tweets support for Russia

Ugandan Lieutenant General Mahoozi Kainerugaba, son of President Yoweri Museveni and leader of the country’s land forces, tweeted on February 28, “The majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine.”  The DFRLab previously identified a network of inauthentic Facebook assets working to prime Lt. Gen. Kainerugaba as the next president of Uganda.

The Ugandan Embassy in Moscow called on nationals living in Ukraine to remain cautious and follow instructions issued by the Ukrainian government. The embassy said, “It is our prayer that the situation will be short lived, and that normality will soon be restored.” The presidency has yet to issue any further comment on the war. 

On February 24, Vladlen Semivolos, Russia’s ambassador to Uganda, spoke to Uganda’s permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Waiswa Bagiire, about developing bilateral cooperation in the United Nations. 

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context

The deputy head of Sudan’s military council, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, was quoted by Russian media outlet FAN as having recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Daglo, who visited Moscow last week, was quoted saying, “The whole world must realize that it is [Russia’s] right to defend herself.” However, the Sudan Tribune reported a statement from Sudan’s Foreign Ministry claiming Daglo’s quote was taken out of context and used as a “cheap attempt to fish in troubled waters.”  

On February 27, Sudan’s state news agency reported that the meeting between Sudanese and Russian officials had been scheduled prior to the war in Ukraine, and that Sudan called for de-escalation “on both sides.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

The post Russian Hybrid War Report: Social platforms crack down on Kremlin media as Kremlin demands compliance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Not long after dawn on February 24, tanks were recorded moving into Ukrainian territory from southwestern Belarus, crossing over at the Senkivka checkpoint. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Russian heavy flamethrower systems can be identified in the videos. Videos showing missiles being launched from the Mogilev area towards Ukraine have also surfaced, yet have not been specifically geolocated as of now. CNN and Newsweek reported that Belarusian troops are also taking part in the attack against Ukraine, despite previous insistence from Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Belarus would not participate in any military action against the country.

In an urgent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lukashenka announced that they had agreed to keep Russian troops stationed in Belarus. Lukashenka previously denied that Belarusian troops would take part in the Ukrainian invasion. He also proclaimed that Ukraine is losing the war and offered to host talks in Minsk.

New Maxar satellite imagery released the day before the attack showed Russian military deployment changes on February 21 and 22. The new images revealed Russia had deployed more than one hundred vehicles and dozens of troop shelters at Bolshoi Bokov airfield in southern Belarus, near the city of Mazyr. This new deployment is less than twenty kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The same set of new images also documented ground being cleared southwest of Belgorod, Russia, in the general vicinity of where Russia later began its attack on Kharkiv.

That same day, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service announced the implementation of a number of security measures along its borders with Russia and Belarus. The new measures included limiting vehicle traffic; using radio stations, drones, and filming and taking pictures; as well as keeping non-residents away from the border zone. Meanwhile, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya urged Western countries to impose tougher sanctions on both Russia and Belarus to deter them from further aggression. According to her, the current sanctions packages are not enough, as Russia and Belarus are not showing any responsiveness to them.

Viktor Gulevich, head of the Belarusian army, previously stated on February 21 that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus would depend on regional NATO troop withdrawals. According to Reuters reporting, Gulevich said Minsk believed it was within its rights to demand that US and NATO member forces withdraw from near Belarusian borders, including from near borders with neighboring countries Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Lastly, new footage has surfaced of Russian Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-24P combat helicopters in the Gomel region of Southeastern Belarus, potentially near the R-35 highway; however, this video has not yet been geolocated. Additional as-yet-unverified videos suggest that the southern Belarusian border where Russian troops are stationed is becoming more muddy, which might impact the tactical capabilities of Russian ground troops in the region.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

A pair of cyberattacks targeted Ukrainian banks and government websites during the twenty-four hours leading up to the Russian invasion. Targets included the web pages for the Ukrainian parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Cabinet of Ministers.

According to the internet monitoring website IsItDownRightNow.com, the websites for the MFA and Cabinet of Ministers were temporarily taken offline on Wednesday. Over several hours, the DFRLab also observed that Ukraine’s security services website would only partially load. 

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, confirmed a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack had occurred. He claimed that unknown actors attacked Ukrainian banks, state servicer provider Diia, and the websites for the Ukrainian parliament, the MFA, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Fortunately, many of the services continued working despite the ongoing attack.

Fedorov confirmed that cyberattacks continued throughout the night and were ongoing. He claimed that all information sources in Ukraine were under attack, but assured citizens that the situation was under control. As of Thursday morning, the websites were accessible from Ukraine.

Meanwhile, open-source research collective InformNapalm also reported a DDoS attack on their webpage. A similar attack was directed at Censor.net, a popular Ukrainian online media outlet. The organizations successfully defended against the attacks and webpage performance was not impacted.

Lastly, cybersecurity firms Symantec and ESET said they had discovered a new destructive malware wiping data from Ukrainian machines.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

On February 24, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reported that columns of Russian tanks entered the Luhansk region of Eastern Ukraine through Krasna Talivka, Milove, and Horodyshche. According to the Border Guard, the columns were led by white cars bearing the logo for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has monitored the conflict on a daily basis for years.

The OSCE previously announced on February 13 that it was pulling out its staff from eastern Ukraine. At the time, Kremlin outlet RT reported that OSCE had evacuated their car fleet but left behind armored vehicles.

At the time of writing, the OSCE had not commented on the matter and the DFRLab cannot independently confirm whether the OSCE vehicles allegedly being used by Russia are authentic or were Russian vehicles with OSCE logos affixed to them.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Twitter cited “human error” after suspending the accounts of several open-source researchers on Wednesday. The social media company dismissed rumors that the removals were the result of a mass reporting campaign. “A small number of human errors as part of our work to proactively address manipulated media resulted in these incorrect enforcements,” said Yoel Roth, head of site integrity at Twitter. “We’re fixing the issue and reaching out directly to the affected folks.”

Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters published a thread listing more than a dozen legitimate accounts that Twitter had suspended. Those with suspended accounts included Roman Burko, the founder of the open-source research collective InformNapalm; Kyle Glen, OSINT researcher and cofounder of Conflict News; Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian right-leaning activist from Odesa; and Maria Avdeeva, research director at the European Expert Association. By Thursday, all of the accounts cited by Waters except @ukrwarreport had been restored.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Shortly after Putin recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples republics on February 21, a pro-Russia online flash mob began tweeting using the hashtags #СвоихНеБросаем (#WeDoNotAbandonOurPeople) and #МыВместе (#WeAreTogether). The campaign expressed support for people living in Donetsk and Luhansk, alleging that they are suffering under Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Twitter campaign created the impression that there is public support for Putin’s decision.

Open-source evidence suggests Putin’s United Russia party could have initiated the flash mob. United Russia started using the #СвоихНеБросаем hashtag on February 20, the day before the Putin’s announcement, calling on its audience to give humanitarian assistance to people evacuated from Donbas to Rostov Oblast. Later, United Russia continued to use the hashtag for other purposes. 

The DFRLab analyzed the hashtags on Twitter and found 59 percent of the mentions were original tweets (1005 out of 1709). Each tweet received an average of 26.4 engagements, suggesting the campaign failed to go viral. The most popular tweet had 223 engagements.

Analyzing the hashtags on Facebook using the monitoring tool CrowdTangle, the DFRLab found that the most engaged–with content came from United Russia accounts or the accounts of their prominent members. The highest number of engagements a post received was 1,300 reactions, 140 comments and 124 shares, which is not considered particularly high. A CrowdTangle query identified 202 posts on Facebook pages, public groups, and verified profiles that received an average of 39 engagements. Meanwhile, a CrowdTangle analysis of Instagram found that 509 posts have used the hashtag since February 20, receiving an average of 720 engagements.

The DFRLab found the hashtag was also used on other social media platforms, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, and Telegram, but has yet to determine their levels of engagement. 

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Anatoly Bibilov, president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, announced a “combat alert” after an emergency security council meeting on Thursday. According to Bibilov, all units of the Ministry of Defense “must be ready to advance to concentration points.” Bibilov also ordered full cooperation with the Russian military base in the region. He cited the Treaty of Alliance and Integration between South Ossetia and Russia, signed in 2015, when reiterating South Ossetia’s “full support” for Russia’s actions.

Bibilov also said security forces were monitoring the situation along the Georgian border “to ensure readiness to respond to all provocations potentially originating from Georgia.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

On February 22 in Moscow, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev and Vladimir Putin signed a declaration regarding allied cooperation. Azerbaijan’s state information agency Azertag published a Russian version of the declaration, which reiterated cooperation between the two states in different fields, including the economy, energy, transportation, trade, health, and education.

Notably, three sections of the declaration mention military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia:

• Paragraph 11 of the declaration states that Russia and Azerbaijan will suppress activities of organizations and entities on their territory, targeting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each party.

• According to paragraph 13, “The parties will deepen cooperation between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat trainings, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.”

• Lastly, in paragraph 16, they state, “In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military support on the basis of the UN Charter, different international agreements and considering the existing international-legal obligations of each party.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksiy Reznikov called on all Ukrainians “who are ready and able to hold a weapon” to mobilize. According to a statement posted on Facebook early Thursday morning, Ukraine has entered “total defense mode.” Reznikov said all that is required to join the ranks of the armed forces is a passport. “The enemy is attacking, but our army is indestructible,” he added.

Following the defense minister’s statement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted a similar statement: “We will give weapons to anyone who wants to defend the country. Be ready to support Ukraine in the squares of our cities.”

Also Thursday, Ukraine banned all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country. “This regulation will remain in effect for the period of the legal regime of martial law,” the State Border Guard Service said.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty Thursday, triggering consultations with Alliance members. Article 4 states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Following initial consultations, NATO issued a statement saying “we have decided, in line with our defensive planning to protect all allies, to take additional steps to further strengthen deterrence and defense across the alliance.”

This comes as NATO held an emergency meeting to discuss Russia’s assault on Ukraine. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Russia’s attack on Ukraine “is a grave breach of international law, and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

On February 24, the official website of the Russian presidency published a video in which Vladimir Putin effectively declared war on Ukraine, announcing that he was ordering the Russian armed forces to conduct a special military operation in Ukraine in accordance with Article 51 of United Nations Charter and in pursuance of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.

After the video’s release, Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta wrote on Facebook and Twitter that the speech had been recorded on February 21, based on an analysis of the recording’s metadata. The story was quickly picked up by the Russian edition of Delfi Estonia media outlet on Facebook, by Ekho Moskvy on Twitter, and Turkish state-controlled media TRT’s Russian language Facebook page.

However, CNN journalist Gianluca Mezzo wrote that when he checked the metadata of Putin’s video, he concluded that it was recorded on February 24 at 03:35:44. He also published a screenshot of metadata info of a file from the website metadata2go.com.

The DFRLab team could not download a video from Kremlin’s website to independently verify its metadata; at the time of writing, Kremlin.ru was no longer functional.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Facebook restricted the page of Zvezda TV, the Russian state-owned TV channel run by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Zvezda published a screenshot of a restriction notice from Facebook on its website, saying that the page is restricted from the platform for ninety days for “repeatedly publishing false information.”

StopFake, the Ukrainian fact-checking organization, had previously flagged two publications from Zvezda on Facebook as false information. The first article claimed that Russia had already suppressed the air-defense forces of Ukraine, while the second reported that Ukrainian military border guard units did not resist Russian forces.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

The commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as “Hemedti,” arrived in Moscow for bilateral talks with senior Russian government officials on February 23. According to the RSF Twitter account, Dagalo will act in his capacity as deputy head of the military-led ruling council, leading a delegation of ministers. Dagalo and the RSF led a military coup in Sudan last October, which has seen sustained violent protests over the last four months.

According to VOA News, Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Khalid Farah said, “This visit was scheduled ahead and has nothing whatsoever to do with what is happening in Ukraine.” Similarly, Dagalo tweeted in Arabic that he hopes the trip will “advance relations between Sudan and Russia to broader horizons and strengthen the existing cooperation” between the two countries.

The DFRLab previously uncovered a network of inauthentic accounts with links to the Internet Research Agency that worked to amplify pro-Russian content in Sudan, promoting Russia as a friend to the Sudanese people.

—Tessa Knight, DFRLab Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, issued a statement warning the media and online outlets against spreading “unverified information.” Roskomnadzor referred to Article 49 of Russia’s Mass Media Law, which obliges editors to verify the authenticity of their reporting prior to publishing it.

According to Roskomnadzor, “When preparing their materials and publications related to the conduct of a special operation in connection with the situation in the Lugansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, they are obliged to use information and data obtained from official Russian sources.”

Roskomnadzor also noted, “The dissemination of knowingly false information entails liability under Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of up to 5 million rubles.” The statement warned that failure to follow this law would result in “immediate blocking of such materials by Roskomnadzor in accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law No. 149-FZ, ‘On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.’”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

The official Telegram channel of Venezuela’s government-owned TV network posted a news update about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, written in alignment with Kremlin messaging. The post stated, “Russia launches special operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. Last Monday, after recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, President Vladimir Putin announced the dispatch of Russian troops with the aim of demilitarizing and denazifying the regions.” 

The post by the Venezuelan government TV network also aligned with President Nicolas Maduro’s February 22 Twitter broadcast, in which he stated, “The Bolivarian Revolution is with Russia…. We know that Putin is defending the right to peace and dignity of the Russian people and the peoples of the world and the world balance.” He continued, “Imperialism and NATO have tried to bury diplomatic agreements based on international law to disrespect Russia. Patiently, President Putin has raised the breach of these agreements and the danger that NATO deploys its weapons offensive, including its atomic weapons aimed at Russia.”

—Iria Puyosa, DFRLab Visiting Fellow, Ann Arbor, Michigan

The post Russian Hybrid War Report: Belarus joins conflict against Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But today, the evolving crises in their countries have exposed Washington’s lack of a clear and coherent policy for the region. Whether in Ethiopia’s year-old insurgency or amid Sudan’s military coup, the United States was ill-prepared to respond.

As a keen observer of the region through my regular contacts with officials in both Ethiopia and Sudan, and as a longtime colleague of Hamdok’s, I’ve seen this dynamic up close. By not being visible and sufficiently engaged, Washington could lose the capacity to influence policy and action to address the region’s many vexing problems. 

As the HoA undergoes dramatic changes, including sustained economic growth, a rising middle class, and a transition to stable democracy, Washington would be wise to rethink its approach to regional cooperation and use of sanctions—among other issues—and lay out a more inclusive, values-driven, and future-oriented strategy for the region. 

‘Either you’re with us or against us.’ 

During the Cold War, US engagement in the region centered on containing communist encroachment. In the ensuing years, US policy became static over several administrations and lacked strategy and coherence—not a good fit for a rapidly changing region. Then, shortly after the collapse of communism, the tragic fallout from the US intervention in Somalia stunted enthusiasm for engaging more actively in the region. 

American attention was only refocused after a string of terrorist attacks—including the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 11 attacks—and incidents of maritime piracy. The superseding objective became disrupting local Islamic extremists linked to a global jihadi network, and the full might and resources of the United States and its Western allies descended on the region. 

But combating terrorism and promoting trade held preeminence over all pretense of interest in addressing what Africans deemed to be more pressing priorities, such as combating drought and desertification, alleviating poverty, and promoting good governance. 

The implicit US mantra of “either you’re with us or against us” coaxed countries to choose sides in a conflict which did not offer neutrality as a position. In return for prioritizing counterterrorism and trade, countries were offered ample humanitarian aid, assistance for democratic governance, and enhanced foreign direct investment (FDI). As the war on terrorism intensified, the United States established Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002 as the region’s operational centerpiece.

In the absence of an overarching framework to understand and address complex regional priorities, the United States pursued singular agendas and responded to challenges and crises when and where they arose—preferring to focus on individual countries rather than adopting a comprehensive regional strategy. This broad agenda was deficient in depth and obligation, and as a result, long-term vision and regional diplomacy declined. 

Without clear direction and purpose, Washington was accused of abetting African despots bent on prolonging their power, either through election-rigging or violating term limits, in exchange for their cooperation in the war on terror. This dented US credibility and its ability to inspire popular policymaking and civic-minded diplomacy among the local populations. 

For example, the United States cozied up to the Meles Zenawi regime in Ethiopia and that of his successor—fully aware of their stained human-rights records and reprehensible governance. A 2018 mass uprising that drove out the US-backed Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front caught Washington flat-footed and short on credibility to influence the turn of events. Abiy Ahmed, the charismatic new leader installed in Addis Ababa, lost no time in seeking broad international support and championing Ethiopia’s interest. 

Why messaging matters

Another consequence of the lack of a clearly articulated US regional policy is the inadvertent message Washington conveys to both democratically installed governments and insurgents-in-waiting: Coming to power through free and fair elections matters—but other interests and priorities take precedence over democratic governance. 

In Ethiopia, for instance, US hesitancy to vigorously condemn a rebel assault on a democratically installed government and constitutional order was the oxygen that fueled the conflict there. The muted response by Washington and Brussels to the aggression emboldened the rebels to set their eyes on Addis Ababa, and the forcible ouster of Abiy became their end game. 

On a continent where political leaders and regional institutions have, at least officially, banned all forms of unconstitutional power grabs, the subdued US response to the unfolding rebel attempt was diplomatically unsettling and politically misguided. 

Ethiopia: The trouble with sanctions

Today, Ethiopia is mired in internal conflict with Tigrayan forces seeking to forcibly replace a democratically elected government. Faulting the United States for overt and covert assistance to one side over the other, both warring parties are snubbing Washington’s appeals and warnings at will. Daily pleas from the Pentagon and White House to cease fire and come to the negotiating table continue to fall on deaf ears. Meanwhile, the new White House special envoy to the region, Jeffrey Feltman, learned the hard way that being the US president’s emissary no longer carries the same sway it once did—and he announced this month that he’s stepping down.

