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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

President Saied has also utilized harsh counter-migration policies to leverage financial support from Europe—specifically Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—creating an incentivization structure and aura of impunity that have fed into the current crackdown.

The situation on Tunisia’s borders is not only a humanitarian catastrophe that could cause the death of hundreds of innocent people—it could also catalyze political, criminal, and diplomatic issues across the broader region. Mass arbitrary expulsions and violent abuse incited by inflammatory speeches of Tunisia’s president have already boosted the numbers of sub-Saharan refugees fleeing to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea since February. Systematic and abusive government crackdowns will exacerbate this fear and could trigger a panicked, mass exodus as Tunisia becomes palpably unsafe for Black Africans, creating a new migration crisis for Europe.

This development also bolsters the already burgeoning business of human traffickers, helping them to entrench and expand other criminal activities. Additionally, it could strain relationships between Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria, as no country wishes to claim these stranded peoples, and Tunisian authorities continue ejecting them into sensitive border zones.

It’s imperative for Europe, and especially the United States, to act to avert this catastrophe—not only for humanitarian reasons but also to protect regional stability and defend key regional interests. The United States has invested more than $1.4 billion in Tunisia’s democracy since 2011 and is invested in promoting democracies to counter China and Russia’s authoritarian systems. As a result, the United States is financially, ideologically, and diplomatically invested in supporting its European allies to stabilize an issue of extreme importance in the central Mediterranean.

A Western policy response should focus on the short-term imperative of providing protection and assistance to the stranded while stopping further expulsions. Additionally, medium-term policies to build structural safeguards can prevent this from re-occurring and perhaps even result in a healthier ecosystem for migrants and migration diplomacy in Tunisia.

Short-term solutions

In light of this ongoing crisis, European and US stakeholders have the opportunity to collaborate in preventing further deaths while simultaneously establishing a solid foundation for holistic and enduring resolutions to the migration predicament in Tunisia.

A first response should come through immediate public statements by senior officials that condemn the crackdown, highlighting Tunisia’s contravention of international conventions it has joined, such as the United Nations and African Refugee Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. All of these accords explicitly forbid the practice of refoulement and forcibly returning or expelling individuals to countries where they may be subjected to torture, threats to their lives or freedom, or other severe forms of harm.

Furthermore, Western governments should call on Tunisian authorities to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to aid the stranded.

Given that the aforementioned suggestions are immediately actionable, uncontroversial, and the most direct way to end the humanitarian crisis, they should be prioritized and enacted as soon as possible. For maximum effect, this could take the form of a joint statement made by the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union (EU), which could be supplemented by senior level phone calls between leaders who have a good relationship with President Saied, like French President Emmanuel Macron.

To create an atmosphere of maximum pressure reflecting the dire situation, further statements condemning the developments and proposing steps forward, such as allowing aid to the stranded, could be issued by the US Congress and the European Parliament—particularly committees such as the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI).

The United States and EU can also provide capacity assistance to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to help conduct voluntary resettlement for stranded Africans who had been working or studying in Tunisia and no longer feel safe, as well as those who were hoping to migrate onwards but would now rather return home. In addition, Western countries can support the home countries of these migrants by helping them provide consular assistance. In many cases, their embassies lack the personnel and resources required to respond to a crisis of this size.

The United States and EU have strong relationships with Tunisia’s defense ministry and interior ministry, respectively, and they should be leveraged. Given the difficulties of directly influencing the infamously intransigent President Saied—and that Tunisia’s security services are perhaps the only institutions retaining significant influence over the president and are the main implementers of these policies—capitalizing on these relationships represents the West’s most practical means of influencing the situation.

As a last resort, the US should communicate that by facilitating these crackdowns in violation of international conventions—the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the United Nations (UN) and African Refugee conventions, the Convention against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—that Tunisia’s security services may end up excluding themselves from further funding programs. Meanwhile, Europeans can threaten to revoke the privileges that the Tunisian interior ministry’s officer class enjoys from their close partnership with Europeans to encourage Tunisia’s security services to uphold the law, cease their participation in egregious human rights abuses, and allow humanitarian organizations to tend to the stranded. This could be further communicated in bilateral conversations between European interior ministers who have recently visited Tunisia to meet with their counterparts.

Medium-term solutions

Since February, the African Union (AU) and countries whose citizens have been victimized by the racist crackdowns incited by President Saied have condemned the situation. They also remain better placed to provide diplomatic accountability measures to try and disincentivize Saied’s regime from continuing this course of action.

Alongside the AU’s responses, the EU could provide support to replicate mechanisms trialed elsewhere—such as the EU-AU-UN Tripartite Taskforce on the Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Libya—to develop and oversee sustained policy responses to help ameliorate the worsening situation of migrants and refugees in Tunisia, and build a working relationship with Tunisian authorities that could help avert such scenarios from reoccurring.

On June 11, when announcing the new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Europe and Tunisia, European Council (EC) President Ursula Von der Leyen claimed that the migration part of the comprehensive package would be implemented in full respect of human rights and would become a model for migration deals with other countries. Considering the developments since, there should be clear stipulations added to the MoU to prevent mass arbitrary expulsions and violent abuse from being repeated, including accountability measures.

Alongside making a more focused, robust, and safeguarded migration pact, the European Parliament should more effectively leverage its role in budgetary scrutiny and oversight over EC spending to not only ensure the future deal is effectively implemented, but also look over existing funding packages given to the Tunisian border police. It is rumored that border guards are disgruntled that additional EU funding has yet to reach them in terms of increased salaries or new equipment and accuse the state of simply repurposing that money to its general budget. In this scenario, border guards are more inclined to accept money from traffickers and thereby enable trafficking instead of policing it. Moreover, this dynamic neutralizes any leverage or incentive this financing could provide to ensure that humanitarian standards are upheld. So, it behooves the European parliament to more closely scrutinize how its existing migration funding is being spent.

The importance of Tunisia’s migration policy—especially given its ability to feed into other delicate issues, such as people smuggling and general regional stability—and its relationship with European migration policy should be routinely highlighted when European and US delegations visit Tunisia. Upcoming visits by European Parliament committees are a prime opportunity to initiate conversations on migration management practices, which can be followed up by identifying robust safeguards to prevent the reoccurrence of such situations.

By implementing these short-term and medium-term policy recommendations, European and US stakeholders can work towards addressing the immediate challenges while laying the groundwork for more comprehensive and sustainable solutions to the migration situation in Tunisia.

Alissa Pavia is associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs’ North Africa Program.

Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

The post After Tunisia expelled 1,200 Black Africans, here’s how the West can help avoid a humanitarian disaster appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

Richard Cashman, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:14:43 +0000

The attempted putsch by Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Wagner troops in late June is perhaps best understood as a symptom of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline. Much like the invasion of Ukraine itself, it is part of a broader historical process that can be traced back to 1989 and the fall of the Soviet incarnation of the Russian Empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Roya Rahmani and Melanne Verveer discuss Afghan women as the way forward and how the international community should engage now, nearly two years after the fall of Kabul. (Rahmani and Verveer’s biographies are below.)

Worth a thousand words

Source: SIGAR, February 2021 report on Support for Gender Equality, 40.

The diagnosis

During the twenty-year US intervention in Afghanistan, metrics gauging women’s health and education and women’s presence in local and national politics all improved.
Since August 2021, those gains are at risk of reversal. Women’s rights have deteriorated, and the international community’s efforts to engage with the Taliban and support Afghan women have been unsuccessful.
Carrots such as international recognition and sticks such as public condemnations and threats of NGO withdrawal have proven ineffective, yet these strategies are endlessly recycled.
The international community and multilateral organizations remain disengaged from strategic policymaking, passively supplying humanitarian aid without directing funding toward strategic future goals.
The West lacks both knowledge of and leverage over Afghanistan’s leadership.

The prescription

Establish a more robust forum for international consultation. Ad hoc consultations aren’t working: Regular meetings of experienced representatives need to be established. The core group should include the United States, the United Kingdom, several European Union countries, key Islamic countries such as Qatar and Indonesia, and NGO and multilateral representatives with on-the-ground knowledge.

Keep security strategy at the heart of engagement. Place the security implications of women’s oppression on every agenda of every meeting. As society disintegrates further, more room is created for terrorist groups to flourish, as shown by the growth of the Islamic State group’s offshoot ISIS-K.

Send female diplomats and delegations from Islamic countries. Bilateral engagement should feature overwhelmingly female delegations and prioritize consultative meetings with Afghan women to hear their perspectives on community needs. Furthermore, Islamic countries and organizations need to be key partners in the West’s efforts for humanitarian relief and overall engagement. Not only do they have the expertise and credibility needed to engage and advise on practical mechanisms for the implementation of programming, but direct engagement between more moderate Islamic countries and the Taliban could be influential. Qatar is a particularly important partner because of its role as an international interlocutor with access to the highest ranks of the Taliban.

Use aid as leverage by strategizing beyond immediate relief. Shifting Western aid from a focus on emergency humanitarian assistance to more sustainable, large-scale economic development initiatives reorients the sense of dependency from the people to the Taliban regime, which also creates a new potential point of leverage for the international community. Donors should craft aid distribution networks that are more local and grassroots, and use creative approaches to keep women at the center of all aid initiatives. This could mean developing aid programs specifically for widows, forming local partnerships that explicitly require the adoption of female-specific tasks.

Take advantage of the internet, and prioritize development projects that keep Afghans connected. Unlike during the 1990s Taliban regime, most Afghans have a mobile phone, internet access, and social media. These new tools must be used proactively by the international community to disseminate key information about the Taliban’s failures, coordinate mobilization, and provide educational resources. Development projects focused on connectivity and subsidizing local media will help keep information flowing into and out of Afghanistan.

Bottom lines

A personal note

“While the regime stays in power, concrete steps have to be taken within the current context to counteract urgent security threats, provide critical aid, get children back in schools after a year-and-a-half gap, and address other imminent issues. Recycling policies from 1996 will not work. After twenty years of societal transformation, Afghanistan is a fundamentally different place.

Without innovation, no progress can be made.

Similarly, without engagement, no progress can be made.

Like other Afghan women, my entire life has been shaped by one conflict after another. Born on the eve of the Saur Revolution, I lived through the Soviet invasion, the Civil War, and the Taliban’s 1990s rule. Until the intervention, each chapter that unfolded was heartbreak anew. The revival of democracy and freedom brought hope. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 was even more painful and shocking than anything before because it shattered an era that had been characterized by so much progress.

I have fought for women’s rights my whole life: the right to go to school and have an income, a voice, and autonomy. I am deeply disturbed and angered by what Afghan women are currently experiencing, and I share the instinctive desire to disengage from Afghanistan entirely given the Taliban’s inhumanity—or at the very least condition aid on women’s rights. However, this does nothing to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis. People simply suffer. Ultimately, we must be doing all that is possible to save lives. It is my hope that this report can help to make the road ahead clearer. The futures of so many Afghans—young girls banned from school, women imprisoned in their own homes, and an entire generation whose dreams have been crushed—depend on what we do now.”

—Roya Rahmani

Like what you read? Check out the full report here:

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Ambassador Roya Rahmani has over twenty years’ experience working with governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. She currently serves as a distinguished fellow at Georgetown University’s Global Institute for Women Peace and Security, the chair of Delphos International LTD, a global financial advisory firm based in Washington, DC, and a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. Rahmani was the first woman to serve as Afghanistan’s ambassador to the United States of America and held the role from 2018 to 2021. She was also the first woman to serve as Afghanistan’s ambassador to Indonesia, serving from 2016 to 2018. She holds a bachelor’s degree in software engineering from McGill University and a master’s degree in public administration from Columbia University.

Ambassador Melanne Verveer is executive director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security, and board director at the Atlantic Council. Verveer previously served as the first US Ambassador for Global Women’s Issues, a position to which she was nominated by President Barack Obama in 2009. She coordinated foreign policy issues and activities relating to the political, economic and social advancement of women, traveling to nearly sixty countries. She worked to ensure that women’s participation and rights are fully integrated into US foreign policy, and she played a leadership role in the administration’s development of the US National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. President Obama also appointed her to serve as the US Representative to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Public Event Wed, June 28, 2023 • 3:00 pm ET

SouthAsiaSource Oct 20, 2022

The lionesses of Kabul & Tehran in Khorasan

By Davood Moradian

Afghan and Iranian women continue to be denied their basic human rights, and this shared struggle is built on an overlapping Iranian-Afghan history and civilizational space known as the Iranian plateau.

Afghanistan Human Rights

SouthAsiaSource Sep 26, 2022

To support Afghan women activists, prioritize local knowledge over numbers

By Sophie Mae Berman and Yelena Biberman

Though Afghan women have been included in certain peacebuilding efforts, these experiences were largely tokenist and minimally empowering.

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

SouthAsiaSource Mar 29, 2022

Let Afghan girls learn

By Nilofar Sakhi

The Taliban must be held accountable for the damage they have caused and continue to inflict upon the people–and most critically the women and girls–of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Education

USAID’s Samantha Power: LGBTQI+ crackdowns are ‘the canary in the coal mine’ for declining freedoms

Atlantic Council — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 00:00:21 +0000

Watch the event

USAID Administrator Samantha Power on advancing LGBTQI+ inclusive development

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on the United States’ efforts to advance global LGBTQI+ human rights and USAID’s commitment to global inclusion.

Human Rights Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Samantha Power
Administrator, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Moderator

Jonathan Capehart
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, the Washington Post and MSNBC

VICENTE GARCIA: Hello. Welcome to this special Pride edition of #ACFrontPage. I’m Vicente Garcia, senior director of engagement and external affairs at the Atlantic Council, and we’re delighted for today’s conversation featuring USAID Administrator Samantha Power on a topic important to me as a member of the LGBTQI+ community, but also to the Atlantic Council in our mission to shape the global future together through US global leadership and global engagement.

Today’s conversation will be led by Pulitzer-winning journalist Jonathan Capehart, who is the host of his own show on MSNBC, serves on the Washington Post Editorial Board, and a frequent commentator on PBS, and the list goes on. We welcome participation by those here joining us today in person during our Q&A session, but also welcome those joining online by using the hashtag #ACFrontPage.

Administrator Power, thank you for joining us here today. We’re very eager to hear from you about the Biden administration’s and USAID’s priorities at addressing global LGBTQI+ human rights. And so now I’ll turn it over to Jonathan to lead our discussion. Thank you.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Thank you very much, Vicente, for the invitation to be here. Thank you all. One more thing, Vicente. As someone who reads teleprompter for a living, I really felt for you because that print is so small.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yeah, seriously. We’re just old, dude.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I know, it’s true, given the distance. But thank you very much for that introduction. And, Administrator Power, thank you very much for being here and taking the time to be a part of this important conversation.

So, as you well know, within the first month of taking office President Biden issued a memorandum that directed various parts of the US government responsible for foreign policy, such as USAID, to prioritize efforts to advance LGBTQI+ rights around the world. How are those efforts going? And what have been the biggest challenges?

SAMANTHA POWER: Thank you so much. And thanks to everybody for turning out. It’s a great energy in the room, great energy this month, and much needed, because we harness this energy to try to do this work in the world.

Well, first to say that USAID is one of fifteen agencies that is being responsive to President Biden’s direction to promote and protect and respect the human rights of LGBTQIA+ people around the world. And I’d say I feel very fortunate every day, no matter what issue I’m working on, to be at USAID, because we have this toolkit. We have programming in public health on maternal and child health. Of course we have PEPFAR, where we work with the State Department and CDC, which has, of course, made a major difference, saving twenty-five million lives and 5.5 million babies is the estimate for the good that it has done over time. And that’s had a particular effect on LGBTQIA+ communities around the world.

But beyond that, we do agriculture. We do economic growth and inclusion, livelihoods work. We’ve helped vaccinate the world. In many parts of the world, if you are LGBTQIA+, coming forward to seek social services may risk something near and dear to you, depending on the legal environment in which you’re working.

When the fallout from COVID occurred and you saw such economic devastation around the world, given the fact that LGBTQIA+ people are often working in the informal sector and may have had, in some instances, less backup, the kinds of crises that have befallen the planet have a disparate impact on marginalized communities and those that have, in a sense, faced preexisting conditions, you might say, including discrimination, stigmatization, violence, et cetera.

So we went forth. We have tripled the size of our staff. We have the great Jay Gilliam, who many of you work with, as our lead LGBTQIA+ coordinator at USAID. That position had been unfilled in the previous administration. This fiscal year we’ve had a dedicated pool of resources of around sixteen million dollars, which does everything from spot emergency assistance to people who need legal defense because they’re being rounded up in some cases or evicted to working really closely with the State Department to help identify people who would be eligible for asylum or to become refugees because of their vulnerability, because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

So, you know, I’d say you see a massive surge in programming, in attention. But for me, I think the—and the thing that Jay has helped us so much with and the team, if you believe in development in 2023—I mean, and actually seeing development outcomes that matter and reversing development setbacks that have occurred—it’s not enough to have, like, a little pot of money, or a big pot of money, even, dedicated to LGBTQIA+. All the programming we do on food security, on education, on health, needs to be—and the list goes on—needs to be attentive and intentional about going out of our way to make sure that we are not just practicing development but inclusive development.

And the biggest challenges—I’m sure we’ll get into them, and I know many in the audience are seized with them—is criminalization, and even in countries that already have criminalized LGBTQIA+ status, you know, new moves, desire to render more salient laws that may be on the books but being ignored by some communities, work in places like Uganda, because of the introduction of the anti-homosexuality act, vigilantes and citizens and others taking what’s happening in the legal space or in the parliament and getting signed into law and viewing it as license to do whatever the hell they want to vulnerable people.

And so it’s not just happening in Uganda. That’s, of course, something that has happened very recently. But we see the instrumentalization of the human-rights agenda that so many in the world aspire to see progress, that being turned on its head. And in places where anti-democratic forces are ascendant or are getting either support or abetted or at least not counteracted by authorities, you see those voices getting louder. And even when there’s not a law and that kind of legal ballast behind those voices, that, in and of itself, is terrifying and exclusionary and a deterrent, again, for these communities to come forward and access these programs at the very time where we’re really seeking to make sure that we’re leaving no one behind.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: So since you brought up Uganda and also your point about, you know, USAID has all of these programs. But there are countries where just presenting yourself to make yourself—avail yourself of these programs could put you in danger. So the question is what is the United States government doing or can it do to push back on what’s happening in countries like Uganda?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, to start—and I would start with what I consider a statement of the obvious but, nonetheless, I think does need to be said because it’s not always the way things are done, which is you start from the proposition of nothing about you without you. This question of tactics and how to prevail or how to counteract are super complicated, right.

Imagine, like, being part of the Biden administration and the tactical questions about how we moved the Inflation Reduction Act and, you know, convinced Joe Manchin to be part of the—I mean, when we’re operating in someone else’s country, you know, understanding, you know, the complex ecosystem in which we work, drawing, I should say, at USAID very heavily on the expertise of our local staff, two-thirds of—at least-two thirds of USAID staff abroad are nationals of the countries in which we work so they can be a great resource, but fundamentally it is the communities that are going to be affected by these laws that provide cues to us on how vocal to be, how much to signal in a deterrent way in advance of the movement of a piece of legislation, which risks then putting the United States at the center of a national drama and potentially triggering nationalism and other forces or some, you know, historical, you know, dynamics—let’s put it that way.

And so—but even what I’ve just said is kind of simplistic because there is no one view. I mean, even within an organization people are debating at fever pitch, you know, what the right approach is. This is just really, really hard.

But we do come in with humility and really try to be in lockstep with the groups who we may have funded in the past or may be funding currently, and in the case of the anti-homosexuality act in—that Uganda has moved forward with President Biden was very clear that the law should be repealed. Came out with a public statement. Has talked—and this is one of the approaches that we have taken not only in Uganda but in other places that are threatening to put in place similar laws—talking about the effects, Jonathan, on this incredibly successful partnership that we’ve had in combating HIV/AIDS.

There’s one report in Uganda that shows that service utilization is down by more than 60 percent since the law was introduced and that’s people who are afraid of coming forward for vital health services because they’re afraid it could lead to their arrest or it could lead to their eviction or it could lead to vigilante violence.

And so here we are, you know, trying to get this epidemic under control by 2030 and we’re part of this grand global coalition and at the same time these steps are being taken that would set back not only the health of LGBTQI+ communities but the health in this instance of all Ugandans.

And so, in a sense, you know, really looking at what the practical effects are of being seen to license community involvement in discrimination, stigmatization, and even law enforcement as you see citizens, again, taking things into their own hands but trying to find also arguments that have broad appeal in terms of services or programs that a broad swath of the societies in which we work are enthusiastic about, you know, showing the link between those—for example, private sector investment. There’s not one country in which USAID works that isn’t interested in fueling economic growth recovering from COVID, getting young people to work.

Well, what does it mean if the multinational companies that we and the Commerce Department and the State Department have been working with to try to encourage them to invest in these countries? Their own anti-discrimination policies and values are not going to make that an attractive place for investment.

So it’s a combination of, you know, the State Department taking steps now potentially to sanction individuals involved in this measure in Uganda. That’s been something that’s been messaged publicly and, again, these sort of practical effects that are going to extend practical harms, that are going to extend beyond if this law is not repealed.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And so let’s talk about another country. I was thinking when you say, in response to my question about Uganda, talking to the groups on the ground, getting their input into what USAID and what the US government should do, let’s talk about Ukraine. There’s a war going on, but hopefully at some point that war will end and reconstruction will begin. Where does the LGBTQI+ community play—come into the conversation about rebuilding? Both from making sure that they are whole in Ukrainian society, but also that their rights are protected and respected?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, this is a complex issue and a complex question, and I could come at it a few different ways. But, first, let me just say that, you know, part of Putin’s motivation, as we well know, for invading Ukraine was watching Ukrainian society, the Ukrainian government, move at really rapid pace to integrate itself into Europe. And, yes, that carries with it a lot of economic benefit for young people in Ukraine, but much of the impetus behind what was, you know, between really 2013 and last year, such a shift, right, in an orientation that went in one direction and then shifted in another direction. Much of it was values-based.

That doesn’t mean everybody was with all aspects of the European agenda, or the European program, or the European Convention on Human Rights immediately. We’ve seen that, of course. But, you know, part of what Ukraine is fighting for and part of what Russia is trying to squelch is liberalization, is broad understanding of who human rights protections apply to. Now, again, that’s a kind of general statement.

What we do—then, shall I say, of course, following Russia’s invasion Ukraine’s work to liberalize and build checks and balances and build in human rights protections, although not making headlines in the American or even the European headline, that work has accelerated. Which is, frankly, remarkable that a country that’s fighting for its life and its people can walk and chew gum at the same time. But meaning, you know, you see [LGBTQI+] protections progressing not only through legislative measures, and regulation, and as we vet—as the Ukrainians vet and we support programs to vet judges, you know, their human rights credentials being assessed in this much more comprehensive way.

But also, again, as the economy—parts of the economy actually flourish—I know this is hard to believe. But, like, the tech sector grew by, I think, seven or eight percent last year. You know, that itself, young people being out and being integrated in the world, there’s just things happening in the society that I think is going to put Ukraine, you know, and above all [LGBTQI+] communities and individuals, in a much more supportive legal and social ecosystem as the whole rationale for the war is about integrating into Europe. And the criteria by which—that Ukraine is going to need to meet, the roadmap and so forth, is going to entail much stronger protections than have existed in the past.

To your point, I think, if I understood it, about reconstruction, again, that’s incumbent on this intentionality that I was talking about. USAID is a critical partner. I was just meeting with the minister of finance yesterday talking about reconstruction out of the recent conference in the United Kingdom. You know, as we think about procurement and nondiscrimination in procurement, you know, how are those checks and those protections built in? As we think right now about health services and making sure that those are restored every place we can, even places close to the front line or as territory is liberated, how does USAID support flow in a manner where we are constantly vigilant to how inclusive those services are, and whether or not they are provided?

I mean, you know, we’ve actually managed to distribute I think it’s something like sixteen million antiretrovirals in Ukraine, you know, just since the war, you know, has started. So, you know, in terms of the mainstream PEPFAR and HIV/AIDS programs, like, those have continued. We’ve managed to be able to keep those afloat. And that took real intentionality on the part of our health team and our Ukraine team.

But I think, again, the principle that we want to bring to everything we do in terms of inclusive development is just that it’s a design feature of any program that we do that we are looking to make sure we are going out of our way, just as we would for religious minorities and on behalf of religious freedom or for women in countries where women are discriminated against, to make sure that we are reaching the full spectrum of beneficiaries, and that any kind of social deterrent or normative factors are ones that we try to circumvent to make sure that we are being inclusive because that’s going to be in the interests of all—again, all individuals living in a country economically and in terms of their ability to—in this instance, to integrate into Europe.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: So what would you—what do you say to people who question why supporting LGBTQI+ rights should be a part of American foreign policy? Because you could see there might be some people around the world, or even in our own country, who think, you know, I’m down with the community, but why make that part of our foreign policy.

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I think one way to take that question, which we do hear a lot and you might even say increasingly in certain quarters, but—is to imagine the counterfactual. You know, imagine a world in which US taxpayer resources are expended in a manner that, you know, in a sense perpetuates or deepens exclusion of individuals who are really vulnerable. I mean, that would be bad. And not only that, it would have the flavor, I think, in many of the countries we work, for a country that for all of our imperfections has long stood for human rights, it would have—it would have the effect, I believe, of being seen to kind of legitimate some of the rhetoric and actions and legal measures that are being put forward.

So, you know, there’s not, like, some place of neutrality here, right? We are the United States. We, you know, for many, many years in a very bipartisan way have stood for human rights. We have stood behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which doesn’t have exceptions or footnotes excluding particular communities. We stand for implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, which explicitly say that no person should be left behind—again, without footnotes or caveats. So I think there are really hard questions about tactics, about in some places how vocal to be to not, again, put ourselves at the center of a narrative, because that in some sense is just what people who would seek to repress or terrorize vulnerable communities would like to see happen. So, again, it’s very, very difficult on the ground to find the right balance of tools.

You know, if you look at the Anti-Homosexuality Act in Uganda, the—you know, we spoke out with thirty-one countries. We spoke out with the United Nations independent expert that US diplomacy, when I was the UN as ambassador, was absolutely critical in securing the creation of that position. And the fact that that position has been renewed three times now, including most recently last year, speaks to, again, changing norms. The fact that international instruments more and more are including—sometimes explicitly, sometimes less so—[LGBTQI+] rights as human rights, the fact that we see same-sex marriage legalized this last year in Estonia and Slovenia, but also decriminalization in places as varied as Barbados and Singapore means that these principles are getting traction.

And these international instruments—and this is a critical part of President Biden’s agenda—are really important, Jonathan, because it gives citizens in a country, you know, where on the books there’s lots of happy talk about human rights, but it gives [LGBTQI+] organizations and individuals, you know, something to hang their arguments on; something to say, look, but the United Nations Human Rights Council just appointed this individual, this individual says this. And so when we can act in company, in a coalition, I think that’s always advantageous, and that is something we seek to do.

When the norms themselves—I was part of getting the Security Council for the first time in what at that time was the seventy-five-year history of the UN to condemn the targeting of individuals on their—on the basis of their sexual orientation—that had never happened before—and hearing from around the world what it meant for the United Nations Security Council to have done that. I mean, this was something that was a consensus document; you know, the Russian Federation, a number of African governments that had laws that were not respectful of these human rights on the books went along with that.

And so, again, thinking tactically about how to do it and how these norms become more salient in international law, I think, is very important. But it is in our interest to have maximum economic inclusion that’s consistent with our economic objectives as a country and our foreign-policy interests. It is in our interest to fight repression against whomever it is being carried out. And it is in our foreign-policy interest to stand up for our values.

President Biden’s polling, I think, reflects broad approval, surging poll numbers; I think a tripling in global polls about—when the question is posed, do you think Joe Biden will do the right thing, a tripling from his predecessor. And if you talk to people around the world and sort of get a sense of why, the fact that human rights are so central to President Biden’s argument and democracy and the importance of democracy delivering, that’s a major distinguishing feature not only of this administration but really of US foreign policy from some of the big geopolitical actors who are more and more active.

So if we go quiet, just in the same way that if we were to go quiet on the rights of Christians in societies in which they are being persecuted, and just defer to prevailing, you know, what is taken as prevailing popular sentiment, I think we would really shortchange what is distinguishing about American foreign policy.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: One more question from me before we open it up to Q&A, and that’s this. Everything you say is, you know, terrific and wonderful in terms of what the administration is doing, American values. But I just wonder, when you travel around the world or talk to your counterparts, particularly those in, say, Uganda and elsewhere, how do you respond to what they might say, such as, you know, well, your own country’s, you know, no—you know, no garden party. You’ve got book bans and drag-queen story hours being banned and don’t-say-gay laws. And we’re awaiting a Supreme Court decision, possibly tomorrow, definitely by Friday, on whether a cake decorator can say, no, I’m not going to decorate your cake because your same-sex marriage, you know, goes against my beliefs.

How do you deal with that when that is thrown back in your face from foreign leaders?

SAMANTHA POWER: You know, we have a policy that Jay has helped shepherd through USAID which will be the first-of-its-kind LGBTQIA+ policy that’ll be out soon. And one of its many, I think, important features is it speaks of the importance of going forth in a spirit of humility and ally-ship. And I’ve already spoken, I think, a little bit about the ally-ship point.

But in general—you know, you didn’t mention the insurrection. You know, like—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Well, I mean, it wasn’t—

SAMANTHA POWER: There’s plenty—there’s—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: It wasn’t an LGBTQIA+ insurrection. So I figured I’d just leave—

SAMANTHA POWER: No, that’s a good point.

JONATHAN CAPEHART:—leave that out. But go on.

SAMANTHA POWER: No, but what I mean is in general we are standing up for democracy and human rights as we are facing domestically very, very significant challenges. And I’ve broadened the aperture a little bit from your question, though your question is very valid, you know, as focused on our discussion, our topic for today.

But I don’t even think we can think about LGBTQIA+ rights outside of the broader context of the anti-democratic movements that exist all over the world, including—you know, which include not recognizing results of elections, including resorting to violence, including, you know, some cases partnering with, you know, outside repressive actors who would seek to widen divisions within democracies.

So, you know, the statistics, it’s—you know, I think it’s sixteen years of freedom in decline around the world. And what we see is attacks on minorities generally—sometimes religious minorities; sometimes LGBTQI+ communities—are often the canary in the coal mine about a broader set of measures and a broader kind of consolidation of power away from the people and in the center. And certainly, a diminishment of checks and balances. I think that’s the abiding feature. And minority rights and the rights of marginalized communities fundamentally are checks on majoritarianism in our country and globally.

So, you know, I think if you go—and I’m not saying that we don’t have, you know, as you put it, kind of thrown back at us things that are happening in this country. But I think really since President Obama, and very much carried through with President Biden, we tend to kind of preempt that moment by situating the dialogue about [LGBTQI+] rights in our own struggles, and not leaving the elephant in the room, you know, over here. But to say, look, we’re—this is—we’re in the midst of, you know, many of these same challenges. There are forces in our countries—in our country that would also wish to go back to what is remembered as a simpler time.

And, you know, often I think that actually sets the stage for a more productive conversation, because it’s not a finger-wagging—you know, you may condemn something that has happened and use the leverage of the United States to demand, you know, a repeal. But it is not from a glass house that we are having conversations like this. And I was just in Africa, and I’ll be traveling again. I mean, the dialogue that we have is a humble dialogue. But it is one that has a North Star that I think can animate us both and that is rooted, fundamentally, not only in American values, at their core, but in international instruments and in universal values.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And so we’re going to open it up to questions. There is a microphone, oh, I thought it was on a stand. It’s an actual person. Thank you. Thank you very much. We’re going to go until about—if I can find my thing—until about quarter to four. So the microphone is there. Short questions, so we can get more answers in. Go ahead.

Q: Hi, Administrator Power. My name is Ryan Arick. I’m an assistant director here at the Atlantic Council. I’m really thrilled to have you here today.

I wanted to ask a question related to US development assistance to Ukraine, and specifically how we’re looking at the LGBTQI+ angle as far as our assistance during the ongoing war. I would appreciate your thoughts. Thank you.

SAMANTHA POWER: You want to go one by one, or?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Yeah.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Quickly.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK. So in brief, one of the things you’ll see, again, in the forthcoming policy, is a broad emphasis on thinking within USAID and within our humanitarian emergency programing about inclusion and about proactive outreach and services. I think there’s been—we’ve always, of course, been for an inclusive process to find and to serve beneficiaries. But to think—you know, to think that all beneficiaries will come forward equally in all communities is not accurate. And so, you know, how this plays out in any specific crisis area, you know, that’s going to be fundamentally up to our engagement with our implementing partners, like the World Food Program, like the ICRC and others. But there is a broad embrace of inclusive response and a broad recognition that gravity alone is not going to get you there.

Again, we’re quite far along in Ukraine because I think the government has every incentive—you know, not saying that there isn’t discrimination that occurs in Ukraine, or that some of those fears don’t still exist. But there are a lot of incentives pulling policy and enforcement in a constructive direction, given the European journey that they are very committed to. But imagine, you know, in other parts of the world where there isn’t that, you know, legal framework or that political will at high levels and so that’s why crisis is going to be very important.

The other thing I’d say is, of course, just continuing our HIV/AIDS work full speed ahead, any work we do in human rights, thinking—so, again, there’s the dedicated LGBTQI+ work and then there’s making sure that all of our programming in these other areas is inclusive of that.

So just—and, finally, just we’ve done a lot with hotlines. There’s so much trauma, so much need for psychosocial service and care. We work very closely with Mrs. Zelensky as well, who has really pushed mental health and so forth. So you will see both in our development programming and in our emergency humanitarian programming, provided the resources are there, which we have to work with Congress to continue to mobilize, but a very significant allocation as well to recognizing the trauma and then the unique traumas that may apply to different communities, including this one.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. We’ve got six questions, ten minutes. So what I want to really try to do is two questions at a time. And, Madam Administrator, if you could—a little more brief—to the first two, ask the questions and then we’ll have the administrator answer. Quick questions.

Q: Hi, Administrator Power. My name is Katie. I’m a graduate student at Johns Hopkins SAIS right in Dupont Circle.

And my question for you kind of revolves around the other countries we haven’t talked about. We’ve talked a lot about Ukraine, Uganda. But what should the USAID and other people in the United States what other countries should we focus on for human rights violations, especially in the community?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Great.

I’m going to get one more.

Q: Hi, Administrator. My name is Divya. I’m an undergraduate at Stanford University and I’m currently an intern at the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency.

My question for you is how and if you have handled and talked about tech governance in regards to LGBTQI+ rights and misinformation, perhaps, regarding HIV/AIDS, vaccines, and more.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Two simple questions—in nine minutes. I’m going to—I’m keeping us on time.

SAMANTHA POWER: So on the first question, I would say that there is a spate now of laws, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa but not only, that are at various stages of legislative movement. Let’s put it that way.

