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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

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Nobody will have failed to notice that while Putin has continued to talk tough, he failed to crush the Wagner uprising and instead struck some kind of deal with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his mutinous troops. Putin demonstrated a readiness to compromise despite the fact that Wagner fighters reportedly shot down a number of Russian aircraft and killed numerous Russian airmen. This indicated an apparent lack of concern for the lives of Russian servicemen at a time when tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been killed as a result of Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine.

The brief Wagner uprising also revealed a remarkable shortage of Russian military strength and fighting spirit on the home front. Wagner troops were able to seize one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. Perhaps even more significantly, they were cheered and supported by crowds of locals. Wagner forces then advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before choosing to turn back.

Meanwhile, there was no surge in street-level or elite support for Putin. Instead, pro-war propagandists fell largely silent as rumors swirled of establishment figures fleeing Moscow. For a brief period, Russia looked to be leaderless and defenseless. The immediate danger has now passed, but these stunning developments have changed attitudes toward Putin and his regime in fundamental ways.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

It would appear that history repeats itself. Just as in 1990 very few foresaw the looming collapse of the USSR, Russia now once again looks suddenly fragile. Unsurprisingly, this is regarded as good news in Ukraine, where any sign of Russian instability is welcomed. Attitudes elsewhere are not so clear-cut. Many international observers are openly alarmed by the potential demise of the Russian Federation in its current form. They worry about the fate of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, and also question the legitimacy of the many new states that could potentially emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Russia.

These concerns mirror attitudes during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is often forgotten that US President George Bush H. W. Bush came to Kyiv in the weeks before Ukraine’s August 1991 declaration of independence to argue against such a move in his “Chicken Kiev” speech. Many of today’s leaders share these fears over the potential disintegration of Russia. Nevertheless, the Wagner revolt has demonstrated that the Putin regime may well collapse due to its own internal weaknesses, regardless of the Western world’s wishes.

Elements of the international community, including in the West, also cling to the idea of reaching some kind of compromise and returning to business as usual with Russia. While it is obvious to almost everyone in Ukraine and in nearby countries including Poland and the Baltic states that Russia will only stop when it is decisively defeated, there are still many observers elsewhere who believe they can turn back the clock to 2021 or even 2013. They fondly recall a time when Vladimir Putin was the respected leader of a economically strong nation at the heart of global affairs, and dream of returning to this state of affairs. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

In reality, there can be no way back to international respectability for Putin. As a result of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, he will be an enemy of the entire Western world for as long as he remains in power. Crucially for the future of his regime, Putin is also clearly no longer able to guarantee domestic security or protect the interests of the Russian elite on the international stage.

As the international community assesses the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia. Western policymakers should now be thinking seriously about how to make any future transition as smooth as possible. This means preparing for the emergence of a democratic Russia, and also exploring what a breakup of the current Russian Federation into a number of smaller states would mean for international security.

When similar processes were underway in the early 1990s, the international community prioritized stability above all else, paving the way for the eventual rise of a revisionist Russia under Putin. This time, a new Russian collapse should be managed in order to bring about a sustainable shift toward democracy. The experience of the past three decades has demonstrated that this is the only way to secure a durable peace. Today’s Western leaders must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors in order to avoid repeating them.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Egyptians aren’t racist. They’re frustrated with Western appropriation of their ancient history.

Shahira Amin — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 15:13:23 +0000

“This is the land of my ancestors,” American actor Danny Glover proudly said to a small group of journalists, including myself, in December 2006, as he kneeled and kissed the ground at the Pyramids of Giza.

I soon discovered that Glover’s conviction is shared by many other American performers of African descent, who take pride in the notion that the kings and queens of ancient Egypt are their ancestors. Many African-American musicians and artists embrace their purported connection with ancient Egyptian civilization, drawing inspiration from it for their music and art.

The idea is rooted in Afrocentrism, a cultural and political movement that originated around the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—when the colonial era ended and slavery was abolished—to counter Eurocentrism, which favors European and Western civilization over non-Western civilizations. The pushback against the colonialist ideas of supposed white superiority empowers Africans in the diaspora who—based on the Afrocentric theory—can be proud of their alleged links to the ancient kingdom that has fascinated the modern world with its art and culture.

Best known for his roles in the Lethal Weapon franchise, Glover, who also provided the voice for Jethro—Tzipporah’s father in the 1998 animated film, The Prince of Egypt—jokingly said to me that he identifies as Egyptian during a 2018 visit to Aswan to attend an African film festival.

However, as much as Afrocentrists claim that ancient Egypt was a predominantly black civilization, it has been refuted by the Egyptian government, which has been promoting ancient Egyptian civilization as the chief element of Egyptian heritage.

This was evident from the lavish parade organized by the state in 2021 to transport twenty-two royal mummies from the Egyptian museum to their new resting place—the National Museum of Civilizations—which featured a rare performance by an Egyptian soprano, who sang in an ancient Egyptian language no longer spoken today. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was on hand to welcome the ancient Egyptian mummies upon arriving at the museum.

Many Egyptians shun their Africanness, preferring to associate themselves with the Middle East and identify as Muslims and Arabs. African refugees in Egypt often complain of harassment and discrimination and claim Egyptians are “racist,” looking down on Sub-Saharan Africans as inferior. Egypt’s Coptic Christians and secularists, meanwhile, choose to distance themselves from Arabism and Islam, associating themselves with ancient Egyptian heritage instead. This is part of a xenophobic nationalism that emerged as a push back against the 2012-2013 rule of the Muslim Brotherhood as opponents of the Islamist group feared that Islamist President Mohammed Morsi would seek to “Islamize” society.

As a result, a series of recent incidents have rubbed Egyptians the wrong way, triggering accusations of “Afrocentrism” from critics and a firestorm on Egyptian social media platforms.

The latest of these is the exhibition “Kemet: Egypt in Hip-Hop, Jazz, Soul, and Funk,” currently being held at the National Museum of Antiquities in the Dutch city of Leiden. The exhibit which continues until September 3, takes visitors on “a musical journey through history,” according to its webpage. The show explores the influence of ancient Egypt in the works of Western musicians of African descent, showcasing photographs, music videos, album covers, and artworks that explain how ancient Egypt served as an inspiration to these artists and how it is reflected in their music.

The mere suggestion by the curators that “Egypt is a part of Africa” has drawn a backlash from the Egyptian government, which retaliated by banning the museum’s team of archaeologists from excavating in Saqqara. At a parliamentary session on May 2, Ahmed Belal, an Egyptian member of parliament, slammed the exhibit, accusing the curators of “distorting Egyptian identity” and “attacking Egyptian heritage and civilization.”

Joining the chorus of condemnation, many Egyptians took to social media to express their rejection of “attempts to distort our history.” Photos of a sculpture showcased at the exhibition, which depicted King Tutankhamun as black, widely circulated on social media platforms and were deemed “offensive” by critics. The backlash from Egyptians prompted the show’s organizers to publish an additional webpage that unapologetically explained the exhibition’s aim, warning that “racist” comments would not be tolerated and would be removed.

The uproar over the controversial exhibition came on the heels of an online hullaballoo over the trailer of a Netflix series portraying Cleopatra as black. The fact that a non-white actress—Adele James—was selected to play the role of the ancient Egyptian queen in the historical series Queen Cleopatra infuriated many Egyptians who accused Netflix of “deliberately erasing and reinterpreting history” and “spreading misinformation.”

Speaking to BNN Breaking, Dr. Zahi Hawas, a prominent archaeologist, insisted that Cleopatra was not black nor of African descent. He argued that she was “of Greek descent” and “resembled the queens and princesses of Macedonia.” Egyptian satirist Bassem Youssef also criticized the casting of a mixed-race actress in the Netflix series. In an episode of Piers Morgan Uncensored, he called the decision “cultural appropriation ” and “falsification of history.”

The Netflix series also spurred a lawsuit against the California-based streaming platform, which was filed by Egyptian lawyer Essam Khalaf. He demanded the Queen Cleopatra series be retracted, describing it as “historical forgery.” Another lawyer, Mahmoud El Sennary, also filed a legal complaint against the streaming service with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, accusing it of “blackwashing Cleopatra.”

The casting of James in the Netflix series and the Leiden exhibition are not the only incidents that have recently sparked controversy in Egypt.

In March, American comedian Kevin Hart had his planned show in Cairo canceled over “Afrocentric remarks” he had allegedly made.

Hart is believed to have said, “We must teach our children the true history of Black Africans when they were kings in Egypt and not just the era of slavery cemented by education in America. Do you remember the time when we were kings?”

Although it is unclear if and when Hart had made the remarks, Egyptian social media users called for the show’s cancellation, accusing him of “blackwashing” their history.

In what appears to be an attempt to appease the nationalists, the authorities decided to call off the comedian’s Cairo debut, citing “logistical issues.”

The angry reactions of Egyptians to the incidents mentioned above have raised eyebrows in the West. Many Europeans and Americans fail to understand the fuss. Why are Egyptians so touchy over any suggested links between Africans in the diaspora and ancient Egypt? A plausible explanation is that decades of looting and trafficking of Egyptian cultural artifacts have made Egyptians defensive—they fear that their heritage and culture are being hijacked. It hasn’t helped that many of the ancient artifacts that were seized during the colonialist era, such as the Rosetta Stone—seized from Egypt by forces of the British empire in 1801—continue to be in possession of other states.

Statements like the one made by former US President John F. Kennedy in 1961—that the United States had “a special interest in the civilization of ancient Egypt from which many of our cultural traditions have sprung”—are seen by Egyptians as appropriation of their ancient civilization. While Kennedy meant well—at the time he was trying to convince Congress to appropriate $10 million of US taxpayer money to rescue Nubian monuments from flooding—similar statements by other Westerners laying claim to ancient Egyptian heritage are not always made in good faith.

Although comments by some Egyptians on social media in reaction to the Leiden exhibit and the Queen Cleopatra series can indeed be dismissed as “racist,” colonialist attitudes denying Egyptians the right to ownership of their history and culture are equally abhorrent.

Perhaps the Arabic hashtag used by social media activists to criticize Netflix says it all: “Egypt for Egyptians.” Egyptians are growing increasingly frustrated with what they perceive as imperialist agendas and attempts to separate them from what is rightfully theirs: their cherished heritage. Western cultural appropriation of ancient Egyptian civilization is a pattern that has persisted since the colonialist era, and Egyptians are now responding with the same nationalist slogan used during the Urabi revolt which demanded an end to British and French hegemony over their country. It is their way of saying, “Enough is enough.”

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

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Ukrainians have good reason to cheer Russia’s Wagner rebellion

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:38:50 +0000

As the Wagner mutiny unfolded in Russia over the weekend, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes about popcorn as millions of Ukrainians settled down to enjoy the spectacle. This gleeful reaction was perhaps predictable, given the unimaginable horror and suffering Russia has brought to Ukraine over the past sixteen months, but there may also be a number of good practical reasons for Ukrainians to cheer Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived revolt. The exact terms of the deal that caused the Wagner warlord to call off his mutiny are not entirely clear and may still be subject to revision, but it is already safe to say that the affair has left Russia weakened and demoralized in ways that favor Ukraine.

The first point to note is that the drama is likely to continue. As Russia’s neighbors can all testify, Vladimir Putin does not honor agreements. He is also notorious for never forgiving traitors. Whatever happens next, we will almost certainly witness the end of Wagner as an independent military force. Individual units will either be broken up, exiled to Belarus, or integrated into the regular Russian army. Putin and his military chiefs simply cannot run the risk of allowing the mercenary group to maintain its powerful military potential.

This will have a considerable impact on the invasion of Ukraine. Wagner troops were responsible for virtually all of Russia’s modest advances over the past year, including the much-hyped seizure of Bakhmut. Wagner’s success was largely down to a distinctive and brutal military doctrine heavily dependent on human wave tactics. These shock troops will find life very different in the ranks of the regular Russian military. Russian generals will view all former Wagner fighters with suspicion and will be reluctant to give them prominent offensive roles. This is a sensible security response to recent events, but it will undermine the Russian military’s already extremely limited ability to advance in Ukraine.

With Russia’s most effective troops no longer playing a prominent role in the invasion, this will increase the options for Ukrainian commanders as they look to develop the country’s current summer counteroffensive. This may have particular significance for the frontline sector close to Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Wagner units were instrumental in securing earlier Russian gains. Ukrainian forces have already made significant advances to the north and south of Bakhmut, and will now be looking to capitalize on the destabilizing impact of the Wagner rebellion in order to push further.

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Ukraine’s military planners may also be encouraged to expand on earlier incursions into the Russian Federation itself. The Wagner mutiny exposed a shocking lack of military defenses inside Russia, with Russian army officials scrambling to assemble units and gather equipment from across the country. Prigozhin was able to seize the major Russian city of Rostov-on-Don without a fight, including the military headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. His troops then advanced virtually unopposed through the Russian heartlands before unilaterally deciding to end their march on Moscow less than two hundred kilometers from the capital city. In the space of a single day, an apparently defenseless Russia found itself on the brink of either civil war or collapse.

This remarkable state of affairs was possible because Putin has deployed the vast majority of Russia’s military potential to Ukraine. The Wagner revolt demonstrated conclusively that there are no more reserves to draw upon. Putin is already close to the maximum of his capacity and has very limited possibilities to escalate the invasion of Ukraine, even if he wished to do so.

This creates all manner of tempting opportunities for Ukraine, which has so far been careful to limit the scope of its military activities inside Russia, in part due to concerns voiced by Kyiv’s international partners. That may now change. In the weeks prior to the start of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, Ukrainian-backed Russian militias launched a number of cross-border raids from Ukraine into Russia’s Belgorod region. While these thrusts were largely symbolic, Ukraine could soon become more ambitious. With the Putin regime seemingly unable to defend itself and in no position to escalate, we may witness bolder Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the whole Wagner drama from a Ukrainian perspective was the obvious weakness and division it exposed within Russia. Any country fighting a major war needs unity, and today’s Russia is clearly not united. Members of the public in Rostov-on-Don and elsewhere appear to have enthusiastically backed the rebellion, while others were indifferent. The limited military presence inside Russia made no serious attempts to intervene, while there was little indication of any surge in public support for Putin or condemnation of Prigozhin. This is all a very long way from the propaganda image promoted by the Kremlin of a strong Russian state supported by a proudly patriotic populace.

The situation in Russia is not yet comparable to the mood in 1917 on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, but the Wagner mutiny is an extremely dangerous signal for Russian society. Any infighting is bad for morale, and the spectacle of Russia’s most successful military force turning against the country’s military leaders is particularly demoralizing. This will damage the fighting spirit of Russian troops in Ukraine while also seriously undermining Putin’s personal authority on the home front.

For Ukraine, the outlook is more promising. The Wagner mutiny was a brief affair, but it has led to the sidelining of Russia’s most effective fighting force while also highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of the Putin regime. This could create practical opportunities for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, and will boost confidence in the country’s ultimate ability to achieve a decisive victory over Russia.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and an advisor to the Ukrainian Government. He previously served as Ukraine’s minister of defense (2019–2020).

The clock is running out on Yousef’s temporary visa in Jordan, necessitating his exit. But where is he to go?

“I felt like walls were closing in on me. I couldn’t breathe,” He confides in me. “I’m out of options.”

He’s not the only one. Facebook private chat groups for Syrian in Jordan are filled with confusion and anxiety. Questions fly back and forth: “Does anyone know if there is a new procedure?” “Is there a way to prolong deportation?” “What happens if I’m stopped on the street?”

Going back to Syria carries the risk of potential detention risk despite the regime’s continuous claims of amnesty for returnees. No one I have spoken to trusts the regime’s claim, and all know that detention in Syria most likely ends in death.

But it’s not just Jordan where Syrians must fear deportation. Living in Turkey has become increasingly difficult as well. Even Syrians who own property in Turkey are getting their residencies rejected. Lebanon is a non-starter.

It’s a terrifying situation to be in. It’s a sort of fear that doesn’t dissipate, and a different one to the sort that drove Syrians out of their homes and into this wretched existence, where they’ve been branded as refugees—rejected and unwanted seemingly everywhere.

I get a message from a mother I know in Lebanon:

“Arwa, please, you have to do something. They are not going to renew our papers. You have to save us.” Umm Mohammed’s voice is cracking, breaking, desperate.

Umm Mohammed and her family fled Syria ten years ago. Her youngest children were born in Lebanon, and her eldest daughter is in university. While life in Lebanon has grown increasingly unbearable for them—the hatred they receive for being Syrian forces them to rarely venture out—at least they encountered no issues with their yearly permit That is, until now.

A relative who knows the family said he was informed through an official that their papers would be stamped “deport/leave”.

“We can’t go back. We just can’t. Our house was destroyed after we left. It was bombed. We have nothing.” Umm Mohammed is begging and begging. “My kids’ lives are here. They are all in school. I haven’t been able to tell my husband yet. He will have a stroke.”

Umm Mohammed and her family registered with the United Nations (UN) in 2013 as refugees. Umm Mohammed says that five years ago, they were called in twice for asylum interviews. Such hope they had! But then they got a phone call from someone who told them they were rejected while failing to provide a reason. Umm Mohammed says they’ve called the numbers on their papers to try to understand why, but no one even answers the phone. They personally visited the offices in their area and in Beirut. However, they could not even get through the front door.

She doesn’t understand what is happening in her life; how everything is just so out of her control. Two of her siblings who interviewed at the same time as her family were resettled in other countries years ago. One is in Norway, and the other is in the United States.

“Please, please just do something to try and see if you can get an answer; if there is anything we can do to get our file moving again.” Umm Mohammed pleads to me. “Our lives are in your hands. My children’s lives are in your hands.”

I called the number on the paperwork she provided me numerous times but received no answer. I’ve reached out to people I know to see if they can point me in the right direction or to the right person. This is hardly the first time I’ve heard about Syrians struggling to get in touch with the UN in Lebanon or to get updates on their status.

The Arab League’s decision to “normalize” relations with the government of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has pushed a fast-forward button on making life harder for Syrian refugees in the region through deportations and rejections of residencies. But it’s hardly anything new.

While Syria’s neighboring countries have long been struggling to host their Syrian refugee populations, with many, like Lebanon, being in a complete crisis of their own, the sheer lack of care provided to refugees is inhumane. This should not be regarded as a “Syria” problem. This is one of the core problems in the overall approach toward managing Syrian refugees. Neighboring countries need to be provided with the support—which has never fully materialized despite pledges—to host and treat their refugee populations with humanity.

Ahmed al-Reems’ story is especially jarring. He arrived in Turkey in 2019, settling in a village around 40 km from the heart of the capital, Ankara. Late last year, Turkish security forces came for him, his wife, his two-year-old son, and his four-year-old daughter in the middle of the night.

“We didn’t understand what was happening, it was 4 am, and they were banging on the door shouting police! police!” Ahmed tells me over the phone. “They said we just want to take you to the immigration department. I asked them to let me pack a bag, at least take diapers for my littlest one. He told me don’t worry about it; you will be back home in a bit.”

When his family boarded the bus, they realized that it was packed with other Syrian families from their same area. Eighteen families—around sixty people in all—had been rounded up at the same time.

They were held for twenty-four hours in a detention facility. There were no blankets nor food, and the conditions were filthy. Ahmed says he and his family were then boarded on another bus and told that they were going to another area in Ankara. Instead, they were driven for hours to Gaziantep (which is close to the border with Syria), given papers, and ordered to sign them.

“I said no at first, but they insisted. I didn’t want to create problems, so we did. I still thought I had a chance of going back home,” Yousef recalls, his voice utterly dejected. “At 6 am, they took us to the border crossing and just shoved us away.”

The presence of Syrian refugees was central to the recent elections in Turkey. The opposition party spouted hateful anti-refugee rhetoric and vowed to rid the country of them. While less vocal about their intentions, the government coalition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who won the presidential vote, has been deporting Syrians for years. However, generally speaking, expulsion had been reserved for those who had not renewed their papers, traveled outside of their permit zone, or incurred other minor infractions.

“It might have been because of the elections,” Ahmed speculates, “but I still don’t understand. I had my residency; we were all legal. I didn’t do anything wrong. I’ve never had any problems.”

In Turkey, they had managed to build a home again. Not exactly the same as the one they had fled from when the bombs arrived in their town in Syria, but it was still a home, filled with their personal belongings and the children’s toys. It’s all gone again. They are back to living in a tent in Idlib.

“I still feel like I’m going to wake up from this nightmare,” Ahmed says. “I feel like I am a dead man.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. She is also the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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How the Saudi Pro League transformed from being unknown to inescapable

Hezha Barzani — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 13:34:17 +0000

Cristiano Ronaldo, Lionel Messi, Karim Benzema, Sergio Ramos, N’Golo Kanté, and many more of international soccer’s biggest stars are either now playing or have mulled over the possibility of joining the Saudi Pro League (SPL)—Saudi Arabia’s domestic soccer league.

Those players are soccer legends, playing at giant European clubs and winning multiple team and individual accolades. They’ve gone from competing in World Cup and Champions League finals to now playing in, or seriously considering playing in, Saudi Arabia. How did the SPL go from a virtually unknown entity to one of the hottest soccer topics in the world?

Outside its homegrown SPL, Saudi Arabia entered the international soccer scene when its Public Investment Fund (PIF) purchased Newcastle United in 2021 for 300 million pounds (over $405 million). At the time of their purchase in the middle of the 2021-2022 season, Newcastle was ranked second to last in the English Premier League (EPL). After having spent around 250 million pounds (nearly $310 million) on new players, Newcastle’s Saudi owners have completely changed the trajectory of the English club in one season, with the team finishing fourth in the EPL this season, a remarkable achievement that secures them a spot in Europe’s top competition next year: the Champions League.

But that’s not all for the PIF’s big soccer investments. At a June 5 announcement, the PIF unveiled its Sports Clubs Investment and Privatization Project, which includes transforming four Saudi clubs—Al Ittihad, Al Ahli, Al Nassr, and Al Hilal—into companies, each of which is 75 percent owned by the PIF and 25 percent owned by different respective nonprofit foundations.

The transformation of these clubs into companies signals the beginning of a broader privatization project, as SPL clubs were formerly under the control of the Saudi Ministry of Sports, with the SPL teams heavily relying on the ministry for financial support. According to a tweet by the PIF, this privatization process would allow soccer and other sports to grow through the attraction of new investments and sponsorships, including from the private sector.

Why is Saudi Arabia spending billions of dollars on sports investments? Some believe that it has to do with the kingdom wanting to diversify its economy and increase tourism, aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030; others believe that Saudi Arabia is “sportswashing”—using these investments to boost its reputation in the Western world. It could be argued that both of these reasons are true, since investing in soccer—the most popular sport in the world—makes financial sense, with the added bonus of offering countries the opportunity to improve their global image.

Grabbing headlines

The SPL’s first significant move was the ground-breaking signing of Ronaldo, one of the greatest soccer players of all time, in December 2022 to Al Nassr for the “biggest salary” in soccer history worth close to 200 million euros (nearly $250 million) a year. Not only did this move surprise the world, but it also set a precedent for future enormous contracts, like Benzema’s three-year, $643 million deal with Al Ittihad and Messi’s rumored one-billion-dollar deal over two years to play for Al Hilal. Although he ultimately decided to join US Major League Soccer team Inter Miami, Messi has well-known ties to Saudi Arabia in his role as a tourism ambassador, a role under which he visits the kingdom frequently.

Since the SPL is not under the rule of the Union of European Football Associations, there are no spending rules, meaning there is no limit on the salaries that Saudi clubs can offer players. The absence of those rules gives SPL clubs an unbelievable advantage in securing talent from Europe, mainly because the PIF’s privatization plan provides the mechanisms for large companies, like Saudi Aramco, to invest in the league.

While the SPL is making international headlines with its big-name signings, these headlines haven’t shied away from calling out Saudi Arabia on its controversial human-rights record. “Sportswashing” often tops articles discussing Saudi Arabia’s, Russia’s, and China’s soccer and other sports ventures. Numerous prominent human-rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch, have been shedding light on the “sportswashing,” most recently highlighting FIFA’s controversial decision to award Saudi Arabia’s state tourism authority sponsorship of the 2023 Women’s World Cup despite its history on women’s rights.

Concerns with the Saudi Pro League

The SPL business model relies on big-name signings to increase the overall value and competition of the league, with an ambitious goal for the SPL to be among the top ten leagues in the world, according to Saudi state news agency SPA. With that being said, this lofty goal for the SPL to become a top-ten league is nowhere near an easy task. For reference, the SPL is currently ranked the fifty-eighth highest-quality league in the world, according to the Twenty-First Group.

Although the SPL is attracting some of soccer’s greatest names, these players are no longer in their prime, with the SPL being perceived by some as a “retirement league.” The real challenge will be if the SPL can attract young talents, such as Kylian Mbappé and Erling Haaland, to leave Europe and play in Saudi Arabia during their prime years. This drastic change would be extremely unlikely, as Europe solidly remains the international soccer hub, with the world’s major competitions taking place on that continent.

While the reputation of being known as a “retirement league” will be hard to shake for the SPL, the impact of securing aging talent can be seen in Ronaldo’s impact. When Ronaldo joined Al Nassr, the Saudi club had 864,000 followers on Instagram; Al Nassr currently has fifteen million followers on Instagram. While there are doubts about securing high-level youth talent to play in Saudi Arabia, what is clear is that signing aging legends like Ronaldo and Benzema still has significant upsides by securing millions of new fans—who then will travel to watch these legends play, growing the Saudi tourism industry—and increasing merchandise and TV revenue, among other benefits.

Looking to the future

Saudi Arabia is levying its soccer investments both at home and abroad as its main push to make a bigger splash in the international sports world; but it’s not stopping at soccer. One of its major investments, which uses a similar business model to the SPL by securing top-level talent with insane contracts, is the LIV Golf league—another initiative backed by Saudi’s PIF (which has already invested two billion dollars). LIV Golf is attracting renowned golfers like Phil Mickelson, who is reportedly being paid two hundred million dollars to participate in the series. On June 6, a major announcement was made as the Professional Golfers’ Association Tour, the leading US professional golf organizer, agreed to merge with LIV Golf, ending a year-long litigation battle that heavily impacted the sport.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia has offered to pay for new sports stadiums in both Greece and Egypt in an effort to join the two nations’ 2030 World Cup bid. The kingdom is already hosting the 2029 Asian Winter Games and has showcased an interest in potentially hosting the 2036 Olympics.

When looking to the future, it’ll be important to keep an eye on Saudi Arabia’s Gulf neighbors—specifically Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—who have also invested considerably in international soccer and the sports industry. Seeing the large expansion of Saudi’s soccer investments could cause Qatar and UAE to also ramp up their domestic soccer leagues and increase other sports-related expenditures.

All of this is a sign that Saudi Arabia is disrupting the international soccer world, which has traditionally been controlled by Europe and the West. While these bold investments into soccer and other sports are for economic and social purposes, they also convey Saudi Arabia’s ability and willingness to disrupt other sectors and fields as it attempts to grow its international power.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

The post How the Saudi Pro League transformed from being unknown to inescapable appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

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Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

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Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

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This latest poll is an important data point that confirms Ukrainian resolve to achieve the complete de-occupation of the country. It also highlights the problems of viewing the current counteroffensive as a make-or-break moment in Ukraine’s war effort.

Some commentators have argued that failure to achieve a major military breakthrough in the coming months would cause a sharp decline in international support for Ukraine and force Kyiv to accept the necessity of some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. In reality, however, the Ukrainian public is staunchly opposed to the kind of land-for-peace deal that would likely form the basis of any negotiated settlement. As long as Ukrainians remain determined to fight on, few Western leaders will be prepared to abandon them.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seems to have a good grasp of the public mood in wartime Ukraine. He has consistently stated that Ukraine’s goal is the liberation of all regions currently under Russian occupation. This uncompromising position has attracted some international criticism, with China pushing for the resumption of peace talks and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva urging Ukraine in April to cede Crimea to Russia in order to end the war.

Ukraine’s Western partners have been far more supportive, providing growing quantities of vital military aid while emphasizing that it is up to Kyiv alone to define what would constitute an acceptable peace. Following some initial hesitation, most Western leaders now also recognize the need for Russia’s invasion to end in a decisive defeat, and acknowledge that anything less would have disastrous consequences for international security.

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It is easy to understand why so many Ukrainians reject the idea of striking a deal with Moscow, despite the terrible toll of the war and the inevitability of further trauma.

Perhaps more than anything else, this determination to liberate the whole of Ukraine reflects an acute awareness of the genocidal agenda underpinning Russia’s invasion and the horrors taking place in Russian-occupied regions. Every time the Ukrainian army advances and liberates territory, officials uncover the same grim evidence of war crimes including summary executions, torture, abductions, sexual violence, and mass deportations. For the vast majority of Ukrainians, the idea of condemning millions of their compatriots to this fate is simply unthinkable.

Many in Ukraine are also convinced that attempts to strike a bargain with the Kremlin are both futile and dangerous. Opponents of a compromise settlement note that the current war is no mere border dispute requiring minor territorial concessions, and point to Russia’s increasingly undisguised commitment to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. They warn that Russian leaders would view any negotiated peace deal as a pause in hostilities, which they would then use to regroup before launching the next stage of the invasion.

Based on Russia’s own actions over the past sixteen months of full-scale war, it is difficult to see how any kind of compromise would prove workable. Putin himself has openly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and in September 2022 announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions representing around 20% of the entire country. If he is not decisively defeated on the battlefield, he will almost certainly seek to go further and attempt to seize more Ukrainian land.

A further factor fueling Ukraine’s commitment to complete de-occupation is the strong desire to free the country once and for all from the historic threat of Russian imperialism. This reflects widespread Ukrainian perceptions of the current war as the latest episode in what is actually a far longer history of imperial aggression that stretches back many hundreds of years.

For centuries, Russian imperial influence has shaped Ukrainian history in ways that have caused untold suffering to generations of Ukrainians while keeping the country trapped in a state of arrested development. Unless Russia is defeated and forced to withdraw entirely from Ukrainian land, this bitter cycle will continue. Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding the high price of victory, but most feel that the price of a premature peace would be far higher, and refuse to pass this burden on to their children and grandchildren. Anyone seeking to end the war without Russian defeat must first reckon with this resolve.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

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Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

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Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

Lesia Dubenko — Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:58:10 +0000

As Ukraine’s long anticipated counteroffensive gets underway, international attention is firmly fixed on military developments. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are able to achieve significant advances, the authorities in Kyiv will also be faced with the challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived for more than a year, and in some cases over nine years, under Russian occupation.

The obstacles to successful reintegration should not be underestimated. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Moscow has prioritized control of the information space and has subjected the population in occupied regions of Ukraine to relentless propaganda. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the communities living in occupied Ukraine can be successfully reintegrated following liberation if the right policies are adopted.

Much to the Kremlin’s disbelief, Ukrainian national identity has proven far stronger than anyone in Moscow anticipated in 2014. Similarly, it should now be abundantly clear that the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian in their daily lives or embrace aspects of Russian popular culture is in no way indicative of political loyalty to the Kremlin.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

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Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive

Olivia Yanchik — Mon, 15 May 2023 13:51:14 +0000

The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group has launched a series of outspoken attacks on the country’s military leadership in recent weeks that point to mounting internal divisions within Putin’s invading army as it prepares to face a potentially decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In one of his most recent rants, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Russian Defense Ministry claims of a “redeployment to defensive positions” near to the hotly contested city of Bakhmut and warned that in reality, the front was in danger of collapsing. “The Defense Ministry’s attempts to cover up the situation will lead to a global tragedy for Russia,” he stated on May 12. “They must stop lying immediately.”

This was the latest in a series of public statements by Prigozhin accusing the Russian army and defense ministry of failing to provide his Wagner troops with sufficient front line support. He had earlier threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut altogether due to alleged ammunition shortages.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

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Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

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Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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At first glance, Russia’s annual Victory Day parade on May 9 was a non-event at best and an embarrassment at worst. Putin’s short speech held no surprises, while the presence of just one antique tank during the military parade itself could only be interpreted as evidence of the dire state of the Russian armed forces.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the event was the identity of the people selected to sit directly alongside Putin on the Red Square podium. While Victory Day marks the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Adolf Hitler, neither of the elderly gentlemen sitting alongside Putin actually fought against Nazi Germany. Instead, they were both veterans of the Soviet security services who had respectively participated in efforts to suppress Ukraine’s independence movement and crush Czechoslovakia’s 1960s anti-Soviet uprising.

To Putin’s right sat the 98-year-old Yuri Dvoikin, who volunteered for the Red Army during World War II but never actually made it to the front lines. Instead, after training as a sniper in 1944, he was dispatched by the Soviet secret police to Lviv in western Ukraine, where his job was to assist in the liquidation of the Ukrainian nationalist underground. The campaign against Ukraine’s independence movement was particularly brutal, with the Soviet authorities employing terror tactics and large-scale deportations. Although the Ukrainians were able to inflict significant casualties on Soviet forces, they were ultimately defeated by the early 1950s.

On Putin’s left sat the 88-year-old Gennady Zaitsev, who, like Dvoikin, never served in what Russia still refers to as the Great Patriotic War. He was drafted into the Red Army in 1953 and joined the KGB six years later after completing his military service. In 1968, he helped suppress the Prague Spring by, among other things, capturing the Czechoslovak Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the 1970s, KGB chief Yuri Andropov appointed Zaitsev to lead the elite Alfa anti-terrorist unit.

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Putin did not have to sit between these two former secret policemen. Indeed, on Victory Day of all days, it would have been far more natural to appear alongside veterans of the war against Hitler’s Germany. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin’s choice of neighbors was a deliberate and symbolic move.

For many within the Russian and Ukrainian elites, Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message would have been crystal clear. The Russian dictator was signaling that despite widespread criticism of the Federal Security Service and its bungling role in the invasion of Ukraine, he continues to value his secret police and sees them as the linchpin of his authoritarian regime.

Putin was also signaling to Ukrainians and domestic critics of his invasion that he is willing to do whatever it takes to win. Soviet forces committed innumerable crimes in their suppression of the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1968, they had no qualms about crushing a country that, like today’s Ukraine, sought to go its own way. By sitting alongside decorated veterans of these two criminal Soviet campaigns, Putin was indicating his approval of their actions and his readiness to embrace similar methods.

The good news is that Putin does not currently appear capable of replicating the bloody Soviet-era crackdowns in western Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. This was all too evident on Victory Day, with the lone T-34 tank rumbling across Red Square serving as the perfect metaphor for Russia’s reduced military might after suffering catastrophic losses in Ukraine. However, the Russian dictator remains defiant and is clearly keen to signal that he has no intention of backing down.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

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Tuesday’s one-tank parade was the latest in a series of blows that had already cast a shadow over preparations for this year’s Victory Day celebrations. In the month preceding the holiday, more than twenty cities across Russia canceled plans to hold military parades. While security concerns were officially cited, these cancellations fueled speculation that Russia simply doesn’t have enough military equipment available to stage regional parades, with the vast majority of tanks and other vehicles having already been sent to Ukraine.

The complete cancellation of this year’s Immortal Regiment marches was an even bigger blow. This mass participation event, which sees members of the public marching through Russian towns and cities while displaying portraits of family members who served in the Red Army during World War II, has become an integral part of Russia’s Victory Day rituals over the past decade and has been endorsed by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the Kremlin decided to ban marches this year amid fears that family members of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine may seek to participate. With Russian officials still in denial over the disastrous consequences of the Ukraine invasion, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was for thousands of grieving relatives to gather in public and draw attention to the scale of the tragedy.

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The negative optics surrounding this year’s Victory Day celebrations are personally damaging for Vladimir Putin, who has been instrumental in placing the holiday at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. It is often assumed that Victory Day has always dominated the Russian calendar, but this is simply not true. In fact, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades. Other holidays such as May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution were considered far more significant.

It was not until Putin came to power at the turn of the millennium that Victory Day began to assume its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Over the past two decades, Putin has transformed Victory Day into the centerpiece of a pseudo-religious victory cult complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. The hysteria surrounding the holiday has come to be known as “Pobedobesie” or “victory mania,” with anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s highly sanitized version of World War II likely to be treated with the kind of severity once reserved for medieval heretics.

The veneration of Russia’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany has proven extremely politically profitable for Putin. It has helped him rebuild Russian national pride following the humiliation of the 1990s, and has paved the way for a return to authoritarianism in today’s Russia by rehabilitating Stalin and minimizing the crimes of the Soviet era. Putin has also revived the lexicon of World War II as a convenient way to attack his enemies, with domestic and foreign opponents routinely branded as “fascists.” Indeed, in modern Russia the term “Nazi” has lost all meaning and has come to indicate anyone viewed as “anti-Putin.”

This toxic trend is most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine. Kremlin leaders have spent years demonizing Ukrainians as “Nazis,” despite the complete absence of any actual far-right politicians in the Ukrainian government. Predictably, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of the country to be his chief war aim. The Russian dictator returned to this theme again during Tuesday’s Victory Day address, directly comparing his unprovoked attack on Ukraine to the struggle against Nazi Germany.

Putin’s endless appeals to the memory World War II are clearly designed to mobilize the Russian public in support of the current war, but they cannot completely disguise the grim realities of his rapidly unraveling Ukraine invasion. What was initially envisaged as three-day campaign to overthrow the Ukrainian government and seize control of the country has become the bloodiest European conflict since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Over the past fifteen months, Russian military losses have been so heavy that senior US intelligence officials are now openly questioning whether Putin’s army still retains the capacity to “sustain even modest offensive operations.” With a major Ukrainian counteroffensive expected to begin in the coming weeks, there is little cause for optimism in Moscow.

It is in some ways poetic that developments surrounding this year’s Victory Day holiday have brought Russian audiences closer to the unpalatable truth. From the cancellation of regional parades and public marches to the lack of tanks on Red Square, it is now becoming painfully obvious to the average Russian that things are not going according to plan in Ukraine. An event conceived as a propaganda spectacle to project the strength of the Putin regime has instead served to underline Russia’s growing weakness. Putin is often accused of living in the past, but this is one Victory Day he will wish to forget.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

This absence of anti-war activity is perhaps unsurprising. The Kremlin has adopted a series of draconian laws in the wake of the invasion that criminalize any criticism while outlawing use of the word “war” in favor of the euphemistic “Special Military Operation.” As a result of these legislative changes, numerous high-profile opposition figures have been given long prison sentences for their anti-war stances. At the same time, it is important to note that although more than one million Russians have fled the country in response to the invasion of Ukraine, very few have taken advantage of their newfound freedoms to stage anti-war rallies outside Russia.

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Public support for the invasion can be seen in the many examples of ordinary Russians mobilizing to back the war effort. Across the country, large numbers of fundraising initiatives have emerged to help supply Russian soldiers with everything from drones and radios to food and warm clothing. These grassroots efforts are entirely voluntary and point to high levels of public sympathy for the Russian soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.

A further indication of pro-war sentiment within Russia is the revival of Stalin-era denunciations targeting anyone seen as critical of the war. There have been numerous high-profile instances of colleagues, teachers, and even family members reporting people to the authorities for voicing anti-war opinions. During the first half of 2022 alone, Russian media and information space regulator Roskomnadzor reportedly received 144,835 individual denunciations.

Social media remains comparatively free in today’s Russia and provides important insights into the public mood. Young supporters of the war have largely congregated on TikTok, where they often form pro-war groups and post messages celebrating the Russian army.

Telegram has emerged as a key platform for Russian audiences seeking to follow the invasion. There are a substantial number of military-themed accounts offering some of the most credible coverage of the war, often including remarkably frank criticism of the Russian establishment. These pro-war accounts have gained considerably in status since February 2022 and have attracted millions of followers.

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Research conducted by Ukraine’s Open Minds Institute has identified widespread pro-war sentiment on Russian social media. While it is important to acknowledge that the Kremlin is believed to invest heavily in bot farms and troll armies, the vast majority of the accounts studied by the Open Minds think tank appear to represent real people with their own wide-ranging interests and long histories of posting on different topics.

Support for the war on Russian social media tends to be expressed in abstract terms relating to national pride rather than any concrete benefits deriving from the invasion. Accounts based in Moscow demonstrate the lowest levels of interest in the war, while regions closest to Ukraine are the most negative. Meanwhile, areas of Russia furthest from the conflict tend to be more positive. Posts and comments closely mirror changing events on the ground and typically reflect the latest developments in Ukraine, indicating high levels of awareness regarding the current status of the invasion.

While it is impossible to determine exact levels of pro-war sentiment within Russian society, it is clear that the invasion of Ukraine enjoys considerable backing. What is fueling these positive attitudes toward a war that has horrified global audiences?

A combination of factors have shaped Russian public opinion in favor of the invasion. Propaganda has played a central role in this process, with Russian audiences subjected to years of relentless messaging throughout the Kremlin-controlled mainstream media preparing the population for war with Ukraine.

Many Russians appear to be driven by feelings of faith and obedience toward the authorities. Other factors include notions of national identity rooted in the imperial past and a strong desire to belong. Many Russians may be choosing to adopt pro-war positions in order to associate with like-minded people and demonstrate their own patriotism. Others may be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid accusations of disloyalty.

Unfortunately, such conformity often comes at the expense of critical thinking or moral constraints. This has made it possible for millions of otherwise unremarkable people to support the largest European war of aggression since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Some observers speculate that much of this support is insincere and would soon evaporate if circumstances within Russia changed. Nevertheless, the currently available evidence indicates overwhelming acceptance of the invasion, at the very least.

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi is founder and CEO of the Kyiv-based Open Minds Institute.