While the war has quieted down somewhat as the rebels have withdrawn to Tigray, sporadic airstrikes and artillery exchanges continue to cause collateral damage. In what is nothing less than a diplomatic mea culpa, US President Joe Biden spoke directly to Abiy by phone on Monday. Biden expressed his concern about recent civilian deaths from the conflict and Abiy briefed him on efforts to address humanitarian assistance, human rights, and reconstruction. Such a gesture, though highly welcome, is unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict and events in the region, given the United States’ limited leverage.

Before expending sufficient diplomatic energy to reconcile the conflict, the United States has expelled the Abiy government from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for violating that trade pact’s prohibition on human-rights abuses—a clear case of punitive economic policy gone astray. 

First, many of the allegations have since been investigated by the United Nations (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, which accuse all sides of the conflict of committing them. Investigators also accused all sides of blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid and stated that they could not verify whether starvation was used as a weapon of war, as previously alleged by the UN and the US State Department. Investigators were barred from entering certain parts of Tigray and proposed further investigation into claims of forced starvation by government forces as well as gross human-rights violations in areas under rebel control. 

Second, the enforcement of AGOA violations has been selective and inconsistent. Past US administrations have been mute in the face of similar violations committed by other AGOA beneficiaries. This is why the haste to terminate Ethiopia’s eligibility before giving bilateral and multilateral diplomacy a sufficient chance to succeed has far-reaching consequences, including on US business and strategic interests in the region. 

The American-Ethiopian Public Affairs Committee estimates that termination potentially means a loss of some two hundred thousand jobs, with young factory workers—mostly poor young women and the heads of households—hard-hit, along with the mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises that supply and service those factories. An AGOA termination “would deal a serious blow to the welfare of millions of low-income workers,” Mamo Mihretu, Ethiopia’s chief trade negotiator, wrote in Foreign Policy.

Moreover, the impact will disproportionately fall on the poorest of the poor, who can least survive such a punitive action and who can least influence the war. In the longer term, this will significantly set back Ethiopia’s long-term trajectory to become the region’s manufacturing hub. 

Beyond Ethiopia, the termination would also disrupt countless livelihoods in Djibouti, Kenya, and Somaliland—neighbors whose ports Ethiopia uses for the import and export of raw materials and finished products. 

It is not lost on US policymakers that effective economic punishments must be smart and purposely targeted. Coupling trade agreements with imprecise political conditions is counterintuitive and achieves neither objective. Coming at a period of turbulence in the HoA, the termination of the trade deal throws into question the resourcefulness of US foreign policy to resolve political disputes through mature diplomatic insight before resorting to punitive measures. 

It is worth pointing out that smart sanctions and other economic tools can address specific policy goals and objectives. But sanctions should never be the first tool out of the box to resolve bilateral disputes; rather, they should be a diplomatic standby of last resort. Nor should they be applied uniformly in vastly different circumstances around the world. 

In the final analysis, hastily designed and poorly targeted economic penalties attest to the failure of diplomatic endeavors and portray a global power gradually losing influence over events and actors on the ground.

Sudan: Tuning out the US

The unfolding crisis in Sudan, where longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir was ousted in a 2019 revolution, is proving to be just as risky for the United States. 

The Trump administration’s endorsement of a debt-relief package helped the country financially recover, while the Biden administration helped strengthen the transition by supporting a hybrid Sovereignty Council. The West, along with Sudan’s Gulf neighbors, lavished Hamdok (who resigned on January 2) with promises of economic aid and FDI—on the condition, of course, that he implement painful structural reforms including removing food and fuel subsidies, harmonizing the exchange rate, cracking down on corruption, signing the Abraham Accords normalizing relations with Israel, and transitioning to elections in 2023. 

Legions of US, EU and other international officials—including Feltman, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, and US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power—descended on Khartoum for endless consultations. The pace and substance of the transition excited the world about the promise of a new Sudan. Meanwhile, the country’s political and military posture, guided mainly by the generals in the Sovereignty Council, pulled further away from traditional allies in the Horn and closer to Egypt. 

They conducted provocative military exercises with Cairo just miles away from Sudan’s borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea—a move that ratcheted up regional tensions at a time when Egypt and Ethiopia are feuding over a dam on the Nile River. The Trump administration’s botched attempt to mediate the Nile dispute was oddly led by the US Treasury at the exclusion of the State Department. The White House attempt to coerce Ethiopia into signing a three-way peace agreement caused the latter to withdraw from the negotiations and disqualified the United States as an honest broker. The collapsed mediation process was replaced by an African Union (AU) initiative focused on the pursuit of African solutions for African problems. 

The US strategy in Sudan is being defined without input from Ethiopia and Eritrea, consequential neighbors with a long history of influencing peace in Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan are presently in a low-intensity dispute over their long and unmarked border. This is not the first time such disputes have arisen, and both countries are committed to peacefully resolve the conflict through the Joint Border Commission. But, regrettably, neither party can mediate in each other’s internal matters. 

However, there is a bigger lesson here for Washington: Short-lived and frequently recurring rows among neighbors should not cause the United States to exclude regional influencers and neighborhood peacekeepers from its national and regional calculus, or from the list of countries to consult. 

Following a round of “successful” meetings with both sides of the Sovereignty Council, and hours after Feltman’s departure from Khartoum, the generals staged a successful coup d’état in late October. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power, arrested the prime minister, dissolved the council and suspended the coalition government. 

Working with limited intelligence on the ground and fewer friends in the region, Washington strategists were once again caught off guard. Condemned by the United States and its allies—with the exception of Egypt—and threatened with sanctions and other punitive measures, the generals continued to pay only lip service, claiming that the army had acted to prevent a civil war.

Within weeks of Hamdok’s reinstatement as prime minister and amid a deadlock with the generals over the appointment of a technocratic government, the differences in the end proved insurmountable. He finally resigned his position on January 2, and in a televised address, he told his people that Sudan’s very survival was questionable and that he had tried “to avoid the country from sliding into disaster” and wanted to “give a chance to another man or woman.” 

The voices of democracy continue to denounce any power-sharing with the military and call on it to immediately hand over power to a civilian government. For its part, the military on December 30 announced the reinstatement of the notorious national intelligence service—now rebranded as the General Intelligence Service. This can only mean more civil unrest on the streets in the coming days and the grim prospect of the use of deadly force to squelch it. 

Once again, escalating tensions in Khartoum expose a US Africa policy with limited diplomatic sway and few allies in the region who could be implored to mediate peace in Sudan. The United States must expend robust diplomatic energy to fully grasp the problems in their totality. It must also work with countries in the region in pursuit of a lasting solution. Barring that, the threat of sanctions and punitive economic measures in lieu of effective diplomacy will simply ring hollow and not give it the eminence and influence it seeks. 

Meet the new powers

The US goal of regaining commanding heights in foreign policy within the first one hundred days of Biden’s administration was an ambitious target. It is now evident that it takes more than an “America is back” mantra to reverse Washington’s eroded leadership position in the HoA.

Non-traditional partners, driven by geo-strategic interests and economic opportunism, have branded themselves as credible alternatives in the economic, political, and security spaces.

Gulf countries, plus Turkey, India, and Iran, view the Red Sea as a lifeline of global maritime logistics and seek to gain a military and commercial foothold in the region. Turkey, in particular, is quickly gaining new commercial and military traction. Distant powers such as China and Russia view the Red Sea and countries in the vicinity as an opening into the rest of Africa, a potential source of tomorrow’s raw materials, and a market for their goods and services. Supporting voices in global politics and establishing strategic military footholds are also a consideration.

In return, these new partners offer African countries financial and technical assistance, defense agreements, and access to their markets. But most important—and perhaps a key differentiator from the United States—is their policy of “non-interference” in their partners’ internal affairs. While these partners are not even a distant second to the United States in terms of foreign aid and technical, financial, and military superiority, they provide sufficient support to cause African countries to believe they have a choice of credible alternative partners. 

For instance, with thirty-nine African countries signed up, China’s dominance in infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative is a case in point. This is an alarming trend the United States cannot afford to ignore. 

After decades of alliance with the United States on regional and global matters—consider, for instance, Ethiopia’s UN Security Council vote to approve the 1991 Gulf War when the evidence wasn’t compelling—most African countries regrettably claim they’ve gained little in return for their longstanding ties to Washington. In 2021, the same Security Council discussed the Tigray conflict almost a dozen times, but the United States did not once support Ethiopia’s position. 

A forward-looking US-HoA engagement policy must embrace strategic competition and cooperation with new partners that have gained a new foothold in the region. As in the recent past, containing the advance of an adversary—China, in this case—is no longer a sufficient objective for engaging with the region. 

In a geo-strategic theater with competition from China and other entrants, it’s essential for the United States to assert its values and clearly communicate the interests it stands for (including the red lines in any relationship that cannot be crossed). Africans must know this with a degree of certainty, and well beyond the four-year election cycles. Consistency and predictability are imperative in international relations. 

Since early December, the US embassy in Addis Ababa, out of an abundance of caution following the collapse of Kabul, has flooded US citizens with alerts about the deteriorating security situation and encouraged them to leave the city. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China flew into the same Addis Ababa and reaffirmed his government’s support for the government and people of Ethiopia, while also discussing other regional interests. Then after a sweeping visit to several countries in the region in early January, Wang announced that China would name a new special envoy to the Horn of Africa, garnering an enthusiastic reception. This is the contrasting friendship and influence that the United States is missing out on. 

The way forward

A progressive reset of US relations with the continent is long overdue. A new Africa policy between partners, anchored in a framework of shared principles and a vision centered on economic, social, and environmental justice, as well as the democratic aspirations of citizens, would be a good place to begin. There should be relationships in which both parties recognize that each side has something to offer and gain. 

Compelling Africans to choose between the United States and new partners is a relic of the Cold War; twenty-first century Africans are capable of defining and articulating their interests and partners of choice. The Prosper Africa trade initiative is an example of a positive pivot away from the traditional donor-recipient model to bilaterally negotiated trade and investment pacts. It allows countries to benefit from their US ties and also uphold their right to cooperate with other partners. But for this to work, all sides must actively invest in building the capacity of African countries and institutions to negotiate from a position of strength and close the knowledge and information asymmetry. 

A defining feature of the HoA is its high degree of interconnectedness, both organically and by design. In 2020, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia agreed to form a new regional bloc—the Horn of Africa Cooperation, with other neighbors to possibly join later. A regional bloc within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—built on a convergence of economic and social interests as well as political, military, and security priorities—it deserves weighty consideration in Washington as part of its HoA engagement strategy. 

Going forward, a US-HoA policy must pay particular attention to the role of African institutions at various levels. It must focus on strengthening the capacity of African-led regional bodies such as the AU, IGAD, and the African Continental Free Trade Area. Such institutions serve to develop and enforce neighborhood consensus and standards of good governance while also collectively repelling assaults on democracy and constitutional orders. 

Biden’s remarks at the February 2021 AU summit struck the right foreign-policy chords, centering on democracy, human rights, and mutual prosperity. The administration has since declared a policy focus on counterterrorism and security, climate change, the pandemic, inclusive democracy and constitutional rule, and rebuilding post-COVID economies. But these lofty pronouncements must now be backed by resources and action on the ground. 

An Afrobarometer survey in 2019-20 showed that Africans prefer to follow the United States’ development model rather than China’s by 32 percent to 23 percent. Meanwhile, 68 percent of African citizens prefer democracy over other forms of government. Despite its convergence of values with Africans, the United States still lags behind the new partners. 

The Biden administration is well-placed to reverse past missteps and set HoA-US relations on the right course. But the fast-changing region will not wait for the United States to catch up; US rhetoric must be backed with action and signal a perceptible change of course, anchored on mutual trust and tilted toward shared values. 

Building loyal allies and gaining influence in the Horn will take time. Even then, the United States may not win over all the countries nor solve all the region’s problems. But either way, tomorrow’s US foreign policy must sufficiently exploit the HoA-US values convergence, a unique advantage not enjoyed by new entrants. This requires a shift from the transactional brand of yesterday and building on shared values and principles. 

Gabriel Negatu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center, managing director at Invest Afrique Inc., and a former Eastern Africa director general for the African Development Bank.

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Yet there’s no road map for what comes next.

Since the October 25 military coup that led to Hamdok’s detention, Sudan’s democratic transition has existed in name only. Upon seizing power, the military stacked state and federal institutions with generals and other allies, dismantled civilian committees aimed at seizing the former regime’s assets, reinstated the powers of the domestic intelligence services to arrest and detain, and, most significantly, ratcheted up pressure on pro-democracy protesters. Since the coup more than fifty unarmed protesters have been murdered, dozens have been raped, and hundreds more injured and illegally detained.

With billions of dollars in international assistance suspended and the country’s historic debt-relief process in serious doubt, the military succeeded in undoing two years’ worth of progress in a matter of weeks and shredded an internationally recognized political road map that would have seen civilians gradually assume greater executive authority in the lead-up to national elections in 2023.

Donor governments were quick to welcome the surprise reinstatement of Hamdok in late November, which seemingly resuscitated the political deal into which they’d invested so heavily and allowed the military to keep up the guise that Sudan’s was still a civilian-led transition. But lasting damage to both the transition and Hamdok’s personal standing—thanks to the deal’s seeming absolution of the military’s many crimes—had been done.

In retrospect, Hamdok faced an uphill battle from the outset. With his lack of political acumen and inability to harness and transform the raw power of the streets into a true agenda for bold action, the affable former United Nations bureaucrat became a political prisoner within a system he helped establish—caught between political forces unable to reach consensus on the way forward and a military regime increasingly bent on undermining the democratic process.

Either way, Sudan’s formal transition to democracy is over, even though its revolution lives on in the hearts of millions of peaceful pro-democracy protesters. Washington and its international partners have now lost the final pretense of what allowed them—for too long—to frame their engagement in terms of supporting a “civilian-led transitional government.”

Time to get tough

With no political agreement or civilian leader left to undermine, Washington and its allies should now pursue a more hardline approach toward the military that holds it accountable for the October coup and the deadly response to peaceful protests since then. That should mean sanctions against figures such as Yasser Mohammed Osman, the director of military intelligence; Jamal Abdelmagid, the director of the General Intelligence Service; and Abdarahim Daglo, the deputy commander of the notorious Rapid Support Forces. All played a direct role in orchestrating the deadly crackdown on demonstrators.

Beyond punitive measures, Washington needs to more actively shape an outcome that meets the demands of the Sudanese people, supports US strategic interests in the region, and reflects President Joe Biden’s own purported commitment to democracy and human rights. 

First, the Biden administration must announce a nominee to serve as US ambassador to Sudan—a promise made two years ago by then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo but still not fulfilled—and challenge the Senate to fast-track the confirmation process. For too long, Washington has done itself a great disservice by not sending an appropriately senior official to ensure international consensus on the ground and to navigate Sudan’s complicated political environment.

In the meantime, the administration should dispatch Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman, who has been largely underutilized in the current crisis, to Khartoum with a letter from Biden explaining the logic behind US sanctions and giving the generals a choice: Engage in a credible, transparent, and inclusive political dialogue to select a new prime minister; refrain from any further abuses against peaceful protesters; and return to full implementation of the 2019 Constitutional Declaration—or face a new wave of sanctions targeting regime leaders and their vast network of financial interests and military companies. 

But to be credible, this choice must have the backing of Sudan’s other international partners, from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to Cairo and Ankara.

Lastly, Washington must move beyond tired bromides claiming to “stand with the people of Sudan” and unabashedly throw its weight behind the country’s pro-democracy movement in tangible and meaningful ways that will begin to swing the balance of power more in the protesters’ favor. That involves funneling some of the currently frozen financial assistance to resistance committees and neighborhood committees to help them better organize, communicate, and develop their own political platform—to become a more formal part of the political process. 

Ultimately, Sudan’s people will decide what the road ahead looks like. But Washington can give them a fighting chance by seeing this moment of peril for what it is: an opportunity to rebalance its approach, recommit to the fundamental ideals of the revolution, and expose the military for what it has always been—not a partner in politics or a defender of the revolution, but a malign force bent on its own wealth and survival at the expense of the country’s well-being.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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Al-Mahdi dissected the evolving political crisis in her country at an event hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on Monday. She said she heard the news of the agreement on television before meeting with Hamdok and other members of his cabinet Monday to express her surprise and disagreement. In the end, all except five of the ministers who attended the meeting submitted their resignations, al-Madhi told the Atlantic Council.

In doing so, they reminded Hamdok that “the democratic transition is inevitable,” Mahdi recounted.

Kholood Khair, managing partner of Khartoum-based think tank Insight Strategy Partners, and Mohanad Hashim, former director of content for Sudan’s national radio and TV broadcaster, also joined in to share their perspectives on how Sudan’s protest movement is reacting to the recent developments, as well as to offer advice on how the United States and western allies can better support the pro-democracy movement.

Below are more highlights from the event, which was moderated by Africa Center nonresident senior fellow Cameron Hudson, including an update on pro-democracy protests and al-Mahdi’s message to international supporters.

The road to democracy

• Sunday’s agreement “didn’t take into consideration” serious developments on the ground in Sudan, such as the escalation of violence by authorities at street protests, said al-Mahdi. On November 17, for example, security forces killed at least fifteen people. She added that the agreement marked a “setback in trust” specifically from Sudanese youth—who are driving the pro-democracy movement and now have more trust in the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) political coalition, which refused to recognize the deal.

• Khair added that the “agreement itself is not that significant” because it “doesn’t really mention the ‘how’s’ or the timeframes” for the promised political transition, making it “difficult to implement.”

• Khair, meanwhile, explained that although the agreement met the international community’s demands, the street protesters were left unsatisfied. “The deal itself is kind of unstable,” she said. “The international community needs to get behind the street or get out of its way.”