Now, what focus entails, again, you know, I think filtering it through what do our partners on the ground think would be most advantageous for any particular individual or entity or institution to do, as we’ve discussed, it’s—you know, figuring that out is no easy proposition. But I think the New York Times recently did a study that did a lay down of how many country—what stage of passage, you know, these laws were.

I mean, it’s kind of—it’s kicked up what’s happened in Uganda and even our response to it has kicked up, you know, more vocal leadership to push through further exacerbating criminalization measures as, by the way, have really important positive decisions that have been made in Africa.

That, in turn, has generated a backlash and we’ve seen something very similar here, of course, over many, many decades where anti-discrimination ordinances, for example, in Florida—you know, I mean, decades ago—then kicked off major—you know, very, very pronounced counter reactions, massive fundraising, et cetera. That’s happening, too, where for a step forward it then, you know, ignites, you know, certain forces and antibodies and then you see, you know, proactive moves that really can set back those rights.

So, again, the tactics I think we’d have to be very, very case specific. But, you know, where I would—especially for those of you who are in civil society or not in the government per se, the actual support for the organizations. And you’ll have the chance, as well, in this country—those of you who are active in the LGBTQI+ community—through the Welcome Corps at the State Department—this is—I’m sorry I’m going on, but this is a very exciting development that we will actually have the chance—in addition to processing people who are being persecuted on the grounds of their sexual orientation or gender identity, we will have the chance as community members to welcome these individuals. Now, that infrastructure is being built and it’s not, you know—you know, yet where there’s a number for you to call, but all of us will have a—well, there’s a number to call for Welcome Corps, but I’m saying very specifically—

SAMANTHA POWER: For—from this—OK. I was told that we were—we were still some weeks away from that. Well, what is the number that people should call, then, if they want—

AUDIENCE MEMBER: There’s a link on—

SAMANTHA POWER: What is the link?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: RainbowRailroad.org.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK. That’s the State Department program?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No.

SAMANTHA POWER: No, no, no, OK. So I’m—sorry, I was talking—

AUDIENCE MEMBER:—to Welcome Corps.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK, great. OK. So RainbowRailroad.org will refer you. I think the State Department piece we are still moving out to make sure that these partnerships can be ignited in rapid fire.

And then the second question, Jonathan, was?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I wrote in my notes tech governance.

SAMANTHA POWER: Tech governance.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Yes.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yes is the short answer. I’ve engaged them—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: We have—we have five minutes and five questions to go.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yes. I have—I have engaged them on disinformation generally, and this is a very important subcomponent. Discrimination isn’t new. Persecution isn’t new. The amount of disinformation, including deepfakes showing President Biden vilifying LGBTQI+—I mean, you know, these things are really exacerbating an already very challenging situation.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. And so we have one, two, three, four, five questions, five minutes. Lord Jesus. All right.

Here’s what I want to do. I want you each to ask your very brief question so your question at least gets articulated, and then Administrator Power will answer. Real quickly.

SAMANTHA POWER: All five.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: All five. All five. Because now we have four minutes.

Q: Thank you very much.

Very quickly, what would you say to other countries that stand on principle of noninterference, we don’t get to tell other governments how to treat their people? Very briefly. Thank you.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Thank you.

Q: Yes. My name is Bishop Joseph Tolton.

Domestically in our country, White supremacy one can argue is cradled by the far religious right in our country. These actors are also responsible for the racialization of homophobia across Africa. Are there whole-of-government conversations about how to hold these actors accountable for their racialized efforts?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Great question.

Q: Hi. David Stacy, Human Rights Campaign.

As you know, nondiscrimination is a touchstone of equality, and the administration right now is reviewing the requirements for grantees and cooperative agreements and across the foreign assistance agencies. Can you speak to the need to do that and USAID’s role in helping the other agencies do something where we’re applying it across the board with all of the agencies on an equal basis?

Q: Hi. Mark Bromley with Council for Global Equality.

You spoke about the value of both dedicated LGBTQI+ funding and integrated funding, and we’re excited that that fifteen million is increased to twenty-five million this year. But on the integration point, how are you thinking about measuring integration for LGBTQI+ persons, particularly in places where, you know, being [LGBTQI+] may be criminalized, it’s difficult/dangerous to measure? How do we make sure that’s more than lip service and that that integration is really happening? Because that is where the true value lies.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Last question.

Q: Hi there. My name is Bryce Dawson from Counterpart International.

You mentioned the difficulties of minimizing intrusion and tactically advocating for LGBTQI+ rights in other nations, as well as mentioned potential procurement policies to ensure [LGBTQI+] protections. Do you have any in the pipeline that you’re working on or anything in the future?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I want to thank everyone for their—for their questions, all five of you or seven altogether. Madam Administrator, you have two minutes.

SAMANTHA POWER: Thirty seconds.

Well, you know, I think that in general we—in our engagements on human rights issues, we hear a lot about noninterference. I mean, there’s no question. I heard about it a lot at the UN. We hear it often from, you know, countries like the Russian Federation that have invaded another country and tried to take over the other country. We hear it from countries that are providing surveillance technology, you know, to other countries, or fueling disinformation in the countries in which we are working.

So, you know, it is a shield. It is an important one to take seriously, because we also, of course, respect sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and so forth. So USAID is active across sectors and involved in these countries. And this agenda, I think, is—and, by that, it’s the human rights agenda more broadly—is central to how we believe as well that we will get the most out of the programs that we are doing across sectors.

And that brings me—and that’s the kind of conversation we have. Is, like, I was using Uganda as an example about making sure that we are also making the pragmatic case for people who are very skeptical because, again, they—there is a kind of seamlessness to the way our work across governance and human rights in citizen security and in the broad sweep of development sectors—from agriculture, to education, to health, et cetera—they do come together in service of development objectives. And that’s what the SDG’s also enshrine.

And then I’m not going to be able to do justice to the other questions in full, beyond I think the point about measuring integration is very important. You know, for those who are not making their identity known to us, that’s not going to be something that, you know, we will be able to measure in that sense. But I think these are the kinds of things that we are working through, through this policy, to make sure that this isn’t just, yes, here’s our standalone programming, and then by everything else we do, you know, operates in the way that we’ve always done it.

And so it’s not going to be, you know, instant, where everything is happening all at once. But all of our missions have to have inclusive development advisors or somebody—and this will be evident out of the policy—but somebody who is a focal point for working on LGBTQI+ rights and programming. So we’re hopeful that that, plus our new office of chief economist, will help us develop a kind of methodology that will be responsive to this concern that somehow it’s going to be invisible and not done, which is certainly our objective is for it to be done and, when appropriate, visible. And certainly, at least visible to us so we know whether we’re achieving what we’re setting out to achieve.

And then, lastly, I would just say, because it’s coming, the point about nondiscrimination among beneficiaries is just really important. And that guidance will be forthcoming, we hope, soon.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Do you have any thoughts on the other question about—I wrote it down real fast, but I know I got it wrong—about the racialized religious efforts on LGBTQI+ rights that have been happening?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I guess all I would say on that—because there are others in our government, I think, who are working on the kind of conversation that was asked about—is just this is another part of the response to the noninterference charge, is—that we do hear from people who don’t want to be engaged on human rights issues. And that is that there are a lot of actors from outside who are very active actually in pushing certain forms of legislation that would have these discriminatory, and these exclusionary, and these dangerous effects. And so, again, the noninterference claim is usually made in a selective way.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And with that, and just two minutes overtime, Samantha Power, nineteenth administrator of USAID. Thank you very, very much for being here.

SAMANTHA POWER: Thank you.

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Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 28 Jun 2023 22:06:15 +0000

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears eager to take full credit for his role in countering Russia’s short-lived but hugely significant recent Wagner rebellion. Speaking on June 27 just days after the uprising came to an abrupt end, Lukashenka provided a detailed and highly flattering account of negotiations with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin that contrasted his own strong leadership with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s apparent indecisiveness.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine.

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort.

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:47:32 +0000

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A blueprint for Turkey’s resilient reconstruction and recovery post-earthquake

Karim Elgendy — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 19:36:30 +0000

The earthquake that struck Turkey and Syria on February 6, 2023, caused widespread devastation. The death toll was estimated at over fifty thousand people, of which around 46,000 were in Turkey. In addition, the earthquake initially left millions of people homeless and without access to basic necessities across the two-hundred-mile-long path of destruction.

In the aftermath of such disasters, there is often a rush to quickly rebuild and restore affected areas. However, Turkey must rebuild its affected cities in a sustainable way that provides for both the short- and long-term needs of its residents. This requires holistic planning, community engagement, and integrating urban sustainability and resilience.

In Turkey, more than 160,000 buildings containing 520,000 apartments collapsed or were severely damaged across provinces such as Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, Gaziantep, and Malatya. According to data from the Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change, the vast majority of the affected buildings were built before 1999. In addition, official estimates in the months after the earthquake indicated that more than 230,000 buildings would have to be demolished, representing approximately 30 percent of the existing building stock.

In response, the Turkish government announced an ambitious plan to build 488,000 homes in the affected region within a year. It also pledged to build an unspecified number of nonresidential buildings such as schools and hospitals. The plan also includes retrofitting and strengthening the existing properties that have sustained light, nonstructural damage, as well as redeveloping infrastructure such as roads and bridges.

The plan is overseen by the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change, and the work is being assigned to the Turkish Housing Development Administration (TOKI), a government agency that has been building public housing for the last four decades. TOKI had recently reported that 134,000 of the houses it built in the earthquake zone did not suffer any structural damage. It did not, however, rule out that any of its buildings were affected.

Construction is already under way in some areas. On May 3, the outgoing minister of environment, urbanization, and climate change announced that 132,000 housing units are already under construction. The total reconstruction cost is estimated to exceed one hundred billion dollars.

Sustainable reconstruction

As long as builders follow Turkey’s earthquake codes for construction, those units and others will be built to be earthquake-resistant. Yet to capitalize on this massive investment and to reduce future risks, the planned neighborhoods and buildings should not merely be resilient to future earthquakes: They should also be rebuilt resilient to known hazards caused or intensified by climate change.

According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Southern Turkey is expected to experience more frequent heatwaves and droughts, in addition to higher temperatures and sea levels. If newly built homes become unlivable in a just few decades because builders didn’t take into account future cooling and ventilation needs, or if neighborhoods rebuilt after this earthquake suffer from congestion and pollution in the future, such large-scale investments could become stranded assets. Major reconstruction at this scale should also not only adapt to climate change but also mitigate it; cities should be sustainably rebuilt so that their damage to the environment—and contribution to climate change—is limited.

Turkish officials’ desires to reconstruct quickly is understandable given the urgency to restore normalcy. However, the benefits of rebuilding with long-term viability in mind—by taking the time to plan for more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive neighborhoods—far outweigh the short-term gains of hasty reconstruction.

In order to rebuild sustainably, builders should approach reconstruction with a wider focus on districts and neighborhoods rather than a narrow focus on individual buildings and infrastructure. These new neighborhoods should use land efficiently, with buildings that have smaller footprints, in order to make more land available for public green spaces—which offer nearby residents improved air quality, among other benefits—urban agriculture, and pedestrian and cycling paths.

Despite the availability of bus networks, cars still represent a significant share of transportation in the five most affected provinces, which contributes to air pollution and traffic congestion. Planning for future neighborhoods should mix residential and commercial areas to reduce the need for commuting. The planning should also develop reliable and sustainable transportation networks, similar to the Kahramanmaraş 2030 transportation plans. This includes measures to reduce air pollution such as encouraging residents to use public transportation and minimizing spaces dedicated to car parking.

The planning that shapes these new neighborhoods should also aim to create a more comfortable environment for residents. This includes orienting the street network and designing buildings in a way that allows for breezes during hot seasons. It also includes planting trees and vegetation and using new materials for roofs and pavements. These measures help keep the sun’s heat at bay while managing rainfall naturally to reduce flooding risk. Local ecosystems such as forests, wetlands, and agricultural lands under threat from deforestation, pollution, and climate change should also be restored.

New neighborhoods also need to be planned with future energy and water use in mind. This includes reducing peak electricity demand by designing buildings that require minimal energy to heat and cool and providing spaces for power installations on rooftops and above pedestrian walkways. Improving water efficiency is also critical given that the five most affected provinces already face high levels of water stress.

The new neighborhoods should also be planned so that they do not displace vulnerable communities and disrupt their social networks and livelihoods. These risks can be avoided by including these communities in the planning, including at the local community level, and engaging stakeholders in the decision-making process.

Leveraging international assistance

In any humanitarian crisis, the pressure on local and national decision makers to act quickly is always immense. Yet, hasty reconstruction brings many risks: inefficient land use; the increased use of energy, water, and material resources; increased carbon emissions; a higher flooding risk; increased congestion; poor air quality; limited access to public spaces; loss of biodiversity; increased vulnerability to climate change impacts; and increased social and economic inequality. The long-term cost of failing to address these issues is nothing short of a failure to protect the surviving earthquake victims and other residents from future disasters.

Being less constrained by the pressure to rebuild hastily, international donors could play a role in ensuring a more positive outcome in Turkey. The European Union pledged six billion euros in grants and loans, while the World Bank pledged $1.78 billion in initial assistance to help with relief and recovery efforts in Turkey. If those institutions and future international donors encourage Turkish policymakers to create sustainable, resilient, and inclusive neighborhoods, they could have a positive impact on the trajectory of the reconstruction efforts.

The window of opportunity to create the foundations for more sustainable and resilient cities is narrow and closing quickly. Thoughtful and inclusive planning requires additional coordination and consultation and may result in a delay of a few weeks or months. Yet it remains the only way to capitalize on this opportunity for Turkey and to address the needs of both current residents and future generations.

Karim Elgendy is an urban sustainability and climate expert based in London. He is an associate director at Buro Happold, an associate fellow at Chatham House, and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington. Elgendy is also the founder and coordinator of Carboun, an advocacy initiative promoting sustainability in cities of the Middle East and North Africa through research and communication.

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‘Any nationality just not Syrian’: Refugee deportations surge in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey

Arwa Damon — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 16:11:25 +0000

“Bring me any nationality, anything, just not Syrian,” joked the Jordanian work permit processing official to Yousef, the Syrian man standing in front of him.

Yousef is not his real name. We’re not disclosing his identity nor additional details due to the precarious nature of his current circumstances. He has been in his profession for nearly ten years, operating an organization in Amman. Yousef’s career has been progressing remarkably. But none of that carries any weight in this instance.

“I’m sorry, there’s nothing I can do. No Syrians,” the official reaffirmed.

The clock is running out on Yousef’s temporary visa in Jordan, necessitating his exit. But where is he to go?

“I felt like walls were closing in on me. I couldn’t breathe,” He confides in me. “I’m out of options.”

He’s not the only one. Facebook private chat groups for Syrian in Jordan are filled with confusion and anxiety. Questions fly back and forth: “Does anyone know if there is a new procedure?” “Is there a way to prolong deportation?” “What happens if I’m stopped on the street?”

Going back to Syria carries the risk of potential detention risk despite the regime’s continuous claims of amnesty for returnees. No one I have spoken to trusts the regime’s claim, and all know that detention in Syria most likely ends in death.

But it’s not just Jordan where Syrians must fear deportation. Living in Turkey has become increasingly difficult as well. Even Syrians who own property in Turkey are getting their residencies rejected. Lebanon is a non-starter.

It’s a terrifying situation to be in. It’s a sort of fear that doesn’t dissipate, and a different one to the sort that drove Syrians out of their homes and into this wretched existence, where they’ve been branded as refugees—rejected and unwanted seemingly everywhere.

I get a message from a mother I know in Lebanon:

“Arwa, please, you have to do something. They are not going to renew our papers. You have to save us.” Umm Mohammed’s voice is cracking, breaking, desperate.

Umm Mohammed and her family fled Syria ten years ago. Her youngest children were born in Lebanon, and her eldest daughter is in university. While life in Lebanon has grown increasingly unbearable for them—the hatred they receive for being Syrian forces them to rarely venture out—at least they encountered no issues with their yearly permit That is, until now.

A relative who knows the family said he was informed through an official that their papers would be stamped “deport/leave”.

“We can’t go back. We just can’t. Our house was destroyed after we left. It was bombed. We have nothing.” Umm Mohammed is begging and begging. “My kids’ lives are here. They are all in school. I haven’t been able to tell my husband yet. He will have a stroke.”

Umm Mohammed and her family registered with the United Nations (UN) in 2013 as refugees. Umm Mohammed says that five years ago, they were called in twice for asylum interviews. Such hope they had! But then they got a phone call from someone who told them they were rejected while failing to provide a reason. Umm Mohammed says they’ve called the numbers on their papers to try to understand why, but no one even answers the phone. They personally visited the offices in their area and in Beirut. However, they could not even get through the front door.

She doesn’t understand what is happening in her life; how everything is just so out of her control. Two of her siblings who interviewed at the same time as her family were resettled in other countries years ago. One is in Norway, and the other is in the United States.

“Please, please just do something to try and see if you can get an answer; if there is anything we can do to get our file moving again.” Umm Mohammed pleads to me. “Our lives are in your hands. My children’s lives are in your hands.”

I called the number on the paperwork she provided me numerous times but received no answer. I’ve reached out to people I know to see if they can point me in the right direction or to the right person. This is hardly the first time I’ve heard about Syrians struggling to get in touch with the UN in Lebanon or to get updates on their status.

The Arab League’s decision to “normalize” relations with the government of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has pushed a fast-forward button on making life harder for Syrian refugees in the region through deportations and rejections of residencies. But it’s hardly anything new.

While Syria’s neighboring countries have long been struggling to host their Syrian refugee populations, with many, like Lebanon, being in a complete crisis of their own, the sheer lack of care provided to refugees is inhumane. This should not be regarded as a “Syria” problem. This is one of the core problems in the overall approach toward managing Syrian refugees. Neighboring countries need to be provided with the support—which has never fully materialized despite pledges—to host and treat their refugee populations with humanity.

Ahmed al-Reems’ story is especially jarring. He arrived in Turkey in 2019, settling in a village around 40 km from the heart of the capital, Ankara. Late last year, Turkish security forces came for him, his wife, his two-year-old son, and his four-year-old daughter in the middle of the night.

“We didn’t understand what was happening, it was 4 am, and they were banging on the door shouting police! police!” Ahmed tells me over the phone. “They said we just want to take you to the immigration department. I asked them to let me pack a bag, at least take diapers for my littlest one. He told me don’t worry about it; you will be back home in a bit.”

When his family boarded the bus, they realized that it was packed with other Syrian families from their same area. Eighteen families—around sixty people in all—had been rounded up at the same time.

They were held for twenty-four hours in a detention facility. There were no blankets nor food, and the conditions were filthy. Ahmed says he and his family were then boarded on another bus and told that they were going to another area in Ankara. Instead, they were driven for hours to Gaziantep (which is close to the border with Syria), given papers, and ordered to sign them.

“I said no at first, but they insisted. I didn’t want to create problems, so we did. I still thought I had a chance of going back home,” Yousef recalls, his voice utterly dejected. “At 6 am, they took us to the border crossing and just shoved us away.”

The presence of Syrian refugees was central to the recent elections in Turkey. The opposition party spouted hateful anti-refugee rhetoric and vowed to rid the country of them. While less vocal about their intentions, the government coalition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who won the presidential vote, has been deporting Syrians for years. However, generally speaking, expulsion had been reserved for those who had not renewed their papers, traveled outside of their permit zone, or incurred other minor infractions.

“It might have been because of the elections,” Ahmed speculates, “but I still don’t understand. I had my residency; we were all legal. I didn’t do anything wrong. I’ve never had any problems.”

In Turkey, they had managed to build a home again. Not exactly the same as the one they had fled from when the bombs arrived in their town in Syria, but it was still a home, filled with their personal belongings and the children’s toys. It’s all gone again. They are back to living in a tent in Idlib.

“I still feel like I’m going to wake up from this nightmare,” Ahmed says. “I feel like I am a dead man.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. She is also the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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Beyond the battlefield: Why we should invest in Ukraine’s democratic future

Peter Erben, Gio Kobakhidze — Mon, 19 Jun 2023 12:31:50 +0000

With all eyes on Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive aimed at liberating the country from Russian occupation, there is also much talk throughout Ukraine and beyond on what happens next. This will be one of the main issues on the agenda at this year’s Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC), which the United Kingdom and Ukraine will host jointly in London in late June. The forthcoming conference will bring together leaders from the international community, international financial institutions, the private sector, and civil society to mobilize international support for Ukraine’s postwar economic and social stabilization.

International support will unquestionably continue to be critical for Ukraine’s ability to withstand and prevail in the face of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, as it will be for Ukraine’s further recovery and reconstruction. In this vein, it is crucial to acknowledge that Ukraine’s commitment to democratic resilience, both during the war and in the post-war phase, is essential to maintaining and expanding these much-needed investments.

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Prior to the February 2022 full-scale invasion of their country, Ukrainians already had a long history of fighting hard for their rights and freedoms. During the decades following the Soviet collapse, independent Ukraine saw significant progress toward mostly free and fair elections and other basic human rights. The nation also decentralized political and budgetary powers, brought greater transparency to government spending, overhauled its banking sector, and made headway on improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, many of which are slated for privatization.

Despite the horrors of the Russian invasion, a number of current indications suggest Ukraine is ready for further progress. The Ukrainian military is now one of the most powerful in Europe. An influential civil society and a relatively free press are among the stronger pillars of this vibrant democracy. The technology sector is thriving and is helping to dismantle what had been a stifling bureaucracy, one of many hangovers from the Soviet Union. But much work remains.

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Today, military victory is obviously Ukraine’s top national priority. At the same time, any Ukrainian will tell you that one of the many realities separating them from Russia is that Ukrainians have a clear military objective and, unlike Russia, know what they are fighting for: freedom. The steps needed to achieve this freedom will extend beyond the battlefield and will include further advances in decentralization, political pluralism, press freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, and democratic elections.

It will, for example, be critical for Ukraine to ensure free and fair elections when the country returns to party politics following the end of armed hostilities with Russia. For this to happen, time will be needed to ensure that necessary legislative amendments are passed in an open manner; that political competitors have reasonable and equitable access to the media; that the electoral infrastructure is ready; that financial reporting for political contestants resumes; and that voter registration lists are up to date. As the international community gathers to plan support for Ukraine’s recovery, it is essential that Ukraine’s allies stand ready to support this critical aspect of the nation’s future.

Just as Ukraine has surpassed all expectations in its courageous fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion launched 16 months ago, the nation must also outperform reform expectations once it defeats Russia’s military. After all, this embodies what the nation is fighting for. Further reform measures are also critical as a means of securing continued and expanding support from the country’s international partners, including for recovery and reconstruction.

Ukraine’s heroic resistance to Russia’s war of aggression is the story of a progressing democracy’s resistance to autocracy. The free world is providing military, economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine because most view Ukraine’s struggle as their own. In this sense, Russia’s full-scale invasion is not only a criminal assault against a sovereign country, but against democracy everywhere. The world needs to see Ukraine’s recovery in the same light as a chance to advance shared democratic values.

Peter Erben is Principal Advisor at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (global) and Senior Country Director at IFES Ukraine. Gio Kobakhidze is Deputy Country Director at IFES Ukraine.

In 1958, public discontent led to the monarchy’s overthrow. During the subsequent republic era, from 1958 to 2003 and under leaders like Saddam Hussein, Iraq witnessed a transition to a presidential republic. Divisions, instability, foreign conflicts, and crippling sanctions revealed the limitations of both systems. Iraq’s journey towards stability and effective governance remains an ongoing struggle.

The US-led invasion in 2003 brought about a new constitution and transformed Iraq’s political system into a federal parliamentary republic. The parliament emerged as the most powerful government branch, with the authority to vote in or out the president and prime minister, pass the budget bill, ratify international conventions, and approve cabinet and ambassadorship positions. The parliament, which is known as the Council of Representatives, is one of the most diverse elected councils in the Middle East; Iraqi groups, particularly women and minorities, are represented proportionally. Despite obstacles and the influence of money and weapons, Iraq has managed to hold national elections regularly every four years. This has resulted in peaceful transitions of power, a significant achievement that was lacking in Iraq prior to 2003.

Recently, in his Foreign Policy article, former Iraqi President Barham Salih called for what is essentially a presidential system. This call harkened back to the message of the Tishreen protest movement, made up of Iraqis taking to the streets in October 2019 to demand political reform. Multiple Shia political figures have also expressed their support for a presidential system.

While some argue that a shift to a presidential system—with a balanced legislative branch and a president elected through popular vote—could help overcome Iraq’s sectarian divide and facilitate reforms, what really matters is the quality of leadership and the resilience of civil society. There is a misperception among the Iraqi youth as well as the elite that only a strongman can fix Iraq’s many problems while the issues are way more complex than that. The current constitution, despite its shortcomings, provides the necessary tools that Iraqi leaders need to establish a stable, prosperous, and democratic country. For example, the Iraqi Political Party Law of 2015 provides legal tools to establish new parties—currently, there are hundreds of new parties registered in Iraq. This may lead to chaos, but it defuses political disagreement among various groups. Additionally, the constitution gave significant executive power to a prime minister to rule the country, while giving the parliament strong oversight.

What Iraq truly needs are democratic leaders who prioritize the nation’s interests over personal gain. For example, Iraq needs leaders that will prioritize job-creation reforms, rather than channeling public wealth to buy votes. Iraq also needs a strong civil society capable of uniting Iraqis on crucial matters. Leaders must be willing to make necessary compromises, embrace diversity, and treat citizens based on democratic principles rather than sectarian or ethnic identities. The achievement of democracy and stability relies on democratic leadership and a vibrant civil society that effectively mobilizes people towards shared national goals.

Unfortunately, Iraq currently lacks a robust civil society capable of nationwide mobilization and unity. Furthermore, the existing political party structure fails to embrace Iraq’s diversity, favoring specific sects, ethnicities, or religious groups. Although the October 2019 demonstrations showed promise in uniting Iraqi youth across ethnic and sectarian lines on economic and justice issues, their aspirations were not fully realized in reshaping the political landscape.

How the international community plays a role

Iraq’s current parliamentary system faces significant obstacles, such as sectarianism, ethnic division, political fragmentation, corruption, weakness in its institutions, security concerns, and socioeconomic and development issues. Tackling these issues requires a concerted effort to strengthen institutions and, in those institutions, promote inclusivity, combat corruption, foster reconciliation, and ensure effective governance. But efforts to take on these challenges shouldn’t focus solely on institutional change—they should also focus on investing in the current and future leaders of the country.

The international community, particularly the United States and Europe, has made significant investments in Iraq’s democratic system. Unfortunately, corruption and sectarianism have undermined these investments over time, highlighting that it’ll take an extensive and holistic strategy to improve democracy in Iraq.

That strategy should first include investments in Iraqi youth, as they will ultimately shape the country’s future. The United States and European Union should specifically prioritize empowering Iraqi youth, developing their leadership abilities, and creating a sense of national unity. By investing in education, creating opportunities for civic participation, and providing platforms for dialogue and cooperation among the diverse communities within Iraq’s borders, international support could foster a new generation of democratic leaders that prioritize all Iraqis’ interests over individual interests.

Additionally, the international community should increase its financial support for civil-society organizations in Iraq, as these play an instrumental role in reconciling ethnic divisions while promoting democratic principles among younger people.

By supporting the development of Iraqi youth and promoting a robust civil society, the international community can help invest in Iraq’s democratic future, unify all Iraqis, and lead the country towards peace, prosperity, and democratic stability.

Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and was a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021.

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Less than half of 1 percent of human trafficking victims are identified. That needs to change.

John Cotton Richmond — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 13:36:22 +0000

Human trafficking victims suffer because governments lag behind. On Thursday, the US Department of State published its annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP report), and the facts should shock us all. Traffickers operate with impunity, forced labor sustains global supply chains, predators rent children for commercial sex, and governments fail to implement strong enough action plans, laws, and treaties to stop them.

One of the most glaring examples of governments’ poor performance is the egregiously low number of victims governments identify—a problem I routinely faced over the last two decades working on this issue as a federal prosecutor, nongovernmental organization leader, and US ambassador. The United Nations (UN) Protocol to Combat Trafficking in Persons is one of the most widely subscribed instruments of international law, under which governments commit to identifying the people whom traffickers exploit. According to the latest TIP report, however, governments around the world reported identifying only 115,324 human trafficking victims in the last year. This number comes from data governments provide to the US State Department about the number of victims whom law enforcement or nongovernmental organizations identify and who receive protection services. Although this number is higher than last year’s number, it is slightly lower than the high of 118,932 victims identified in 2019.

The UN estimates that traffickers are compelling 27.6 million people into forced labor or sex trafficking.

Meanwhile, the estimated number of human trafficking victims is increasing. Compare the number of victims that governments reported identifying with the UN estimate based on surveys and data modeling. The UN estimates that traffickers are compelling 27.6 million people into forced labor or sex trafficking.

If 27.6 million victims exist and governments are only identifying 115,324 victims, then the world only identifies less than half of 1 percent of the estimated victims (0.4 percent). This means that 99.6 percent of victims remain trapped by their traffickers, unable to decide where they work or who touches their bodies.

Sex trafficking dominates the discussion of governments’ lackluster victim identification efforts. Forced labor has received less attention, but in this year’s TIP report governments identified a higher number of forced labor victims than in any prior year: 24,340. This improvement, along with governments prosecuting the largest number of labor traffickers, is encouraging. However, when the victim identification statistics are isolated for just forced labor, governments are only identifying 0.1 percent of the total estimated forced labor victims.

Victim identification is made even more difficult due to state-sanctioned human trafficking. The TIP report found that in eleven countries, the governments themselves trafficked people. These offenders include Cuba, North Korea, Eritrea, and China, where millions of Uyghurs are forced to work in Xinjiang reeducation camps. It is especially odious when the government charged with identifying victims is, in fact, the perpetrator.

Without effective victim identification, governments cannot hold traffickers accountable, and people of goodwill cannot offer tailored, trauma-informed services to trafficking survivors. Society cannot address what it cannot identify. Victim identification is the prerequisite to successful prosecution and prevention of this crime. Yet, governments’ rate of victim identification is appallingly low.

It is time for governments to match their rhetoric with their resources and dramatically increase funding for prevention efforts, investigators, prosecutors, service providers, and trauma-informed care. Specialized investigative units should no longer be paper tigers. Survivor leadership should no longer be an ornamental add-on. Holding companies and individuals accountable for committing human trafficking crimes should no longer be elective. Human trafficking victims should no longer be prosecuted for the unlawful acts their traffickers compel them to commit.

Improvement and success must begin with increased victim identification. There are several practical steps that concerned citizens should ask their governments to take:

Mandate that educators and health care providers become mandatory reporters.
Invest in specialized investigative units and prosecutors focused on stopping traffickers.
Create pathways for survivors to rid themselves of criminal records caused by their traffickers.
Ensure companies are not using forced laborers to produce solar panels, electric vehicles, apparel, tomatoes, and batteries.
Fund trauma-informed services for survivors.
Elevate and center survivors in the fight to put traffickers out of business.

Traffickers thrive in an ecosystem where mere intentions and underfunded public justice systems are their only challenges. It is time for leaders to arise and become champions for freedom. Millions of victims count on governments, civil society, and faith communities to do more than merely care about their plight, designate awareness days, and think good thoughts. Survivors need the world to accelerate its strategic investment and meaningful action to increase victim identification.

John Cotton Richmond is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, chief impact officer at Atlas Free, president of the Libertas Council, and former US ambassador-at-large to monitor and combat trafficking in persons.

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Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 23:31:15 +0000

As Ukraine’s long awaited counteroffensive gets underway, a new survey has found that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are ready to continue the war beyond the summer campaign if necessary in order to complete the liberation of the country. The poll, conducted in late May and early June by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), found that 84% of Ukrainians opposed making any territorial concessions to Russia, even if this means prolonging the war.

In line with other surveys of public opinion in wartime Ukraine, the KIIS poll identified strikingly similar attitudes across the country, with 75% of respondents in eastern Ukraine ruling out any territorial concessions compared to 84% in central Ukraine and 86% in both the south and west. This illustrates the unifying impact the Russian invasion has had on Ukrainian public opinion, and underlines the significance of the ongoing war as a major milestone in modern Ukraine’s nation-building journey.

Until very recently, international media coverage of Ukraine often depicted the country as deeply divided between pro-Russian east and pro-European west. This was always an oversimplification and is now clearly no longer the case. Instead, attitudes toward key issues such as the war with Russia and membership of NATO have converged, with strong support for Euro-Atlantic integration evident in every region of Ukraine. Meanwhile, pro-Russian sentiment has plummeted to record lows, especially in the predominantly Russian-speaking regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have witnessed the worst of the fighting.

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This latest poll is an important data point that confirms Ukrainian resolve to achieve the complete de-occupation of the country. It also highlights the problems of viewing the current counteroffensive as a make-or-break moment in Ukraine’s war effort.

Some commentators have argued that failure to achieve a major military breakthrough in the coming months would cause a sharp decline in international support for Ukraine and force Kyiv to accept the necessity of some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. In reality, however, the Ukrainian public is staunchly opposed to the kind of land-for-peace deal that would likely form the basis of any negotiated settlement. As long as Ukrainians remain determined to fight on, few Western leaders will be prepared to abandon them.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seems to have a good grasp of the public mood in wartime Ukraine. He has consistently stated that Ukraine’s goal is the liberation of all regions currently under Russian occupation. This uncompromising position has attracted some international criticism, with China pushing for the resumption of peace talks and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva urging Ukraine in April to cede Crimea to Russia in order to end the war.

Ukraine’s Western partners have been far more supportive, providing growing quantities of vital military aid while emphasizing that it is up to Kyiv alone to define what would constitute an acceptable peace. Following some initial hesitation, most Western leaders now also recognize the need for Russia’s invasion to end in a decisive defeat, and acknowledge that anything less would have disastrous consequences for international security.

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It is easy to understand why so many Ukrainians reject the idea of striking a deal with Moscow, despite the terrible toll of the war and the inevitability of further trauma.

Perhaps more than anything else, this determination to liberate the whole of Ukraine reflects an acute awareness of the genocidal agenda underpinning Russia’s invasion and the horrors taking place in Russian-occupied regions. Every time the Ukrainian army advances and liberates territory, officials uncover the same grim evidence of war crimes including summary executions, torture, abductions, sexual violence, and mass deportations. For the vast majority of Ukrainians, the idea of condemning millions of their compatriots to this fate is simply unthinkable.

Many in Ukraine are also convinced that attempts to strike a bargain with the Kremlin are both futile and dangerous. Opponents of a compromise settlement note that the current war is no mere border dispute requiring minor territorial concessions, and point to Russia’s increasingly undisguised commitment to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. They warn that Russian leaders would view any negotiated peace deal as a pause in hostilities, which they would then use to regroup before launching the next stage of the invasion.