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is the latest stage in the unfinished Soviet collapse

Richard Cashman — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:43:46 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began just over one year ago, growing numbers of international commentators and policymakers have reached the conclusion that the invasion is an act of old-fashioned imperialism. Until recently, such characterizations of Putin’s Russia had been restricted to the fringes of the international debate, but they are now firmly established in the mainstream.

One reason for the erstwhile reluctance to describe Russian behavior as imperial was the implication that despite the fall of the USSR, the Russian Federation itself was still fundamentally an empire in terms of structure and mentality. This creates obvious policy and diplomatic complications for Western leaders seeking to engage with Moscow and integrate Russia into a common European security architecture. Added to this is the understandable fear of playing into Kremlin narratives about the West seeking to break up Russia.

It is perhaps for these reasons that recent use of the imperial label has most often been in the context of Moscow “re-acquiring” an imperial mindset under Vladimir Putin’s leadership. In reality, however, it makes more sense to view today’s Russia within the context of ongoing imperial decline.

This process of imperial retreat began in 1989 with the loss of the outer empire in Central and Eastern Europe, and has since led to violent efforts in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine to preserve what Russia views as its inner empire. Recognizing modern Russia’s imperial identity will not make policy and diplomacy any easier, but it should lead to fewer illusions.

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When addressing today’s Russian Federation, the concept of “de-imperialization” probably has wider utility than “decolonization,” as it focuses on the core imperial issue of power without the need for agonized debate about the exact nature of a colony.

In respect of institutions and imperial organization, much about Russia has remained constant since the initial phase of decline in 1989-91. Within the Russian Federation, elected regional governors were short-lived phenomena and economic flows have continued to move overwhelmingly from the peripheries to the metropole. In the military sphere in Ukraine, which the Kremlin sees as integral to the core of its empire, ethnic minorities from the peripheries of the Russian Federation have been disproportionately mobilized in order to preserve favorable sentiment in major cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Beyond the Russian Federation, many imperial linkages have also remained. The Commonwealth of Independent States was swiftly established in 1991, while the non-Russian former Soviet republics became known as the “near abroad,” indicating Russian perceptions of partial sovereignty. Tellingly, Russia’s new internal security service, the FSB, was given the remit for these former Soviet republics rather than the Kremlin’s external service, the SVR.

While the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe and the 1991 Soviet collapse entailed an acknowledged loss of prestige, imperial attitudes in Russia’s metropolitan political, academic, cultural, and information spaces have remained largely devoid of self-examination. This has become abundantly clear from the bilious propaganda targeting Ukrainians (along with Kazakhs, Baltic peoples, and Georgians) over the last year.

Crucially, Russia did not suffer a decisive military defeat in the 1989-1991 period in the fashion that ended the other land-based European empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Turkey. Even with strategic defeat in Ukraine, Russia is not going to be occupied and have a post-imperial reality imposed on it. And so, ultimately, it is only Russians who can carry themselves to that reality, as the maritime empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal have substantially, though not entirely, managed to do following their respective military failures to sustain empire.

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Despite the genuine security complications entailed by a contiguous imperial core and peripheries, a conscious process of de-imperialization still seems, in principle, a route open to Russia. It need not entail further territorial losses from Russia’s recognized 1991 borders, but should involve Russian federal institutions being reformed and the independence of neighbors being respected. This should include their right to join an alliance like NATO without threats of invasion, just as Finland and Norway have been able to do.

Indeed, this has latterly been the message from Russian opposition figures including Gary Kasparov, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Alexei Navalny, who have outlined policies for continuing Russia’s process of de-imperialization. This does not necessarily have to be a hard sell to the Russian people. The metropoles of Europe’s maritime empires initially feared that the loss of empire would make them poorer; in fact, it made them richer.

In contrast, Putin and the clan which assumed power in Moscow at the turn of the millennium have coordinated all policy with the aim of reversing rather than managing Russia’s imperial decline. This has meant denial of the long-known problem of Russian chauvinism and further concealing rather than confronting of Russian and Soviet crimes committed in the name of empire.

The International Criminal Court’s issuing of an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes means the process of delegitimizing his leadership is now underway. The logical concomitant policy step is building relationships with alternative Russian elites who already or might in future support further de-imperialization.

In addition to realistic policy-making at the state level, Western academics and journalists can contribute to “decolonizing” Russian, Eurasian, and Slavonic studies and associated cultural spaces, drawing on similar approaches to European and North American history.

Western governments and their cultural emanations can prioritize engaging with countries of the global south to debunk the absurd but successful Kremlin narrative portraying Russia as an anti-imperial center of power, both historically and still today. This might include developing university programs and organizing academic conferences and exchanges, but also via objective news, cinema, television, and social media. Facilitating messages from countries like Ukraine, as a former imperial subject, might also modify policy-making in these countries.

The process begun in 1989 certainly did not culminate in 1991. Renewed awareness of its ongoing nature is to be welcomed, but from that should flow realistic policy that supports rather than compromises Russia’s former imperial subjects, and empowers Russians working toward a post-imperial future.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Putin cancels Victory Day parades as Ukraine invasion continues to unravel

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Apr 2023 20:40:08 +0000

With Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations less than one month away, the Kremlin has taken the highly unusual step of canceling a number of military parades in regional capitals. Scheduled parades to mark the World War II Soviet victory over Nazi Germany have been called off in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, which both border Ukraine. Victory Day celebrations in Russian-occupied Crimea have also reportedly been scrapped.

The cancellations are officially due to security concerns related to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, numerous commentators have speculated that Moscow is also increasingly short of tanks and is understandably eager to avoid highlighting the scale of the losses suffered by the Russian army in Ukraine. Whether the real reason is security issues or equipment shortages, the decision to cancel this year’s Victory Day parades represents a painful blow for Vladimir Putin that hints at the grim reality behind Moscow’s upbeat propaganda portrayals of his faltering Ukraine invasion.

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Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations are closely associated with Putin personally. Throughout his reign, he has placed the Soviet World War II experience at the heart of efforts to rebuild Russian national pride following the perceived humiliations of the 1990s. Putin has transformed traditional Russian reverence for the Soviet war effort into a quasi-religious victory cult complete with its own dogmas, feast days, and heretics. Victory Day itself has become by far the biggest holiday of the year, with the defeat of Nazi Germany elevated above all other events and achievements as the defining moment in Russian history.

This victory cult has long set the tone in Russian politics and public life. Domestic and foreign opponents of the Putin regime are routinely attacked as “fascists,” with all manner of current affairs issues viewed through the polarizing prism of World War II. This trend is nowhere more evident than in the official Russian approach toward Ukraine. For years, the Ukrainian authorities have been groundlessly branded as “Nazis,” while the current invasion of the country is portrayed as a modern-day continuation of the fight against Adolf Hitler.

The significance of Victory Day for national identity in Putin’s Russia and the holiday’s close associations with the war in Ukraine make this year’s parade cancellations especially embarrassing. Other public celebrations could be postponed or abandoned without much fuss, but failure to mark Victory Day points to serious problems that are difficult to disguise even in Russia’s tightly controlled information environment. While Kremlin propagandists continue to insist the invasion of Ukraine is going according to plan, the apparent inability of the authorities to guarantee security inside Russia during this most important of national holidays would suggest otherwise.

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While traditional Victory Day events will not take place on May 9 in some Russian regional capitals, the country’s main holiday parade in Moscow is set to proceed as planned. However, Putin will likely have little to celebrate. In recent months, his invasion has met with a series of setbacks on both the military and diplomatic fronts that leave the prospect of victory more distant than ever.

In Ukraine, Russian efforts to launch a major offensive fell flat during the first three months of 2023, with the Russian military securing only nominal gains despite suffering catastrophic losses in both men and equipment. High casualty rates and a reliance on suicidal “human wave” attacks have led to plummeting morale among Putin’s invading army, with recently mobilized troops particularly prone to demoralization. Since the beginning of the year, dozens of videos have been posted to social media featuring groups of Russian soldiers addressing Putin and other state officials while complaining of poor conditions, cannon fodder tactics, and heavy losses. This is fueling doubts over the Russian army’s ability to mount major offensive operations.

Meanwhile, Russia’s winter bombing campaign against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure appears to have ended in failure. Putin had hoped to destroy the Ukrainian energy grid and freeze Ukrainians into submission, but a combination of creativity and enhanced air defenses enabled Ukraine to keep the lights on. In a sign that the worst of the crisis is now over, Ukraine resumed electricity exports to neighboring European countries in early April.

Nor is there any indication that Western support for Ukraine is in danger of weakening. On the contrary, during the first three months of 2023, Ukraine’s partners expanded their military aid to include previously taboo items such as modern battle tanks and Soviet era fighter jets. Putin still hopes he can outlast the West in Ukraine, but international opposition to his invasion currently appears to be stronger than ever. Indeed, this continued Western resolve was the key message behind US President Joe Biden’s February visit to Kyiv.

There was further bad news in March when the International Criminal Court in The Hague charged Putin with war crimes over his role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While the Russian dictator is not expected to appear in court anytime soon, the indictment is a serious blow to Putin’s prestige that undermines his status both domestically and on the international stage. Weeks later, Finland joined NATO in a move that more than doubled the length of Russia’s shared borders with the military alliance. Even Xi Jinping’s much-hyped visit to Moscow failed to lift the mood, with the Chinese leader offering plenty of platitudes but little in the way of concrete support.

These unfavorable circumstances will make Putin’s job all the more difficult as he attempts to strike the right note in this year’s Victory Day address. With little to look forward to, he is likely to seek inspiration from the glories of the past. However, comparisons between World War II and Russia’s present predicament may not prove very flattering. At the height of the Nazi advance in late 1941, Moscow famously staged the annual October Revolution parade on Red Square with the might of the invading German army located a mere few miles away. In contrast, Putin is evidently now unable to defend Russia against the far more modest threat posed by a country he expected to conquer in just three days. Throughout the Putin era, Victory Day has served to showcase Russia’s resurgent strength, but this year’s holiday may become a symbol of his regime’s growing weakness.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Anti-war Russians struggle to be heard

Christopher Isajiw — Thu, 06 Apr 2023 18:12:04 +0000

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the Putin regime has worked hard to present the impression of overwhelming Russian domestic support for the war effort. This has involved everything from celebrity endorsements and relentless pro-war coverage in the Kremlin-controlled mainstream Russian media, to online flash mobs and carefully choreographed mass rallies in central Moscow.

Meanwhile, a ruthless clampdown has made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for dissenting voices to be heard. Nevertheless, opposition figures continue to question the true levels of public backing for the invasion, while insisting that large numbers of Russians are either opposed or indifferent. The real situation within Russian society is certainly far more complex than the Kremlin would like us to believe, but today’s suffocating atmosphere means there is little reason to expect an increase in visible anti-war activity any time soon.

Officially at least, Putin’s approval rating has increased significantly since the start of the full-scale invasion just over one year ago. According to Russia’s only internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, the Russian President’s rating rose from 71% on the eve of the invasion to 82% in March 2023. The same source indicates consistently high levels of support for the invasion of Ukraine, with over 70% of respondents expressing their approval in every single survey conducted throughout the past thirteen months.

These figures point to strong levels of public support for the war but they must be viewed in context. Critics question the validity of any public opinion polling in a dictatorship such as Putin’s Russia, where people are legally obliged to call the invasion a “Special Military Operation” and can face criminal prosecution for social media posts. This is worth keeping in mind when analyzing surveys of Russian opinion.

Many poll respondents may be inclined to demonstrate their patriotism and their support for the Russian military while being less enthusiastic about the invasion itself or the Kremlin’s war aims. Others may have become swept up in the relentless flow of pro-war propaganda or cut off from alternative sources of information. It is also important to acknowledge that a large majority of people refuse to participate in polling of this nature. They may choose to decline for a wide range of reasons, but it is possible that many simply prefer not to share anti-war opinions with strangers.

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What evidence is there of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia? When the invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, efforts to claim strong public backing for the war were hampered by a series of protests in cities across the country involving mainly young Russians. However, these public demonstrations failed to reach any kind of critical mass and were fairly rapidly suppressed by the authorities with large numbers of detentions.

Other Russians have voted with their feet. A mass exodus of Russian nationals began during the first weeks of the war, with a second wave starting in September 2022 in the wake of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of military-age Russian men fled to neighboring countries in the last four months of the year, leading in some cases to massive queues at border crossings.

This outflow of people has had a considerable negative demographic impact on Russia, but it would not be accurate to claim that everyone who has left the country during the past year holds anti-war views. Many chose to leave in order to avoid military service, while others feared the inconvenience of wartime conditions. Thousands of wealthy Russians have relocated to destinations like Dubai, where they can manage their Russian businesses while distancing themselves physically and psychologically from the war.

For those who remain in Russia, it is still possible to live a fairly normal life despite the imposition of sanctions and the departure of many high-profile Western brands. Meanwhile, some members of Russia’s billionaire elite are believed to oppose the war, but most see their fortunes as tied to Putin and are fearful of the consequences if they break with the regime publicly.

There are indications that the war is becoming less and less popular among the very troops charged with leading the invasion. The refusal of many contract soldiers to extend their service has forced the Russian authorities to introduce legislative changes, while in recent months there has been a sharp increase in video addresses on social media featuring mobilized Russian soldiers complaining about suicidal tactics and high death tolls. At the same time, there is little indication yet that mounting demoralization on the front lines is shaping the public mood back in Russia itself.

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What of Russia’s beleaguered political opposition? For more than twenty years, the Putin regime has sought to silence any genuine opposition forces via increasingly direct means. These efforts have intensified since the onset of the Ukraine invasion, with independent media outlets shut down and many of the country’s relatively few remaining opposition figures either jailed or forced to flee. Some have attempted to speak out against the war while in exile, with others who left Russia in previous years such as Gary Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky serving as vocal opponents of the invasion.

The most prominent opposition figure in today’s Russia, Alexei Navalny, remains in prison. Navalny has managed to issue a number of statements from jail condemning the war. In February 2023, he published a fifteen-point plan calling for the Russian military to withdraw completely from Ukraine and arguing that Russia must accept Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. While many have welcomed Navalny’s unambiguous opposition to the invasion, others remain wary due to his ties to Russian nationalism and earlier reluctance to back the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

At this point, extreme Russian nationalism appears to pose a far greater threat to the Putin regime than liberal anti-war sentiment. A new class of pro-war bloggers has emerged over the past year and has become a powerful force within the more active segments of Russian society. Hardliners such as Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have gained in stature thanks to their prominent roles in the invasion and have engaged in rare public criticism of key establishment figures.

The authoritarian nature of the Putin regime makes it almost impossible to accurately gauge levels of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia. It may take a decisive military defeat before many of those who oppose the war dare to speak up and demand change. In a sense, this is exactly what Putin is fighting against. He invaded Ukraine primarily because he feared Ukrainian democracy would serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia itself. So far, he has managed to prevent anti-war or pro-democracy movements from gaining momentum. However, if his invading army’s battlefield fortunes continue to deteriorate in Ukraine, those who dream of a different Russia may finally find their voices.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

The strategy document for Belarus envisions the comprehensive russification of Belarusian society along with a sharp reduction in the influence of nationalist and pro-Western forces, which are viewed by Russia as virtually indistinguishable in relation to both Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian political, financial, business, and education systems would be fully integrated into Russia, with a network of pro-Russian media, NGOs, and cultural institutions established to aid this integration process.

In the military sphere, the Belarusian army would become de facto part of the Russian military, with Belarus increasing the number of Russian bases in the country and allowing Moscow to dramatically expand its military presence. Putin’s recently announced intention to base Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus are an indication that this plan is already advancing.

The publication date of this alleged Russian blueprint for the takeover of Belarus is particularly interesting. It was reportedly produced in summer 2021 at a time when Putin’s mind seems to have been turning toward grand visions of imperial conquest. Increasingly isolated due to the Covid pandemic and surrounded by a shrinking circle of imperial hardliners and sycophants, Putin appears to have made the fateful decision in mid 2021 to extinguish Belarusian and Ukrainian independence once and for all.

Efforts to unofficially annex Belarus were well underway by this point. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was already heavily reliant on Russia following a Kremlin intervention to prop up his tottering regime in the wake of nationwide protests over the country’s rigged August 2020 presidential election.

As Kremlin officials were busy drawing up plans to incorporate Belarus, Putin himself was penning a 6000-word treatise outlining his denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood and his insistence that Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). Putin’s July 2021 essay was widely seen as a declaration of war against Ukrainian independence. His lengthy article laid the ideological foundations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began seven months later.

Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine share many common features with his vision for the takeover of Belarus. Following the anticipated military conquest of Ukraine, Russia intended to install a puppet ruler in Kyiv who would replace Zelenskyy and play the same role as Lukashenka in Belarus. For both countries, Moscow’s ultimate goal is the same: Complete absorption into a new Russian Empire.

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire have been evident since his first term in office but became more obvious following his formal return to the presidency in 2012. From this point onward, Putin began to openly embrace an imperialistic brand of nationalism that positioned him as the latest in a long line of Kremlin rulers celebrated as “gatherers of Russian lands.” In the contemporary context, this meant incorporating fellow East Slavic states Belarus and Ukraine into a new Russia-led union.

The idea of a union between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was not new and first gained prominence during the collapse of the USSR when promoted by Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. East Slavic unity had both ideological and practical appeal for Putin. It would secure his place in Russian history while also creating a solid basis for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s alternative to the EU.

Initially, Putin hoped to absorb Ukraine without a fight. Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, the Kremlin adopted many of the same tactics later used in Belarus to strengthen Russia’s grip on the country. However, post-Soviet Ukraine had a far stronger sense of national identity than Belarus, with a majority of Ukrainians seeing themselves as Europeans and embracing the country’s fledgling democratic traditions. This was to prove a major obstacle for Putin’s imperial project.

As Ukraine prepared to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union in last 2013, Moscow unleashed a trade war and began pressuring Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych to reject Brussels in favor of Moscow. When Yanukovych attempted to do so, mass protests erupted in Ukraine that escalated into a full-scale revolution in support of democracy and European integration. Within three months, Yanukovych found himself deserted by his allies and escaped to Russia.

Russia responded to the success of the Euromaidan Revolution by occupying Crimea and attempting to orchestrate uprisings throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Targeted regions of Ukraine were rebranded by the Kremlin using the old Czarist-era imperial term of “Novorossiya” or “New Russia.” This strategy was only partially successful, with Kremlin-backed uprisings defeated in most major Ukrainian cities except for Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Kremlin control was secured with the assistance of the invading Russian army.

Over the next eight years, Putin attempted to rebuild Russia’s political influence inside Ukraine while pressuring the country to accept a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the February 2015 Minsk Accords, which had brought the worst of the fighting to an end in eastern Ukraine without establishing a durable peace. Moscow’s vision for the implementation of the Minsk Accords would have transformed Ukraine into a dysfunctional Russian satellite, but this outcome met with resistance from successive Ukrainian presidents.

By early 2021, Putin had come to the conclusion that his strategy was failing and appears to have recognized that Ukraine was slipping irreparably out of the Russian orbit. At this point, he and other Kremlin leaders began referring to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” and portraying the country as an intolerable outpost of NATO and US interests on Russia’s borders. The available evidence suggests that by the time Putin published his notorious essay in summer 2021, he was already fully committed to crushing Ukrainian independence by military means.

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In a clear echo of the strategy adopted for Belarus, Russia’s FSB security service was tasked in 2021 with preparing plans for the military occupation and pacification of Ukraine. However, a combination of FSB corruption, wishful thinking, and misplaced stereotypes about modern Ukraine resulted in a series of disastrous miscalculations.

Collaborators within the Ukrainian government told FSB agents what they wanted to hear with no regard for the realities on the ground, while the Kremlin’s networks of Ukrainian informants, NGOs, and other “experts” assured their Russian colleagues that the invading Russian army would be welcomed. Meanwhile, FSB officers confidently predicted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would soon be captured or forced to flee, with organized Ukrainian resistance unlikely to last longer than a few days.

These intelligence failures persuaded Putin to embark on the biggest gamble of his presidency with a wholly inadequate force of less than 200,000 troops. This was regarded as sufficient to install a pro-Russian regime and place Ukraine on the same path as Belarus toward absorption into the Russian Federation.

Captured documents, prisoner accounts, and the actions of the Russian occupation forces in regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control now make it possible to produce a comprehensive picture of Russia’s plans for the subjugation of the country. These plans share many features with Moscow’s approach to the creeping annexation of Belarus, while employing infinitely more direct and brutal methods.

The events of the past year make clear that Russia’s stated invasion objective of “de-Nazification” actually means the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or otherwise silencing of anyone deemed to be a Ukrainian patriot. Those targeted since the invasion began in February 2022 have included elected officials, civil society activists, educators, journalists, army veterans, and cultural figures.

The systematic suppression of Ukrainian national identity has been undertaken alongside intensive russification efforts, including the introduction of a Kremlin-approved Russian school curriculum and the promotion of an imperial identity. In parallel, local businesses have been forced to integrate into the Russian economy, with the wider population in occupied Ukraine obliged to accept Russian citizenship.

The obvious similarities between the Kremlin’s long-term Belarus strategy and the tactics being employed in occupied Ukraine undermine Russian efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a defensive measure driven by valid security concerns. Instead, a picture emerges of Vladimir Putin’s overriding ambition to absorb both countries and secure his place in history as a “gatherer of Russian lands.”

While his approach to each country may currently differ in the details, Putin clearly aims to bring both Ukrainian and Belarusian independence to an end, and has placed these imperial ambitions at the heart of his entire reign. This makes a mockery of calls for a compromise with the Kremlin. Instead, Western leaders must recognize that peace in Europe will remain elusive until the Russian dictator is forced to abandon his dreams of empire.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the newly published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is eroding Kremlin influence in Kazakhstan

Kamila Auyezova — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 13:32:31 +0000

The invasion of Ukraine was meant to advance Vladimir Putin’s vision of a revived Russian Empire. Instead, it is forcing neighboring countries to reassess their own relationships with Moscow and fueling growing calls for decolonization and derussification throughout a region that was once viewed by many international observers as an informal extension of Russia itself.

This embrace of decolonization is nowhere more evident than in Kazakhstan, the largest state in Central Asia and a regular target of imperialistic Russian rhetoric. In the year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Kazakh society has actively sought to accelerate ongoing nation-building processes amid a notable rise in anti-imperialist sentiment. Meanwhile, the Kazakh authorities have made it clear that they do not condone Moscow’s military campaign in Ukraine and refuse to back the war.

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One of the earliest indications that Kazakhstan would not align with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine was the decision in spring 2022 to cancel the country’s traditional World War II Victory Day celebrations. The cancellation was an unambiguous rebuff to the Putin regime, which has placed the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany at the heart of modern Russian national identity and expects regional leaders to demonstrate their loyalty via reverence for the Soviet war effort.

This snub was followed by an even more direct and public fallout in June 2022. While sharing a stage with Putin at a flagship annual economic forum in Saint Petersburg, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that he would not recognize Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

Perhaps the most eye-catching indication of Kazakh public support for Ukraine has been the “Yurt of Invincibility” initiative, which has seen a number of traditional Kazakh yurts set up in Ukrainian towns and cities in recent months to help Ukrainians cope with electricity blackouts caused by Russian bombing of the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Organized by the Kazakh business community and backed by private donations, the yurt initiative has proved highly popular among Ukrainians while sparking considerable anger in Russia. However, Kremlin attempts to elicit an official response from the Kazakh authorities were politely declined, with Kazakh Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aibek Smadiyarov stating there was “nothing to explain.”

It is not hard to imagine why the appearance of “Yurts of Invincibility” across Ukraine struck such a nerve in Russia. Manned by activists offering free electricity and internet access along with hot drinks, the yurts represent a humane response to the inhumanity of Russia’s brutal invasion. In a very real sense, these traditional Kazakh abodes serve as symbols of post-colonial solidarity between Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

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Russian discontent over the critical Kazakh response to the invasion of Ukraine has led to attacks on Kazakhstan from Russian officials and in the country’s Kremlin-controlled information space. Since the start of the invasion, pundits on Russia’s notoriously inflammatory political talk shows have begun speculating over the possibility of future Russian military intervention in Kazakhstan. During a November 2022 episode of prominent regime propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s daily show, one commentator declared: “the next problem is Kazakhstan.” He went on to claim that “the same Nazi processes can start there as in Ukraine.”

These provocative statements were echoed by Russian Ambassador to Kazakhstan Alexei Borodavkin, who warned in December 2022 that “radical nationalist tendencies” were becoming more and more visible in Kazakhstan, before suggesting Russia was ready to “help” the Kazakh authorities address this issue.

The Russian Ambassador’s comments were particularly provocative as they closely mirrored the kind of language used by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of Ukraine. This played on longstanding Kazakh fears that Moscow may attempt to exploit the presence of a large ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, which is concentrated in northern regions of the country bordering the Russian Federation.

Suggestions that ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan are somehow oppressed have sparked a bitter response from many Kazakhs, who pride themselves on their tolerant attitude toward Russia and their respectful approach to the shared inheritance of the imperial past.

Unlike other post-Soviet states, Russian remains an official language in today’s Kazakhstan. The country also accepted hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing mobilization into the Russian military in late 2022. Critics say this welcoming stance makes a mockery of Kremlin propaganda claims about a rising tide of Russophobia in today’s Kazakhstan.

The past year has witnessed historic shifts in allegiances and attitudes across the entire post-Soviet space. Ukraine’s heroic fight against Russian imperialism has prompted countries throughout the region to question the nature of their own ties to the Kremlin and seek geopolitical alternatives capable of countering Russian influence.

In Kazakhstan, the invasion has amplified anti-imperial sentiment and enhanced existing decolonization processes. These trends look set to gain further momentum in 2023. Geography alone dictates that Kazakhstan cannot realistically hope to cut all ties with Russia, but there is no escaping the fact that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has seriously undermined Russian influence in a country where all roads once led to Moscow.

Kamila Auyezova is a research analyst who focuses on geopolitical and climate issues in Eurasia. You can find her on Twitter @KAuyezova.

Child abductions reveal the genocidal intent behind Putin’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 20:58:18 +0000

The recent International Criminal Court decision to charge Vladimir Putin with war crimes has shed much-needed light on one of the darkest chapters of Russia’s ongoing invasion. During the past year, Russian forces have reportedly abducted thousands of children from occupied regions of Ukraine and attempted to deprive them of their Ukrainian identity. This campaign of forced deportations and anti-Ukrainian indoctrination reveals the genocidal intent at the heart of Russia’s Ukraine invasion.

Article II of the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention identifies five acts that qualify as genocide. The fifth act, forcibly transferring the children of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group to another group, concisely and accurately describes Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have attempted to disguise the abductions as a routine wartime security measure, but Moscow’s well-documented efforts to “re-educate” young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians tells a very different story.

Since the invasion began in February 2022, evidence has mounted of a large-scale Russian operation to abduct and indoctrinate Ukrainian children throughout the territories that have fallen under their control. One recent report published by the Yale School of Public Health in February 2023 identified a systematic Russian program to re-educate thousands of abducted Ukrainian children via a network of more than 40 camps and facilities stretching from Russian-occupied Crimea to Siberia. “This is not one rogue camp, this is not one rogue mayor or governor,” commented Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. “This is a massive logistical undertaking that does not happen by accident.”

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Ukrainians in liberated regions have recounted how they frequently had to hide children from Russian occupation forces. Numerous Ukrainian orphanages were forced to smuggle children out of occupied areas to prevent them from being seized and sent to Russia. Some of the victims of these Russian abductions have been orphans or children living in care. Others have been physically separated from their families and told they are no longer wanted. In some cases, Ukrainian parents claim to have been tricked or coerced into sending their children to Russia. The overall number of abducted children is not yet known. Current estimates indicate that well over ten thousand young Ukrainians have been abducted and sent to Russia. Many fear the real total figure may be far higher.

Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who has been indicted alongside Putin by the ICC for the “unlawful deportation and transfer” of Ukrainian children, has spoken openly about the apparent effectiveness of Russia’s indoctrination efforts. In late 2022, she acknowledged that a group of 30 children brought from Russian-occupied Mariupol initially sang the Ukrainian national anthem and shouted the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” but claimed that this criticism was “transformed into love for Russia.”

The abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children is only one element of comprehensive Russian efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity. Throughout Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, any symbols of Ukrainian identity and statehood are suppressed while access to the Ukrainian media is blocked. The Ukrainian language is being removed from the school system, with educators imported from Russia to teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that promotes a Russian imperial identity while demonizing Ukraine. Parents who question these policies are told their children will be taken away if they refuse to comply.

Russia is also imposing more direct measures to outlaw any expressions of Ukrainian identity. Throughout the country, Russian-occupied regions have witnessed the same pattern of arrests targeting anyone deemed a threat to the Kremlin authorities. This typically includes local officials, journalists, former members of the Ukrainian military, civil society activists, and anyone expressing pro-Ukrainian views. In numerous instances, patriotic tattoos or pro-Ukrainian content on mobile phones have led to detentions and disappearances. Investigators working in newly liberated regions have uncovered evidence indicating thousands of civilian deaths along with the widespread use of sexual violence and torture.

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While the mass killing of Ukrainian civilians has been well documented, there is not yet any international consensus over whether Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. A recent UN report found that Russia was guilty of “a wide range of war crimes” in Ukraine, but commission head Erik Mose said investigators had not yet uncovered conclusive proof confirming genocide.

Others argue that more than enough evidence of genocide has already been found, and point specifically to the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Speaking to CNN’s Christiane Amanpour on March 22, Ukrainian Nobel laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk characterized the abductions as a component of “the genocidal policy which Russia has imposed against Ukraine.” Likewise, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that the abduction of young Ukrainians amounted to genocide. “The most chilling crime is that Russia steals Ukrainian children,” he commented. “This is a genocidal crime.”

In order to prove that Russia is guilty of genocide, it is vital to demonstrate genocidal intent. It is this intent “to physically destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,” that legally distinguishes genocide from war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In this particular case, Russia itself has provided mountains of evidence indicating a clear intention to destroy the Ukrainian nation. Indeed, there are few examples in history where a genocidal power has incriminated itself so comprehensively. Vladimir Putin himself has frequently argued against the existence of a separate Ukrainian identity, and has even published lengthy articles denying Ukraine’s historical legitimacy. Meanwhile, genocidal language aimed at Ukraine has become completely normalized in the Russian mainstream media and among senior government officials.

The grotesque calls for genocide that are so commonplace in today’s Russia have helped inspire the criminal actions of Putin’s invading army. Among the long list of crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine, the methodical abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children stands out. The scale and systematic nature of the abductions make them an unmistakable symbol of Russia’s intention to eradicate Ukrainian identity and extinguish the Ukrainian nation. It is therefore fitting that this should be the first crime Vladimir Putin is indicted for. Putin hoped the invasion of Ukraine would secure his place among Russia’s greatest rulers. Instead, he looks destined to enter history as a genocidal dictator forever linked with the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Will morale prove the decisive factor in the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 22:13:28 +0000

Graphic footage emerged this week on social media depicting what appeared to be the final moments of a captive Ukrainian soldier being summarily executed by Russian forces. The brief video of this apparent war crime shows an unarmed Ukrainian POW, who was later identified as Chernihiv native Oleksandr Matsievsky, calmly repeating the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine” before being gunned down by his captors in a hail of bullets.

These memorable last words resonated deeply with the Ukrainian public, who responded with a mixture of outrage over the criminal nature of the killing and admiration for the stunning courage of the victim. Within hours of the video’s appearance, Matsievsky was being commemorated across Ukrainian social media with hundreds of portraits and memes paying tribute to his defiant stand. Murals have already appeared on the streets of Ukrainian cities. There is even talk of a monument.

Matsievsky is the latest symbol of Ukraine’s unbreakable resolve in a war which has already produced plenty. From the famous “Russian warship, go f**k yourself” of the Snake Island garrison, to the seemingly superhuman tenacity of the Azovstal defenders, Ukraine has witnessed a large number of iconic moments over the past year capturing the spirit of resistance that has gripped the country since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

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This is not at all what Russia was expecting. When Putin gave the order to invade Ukraine, he had been led to believe the Ukrainian public would welcome his troops and had been assured that organized military resistance would collapse within a matter of days. Billions of dollars had been spent preparing the ground by bribing Ukrainian officials to change sides and back the invasion. The stage was supposedly set for a triumph that would extinguish Ukrainian statehood and confirm Putin’s place among Russia’s greatest rulers.

It is now clear that Putin’s complete misjudgment of Ukrainian morale was one of the most remarkable intelligence failures of the modern era. He appears to have fallen into the trap of many long-serving dictators and surrounded himself with loyalist yes-men intent on telling him what he wanted to hear.

This toxic trend was exacerbated by the enforced isolation of the Covid pandemic, which appears to have further fueled Putin’s Ukraine obsession and strengthened his conviction that the country must be subjugated at all costs. In the increasingly claustrophobic climate of the Putin Kremlin, it is hardly surprising that his intel chiefs chose to reinforce these prejudices and encourage his reckless imperial ambitions. If they had attempted to counsel caution, they would likely have been dismissed.

This sycophancy was to have disastrous consequences. Far from greeting Putin’s invading army with cakes and flowers, the Ukrainian nation rose up and united in defiance against Russian aggression. Tens of thousands flocked to enlist in the Ukrainian military and territorial defense units, while millions more mobilized to support the war effort through fundraising, donations, and the improvised production of essential items such as anti-tank obstacles and Molotov cocktails.

Within weeks of the invasion, a vast network of Ukrainian volunteers was supplying frontline soldiers with everything from food and medicines to drones and jeeps. Despite the horrors of the past year, this steely determination to defy Russia remains firmly intact throughout Ukrainian society. Whatever else today’s Ukraine may lack, morale is certainly not an issue. Quite the opposite, in fact.

The same cannot be said for the Russian army. In response to the catastrophic losses suffered during the first six months of the invasion, Putin announced Russia’s first mobilization since World War II in September 2022. The bulk of the estimated 300,000 men mobilized last year are now in Ukraine, where they are being thrown straight into battle despite being untrained and under-equipped.

Since late January, a steady stream of videos have begun appearing on social media featuring groups of mobilized Russian troops appealing to Putin or their own regional representatives. They typically complain of suicidal tactics and heavy casualties while protesting their role as frontline shock troops and calling for redeployment to rear areas. In some cases, mobilized men have announced that they will directly refuse to follow orders.

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Growing signs of demoralization within the ranks of the Russian military could become a major issue for the Kremlin at a time when Putin faces no other obvious domestic challenges to his war policy.

At present, there is little sign of significant anti-war sentiment on the home front inside Russia. On the contrary, independent surveys indicate consistently high levels of public support for the invasion, while those who do object have largely chosen to keep quiet or flee the country. While many question the validity of polling data in a dictatorship, the complete absence of any meaningful efforts to protest the war points to a passive acceptance of the invasion at the very least.

The prospects of a Kremlin coup look to be similarly slim. While many within the Russian elite are said to have been appalled by the decision to invade Ukraine, they have since reconciled themselves to the new reality and are for the most part far too personally dependent on Putin to mount any serious challenge to the Kremlin.

This leaves the military as the one potential source of serious opposition to the war. If Russian commanders persist with their human wave tactics and mobilized troops continue to die in large numbers, the current tide of discontent may evolve into outright mutiny, with highly unpredictable consequences for Putin and his regime.

The importance of morale in warfare has long been recognized. Napoleon Bonaparte famously observed that three-quarters of military success is down to morale. This helps explain why the Ukrainian army has over-performed so spectacularly during the first year of the invasion, while Russia itself has struggled to live up to its prewar billing as the world’s second most powerful military.

Crucially, Ukrainians know exactly what they are fighting for. They are defending their homes and families against an enemy intent on committing genocide and wiping their country off the map. Understandably, they need no further motivation. In contrast, Russians have been told they are fighting against everything from NATO expansion and gay parades to Anglo-Saxon Satanists and Ukrainian Nazis.

While Ukrainian soldiers are focused on the clearly defined objective of liberating their country, Russia’s war aims appear to be far more ambiguous and are often subject to sudden revision. Once the cannon fodder approach of the Russian generals is factored in, it is no surprise that morale is becoming such an issue for Putin’s army.

Could collapsing morale decisively undermine the Russian invasion? We should have a better idea regarding the scale of the problem in the coming few months, as both Russia and Ukraine pursue major spring offensives that will test the resilience of their respective armies. At this stage, Putin is preparing for a long war and still hopes to outlast the West. He has a stable home base and sufficient resources to potentially continue the invasion for at least two more years. However, the situation could change dramatically if his demoralized army refuses to fight.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

In foreign policy, the similarities were even more striking. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula drew widespread comparisons with Hitler’s early foreign policy successes, such as the Anschluss with Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland. In an alarming echo of 1930s diplomacy, these early examples of Russian aggression met with a similarly underwhelming international response. Just as Hitler was encouraged by the appeasement policies of the West to swallow the rest of Czechoslovakia and invade Poland, the weak Western response to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine set the stage for last year’s full-scale invasion.

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Like Hitler before him, Putin has framed his attack on Ukraine as a campaign to defend ethnic compatriots who have found themselves beyond the borders of the motherland. Given the extent of the Russian diaspora throughout the former USSR and beyond, this creates considerable scope for further expansionist wars.

Putin’s self-assumed position as guardian of Russians abroad, along with the Kremlin’s conveniently flexible interpretation of who qualifies as “Russian,” potentially endangers a long list of countries with significant Russian minorities including Kazakhstan, Moldova, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia. All have prior experience of the Russian and Soviet empires; all remain vulnerable to Kremlin influence and potential military intervention.

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has been promoting its imperial agenda via the so-called “Russian World” ideology, which envisions Russia as the guardian of a unique civilization extending beyond the borders of today’s Russian Federation and united by the Russian language, Slavic ethnicity, and the Orthodox faith. In 2007, the Kremlin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF) to serve as a platform for Russia’s influence operations. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev referred to the RMF as the “key instrument of Russian soft power.”

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If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, the countries most immediately at risk are Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The latter two both have authoritarian regimes that currently enjoy Moscow’s support but are nevertheless nervous about Russia’s expansionist ambitions.

Kazakhstan is vulnerable due to its isolated geographical position between Russia and China as the world’s largest landlocked country. Russian nationalists have long identified border regions in northern Kazakhstan with large ethnic Russian populations as potential targets for a new imperial adventure. With the Kazakh leadership refusing to publicly back the invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists have recently begun discussing the possibility of future military intervention.

Belarus is already deeply involved in the attack on Ukraine and served as a launch pad for the invasion in February 2022. This role as junior partner in Putin’s war reflects Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s dependence on the Kremlin, which intervened to prop up his regime following a pro-democracy uprising in August 2020. Members of Belarus’s exiled opposition argue that the country is already effectively under Russian occupation. While some would question this conclusion, today’s Belarus is clearly in danger of being either officially or unofficially annexed by Russia.

Meanwhile, undeterred by Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine, the Kremlin has recently begun escalating its rhetoric against Moldova. In early February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the West seeks to turn the country into an “anti-Russian project” and warned that Moldova could become “the next Ukraine.” Weeks later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Russia of plotting to overthrow her pro-EU government.

At present, it is difficult to predict where Russia is most likely to strike next. The one thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that if Moscow is not defeated in Ukraine, it will continue to pursue expansionist policies. In other words, the future peace and stability of Eurasia hinges on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

All those currently calling for compromise with the Kremlin in Ukraine would be wise to recall that policies of appeasement toward Hitler were widely popular at the time among populations desperate to avoid another world war. We now know how disastrously misguided those policies were and have no excuses for repeating the mistake. Defeating Putin in Ukraine will not be easy, but it is the only way to secure a lasting peace and convince Moscow that the era of easy victories over vulnerable neighbors is over.

Arman Mahmoudian is a PhD candidate and international affairs researcher at the University of South Florida.

Russian War Report: DFRLab releases investigations on Russian info ops before and after the invasion

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 16:01:41 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Tracking narratives

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

Security

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

DFRLab releases investigations on Russian information operations before and after the invasion

This week, our team at the DFRLab released two investigative reports on how Russia employed information operations before and after its invasion of Ukraine one year ago today. The first report, Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine, examines how the Kremlin and its media proxies employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine.

To research this report, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation published from 2014 to 2021 to identify recurring anti-Ukraine rhetoric, then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets in the ten weeks leading up to the invasion. This allowed us to produce a timeline showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war. When Vladimir Putin announced the invasion one year ago today, these narratives effectively served as his talking points, recurring more than 200 times during his remarks.

In our new reports, the @DFRLab analyzed 10,000+ narrative examples from Russian sources before the invasion that contained false and misleading narratives used later to justify the war. In his speech announcing the invasion, Putin used such narratives 200+ times in one speech. pic.twitter.com/bgjzSbzqnp
— DFRLab (@DFRLab) February 22, 2023

The second report, Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine, compiles some of our most important findings on Russian information operations identified over the last year in our Russian War Report. Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its information strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America.

We will continue marking the first anniversary of the war next week with the publication of the DFRLab Cyber Statecraft Initiative report, A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment. A Parallel Terrain analyzes Russia’s continuous assaults against the Ukrainian information environment, not only striking though but attempting to contest and claim this environment in parallel with its conventional invasion. It examines how Russian offensives and Ukrainian defense move through this largely privately owned and operated environment, and how this war has highlighted the growing role that private companies play in conflict. This report will be published February 27. 