• Hashim added that the base which provided the prime minister legitimacy “has just walked away” from him because of the deal. “They view that this… is a continuation” of the prior 2019 coup. “Hamdok might have miscalculated this big time,” he said.

Call for back-up

• Al-Mahdi said international support for the people of Sudan is “overwhelming,” particularly because partners were “well-prepared by the first coup attempt” in September. Even countries she suspected “wanted to support the coup”—such as Egypt and Israel—didn’t do so outwardly.

• The White House and US Congress seemed united in “one line in support of the revolution of Sudan and the transition,” al-Mahdi said, praising the United States for its support. That support, she said, went beyond mere words and extended to key meetings between US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman and Sudanese leaders.

• Hashim argued that US support “seemingly is cautious, perhaps even timid,” pointing to the fact that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in the region last week but didn’t visit. “There hasn’t been a clear US policy for Sudan,” he said.

• But “we need for the United States to continue with us,” al-Mahdi urged, and the United States must tell the military—“while not frightening them”—that it “cannot mess with political parties” because it would pose a “serious threat to democratic transformation” in Sudan.

What’s to come

• Al-Mahdi explained that the coup “was not really, in essence, a surprise” and that she had a sense it could take place “at any moment since the early months of 2020.” But it was still a crime: “All the violators should be put into jail and…condemned,” she said.

• In order to secure this transition period, the FFC should work with the military to clarify its role to protect the state and constitution and at the same time “stop the killing in the street.” And after the first post-coup election, it’ll be important for “everyone to go and abide by their role as agreed [upon] by everybody” to build a strong state and continue Sudan’s democratic transition, al-Mahdi said.

Katherine Walla is the assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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By Monday morning, a state of emergency had been imposed, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was detained, and critical parts of the country’s transitional constitution were suspended.

Since June, Hamdok, a civilian technocrat, had been warning about exactly this turn of events. In perhaps its most transparent act of its takeover, the military had even signaled to observers at home and abroad that a coup d’état remained a lifeline of last resort, as pressure mounted on the military to transfer its chairmanship of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council to civilian leadership. That message came in the form of a foiled coup attempt earlier this month which many observers viewed as a trial balloon to test local and international reaction.

The response could not have been more clear: International envoys descended on Khartoum, warning of aid suspensions, targeted sanctions, and delays in international assistance on critical needs such as debt relief.

The public’s response was equally swift and clear. More than one million pro-democracy protesters took to the streets across Sudan. Demand for civilian rule hasn’t dimmed since 2019. If anything, military efforts to blame civilian leaders for the slow implementation of reforms and sclerotic economic progress have failed—instead fueling demand for democratic governance as the only way out of the country’s morass.

The only surprise from this week’s development is the timing—coming just hours after Sudan’s military head of state assured US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman that he remained committed to the core tenets of the transition to civilian rule, and was prepared to work cooperatively with Sudan’s fractious political parties to advance the most controversial and unimplemented aspects of the transitional charter.

That promise unraveled quickly. 

New realities in Africa

Few could argue the United States was insufficiently engaged in Sudan, or that it hadn’t brought its highest-level actors to bear on the events leading up to the coup. Between multiple visits from Feltman and high-level calls from both National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Washington has rarely been as coordinated and consistent in its message as it has been with Khartoum.

Instead, this may reflect a new era for US diplomacy in Africa—one in which the United States is one of many powerful actors vying for influence to shape political outcomes. In a context where Washington’s voice is diluted amid competing powers, Sudan has emerged as the ultimate battleground. Although Sudan has always sat at a strategic crossroads, the revolution has re-shuffled the political deck in the country, and opportunity has emerged for new global players eager to exploit more than just the country’s rich gold deposits or strategic location.

Egypt has long looked paternalistically at Sudan, and while its official statements have called for calm, no one expects Cairo to demand a restoration of civilian rule or adherence to the transitional constitution considering the circumstances of General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s own rise to power. Similarly, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have long seen Sudan as a national-security imperative—not only as a vital security partner across the Red Sea, but as a principal source of the livestock and grain that those desert societies demand in abundance. 

Though late to the party, Russia has shrewdly engaged Sudanese security officials through negotiations over a naval basing agreement and growing informal ties between Sudan’s notorious Rapid Support Forces militia and the Russian mercenary group Wagner. Underpinning Moscow’s engagement has been a sustained and sophisticated information campaign—which has provoked three Facebook takedown actions so far—intended to sow doubt in the minds of Sudan’s youth over the efficacy of civilian rule.

The not-so-hidden hand of Turkey, Qatar, and Kuwait—all in search of bigger military contracts, investment opportunities, or political leverage against larger Gulf states—has only widened the options available to Sudanese leaders searching for a lifeline.

All these influences now explain the flurry of phone calls to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others from US officials seeking guarantees that these countries’ leaders gave no nod to the military’s move. While US influence in Sudan may be diluted, there still seems to be hope that Washington can impress upon backers of factions among Khartoum’s power players that Sudan won’t know stability—and that their interests there will remain at risk—as long as popular demands for democratic rule remain unmet.

But it feels like misplaced hope to expect genuine assistance from countries that have never hidden their preference for like-minded military rulers and which likely fear the domestic consequences of civilians successfully overthrowing a military in the Arab world. Even more misplaced would be the expectation that the streets of Khartoum would accept a deal bearing Riyadh or Abu Dhabi’s fingerprints.

Time to get tough

After the West failed to prevent the seemingly inevitable coup last week, the prospects for reversing it now appear even more dim.

That’s because the military, which was fully aware of the consequences of its takeover, believes it has chosen the only path available to ensure its own security. Knowing the United States would suspend its $700 million financial assistance program—the vast majority of which was going to subsidize incomes and basic foodstuffs for Sudan’s poorest—it has once again cravenly put its own survival above that of its people.

For the United States and its partners, this black eye will not quickly fade and could well create lasting ripple effects across the region. If hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid and intensive diplomatic engagement can’t convince Sudan’s military to stay the democratic course, what chance does Washington have in countries like Guinea, Mali, or Chad—where Western diplomats are also pushing back against military takeovers in favor of civilian regimes?

That’s why it’s critical that Washington rejects any other deal among international elites that relieves the growing near-term pressure, but which ultimately betrays the demands of the millions of Sudanese calling for genuine change. While it has a painful history of thirty years of sanctions in Sudan, the United States must seriously consider targeted measures against military leaders and their political allies (and even external actors) that have aided the takeover and undermined civilian rule.

The United States must also redouble its efforts to support Sudan’s vibrant civil society groups, which have become virtually the last hope for the country’s revolution, by funneling money to sustain their work and skirt the military’s insidious control of the internet.

Another attention-grabbing move would be a US State Department designation of the country’s Rapid Support Forces—a paramilitary force responsible for the arrests and torture of several prominent politicians and activists this week—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, a precedent set when the Trump administration designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Further isolating and discrediting Sudan’s ultimate bad actor would show solidarity with the streets and would help remove a perennial spoiler from the country’s political future.

Lastly (and as odious as it may be), the United States must remain open to the possibility of facilitating a soft landing for military leaders in exchange for their exit from the political and economic space they control. While they clearly can’t imagine a Sudan they don’t totally control, Sudan’s military brass likely also can’t imagine a future for themselves in which the threat of accountability hangs over them as it does now. Legislation absolving military leaders of past crimes and granting them immunity is a betrayal to Sudan’s many victims of atrocity and oppression, to say nothing of the blow it levels against international criminal justice. But it may be required to send the army back to the barracks.

As Sudan rests on a knife’s edge, there are no simple solutions. But as the United States contemplates a way forward, it should learn from hindsight—namely, that if two years of transition hasn’t changed the military’s fundamental nature, nor will two more years of shared governance with civilians. 

US policy must recognize that Sudan’s military is bent on its own survival above all else. The military fooled Washington once—and cannot be allowed to do so again.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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On Monday, Sudan’s military arrested the country’s civilian leaders—including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok—in an apparent coup that’s likely to stymie the country’s already-slow progress toward political reform. The move comes just weeks after a failed takeover attempt by loyalists to ex-dictator Omar al-Bashir and amid repeated warnings that tensions between Sudan’s civilian and military leaders were reaching their breaking point. What’s next for Sudan and the global partners in its state-building project? Our experts weigh in.

• Cameron Hudson (@_hudsonc): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan

• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Director of the Africa Center

• Will Wechsler (@WillWechsler): Director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs

Out of balance

• The delicate balancing act of Sudan’s political transition had “hit a wall” lately, Cameron tells us. And the writing for the coup was on that wall. For months, the transitional governing structure—split between the civilian leaders who helped topple Bashir in 2019 and Sudan’s powerful security services—had been unraveling, with the military particularly fearful of losing its grip on power.

• “Civilian leaders had essentially reached the limits of their ability to reform the political and economic space without the military giving an inch,” Cameron adds.

• Now, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken charge, dissolving that structure and declaring a state of emergency. The military says it will install a new technocratic government until the country holds elections in July 2023. Which makes Rama wonder: “Who will run? A soldier? A Sudanese Sisi?” referring to the Egyptian strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 

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Money matters

• As Sudan’s economy spiraled in recent weeks—inflation, for instance, has topped 400 percent—the military seized the moment to “accuse the government of ignoring the people’s needs,” Rama notes.

• While foreign aid has helped Sudan muddle along, Cameron adds, “a full-fledged recovery… was never going to be achieved without the military relinquishing its control over the major revenue-generating parts of the economy,” from port operations to gold mining to livestock exports.

• As for the Western countries expressing shock and dismay at the upheaval in Sudan, Rama recommends they look in the mirror, considering the strictures that came with Sudan’s International Monetary Fund loans in recent years. “On the economic front, they should perhaps have supported this government rather than suffocating it with tough austerity measures that ended up plunging the population into despair and offering the military the ideal pretext they wanted to pull off this coup,” she tells us.  

• And even tougher economic times are likely ahead as a result of the coup, Cameron predicts, since “international assistance will be quickly suspended, including Sudan’s debt-relief process” with the IMF.

Regional rumblings

• The military’s power grab will reverberate far beyond Sudan, Will says. Most regional powers “with interests in Sudan have never fully shared Washington’s commitment to a democratic transition,” he notes, and “some neighbors will undoubtedly quietly welcome the coup and its supposed promise of greater stability” in a country that has now suffered some sixteen coup attempts since 1956.

• It also throws into question the country’s much-vaunted normalization with Israel, Will adds. Sudanese Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari met with Israeli officials on the margins of our N7 Conference earlier this month, “the first multilateral gathering between Israel and the six Arab states that have announced normalizations,” Will points out. 

• But a formal normalization ceremony, for which the Biden administration had negotiated a substantial US aid package for Sudan, had been waylaid by scheduling problems, Will says. And now he thinks it won’t happen “anytime soon,” particularly since US law prevents most kinds of foreign assistance following a coup. The State Department announced Monday that it was halting $750 million in aid.

• Meanwhile, Cameron advises against any expectations that the West can push back against the coup. In fact, he says, just hours before the coup Burhan told Jeffrey Feltman, the US special envoy to the Horn of Africa, that he’d stay committed to civilian rule. “The military took this decision knowing full well the likely consequences of their actions,” Cameron explains. “So while the [international] condemnation will be quick and unanimous, it is unlikely to be sufficient to reverse this setback.”

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Just months after the April 2019 ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir, Hamdok traveled to Washington—the first Sudanese head of government to be welcomed by US officials since 1985—where he appeared at the Atlantic Council.

In an address and subsequent discussion with nonresident senior fellow Cameron Hudson, a hopeful Hamdok outlined his country’s challenging transition from dictatorship.

Perhaps most striking was his statement about the delicate governing structure between the civilian leaders who helped topple Bashir and the country’s powerful military. While praising the “homegrown” nature of the compromise, Hamdok also warned that any backsliding could lead to “a failed state.”

“It will be Yemen. It will be Libya. It will be Syria. It will be all those,” he warned.

Watch the full video:

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In recent weeks, the United States and its European allies have launched a diplomatic campaign to convince Ethiopia’s once-venerated prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, to relent in his campaign to vanquish militarily his greatest political threat in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). I once feared the onset of a bloody struggle for control over Tigray that would pit near-equally matched foes against each other in something approximating conventional, interstate war. But what has instead emerged is a widespread TPLF insurgency that could drag on and take as many lives through deprivation as it does through combat.

The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies. Indeed, it is this possible unintended consequence of Abiy’s “law and order operation” in Tigray that could well do the most extensive damage in the region. In contrast to the conflict in Tigray, however, it is not too late for the United States and its allies in the region and beyond to do something to prevent a border war that would amount to a historic strategic blunder.

The seeds of this potential calamity were planted at the start of the last century when the border between Ethiopia and Sudan was first agreed to, though never formally demarcated, by modern Ethiopia’s founding father, Emperor Menelik II, during the British-Sudanese condominium. Since 1993, a patch of agricultural land on the Sudanese side of the border, referred to as the al-Fashqa Triangle, has been occupied by Amhara farmers. Many of them were relocated there by the Sudanese government in recognition of historic claims to the area by this powerful minority group. Since 2008, a de-facto agreement has existed whereby Ethiopia has acknowledged the historic legal boundary putting al-Fashqa inside Sudan, while Sudan has granted Amhara farmers continued rights to cultivate the land. Efforts to definitively demarcate the border have been stalled since the last meeting of an ad-hoc border commission last year, but Sudan’s designs on the region have never abated. Indeed, as recently as August 2020, in remarks by the head of the Sudanese army and chairman of the transitional government’s Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to the Army General Command, he predicted that they would “raise the flag of Sudan above al-Fashqa… and not waste one inch of the homeland.”

What has broken that decade-plus status quo is the onset of conflict in Tigray and a series of strategic and tactical calculations by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Unlike many outsiders, senior-level Sudanese officials claim not to have been surprised by the brutal assault by the TPLF on the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) Northern Command outpost in Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, on the night of November 4. Only a week prior, a delegation led by the deputy head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, General Mohammed “Hemedti” Dagalo, met with Abiy in Addis, where the restive Tigray region, mounting border tensions, and the stalemated negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) were all reportedly topics of discussion.

More surprising to the Sudanese was the Ethiopian government’s near-immediate need for supplementary troops—pulled in from Ethiopian deployments in Somalia and, most notably, the al-Fashqa Triangle—to respond to the TPLF attack in Mekelle. The subsequent entry into the Tigray conflict of Eritrean forces and Amhara state militias further indicated that the ENDF was unable to subdue the TPLF uprising on its own and was operating from a greater position of relative weakness than was perhaps anticipated. 

By December, as primarily SAF forces gathered along the Sudanese side of the border to monitor the crossing of Tigrayan refugees and possible retreating TPLF forces, SAF and ENDF troops found themselves in closer proximity than ever before—increasing the risk of clashes. Multiple ENDF surprise assaults on SAF army officers prompted SAF forces to move in on the night of December 29. In that incursion, SAF forces reportedly destroyed Ethiopian army outposts and administrative centers while also displacing Amhara farmers and destroying crops in their successful bid to reclaim the entirety of the al-Fashqa Triangle. 

Sudan has presented its tactical decision as a legitimate response in light of the ENDF’s own unprovoked incursions against Sudanese patrols and Khartoum’s historic and legal claims to the area. But there is no question that the SAF, which has witnessed its traditional importance in Sudan’s body politic decline substantially under the country’s civilian-led transitional government, see in their defense of Sudan’s territorial integrity an opportunity to once again assert its primacy as the protector of the Sudanese state. 

It is also true that in its effort to change facts on the ground, whether justified or not, the SAF has now further aggravated an inherently unstable situation in the region and may have disrupted the delicate balance among security forces inside Sudan that has kept the transition there on track.

As bellicose rhetoric by both sides has increased in recent weeks, Khartoum and Addis have come to frame the threat of territorial loss in national-security and even existential terms—similar in certain respects to how each side has recently described the contentious and protracted GERD talks. Sudan’s ambassador to Ethiopia was recently recalled to Khartoum, and various peace envoys and proposed mediators from the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, South Sudan, and the African Union (AU) have all largely seen their willingness to help the parties achieve a negotiated solution rebuffed. Even Eritrea, whose peace agreement with Ethiopia has emerged as more of a mutual-security pact, tried unconvincingly to paint itself as a peacemaker in a letter last week from President Isaias Afwerki to Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Sudan’s newly appointed foreign minister, Mariam al Saddig, suggested in late February that Sudan would be open to talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But that regional body, currently chaired by Hamdok and historically controlled by Ethiopia, has not yet offered its good offices and likely lacks the independence to offer impartial mediation.

In the absence of concerted external mediation, both sides risk turning their cold war much hotter. And with such intertwined politics and long histories, both sides have the points of leverage to do it. Ethiopia currently supplies the totality of troops (more than five thousand) to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Abyei, the highly contested region along the Sudan-South Sudan border that remains at the heart of the tensions between those two countries. Concerns abound that Ethiopia could withdraw those troops, potentially forcing the SAF to fill a security vacuum there that could well spark renewed conflict with Juba. There are also worries that Sudan could unilaterally expel those forces out of fear that Ethiopia could use these forces as a fifth column in the event of a sustained outbreak of violence along its border—opening a new front against Sudan and vastly expanding their zone of conflict. Addis, for its part, is right to fear Khartoum’s ability to re-arm and re-supply TPLF rebels should Sudan wish to open its own additional front in a border conflict.

Adding to the volatility has been an influx of allied armies and militias into the border zone between Sudan and Ethiopia. On the Ethiopian side, it is not just the ENDF, but also Amhara militias and Eritrean Defense Forces. Similarly, on the Sudanese side of the border, the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have also been identified in increasingly large numbers.