Based on Russia’s own actions over the past sixteen months of full-scale war, it is difficult to see how any kind of compromise would prove workable. Putin himself has openly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and in September 2022 announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions representing around 20% of the entire country. If he is not decisively defeated on the battlefield, he will almost certainly seek to go further and attempt to seize more Ukrainian land.

A further factor fueling Ukraine’s commitment to complete de-occupation is the strong desire to free the country once and for all from the historic threat of Russian imperialism. This reflects widespread Ukrainian perceptions of the current war as the latest episode in what is actually a far longer history of imperial aggression that stretches back many hundreds of years.

For centuries, Russian imperial influence has shaped Ukrainian history in ways that have caused untold suffering to generations of Ukrainians while keeping the country trapped in a state of arrested development. Unless Russia is defeated and forced to withdraw entirely from Ukrainian land, this bitter cycle will continue. Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding the high price of victory, but most feel that the price of a premature peace would be far higher, and refuse to pass this burden on to their children and grandchildren. Anyone seeking to end the war without Russian defeat must first reckon with this resolve.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The case of Syrian NGOs calls for further study. Since the 2011 civil war began, they emerged in abnormal circumstances under conflict, developed very quickly, and had to deal with the absence of a government response and the vast needs resulting from military operations and forced displacement waves. Despite such realities, these NGOs were somehow able to quickly address the effects of the earthquake while being one of the parties most affected by the disaster.

Syrian NGO offices are mostly concentrated in areas where the earthquake struck, such as Turkey’s Gaziantep and Hatay provinces. Some NGO employees and their families ended up becoming victims as a result. Others suffered from instability. Despite this, they arranged their affairs within a short period and designed the required response for the affected people in northern Syria.

However, notwithstanding their brave efforts, there were many gaps in their response due to faults in organizational structure, policies, and management. It may seem harsh to make criticisms in these circumstances, but introspection is necessary to learn from these mistakes and avoid repeating them. The Syrian humanitarian NGOs’ responses reflected many gaps that are supposed to be remedied in their structure, policies, and management. It was evident that there was a lack of expertise and qualified cadres to deal with disaster situations, who had access to courses—offered by the international community—that did not focus on this aspect effectively.

The cadres of international NGOs—particularly the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA —were not in a better position. Emergency responses were absent from these offices, which were located on the other side of the border, and aid was delayed for days—something that is considered to be a crucial flaw in a rescue operation. Moreover, the assistance provided—food and tents—did not initially include items of priority, such as heavy equipment to clear rubble, specialized teams to assist in rescue missions, and medical aid to treat the wounded.

When comparing this poor United Nations response to that of the Haiti earthquake in 2010, the differences are evident, although the conditions are similar. The OCHA office in Haiti was heavily impacted, yet the staff was mobilized with the help of the international community and its NGOs to support the three-month response. In addition, adequate humanitarian action was taken, exhibited by the collection and disbursement of funds three days after the earthquake occurred and the arrival of hundreds of organizations.

Thus, an important question arises: Why did the response of the UN cadres not live up to expectations despite their field experience and previous recommendations to develop disaster responses?

Chaos and poor response

From monitoring the forms of humanitarian response the Syrian NGOs took, I identified chaos as the prominent feature, especially in the first week. For example, the NGOs completely failed to activate the existence of local humanitarian networks, which include dozens of international NGOs. Each organization designed its response individually and launched the same activities without having a clear strategy regarding the utilization of available resources, leading to duplication and waste in providing in-kind assistance and meals. Communication and coordination to improve the response took a long time in these critical hours.

The powerful collaboration between Syrian humanitarian local networks did not emerge except in advocacy activities and via political pressure. As a result, this showed the actual effect of networks in coordinating work on the ground and managing dozens of new volunteer teams that launched humanitarian activities without having any of the required experience.

The earthquake response caused a decline in Syrian NGOs’ reputations. People were divided between those who supported the NGOs’ work and praised their experience and those who questioned the NGOs and demanded that donors deliver their donations directly to people in need. Although this division came to the fore due to this natural disaster, it is not new and cannot continue to be ignored. That is why this case needs to be studied in greater depth. It is imperative that we restore the Syrian public’s confidence in these organizations.

The disaster also revealed other flaws, according to my evaluation. The risk management of humanitarian organizations and international donors extended to nothing more than warehouses storing foodstuffs. There was an acute shortage of rescue machinery and equipment, specialized medical materials, and fuel, and the process of securing and purchasing aid was confusing during this chaos. Moreover, the absence of prior preparation and the lack of experience in dealing with this type of calamity caused a lot of improvisation and uncertainty.

Lessons learned from the disaster response

It is often the case that the focus during and after a natural disaster is on losses or physical destruction, while the weaknesses of the society in question, which surfaced during the event, is ignored. This creates the potential for new disasters that will intensify the disadvantages of a society and exacerbate the problems in its aftermath mainly due to the weakness and fragility of government policies.

The international community and its NGOs bear a large part of the responsibility for the losses incurred by the earthquake in northwest Syria. They have led a cross-border humanitarian response since 2014 and possess the expertise and qualifications to help local communities and NGOs get out of the aforementioned weakness cycle. During these eight years, relief and in-kind aid—such as cartons containing foodstuffs, clothes, or hygiene baskets—have plunged these communities into new levels of vulnerability, by increasing their dependence without helping them to reach self-sufficiency or building their capacity. The international responses have exhausted local authorities, councils, and professional syndicates from emergency response procedures instead of investing in building their capabilities and training them effectively, thus producing cadres with insufficient experience and tools. Consequently, the local councils were highly unprepared to take the initiative, manage responses, and reduce the chaos of the disaster.

On the other hand, the response of the UN, international NGOs, and Arab countries was shameful, as they sided politically with the Bashar al-Assad regime and ignored the most fragile and needy areas. These actors delivered the majority of aid through the regime and the organizations founded by the security apparatus of the Syrian regime. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights’ report, 90 percent of the aid intended for earthquake victims was stolen.

Such corruption, which ignored opposition areas and left them mired in cycles of weakness and need, could stir up the conflict again and renew military operations. The financial and diplomatic activities that occurred under the guise of “disaster diplomacy” have broken the Assad regime’s international isolation and secured funding that it can use to regain control of northwest Syria.

From these mistakes, it is clear that humanitarian response planning in Syria requires a full review process that reconsiders existing approaches and involves local partners while listening to their experiences. A good place to start would be to redesign the risk management training provided to NGOs and local communities, as well as providing them with capacity-building projects. This way, those on the ground will be empowered to carry out their own affairs, enhance their own stability, and break out of the cycle of weakness to stand prepared for any disaster that may come.

Kenda Hawasli is the director of the social unit at the Syrian Dialogue Centre based in Istanbul, Turkey.

The post I work in Syrian civil society. There were gaps in our performance after the February 6 earthquake. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

Lesia Dubenko — Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:58:10 +0000

As Ukraine’s long anticipated counteroffensive gets underway, international attention is firmly fixed on military developments. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are able to achieve significant advances, the authorities in Kyiv will also be faced with the challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived for more than a year, and in some cases over nine years, under Russian occupation.

The obstacles to successful reintegration should not be underestimated. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Moscow has prioritized control of the information space and has subjected the population in occupied regions of Ukraine to relentless propaganda. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the communities living in occupied Ukraine can be successfully reintegrated following liberation if the right policies are adopted.

Much to the Kremlin’s disbelief, Ukrainian national identity has proven far stronger than anyone in Moscow anticipated in 2014. Similarly, it should now be abundantly clear that the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian in their daily lives or embrace aspects of Russian popular culture is in no way indicative of political loyalty to the Kremlin.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

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Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

Could Russia be held accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam?

Danielle Johnson — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 20:48:50 +0000

In the early hours of June 6, the Kakhovka dam spanning the Dnipro River in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine collapsed, sparking a major humanitarian and ecological disaster in the surrounding area. The unfolding catastrophe has been labeled as a war crime and an act of ecocide, but holding anyone legally accountable will likely prove challenging.

The sheer scale of the disaster in southern Ukraine remains difficult to grasp. Floodwaters have already displaced thousands of people. Many more are trapped or at risk, including elderly or ill residents who were unable to leave the area earlier on in the war. Initial reports indicate that the authorities in areas under Russian occupation have restricted access to emergency services while preventing residents from leaving. There have also been widespread reports of the Russian military shelling evacuees and rescuers.

Dozens of towns, cities, and farms have been or will be destroyed as the waters continue to rise and move downstream, while large numbers of people throughout a vast area face a lack of access to clean drinking water and essential services. Much of the surrounding farmland is now unusable, which will impact the livelihoods of thousands of Ukrainians and potentially undermine global food security.

There are additional concerns over a potential nuclear disaster as the reservoir behind the collapsed dam supplies the cooling water for the nearby Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Floodwaters are also thought to have dislodged significant numbers of mines, creating further potential for civilian casualties.

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While the Kremlin has denied blowing up the dam and has instead accused Ukraine, initial analysis strongly suggests Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused it to collapse.” Only Russian forces could have carried out such an explosion.

Many have also questioned the credibility of Moscow’s counterclaims suggesting the dam was destroyed by Ukrainian missile or artillery fire. Independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

Russia also has a clear military motive and a long record of attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. At the time of the dam collapse, Russian forces were preparing to face a long anticipated Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. The widespread flooding produced by the disaster effectively ruled out the possibility of Ukrainian troops attempting a river crossing along an entire section of the 1000-kilometer front. Meanwhile, Russia spent much of the winter and spring seasons conducting a methodical nationwide bombing campaign designed to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and freeze the country into submission. While the destruction of a major dam would mark an escalation in this campaign, it would clearly not be unprecedented.

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Despite the likelihood that Russia is responsible for the dam collapse, in legal terms it is still too early to hold anyone directly accountable. First, there would need to be incontrovertible proof that this was actually an attack rather than some kind of horrible accident, miscommunication, or mistake made amid the “fog of war.” Then, the issue of attribution would have to be dealt with. This means that Russia’s responsibility for the attack would need to proven beyond doubt.

If it can be established that Russia intentionally carried out an attack on the dam, there are many potential pathways to justice. For example, Ukraine could pursue accountability through its own domestic courts; international actors could establish a regional tribunal; the International Criminal Court could investigate and potentially indict a responsible individual; or countries could choose to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute Russia for its actions.

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to overcome in pursuing accountability through these mechanisms. History has shown that the wheels of justice are excruciatingly slow in international war crimes cases. Prosecutors and Ukrainians alike would have to show extraordinary patience in waiting for these approaches to pay dividends. It would also be difficult to prove who ordered the attack and get that person in the dock, barring unlikely regime change within Russia itself. These are neither fair nor easy circumstances for Ukrainians to accept in the face of such trauma.

Furthermore, there are still huge information gaps. There would need to be a committed fact-finding effort, starting in the immediate present, to fill these gaps for a case that might not be prosecuted for many years or even decades. Ukrainians have shown an unprecedented ability to document abuses in real time throughout the current war. The onus would be on them to identify the individual Russian units and commanders responsible for blowing up the dam.

The challenges are even greater if Ukraine or the international community wants to pursue specific accountability for ecocide. Although there has been a lot of momentum in this direction, ecocide is not yet codified as a crime under international law (although it is under Ukrainian law). Even if this were to be accomplished in the near future and ecocide came to fall under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, there would still be enough ambiguity and lack of legal precedent to potentially deter prosecutors from pursuing the charge of ecocide in the Kakhovka dam case. There would also need to be an extensive investigation, which would not be easy given bureaucratic and financial barriers along with the fact that many affected areas remain under Russian control or are heavily mined.

In light of these obstacles, what can be done in the short-term to help hold Russia accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and its devastating consequences? First, the international community needs to broaden its view of what might constitute justice beyond the courtroom. This means listening to and supporting local civil society in Ukraine. It also means investing in Ukraine not only in the short-term, but in sustainable ways that bolster the country’s longer-term recovery and reconstruction, quite possibly by using frozen Russian assets to finance it. This requires helping the Ukrainian authorities combat corruption and build the capacity of the country’s own judicial system to pursue accountability.

In the pursuit of justice for Ukraine, the most meaningful steps are those that ensure Russia’s decisive defeat. Accountability will be much more difficult to achieve if the conflict becomes protracted or frozen. In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever face prosecution over the destruction of Kakhovka dam. Ultimately, the only way to achieve a just and durable peace is through Ukrainian victory.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

The fight against courtroom corruption continues in wartime Ukraine

Olena Halushka — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 15:30:28 +0000

The head of Ukraine’s Supreme Court, Vsevolod Kniaziev, was detained in mid-May on corruption charges based on an alleged $2.7 million bribe. The charges were brought by Ukraine’s leading anti-corruption bodies, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). This landmark case reflects the considerable progress made in Ukraine’s struggle against corruption within the judiciary, while also highlighting the key issues that must still be addressed in order to create a rule of law environment that will allow Ukraine to prosper.

The charges against Kniaziev are not entirely unprecedented. In the three-and-a-half years since the creation of Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court, 23 judges have been convicted. Anti-corruption investigations have also led to changes in Ukraine’s judicial infrastructure, such as the liquidation of the controversial Kyiv District Administrative Court, which had long been a focus of major anti-corruption probes.

In summer 2022, Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts received a boost with the appointment of Oleksandr Klymenko as new head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in line with Ukraine’s obligations regarding EU candidate country status. Klymenko’s appointment was widely seen as a watershed moment that signaled an end to the collective sense of impunity within the Ukrainian establishment. The recent arrest of the Supreme Court head has confirmed that earlier reform failures are not irreversible. It is now important to draw the right conclusions as Ukraine looks to finalize the reform of judicial governance bodies and repair the country’s Constitutional Court.

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The relaunch of Ukraine’s Supreme Court was one of the initial efforts to reform the country’s widely discredited judiciary in the initial aftermath of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. However, it did not produce the desired results as a number of factors robbed the court of true independence. Unreformed judicial governance bodies were tasked with hiring Supreme Court judges, with civil society offered a superficial role in the selection process and Ukraine’s international partners largely standing aside. As a result, civil society observers assessed that around a quarter of all selected candidates were questionable.

The creation of the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2017-2019 was a more positive experience, with all candidates scrutinized by an independent panel composed of international experts. This paved the way for the cleansing of two judicial governance bodies, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges, with foreign experts once more playing a crucial role.

In January 2023, Ukraine appointed eight new members to the country’s key judicial governance body, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), thereby enabling it to resume its work. On June 1, the HCJ appointed new members to the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), which is another significant step forward. However, it is important to highlight that no agents of change from civil society were appointed, while two of the new members have questionable reputations. The next challenge is for the HQCJ to finish qualification assessments and hire judges to fill more than 2,500 vacancies. In addition, further measures are also expected in order to restore public trust in the Supreme Court.

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The next big issue on the path toward rule of law and EU accession is the selection procedure of Constitutional Court judges. EU candidate country status has opened up an historic opportunity to repair the Constitutional Court, which has long wielded effective veto power over any reform efforts in Ukraine. Reforming the Constitutional Court is widely seen as the most politically challenging element of judicial reform for the Ukrainian government to implement.

Additionally, some anti-corruption initiatives that were justifiably put on hold following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion must now be revived. This includes asset declarations for all state officials. The recent bribery charges brought against the head of the Supreme Court underline the urgency of a return to the asset declaration submission and verification process. Concerns regarding this issue have recently been voiced by the International Monetary Fund and EU Ambassador to Ukraine Matti Maasikas.

An independent judiciary and the rule of law have long been recognized as vital pillars for Ukraine’s future success. As the country looks toward the post-war recovery period, these factors are now more important than ever. During the rebuilding process, Ukraine’s partners will demand transparency and security for all state and private sector investments. Additionally, judicial reform has a central role to play in Ukraine’s further EU integration. Crucially, creating a fair legal environment free from corruption is also a key demand of Ukrainian society, including the hundreds of thousands currently defending the country against Russian invasion.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Today, the Diia ecosystem offers the world’s first digital passport and access to 14 other digital documents along with 25 public services. It is used by more than half the Ukrainian adult population. In addition to consumer-oriented functions, the system collects information for the national statistical office and serves as a digital platform for officials. Diia is widely seen as the world’s first next-generation e-government platform, and is credited with implementing what many see as a more human-centric government service model.

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In today’s increasingly digital environment, governments may find that they have a lot of siloed systems in place, with each system based on its own separate data, infrastructure, and even principles. As a result, people typically suffer from additional bureaucracy and need to deal repeatedly with different official organizations. Most e-government initiatives are characterized by the same problems worldwide, such as technical disparity of state systems, inappropriate data security and data protection systems, absence of unified interoperability, and inefficient interaction between different elements. Ukraine is pioneering efforts to identify more human-centric solutions to these common problems.

One of the main challenges on the path to building sustainable e-government is to combine user friendliness with a high level of cyber security. If we look at the corresponding indices such as the Online Services Index and Baseline Cyber Security Index, we see that only a handful of European countries have so far managed to achieve the right balance: Estonia, Denmark, France, Spain, and Lithuania. Beyond Europe, only Singapore and Malaysia currently meet the necessary standards.

Ukraine has a strong record in terms of security. Since the onset of the Russian invasion, the Diia system has repeatedly been attacked by Russian cyber forces and has been able to successfully resist these attacks. This is an indication that the Ukrainian platform has the necessary reserve of cyber security along with a robust and secure digital public infrastructure.

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The success of the IT industry in Ukraine over the past decade has already changed international perceptions of the country. Instead of being primarily seen as an exporter of metals and agricultural products, Ukraine is now increasingly viewed as a trusted provider of tech solutions. The Ministry of Digital Transformation is now working to make Diia the global role model for human-centric GovTech. According to Samantha Power, the Ukrainian authorities are interested in sharing their experience with the international community so that others can build digital infrastructure for their citizens based on the same human-centric principles.

USAID has announced a special program to support countries that, inspired by Diia, will develop their own e-government systems on its basis. This initiative will be launched initially in Colombia, Kosovo, and Zambia. Ukraine’s Diia system could soon be serving as a model throughout the transitional world.

As they develop their own e-government systems based on Ukraine’s experience and innovations, participating governments should be able to significantly reduce corruption tied to bureaucratic obstacles. By deploying local versions of Diia, transitional countries will also develop a large number of their own high-level IT specialists with expertise in e-government. This is an important initiative that other global development agencies may also see value in supporting.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

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In recent months, China has sought to play an active role in efforts to negotiate a peace between Russia and Ukraine. However, many in Kyiv and throughout the West remain skeptical of China’s apparently contradictory views on the peace process. Critics have accused China of publicly supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity while also indicating the need for Kyiv to cede land as part of any potential settlement.

While stopping short of outright support for Russia’s invasion, China has adopted a public position that could be termed as Kremlin-friendly neutrality, and has accused the West of provoking the war. This posture is unsurprising. Beijing shares Moscow’s goal of challenging Western dominance and replacing it with what they see as a more multipolar world. China fears that if Russia loses the current war, it will greatly strengthen the West while undermining the global standing of China and other authoritarian regimes.

More specifically, a Russian defeat would considerably complicate any future Chinese efforts to invade Taiwan. If Western military aid helps Ukraine to secure victory over the once vaunted Russian army, this will increase the chances of similar Western support for Taiwan against possible Chinese aggression. The disastrous performance of Putin’s army in Ukraine has already undermined Russia’s claims to military superpower status and significantly boosted Western confidence. China is not eager for this unwelcome trend to gain further momentum.

On Russia’s western border, Belarus has emerged as something of a captive partner in the attack on Ukraine, with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka serving as the single most vocal backer of Russia’s war while also allowing his country to be used as a platform for the invasion. Russian troops flooded into northern Ukraine from Belarus on the first days of the war in February 2022; Russia continues to launch airstrikes on Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory.

Lukashenka has little choice but to back Putin. He only remains in power because Russia intervened in 2020 to prop up his regime in the wake of pro-democracy protests over a fraudulent presidential election. Lukashenka’s brutal Kremlin-backed crackdown against the Belarusian protest movement left him internationally isolated and heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would likely reignite domestic unrest inside Belarus and would almost certainly spell doom for the Lukashenka regime.

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While the failure of Putin’s invasion could lead to regime change in Belarus, some in Armenia sees the prospect of a Russian defeat in Ukraine in starkly existential terms. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reportedly warned Armenians recently: “If Russia loses the war in Ukraine, I have no idea what will happen to Armenia.”

Many Armenians remain heavily invested in the traditional view of Russia as a protector of the country against the perceived threats to national security posed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. This thinking has shaped Armenian politics and foreign policy for much of the post-Soviet era. The country is a founding member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and backed out of an association agreement with the EU a decade ago following Kremlin pressure, instead joining Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia maintains military bases in Armenia and has dominated efforts to regulate the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan’s concerns are unsurprising but short-sighted. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would potentially allow Armenia to pursue a more independent foreign policy while expanding economic and political ties with the European Union. Alarm over the threat of renewed hostilities with Azerbaijan is understandable, but there is little prospect of Armenia itself being invaded, especially if US and EU-brokered talks produce a peace treaty that recognizes the Armenian-Azerbaijani border while providing satisfactory guarantees for Karabakh’s Armenian population.

As a staunch opponent of the West and critic of perceived Western influence over global affairs, Iran shares China’s geopolitical motivations for supporting Russia’s invasion. Many in the Iranian leadership are also fearful that a Russian defeat in Ukraine could increase demands for democratic change inside Iran itself and fuel a new round of domestic protests.

There are additional practical reasons for Tehran’s pro-Russian stance. Faced with tightening international sanctions and cut off from Western technologies, Russia has turned to Iran as an alternative source of military assistance. In exchange for Iranian drones and other supplies, Moscow is believed to be providing Tehran with everything from fighter jets to air defense systems, while also assisting Iran’s nuclear program.

This burgeoning military partnership between Russia and Iran is proving deadly for Ukraine, with Iranian drones regularly used to strike civilian targets across Ukraine. It also poses a significant threat to Israeli national security and has sparked heated debate over Israel’s apparent reluctance to provide military support to Ukraine. If cooperation between Moscow and Tehran continues to intensify, Russian air defense systems could limit Israeli operations in Syria and complicate any future preventative strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, there appears to be little chance of an outright Russian victory of the kind envisaged by Putin when he first gave the order to invade in February 2022. Instead, the most likely scenarios are now either some form of stalemate or a Ukrainian military victory.

If Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the consequences will reverberate around the globe. China is powerful enough to survive such a shock but would be geopolitically weakened. The Belarusian and Iranian regimes would face a far more uncertain future and might not survive. Meanwhile, Armenia may find that despite its current misgivings, the defeat of Russia could allow Yerevan to return to the path of European integration.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

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Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes

sodal — Fri, 19 May 2023 14:06:14 +0000

original source

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

Failing to address the democratic deficiencies of hybrid regimes sets up the United States for long-term strategic failure and hinders American economic prosperity. To avoid these outcomes, the United States must carve out a new path forward that preserves near-term US interests while also pressing these States to make democratic progress.

Patrick Quirk

Fellow

Patrick Quirk

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

The post Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

New Bernard Henri-Lévy documentary challenges Ukraine fatigue

Melinda Haring, Jacob Heilbrunn — Thu, 18 May 2023 16:06:51 +0000

For anyone seeking to make sense of Russia’s war in Ukraine, viewing French public intellectual Bernard Henri-Lévy’s new feature-length documentary “Slava Ukraini” (“Glory to Ukraine”) isn’t an option. It’s a must. A gritty, intense, and probing examination of the impact of the war, it offers what is surely the ultimate antidote to Ukraine fatigue.

As he pondered the course of the war, Henri-Lévy came to the conclusion that the best way to combat the West’s mounting impatience with the 15-month war and counter the push for preliminary negotiations was to show rather than tell. Instead of writing an essay, the 74-year-old French filmmaker and philosopher took to the road to illuminate the bravery of ordinary Ukrainians against what he calls the “master terrorist” in the Kremlin.

The film, which carefully traces Henri-Lévy’s journey across Ukraine, is about far more than jerky shots of the Frenchman and his crew dodging bullets and drone attacks. It is about Ukraine’s defiance of Putin’s attempt not simply to wage a war of territorial conquest, but to efface the idea of Ukrainian nationhood itself. “If I dare to give a certain logic to this crazy war, it is in the logic of the denial of Ukrainian identity,” he says. “This barbarity matches the logic of denying the very existence of Ukraine.”

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As he journeys from Ukraine’s capital to the east, Henri-Lévy captures the dignity of the Ukrainian people through short vignettes that remain with you long after the credits roll. The Frenchman focuses on ordinary Ukrainians like the elderly woman who appears in the documentary engaged in the quotidian task of stirring a steaming pot of borscht and pleads for an end to the constant violence that has upended her life. She hopes to make it to her seventieth birthday, she says.

In Kyiv, after another Russian air strike hits a woman’s apartment, she apologizes profusely to Henri-Lévy for wearing a dirty black coat. Her kitchen is unusable after the bombing and her crockery is battered, but she’s more focused on the state of her appearance. She takes the French filmmaker to her makeshift bed, a chair inside a bathroom tub where she waited out the aerial assault, and smiles with pride at her ability to snatch a few hours of sleep.

Another scene captures everyday life for those who couldn’t leave cities and towns that Russia has pounded relentlessly in the east. A man who appears to be approaching pension age tries to chop wood with an axe, complaining that it’s warmer outside than inside.

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In Pavlograd, the French filmmaker dons a hard helmet and overalls to cover his black designer suit and spotless white shirt as he descends below ground to watch Ukrainian miners drill iron ore. The precious ore is eventually made into bullet-proof vests for soldiers at the front. After the steel miners are done for the day, they carry on packing care boxes of food and medicine for displaced families.

Henri-Lévy observes that every steelworker is a hero, just like the brave men and women on the front lines. In one of his characteristic meditative asides, he observes that the Greeks and Romans admired heroes in part because they were so rare. “In Ukraine, heroes are everywhere,” he says. The Frenchman confesses that he keeps coming back to Ukraine because it is rare in history to see so many people embody heroism in one place.

The documentary also features moments of exhilaration. Henri-Lévy captures joyous scenes from recently liberated Kherson, where hundreds mill in the main square, some searching for power to recharge their phones and tell their loved ones they are still alive. Perhaps the hardest and most powerful scene comes when Henri-Lévy visits a torture cell that still has fresh blood on the floor. The Russians never actually appear on film, but their depraved conduct casts a dark shadow over the documentary.

This film is anything but neutral and Henri-Lévy makes no attempt to disguise his sympathies. “I am partisan. I don’t give five minutes to the Jews and five minutes to the Nazis,” he says.

The Frenchman has consistently refused to engage in bogus moral hand-wringing when it comes to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, he is clear about which side he’s on, as viewers of “Slava Ukraini” will no doubt recognize. “I want the Ukrainians to win,” he commented on May 11 at a screening of the documentary at the E Street Cinema in Washington, DC.

Melinda Haring is director of stakeholder relations and social impact at the Superhumans Center. Jacob Heilbrunn is Editor of the National Interest. Haring and Heilbrunn are both non-resident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. “Slava Ukraini” was shown at a series of screenings in May organized with the Ukrainian American charity Razom. It can be viewed on Apple TV and YouTube.

Tracking narratives

Prigozhin accuses Russian defense ministry of creating “shell hunger” in Bakhmut

Russian city organizes Victory concert on riverbank facing Estonia

Interference on satellite imagery suggests Russia is increasing its means to surveil border activity

A May 6 satellite image caught by the Sentinel-1 satellite of the European Space Agency revealed an interference pattern that was recorded stretching 172 kilometers in north-eastern Ukraine. This pattern almost exactly covers the border between the Russian city of Belgorod and Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second most populous city. The interference was cast as a result of electromagnetic emissions caught within the 5Ghz range, also known as the NATO C-band. Open source researcher Brady Africk first reported the pattern.

Radar interference captured along the Ukraine-Russia border. (Source: @Bradyafr/archive)

The imagery shows several layers of pink straight lines, which are different from patterns usually observed by analysts. In a January 2023 edition of the Russian War Report, the DFRLab reported an interference pattern with bulkier interferences that was attributed to a potential anti-air defense missile system deployed in the Krasnodar Krai region.

Additionally, similar patterns were recorded throughout April 2023. The DFRLab compiled imagery data from April 14 to April 21 that shows how Russia may have increased its deployment of military radars and anti-air defense systems in the region. The April 29 drone attack against an oil depot in Crimea also indicates that Russia could have been building up its defense systems in the southern occupied territories of Ukraine.

A map based on the aggregated Sentinel-1 imagery over the Azov Sea showing several interference patterns. (Source: DFRLab via ESA Sentinel-1)

The May 6 interference pattern resembles the one cast over mainland Crimea in April, suggesting similarity in the type of devices or equipment responsible for its emission. This assessment indicates that Russia could be transitioning towards further deployments of defense systems and military-class radar monitoring on its borders with Ukraine and in occupied territories.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Zelenskyy says Ukraine preparing for “new events” as Transnistrian official asks for increased Russian troop presence

The Russian army carried out a large-scale missile and drone strike over Ukrainian territory in the early hours of May 8. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported on May 8 that Russian forces launched sixteen missiles at Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa, and that Ukrainian troops shot down all thirty-five launched Shahed drones. A drone appears to have hit a tall building in Kyiv, possibly after being shot down. There were also reports that falling debris caused other damage. The drone strike is one of the largest attacks on Kyiv since February 2022.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on May 7 that Ukrainian forces are preparing for “new events” in May or June 2023, an indication that Ukrainian forces may be preparing to conduct counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian military sources said that Russian forces continue to transfer equipment, ammunition, and supplies to prepare for defensive operations.

Footage from Bakhmut on May 5 shows the possible use of incendiary shells against the remaining areas held by the Ukrainian army. The footage suggests ammunition is available, despite Wagner’s Yevgeny Prigozhin claiming the group does not have enough ammunition in Bakhmut.

Footage from Bakhmut on May 5 shows the possible use of incendiary shells against the remaining areas held by the Ukrainian army.

Meanwhile, the evacuation of civilians from Russian-occupied frontline towns in the Zaporizhzhia region has led to fuel shortages, problems with ATMs, and connectivity issues, according to Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov. He added that Russian forces have reportedly removed medical equipment from the city’s hospital, asked patients to evacuate, and closed several hospital wards.

Elsewhere, conflicting reports are emerging from the Orikhiv region. The city is in north Zaporizhzhia Oblast, eight-five kilometers from Melitopol. On May 3, Russian media claimed that Ukrainian forces were trying to attack Orikhiv. On the same day, Vladimir Rogov, a member of the Zaporizhzhia occupation administration, told the media that the situation in the direction of Orikhiv was under control, adding that Ukraine’s army is conducting surveillance. The Zaporizhzhia region is critical to Russia because of its proximity to Melitopol. On May 9, Russian Telegram channels reported their belief that the Ukrainian army had completed preparations for a counter-offensive and that Orikhiv would be among the areas that would come under pressure. In addition, reports emerged that the Russian Volunteer Corps, fighting for Ukraine, is conducting attacks against Russian forces in Orikhiv. The Russian Volunteer Corps is a paramilitary unit that claimed responsibility for an attack in Russia’s Bryansk region in March 2023. The same unit published a video on May 9 claiming they are actively fighting against Russian forces in Orikhiv.

The Russian government does not recognize that Russian actors are fighting on the side of Ukraine, shifting responsibility for the attacks to Ukrainian forces. The strengthening of such military units is a trend that likely causes concern within the Russian command structure. Moscow will likely continue to deny the participation of Russians in the battles against Russian forces. However, as Ukraine prepares a possible counter-offensive, the Russian command could use the presence of Russian volunteers as propaganda, creating a state of paranoia and suspicion to attack opposition groups within Russia. The video footage of the Russian Volunteer Corps received attention among Russian opposition groups, like Rospartizan, who on May 9 attacked the liberal opposition for not taking arms against the Russian government.

Lastly, Leonid Manakov, Transnistria’s representative in Moscow, asked Russia to increase the number of Russian forces in Transnistria due to claims of “terrorist risks.” His request follows reports that Moldovan authorities detained members of the pro-Russian Shor party in April and May. US officials warned in March that individuals linked to Russian military intelligence were planning staged protests against the Moldovan government. Russia is unlikely to increase its military presence in Transnistria, especially when considering a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive. However, the risk of infiltrations and attempts to destabilize Moldova remains, including through disinformation and fear-mongering, which would serve Russia’s military goals in the Odesa region and western Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Prigozhin accuses Russian defense ministry of creating “shell hunger” in Bakhmut

In a press release published on May 6, Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin revealed more details about the group’s ongoing dispute with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Prigozhin said that in October 2022, in cooperation with Sergei Surovikin, General of the Russian Armed Forces, Wagner launched “Operation Bakhmut Meat Grinder” to provoke Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into sending as many Ukrainian forces as possible to defend the city. Prigozhin argued that taking control of Bakhmut was not a key objective of the operation; rather, the primary goal was “grinding the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” to allow the Russian army respite to restore its combat capability. Prigozhin stated that Wagner killed about 50,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Bakhmut and prevented Ukraine’s counter-offensive.

The statement claimed that Wagner has successfully managed to occupy 1,500 square kilometers of Ukrainian land and seventy-one settlements, while the Russian MoD has suffered setbacks and defeats on the frontlines. Prigozhin purported that the Russian army faced a lack of control and discipline, was embroiled in mobilization scandals, and had supply problems. He asserted that to compensate for their failures and envy towards Wagner, the MoD took counter-actions against Wagner, prohibiting it from recruiting Russian prisoners as volunteers and reducing the supply of ammunition to 30 percent of the amount Wagner required, followed by a further decrease to 10 percent. Other measures reportedly taken by the Russian MoD included suspending issuing orders and medals to dead Wagner fighters, denying personnel transfers from Africa to Ukraine, and disabling special communication systems.

Prigozhin added that to impose a complete “shell blockade” on Wagner, the Russian MoD fired Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev, who led the siege of Mariupol in 2022 and later became deputy ninister of defense overseeing logistics and supplies. After leaving the MoD, Mizintsev reportedly joined Wagner as a deputy commander. Prigozhin said that most of Wagner’s fighters and commanders left the Russian army to join Wagner because they had lost confidence in the MoD. Due to this, he ruled out the possibility of Wagner integrating into the MoD.

After seven months of carrying out “Operation Bakhmut Meat Grinder,” Prigozhin concluded that Wagner has lost its combat potential. He claimed that between October 2022 and May 2023, Wagner received 38 percent of the ammunition requested from the MoD and 30 to 40 percent of the tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles required for combat missions. He added that Wagner currently has 30,000 soldiers on combat missions in Bakhmut, while Ukraine has around 35,000 troops in the area, and its numbers would need to be three times higher to achieve success. He suggested that “shell hunger” resulted in two-thirds of Wagner’s losses and killed “tens of thousands” of Russian soldiers.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian city organizes Victory concert on riverbank facing Estonia

The Russian city of Ivangorod, separated by a small river from the Estonian city of Narva, organized a May 9 Victory Day concert for residents of Narva, a predominately Russian-speaking town with a large Russian population. This is the first time Ivangorod has organized a May 9 concert on the riverbank, opposite the Narva Museum. In response, the Narva Museum hung a large poster on the exterior of the building depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin with blood-like spatter over his face and the text “Putin War Criminal.”