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington, DC

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

On February 21, Vladimir Putin delivered an address to the Russian parliament that regurgitated many of the same narratives previously used to justify the invasion of Ukraine, which we explored in our Narrative Warfare report. The speech attempted to depict Putin as innocent of the bloodshed he started one year ago today. Putin spoke of a self-sufficient Russia and urged entrepreneurs to give up investments from overseas. Putin also urged Russian parents to protect their children from the “degradation and degeneration” of the West, one of the recurring themes we documented in Undermining Ukraine. Putin also said that the Sea of Azov “again became Russia’s landlocked sea” and added that Russia would develop the ports and cities in the area; he did not provide a timeline for this endeavor, however.

Putin also announced the creation of a special fund to compensate and assist those involved in the war and the relatives of the dead and wounded, as well as an additional fourteen days of annual leave for combatants to be with family and loved ones.

Putin delivered his speech just hours before US President Joe Biden delivered an address in Warsaw.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

On February 23, the Russian defense ministry claimed that Ukrainian armed forces were planning a provocation against the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria “with the involvement of the nationalist Azov battalion.” The ministry added that Ukraine plans to stage an attack by Russian forces in Transnistria as a “pretext to invade.” To accomplish this, Ukrainian soldiers would allegedly dress in Russian military uniforms. Several pro-Russian Telegram channels circulated pictures alleged to show military equipment along the border of Transnistria. These accusations are eerily similar to ones made by leaders the breakaway Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which Putin used as a pretext for Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In light of these allegations, the Moldovan government issued a statement on February 23 denying the Russian defense ministry’s claims and urged the population to remain calm and follow credible sources.

Later that evening, the Russian defense ministry released another statement claiming there was “a significant accumulation of personnel and military equipment of Ukrainian units near the Ukrainian-Pridnestrovian border, the deployment of artillery at firing positions, as well as an unprecedented increase in flights of unmanned aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the territory of the PMR [Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic].” These claims were shared without any evidence. According to the statement, these purported plans represent a direct threat to the “Russian peacekeeping contingent legally deployed in Transnistria,” and Russia will “adequately respond to the impending provocation of the Ukrainian side.”

It should be noted that both statements referred to the unrecognized Transnistria region as the “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic,” the pro-Russia separatist name for Transnistria. Russian authorities previously referred to the area as Pridnestrov’ye, the Russian word for Transnistria, which tacitly acknowledged it was a part of Moldova, while “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic” implies it is an independent entity.

On February 22, Putin revoked a 2012 decree that contained a clause stipulating Russia’s commitment to search for ways to settle the Transnistrian conflict “with respect to Moldova’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutral status.” The Kremlin warned that relations between Russia and Moldova are “extremely tense,” accusing the Moldovan government of having an anti-Russian agenda. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov recommended that Moldovan authorities “be cautious” in their assessments of the Transnistrian settlement.

—Victoria Olari, Research Assistant, Moldova

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Ukrainian intelligence reported on the movement of Russian convoys not bearing identification marks headed toward the Chernihiv region. The troops reportedly wore uniforms resembling those of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian military bloggers also reported that a Russian reconnaissance drone was detected in the Sumy region. Low-res satellite imagery indicates there may be renewed activity at the Zyabrovka airfield in Belarus, located north of Chernihiv, as movement was detected on February 18. In February 2022, before the invasion, Zyabrovka served as the site of joint air drills with Russia. Poland-based Rochan Consulting also reported that S-300 systems facing Chernihiv were deployed last month.

On February 21, Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, said that Russia intensified its operations earlier this month in the directions of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia. Skibitsky said Russia is concentrating military efforts on capturing Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Marinka, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar. On February 23, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense also reported on heavy fighting near Bakhmut, but said Ukrainian forces have managed to keep a key supply route in the western direction open despite Russia’s attempts at encirclement over the last six weeks. The UK ministry confirmed Vuhledar is under heavy shelling and said there is a “real possibility that Russia is preparing for another offensive in this area.”

On February 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced new commander roles, with Andrey Mordvichev leading the Central Military District (TsVO), Sergey Kuzovlev leading the Southern District (YuVO), Yevgeny Nikiforov leading the Western District (ZVO), and Rustam Muradov maintaining command of the Eastern District (VVO), which is responsible for operations in Vuhledar. Muradov is the commander who ordered the frontal assault on Vuhledar from February 8 to 10, which resulted in the defeat of the 155th Marine Corps of the Russian Navy. On February 20, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu presented epaulets to senior officers at the National Center of Defense Management in Moscow.

Meanwhile, the internal power struggle between Russian defense officials and Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin continues. In a series of audio clips, he accused the Russian defense ministry of lying about supplying Wagner troops with requested artillery munitions, claiming soldiers received only twenty percent of the artillery ammunition promised to them. Prigozhin urged the ministry to fulfill its promises instead of “lying” to the Russian public. Russian military bloggers defended and amplified Prigozhin’s claims, accusing the defense ministry of failing to support Russia’s most effective forces.

On February 23, the Russian army shelled Liubotyn in Kharkiv oblast with a Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket system, resulting in damaged buildings. Damage was also reported in Lemishchyne and Morozova Dolyna, also in Kharkiv oblast, due to Russian artillery shelling. In Kupiansk, two people were reportedly buried under rubble after a Russian S-300 missile strike. Observers also reported explosions in Kramatorsk.

That same day, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak announced the “preventive expansion of security measures” along the country’s borders with Belarus and the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, where the first fortifications are already underway.

According to a Reuters report, the European Union will develop and implement a program for the joint purchase of artillery shells for Ukraine. This will enhance coordination and facilitate investment in new production facilities.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

As previously noted, Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin published multiple audio recordings lashing out at Russian military leadership for not adequately supplying a Wagner Group division with artillery munitions. The audio recordings revealed the model of collaboration between the Wagner Group and Russian Army according to Prigozhin.

On February 20, in reply to a media inquiry by RT correspondent Konstantin Pridybaylo about insufficient ammunition supplies, Prigozhin said that “there is ammunition in the country” and “the industry is producing as much as needed, even with oversupply,” but “no decisions are made” to supply the Wagner Group. “No one understands where alleged limits are coming from, where procedures to receive [ammunition] are coming from, no one knows the ways one or the other documents are signed,” he added. “Everyone is showing me upwards saying: ‘You know, Yevgeny Viktorovich, you have complicated relationships up there….You need to go, apologize, and obey. Then your fighters will receive ammunition.’”

In another audio recording on February 21, Prigozhin went further, stating “The Chief of General Staff [Valery Gerasimov] and the Minister of Defense [Sergei Shoigu] are handing out commands to the right and left not only to not give ammunition to the Wagner Group, but also to not provide help via air transport….This is direct opposition that is nothing short of an attempt to destroy the Wagner Group. It can be equated to treason.” In another audio recording that day, Prigozhin said that “other divisions are in constant undersupply of ammunition.” He claimed that “a bunch of near-the-war functionaries” are “trying to twist intrigues” by “calling Telegram channels and telling them, ‘Do not publish Prigozhin. Write that he – I don’t know – eats ammunition or sells it to Americans.'” By the end of the day, the Russian Ministry of Defense denied that it was blocking ammunition supply to “voluntary assault squads.” In return, Prigozhin accused the ministry of lying about ammunition supplies to Wagner Group forces fighting near Bahkmut.

The next day, on February 22, Prigozin continued to pressure defense ministry decisionmakers to supply Wagner Group with ammunition by forwarding a graphic image showing dozens of dead men lying on the snowy ground, as well as a screenshot of an ammunition request dated February 17 addressed to Chief of Staff Gerasimov. In an audio recording posted around the same time, Prigozhin stated, “The final signature needs to be made by either Gerasimov or Shoigu. None of them want to make the decision. I’ll explain. The Wagner Group allegedly does not exist. Previously, we received ammunition via some military divisions that are allegedly taking Bakhmut instead of us. But there is no one else and everyone knows about it by now.”

He also mentioned that a call to “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”) had been “launched on social media.” Wagner accounts on VKontakte and pro-war Telegram channels amplified variants of the slogan.

Wagner campaign image using a variant of Prigozhin’s slogan, “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”). It warns that not supplying Wagner forces with sufficient ammunition is “criminal” and either “a mistake or a betrayal.” (Source: VK/archive)

The DFRLab also identified a petition on Change.org with the slogan; it was deleted by February 24.

Screenshot of Google Search result showing the now-deleted Change.org petition. (Source: Change.org/archive)

Finally, in an audio recording on February 23, Prigozhin announced, “Ammunition shipment begins…on paper for now, but the most relevant papers are already signed.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: DFRLab releases investigations on Russian info ops before and after the invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s invasion shatters the myth of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 21:59:11 +0000

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reaches the one-year mark, the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is still far from over. Nevertheless, it is already abundantly clear that Ukraine’s relations with Russia have fundamentally changed forever. After Mariupol, Bucha, and countless other Russian war crimes, there can be no more talk of a return to an earlier era of close ties and blurred borders.

The troubled history of Russian-Ukrainian relations stretches back centuries. It a story of unequal interaction shaped by the politics of Russian imperialism. During the post-Soviet era, the bilateral relationship has been particularly turbulent as Russia has sought to retain its dominant position while preventing Ukraine from asserting its independence. Throughout this period, the Kremlin’s heavy-handed and tone-deaf policies have consistently proved counter-productive, serving only to widen the divide separating today’s Russia and Ukraine.

The first major watershed moment in this unfolding geopolitical divorce came in 2004 with Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, which saw mass protests over a rigged presidential vote leading to the subsequent election of pro-European candidate Viktor Yushchenko in a rerun ballot. Prior to the vote, Putin personally visited Ukraine to support pro-Kremlin candidate Viktor Yanukovych. This hubris backfired spectacularly and was widely regarded as a key motivating factor behind the huge street protests that erupted weeks later.

The Kremlin-controlled Russian media responded to the Orange Revolution with a coordinated anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign that set the tone for many years to come. Yushchenko and his American wife, First Lady Kateryna, were vilified, while Ukraine itself was dismissed as an artificial country and Ukrainians dehumanized as “fascists.” Within months of Ukraine’s popular uprising, Moscow launched the Russia Today TV channel (now RT) to take the information war to international audiences.

A furious and humiliated Putin regarded the Orange Revolution as an act of aggression against Russia and accused Western governments of orchestrating the protests. This was to prove a major turning point in his reign. Prior to the Orange Revolution, Putin had frequently spoken of integrating Russia into the club of leading democracies. After 2004, he turned sharply away from the West and began to court a more traditional form of Russian nationalism. This included the championing of the Russian Orthodox Church and the rehabilitation of early twentieth century White Russian emigre imperialist ideologies.

While Putin’s Russia lurched back toward the authoritarian past, Ukraine continued to consolidate its fledgling democracy. The Orange Revolution had succeeded in ending government censorship over the Ukrainian media, meaning that there was no centrally orchestrated anti-Russian campaign in Ukraine to match the Kremlin’s own poisonous anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Instead, many of Ukraine’s most popular TV channels continued to broadcast Russian-made content and adopt Russia-friendly editorial positions. This reflected the prevailing mood within Ukrainian society, with attitudes toward Russia remaining broadly positive.

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The second major watershed in the post-Soviet relationship between Russia and Ukraine was the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. When Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, fled the country following the mass killing of protesters, Putin chose to intervene directly by occupying Crimea and sparking a war in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Russian media escalated the information war against Ukraine, branding the revolution a “putsch” while portraying Ukrainians “Nazis” and puppets of the West with no real agency of their own.

The onset of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 had a profound impact on Ukrainian public opinion. As Russian troops flooded into Kremlin-created “separatist republics” in the east of the country, polls showed a surge in negative Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia’s political leaders. Similar trends were evident among Russian audiences, with Ukraine rising to second place behind America in polls identifying hostile nations.

During the eight years after the 2014 crisis, Ukraine and Russia moved further apart as the undeclared war between the two countries in eastern Ukraine rumbled on. In a bid to reduce the Kremlin’s ability to wage information warfare, Ukraine banned Russian social media, newspapers, TV channels, and Moscow-made television content. Meanwhile, affirmative action policies led to a rise in Ukrainian-language TV, cinema, and pop music, while many Russian cultural figures found they were no longer welcome in Ukraine.

Attitudes toward the shared part also diverged. While the Putin regime rehabilitated the Soviet era and glorified the Red Army role in World War II, decommunization legislation adopted by the Ukrainian authorities in 2015 outlawed Soviet symbols and led to a wave of name changes across the country as cities, towns, villages, and individual streets ditched Soviet-era names. Once seen by some as virtually indivisible, the two countries were now on strikingly different trajectories.

The spring 2019 election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s new president sparked fresh hope for a revival in Russian influence, but this was short-lived. As a native Russian-speaker who had spent much of his showbiz career in Moscow prior to entering politics, Zelenskyy was seen by many Russians as a potentially pliable partner. However, he proved just as principled as his predecessor, refusing to implement a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the Minsk peace plan to end the simmering war in eastern Ukraine and shutting down a series of TV channels linked to Russia’s unofficial representative in Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk. Zelenskyy also sought to revive international interest in the Russian occupation of Crimea, launching the Crimean Platform initiative in summer 2021.

With Russia’s soft power influence inside Ukraine in apparently terminal decline, the confrontation entered a dangerous new phase which saw the Kremlin adopting an increasingly radical stance. Russian officials and propagandists began questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, which was branded as an unnatural “anti-Russia” that sought to divide the “Russian people” and could no longer be tolerated.

In July 2021, Putin himself took the highly unusual step of publishing a long, rambling personal essay entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” that questioned Ukraine’s right to exist and was widely interpreted as a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Seven months later, many of the core ideas from this essay would feature in a series of unhinged speeches that marked the launch of the current full-scale invasion. Earlier talk of brotherhood had given way to openly genocidal rhetoric.

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The brutality of Russia’s invasion has disproportionately affected the predominantly Russian-speaking populations of eastern and southern Ukraine, leading to an historic shift in attitudes toward Russia in what were previously the most pro-Russian regions of the country. Dozens of towns and cities in these regions have been reduced to rubble, with thousands of civilians killed and millions subjected to forced deportation. As a result, anti-Russian sentiments that were traditionally more prevalent in central and western Ukraine are now also widely embraced in the south and east. A recent poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group found that 98% of Ukrainians believe the Russian military is guilty of war crimes, while 87% also hold Russian citizens accountable.

Ukrainians now overwhelmingly express negative attitudes toward the Russian population and have been horrified to witness the popularity of the war among ordinary Russians. They point to the consistently high levels of support identified by Russia’s most respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, and also note the almost complete absence of anti-war protests. Millions of Ukrainians with friends and family in Russia have learned from bitter personal experience that many Russians wholeheartedly back the war and refuse to acknowledge the atrocities taking place in Ukraine.

Amid the horrors of today’s full-scale war, the breakdown in relations between Russia and Ukraine has now reached the point of no return. Evidence of this historic shift can be seen throughout Ukrainian society. Large numbers of Ukrainians are switching their everyday language from Russian to Ukrainian. Derussification efforts have gained new grassroots momentum, with individual communities seeking to remove the last vestiges of the imperial past in both its Czarist and Soviet forms. Ukrainians are also deserting the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church in growing numbers and flocking to the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The current war has accelerated an ongoing deterioration in bilateral ties that has long reflected Russia’s misguided efforts to keep independent Ukraine in the Kremlin orbit. For decades, Russian leaders have been oblivious to the transformations taking place in post-Soviet Ukrainian society and have ignored Ukraine’s strengthening national identity. Their efforts to prevent Ukraine’s departure from the Russian sphere of influence have proved self-defeating and have resulted in deepening hostility along with a realization among Ukrainians that their country will never be truly free until it cuts all ties with Russia.

Many Russians remain in denial over the depth of the divide now separating them from their Ukrainian neighbors, preferring instead to blame everything on phantom fascists and meddling Westerners. This is wishful thinking. In reality, the two countries have never been further apart and the seeds of hatred sown by Putin’s invasion will continue to define the bilateral relationship long after Russia is defeated.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of “Fascism and Genocide: Russa’s War Against Ukrainians” published by Columbia University Press.

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One of the key reasons behind the sharp recent rise in casualties is Russia’s growing reliance on mobilized personnel with limited military training. In September 2022, Vladimir Putin responded to escalating losses in Ukraine by launching Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Most of the approximately 300,000 men who were mobilized last year have now been deployed to Ukraine. The arrival of these additional numbers helped Russia to blunt Ukraine’s advances during the winter months, but it is unclear whether mobilized troops will prove as effective in an offensive capacity.

Many mobilized Russians appear to be less than enthusiastic about their new role as the shock troops of Putin’s faltering invasion. Since the first week of February, a growing number of video appeals have been published on social media featuring groups of mobilized soldiers complaining about everything from a lack of basic military equipment to the suicidal orders of their superiors. In one fairly typical video, the wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers from Tatarstan claim their men are being used as “cannon fodder” in Ukraine.

With hundreds of thousands of mobilized Russians expected to take part in Putin’s big offensive, this emerging trend could pose a significant threat to the Kremlin. If current casualty rates are any indication, the coming attack could result in unprecedented loss of life and spark a complete collapse in morale among Russia’s already demoralized mobilized troops. This would make life very difficult for the Russian army in Ukraine, which would find itself confronted by a breakdown in discipline that would severely limit its ability to stage offensive operations. Nor is there any guarantee that the problems would stop there. Russia’s own experience in 1917 is a reminder of the unpredictable consequences that can follow when an army in wartime stops taking orders.

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It is still premature to speak of mutinous mobilized soldiers, of course. Nevertheless, maintaining military discipline may be the biggest single challenge currently facing the Putin regime. At present, the Russian dictator appears in little danger domestically, with independent polling by the Levada Center continuing to identify strong Russian public support for the war in Ukraine. While some question the validity of this data, there is no escaping the near complete absence of any genuine anti-war activity in today’s Russia. One year since the invasion began, most opponents have chosen to remain silent or have left Russia altogether.

Likewise, Putin seems to have weathered the worst of the economic storm brought on by Western sanctions. The Russian economy has been hard-hit by measures imposed over the past year, but the damage has been significantly less than anticipated and is certainly far from fatal. This may change if the country’s economic outlook continues to worsen, but at this stage there is no indication that shrinking incomes or the departure of Western brands from Russian stores will fuel protests anytime soon. While members of the Russian elite are also feeling the pinch, most owe their positions to Putin and see no realistic alternative to the current status quo, however imperfect.

The relative calm on Putin’s home front contrasts sharply with the precarious position of his army in Ukraine. Putin had initially anticipated a quick and triumphant campaign that would confirm Russia’s Great Power status and extinguish Ukrainian statehood once and for all. Instead, he finds himself embroiled in the biggest European conflict since World War II with his battered army in increasing disarray and his hopes of military success dwindling.

In order to snatch a victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat, Putin must now rely on the overwhelming numbers provided by mass mobilization. This is a tried and tested Russian tactic, but it also carries considerable risks. Sending thousands of untrained men to fight against battle-hardened and highly motivated Ukrainian troops could result in the kind of carnage that breaks armies. If that happens, the fallout would likely reverberate throughout Russia and destabilize the entire regime. Putin may then find that saving his invasion is the least of his worries.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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The last big Russian collapse caught the world by surprise and was far from universally welcomed. Indeed, some in the West saw the looming 1991 disintegration of the USSR as hugely destabilizing from an international security perspective and sought to prevent it. Most notoriously, US President George H. W. Bush traveled to Kyiv just weeks before the August 1991 Ukrainian Declaration of Independence to warn members of Soviet Ukraine’s parliament against “suicidal nationalism.”

Critics argue that the international community has been equally accommodating of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to rebuild Russia’s imperial influence since the turn of the millennium. The Second Chechen War, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, and the 2014 invasion of Ukraine all failed to fundamentally disrupt relations between Russia and the West. Indeed, in areas such as the energy sector, cooperation continued to deepen even after Moscow had illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparked a war in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. These flourishing economic ties helped create the financial foundations for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

As the Putin regime has attempted to reassert its imperial influence in Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries that were formerly part of the Czarist and Soviet empires, Moscow has also been actively restricting the rights of the dozens of different national and ethnic groups within the boundaries of the modern Russian state. Despite calling itself the Russian Federation, today’s Russia is a highly centralized and increasingly authoritarian country. National minorities throughout Russia must contend with the colonial exploitation of natural resources in their homelands while also playing a disproportionately prominent role in the Kremlin’s wars of aggression.

Over the past year, Putin’s imperial ambitions have run into serious trouble in Ukraine. The Russian dictator expected a short, victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, his invading army has suffered catastrophic losses in both men and armor amid a series of battlefield defeats that have seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a military superpower.

Despite these setbacks, Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists continue to promote an unapologetically imperialistic agenda. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently hinted that Moldova may face the same fate as Ukraine, while menacing statements directed at the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian nations are routine features of the Kremlin-controlled Russian media. Until this imperial aggression is addressed, it will remain the greatest single threat to European security.

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There are various different perspectives on the problem of Russian imperialism. Some commentators advocate a reformed Russia existing as a genuinely federal and broadly democratic state within its current borders. Others argue that today’s Russia is an unrepentant empire and will remain so until it is broken up into a series of smaller countries.

This second and more radical option alarms many Western policymakers and commentators, who fear that the break-up of the Russian Federation would have disastrous consequences for nuclear proliferation and regional security. Gloomy forecasts anticipate a Russian collapse leading to a chaotic aftermath marked by the rise of nuclear-armed regional warlords and uncontrolled migration involving tens of millions of people.

In many ways, these fears mirror similar concerns at the time of the Soviet collapse. However, while the fall of the USSR brought considerable human misery for huge numbers of former Soviet citizens, this was accompanied by only a relatively small number of localized armed conflicts. Meanwhile, those nations that escaped the Soviet sphere of influence and were welcomed into NATO and the EU have gone on to prosper. Indeed, it is no coincidence that post-Soviet Russian aggression has focused on Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, all countries that the West hesitated to embrace after 1991.

The post-Soviet experience offers important lessons for today’s policymakers as they look ahead to the increasingly realistic possibility of a post-Russia world. While the collapse of the Russian Federation is a daunting prospect, it does not necessarily have to end in disaster.

In order to avoid the worst-case scenarios that many are currently predicting, it is vital to manage the process by engaging with democratically-minded people in all regions of Russia along with the country’s national minorities. In order to avoid being caught out, Western leaders need to accurately gauge the mood within Russia and assess the appetite for greater regional autonomy or independence.

Many in the West remain reluctant to take any steps that could be seen as promoting the idea of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, some argue that talk of decolonizing the Russian Federation risks legitimizing popular Kremlin propaganda narratives of a Western plot to destroy Russia. At the same time, there is no escaping the fact that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has put Russian imperialism at the top of the international security agenda while fueling serious discussion over the viability of the Russian state. In today’s highly volatile geopolitical climate, it makes sense to prepare for every eventuality.

Russian imperialism has proven deeply resistant to previous democratization efforts. Nevertheless, we may yet live to see the emergence of a democratic Russia as a productive and respected member of the international community. Alternatively, the Russian Federation may go the same way as the Czarist and Soviet empires and fragment into a number of smaller states, which could then develop into successful democracies. The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that unless today’s Russia abandons its imperial identity, Europe will face more wars.

Taras Byk is a manager at Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv.

Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

Botakoz Kassymbekova — Wed, 01 Feb 2023 11:26:20 +0000

Vladimir Putin insists Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” but his brutal invasion of Ukraine has revealed a remarkable lack of “brotherly” Russian empathy for Ukrainians. While many people in other former Soviet republics have identified with Ukraine’s suffering, relatively few Russian citizens have shown any sign of compassion or remorse for the genocidal violence being perpetrated in their name.

According to research conducted by Russia’s internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, Russian public support for the war remained above 70% throughout 2022. Speaking to Germany publication Der Spiegel in early 2023, Levada Center scientific director Lev Gudkov observed that mounting evidence of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine had made virtually no impact on Russian public opinion. “The Russians have little compassion for the Ukrainians. Almost no one here talks about the fact that people are being killed in Ukraine.”

Much of the available evidence supports these poll findings and points to a remarkable absence of empathy. Millions of Ukrainians have friends and family in Russia. Many report being shocked by the lack of compassion they have encountered since the start of the invasion. Rather than sympathy or concern, they have been confronted by cold indifference, outright denials, or pro-Kremlin propaganda tropes.

The hundreds of thousands of Russians who fled the country over the past year have not staged any major anti-war rallies while in exile, despite no longer being subject to draconian Kremlin restrictions. Inside Russia itself, there have been no significant protests since the first weeks of the war. The contrast provided by mass anti-government rallies over the past twelve months in other repressive dictatorships such as China and Iran has cast the silence of the Russian population in an even more unfavorable light.

This apparent lack of empathy for the victims of Russian imperial aggression is nothing new. Many Russians displayed similar attitudes toward the two Chechen wars of the early post-Soviet era and the 2008 invasion of Georgia. More recently, the 2014 invasion of Crimea was widely cheered and remains arguably the most popular single event of Putin’s entire 23-year reign. Such thinking reflects the unapologetically imperial identity which the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet and Czarist eras.

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Modern Russian national identity remains firmly rooted in notions of a sacred imperial mission that perceives Russia as being a unique civilization locked in an eternal struggle against various constructed foreign enemies. Hundreds of years ago, the messianic vision of the czars gave rise to the idea of Russia as the Third Rome and leader of Orthodox Christianity. In the twentieth century, this belief in imperial exceptionalism was harnessed to identify Russians as the nation that would save the world from capitalism and lead a global communist revolution.

Under Putin, the lyrics may have changed but the tune remains largely the same. Indeed, it is telling that while Soviet communism has long since been consigned to the ash heap of history, today’s Russia has seamlessly inherited the USSR’s Cold War-era animosity toward NATO, the United States, and the Western world in general.

The sense of imperial mission pervading modern Russian society has helped nurture values of sacrifice and obligation at the expense of individual human rights. Many Russians take it for granted that they are destined to rule over other nations and interpret their colonialism as fundamentally benevolent, even when it is obviously unwelcome. Russia’s victims must be liberated, whether they like it or not.

Whether driven by the Orthodox faith, the communist ideology, or Putin’s far vaguer notions of a “Russian world,” this highly paternalistic brand of imperialism grants Russians the right to speak on behalf of their subject peoples. Accordingly, there is no need to actually listen to these conquered peoples or empathize with them, even while proclaiming them as “brothers.” Those who oppose this holy crusade are logically understood to be representatives of evil. It is no coincidence that a whole host of senior Russian officials include Putin himself have sought to frame the invasion of Ukraine as a battle against Satanists.

While Russian opposition figures are often critical of the Putin regime, they are typically far less outspoken on the topic Russian colonialism, the root cause of the current genocidal Ukraine invasion. Instead, some seek to portray themselves as the real victims of the Kremlin while failing to make the obvious connection between the authoritarianism they claim to oppose and the imperialism they choose to ignore. By blaming everything on Putin, they embrace the same convenient victimhood that the Kremlin itself promotes when faced by the negative consequences of its imperial policies.

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The national mythologies of today’s Russia and Ukraine could hardly be more different. While many Russians readily embrace their country’s imperial identity, imperial ideas do not resonate in Ukraine. Even before the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion one year ago, Ukrainians already tended to define their national identity in terms of resistance to the narrative of submission, while prioritizing personal freedoms over obligations to the state.

Since the early 1990s, Ukraine’s post-Soviet nation-building journey has been shaped by a struggle for true independence. This has led to the merging of civic and anti-colonial resistance movements, with the country’s two Maidan revolutions serving as important landmarks on the road toward internal and external freedom.

For almost two decades, Ukraine’s trajectory has been viewed with mounting anger and alarm in the Kremlin. Haunted by the Soviet collapse of the late twentieth century, the Putin regime regards Ukraine’s democratization as an existential threat to its own authoritarian model and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat.

For the time being, other post-Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan act as alternatives to Ukraine’s anti-colonial identity. In these countries, domestic democratic development has been stifled by Kremlin-backed regimes that have chosen not to break decisively with the imperial past. However, there are signs that the current status quo may not be as stable as Moscow would like to think.

Ukraine’s defiant resistance to Russia’s invasion is energizing civil society throughout the former USSR and fueling unprecedented debate over the role of Russian colonialism. On the international stage, the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has introduced contemporary global audiences to the realities of modern Russia’s imperial identity.

Commentators around the world are now actively discussing the practical implications of a post-colonial Russia. Such talk is no longer considered entirely fanciful. On the contrary, many now believe that defeat in Ukraine would deal a decisive blow to hopes of a new Russian Empire and transform the entire Eurasian political landscape. Ultimately, It is up to Russian society itself to dismantle the country’s imperial identity in order to reckon with the horrors of Russia’s past and address the crimes of the current genocidal war.

Botakoz Kassymbekova is Assistant Professor of Modern History at the University of Basel.

And yet we now know from leaked and captured documents that Russia’s military and political elite anticipated only minimal organized resistance in Ukraine. Rather than preparing for a major war, they genuinely believed a large proportion of the Ukrainian population would greet them as liberators. Strikingly, they also doubted whether the country’s military had the stomach for a serious fight.

These absurd expectations were shaped by decades of misleading Kremlin propaganda. For generations, the Russian state has denied Ukraine’s right to exist and questioned the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity. Putin has been a particularly prominent advocate of such arguments and has frequently claimed that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). In the years between the 2014 occupation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of February 2022, he repeatedly branded Ukraine an artificial country that had been unjustly separated from its rightful place as part of historical Russia.

Russian state propagandists have also long sought to discredit Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition toward Euro-Atlantic integration by dismissing it as a foreign plot. Rather than acknowledge the Ukrainian people’s right to determine their own future, the Kremlin has consistently insisted that the vast majority of Ukrainians see themselves as Russians but are victims of an extremist fringe acting in the interests of outsiders.

Such delusions seem to have penetrated the upper echelons of the Russian leadership. At no point in the lead-up to the war does anyone in the Kremlin appear to have taken the idea of Ukrainian agency seriously. Instead, they assumed the 2022 invasion would be a repeat of the spring 2014 takeover of Crimea, which saw Russian troops rapidly seize the Ukrainian peninsula amid post-revolutionary political paralysis in Kyiv. This was to prove an extremely costly mistake.

From the very first hours of the invasion, Russian troops ran into fierce Ukrainian resistance and began suffering heavy losses. Just over a month after the first columns of Russian tanks had crossed the border, Putin was forced to admit defeat in the Battle of Kyiv and withdraw from northern Ukraine entirely. His army has yet to regain the initiative, and has since retreated from Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine and Right Bank Kherson in the south.

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As well as fatally underestimating Ukraine’s military capabilities, Putin also wildly overestimated the strength of his own army. Like many senior figures in Moscow, he took Russia’s military superpower status for granted and did not seriously consider the possibility of defeat at the hands of a minor state such as Ukraine. This confidence was shared by most Russians, who have traditionally embraced notions of their country’s military might with the zeal of religious dogma.

Despite a series of embarrassing setbacks in Ukraine, large numbers of Russians remain in denial and cling to the hope that Russia has yet to deploy its full military potential. Putin himself has fueled such wishful thinking by declaring that he has “not yet begun” to wage a real war in Ukraine. However, this bravado cannot disguise the significantly less imposing reality of a depleted and demoralized Russian army that is increasingly dependent on mobilized troops, outdated armor, and Iranian drones.

Putin has recently adopted a somewhat strange war strategy that appears primarily designed to appease domestic audiences. Since early October, Russia has been focusing on the mass aerial bombardment of Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. This air war is hugely expensive and offers minimal military advantages. However, it is psychologically effective in convincing Russian audiences that their cause is not yet lost.

The Kremlin’s carefully curated propaganda machine works hard to amplify the impact of these airstrikes while exaggerating the hardships experienced by the Ukrainian civilian population. Likewise, state media also trumpets every minor gain achieved by Russian troops on the ground in eastern Ukraine, even when these advances are measured in meters. This creates the impression that Russia has stopped trying to win the war and is merely attempting to demonstrate that it is not losing.

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The war is far from over, of course. In September 2022, Putin demonstrated his resolve by ordering Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Many international observers expect him to mobilize a further 500,000 troops in the coming weeks. This massive increase in Russian military manpower is already reducing Ukraine’s ability to advance and could allow Moscow to regain the initiative in the months ahead.

At the same time, the damage to Russia’s reputation has already been done. Russia’s global standing has always relied heavily on international perceptions of the country as a major military power. This myth has now been ruthlessly exposed on the battlefields of Ukraine. Countries which had earlier felt obliged to remain on good terms with Russia now understandably feel they have little to fear, while those who previously saw Moscow as a powerful partner have been forced to rethink this relationship.

Domestically, the consequences may be even more critical for Putin. Belief in Russia’s military strength served as the foundation stone of the country’s modern national identity. It was a source of patriotic pride that helped justify the often harsh living conditions and limited individual rights that all Russian citizens are forced to accept. This entire facade is now in danger of collapsing.

The failing invasion of Ukraine is not only exposing the relative weakness of the Russian military; it is revealing the rot at the heart of the Russian state and the emptiness of the Kremlin’s imperial posturing. This raises a number of grave questions about the future of the Russian Federation that Putin is unable to answer. For the past 22 years, he has succeeded in creating a parallel propaganda universe, but reality is now rapidly closing in.

Victor Tregubov is a Ukrainian political activist and commentator.

This has brought post-Soviet Ukraine into ever more intense confrontation with Putin’s Russia, which views the current Ukrainian trajectory as an existential threat to its own brand of authoritarian imperialism. If the former imperial heartlands of Ukraine succeed in freeing themselves from the Kremlin, this would drastically undermine Russia’s influence over other neighbors such as Moldova and Belarus along with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In a worst-case scenario, Ukraine’s integration into the Western world could serve as a catalyst for the collapse of the Russian Federation itself.

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Modern Ukraine’s civilizational split from authoritarian Russia began with the country’s December 1991 referendum, which produced a landslide vote in favor of Ukrainian independence. This momentous issue was decided not by violence but at the ballot box, following extensive public dialogue. The 1991 referendum set the political tone for independent Ukraine and established peaceful transfers of power via democratic means as a core principle for the newly independent country.

Ukraine’s political climate has not always been so orderly, of course. This is especially true of the numerous occasions when Russia has sought to interfere directly. Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Revolution of Dignity stand out as particularly important turning points in the unraveling relationship between post-Soviet Kyiv and Moscow. These revolutions highlighted the Ukrainian public’s determination to prevent Russia from derailing the country’s democratic development.

Crucially, both revolutions were grassroots movements sparked by Russian interventions seeking to prevent Ukraine’s European integration and steer the country back toward a more authoritarian form of government. On both occasions, ever-widening groups within Ukrainian civil society engaged with each other and learned to cooperate, often forging ties with other regions of the country.

These people power uprisings marked the consolidation of Ukrainian civil society and highlighted the country’s capacity for collective action. As a consequence, civil society now has a high sense of self-efficacy and social capital. Independent Ukraine’s two revolutions established the democratic principle of rule by the people not only in theory but also in practice, while highlighting the diverging political paths of post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine.

Another crucial turning point in Ukraine’s nation-building journey was the annexation by Russia of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow’s subsequent armed intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. This did much to undermine pro-Russian sentiment and strengthen Ukrainian identity throughout the country.

Putin’s use of force in 2014 discredited Russia as a potential partner while serving to remove much of his traditional support base in Ukraine. With economic opportunities sharply reduced and the political climate turning decisively against Moscow, many Kremlin sympathizers in the occupied parts of the Donbas and elsewhere in Ukraine chose to relocate to Russia. Others soon became disillusioned with the realities of the Russian occupation.

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As relations with Russia have deteriorated, ties with the global Ukrainian diaspora have flourished. For decades, the Kremlin sought to portray the diaspora in dismissive terms as a reactionary force that was out of touch with contemporary Ukrainian realities. In recent years, diaspora Ukrainians have debunked these stereotypes and served as a vital bridge between the country and its international partners.

Deepening ties with Ukraine’s Western partners have played an important role in consolidating the country’s historic turn toward the democratic world. Much of the support Ukraine has received since 2014 has been conditional on social and economic reforms that have re-affirmed the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Civil society actors and government officials have come to recognize that these conditions lead to higher standards of living and a better quality of life in general. This is in stark contrast to relations with Russia, which even before the outbreak of hostilities in 2014 had long been associated with stagnation and inertia.

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s historic turn toward the West has been dramatically reinforced by the previously unimaginable horrors of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While Russian troops have killed thousands of civilians and destroyed entire Ukrainian cities, Ukraine’s Western partners have offered a wide range of essential aid and welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees. For many Ukrainians, the experience of the past ten months has fundamentally altered perceptions of both Russia and the West. While they will long remember the Western response with immense gratitude, they will never forgive Russia.

The war has also fostered national integration within Ukraine by fueling unprecedented interaction among people from different regions of the country. This integration has been happening as Russian missiles and bombs fall equally on Ukrainian citizens regardless of their region, ethnicity, or worldview. With the ferocity of the Russian invasion forcing millions of citizens to flee their homes in the Donbas, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Kherson, and numerous other provinces, a massive cultural exchange is taking place as different segments of the population are brought together and united by a common cause.

This cultural exchange extends beyond Ukraine’s borders to the country’s European neighbors. Millions of Ukrainians have sought sanctuary in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic States, and a host of other European countries. The support extended by these countries shows that they, in turn, all appreciate the sacrifices currently being made by Ukrainians in defense of European security.

The huge refugee wave since February 2022 has resulted in entirely new levels of interaction between Ukrainians and other Europeans. As a result, earlier misconceptions are being replaced by a more nuanced understanding of each other and an appreciation of how much Ukrainians have in common with the wider European community. The growing solidarity and engagement of the past ten months is laying the foundations for what promises to be decades of intensifying partnership and cooperation.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is still far from over, but it is already difficult to see how Putin can achieve his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and forcing a Russified Ukraine back into the Kremlin’s exclusive sphere of influence. Instead, the war has dramatically accelerated long-term trends and widened the civilizational divide separating Moscow and Kyiv. A reduced Russia now looks destined to spend an extended period in international isolation, while Ukraine is firmly on track to cement its position as a valued member of the democratic world.

As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the US Congress during his historic December 2022 address, “Your money is not charity. It is an investment in global security and democracy.” Indeed, at present it would appear that US support for Ukraine has been one of the most successful foreign policy investments in American history.

Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor of comparative politics living in Almaty.

Putin is preparing for a long war

Alexander Motyl — Wed, 04 Jan 2023 01:37:20 +0000

Vladimir Putin has just admitted Russia is in serious trouble. A comparison of his recent New Year address with the speech he delivered just one year earlier reveals a dramatic change in tone, focus, and language that hints at mounting alarm behind the scenes in the Kremlin over the rapidly unraveling invasion of Ukraine. Gone, too, was the Moscow skyline setting that typically serves as the backdrop for this keynote annual address. Instead, a somber-looking Putin spoke while flanked by rows of soldiers in uniform.

This symbolism matters. In modern Russia, the head of state’s New Year speech is an important tradition that seeks to set the tone for the coming year. On this occasion, the mood Putin sought to convey was of a country facing the prospect of a long and difficult war. After months spent downplaying the invasion of Ukraine as a “Special Military Operation,” he was now belatedly acknowledging the severity of the situation.

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Back on December 31, 2021, Putin had been far more upbeat. “We are united in the hope that changes for the better lie ahead,” he said. “As we ring in the New Year, we hope that it will bring new opportunities for us. Of course, we hope luck will be on our side, but we understand that making our dreams reality primarily depends on us.” The final line of his address was downright soppy: “May love fill every heart and inspire us all to achieve our goals and scale the greatest heights. For the sake of our loved ones and for the sake of our only country, our great Motherland.”

Could this really have been the same Vladimir Putin who was already planning to unleash a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and plunge Europe into its largest conflict since World War II? In fact, despite the massive Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders in late 2021 and Moscow’s visibly worsening relations with the West, neither of these important developments was mentioned at all.

What a difference a year makes. In a nine-minute New Year speech that was reportedly the longest of his 22-year reign, Putin marked the arrival of 2023 by lashing out at the Western world and warning that the fate of Russia was at stake. “The West lied about peace,” Putin declared. “It was preparing for aggression, and now they are cynically using Ukraine and its people to weaken and split Russia. We have never allowed this, and never will allow anybody to do this to us.”

Domestic opponents were also targeted. In an apparent reference to the large numbers of military-age Russian men who chose to flee the country in the second half of 2022 rather than join the invasion, he noted that the past twelve months had “put a lot of things in their place, clearly separating courage and heroism from betrayal and cowardice.”

The speech concluded on a defiant and ominous note, with Putin indicating that Russia’s survival as an independent state was now under threat. “Together, we will overcome all difficulties and preserve our country’s greatness and independence,” he said. “We will triumph, for our families and for Russia.”

There was no frivolous talk of love, trust, and hope as in December 2021. No dreamy wishes, no hopeful expectations. This time, Putin was sounding the alarm bell. Naturally, the West was at fault and the Russian dictator himself bore absolutely no responsibility for the mess his country currently finds itself in.

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Putin seems to believe, or at least wants the Russian public to believe, that Russia is tottering on the edge of a precipice with its very existence as a coherent state now in danger. In his address, he spoke several times of the need to defend and preserve Russia’s independence. This was new and noteworthy.

For many years, Putin has consistently expressed his commitment to maintaining Russia’s Great Power status and its prominent role in the international arena. He has frequently accused the West of wanting to subvert Russia. But fear of losing independence was a problem for Ukrainians, Balts, and Russia’s other neighbors. It was not something for Russians to worry about.