Given the lack of interoperability among many of these forces, coupled with the fact that the vast majority of this mobilization is occurring in a narrow band along the border that is only a few kilometers wide, the chances are high that the slightest misstep or miscalculation could result in a large-scale outbreak of violence and a rapid escalation among three national armies and many state and national militias. This is particularly true inside Sudan, where the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have even turned on each other in the past year in areas like Darfur and Kordofan when they have been deployed in close proximity.

Absent some kind of international monitoring, there are simply too many well-armed forces in too close proximity with too little experience working with each other to discount the risk of a cataclysmic conflict breaking out.  

The tense standoff has bred rumors that additional outside forces could light the spark that ignites that conflict. Egypt, which has grown increasingly frustrated with the state of GERD negotiations, is often identified as a prime potential instigator. But while there is no question that Egypt has sought to use its historic ties to Sudan to produce a GERD outcome to its liking, Egyptian officials privately express a clear-eyed understanding that an Ethiopia wracked by internal war and interstate conflict will be incapable of focusing on, let alone reaching, a binding political and technical agreement on the demanding issues that the GERD presents. 

So where do we go from here? It seems unlikely that ad-hoc bilateral demands for de-escalation and withdrawal from contested areas will be sufficient at this stage. Late last month, AU Commission Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat dispatched retired Mauritanian diplomat Mohamed Lebatt to Addis and Khartoum to probe each side’s willingness to accept outside meditation on the brewing border conflict. While no progress was made, it is a conversation worth building on.

Coordinated, high-level outside mediation is urgently required to avert the potentially dire consequences of a conflict for not just the civilian populations in the border area, but also the countries at the center of the dispute and the Horn of Africa as a whole. Sudan recently proposed outside mediation for the final phase of the GERD negotiations that would include the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union. Some sponsorship of border mediation by this grouping—under the leadership of an eminent, empowered figure—is worth pursuing given the substantial risks to international peace and security and the potential for the parties’ largest donors to bring financial leverage to efforts to reach a resolution.

While all these disputes are linked, there is no single process, individual, or institution that will be able to untangle the overlapping and complicated politics of the competing conflicts. What is essential is coordination. Any process that can be put in place to help with the de-escalation of war in Tigray should be kept on its own track. So too with the GERD. And so too with a process for unwinding the military buildup and tensions on the border, which should be narrowly defined and time-limited so as not to be exploited as a potential leverage point in any other mediation processes. But these must all be coordinated by a central Contact Group with the power, leverage, and legitimacy to advance options for resolution and enforce outcomes that contribute to overall peace.

Such processes must be jumpstarted now to avoid a downward spiral, and there are several immediate steps that Washington can take to do just that. In a fortunate coincidence, the United States took up the presidency of the UN Security Council in March. The newly installed US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, should prioritize a special session of the Security Council to discuss the manifold crises emerging in the Horn of Africa, with added attention to the still-unfolding conflict in Tigray and the stalemated GERD talks. Given the many competing interests at play in the Horn from all manner of external powers, the session should include discussion of an International Contact Group that can promote dialogue and transparency and ensure that potential spoilers remain in the tent rather than outside of it.

To support and complement this effort, the United States should also appoint a Horn of Africa envoy who is capable of both setting the policy agenda in Washington and corralling leaders in Europe and the region in the near term. In the long run, an envoy can only succeed if he or she is equipped with a clear set of policy objectives and the tools to advance them. In contrast to its approach in the Great Lakes or Sahel regions, Washington has for too long viewed the countries in the promising but volatile Horn of Africa in a vacuum or else simply provided wide berth to the area’s anchor state, Ethiopia, to project its power and influence to police regional disputes. With Addis having lost the ability to play that role any longer, the burden has shifted to Washington to become more actively involved in protecting its interests in the region. 

That process promises to be complicated and messy. But preventing a war is surely more attractive an enterprise than ending one.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

The post The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In his remarks, Gov. Beasley briefed participants on the humanitarian situation in the Horn and the latest from his conversations with regional leaders. He placed considerable weight on the developments in Ethiopia, where his visit facilitated an initial agreement on humanitarian access. This issue of access remained a point of interest for participants, representing the US government, diplomatic community, and humanitarian NGOs. Gov. Beasley also reflected on Sudan’s progress and the continued humanitarian need in South Sudan.

Looking ahead, Beasley underscored that the WFP has helped get the ball rolling but that more progress will be needed, toward which the United States and others can play a constructive role.

Event Recap Jan 28, 2021

Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister provides humanitarian update

By Africa Center

On Thursday, January 28, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, for a wide-ranging update on the security and humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

Sudan’s outgoing state minister of foreign affairs reflects on regional issues

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Omer Gamereldin Ismail, the outgoing Sudanese state minister of foreign affairs, for a discussion on key regional and bilateral issues for Sudan.

Africa Conflict

The post WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Responding to questions, the Minister outlined Sudan’s position on issues including the status of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), tensions on the border with Ethiopia and the need to deescalate the situation in Tigray, and the security environment in Darfur. Particular interest was also given to the role the United States and other friends of Sudan could play in contributing to reform efforts.

Hudson closed by reflecting that Sudan remains at the heart of both the opportunities and challenges facing the Horn of Africa, but that he is reassured that US stakeholders, including those in attendance, are committed to seeing Sudan succeed.

Event Recap Jan 28, 2021

Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister provides humanitarian update

By Africa Center

On Thursday, January 28, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, for a wide-ranging update on the security and humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

Sudan’s outgoing state minister of foreign affairs reflects on regional issues

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Omer Gamereldin Ismail, the outgoing Sudanese state minister of foreign affairs, for a discussion on key regional and bilateral issues for Sudan.

Africa Conflict

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The Africa Center’s Coronavirus: Africa page documented the early impact of the pandemic, and our virtual convenings with the leadership of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Food Programme highlighted the early successes and agency of African stakeholders in combatting the crisis. The likelihood of greater pan-African collaboration in the wake of COVID-19 was a key finding of the Center’s report on great power competition in Africa in the post-COVID landscape. That report was the result of a newly-launched collaboration with the Policy Center for the New South, which seeks to explore and reframe perceptions of Africa through a series of paired research papers written from both North and South lenses.

COVID-19 did not slow the pace of political developments in Africa this year. Sudan’s transitional government achieved a watershed when the US State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) designation was finally lifted and a massive aid package was bestowed on the nation in exchange for normalization of relations between Khartoum and Tel Aviv. The Africa Center’s convenings and analysis on this topic provided thought leadership across the political spectrum that helped steward the SST lifting to a successful conclusion. The Center’s robust analysis of the conflict in northern Ethiopia between the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and members of the former authoritarian regime helped to shape perceptions of the dispute both regionally and in Washington, DC.

Looking ahead, it’s clear that in 2021 the new Biden administration will be challenged by the need to repair and reinvigorate key bilateral relationships on the continent (including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa), and there is a major question mark over how many of the former administration’s initiatives will be abandoned. Prosper Africa’s launch was problematic, but in concert with the launch of the new US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its equity capability, it signaled a concrete shift in US priorities to “trade, not aid” that was long overdue. The Africa Center marked that transition with a summit-level conference hosted in cooperation with the DFC, which laid out the United States’ all-of-government approach to Africa policy and, importantly, underscored both the strong bipartisan support for Prosper Africa’s expanded toolkit and the essential role of African development finance institutions in the process.

An event under the auspices of our new Afro-Century Initiative—which unites a coalition of African development finance institutions in an effort to forge a more authentic, optimistic narrative on Africa—capped the Center’s year of programming. An esteemed panel of economists and business leaders offered the following observations and predictions for what 2021 has in store for Africa’s economies:   

What to watch for in 2021:

• African markets have an advantage in 2021 and beyond, says Renaissance Capital’s Global Chief Economist Charlie Robertson, because the continent has been the least hurt by COVID-19 relative to other regions (a story similar to that of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis). Consequently, low interest rates in the West could push more institutional investors to chase high yields in Africa by increasing portfolio exposure in African fixed income and equities.

• Getting Africa to “catch up” is the wrong framing, says AfroChampions Co-Founder Edem Adzogenu. To him, the attitude must rather be: “can you turn in a completely different direction and perfect another model that passes the others but also learns from them.”

• The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can be a “game-changer,” says the Africa Finance Corporation’s Chief Economist Rita Babihuga-Nsanze, but there is still a lot of work that needs to be done to build an enabling environment, especially when it comes to infrastructure.

• While China will remain a key financing partner, the scaling back of Belt and Road Initiative lending will provide space for new international lenders and other financial institutions to support the continent’s growth ambitions, says Standard Chartered Bank’s Chief Economist for Africa Razia Khan. According to Babihuga-Nsanze, African development finance institutions can play a critical role in closing the financing gap that emerges.

• Chinese growth—not lending—is going to lift the whole continent, says Robertson, but African countries need to invest in the right infrastructure. China’s GDP is likely to grow about $2.3 trillion next year and another $2.3 trillion the year after: equaling the size of the entire African market. This growth could help drive commodity price increases and create a lever for wealth creation in Africa, lifting the whole continent. Yet, key to cashing in on this Chinese growth will be Africa’s ability to build infrastructure to enable it, while forgoing projects that do not.

• Value addition and industrialization are two critical trends, according to Babihuga-Nsanze. The post-COVID reset will provide a push to shore up local supply chains and double down on the building of local industrial parks, which can promote investment.

• Ghana is a market set for growth, Khan and Robertson agree. But Nigeria must make good on its diversification promises, while South Africa’s political reforms will have investors watching.  

• Observers are missing the huge SME-driven informal sector, notes Adzogenu, as well as the huge creatives space. For African Development Bank Chief Economist and Vice President Rabah Arezki, the bottom-up wave of fintech and innovation will transform the continent, including in rural areas where growing digitization could be critical for improved agriculture. To Africa Center Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby, digitization is the single most significant trend coming out of 2020 for Africa.

The last word:

• “For a continent that has the youngest population, [Africa] should be the center of the world. I mean this should be the center for the freshest ideas for innovation and everything, and the center for which people can come and bring their ideas to bring growth that will benefit the entire world as well.” –Edem Adzogenu, AfroChampions

Explore highlights from the Africa Center’s year of programming

New Atlanticist Oct 16, 2020

The US government makes its big push for investment in Africa

By David A. Wemer

Buoyed by bipartisan commitment and a new government agency, the United States has taken new and significant steps to help drive investment in Africa, strengthen the region’s dynamic economies, create lucrative opportunities for US and African businesses, and advance US foreign-policy goals in the region.

Africa Future of Work

New Atlanticist Jun 18, 2020

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta says his country needs ‘fiscal space’ amid the COVID-19 crisis

By Larry Luxner

“Coronavirus is mainly a health issue, and our key focus is ensuring that we keep our people safe,” Kenyatta said. “But this is also an economic crisis because it has resulted in some key sectors hugely affected by lockdowns. We were forced to close our airspace, which affected tourism, a very critical part of our economy.”

Africa Coronavirus

Report Nov 30, 2020

African agency in the new Cold War: Traditional power competition in the post-COVID-19 African landscape

By Bronwyn Bruton

In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020

Reducing Africa’s infrastructure deficit: An interview with AFC President & CEO Samaila Zubairu

By Africa Center

The Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), a pan-African development finance institution, has been developing and financing infrastructure, natural resources, and industrial assets to increase economic prosperity and growth across the continent since 2007. Watch Samaila Zubairu, president and chief executive officer of the Africa Finance Corporation, join Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby for an interview to discuss AFC’s investment philosophy, innovation, and future growth, along with the critical role of African development finance institutions in improving economic prosperity.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 15, 2020

An interview with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy

By Africa Center

US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador Tibor Nagy, joins Atlantic Council Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton to discuss bipartisan support for increased US trade and investment in African countries.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020

Financing African trade and development: An interview with TDB Group President & CEO Admassu Tadesse

By Africa Center

The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB) has been financing trade and development projects and promoting economic integration and prosperity in the region since 1985. Watch an interview below between Mr. Admassu Tadesse, president and chief executive officer of TDB Group and Ms. Aubrey Hruby, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Mr. Tadesse covers what makes TDB unique and different, the role African development finance institutions (DFIs) play in returning the African continent to economic growth post-COVID, how TDB can interface with US investors, and ways DFIs can be catalytic in increasing capital flows to African markets.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist May 8, 2020

WFP’s David Beasley warns of dire famines in Africa, Mideast if COVID-19 supply chains damage continues

By Larry Luxner

Up to 300,000 people could starve to death every day if the COVID-19 pandemic ruptures global food supply chains—even more than the roughly 275,000 people who have died of the disease worldwide so far.

Coronavirus International Markets

AfricaSource Nov 13, 2020

Calls for negotiation are driving Ethiopia deeper into war

By Bronwyn Bruton

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Prize for his peacemaking with Eritrea, has confounded allies by resisting all attempts to dampen the ongoing military confrontation with a powerful northern insurgent group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF effectively controlled the Ethiopian government from 1991 until February 2018, when it was driven […]

Africa Conflict

New Atlanticist Apr 29, 2020

Africa still sees a massive pandemic in its future, but partnerships may lessen blow

By Katherine Walla

With an uncertain future for the pandemic that lies ahead, the Africa CDC is encouraging pivotal partnerships to act quickly to secure Africa amid haphazardly understood policies, little access to water and sanitation, and resource constraints.

Africa Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020

Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis

By David A. Wemer

A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Jul 10, 2020

Dr. Dambisa Moyo, panel reinvigorate debate on a Marshall Plan for Africa

By Africa Center

On Friday, July 10, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on whether the time has come for a Marshall Plan for Africa. The panel featured Global Economist and Author Dr. Dambisa Moyo, former US Congressman Dr. David Brat, and Africa Center Senior Fellow Ms. Aubrey Hruby. The virtual conversation was moderated by Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu, with opening and concluding remarks given by the Center’s Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton.

Africa Corruption

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Explore the program

The post African outlook 2021: The Africa Center reflects on 2020 and looks ahead appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Leaving aside for a moment the last-ditch effort by the Trump Administration to exploit Sudan’s efforts to remove the terror designation to expand its own Middle East peace plan, the Administration should be acknowledged for betting on the prospects of democratic transition in Sudan. From the early days of the transition, Washington and many other capitals were skeptical that the civilian half of the transitional government was strong enough to stay the course and to keep at bay revanchist forces within the security sector. Equally questionable was the prospect that Sudan’s security forces would not overstep their constitutional limits and remain partners in steering Sudan toward a definitive, civilian-led future. While the transition is not yet complete, and faces increasingly stiff headwinds, today’s removal of the terror designation should be seen as affirmation that the sometimes-competing wings of the transitional government have and are largely abiding by the principals of the revolution: Freedom, Peace, and Justice.

Procedurally, today’s announcement is the culmination of a process of bilateral negotiations that started early this year that saw Sudan meet policy and statutory requirements demonstrating that it no longer supported international terrorism and would work with US counterterror efforts going forward. It removes perhaps the greatest sticking point and inconsistency in US policy and the bilateral relationship: the US treatment of Sudan as both a reliable counterterror partner and a terrorist state. For nearly two decades, this has been the first and last talking point of every Sudanese official in any bilateral conversation with an American diplomat. With this hypocrisy removed, the chances for deeper and more serious bilateral relations are at last possible.

Statements today from Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Risch both suggest that with the terror restrictions out of the way, the United States will lean forward on arrears clearance, bridge loans, and ultimately debt relief to revive Sudan’s failing economy. This represents perhaps the most tangible and immediate prize associated with Sudan’s delisting. Other promises—such as trade delegations, investment summits, and subsidized staple imports, offered as part of the Administration’s Israel gambit—may not materialize in the waning days of Trump’s term. But setting in motion a multilateral process that allows Europeans and the international financial institutions to move forward this critical engagement is what is most necessary now.

But despite today’s news, challenges in this terror saga still remain. Negotiations are still ongoing over when and how Sudan will have its sovereign immunity restored and be granted the legal peace it seeks to be protected against future terror-related claims. The greatest impediment to sovereign immunity stems from a claim from a group of 9/11 victims who have tried to argue that because of Sudan’s complicity in other al-Qaeda orchestrated terror attacks, like the USS Cole and the US Embassy bombings, Sudan should now also be tried for its possible involvement in the September 11 attacks. 

Ironically, these claims have emerged now because 9/11 victims felt for the first time that Sudan had recognized the legitimacy of the US justice system over them and were prepared to pay large sums of money to meet the political demands for getting off the terror list. Under Omar al-Bashir, 9/11 families never thought their suits would go anywhere and never thought Sudan could be compelled to pay, so they chose not to pursue their suits when the opportunities were abundant. But that all changed under the transitional government, which has showed a willingness to negotiate and make amends. The idea that the Sudanese are now being potentially punished for their cooperation is regrettable. That these groups have found champions among the Senate’s Democratic leaders is even more disheartening. 

Good faith efforts to resolve the obstacle to a final settlement appear to be continuing within the Senate and among victim groups. The Trump Administration has even offered substantial financial settlements—from US taxpayer funds—to compensate victims who don’t even have a legal court judgement in their favor. If they don’t succeed, Sudan could be faced with future lawsuits from terror claimants and US businesses could have liens placed on the repatriation of revenues coming from Sudan. This would undermine and deter the kind of reputational cleansing and investment promotion removal from the terror list was intended to promote. It would also represent another self-inflicted wound to US policy of the kind that today’s announcement was trying to correct.