The decision to host the “large format” concert on the Narva riverbank for “Narva inhabitants to see” was made at the “federal level,” according to Aleksandr Sosnin, head of the Ivangorod administration, during an April 12 press conference.

Videos shared online show that scores of people gathered in Narva to listen to the concert. LenTV24, a pro-Kremlin regional infotainment YouTube channel, reported an altercation between a younger man carrying a Ukrainian flag–more than five hundred Ukrainian refugees reside in Narva–and an older man who attacked him. The altercation was captured on video and spread on Telegram and Facebook. Zhanna Ryabceva, a member of the Russian Duma, shared the video on Telegram. It was then shared approximately one thousand times, including by sixteen public Telegram groups and channels, according to Telegram monitoring tool TGStat. Later, the video, with a caption identical to the one used in Ryabceva’s post, was published by at least three Facebook accounts that identified as being based in Russia. One of the accounts, Ruslon Bely, was previously involved in amplifying a Secondary Infektion influence operation targeting Denmark with a forged letter that alleged Greenland was seeking independence and closer cooperation with the United States.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Russia wages an invisible war with radar waves and Russian music across borders appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How the women and girls of Iran have fueled their ‘unprecedented’ protests: Bravery, solidarity, and innovation

Atlantic Council — Thu, 11 May 2023 18:23:49 +0000

Watch the event

Public Event Thu, May 11, 2023 • 11:00 am ET

Woman, Life, Freedom: Eight months of ongoing protests in Iran

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – An in-depth conversation examining the ongoing anti-government protests in Iran following the murder of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini, and the decades-long fight for gender equality and social justice in the country.

Human Rights Iran Middle East Women

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Azam Jangravi
Iranian women’s rights advocate and a Girl of Revolution Street

Mehrangiz Kar
Iranian women’s rights lawyer and writer

Nazanin Nour
Iranian-American actor, writer, and activist

Moderator

Ali Rogin
Correspondent, PBS NewsHour

Introductory remarks

Holly Dagres
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs;
Editor, MENASource and IranSource

HOLLY DAGRES: Good morning, everyone. My name is Holly Dagres, and I am a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and I’m honored here to give remarks for today’s Atlantic Council Front Page event.

Zan, zendegi, azadi—“women, life, freedom”—the slogan heard across the globe. Contrary to the lack of media coverage, this month marks eight months of ongoing protests in Iran against the Islamic Republic. Protests that are taking place in various ways, from street gatherings, rooftop chants, graffiti, to public displays of not wearing mandatory hijab. This continuity is unprecedented. The clerical establishment is in a tinderbox situation, and it’s only a matter of time before the protesters pour into the streets en masse because the people of Iran have had enough. They want the regime gone.

As I speak over thirteen thousand schoolgirls have been poisoned at schools across the country. Many believe this is a punishment for their participation in anti-establishment protests. Additionally, in the past two weeks there have been an alarming rise in executions, with over fifty-seven executed. Human rights organizations widely believe that these wave of executions are an effort to instill fear and silence dissent. Every day, women remain defiant against mandatory hijab, by appearing in the streets without the veil. And even in some cases, dresses and shorts, items of clothing only seen at home, behind closed doors, ordinary freedoms we here take for granted.

The world admires and applauds the bravery of the people of Iran, but especially their women and girls. As an American of Iranian heritage, I’m absolutely thrilled to introduce this incredible cohort of Iranian women who will be accepting the 2023 Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award on behalf of the women and girls of Iran at tonight’s Annual Distinguished Leadership Awards… which I should note will be livestreamed.

Dr. Mehrangiz Kar is a human rights lawyer and an activist. She was one of the first women attorneys to oppose the Islamization of gender relations following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Kar has been an active public defender in Iran’s civil and criminal courts, and has lectured extensively both in Iran and abroad.

Azam Jangravi is an Iranian paralegal, human rights advocate, and former political prisoner, residing in Canada. She is primarily known for being one of the girls of revolution street during the protests against compulsory hijab in 2017. Jangravi was taken into custody in 2018 after removing her headscarf in protest on Enghelab Street, standing atop an electricity transformer box, and waving it above her head. She was later released temporarily on bail and fled from Iran to Turkey, before relocating to Canada.

Nazanin Nour is an Iranian-American actress, writer, and activist. She has appeared on shows such as Netflix’s “Big Mouth,” “Madam Secretary,” and “Persia’s Got Talent,” and can currently be seen in the film “A Thousand Little Cuts” on Showtime. Nour could most recently be seen on stage in Washington starring in the studio theatre production of “English.” She is one of several Iranian Americans in the public eye speaking out on the ongoing situation in Iran.

I’d like to also note that Dr. Mahnaz Afkhami is sick with COVID-19 and was unable to attend, but she is recovering.

Finally, I’m delighted to introduce our brilliant moderator, Ali Rogin, of PBS NewsHour. Ali, over to you.

ALI ROGIN: Holly, thank you so much, and welcome to everybody in the room today and to all our viewers tuning in online, and I’m honored to be joined by these three incredible women.

As Holly mentioned, we are here today to discuss the state of women’s rights and human rights in Iran from prerevolution all the way to the current zan, zendegi, azadi movement and we can do all that in forty-five minutes. That is a very steep task but I know that this is a very well-equipped group to do just that. So let’s get right into it.

The first question I’m going to ask and, parenthetically, before I do I want to note I’m going to ask a few questions and then we’re going to open it up to questions from the audience here and online. So please submit your questions in the format that’s already been presented to the group, and for this panel each of the questions I’m going to ask, the first one will be open-ended, and then each one will be directed to one of you specifically. But I invite anybody to weigh in as well.

So the first question—as Holly mentioned, the Islamic Republic is doubling down on its repressive tactics. It’s increased. There have been thirteen thousand schoolgirls that have been poisoned. Hangings are at a historic high. So what do these oppressive measures tell you about the state of the regime and whether or not it is under pressure from these protests? Whoever would like to begin. Maybe we go down the line.

Dr. Kar?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: OK. As you know, in this movement regular women, students of university, students of high school, all labor and they are involved with that, and in zan, zendegi, azadi all Iranian women from all layers of the society, they are—they were working and now they are working in some other style.

And something that you asked about that, like poisoning, poisoning daughters in high schools, we think the—you know, the reason is because they were working a lot in the movement. And one of their activity was—because probably you don’t know that in schoolbooks, the first page is a picture of Khomeini and the second page is a picture of Khamenei, and the students of high school, sometimes they—you know, they taking out these pictures from their schoolbooks and simply removing—removing—

ALI ROGIN: And they’re removing [them] from the—from the walls?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yeah, removing, in front of the camera—in front of the camera. And these, you know, film and video posted to some media outside the country, and that’s the reason.

I think they are very against the against daughters in high school. And we think that now this is some kind of revenge sometimes… and the government doesn’t care about that and doesn’t say anything and doesn’t investigate—very serious investigate in that, and they don’t say what is this. Sometimes, they say something that is not true… They say that this is not true. This is something that, you know, they pretend that there is nothing, there is no poison.

And this is something that the people in Iran, now they are very angry with that because the students of—women students, daughters and students of high schools, they don’t have any safety, any security. And the parents now, they are very angry. And they go around the high schools, and they say: If the government cannot guarantee our daughter’s life and our daughter’s security, we will go around the high school and we will, you know, find something that they poison them, and this is our duty if the government doesn’t do their duty.

ALI ROGIN: So that’s going to be a big test.

But I’m curious to get all your thoughts—and I apologize; we didn’t discuss this in advance—but who do you think is behind these poisonings?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: The government.

ALI ROGIN: Is it the government?

NAZANIN NOUR: I mean, everybody believes it’s regime—the regime is complicit, because this is also a regime that has eyes and ears everywhere. They’re able to—they kidnap dissidents abroad, and bring them back to—for execution. They have intelligence on dissidents abroad. There was the, you know, kidnapping that was—that the FBI foiled the plot against a leading voice, Masih Alinejad. So, it’s very difficult for anybody to believe that a regime that uses facial recognition technology to send tickets to women who aren’t wearing their hijab properly, cannot find out who’s behind these poisonings. So, everybody believes that the regime is actually behind this.

And it’s been going on since November of 2022, so that’s months now that this has been happening. And there’s countless videos on the internet from activist groups within Iran that are showing girls in hospitals, you know, with oxygen masks. They can’t breathe, they smell tangerine in the air, or rotten fish in the air. So, it’s very real.

And I know that the regime tries to downplay it, but, you know, it’s also very difficult to kind of loiter around a girls’ school in Iran. And so, again, it’s—again, that’s why it’s very difficult for anybody to believe that the regime is not complicit in this. Parents that have gone to ask questions are met with brute force by regime forces. So, not only are no answers being given, this is still continuing as of just a few days ago, we saw videos from other poisonings. And it’s across all cities and provinces in Iran, too. So—

ALI ROGIN: So, what I’m—what I’m curious about is—Azam, is this an example of the regime really feeling the pressure, that they are taking these steps of poisoning young girls?

AZAM JANGRAVI: Actually, I don’t know. It’s really complicated. But it might be the regime is behind of this situation.

Mehrangiz and Nazanin mentioned about poisoning, and I want to talk about executions. Well, the government is now trying to create fear among people by increasing executions. In the past ten days, over fifty-five people have been executed in—from in which twenty-six Baloch citizens executed. And I think—this by the suppression of Islamic Republic of Iran.

But the protest is ongoing in Balochistan, and every Friday they shut down the internet. And I think we have to talk about Balochistan and Kurdistan and—because the suppression in that areas every time increased by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

ALI ROGIN: That’s a very, very important point.

Azam, I want to stay with you and ask, let’s take a step back and let’s talk about the factors that led to this round of protests.

AZAM JANGRAVI: The protests that begin in mid-September were unprecedented in their scale and duration. People from all level of society, including women of various cities and social classes, came together to demand change.

A key point of contention was the mandatory hijab laws, which require all Iranian women to cover their hair. And although the protests were initially led by women, they soon expand to include men as well. The government attempt to suppress the protest with violence and repression, but the movement continued to grow and gained momentum. People from different backgrounds joined in—driven by a shared sense of frustration with the current government. While there have been some reports of misinformation circulating about the government’s intention, most people understand that the issue of mandatory hijab is just one of the many issue that need to be addressed.

It is clear that until there is real change in Iran, people will continue to demand change and speak out against the injustices in Iran. As I said, the government is now trying to create really fear among people by execution. Two men were executed in the past week, Yousef Mehrdad and Sadrollah Fazeil Zare were executed for just running online group criticizing Islam. Dual Swedish-Iranian citizen also executed last week. Additionally, more than eleven individuals are currently on deaths way—on death row in connection with the now recent protests. The world has been outraged by these killings and has called on Iran to stop them. We need to act now and raise our voices and call on the Islamic Republic to stop their executions.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin, to Azam’s point about the need to raise your voice, we’ve seen some really interesting subversive ways that protesters, especially the young women and girls in Iran, are using social media. They’re using just formats that the regime is not familiar with to register their dissent. So does that add a new dimension that we haven’t seen before in previous iterations of these protests? And how is that affecting how this message is being communicated to the regime?

AZAM JANGRAVI: Yeah, absolutely. Social media’s been a huge help actually in this movement. It’s the first time that we’ve seen it. Gen Z is very adept at using TikTok and Instagram, and figuring out how to make things trend and go viral. An example of that is the video of the girls of Ekbatan. I don’t know if everybody saw that video, but there’s a song by Rema, a popular Afrobeats artist, with Selena Gomez. And they have a song called “Calm Down.” So these young girls made this dance video, and then they were detained afterward, of course, and had to give a forced apology video.

But that went viral. And that caused everybody around the world, from various countries—I mean, this—it was, like, trending billions in hashtags on TikTok. And it raised awareness for people to understand what’s actually happening in Iran. It gives people outside of Iran a connection to those inside showing, hey, we’re actually more similar than you might think, because a lot of people don’t have information on what Iran was like prior to 1979 either. And so social media’s been a really huge tool in pushing this forward.

And this is also—the Gen Zers are the ones who were at the forefront of all of this. And as Dr. Kar and Azzi said, this is—these poisonings seem to be a retaliation for the fact that they have been ripping up pieces of the supreme leader, they’ve been setting fire, there’s countless photos now that are iconic, that Time replicated, with the girls with their backs to the camera with the middle finger. So all of these things that they’re doing, they’re very smart. They know exactly how to get the attention of people across the world, and it’s—we have never seen that level of social media activity to move a movement forward when it comes to Iran.

ALI ROGIN: And it’s fascinating because it really does seem to be techniques using forums that are just completely unfamiliar to especially the conservative clerics.

So Dr. Kar, for you, you have—for a long time, part of your scholarship has been about tracking the divisions between the moderates, the reformers within the government, and the hardliners, looking from the 1990s to now. So can you get us up to date on what is the balance, what is the tension currently in the regime between moderates and conservatives? Is there any tension there, or is it just completely overrun by conservatives? How do you see those tensions playing out now, versus in previous decades where there was a bit of a reformist element?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: At the beginning I would like say that I practiced as a lawyer twenty-two years in Islamic Republic of Iran, so when I started to practice as a lawyer in Iran I was very young, and immediately we had Islamic—the revolution, Islamic Revolution and victory of Khomeini in this revolution. So I had been in a very complicated situation, not because I was a lawyer but because I was a woman and lawyer. I think two criminal in their eyes, because they—immediately they said that women cannot be judge, so they removed all female judge from judiciary system. And we were not sure that they give us permission to continue work as a lawyer, but they did, and they said because everybody is able to choose a lawyer, probably a mad lawyer, a crazy lawyer, and this is—and Islam—Islam doesn’t care about that. This is something that the people—

ALI ROGIN: If you want to choose a female lawyer, that’s your choice.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yes, is your choice; if you want to choose a mad, you know, lawyer, that is your choice. And that’s why we could survive. This was the reason, the base of our job.

So I can say that since Khomeini ordered for mandatory hijab, this movement started in Iran and continued. But sometimes it was very slow, it was very hard; sometimes it was getting clear and obvious. I can say that in first decade we were very, very active for mandatory hijab. And for something that is full of, you know, our penal code and family law after they came on power are full of discriminations against women, gender discrimination, and we can say this is some kind of gender apartheid. But we cannot have demonstration. Just somebody like me started talking and writing about these legal discriminations.

After that, the second we had involved with a very bad war between Iran and Iraq, and eight years we had been involved with that. And that’s why everything was closed about women’s rights and human rights, and nobody could talk about that in any other country that is involved with war. So we can say that during the time everything was slow or nothing. Nothing was active in that.

After war, after eight years that the war was over, Hashemi Rafsanjani was on power as president and he ordered open very small, very small opportunity for writing and talking about something, but under control—under very heavy control.

ALI ROGIN: And remind us, this is in the 1990s?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: 1990s, yes. And because I should make short everything, this is history and it is not easy—

ALI ROGIN: No, it—you’re doing a great job.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: After 1990, we reached 1996. And 1996 is very important period of revolution history started because the name is reformism movement. And the president, Khatami, and the people—most people of Iran, for the first time they voted to a president of this system, this political system. After that, because the slogan was different like rule of law and like we should—we should have civil society, it was very important because he ordered and the reformists ordered that women can have independent NGO. And it was very helpful for women. It was the first time that something like that happened in Iran.

But either during this time they didn’t give me permission because it—

ALI ROGIN: How interesting, during the reformist era.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: No, yeah, everything was under control. And they said: No, no, you cannot. You cannot have any NGO. And I do have all documents of that.

But some of young Iranian women, they could register and they could be active as NGO. This was something that started, you know, another kind of—

ALI ROGIN: Activism, or another kind of activism, or—

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yes, yes, yes, as NGO.

ALI ROGIN: Yeah.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: And it—and they could be very active.

And then, after that, we had some campaign like one million signature and no to stoning and something like that. And Iranians—some part of Iranian women, they came to streets and it was very important. They came to public area, and they were talking and they were giving a slogan against discriminations, not against political system.

But after that, step by step, Ahmadinejad came and stopped everything and suppressed all women activists. And you know, they—most of them, they left Iran, and now they are all over the world. And after that, everybody thought that everything is stopped and never—you know, never be active about women’s rights. But as you know and as you see now, everything is full of energy and started a movement: Mahsa; and zan, zendegi, azadi. This is full of energy. This is full of anger. And this is different with some other that we had been before that.

ALI ROGIN: And to—Dr. Kar, to your point about how many activists left Iran, so now the diaspora is very rich, very, very vocal. And so, Nazanin, I’m curious to get your sense of what is the state of the diaspora now? Are they united around these protests, any more so than perhaps the cohesion was in previous years?

NAZANIN NOUR: Yeah. I want to say, just to that point too that you brought up of differences in the government, reforms, et cetera, that the people—the information coming out of Iran and people I talk to on the ground, most people don’t see any difference between any—they all think it’s the—you know, they’re all cut from the same cloth. So it’s a regime that’s irreformable and irredeemable in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of Iranians.

To the diaspora, yes, I remember in 2009 I was actually in Iran. I got there two days before the election, the Green Movement elections. And I witnessed what happened afterward, which was the violent suppression and oppression by the state to quash those protests. And I remember that it must have been like a blip in the American media. Maybe it was in a forty-eight-hour news cycle, and then it was gone. And so—and we’ve had protests that have built up in Iran since—you know, for the last twelve to thirteen years. But if you just want to go back, 2017, 2018, 2019. There was bloody November in 2019, fifteen thousand protesters got killed within a few days and it wasn’t on the news at all.

And now we saw that actually, yeah, the diaspora rallied around the people of Iran. I had never seen that level of unity in the entire time that I’ve lived in this country, as far as, you know, giving a spotlight and attention to Iran. There’s protests and rallies that have been held in—major protests and rallies held in cities and countries all over the world ever since September. Most of them are happening in cities every weekend.

And while we would love more media coverage, and attention, and a spotlight kept on Iran and all the atrocities—the poisonings, the executions, the fact that the people want this regime gone—the unity that I’ve seen and the level of attention is something that I’ve never seen before. And it’s absolutely necessary and vital to keep, you know, because their internet gets cut off. They don’t have the means, a lot of the times, to get the messages out. So it is up to the people in the diaspora to continue to amplify their voice and make sure that the world hears what they’re saying and what’s actually happening inside of the country.

ALI ROGIN: Absolutely.

Let’s take a couple questions from the audience. I invite anybody who has a question. While you’re thinking of your questions, I’d love to ask, Azam, you were one of the kind of, as we say, OGs of the anti-hijab movement. You stood on an electric transformer, as we said. You’re a girl of revolution street, which is where these protests were happening. So what does it mean to you to see these women and young girls in the streets now?

AZAM JANGRAVI: The fight for women’s rights in Iran has been ongoing for over forty-four years, as Mehrangiz says. One of the first protests against mandatory hijab in Iran occurred on March 8, 1980, where women have used various campaigns, activist groups, NGOs, to protest the violation of their rights and demand justice and equality. However, they have paid heavy price for their activism, including suppression, threats, imprisonments, and mental and physical torture.

In 2018, when I decided to protests against mandatory hijab, there were already ongoing protests against the regime in Iran. The Iranian public was expressing their anger in the protests with a wide range of chants directed towards the regime and its leadership. In the same days, Vida Movahed performed a symbolic act of taking her scarf off and putting it on a stick to peacefully protest hijab laws—a brave move that followed forty years of women’s activism. And this is important because the forty-four years ongoing activism, you know? And I also wanted to be part of these forty-year-old movement and raise my voice against mandatory hijab laws.

As an Iranian woman, I had experienced a lot of problems in my life, particularly when I decided to separate my ex-husband. And these difficulties made me more aware of inequality and separation that Iranian women have to endure. This made me think about what was happening to Iranian women. Then I felt compelled to protest against such cruelties, you know. I believe that each woman in Iran has explained it and said similar problems as this is a year of separation.

My hope was to be part of the activists who cared about creating more awareness in society. And on the day I protested, no one stood by me or supported me when I was arrested, you know. And right now we have seen every man stand for women. This is the more important things. I think this learning and becoming aware process has done so that men are now standing by women, fighting for human and women rights.

ALI ROGIN: To that point—and I’m so sorry to cut you off, Azam, but I do want to get to some audience questions. And somebody asked something that I think ties into this, which is the solidarity that we’re seeing, is that translating to internationally.

Somebody asks, how do you see the influence of regional solidarity among women. Is it active in places like Afghanistan? Are they giving each other energy and support as needed? So let’s broaden it out and look at the regional solidarity that’s happening. What are you all seeing? Whoever wants to take that. And I think, unfortunately, that may be our last question of the session.

NAZANIN NOUR: I mean, there were videos of women in Afghanistan that were marching with signs in solidarity with the women of Iran as well. I mean, they’re neighbors and, you know, African women are under terrible suppression and oppression themselves.

And I feel like there has been a global outcry but there needs to be more. There’s actions that have been taken by various countries. At the U.N. there’s a fact finding mission that was created. You know, people banded together and got the Islamic Republic kicked off the Commission on the Status of Women, for example.

But I still feel like there hasn’t been the amount of solidarity that there needs to be and the amount of support for—it’s a human rights issue. It’s a human rights crisis. It’s a women’s rights crisis. So we need people from around the world in various countries that also believe in women’s rights and human rights to also stand up for the women, girls, and the people of Iran.

ALI ROGIN: Excellent. And somebody else asks a question. With all that is going on we see regional neighbors like Saudi Arabia normalizing ties with Iran. What does this mean for the protest movement? Are there any implications with other countries in the region normalizing ties with Iran?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: You mean the relationship—the new relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

ALI ROGIN: Yes. Yes. Are there any implications there for the protest movement?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: … We cannot predict the future of these negotiations because a lot of, you know, challenges are between Iran and Saudi Arabia and I don’t believe that everything could be. But we know Saudi Arabia that we—everybody knows is very serious, serious with Islam and with limitations and the discriminations, gender discrimination.

But now we are—you know, we are hearing that something has changed either in Saudi Arabia and this is something that Iranian people they are watching that and they think why they are—you know, they are pushing to a very bad situation, war situation, and Saudi Arabia is going toward and this is something that Iranian women know and they think about it but they don’t compare themselves with women in Saudi Arabia because we had a very different background during shah, during Pahlavi. Pahlavi changed a lot of things in Iran, like women’s rights.

ALI ROGIN: Right.

NAZANIN NOUR: But also anything that—like, anything that legitimizes the government is not going to be a good move. Anything, you know, that emboldens them is not going to be a good move, or solidifies their status.

But it’s not deterring people in Iran from protesting in their own ways. They still do come out to the streets. It might not be to the same effect as it was a few months ago, but the fact that women are taking off their hijabs, men are supporting them—also by wearing shorts, by the way, because that’s not allowed. So, that’s one way that people are dissenting, using civil disobedience. So those types of things are continuing to happen, and they’re not going to stop. And schoolgirls, university students in general, boys and girls, have been protesting for the last few weeks, as well.

So, I don’t believe that that is going to stop what has already started in Iran. There’s no going back, is what the people of Iran say.

ALI ROGIN: In the time that we have left, I’d like to go around. And in a few sentences, can you tell me what you would like to see from the international community, to give the support that this movement needs?

Dr. Kar, would you like to begin?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Now we can understand that it’s not enough that human rights institution, international human rights institution, work for removing gender discrimination in Iran. Now we can understand that all Western government, they should work with human rights institution because, as my friends mentioned about execution, now it’s very important if they can stop it. Because if everybody is getting crazy in Iran by this situation, and either us that are outside Iran, when we get this news we cannot—we cannot—what could we do?

ALI ROGIN: Right.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Because six others, they do one execution in Iran now. And all of them that call it an investigation, it is not justice. They don’t have lawyer. They don’t have lawyer. And the lawyer is coming from government and it is related with government.

So we can say that international community can do a lot of work for Iran, but so far we cannot see any results of that in this movement that now it is our focus.

ALI ROGIN: Azam.

AZAM JANGRAVI: As an internet security researcher and digital security trainer, my concern is about internet, because the Islamic Republic of Iran, when it wants to suppress the people of Iran, they shut down the internet. And it would be good for Iranian people if the international community find a way to help people for internet, and—especially VPNs, especially, you know, support us for helping people, for internet shutdowns.

ALI ROGIN: Right, we’ve seen that the sanctions don’t really seem to discriminate between uses for speaking out, and for doing business with the regime.

AZAM JANGRAVI: Exactly.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin.

NAZANIN NOUR: I just think overall, the global community needs to condemn the actions of the Islamic Republic, not legitimize them. Even the smallest action, like heads of states, when they meet with Islamic Republic officials—women not wearing the headscarf. You know, it’s not obligatory; they don’t have to do it.

I think things like, you know, the U.N. just appointed the Islamic Republic to a commission that’s overseeing human rights. And it’s an absolute slap in the face to Iranians, because they just executed two people two days ago, simply for running a social media channel that was questioning religion. So, the world needs to stop doing things like that, because all they’re doing is solidifying and emboldening the regime.

They need to pass legislation and do things that support the people of Iran, instead of emboldening the regime. They need to hold them accountable for human rights abuses. They need to, you know, list—the EU can list the IRGC as a terrorist organization. The US can pass the MAHSA Act. There’s a lot of things that can be done that haven’t been done yet. And I hope to see that.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin Nour, Mehrangiz Kar, and Azam Jangravi, thank you so much for being here today. This has been a fascinating conversation, and congratulations tonight on the award that you are receiving from the Atlantic Council. It is so well deserved.

I think we can all join in a round of applause for this incredible panel.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Thank you. Thank you for having us.

AZAM JANGRAVI: Thank you.

ALI ROGIN: So that concludes the program. Thank you so much for joining us.

NAZANIN NOUR: Thank you. Ali.

Watch the event

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After a failed coalition effort, where is the Iranian opposition headed?

Arash Azizi — Wed, 10 May 2023 19:39:45 +0000

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article was updated on May 12 to remove a reference to Pahlavi giving into outside pressure. His exact motives are unclear.

On February 10, a press conference hosted by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security led to something many Iranians had waited to see for months: a show of unity between opposition figures.

This included Reza Pahlavi, the country’s former crown prince; Masih Alinejad, a women’s rights activist against compulsory hijab; Hamed Esmaeilion, writer and advocate for the families of those killed on a Ukrainian passenger airliner downed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 2020; Shirin Ebadi, 2003 Nobel Peace laureate; Abdullah Mohtadi, once the founding leader of the Communist Party of Iran and now head of the left-wing Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan; Nazanin Boniadi and Golshifteh Farahani, two popular actresses based in the United States and France, respectively; and Ali Karimi, one of Iran’s best-known soccer legends, now an anti-regime activist based in Germany.

Speaking at the event, the group pledged unity and said they would publish a charter of demands within a month. However, when this document, known as the Mahsa Charter, was finally published on March 13, it had already lost the support of Karimi—a firm supporter of Pahlavi—and Farahani, who made no explanation for their absence. This was the beginning of a process of losing supporters that quickly led to the group’s disintegration.

Cracks were visible from the outset, with much of the division revolving around Pahlavi’s persona. Some in the Iranian opposition have been long skeptical of his ambition. While Pahlavi has attempted to espouse broadly liberal democratic politics, many of his right-wing supporters are said to be chauvinistic, aggressive, and opposed to working with others.

Within hours of the charter’s publication, many supporters of Pahlavi went on social media to attack the coalition, christened the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI), and its new charter. Much of their complaints ranged from vague to conspiratorial. Some complained that the phrase “the Iranian nation” had not been used even though the text spoke of “the people of Iran” and committed itself to the country’s territorial integrity. Some complained about the clenched fist logo used by ADFI, claiming it signaled a hidden leftist agenda.

On April 4, Pahlavi declared that he had asked his coalition partners to include new figures in the ADFI. Less than a week later, he claimed the group had failed to “come to a consensus” on the inclusion of these figures and added that he won’t “limit [himself] to one group.” Pahlavi seemingly, in effect, torpedoed the coalition with one tweet. Under the barrage of personal attacks launched by many Pahlavi supporters, Boniadi temporarily deactivated her Twitter account (she came back on May 1).

The group’s demise was confirmed on April 16 when Pahlavi declared a momentous trip to Israel, where he was hosted by Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel. In Israel, Pahlavi met twice with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and once with President Isaac Herzog. He also took part in Israel’s Holocaust Memorial Day ceremonies at Yad Vashem, prayed at the Western Wall, visited the Baha’i gardens in Haifa, and also met with members of the Israeli-Iranian community.

The trip wasn’t necessarily controversial for many Iranians. Most major forces in the Iranian opposition—including center-left and far-left groups—advocate for the normalization of relations between Iran and Israel and oppose the regime’s anti-Israel and anti-Semitic policies. Alinejad openly supported the trip, and none of the ADFI figures opposed it. However, the fact that Pahlavi had gone on the trip solo showed (in addition to his previous tweets) that the sun was setting on a coalition that was only a few weeks old.

On April 21, Esmaeilion declared that he was leaving the coalition due to “pressures from outside, pressed via undemocratic methods.” Pahlavi had resisted demands for the formation of a more structured organization for ADFI, Esmaeilion said. On April 26, Alinejad, Mohtadi, Boniadi, and Ebadi effectively published the obituary of ADFI, declaring it had come to an end while pledging that they were committed to working together in future joint efforts. The new coalition, which had given hope to many, had come to an ignominious end in less than two months.

In media interviews, Esmaeilion insisted that Pahlavi’s trip to Israel had nothing to do with his decision to leave the ADFI. In fact, Esmaeilion said he had deliberately postponed leaving the group so that he could wait for Pahlavi’s trip to finish. As expected, pro-regime media in Iran salivated over the news of the coalition’s collapse and covered it widely. Mehdi Chamran, a conservative head of Tehran’s city council, gleefully declared that “their coalition [had] collapsed, which shows that non-believers in Islam will never reach any results.”

Diversity of the opposition

For as long as the Islamic Republic has existed, it has faced efforts to unseat it by opposition groups based abroad. In the 1980s, just as it massacred thousands of opposition supporters inside the country, the Islamic Republic assassinated dozens of opposition leaders around the world. The victims included leaders of all hues, including former regime loyalists, nationalists, and Marxists. In the decades to come, these opposition organizations remained small, divided, and without much significance to Iranian politics. While the Iranian diaspora has had an immense cultural and social influence on Iran, its political influence has been small. Instead, groups and activists inside Iran have driven change even at the cost of relentless repression by the regime.

In the past few years, with the total sidelining of even the meekest domestic political opposition, some hoped that the opposition abroad could break this pattern and lead to change inside the country. There were many odds in their favor. Millions of Iranians get much of their news from satellite stations based in London and Washington, which give an enviable platform to the opposition, who can benefit from a diaspora that boasts millions of young and talented Iranians around the world. Yet the opposition has repeatedly failed to build any significant political organization.

Beyond the failure of attempting to build a broad front like the ADFI, no single political camp has been able to organize its own supporters either. Most ‘political parties’ abroad consist of, at most, a few dozen people, usually above the age of fifty. As a result, any significant change will likely come from inside Iran.

That being said, there have been positive developments in the diaspora. On April 22, hundreds of Iranian leftists gathered in Germany for a meeting that signaled support for a Charter of Minimum Demands published by twenty organizations in Iran, including trade unions and feminist bodies. The meeting had been endorsed by dozens of organizations, ranging from socialist and communist groups to LGBTQ+ bodies and more than one thousand activists. It also heard solidarity messages from people inside Iran, such as Reza Shahabi, the leader of Tehran’s Bus Workers Union, who is currently in Evin prison. Such meetings show the diversity of the Iranian opposition scene abroad and its many links to those inside the country.

At the same time, an inspiring show of the persistent relevance and strength of domestic opposition was on display at a virtual meeting held on April 22 and 23, but it was covered much less widely than the ADFI and its dramas. Inspired by the call for fundamental change from Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi, the 2009 presidential candidate and former prime minister under house arrest since 2012, the Saving Iran summit brought together leading lights of civic movements inside the country and in exile.

Former member of parliament (MP) Alireza Rajayi called for structures that could give leadership to the movement. California-based sociologist Nayere Tohidi called for “national solidarity against the tyrannical government,” which should include a wide range of people, from Pahlavi to those like Mostafa Tajzadeh, former deputy interior minister under reformist President Mohammad Khatami, who has been in prison since before the protests began. From their prison cells in Tehran, Tajzadeh sent a message to the gathering, as did Faezeh Hashemi, a popular former MP and daughter of late President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The latter is known for her outspoken critiques of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Underscoring the event’s influence, the regime quickly arrested three people who had spoken there.

Pahlavi at a crossroads

The spirit of solidarity evident in the Women, Life, Freedom movement seems to be miles away from the acrimonious scene witnessed around the Iranian opposition abroad or on social media. Esmaelion’s departure came after relentless abuse was hurled at him by some supporters of Pahlavi. Such behavior isn’t limited to cyberspace. In a recent demonstration in London on April 30, supporters of Pahlavi, some of them masked, attacked Esmaeilion with foul slogans.

Pahlavi represents a figure with many contradictions. In his public pronouncements, he espouses a tolerant and liberal view and claims Martin Luther King and Gene Sharp as role models. Addressing a leadership summit by the Anti-Defamation League in Washington DC on April 30, Pahlavi sounded like an inspiring statesman, as he recounted the oppression meted out by the regime to Iran’s religious minorities while also paying homage to those like Shia Muslim Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who resisted the tyranny of the regime.

Although Pahlavi’s trip to Israel came with its own risks, it brought him gravitas and wall-to-wall coverage. While Iran’s foreign ministry declared the trip unworthy of comment, state-backed media covered it relentlessly, attracting comments and attacks by state broadcasters and clerics, showing his continued relevance.

However, critics say Pahlavi hasn’t done enough to distance himself from many of his chauvinistic supporters who don’t practice the liberal message he preaches. Some supporters predictably claim this to be a case of some “bad apples.” But the evidence doesn’t support this view.

This isn’t just about masked protesters and online trolls. Some of Pahlavi’s vocal supporters have repeatedly made divisive moves. His wife, Yasmine Pahlavi, once shocked many by sharing a message on her Instagram stories that wished “death” to “mullahs and leftists.” Some prominent supporters openly praise Parviz Sabeti, a notorious official of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, which was known for the gruesome torturing of opponents. Pahlavi speaks of a need for national reconciliation and even welcomes former members of the IRGC. Yet, some of his prominent supporters preach a far-right nationalism that is aggressively exclusionary to those they call the “1979ers,” which seems to include all of Iran’s leftists and republicans.

The collapse of the ADFI also showed Pahlavi’s difficulties in working with others inside an organized structure. This is more jarring when recalling his previously failed projects. In 2013, he launched the National Council of Iran with much fanfare. However, the organization withered on the vine and he resigned from its presidency in 2017. Pahlavi is, thus, at a crossroads. Does he want to be an inclusive national figure that brings together a broad coalition of pro-democracy forces against the Islamic Republic? If so, he needs to decisively break with the brewing far-right faction around him.