Can Putin be serious? Of course, he may simply be trying to terrify his domestic audience and thereby prepare the Russian public for further sacrifices in the futile and unwinnable war against Ukraine. Alternatively, he and his colleagues in the Kremlin may really sense that, their publicly expressed bravado notwithstanding, the writing is on the wall for Russia.

More than ten months since the invasion of Ukraine began, very few analysts still see a clear path to victory for Russia. On the contrary, there is broad agreement that Putin’s options are narrowing as his military fortunes decline. Russia has already been noticeably weakened by the failing invasion. Defeat in Ukraine could lead to the break-up of the Russian Federation itself, or turn the country into a vassal state of China or the West.

Putin’s speech was an unambiguous attempt to mobilize Russian society and place the whole country on a war footing. It is not yet clear whether this was successful. One thing is for sure: if the coming year turns out to be anything like 2022 for Russia, there is little chance that Putin will still be around to deliver another New Year address on December 31, 2023.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

2022 REVIEW: Russia’s invasion has united Ukraine

Taras Kuzio — Wed, 21 Dec 2022 17:05:20 +0000

Ever since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Western coverage of the country has tended to exaggerate regional differences, creating the impression of a weak state with divided loyalties. Misleading portrayals of Ukraine as a nation split between pro-Russian east and pro-European west have had a profound impact on outside perceptions, leading many international observers to believe that much of the local population in eastern Ukraine would actively support Russia’s 2022 invasion or at least remain neutral.

Such thinking can be traced back to Russia, which has long promoted the idea of modern Ukraine as an artificial state with a large ethnic Russian minority in need of Moscow’s protection. For years, Vladimir Putin denied Ukraine’s right to statehood while insisting Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). He openly accused Ukrainians of occupying historically Russian lands and declared Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

These distorted perceptions of Ukraine’s history and national character meant that few expected the country to survive against the full might of the Russian military. On the eve of this year’s invasion, there was general agreement in Moscow and most Western capitals that Ukraine would be defeated within a matter of days. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not seen as a credible wartime leader and was widely expected to abandon Kyiv. Likewise, the military prowess of the Ukrainian army and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian nation were also underestimated.

Inside the Kremlin, it appears that Putin’s decision to invade was influenced by a combination of faulty intelligence and over-consumption of his own anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The Russian dictator seems to have genuinely believed myths about an oppressed pro-Russian minority in Ukraine who would welcome his invasion and rise up in support of the advancing Russian army. Rarely in international affairs has anyone ever been so mistaken.

In fact, no Ukrainian region welcomed Putin’s invading army. While instances of collaboration have been recorded throughout the occupied regions of southern and eastern Ukraine, these have proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the number of people prepared to collaborate has been dwarfed by the sheer scale of Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian occupation. Russian troops who were told they would be treated as liberators have been shocked and distressed to find themselves acting as occupiers in hostile territory. Meanwhile, Ukrainians from all regions have been brought together by the common cause of defeating Russia. An invasion that was meant to extinguish Ukrainian statehood has inadvertently united the country.

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Ukraine’s nation-building journey did not begin overnight with the advent of this year’s Russian invasion, of course. A modern Ukrainian national identity has been gradually evolving throughout the three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Key milestones in this journey include the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, and the shock waves caused by the subsequent Russian invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the significance of the changes that have taken place within Ukrainian society since February 24 cannot be overstated. Crucially, attitudes toward key issues of national identity and foreign policy have become aligned throughout the country.

The biggest changes have taken place among Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have suffered most from Russian aggression. It is one of the bitter ironies of the invasion that the devastation inflicted by Putin’s troops has fallen disproportionately on the regions of Ukraine that Moscow claims to be protecting. The Russian army has reduced dozens of towns and cities throughout southern and eastern Ukraine to rubble and killed thousands of civilians. Millions more have been subjected to a brutal occupation regime marked by executions, abductions, terror tactics, and forced deportations.

Until 2022, these Ukrainian regions had traditionally been more sympathetic to the Soviet past and tended to favor pro-Russian politicians. Many openly embraced Soviet myths of Russians and Ukrainians as “brotherly peoples.” However, the horrors of the invasion have forced a radical rethink and led to the widespread rejection of Russia.

The rift caused by the current invasion has moved beyond far politics. Following the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, most Ukrainians expressed negative views of Russia’s leadership while remaining largely positive toward the Russian people. This is no longer the case. Ukrainians have noted that the vast majority of ordinary Russians appear to support the war or at least refrain from criticizing it. Millions of Ukrainians with Russian relatives have experienced this phenomenon for themselves in painful telephone conversations.

As a consequence, most Ukrainians no longer draw any meaningful distinction between the Russian state and the Russian people. An August 2022 poll conducted by Ukraine’s Rating Agency found that only 3% of Ukrainians held positive views of Russians while 81% regarded Russians negatively. This negative rating was almost double the 41% recorded just four months earlier. Ukrainian antipathy towards Russians will only deepen as the war takes a greater toll in civilian lives, military casualties, and physical destruction.

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Ukraine’s fundamental break with Russia has impacted every aspect of the country’s social, cultural, and religious life. The Russian language is now noticeably in decline among Ukrainians because it is negatively viewed as the language of military aggression. Many Ukrainians who grew up predominantly speaking Russian are becoming bilingual or switching to speaking Ukrainian.

There is growing public support across the country for policies of de-Russification. Almost three-quarters of Ukrainians (73%) back the idea of renaming streets and public places commemorating Russian historical figures and events, including two-thirds of respondents in eastern Ukraine. By weaponizing Russian history and using it to justify the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has convinced millions of previously sympathetic Ukrainians to view symbols of the Russian imperial past as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing attack on Ukrainian statehood.

Support for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine has also plummeted, with recent polling indicating that only 4% of Ukrainians currently identify as adherents. This is hardly surprising, given the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the principal cheerleaders of Putin’s invasion. Recent searches of Russian Orthodox Church premises in Ukraine have netted an array of Russian passports, imperial symbols, and literature denying the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Converging Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia are immediately apparent in relation to the peace process and foreign policy. A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey conducted in July 2022 found almost no difference of opinion between Ukrainians who identified as Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking on the issue of a potential land-for-peace deal to end the war, with 85% of Russian speakers opposed compared to 90% of Ukrainian speakers. Likewise, there was no longer any evidence of a significant regional split, with 83% in eastern Ukraine and 85% in the south opposing any territorial compromises with the Kremlin.

The same shift toward greater national consensus is evident on foreign policy matters. Regional differences over the country’s future geopolitical direction were long seen as the most obvious indication of a divided Ukraine. However, since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, successive surveys have found that clear majorities in all regions of Ukraine now support Ukrainian membership of NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, enthusiasm for deeper integration with Russia or membership of the Moscow-led Eurasian Union has evaporated.

By invading Ukraine, Putin hoped to reverse the verdict of 1991 and bring Ukrainian independence to an end. Instead, Russia’s attack has backfired disastrously. The full-scale invasion which began on February 24 has served to accelerate Ukraine’s nation-building progress and unite the country in ways that would have been difficult to image just one year ago. The trauma and sacrifices of the past ten months mean that these changes are in all likelihood irreversible and will continue to shape Ukraine’s development for decades to come as the country strengthens its sovereignty and moves further away from Russia.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

US President Joe Biden describes Putin as a rational actor who has miscalculated. This is probably true, but it is also important to recognize Putin’s miscalculation as a symptom of a flawed worldview that is disconnected from reality. In short, Putin fell into the same trap that eventually catches out many long-serving dictators; he drank his own Kool-Aid.

In a military context, believing in one’s own inflated prowess is catastrophically dangerous. Thanks to decades of propaganda, Russians take it for granted that their country is a military superpower. This myth has been shattered in Ukraine. Despite having less than one-third of Russia’s population, a far smaller economy, and being an emerging democracy rather than a militarized dictatorship, Ukraine has more than held its own for almost a year against the invading Russian army.

While the West has provided Ukraine with significant military aid, the extent of Western involvement in the war should not be overstated. So far, only about one percent of the relevant available Western weaponry has actually been sent to Ukraine. Key partners such as the US, UK, France, and Germany have resisted Ukrainian pleas for tanks, jets, and long-range missiles. Instead, they have provided anti-tank weapons, limited quantities of artillery, and shorter range missile systems. Nevertheless, this has proved sufficient to stop Russia’s offensive and liberate about half of the territory occupied by Putin’s troops during the initial stages of the invasion.

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Faced with mounting setbacks in Ukraine, Putin has become increasingly delusional. Rather than acknowledge Russia’s embarrassing defeats and catastrophic losses, he insists everything is going according to plan. This is creating opportunities for Russia’s far right forces, which do not suffer from the same limitations. While Kremlin officials absurdly attempt to portray retreats as “goodwill gestures,” the far right wins over the Russian public by speaking frankly about the country’s military disasters in Ukraine.

Until the invasion began in February 2022, the only political opposition in Russia was represented by jailed anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny, who had attempted to play broadly by Western democratic rules. When the war started, the remnants of Russian civil society were ruthlessly stamped out. Prominent opposition figures were jailed or forced into exile, while new laws criminalized all forms of public dissent. These trends have intensified over the intervening nine months, extinguishing any lingering hopes of a serious democratic opposition to the Putin regime.

Instead, the most serious challenge to Putinism may come from a newly emerging political movement that is even further to the right on the political spectrum than Putin himself. At present, this is a disorganized but vocal movement that has found its voice in the many unofficial Russian “war correspondents” and social media accounts reporting on the invasion while bypassing the Russia’s Kremlin-controlled mainstream information space. Most write from a Russian nationalist perspective while employing ethnic slurs for Ukrainians. They are unambiguously pro-war and often apparently pro-Putin. However, their content is frequently at odds with Russia’s official propaganda and highly critical of the military officials leading the invasion.

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While there is currently no single nationalist leader, the most prominent figure among Russian ultra-nationalists is Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group paramilitary force. Prigozhin once sought to distance himself from Wagner but has recently made his connection very public. He has released footage of his recruitment speeches and has opened a swanky head office in Saint Petersburg. This reflects the rising profile of Wagner itself. Formerly seen as a shadowy mercenary group used by the Kremlin in hybrid war hot spots such as Ukraine, Syria, and Africa to create a veneer of plausible deniability, Wagner has been one of the few Russian military units to perform credibly during the initial stages of the Ukraine invasion and has visibly grown in stature.

With his own public profile on the rise, Prigozhin has begun testing the boundaries by publicly deriding senior figures within the Russian military hierarchy. Meanwhile, his Wagner troops operate in Ukraine as an army-within-an-army, pursuing their own clearly defined battlefield objectives and openly positioning themselves as a military elite in contrast to the under-performing regular Russian army.

Wagner fighters have become the poster boys of the ultra-nationalists, who are themselves less prone to official delusions and more interested in the realities of hard power. Freedom from the constraints of the Kremlin propaganda machine is a major asset in their struggle for credibility among Russian audiences. This makes the far right a potentially formidable opponent in a future internal power struggle against the Putin regime.

It is hard to predict what the world could expect from a post-Putin Russia ruled by far right forces, but there is clearly little room for optimism. An ultra-nationalist successor regime would likely be even more inclined to wage war against Russia’s neighbors while ruthlessly targeting civilians. This extremism would be driven in part by the growing conviction within nationalist circles that Putin is failing in Ukraine precisely because he has not been ruthless enough in his leadership of the war.

Putin’s domestic position is not yet sufficiently weak to talk of an imminent fall from power, but it is already apparent that he is far weaker today than he was just one year ago. At the same time, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has catapulted a wide range of formerly fringe nationalist figures into the Russian mainstream and transformed Yevgeny Prigozhin into a political heavyweight. This swing to the right has not yet been fully appreciated by many Western observers, but it offers alarming indications of where Russia may be heading politically and must be watched carefully in the months ahead.

Stanislav Shalunov is founder and CEO of NewNode and creator of FireChat.

Throughout the 1990s, civic attachment to the Russian Federation remained weak. Meanwhile, more overtly imperial forms of identity proved to be far more popular, leading to calls for a return to the Soviet and Czarist eras or for a resurgent Russia to lead a new Eurasian empire. This trend was evident even before the Soviet Empire fell, with celebrated dissident author Alexander Solzhenitsyn calling in 1990 for a new Russian Union of the three Eastern Slavic nations (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus). This concept would be revived and broadened almost two decades later to serve as the basis for Putin’s “Russian World” ideology.

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The continued popularity of supra-national imperial identities in post-Soviet Russia was clear during the 1993 constitutional crisis, which saw an alliance of communists and extreme nationalists attempt to overthrow President Yeltsin. Three years later during the Russian presidential election, Yeltsin embraced the imperial agenda of a union state with Belarus to help counter strong revanchist support for Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov.

By the time KGB veteran Vladimir Putin became president at the turn of the millennium, Russia was already visibly shifting away from its brief flirtation with European integration. Putin openly embraced Russia’s imperial identity and laid claim to Eurasia as the Kremlin’s exclusive sphere of influence. He was reportedly obsessed from the very start of his presidency with the idea of bringing Ukraine firmly back into the Russian orbit.

Putin’s position was perhaps predictable. The Soviet KGB where he spent the formative years of his professional career was a strikingly chauvinistic institution that openly embraced a sense of Russia’s imperial mission. This mentality was passed on to the KGB’s post-Soviet successor agencies, which assumed a dominant role in Russia following Putin’s rise to power.

Among policymakers in Putin’s Russia, other former Soviet nations such as Ukraine were never credited with real agency or genuine sovereignty. Instead, they were routinely regarded as part of modern Russia’s informal empire. Such ideas enjoyed widespread support among the Russian public and were heavily promoted in the carefully curated Russian mainstream media.

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In 2012, Putin returned to the presidency with the goal of entering history as the gatherer of Russian lands. In practice, this meant completing the reintegration of Belarus and Ukraine. Putin had always viewed these two East Slavic states are core members of his envisioned Eurasian Economic Union. With Crimea annexed in 2014 and Belarus transformed into a Russian puppet state in 2020, the last and decisive step in this historic process was to be the complete subjugation of Ukraine in 2022.

Unfortunately for Putin, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan. Far from completing his historic reunification mission, the rapidly unraveling attack on Ukraine has shattered Russia’s reputation as a Great Power and as a military force to be reckoned with. As a consequence, many now view Russia as a declining power.

Moscow’s ability to project influence throughout its former empire has suffered accordingly. This presents Russia’s neighbors and the Western world with a golden opportunity to encourage the evolution of a post-imperial Russian identity that could serve as the basis for Russia’s reintegration into the wider international community.

In order to achieve this goal, the democratic world must rethink its own policies toward Russia and stop informally acknowledging Moscow’s claims to a sphere of influence. This outdated and unhelpful approach merely serves to legitimize Russia’s imperial ambitions. Instead, the West should treat Russia as an ordinary nation state and hold Moscow to the same standards applied to others.

Western leaders should also encourage the non-Russian states of the former USSR to stop buttressing Russia’s supra-national identity and end their participation in post-Soviet structures whose main purpose is to prolong Russia’s regional dominance. Members of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and Eurasian Economic Union should be encouraged to withdraw. Armenia should be encouraged to return to the EU Association Agreement it abandoned under Russian pressure in 2013.

Another key step toward a post-imperial Russia is elimination of the grey zone between NATO and the EU on one side, and a Russia-dominated Eurasia on the other. While the current war in Ukraine cannot continue forever, a fresh Russian invasion is virtually inevitable unless Ukraine in offered a clear road map toward NATO membership. Ukraine’s current position in the geopolitical grey zone helps keep Russia’s imperial aspirations alive and makes a lasting peace in Europe unattainable.

Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU would rule out any further Russian invasions and dramatically reduce the scope for new imperial adventures. This would lead to a decline in support within Russia for aggressive imperial ideologies and discredit the entire notion of Putin’s “Russian World.” Instead, we would likely witness the growth of Russian civic identity.

Three decades after the fall of the USSR, Russia is currently in real danger of losing its Great Power status. The disastrous invasion of Ukraine has exposed internal weaknesses and sparked an unprecedented collapse in Russian influence throughout the former Soviet Empire. It is clearly in the interests of the democratic world to encourage this process of imperial retreat. The transformation of Russian national identity into a post-imperial and civic form would pave the way for a new era of European peace and productivity. The ultimate beneficiaries of this would be the Russian people themselves.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His forthcoming book is “Genocide and Fascism, Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

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Putin’s speaking style is also worthy of note. In contrast to twentieth century dictators like Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler who were notorious for raving and gesticulating wildly, Putin’s often outrageous assertions are delivered in a soft-spoken and understated tone that creates the impression of a level-headed and entirely rational politician.

The annual Valdai Discussion Club held in Moscow this October was a case in point. Putin’s keynote address was a diatribe against the West, which he accused of attempting to eliminate the rich diversity of cultures around the world. Putin claimed he stood for traditional values, the dignity and sovereignty of all peoples, and the free exchange of science and cultural achievements. He assured listeners that he was against isolationism and any kind of racial, ethnic, or religious intolerance.

This was Putin the impeccable humanist on display. It would be difficult to imagine a figure further removed from Medvedev’s bloodcurdling proclamations. Judging by Putin’s demeanor at the Valdai event, few would believe this was the same man who had ordered the destruction of Grozny, Aleppo, and Mariupol, or who just months earlier had unleashed the largest European conflict since World War II.

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While Medvedev uses the language of the gutter, Putin adopts the academic tone of the historian and disguises his imperial aggression by arguing at length that Russians and Ukrainians are actually “one nation.” He expresses exasperation at the alleged oppression of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking population, and positions his invasion as an unfortunate necessity. Whereas Medvedev is the voice of righteous fury, Putin is the voice of reason.

Unfortunately for the Kremlin, Putin and Medvedev’s good cop, bad cop routine is now failing in the West. The international media spotlight of the past nine months has done much to expose Russian lies and reveal the naked imperial ambition behind Moscow’s talk of phantom fascists and oppressed minorities. Few remain receptive to Putin’s convoluted explanations for the invasion of Ukraine other than ideological allies and those still willing to buy into the Kremlin’s conspiratorial narratives.

The contrasting rhetoric being offered up by Putin and Medvedev has proven more successful among domestic audiences and has helped convince millions of Russians that the Kremlin authorities know what they are doing in Ukraine. Raised in an authoritarian political culture, many Russians find Medvedev’s extremism emotionally appealing and are persuaded by Putin’s more measured approach.

The impact of this strategy is plain to see. While the Russian death toll for the invasion of Ukraine approaches 100,000 and the Russian economy continues its downward slide, there is no sign of any significant domestic opposition to the war. As more Russian sons and husbands return from Ukraine in coffins, the durability of the Kremlin duo will be further tested, but at present their double act appears highly effective.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University, Newark. Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor of comparative politics, living in Almaty.

The long-term impact of Morocco’s magical World Cup run

Morocco’s triumphs signal a new world order in more than soccer

No politics… except Palestine

Where is the UAE?

In Rabat, unprecedented unity behind the Atlas Lions

Gulf neighbors get cozy

DECEMBER 15, 2022 | 10:01 AM WASHINGTON | 6:01 PM QATAR

The long-term impact of Morocco’s magical World Cup run

The world abruptly woke up from the roller-coaster ride of a dream that was Morocco’s miraculous World Cup run on Wednesday when the Atlas Lions lost 2-0 to defending champion France in the semifinals. But Morocco nonetheless succeeded by inspiring millions of children from Africa and the Middle East, uniting much of the world during an uncertain time with its historic performance.

Not only was Morocco the first African and Arab nation to ever reach the semifinals of the World Cup, but it accomplished that feat with a roster in which fourteen out of twenty-six players were born abroad, mostly in Europe. While this phenomenon can be attributed to the failure of some European nations to assimilate migrants from North Africa, it has implications for the future of international soccer teams in African and Arab nations. Children in the region and in the diaspora have seen the successes of Morocco and could now be inspired to play for the nation of their cultural roots over the country where their family may have emigrated. Western nations are known for having powerhouse teams made up from immigrants, most notoriously France’s 2018 World Cup-winning team, in which twelve of twenty-three players had African roots, spanning nine different nations. Therefore, this shift in which nation a player chooses to represent could cause a seismic shake-up in the international soccer hierarchy, with more African and Middle Eastern teams potentially rising in rank from a generation of youth that have been inspired by the 2022 Atlas Lions.

Off the field, it could be argued that Morocco’s World Cup run was more successful in bringing together the Arab and African community than traditional diplomatic routes—showcasing the overwhelmingly positive impact that soccer and other sporting events can have. With Africa and the Middle East having large youth populations, governments in the region and international organizations should seize this positive momentum by building infrastructure and programs to support inclusive sporting opportunities for young people.

From kids running around with a soccer ball at their feet in the historic streets of Marrakech, to neighboring nations such as Tunisia celebrating the victories of Morocco’s team like their own country had won, to internally displaced people’s camps in northern Syria tuning into the matches, the Middle East and Africa stood and cheered in unison behind the Atlas Lions and the beautiful game. Although their inspiring World Cup run is over, this special group of Moroccans has forever etched their names into history and changed the future of soccer and the region for the better.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

DECEMBER 10, 2022 | 2:18 PM WASHINGTON | 10:18 PM QATAR

Morocco’s triumphs signal a new world order in more than soccer

Soccer has proven to be much more than a simple sport. It is a powerful diplomatic tool, an avenue for national branding, and a potent apparatus for symbolic power in the Bourdieusian sense. When an underdog with a 0.01 percent chance to win the 2022 World Cup at the start of the tournament advances to the semifinals and eliminates football legends such as Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, it is undeniably added symbolic capital to the regional and international credit of the Atlas Lions.

With a stunning, intense victory over Portugal on Saturday, Morocco became the first Arab country and the first African country to make the World Cup semifinals. The kingdom’s wins were perceived as symbolic redemption for defeats and deceptions of MENA and African countries in modern times, as well as an act of metaphorical revenge against Western colonizers and imperialist legacies. African and Middle Eastern populations have been fervent supporters of this tournament’s dark horse, as they can identify with its tenacity and resilience vis-à-vis teams four times its market value (based on the transfer value of each team’s players).

Although the Moroccan team relies heavily on diaspora players, with fourteen out of twenty-six team members born abroad—mostly in European nations such as France, the Netherlands, or Spain—these double nationals chose to play under the colors of their country of origin. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a failure of European integration and assimilation of migrants from North African nations. These phenomenal footballers couldn’t identify with their host countries and continued to pay allegiance to the Arab Islamic kingdom where their families emigrated from.

Players who prostrate to pray after each win and wave the Palestinian flag, alcohol-free matches, and high-level competition in an Arab land are all peculiar and novel sights for global spectators. These symbolic elements could be signs of a changing world order where euro-centric value systems are no longer dominant, and a more diverse football culture is being established. Similarly, European teams such as Italy and Germany that were disqualified early could also be a symbolic reflection of their own countries’ post-pandemic woes. Could France be next?

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

DECEMBER 7, 2022 | 1:54 PM WASHINGTON | 9:54 PM QATAR

No politics… except Palestine

FIFA and Qatar have diligently worked to silence issues deemed too political, from rainbow flags and attire in support of LGBTQ rights to t-shirts commemorating the death of Mahsa Amini and demanding rights for Iranian women. Stadium security and police have forced fans to hand over their items or have taken fans away from the stadium areas. Those instances have circulated widely on social media and fan group chats. Too frequently, security has made an issue where one really did not exist, resulting in more attention, not less, on the fan advocate.

In contrast, support for Palestinians is prominent across the World Cup, with Palestinian flags and chants everywhere: matches, the souq, public transportation, and even social media platforms. In Morocco’s win over Spain, players and fans donned the flag for photos, and fans sang pro-Palestine songs. Fans from elsewhere in the world who are not well versed on the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict are learning; some fans are even now becoming converts to the Palestinian cause. Examples of fans donning the Palestinian flag are more and more common each day in malls, television interviews, and the many fan areas in and around Doha.

One lasting outcome of the World Cup could well be that fans who were disinterested in the issues surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict are now at least interested and remain aware of happenings in the broader Levant. The world may also see more Palestinian flags at international matches moving forward as World Cup fans continue to commemorate their attendance in Qatar by raising the flag that they were gifted–and commentators would be forced to acknowledge the change in fan behavior.

—Jennifer Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is attending the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar.

DECEMBER 6, 2022 | 2:11 PM WASHINGTON | 10:11 PM QATAR

Where is the UAE?

Noticeably absent from the Gulf’s neighborhood block party is an Emirati presence. This unique tournament has Arab culture and societies on display—whether they qualified for the World Cup or not. Unlike the Qatari, Saudi, and Palestinian flags found everywhere, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) flag is noticeably missing from the fan zones and stadiums. Plus, UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan only came to Doha on an official visit on December 5, well after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) initial visit to Qatar to take in the spectacle. And unlike MBS and his informal family visits with the Qatari royal family, the UAE leader’s visit was short and formal. Despite lingering trust issues between Qatar and the UAE in the post-blockade period, the lack of Emirati presence is somewhat surprising during the first-ever Middle East-hosted World Cup. Arguably, Abu Dhabi appears to be taking its relationship with Saudi for granted as MBS, on behalf of Riyadh, soaks up the love from Qatari leaders.

DECEMBER 6, 2022 | 1:55 PM WASHINGTON | 9:55 PM QATAR

In Rabat, unprecedented unity behind the Atlas Lions

You want drama? Heart-pounding, nerve-wracking drama? Join a sports bar full of Moroccan fans desperately cheering on their beloved underdog Atlas Lions in a scoreless draw against mighty Spain. And you want a heart attack? Have it go to penalty kicks. You want an explosion of joy? Morocco, three-nil.

A busy street in Rabat during Morocco’s World Cup match. And the hotel sports bar. pic.twitter.com/vX49AfVDZb
— Dan Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro) December 6, 2022

Here in Rabat, the work week might as well be over. Delirious Moroccans are pouring into the streets, honking, dancing, singing their hearts out.

The Moroccan squad played with the pluck, modesty, and unity that characterizes this nation. Morocco is a leader in Africa and the Arab world, but does not flaunt its weight. It is used to not being in the room with great powers. It looks after its own interests, is a good partner to those it chooses as its friends (the United States, and now Israel, among them), and rarely makes much of a fuss.

But it is also a society that feels deeply proud of its ancient history, cultural diversity, and the broad consensus in support of the royal leadership. A quiet, humble self-confidence expresses itself in cultural pride and legendary hospitality.

Tonight, Moroccans are more unified than ever. As the exhausted players tossed Bono, the hero goalkeeper, into the air, the happy din in the streets was already rising.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is the director of the N7 Initiative.

DECEMBER 5, 2022 | 9:22 AM WASHINGTON | 5:22 PM QATAR

Gulf neighbors get cozy

Saudis make up the third-largest group of ticket purchasers behind Qataris and Americans. After a shocking win against Argentina, the Saudis came out of their proverbial shell. They wore their flag proudly around their shoulders, bought up green scarves with their national symbol, and could be spotted at Saudi matches and even non-Saudi matches in their team’s jerseys. Saudis and Qataris could be seen partying at the Saudi House, a pavilion set up on the Corniche, or the main thoroughfare along the Doha waterfront. In short, it’s now “cool” to be Saudi at the World Cup.

With this newfound status, the Saudis have embraced the atmosphere and have actively engaged with fans from around the world. By fixing thobes and ghutrahs (robes and headscarves) of foreign fans embracing the local culture, joking in social media posts asking “Where’s Messi?!,” and simply striking up conversations with other fans, no matter where they are from, the Saudis are a key fixture in this World Cup. In many ways, they have made the tournament their own, playing host alongside the Qataris, to ensure fans from other parts of the world have fun and begin to see that Gulf Arabs are not as often portrayed in Western media according to stereotypical representations.

Along with the strong representation of Saudi fans, senior leaders from both Qatar and Saudi Arabia took part in the tournament’s opening ceremony and attended matches. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s seat next to FIFA President Gianni Infantino on the ceremony stage was no coincidence: It was a clear overture from the Qatari emir that it was time for the two countries to put the blockade, which was in effect from 2017 to 2021, behind them and start anew. Similarly, attendance at matches, and sharing of the royal box, by senior members of both Qatari and Saudi ruling families is a sign that the countries are looking forward.

At a more grassroots level, under a program established for the tournament, Qatari families are hosting fans, which has enabled them to reconnect with families, friends, and colleagues. Many Qataris are hosting multigenerational Saudi families, solidifying deep connections based on their time together and shared experiences attending matches. To ease congestion on roads and infrastructure during the World Cup, Qatar closed its schools, meaning that Qatari children are home and likely spending significant time with their guests—meaning the connections they build are likely to result in future communication and travel between the two countries.

DECEMBER 2, 2022 | 1:02 PM WASHINGTON | 9:02 PM QATAR

Saudi Arabia lost at the 2022 World Cup. But its sports sector is winning.

The Saudi Arabia versus Argentina match during the 2022 World Cup resulted in one of the biggest upsets in Argentina’s history, with the two-time champions experiencing its first defeat in thirty-six matches. The day of the November 22 match, Saudi ministries, government agencies, schools, and universities were directed to end working hours early so that people could watch the game. After Saudi Arabia’s victory, King Salman declared the next day a national holiday.

The Saudi victory brought euphoria not just to Saudis but also the entire region, with social media users from other Arab countries sharing videos of their reactions to the Saudi national team victory. As journalist Sarah Dadouch put it: “The Arab world in particular witnessed a rare moment of shared ecstasy.”

The outcome of the game was not a coincidence. As Saudi Sports Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Turki Al Faisal stated, the team had been preparing for that moment for three years. The ministry’s significant efforts to promote and support soccer reflects its overall direction and goals.

The sports sector is one of the vital pillars of Saudi Vision 2030 and the Ministry of Sport’s dedication is tangible in Saudi Arabia, where one can witness the enhanced facilities and increased citizen participation in sports. This change did not occur overnight, and it is partly the result of the widespread public support for sports and entertainment and a desire to compete at the international level.

—Lujain Alotaibi is a project coordinator at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. Follow her on Twitter: @LM_Otaibi.

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Dec 2, 2022

Saudi Arabia lost at the 2022 World Cup. But its sports sector is winning.

By Lujain Alotaibi

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

NOVEMBER 25, 2022 | 9:08 PM WASHINGTON | 5:08 AM QATAR

The ties that bind the US and England

The relationship between the United States and England is uniquely close; it’s appropriate, perhaps, that the two teams drew when they played in Qatar. The connections are very strong: Nine of the twenty-six-man US squad play in UK leagues, the same number that play in the United States (the remainder play in Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey). Some even play in the same club teams.

It goes deeper. US defenders Antonee Robinson and Cameron Carter-Vickers were born and raised in England. Midfielder Yunus Musah lived in England in his teenage years, went through Arsenal’s players’ academy, and even played for the English youth national team—before making the decision to play for the United States. “It was very difficult because, as I’ve said, I had such a great time in England. They did a lot for me in that country,” he said recently. The United States “obviously took one of ours, which we weren’t very happy about,” said England coach Gareth Southgate laconically earlier this week.

Friday’s draw means England has yet to beat the United States in the World Cup. They have played only three times at that level, and the United States won the first encounter in 1950, shocking the world’s oldest footballing nation; the second and now the third were draws.

—Andrew Marshall is the senior vice president of engagement at the Atlantic Council.

NOVEMBER 23, 2022 | 1:24 PM WASHINGTON | 9:24 PM QATAR

A World Cup for all Arabs, but…

By Sarah Zaaimi

Qatar and its leadership are aggressively branding the 2022 World Cup as an event for all Arab countries: The first event of the sport hosted by an Arab and Muslim-majority country, they claim. The rest of the Arab states, however, may feel differently about such a statement, given the contentious nature of pan-Arabist discourse in an undeniably racially, religiously, and linguistically hybrid region and Qatar’s interventionist records in many regional conflicts.

The ongoing World Cup actively included contributions and elements from across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Moroccan artist RedOne produced the official music and designed the launching event; the official cup balls were created in Egypt; and Arabs from various countries are providing security for the event, sculpting the iconic globe trophy, or participating in the dozens of artistic performances on the agenda. Doha is also a hub for Arab expatriates who constitute a core component of Qatar’s workforce, operating primarily in the government, media, business, and hospitality industries. Despite their tremendous contributions, these migrants possess no pathway toward Qatari citizenship, according to the laws in place.

Beyond the buoyant façade reflected at the launching event, where Arab leaders from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan came together to celebrate the kick-off of the World Cup, many structural differences persist between the MENA brothers. It is essentialist and reductionist to label all countries with Arabic-speaking majorities or Arab cultural elements as “Arab.” The region is much more complex and has undergone serious revisionist identity quests since the pan-Arab ideology of the fifties and sixties. For example, countries like Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, with significant Amazigh communities, find it insulting to be reduced to one component of their complex and multi-layered heritage. Other communities in the region must feel the same, like Kurds, Assyrians, Nubians, etc.

On the political front, Qatar, in its pursuit to widen its geostrategic reach and overcome its “small state syndrome” ended up upsetting many fellow MENA countries. The healing process from the schism with other Gulf Cooperation Countries hasn’t been completed yet, especially with the UAE. Qatar’s financial and ideological meddling in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is still fresh in the memories of the citizens of these countries. At the same time, Al-Jazeera and Qatari media continue to upset multiple MENA regimes and undermine the territorial integrity of certain sovereign states. A World Cup for all Arabs, yes, but…

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 12:03 PM WASHINGTON | 8:03 PM QATAR

Money talks. And Saudi Arabia’s World Cup squad was screaming today.

By Hezha Barzani

Saudi Arabia just defeated one of the World Cup favorites—Lionel Messi led Argentina, with the Saudis breaking the third-highest ranked FIFA team’s thirty-six game unbeaten streak. This game is already being regarded as one of the most shocking upsets in World Cup history, but it is also just one piece of an enormous economic and cultural focus placed recently on the sport by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Last year a Saudi Arabia-led consortium, led by the Saudi sovereign wealth fund (the Public Investment Fund), purchased Newcastle United for over £300 million (over $405 million). This purchase was significant from an economic standpoint, as Saudi Arabia joined Gulf neighbors Qatar (ownership ties with Paris-Saint Germain) and the United Arab Emirates (ownership ties with Manchester City) in the lucrative European soccer investment arena. This purchase also aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, which includes revamping the nation’s tourism sector and branding the Kingdom as a “football loving nation.” In addition to the massive purchase of Newcastle United, it is clear that economically, Saudi Arabia has long-term commitments to the sport, with its sovereign wealth fund recently announcing more than two billion dollars in soccer sponsorship deals.

A large portion of these deals involves the development of Saudi Arabia’s domestic soccer clubs. From a cultural perspective, Saudi Arabia getting involved in European soccer will have a profound impact on the Saudi youth population and overall development of their soccer talent. With the Cup being played in neighboring Qatar, Saudi soccer academies are expecting an enrollment spike, while the government is simultaneously promoting more physical activity, showcasing how the Kingdom is laying plans for long-term international success.

With Saudi Arabia bidding to co-host the 2030 World Cup, it is making a strong play to become the capital of the soccer world in the Middle East. This decisive win against Argentina further cements its claim, but only time will tell if this victory was luck or the first sign of an emerging soccer powerhouse—thanks to the government’s economic and cultural investment.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 10:18 AM WASHINGTON | 6:18 PM QATAR

How China stands to win from Western attacks on Qatar

By Ahmed Aboudouh

Western media has launched a campaign to criticize World Cup host Qatar for its abhorrent record on LGBTQ+ rights and migrant labor, mainly of Asian origin. While justified, the campaign has been widely castigated as selective, hypocritical, and indicative of a double standard. China has found a chance to exploit this apparent Western grudge against the first Arab and Muslim country to host the World Cup. In addition to a Chinese construction company building Lusail Stadium, which will host the World Cup final, other firms supplied the tournament with everything “made in China”—from LED big screens, a solar power plant, and clean energy shuttle vehicles, to flags and throw pillows.

China knows how this feels. It has been chastened in the past while hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics with diplomatic boycotts and a similar media crusade for its “genocide” against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. There is no doubt that the reasoning behind such campaigns is entirely just. But going soft on hosts with even worse human rights records, as was the case with Russia in 2018, while scolding Qatar is mindboggling.

These kinds of media campaigns can be self-harming at best for two reasons. First, they signal that Western countries, especially Europeans, will seek to maintain hegemony over soccer by wielding prejudice. Second, they encourage China (and other rivals) to score geopolitical points by doubling down on smaller countries’ grievances toward those over-the-top media offensives and positioning China as a viable alternative and trusted leader of the Global South. Years of backbreaking diplomatic work to confront China’s soft power expansion in the Middle East is now at risk.

— Ahmed Aboudouh is a nonresident fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and a senior journalist covering world affairs at the Independent newspaper in London.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 8:39 AM WASHINGTON | 4:39 PM QATAR

Watch for the Iran team’s small acts of defiance to continue

By Masoud Mostajabi

In the history of the World Cup, Iran has qualified a total of six times—five under the Islamic Republic. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranians across the globe have agreed on little. But when it has come to supporting Team Melli (“the nation’s team”), all have cheered—until now. At the 2018 Cup, Iran’s win over Morocco provoked celebration among the likes of exiles and diaspora communities, then Islamic Republic President Hassan Rouhani, and former heir apparent to the throne Reza Pahlavi—an outpouring stemming from a shared membership in a national family.

However, for the first time in memory, this year many Iranians have soured on the team, thanks in large part to Team Melli’s meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi before traveling to Qatar—which came amid the deadly crackdowns by Raisi’s security services against protesters. The team’s silent protest by refusing to sing the national anthem on Monday was widely seen as too little too late. Iranians expect more from a team they consider a representative of the people. In a country losing its youth, a loss or win in a tournament is meaningless. Unlike most fans enjoying the games, Iranians are in mourning.

However, these players are themselves part of this generation of youth, having grown up watching heroes such as Ali Daei and Ali Karimi, vocal supporters of today’s protests. Many of the players have commented in support of the protestors, changed their social media profile photo to black, or covered up the national emblem. It’s early in the tournament, so the world can watch for these small acts of defiance to continue—with Friday’s match against Wales the next major opportunity.

—Masoud Mostajabi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter @MMostajabi1.

NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 10:22 AM WASHINGTON | 6:55 PM QATAR

Why Iran’s subtle stance is being seen as “meaningless”

By Holly Dagres

Since antigovernment protests began in Iran on September 16 after Mahsa Jina Amini was murdered by so-called “morality police,” many Iranian athletes competing in international competitions have taken clear stances that show solidarity with the protesters. But one group of athletes that has disappointed Iranians is Team Melli, the Iranian men’s national soccer team. Except for heaving worn black jackets over their kits during a World Cup friendly with Senegal on September 27, Team Melli has not taken a notable stance.

However, what has caught the attention of many Iranians is that Team Melli met with hardline President Ebrahim Raisi last week and took celebratory photos of their World Cup entry. Photographs of both incidents have gone viral, and not for a good reason, as these events took place while protesters were being fatally beaten with batons or shot by security forces. As a result, many Iranians see Team Melli not as their team, but rather as the team of the Islamic Republic. This was best captured by a banner hanging over a bridge in Tehran that read “don’t let your foot slip on the blood,” referring to the blood of both protesters slain since September 16 and those being killed by security forces while the match between England and Iran took place. Right before the game began, Team Melli finally took a subtle stance by remaining silent during the Islamic Republic’s anthem. While their silence and stony faces may seem significant to an outsider, it’s a belated gesture that many Iranians interpret as meaningless given how little Team Melli has done to show solidarity with their international platform.

—Holly Dagres is editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs. She also curates The Iranist newsletter. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

NOVEMBER 20, 2022 | 4:15 PM WASHINGTON | NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 12:15 AM QATAR

Focus on Qatar’s human-rights record is justified—but why have other hosts been left unscathed?

By Joze Pelayo

Despite the loud beats of FIFA anthem “Tukoh Taka,” World Cup watchers can still clearly hear the outrage against Qatar.

The significance of the first World Cup in the Arab world has been overshadowed by legitimate criticism about the country’s track record on minority rights and treatment of migrant workers. Serious abuses need to be addressed.

But Western coverage so far has been based on double standards and selective outrage; were the calls for a boycott of Russia’s World Cup in 2018 and the Beijing Olympics in 2022 this loud? The Biden administration had announced a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing event due to China’s ongoing genocide against Uyghurs. Russia used its 2018 World Cup, and also its 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, to sportswash and distract the world from Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Crimea—a prelude to today’s invasion—and the Russian leader’s increasingly imperialistic ambitions. Where was the outrage from European critics then?

Qatar is the first Arab and Muslim-majority country to host the World Cup—so one wonders whether that is the variable that makes Qatar the target of critical countries. Or, will countries critical of Qatar this year similarly scrutinize the 2026 host countries—Canada, the United States, and Mexico—regarding migrants’ rights?

Qatar’s mistreatment of predominantly South Asian workers is deplorable, and criticism is justified. But the selective outrage shown mainly from some countries in Europe is also borderline arrogant and racist.

On a brighter note, the United States’ Nicki Minaj, Colombia’s Maluma, and Lebanon’s Myriam Fares are bringing the Arab-Latin relationship and a shared passion for soccer to a new level with “Tukoh Taka,” which features English, Spanish, and Arabic lyrics. The song briefly reached number one in iTunes in the United States, making it the highest-charting FIFA World Cup song ever—and Fares the first Arab artist to reach such a spot in the United States.

—Joze Pelayo is an assistant director at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative/Middle East Programs.