But in the end, today’s announcement ultimately moves the US out of the way of Sudan’s own success or failure. As inflation soars and the Sudanese pound continues its precipitous decline, what Sudan makes of this opportunity is now up to its leaders.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

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Sudan became the latest country to normalize its relationship with Israel on October 23, as an agreement between the two countries ended the official status of war between them. US President Donald Trump announced the agreement following a discussion with Sudanese Chairman of the Sovereignty Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The agreement comes at the same time as Trump announced that he will remove Sudan from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism List in recognition of the country’s progress towards democracy after the ouster of former leader Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and in return for a compensation package from Sudan for US terrorism victims. In a joint statement, the Trump administration said that the United States “will take steps to restore Sudan’s sovereign immunity and to engage its international partners to reduce Sudan’s debt burdens, including advancing discussions on debt forgiveness consistent with the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.” Israel and Sudan will also “begin economic and trade relations, with an initial focus on agriculture,” and will “meet in the coming weeks to negotiate agreements of cooperation in those areas as well as in agriculture technology, aviation, migration issues and other areas for the benefit of the two peoples.”

The normalization agreement follows similar agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as both the United States and Israel have sought to improve Israeli ties with countries across the region, especially as Iran continues its military aggression.

Atlantic Council experts react to the normalization between Sudan and Israel, and analyze what it means for both countries and the wider region:

Cameron Hudson: Normalization a watershed moment for Sudan.

Jonathan Ferziger: Netanyahu’s Africa strategy yields success.

Carmiel Arbit: Troubled history makes Sudan-Israel peace more meaningful.

Normalization a watershed moment for Sudan

“Today’s dual White House announcements that the Trump administration is both removing Sudan from the terrorism list and that Sudan and Israel are normalizing relations are both watershed events that will hopefully further Sudan’s political and economic transformation. While all sides would like to see these announcements as having been reached on their own merits, coming as they do only minutes apart, it is hard not to see them as linked. 

“To its credit, Washington lived up to its word and announced Sudan’s removal from the terror list after Khartoum met the last requirement of transferring $335 million to Washington’s settlement payment for the 1998 US Embassy bombings. This is a huge political win for Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, who came into office pledging to shed the legacy of Sudan’s terrorist past and remake its relations with the international community, but who in recent months has come under withering criticism for his inability to stabilize the country’s failing economy.  These announcement no doubt help to do that but could come at significant political cost to him as many at home will see Khartoum’s normalization with Tel Aviv as too high a price to pay for achieving its delisting. But Hamdok hopes that the extensive package of sweeteners that Trump and Netanyahu have attached to the normalization deal, including debt relief, development assistance, and huge investment guarantees, will be enough to mitigate the accusations that are certain to emerge that Sudan was “bullied” and “blackmailed” into an agreement that is not supported by the Sudanese public. Critical now for the prime minister will be to translate today’s announcement promises from Washington and Tel Aviv into lower bread prices, shorter fuel lines, and more abundant electricity—tangible signs to average Sudanese that the country is finally turning the corner. If those benefits can be felt quickly, then most will believe that the bargain was worth it.”

Cameron Hudson, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and previosuly served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration.

Netanyahu’s Africa strategy yields success

“After the on-again, off-again drama leading up to this agreement over recent weeks, as all the pieces of the $335 million compensation package for US terrorism victims were being put together by the Trump administration, this peace accord between Sudan and Israel is a significant and historic achievement. The question is whether it will hold, and there are good reasons to suggest it may not, considering the unstable nature of Sudan’s transitional government. One important precedent is the agreement Israel forged with the Republic of South Sudan in 2011, only to watch the fledgling country descend into a brutal civil war two years later. Peace with Sudan, which was actually in a state of war with Israel in contrast to the agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, is a success for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Africa strategy, in which he has built a wedge of support in eastern Africa. In contrast to the chill Israel encountered for years because of African support for the Arab boycott, Israel now adds a new ally to its fertile and growing relations with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, and Uganda that have given it a stronger anchor on the African continent.”

Jonathan Ferziger, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.   

Troubled history makes Sudan-Israel peace more meaningful

“Sudan is a welcome, if complicated, addition to the Abraham Accords. Unlike the UAE and Bahrain, Sudan has waged war with Israel. Its forces joined the Arab–Israeli War in 1948 and the Six-Day War in 1967, playing host to an Arab league summit after the latter that denounced recognition, peace, or negotiations with Israel. Its population is more fervently anti-Israel and, in many cases, anti-Semitic than it’s Gulf counterparts. Accordingly, peace with Sudan is that much more meaningful than the earlier normalization agreements. But the former Islamist state also finds itself amidst a major internal transformation, one that is far from complete. The decision by the caretaker government to enter this deal amidst internal controversy and uncertainty at home is risky at best.   

“The United States for its part is showing a willingness to keep raising the ante. In exchange for the deal, Sudan will be removed from the state sponsor of terror list and will enjoy millions if not billions of dollars of economic assistance from the UAE and the United States. Subsequent Arab countries contemplating peace—each with their own long list of demands—are sure to take note.” 

Carmiel Arbit, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Further reading:

AfricaSource Oct 19, 2020

Sudan is removed from the terror list. Now what?

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After twenty-seven years on the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list, President Trump today announced, via Twitter, that Sudan’s terror designation was at long last being removed. While many details of the deal struck between the Trump Administration and the transitional authorities in Sudan have yet to emerge, the announcement by itself should be welcomed as a major achievement for both Washington and Khartoum.

Africa Democratic Transitions

MENASource Sep 11, 2020

Experts react: US brokers another deal in Middle East with Israel and Bahrain

By William F. Wechsler, Kirsten Fontenrose, Marc J. Sievers, Jonathan H. Ferziger, Barbara Slavin, Carmiel Arbit, Michel Duclos, Richard LeBaron, Mark N. Katz, Thomas S. Warrick, Sina Azodi, Joze Pelayo

Atlantic Council experts react to Bahrain agreement to normalize ties with Israel and what it means for the wider region.

Israel Middle East

New Atlanticist Aug 13, 2020

Will US-brokered agreement between UAE and Israel be a regional gamechanger?

By Atlantic Council

A US-brokered deal has seen Israel and the United Arab Emirates normalize relations for the first time in history. Atlantic Council experts discuss what the agreement means and what is next for the wider region:

Conflict Israel

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After twenty-seven years on the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list, President Trump today announced, via Twitter, that Sudan’s terror designation was at long last being removed. While many details of the deal struck between the Trump Administration and the transitional authorities in Sudan have yet to emerge, the announcement by itself should be welcomed as a major achievement for both Washington and Khartoum. The troubled relationship has officially been reset and a new chapter has begun.

For the increasingly beleaguered transitional government of Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, and the rest of Sudan, the news comes in the nick of time. With inflation exceeding 200 percent and the Sudanese pound falling to 262 against the dollar (down from 82 when the civilian government came into office only thirteen months ago), Sudan’s economy is in freefall. Bread and fuel lines across the capital, Khartoum, are longer today than when President Bashir was in office, and talk among the people stuck in those lines invariably is turning to disgruntlement over the government’s handling of the crisis. 

While Sudan’s removal from the terrorism list won’t do much in the short term to alleviate the economic pain, it provides a monumental political win for the transitional government, which came into office pledging to remove Sudan from the list and remake the country’s relationship with the rest of the world. Removal from the terrorism list was the government’s ultimate prize and brings with it a precious injection of political capital that, at a minimum, will provide more time for the government to try to get its economic house in order and make good on the promise of delivering a lasting democracy dividend to Sudan’s long-suffering population.

For Washington, the decision to remove Sudan from the list is significant for a number of reasons.  Many will view it as a vindication of the Administration’s “America First” approach to foreign policy, given the President’s framing of the deal as bringing in millions in compensation for American victims of Sudan’s past terrorist acts and the still-expected announcement of Sudan’s normalization of relations with Israel, perhaps as soon as this week. But Trump drove a hard bargain when hard bargaining wasn’t required.

In the end, the concessions won from Sudan come at a cost to the United States. Arguably, Washington’s hard-nosed approach to negotiations with Sudan over the last few months has served to alienate our friends and allies in Europe and Africa, who are themselves anxious to see the terror label lifted, and further contributed to a rising tide of anti-Americanism inside Sudan (which the United States now hopes to  partner with across a host of fields, from counter-terrorism to trade). Washington must now work to ensure that the cost of its achievement isn’t pyrrhic.

In the two weeks left before election day, the Administration would do well to frame Sudan’s unshackling from its terror list as not merely a one-off diplomatic win or an added vindication of its Middle East peace plan, but instead, as a step towards the greater cause of achieving peaceful democratic transition in the Horn of Africa and beyond. This would be a stark departure from the Administration’s overall indifferent approach to democracy promotion and a small, albeit, counter to the narrative that Washington values stability over democracy. Going forward, Sudan has the potential to demonstrate that these goals are not mutually exclusive and set an example for the wider region.

Washington should also immediately take steps to make good on the long list of inducements promised to Sudan in exchange for Khartoum’s likely soon-to-be announced normalization of relations with Israel. While the White House document detailing the specifics has yet to be released, the long list reportedly includes:

• Additional development and humanitarian assistance reportedly worth hundreds of millions more than even current aid levels, and including surplus wheat and medical supplies the Sudanese people desperately need;
• A US trade and investment conference for Sudan along with a high-level trade delegation to Sudan led by the Development Finance Corporation;
• A pledge to engage the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to support and fast-track discussions on restructuring Sudan’s $65 billion in external debt, clearing its more than $3 billion in arrears, and creating a pathway for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative;
• Earmarks in the 2021 budget for the US share of debt relief to Sudan, likely to cost in excess of $300 million;
• Removal of Sudan from the Administration’s travel ban list; and
• Engagement with Congress on legal peace legislation for Sudan that would finally resolve terrorist claims against it and provide for an orderly approach to addressing outstanding 9/11 victims claims.

In truth, most of these things would have already been in train if the Administration was truly committed to nurturing Sudan’s democratic transition, staving off financial collapse, and deterring the return of military rule.  Instead, the Trump Administration has kept the transitional government guessing, the Sudanese people’s frustration mounting, and the military poised to step in to secure a final deal if the civilian authorities did not. (To their credit, Sudan’s civilian and military leaders have largely kept their differing tactical approaches to these negotiations private, and have showed great discipline in forging a common position that hopefully leaves the transitional government stronger as a result.)

Fortunately, any sins Washington may be blamed for in its own negotiations will likely be quickly forgiven, assuming the Administration sets upon a quick and transparent implementation of the agreement. That must start with a formal notification to Congress as early as this week of its intention to remove Sudan from the terrorism list and immediate high-level engagement with Congress to ensure that it, in the first place, does nothing to derail the deal, and in the second, is able to reach its own agreement to grant Sudan its “legal peace” against any new terrorist claims. Coming in the midst of a re-election bid, the Supreme Court nomination, and COVID-19 relief negotiations, this could be asking a lot—but it is what is required if Sudan hopes to enjoy the maximum benefit from this agreement.

Similarly, the Biden campaign has a role to play in upholding this historic agreement. Khartoum remains rightfully anxious that a deal struck so close to a possible change in Administration could suffer a similar fate to the Iran nuclear deal. To put Sudan at ease and to signal to allies that the agreement has bipartisan appeal, Vice President Biden should offer an assurance that, should he inherit this deal next January, his Administration will abide by the its main points.

Ultimately, while this is a moment for congratulations and positive reflection on how much has changed in Sudan and in the US-Sudan relationship in the eighteen months since President Bashir was removed, it is also the time to look forward. With the anachronistic state sponsor of terrorism designation out of the way, expectations in Sudan are high, and the pressure for Sudan’s young government to capitalize on this opening and accelerate domestic efforts to undo, reform and modernize the political and economic life of the country are even higher.

While it is in the United States’ long-term national security interests to help in that endeavor, it can no longer be blamed for standing in the way.  That alone is significant progress.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

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The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

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The event served as an opportunity to introduce Ambassador Satti to Washington’s core community of Sudan watchers and to update him on the various ongoing efforts in Washington in support of a stronger bilateral relationship. The event was opened by veteran US diplomat and Atlantic Council Board Director Amb. Mary Carlin Yates and moderated by Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Cameron Hudson.  

Participants, representing Congressional offices, think tanks, and not-for-profits, shared questions and insights on topics including US Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit to Khartoum, expectations surrounding normalization efforts with Israel, developments on the Sudanese peace process, and the status of settlements to compensate US victims of terrorism. Participants pledged continued support to the Ambassador and to maintain regular discussions under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.

AfricaSource Aug 31, 2020

A no strings attached policy toward Sudan

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Secretary Pompeo’s stopover in Sudan last week marked another momentous step forward in the rapidly warming bilateral relationship between Sudan and the United States—the first visit to Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, by a US Secretary of State in fifteen years. Unlike Condoleezza Rice’s stopover in 2005, aimed at heaping pressure and opprobrium on the country’s then-autocratic […]

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Aug 25, 2020

Sudanese armed movement leaders offer differing assessments of the peace process

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, August 25, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on the status of and challenges to the peace process in Sudan. The panel featured General Abdelaziz al-Hilu, Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N); Dr. Gibril Ibrahim, Chairman of the Justice and Equality Movement; Dr. Elshafie Khidir, Sudanese political advisor and commentator; and Dr. Annette Weber, Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Africa Conflict

AfricaSource Mar 16, 2020

Removing Sudan’s terrorism designation: Proceeding with caution

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No aspect of US policy towards Sudan has garnered more scrutiny, from both inside and outside the country, than Sudan’s continued designation on the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. But the issue itself—whether Sudan should remain on the list and what would be required to remove it—is vastly complicated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

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Secretary Pompeo’s stopover in Sudan last week marked another momentous step forward in the rapidly warming bilateral relationship between Sudan and the United States—the first visit to Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, by a US Secretary of State in fifteen years. Unlike Condoleezza Rice’s stopover in 2005, aimed at heaping pressure and opprobrium on the country’s then-autocratic ruler, Omar al-Bashir, for unleashing hell in Sudan’s far-western Darfur region, Pompeo’s stop, on its surface, appeared intended to confer praise and legitimacy on the year-old, civilian-led transitional government. Upon reflection, it will hopefully be looked back upon as the penultimate step in Sudan’s multidecade-long journey to be removed from the US State Sponsor of Terrorism List.  

As much as there remains obstacles to Sudan’s ultimate de-listing, coming primarily from victim groups of Sudan’s past terror-related crimes and their allies in Congress, the tenor and substance of the conversation in Washington around Sudan has fundamentally changed this year. Reduced, though not eliminated, are the doubts that recidivist military and Islamist factions are waiting in the wings to overthrow or undermine civilian rule as soon as Washington’s ultimate sanction is removed. Indeed, prior to Pompeo’s visit, Washington had seemed to finally recognize that the best way to weaken the potential spoilers in Sudan is to bet big on civilian leaders and the transitional government. Sudan’s removal from the terror list had begun to no longer appear a question of whether it should happen, but rather how and when it will happen. Sadly, Pompeo’s visit last week did little to provide needed responses to these questions.

To his credit, Pompeo has invested some precious diplomatic capital in his relationship with Sudan and its affable Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok. The historic and highly successful visit of Hamdok to Washington last December, which Pompeo missed due to his own travel, was followed up by the briefest of exchanges between them on the margins of the Munich Security Conference in February. However, through a series of regular phone calls, Pompeo has followed the positive reform efforts out of Sudan and the country’s multiple efforts to resolve terror claims against it, implement painful economic reforms, and work with the country’s military to present a united front through the transition. Following each call, Pompeo has sounded the right tone in his tweets and press statements, taking great care to repeatedly praise “the civilian-led transitional government.”

This all led to Pompeo’s historic trip this week and the something of a surprise outcome where the topic of Israel’s normalization of relations with Sudan emerged as the big ask by the United States and what some now fear is a new requirement for Sudan’s removal from the terror list. After all, since the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, made the first secret contact with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in February (a meeting explicitly encouraged by Pompeo in a call with Burhan), many in the Trump foreign policy orbit have been tempted by the notion that Sudan could move from terrorist state to friend of Israel with the guided hand of Washington. 

When the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced earlier this month that it had achieved a historic peace deal with Israel with the help of Washington, it breathed new life into the Administration’s Middle East peace proposal, which had seemingly been languishing for months. It also lit a fire under Pompeo and his team that they had a limited window to replicate the UAE success with other Arab states. Pompeo’s hastily announced Middle East tour this week appears to have been an effort to do just that.

But by adding Sudan to the list of other Arab stops, like Bahrain and Oman, the established logic behind removing Sudan from the terror list began to morph as well. No longer does de-listing appear to be part of the US leverage to further encourage and support the transitional government and their efforts to reform and transform the Sudanese state. Instead, de-listing seemingly has become the leverage to achieve a Middle East foreign policy coup in the waning days before the November election.

On its surface, it is perhaps understandable that Pompeo’s team saw this as a win-win. After all, Sudan has been clear that its top priority with Washington is being removed from the terror list and it has demonstrated a willingness to do almost anything to satisfy Washington’s demands; namely, settling the terror-related legal judgments against it. Sudan has done this, reportedly scraping together nearly $350 million to be distributed to American and African victims of the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Sudan’s civilian leaders have also repeatedly emphasized their intention to establish a “balanced foreign policy” and deepen their relations with established democracies. Viewed from Washington, what better example of both and demonstration that Sudan truly belongs off the terror list than normalizing relations with the Middle East’s only true democracy?

But in their haste to get something for nothing, Pompeo and his team ignored both the deep sensitivities in Sudan around the United States seemingly “moving the goalposts” on sanctions removal, but perhaps more importantly, the very fragile state of the transition in Sudan that SST removal is ostensibly intended to support. As much as both Hamdok and Pompeo have sought to rebuild relations based upon mutual respect, distrust and misunderstanding in official bilateral relations still run deep. From the US bombing of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant outside Khartoum in 1998 to US support for South Sudanese independence in 2011, US policy is still viewed by many as not just anti-Bashir, but anti-Sudan.