On the other hand, the recent troubles of the opposition and the collapse of the ADFI could also be a moment of crisis that leads to positive change. If—in political competition with Pahlavi and one another—opposition figures attempt to organize their supporters and build effective structures, Iranians will get some nascent practice at democratic politics, which they have been deprived of for years. In the absence of such organized efforts, it is unlikely that the Iranian opposition abroad can break out of its decades-long pattern of political irrelevance.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar based at New York University. He is the author of “The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions.” Follow him on Twitter: @arash_tehran.

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Engelke in The Hill discussing the polycrisis’ impact on the world’s youth

sodal — Thu, 04 May 2023 15:51:25 +0000

original source

On April 28, Peter Engelke, along with UNICEF’s Jasmina Byrne, co-authored an op-ed for The Hill discussing the “polycrisis”: multiple near-simultaneous shocks, with strong independencies among them, taking place in an ever-more integrated world. This includes the likes of the COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing war in Ukraine, climate change, economic upheavals, and more. As these factors compound, the authors argue, the ones most hurt will be the world’s youth and children.

To combat this array of crises, the authors advocate for increased investment in foresight capabilities within governing structures, empowering the voices of the youth, and rethinking the management of public goods.

These tasks will be difficult. Each requires a consensus within and across governments, multilateral institutions and non-state actors including corporations, philanthropies, and non-profit organizations… But above all, it will demand that older generations acknowledge that neglecting to overcome the polycrisis would be a profound moral failure, consigning the world’s children and youth to a bleak future.

Peter Engelke

Staff

Peter Engelke

Deputy Director of Foresight, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

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Modernizing MENA education: How to close the career success gap

Nibras Basitkey — Wed, 03 May 2023 21:48:57 +0000

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, historically recognized for its strong educational system, is struggling to equip its students with the essential competencies required to secure employment opportunities. This comes at a time when the job market is experiencing rapid growth, driven by new technologies and innovations. Furthermore, the region has a substantial number of youth, with over 28 percent of its population aged between fifteen and twenty-nine, according to World Bank Data. This represents a remarkable 108 million people—the largest cohort of young people transitioning to adulthood in the region’s history.

In order to accommodate the significant influx of youth into the workforce, the MENA region will need to generate three hundred million fresh employment opportunities by 2050. Interestingly, despite the generous spending on public education, the likelihood of unemployment may actually increase with higher levels of education, which sets it apart from other regions in the world.

As mentioned before, the education system in the MENA region often falls short in adequately providing students with the skills and competencies required for a successful path to employment. This gap is evident in the high percentages of skill deficits that exist across the region, with 70 percent of the workforce lacking essential skills. This figure underscores the urgency to prioritize closing the divide between education and employment. Without such efforts, the gap is likely to persist further as new technologies emerge, creating substantial obstacles for job seekers and organizations in search of competent candidates.

The importance of bridging the gap between education and job market needs is further emphasized by a recent report unveiled at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in 2022. According to the “Catalyzing Education 4.0: Investing in the Future of Learning for a Human-Centric Recovery” report, investing in the skills of primary and secondary school children in the Middle East and North Africa can generate an additional $266 billion for the region’s economy by 2030. In addition, the effect of equipping the current generation of school-aged children is highlighted, showing that enhancing collaborative problem-solving abilities alone could make an astounding contribution of $2.54 trillion to the global economy—equivalent to more than $3,000 per child of school age.

The report also underscores the importance of investing in the skills of the next-generation workforce. The findings suggest that broad-based investment in future skills could contribute to a boost of $8.3 trillion in productivity for the global economy by 2030. Thus, efforts to address the skills gap and provide students with relevant skills and competencies are crucial for ensuring long-term economic prosperity in the Middle East.

Identifying the challenge in the skill gap

The job market is constantly changing, yet educational institutions must adapt accordingly to ensure that students are prepared with the essential skills for success in the workplace. Recognizing these challenges can empower companies, education providers, and governments to address the skills gap, formulate effective strategies, and prevent future skill shortages.

The education systems in the MENA region are failing to keep pace with the rapidly evolving labor market, which is increasingly characterized by emerging technologies, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Moreover, a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) survey indicated that 60 percent of CEOs think that Middle East education systems are falling short in equipping students with the necessary skills for employment. The majority of Middle East countries continue to use traditional curricula that are often outdated and do not reflect the changing needs of the labor force. Many institutions focus too much on theoretical knowledge and rote memorization and fail to offer experiential learning opportunities. This approach may have been effective in the past, however, it is no longer relevant today, as the region witnesses the influx of new technologies and becomes a hub for innovation.

Addressing challenges facing MENA students in the job market

Students need to be prepared to face real-world challenges, where they may be required to apply their knowledge to practical situations. In order for this to happen, they need to be taught problem-solving, critical thinking, creativity, communication, and teamwork. These skills are difficult to acquire solely through classroom learning and require hands-on experience. Therefore, it is essential for educational institutions in the Middle East to provide students with opportunities such as internships, apprenticeships, project-based learning, and vocational and technical programs. By gaining practical skills and experience, students will be better equipped to meet the demands of the job market and become more competitive candidates for employment. Currently, there is a disconnect between education and employer demand—something that is evident in the youth unemployment rate, which stands at nearly 26 percent.

Moreover, the study conducted on the impact of education on labor market outcomes in Egypt and Jordan found that vocational and technical education (VTE) graduates tend to have better employment outcomes compared to their general education (GE) counterparts. The research suggests that this could be attributed to the fact that VTE programs are better tailored to meet the needs of the labor market and have a more robust alignment between graduates’ skills and the market’s demands.

In response to these realities, it is imperative to take a comprehensive approach that involves collaboration between educational institutions and employers. This will foster innovation and entrepreneurship, leading to economic growth and job creation. Additionally, providing career counseling and guidance can help students identify the right career path for them and the tools and knowledge this will acquire.

Finally, it is crucial for governments in the region to prioritize education and allocate sufficient resources to support reforms. To achieve this, policymakers must commit to investing in infrastructure, teacher training, and curriculum development to create an education system that meets the demands of the twenty-first century workforce.

If these changes can be implemented, the MENA region will unlock massive potential that will address unemployment rates, resuscitate economic growth, and ensure long-term prosperity.

Nibras Basitkey is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

The post Modernizing MENA education: How to close the career success gap appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi — Tue, 02 May 2023 18:56:56 +0000

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin has worked hard to create the impression of enthusiastic support for the war among the Russian population. However, many continue to question the true scale of this public backing. In order to get a sense of Russian attitudes toward the invasion, we need to go beyond official statements and explore everything from online activity and fundraising initiatives to psychological factors that may be shaping opinion in Putin’s Russia.

Polling data remains the most commonly cited evidence of widespread Russian support for the invasion of Ukraine. However, such indicators must be treated with a high degree of skepticism due to the obvious risks inherent in expressing anti-regime opinions in an authoritarian state such as modern Russia. Over the past year, various polls have identified strong levels of public support ranging from 55% to 75%, with relatively little fluctuation. The Levada Center, which is regarded by many international observers as Russia’s only legitimate independent pollster, has conducted monthly polls since the beginning of the invasion that have consistently indicated public backing of over 70%.

While opinion polls indicating pro-war sentiment must be treated with caution, there is very little evidence of any active opposition to the invasion within Russian society. In the weeks following the outbreak of hostilities, relatively small protests took place in a number of Russian cities, but this trend failed to gain momentum. Despite awareness of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine and the Russian military’s unprecedented losses, there remains no real anti-war protest movement in Russia.

This absence of anti-war activity is perhaps unsurprising. The Kremlin has adopted a series of draconian laws in the wake of the invasion that criminalize any criticism while outlawing use of the word “war” in favor of the euphemistic “Special Military Operation.” As a result of these legislative changes, numerous high-profile opposition figures have been given long prison sentences for their anti-war stances. At the same time, it is important to note that although more than one million Russians have fled the country in response to the invasion of Ukraine, very few have taken advantage of their newfound freedoms to stage anti-war rallies outside Russia.

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Public support for the invasion can be seen in the many examples of ordinary Russians mobilizing to back the war effort. Across the country, large numbers of fundraising initiatives have emerged to help supply Russian soldiers with everything from drones and radios to food and warm clothing. These grassroots efforts are entirely voluntary and point to high levels of public sympathy for the Russian soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.

A further indication of pro-war sentiment within Russia is the revival of Stalin-era denunciations targeting anyone seen as critical of the war. There have been numerous high-profile instances of colleagues, teachers, and even family members reporting people to the authorities for voicing anti-war opinions. During the first half of 2022 alone, Russian media and information space regulator Roskomnadzor reportedly received 144,835 individual denunciations.

Social media remains comparatively free in today’s Russia and provides important insights into the public mood. Young supporters of the war have largely congregated on TikTok, where they often form pro-war groups and post messages celebrating the Russian army.

Telegram has emerged as a key platform for Russian audiences seeking to follow the invasion. There are a substantial number of military-themed accounts offering some of the most credible coverage of the war, often including remarkably frank criticism of the Russian establishment. These pro-war accounts have gained considerably in status since February 2022 and have attracted millions of followers.

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Research conducted by Ukraine’s Open Minds Institute has identified widespread pro-war sentiment on Russian social media. While it is important to acknowledge that the Kremlin is believed to invest heavily in bot farms and troll armies, the vast majority of the accounts studied by the Open Minds think tank appear to represent real people with their own wide-ranging interests and long histories of posting on different topics.

Support for the war on Russian social media tends to be expressed in abstract terms relating to national pride rather than any concrete benefits deriving from the invasion. Accounts based in Moscow demonstrate the lowest levels of interest in the war, while regions closest to Ukraine are the most negative. Meanwhile, areas of Russia furthest from the conflict tend to be more positive. Posts and comments closely mirror changing events on the ground and typically reflect the latest developments in Ukraine, indicating high levels of awareness regarding the current status of the invasion.

While it is impossible to determine exact levels of pro-war sentiment within Russian society, it is clear that the invasion of Ukraine enjoys considerable backing. What is fueling these positive attitudes toward a war that has horrified global audiences?

A combination of factors have shaped Russian public opinion in favor of the invasion. Propaganda has played a central role in this process, with Russian audiences subjected to years of relentless messaging throughout the Kremlin-controlled mainstream media preparing the population for war with Ukraine.

Many Russians appear to be driven by feelings of faith and obedience toward the authorities. Other factors include notions of national identity rooted in the imperial past and a strong desire to belong. Many Russians may be choosing to adopt pro-war positions in order to associate with like-minded people and demonstrate their own patriotism. Others may be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid accusations of disloyalty.

Unfortunately, such conformity often comes at the expense of critical thinking or moral constraints. This has made it possible for millions of otherwise unremarkable people to support the largest European war of aggression since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Some observers speculate that much of this support is insincere and would soon evaporate if circumstances within Russia changed. Nevertheless, the currently available evidence indicates overwhelming acceptance of the invasion, at the very least.

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi is founder and CEO of the Kyiv-based Open Minds Institute.

The strategic significance of this unequal alliance between Lukashenka and Putin increased considerably during the buildup to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka acquiesced to the transportation of Russian troops and military equipment across Belarus, which served as the gateway for Moscow’s failed Kyiv offensive during the initial weeks of the war. The country has continued to play an important role in the ongoing conflict, providing logistical support, training Russian troops, and supplying weapons, while also serving as a launch pad for Russian airstrikes across Ukraine.

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Belarus’s involvement in the invasion of Ukraine has led many to brand Lukashenka as Putin’s last remaining ally. While other leaders have refused to condemn the Russian dictator, Putin’s Belarusian counterpart remains one of the few still prepared to publicly defend him. However, while much of the outside world sees Belarus as Russia’s little brother, notions of a passive population fail to recognize the significant opposition Belarusians have already expressed over their country’s contributions to Russia’s war.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, Belarusian opposition groups have employed a wide range of tactics to disrupt the Russian war effort. This has included a campaign to sabotage Belarusian railroads being used to transport Russian troops, equipment, and ammunition to Ukraine. Hackers have also accessed Russian military networks and logistical operations. In February 2023, Belarusian anti-war partisans claimed responsibility for an attack that caused significant damage to a Russian spy plane based at an airfield close to Minsk.

Belarusians are also fighting shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainians against the Russian invasion. Although exact numbers are difficult to determine, the Belarusian contingent is believed to be among the largest of the foreign volunteer forces fighting for Ukraine, and includes the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion. Many of the Belarusians currently fighting alongside the Ukrainian military believe that defending Ukraine is a stepping stone toward a free Belarus and are convinced that victory over Russia in Ukraine will lead to the fall of Lukashenka in Belarus.

Meanwhile, exiled Belarusian opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya remains an outspoken opponent of Lukashenka and has proven a staunch critic of his role as Putin’s junior partner in the invasion of Ukraine. Tsikhanouskaya has repeatedly underlined that Ukrainians and Belarusians share a common enemy in their struggle to shake off Russian authoritarianism and embrace European democracy. “The war won’t be over until both our countries are free,” she declared in March 2023.

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Moscow and Minsk are both well aware of the dangers posed by public opposition in Belarus to their country’s involvement in the invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka’s violent suppression of anti-regime protests in 2020 succeeded in forcing activists to retreat from the streets of Belarus’s major cities, but discontent still simmers just below the surface. If Putin pushes Lukashenka to become more directly involved in the war, it could spark a new round of unrest with unpredictable consequences for both dictators.

Potential triggers include the planned deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. The presence of Russian nukes would deepen existing Belarusian concerns over Moscow’s increasingly overt military presence in the country. This could potentially destabilize the Lukashenka regime at a time when Russia already finds itself overstretched in Ukraine and lacking the spare resources to rescue its ally once again.

Meanwhile, speculation continues over the possibility of Belarusian troops joining the invasion. So far, Lukashenka has resisted Kremlin pressure to send his army across the border into Ukraine, but Putin’s patience may eventually run out. Any attempt to force Belarusian troops to enter the war would represent a huge gamble for the two authoritarian rulers. Numerous commentators have questioned whether the Belarusian military could be relied upon to follow orders, with some arguing that many soldiers would be likely to mutiny or switch sides and fight for Ukraine.

Direct Belarusian participation in the Ukraine invasion would also dramatically increase the chances of domestic instability inside Belarus. Alyaksandr Azarau, who leads the BYPOL organization of exiled former Belarusian military and security service officers, believes wartime realities would rapidly reignite the flames of the 2020 protests. “If small Belarus starts getting coffins from Ukraine, it will inevitably stir up protests that the authorities barely managed to stifle with mass repressions,” he told the Associated Press in late April.

This represents something of a conundrum for Putin. Faced with mounting international isolation and struggling to advance in Ukraine, he is understandably eager to strengthen his grip on neighboring Belarus and force Lukashenka to join his faltering invasion. However, if Putin pushes too hard, the outcome could be disastrous for his last remaining ally.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire are unraveling in Ukraine

Mark Temnycky — Tue, 25 Apr 2023 20:09:04 +0000

Over the past year, Russian President Vladimir Putin has openly compared his invasion of Ukraine to eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great’s imperial conquests, and has boasted of “returning” historically Russian lands. However, his dreams of a new Russian Empire are now in danger of unraveling as military setbacks in Ukraine undermine Moscow’s position throughout the entire former USSR.

The invasion of Ukraine has clearly not gone according to plan. Putin anticipated a short and victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian statehood and force the country decisively back into the Russian orbit. Instead, his army has lost tens of thousands of soldiers and vast amounts of equipment while struggling to achieve its military objectives. With the war now in its fifteenth month, Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine and finds itself subject to unprecedented international sanctions that pose a grave threat to the country’s long-term development.

Crucially, the faltering invasion of Ukraine has also undermined Russian influence throughout the post-Soviet region. Following the 1991 collapse of the USSR, Russia remained deeply reluctant to concede full sovereignty to the 14 non-Russian countries that emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. While Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania soon began pursuing a path of Western integration leading to EU and NATO membership, Russia was initially able to maintain its dominant position in relation to most of the newly independent post-Soviet nations.

Over the past three decades, relations between Russia and its former Soviet vassals have varied greatly, with some welcoming continued strong ties and others seeking to turn away from Moscow. Putin has made no secret of his desire to revive Russian influence throughout his country’s former imperial domains, and has publicly lamented the fall of the USSR as the “disintegration of historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union.”

The Kremlin has employed a mixture of carrot and stick tactics in order to retain and strengthen its influence across the former USSR. Measures have ranged from elite enrichment, customs unions, and security cooperation to trade wars, military interventions, and the creation of “frozen conflicts.”

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The 2014 invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and Donbas region was a major landmark in Russia’s post-Soviet empire-rebuilding efforts, but the full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later was to prove the biggest turning point of all. Since February 24, 2022, countries throughout the former Soviet Empire have rallied in support of Ukraine and have sought to distance themselves from an increasingly isolated and humbled Russia.

Throughout the war, the three Baltic states have supplied large amounts of defense, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while welcoming thousands of Ukrainian refugees. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have also been very supportive of Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership bids. During a recent Kyiv visit, Estonian PM Kaja Kallas underlined this backing, commenting, “For peace in Europe, we need Ukraine in the EU and NATO. The way to lasting peace is to end grey areas in European security.”

In the South Caucasus region, Russia’s status has clearly been diminished by the invasion of Ukraine and the embarrassing failures of Putin’s once-vaunted military. The Kremlin has long served as peacekeeper and arbiter between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the region, maintaining a significant military presence in Armenia. However, the war in Ukraine has prevented Russia from fulfilling its commitments, with Moscow unable to stop renewed fighting. This has encouraged the Armenians to reconsider their relations with Russia.

With Russian influence in decline, the Armenian government has deepened cooperation with both the United States and the European Union, including the opening of a new EU Mission in Yerevan. Armenia has also begun to distance itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-led military bloc bringing together six former Soviet republics.

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In Central Asia, the invasion of Ukraine has amplified existing distrust of Russia. This is most apparent in the region’s largest nation, Kazakhstan. Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan has a significant ethnic Russian population, leading to concerns that the country could become the next target of Russian imperial aggression. These fears have been further fueled by Kremlin propagandists, who have warned that Kazakhstan will pay a high price for the country’s alleged disloyalty to Moscow. Kazakh officials appear unmoved by these threats, and have recently canceled Victory Day celebrations for the second consecutive year in what many see as a direct snub to Putin.

Since the invasion of Ukraine began, Kazakhstan has attempted to strengthen ties with China, Turkey, the EU, and the US, while questioning its relationship with Russia and the CSTO. This geopolitical shift was perhaps most immediately obvious in summer 2022, when Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made international headlines by rejecting recognition of Russian territorial claims against Ukraine while standing alongside Putin at a flagship economic forum in Saint Petersburg.

Over the past fifteen months of the invasion, Kazakhstan has demonstrated its support for Ukraine via the donation of considerable quantities of humanitarian aid. Other countries throughout the former Soviet world have done likewise. Azerbaijan has sent nearly €20 million in humanitarian and medical assistance. Turkmenistan has dispatched a cargo plane filled with medicines and medical supplies. Uzbekistan sent several tons of humanitarian aid. Given continued Russian leverage in the region and Moscow’s traditional expectations of loyalty, these relatively innocuous moves should be seen as bold gestures that reflect a changing geopolitical climate.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed the extent of Kremlin control over Belarus, with Russia using its neighbor as a platform for airstrikes against Ukraine and the failed Kyiv offensive of early 2022. However, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has so far resisted pressure to directly enter the war, despite being heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival. With the Belarusian public and military both believed to be strongly against any direct participation in the invasion, Lukashenka finds himself in a difficult position. He understands that if he were to involve Belarusian forces in the war, this would likely lead to a strong and unpredictable domestic backlash.

Putin saw the invasion of Ukraine as a key step toward rebuilding the Russian Empire. Instead, it has forced countries across the former Soviet Union to distance themselves from the Kremlin. These countries feel able to do so in part due to the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine, which has made a mockery Moscow’s claims to military superpower status while reducing Russia’s ability to intimidate its neighbors. The invasion of Ukraine is still far from over, but the damage done to Russia’s regional influence and to Putin’s own imperial ambitions is already impossible to ignore.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He can be found on Twitter @MTemnycky.

Russia’s invasion highlights the need to invest more in Ukrainian studies

Oleksandra Gaidai — Tue, 25 Apr 2023 16:44:06 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the need for greater international investment in Ukrainian studies. However, this discussion does not always take into account the realities of wartime Ukraine.

While Russia’s invasion has generated unprecedented international interest in Ukrainian studies, it has also had a profound and overwhelmingly negative impact on the academic community in Ukraine itself. This must be taken into account. After all, the international development of Ukrainian studies depends largely on the state of academia in Ukraine. As Andriy Zayarnyuk wrote last year, “the center of Ukrainian studies is now in Ukraine.”

A recent report evaluating the current state of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar studies identified more than 160 study centers located mainly in North America and Europe. Ukrainian studies centers are mostly placed within Slavic studies departments, with courses tending to focus on Ukrainian culture, language, and literature rather than politics and economics.

Europe has the most centers primarily concentrated in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Poland. Notably, Ukrainian studies remains virtually nonexistent in some neighborhood countries such as Romania and Turkey. This absence became particularly evident following Russia’s full-scale invasion, with a recent survey of Ukrainian studies professionals identifying increased demand for expert commentary.

Even in countries with Ukrainian studies programs, the focus is often limited. Universities typically employ individual lecturers who offer courses on Ukrainian topics which can change from semester to semester. Factors leading to the closure of Ukrainian studies centers include lack of funding, lack of student interest, weak institutionalization, and reliance on the activities of individual researchers.

A more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian studies is clearly needed. This should include the establishment of Ukrainian professorships to make studies an integral part of the academic environment and less exposed to changes in political preferences.

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Growing international interest in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s invasion has already boosted the field of Ukrainian studies. Universities have been able to bypass bureaucracy to host more people from Ukraine, with a diverse range of Ukrainian academics fleeing the war and arriving in the West over the past fifteen months. Among students, interest in Ukrainian studies has never been higher. The challenge is to ensure this does not become a mere passing fad.

To make Ukrainian studies more resilient in the long run, Ukrainian topics need to be integrated into existing classes on subjects such as Soviet or Russian imperial history, or even European studies, contemporary politics, and international relations. The goal should be to make Ukraine part of the conversation on different issues.

At the same time, much will depend on parallel progress in Ukraine. Key objectives include translating source materials, integrating Western academic practices, and improving English skills among the academic community.

Wartime realities in Ukraine have created new possibilities for Ukrainian academia but have also deepened many of the problems that existed before the invasion. Much of the country’s educational infrastructure has been destroyed, but the impact on human capital has been even more devastating. In short, Ukraine is currently losing many of its best people including significant numbers of irreplaceable academic professionals.

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Ukraine’s universities are currently in survival mode but reform is also on the agenda. Just one day before the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the Ukrainian government adopted a new two-year development strategy for the country’s higher education system. The Ministry of Education has since announced that it will use this strategy as a road map for the reconstruction and continuation of reforms in the post-war period. However, the strategy was designed before the war and does not target the specific problems caused by Russia’s invasion.

Last month, Oksen Lisovyi was appointed as Ukraine’s new Minister of Education. It is not yet clear whether he intends to implement radical reform with long-term goals or keep the existing higher education system largely in place. While support for change is widespread, many within the academic community and education industry also appear to favor a more conservative approach.

Ukraine may not have the luxury of time for an extended debate. Funding for education has been severely cut as a result of the Russian invasion, with academics struggling to survive on inadequate salaries. This is forcing many to consider a career change. Others have left their university positions to serve in the army. It is not clear how many will return to academia, or whether they will have jobs to return to.

Students also find themselves confronted by harsh realities. With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, today’s Ukrainian high school graduates face a choice between an uncertain fate in their homeland or exploring the wide range of study options currently available at European and North American universities.

Ukraine’s universities have responded to the challenges of the invasion with ingenuity, utilizing tools developed during the Covid pandemic to switch to distance learning. However, uncertainty over the future looms large.

Some Ukrainian universities still maintain cooperation with Western institutions, but these relationships typically depend on prewar ties and offer one-sided academic mobility enabling Ukrainian scholars and students to study abroad. It would be good to see European and North American universities launch more nonresident fellowships for Ukrainians who are unwilling or unable to leave the country.

It may also be time to consider establishing new platforms and institutions for collaboration between Ukrainian scholars and their international colleagues. Ukraine can offer opportunities for Western academics focused on the Soviet and Russian empires who are no longer able to access Russian archives. Ukraine’s State Archive Service has been digitizing materials for some time and has introduced a united search system of Ukrainian archives.

The past year of war has sparked unprecedented interest in Ukrainian studies while creating both huge challenges and exciting opportunities. Ukrainian studies is now widely recognized as an important field that requires far more international attention. Looking ahead, the discussion must address both institutional and practical issues. The most important task at this stage is to prevent the further erosion of Ukraine’s academic potential and create the conditions for sustainable post-war development.

Oleksandra Gaidai is a Department of History postdoctoral fellow at American University.

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is the latest stage in the unfinished Soviet collapse

Richard Cashman — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:43:46 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began just over one year ago, growing numbers of international commentators and policymakers have reached the conclusion that the invasion is an act of old-fashioned imperialism. Until recently, such characterizations of Putin’s Russia had been restricted to the fringes of the international debate, but they are now firmly established in the mainstream.

One reason for the erstwhile reluctance to describe Russian behavior as imperial was the implication that despite the fall of the USSR, the Russian Federation itself was still fundamentally an empire in terms of structure and mentality. This creates obvious policy and diplomatic complications for Western leaders seeking to engage with Moscow and integrate Russia into a common European security architecture. Added to this is the understandable fear of playing into Kremlin narratives about the West seeking to break up Russia.

It is perhaps for these reasons that recent use of the imperial label has most often been in the context of Moscow “re-acquiring” an imperial mindset under Vladimir Putin’s leadership. In reality, however, it makes more sense to view today’s Russia within the context of ongoing imperial decline.

This process of imperial retreat began in 1989 with the loss of the outer empire in Central and Eastern Europe, and has since led to violent efforts in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine to preserve what Russia views as its inner empire. Recognizing modern Russia’s imperial identity will not make policy and diplomacy any easier, but it should lead to fewer illusions.

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When addressing today’s Russian Federation, the concept of “de-imperialization” probably has wider utility than “decolonization,” as it focuses on the core imperial issue of power without the need for agonized debate about the exact nature of a colony.

In respect of institutions and imperial organization, much about Russia has remained constant since the initial phase of decline in 1989-91. Within the Russian Federation, elected regional governors were short-lived phenomena and economic flows have continued to move overwhelmingly from the peripheries to the metropole. In the military sphere in Ukraine, which the Kremlin sees as integral to the core of its empire, ethnic minorities from the peripheries of the Russian Federation have been disproportionately mobilized in order to preserve favorable sentiment in major cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Beyond the Russian Federation, many imperial linkages have also remained. The Commonwealth of Independent States was swiftly established in 1991, while the non-Russian former Soviet republics became known as the “near abroad,” indicating Russian perceptions of partial sovereignty. Tellingly, Russia’s new internal security service, the FSB, was given the remit for these former Soviet republics rather than the Kremlin’s external service, the SVR.

While the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe and the 1991 Soviet collapse entailed an acknowledged loss of prestige, imperial attitudes in Russia’s metropolitan political, academic, cultural, and information spaces have remained largely devoid of self-examination. This has become abundantly clear from the bilious propaganda targeting Ukrainians (along with Kazakhs, Baltic peoples, and Georgians) over the last year.

Crucially, Russia did not suffer a decisive military defeat in the 1989-1991 period in the fashion that ended the other land-based European empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Turkey. Even with strategic defeat in Ukraine, Russia is not going to be occupied and have a post-imperial reality imposed on it. And so, ultimately, it is only Russians who can carry themselves to that reality, as the maritime empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal have substantially, though not entirely, managed to do following their respective military failures to sustain empire.

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Despite the genuine security complications entailed by a contiguous imperial core and peripheries, a conscious process of de-imperialization still seems, in principle, a route open to Russia. It need not entail further territorial losses from Russia’s recognized 1991 borders, but should involve Russian federal institutions being reformed and the independence of neighbors being respected. This should include their right to join an alliance like NATO without threats of invasion, just as Finland and Norway have been able to do.

Indeed, this has latterly been the message from Russian opposition figures including Gary Kasparov, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Alexei Navalny, who have outlined policies for continuing Russia’s process of de-imperialization. This does not necessarily have to be a hard sell to the Russian people. The metropoles of Europe’s maritime empires initially feared that the loss of empire would make them poorer; in fact, it made them richer.

In contrast, Putin and the clan which assumed power in Moscow at the turn of the millennium have coordinated all policy with the aim of reversing rather than managing Russia’s imperial decline. This has meant denial of the long-known problem of Russian chauvinism and further concealing rather than confronting of Russian and Soviet crimes committed in the name of empire.

The International Criminal Court’s issuing of an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes means the process of delegitimizing his leadership is now underway. The logical concomitant policy step is building relationships with alternative Russian elites who already or might in future support further de-imperialization.

In addition to realistic policy-making at the state level, Western academics and journalists can contribute to “decolonizing” Russian, Eurasian, and Slavonic studies and associated cultural spaces, drawing on similar approaches to European and North American history.

Western governments and their cultural emanations can prioritize engaging with countries of the global south to debunk the absurd but successful Kremlin narrative portraying Russia as an anti-imperial center of power, both historically and still today. This might include developing university programs and organizing academic conferences and exchanges, but also via objective news, cinema, television, and social media. Facilitating messages from countries like Ukraine, as a former imperial subject, might also modify policy-making in these countries.

The process begun in 1989 certainly did not culminate in 1991. Renewed awareness of its ongoing nature is to be welcomed, but from that should flow realistic policy that supports rather than compromises Russia’s former imperial subjects, and empowers Russians working toward a post-imperial future.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Vladimir Kara-Murza’s 25-year sentence is a verdict against all Russians

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 11:17:16 +0000

The Kremlin has sentenced Russian opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in jail for speaking the truth about the invasion of Ukraine. This is not the first long prison sentence handed out by the Kremlin authorities to opponents of the war, but it is by far the harshest act of retribution so far. The sentence represents another significant milestone in Russia’s retreat into Stalinism.

I know Vladimir Kara-Murza personally. He is a man of remarkable courage. He stood up against the criminal invasion of Ukraine knowing that his principled position would inevitably have grave consequences. At a time when the absence of anti-war protests in Russia shames the country, Vladimir Kara-Murza chose a different path.

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The verdict and sentencing of Vladimir Kara-Murza was not unexpected. On the contrary, modern Russia has been heading steadily in the direction of totalitarianism for many years. The list of regime victims is long and stretches back more than two decades to the very beginning of Putin’s reign. Some are familiar names whose deaths led to public outcry. Others are forgotten. Russia’s descent continued regardless.

The Russian people have now reached a new point in this grim journey. Almost seventy years since the death of the Soviet dictator, Stalinism has returned to Russia. The ruthless attacks on today’s political opponents and dissidents offer chilling echoes of the purges and show trials of the totalitarian Stalin era.

Even in this increasingly lawless climate, the 25-year sentence handed down to Kara-Murza stands out. It is a very deliberate and very public demonstration of the Kremlin’s determination to crush any sign of domestic dissent. The Putin regime is sending an unambiguous message to every single person in Russia that nobody and nothing is safe. From now on, the Kremlin will tear its opponents apart without any sense of restraint whatsoever.

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By condemning Vladimir Kara-Murza to a quarter of a century in jail, the Kremlin has made clear that it no longer feels constrained and will freely trample on the last surviving vestiges of individual rights. Kara-Murza’s sentence is a verdict against all Russians.

There are virtually no anti-war protests in today’s Russia, despite widespread awareness of the monstrous crimes being committed in Ukraine. Everyone in Russia has seen the destruction of Mariupol, Bakhmut, and dozens of other Ukrainian cities, albeit through the distorting lens of Kremlin propaganda. They all know their president has been charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. And yet only a relative handful of brave souls like Vladimir Kara-Murza dare to speak out.

With the sentencing of Kara-Murza, the Kremlin is now informing every single person in Russia that they are nothing. The Putin regime loves to spread fear among Russians. It wants more blood. I have no illusions that the Russian people will stand up for their freedoms. But they must now understand that unless they rise up to oppose the Kremlin, they will pay for it for the rest of their lives.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is the former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16). He currently serves as Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum.

Safeguarding the past: The Arab world’s cure to Holocaust amnesia

El Mehdi Boudra — Mon, 17 Apr 2023 21:30:38 +0000

Seventy-eight years after World War II, as facts fade and fewer survivors remain, the Holocaust risks being forgotten. This natural amnesia is compounded by widespread campaigns to revise or repress Holocaust history. International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27 and Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom Hashoah) on April 17 are important annual observances to counter these trends, but much more needs to be done year-round. Surprisingly, the Arab world may soon become a world leader in rejecting denialism to reassert “Never again!”

Present events constantly reshape the perceptions of the past and, indirectly, future outcomes. There are people in every country around the world who claim that the Holocaust never took place. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Holocaust denial is mainly a trend among the younger generation due to a lack of Holocaust education in schools and after-school activities. For decades, the Holocaust has been a taboo subject, politicized and conflated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in official discourse. Historical truth is clouded, if not overshadowed, by key actors in the Arab world who connect Israeli state policies and the Jewish people worldwide—past and present, using them interchangeably, as if they were one. Opposition to Israel becomes resistance to the reality of Jewish suffering and injustice done to Jews in the past.

As a result, the Holocaust was absent from public consciousness until 2009, when Morocco’s King Mohammed VI became the first Arab leader to recognize the Holocaust by addressing the matter in a message addressed to the launch event of the Aladdin Project at UNESCO in Paris.

“Amnesia has no effect on my understanding of the Holocaust, or that of my people,” said the king, adding, “We must together endeavor to reassert reason and the values which underpin the legitimacy of a space of co-existence where the words of dignity, justice, and freedom will express themselves in the same way and will coexist, with the same requirements, regardless of our origins, cultures or spiritual ties. This is our interpretation, in Morocco, of the duty of remembrance dictated by the Shoah.”

Speaking at international conferences and forums devoted to the Holocaust and intercultural dialogue, King Mohammed VI and representatives of the Moroccan government have frequently emphasized the significance of denouncing anti-Semitism, instilling togetherness, and religious coexistence in Moroccan society, learning from the lessons of the Holocaust, and highlighting the crucial role that education plays in this context.

Challenges for Holocaust education in the Arab world

Past efforts at Holocaust education in the Arab world have too often suffered from a lack of context-specific sensitivity. In contrast to the king’s speech, which expresses the values and ideals of the Moroccan tradition as the basis for affirming Holocaust remembrance, others have simply translated Euro-centric Holocaust materials into Arabic, mainly from fear by civil society actors they would be blamed for “normalizing” with Israel if they tried to teach about the Holocaust. To effectively use Holocaust education as a tool for genocide prevention, the content should be tailored to Arab audiences using relevant wording, metaphors, names, and historical events.