The post Offside: Watch the World Cup alongside the Atlantic Council appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kherson euphoria highlights the folly of a premature peace with Putin

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 17 Nov 2022 14:26:51 +0000

Last week’s liberation of Kherson produced some of the most iconic scenes since the beginning of the Russian invasion. The arrival of Ukrainian troops in the city sparked wild celebrations from a civilian population brutalized by eight months of Russian occupation. “This is what liberation looks like. This is what liberation feels like,” commented CNN’s Nic Robertson in one of many memorable reports from the city. Sky News correspondent Alex Rossi described the atmosphere as “euphoric” as he was mobbed by joyous locals cheering Russia’s retreat.

Despite harsh conditions and a lack of basic amenities in Kherson, the party began almost as soon as news of the Russian military withdrawal was confirmed. Speaking to AFP, one Kherson resident summed up the mood in the liberated city. “We have no electricity, no water, no heating, no mobile or internet connection. But we have no Russians! I am extremely happy. We can survive anything but we are free.”

This footage should be compulsory viewing for anyone who still believes in the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Putin’s Russia. Despite overwhelming evidence of the Kremlin’s genocidal agenda in Ukraine, opinion pieces continue to appear with depressing regularity in the international media arguing that the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to pressure the country into peace talks.

The authors of such articles typically acknowledge Russia’s criminality before emphasizing the alleged inevitability of compromise. The wave of emotion that swept Kherson following the city’s liberation is a timely reminder for advocates of appeasement that compromising with the Kremlin actually means condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of Russian occupation.

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At this point, it is no longer possible for any honest observer to deny knowledge of Russian war crimes in occupied Ukraine. In every single liberated region of the country, Ukrainian forces have encountered the same grim revelations of mass graves and torture chambers along with accounts of abductions, executions, sexual violence, and forced deportations involving millions of victims.

Meanwhile, the methodical Russian bombardment of cities such as Mariupol is believed to have killed tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians. Attempts to document these atrocities are still at an early stage, but United Nations inspectors have already confirmed that Russia has committed war crimes against the Ukrainian civilian population.

Russian occupation forces have also made no secret of their desire to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity. Wherever the Kremlin has established control, the Ukrainian language has been suppressed and the Ukrainian currency phased out. Access to Ukrainian media has been blocked. Teachers have been brought in from Russia to indoctrinate Ukrainian schoolchildren. At the same time, Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have explicitly declared their intention to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and proclaimed their genocidal denial of Ukraine’s right to exist. This is the ghoulish reality that so-called foreign policy realists believe Ukraine must be made to accept.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Russia currently occupies around 20% of Ukraine. Any peace agreement reached in the near future would inevitably involve ceding some or all of this territory to Moscow for an indefinite period. Millions of Ukrainians would then face a desperate future. Many would make the agonizing choice to flee their homes for free Ukraine, leaving behind their former lives and worldly possessions. Those who remained would be forced to adopt a Russian imperial identity or risk savage repression if they continued to resist.

Despite the risks involved, resistance would likely continue. The outpouring of emotion in liberated Kherson highlighted the strength of Ukrainian national feeling in occupied areas of the country and made a mockery of the idea that Moscow enjoys the support of the local population. Just weeks before Putin’s troops retreated from Kherson, the Kremlin claimed 87% of residents had voted in favor of joining Russia. The widespread public jubilation that greeted Russia’s withdrawal vividly illustrated the absurdity of that figure.

Nor is it clear exactly what everyone is so afraid of. Ukraine has already shattered the myth of Russia’s military invincibility and has successfully liberated more than half the territory occupied since the invasion began nearly nine months ago. Putin’s once vaunted army is demoralized and decimated, while the Russian dictator himself is an international pariah. His energy weapon has been partially disarmed and he has recently been forced to distance himself from earlier attempts at nuclear blackmail following rebukes from China and stern warnings from the United States. It makes no strategic sense whatsoever to offer Putin a face-saving peace deal at this point.

For now, there is little public indication that Western leaders are listening to calls for a return to negotiations. Instead, they remain insistent that any decision to resume diplomatic efforts can only be made by Ukraine. However, as the war drags on and the economic costs for Ukraine’s partners continue to mount, the voices currently pushing for Ukrainian concessions will grow louder.

As the war enters a potentially decisive period, it is vital to keep in mind that any compromise would come with crippling costs. For Ukraine, it would mean betraying and abandoning millions of citizens. For Western leaders, it would mean empowering Putin while sacrificing the foundational values of the democratic world. The problems posed by an aggressive and revisionist Russia would be unresolved, but the West’s position would be significantly weaker.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. Their country has been devastated by Russia’s invasion and their population left deeply traumatized. Thousands have been killed and millions have been forced to flee. Nevertheless, Ukrainians also understand that Putin must be defeated before peace can return to Europe. All they ask for is the continued support of their international partners. One way to demonstrate this support is by ending unhelpful appeals for a premature peace.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Although there were no legal grounds for the removal of Catherine, her continued presence often sparked political conflicts within Odesa society and on the national stage. This tension reflected growing demands to reassess the nature of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia as a new generation of Ukrainians increasingly questioned the imperial dogmas established by centuries of Czarist and Soviet official histories.

Many also objected specifically to Catherine and pointed to her personal role as a key figure in the subjugation of Ukraine. While the Russian empress is known internationally as Catherine the Great, significant numbers of Ukrainians object to this title and regard her instead as a notorious tyrant. They note that Catherine extinguished the broad autonomy of the Ukrainian Cossacks and oversaw the aggressive colonization of Ukraine.

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Catherine’s eighteenth century reign is closely associated with the imperial myths that now serve as historical justification for Vladimir Putin’s campaign to reconquer Ukraine and destroy Ukrainian statehood. Under Catherine, Russian imperial power expanded into southern Ukraine and Crimea, with the Czarist authorities posing as pioneers and founders of towns and cities such as Odesa that in reality had already existed in one form or another for centuries.

It was during this period that Catherine’s favorite, Grigory Potemkin, is said to have erected the infamous “Potemkin Villages” along the banks of Ukraine’s Dnipro River in order to create the false impression of a prosperous and happy colony for the visiting empress. Some historians now believe the legend of the Potemkin Villages may itself be a fabrication, but critics of Catherine nevertheless see it as fitting that her oppressive conquest of Ukraine is associated with one of history’s most notorious political deceptions. To them, she is anything but “great.”

Despite this challenging legacy, Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument was broadly popular among residents of the Black Sea port city until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022. This popularity was not based on support for her actions against Ukrainian statehood or Cossack autonomy; instead, Catherine served as a symbol of the imperial identity that many in Odesa embraced following the Soviet collapse. She embodied the sense of pride Odesites felt over the prominent place occupied by their hometown in Russian imperial history.

Attitudes have changed dramatically since February 24. The shock and trauma of Russia’s invasion has convinced many Odesites to abandon their previous enthusiasm for the city’s Russian imperial heritage and has sparked a surge in public demands for the removal of Catherine.

It is not hard to see why. From the early days of the invasion, it has been clear that Odesa is one of the Russian army’s primary objectives. The city’s port has been blockaded by the Russian Black Sea fleet, with the nearby coastline fortified in anticipation of a possible Russian amphibious landing. Inside the city itself, Odesites have grown used to the daily terror of missile airstrikes and kamikaze drone attacks.

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For Putin, Odesa has enormous strategic and symbolic importance. Capturing the port city would allow him to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea altogether and strangle the Ukrainian economy. Most analysts agree that without Odesa, Ukraine would no longer be economically viable as an independent state. The city could also serve as an excellent launch pad for the Russian occupation of Moldova.

Odesa’s place in the Russian imagination also makes it a particularly valuable prize. Many of Putin’s compatriots view Odesa as a sacred Russian city and bitterly resent its present status as the southern capital of independent Ukraine. They regard Odesa as even more deeply entwined in Russian national identity than Crimea or Kyiv and sincerely believe the city’s return to Kremlin rule would help correct the injustice of the post-Soviet settlement.

Crucially, Putin has harked back to Catherine the Great in his attempts to provide historical justification for the invasion of Ukraine and the capture of Odesa. Likewise, Kremlin officials and regime proxies have actively revived the term “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”), which was coined during Catherine’s reign to refer to her imperial possessions in southern Ukraine. In areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces, Catherine’s legacy has been used to legitimize the Kremlin’s claims. This is part of a conscious attempt to change the optics of the invasion and portray Russia as liberator rather than an aggressor.

Unfortunately for Putin, Odesites have shown little interest in being liberated by him or his soldiers. On the contrary, they have rallied to the defense of their city and have loudly condemned the Russian invasion. One of the many ways in which Odesites have expressed their opposition to Russia’s imperial aggression is by demanding the removal of the city’s Catherine the Great monument.

The Odesa authorities were initially hesitant to bow to public pressure, with Odesa City Council refusing in September to support a proposal to dismantle the Catherine monument. However, following an online public vote, Odesa Mayor Hennadiy Truhanov announced on November 5 that he would now back calls for the removal of the statue. On day later, the monument was fenced in and a notice from the municipal authorities appeared announcing that it would soon be dismantled.

Skeptics caution that the saga of Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument may still be far from over and warn that recent steps could simply be a stalling tactic to ease tensions and prevent further embarrassing acts of vandalism. However, the symbolism of Odesa’s boarded up Russian empress is already undeniable and reflects the city’s decisive turn away from the imperial myth-making that Putin has tried so hard to exploit.

The Kremlin has sought to win Odesites over with a highly sanitized and largely mythical version of history, but Moscow’s appeals to imperial nostalgia have clearly fallen flat. While Putin’s Russia remains trapped in the past, today’s Ukraine is building its identity around a compelling vision of the country’s future as an increasingly self-confident European democracy. This has proved far more persuasive to Odesites than the authoritarianism, isolation, and endless aggression offered by the Putin regime.

For decades, Odesa was arguably Ukraine’s most Russophile city. However, the current invasion has made Russia so toxic that even formerly sympathetic Odesites no longer want anything to do with Moscow’s imperial agenda. Putin claims to be waging war in order to return “historic Russian lands,” but in reality he has only succeeded in convincing Ukrainians that there is no place for Russia in their country’s future, and no place for Russian Empress Catherine the Great in a free Odesa.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Arestovych is not wrong. Ukraine has been waging a methodical and highly effective counter-offensive in the region around Kherson since the summer months. This campaign has featured incremental gains along a broad front alongside precision airstrikes on bridges to cut the Russian army off from resupply. These tactics appear to have worn down Putin’s troops and paved the way for today’s painful decision to withdraw.

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If confirmed, Russia’s retreat from Kherson will be a hugely significant development that could serve as a turning point for the entire war. In terms of military strategy, the loss of Kherson leaves Moscow with little chance of achieving its stated goal of occupying key port city Odesa and seizing Ukraine’s entire Black Sea coastline. Instead, Putin’s invading army will find itself confined to the eastern half of Ukraine up to the Dnipro River.

While Russia’s withdrawal will have a significant military impact, the loss of Kherson will resonate far beyond any immediate strategic implications. Kherson is the only regional capital captured by Russia since Putin launched his invasion almost nine months ago. The Kremlin has gone to great lengths to strengthen its grip on the city and surrounding region, ruthlessly crushing any potential opposition while imposing policies of russification and eradicating symbols of Ukrainian identity.

Kherson was one of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions to be illegally annexed by Russia on September 30 as Moscow sought to raise the political stakes of its invasion following a series of battlefield setbacks. The annexation ceremony took place amid much pageantry in the Kremlin’s imposing St. George’s Hall, with Putin himself delivering a fiery anti-Western speech before declaring the four regions to be irreversibly part of the Russian Federation. He now faces the embarrassing task of explaining why “forever” turned out to be less than six weeks.

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Unsurprisingly, Putin does not appear in any hurry to accept the blame for the loss of Kherson. Instead, he was conspicuously absent from the carefully choreographed TV event announcing the Russian army’s withdrawal. This is very much in keeping with Putin’s traditional aversion to bad news, which also saw him pass on responsibility for unpopular Covid-related decisions to local officials and regional governors.

Given the gravity of the situation facing the Russian army in Ukraine, even Putin’s much-vaunted propaganda machine may now struggle to shield him from criticism. The retreat from Kherson is the latest in a long line of defeats that have done much to shatter Russia’s reputation as a military superpower and raise questions about Putin’s leadership.

During the first weeks of the invasion, Russia lost the Battle of Kyiv and was forced to withdraw from northern Ukraine. After months of minimal progress in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, Putin then suffered another crushing blow when a lightning Ukrainian counter-offensive succeeded in liberating most of the Kharkiv region in a matter of days. With morale now likely to plummet further, his invasion is in danger of unraveling completely.

The loss of Kherson will spark a fresh round of recriminations inside Russia as supporters of the invasion and regime officials search for guilty parties to blame for the debacle. The mood among regime loyalists and hardliners is already dark. Former Kremlin advisor Sergei Markov branded the decision to leave Kherson, “Russia’s biggest geopolitical defeat since the collapse of the USSR.” Meanwhile, influential pro-war Telegram account War Gonzo, which has over 1.3 million mostly Russian subscribers, described the announced withdrawal as, “a black page in the history of the Russian army. Of the Russian state. A tragic page.”

Putin will now be hoping his beleaguered troops are able to dig in and defend a new front line along the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. He desperately needs to secure some breathing space in order to train and equip recently mobilized troops, but Ukraine appears in no mood to accept increasingly urgent Russian proposals for a fresh round of negotiations. Instead, Kyiv will seek to press home its obvious advantage.

The liberation of Kherson will provide the whole Ukrainian nation with a welcome morale boost and will also energize the international coalition of countries supporting the fight back against Russia’s invasion. Ukraine has held the military initiative in the war since July and has now once again demonstrated that it is more than capable of defeating Russia on the battlefield. Victory in Kherson will be seen as further proof that Ukraine can deal a decisive blow to Putin’s imperial ambitions if provided with the tools to do so.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

According to Reuters, Ukraine informed Russia during the first days of the invasion that it was ready to meet Moscow’s demands and rule out the possibility of future NATO membership, only for this offer to be rejected by Putin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy went public in the following weeks with similar proposals to abandon Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, but Russia chose to continue its invasion.

The entire notion that Russia views NATO as a credible security threat was further undermined in summer 2022 when Moscow passively accepted neighboring Finland’s historic decision to join the military alliance. Putin has repeatedly cited Ukraine’s deepening NATO ties as justification for his invasion, but the prospect of imminent Finnish membership provoked no meaningful security response whatsoever from the Kremlin.

If Putin genuinely believed a NATO invasion of Russia was even a remote possibility, he would surely have reinforced the Finnish border. On the contrary, in the months following Helsinki’s decision to join the alliance, Russia dramatically reduced its military presence close to Finland and the nearby NATO member Baltic states in order to bolster the invasion of Ukraine. Whatever Putin may say in public, he clearly understands that NATO poses no threat to Russia.

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Russian myth-making about “Ukrainian Nazis” is even older than complaints over NATO expansion and dates all the way back to Soviet World War II propaganda. For decades, Moscow has exaggerated wartime cooperation between Ukrainian nationalist groups and the Third Reich while conveniently ignoring the far more consequential Nazi-Soviet Pact. By conflating Ukraine’s centuries-old liberation movement with Nazism, generations of Kremlin leaders have sought to render Ukrainian national identity toxic in the eyes of domestic and international audiences alike.

Putin’s enthusiasm for the “Nazi Ukraine” trope is very much in line with his broader efforts to place the Soviet World War II experience at the heart of modern Russian identity. Over the past two decades, Putin has turned traditional Russian reverence for the generation who defeated Hitler into a quasi-religious victory cult complete with its own feast days, holy relics, and doctrinal dogmas. This has enabled him to whitewash the crimes of the Soviet era while attacking contemporary adversaries as the spiritual successors to the Nazis. In Putin’s Russia, accusations of Nazism are a routine feature of the public discourse and have been leveled against a dizzying array of individuals, organizations, and entire countries, but Ukraine remains by far the most popular target.

The effectiveness of these tactics has always depended heavily on outside ignorance of Ukraine and Russia-centric reporting by Moscow-based international correspondents. Unfortunately for Putin, his invasion has shone an unprecedented media spotlight on Ukraine that has done much to debunk the whole “Nazi Ukraine” narrative.

This was long overdue. Throughout the past 31 years of Ukrainian independence, the far-right has never come close to achieving power in Ukraine and remains significantly less influential than in many other European countries. While far-right candidate Marine Le Pen received 41.45% in France’s 2022 presidential election, the Ukrainian far-right typically struggles to secure low single digit support at the ballot box. During Ukraine’s last presidential election in 2019, the leading nationalist candidate garnered 1.6% of the vote. Months later in the country’s most recent parliamentary election, many of Ukraine’s far-right parties joined forces in a bid to improve their fortunes. This united nationalist platform failed miserably, winning a mere 2.15% of votes.

Nothing highlights the absurdity of Russia’s “Nazi Ukraine” allegations better than the rise of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Ukrainian President is both Jewish and a native Russian speaker. According to the Kremlin, this should make him deeply unappealing to Ukrainian voters. On the contrary, Zelenskyy was elected president by a record margin and subsequently secured a unique parliamentary majority for his newly formed political party. This success was all the more remarkable as it was achieved during wartime elections held amid an atmosphere of heightened patriotic fervor.

Since the start of the invasion, Russia’s failing efforts to portray Ukraine as a Nazi state have forced Moscow into ever more implausible mental gymnastics. Unable to produce any actual Ukrainian Nazis, regime officials and propaganda proxies have attempted to argue that the very idea of an independent Ukraine is in itself a Nazi concept, while also acknowledging that Putin’s stated war aim of “de-Nazification” in practice means the “de-Ukrainization” of Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s confusion was perhaps most immediately evident in the bizarre and disgraceful anti-Semitic comments made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during a May appearance on Italian TV program Zona Bianca. When asked to address the obvious contradictions between Russia’s “Nazi Ukraine” claims and the fact that Ukraine has a Jewish president, Lavrov responded by declaring that Adolf Hitler also had “Jewish blood.” His statement sparked a wave of global condemnation, with Putin eventually forced to intervene and offer a personal apology to Israeli leaders.

This embarrassing incident illustrated the remarkable recent degradation of Russian diplomacy, which has now reached the point where it is often indistinguishable from internet conspiracy theories. Forced by Putin’s invasion to defend the indefensible, Russia’s top diplomats have retreated into an alternative reality world of blanket denials and dark fantasies. While Lavrov rants about “Jewish Hitler,” Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya stuns his colleagues with fantastic tales of genetically engineered Ukrainian mosquitoes. No wonder exasperated British Ambassador Barbara Woodward recently felt moved to ask, “How much more of this nonsense do we have to endure?”

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The awkward absence of Ukrainian Nazis and Russia’s non-response to Finland’s NATO membership bid have left Putin in desperate need of new narratives to explain his ongoing invasion. Disinformation researchers have recently noted a spike in Russian references to Ukraine as a “terrorist state” amid apparent efforts to position the war as a counter-terrorism operation. This has included a high-level campaign led by Putin himself and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who have both groundlessly accused Ukraine of plotting an act of nuclear terrorism involving a dirty bomb.

While the idea of Ukraine nuking itself may seem far-fetched even by Russian standards, this is by no means the Kremlin’s most audacious excuse. Since late September, senior regime officials have gone even further and have been actively seeking to rebrand the invasion of Ukraine as a holy war against Satanism. Putin set the tone by calling his opponents “Satanic” during a landmark address marking the official annexation of four Ukrainian regions.

Others have enthusiastically followed Putin’s lead. In October, the deputy secretary of Russia’s influential National Security Council, Alexei Pavlov, declared that it was becoming “more and more urgent to carry out the de-Satanization of Ukraine.” This call was echoed by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who stated in a November 4 post marking Russia’s National Unity Day that the goal of the Ukraine invasion was “to stop the supreme ruler of Hell, whatever name he uses: Satan, Lucifer, or Iblis.” Key propagandists including Vladimir Solovyov have also endorsed the idea that Russia is at war with Satanism.

Behind Moscow’s increasingly outlandish attempts to justify the invasion stands a deeply unpalatable truth. Far from being a reaction to Western encroachment or Ukrainian extremism, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine is the product of an unapologetically imperialistic mindset that he shares with millions of Russians who refuse to accept the verdict of 1991.

Putin’s entire reign has been shaped by his burning resentment at the perceived injustice of the Soviet collapse, which he regards as the “disintegration of historic Russia.” This has fueled his obsession with Ukraine, which for centuries occupied a key position at the very center of Russian imperial identity. Putin sees the existence of an independent Ukraine as a symbol of the unjust post-Soviet settlement and regards the country’s embrace of European democracy as an existential threat to Russia. He has repeatedly denied Ukraine’s right to statehood while arguing that modern Ukraine has been artificially separated from Russia. On the eve of the invasion, he called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

The Russian dictator’s most revealing remarks came in summer 2022, when he directly compared his invasion of Ukraine to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great. Putin sought to qualify this claim by insisting he was merely “returning historically Russian lands,” but the actions of his invading army bear all the hallmarks of a brutal colonial conquest. Russian troops have reduced entire cities to rubble and killed tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians. In areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, the Russian military has engaged in mass executions and forced deportations. Meanwhile, all symbols of Ukrainian national identity have been ruthlessly erased.

This is the grim reality that all advocates of appeasement and proponents of a negotiated peace must address. Nobody wants to end the current war more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they also recognize that there is no room for compromise between genocide and survival. Russia has gone to great lengths to disguise the true nature of its imperial war in Ukraine, but Ukrainians are not fooled. They understand perfectly well that unless Russia is decisively defeated, Ukraine will cease to exist.

Instead of listening to Moscow’s fake grievances and fairytales about devil-worshiping phantom fascists, the international community must make clear to the Kremlin that Russian imperialism has no place in the modern world. The increasingly absurd nature of Putin’s excuses is an indication of his mounting desperation, but he has yet to abandon the colonial conquest of Ukraine. Unless he is forced to do so, Russia’s unreconstructed imperial ambitions will remain a threat to world peace.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Opinion polls indicate that most Ukrainians share this sentiment and understand victory to mean the return of all occupied territories. In a June 2022 survey conducted by IRI, two-thirds of Ukrainians supported the liberation of eastern and southern Ukraine including Crimea. These poll results identified only minor regional differences ranging from 64% in the west and 67% in the south to 59% in the east. Meanwhile, just 5% of Ukrainians would be prepared to recognize Crimea as Russia and 2% would accept Moscow’s attempts to annex eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Ukraine’s complete liberation remains an ambitious goal but it is no longer confined to the realms of fantasy. Following a string of stunning counteroffensive advances in September and October, many now believe Ukraine could push Russia back to the front lines of February 24 by the end of this year and return the rest of the country to Ukrainian control by the middle of 2023.

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Vladimir Putin would be highly unlikely to survive the humiliation of a decisive Ukrainian victory. While it is impossible to predict exactly how his reign might end, it is equally hard to imagine the strongman Russian ruler surviving such a disastrous defeat. This is particularly true as the war is widely perceived within Russia as Putin’s personal project.

We can already say with some confidence that if Putin is ousted, his successor will not be a democrat. Modern Russia has no credible national democratic movement and lacks the pluralistic political traditions that made it possible for democracy to take root in post-Soviet Ukraine and the Baltic states. Given the political climate in Russia, any successor would almost certainly be a nationalist figure from within the ranks of the current elite. However, he (and yes, it would inevitably be a “he”) would probably be more pragmatic and therefore less prone to ranting about Ukraine.

In order to escape war guilt and bring sanctions to an end, he would seek to blame everything on Putin. This could help secure breathing space to repair Russia’s battered economy and armed forces. It would also give Ukraine some time to embark on a massive post-war reconstruction drive. At the same time, numerous major obstacles to a sustainable peace settlement would remain.

One of the most immediate challenges of the post-war period will be the quest for justice. In practice, this will mean attempting to charge the leaders of a nuclear power with war crimes. No successor regime will hand over Putin or any other senior Russian officials to an international tribunal, so it is reasonable to assume that war crimes prosecutions would have to take place in absentia. Nevertheless, it is vital for those guilty of war crimes to be held publicly accountable. Defendants should include a wide range of Russian politicians and military commanders along with the many regime propagandists who have provided the ideological foundations for Putin’s genocidal invasion.

Another urgent question will be how to make Russia pay for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. The obvious answer is to use the frozen Russian assets currently held by various Western nations. Work is already underway to create a legal framework for the reallocation of these frozen Russian assets, but this process could take years and will be fiercely contested by the Kremlin.

War crimes prosecutions and reparations can help undermine the sense of impunity within Russian society that helped make the current invasion possible. While most available evidence confirms overwhelming Russian public support for the war in Ukraine, Russia’s most respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, has found that a clear majority of Russians do not believe they are morally responsible for the deaths of Ukrainian civilians or the widespread destruction taking place in Ukraine.

Such attitudes are hardly surprising in an authoritarian society where nobody has ever been held accountable for the horrors of the Soviet era. Nevertheless, it is in everybody’s interests to end this cycle of impunity and encourage Russians to confront the crimes being committed in their name.

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Whatever form Ukrainian victory takes, it will not mark the end of the historic confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. Today’s war is part of a grim saga stretching back centuries that is rooted in Russia’s refusal to recognize Ukraine’s right to exist.

Putin himself has frequently claimed that modern Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”) and has accused Ukraine of being an artificial “anti-Russia” that poses an existential threat to Russian statehood and cannot therefore be tolerated. This genocidal logic is widely embraced in today’s Russia and will not disappear overnight. In reality, it may take decades before a majority of Russians are finally able to accept that Ukraine is a separate and fully independent nation.

Any leader of a post-Putin Russia would almost certainly continue to regard Ukraine as a threat. While they may not necessarily share Putin’s highly emotional obsession with the country, they would likely view Ukraine’s consolidation as a European democracy as a potential catalyst for democratic change inside Russia. In order to prevent this nightmare scenario, they would seek to undermine Ukraine’s economic recovery and derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

In public at least, Russia’s new leaders could be expected to declare their commitment to peaceful coexistence with Ukraine. However, such politically convenient rhetoric would not stop them from continuing to wage a hybrid war against the country. This could include everything from cyber warfare and terrorist attacks to political assassinations, disinformation operations, infrastructure sabotage, and the funding of pro-Russian networks throughout Ukraine. It would only be a matter of time before Ukraine faced a renewed Russian military threat.

In order to prevent another Russian invasion, Ukraine must transform itself and become a European Israel. Ukraine’s defense spending was already in the region of 4-5% of GDP prior to the onset of the current full-scale invasion. This must remain the norm for the foreseeable future. Likewise, the international security support that Ukraine has received since February must continue beyond the end of the current hostilities. It is vital that the Ukrainian military maintain its technological and organizational edge over the Soviet-style Russian army. Ultimately, this is the only security guarantee that matters.

Ukraine’s leaders appear increasingly confident of victory but they are also under no illusions regarding the future of relations with Russia, regardless of who sits in the Kremlin. “Knowing what I know first-hand about the Russians, our victory will not be final,” Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhny told TIME magazine in September. “Our victory will be an opportunity to take a breath and prepare for the next war.”

The current war is merely the latest chapter in Europe’s longest independence struggle. This struggle will only end when Russia finally accepts that Ukraine is a sovereign country and Ukrainians are not Russians.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming book “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Of course, the results of the upcoming Congress cannot be determined with metaphysical certitude. The world will have to wait for the latest big reveal, like always, to see if Xi still rules the roost. Perhaps more importantly, the global community will find out who else will sit on the all-powerful Standing Committee of the party’s Politburo with him,¹ to gauge how much control he will command in coming years. However, barring unforeseen circumstances, world leaders should expect to see Xi at global forums for at least five more years.

The implications of Xi’s continued grip on power are tremendous for both China and the world. The decisions he makes in Beijing will reverberate well beyond China’s borders to influence the global economy, the development of technology, international governance, and war and peace. At this stage in China’s political cycle, the world would usually ask: Who will rule China? This year, the important question is: What will Xi do with his power?

Return of one-man rule

To appreciate the importance of the twentieth Congress, it is critical to understand how dramatically Xi has altered the way China is governed. Beginning in the 1980s, the Communist Party fostered a system of collective leadership, in which power was shared within the party and between the party and state apparatus. This system was developed to include regular, peaceful transitions of power from one leadership team to another at congresses held every five years. Top leaders stayed in their official posts for no more than ten years. The system was a reaction against the turmoil of the first three decades of the People’s Republic. Mao ruled as more than a dictator—he was practically a Communist demigod; his every word was gospel. However, allowing one person to wield such immense power proved catastrophic for China. Mao’s Great Leap Forward (1958-61), an ideologically motivated attempt to catapult a poverty-stricken China into the ranks of the rich by mass movements, left some 30 million Chinese dead from famine. He followed that up in 1966 with the Cultural Revolution, a campaign to uproot the stubborn vestiges of an old, corrupt China (and solidify Mao’s own political position), which resulted in a decade of widespread violence and economic paralysis. By the time of Mao’s death in 1976, China was exhausted, desperately poor, and dangerously isolated.

The reformers who eventually succeeded Mao, led by Deng Xiaoping (a victim of the Cultural Revolution himself), reacted against the trauma of one-man rule. “It is not good to have an over-concentration of power,” Deng said in a 1980 speech on this subject. “It hinders the practice of socialist democracy and of the Party’s democratic centralism, impedes the progress of socialist construction, and prevents us from taking full advantage of collective wisdom.”²

The Communist Party still dominated—that was the unfortunate lesson of the massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989—but within the party and state, space opened for greater debate on policy. That allowed for a wider range of expertise to influence the policy process and earned the Chinese state a reputation as a “technocracy”—a finely tuned, generally pragmatic, and usually predictable policymaking machine. It is impossible to separate China’s tremendous economic success from the emergence of this collective governance system.

Xi has thoroughly altered this system. He has sidelined other major figures in the governing order and claimed their power for himself. For instance, in the past, the premier, the number two position in the ruling hierarchy, took responsibility for economic matters. The current person in that post, Li Keqiang, was widely expected to take on this role when Xi’s leadership team first took control in 2012. However, under Xi, Li has become a marginal figure. Xi has grasped control over the policymaking process across all sectors by dominating high-level commissions of top leaders on various areas of policy and by promoting allies and loyalists into key positions throughout the party and state apparatus.³

Xi’s grip on policy has been further enhanced by the relentless promotion of his personality cult. Xi is presented to the Chinese people (and from there, the world) as a brilliant theoretician who possesses the wisdom to achieve the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and resolve the most complex problems facing the international community. Xi’s ideas, encapsulated in Xi Jinping Thought, echo Mao’s Little Red Book in the way they have become the source of extensive study and fawning reverence. Xi’s mere utterance can send officials and bureaucrats scampering to decipher and implement his wishes.

To a great degree, what Xi wants, Xi gets. As a result, Chinese policymaking has become increasingly dependent on the decisions and desires of a single individual. That has already rendered the direction of Chinese policy less predictable.

Anticipating the course of Chinese policy has thus become a matter of identifying Xi’s priorities—whether national, ideological, or personal. In a sense, the current system of Chinese governance is exactly what Deng and his fellow reformers intended to avoid. China and its vast population have again been set adrift on the whims of a single individual.

The future of zero-COVID

Attempting to read Xi’s mind is a dangerous (and thankless) task. Yet any attempt to assess the direction of Xi’s China must give it a whirl. Fortunately, after a decade in charge, Xi has left a lengthy record of speeches, initiatives, and actions that offer a foundation from which to peer into the future of Xi’s agenda. Of course, as with the stock market, past performance cannot determine what might come with certainty. Xi could break with his own precedents and shift course in the face of new challenges and circumstances, or he could come under enough pressure internally or externally to compel him to revise his agenda. At the same time, he has expressed a slate of ideas and beliefs that can help the beleaguered China watcher more comfortably envision the course upon which he could take the country. The fact that Xi is more ideologue than pragmatist also makes it somewhat safer to assume his past practice will continue into the future.

Still, there remains some expectation (or hope) both within China and elsewhere that Xi will change aspects of his policies once he secures his coveted third term. This thinking holds that Xi will have greater flexibility in policy choices once his own authority is locked on track. This possibility is discussed most often in relation to Xi’s most prominent program: zero-COVID.

Xi’s insistence that his government keep COVID cases at or near zero has prevented a major pandemic on the scale suffered in most other countries. However, the continuation of the zero-COVID policy nearly three years since the epidemic’s initial outbreak in Wuhan has suppressed economic growth, badly damaged small businesses, and fomented widespread public frustration. Speculation has persisted for some time that Xi might be willing to ease the strict pandemic controls—which include recurring lockdowns of major cities, long quarantines for travelers, and repetitive testing—after the upcoming Congress. That expectation is based on the assumption that Xi has insisted on maintaining zero-COVID for personal political motivations. After having touted zero-COVID as a great success both at home and abroad, Xi became “boxed in” by a political narrative that ties him intimately with the approach.⁴ This has made it difficult for him to change course from a political perspective, especially ahead of the Congress. A major outbreak before Xi’s anointment would simply be too embarrassing for him to risk. With the Congress behind him, the argument goes, Xi will be freed to adjust or even lift zero-COVID to address pressing economic concerns.

Yet there are equally good reasons to suspect zero-COVID is here to stay, at least in some form. Five years ago, there was similar chatter that Xi would return to liberal economic reform once he claimed his second term. Instead, he moved further from that path. Xi may calculate that that political narrative in which he defeated the virus where other, mere mortal leaders failed will continue to be too useful to his stature to lift zero-COVID, even after the Congress. He also seems to believe that abandoning the policy would have negative political consequences for the Communist Party more broadly, A late July 2022 Politburo meeting concluded the policy needed to be addressed within a political perspective. After all, the party markets itself to the Chinese public as infallible; ditching zero-Covid could appear an unacceptable admission it has erred.

There is also a possibility that Xi is committed to zero-Covid because he believes it is best for China, or his vision of what China should be. The assumption underlying much of the debate about zero-COVID is that the leadership wants to find an off-ramp but has not managed to do so. There are some members of the political and business elite who would support a loosening of the COVID strictures. However, Xi has continually reiterated that zero-COVID is the best policy for China, even as its economic and social costs mount, and the approach appears to present possible political downside as well. The two-month lockdown of Shanghai earlier this year provides a telling example. Despite these problems, Xi has shown a consistent tendency to tighten the state’s grip over society to advance his ideological agenda of a refashioned China and to solidify his personal grip on party and state. Zero-COVID has been and can continue to be a convenient tool to achieve his goals. For instance, while business leaders may be troubled by the growing isolation of China due to restrictions on travel and quarantines for travelers, Xi may see these measures as a way to limit foreign influence—a physical cordon on dangerous outside ideas and information to match the digital Great Firewall. Note that Beijing reduced the quarantine period for incoming travelers in June but has not eased restrictions on Chinese nationals’ outbound travel, introduced in May. Furthermore, Xi may find the enhanced monitoring of the populace and empowerment of local, community-level officials in the name of pandemic prevention useful to tighten state control over society. That suggests zero-COVID, or a form of it, may become a fact of life in China. It is likely that a number of its restrictions and rules will be retained to the benefit of Xi’s surveillance state but to the detriment of personal privacy.

The future of economic policy

Another element in the debate about zero-COVID is the current miserable condition of the Chinese economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts gross domestic product (GDP) will expand a mere 3.3 percent in 2022. Zero-COVID is a major contributing factor to this slowing growth. Its persistent lockdowns and restricted travel have suppressed consumption, supply chains, and small business, especially in the service sector. The assumption among many China experts is that at some point, Beijing will have to loosen COVID controls to alleviate the deepening economic problems.

However, Xi appears to be deviating from past practice in regard to the importance of economic growth as a policy goal. China watchers have been conditioned over the past three decades to assume the Chinese leadership will prioritize economic development over all other issues. The Communist Party has long marketed the country’s high growth rates as a mark of its competence and legitimacy. Further, the party’s obsession with social stability prompted officials to fear the joblessness and discontent caused by weak economic conditions. Amid zero-COVID, however, Xi has signaled that economic development may no longer be the party’s No. 1 priority. In recent months, even as Li, the premier, has exhorted local officials to resurrect economic growth, the party has also been willing to accept economic sacrifices in order to maintain the zero-COVID stricture.

That could be part of a much broader and critical shift in the direction of Chinese policy. Going forward, the pursuit of economic development may be balanced, or even downgraded, relative to political, security, and social concerns.⁵

Such a shift has major implications for China’s economic relations with the rest of the world. It explains why Xi has replaced the long-standing, guiding principle of “reform and opening up” with a new mantra of “self-sufficiency.” Xi will almost certainly continue to stress the need to reduce China’s vulnerabilities to the outside world by substituting imports with homemade alternatives. As Xi once said: “The essence of the new development dynamic is realizing a high level of self-reliance.”⁶ Xi will therefore persist in his efforts to develop Chinese technologies through state-led industrial policies with their heavy subsidization of local high-tech industries, despite their massive waste of resources and underwhelming results thus far.

That suggests two important trends for economic policy in Xi’s third term. First, he will continue to prioritize economic security over economic efficiency—in other words, he is willing to sacrifice growth for political objectives. Second, Xi’s economic agenda will also foment greater competition with the United States and other advanced economies in cutting-edge technologies—most of all semiconductors. Chinese policymakers will persist in pursuing tactics, such as forced technology transfer and subsidization, that are a cause of trade friction with Washington. Overall, Xi’s economic policies will have the effect of limiting the further integration of the Chinese economy into the global economy, likely increasing disputes with trading partners, encouraging foreign governments to impose restrictions on business investment and trade with China, and capping the ability of Chinese companies to go global.

Xi’s penchant for political control will influence the course of economic policy in other ways as well. He has partially reversed domestic economic liberalization, and instead, he is reasserting a level of state influence over the private sector. The most visible manifestation of that trend has been the imposition of greater regulation on many sectors of the economy over the past two years. That campaign constrained the ability of some companies, especially in technology, to expand, or, in the case of private education services, even survive. Global investors wonder if the harsh crackdown has finally run its course. But that is the wrong question to ask. Xi has displayed a wariness of private enterprise distinct from his recent predecessors. He has spoken of the need to “prevent the disorderly expansion and unchecked growth of capital,”⁷ and he appears to fear that the growing wealth and influence of private companies and entrepreneurs could present a threat to the Communist Party’s dominance. Xi may intend to subordinate the private sector to the interests of the state and party. Under Xi, the Communist Party adopted a policy to enhance its control over the management of private companies. Xi has also elevated the narrowing of income disparities, between both income groups and regions of the country, to priority status in Beijing’s economic agenda with his campaign for “common prosperity.” Although the policy platform to achieve “common prosperity,” remains a vague work-in-progress, the prominence placed on this idea is a signal that Xi disapproves of the unfettered expansion of personal wealth generated through entrepreneurship and private enterprise. Such an attitude is detrimental to economic development since it discourages entrepreneurial activity and innovation. As in all countries, however, pressuring the rich makes for good politics, and Xi seems to revel in such populist exploits. Though Chinese officials have stressed that “common prosperity” is not a code for soaking the wealthy, its main achievement thus far has been arm-twisting major private firms to divert more profits into charitable causes. Expect Xi to persist in these populist causes as a method of bolstering his credentials as a “man of the people.”

Xi and Taiwan

All the factors discussed above add up to slower growth, and a problem for the Communist Party. The leadership will no longer be able to justify their repression with the promise of economic benefit. The party’s implicit social contract with the public—let us rule and we will make you rich—could break down. Xi must instead find other sources of “performance legitimacy,” or other measures of the party’s right to rule, and new endeavors to rally support for and redirect frustration away from the Communist regime.

It has become fairly obvious over the course of Xi’s term that he is attempting to capitalize on nationalist causes as a substitute for economic development and the new source of party legitimacy. Much of Xi’s public discourse focuses on achieving national rejuvenation. This goal goes beyond simply gaining wealth to restoring China’s greatness on the world stage. Inevitably, such appeals to nationalism lead to the issue of Taiwan. Claiming Taiwan has long been a top priority for the People’s Republic, but Xi appears to be elevating the issue even higher on Beijing’s to-do list. Further, he is doing so in potentially dangerous and destabilizing ways. Beijing has not held any serious dialogue with Taipei since the current Taiwanese President, Tsai Ing-wen, took office in 2016. Instead, Xi has chosen to increase diplomatic and military pressure on Taiwan in an attempt to prevent Tsai from extending her government’s international stature and ties to other countries, especially the United States. Since mid-2020, Xi has launched a concerted campaign of military intimidation by routinely sending squads of jets buzzing near the island and holding drills in the surrounding waters. Beijing has intensified efforts to isolate Taiwan’s government on the international stage. For example, China employed economic coercion against Lithuania after the Baltic nation strengthened ties with Taipei. China’s protests reached a fever pitch in response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in early August 2022. Accusing Washington of undermining the idea of “one China,” Beijing threatened the United States with unspecified countermeasures and staged extensive military exercises surrounding Taiwan, creating the effect of a blockade for the first time.

All parties are blaming one another for this escalation. Yet it is undeniable that the Xi administration has purposely chosen a more hostile, militant approach to the Taiwan question. Xi’s posture could be driven by a fear that the island is being drawn ever more tightly into the United States’ orbit and away from China’s. A debate has erupted among foreign policy analysts over whether Washington is fanning those fears, inadvertently or otherwise, by its persistent displays of support for Taiwan’s democratic government. As is the case with much of Xi’s foreign policy, however, his assertive approach has created the very situation he intends to prevent. Rather than convincing Tsai to submit, Xi reinforced Taiwan’s determination to gain greater international support, and prodded other governments, including the United States, to express and provide that support. In August 2022, for instance, the administration of US President Joseph R. Biden opened formal trade negotiations with Taiwan.