But beyond the reputational deficit the United States faces, pressing for normalized relations with Israel, a country which an entire generation of politicians in Sudan swore to never “recognize, cooperate, or negotiate with,” belies Pompeo’s repeated claims that US policy now seeks to strengthen the bonds of the transitional government and promote productive relations between its military and civilian wings. Indeed, the request completely ignored the fragile moment the transitional government is in. With the Forces of Freedom and Change officially split on relations with Israel and with civilian leaders facing their harshest criticism yet from internal constituencies whose patience is running low one year into a transition that has yet to see institutionalized political reform or the beginnings of an economic recovery, now is not the moment to introduce such a politically charged issue into Sudan’s body politic. 

Importantly too, the request also risks undermining the very delicate balance of power that exists between military and civilian leaders. In the end, security and intelligence forces would likely be the first and most significant beneficiaries of Israeli largesse through improved access to intelligence and defense equipment (like sought-after Israeli software for cracking the WhatsApp messaging platform), training, and information sharing. Meanwhile, civilians would be left to manage the plight of more than 30,000 Sudanese refugees stranded in Israel that Tel Aviv has been anxious to see repatriated, but who would only add to Sudan’s internal economic burden.

In the end, Sudan appears to have escaped a moment of reckoning as both civilian and military leaders rebuffed Pompeo’s Hail Mary. But the normalization issue has not gone away and is likely to re-emerge before the November Presidential elections in the United States. With an invitation to Sudan to attend an upcoming and ill-defined Middle East Peace Summit somewhere in the region, pressure will remain on Sudan to quicken its rapprochement with Israel. Washington, in turn, could choose to slow roll the final administrative steps needed to remove Sudan from the terror list in a last bid effort to pluck what it thinks is low hanging fruit in Khartoum. There is, however, a middle ground.

It remains in Sudan’s interest to explore a relationship with Israel, to allow it to be debated publicly, and to explore a broader potential set of benefits in areas like development, investment, and trade that would benefit all Sudanese. A visit by Hamdok to Tel Aviv to initiate that discussion could deliver high symbolic value and demonstrate good faith to interested US audiences but would come at reduced political cost to the transition domestically. Trade delegations, student exchanges, and cooperative arrangements in public health are some intermediate steps that could ultimately test the potential of improved relations without crossing the point of no return that normalization represents.

For its part, Washington should not hesitate in its privately stated commitment to remove Sudan’s terror label. There is still work to be done to engage Congress around outstanding issues regarding restoring Sudan’s sovereign immunity and providing it “legal peace,” which would importantly ensure that it could not be held liable for any additional terror-related lawsuits. These talks will take time and could well involve political bargaining in Washington—at a moment when US bipartisanship is ebbing. Delaying further, in the hopes of driving Sudan into the arms of a domestically fraught suitor like Israel, would ignore the fragility of the moment Sudan is in and undervalue the important changes that have already occurred.  

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

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Hudson began by framing the changing circumstances in Sudan, referencing US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s historic visit to Khartoum, occurring concurrently with the event. He argued that instead of pressuring and isolating Sudan as has been done in the past, the United States and international community are now actively engaged in celebrating Sudanese progress and ensuring that the demands of the revolution are met: namely freedom, peace, and justice. Of course, challenges remain. For the civilian-led transitional government at the helm, the peace process is a top priority, but an agreement remains elusive, just as violence ticks up across Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and Sudan’s eastern regions.

Reflecting on the peace process, armed movement leaders General al-Hilu and Dr. Ibrahim voiced differing perspectives. Dr. Ibrahim spoke with a plainly optimistic tone, noting that “the scope of agreements we have been able to negotiate is unprecedented,” citing breakthroughs on land rights, the status of the Two Areas, devolution, and resource-sharing. General al-Hilu, in comparison, gave a more reserved evaluation of the process. He was clear that the SPLM-N had not withdrawn from the Juba peace talks and had in fact reengaged since September 2019. However, he emphasized the need for a comprehensive settlement, stating that piecemeal attempts have failed for decades. To him, the deadlock relates to the relationship between the state and religion, saying that “a secular constitution must be adopted to ensure the neutrality of the state.”

The panelists also discussed competing opinions of the government negotiating team. Dr. Ibrahim stressed that the peace process has not been controlled by the military, citing Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s central role, whereas General al-Hilu admitted to complaints with the chairman of the government delegation. Dr. Khidir, speaking as a regular advisor to both civilian and military stakeholders, described civil-military cooperation as proceeding “smoothly” but not always as agreed upon.

With these varying stances laid out, the challenges to concluding durable peace are clear. Yet actors’ public commitment to the process and to open dialogue provides room for optimism. For Dr. Khidir, despite differences, peace is “not a mission impossible” and there exists room to bridge the gap. Building on this, Dr. Weber closed the event saying, “We all owe it to the Sudanese who did bring this revolution about,” stressing the need for the international community to provide a more robust economic response to support the transition.

Missed the event? Watch the webcast, below, and engage us @ACAfricaCenter with any questions, comments, or feedback.

Event Recap Jan 28, 2021

Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister provides humanitarian update

By Africa Center

On Thursday, January 28, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, for a wide-ranging update on the security and humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

Sudan’s outgoing state minister of foreign affairs reflects on regional issues

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Omer Gamereldin Ismail, the outgoing Sudanese state minister of foreign affairs, for a discussion on key regional and bilateral issues for Sudan.

Africa Conflict

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But the conference’s success was never going to be judged solely on financial pledges. Rather, it was the pledges of political capital that Hamdok needed to shore up his own position and keep at bay, for at least just a little longer, the still powerful and ascendant forces of Sudan’s military and Rapid Support Forces, who still wield executive authority.

That is why, after searching for months to no avail for a deep-pocketed donor to host what was originally thought to be a traditional pledging conference, Sudan and its supporters rebranded yesterday’s display of support as a Partners Forum rather than a Donors Conference. Hamdok addressed the new frame in his opening statement, noting that “the difference is not one of semantics.” As he described it, yesterday was not about a one-off pledge of support, but the start of a long-term relationship with those who share in the vision of seeing a transformed Sudan that is stable, secure, and prosperous.

It was a smart move, because yesterday’s conference was never going to be able to fully gap-fill the $1.5-2 billion hole in Sudan’s state budget or fully fund the ambitious Family Support Program that intends to lessen the pain of the country’s orthodox economic reform program by providing 80 percent of citizens a modest $5 per month stipend. Rather it was about creating enduring partnerships that Sudan needs to revitalize its economy and to put the country on a long-term development footing. According to Hamdok, those are:

• Restarting and reinvigorating productive sectors of the economy;
• Creating jobs, especially among youth where unemployment remains above 40 percent;
• Supporting human development, especially in the areas of health spending and education;
• Supporting those hurt by the economic reform program, to wit the aforementioned Family Support Program;
• Addressing Sudan’s myriad debt issues through restructuring, forgiving, and repaying; and
• Responding to the extraordinary health and economic threats posed by COVID-19.

This basket of needs made it possible for the more than forty-five countries and international institutions that participated in the Forum to find a priority to support within their respective post-COVID budget-constrained environments. That’s good, because as with other pledging conferences, yesterday’s show of financial largesse was also replete with fuzzy math and double ledger accounting. 

While certainly a move in the right direction, in real dollar terms the increases in funding committed during the Forum represented only modest gains in support, and served as more of a commentary on how paltry previous assistance numbers to Sudan have been than a reflection of a seismic shift in spending. For example, fully two-thirds of participants pledged to assist in Sudan’s fight against COVID-19, though most of that pledged support will come in the form of in-kind medical support and technical assistance. Big donors, including the United States, crowed over the large total sums being provided—even though the bulk of their giving comes in the form of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected areas and reflects only a marginal, if any, increase on the previous year’s spending. And many other countries touted three-fold, five-fold, and even ten-fold increases in development funding over past years.

Perhaps the most noteworthy initiatives were from the International Financial Institutions which included the World Banks’s $400 million pre-arrears clearance grant that could allow Sudan to tap into as much as $1.75 billion in support over the next three years, coupled with a year-long staff-monitored program from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help Sudan consolidate its nearly $60 billion in external debt, begin to address its $3 billion in arrears, and put it on a path toward Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief.

The only note of discord puncturing the triumphalism of the day was the repeated calls for the United States to finally remove its State Sponsor of Terrorism designation. Fully one-third of all speakers yesterday referenced what still stands as one of the biggest brakes on new investment and an anchor weight to a past that Sudan and all those virtually assembled were trying to shed. It would seem that while Sudan still suffers from the financial and reputational effects of the designation, the terrorism albatross now rests squarely on US shoulders until it can be removed.

So while there were no surprise announcements of multi-billion dollar pledges or zeroing out of debt obligations, the prime minister and his team should take away an enormous sense of pride in the quality of their presentations and the outpouring of genuine support and friendship from so many diverse nations from around the world. Particularly powerful were the reminders from countries like Portugal, South Africa, Romania, and South Korea, who offered poignant reflections on their own transitions to democracy and development.

But what made this a true turning point is when one puts yesterday’s conference into the context of the only other international convenings on Sudan. Thirteen years ago, many of those same countries gathered to hold Sudan to account for its genocidal actions in Darfur and began looking at ways to maximize pressure on the country to relent in its campaign of terror. Subsequent to that, in September 2010, world leaders once again gathered in an extraordinary session on the sideline of the UN General Assembly meeting to heap pressure on Sudan to ensure that the soon-to-be independent South Sudan could proceed with its independence vote.

These international conferences worked in one important respect—they inflicted pain on Sudan and its citizens in ways that have outlasted the issues themselves. We must hope that yesterday’s Partners Forum has a similar lasting effect on Sudan, only this time for the good of its people, its government, and its economy.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

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The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

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The Honorable Ministers outlined the substantial progress made by Sudan’s transitional government since coming to office in September 2019. Updates from Minister Elbadawi revolved around donor financing and Sudan’s economic reform plan. Minister Abdulbari focused his remarks on the status of judicial reform, efforts to dismantle the previous regime, and the negotiation of settlements with US and foreign victims of terrorism.

Following the ministerial panel, Hudson initiated a second panel that featured commentary from three experts on the Sudan: Ms. Lauren Blanchard, specialist in African affairs at the Congressional Research Service; Dr. Suliman Baldo, senior policy advisor at the Enough Project; and Mr. Payton Knopf, advisor to the Africa Program at the US Institute of Peace. Topics under discussion included civil-military relations, the removal of Sudan’s terrorism designation, and the role of regional actors in Sudan. In his closing remarks, Hudson spoke of a narrow window of opportunity to support civilian rule in Sudan and reiterated the importance of robust US engagement with Sudan during this pivotal period.

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Not yet one year into a historic political transition and in the midst of an economic collapse, Sudan’s future was already hanging in the balance. The addition of a national and global public health crisis now has the potential for a ‘make or break’ impact on the country. If the government doesn’t respond effectively, the pandemic could call into question the case for long-term civilian rule and the prospects for economic stabilization—which may in turn undermine the international community’s commitment to backing the revolution.

Taking action

Sudan’s transitional government should be applauded for many of its early efforts to deploy its limited resources wisely. Recognizing the potentially devastating health and economic effects of the virus, the government has focused on educating the public on prevention and mitigation efforts—demonstrating once again just how much has changed for the better in a post-Bashir Sudan.

A high-level ministerial committee was stood up early on to coordinate efforts, and it declared a nationwide health emergency weeks ago, on March 16. Co-chaired by the ministers of health, information, and interior (the last of which is a military appointee), the committee has helped bridge many of the operational divides that Sudan’s transitional constitution created between civilian and military leaders. The group moved early to close Sudan’s land borders with Egypt, when an early cluster of cases emerged there, and started requiring health checks and quarantines at the Port Sudan sea border as many Sudanese started returning from Gulf countries earlier this month. The restriction on air travel to and from highly-infected countries has now turned into a global travel ban with all of Sudan’s airports closed to international traffic.

At home, the government is taking social distancing seriously, making every possible effort to limit the kinds of large social gatherings that, ironically, had become the symbol of the Sudanese people’s strength and resilience as they took to the streets for ten months last year in pursuit of “Freedom, Peace, and Justice.” In the past two weeks, a nationwide curfew has been imposed from 8pm to 6am every day; a prohibition on large-scale political, social, cultural, and sports gatherings is in effect; schools and universities have once again been shuttered for the remainder of the academic year; and this week, even Sudan’s prisons were emptied of more than four thousand non-violent offenders to reduce overcrowding and blunt the spread of the disease there. The government is now also said to be considering a two-week shelter in place requirement, following South Africa’s lead, which would see the social and economic life of the country ground to a halt.

With a level of transparency rare for the country, Sudan’s civilian health minister is now holding daily press conferences to update the country on best practices for prevention and to highlight the ever-expanding list of government efforts to fight the disease. The ministry has further teamed with the country’s mobile phone operators to push out daily reminders of best practices for social distancing.

But will it be enough? Sudan currently reports only five confirmed cases nationwide, with one fatality. All are being attributed to Sudanese returning home from abroad and carrying the infection with them. However, given the almost total lack of testing and near-absent health care system, that figure is most assuredly grossly underestimated. Last week alone, more than three hundred Sudanese suspected by health officials as having the virus escaped from government-administered quarantine facilities, while one hundred Sudanese nationals returning from Egypt were reportedly able to evade health screenings at the border.

From prevention to response

Despite the government’s worthwhile prevention efforts, when the virus takes hold—and all indications are that it will—Sudan is in perhaps one of the worst situations anywhere in the world to mobilize an effective national response. The same conditions that plague many other parts of Africa, and that will make the disease so difficult to prevent from spreading there, also haunt Sudan, namely: grinding poverty, lack of household savings to offset lost income, and lack of access to clean water, proper sanitation, and health supplies. And while it may not have the teeming urban slums of mega-cities like Nairobi or Lagos, Sudan still has millions living in displaced persons camps across Darfur and the Two Areas where COVID-19 could rip through with devastating effect.

A collapsed health care system hollowed out by thirty years of corrupt rule has also left the country with as many as only eighty ventilators and two hundred intensive care hospital beds. Even government-run containment facilities lack the ability to care for the sick for the necessary fourteen-day quarantines. Perhaps most disturbing is a growing popular sentiment that Sudan’s high daily temperature and young population will stave off the worst effects of the disease, causing many young people to feel impervious to the malady—a not uncommon response globally, but a potentially devasting one in a country like Sudan where many generations live under one roof.

Beyond the basics of a functioning health care system or the compliance of a willing public, Sudan lacks the economic resilience required to withstand the near-term effects of the pandemic. The country is already suffering from a balance of payments crisis, an exchange rate crisis, and a massive debt and arrears burden that has seen the country unable to pay for basic commodities like wheat in recent weeks. Simply put, Sudan has virtually no fiscal or monetary policy tools left to deploy to cushion the inevitable blow that will come from a further loss of productivity, revenue earnings, and foreign exchange.

Adding to Sudan’s economic burden, the national-level economic conference intended to enlist broad-based public support for the government’s economic reform agenda (namely, the cutting of subsidies for commodities like fuel and wheat), has been postponed from this past week and has not been rescheduled. And an international donor conference intended to bring in fresh pledges of international financial support still lacks a host and also appears destined to be pushed back from its hoped-for June date.

More broadly, as both Arab Gulf and Western governments turn their political attention to domestic response efforts, they are likely at the same time to revisit development budgets in the face of their own economies and societies being ravaged by the disease. In the face of this pull-back, profoundly aid-dependent countries like Sudan have to reconcile themselves to the likelihood that even pledged assistance funds might not materialize this year, and a go-it-alone approach may have to be contemplated.

Political costs

While the likely prospect of simultaneous health and economic crises should incite serious soul searching in Sudan, perhaps most worrying of all are the potential political and social costs that these dual crises could exact on the country. After all, Sudan, in the midst of an extraordinary political transition period, lacks a unitary command structure, and the transitional arrangement requires the civilian authorities and military to share power and duties in ways that are not always clear under Sudan’s transitional constitution. Thus far, in the prevention phase of the pandemic, that coordination has seemingly gone well, with military forces acting in line with civil authorities to close borders and limit public gatherings to enforce social distancing.

But will that coordination continue as the crisis deepens? Some in Sudan’s international “Friends Group” are already quietly identifying a timid response from the prime minister himself, who they have never credited with forceful or decisive leadership, as a potential concern. At a time of national crisis, fears are real that the military, as the country’s only functioning national institution, will step forward in ways that make civilian authorities look weak or feckless, and just at the moment when civilian rule should be becoming more entrenched, not less.  

Going forward, all eyes will be assessing Prime Minister Hamdok’s ability to reassure a worried public, the skeptical donor community, and an unreformed security sector that he can rally a national response to the crises the country faces. If any of those audiences loses faith in his, or the civilian cabinet’s, ability to take decisive action to lead the country through the crisis without reverting to military rule, Sudan’s transition risks stalling out and reverting to the old power centers that held sway in the country for the past three decades.  

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Questions? Tweet them to our experts @ACAfricaCenter.

For more content, go to our Coronavirus: Africa page.

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

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The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

The post Coronavirus comes to Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But the issue itself—whether Sudan should remain on the list and what would be required to remove it—is vastly complicated. To the chagrin of many Sudanese, far more than a stroke of President Trump’s pen is needed to secure Sudan’s removal. Rather, the process involves an interlocking network of legislative processes, legal rulings, financial settlements, intelligence assessments, and, most of all, politics, to unwind this ultimate tool in America’s sanctions arsenal.

This paper ultimately argues that the costs of inaction likely outweigh the benefits, but its main purpose is to outline and explain the network of complicating procedural and political factors that make this such a thorny issue to resolve with any expediency. But, despite the difficulties on the path to delisting, there is a way forward. And though, as I argue, removing Sudan’s terrorism label will have only a marginal impact on the near-term economic crisis the country faces, it is a crucial ingredient in Sudan’s long-term recovery and in its hopes of ushering in a civilian-led, democratic regime.