In contrast to other areas of the world, World War II battles were fought, and Jews of the MENA region, directly or indirectly, experienced the Holocaust. Employing this little-known history in creating educational content is essential to sparking children’s imagination.

On the other hand, if this would only be a requirement, rather than a shared process of mutual development, educators would not take ownership of these materials and will lack the motivation to use these materials towards the essential goal of developing Holocaust education within the Arab world.

The power of participation

Today, initiatives all over the Middle East and North Africa try to promote Holocaust education through standard education approaches. However, teacher-to-student Holocaust education, while powerful, cannot reach the vast audience in need of this vital information and perspective. There is an increasing need to use state-of-the-art media, including those that allow for online sharing of ideas. While the hateful have exploited the Internet to spread racism, Holocaust denial, and other destructive ideologies, it can also serve as a powerful tool to educate and empower those fighting hate.

In 2011, the Kivunim Institute and Mimouna Association organized the first conference on the Holocaust in the Arab world commemorating the actions of the late King Mohammed V at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. An article in the New York Times praised the event as a “first of its kind in an Arab or Muslim nation, and a sign of historical truth triumphing over conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic dogma.”

The Mimouna Association and United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in 2017 jointly created the first Arabic-language Holocaust curriculum by and for Muslims. The Holocaust education material created was tailored to the specific context of the Arab and Muslim world.

The USHMM, which is celebrating its thirtieth anniversary this month, has prioritized promoting Holocaust education in the Arab world, for example, through Holocaust commemorations in Morocco in 2018 and 2022, and Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022 and 2023. In 2022, the USHMM organized an important Holocaust commemoration in the UAE and Egypt.

In the Emirates, Ahmed Obaid Al Mansoori created in 2021 the first Holocaust memorial exhibition in the Arab world at the Crossroads of Civilization Museum in Dubai. This permanent exhibit is the first of its kind in the Arab world, and offers visitors a setting within which to begin to understand the Holocaust and fight the denial of this dark chapter of human history.

In Morocco this year, the Mimouna Association, in partnership with the Council of Jewish Communities in Morocco, the United Nations Information Centre, and the ASF, provided over 120 students from different Moroccan universities and institutes, Moroccan Muslim activists, and members of the Moroccan Jewish community with an opportunity to engage and learn more about the history of the Holocaust.

In the largest synagogue of Casablanca, 350 guests—including university students, Morocco’s Minister of Education Chakib Benmoussa, diplomats from the United States, Israel, France, Germany, Poland, The Vatican, and Spain, as well as representatives from Moroccan civil society and international organizations—packed the pews to honor King Mohammed V, savior of the Moroccan Jewish community.

Recognizing the deep convictions, moral approach, and brave policy of Sultan Mohammed V, the US ambassador to Morocco, Puneet Talwar, affirmed, “His Majesty King Mohammed V protected Morocco’s Jews from the Nazis. And His Majesty King Mohammed VI has carried on that legacy. He has spoken forcefully against the denial of the Holocaust.”

The Chief Rabbi of Casablanca, Rabbi Joseph Israel, said a customary Moroccan prayer honoring the king and his forefathers. The Muslim students also heard the Chapters of Psalms, Kaddish, Yizkor, and the Kel Malei Rachamim in memory of the Holocaust victims.

On the eve of Yom Hashoah, it is no longer considered taboo in the MENA region to promote Holocaust education and genocide prevention. The region’s youth are far more receptive to discussing the events of one of the darkest chapters of human history, despite the political, religious, and educational challenges shrouding this historic move that has been praised in some nations in the region and criticized in others.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter: @ElBoudra.

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Anti-war Russians struggle to be heard

Christopher Isajiw — Thu, 06 Apr 2023 18:12:04 +0000

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the Putin regime has worked hard to present the impression of overwhelming Russian domestic support for the war effort. This has involved everything from celebrity endorsements and relentless pro-war coverage in the Kremlin-controlled mainstream Russian media, to online flash mobs and carefully choreographed mass rallies in central Moscow.

Meanwhile, a ruthless clampdown has made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for dissenting voices to be heard. Nevertheless, opposition figures continue to question the true levels of public backing for the invasion, while insisting that large numbers of Russians are either opposed or indifferent. The real situation within Russian society is certainly far more complex than the Kremlin would like us to believe, but today’s suffocating atmosphere means there is little reason to expect an increase in visible anti-war activity any time soon.

Officially at least, Putin’s approval rating has increased significantly since the start of the full-scale invasion just over one year ago. According to Russia’s only internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, the Russian President’s rating rose from 71% on the eve of the invasion to 82% in March 2023. The same source indicates consistently high levels of support for the invasion of Ukraine, with over 70% of respondents expressing their approval in every single survey conducted throughout the past thirteen months.

These figures point to strong levels of public support for the war but they must be viewed in context. Critics question the validity of any public opinion polling in a dictatorship such as Putin’s Russia, where people are legally obliged to call the invasion a “Special Military Operation” and can face criminal prosecution for social media posts. This is worth keeping in mind when analyzing surveys of Russian opinion.

Many poll respondents may be inclined to demonstrate their patriotism and their support for the Russian military while being less enthusiastic about the invasion itself or the Kremlin’s war aims. Others may have become swept up in the relentless flow of pro-war propaganda or cut off from alternative sources of information. It is also important to acknowledge that a large majority of people refuse to participate in polling of this nature. They may choose to decline for a wide range of reasons, but it is possible that many simply prefer not to share anti-war opinions with strangers.

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What evidence is there of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia? When the invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, efforts to claim strong public backing for the war were hampered by a series of protests in cities across the country involving mainly young Russians. However, these public demonstrations failed to reach any kind of critical mass and were fairly rapidly suppressed by the authorities with large numbers of detentions.

Other Russians have voted with their feet. A mass exodus of Russian nationals began during the first weeks of the war, with a second wave starting in September 2022 in the wake of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of military-age Russian men fled to neighboring countries in the last four months of the year, leading in some cases to massive queues at border crossings.

This outflow of people has had a considerable negative demographic impact on Russia, but it would not be accurate to claim that everyone who has left the country during the past year holds anti-war views. Many chose to leave in order to avoid military service, while others feared the inconvenience of wartime conditions. Thousands of wealthy Russians have relocated to destinations like Dubai, where they can manage their Russian businesses while distancing themselves physically and psychologically from the war.

For those who remain in Russia, it is still possible to live a fairly normal life despite the imposition of sanctions and the departure of many high-profile Western brands. Meanwhile, some members of Russia’s billionaire elite are believed to oppose the war, but most see their fortunes as tied to Putin and are fearful of the consequences if they break with the regime publicly.

There are indications that the war is becoming less and less popular among the very troops charged with leading the invasion. The refusal of many contract soldiers to extend their service has forced the Russian authorities to introduce legislative changes, while in recent months there has been a sharp increase in video addresses on social media featuring mobilized Russian soldiers complaining about suicidal tactics and high death tolls. At the same time, there is little indication yet that mounting demoralization on the front lines is shaping the public mood back in Russia itself.

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What of Russia’s beleaguered political opposition? For more than twenty years, the Putin regime has sought to silence any genuine opposition forces via increasingly direct means. These efforts have intensified since the onset of the Ukraine invasion, with independent media outlets shut down and many of the country’s relatively few remaining opposition figures either jailed or forced to flee. Some have attempted to speak out against the war while in exile, with others who left Russia in previous years such as Gary Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky serving as vocal opponents of the invasion.

The most prominent opposition figure in today’s Russia, Alexei Navalny, remains in prison. Navalny has managed to issue a number of statements from jail condemning the war. In February 2023, he published a fifteen-point plan calling for the Russian military to withdraw completely from Ukraine and arguing that Russia must accept Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. While many have welcomed Navalny’s unambiguous opposition to the invasion, others remain wary due to his ties to Russian nationalism and earlier reluctance to back the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

At this point, extreme Russian nationalism appears to pose a far greater threat to the Putin regime than liberal anti-war sentiment. A new class of pro-war bloggers has emerged over the past year and has become a powerful force within the more active segments of Russian society. Hardliners such as Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have gained in stature thanks to their prominent roles in the invasion and have engaged in rare public criticism of key establishment figures.

The authoritarian nature of the Putin regime makes it almost impossible to accurately gauge levels of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia. It may take a decisive military defeat before many of those who oppose the war dare to speak up and demand change. In a sense, this is exactly what Putin is fighting against. He invaded Ukraine primarily because he feared Ukrainian democracy would serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia itself. So far, he has managed to prevent anti-war or pro-democracy movements from gaining momentum. However, if his invading army’s battlefield fortunes continue to deteriorate in Ukraine, those who dream of a different Russia may finally find their voices.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

Take wastewater management. Israel has developed technologies and protocols for the use of treated sewage water for agricultural purposes. It is an important efficiency that ensures multiple uses of significant quantities of water. But applying the technology and Israel’s approach, without modification, would not be effective in every other location. Specific details such as the soil chemistry in which the reused water is deployed, the types of crops it irrigates, and education campaigns taking into account local cultural factors all have bearing on how successful these techniques will be in other countries.

Eliminating food waste is another area that calls for regional approaches. Most N7 countries have some programs—either government- or private-sponsored—to rescue food that would otherwise rot or be discarded. But much more can be achieved if the countries work together with cross-border public-private partnerships, harmonize food safety standards, liberalize and increase efficiency of trade in agricultural commodities, and fast-track crisis management and information sharing protocols—all designed to help N7 countries ensure that food gets to where it is needed.

Applying existing research and expanded training to unique conditions in each country to improve food security also received extensive attention. There is no shortage of expertise in desert agriculture in these countries, but what works in one set of geological and climactic conditions, or with one set of crops, may not succeed when those variables change. With precise experimentation and training, the N7 countries could improve the productivity of cereals and fruit trees by 30 percent in five years and reduce crop losses to pests and diseases by 20 percent in the same period.

All of these projects require the pooling of resources, talent, intellectual capital, and creativity across the boundaries of the N7 countries and beyond, coupled with the ability to influence policymakers by bringing them practical solutions. That work will be especially driven by those former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his address to the conference, called the “change-makers,” mostly from the younger generation.

The collaborative atmosphere of the conference was notably warm, as these scientists, entrepreneurs, and policymakers forged personal connections that can translate into longer-term relationships. That included an outing to the Abrahamic Family House, the UAE’s newly opened compound with a mosque, a church, and a synagogue that symbolizes interfaith coexistence.

Even in a period of significant regional tension, governments gave their backing and encouragement to these discussions. Israeli National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi, an attendee at the N7 Conference on Education and Coexistence in Morocco in December, engaged the conference in a virtual discussion. Israeli Ambassador to the UAE Amir Hayek was a constant presence.

Nawal Al Hosany, the UAE’s permanent representative to the International Renewable Energy Agency, and Kristofer Hamel, who leads the Food Security Initiative for the UAE as it plans to host the twenty-eighth United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP28) later this year, addressed plenary sessions.

From the United States’ side, US Ambassador to Israel Thomas R. Nides and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Yael Lempert—who leads US efforts to advance the Negev Forum—and multiple congressional supporters of the Abraham Accords from both parties addressed the forum virtually. They included House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, Senator Cory Booker, Senator Joni Ernst, and Representative Brad Schneider.

What this participation tells us is that officials charged with managing relationships in the region see value in the work of such Track 1.5 conferences—that is, including government officials in an unofficial capacity along with non-governmental experts. This conference, hosted by the N7 Initiative (a partnership between the Atlantic Council and the Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation) with the support of the UAE government, mostly consisted of sessions conducted under the Chatham House rule of non-disclosure to ensure the comfort of participants and promote open exchanges between them. At a time when many official exchanges seem stalled or are moving slowly, these kinds of exchanges can have outsized value in finding areas of shared interest and forging common bonds.

Daniel B. Shapiro is director of the N7 Initiative and distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is a former US ambassador to Israel.

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Russia’s Ukraine invasion is eroding Kremlin influence in Kazakhstan

Kamila Auyezova — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 13:32:31 +0000

The invasion of Ukraine was meant to advance Vladimir Putin’s vision of a revived Russian Empire. Instead, it is forcing neighboring countries to reassess their own relationships with Moscow and fueling growing calls for decolonization and derussification throughout a region that was once viewed by many international observers as an informal extension of Russia itself.

This embrace of decolonization is nowhere more evident than in Kazakhstan, the largest state in Central Asia and a regular target of imperialistic Russian rhetoric. In the year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Kazakh society has actively sought to accelerate ongoing nation-building processes amid a notable rise in anti-imperialist sentiment. Meanwhile, the Kazakh authorities have made it clear that they do not condone Moscow’s military campaign in Ukraine and refuse to back the war.

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One of the earliest indications that Kazakhstan would not align with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine was the decision in spring 2022 to cancel the country’s traditional World War II Victory Day celebrations. The cancellation was an unambiguous rebuff to the Putin regime, which has placed the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany at the heart of modern Russian national identity and expects regional leaders to demonstrate their loyalty via reverence for the Soviet war effort.

This snub was followed by an even more direct and public fallout in June 2022. While sharing a stage with Putin at a flagship annual economic forum in Saint Petersburg, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that he would not recognize Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

Perhaps the most eye-catching indication of Kazakh public support for Ukraine has been the “Yurt of Invincibility” initiative, which has seen a number of traditional Kazakh yurts set up in Ukrainian towns and cities in recent months to help Ukrainians cope with electricity blackouts caused by Russian bombing of the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Organized by the Kazakh business community and backed by private donations, the yurt initiative has proved highly popular among Ukrainians while sparking considerable anger in Russia. However, Kremlin attempts to elicit an official response from the Kazakh authorities were politely declined, with Kazakh Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aibek Smadiyarov stating there was “nothing to explain.”

It is not hard to imagine why the appearance of “Yurts of Invincibility” across Ukraine struck such a nerve in Russia. Manned by activists offering free electricity and internet access along with hot drinks, the yurts represent a humane response to the inhumanity of Russia’s brutal invasion. In a very real sense, these traditional Kazakh abodes serve as symbols of post-colonial solidarity between Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

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Russian discontent over the critical Kazakh response to the invasion of Ukraine has led to attacks on Kazakhstan from Russian officials and in the country’s Kremlin-controlled information space. Since the start of the invasion, pundits on Russia’s notoriously inflammatory political talk shows have begun speculating over the possibility of future Russian military intervention in Kazakhstan. During a November 2022 episode of prominent regime propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s daily show, one commentator declared: “the next problem is Kazakhstan.” He went on to claim that “the same Nazi processes can start there as in Ukraine.”

These provocative statements were echoed by Russian Ambassador to Kazakhstan Alexei Borodavkin, who warned in December 2022 that “radical nationalist tendencies” were becoming more and more visible in Kazakhstan, before suggesting Russia was ready to “help” the Kazakh authorities address this issue.

The Russian Ambassador’s comments were particularly provocative as they closely mirrored the kind of language used by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of Ukraine. This played on longstanding Kazakh fears that Moscow may attempt to exploit the presence of a large ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, which is concentrated in northern regions of the country bordering the Russian Federation.

Suggestions that ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan are somehow oppressed have sparked a bitter response from many Kazakhs, who pride themselves on their tolerant attitude toward Russia and their respectful approach to the shared inheritance of the imperial past.

Unlike other post-Soviet states, Russian remains an official language in today’s Kazakhstan. The country also accepted hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing mobilization into the Russian military in late 2022. Critics say this welcoming stance makes a mockery of Kremlin propaganda claims about a rising tide of Russophobia in today’s Kazakhstan.

The past year has witnessed historic shifts in allegiances and attitudes across the entire post-Soviet space. Ukraine’s heroic fight against Russian imperialism has prompted countries throughout the region to question the nature of their own ties to the Kremlin and seek geopolitical alternatives capable of countering Russian influence.

In Kazakhstan, the invasion has amplified anti-imperial sentiment and enhanced existing decolonization processes. These trends look set to gain further momentum in 2023. Geography alone dictates that Kazakhstan cannot realistically hope to cut all ties with Russia, but there is no escaping the fact that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has seriously undermined Russian influence in a country where all roads once led to Moscow.

Kamila Auyezova is a research analyst who focuses on geopolitical and climate issues in Eurasia. You can find her on Twitter @KAuyezova.

The real definition of victory for Ukraine

Victor Pinchuk — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 12:51:16 +0000

For centuries, Ukrainians have fought for their independence. The current war is a continuation of this historic struggle. Today, Ukrainian heroes are dying for the cause of independence; it is this very cause that Russia is trying to deny and destroy.

How can we define independence? Of course, it means a country that is truly sovereign and controls all of its territory, but for Ukraine it means something more. For Ukraine, true independence will only be achieved when the country is secure and anchored in the West, its natural geographic, political, and strategic home. Genuine independence will only come with Ukraine as a member of the European Union and NATO.

EU and NATO membership are integral components of victory and must already become reality right at the moment the war ends. Ukraine’s international friends must provide sufficient weapons to create the circumstances where this becomes possible. But beyond military aid, they should also support Ukraine’s geopolitical goals. They must do so with a grand vision rather than incrementally. They must be ready for Ukrainian EU and NATO membership as soon as the fighting stops.

The terrible war we are currently experiencing is not primarily a fight over territory. This is true for both Russia and Ukraine. Russia’s main goal is not to take and annex a certain number of square miles from Ukraine. Russia wants to annihilate Ukraine as state; to make Ukrainians as a nation disappear.

For the Russian Empire, a free Ukraine poses an existential threat. Russia cannot tolerate the emergence of a post-Soviet, post-communist, Orthodox, Slavic country that is a successful, prosperous, free democracy and market economy. So the empire wants to drag us back to the past through war.

For Ukrainians, there is now a chance that their country will finally win its centuries-long fight for independence and become truly free. In past centuries, Ukrainians demonstrated the same bravery we see today, but they were alone in their fight against the empire. Today, the whole civilized world stands with Ukraine.

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In order to be independent, Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be restored in line with the country’s internationally recognized 1991 borders. A tribunal for war criminals and reparations must also be established. But this will not create a truly independent Ukraine. For that to happen, Ukraine requires two more key steps.

First, Ukraine must receive credible security guarantees from the West that will prevent Russia from attacking again. Without such guarantees, there will be no real end to the war and no victory, just a pause. The second vital step is the radical reform of Ukraine’s institutions. This means the rule of law, democracy, and independent institutions. Freeing Ukraine from Russian occupation will not bring victory unless the country is also freed from the bad practices of the past.

Let’s address these steps one by one. The war has demonstrated that Ukraine needs NATO membership. Therefore, Ukrainian NATO membership must be an integral element of any lasting settlement. It is possible that security guarantees similar to NATO membership could serve as a pathway to this goal, if provided either by NATO itself or a coalition of countries.

In order to place radical institutional reforms on an irreversible path, Ukraine needs the country’s EU membership to be finalized or imminent by the end of the war. EU membership is not a substitute for reforms, but a necessary incentive for them. It is for Ukrainians to conduct reforms, while the EU role is to assess them and decide on integration. Experience has shown that the EU accession process is a uniquely powerful tool for radical institutional reform. And EU membership is the best insurance against a return to bad practices.

If these two goals are achieved, financial resources will flow to Ukraine. This will not only be in the form of international assistance and reparations, but also in terms of private investment. A free and secure Ukraine will enjoy very strong growth that will benefit all involved.

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Many of Ukraine’s international friends agree the country’s security and institutional reforms are the first priority after victory. They acknowledge that EU and NATO membership should be on the agenda, but only after victory. I strongly disagree. These steps cannot wait until after victory; they are essential components of victory.

For Ukraine, true victory means security and reform. It means NATO and EU membership, or at the very least, iron-clad security guarantees along with key practical components of EU integration in place. Without these steps, there will be no victory.

The EU must strengthen its existing commitment to Ukrainian membership and implement it with unprecedented speed and political will. NATO accession must be on the agenda of the coming July 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius.

This will not be simple. Current EU and NATO regulations make speedy accession difficult. But at key moments in history, merely following the rules is insufficient. With the right political leadership, existing rules can be adjusted and new standards adopted to meet the needs of the moment.

Never in the history of the EU has a country served as such an inspiration for Europe or sacrificed so much for Europe. Never in the history of NATO has a country fought so bravely and sacrificed so many lives to defeat a deadly threat that also endangers NATO.

Now is not the time to ask yourself how much more can be done within the existing limits. Instead, the real question is: How do we get this right? If this is not the time to change existing practices and procedures, when is the right time?

My message to Western leaders is simple: If you get Ukraine right, you will not only save lives. You will also show the whole world that the Western alliance and the European Union are the future. And for you, too, this will be a real victory.

Victor Pinchuk is a businessman, philanthropist, and the founder and member of the board of Yalta European Strategy. He is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s International Advisory Board. The Victor Pinchuk Foundation is a donor to the Atlantic Council.

Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave: A playbook for countering the authoritarian threat

Hardy Merriman, Patrick Quirk, Ash Jain — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 12:00:00 +0000

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Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave is a joint project between the Atlantic Council and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC), aimed at catalyzing support for nonviolent pro-democracy movements fighting against authoritarian rule.

The project recognizes that civil resistance movements—using tactics such as strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, and a range of other nonviolent tactics—are one of the most powerful forces for democracy worldwide and therefore central to reversing the last seventeen years of democratic recession.

The project produced a three-part report, titled Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave: A Playbook for Countering the Authoritarian Threat, that:

Proposes new approaches and tools to support civil resistance movements
Advances a new international norm — the “Right to Assist” pro-democracy movements
Develops strategic and tactical options to constrain authoritarian regimes and drive up the cost of their repression

Introduction

The security of the United States, democratic allies, and humanity’s future depends significantly on the state of democracy worldwide.

Yet over the past seventeen years, authoritarianism has risen globally, while democracy shows alarming decline. Dictatorial regimes in China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela and many other countries have become more repressive. Meanwhile, democracies in all parts of the world have backslid, with some regressing completely into authoritarianism.

This playbook focuses on a key factor that can help reverse both of these trends. Popular civil resistance movements—using tactics such as strikes, boycotts, protests, and many other tactics of noncooperation—are historically one of the most powerful drivers of democracy worldwide. They can play a central role in transforming authoritarian regimes and countering democratic backsliding. We offer recommendations for how the United States and democratic allies can adeptly support and enable these movements.

The stakes in this contest over global governance could not be higher. A more authoritarian world is a world dangerous for democracies. As autocrats support each other, abuse their own populations, and undermine democratic states, they also perpetrate and create conditions for violent conflict, atrocities, humanitarian crises, the growth of violent non-state actors, subversion of multilateral institutions, and transnational corruption. These produce massive human suffering, and further exacerbate internal weaknesses of democratic governments, thereby creating a positive feedback loop that contributes greatly to the present-day autocratic wave.

Turning the tide now requires urgency, clear vision, strategy, collective action, discipline, and innovative tactics. Democracies must unify, strengthen their alliances, and go on offense because the future depends on it.

Yet this threat can be countered. Three previous global democratic waves have emerged from democratic troughs. Developing a strategy to catalyze a fourth wave begins with a clear-eyed look at the challenges we currently face. Externally, democracies confront an increasingly existential conflict waged against them, with authoritarian governments using democratic openness to enable them to spread corruption, undermine government institutions, influence economic decision-making, and manipulate the information environment. Simultaneously, many democracies are experiencing legitimacy crises due to long-standing failure to deliver adequately for their constituents. This core weakness has made them more vulnerable to populism, polarization, disruptive information technologies, external authoritarian attacks, and internal demagogues who now use a well-trod path to weaken democratic governance from the inside out. Past denial about the potency of these threats enabled them to grow. Turning the tide now requires urgency, clear vision, strategy, collective action, discipline, and innovative tactics. Democracies must unify, strengthen their alliances, and go on offense because the future depends on it.

Any strategy to counter authoritarianism will entail action on multiple fronts. By articulating in this playbook how to better support and create an enabling environment for pro-democracy civil resistance movements, we focus on one of the greatest foreign policy opportunities available today—engaging the power potential of populations worldwide who want to protect and advance human rights and democratic rule. Our allies are found not only in fellow governments and registered civil society organizations, but also among billions of people who live daily under either weakening democracies or the abuse of dictatorship.

Authors

Fellow

Hardy Merriman

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Civil Society Human Rights

Fellow

Patrick Quirk

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

Former staff

Ash Jain

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

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Child abductions reveal the genocidal intent behind Putin’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 20:58:18 +0000

The recent International Criminal Court decision to charge Vladimir Putin with war crimes has shed much-needed light on one of the darkest chapters of Russia’s ongoing invasion. During the past year, Russian forces have reportedly abducted thousands of children from occupied regions of Ukraine and attempted to deprive them of their Ukrainian identity. This campaign of forced deportations and anti-Ukrainian indoctrination reveals the genocidal intent at the heart of Russia’s Ukraine invasion.

Article II of the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention identifies five acts that qualify as genocide. The fifth act, forcibly transferring the children of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group to another group, concisely and accurately describes Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have attempted to disguise the abductions as a routine wartime security measure, but Moscow’s well-documented efforts to “re-educate” young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians tells a very different story.

Since the invasion began in February 2022, evidence has mounted of a large-scale Russian operation to abduct and indoctrinate Ukrainian children throughout the territories that have fallen under their control. One recent report published by the Yale School of Public Health in February 2023 identified a systematic Russian program to re-educate thousands of abducted Ukrainian children via a network of more than 40 camps and facilities stretching from Russian-occupied Crimea to Siberia. “This is not one rogue camp, this is not one rogue mayor or governor,” commented Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. “This is a massive logistical undertaking that does not happen by accident.”

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Ukrainians in liberated regions have recounted how they frequently had to hide children from Russian occupation forces. Numerous Ukrainian orphanages were forced to smuggle children out of occupied areas to prevent them from being seized and sent to Russia. Some of the victims of these Russian abductions have been orphans or children living in care. Others have been physically separated from their families and told they are no longer wanted. In some cases, Ukrainian parents claim to have been tricked or coerced into sending their children to Russia. The overall number of abducted children is not yet known. Current estimates indicate that well over ten thousand young Ukrainians have been abducted and sent to Russia. Many fear the real total figure may be far higher.

Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who has been indicted alongside Putin by the ICC for the “unlawful deportation and transfer” of Ukrainian children, has spoken openly about the apparent effectiveness of Russia’s indoctrination efforts. In late 2022, she acknowledged that a group of 30 children brought from Russian-occupied Mariupol initially sang the Ukrainian national anthem and shouted the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” but claimed that this criticism was “transformed into love for Russia.”

The abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children is only one element of comprehensive Russian efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity. Throughout Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, any symbols of Ukrainian identity and statehood are suppressed while access to the Ukrainian media is blocked. The Ukrainian language is being removed from the school system, with educators imported from Russia to teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that promotes a Russian imperial identity while demonizing Ukraine. Parents who question these policies are told their children will be taken away if they refuse to comply.

Russia is also imposing more direct measures to outlaw any expressions of Ukrainian identity. Throughout the country, Russian-occupied regions have witnessed the same pattern of arrests targeting anyone deemed a threat to the Kremlin authorities. This typically includes local officials, journalists, former members of the Ukrainian military, civil society activists, and anyone expressing pro-Ukrainian views. In numerous instances, patriotic tattoos or pro-Ukrainian content on mobile phones have led to detentions and disappearances. Investigators working in newly liberated regions have uncovered evidence indicating thousands of civilian deaths along with the widespread use of sexual violence and torture.

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While the mass killing of Ukrainian civilians has been well documented, there is not yet any international consensus over whether Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. A recent UN report found that Russia was guilty of “a wide range of war crimes” in Ukraine, but commission head Erik Mose said investigators had not yet uncovered conclusive proof confirming genocide.

Others argue that more than enough evidence of genocide has already been found, and point specifically to the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Speaking to CNN’s Christiane Amanpour on March 22, Ukrainian Nobel laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk characterized the abductions as a component of “the genocidal policy which Russia has imposed against Ukraine.” Likewise, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that the abduction of young Ukrainians amounted to genocide. “The most chilling crime is that Russia steals Ukrainian children,” he commented. “This is a genocidal crime.”

In order to prove that Russia is guilty of genocide, it is vital to demonstrate genocidal intent. It is this intent “to physically destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,” that legally distinguishes genocide from war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In this particular case, Russia itself has provided mountains of evidence indicating a clear intention to destroy the Ukrainian nation. Indeed, there are few examples in history where a genocidal power has incriminated itself so comprehensively. Vladimir Putin himself has frequently argued against the existence of a separate Ukrainian identity, and has even published lengthy articles denying Ukraine’s historical legitimacy. Meanwhile, genocidal language aimed at Ukraine has become completely normalized in the Russian mainstream media and among senior government officials.

The grotesque calls for genocide that are so commonplace in today’s Russia have helped inspire the criminal actions of Putin’s invading army. Among the long list of crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine, the methodical abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children stands out. The scale and systematic nature of the abductions make them an unmistakable symbol of Russia’s intention to eradicate Ukrainian identity and extinguish the Ukrainian nation. It is therefore fitting that this should be the first crime Vladimir Putin is indicted for. Putin hoped the invasion of Ukraine would secure his place among Russia’s greatest rulers. Instead, he looks destined to enter history as a genocidal dictator forever linked with the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

An imperative for women’s political leadership: Lessons from Brazil

Valentina Sader, Isabel Bernhard — Tue, 21 Mar 2023 13:00:00 +0000

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In politics and positions of power, the lack of equitable representation of women is striking. Women represent 49.7 percent of the world population, yet only twenty-seven countries have a female leader as of February 2023.2 Brazil, which elected its first and only woman president in 2011, has seen slow progress in ensuring greater female participation in politics. Political violence against women, among other factors, is a deterring factor for women’s political participation.

Political violence is not a new phenomenon, nor it is exclusive to women. However, evolving analysis has identified differences between political violence generally and political violence against women. The latter is directed at women with the intent of restricting their political participation and active voice, while also generalizing women’s participation as “wrong.” In the Brazilian context, political violence against women is a “physical, psychological, economic, symbolic, or sexual aggression against women, with the purpose of preventing or restricting access to and exercise of public functions and/or inducing them to make decisions contrary to their will.” As such, political violence against women plays an important role in deterring women’s active participation in politics—and even more daunting for black, indigenous, or LGBTQI+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer) women.

Brazil has a unique opportunity to adjust its legislation and reframe the incentives in the political sphere tackle this issue now, ahead of municipal elections in 2024. Doing so will ensure greater and more equitable political participation, enrich the political debate, strengthen the legislative agenda, and further solidify the country’s democratic ethos, even if other challenges to democracy remain. This report presents solutions Brazil could take to reach this more representative and resilient version of democracy.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Taiwan supports Ukraine and studies country’s response to Russian invasion

Kira Rudik — Thu, 16 Mar 2023 01:53:23 +0000

In the year since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainians have learned who they can truly count on as friends. Taiwan has emerged as an important Asian ally, offering strong support to Ukraine at a time when other countries in the region have preferred to maintain a more neutral stance.

This backing was recently evident as Ukraine struggled with the consequences of a nationwide infrastructure bombing campaign unleashed by Vladimir Putin with the aim of freezing the country into submission. In October 2022, Russia began launching regular waves of airstrikes against residential areas and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine. The goal was to leave tens of millions of Ukrainians without access to power, heating, water, and other basic amenities during the coldest period of the year. Moscow believed this would break their will to resist.

With towns and cities throughout Ukraine plunged into darkness, the population began adjusting to a new reality marked by bottled water, flashlights, canned food, and candles. Large numbers of generators were urgently imported into Ukraine, providing homes, businesses, and public services with electricity. Taiwan was at the forefront of international efforts to provide Ukrainians with sufficient generators. In early March, the seventeenth powerful generator unit arrived in Kyiv as part of an aid package from the Taiwanese government coordinated via the Darnychany charity fund.

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The delivery of generators is only one of the many ways Taiwan has shown its support for Ukraine over the past year. Since the full-scale Russian invasion began in February 2022, Taiwan has provided hundreds of tons of humanitarian goods along with financing to help Ukrainian communities coping with the aftermath of Russian aggression. Taiwanese officials have also offered training programs to their Ukrainian colleagues. In late 2022, Taipei confirmed the allocation of a further $56 million in aid for Ukraine to help finance rebuilding and recovery efforts during the current year.

These policies of support appear to enjoy a high degree of popular backing among the Taiwanese public. Numerous pro-Ukrainian rallies have taken place in Taipei over the past year. Meanwhile, when Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu announced news of the country’s plans to provide Ukraine with generators, I was struck by the overwhelmingly positive tone of the coverage in the Taiwanese media and throughout the country’s social media space. This supportive response was very touching and pointed to a strong consensus within Taiwanese society that the country’s national interests are best served by standing with Ukraine.

I encountered these sentiments for myself in late 2022 while traveling to Taiwan as part of an official Ukrainian delegation. It soon became apparent that the Taiwanese people have been deeply moved by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the heroism of the Ukrainian people. There was huge sympathy for Ukraine and great interest in our experience, which many clearly see as offering important insights for Taiwan itself.

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During our visit to Taiwan, journalists and members of the public alike asked me the same thing again and again. “If you had known two or three years ago that Russia was preparing to launch a full-scale invasion, what would you have done differently?” This line of questioning is hardly surprising. The Taiwanese are understandably eager to study Ukraine’s experience because they also live alongside a large neighbor with territorial claims to their country, and wish to be as prepared as possibible for all eventualities.

The idea that the fates of Ukraine and Taiwan are now somehow linked has often been discussed over the past year. During the early months of the Russian invasion, I remember reading a comment on social media from somebody claiming that Ukraine was “not only fighting for its own freedom but also indirectly saving Taiwan.” Such claims may sound exaggerated but they are in fact entirely justified. We are well aware in Ukraine that our fight against Russian imperialism will also shape the wider world and define the future of international relations. For obvious reasons, this is nowhere more acutely felt than in Taiwan.

With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in its second year, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians remain confident of victory. It would be a victory for the entire free world that would send a powerful warning to autocrats around the globe who may be thinking of launching their own “special military operations” against peaceful neighbors. Defeating Russia would be the best way to say “thank you” to all of Ukraine’s partners throughout the democratic world including Taiwan.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party, member of the Ukrainian parliament, and Vice President of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).

Raising capital can be an uphill battle for women in the region. The majority of women entrepreneurs in MENA do not seek a formal source of financing and rely on their savings or family support. Those who do seek investment face unique challenges. According to a report by Wamda and TiE Dubai, a staggering 66 percent of women founders in MENA believe that investors are less inclined to invest in start-ups led by women. Their concern is borne out by the fact that less than $50 million was invested in female-only start-ups in the first nine months of 2022, accounting for about 2 percent of total start-up investment in the region during that period.

To overcome this challenge, venture capital firms should be more diversified and the number of women with decision-making power should increase. Specialized training on how to pitch and approach funders is another form of support that could be helpful to women entrepreneurs in the region.