It does not appear that Xi perceives or accepts the counterproductive nature of his Taiwan policy. He seems committed to coercion, viewing this as his best method of preventing Taiwan’s drift toward Washington. One reason could be that appearing “tough” on Taiwan bolsters his domestic political stature. Another could be that other options are unappealing. If he is unwilling to make compromises with the Tsai administration, he may see dialogue as a dead end.

Once Xi secures his third term, the big question is how much pressure he will bring to bear on Taiwan. Beijing’s reaction to the Pelosi visit offers contradictory clues. On the one hand, Beijing’s military exercises crossed red lines, most of all in the People’s Liberation Army’s decision to blockade the island. This move suggests Xi may be aiming to create a “new normal” in the Taiwan Strait, in which the Chinese military exerts greater control in the waterway and intensifies its harassment of Taipei’s government. On the other hand, Beijing restrained its military from taking certain risks during those exercises. For instance, no planes entered Taiwan’s airspace. That indicates that Xi, fearing actual conflict, may place limits on how drastically he wishes to alter the status quo.

Either way, the emerging cycle of reaction and counterreaction is potentially creating a downward spiral into heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Barring some unforeseen and tectonic shift in policy in Washington and Taipei, Beijing’s more assertive attitude to the Taiwan issue will likely continue in Xi’s third term. This raises the frightening prospect of conflict over Taiwan, either accidentally—such chances increase with the intensity of Beijing’s military harassment—or by design. The centralization of power in Xi Jinping raises the possibility that he could decide a military solution to the Taiwan problem is necessary perhaps to bolster his own political position. With the highest ranks of the Chinese government stacked with loyalists, he could encounter little internal opposition to such a drastic course of action.

That is speculation, of course, but the direction of Xi’s Taiwan policy is transforming the risk of war over the fate of the island from an outside possibility to a more urgent danger to the security and stability of East Asia.

Xi and the world

The more aggressive position on Taiwan is part of a much wider shift in China’s foreign policy under Xi’s guidance. When Xi took power a decade ago, the United States was still China’s partner. Since then, Xi has transformed Washington into China’s chief adversary. The finger-pointing goes both ways as to which side is to blame. Xi’s government admits to no responsibility for soured relations, but it is indisputable that Xi’s policies have played an outsized role in causing the US-China rift. His predatory industrial programs, aggressive pursuit of contested territorial claims in the South China Sea, and his friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which persists despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have all contributed to strained relations.

Xi is not likely to become any friendlier. He appears to believe the United States is determined to suppress China’s rightful ascent into a global power. The Chinese political and academic elite seem to be convinced that the US is in inexorable decline, and Washington is trying to “keep China down” in order to cling to its wobbly hegemony. This thinking permeates many of Xi’s foreign and economic policies. His “self-sufficiency” drive is meant to protect China from what he sees as Washington’s nefarious designs to use the United States’ economic heft and technological advantages to restrain China’s economic advance. His partnership with Putin is designed to decrease his economic reliance on the West and enlist Moscow as a partner in his quest to undermine the US-led world order. Xi’s latest diplomatic projects, the Global Security Initiative and Global Development Initiative, aim to replace the norms and rules of the current liberal order with a system more favorable to autocratic regimes and the expansion of Chinese power. Barring a dramatic turn in US policy to capitulate and align with Beijing’s interests, none of these efforts to overthrow Pax Americana are likely to change in Xi’s next term. The more powerful Xi becomes, the more they may intensify.

To many inside and outside of China, Xi’s anti-US sentiments have set the stage for a dangerous gamble. Still relatively poor and far behind in technological development, China needs friendly relations with the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and the Asia-Pacific to continue to achieve economic progress. However, Xi probably does not see it that way. An adversarial relationship with the United States is, in many respects, beneficial to Xi’s political standing, especially at home. The narrative of Xi’s personality cult is that he is the man with the will and the wisdom to attain the “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation. Too long a victim of the West, China will now seize its moment to overcome its enemies and restore its greatness. This epic drama requires a villain and the United States (along with its allies, especially Japan) can play that role nicely. It is clear that Xi wants the Chinese public to despise and distrust the United States. Chinese media has become a constant anti-US propaganda machine, painting Washington as resolutely hostile, and US society as violent, racist, and unjust. By pushing such messaging, while raising the Great Firewall ever higher to constrain the flow of outside information into the country, the Chinese state is attempting to reshape and control Chinese public opinion about the United States. Xi, as the star of this show, is often portrayed as standing firm against the big, bad Americans, finger-wagging the US president, for example, on Taiwan. Around the world, too, Xi can portray China as a better alternative to the (supposedly) decaying and irresponsible United States, and himself as the statesman to usher in a new era. By pursuing this course, Xi aims to rally other nations already hostile to Washington and transform himself into the leader of a new global order, with China at its apex.

This narrative may serve Xi’s political interests, but it does not bode well for his relations with Washington since it makes serious dialogue or compromise almost impossible. The main goal of Beijing’s current diplomacy appears to be gaining compliance from other governments to align with Xi’s goals, and it often degenerates into threats, warnings, and demands. Much of the fiery rhetoric may, again, be directed at a domestic audience to bolster Xi’s credentials as a diehard defender of the nation. It may also be motivated by Beijing’s growing conviction of the inevitability of its rise and belief that eventually, even the most recalcitrant nations will have to submit. Whatever the cause, five more years of Xi’s foreign policy almost certainly means five more years of increasing conflict with many of the world’s major economic and military powers. This includes not only the United States and its allies, but also emerging nations that feel threatened by Beijing’s aggressiveness, such as India and Vietnam.

Conclusion

In his decade at China’s helm, Xi Jinping has brought about drastic changes in Beijing’s governance, economic agenda, and foreign policy. There is little evidence at this point that he intends to alter course. Instead, there is more reason to believe that the more entrenched Xi becomes in his position, the more aggressively he will pursue his agenda at home and abroad. The only caveat is whether current poor conditions in China—a slowing economy, the strains of zero-COVID, and greater tensions with the international community—have weakened him enough to allow other factions with the Communist Party to place officials into senior positions who can check his power and alter his policy program. That will not be known until the upcoming Congress. Such an outcome is certainly possible. Yet policymakers around the world would be wise to approach the twentieth Party Congress with the assumption that Xi stays in charge and in control.

Working under this assumption means the world’s China watchers will need to adjust the way in which they understand the process of policymaking in Beijing. To an increasing degree, Beijing’s decisions will be Xi’s decisions. Determining what the Communist government will or will not do is becoming a process of figuring out what fits with Xi’s personal political calculations and ideology. As shown by zero-COVID or “wolf warrior” diplomacy, Xi will make policy choices that may be beneficial to his own political standing, or helpful for his vision for China’s future, but harmful to the country in many other respects. In a system heavily dominated by Xi loyalists, the degree of policy debate may narrow, creating “echo chamber” conditions that shield Xi from the real impact of his choices and the information he requires to make sound decisions.

It is also likely that Xi’s third term will see a continuation, and possibly an intensification, of the trends already underway in Chinese policy. In foreign affairs, that means greater hostility to the United States and its global allies, closer relations with Russia and other autocratic regimes, more aggressive pursuit of regional territorial claims and other interests, and heightened tensions over Taiwan. With the economy, Xi will almost certainly remain cool to liberalization and persist with state-led industrial programs, the fixation on self-reliance, and heavier control of the private sector. In general, Xi’s third term will likely see rising nationalism and continued decoupling from the world in business, information, culture, education, and even personal exchanges.

Perhaps the biggest unanswered question about Xi’s third term is: what happens five years from now, when China is again due for another leadership shuffle? Having flushed the party’s collective governance system down the political toilet, Xi has created uncertainty over how leaders will be selected and how the country will be governed in the future. Can the system of collective rule be reestablished? Or will Chinese politics become a contest of competing strongmen?

A case can be made that Xi, by holding onto power, has merely restored China to its usual norm. The era of collective leadership can be seen as a brief aberration in a political environment more often dominated by an individual. At the same time, many in the political and business elite in China likely remain wary of a reversion to the days of Mao, when the fate of the nation rested in the unreliable hands of a single leader. Perhaps pressure will mount in coming years to restore greater balance within Chinese governance. Or perhaps Xi will manage to quash any further resistance and rule for life. After four decades of walking a fairly predictable path, Xi is sending China into the unknown.

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Report May 11, 2022

China’s faltering “zero COVID” policy: Politics in command, economy in reverse

By Jeremy Mark, Michael Schuman

Could Beijing’s doubling down on the “zero COVID” policy undermine the narrative of China’s superiority in responding to the pandemic—and the image and stature of Xi’s rule?

China Coronavirus

Report Jul 28, 2022

Cooperation with China: Challenges and opportunities

By Michael Schuman, David O. Shullman

Cooperation with China should focus on areas where our interests still align and where we can keep Beijing grounded in the international system. Like-minded allies and partners must pair such efforts with commitments to defend against China’s violations of international norms, impose costs on irresponsible behavior, and strengthen themselves and current global institutions to compete effectively and uphold liberal values.

China Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Oct 3, 2022

Why China’s leadership must respond to the country’s property crisis

By Jeremy Mark

The country’s rapidly metastasizing property downturn threatens to engulf heavily indebted developers, homeowners, financial institutions, and local governments.

China Economy & Business

1 For an explanation of how the congress works, see “Raising the Curtain on China’s 20^th Party Congress,” https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/raising-curtain-chinas-20th-party-congress-mechanics-rules-norms-and-realities-power.

2 Deng Xiaoping, “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” Aug 18, 2980, in The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2 https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/on-the-reform-of-the-system-of-party-and-state-leadership/

3 Nis Grunberg, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Jan. 27, 2022. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Nis_Gr%C3%BCnberg_Testimony.pdf

4 Jeremy Mark and Michael Schuman, “China’s Faltering ‘Zero-COVID’ Policy: Politics in Command, Economy in Reverse,” Atlantic Council, May 11, 2022 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-faltering-zero-covid-policy-politics-in-command-economy-in-reverse/

5 Howard Wang, “’Security Is a Prerequisite for Development’” Consensus Building Toward a New Top Priority in the Chinese Communist Party,” Journal of Contemporary China, Aug. 7, 2022 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2022.2108681

6 Xi Jinping, “Understanding the New Development Stage, Applying the New Development Philosophy, Creating a New Development Dynamic,” Quishi, July 8, 2021 http://en.qstheory.cn/2021-07/08/c_641137.htm

7 Xi, “Understandng the New Development Stage.”

The post What Xi Jinping’s third term means for the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Memo to Elon Musk: Only Ukrainian victory can stop Vladimir Putin

Doug Klain — Wed, 05 Oct 2022 20:16:04 +0000

Ukraine should get real and agree to a ceasefire with Russia. An uncomfortable peace is better than continuing this horrific war, even if that means allowing Russia to keep the Ukrainian lands it currently occupies and perhaps has some right to.

This is the essence of the deeply flawed argument put forward by US tech billionaire Elon Musk on social media in recent days. Musk garnered headlines for his Kremlin-friendly peace proposals, but in reality he is merely one of many voices in the West calling on Ukraine to abandon millions of its citizens to perpetual Russian occupation in order to end Europe’s biggest armed conflict since World War II.

Ever since the early days of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, advocates of appeasement have pushed the idea that Ukrainian political and territorial concessions are the only way to end Russian aggression. These arguments ignore the genocidal reality of the war while denying agency to Ukrainians and relying on flawed assumptions of Russia’s behavior and capabilities.

Russia has not put forward a single sensible peace plan since the invasion began on February 24. Moreover, Moscow has rejected Ukraine’s proposals. During the initial stage of the war, Ukraine offered to abandon NATO membership and make further concessions to the Kremlin, but Putin preferred to proceed with his bid to seize Kyiv.

Despite multiple military setbacks, Moscow’s position has hardened over the intervening months, with Putin essentially demanding Ukraine’s capitulation and insisting that any settlement must include the surrender of entire Ukrainian regions to Russia. Such imperial posturing cannot serve as the basis for serious negotiations.

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The idea that Ukraine should be willing to trade some of its regions in exchange for peace might make sense in the abstract. This is especially true for those who believe Russia’s policymakers remain fundamentally rational actors who are merely seeking greater security for their own state. However, this logic ignores the crimes committed under Russian occupation and the genocidal agenda underpinning the entire invasion.

When the Russian army retreated from northern Ukraine in the second month of the war, advancing Ukrainian troops encountered widespread evidence of war crimes in the formerly occupied suburbs of Kyiv including mass executions and large-scale sexual violence against women, men, and children. Similar revelations in other liberated regions and testimonies of people who have fled occupied Ukraine indicate that these crimes are a deliberate feature of Russia’s so-called Special Military Operation.

In areas of Ukraine currently under their control, Russian forces are terrorizing the civilian population. Millions of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation to the Russian Federation, with special laws adopted in Moscow to allow for the Russification of Ukrainian orphans. Children who remain in regions of Ukraine under Russian control are forced to undergo indoctrination in schools, with teachers imported from Russia to impart distorted histories. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian language is being eradicated from public life along with all symbols of Ukrainian statehood. Ukrainian media outlets are blocked and residents are pressurized to accept Russian citizenship.

More than seven months since the invasion began, it is now impossible to escape the conclusion that Russia aims not only to extinguish Ukrainian statehood but also to eradicate Ukrainian national identity wherever it is able to establish its authority. When proponents of a supposedly realistic peace agreement call on Ukraine to cede territory, they are actually asking Ukraine to accept genocide. Plainly, no Ukrainian leader could ever agree to a peace deal that consigned the civilian population to such a fate.

Nor do most Ukrainians share Elon Musk’s belief that they have no option but to compromise with the Kremlin. As a result of Russian aggression, Ukrainian national identity has never been stronger. Record numbers of Ukrainians back Euro-Atlantic integration, while recent military successes have further strengthened Ukrainian resolve to liberate all Russian-occupied regions of the country.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Elon Musk and other self-styled realists fail to grasp that Russia currently has far more reason than Ukraine to seek an off-ramp from the conflict, even if it may be hard to swallow for Russians. Russia is now clearly losing the war and has suffered a string of humiliating defeats on the eastern and southern fronts over the past month. Ukrainian forces are receiving some of the best weapons in the world along with the financial, intelligence, and military support of NATO and other global partners. Ukrainian morale is high, with soldiers fighting to free their homeland and their families from occupation.

Russia, on the other hand, is in increasingly dire straights. Putin has launched Russia’s first mobilization campaign since World War II in order to compensate for staggering battlefield losses. While the actual number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine remains a closely guarded secret, even the most conservative estimates put the figure in the tens of thousands. The Russian military has also lost huge amounts of equipment in Ukraine including more than 1000 tanks. Putin now finds himself forced to rely on nuclear intimidation in order to maintain the fearsome mystique of his once-vaunted army. Unsurprisingly, the remaining Russian forces in Ukraine are suffering from collapsing morale.

Meanwhile, the situation inside Russia is also deteriorating. Sanctions imposed in response to the invasion of Ukraine are hurting the economy, while travel restrictions are narrowing the horizons of ordinary Russians. An estimated 700,000 Russians have fled the country in the two weeks since mobilization was announced, inflicting further economic damage and fueling public discontent.

Ukraine is currently advancing simultaneously on multiple fronts against what is an increasingly poorly-armed and demoralized enemy. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe Russia can regain the battlefield initiative in the months ahead. With this in mind, it makes little sense to preach restraint or expect concessions from Kyiv.

Putin’s nuclear blackmail is the elephant in the room, of course. His threats must be taken seriously, but the West cannot allow nuclear saber-rattling to become a trump card that enables Russia to claim whatever territory it wants. Putin knows the specter of a nuclear strike frightens Western leaders and sparks whispers of ending support for Ukraine. If he succeeds, he will use the same tactic again and again. Others, too, will take note and draw the obvious conclusions.

The best response to these nuclear threats has come from the Ukrainians themselves. Officials in Kyiv have defiantly declared that while a nuclear strike would dramatically increase the costs of the war, it would not alter the eventual outcome. In other words, even if Putin crosses the nuclear threshold, he will not be able to prevent a Ukrainian victory. Western leaders should follow suit and make crystal clear that any nuclear escalation would have catastrophic consequences for Russia.

Ukrainians want peace, but not at any price. Crucially, they recognize that unless they are victorious, their homeland will cease to exist. Elon Musk and other proponents of land-for-peace proposals need to understand that the single best way to bring peace to Ukraine is by sending the weapons that will help secure a Ukrainian victory. There is no middle ground between Russia’s goal of destroying Ukraine and Ukraine’s own will to survive.

Ukraine is not standing in the way of peace. Nor is peace something that can be imposed on Ukraine by the country’s Western partners. Anyone who genuinely wants to bring the Russian invasion to an end should focus on pushing the international community to give Ukrainians the tools they need to defend themselves. Until Russia is decisively defeated, the war in Ukraine will go on and the suffering of Ukrainians will continue.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on Twitter @DougKlain.

A comprehensive defeat in Ukraine would argue strongly against continued revanchism and aggression by any successor, especially when such actions precipitated Putin’s downfall. Meanwhile, economic distress would prevent the rearming of the depleted and demoralized Russian military. With a GDP one-twentieth the size of NATO’s, Russia does not possess the resources to continue endlessly confronting the West.

Reaching out for help from China, Iran, or North Korea is also unlikely to help Putin’s successor. Iran and North Korea are economic lightweights whose defense sectors are a generation or more behind the West.

China has a long and difficult history with Russia in the Far East and, over the long term, is a much greater threat to Russian interests. Siberia is both thinly populated and endowed with enormous energy, timber, and mineral resources. China has long cast a covetous eye toward the region. Beijing is well aware that Moscow’s ability to defend its enormous borders is minimal, and that encouraging Russian dependence on Chinese economic and military assistance will lead to Chinese dominance and control.

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For any successor regime, sanctions relief and reestablishing a sound economy based on energy sales and commodities exports will be a top priority, not more war and crisis. Putin’s extraordinary aggression is driving Europe away from Russian energy and toward alternate sources, killing the golden goose that enabled Russia to escape from the economic weakness of the 1990s. Russia’s economic future lies in closer integration with the West and the international community, not deeper isolation. However attractive it may be to autocrats, the North Korean model will not appeal to the Russian people.

Inside Russia’s power vertical, elites will wish to move away from an environment where fear of imprisonment or assassination has become the rule. If Putin is removed from power, self-preservation on the part of Russia’s oligarchs, generals, and senior functionaries will be a primary driver. Few will want to return to an environment of fear and distrust. Any new leadership will be mindful of the reasons behind Putin’s fall and will likely take heed. Just as the Politburo moved to end the terror following Stalin’s death, a return to normalcy and stability will likely be a high priority in a post-Putin environment.

Because there is no obvious mechanism for a peaceful transition of power, there is potential for a power vacuum to develop in the event of Putin’s ouster. Russian leaders will certainly want to avoid state collapse or dismemberment, as happened after the fall of the Soviet Union. This argues for more power-sharing and a more balanced approach to government where ministries, courts, and parliament can check the tendency towards absolutism.

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While true Western-style democracy may not emerge in the short term, some liberalization would be likely in a post-Putin Russia. Even following a failed campaign in Ukraine, Russia enjoys numerous real advantages. There are no direct threats to Russian territory or sovereignty, while the country has a powerful nuclear arsenal, a huge land area with vast natural resources, an educated and enterprising population, and a strong and intact culture. Western leaders will be eager to embrace a reformed Russia posing no threat to its neighbors. Sensible Russian leaders will recognize and want to leverage these opportunities.

The emerging generation of Russians will also have a voice in a new Russia. Though effectively controlled and even repressed by Putin, many younger Russians are aware of the outside world, do not support the war in Ukraine, and want a more open and prosperous life. Social media provides a platform to organize and give voice to this generation that the state can only suppress with difficulty.

There is currently a tendency to see Russia and Russians as irredeemable. And there is clearly a strain in Russian history and culture that suggests imperialism and expansionism are embedded in the national DNA. But many states (Japan, Germany, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, and Greece all come to mind) have managed to throw off militarism and autocracy.

We should be careful to guard against the assumption that Putin’s successor will inevitably be worse than Putin himself. That logic drives us into the “don’t humiliate Putin” camp, which is shorthand for “don’t let Ukraine win.” That can’t be good for Ukraine, the West, or the wider world.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

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#AtlanticDebrief – Will Jean Monnet’s vision for Europe win out? | A Debrief from Nathalie Tocci

nlawler — Fri, 23 Sep 2022 16:09:15 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

What is the current scene in Europe on the struggle between European integration and Euroscepticism? What do Italy and Sweden’s elections mean for European unity and cooperation, particularly in the face of Russian aggression? Should Europe be expecting a resurgence of populism or the far-right in Europe?

For this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Europe Center Senior Fellow Damir Marusic sits down with Dr. Nathalie Tocci, Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, to discuss these issues and answer the “Jean Monnet” question: if Europe can be adaptable and resilient in the face of crisis.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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Will Ukraine invasion condemn Putin to place among Russia’s worst rulers?

Anders Åslund — Thu, 22 Sep 2022 18:08:03 +0000

Vladimir Putin refuses to admit defeat in Ukraine. On September 21, he announced plans for a partial mobilization while also vowing to annex large swathes of Ukraine and threatening to defend his gains with nuclear weapons. This latest show of strength cannot disguise the grim realities of Putin’s rapidly unraveling invasion. Seven months after Russian tanks first crossed the border, his depleted and deeply demoralized army has ground to a halt and the military initiative has passed decisively to the advancing Ukrainians.

While it remains unclear exactly how the war will end, it is already painfully apparent that the invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster for Russia in general and for Putin personally. It has undone the progress achieved during Putin’s first decade in power and has ruthlessly exposed the many failures of his 22-year reign. Putin has long dreamed of securing his place among the titans of Russian history. Instead, he now looks destined to be remembered as one of the country’s worst rulers.

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It is hard to overestimate the negative impact Putin has had on Russia and the wider international community. He has unleashed a series of unjustified wars and suppressed personal freedoms inside Russia itself; he has fostered a culture of xenophobia and cut Russians off from the developed world; he has stalled the Russian economy and ended the country’s modernization; and he has spread an information epidemic of fakes and falsehoods around the globe.

For Russians who dream of a return to imperial greatness, Putin’s biggest crime is his inept invasion of Ukraine. Russia is no stranger to humiliating military losses. In the past two centuries, four defeats stand out as particularly significant: the Crimean War (1853-56), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), World War I (1914-17), and the Afghanistan War (1979-88).

Encouragingly, all four defeats were followed by periods of liberalization. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, Czar Alexander II abolished serfdom throughout the Russian Empire. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War led to the creation of the Duma, while Russia’s premature exit from World War I heralded the country’s first reasonably democratic elections. Meanwhile, the failure in Afghanistan was a significant factor in the collapse of the USSR. While pessimists predict that Putin will be followed by an even worse tyrant, the historical record suggests that military defeat is likely to lead to a relaxation of Russia’s authoritarian instincts.

It is difficult to see Putin surviving the war in Ukraine. The invasion he so recklessly ordered has devastated the Russian military and made his country a global pariah without achieving anything in return. The war has also led to a sharp deterioration on the domestic front. Echoing the worst excesses of Stalin and Hitler, Putin has normalized the genocide of Ukrainians and made it an everyday topic of discussion on Russian television. Meanwhile, as the excellent investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan have pointed out, his FSB security service has increasingly come to resemble the dreaded Soviet era NKVD.

Putin has had a highly negative impact on Russia’s international relations that goes far beyond the fallout from the invasion of Ukraine. His long record of broken promises and shameless dishonesty has made other world leaders increasingly wary of engaging. Some have persevered longer than others, but even the patient leaders of France and Germany appear to have now reached the conclusion that Putin’s words carry little weight.

The Russian ruler’s diminished status on the international stage was on display in Uzbekistan at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Putin was once notorious for keeping many of the world’s most prominent statesmen waiting. However, in Tashkent he was made to wait by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. The only politicians who appear genuinely comfortable in his company are representatives of fellow pariah regimes such as Iran and North Korea.

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Putin’s reign has also been bad for the Russian economy. During his first two presidential terms, lingering Gaidar-Yeltsin reforms and high energy prices created the false impression of sound economic management. This was an illusion. The Russian economy has stagnated since 2014 and is now sinking, with optimistic official forecasts predicting a six percent decline in 2022 and no recovery for a decade.

Russia’s unrivaled resource base is enough to make it the richest country on the planet. Instead, Putin has blocked modernization and left Russia completely dependent on the export of its natural resources. Even based on official figures, Russian real disposal income fell by ten percent between 2014 and 2020.

Rather than opening up the country and diversifying the economy, Putin has isolated Russia and scared away foreign businesses with his wars and his repressive domestic policies. This has led to a brain drain of Russia’s best minds, with official figures showing over 400,000 people leaving the country in the first half of 2022 alone. Many of those who vote with their feet are from the well-educated and entrepreneurial segments of society.

The only economic issue that seems to genuinely interest Putin is the wealth of his cronies and his family. He has made no effort to curb massive capital outflows from Russia, possibly because much of this outflow is linked to him or his allies. While salaries for ordinary Russians stagnate, members of Putin’s inner circle have acquired immense wealth. Although no official records exist, it has long been speculated that Putin himself is one of the world’s richest men.

The catastrophic consequences of Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine have helped cast an unforgiving light on the rest of his reign. He has caused enormous damage to the Russia while drastically undermining the country’s credibility in international affairs. Russia today is noticeably more isolated and less free than at the beginning of his rule over twenty years ago. It is a society trapped in a toxic vision of the past and openly hostile to much of the modern world. This is Putin’s legacy.

The one area where Putin has genuinely excelled is in the creation of a world-class propaganda machine. However, even this cannot disguise his shortcomings forever. If the war in Ukraine is indeed lost, it will only be a matter of time before the Russian public demands an end to the discredited Putin era.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

One of the first—and most challenging—responsibilities of the incoming government will be to draft its budget law for 2023, which must be submitted to the European Commission by mid-October and approved by the end of the year. This and debt sustainability are the issues that both Brussels and financial markets are anxiously monitoring.

The current government will also leave a lot on the agenda. The next government will have its docket full with issues like tax reform, competition regulation, judicial reform, and even enacting a minimum wage—Italy is one of six EU countries without a federally regulated minimum wage, and will have to introduce one to comply with new EU law.

Meanwhile, climate change and energy solutions have surfaced as important campaign battlegrounds for the first time, especially since the new government will face a potentially volatile winter marked by Russian gas cut-offs. Candidates have prioritized discussion of economic and energy challenges, including the effects of the war in Ukraine, with both Meloni and Letta proposing measures to limit spiraling energy prices.

Anti-immigrant sentiments have also been a campaign feature, particularly after Meloni shared a video on social media of an undocumented immigrant raping a woman, for which she was heavily rebuked by her rival Letta. LGBTQ+ and abortion rights, which could face restrictions under a Meloni-led government, are also the subject of debate.

How did Italy go from technocrats to far-right populists? 

Prime Minister Mario Draghi—who is credited with leading Italy out of the COVID-19 economic downturn—has largely been viewed as a figure of economic stability in Europe, thanks to his tenure as former president of the European Central Bank and his role as a vocal advocate of EU responses to the economic and energy crises stemming from Russia’s war in Ukraine. Taking over as a technocrat only eighteen months ago, he resigned in July when the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) withdrew its support from the governing coalition—accusing Draghi of failing to do enough to address Italy’s worsening economic conditions—and the League and Forza Italia followed suit.

President Sergio Mattarella had turned to Draghi early in 2021 as a steady hand outside of party politics who could lead the country out of the darker days of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite opposition from M5S, which preferred a political government. However, the collapse in July of Draghi’s technocratic government perhaps showed that  leaders cannot prevail outside of party politics.

Italy is no stranger to technocratic governments, as Draghi’s is the fourth in the past two decades. But dissatisfaction with unelected leadership has already paved the way for populists in the past: Mario Monti was similarly installed as prime minister in 2011 in the wake of the global financial crisis, but two years of public dissatisfaction gave way to a populist surge headed by M5S, which earned the highest share of votes in its first-ever national election after Monti’s government fell apart in 2013.

History now seems to be repeating itself, with the parties withdrawing support from Draghi in favor of an electoral approach to resolving the country’s challenges (Meloni and other right-wing leaders were already calling for early elections by the time Draghi resigned).

The rise of Meloni’s far-right brand

Entering conservative politics in her teens, Meloni’s popularity has skyrocketed in recent years. Her controversial views on the EU and anti-immigration positions resonated with an increasingly disaffected public, propelling her party from 4 percent in 2018 to more than 25 percent in 2022.

Meloni, 45, describes herself and the Brothers of Italy as conservatives. Individual freedom, private enterprise, educational freedom, the centrality of the family and its role in society, border protection from unchecked immigration, and the defense of Italian national identity are among the issues she campaigns on the most.

Concerns in the West about the Brothers of Italy’s roots as a neofascist party have been met with claims that fascism has been handed over to history. But Meloni doesn’t hide her admiration for autocratic Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán, for instance, and also opposes gay rights, claiming that children should be raised by a mother and a father. As prime minister, Meloni says she would put up naval blockades in the Mediterranean to deter migrants, while her slogans “God, family, fatherland” and “Less Europe, but a better Europe” worry Europeans. While she appears to have embraced Atlanticism in the final days of the campaign, it’s unclear how serious she is about that stance.

While she has stated that Italy will continue to support Ukraine, her coalition would undoubtedly raise questions about the country’s policy, given the ties of League leader Matteo Salvini and Silvio Berlusconi, the former prime minister who now heads Forza Italia, to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

A new headache for the EU?

With the Ukraine war and growing energy crisis absorbing the focus in Brussels, the EU may not be enthusiastic to work with the likes of Meloni, who could lead Italy down the path already traveled by Hungary or Poland, as Letta warns.

Meloni sees Italian individualism as the solution to becoming a more influential European actor. “We want a different Italian attitude on the international stage, for example in dealing with the European Commission, [but] this does not mean that we want to destroy Europe, that we want to leave Europe, that we want to do crazy things,” she said last month. “It simply means explaining that the defense of the national interest is important to us as it is for the French and for the Germans.”

A Meloni-led government could well be at odds with the Commission from an early stage. The leader of the Brothers of Italy has questioned EU fiscal requirements, claiming that the EU Stability and Growth Pact—which aims to keep national budget deficits below 3 percent of gross domestic product—should not apply in the current economic climate, and that Italy should not be subject to those conditions to receive pandemic recovery funding. She has also decried the EU’s response to the energy crisis, citing the impact of continued rising prices on firms and households.

Meloni’s premiership could also see Italy tilt toward protectionism. For example, her party wants the state to purchase a controlling share in Telecom Italia, which Meloni says would result in a “state owned, non-vertically integrated network and private operators operating under free competition,” effectively cutting out other European investors.

Will Meloni tone down her calls for Italy’s sovereignty once she enters Palazzo Chigi? Many populist leaders have done just that in recent years after winning elections. Chances are that a more conventional political line toward Europe will be embraced once in power—but that remains to be seen.

The lay of the land

For the first time, Italians are voting to fill a shrunken Parliament. A 2020 constitutional referendum reduced the number of seats in the lower house from 630 to 400, and shrank the senate from 315 members to 200. A smaller legislature will reduce the size of future majorities, which means more emphasis on party loyalty and potentially more stability to implement legislative agendas.

Here’s a look at the main contenders and what they promise:

The centrodestra (center-right) coalition is led by the Brothers of Italy, joined by Salvini’s League and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. The Brothers, who are marked by a post-fascist history, focus on promoting the traditional Italian family, while the populist League has called for curbing immigration and rolling back EU authority. Italy’s mixed electoral law favors broad coalitions of this nature, making a center-right government all the more likely.
Letta’s PD, which polls show as neck and neck with Meloni’s party, heads the center-left coalition. According to polls, the three right-wing parties have a total of 46.5 percent of the vote, compared to the center-left alliance’s 29 percent. Letta has ruled out an alliance with the populist M5S, claiming that the government crisis has resulted in an “irreversible” break between the two parties. Letta’s party has positioned itself as the pro-European alternative to the right’s brand of nationalism and maintains an anti-Putin stance and support for LGBTQ+ rights.
The Five Star Movement (M5S), led by former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, has decided to run alone. The party divided when former leader Luigi Di Maio left to form the Civic Commitment (Impegno Civico) party; support for M5S has since plummeted from 32 percent in the 2018 to roughly 12 percent now. It proposes to issue common EU debt in order to establish an energy-recovery fund, to review the EU Stability and Growth Pact, and to allow workers to keep more of their gross wages. On social policy, M5S overlaps with the PD.
Action (Azione) is a liberal party led by Carlo Calenda, a member of the European Parliament. It has joined with the former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s Italia Viva in what the two parties call a “third pole” alliance. While the partnership is currently polling at about 7 percent, it’s possible the third pole’s appeal to centrist and moderate voters could lead to a new political geography in Italy in the long term.

What’s next for Italy?

The conditions for this election show that Italy cannot continue to be governed by technocrats. But will Italians be better off under the leadership of a so-called sovereign coalition—or is this the final episode of populist politicians exploiting the hearts of disappointed citizens? There seems to be little concern about whether Italy will remain a solid transatlantic partner, but the big question mark looms over relations with Europe. Will Italy fight at any cost for a Europe whole and free, or will it simply squabble with other European countries?

As the Italians say, non si sa—no one knows.

Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and host of the Europe Center’s #BalkanDebrief series.

Akshat Dhankher is a program assistant at the Europe Center.

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Weaponizing education: Russia targets schoolchildren in occupied Ukraine

Oleksandr Pankieiev — Tue, 20 Sep 2022 13:23:06 +0000

Ukraine began a new academic year on September 1 with the country still engaged in a fight for survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. For millions of Ukrainian schoolchildren, this meant a return to the classroom with the prospect of lessons being regularly interrupted by air raid sirens. Schools without adequate air raid shelters were unable to open at all.

For those living in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, the situation is far worse. Schools under Russian control are being forced to adopt a Kremlin-curated curriculum designed to demonize Ukraine while convincing kids to welcome the takeover of their country and embrace a Russian national identity. Teachers and parents who dare to object face potentially dire consequences.

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Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion began on February 24, Ukrainian children have been among the primary victims of what is Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Hundreds have been killed, while millions have been displaced by the fighting and forced to flee to unfamiliar surroundings elsewhere in Ukraine or outside the country. Thousands of Ukrainian children are also thought to have been subjected to forced deportation to the Russian Federation.

The Kremlin is now targeting young Ukrainians as part of its campaign to eradicate Ukrainian national identity in areas under Russian control. In an address to mark the start of the new school term on September 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin underlined the importance of indoctrinating Ukrainian schoolchildren.

Putin dedicated part of his speech to Ukraine, lamenting that Ukrainian children aren’t taught that Russia and Ukraine were once both part of the Soviet Union or that Ukraine has no history as an independent state. He also declared that the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine was historically Russian territory that had been wrongly included within Ukraine’s borders by the Bolsheviks. Putin blamed the education system in Ukraine for distorting historical facts and contributing to the creation of anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine that posed a threat to Russia.

This emphasis on the reeducation of young Ukrainians should come as no surprise. Throughout Putin’s 22-year reign, the Russian school system has grown increasingly politicized as the Kremlin has sought to bring aspects of the national curriculum into line with officially endorsed narratives. Textbooks and teaching materials have been developed to reflect the state’s approved view of Russian history in particular, with children subjected to highly sanitized versions of the Soviet past.

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In occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia has embarked on a comprehensive reeducation program that includes specific efforts to challenge the entire notion of a separate and distinct Ukrainian nation. This began during the initial period of occupation with the removal of Ukrainian textbooks and all symbols of Ukrainian statehood from schools. In some cases, Ukrainian history books were demonstratively burned.

The occupation authorities have attempted to pressure Ukrainian teachers into adopting the Russian curriculum. Despite the obvious risks involved, many have refused to cooperate. Russia has sought to overcome objections via both threats and incentives. Those who agree to adopt the new Kremlin-approved teaching guidelines are offered cash payments, while anyone who objects faces dismissal along with possible imprisonment or worse.

Confronted with a shortage of Ukrainian teachers willing to cooperate with Moscow’s russification agenda, the occupation authorities are seeking to import staff from Russia itself. Hundreds of Russian teachers are believed to have agreed to relocate to Ukraine and teach in the occupied regions. Unsurprisingly, the subjects most in demand are Russian history, literature, and language. This influx of Russian teachers has been accompanied by the distribution of new textbooks aligned with Kremlin thinking.

Volunteering to indoctrinate children in occupied Ukraine may not be entirely risk-free for educators who choose to do so. A number of Russian teachers were reportedly detained during Ukraine’s recent successful counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region after having been abandoned by the fleeing Russian military. While details have yet to be confirmed, they may now face criminal charges.

The risks are far higher for Ukrainian parents who refuse to enroll their children in schools offering the Russian curriculum. The occupation authorities have warned parents who protest that they face fines and possible imprisonment. In some cases, Kremlin appointees have threatened to remove parental rights and separate children from their families. With forced deportations and the illegal adoption of Ukrainian children already well-known features of the occupation, these cannot be treated as idle threats.

Russia’s campaign to completely russify the Ukrainian education system is part of a broader drive to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and eradicate Ukrainian national identity in areas under Russia’s control. The apparently voluntary participation of Russian schoolteachers in these efforts raises troubling questions about the role of non-military personnel in possible war crimes. With hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian children currently vulnerable to Kremlin indoctrination, their fate is a powerful argument for the urgent liberation of Russian-occupied Ukraine.

Dr. Oleksandr Pankieiev is a research coordinator and editor-in-chief of the Forum for Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta’s Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

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Evidence of Russia’s declining influence can be seen throughout the post-Soviet world. On the frontlines in Ukraine, Putin’s invasion force is suffering from increasingly obvious manpower shortages that make a mockery of attempts to portray Russia as the world’s number two military power. Moscow has been forced to withdraw troops from deployments across the former USSR while also recruiting soldiers from among the Russian prison population.

Russian military withdrawals from Central Asia have led to renewed border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The changing dynamic in the region was also on display at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan, with the leaders of India and China both expressing concerns over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the President of Kyrgyzstan keeping Putin waiting prior to their bilateral meeting. Putin was once notorious for making world leaders wait, but the shoe is now on the other foot.

Russia’s withdrawal of nearly 1,000 troops from Armenia to bolster the faltering invasion of Ukraine was a signal to the countries of the South Caucasus that Kremlin influence in the region is in decline. Armenia has so far refused to see the writing on the wall and continues to place all its eggs in the Russian basket. Azerbaijan, which has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy and has not joined Russian-led initiatives, has used Moscow’s waning influence to launch a military operation against Armenia.

The European Union has tried but so far failed to broker a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would recognize the border separating the two nations and end three decades of intermittent conflict. Meanwhile, Armenians have protested in Yerevan over the possible signing of a peace treaty, but it is difficult to see how Armenia could hope to defeat its wealthier and militarily stronger neighbor without Russian support.

Russia’s retreat from the region also has major implications for nearby Georgia and the country’s dominant figure, pro-Kremlin oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Under Ivanishvili’s influence, Georgian democracy has stagnated. Notably, the country was not offered EU candidate status alongside Ukraine and Moldova in summer 2022.

Georgia has not officially backed Ukraine over the Russian invasion and has instead joined Armenia in helping Moscow evade sanctions. This stance is out of step with Georgian public opinion, with a clear majority of Georgians supporting Ukraine. Indeed, the largest international military unit fighting Russia in Ukraine is the Georgian Legion. Georgia is now believed to be contemplating whether to use the collapse in Russian power to intervene against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two Kremlin-controlled breakaway Georgian regions recognized by Moscow as independent states.

Moldova is also watching events in Ukraine closely and eyeing its own Kremlin-orchestrated frozen conflict. Russian troops have been stationed in the Transnistria region of Moldova since the early 1990s. Ukraine’s military successes are now sparking debate over whether the time has come to challenge the continued presence of this small and isolated Russian army outpost.

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Russia’s retreat is nowhere more immediate or obvious than in Ukraine. Putin’s brutal invasion was supposed to derail Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and force the country firmly back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, it has turned Ukrainian public opinion decisively against Russia while also uniting Ukrainians. Polls now consistently indicate similar attitudes throughout both western and eastern Ukraine toward Russia, national identity, language, and foreign policy. Rather than destroying the Ukrainian nation, Russian aggression has dramatically accelerated the country’s nation-building progress.

Throughout the former USSR, Russia’s only remaining loyal allies are Belarus and Armenia. The Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union no longer appear to be functioning in any meaningful sense.

Ukraine and Moldova are now firmly within the EU sphere of influence. Azerbaijan has cemented a strategic alliance with Turkey and is a rising economic and military power whose energy resources will become increasingly important to the EU as Europe seeks to end its dependency on Russia. Georgia’s unnatural pro-Russian stance is crumbling. Meanwhile, China has replaced Russia as the preeminent power in Central Asia. Russia’s humiliating military setbacks in Ukraine and economic isolation from the Western world have confirmed its status as China’s junior partner.

Thirty years on from the disintegration of the USSR, Russia is in the midst of another imperial collapse. Countries that spent the past three decades as part of Moscow’s informal empire are now turning away from Russia and taking control of their own destinies. Unsurprisingly, Europe, Turkey, and China are now all seen as more attractive partners.