Contents

• What is the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list and why was Sudan placed on it?
• Why has Sudan been on the list for so long when it has cooperated with the United States on counterterrorism since 2001? Is the United States guilty of “moving the goalposts” in its promises to remove Sudan from the list?
• What is the process for removing a country from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?
• What additional requirements has the United States imposed on Sudan for it to be delisted?
• Where is Sudan in the removal process? 
• When can we expect Sudan to be removed?
• What other countries have been removed from the list and what was the process?
• What is the US policy toward removing Sudan from the terrorism list? Has the decision actually been made to remove Sudan from the SST list?
• What could cause the Trump administration to delay or decide not to remove Sudan from the SST list?
• What impact will lifting the SST designation have on Sudan’s troubled economy?
• Is this the last sanction remaining in the US-Sudan relationship?
• Should the United States remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?

What is the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list and why was Sudan placed on it?

The State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list came into being in 1979 and is used to designate those countries that have “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” Currently, the only countries on the list are: Sudan, Syria, Iran, and North Korea.

There has long been a popular conception that Sudan was added to the list in response to its harboring of Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996. However, bin Laden in those years was not yet attracting the kind of high-profile notoriety he did after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998. In fact, Carlos the Jackal and Abu Nidal, both also residents of Khartoum at the time, were then seen as higher profile terrorist threats by the United States.

Rather, in its 1994 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, following Sudan’s August 1993 addition to the list, the State Department explained that, “Despite several warnings to cease supporting radical extremists, the Sudanese Government continued to harbor international terrorist groups in Sudan. Through the National Islamic Front (NIF), which dominates the Sudanese Government, Sudan maintained a disturbing relationship with a wide range of Islamic extremists. The list includes the Abu Nidal Organization, the Palestinian HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Lebanese Hizballah, and Egypt’s al Gama’at al-Islamiyya.”

The report also noted that “Sudan served as a convenient transit point, meeting site, and safehaven for Iranian-backed extremist groups,” and highlighted “Khartoum’s anti-US rhetoric,” especially in the wake of the 1993 Gulf War in which Sudan closely sided with Saddam Hussein and stepped up its criticism of the United States’ broader policies in the Middle East in support of Israel.

In his statement to the press, then-State Department Spokesman Mike McCurry noted that, “We also believe safe houses and other facilities used to support radical groups are allowed to exist in Sudan with the apparent approval of the Sudanese Government’s leadership… Further, we believe that reports of training in Sudan of militant extremists that commit acts of terrorism in neighboring countries are credible.”

Despite being added to the list in 1993, the low point in bilateral relations came five years later, when in 1998 the United States conducted cruise missile strikes against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant outside of Khartoum—which was believed at the time to be manufacturing chemical weapons for use by al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups—in retaliation for the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, for which US courts would later find Khartoum complicit.

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Why has Sudan been on the list for so long when it has cooperated with the United States on counterterrorism since 2001? Is the United States guilty of “moving the goalposts” in its promises to remove Sudan from the list?

The history here is fraught and is frequently misinterpreted by both sides. Without question, the big change in Sudan’s counterterrorism (CT) relationship with the United States came in the months after the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. In a speech to a joint session of Congress that month, President Bush famously warned,

“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”

Taking a lesson from the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan, and not wishing to once again be on the wrong side of the United States or risk another strike similar to the 1998 al-Shifa attack, Sudan began a campaign of expelling foreign jihadists from its soil and cooperating with US CT officials in the fight against—primarily—al-Qaeda.

This led to a period of seemingly warmer relations between the two countries’ intelligence agencies and in bilateral relations as the United States took a lead role in brokering peace talks between North and South Sudan in Naivasha, Kenya and appointed the first ever Presidential Envoy to the country. During this period, President Bush spoke with some frequency to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, acknowledging in his calls Sudan’s newfound cooperation on CT, while also encouraging him to rewrite his own legacy by signing a historic peace deal with South Sudan.

The high-water mark in CT cooperation came in April 2005, four months after Bashir signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with South Sudan, in the presence of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, when Salah Gosh, then Sudan’s notorious head of national intelligence, was flown via private jet to Washington for consultations with the Central Intelligence Agency as part of what Sudan saw as a first low-profile effort at removing them from the terrorism list.

However, those efforts would quickly stall as Bashir almost simultaneously escalated fighting in the country’s western Darfur region to the point of genocide. As US domestic pressure grew on President Bush to respond forcefully to the massacre of civilians, denial of humanitarian access, and blocking of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers in Darfur—with critics like future National Security Advisor Susan Rice arguing in the Washington Post for the US to “strike Sudanese airfields, aircraft, and other military assets….and blockade Port Sudan,”—any hope of discussing Sudan’s removal from the SST list became politically impossible. In the eyes of Khartoum, allowing the internal conflict in Darfur to trump the goodwill built up by the making of peace with South Sudan and cooperation on CT prompted their first charge that Washington had “moved the goalposts” on SST.

It would not be until the Obama administration that a new attempt at removing Sudan from the terror list would be initiated. This time led out of the White House by the president’s CT czar, John Brennan, the effort did not start out to acknowledge any overall improved behavior on the part of the Sudanese regime, but rather represented an attempt by the CT community, namely Brennan himself as a former intelligence officer, to rationalize the use of the list and avoid its ongoing politicization associated with keeping countries on that were clearly cooperating with the United States in fighting terrorism. As the argument went, if Sudan was not supporting international terrorism and was cooperating with US efforts to fight it, it should not be on the list, irrespective of Khartoum’s overall human rights and authoritarian record, which remained abysmal.

However, powerful constituencies within the White House, namely long-time Sudan hawks Susan Rice and Gayle Smith, now joined by anti-genocide crusader Samantha Power, effectively blocked any CT rapprochement as long as there were not parallel improvements in Sudan’s internal politics.

To get there, an elaborate “roadmap” was established that would ultimately enable Sudan to be removed from the SST list provided it continued its CT cooperation with the United States, in addition to several other important conditions. Those included: allowing South Sudan to proceed with its 2011 independence referendum and implement the results of that vote free of Sudanese interference; demonstrating a marked improvement in the country’s human rights situation; removing restrictions on the operations of UN peacekeepers in Darfur; suspending support to regional destabilizers like the Lord’s Resistance Army in neighboring Uganda; and dramatically improving international humanitarian access to war-affected areas throughout the country.

However, as was typical of the Bashir regime at the time, “progress” in meeting the US asks generally involved taking two steps backwards for every step forward. Where Sudanese interlocutors could make the case for rescission, their US counterparts could cite even more examples of where Sudan was engaged in deliberate backsliding. In the wake of South Sudan’s independence, this back-and-forth only further fueled the accusation by Sudanese officials that America was once again moving the goalposts on SST revision.

Despite this mixed record, there was reportedly one last-ditch effort aimed at removing Sudan from the list in the waning days of the Obama administration after Sudan, in late 2015, decided to sever its three-decades-old ties with Iran as part of an attempt to tap into Saudi Arabian resources to revive Sudan’s faltering economy. During this time, US intelligence reportedly completed the required six-month review and concluded that Sudan was no longer sponsoring terrorism and was cooperating fully with American CT efforts. However, in meeting the final requirement, Sudan reportedly refused to provide the assurances that Washington needed that it would disavow any and all future support to Hamas, which maintained a small political office in Khartoum, thus derailing Sudan’s last best effort for removal.

However, the roadmap process did eventually lead to the removal of the most biting economic sanctions on the country in the opening days of the Trump administration in 2017, which noted at the time that, “The government of Sudan’s actions during the last nine months show that it is serious about cooperating with the United States and has taken significant steps to stop conflict and improve humanitarian access within Sudan, and to promote regional stability,” but that “any further normalization of ties will require continued progress by the government of Sudan.”  However, in the waning days of the Bashir regime, sufficient progress was never made to build up the political will and popular support necessary in the United States to remove Sudan from the list, prompting a final call that the United States had again moved the goalposts.

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What is the process for removing a country from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?

The process for removing a country is both legally well-defined but politically quite opaque. Herein lies the perennial challenge faced by Sudan: what must it do to sufficiently satisfy both the requirements of the statute and the powerful domestic constituencies that have long held sway over US-Sudan policy?

From a practical standpoint, the legal process involves two avenues. In the first approach, the president reports to the Congress that:

• there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned;
• that government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and
• that government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Clearly, from the time Sudan’s new civilian cabinet was established in September 2019, this was Khartoum’s strategy: declaring a fundamental change of leadership in Sudan to trigger the rescission process. Only three weeks after assuming his new role, Prime Minister Hamdok used his address at the UN General Assembly to press this point, saying:

“The Sudanese people have never sponsored, nor were supportive of terrorism. On the contrary, those were the acts of the former regime which has been continuously resisted by the Sudanese people until its final ouster. These sanctions have played havoc on our people, causing them untold misery of all types and forms.

We, in the transitional government, call on the United States of America to take Sudan off the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and not to continue punishing the Sudanese people for the acts committed by that vicious regime, especially that our people have been victims of and courageously resistant to.”

However, while showing consistent support to the new civilian government and the grassroots protest movement that brought it to power, the Trump administration has remained skeptical over just how “fundamental the change in leadership and policies” has been in Sudan under a transitional government that amounts to a power-sharing arrangement between military, militia, and civilian actors, but where veto power—it is believed—continues to rest with armed actors.

Only after several months of unsuccessful lobbying of US officials by Sudan and its European and Arab backers in late 2019 that the transitional government is fundamentally different from the previous one has Khartoum now seemed to accept that the more traditional path toward rescission is likely its only available option.

Under that approach, the president would, forty-five days before the rescission is to enter into effect, notify Congress that:

• the government has not provided any support for acts of international terrorism during the preceding six-month period; and
• the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

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What additional requirements has the United States imposed on Sudan for it to be delisted?

The United States has added a number of additional requirements related to SST rescission that mostly involve making amends for Sudan’s past acts of and support for terrorism. The most notable and explicit requests that have been relayed to Sudanese leaders from senior State Department officials are that Sudan settle the court judgments against it for the 1998 US embassy attacks in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, along with the separate settlement for the 2000 USS Cole attack in the port of Aden, Yemen.

The initial 2007 USS Cole case involves an $8 million judgment to the families of the seventeen US Navy servicemen killed in the attack, with the judge noting at the time that, “It is a further tragedy that the laws of the United States, in this instance, provide no remedy for the psychological and emotional losses suffered by the survivors.” This sentiment was addressed in a subsequent 2010 case in US District Court when fifteen Cole sailors and three family members sought and were awarded additional damages in the amount of $314 million. But in March 2019, the US Supreme Court overturned that ruling on the grounds that Khartoum had not been properly notified of the lawsuit. Despite that win for Sudan, the threat of further legal action has helped motivate Sudan’s new civilian government to pursue a final financial settlement directly with the plaintiffs.

Similarly, US Courts found that in relation to the US embassy bombings that Sudan “provided safe harbor, as well as financial, military and intelligence assistance, to al-Qaida,” adding at the time that “Sudanese government support was critical to the success of the 1998 embassy bombings,” and that “because this amounted to the provision of material support for acts of extrajudicial killing…Sudan was not entitled to [sovereign] immunity.” The country was ordered to pay $10.2 billion in criminal and punitive damages, only to have the $4.3 billion in punitive damages later overturned on appeal. However, plaintiffs in 2019 appealed this ruling and in February 2020 the US Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case that could very well see the $4.3 billion in punitive damages added back to the total fine. A decision on this case is expected sometime in Spring 2020.

Privately, the United States has also begun pressing Sudan to formally accept responsibility for the murder of John Granville, a US Agency for International Development employee who was gunned down along with his Sudanese driver, Abdel Rahman Abbas, in a terrorist-related attack in the early hours of New Year’s Day 2008. While the previous government of Sudan claimed no responsibility for the attack, justice was also never fully carried out for this crime, with four of the five accused mysteriously breaking out of prison in June 2010. While there is no US legal judgment against Sudan for the handling of the matter, the politically sensitive case remains an open sore in the United States’ relationship with Sudan. While the details of these talks remain private, reports suggest that the Hamdok government is seeking an appropriate settlement in line with the other formal terrorist-related claims against it.

It should also be noted that despite these many demands, Sudan in recent months has seemingly decided to go even further than what the United States has requested in trying to make amends for its past behavior in hopes of furthering its chances of losing the terrorism designation. Efforts in the past month suggesting that Sudan would seek to normalize bilateral relations with longtime foe Israel and that it would begin talks with the International Criminal Court on seeking an agreement to hold accountable five Sudanese for past atrocity crimes in Darfur, including former President Bashir, demonstrate the fundamental nature of the changes occurring in Sudan and potentially the lengths that both military and civilian rulers seem prepared to go to be removed from the terror list.

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Where is Sudan in the removal process?

While no public announcement has been made, Sudan has reportedly met the most critical requirement of being delisted by having the US intelligence community complete its six-month look back at Sudan’s support for international terrorism and finding it to be supportive of US CT efforts and not supporting international terrorism. Any activity even resembling questionable behavior in this regard would likely have derailed Sudan’s chances for the foreseeable future as it would have only reinforced lingering concerns within some circles of the US government that armed factions within the transitional government remain unrepentant and in control of decision-making.

Sudan is also reportedly in the process of providing the written assurances, as required under the statute, to the State Department that it is not providing support to international terrorism and has pledged support and deepened cooperation with US CT efforts in Sudan and globally. This now presumably also explicitly includes the renunciation of support to Hamas, which was responsible for derailing Sudan’s last best chance at delisting at the end of the Obama administration.

Equally as important, Sudan has recently made considerable progress around settling the open terrorism cases against it. However, important questions and potential sticking points remain.  In February 2020, Sudan’s transitional government reached a deal with the families and survivors of the USS Cole involving a $70 million settlement to the parties to the original lawsuit, thus fulfilling an important US requirement.

While there are ongoing negotiations with State Department lawyers to settle the embassy bombing lawsuit, several important factors could delay or imperil a final deal from moving forward. Given the size of the judgment against Sudan in this case, currently standing at nearly $6 billion, even a settlement involving pennies on the dollar would likely be too much for Sudan to pay for on its own given the country’s failing economy. Complicating this question of funding is the fact that US legal experts expect that when the US Supreme Court issues its final ruling on whether Sudan owes an additional $4.3 billion in punitive damages, the ruling is likely to favor the plaintiffs, which would bring Sudan’s total obligation back to over $10 billion.

Reports are that Sudan is working feverishly to reach a settlement on the $6 billion outstanding, rumored to be somewhere in the neighborhood of $500 million, before the US Supreme Court rules and victims’ families decide to try for a substantially higher settlement that would be even further out of reach for Sudan to afford or finance. So, while timing is of the essence, so too is the question of financing.

Sudan hasn’t anywhere close to the necessary funds to cover the $70 million owed to victims of the USS Cole, let alone the ability to find an additional $500 million for the embassy bombing settlement. And even if they did, popular outrage could well topple any government that chose to repay a foreign debt to the richest country in the world, at a time of such domestic economic crisis, and that the public steadfastly believes it is ultimately not responsible for.

Sudan’s politics aside, the United States for its part has also not determined what financing arrangement it will accept—whether a pledge of repayment is sufficient or whether the funds must be transferred in whole to a US bank or, harder still, that the funds be dispersed in full to the parties to the lawsuits. The modalities of each of these is critical as each one has the potential of adding weeks or months to the time it takes to ultimately satisfy the US conditions.

And finally, though mention has been made of the enormous sums that Sudan is soon going to owe under these various settlement agreements, very little has been done to determine where the money might come from and when it might be available to settle these suits. The overwhelming presumption is that sums this large would necessarily have to come from supportive Gulf states, which have previously floated Sudan’s economy billions in direct budgetary support. However, Gulf states themselves have recently privately indicated that such largesse may no longer be forthcoming. To that end, an international donor conference for Sudan, intended to support the country’s economic stabilization and long-term development, still cannot find a host four months after being announced, suggesting that Khartoum’s traditional benefactors may have reached their own saturation point.

This dilemma presents a perhaps insurmountable challenge to Sudan that may only be resolved through Washington’s direct intervention with Gulf states on Khartoum’s behalf. Thus far, Washington has largely used its influence with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to create political space for Sudan to continue along its path of transition free of foreign interference from regional actors that may have a preferred outcome to Sudan’s ultimate leadership question. But if that political investment is to pay off, Washington may soon need to double down on its involvement on behalf of Khartoum—thus making the delisting truly a shared project of these two governments.

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When can we expect Sudan to be removed?

Given the many challenges (outlined above) of money, political will, timing, and attention required to remove Sudan from the list, the most optimistic scenario if all those elements align perfectly would be to see the start of the forty-five-day review process by Congress initiated sometime towards the end of Spring 2020. That would allow for the earliest possible removal by mid-summer. However, it should also be noted that during the forty-five-day period, Congress is free to introduce a joint resolution that could impose additional demands or prerequisites on any delisting being finalized.

An alternative, and perhaps more likely, scenario would be that for a variety of reasons, Sudan misses the small window it currently has at being removed and is forced to wait until potentially months after the US presidential election to revisit the issue.

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What other countries have been removed from the list and what was the process?

In large and complicated policy processes, it is not uncommon for lawyers, bureaucrats, and politicians to lean on precedent when charting a path forward. Regrettably for Sudan, the delisting process for SST has few precedents and the lessons that have been drawn from them suggest a more cautious, go-slow approach than what Sudan is likely hoping for.

Since the creation of the list in 1979, only five countries have ever been removed: Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and South Yemen—the latter when it merged with the Yemen Arab Republic in 1990. Of these, North Korea was relisted in 2017, nine years after being delisted, for violating the terms of its nuclear agreement with the United States. At various points, both Iraq and Libya have been seen as contenders for relisting as well given the various terrorist forces that have emanated from both since their respective delistings in 2004 and 2006. Cuba, too, whose delisting came as part of a larger deal by the Obama administration in 2015 to reestablish bilateral relations after Fidel Castro relinquished power, is still seen in many circles as a mistake.