Networking is another obstacle female entrepreneurs in MENA face, as they are often shut out of male-dominated business environments. Building a strong network helps create the social capital that fuels collaboration and access to funding, and provides a support system for entrepreneurs on their journeys. According to one study published in Cross Cultural & Strategic Management conducted in Turkey and in four MENA countries—Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Egypt—networking was identified as the primary factor that helped women entrepreneurs overcome obstacles, such as access to capital or discovering new market opportunities.

Finding supportive and inclusive networks isn’t easy in the region, but some programs like the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship and groups such as the Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB) are creating support systems for women entrepreneurs to connect with other founders, find mentors, and grow their businesses.

Another challenge for female entrepreneurs in MENA is that women are still expected to focus on raising families rather than pursue taxing careers, which contributes to the region having the lowest female labor force participation rate (24.6 percent) in the world at half the global average.

Changing social pressures and expectations is a slow process, which is why it’s so important to continue to highlight accomplished women entrepreneurs and other successful women from the region. Events like International Women’s Day and Women’s History Month are helpful platforms for women entrepreneurs and business leaders to celebrate their achievements and share their stories. However, civil society and other organizations should strive to highlight such stories all year round so young women and girls have strong role models.

However, increasing women entrepreneurship and business leadership in MENA isn’t simply a matter of gender equality, but a key to accelerating the region’s economic and social progress. It is also good for private companies. Research has repeatedly shown that companies with more women simply do better. In a study of 1,069 leading firms across thirty-five countries, researchers concluded that gender diversity leads to increased company productivity in terms of market value and revenue.

To mark and celebrate Women’s History Month, let’s take a moment to acknowledge the incredible women entrepreneur trailblazers in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite the many challenges, these women are changing the business landscape. But the public and private sector must be proactive to truly create opportunities. Governments around the region need to create policies that both foster employment opportunities for women and provide more support for female entrepreneurship. In addition, private-sector companies should help create more welcoming business environments for women, which would be a win-win for them as well. It’s time to tap into the full power of women in business and take concrete action to support their success.

Lynn Monzer is the associate director with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

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Will morale prove the decisive factor in the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 22:13:28 +0000

Graphic footage emerged this week on social media depicting what appeared to be the final moments of a captive Ukrainian soldier being summarily executed by Russian forces. The brief video of this apparent war crime shows an unarmed Ukrainian POW, who was later identified as Chernihiv native Oleksandr Matsievsky, calmly repeating the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine” before being gunned down by his captors in a hail of bullets.

These memorable last words resonated deeply with the Ukrainian public, who responded with a mixture of outrage over the criminal nature of the killing and admiration for the stunning courage of the victim. Within hours of the video’s appearance, Matsievsky was being commemorated across Ukrainian social media with hundreds of portraits and memes paying tribute to his defiant stand. Murals have already appeared on the streets of Ukrainian cities. There is even talk of a monument.

Matsievsky is the latest symbol of Ukraine’s unbreakable resolve in a war which has already produced plenty. From the famous “Russian warship, go f**k yourself” of the Snake Island garrison, to the seemingly superhuman tenacity of the Azovstal defenders, Ukraine has witnessed a large number of iconic moments over the past year capturing the spirit of resistance that has gripped the country since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

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This is not at all what Russia was expecting. When Putin gave the order to invade Ukraine, he had been led to believe the Ukrainian public would welcome his troops and had been assured that organized military resistance would collapse within a matter of days. Billions of dollars had been spent preparing the ground by bribing Ukrainian officials to change sides and back the invasion. The stage was supposedly set for a triumph that would extinguish Ukrainian statehood and confirm Putin’s place among Russia’s greatest rulers.

It is now clear that Putin’s complete misjudgment of Ukrainian morale was one of the most remarkable intelligence failures of the modern era. He appears to have fallen into the trap of many long-serving dictators and surrounded himself with loyalist yes-men intent on telling him what he wanted to hear.

This toxic trend was exacerbated by the enforced isolation of the Covid pandemic, which appears to have further fueled Putin’s Ukraine obsession and strengthened his conviction that the country must be subjugated at all costs. In the increasingly claustrophobic climate of the Putin Kremlin, it is hardly surprising that his intel chiefs chose to reinforce these prejudices and encourage his reckless imperial ambitions. If they had attempted to counsel caution, they would likely have been dismissed.

This sycophancy was to have disastrous consequences. Far from greeting Putin’s invading army with cakes and flowers, the Ukrainian nation rose up and united in defiance against Russian aggression. Tens of thousands flocked to enlist in the Ukrainian military and territorial defense units, while millions more mobilized to support the war effort through fundraising, donations, and the improvised production of essential items such as anti-tank obstacles and Molotov cocktails.

Within weeks of the invasion, a vast network of Ukrainian volunteers was supplying frontline soldiers with everything from food and medicines to drones and jeeps. Despite the horrors of the past year, this steely determination to defy Russia remains firmly intact throughout Ukrainian society. Whatever else today’s Ukraine may lack, morale is certainly not an issue. Quite the opposite, in fact.

The same cannot be said for the Russian army. In response to the catastrophic losses suffered during the first six months of the invasion, Putin announced Russia’s first mobilization since World War II in September 2022. The bulk of the estimated 300,000 men mobilized last year are now in Ukraine, where they are being thrown straight into battle despite being untrained and under-equipped.

Since late January, a steady stream of videos have begun appearing on social media featuring groups of mobilized Russian troops appealing to Putin or their own regional representatives. They typically complain of suicidal tactics and heavy casualties while protesting their role as frontline shock troops and calling for redeployment to rear areas. In some cases, mobilized men have announced that they will directly refuse to follow orders.

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Growing signs of demoralization within the ranks of the Russian military could become a major issue for the Kremlin at a time when Putin faces no other obvious domestic challenges to his war policy.

At present, there is little sign of significant anti-war sentiment on the home front inside Russia. On the contrary, independent surveys indicate consistently high levels of public support for the invasion, while those who do object have largely chosen to keep quiet or flee the country. While many question the validity of polling data in a dictatorship, the complete absence of any meaningful efforts to protest the war points to a passive acceptance of the invasion at the very least.

The prospects of a Kremlin coup look to be similarly slim. While many within the Russian elite are said to have been appalled by the decision to invade Ukraine, they have since reconciled themselves to the new reality and are for the most part far too personally dependent on Putin to mount any serious challenge to the Kremlin.

This leaves the military as the one potential source of serious opposition to the war. If Russian commanders persist with their human wave tactics and mobilized troops continue to die in large numbers, the current tide of discontent may evolve into outright mutiny, with highly unpredictable consequences for Putin and his regime.

The importance of morale in warfare has long been recognized. Napoleon Bonaparte famously observed that three-quarters of military success is down to morale. This helps explain why the Ukrainian army has over-performed so spectacularly during the first year of the invasion, while Russia itself has struggled to live up to its prewar billing as the world’s second most powerful military.

Crucially, Ukrainians know exactly what they are fighting for. They are defending their homes and families against an enemy intent on committing genocide and wiping their country off the map. Understandably, they need no further motivation. In contrast, Russians have been told they are fighting against everything from NATO expansion and gay parades to Anglo-Saxon Satanists and Ukrainian Nazis.

While Ukrainian soldiers are focused on the clearly defined objective of liberating their country, Russia’s war aims appear to be far more ambiguous and are often subject to sudden revision. Once the cannon fodder approach of the Russian generals is factored in, it is no surprise that morale is becoming such an issue for Putin’s army.

Could collapsing morale decisively undermine the Russian invasion? We should have a better idea regarding the scale of the problem in the coming few months, as both Russia and Ukraine pursue major spring offensives that will test the resilience of their respective armies. At this stage, Putin is preparing for a long war and still hopes to outlast the West. He has a stable home base and sufficient resources to potentially continue the invasion for at least two more years. However, the situation could change dramatically if his demoralized army refuses to fight.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

Serhiy Prytula — Wed, 08 Mar 2023 23:09:44 +0000

No Ukrainian will ever forget the morning of February 24, 2022, when life as we knew it was shattered by the enormity of Russia’s full-scale invasion. I was awoken in Lviv that morning by a constant stream of phone calls from people asking for help. This was nothing new, as I had been supporting the Ukrainian military since the onset of Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014. However, it was immediately apparent that we were facing something on a different scale entirely; the largest European war since the days of Hitler and Stalin was underway in my homeland.

Despite the horror of the situation, Ukrainians did not panic. Many made their way to join the military or signed up for local territorial defense units. Others brought vital supplies including everything from food and medicines to bullets and bulletproof vests. People across the country begun fundraising via social media and other online platforms. Civil society support networks developed through Ukraine’s two people power revolutions and the past eight years of resistance to Russian aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine grew larger and stronger. Just hours after news of the Russian invasion had stunned the watching world, Ukrainians were already establishing logistical channels that would allow civilian volunteers to support the fightback.

I rushed to Kyiv while issuing a social media appeal for people to come and collect what supplies we had from our office, which had already been transformed into a volunteer hub. Within a couple of days, we had assembled an entire team to work on meeting the needs of Ukraine’s defenders. It soon became clear that nothing is impossible for Ukrainians. The entire nation united in defiance of Russia’s invasion. On the battlefield, Ukrainian troops out-thought and outfought the Russian invaders with a combination of innovative tactics and raw courage. Using a range of newly acquired Western arms along with older weapons largely inherited from the Soviet era, they were able to destroy entire columns of Russian tanks and inflict devastating casualties on Putin’s army.

Ukraine’s remarkable resilience would have a profound impact on global opinion and would go on to shape the international response to the Russian invasion. On the eve of Russia’s attack, many Western leaders believed Ukraine would fall within a matter of days and were deeply reluctant to provide weapons, partly as they feared their technology would soon be captured by the advancing Russians. However, when it became apparent that Ukrainians were both willing and able to resist the invasion, the democratic world soon warmed to the idea of supporting Ukraine in its fight for survival. A dramatic shift began to take place with more and more countries lining up to stand with Ukraine. Looking back, it is now clear that the strength of the Ukrainian nation in those momentous first days of war changed the course of world history.

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As the war unfolded during the spring months, so too did Ukraine’s volunteer efforts. Improvised initiatives to source supplies for volunteer fighters rapidly evolved into nationwide projects with the support of millions of private and corporate donors both in Ukraine and across Europe, North America, and beyond. By summer 2022, Ukrainians were crowdfunding sophisticated combat drones, armored vehicles, and a satellite. Since the first days of the invasion, Ukrainian social media has been full of posts showing the latest deliveries of drones, jeeps, radio equipment, and night vision goggles for the troops on the front lines. These efforts have made it easier for the government to concentrate its limited resources on acquiring big ticket items such as artillery, air defense, and missile systems.

Ukraine’s popular resistance has undoubtedly impressed the world. This is evident in the reactions I encounter while traveling to Western capitals. I sense a sincere respect for the Ukrainian people when speaking with government officials and members of the public alike; I can also see this respect in the countless Ukrainian flags on display throughout the Western world that serve as universal symbols of freedom and bravery. Most of all, the West has shown its support by providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in military aid. These Western weapons have had a major impact on the course of the war, enabling Ukraine to destroy advancing Russian forces, strike ammunition bases far behind the front lines, and protect Ukraine’s cities from Russian airstrikes.

While international support for Ukraine has been hugely effective, major challenges lie ahead. Following initial setbacks, Russia is now preparing for a long war. Putin has launched the country’s first mobilization since World War II and is attempting to place the Russian economy on a war footing. Meanwhile, Kremlin propaganda is warning the Russian public that they are locked in a fight for survival. Despite suffering catastrophic losses in both men and machines, the Russian dictator remains determined to pursue his goal of destroying the Ukrainian state and extinguishing Ukrainian identity. With no sign of any serious domestic opposition to the war inside Russia, he appears in a position to continue the current invasion indefinitely.

Is the West really prepared for the kind of long war that Putin clearly has in mind? Recent indications such as US President Joe Biden’s visit to Kyiv and the move to provide Ukraine with modern battle tanks indicate that the democratic world will not waver in its support for Ukraine. Indeed, this was the key message during Biden’s surprise trip to the Ukrainian capital. At the same time, the delays that preceded the recent decision to deliver Leopard 2 tanks sent an ominous signal to a country fighting for its life. Every lost day means hundreds of Ukrainian lives. As the death toll rises, so does frustration over the apparent lack of urgency among many of Ukraine’s partners.

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While Western leaders currently oppose any talk of appeasing Putin, there are concerns in Kyiv that the mood could change as the next round of election cycles approaches and domestic political priorities begin to shift in Western capitals. This uncertainty is extremely dangerous. It fuels Putin’s own belief that he can ultimately outlast the West, and encourages him to dig deeper in order to continue the invasion.

As the war enters its second year, it is now obvious that an even greater international commitment is required in order to defeat Putin. This enhanced commitment should include dramatically increased weapons supplies to Ukraine and far tougher sanctions measures imposed against Russia. If that does not happen, the war will drag on and calls will inevitably grow for Western leaders to pressure Ukraine into some kind of negotiated settlement to end the fighting.

Calls for a compromise peace with the Kremlin are delusional. The only way to secure a sustainable peace is through Ukrainian victory. Any other scenario would have dire consequences for the future of both Ukraine itself and the international security system as a whole.

If Russia is not stopped now, it will inevitably go further. In addition to Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and the Baltic states would all be at immediate risk of invasion. Elsewhere, other autocratic regimes would draw the logical conclusions from Russia’s success and adopt their own aggressive foreign policies. The entire world would be plunged into a dark new era of international instability and authoritarian aggression.

The Ukrainian people will fight on, even if they must fight alone. They are well aware of Russia’s genocidal intentions and recognize that they have no choice; either they defend themselves, or their country will cease to exist. So far, the international community has backed Ukraine admirably. Western leaders must now demonstrate in words and deeds that they are fully committed to standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes. They can begin by ramping up armament production at home and sending Ukraine the fighter jets Kyiv so desperately needs.

Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion has in many ways reinvigorated the Western world and reminded international audiences of the core values that unite all democracies. However, unless Putin is decisively defeated, those same values will be fatally compromised. Ukrainians made their choice one year ago. It is now up to the West.

Serhiy Prytula is a Ukrainian volunteer and founder of the Prytula Charity Foundation.

In the late 1980s, the Communist system in Eastern Europe began to crumble under the weight of its own internal contradictions and thanks to the role of civil society in Poland and other countries across the region. This democratization drive was people-centered and soon spread to the Soviet Union itself, which collapsed in 1991. A new wave of democratization emerged at the turn of the millennium with the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan all taking place within the space of six years.

Each of these revolutions served as a potential model for neighboring populations that were also suffering from the same kind of chronic corruption and lack of political accountability. By studying and adopting the tactics of the activists who led these grassroots pro-democracy movements, they could push back against their own ineffective and autocratic political systems. This represented a serious threat to Putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime in Russia. The Kremlin responded by dubbing the uprisings “color revolutions” and attempting to discredit them as artificially orchestrated Western vehicles for regime change.

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The idea of revolutionary ideologies proving contagious is nothing new. Revolutions that succeed in changing the political order in one country have always had the potential to inspire calls for similar change among neighboring populations. In the nineteenth century, liberal revolutions were seen as a threat to the dominant conservative monarchical system of government across Europe. This led to the Concert of Europe, which saw the continent’s major powers cooperate to prevent the spread of the liberal revolutionary movement.

When Vladimir Putin looked west during the early years of his reign, it wasn’t NATO expansion that worried him. He was scared by the sight of ordinary people in Russia’s neighborhood attempting to topple their autocratic governments. As more countries in the region sought to liberalize, Putin instituted a set of laws to suppress Russian civil society and stifle any attempts to push for reforms on the domestic front.

The rising tide of democratization close to Russia’s borders in the 2000s was not only a threat to Russia’s internal stability; it also posed external challenges. This shift toward more democratic government across the region was helping to consolidate the rules-based system that had gradually begun to replace the old European balance of power in the decades following World War II.

This approach to international relations presented obvious challenges to Putin, who favored a world where great powers could dominate their weaker neighbors. The Russian dictator would have much preferred a return to the power dynamics of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe. Instead, he found himself confronted by a new “Concept of Europe,” meaning a system where all states are respected, regardless of strength or size. This directly undermined Putin’s vision of Russia’s privileged place in international relations as one of a handful of great powers with the right to a voice in global affairs.

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Over the past two decades, concerns over the growing threat posed by a new wave of democratization fueled Putin’s growing obsession with Ukraine, which he came to regard as the key battlefield in the ideological struggle for the future of Europe. Viewed from the Kremlin, Ukraine was a contested space where Russian illiberalism was in direct confrontation with liberal democracy. The Russian dictator appears to have convinced himself that Ukraine’s embrace of European democracy could eventually prove fatal for Russia itself.

Crucially, Putin stubbornly refused to recognize the agency of the Ukrainian people. Instead, he continued to insist that the country’s two post-Soviet revolutions and subsequent reform movements were driven by external pressure from the United States and the European Union. This was wishful thinking to spare the blushes of a rejected Russia. While the West was indeed supportive of Ukraine’s transformation, the desire for change always came primarily from the Ukrainian people.

As the full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, this Ukrainian hunger for a democratic future is more evident than ever, as is the country’s wholesale rejection of Russian authoritarianism. The weapons provided by Ukraine’s international partners have helped inflict devastating casualties on Putin’s invading army, but they would be useless without the soldiers to operate them. Luckily for Ukraine, the country can count on hundreds of thousands of highly motivated men and women who are prepared to defend their country’s European choice against Russia’s brutal assault.

Putin hoped his invasion would deal a decisive blow to Ukraine’s dreams of European integration and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He expected to conquer Kyiv in a matter of days and planned to extinguish Ukrainian independence entirely. Instead, he has achieved the exact opposite. Today’s Ukraine is more united than ever around the idea of a liberal democratic future as part of the Western world. As the Russian military now knows to its cost, this is a vision Ukrainians are ready to fight for.

Michael Williams is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Growing polarization and instability in the country have increased the likelihood that as elections draw near, curbs on speech, largely limited thus far to television channels, may extend to internet platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

For example, on September 6, 2022, YouTube encountered disruptions across Pakistan ahead of Khan’s speech at a rally. This was not the first such disruption—NetBlocks confirmed that a similar disruption also occurred on August 21, 2022, when Imran Khan was making another public speech. In addition, Wikipedia was blocked (and subsequently unblocked) by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) a few weeks ago for its failure to “remove or block allegedly sacrilegious content.”

Other notable examples in the recent past include TikTok, which has been banned and unbanned on numerous occasions, and YouTube, which was blocked in the country back in 2012 and was only unblocked by the PTA more than three years later.

These developments make clear that the PTA indeed has the capability to disrupt internet services across Pakistan on a whim, something that journalist Abid Hussain pointed out as far back as April 2021 on Twitter. To further control access to the internet, the PTA has also been seeking to limit the use of virtual private networks in the country.

As the conflict between the current government, the military establishment, and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf party sharpens ahead of elections—Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province, is expected to go to elections on April 30—further curbs on expression and disruptions to the internet, especially platforms like YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Facebook, cannot be ruled out.

In recent months, US companies and US government stakeholders have often chosen not to react to these developments, preferring to adopt a wait-and-watch approach. In addition, they have followed a strategy to engage privately and discreetly, hoping to positively influence government stakeholders through private conversations.

As the crisis in Pakistan deepens, it is time for diplomatic and business stakeholders with an interest in strengthening its democracy and maintaining a largely open internet in the country to shift their approach.

Given the evolving situation, these stakeholders should consider the following steps to proactively deter further curbs on expression on the internet in Pakistan:

Enhance level of engagement with domestic civil society: Recent weeks have seen a flurry of concerning developments in Pakistan, with the recent PEMRA order being the key development. US companies and diplomats must deepen conversations with civil society stakeholders, especially the digital rights community that has been voicing these concerns for years.

Proactively communicate concerns to Pakistani government officials: Ongoing diplomatic conversations between Islamabad and Washington have focused on the potential for deepening investment in the country’s technology sector. The PTA’s recent and past actions, however, undermine confidence in Pakistan’s internet economy and it is important that the negative economic impact of arbitrary bans and disruptions to the internet is clearly communicated to Pakistani stakeholders.

Build new alliances with the technology and content creator ecosystem: In private conversations, members of Pakistan’s burgeoning technology and content creation ecosystem continue to express growing concern over curbs on freedom of expression. These stakeholders are domestic allies for companies like Meta, Google, and Twitter. However, limited interactions and collaboration with these stakeholders mean that more often than not, a united front is not presented to deter Pakistani government stakeholders from taking adverse actions that curb expression, undermine democracy, and hurt confidence in the country’s digital economy.

The coming months will be a challenging period for Pakistan’s flawed and floundering democracy. This challenge will be compounded by the state’s own capabilities and predilections to curb expression both in the traditional media and the internet.

With the PTI and Imran Khan possessing a strong advantage in their ability to digitally percolate party messaging through Pakistani society, the government and its institutions may be incentivized to take drastic measures to disrupt internet services and platforms that allow Khan to bypass television channels who may not air his speeches. As elections draw near, the likelihood of such actions is increasing. For this reason, it is important for US stakeholders—including private sector companies—to proactively monitor the evolving situation and develop strategies to deter such actions.

Doing so may perhaps safeguard Pakistan’s internet economy, its democracy, and the global reputation of internet platforms that are vital to public discourse within and outside Pakistan.

Uzair Younus is director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He also is the Vice President at The Asia Group.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

SouthAsiaSource Mar 4, 2023

Can Swift Retort still inspire swift reforms?

By Ali Hasanain

After Operation Swift Retort four years ago, I argued that if Pakistan really wants to compete with India, it must focus on rapid economic growth. Regrettably, our national leadership has had other priorities, and we have fallen further behind.

Economy & Business India

New Atlanticist Dec 21, 2022

Pakistan’s foreign minister pitches more global aid and investment—and ‘less chaos’

By Nick Fouriezos

Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event in Washington about how the international community can help Pakistan tackle its challenges.

Climate Change & Climate Action Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Oct 15, 2020

Why Pakistan’s TikTok ban is a bad sign for investors

By Kalsoom Lakhani

Banning content is different from banning platforms. In a conservative country like Pakistan, clear delineations around content standards not only guides players navigating this landscape, it also helps ease the risk of investors looking to operate in the country.

Digital Policy Inclusive Growth

Ukraine’s women are playing a key role in the fight against Russia

Adrienne Ross — Thu, 02 Mar 2023 14:37:03 +0000

As the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian people continues to amaze the watching world. One of the most striking aspects of Ukraine’s fight back against Russian aggression has been the prominence of the country’s women. From frontline soldiers to unofficial ambassadors, Ukrainian women are playing a key role in the struggle to defeat Vladimir Putin.

Ukrainian parliamentarian Mariia Ionova believes the contributions being made by Ukraine’s women are worth sharing with international audiences. “It’s such an asset for our country, the success stories of women who have done so much to meet very urgent needs,” she says. Ionova highlights the efforts of Ukrainian women to fill crucial humanitarian gaps during the early stages of the war at a time when many of the largest international aid organizations were struggling.

Despite being underrepresented in both national and local government, Ukrainian women have emerged as prominent advocates of their country in the international arena. This is partly a result of martial law, which prevents most military age Ukrainian men from leaving the country. Ukrainian women face no such restrictions and have risen to the challenge of representing Ukraine around the world as unofficial ambassadors.

Prominent civil society activist and former Ukrainian MP Hanna Hopko is part of this new class of wartime ambassadors. In the weeks following the invasion, she launched the International Center for Ukrainian Victory in Warsaw. Over the past year, she has addressed policymakers and elected officials in 14 countries, including several separate trips to Washington.

Like many Ukrainian women active on the international stage, Hopko endures long periods of separation from her family and speaks of the emotional obligation to serve. “All women, mothers, sisters, wives, and daughters are fighting for our victory, freedom, and independence. We do it because we are full of love, but the sacrifices that come with this can be incredibly painful.”

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Ukrainian First Lady Olena Zelenska in many ways epitomizes the enhanced international role being played by the country’s women. Before the war, Zelenska rarely courted publicity and generally shunned the limelight. However, with her husband committed to remaining in wartime Kyiv, she has taken to the global stage with increasing confidence and has proven a highly effective ambassador, not least when she chided business leaders and politicians during a recent appearance at the World Economic Forum in early 2023.

Zelenska’s international visits have given global audiences a more personal perspective on the horrors of the Russian invasion. During a summer 2022 address to members of the US Congress, she presented graphic images showing the aftermath of Russian airstrikes. While speaking before British MPs in Westminster, she revealed distressing details of Russian sexual violence against the civilian population in occupied regions of Ukraine. While always aware of her status as Ukraine’s First Lady, she has also been able to speak engagingly as a wife and as a mother.

Another prominent figure is Ukrainian human rights lawyer Oleksandra Matviichuk, who directs Kyiv’s Centre for Civil Liberties, which in 2022 became the first Ukrainian organization to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Matviichuk has used the higher profile that comes with being a Nobel Laureate to call on the international community to arm Ukraine and bring Russia to justice. “We cannot choose the country in which we are born or the period we live in, but we can always choose whether to be an active person and respond to challenges or to be passive and indifferent,” she says.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The impact of Ukrainian women on the country’s war effort is nowhere more obvious than on the frontlines of the conflict. More than 50,000 women currently serve in the Ukrainian military, with many involved in combat operations.

Ukrainian MP Maryna Bardina, who co-chairs the parliamentary Equal Opportunity Caucus, which is dedicated to supporting gender equality in Ukrainian daily life, says one of their current priorities is making sure Ukrainian women serving in the military have everything they need including properly tailored uniforms. She notes that while record numbers of Ukrainian women are volunteering for military duty, they are also often confronted with mounting responsibilities on the home front.

“Ukrainian women are bearing a particularly heavy burden in this war,” comments fellow MP Mariia Ionova. “Women serving as soldiers are dying at the front. When their husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons are killed, they are left to take care of the family, which often includes children and elderly relatives. When hospitals and schools are destroyed or forced to close as a result of war damage, they lose their jobs and also their prospects for the future.”

With no end in sight to the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022, Ukrainian women look set to face further stress and heartache in the coming months. Hopko tries to remain philosophical about the challenges that lie ahead. “We have no luxury to cry or to be weak,” she says. “We have to be strong because at stake is the future of our children and grandchildren; the future of our nation.”

Adrienne Ross is host of Democracy! The Podcast.

Mayors and governors will drive the future of North American economic integration

Willow Fortunoff, Mary Ann Walker — Tue, 28 Feb 2023 22:17:43 +0000

Recently, US President Joe Biden toasted a group of governors, praising their ability to “get things done”—without the lengthy delays and debates of national politics. And last month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told mayors that their “leadership is vital, and it’s going to be even more so in the years ahead.”

Taken together, their comments signal a broader recognition from the Biden administration of the power of local officials to help achieve national goals. But as Biden works to boost North American economic competitiveness vis à vis China, US governors and mayors are being left out of the conversation. They’re not the only ones: Local leaders across North America, from Mexico to Canada, are being left out of discussions geared toward improving the continent’s economic integration. Biden should tap into the economic and political power of local leaders, and he should start by including them in diplomatic summits such as the North American Leaders Summit (NALS).

Local leaders drive day-to-day collaboration throughout North America, yet they weren’t invited to the NALS last month. So while Biden, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met to “promote a common vision for North America,” that vision will be unachievable without the local officials who have built a regional web of economic integration capable of weathering national partisan shifts. Biden, AMLO, and Trudeau should embrace this web by encouraging local and national leaders to establish multi-level ties between their governments and to deepen subnational bonds across borders.

A web of economic integration

The North American countries have a crucial, yet also tense, relationship: That was evident at NALS, which took place amidst Washington and Ottawa’s ongoing disputes with Mexico City’s energy policies. The summit itself reflects this inconsistency in the North American relationship, as last month’s convening was the first in five years and was pushed back several times. The US-Mexico relationship has been complicated by national politics, including when former US President Donald Trump called for a border wall and when AMLO boycotted the US-hosted Summit of the Americas in 2022. The US-Canada relationship also experienced friction during the nineteen-month COVID-19 border closure, the longest border restriction the countries have shared in history.

But US mayors and governors routinely build a foundation of cooperation with their cross-border counterparts focused on practical priorities such as employment and economic growth. Mexico and Canada are the United States’ top trading partners, and the economic interlinkages are most obvious in border states. In 2021, Mexican foreign-owned enterprises in California provided nearly ten thousand jobs, while seven in every ten dollars invested in Baja California, Mexico, come from the United States. The same year, Mexican companies investing in Texas generated 5,364 jobs while Texan companies investing in Mexico created 9,110 jobs. The economic impacts are particularly clear in smaller states such as Vermont, where Canadian-owned businesses employed nearly three thousand people in 2021 and Canadian tourists have contributed two hundred million dollars annually to the state’s economy.

Such collaboration is bipartisan. In April 2021, North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum, a Republican, created the Essential Worker Cross-Border Vaccination Initiative with the Manitoba premier to vaccinate essential workers transporting goods and services across the border, ensuring that commercial flows between their communities remain ongoing. In April 2022, Texas Governor Greg Abbott, a Republican, signed memoranda of understanding with the governors of Mexico’s four border states to enhance border security and mitigate slowdowns in commercial border traffic. And in October 2022, California Governor Gavin Newsom, a Democrat, announced an agreement between Californian and Mexican border communities to support the construction of the Otay Mesa East Port of Entry at the San Diego-Tijuana border, which is being built as part of an effort to boost economic cooperation and trade.

Locally driven economic relationships pave the way for economic integration on a national level. Javier Martínez, founder and president of the Association of Mexican Entrepreneurs Los Angeles, told us that investment between California and Mexico drives the “incorporation of small and medium firms [into] the supply chains of the global firms,” strengthening national economic collaboration and opening opportunities for practices such as nearshoring. Local leaders are much more than implementers of national economic policies—they’re incentivized by the potential economic benefits to shape trade relationships from the bottom up. This was evident in 2017 and again in 2019, when Mexican and US mayors came together to support a modernized North America Free Trade Agreement and later urge the passage of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). In 2022, US and Canadian mayors prepared a joint letter calling on their national governments to repeal the remaining COVID-19 border restrictions and hasten the return to pre-pandemic cross-border exchanges.

The collaboration spearheaded by local leaders is resilient to national partisan shifts. The aforementioned diplomatic disputes between the United States, Mexico, and Canada can impede cooperation and stall advancements in the North American relationship—yet these national-level tensions typically don’t stop cities and towns from promoting trade and tourism with their northern and southern neighbors. Initiatives by Biden, AMLO, and Trudeau to strengthen North American competitiveness may not outlast the national leaders’ terms if they don’t actively engage with the local leaders who have built the region’s economic integration and have a vested interest in its future.

A missed opportunity at NALS

At NALS, national leaders laid out their plans to mount a combined defense against China’s rising economic dominance by overhauling North American industrial capacity and integration. The gathered leaders announced steps to boost their roles in critical-mineral supply chains, which are currently dominated by China. They also pledged to organize the “first-ever trilateral semiconductor forum” as the next move in an escalating contest with China over control of the industry.

These policies aim to reverse a decline in US-based manufacturing that has led to a $382.9 billion US goods trade deficit with China and the US manufacturing workforce declining by more than a third. Because these local leaders have their communities in mind, they’re accustomed to reframing national-security objectives (such as semiconductor manufacturing) as priorities for their districts and constituents. Yet the roster for the trilateral semiconductor forum scheduled for early 2023 only includes “senior industry representatives” and “cabinet level participation” from the three countries. There is no mention of a role for mayors and governors who will play an essential role in forging the requisite economic and diplomatic cooperation from the bottom up.

How to implement this cooperation

North American national leaders should affirm local leaders’ role as trailblazers in their mission of advancing a closer economic alliance. They can do that by making space for local officials at the next NALS, whenever it takes place. The White House should work with US State Department’s Special Representative for Subnational Diplomacy Nina Hachigian to design parallel sessions at NALS that convene local leaders who represent communities that are part of critical-mineral and semiconductor supply chains to compare strategies and report out to national leaders. These sessions should focus on creating city- and state-specific NALS deliverables on economic cooperation and trade that resonate with communities in all three countries.

In contrast to the most recent NALS, mayors from across the Western Hemisphere will convene at this year’s inaugural Cities Summit of the Americas; it’s equally important to bring national leaders to spaces in which local leaders are gathering to ensure that neither perspective is siloed. The US State Department, White House, 24 Sussex, and the Palacio Nacional should ensure that cabinet-level officials and above are also represented at the Cities Summit so that they can get up to speed on their local leaders’ priorities and ideas.

In between the various summits, national leaders should support and expand bilateral initiatives led by cities and states. Many border communities have taken it upon themselves to set up economic commissions: For example, the Los Angeles Mayor’s Office, Mexico’s Foreign Ministry, and the Mexican Council of International Affairs launched the MEXLA commission to deepen ties including trade and energy collaboration. The Arizona-Mexico Commission created an economic development committee to strengthen development efforts, and the Texas Association of Business launched a Mexico Trade and Investment Policy Council to help companies navigate the Texas-Mexico business relationship. On the northern border, Michigan’s Economic Development Corporation established an international trade program that leads business delegations to Canada. Meanwhile, the Buffalo Niagara Partnership signed an agreement with two Ontario Chambers of Commerce to help local businesses take advantage of the cross-border economy and trade. Yet the landscape of bilateral cooperation across North America is made up of these sporadic examples that lack consistency and coordination. Hachigian should take stock of existing subnational initiatives to glean effective strategies and assess where more support is needed.

To strengthen existing initiatives led by local leaders, Hachigian’s Unit for Subnational Diplomacy should assemble the knowledge of local leaders who have been fostering bilateral economic partnerships into a toolkit for all US states to use in building cross-border partnerships. Hachigian’s office can then work to disseminate these toolkits and trainings through existing subnational bodies, such as the National Governors Association and US Conference of Mayors.

The Unit for Subnational Diplomacy should also work with universities, research institutions, and local chambers of commerce to conduct a widespread review of state and city-level economic cooperation with Mexico and Canada to identify the benefits of advancing economic cooperation. This uncovered data can be shared with constituents to substantiate the value of maintaining international commissions, incentivize additional mayors and governors to deepen North American trade relationships, and plainly reveal the impact of local efforts to national leaders.

These steps will equip mayors and governors from all fifty states with the tools to champion economic integration initiatives, further strengthening their role as important advisors to national leaders and crucial players in future policy discussions.

North American local leaders are already getting the job done on the ground; they have earned a seat at the diplomatic table.

Willow Fortunoff is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Mary Ann Walker is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Advisory Council.

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Russia’s invasion one year on: Ukraine is stronger than ever

Vitaly Sych — Tue, 28 Feb 2023 13:32:38 +0000

When my family and I left Kyiv on the first morning of Russia’s full-scale invasion last February, we had no idea if we would ever be able to return home or whether Ukraine itself would survive. In the following days, as the biggest European conflict since World War II continued to unfold, this sense of dread only deepened.