Once again, it is Ukraine that is serving as the catalyst for Russia’s retreat. Putin’s invasion was meant to extinguish the Ukrainian state once and for all. Instead, Russian imperial influence is in danger of receding to levels not witnessed in hundreds of years.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide: Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

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In comparison with earlier IRI polling data going back to 2012, the scale of the shift in public opinion on these issues is striking. In March 2012, over a year away from the anticipated November 2013 Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, only 17 percent of respondents in southern Ukraine said the country should enter into an economic union with the EU. Meanwhile, a clear majority of 60 percent preferred the idea of a Customs Union with Russia.

Today, these positions have been completed reversed. Only about one percent now say they would choose a Moscow-led Customs Union, with almost 80 percent of respondents across southern Ukraine voicing their support for EU membership.

The starting point for this transformation in public opinion was Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in early 2014. The Russian occupation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region eight years ago had a profound impact on public opinion throughout southern Ukraine and led many to completely reevaluate their views of Ukraine’s place in Europe and the wider world.

Support for EU membership climbed to 36 percent in September 2014 and went on to reach almost 50 percent in early 2015, where it would hold steady until the all-out invasion by Russia in February 2022. Meanwhile, the Customs Union option remained appealing for almost one-third of residents in southern Ukraine up until February 24, 2022. However, this support almost completely evaporated following Putin’s decision to invade.

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On the more controversial question of possible NATO membership, respondents in southern Ukraine were firmly against joining the alliance when IRI first began polling on this question. Going back to March 2014, 52 percent of southern Ukraine residents were opposed, with only 11 percent indicating they would vote “yes” in a referendum on NATO membership. Those numbers have now flipped, with only six percent saying they would vote “no” and 66 percent saying they would vote in favor of joining NATO.

The trends evident in terms of EU and NATO membership can also be seen in attitudes throughout southern Ukraine on the topic of possible peace talks with Russia. When asked what concessions they would be prepared to make in order to end the war, the most popular response with 39% was “none of the above.” On the issue of Ukraine’s territorial boundaries after the war, almost 70 percent of respondents in southern Ukraine stated in the most recent IRI survey that post-war Ukraine should maintain its internationally recognized 1991 borders, including Crimea and all the mainland Ukrainian regions currently under Russian occupation.

These are strong numbers from a region that has previously been stereotyped as pro-Russian. While there have been a number of prominent collaborators during the current invasion, the overall mood is clearly shifting in the opposite direction. Indeed, it is remarkable to see not just the optimism and resilience of the people of this region, but also their firm turn away from Russia and the imperial vision of Vladimir Putin.

Whether this change in attitudes remains in place in the post-war period is another question. There will inevitably be challenges associated with meeting expectations once areas of southern Ukraine currently under Russian occupation are liberated. The international community must keep this important region in focus not only in the days ahead but in the months and years to come. For now, it certainly looks like Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has backfired spectacularly.

Michael Druckman is resident program director for Ukraine at the International Republican Institute.

Ukraine is winning but needs weapons to end Russia’s genocidal occupation

Kristina Hook — Tue, 13 Sep 2022 12:19:06 +0000

Ukraine’s stunning counteroffensive success in the Kharkiv region has provided conclusive proof that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are more than capable of defeating Russia on the battlefield. Now is the time to end the war by providing Ukraine with everything necessary to consolidate these gains and secure a decisive victory.

Victory requires a coordinated, multifaceted, and long-term approach with economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and logistical support all needed in order to bolster the Ukrainian transition to NATO-standard weaponry. Above all, this means a full commitment by Ukraine’s partners to increase arms supplies to the country.

The scenes accompanying recent Ukrainian advances have helped bring into focus the genocidal consequences if Russia is not decisively defeated. As Ukrainian troops liberated towns and villages across the Kharkiv region last week, their progress was marked by a steady stream of videos capturing the emotionally charged moments of liberation. This footage is a powerful reminder of the plight facing millions of Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation.

In one video from Balakliya, elderly women emerged from their apartment building to greet Ukrainian soldiers, their ecstasy evident. “We have prayed for you to come save us for half a year!” one cried while embracing the soldiers. “What good boys!” another repeated. Belying Russian propaganda that Russian-speakers in Ukraine are persecuted, the women embraced the Ukrainian soldiers with affectionate words in the Russian language.

Another video from Balakliya underscored exactly what is at stake in the counteroffensive. In this video, Ukrainian soldiers triumphantly removed a Russian propaganda billboard featuring the slogan “We are with Russia! One people!” This billboard was a blunt example of the genocidal language employed by the Kremlin in its campaign to destroy the Ukrainian national group.

Russia’s “one people” propaganda denies Ukrainians the right to view themselves as a distinctive national group, a category protected under the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. It is one more piece of evidence demonstrating Moscow’s intent to eradicate Ukrainian national identity through violent, coerced Russification and the killing of those they view as “irredeemably Ukrainian.”

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Ukrainians throughout the country are well aware of Russia’s genocidal intentions. Indeed, Kremlin leaders and propagandists alike make no secret of their desire to wipe Ukraine off the map of Europe completely. Putin himself has dismissed Ukraine as an illegitimate and intolerable “anti-Russia.” Russian television pundits and politicians alike have demonized Ukrainians, saying, “We and Ukraine cannot continue to exist on the same planet. It is impossible to coexist with infernal evil.”

In areas of Ukraine that have fallen under Russian control since the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, the occupation authorities have declared that Russia has come “forever.” All traces of Ukrainian identity have been targeted and suppressed including Ukrainian language road signs, tattoos, and education. Teams of schoolteachers have even been brought in from Russia to indoctrinate Ukrainians.

As the whole world saw following the early April liberation of Kyiv region towns such as Bucha and Irpin, Russian troops have engaged in the systematic mass murder of Ukrainian civilians. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians including large numbers of children have also been subjected to forced deportation to the Russian Federation.

The horrors of Russian occupation have shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward the war. Unsurprisingly, polls consistently show that most Ukrainians reject any talk of surrendering their land (and fellow citizens) in any agreement and understand that they will never be safe until Russia is defeated.

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Many Ukrainians are also guided by their historical experience of previous genocidal campaigns waged by the Kremlin. Throughout the past eight years of Ukraine’s armed conflict with Russia, Ukrainians have repeatedly referenced the 1932-33 Holodomor famine to underscore that “Russia past and present is threatened by an independent, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine.”

While Ukrainians view their current fight against Russian imperialism as part of a centuries-long struggle, one critical distinction separates today’s brutal war from earlier atrocities. Whereas the international community largely ignored the 1930s Soviet genocide, Ukraine now enjoys overwhelming backing from the democratic world. This could well prove decisive.

History indicates that genocidal campaigns typically end either in the total victory of the perpetrators or the victims, with external support often playing a decisive role. Efforts to find “middle ground” or promote negotiated settlements in such situations do not last or protect victims.

Increased international military aid is now crucial. This aid should include more advanced weapons systems that will allow the Ukrainian military to build on recent battlefield successes and secure ultimate victory. It is equally important to enhance Ukraine’s air defense capabilities in order to protect the country’s civilian population from Russian retribution as Putin’s army is forced to retreat.

The achievements of Ukraine’s counteroffensive should be sufficient to silence the skeptics who continue to question the value of arming the country. Likewise, the accompanying scenes of liberation should be enough to convince advocates of appeasement that condemning Ukrainians to Russian occupation is morally repugnant. Now is the moment for the international community to consolidate its support for Ukraine and deal a decisive military blow to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

Kristina Hook is Assistant Professor of Conflict Management at Kennesaw State University’s School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding, and Development and a former US Fulbright scholar to Ukraine.

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#BritainDebrief – What are the origins of Europe’s energy crisis? | A Debrief from Dr. Helen Thompson

Ben Judah — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 22:22:57 +0000

What are the origins of Europe’s energy crisis?

As concerns continue to grow over Europe’s capacity to endure a winter with less Russian natural gas, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Dr. Helen Thompson, Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge University, on Europe’s energy, climate and geopolitical reckoning. What are the historical origins of Europe’s predicament? Is the current crisis only caused by war in Ukraine? Why have Western Europe politicians become more “energy illiterate” when describing policy objectives? Is this a geopolitical and climate-related reckoning for Europe, in addition to it being an energy security-related reckoning?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What are the origins of Europe’s energy crisis? | A Debrief from Dr. Helen Thompson appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#BritainDebrief – What future for the Scottish Lib Dems? | A Debrief with Alex Cole-Hamilton

Ben Judah — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 22:15:30 +0000

What future for the Scottish Lib Dems?

As Nicola Sturgeon recently declared her intention to hold a second independence referendum without Westminster’s consent, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Alex Cole-Hamilton, leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, to discuss the future of the union. Can the Scottish Lib Dems benefit from the recent wins that their English counterparts have had lately? How will the Scottish Lib Dems tailor their electoral strategy under a Truss premiership?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What future for the Scottish Lib Dems? | A Debrief with Alex Cole-Hamilton appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There can be no compromise between Russian genocide and Ukrainian freedom

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 08 Sep 2022 21:41:41 +0000

Ever since Vladimir Putin’s troops first crossed the Ukrainian border on February 24, there has been no shortage of Western commentators seeking to explain why Ukraine really has no choice but to offer Russia land in exchange for peace. Despite a series of Ukrainian military successes and mounting evidence that the Russian invasion has run out of steam, calls for a compromise peace continue.

The self-styled foreign policy realists behind these calls tend to overlook the fact that the land they are so eager to give away is actually home to millions of Ukrainians who would face a desperately bleak future under Russia’s genocidal occupation. Such arguments reflect a fundamental failure to grasp the unrepentant imperialism at the heart of modern Russian identity and the genocidal objectives underpinning the invasion of Ukraine.

Many in the realist camp remain convinced that the roots of the current conflict lie in NATO enlargement and Western encroachment into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. They typically approach today’s war as a wholly rational geopolitical dispute and insist that Putin’s actions, however brutal, are a more or less inevitable response to the West’s own provocative policies in the decades following the Soviet collapse.

This Kremlin-friendly narrative has never really stood up to serious scrutiny. After all, even the most rabid of Russian propagandists recognizes that the entire notion of a NATO attack on Russia is pure fantasy. Even if NATO did genuinely harbor plans to invade Russia, why would they not simply use the Baltic states, which offer the same geographical proximity as Ukraine and have been members of the alliance for almost two decades?

The events of the past six months have further undermined the credibility of Moscow’s NATO mythology. Senior Kremlin officials now freely acknowledge that the current Russian invasion would continue even if Ukraine were to rule out NATO membership altogether and officially embrace neutrality, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has suggested.

Meanwhile, Russia has accepted neighboring Finland’s recent decision to join NATO with barely a murmur. This meek response to the fast-tracked Finnish membership bid has made a complete mockery of the Kremlin’s earlier protestations over the unacceptability of a growing NATO presence on Russia’s borders.

In reality, of course, Putin understands perfectly well that NATO poses no security threat to Russia. He has simply used the issue to his advantage. The Russian dictator has exploited lingering Western divisions over the wisdom of the alliance’s post-1991 enlargement as a convenient way of disguising and legitimizing his own historic mission to destroy independent Ukraine.

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Putin is the latest in a long line of Russian rulers who have sought to eradicate Ukrainian identity and wipe Ukraine off the European map. This dark history provides essential context for anyone wishing to make sense of today’s war. Indeed, the current invasion is the latest link in an unbroken chain of imperial oppression stretching back for more than three hundred years.

For centuries, successive Russian regimes ruthlessly suppressed Ukraine’s independence aspirations while imposing wave upon wave of russification. Generations of Ukrainians were robbed of their past and banned from using their own language. The nadir was reached in the earlier 1930s when millions were starved to death in a genocidal famine engineered by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin to eradicate Ukrainian national identity in its rural heartlands.

While Ukraine officially achieved independence in 1991, Russia never came to terms with this separation. Instead, Moscow sought to keep independent Ukraine firmly within the Kremlin orbit and viewed Ukrainian efforts to embrace a democratic European future as an existential threat to authoritarian Russia that must be prevented at almost any cost.

Throughout his reign, the need to either control or crush Ukraine has dominated Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking. His pivot from early cooperation with the West to Cold War-style confrontation came about as a direct response to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. Ten years later when millions of Ukrainians took to the streets once again in defense of their European choice and fledgling democracy, Putin went one step further and ordered his military to intervene. The 2014 seizure of Crimea and occupation of eastern Ukraine set the stage for this year’s full-scale invasion and illustrated Putin’s readiness to make remarkable sacrifices in order to resolve the Ukrainian question.

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While advocates of appeasement may well be genuinely unaware of Russia’s true intentions, Ukrainians are under no such illusions. They are painfully familiar with Russia’s deeply entrenched culture of denial regarding their country’s right to exist. They also noted how Russian rhetoric toward Ukraine grew increasingly radical in the months leading up to the invasion. Putin himself published an unhinged 5,000-word historical essay in July 2021 that many likened to a declaration of war on Ukrainian statehood.

As the outbreak of hostilities drew closer, Putin’s obsession with the destruction of Ukraine became increasingly obvious. He proclaimed Ukraine an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space, while at the same time denouncing the present Ukrainian state as an illegitimate “anti-Russia” that could no longer be tolerated.

During the first six months of the invasion, Russia’s genocidal intentions have become even more explicit. Regime officials have routinely questioned Ukraine’s continued existence, while debates over the desirability of genocide in Ukraine has become an everyday feature of Kremlin-controlled Russian TV. Meanwhile, state media has helpfully clarified that Putin’s promised “de-Nazification” actually means the “de-Ukrainianization” of Ukraine.

These chilling words have been more than matched by deeds. The advancing Russian army has employed massive artillery bombardments to destroy entire Ukrainian towns and cities along with their civilian populations. Tens of thousands are believed to have been killed in Mariupol alone as Russian forces methodically destroyed the Ukrainian seaside city.

In regions under Russian occupation, Putin’s troops have systematically engaged in mass murder. Groups of victims have repeatedly been found in liberated areas with hands bound and showing signs of torture. Millions of Ukrainian civilians have been forcibly deported to Russia, including thousands of children. Those left behind are subject to terror tactics including abductions and hostage-taking. The Ukrainian language has been removed from every aspect of public life, while parents who refuse to subject their children to Russian indoctrination have been warned that they risk losing custody.

Given openness of Russia’s plans to extinguish the Ukrainian nation, it is hardly surprising that an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians firmly oppose any kind of land-for-peace deal with the Kremlin. They recognize that a negotiated settlement which cedes parts of Ukraine to Russian control would condemn the residents of those regions to genocide while paving the way for the next Russian invasion once Putin’s battered military regroups and rearms. Rather than accepting this dismal fate, there is a determination to continue fighting until a decisive victory can be secured. Faced with the destruction of their nation, most Ukrainians believe they have no other choice.

Media portrayals of the war in Ukraine often depict it as a struggle between Russia and the West but this geopolitical framing is misleading. What we are currently witnessing is actually the latest chapter in Europe’s longest independence struggle. As long ago as 1731, French thinker Voltaire was moved to write, “Ukraine has always aspired to be free.” This epic journey may now be entering its final stages.

Thanks to the remarkable courage and resilience demonstrated over the past six months, the Ukrainian nation is currently closer to securing true freedom than at any time in its long and troubled history. It is vital that the democratic world now remains united behind Ukraine as the war enters what is likely to be a decisive period. There should be no more talk of concessions or compromises. Partial genocide is not an option. Instead, the only way to achieve a lasting peace is by helping Ukraine to win the war.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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Although Russia’s 1993 Constitution defines the country as a federation, in reality it is a centralized neo-imperial construct. This state is approaching the end of a regime cycle in which the political status quo is becoming increasingly precarious. Not since the fracturing of the Soviet Union have several simultaneous crises become so stark, including government inability to ensure sustained economic development, widening disparities between Moscow and the federal regions, and looming military defeat or indefinite stalemate in Ukraine.

The Russian Federation is faced with an existential paradox in which the liberal opposition is no position to replace the regime. Without political pluralism, economic reform, and regional autonomy, the federal structure will become increasingly unmanageable. However, even if democratic reforms were undertaken, several regions could nevertheless use the opportunity to secede. The potential for violent conflicts may diminish in the event of systemic reform, while the prospects for violent conflict substantially increase if reforms are indefinitely blocked.

As the country slides toward turmoil, the existing federal system will be viewed as illegitimate by expanding sectors of the population. A spectrum of domestic scenarios can then materialize that will thrust the country toward fragmentation, including intensifying intra-elite power struggles, escalating conflicts between the Kremlin and regional governments, and a breakdown of central controls in several parts of the country.

Moves toward separation by any of the 22 non-Russian republics would be likely to provoke similar demands for self-determination among several regions with ethnic Russian majorities. This would significantly weaken the center and lessen the likelihood of maintaining an autocratic state. Instructively, in the early 1990s when the Soviet Union began to unravel, 40% of the predominantly ethnic Russian regions pressed for greater autonomy and some veered toward sovereignty similar to the national republics. Separatist movements often start with demands for economic decentralization and then escalate in response to central government actions along with soaring elite and public aspirations.

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Public acquiescence and regime survival under Putin’s rule are based on a combination of aggressive foreign policy, militarism, anti-Western propaganda, and rising living standards. But the failing and costly war in Ukraine will deepen social and regional discontent regardless of Kremlin propaganda.

Disquiet in numerous republics and regions will be driven by an accumulation of grievances including sharply rising poverty levels, stark socio-economic inequalities, falling federal financial subsidies, deteriorating local infrastructure, environmental disasters, collapsing healthcare services, rampant official corruption, and public alienation from central decision-making. Moscow will be increasingly perceived as the exploiting colonial metropolis.

In the coming years, the Russian Federation could face a repeat of either the Soviet or the Yugoslav collapse, or some combination of the two. While some republics may exit Russia relatively unscathed, outright conflicts could materialize between the center and some federal subjects. Moscow can try to emulate Serbia in the 1990s by mobilizing ethnic Russians to carve out ethnically homogenous regions from rebellious republics while expelling non-Russian populations, but this will simply hasten the rupture of the imperial state.

Some national republics where the number of ethnic Russians is shrinking may seek full emancipation and statehood, including in the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga. Several predominantly ethnic Russian regions in Siberia, the Urals, and the Russian Far East will also benefit from sovereignty and control over local resources such as fossil fuels, metals, and precious minerals that Moscow now exploits in the manner of a colonial empire.

As Russia lurches toward an escalating internal crisis, NATO will face the urgent challenge of managing the multi-regional impact of growing turmoil. With Russia sliding toward dissolution, NATO will need to prepare its members for any conflict spillovers or territorial incursions.

With this in mind, Western governments should simultaneously declare support for democracy and federalism in Russia as well as the rights of republics and regions to determine their sovereignty and statehood. This can help embolden citizens by demonstrating that they are not isolated on the world stage. As the process unfolds, linkages must be developed with emerging states and closer coordination pursued with all of Russia’s neighbors directly affected by the rupture of Europe’s last imperial construct.

Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His new book, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture, has just been published. A Ukrainian translation will be available from arc.ua Kyiv in October.

Russia’s self-defeating invasion: Why Vladimir Putin has lost Ukraine forever

Taras Kuzio — Fri, 02 Sep 2022 19:06:31 +0000

Russia’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine was meant to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and eradicate Ukrainian identity. Instead, it is turbocharging the de-Russification of the country. In the six months since the invasion began, Ukrainian support for de-Russification has become a truly nationwide phenomenon, reaching record highs far in excess of the significantly more modest public backing for de-Communization policies following the country’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. This wartime trend is rapidly reversing centuries of Russification and directly undermining Vladimir Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire.

Putin’s criminal war is having a truly historic impact on Ukrainian society and bringing Ukrainians together in a quite literal sense. The invasion has forced millions of Ukrainians to flee to the west of the country, where they have either sought refuge or traveled further into the EU. This has led to unprecedented intermingling between Ukrainians from different regions of the country, which is fueling feelings of solidarity and national integration. Recent opinion polls consistently indicate converging opinions on national identity, language, relations with Russia, and future geopolitical objectives among Ukrainians from all regions of the country. One of the national issues Ukrainians are now most united on is the need for de-Russification.

A further factor driving national integration is the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to serve in the country’s military, with many deploying to frontline regions in the east and the south. Likewise, Ukraine’s large volunteer force is based throughout the country, bringing a wide variety of people from different professional and regional backgrounds into contact with each other for the first time.

The invasion is also speeding up Ukraine’s linguistic de-Russification, with the Russian language now increasingly associated with military aggression. The number of Ukrainians who support Ukrainian as the country’s official state language has risen to 86%. Just 2% of Ukrainians believe Moscow’s claims of a “genocide” against the country’s Russian speakers, but the deliberate weaponization of the Russian language by Vladimir Putin has led many Ukrainians to view the language less favorably.

At the same time, Russian remains widely used in everyday life throughout Ukraine. Language change is a slow process with Russian-speakers typically becoming bilingual before fully adopting Ukrainian. Recent data indicates that 85% use both Ukrainian and Russian at home while just 13% of the Ukrainian population uses only Russian.

Ethnic re-identification appears to be proceeding at a faster pace with 92% of Ukrainian citizens now declaring themselves ethnic Ukrainian in one recent survey. This figure would make Ukraine the third most homogeneous country in Europe after Portugal and Poland. Meanwhile, only 5% of today’s Ukrainian population identified as ethnic Russians in the same survey, representing a striking decline from 22% in the 1989 Soviet census and 17% in the 2001 Ukrainian census.

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Ukraine’s relationship with the past is undergoing radical change in response to Russia’s invasion, leading to a widening of the memory divide separating the two neighboring countries. Only 11% of Ukrainians now express nostalgia for the USSR compared to approximately two-thirds of Russians. Likewise, 84% of Ukrainians hold a negative view of Stalin while most Russians have a positive attitude toward the Soviet dictator.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian attitudes toward the country’s twentieth century liberation movement have experienced a major shift. During the early decades of Ukrainian independence, public opinion was often deeply divided on the issue of Ukrainian nationalist groups. This began to change following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, when 41% expressed positive views of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Since the February 2022 invasion, this figure has rocketed to 81%.

Ukrainians are now less inclined to differentiate between the Kremlin and ordinary Russians. Following the invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, a majority of Ukrainians blamed Russia’s leadership. However, they now overwhelmingly hold both the Kremlin and the Russian people responsible for the current invasion. As a consequence, the number of Ukrainians who express positive views of Russians has plummeted from 47% in 2018 to just 3% today.

This collapse in positive attitudes toward ordinary Russians is not difficult to explain. Everything from polling data to anecdotal evidence demonstrates overwhelming Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians with relatives in Russia have personal experience of their family members either applauding the war or accusing them of lying about the horrors of the invasion.

It is also striking that the vast majority of civilian victims during the first six months of the invasion have been the same Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the south and east of the country who Putin claims to be protecting. Tens of thousands were murdered in Mariupol alone, while dozens of other towns and villages have been similarly reduced to ruins in regions of Ukraine that the Kremlin cynically trumpets as “historical Russian lands.”

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Given the scale of the carnage, it is hardly surprising that 89% of Ukrainians believe the Kremlin is committing genocide in Ukraine. Almost nine in ten Ukrainians think Russia is seeking the destruction of the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian national identity, while half regard Russia as a fascist regime.

This sense that Ukraine is facing an existential challenge is fueling de-Russification and is also driving Ukrainians to reject any talk of a compromise peace. There is a strong sense throughout the country that without a decisive victory, Ukraine will never be secure. Around half of Ukrainians believe there can never be reconciliation with Russia and another third think it may only become possible in two to three decades. In other words, 78% of Ukrainians rule out any normalization of relations with Russia for at least a generation.

De-Russification at the official level has seen openly pro-Kremlin political parties banned and pro-Kremlin media shuttered. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine is on life support with only 4% of Ukrainians now professing membership. This is compared to 54% who identify as members of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. With the Ukrainian government recently imposing sanctions on ROC head Patriarch Kirill and seven leading members of the ROC clergy for their role in the invasion, the ROC has an uncertain future in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s school curriculum is undergoing wartime de-Russification, with Ukrainian schoolchildren no longer studying Russian language and literature. The cultural de-Russification process also includes the removal of monuments to Russian literary figures such as Pushkin and Dostoyevsky, along with changes to thousands of street and place names across the country.

Monuments to Russian-Ukrainian friendship along with Russian and Soviet history are being rebranded or pulled down. In Kyiv, a prominent monument to Russian-Ukrainian friendship has been renamed while the city’s iconic motherland monument will have its Soviet crest replaced by a Ukrainian tryzub (trident). In Odesa, debate is raging about whether to remove the monument to Russian Empress Catherine the Great.

Irrespective of how long the war will last, it already seems clear that the end product will be a de-Russified and Europeanized Ukraine. This is exactly what Vladimir Putin hoped to prevent. The Russian dictator’s genocidal invasion is both a crime and a blunder on a scale unparalleled in modern European history.

Taras Kuzio is a Professor of Political Science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

With these uncertainties in mind, we need to ask what true accountability would look like. Holding criminals accountable is meant to deter them and others from future crimes, foster reconciliation between perpetrators and victims, and promote sustainable peace. As Putin’s crimes are rooted in an historic failure to impose accountability, any legal punishments for the invasion of Ukraine would only go so far in accomplishing these goals. Prosecuting war criminals must go hand in hand with efforts to challenge the historical narrative that drove the invasion in the first place. This means confronting Russia’s imperial identity and addressing the toxic notion that Ukrainians have no right to exist as an independent nation.

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If Russia is to be held accountable, the international community must do everything possible to ensure a Ukrainian military victory and the liberation of all occupied Ukrainian land. Following Russia’s defeat on the battlefield, Ukraine will need to receive credible security guarantees offering protection equivalent to NATO membership. Likewise, Western leaders should commit to making Russia pay reparations. Above all, the war must end on Ukraine’s terms. Any attempts to push Ukraine into accepting a compromise peace would be an affront to the country’s immense sacrifices and would also fly in the face of the need for accountability. It is vital that Russia publicly recognize its guilt and acknowledge the sanctity of Ukrainian sovereignty.

One way to achieve greater accountability is by empowering Ukrainians. The international community must work to support Ukrainian society in its efforts to hold Russia accountable. This support should include everything from technical assistance to helping local civil society systematically gather evidence and document atrocities. Ukraine has a functioning legal system but it does not have nearly enough capacity to cope with the volume of war crimes committed by Russian forces over the past six months. International assistance can make a big difference.

Ukraine’s international partners should also assist in the long quest to identify all the victims of Russia’s genocide. For the average Ukrainian, anger at Putin may be something of an abstraction. Indeed, while he is the individual most directly responsible for the invasion, he is neither the soldier who pulled the trigger nor the one who launched the bombs that destroyed civilian homes, hospitals, and schools. Like genocidaires throughout history, Putin’s intent is to destroy Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity, but he does not act alone. Recognizing each and every victim is an important step towards meaningful accountability for the crimes committed against the Ukrainian nation.

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We need to consider how to target Putin’s false historical narratives at their very roots. One way to do this is to recognize, as Yale historian Timothy Snyder has said, that we need more history and less memory. While it is an open question to what extent Russians themselves bear collective responsibility for Putin’s invasion, polls indicate that a clear majority of Russians do support the war. While exact figures remain elusive, many Russians have evidently bought into Putin’s views of history. With Russia becoming an increasingly closed and authoritarian country, where does that leave those of us who want to see accountability from the inside out?

Here, we need to think beyond the immediate term. “Canceling” Russian culture is not necessarily the answer, but amplifying Ukrainians and their culture absolutely is. Getting their stories to Russians is critical, whether through technologies like VPNs or by supporting the Russian investigative journalists who have fled the country but are continuing their courageous work while based outside Russia.

Here in the West, we can work to advance public awareness, both of today’s Russian genocide and of historic Soviet crimes. This means making sure we document them in history books, teach them in schools, memorialize the victims in public places, and even recognize our own complicity in ignoring past events like the Soviet-era Holodomor famine in Ukraine.

Putin and his regime must face legal punishment for the genocidal invasion of Ukraine. But in order to achieve meaningful accountability, we must also address the unrepentant imperialism that makes it possible for Russians to dehumanize Ukrainians and destroy entire Ukrainian cities. This will require a long-term approach to historical justice that goes beyond the courtroom and seeks to strengthen every aspect of Ukrainian statehood while fundamentally challenging the way Russians view their own past.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and specializes in Russian and Ukrainian affairs.

This initiative is arguably long overdue. Ever since the Russian invasion in early 2014, Moscow’s false claim that Crimea is “historically Russian land” has remained largely unchallenged in the international arena. In reality, Russia did not appear until relatively late in Crimea’s more than two thousand years of recorded history, with the Russian Empire annexing the peninsula in the final years of eighteenth century. Prior to this, Crimea had been home to the Crimean Khanate for over three hundred years, a far longer span than the subsequent period spent under Russian rule. This is largely overlooked in Russian histories and is rarely referenced in international coverage of Crimea. Instead, the peninsula is misleadingly portrayed as part of Russia’s ancient heritage. This helps legitimize Moscow’s wholly illegitimate claims to Crimea.

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Since Ukraine became independent in 1991, the process of decolonizing the country’s past has been slowly gathering pace. A more nuanced study of the entire post-Soviet region that goes beyond traditional Russia-centric approaches is essential for anyone seeking to make sense of contemporary Ukraine or looking to understand the origins of the invasion launched by the Kremlin in February 2022. This is perhaps nowhere truer than on the issue of Crimea.

For decades following the Soviet collapse, many international observers spoke favorably of the “civilized” divorce between Russia and Ukraine. They often identified Crimea in particular as a success story, noting the absence of violent conflict and praising the compromises that made it possible to manage the return of the Crimean Tatars from Soviet exile along with the division of the Black Sea Fleet.

The true picture of Crimea in the 1990s is not quite so rosy. While open conflict was indeed avoided, the volatile political debates that raged over the future of the peninsula highlighted the continued strength of imperial sentiment in the supposedly democratic and pro-Western Russia of the Boris Yeltsin era. Russian politicians agitated against Ukraine over the issue of Crimea throughout the 1990s and were often accused of fueling separatist movements on the peninsula. As Paul D’Anieri noted in his 2019 book Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War, “Even many Russian liberals who accepted Ukraine’s independence believed that Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet were Russian.”

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Simmering imperial anger in Russia over the loss of Crimea was a warning sign of potential conflict that went unheeded and ultimately led to today’s war. It is now painfully apparent that Russian society as a whole has never fully accepted the loss of Ukraine and still clings to obsolete notions of the country’s place within Russian imperial identity. Failure to move beyond the imperial past in the 1990s has turned modern Russia into a backward-looking country that is driven by a revisionist desire to reassert its authority over former colonies rather than building pragmatic neighborly relations.

The Western world must share some of the blame for this tragic reality. During the 1990s, many Western politicians and academics continued to view the post-Soviet world through a Russian prism while embracing Kremlin-friendly historical narratives shaped by centuries of Czarist imperialism. This helped to justify Russia’s continued regional dominance while reducing the newly independent peoples of the former USSR to the status of footnotes in their own national stories. It is now time to challenge such outdated thinking and decolonize perceptions of the entire post-Soviet region.

For far too long, academic courses at Western universities focusing on Eastern European studies have placed disproportionate emphasis on understanding Russia. In the years to come, this needs to change. Instead, Western academics must dedicate far more time to understanding Ukraine. Learning about the complex history of Crimea from a non-Russian perspective is an important step in the right direction.

Dr. Oleksandra Gaidai is Head of Academic Programmes at the Ukrainian Institute.

Atlantic Council — Sun, 14 Aug 2022 17:22:00 +0000

The post Nawaz in Dawn: The forever shining idea of Pakistan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dr. Shahid in The Geopolitics: Revisited: Partition and the Bengali Muslims of India

Atlantic Council — Fri, 12 Aug 2022 20:03:00 +0000

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Putin has forced Ukrainians to view Russian culture as a weapon of war

Kate Tsurkan — Mon, 08 Aug 2022 16:15:27 +0000

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has amplified the ongoing debate over Russia’s cultural presence in Ukrainian society and accelerated efforts to remove vestiges of the imperial past. Some Russian intellectuals have voiced concern over the targeting of Russian culture in Ukraine, with author Mikhail Shishkin going as far as to ask in a recent piece for The Atlantic whether a Ukrainian author would “speak up for Pushkin.”

This raises challenging questions regarding the separation of culture from politics and the role played by culture in Russian imperialism. With Russian troops occupying vast swathes of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin proudly declaring the return of “historic Russian lands,” is now the right time for Russian intellectuals to rally in defense of Pushkin?

Figures like Shishkin certainly have the right to speak out over perceived attacks on Russian culture in wartime Ukraine. Yet others also have the right to challenge the intent behind such statements. As Russia’s genocidal campaign enters its sixth month with no apparent end in sight, what message do famous Russian intellectuals wish to convey when they use their name recognition to focus on the preservation of Russian culture in Ukraine? Are they really tone-deaf to the centuries of imperial politics underpinning the formerly dominant position of Russian culture in Ukraine? Do they not see how Putin has weaponized Russian culture in his quest to rebuild the Russian Empire?

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Russia is committing genocide against the Ukrainian people and making no secret of the fact. On the contrary, the overwhelming physical evidence of war crimes in Ukraine itself is supported by an endless array of proofs from Russian officials and propagandists in Moscow that demonstrate clear and unambiguous genocidal intent.

Since the invasion began on February 24, testimonies of survivors who fled Russian occupation have made clear that Putin’s ultimate objective is to wipe Ukraine off the map. Russian troops are trying to achieve this criminal goal through a combination of mass murder, terror tactics, deportation and depopulation. Mass graves have been uncovered wherever Russian troops have been forced to retreat. The Ukrainian authorities have been overwhelmed with accounts of torture and sexual violence. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been forcibly relocated to Russia. Air raid sirens sound in nearly every region of Ukraine on a weekly or sometimes daily basis. Civilian buildings are frequently the target of missile strikes. Millions of Ukrainians have fled their homes. No part of the country is safe.

Meanwhile, Kremlin TV pundits routinely question the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood and call for the forced “re-education” of Ukrainians to rob them of their Ukrainian identity. Officials declare that Ukraine “no longer exists,” while editorials in Russian state media confirm the invasion’s stated military goal of “de-Nazification” actually means “de-Ukrainianization.” Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who the West once naively hailed as a liberal change-maker, now regularly posts deranged anti-Ukrainian messages on his Telegram channel alongside maps of Ukraine divided up among Russia and other neighboring countries.

Throughout occupied Ukraine, the campaign to erase Ukrainian identity frequently employs Russian cultural icons. For example, billboards featuring giant portraits of Pushkin have been erected in the occupied city of Kherson in southern Ukraine as part of efforts to promote Russia’s imperial claims. In such circumstances, it is only natural that Ukrainians would begin to view Russian culture as an extension of Russian military aggression and cling more fiercely to their national identity instead.

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Several noted Ukrainian authors who wrote mostly in Russian until the invasion have underlined how the conflict has made it impossible to separate culture from politics.

One such example is Volodymyr Rafeyenko, who wrote Mondegreen, his first novel in Ukrainian, after fleeing his native Donetsk in 2014. As he explained in a recent piece for Literary Hub, he was fully prepared to be a bilingual author but everything changed following the start of the full-scale invasion in February. “Genocide, the murders of children and adults, rapes, torture, the destruction of churches and museums, kindergartens and schools. Beastly, ungodly cruelty. All of this will be closely connected with the Russian language. And nothing can be done about it. The Russian language in its entirety has become obscene, speech outside the bounds of decent human discourse. And these days, if I have to use it in some private communication, I always feel something like disgust mixed with shame, guilt and physical pain.” After February 24, Rafeyenko found himself displaced yet again due to Russian aggression when he and his wife were trapped in the occupied suburbs of Kyiv. Thanks to the help of friends, they were able to evacuate to the west of the country.

The daily brutality of Russia’s invasion has compelled many Ukrainian artists to call on the world to suspend any and all cooperation with the Russian cultural sphere for as long as the war continues. Critics like Mikhail Shishkin have argued that it is Putin and not Pushkin who is directly responsible for the crimes taking place in Ukraine. Many Russian liberals appear to find it incomprehensible that poetry and other forms of high art could be spoken of in the same vein as mass torture, kidnapping, rape, and murder. Such posturing is either conveniently shortsighted or intellectually dishonest.

For centuries, Russian literature has played an important role in the shaping of negative imperialistic stereotypes about Ukraine. The country has routinely been depicted as a backward and inferior region of Russia that is incapable of self-rule and undeserving of statehood. One particularly notorious example is the infamous poem by celebrated Soviet dissident Joseph Brodsky entitled “On the Independence of Ukraine,” which was written during the breakup of the Soviet Union. In this vicious and vulgar poem, he uses a Russian ethnic slur to refer to Ukrainians and contemptuously declares that on their deathbeds, Ukrainians will forsake nineteenth-century Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko in favor of Pushkin.

Brodsky’s poem sheds light on a painful truth that many in the West are still struggling to grasp. While Russian literary figures have traditionally been lionized by Western audiences as symbols of a freer Russia, their readiness to take a stand against the autocracy of the Russian state does not necessarily make them natural allies of the Ukrainian national project. Indeed, Ukrainians have long noted that Russian liberalism ends at the Ukrainian border.

None of this means that the tone–deaf words of Russian writers such as Mikhail Shishkin are tantamount to war crimes committed by the Russian army. However, understanding the nuances of Russian-Ukrainian relations should compel us to reexamine how the public sphere engages the topic of Ukraine. This is especially true in the context of ongoing Russian aggression and against an historic backdrop of Russian imperialism. Ideally, the current war should spark a fundamental shift in international perceptions of Ukraine and expose the folly of attempting to view the country through a Russian prism.

Russian artists, like Ukrainian artists, have been victims of the Russian state in its many ugly forms. Yet political oppression should not be confused with genocide. While Russian authors like Mikhail Shishkin sit in exile and mourn the loss of Pushkin statues in Ukraine, their Ukrainian contemporaries such as Oleh Sentsov, Artem Chapeye, Artem Chekh, Oleksandr Mykhed, Illarion Pavliuk, Stanislav Aseyev, Pavlo Stekh, Yaryna Chornohuz and many more have taken up arms to save their country from destruction. In the final analysis, it is their nation-building experience and not the fate of Pushkin that is the true story of this war. This is a story the world desperately needs to hear.

Kate Tsurkan is a Ukraine-based American writer and Chief Editor of Apofenie Magazine.

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The results of this new Levada Center survey will come as a wake-up call for all those who hoped Vladimir Putin would face a domestic backlash as the costs of the Ukraine invasion became increasingly apparent to the Russian public. On the contrary, it appears that the vast majority of Russians have acclimatized to the new wartime reality despite the worsening economic climate in their own country and mounting revelations of war crimes being committed in their name across the border in Ukraine.

There has been much debate over the true level of pro-war sentiment in Russia since the invasion began on February 24, with critics arguing that opinion polls cannot be regarded as trustworthy measures of the public mood in authoritarian societies such as Putin’s Russia. It is also important to note that the Kremlin introduced draconian measures at the start of the war that effectively banned any public criticism of the invasion and imposed long prison sentences for displays of opposition.

At the same time, it must also be said that this tough stance has rarely been tested. There has been virtually no sign of an anti-war movement emerging inside Russia since a brief wave of small-scale anti-war protests which fizzled out in the early weeks of the conflict. Despite widespread initial reports of horror and alarm within the Russian establishment over Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, the country’s political, business and cultural elites have since largely mobilized in support of the Kremlin. There have been very few resignations, with the relatively few who have preferred to leave the country generally choosing to remain silent.

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If Russian society as a whole seems to have accepted the war, the same cannot be said for the country’s military. Reports of demoralization among Putin’s invasion force have become a common feature of the invasion over the past five months as Russian casualties have continued to mount at an alarming rate.

While the exact number of Russians killed or wounded in Ukraine remains a closely guarded secret, US officials believe the figure is already above 75,000 and rising. Other calculations are slightly lower, but all serious sources outside of Russia itself acknowledge that Russian losses now number in the tens of thousands.

Meanwhile, Moscow’s increasingly desperate recruitment efforts hint at the scale of the manpower crisis facing the Kremlin. Across Russia, potential army recruits are being enticed with mouth-watering salaries five or six times higher than the national average along with the promise of short-term contracts. In May, the Kremlin scrapped age limits on newly enlisted men in an apparent bid to fill gaps created by heavy losses in Ukraine. More recently, recruiters have begun scouring Russian prisons and offering convicts the chance to sign up in exchange for an amnesty.

Russia’s current troop shortages are in large part due to Vladimir Putin’s reluctance to officially declare war on Ukraine. Instead, he has branded the invasion a “Special Military Operation.” As a consequence, Russian contract soldiers are not legally obliged to fight in Ukraine and can theoretically resign from the army at any moment. Thousands are believed to have already done so, leading to increasingly desperate measures as the Russian authorities seek to prevent more soldiers from quitting.

Reports this week claimed that hundreds of Russian soldiers have been illegally imprisoned by their own commanders in the east Ukrainian conflict zone after refusing to take any further part in the war. In one written testimony republished by the UK’s Guardian newspaper, a Russian soldier claimed he was jailed after deciding to stop fighting “as a result of what I believe were the tactical and strategic mistakes of my commanders and their total disregard for human life.”

Low morale among Russian troops represents a serious challenge for the Kremlin as both Russia and Ukraine prepare for what many now fear will be a long war. Ukraine has also suffered heavy casualties during the first five months of hostilities but Ukrainian troops are supremely motivated by the knowledge that they are fighting for their homeland against a foreign aggressor. Unlike their Russian enemies, they have nowhere else to go.