In all cases, the requirements for delisting were equally as long and as complicated as the case of Sudan is proving to be, if not longer. The Libya case is particularly relevant as it is the case that Sudan’s delisting efforts are reportedly being modeled on. In this example, over the course of eight years, Tripoli, under then-President Muammar al-Qaddafi, agreed to turn over two of its citizens for trial in the Hague for their role in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; accepted responsibility as a government for the bombing and agreed to pay millions in compensation to victims’ families; repeatedly pledged to renounce terrorism by cutting funding to and closing terrorist training camps on its soil; and lastly, surrendering the entirety of its weapons of mass destruction program to UN inspectors.

In the end, Congress chose not to use its forty-five-day review period to hold up the laboriously arrived at agreement spanning two presidential administrations, but did introduce subsequent legislation expressing that, “The President should not accept the credentials of any representative of the Government of Libya until…a good faith effort to resolve all outstanding claims of United States victims of terrorism sponsored by Libya had been made…and that final payment be made to the families of the victims of the attack on Pan Am Flight 103.”

Given this precedent, Sudan should be prepared for similar legislative action from Congress that would guard against future backsliding or the military reasserting itself into a more powerful governance role.

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What is the US policy toward removing Sudan from the terrorism list? Has the decision actually been made to remove Sudan from the SST list?

There has been an active and ongoing debate within the US interagency (the collection of government departments and agencies that have a stake in the national security decision-making process) about how best to support civilian rule in Sudan’s transition to democracy.  Despite the overall lack of an approved policy, the national security bureaucracy appears to be moving forward as if the delisting has been decided so that when, and if, the decision is made the effects can be immediate.

However, important differences in the US approach do remain and will have to be resolved before Washington is able to fully commit to taking its own politically costly steps, outlined above, that will be necessary to ultimately remove Sudan from the list. In one policy camp are those with the knowledge that while the terrorism designation is having both a tremendous detrimental effect on the Sudanese economy by deterring new investment and preventing Sudan from accessing certain forms of international financing, it is also a potentially very powerful point of leverage to help press for the continued consolidation of civilian rule.

By this argument, this group contends that removing the terrorism designation toward the end of the transitional period in 2022 would both create the incentive for continued reforms but also hopefully keep the military and security services in check during this period. At the same time, it would buy time and build the confidence of US authorities, which remain leery of the future ambitions of the military and certain threatening individuals like Rapid Support Forces leader Mohammed “Hemedti” Dagalo, that these military actors no longer pose a threat to the new Sudan.

The greatest concern of this group is that the United States could move too quickly in lifting sanctions and give up whatever powerful leverage might have built up over the years. Some also fear that if the United States were to deliver Hamdok the single biggest win the new government has laid out for itself in the first year of a three-year transition, he might rapidly, and inadvertently, outlive his usefulness in the eyes of the security sector, whose officials, many believe, have not yet given up their designs on power. In the end, as much as Washington does not want to be held responsible for the failure of the transitional government because it waited too long to deliver sanctions relief, it also does not want to inadvertently empower the very armed factions it wants to see removed from the political scene.

The other camp in the US policy debate reflects a more traditional view of the dispensation of American influence and tracks more consistently with positions pursued by European allies. In short, they argue that the United States should move as fast as it can to remove as many of the sanctions and barriers to trade and investment with Sudan as possible, overwhelming the new government with political backing and financial assistance such that the vast majority of Sudanese civilians experience an immediate benefit from the change in government brought about by their revolution. This scenario, it is argued, offers the most unambiguous proof that the tidal change toward democracy and economic reform would lift all boats in the Sudanese political space. The risk here is that in the event of backsliding later on, the United States has no tools left to punish or deter future bad behavior because all incentives have been frontloaded.

The case most often cited by US officials today is that of Myanmar, where comprehensive US sanctions on the country, not unlike those in place for decades on Sudan, were lifted in 2013 shortly after the parliamentary election of the country’s then-human rights icon, Aung San Suu Kyi. At the same time, Myanmar’s military, which still held executive power in the country, began a campaign of mass human rights abuses and genocide against the minority Muslim Rohingya community that continues to this day. Regrettably, US officials no longer have their powerful sanctions tools in place because those incentives were frontloaded as part of Myanmar’s presumed democratic transition to encourage further reforms.

Reflecting on the debate still playing out in the US approach to Sudan, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo noted at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020, after a brief pull-aside meeting with Sudanese Prime Minister Hamdok, “The Sudanese reminded me that they would love to get off the [terrorism] list and we always measure twice and cut once before we remove someone from a list like that.”

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What could cause the Trump administration to delay or decide not to remove Sudan from the SST list?

Once again there are a set of practical impediments, but also political ones, that could imperil any final arrangement on removing Sudan from the SST list. On the practical side there are the details outlined above as to whether Sudan will be able to reach a final settlement on all the outstanding terrorism cases and then whether and how it will be able to meet the financial requirements attached to each of those in a timely matter.

There is also the practical question of timing. This is an election year in the United States and by the time many details of a possible deal are finally in place, the president could well be out of Washington for long stretches on the campaign trail or else not focused on concluding the deal.     And, of course, there is also the very real question around the nature and quality of the deal that gets struck and whether the president will approve of the final settlement. With only months before the election, the administration will want a deal that achieves the maximum benefit for the American victims of terrorism, but too high a bill will put its implementation out of reach for Sudan and its backers.

Perhaps most importantly, the United States continues to pay close attention to the situation on the ground in Sudan and any recidivistic moves on the part of the military or associated militias to resist further reforms or undermine the existing constitutional agreement will only confirm Washington’s worst fears and would likely pause any forward progress.

Furthermore, any dramatic changes to Sudan’s governing structure would also likely imperil a future thaw. The risk of Prime Minister Hamdok being removed either by assassination, which was attempted in early March 2020, or even by nominally democratic means by the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, acting currently as a parliament-in-waiting, would shake American confidence in the transition process to date, which has become personified to many in the West by the prime minister individually. His political, and literal, survival remains an essential ingredient for delisting going forward.

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What impact will lifting the SST designation have on Sudan’s troubled economy?

Much has already been written about the likely impact that removing the SST designation will have on the Sudanese economy, but the short answer is that it will likely have little effect in the near-term. It should be noted, once again, that the bulk of the comprehensive sanctions against Sudan were lifted by the Trump administration in early 2017. In fact, it was after this lifting that Sudan’s economic freefall was accelerated, leading to the dramatic events that ended with the overthrow of President Bashir just two years later. Moreover, recently-announced investments by US firms Oracle, Visa, and even Yum! Brands (operator of Pizza Hut and Kentucky Fried Chicken, now with outposts in Khartoum) demonstrate that the terror designation was not the barrier to entry into the Sudanese market that many thought it was.

What many in Sudan have failed to fully grasp is that the lack of new foreign direct investment into the country during the 2017 to 2019 period, when sanctions were lifted and Bashir was still in office, demonstrates just how powerful the lingering effects of Sudan’s thirty years of autocratic rule and terror designation are on the country. So while removing Sudan from a terror club that currently includes Iran, Syria, and North Korea will begin to remedy some of the reputational effects of being listed, the terror designation is only one symptom of a much larger disease that has grown out of Sudan’s well-documented history of autocratic rule, terrorism, gross human rights abuses, Islamic fundamentalism, and genocide. That is a reputation that the overthrow of a dictator and six months of civilian rule cannot erase, but that the further transition to civilian rule and democratic freedoms will over time.

Beyond the removal of sanctions, another key inhibitor to Sudan’s economic growth is the country’s opaque business and financial environment which has suffered from decades of being off limits to the Western financial services industry. In addition, Sudan’s banking laws remain woefully inadequate to meeting international standards for transparency and combatting illicit and terrorist finance. Until significant efforts are made, presumably with Western technical assistance, to introduce new transparency and banking supervision laws to meet international standards, the kinds of Western financial backing and investment partnerships Sudanese believe will be unlocked by the removal of sanctions are unlikely to materialize.

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Is this the last sanction remaining in the US-Sudan relationship?

While the terror designation in the Sudanese popular consciousness is seen as the end-all and be-all, there are numerous other US sanctions and prohibitions which will continue as bilateral irritants but will likely not have the biting effect that previous sanctions or the terrorism designation have had. In particular, prohibitions under Section 7008 of the State Department Foreign Operations funding, known colloquially as the “coup provision,” which limits certain kinds of foreign assistance to governments and their militaries where “a country’s military has overthrown, or played a decisive role in overthrowing, the government,” will remain in place.

In the case of Sudan, the 1989 coup that brought Bashir and the National Islamic Front to power remains the last official change in government and even though Bashir was removed from office in 2019 and a new civilian cabinet was installed, because neither occurred through a democratic election and because the military still maintains executive authority under the transitional constitution, the coup provision will remain in effect until at least 2022 when the next elections are expected.

Beyond that, a network of Darfur-related executive and congressional sanctions is also still on the books. While the negotiations that the government is leading in Juba, South Sudan to a comprehensive peace agreement with the remaining armed groups continues, the Darfur-related sanctions remain in effect. And while the practical impact of those sanctions may not seem significant now, they will continue to have a dampening effect on outside investment until durable peace and credible accountability mechanisms have been implemented.

One final impediment exists at the state level when during the height of the Darfur conflict advocacy groups established a divestment task force which lobbied more than thirty state legislatures to pass laws prohibiting companies doing business in Sudan to get contracts or receive investments from state pension funds. Those laws are still on the books, with some slated to be removed when the US government lifts its own Darfur sanctions, while others would require additional legislative action.

While President Bush signed into the law the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act, which enabled these sanctions to be enacted, the concern of the policy community at the time was that if and when Sudan ever did what was required of it to have these sanctions removed, would the advocacy community be as strong and vocal in encouraging new investments in Sudan as they were in deterring and divesting past investments? Sadly, the answer to that question is clearly no. But at a minimum, they should bear the responsibility of working to ensure that individual states, which are not paying close attention to unfolding events in Sudan, are taking appropriate steps to unwind their sanctions when the conditions are finally met.

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Should the United States remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?

The time has most certainly come for Sudan to be removed from the SST list if for no other reason than it is neither reflective of Sudan’s behavior in the past twenty years or the present. While there are no guarantees of what Sudan’s future might hold, removing the country now increases the likelihood for a soft landing and could create even greater leverage for the United States to shape an outcome to its liking.

But where flaws in this question emerge is in assuming that the designation is the only choice Washington has to make and the only piece of leverage that the United States has to shape the road ahead in Sudan. Rather than framing this as a binary question, posed in a vacuum, the decision to remove Sudan should be nested in a much broader US strategy that seeks to continue to empower the role of moderates and civilians across the government and mitigate the potential for spoilers, such that at the end of Sudan’s transition period in 2022 it is poised to usher in a new chapter of legitimately democratic rule. Ideally this would include a set of policies and accompanying funding authorities that emphasize economic recovery and budgetary transparency; reform of the security sector; reform of the justice sector to promote broad-based accountability; a commitment to fighting corruption; and lastly, investments to reform the political space and strengthen the capacity of government institutions.

It is a large and complex undertaking, but fortunately not one that the United States will have to shoulder on its own. Already, German, French, and European Union commitments to supporting these priorities are quite substantial—totaling nearly €200 million. Even if the United States did nothing else, removing its terrorism designation would, at a minimum, have a catalytic effect on others’ development efforts and would unleash the power of Sudan’s own private sector to tap into international capital markets to help rebuild the economy on both concessional and commercial terms.

But perhaps more importantly, the United States cannot afford for Sudan’s revolution and experiment in civilian rule to fail for reasons that go well beyond the country. Sitting at the crossroads of the African continent and Arab world, Sudan has emerged as a frontline state in the battle between authoritarianism and democracy. As Prime Minister Hamdok proudly contends, after a series of failed democratic transitions from Egypt to Syria, Sudan could very well become the model for what transitions can and should look like in a region more marked by militarism than liberalism. As forces from expanding youth populations, to the power of the internet, to declining living standards, to climate change continue to test the populations of this region, supporting examples of successful transitions will become critical to ensuring soft landings and avoiding crises of migration, conflict, and extremism.

Nowhere is that example more present than in the Sahel region on Sudan’s western border.  And as the Trump administration doubles down on an expanded diplomatic strategy there, with the recent announcement of a new Special Envoy for the region, to push back against the terrorist forces engulfing countries from Mauritania to Chad, Sudan can either stand as a reliable bulwark against the further spread of radical Islam across Africa to the Red Sea or it can fall prey to those same forces and contribute further to the broader region’s unrest.

On whatever grounds the United States is motivated to act in Sudan, for promoting democracy or preventing extremism, the path forward should include removing the country’s terrorism designation. 

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Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

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Khartoum was rocked on March 9 by an explosion that sent shockwaves well beyond Sudan’s capital city.

Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, a former United Nations economist, who since last September has led Sudan’s bumpy transition from authoritarian security state to proto-civilian rule, was targeted for assassination as his convoy plied the streets of Khartoum. 

Many details of the unsuccessful assassination attempt remain unknown several days after it occurred, like who carried out the attack and for what purpose. But theories and conspiracies abound to fill the void. 

Some cite former members of deposed President Omar Bashir’s former ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP), which has been singled out in recent months by the new government for dismantlement. Party offices and finances were seized, the party itself has been disbanded, and efforts have been announced to seek justice for all variety of crimes committed during the party’s thirty years in power, starting with the 1989 coup that ushered in the NCP’s precursor, the National Islamic Front. Denying the attack, senior NCP member Muhanad al-Sheikh told media just after the attack, “we have nothing to do with the violence and we believe that the government is circulating these claims to pave the way for repression and discrimination against us.”

Sudan’s once powerful Islamist movement, a perennial boogeyman, is also seen as a likely suspect in the attack. Overlapping substantially with the NCP for adherents, Islamist elements have been blamed for efforts to undermine the government’s reform efforts through a “deep state” network that sees many of them still embedded across the new government’s ministries. Recent efforts to retire or simply purge their ranks—specifically from the Foreign Ministry and the General Intelligence Service—have been met with anger, defiance, and even armed resistance.

In January, several dozen furloughed intelligence officers took up arms and refused to leave their headquarters when presented with their pink slips. The standoff was quickly put down, but it suggested that this once powerful—and still angry—minority would likely not go quietly and could be heard from again.

But if the intent of the attackers was to somehow derail the government from its reform agenda or undermine international confidence in the new government by transitioning from passive deep-state tactics to more kinetic ones, the effort failed miserably.

As if to demonstrate that he was non-plussed by the attack on his life, the ever-ebullient prime minister was tweeting from his office within hours of the attack, telling followers, “rest assured that what happened today will not stand in the way of our transition, instead it is an additional push to the wheel of change in Sudan.”

Seeming to echo the prime minister’s resolve, statements of support have since poured in from dozens of Western, Arab, and African capitals in support of the prime minister and the civilian-led transitional government. The sentiment expressed by the US State Department spokesman that day captures what all expressed: “The United States strongly supports Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government. We stand with it and the Sudanese people in their pursuit of peace, security, prosperity, democracy, and equality.”

Indeed, rather than serving as a wakeup call to those inside Sudan that the former regime was still a force to be feared, the attack may have instead put Western nations on notice to support the civilian government while it still can. The United States, which has been criticized for its slow pace of engagement, may particularly be taking note and realizing that as imperfect as the transitional government may be, it is still a partner the United States can work with.

To that end—and seeming to go beyond all others in responding—the United States deployed an FBI team on March 11 to Khartoum to assist in the ongoing investigation—an historic first for a country that is still counted among the ranks of Syria, Iran, and North Korea on the United States’ State Sponsor of Terrorism list.

This outpouring of political and technical support also acknowledges that this early on in the transition, Hamdok himself remains an essential component in unifying and building bridges between civilian and armed actors in the country, who for the time being seem to have reached a workable, ruling accommodation under his non-threatening leadership style. 

While many inside Sudan would prefer to see a more confrontational approach, with the prime minister more openly critical of military and militia forces that seem at times openly defiant of his authority, Hamdok has chosen a path largely marked by compliance and cooperation. 

As the former regime breathes its last gasps, the current governing coalition seems well poised to withstand those final throes. What emerges after that remains an open question, but continued international support for the cause of civilian, democratic rule in Sudan will remain an essential ingredient.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading:

AfricaSource Jan 15, 2020

Sudan’s uncertain road ahead

By Cameron Hudson

Nearly six months in, the governing bargain between civilians and security forces seems to be holding strong, but there has been little concrete progress towards determining which side will emerge as the dominant actor at the end of the transition. That means that there is ongoing uncertainty over who ultimately is in charge, not only today, but well into the future. And uncertainty over what the political future will be means uncertainty over whether – and which – people will have jobs and the resources they need to support their families.

Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Dec 6, 2019

Prime minister promises “Sudan will never be the same again”

By David A. Wemer

Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok became the first Sudanese leader to travel to Washington, DC in more than thirty years, seeking to win more international support for his transitional government as it tries to guide Sudan towards democracy. “There is a success story that is emerging” in Sudan, Hamdok told an audience at the Atlantic Council on December 5. In a “region full of crises and riddled with conflicts, Sudan provides hope,” Hamdok declared.

Democratic Transitions Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

AfricaSource Dec 2, 2019

Sudan’s prime minister comes to Washington

By

Thus far, the prime minister has done a poor job of managing the outsized expectations of his people to be out from under Washington’s punitive regime. Many will surely be disappointed when and if he returns home without one of these large deliverables, but Hamdok need not leave Washington empty-handed.

Africa Civil Society

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