Motivation is likely to become a key factor in the months ahead. This is one category where the Ukrainian military enjoys an unquestionable and overwhelming advantage. While ordinary Russians cheer the invasion from their sofas, demoralization within the ranks of Putin’s army could become a major problem for the Kremlin as the brutal war unleashed by the Russian dictator drags on with no end in sight.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Putin himself has justified land seizures in Ukraine by comparing the current war to the early eighteenth century imperial conquests of Peter the Great, who transformed Muscovy into the Russian Empire. Meanwhile, Russian Orthodox Church head Patriarch Kirill has positioned the invasion as a holy mission to reunite Russian lands.

The destruction of eastern Ukraine by the Russian military draws upon the fascist ideological premise of rejuvenation through a cleansing of the past. According to the ideologues of the new Russian Empire, this will lead to the rebirth of formerly Ukrainian regions that Putin has repeatedly described as “ancient Russian lands” and now calls “liberated territories.”

In Putin’s warped worldview, it is precisely the most predominantly Russian-speaking regions of eastern Ukraine that require what Yale professor Timothy Snyder has described as “cleansing violence” in order to free these regions from their contamination by “nationalist” ideas of Ukrainian statehood. Such thinking directly echoes the worst excesses of the totalitarian twentieth century and makes a mockery of Russia’s claims to be carrying out a “de-Nazification” operation in Ukraine.

Unsurprisingly, 89% of Ukrainians believe Russia’s military actions constitute genocide and nearly half of Ukrainians describe Putin’s regime as fascist or Nazi. America historian Snyder is one of a growing number of international experts to agree and has noted that a time traveler from the 1930s would have no difficulty identifying the Putin regime as fascist. “The symbol Z, the rallies, the propaganda, the war as a cleansing act of violence and the death pits around Ukrainian towns make it all very plain,” he wrote in May.

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In parallel with the physical destruction of eastern Ukraine, Putin’s genocidal plan also involves the systematic depopulation and ethnic cleansing of occupied regions. As a country dominated by the former Soviet security services, modern Russia has vast experience in the practicalities of ethnic cleansing and population expulsions. Indeed, the Soviet era witnessed many of the largest forced deportations in world history from Crimea, western Ukraine and the three Baltic republics. These crimes against humanity are now being repeated throughout occupied eastern and southern Ukraine.

Since the start of the invasion on February 24, more than one million Ukrainians have been forcibly deported to the Russian-occupied Donbas region of eastern Ukraine or the Russian Federation itself. They have then been herded into so-called “filtration camps” and subjected to a wide range of human rights abuses including degrading strip searches and regular beatings. Those thought to harbor pro-Ukrainian views are subjected to particularly savage treatment and can expect to be singled out for further detention.

Ukrainians who come through the filtration process are typically sent to destinations throughout Russia, often finding themselves stranded thousands of kilometers from home and forced to live in dire conditions. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this large-scale ethnic cleansing campaign is the fate of over 200,000 Ukrainian children who have been sent to Russia. Their removal from Ukraine is a textbook example of genocide as defined by the UN Genocide Convention.

Throughout the occupied regions of eastern and southern Ukraine, Russian forces are ruthlessly eradicating all signs of Ukrainian statehood. This “de-Ukrainianization” of Ukraine is the grim reality behind Putin’s lofty claims to be “de-Nazifying” the country. Ukrainian schoolteachers are being forced to adopt the Russian curriculum, with any use of the Ukrainian language subject to severe punishment. Ukrainian history books have been burned, monuments removed, and symbols of Ukrainian identity outlawed.

Needless to say, the Ukrainian media is now banned throughout the occupied regions. The importance of propaganda to Moscow has been underlined by the deployment of special trucks with giant TV screens amid the ruins of occupied Mariupol. Those residents who survived the brutal siege of the city are now bombarded with Kremlin messaging from these Orwellian propaganda vehicles as they queue for food and water.

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Perhaps the most brutal aspect of this “de-Nazification” is the physical removal of anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian. Prior to the invasion, US intelligence warned that the Kremlin had created “Kill Lists” of Ukrainian journalists, elected officials, intellectuals, and civil society activists who were to be killed. These fears have proven well-founded, with thousands of Ukrainians subjected to abduction and illegal detention since February 2022.

Something as innocuous as a social media post disparaging the Russian military or supporting Ukrainian troops can be enough to ensure a person’s disappearance. The fate of most victims remains unknown, but evidence from liberated areas such as Bucha to the north of Kyiv and accounts from those who have returned from captivity indicate that torture and executions are common. The United Nations Office of Human Rights has stated that Russian troops have executed civilians in over 30 Ukrainian settlements and has identified executions in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions.

How has Putin persuaded so many Russians to participate in this genocide? The transformation of the Russian military into willing executioners of Ukrainians follows the same template used by both the Nazis and the Stalin regime. Prior to the mass killings of Poles, Ukrainians and other “enemies” of Soviet power in the 1930s, victims were first dehumanized by the state propaganda machine. The Kremlin media has repeated this process since the mid-2000s. In the words of the EU Center to Combat Disinformation, the Russian media has long called “for the eradication of Ukrainians in a manner that can only be described as genocidal.”

The Kremlin-controlled Russian media has frequently questioned Ukraine’s right to exist while demonizing Ukrainians as Nazis, fascists, and disloyal stooges of the hostile West. Ukrainian statehood is often portrayed as an entirely artificial construct propped up by foreign masters for the sole purpose of weakening Russia. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture are mocked and humiliated in terms reminiscent of late nineteenth century colonialism. This poisonous propaganda cocktail set the stage for the genocide that is now unfolding in plain view.

What would a future “de-Ukrainianized” Ukraine look like? If Putin’s genocide is allowed to continue, regions under Russian control will become heavily depopulated. Only those regarded as sufficiently Russified and loyal to Moscow will be allowed to remain, with others subjected to execution, imprisonment, deportation or exile. Russian citizens will be brought in from across the Russian Federation to repopulate occupied areas and transform the demographic balance in Moscow’s favor.

This process will mirror similar Soviet policies which saw millions of ethnic Russians and other nationalities from across the USSR brought to Ukraine to dilute the country’s sense of national identity. Dramatic population shifts of this nature have already taken place in Crimea since the Ukrainian peninsula was occupied by Russia in 2014. The Kremlin is reportedly now beginning to move Russian citizens into occupied areas of mainland Ukraine such as Kherson and Zaporizhia regions.

Western policymakers should be in no doubt that the many different Russian war crimes currently taking place in Ukraine are all part of a coherent plan to commit genocide. Putin has made his genocidal intentions toward the country clear on numerous occasions. He is now slowly but surely realizing his criminal vision of a Ukraine without Ukrainians. If he is not stopped, future generations will struggle to comprehend why the democratic world stood by and let it happen.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the recently published “Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War.”

Atlantic Council — Wed, 29 Jun 2022 03:46:00 +0000

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Odesa rejects Russia: Putin’s Ukraine War turns old allies into bitter enemies

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Mon, 27 Jun 2022 18:07:48 +0000

Vladimir Putin has long claimed to be the champion of pro-Russian Ukrainians. However, it is now painfully apparent that the Ukrainian regions most closely associated with pro-Kremlin sentiment have also been hardest hit by the current invasion.

Since the war began four months ago, Putin’s invasion force has killed thousands of the Russian-speaking and ethnic Russian Ukrainians they claim to be protecting. The Russian military has also reduced multiple largely Russian-speaking Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble. Unsurprisingly, the unfolding carnage has forced a radical rethink of attitudes toward Russia and transformed many previously sympathetic Ukrainians into bitter opponents of the Kremlin. This historic shift is nowhere more immediately apparent than in Black Sea port city Odesa.

While Putin believes he has an historic right to the whole of Ukraine, Odesa has always occupied a particularly special place in the Russian imagination. For much of the late czarist period, Odesa was known as the southern capital of the Russian Empire. It would remain deeply embedded in Russian national identity throughout the Soviet era. Odesa was celebrated across the USSR for its unique sense of humor and colorful criminal underworld. The city was renowned for its associations with giants of Russian history such as Grigory Potemkin and Russian literary legends ranging from Pushkin to Isaac Babel.

Many in Odesa shared this sense of close cultural affinity with Russia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, pro-Russian sentiment remained strong in Odesa while notions of Ukrainian patriotism often struggled to take root. Pro-Kremlin parties tended to dominate the local political scene while Moscow-friendly initiatives such as recognizing Russian as Ukraine’s second state language enjoyed widespread public backing.

At the same time, there was relatively little appetite in Odesa for an actual Russian reunion. While a majority of Odesans favored strong ties between Ukraine and Russia and saw the two countries as closely related, only a minority of residents wanted to separate from Ukraine or become part of modern Russia. Instead, local identity tended to dominate over issues of citizenship, with many Odesa residents preferring to see their nationality as “Odesan” rather than Ukrainian or Russian. This typically whimsical take on the nationality debate captured the essence of identity politics in post-Soviet Odesa but proved too nuanced for the Kremlin.

During the buildup to the February 2022 invasion, Putin appears to have convinced himself that Odesa and other traditionally Russophile Ukrainian cities throughout the south and east of the country were secretly waiting for liberation and would welcome his army with cakes and flowers. This catastrophic miscalculation has sparked the largest European conflict since WWII and done much to shatter the generational ties that once bound Russia and Ukraine so closely together.

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Prior to 2014, Odesans overwhelmingly expressed positive attitudes toward Russia. Meanwhile, surveys consistently identified majority backing for some form of customs union with Russia and other former Soviet states. Meanwhile, relatively few in the Black Sea port city favored EU membership. A poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in February 2014 during the climatic weeks of Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution found that 24% of Odesans wanted to see Ukraine join the Russian Federation, representing one of the highest percentages in the entire country.

Even as Russia waged a localized war in eastern Ukraine from spring 2014, positive perceptions of Odesa’s Russian heritage continued to translate into strong support for Moscow-leaning politicians. However, everything changed on February 24, 2022.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has devastated the country and caused untold suffering. Tens of thousands have been killed during the first four months of the war, with millions more forced to flee their homes. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has embarked on the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian economy. Factories, shopping centers and vital infrastructure have been targeted with airstrikes, while Odesa’s ports have been blockaded in order to cut off Ukraine’s economic lifeline to global markets.

Odesa has not yet found itself on the frontlines of the fighting but it has suffered numerous airstrikes. Since February, it has become a fortress city prepared to defend itself against Russian assault from both land and sea.

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Odesans are now under no illusion that they face a fight for survival. Other predominantly Russian-speaking Ukrainian cities with similarly strong historical links to Russia have been shown no mercy. Instead, they have been subjected to brutal bombardment and in many cases wiped off the face of the earth. Ukraine’s second-largest seaport after Odesa, Mariupol, has been almost completely destroyed with more than twenty thousand civilians feared dead. Many of the victims were ethnic Russians. Few doubt that Odesa will suffer a similar fate if Russian troops are able to advance on the city.

The genocidal savagery of Putin’s invasion has had a profound impact on Odesan attitudes toward Russia while also dramatically strengthening Ukrainian identity in the city. A survey conducted in June 2022 by Ukrainian pollster SOCIS captured the historic shifts taking place in Odesa. It found that 78% of Odesa residents expressed pride in Ukrainian identity. At the same time, 88% noted a major deterioration in their assessment of Russia’s leaders and 80% cited a sharp decline in feelings toward Russians in general. Odesa’s dramatic turn away from Russia over the past four months has been mirrored throughout Ukraine’s most traditionally pro-Kremlin regions.

Many observers argue that Putin’s invasion has unraveled on the battlefield. They typically point to Russia’s landmark defeat in the Battle for Kyiv and the failure to capture Kharkiv. These military setbacks should certainly not be underestimated. Nor should today’s modest Russian advances at great cost in eastern Ukraine be seen as repairing the damage done by the earlier failures of Putin’s invasion force. Nevertheless, the Russian dictator’s most meaningful defeat has surely come in the battle for hearts and minds.

By unleashing a war of annihilation, Putin has irreparably alienated millions of Ukrainians who were previously sympathetic to the idea of closer ties with Russia. This is a strategic catastrophe for the Russian nation that has reversed centuries of imperial expansion. It has transformed the geopolitical landscape entirely and destroyed any hope of a pro-Russian government emerging in Ukraine for decades to come.

Putin dreamed of securing his position in history as the founder of a new Russian Empire. Instead, he has doomed himself to a legacy of historic failure and a place in infamy as one of the worst war criminals of the twenty-first century.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Rafiq in The National Interest: America must stand up for human rights in India

Atlantic Council — Sun, 26 Jun 2022 14:35:00 +0000

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Unholy War: UK sanctions Putin’s Patriarch for backing Ukraine invasion

Taras Kuzio — Fri, 17 Jun 2022 15:57:00 +0000

Britain has this week imposed sanctions on Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill for his “prominent support of Russian military aggression in Ukraine.” This dramatic step was not entirely unprecedented. The European Union similarly sought to sanction Patriarch Kirill in early June but the initiative was blocked by Hungary.

The UK move follows on from widespread criticism of the religious leader’s stance in support of the war in Ukraine, with Pope Francis earlier urging his Russian colleague to stay out of politics in order to avoid becoming “Putin’s altar boy.” Opposition has also been registered across the Orthodox world and from within the ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church itself, with individual priests and entire congregations seeking to distance themselves from the Patriarch as the horrors of the conflict in Ukraine have become increasingly apparent.

Patriarch Kirill has come under fire for repeatedly portraying the invasion of Ukraine as a holy war while endorsing Putin’s denials of Ukrainian independence and repeating Kremlin propaganda about imaginary fascists. During one fairly typical sermon in mid-March at the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow, Patriarch Kirill attempted to justify the war, saying it was essential to “defend God’s truth” that Russians and Ukrainians were “one people” joined by a “common national identity.”

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Patriarch Kirill’s support for the war underlines the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the central pillars of Putin’s new Russian imperialism. For much of Putin’s 22-year reign, the Russian Orthodox Church has served as a key soft power tool and source of ideological inspiration for his imperial agenda.

Since being appointed in 2009, Patriarch Kirill has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Kremlin’s revisionist foreign policy. He has preached a doctrine of imperial expansion in the former Soviet space while championing domestic authoritarianism and describing Putin’s increasingly dictatorial rule as “a miracle of God.”

This support has proven particularly important following Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 and his turn towards open imperialism. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Ukraine in 2014, the Russian Orthodox Church featured prominently in Moscow’s efforts to persuade Ukrainians to reject Euro-Atlantic integration and embrace notions of spiritual unity with Russia.

Patriarch Kirill is deeply implicated in Russian military aggression against Ukraine. The Russian Orthodox Church provided ideological sustenance for Putin’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and backed subsequent efforts to destabilize and partition mainland Ukraine. As Kremlin forces instigated uprisings throughout eastern and southern Ukraine in spring 2014, numerous accounts emerged of local members of the Kremlin-linked Moscow Patriarchate offering both spiritual and practical support.

Patriarch Kirill fanned the flames of the escalating conflict by echoing the Kremlin and condemning the alleged persecution of Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Meanwhile, Orthodox priests from Ukraine’s Moscow Patriarchate sparked fury and disbelief by refusing to carry out funerals for Ukrainian soldiers killed defending the country against Russian invasion.

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Patriarch Kirill’s cheerleading for the Kremlin’s ongoing eight-year military campaign against Ukraine reflects Putin’s own view of the Russian Orthodox Church as the spiritual glue that binds the “Russian World” together.

The “Russian World” is vague but powerful concept championed by Putin of a wider civilizational community transcending modern national borders and state sovereignty. It is rooted in notions of a common religion, language and cultural heritage, with the Russian Orthodox Church providing the institutional foundations for this informal empire. For more than a decade, advocates of the “Russian World” have recognized the reconquest of Ukraine as their primary objective.

The Russian Orthodox Church has consistently supported the Kremlin’s historical claims to dominance over Ukraine while working against Ukrainian efforts to assert an independent identity. This has included the rehabilitation of empire-builders from previous generations and the glorification of tyrannical Russian leaders such as Ivan the Terrible and Joseph Stalin within a cult of imperialism, chauvinism, and xenophobia.

Unsurprisingly, this had fueled anger and opposition throughout Ukrainian society, where the vast majority of the population identifies as Orthodox. Millions of Ukrainians remain at least nominally aligned to the Kremlin-backed Moscow Patriarchate. However, Patriarch Kirill’s stance has forced many to question their loyalties.

Disquiet over the Russian Orthodox Church’s open support for Putin’s imperial ambitions played an important part in the 2019 ruling by the Patriarch of Constantinople to grant Ukraine autocephaly or Orthodox independence. This historic decision was bitterly opposed in Moscow and sparked a rift that has shaken the entire Orthodox world while exposing the Russian Orthodox Church’s close ties to the Kremlin.

Britain’s highly unusual recent decision to sanction Patriarch Kirill highlights the extent of international alarm over the Russian Orthodox Church’s decision to support the largest European invasion since WWII. There is a growing consensus among Western governments, religious leaders of different denominations and even members of his own Church that Patriarch Kirill of Moscow now has blood on his hands. As condemnation mounts, this week’s UK sanctions measures are unlikely to be the last.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the recently published book “Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War.”

#BritainDebrief – What future for the United States and Northern Ireland? A Debrief with Rep. Brendan Boyle

Ben Judah — Wed, 15 Jun 2022 19:24:09 +0000

What future for the United States and Northern Ireland?

As the US Congressional delegation to Northern Ireland works to end the ongoing political crisis in Stormont, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with US Representative Brendan Boyle to discuss what the United States can do in a mediator role between the Unionists and Irish Nationalists and also what future exists for Irish unification. What has the United States done historically in relation to lowering tensions in Northern Ireland? What can the United States do to assuage the worries of unionists who feel threatened by Irish nationalism?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Vladimir Putin’s dark journey from economic reformer to war criminal

Anders Åslund — Mon, 13 Jun 2022 17:53:02 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s 22-year reign has been marked by a steady decline in the goals he has set for himself and his country. He initially embraced progressive notions of domestic reform and international integration, but has since led Russia deeper and deeper into authoritarian isolation. His recent comments comparing himself to Peter the Great and boasting of plans to seize Ukrainian lands represent a new low in this depressing journey from would-be reformer to war criminal.

It is tempting to assume that Putin was always an unapologetic authoritarian and an enthusiastic imperialist but during the early years of his reign, he often championed sensible reforms while promoting initiatives to modernize and diversify the Russian economy.

Soon after he was first appointed president in 2000, Putin published an essay claiming that he wanted Russia to reach Portugal’s level of GDP per capita by the end of his two terms in office. This was a realistic and pragmatic economic target, as Portugal was then the poorest EU member state. However, two decades later in 2021, Portugal’s GDP per capita in current USD was twice as high as Russia’s.

Despite the damage suffered by Portugal during the 2010 euro crisis, Russia has actually fallen further behind the Portuguese economy. This should come as no surprise. The Russian economy has stagnated since 2014 when the West imposed its first round of sanctions following the invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. After almost a decade in the doldrums, Putin now appears to have given up entirely on Russia’s economic development. He is not even planning for any growth until 2030.

Until the end of his first presidential term in 2004, Putin spoke extensively about the need for the rule of law and other systemic reforms. In 2002, Russia adopted far-reaching judicial reforms along with a new civil code and a liberal tax code, while also allowing private ownership of agricultural land. In effect, Putin completed the progressive economic reforms begun by the Yeltsin administration during the 1990s.

These policies paid dividends. Russia enjoyed a period of uniquely strong economic expansion during the early years of the Putin era, with annual growth rates of around seven percent from 1999 to 2008. In truth, Putin had arrived at a laid table with prepared reforms, while his economic success also owed much to a sustained commodity boom. Nevertheless, it was still possible to argue that Putin was steering Russia toward a future governed by the rule of law.

During this early period, Putin also called for far-reaching international integration, making Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organization a key goal. However, he gradually lost interest in this initiative. Despite strong Western support, Russia did not join the WTO until 2012. By that point, Putin had already begun embracing isolationist policies protectionism and import substitution.

When did the turning point come? Some say it was Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which poisoned Putin against the West. Others argue that Putin’s early flirtation with a more reformist agenda was merely political pragmatism as he consolidated his position at home and abroad. With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears obvious that Putin’s background as a KGB officer and his alleged ties to organized crime were decisive in shaping his reign. During the second half of the 2000s, this toxic baggage increasingly took over.

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In truth, the warning signs of a return to authoritarianism were there from the very beginning. The first indication was Putin’s suppression of independent Russian television in 2000, which saw the Kremlin take over Vladimir Gusinsky’s NTV and Boris Berezovsky’s ORT. In May 2001, he established direct control of Gazprom, Russia’s wealthiest state company.

With the arrest of leading Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky in October 2003, Putin initiated the renationalization of Russia’s most successful private companies. This revival of state dominance was mirrored throughout the Russian economy, with the security services and Putin’s personal favorites often the beneficiaries.

Despite the changing political climate in Russia, for many years Putin continued to publicly advocate for academic openness and innovation. This is no longer the case. Instead, the Kremlin now promotes ideas of isolation and orthodoxy. Meanwhile, the language of scientific and technological development has become increasingly reminiscent of the Brezhnev era Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, many of Russia’s leading scientists and entrepreneurs have chosen to leave the country and pursue their careers in freer environments.

With any sense of optimism about the future gradually fading from view, Putin has become dependent on the propaganda power of an idealized past. He has rehabilitated the Soviet era and transformed the Red Army role in the defeat of Hitler into a victory cult that now serves as an unofficial state religion. Most of all, he has sought to justify his increasingly dictatorial rule by identifying enemies and waging wars of aggression.

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Putin has used various excuses to justify his aggressive foreign policies. On different occasions, he has claimed to be protecting Russian citizens in Georgia, preventing NATO expansion, defending Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and liberating Ukraine from Nazis. While these narratives may have worked inside Russia, they have had limited success in convincing outside audiences.

The current invasion in Ukraine has exposed the limitations of Putin’s expensively assembled disinformation apparatus. With Moscow now struggling to shape international perceptions of Putin’s wars, he appears to have switched to open intimidation. Since the invasion began in February 2022, Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have frequently issued thinly-veiled threats of nuclear war.

Meanwhile, Putin himself has abandoned his earlier denials and embraced the archaic rhetoric of imperial expansion. Speaking at a recent Moscow event to mark the three hundred and fiftieth birthday of Russian Czar Peter the Great, Putin eulogized Peter’s conquests in the Great Northern War and praised him for “returning” historically Russian lands. “It seems that it has fallen to us, too, to return (Russian lands),” Putin commented in a clear reference to the current war in Ukraine.

Putin’s reliance on nuclear blackmail and his absurd search for legitimacy in the imperial past reflect his failure to build an attractive modern state. After more than two decades in power, he is unable to deliver a coherent vision of a brighter future. Instead, Putin’s earlier talk of reform and innovation has been completely eclipsed by the repressive logic of his authoritarian kleptocracy. All that remains is imperialism.

Many Western leaders fear what might come after Putin. They worry about the possible break-up of the Russian state or the rise of an even less predictable dictator in his place. However, few scenarios are more alarming than a continuation of Russia’s current descent into full-scale fascism under an increasingly isolated and unhinged Putin. He is already the greatest single threat to global security and will likely remain so until he loses power. The West should not be afraid of pursuing this objective.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Putin’s latest comments underline his imperial objectives in Ukraine and expand on years of similar statements lamenting the fall of the Russian Empire. For more than a decade, he has questioned the historical legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood and publicly insisted that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”). Putin has also repeatedly accused Ukraine of occupying ancestral Russian lands and has blamed the early Bolsheviks for bungling the border between the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet republics.

His unapologetically imperialistic attitude toward Russian-Ukrainian relations was laid bare in July 2021 in the form of a 7,000-word essay authored by Putin himself which set out to explain the alleged “historical unity” binding the two nations together. “I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. For we are one people,” Putin the amateur historian concluded. This bizarre treatise was widely interpreted as a declaration of war against the entire notion of an independent Ukraine and has since been made required reading for all Russian military personnel.

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The Russian dictator’s obsession with Ukraine reflects his burning resentment over the collapse of the USSR and his lingering bitterness at post-Soviet Russia’s dramatic loss of international status.

This nostalgia is not rooted in a fondness for the ideology of Marxist-Leninism. Instead, Putin regards the disintegration of the Soviet Empire as the demise of “historical Russia” and has spoken of how the 1991 break-up left “tens of millions of our compatriots” living beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. As the former Soviet republic with the deepest ties to Russia and the largest ethnic Russian population, independent Ukraine has come to embody this sense of historical injustice.

Putin’s efforts to “return” Ukrainian land to Russia did not begin with the invasion of February 24. The current campaign of imperial conquest actually started eight years earlier with the Russian takeover of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, which Putin seized in a lightning military operation that took advantage of political paralysis in Kyiv in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.

Following his success in Crimea, Putin then attempted to partition mainland Ukraine by instigating pro-Kremlin uprisings throughout the south and east of the country. This initiative fell flat after Kremlin agents ran into stronger than expected local opposition from Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriots, leaving Putin’s proxies in possession of a relatively small foothold in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Control over Crimea and the Donbas allowed Putin to keep Ukraine destabilized, but his true objective has always been the reestablishment of complete Russian control over the whole country. After eight years of geopolitical pressure and hybrid warfare failed to achieve the desired outcome, and sensing that Ukraine was now in danger of moving irreparably out of the Russian orbit, Putin made the fateful decision in early 2022 to launch a full-scale invasion.

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By abandoning all pretense and comparing himself to Peter the Great, Putin has now confirmed that he is waging an old-fashioned imperial war of conquest with the goal of annexing Ukrainian territory. Recent statements from Kremlin officials have also made these imperial intentions explicit. During a visit to southern Ukraine’s Russian-occupied Kherson region in early May, Russian Senator Andrei Turchak declared that the current Russian presence in the region would be permanent. “Russia is here forever,” he stated. “There should be no doubt about this. There will be no return to the past.”

This openly imperialistic agenda represents an unprecedented challenge to international law and poses a grave threat to the entire post-WWII global security system. It also exposes the absurdity of appeals to appease Moscow or accept some kind of negotiated settlement that would avoid “humiliating” Russia. There can be no compromise with the Kremlin as long as Putin continues to deny Ukraine’s right to exist and declares his intention to annex entire regions of the country.

If Putin is not decisively defeated in Ukraine, he will surely go further in his mission to “return” lost Russian lands. The list of former Russian imperial possessions that could potentially become targets is extensive and includes Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the nations of Central Asia. Nor can future Russian attacks on the former Warsaw Pact countries of Central Europe be entirely ruled out. If this sounds far-fetched, it is important to remember that almost nobody in Ukraine believed a Russian invasion was even remotely possible until it actually happened.

Today’s brutal colonial war in Ukraine is a reminder that unlike the other great European empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Russia never underwent a period of de-imperialization. Despite collapsing spectacularly in both 1917 and 1991, Russia’s imperial identity is still very much intact and has become a central pillar of the Putin regime. Until Russia enters the modern era and becomes a post-imperial power, peace in Europe will remain elusive. The best way to speed up this process is to ensure Ukraine wins the war.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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Only total defeat in Ukraine can cure Russia of its imperialism

Dennis Soltys — Tue, 07 Jun 2022 14:54:52 +0000

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now in its fourth month and encountering serious military setbacks, there is a growing debate over what a potential Ukrainian victory might look like.

Some government officials in Kyiv have announced Ukraine’s aspiration to liberate all territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea. The Ukrainian army’s proven ability to defeat Russian forces on the battlefield and the accelerating delivery of heavy weapons from the West make this goal of complete liberation at least theoretically possible.

However, some Western leaders fear the consequences of a comprehensive Ukrainian victory and favor the idea of a compromise peace. Most notably, French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly warned against “humiliating” Vladimir Putin. Advocates of appeasement ignore the fact that any settlement which leaves Russia in possession of Ukrainian lands occupied since 2014 would weaken the international security order and effectively reward Russia for aggression, thereby setting the stage for further wars.

Talk of a Ukrainian victory is certainly optimistic but by no means implausible. Moscow has already suffered catastrophic losses during the first 100 days of the war, with British military intelligence in mid-May estimating that Russia had lost around one-third of its invasion force amid “consistently high levels of attrition.”

Ukraine’s battlefield success has so far been achieved largely with outdated Soviet arms and light defensive Western weapons. With more sophisticated heavy weapons now beginning to reach Ukraine in significant quantities, further Ukrainian victories seem possible.

There are a number of good reasons to pursue the complete liberation of Ukraine. On purely humanitarian grounds, the millions of Ukrainians living in occupied areas of the country deserve to be freed from Russian rule. Forcing Russian troops to retreat entirely from Ukraine would also be the best way to prevent another round of aggression in the years ahead.

Crucially, Ukraine’s liberation would be a victory for international law that would mark an end to relative impunity Putin has enjoyed since he first attacked Ukraine in 2014. This last point is fundamental if a lasting peace is to be established. But in order for international law to prevail, Russia must first be cured of its imperialistic instincts.

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Discussion of a post-imperial Russia inevitably brings to mind the European experience with other fallen empires. The broadly accepted lesson of the post-WWI Treaty of Versailles is that a defeated foe should not be humiliated as this will cause revanchism, as occurred with the rise of the Nazis in post-war Germany. This appears to be a strong motivating factor behind President Macron’s calls for a compromise settlement in Ukraine, but such thinking is dangerously misguided.

As not a single Allied shell had fallen on German territory in WWI, this left room for the infamous “stab in the back” theory of a conspiracy behind the German defeat. Accordingly, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels were able to persuade their public to make a second try and correct an alleged historical injustice by launching another war.

There are obvious parallels here with the revisionist view regarding the collapse of the USSR. During his two decades in power, Putin has been remarkably successful in rehabilitating the Soviet past while blaming the collapse of the empire on Pentagon intrigue and the cloying egoism of Mikhail Gorbachev. As a result, many Russians are now convinced that the USSR was also a victim of a grave historical injustice and enthusiastically embrace efforts to reclaim territories lost in 1991.

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Post-Soviet Russia never underwent a period of de-imperialization that might have enabled the country to move beyond the imperial mindset that Soviet Russia had itself inherited from the Czarist era.

This contrasts with the post-WWII experience of Germany and Japan. Both countries experienced catastrophic defeat followed by periods of foreign occupation. It was this trauma that caused them to deeply reexamine their cultural values and turn away from centuries of militarism. The occupation powers in both Germany and Japan also oversaw a “re-education” of the two societies. This role as external change agents was necessary because neither society was likely to engage in re-education on their own.

There is no prospect that a Western coalition will occupy today’s Russia, of course. At the same time, a nation accustomed to a long imperial history and soaked in the revisionism of the Putin era is unlikely to find within itself the cultural and intellectual resources to rethink its most cherished national mythologies. It would take something as profoundly shocking as defeat in Ukraine to force Russians into a national reckoning on such a scale.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a deeply traumatic event for all Russians, but it is now apparent that this trauma was not sufficient to cause a rejection of Russia’s imperial identity. Instead, Putin has skillfully revived imperial sentiments to generate popular support for his expansionist foreign policy.

The West has also played a significant role in this process, with Western leaders and commentators all-too-often embracing Russia’s post-Soviet victimization narrative while disregarding or downplaying the victimization of Russia’s neighbors. This has helped contribute to the mood of unrepentant imperialism in modern Russia that set the stage for the invasion of Ukraine.

In order to bring the prevailing cycle of Russian imperial aggression to an end, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine must result in unambiguous defeat. A Ukrainian victory would send shock waves through Russian society and force Russians to engage in a long overdue exploration of the country’s imperial identity. If defeat is painful enough, it could spark fundamental changes within Russia and lead to the kind of breakthrough that the false dawn of 1991 failed to achieve. Anything less will merely serve as a temporary pause before the next Russian invasion.

Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor currently living in Kazakhstan.

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While younger Russians were less likely to back the invasion, the survey identified comfortable majorities in favor of the war among every single age group. Sixty percent of 18-24 year old respondents voiced their support, rising to eighty three percent of those aged over 55. Nor is there much expectation of a quick victory, with almost half respondents (44%) predicting that the war would last for at least a further six months.

These figures are bad news for anyone hoping to see a domestic backlash within Russia as the war in Ukraine drags on and the costs become increasingly apparent to ordinary Russians. On the contrary, the slight rise in support since April suggests that a majority of Russians have accepted today’s wartime conditions as the new normal and are largely supportive of the Kremlin’s official narrative.

Since the outbreak of hostilities, the Putin regime has worked hard to control domestic perceptions of the conflict, which it euphemistically calls a “special military operation.” Draconian new legislation was adopted in the first days of the war introducing tough penalties for any media coverage that deviated from the official Kremlin narrative, while any attempts to stage anti-war protests have been ruthlessly stamped out.

So far, the Kremlin’s precautions have proven highly effective. During the first three months of hostilities in Ukraine, no major anti-war rallies have taken place anywhere in Russia. Instead, those who opposed the invasion have largely chosen to keep quiet or have left the country.

Despite multiple reports of concern behind the scenes, the regime has also remained solidly supportive of the war with no prominent figures seeking to protect their reputations by stepping down or speaking out against the invasion. This absence of high-level resignations was inadvertently underlined in early May when mid-ranking Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev made global headlines by announcing his decision to resign over the war.

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The one area where opposition to the war is increasingly evident is within the ranks of Russian military itself. Since the outbreak of hostilities in late February, significant numbers of Russian troops have refused to fight in Ukraine or have abandoned their units and deserted.

While the exact number of Russians refusing to follow orders remains a closely guarded secret, one widely reported incident saw 115 members of Russia’s National Guard dismissed after they refused to fight in Ukraine. Meanwhile, a lawyer representing Russians who do not want to participate in the invasion has claimed that he’s been contacted by more than a thousand soldiers.

Collapsing morale within Putin’s military may now represent the greatest single threat to Russia’s war effort. While the Kremlin-controlled Russian media can disguise the true nature of the war indefinitely, those on the frontlines know the reality of Russia’s losses and are well aware of the atrocities being committed against the Ukrainian civilian population. As more and more soldiers seek to escape the Ukrainian meat grinder, Putin faces challenges finding enough troops to maintain the invasion without taking the politically risky move of ordering a general mobilization.

There are signs that the Kremlin is already beginning to face manpower issues. Recent legislation removed age limits for Russian soldiers in an apparent bid to fill out depleted ranks by recruiting men over the age of forty. The regime has also been relying on ethnic minority soldiers from many of Russia’s poorest regions along with conscripts from Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine. If mounting losses and desertions force the Kremlin to enlist thousands of young Russians from Moscow and St. Petersburg, the current pro-war consensus may not survive.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

In normal circumstances, it would be tempting to dismiss Putin’s pseudo-scientific imperial narrative as the harmless rant of a delusional dictator. However, his historically illiterate essay was no laughing matter. It was subsequently made required reading for all Russian military personnel and is now widely regarded as an unofficial declaration of war against the continued existence of an independent Ukraine.

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Putin is not the first Russian ruler to insist Ukrainians are in fact Russians. Similar arguments were common during Czarist rule when much of today’s Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian Empire. This continued in modified form throughout the Soviet era with Ukraine and Russia typically portrayed as “brotherly nations.”

Over the past two decades, Putin has taken this propaganda trope to new extremes. He has weaponized the “one people” narrative to demonize any Ukrainians who insist on a separate identity, while at the same time portraying today’s Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” that can no longer be tolerated.

Unsurprisingly, the “one people” concept was always far more popular among Russians than Ukrainians. In the aftermath of Putin’s essay, polls found that an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians rejected his claims of historical unity between the two nations. Following the full-scale invasion of their country, the percentage of Ukrainians who now view Russians as a “brotherly nation” has become vanishingly small. With tens of thousands of Ukrainians killed and entire cities reduced to rubble, the myth of “one people” is officially dead.

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Putin’s promotion of fraternal narratives has always been a way of expressing his territorial claims to Ukraine. Legitimizing these claims means whitewashing centuries of imperial oppression. While the close geographical proximity of the two countries means that they inevitably share many features of a common past, the story of Russia’s relations with Ukraine has always been defined by Russia’s aggressive expansion and Ukraine’s struggle for independence.

For hundreds of years, Russian rulers suppressed Ukrainian statehood aspirations while ruthlessly russifying the country. The reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great were marked by particularly gruesome atrocities, but there was no single period when Ukrainians were not subjugated in their own land. Indeed, as long ago as 1731, French writer Voltaire was moved to observe, “Ukraine has always aspired to be free.”

Efforts to eradicate Ukrainian identity accelerated during the Soviet era. The early Bolsheviks brutally crushed the fledgling Ukrainian state established in 1918 amid unprecedented bloodshed in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Stalin’s reign then saw the mass murder of Ukraine’s intellectual leadership. The darkest period of all came in the early 1930s when the Soviet authorities engineered a genocidal famine to wipe out the agrarian communities that had for centuries served as the traditional repositories of Ukrainian national culture. An estimated four million Ukrainians starved to death.

Putin makes no effort to address or excuse these staggering crimes. On the contrary, he simply ignores them while portraying periods of enforced cohabitation as evidence of eternal brotherhood.

Sadly, international audiences still sometimes struggle to grasp the scale of Putin’s cynicism and continue to repeat the Kremlin’s “one people” propaganda. In April 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that he still considers Russians and Ukrainians “brotherly peoples.” Others have echoed Russia’s fraudulent historical claims to advocate for appeasement or undermine international support for Ukraine.

This needs to change. There should be no more talk of a compromise peace or attempts to placate Putin while Moscow is engaged in the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. Instead, the international community must be unambiguous in its rejection of Russian falsehoods and historical distortions.

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine relies heavily on a series of myths that reflect modern Russia’s failure to break with its imperialistic past. While the rest of Europe underwent decades of turbulent decolonization following WWII, Russia still clings to an anachronistic imperial identity that prevents its own development while exposing its neighbors to the horrors of colonial conquest. The current war in Ukraine is a throwback to an altogether darker era and a painful reminder that if Europe wants lasting peace, it must work toward a post-imperial Russia.

Nestor Barchuk is international relations manager at the DEJURE Foundation.

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Vladimir Putin is running out of options to avoid defeat in Ukraine

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 17 May 2022 12:29:02 +0000

When Vladimir Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, he envisaged a lightning campaign that would be over in a matter of days with Ukraine’s pro-Western government deposed and the country firmly back in the Russian orbit. However, things have not gone according to plan. The Russian military has suffered catastrophic losses and failed to achieve its key objectives, while Ukraine has fought tenaciously and secured the support of the entire democratic world. As the war approaches the three-month mark, Putin is now rapidly running out of options to avoid a disastrous defeat that will shatter Russia’s pretensions to military superpower status and threaten the future of his entire regime.

According to British estimates, Russia has already lost approximately one-third of the 190,000-strong invasion force assembled in February 2022. Putin chose to invade with this obviously inadequate force due to a combination of faulty intelligence and his own faith in Russian nationalist dogma, which convinced him that the Ukrainian public would greet advancing Russian soldiers as liberators and shower them with flowers.

Instead, his troops received an overwhelmingly hostile reception and were soon reporting severe battlefield losses. Amid mounting setbacks, Russia lost the Battle for Kyiv and was forced to retreat entirely from northern Ukraine. More recently, Russian forces have been pushed away from Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, while the much anticipated Donbas Offensive in eastern Ukraine has made painfully slow progress.

Putin’s most obvious option at this point would be to escalate the conflict by moving from today’s so-called “Special Military Operation” to an official declaration of war against Ukraine and full mobilization. This might help to fill growing gaps within the ranks of the Russian military, but public opposition to mobilization could also destabilize the domestic situation within Russia at a time when the Kremlin is already paranoid over possible signs of revolt. Perhaps this fear of opposition helps explain why a significant number of oligarchs and their families have died in suspicious circumstances in recent months.

Nor would mobilization necessarily produce the kind of fighting force Putin currently needs. An army full of conscripts and reservists with limited military training would be no match for Ukraine’s battle hardened and highly motivated troops armed with superior Western weapons.

Putin’s predicament is likely to worsen in the coming months, making his invasion of Ukraine even more untenable. Western sanctions will begin to have a greater impact from the end of the summer season onward as Russia’s inability to replace Western imports becomes impossible to disguise and as the savings of ordinary Russians begin to run out. Unemployment figures will likely reach record highs and economic forecasts will deteriorate as the costs of international isolation continue to mount.

Growing public awareness of the grim military situation in Ukraine will add to the gloomy mood. Based on the current rate of attrition, the Russian army will suffer 50,000 combat deaths by September. Such losses are completely unprecedented for a major power in modern warfare and cannot be entirely explained away or otherwise disguised by the Kremlin propaganda machine.

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The Kremlin currently faces a series of parallel challenges as it seeks to prevent the faltering invasion of Ukraine from unravelling completely.

There are no more pressing issues than the rising number of Russian soldiers refusing to fight in Ukraine. Reports of resistance to deployment have been emerging since the early days of the war and continue to mount. Growing numbers of Russian contract soldiers have resigned from the army or simply refused to fight in Ukraine, while members of Russia’s National Guard have allegedly argued that they are legally only obliged to serve within the borders of the Russian Federation.

Other forms of protest have been more informal. Large numbers of Russian troops have simply abandoned their tanks and armored vehicles in Ukraine and fled or surrendered. This has enabled the Ukrainian military to acquire over 230 Russian tanks and earned Russia the unwelcome status of Ukraine’s number one arms supplier.

Morale among Putin’s invasion force now appears close to breaking point. Anger at incompetent officers has led to at least one incident of soldiers running over their commander. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Security Service has intercepted numerous telephone conversations of Russian troops calling home and describing the hell they face in Ukraine and the often staggering scale of the casualties within their individual military units.

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