One year on, I can now look back with slightly less emotion and a sense of cautious optimism that is rooted in the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine has not only survived, but has actually achieved a number of landmark battlefield victories over Putin’s invading army and has proven to international audiences that Russia can be beaten.

On the personal front, I have been back in Kyiv since May 2022, although my wife and two children remain among the millions of Ukrainians currently living in exile. Thankfully, they are able to visit.

Life in wartime Ukraine can be extremely stressful but Ukrainians have proven themselves far tougher and more resourceful than almost anyone could have imagined. For those living in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities far from the front lines, the greatest threat has come from frequent Russian missile and drone attacks. This airstrike campaign began on October 10 and has since become a feature of daily life.

During those initial October air raids, I found myself in our makeshift neighborhood bomb shelter for the first time, huddled in an underground car park together with 100 other people and their assorted pets. More recently, if I am at home when an attack takes place, I can often see explosions from my apartment window and feel the impact of incoming missiles through the shaking walls of the building.

Russia’s air campaign brought the war closer for millions of Ukrainians, creating a sense of heightened physical danger along with frequent blackouts. The whole of Ukraine spent the winter season with severely limited access to light, electricity, heating, water, and internet. I often had to walk up 20 flights of stairs just to reach my apartment. For people with mobility issues or families with small children, that is simply not an option.

Despite these hardships, Russia’s air attacks have failed to break Ukraine’s spirit. While everyone inevitably talks about the many inconveniences these attacks bring, nobody really complains. Instead, there is an understanding that this is part of the price we must pay for finally saying goodbye to Russia, and a determination to get on with our lives. After the first major attacks, people were shocked and discussed the implications for days on end. But after a few weeks, cafes and restaurants would fill up again within hours of each new bombardment.

Over the past five months, Ukrainians have acquired vast quantities of generators to provide power for businesses, homes, and public services. Each time a blackout begins, an orchestra of generators starts to play. This rumbling of engines has served as the background soundtrack to the winter season in wartime Ukraine. Meanwhile, we have all learned to keep our gadgets fully charged and to have power banks at the ready, just in case. Life goes on.

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Winter is now coming to an end and Ukrainians have not been frozen into submission. Indeed, there have been very few blackouts in recent weeks as Ukraine’s heroic air defense forces and power sector professionals continue to perform miracles. Putin’s bombing campaign is the latest in a long line of unsuccessful Russian efforts to undermine Ukrainian morale.

Surprisingly, the Kremlin-controlled Russian media openly boasted of targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Prior to the onset of the air attacks in late 2022, Kremlin propagandists had consistently insisted that the Russian army only struck military targets. However, it seems that a series of embarrassing military defeats in Ukraine left the Putin regime in desperate need of victories. It says much about the state of Russia’s war effort that the only victory Moscow could hope to deliver was news that Ukrainian civilians were being plunged into freezing darkness in the depths of winter.

The defiant Ukrainian response to Moscow’s terror-bombing tactics reflects the mood in the country as the war enters its second year. It also underlines the counter-productive nature of Putin’s invasion. The Russian dictator wanted to wipe out Ukrainian identity entirely. Instead, he has achieved the exact opposite.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Throughout the country, Ukrainian national identity is visibly strengthening. Many people are switching from Russian to the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives. Monuments to Soviet figures are being removed from public spaces, and streets honoring Russian writers are being renamed. After decades of domestic geopolitical divisions, Ukrainian support for EU and NATO membership has rocketed to over 80% and is backed by strong majorities in every part of the country.

Whereas Ukrainian public anger following the initial Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely directed against the Russian political leadership in the Kremlin, we are now witnessing demands for the wholesale de-russification of Ukraine. Most Ukrainians have been sickened by the atrocities of the Russian army and horrified by the obvious popularity of the war among the Russian public. They no longer wish to have anything in common with a nation that destroys entire cities and commits countless war crimes.

Ukrainians also understand perfectly well that when Russians talk about “Ukrainian Nazis” and call for the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine, they actually mean the de-Ukrainianization of Ukraine and the permanent return of the country to Russian control. The atrocities committed by Russian forces in occupied areas of Ukraine have brought home the horrors that would await the rest of the country if Ukrainian resistance were to crumble.

This has helped fuel a national outpouring of volunteerism as everyone has sought to contribute to victory. Ordinary Ukrainians have donated billions of dollars to help fund the country’s defense. People give whatever they can, with some contributing large sums and others handing over their last pennies. One day recently, three young boys approached my car selling home-made bracelets to raise funds for the army. Similar scenes can be encountered in towns and cities across Ukraine every day.

I recently attended a press conference in Kyiv to mark US President Joe Biden’s surprise visit to the Ukrainian capital. Biden made a point of expressing his admiration for Ukraine’s astounding resilience. The reason is simple: we know that our country is currently engaged in an existential fight for survival. If we stop fighting, we will simply disappear. If the Russians stop fighting, the war will end.

As things currently stand, the invasion is far from over. The military situation is complex and unpredictable. Ukraine enjoys strong morale following a series of battlefield successes and is also benefiting from a steady flow of modern weapons from the country’s Western partners. Meanwhile, Russia has strength in numbers thanks to the country’s first mobilization since World War II, while Putin appears to be preparing domestic audiences and the Russian economy for a long war. Ukrainians remain confident of ultimate victory, but there is also widespread recognition that the journey will be long and difficult.

Despite this uncertainty, there are reasons to look ahead with a sense of confidence. One year ago, Kyiv was supposed to fall within a matter of days. Instead, the Ukrainian capital has become a global symbol of courage and freedom. Over the past year, Ukraine has earned the respect of the watching world. Indeed, no country has ever undergone such a complete image transformation in such a short space of time. Once known primarily for corruption and poverty, Ukraine is now a byword for bravery.

For the first time in my life, I firmly believe Ukraine has a realistic change of joining the European Union. When this finally happens, it will confirm a civilizational shift that has been underway for the past few decades as Ukraine has struggled to shake off the shackles of empire and shed the country’s post-Soviet legacy. Despite the horrors of Russia’s ongoing invasion, I am convinced Ukraine is now moving toward better times. Most of all, I am absolutely sure this bright future is thoroughly deserved.

Vitaly Sych is Chief Editor of NV media house which includes a weekly magazine, national talk radio station, and news site NV.ua.

Atlantic Council — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 19:27:46 +0000

original source

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Iran’s ‘women, life, freedom’ revolution has a manifesto. Here are the next steps.

Shadi Sadr — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 12:08:27 +0000

On February 13, when I saw the Manifesto for Minimum Demands of Independent Trade Union and Civil Organizations of Iran on Twitter, I was sent back to the early 2000s. I noticed some of the women’s rights organizations I used to work with among the signatories, still braving the dangerous waters of activism in Iran—a strong manifestation of the urgent need for structural changes. As noted in the manifesto, “No clear and attainable vision can be imagined to end [the current crisis] within the framework of the existing political system.”

Signed by twenty organizations and released on February 13, the manifesto soon gathered the support of many other civil society organizations, including another eighteen groups of young activists and university students, which have just been formed over the past five months. These labor, teacher, retiree, women, student, and youth organizations came together in a very dangerous security situation, with at least 530 killed and more than nineteen thousand arrested, according to organization Human Rights Activists in Iran. They offer an articulate and elaborate meaning to the slogan “woman, life, freedom,” aiming to end the formation of any power from above and to establish a society free of oppression, discrimination, tyranny, and dictatorship.

Apart from the significance of listening to the voices of those believing in a fundamental bottom-up change in Iran, what they seek is equally important. The manifesto, which, according to the signatories, is only the beginning of a solidarity-building process, includes many human rights principles, such as non-discrimination, freedom of expression, right to assembly, right to work, absolute prohibition of torture, and abolition of the death penalty. It emphasizes gender equality in law and practice and recognition of the LGBTQ+ community. Highlighting the fact that Iran is a multi-ethnic and multilingual country, it states that the laws and cultural practices that institutionalizes discrimination and oppression against national and religious groups must be eliminated. Some rightly argued that the manifesto should have explicitly mentioned the rights of people with disabilities.

The manifesto seeks a secular state where religion is a private matter and where the country is run by the direct and permanent involvement of people through local and national councils. It puts forth that the people of Iran must have the power to dismiss any government official through voting.

The manifesto’s economic and social components demonstrate a profound alternative to the current situation, which involve measures similar to those implemented in social democracies, including free education and healthcare for everyone, social security, and prohibition of child labor.

As a revolutionary document, the manifesto points out the fact that many individuals and entities have benefited from corruption and the looting of the Iranian people’s resources and wealth over the years. As such, they should be returned to their real owners and spent on rebuilding the educational, health, and environmental infrastructure, particularly in areas disadvantaged under both the Islamic Republic and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s regime.

Lastly, the manifesto advocates the need for a nuclear-free Iran and normal relationships with all countries.

The only major flaw of the manifesto is its lack of transitional justice and, in particular, how the signatories envisage dealing with those responsible for human rights abuses. The manifesto was published at a time when Iranian society was heavily debating what to do with officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers, who want to join the revolution and have been heavily involved in the brutal crackdown on protesters. Should the movement give them a blanket amnesty? Should they be held accountable? Should they at least share the truth about the crimes they have been involved in or are aware of?

These questions have occupied Persian language media and social media spaces in regard to high-profile political figures, such as 2009 Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi—who has been under house arrest since 2011 and served as prime minister during the mass executions of political prisoners during 1988—and some of the Shah’s officials, such as US-based Parviz Sabeti—the former deputy director of the notorious secret police and security apparatus known as SAVAK, which was responsible for torture and executions—who have both supported the movement in one way or another.

A manifesto of such gravity should have taken a position on such a core issue in the democratization process. At the very least, it should be added to the manifesto in a revised version—there is certainly room for that.

Now that a democratically developed manifesto has attracted the support of many grassroots groups in Iran, the ball is in the exiled opposition’s court. Activists forced to flee Iran in the past four decades now have a choice to make. Whether they will use it as a minimum base for solidarity and coordination between inside and outside forces or issue other manifestos is an open question.

One thing is certain: this revolution began in the streets of Iran led by minorities or minoritized groups and was built on decades of resistance against tyranny. After years of persecution and courage, the same activists I worked with in Iran are beginning to see the light at the end of the tunnel. No opposition will succeed in defeating the Islamic Republic without the blessing and support of those forces.

Shadi Sadr is a human rights lawyer and a member of the panel of judges at the International People’s Tribunals on Indonesia, Myanmar, and China. She co-founded and directed Justice for Iran, one of the organizers of the Iran Atrocities’ (Aban) Tribunal. Follow her on Twitter: @shadisadr.

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Superhumans Center: Symbol of Ukrainian defiance amid Russia’s war

Andrey Stavnitser — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 01:46:27 +0000

This week marks the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Many thousands have been killed and millions more displaced. Ukraine’s GDP has dropped by around 40 percent. And more than ten thousand Ukrainians have lost limbs. In the face of this senseless violence and destruction, Superhumans Center, the charity I head, is building a world-class medical center in the middle of a war. It’s the ultimate act of faith and defiance.

When the invasion began, my company with more than 5000 employees near Odesa on the Black Sea had to close its doors immediately. We paid salaries as long as we could. Several dozen workers are now fighting against the ongoing Russian invasion.

At first, I couldn’t eat or sleep. Due to a medical issue, I couldn’t fight. But I could organize. Prior to the war, my logistics company had been able to transport anything throughout Ukraine, across the Black Sea, and beyond. After the war started, we immediately pivoted and began moving humanitarian goods, setting up Help Ukraine Center warehouses and distribution centers in Poland. The mere act of sorting clothes began to make me and dozens of other volunteers, including many Ukrainians, feel useful.

There have been moments of exceptional pain and exceptional clarity during this long year. When Russian soldiers occupied my home outside Kyiv in the first weeks of the war, I immediately called the Ukrainian army and gave them the GPS coordinates. My large home was destroyed. I have no regrets.

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As the war ground on and Ukrainians received more clothes than they could possibly wear, more of our countrymen were coming back from the frontlines without arms and legs. Ukraine didn’t deal well with its soldiers who were maimed during World War II; veterans were ignored and forced to sit at home. It was time for a transformational change.

Society should celebrate sacrifice and welcome differences; we can do this by giving Ukraine’s heroes world-class prosthetics and treatment free of charge in their home country and in their language. However, the Ukrainian state is nearly broke. Ukrainian hospitals, overwhelmed with complex injuries, are dealing with problematic amputations that only have costly solutions. I will never forget when one soldier without an arm on the right side of his body and only two mangled fingers on his left hand showed me a picture of the heavy wooden arm he was offered in Kyiv.

We had to get involved. Together with my longtime business partner Philipp Grushko and Olga Rudnieva, one of the most capable managers in Ukraine, we began to sketch ambitious plans at our warehouse in Lublin, Poland. Over the din of British volunteers whistling as they sorted clothes and blankets, and the reverse noise as the forklift loaded vans headed to Lviv, we resolved to build a modern medical center for children and adults to focus on the future, not the everyday suffering that renders the most resolute useless.

Superhumans Center will be the leading war trauma hospital in Ukraine and will include a state-of-the-art prosthetics and facial reconstruction center. Our experts will carefully restore mobility, comfort, and quality of life to Ukraine’s war heroes, children, and civilians who have been gravely injured in Russia’s war of aggression and are now dependent on a prosthesis due to amputation. Amputations aren’t a fun subject, and the challenges are hard in today’s Ukraine, but we will meet them.

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This beautiful vision is not a pipe dream. Superhumans Center will open in April. We are grateful to have the support of Ukrainian First Lady Olena Zelenska, Sting and his partner Trudie Styler, and many others. Howard G. Buffett has changed thousands of lives by backing and building our medical center.

Ahead of the construction schedule, we are refitting a government-owned hospital in collaboration with Ukraine’s Ministry of Health. The first phase includes a rehabilitation clinic, prosthetics lab, and psychological support unit. In the second half of 2023, wards and further surgical departments will open. Eventually, we will open an educational center to train prosthetic specialists and rehabilitation professionals.

Can the international community help? You bet. Dollars and doctors are what we most desperately need. We invite medical doctors and prosthetic specialists to join our effort and give a week of their precious time to train Ukrainian doctors in person in Lviv.

We’re already changing lives. In January, we measured and fitted two Ukrainian soldiers for state-of-the-art bionic hands that they will receive in March. Andriy Gidzun and Vitaliy Ivashchuk both lost their arms in early 2022 as a result of Russia’s invasion. They were overjoyed as they experienced the ability to hold a cup again and catch a ball.

This is just the beginning. The need has never been greater. More than 10,000 Ukrainians likely need complex operations or prosthetics now. Tragically, this number will only grow. Russia continues to indiscriminately shell civilian targets across Ukraine and shows no signs of relenting.

As the invasion enters its second year with Russian President Vladimir Putin still undeterred, we Ukrainians know that the end of the war is far away. Superhumans Center will be there, rebuilding one life at a time, arm by arm, leg by leg.

Andrey Stavnitser is the co-founder of the Superhumans Center in Lviv, Ukraine, and the co-owner of the largest private port in Ukraine. He tweets @stavnitser.

Rebuilding Ukraine: Private sector role can help counter corruption concerns

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 20:03:04 +0000

Ukraine has been hit by a series of damaging corruption allegations in recent weeks. So far in 2023, a number of senior government figures including ministers, deputy ministers, and regional governors have all come under scrutiny. Some have resigned or been dismissed. The timing is particularly unfortunate for a besieged country that is currently reliant on foreign aid as it fights for survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Alarm over potential corruption reflects Ukraine’s often troubling prior record, despite the country’s reform progress since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Such scandals sow doubt among Ukraine’s international partners and could help convince some to hesitate before providing desperately needed financial support.

The problem with all of this, of course, is that Ukraine depends heavily on the continued support of Western governments and donors, who understandably tend to look askance at the mere suggestion that their donations could be misappropriated. Even if the current flurry of corruption allegations prove to be entirely or at least partially unfounded, the mere perception of corruption risk could alienate the very entities upon which Ukraine’s future recovery will hinge.

This is not a new problem. Ukraine has long been regarded as one of the world’s more corrupt countries and ranked 122nd of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index. In the present circumstances, Ukraine simply cannot afford to be seen as corrupt and must do everything possible to counter such negative perceptions.

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While confidence remains low in Ukraine’s state institutions, the country’s private sector does not appear to suffer from the same problem. On the contrary, Ukrainian businesses enjoy a growing international reputation as resilient, innovative, and cost-competitive. Many are noted for their skilled, modern, savvy, and hard-working talent. The uniquely challenging circumstances of the Russian invasion have served to highlight these positive characteristics.

Although the Russian invasion is now entering its second year, international companies have continued to look for investment opportunities in Ukraine. Even in the midst of Russia’s late 2022 bombing campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Sergiy Tsivkach of UkraineInvest, the country’s state investment promotion agency, reported that $5 billion of foreign private investment was in the pipeline for Ukraine’s manufacturing sector alone. “There are billions more across other sectors,” he noted. “Private investment in industry is the most important way to restore the Ukrainian economy and create new jobs.”

In a January 17 interview, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi summed up why some foreign companies are excited about Ukraine despite the ongoing invasion. “I’m very optimistic,” he commented. “You really do see the spirit of the Ukrainian people here, the resilience. But even beyond that, you see the entrepreneurial energy here.”

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The contrast could hardly be starker between the global optimism surrounding Ukraine’s private sector and the spectacle of the United States sending inspectors to the country early this year to investigate whether foreign assistance funds are being misused or misplaced. This is a hint, a strong one, about the best way to approach the country’s future reconstruction.

Private companies seeking Western investment have to meet Western standards, requirements, and anti-corruption norms. Major international companies simply won’t invest unless they are comfortable that they are not exposing themselves to unnecessary risk, including the financial, criminal, and reputational risk of corruption scandals. Similarly, Ukrainian companies cannot reliably attract foreign investment unless they can demonstrate that these risks are at a minimum.

Even where there may not be specific legal consequences for corruption, there are certainly reputational and financial risks. This means private companies have obvious incentives to operate cleanly and transparently that are often limited or absent in the public sector.

International confidence in Ukraine’s private sector and its ability to weather the storms of the Russian invasion is pronounced. Ukraine should capitalize on this and seek to minimize concerns about public sector corruption by letting the private sector take the lead on national reconstruction.

This approach would make the West a shareholder in Ukraine’s future. Leaving the private sector to lead the way would also introduce numerous checks on corruption as each individual contract is signed, executed, and monitored with the Western oversight of foreign investors. Even if the government officials in question are doing absolutely nothing wrong, it seems beyond dispute that the international community would sooner trust Ukraine’s private sector than its scandal-plagued public sector. Trust, in turn, begets investment.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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Russia’s new offensive will test the morale of Putin’s mobilized masses

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 14 Feb 2023 21:53:57 +0000

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, speculation is mounting that Moscow will soon launch a major new offensive. Indeed, some commentators believe this offensive may already have begun, with reports emerging in recent days of Russian troops attempting to advance at numerous points along a frontline stretching hundreds of kilometers across southern and eastern Ukraine.

This widely anticipated offensive is an attempt by Moscow to regain the initiative following months of battlefield defeats and humiliating retreats in Ukraine that have undermined Russia’s reputation as a military superpower. Vladimir Putin is now desperate to demonstrate that his invasion is back on track and has reportedly massed huge reserves for a new push to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses. However, after a year of catastrophic losses that has left many of Russia’s most prestigious military units seriously depleted, doubts remain over the ability of untested replacement troops to carry out large-scale offensive operations.

Initial indications are not encouraging for the Kremlin, to say the least. Thousands of Russian soldiers including elite marines and special forces troops are believed to have been killed in late January and early February during a badly bungled attempt to storm the town of Vuhledar in eastern Ukraine. The failed attack sparked widespread dismay and anger among pro-Kremlin military bloggers, with many accusing Russian army chiefs of incompetence. The disaster contributed to what British military intelligence said was likely to be “the highest rate of Russian casualties since the first week of the invasion.”

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One of the key reasons behind the sharp recent rise in casualties is Russia’s growing reliance on mobilized personnel with limited military training. In September 2022, Vladimir Putin responded to escalating losses in Ukraine by launching Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Most of the approximately 300,000 men who were mobilized last year have now been deployed to Ukraine. The arrival of these additional numbers helped Russia to blunt Ukraine’s advances during the winter months, but it is unclear whether mobilized troops will prove as effective in an offensive capacity.

Many mobilized Russians appear to be less than enthusiastic about their new role as the shock troops of Putin’s faltering invasion. Since the first week of February, a growing number of video appeals have been published on social media featuring groups of mobilized soldiers complaining about everything from a lack of basic military equipment to the suicidal orders of their superiors. In one fairly typical video, the wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers from Tatarstan claim their men are being used as “cannon fodder” in Ukraine.

With hundreds of thousands of mobilized Russians expected to take part in Putin’s big offensive, this emerging trend could pose a significant threat to the Kremlin. If current casualty rates are any indication, the coming attack could result in unprecedented loss of life and spark a complete collapse in morale among Russia’s already demoralized mobilized troops. This would make life very difficult for the Russian army in Ukraine, which would find itself confronted by a breakdown in discipline that would severely limit its ability to stage offensive operations. Nor is there any guarantee that the problems would stop there. Russia’s own experience in 1917 is a reminder of the unpredictable consequences that can follow when an army in wartime stops taking orders.

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It is still premature to speak of mutinous mobilized soldiers, of course. Nevertheless, maintaining military discipline may be the biggest single challenge currently facing the Putin regime. At present, the Russian dictator appears in little danger domestically, with independent polling by the Levada Center continuing to identify strong Russian public support for the war in Ukraine. While some question the validity of this data, there is no escaping the near complete absence of any genuine anti-war activity in today’s Russia. One year since the invasion began, most opponents have chosen to remain silent or have left Russia altogether.

Likewise, Putin seems to have weathered the worst of the economic storm brought on by Western sanctions. The Russian economy has been hard-hit by measures imposed over the past year, but the damage has been significantly less than anticipated and is certainly far from fatal. This may change if the country’s economic outlook continues to worsen, but at this stage there is no indication that shrinking incomes or the departure of Western brands from Russian stores will fuel protests anytime soon. While members of the Russian elite are also feeling the pinch, most owe their positions to Putin and see no realistic alternative to the current status quo, however imperfect.

The relative calm on Putin’s home front contrasts sharply with the precarious position of his army in Ukraine. Putin had initially anticipated a quick and triumphant campaign that would confirm Russia’s Great Power status and extinguish Ukrainian statehood once and for all. Instead, he finds himself embroiled in the biggest European conflict since World War II with his battered army in increasing disarray and his hopes of military success dwindling.

In order to snatch a victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat, Putin must now rely on the overwhelming numbers provided by mass mobilization. This is a tried and tested Russian tactic, but it also carries considerable risks. Sending thousands of untrained men to fight against battle-hardened and highly motivated Ukrainian troops could result in the kind of carnage that breaks armies. If that happens, the fallout would likely reverberate throughout Russia and destabilize the entire regime. Putin may then find that saving his invasion is the least of his worries.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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Is Putin’s Russia heading for collapse like its Czarist and Soviet predecessors?

Taras Byk — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 22:04:09 +0000

On January 31, delegates gathered at the European Parliament in Brussels for a conference exploring the prospects for the “decolonization” of Russia. Organized by MEPs from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) political group within the European Parliament, this event highlighted growing international recognition of modern Russia’s imperial identity and increasing awareness of the threats this poses to European security.

Participants included representatives of the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, many of whom have been working for some time within the framework of the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum. They were joined by numerous Members of the European Parliament and a host of international experts.

An event on this scale would have been hard to imagine just one year ago. However, the invasion of Ukraine has thrust the topic of Russian imperialism firmly into the European mainstream. Over the past year, a steady stream of analytical articles and opinion pieces have appeared in respected international publications accusing Vladimir Putin of pursuing an imperial agenda in Ukraine and calling for the decolonization of Russia itself. While there is still no consensus on the desirability of a new Russian collapse, the topic is no longer taboo.

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The last big Russian collapse caught the world by surprise and was far from universally welcomed. Indeed, some in the West saw the looming 1991 disintegration of the USSR as hugely destabilizing from an international security perspective and sought to prevent it. Most notoriously, US President George H. W. Bush traveled to Kyiv just weeks before the August 1991 Ukrainian Declaration of Independence to warn members of Soviet Ukraine’s parliament against “suicidal nationalism.”

Critics argue that the international community has been equally accommodating of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to rebuild Russia’s imperial influence since the turn of the millennium. The Second Chechen War, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, and the 2014 invasion of Ukraine all failed to fundamentally disrupt relations between Russia and the West. Indeed, in areas such as the energy sector, cooperation continued to deepen even after Moscow had illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparked a war in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. These flourishing economic ties helped create the financial foundations for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

As the Putin regime has attempted to reassert its imperial influence in Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries that were formerly part of the Czarist and Soviet empires, Moscow has also been actively restricting the rights of the dozens of different national and ethnic groups within the boundaries of the modern Russian state. Despite calling itself the Russian Federation, today’s Russia is a highly centralized and increasingly authoritarian country. National minorities throughout Russia must contend with the colonial exploitation of natural resources in their homelands while also playing a disproportionately prominent role in the Kremlin’s wars of aggression.

Over the past year, Putin’s imperial ambitions have run into serious trouble in Ukraine. The Russian dictator expected a short, victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, his invading army has suffered catastrophic losses in both men and armor amid a series of battlefield defeats that have seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a military superpower.

Despite these setbacks, Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists continue to promote an unapologetically imperialistic agenda. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently hinted that Moldova may face the same fate as Ukraine, while menacing statements directed at the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian nations are routine features of the Kremlin-controlled Russian media. Until this imperial aggression is addressed, it will remain the greatest single threat to European security.

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There are various different perspectives on the problem of Russian imperialism. Some commentators advocate a reformed Russia existing as a genuinely federal and broadly democratic state within its current borders. Others argue that today’s Russia is an unrepentant empire and will remain so until it is broken up into a series of smaller countries.

This second and more radical option alarms many Western policymakers and commentators, who fear that the break-up of the Russian Federation would have disastrous consequences for nuclear proliferation and regional security. Gloomy forecasts anticipate a Russian collapse leading to a chaotic aftermath marked by the rise of nuclear-armed regional warlords and uncontrolled migration involving tens of millions of people.

In many ways, these fears mirror similar concerns at the time of the Soviet collapse. However, while the fall of the USSR brought considerable human misery for huge numbers of former Soviet citizens, this was accompanied by only a relatively small number of localized armed conflicts. Meanwhile, those nations that escaped the Soviet sphere of influence and were welcomed into NATO and the EU have gone on to prosper. Indeed, it is no coincidence that post-Soviet Russian aggression has focused on Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, all countries that the West hesitated to embrace after 1991.

The post-Soviet experience offers important lessons for today’s policymakers as they look ahead to the increasingly realistic possibility of a post-Russia world. While the collapse of the Russian Federation is a daunting prospect, it does not necessarily have to end in disaster.

In order to avoid the worst-case scenarios that many are currently predicting, it is vital to manage the process by engaging with democratically-minded people in all regions of Russia along with the country’s national minorities. In order to avoid being caught out, Western leaders need to accurately gauge the mood within Russia and assess the appetite for greater regional autonomy or independence.

Many in the West remain reluctant to take any steps that could be seen as promoting the idea of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, some argue that talk of decolonizing the Russian Federation risks legitimizing popular Kremlin propaganda narratives of a Western plot to destroy Russia. At the same time, there is no escaping the fact that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has put Russian imperialism at the top of the international security agenda while fueling serious discussion over the viability of the Russian state. In today’s highly volatile geopolitical climate, it makes sense to prepare for every eventuality.

Russian imperialism has proven deeply resistant to previous democratization efforts. Nevertheless, we may yet live to see the emergence of a democratic Russia as a productive and respected member of the international community. Alternatively, the Russian Federation may go the same way as the Czarist and Soviet empires and fragment into a number of smaller states, which could then develop into successful democracies. The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that unless today’s Russia abandons its imperial identity, Europe will face more wars.

Taras Byk is a manager at Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv.

In Syria, the earthquake ‘did what the Assad regime and Russians wanted to do to us all along’

Arwa Damon — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 14:40:05 +0000

As I write this, I have images juxtaposed in my mind on top of the photos and videos that are coming out now. They are the images of past tragedies: children’s dust-covered and blood-streaked faces; mothers crying silently; and rescue teams desperately digging through rubble—often with their bare hands.

Like an evil creature from the most horrific of nightmares, the deadly 7.8-magnitude earthquake on February 6 destroyed hundreds of miles of homes and lives in southern Turkey and decimated a population that was already in many ways decimated in Syria.

I know the areas impacted by the earthquake well. The southeastern Turkish city of Gaziantep is where my charity, International Network for Aid Relief & Assistance (INARA), has its Turkey office based, and is where all our staff and beneficiaries live. In my years as a CNN senior international correspondent, that border zone is where I spent weeks on end covering everything from refugees flooding across, to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)’s takeovers of areas in Syria, to the relentless bombing of the miserable Syrian rebel-held swath of Idlib.

Turkey, well equipped to deal with the aftermath of natural disasters, has mobilized its emergency teams and military. On the ground, international rescue teams continue to arrive from the United States, Ukraine, Lebanon, Japan, and more, as many countries pledge their support for the victims in Turkey and Syria. However, whether the level of international response will be enough or not is yet to be seen. The earthquake has already killed more than 19,000 people. The scale of the crisis is incredibly vast. Turks and Syrians in Turkey have posted countless messages on social media about the lack of rescue efforts in certain areas, and people I know have messaged that their friends are still trapped under the rubble.

While aid increasingly flows into Turkey from around the world by air, land, and sea, areas on the other side of the border in Syria’s rebel-controlled areas are seeing none of that. Syrians impacted by the earthquake in northwest Syria have already endured a twelve-year war, hunger, cold, and a pandemic. They have long felt and, in fact, been abandoned by the international community. Since the earthquake rocked the region, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been pleading to international agencies and the world’s governments to provide much-needed support to implement effective search and rescue operations in the vital first seventy-two hours of the crisis.

In a continuation of what has become a daily reality throughout the last twelve years, NGOs have to beg and plead for funding for Syria, but never come close to hitting their targets. On the ground, the Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets—experts in saving lives in the aftermath of bombings—has been leading the search and rescue efforts. However, this level of destruction all at once eclipses their capacity.

The White Helmets and other volunteer groups are suffering from a lack of everything that they could possibly need, including a shortage of diesel to run their heavy machinery, a lack of shelters for those now out in the cold and snow, and a lack of winterization kits. While local organizations rush to deliver humanitarian assistance—a drop in the bucket of what is needed—there has yet to be a single official rescue team dispatched by governments across one particular border into Syria. In fact, there has not been anything going across that border at all.

Despite having several functioning border crossings between Turkey and northwest Syria, there is only one lone border crossing that has been authorized by the United Nations (UN) Security Council to deliver UN aid to rebel-held Idlib and the 4.1 million people who live there, many of whom are originally from elsewhere, having fled bombings by the Bashar al-Assad regime, Russia, and Iran multiple times. The border crossing’s existence has always been heavily politicized, with the threat of a Russian veto looming every six to twelve months as the Assad government in Damascus continues to insist that all aid to Syria should come through the capital. Right now, that border crossing is not functional. The UN has said that, while the crossing itself is intact, the roads leading to it are either closed or damaged—all of which leaves this rebel-held region at the mercy of its meager resources and a government that wants to wipe its population off the map.

The Assad government-controlled areas, like Aleppo and Lattakia, have also been impacted in devastating fashion. Hundreds have lost their lives there, since there is a severe lack of infrastructure or ability to launch rescue operations despite being under Assad regime control. However, aid has arrived in Damascus from countries like Iraq, Iran, and Russia.

In theory, Damascus could be an entryway to reach all Syrians in need, but that’s hardly about to happen, given that access to humanitarian aid has become one of the biggest geopolitical cards. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock called on Russia and all international actors to put pressure on the Assad regime to allow aid to reach everyone in the country. This is tragically laughable, since the international voices that did not work to stop the Assad government from bombing its people are hardly going to be effective in getting the regime to feed and keep its people warm.

To quote a Syrian friend in the hours after the earthquake struck: “It did what the Assad regime and Russians wanted to do to us all along.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and a former senior international correspondent at CNN.

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Hero Ukrainian medic: “Russia will not stop until it is stopped”

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 06 Feb 2023 20:57:18 +0000

Paievska’s sobering assessment reflects her own personal experience on the front lines of the war and as a prisoner of the Russians. In the first weeks of the invasion almost one year ago, she served as a medic during the siege of Mariupol and witnessed firsthand how Putin’s troops reduced this once thriving Ukrainian port city of half a million to ruins.

Harrowing bodycam footage recorded by Paievska as she treated wounded soldiers and civilians was smuggled from the besieged city by Associated Press journalists and helped alert the outside world to the scale of the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. By the time these images reached international audiences, Paievska herself was already in Kremlin captivity.

The Ukrainian medic would spend a total of three months as a prisoner of war. She has since spoken at length about the appalling conditions she encountered during her time in Russian custody. Addressing US lawmakers in September 2022, Paievska described how numerous fellow prisoners including children as young as seven died in her arms as a result of torture or due to a lack of basic medical care. “In this torment of hell, the only things they felt before death were abuse and additional beatings.”

The barbaric treatment of Ukrainian prisoners came as no surprise, she says. On the contrary, Paievska saw it as entirely in keeping with the everyday realities in today’s Russia. “The Putin regime is a police state where everything is built on blood. They routinely torture their own people, so why should they take pity on me or any other Ukrainian prisoners?”

Paievska insists this traumatic experience has not robbed her of her humanity, but admits she is now more convinced than ever of the need to isolate Russia. “I have no feelings of hatred toward them, despite everything they did to me and my comrades. I see them as sick people. You cannot be angry with somebody for being ill, but the international community must do everything in its power to isolate them.”

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Throughout her incarceration, Paievska says the Russians she encountered frequently expressed hardline political opinions that closely mirrored the most radical forms of Kremlin propaganda. These unsolicited rants left a strong impression of popular support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and made a mockery of attempts to blame Putin personally for the war. “They seem to sincerely believe Russia has a great mission to free the planet from capitalism, Western dominance, fascism, and other invented problems. They are convinced that only Russians have souls and think Russians will conquer the world.”

These messianic delusions have helped feed a poisonous hatred of all things Ukrainian that shapes Russian attitudes toward the war. For years, the extremist brand of imperialistic Russian nationalism promoted by the Putin regime has portrayed any expressions of Ukrainian independence as hostile acts of anti-Russian betrayal. This warped logic set the stage for the widespread war crimes that have accompanied Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. “They are absolutely sure there is no such thing as the Ukrainian nation and regard us all as misguided Russians,” says Paievska. “As far as they are concerned, the Ukrainian state does not exist and neither does the Ukrainian language. To them, we are fools and traitors for rejecting Russia.”

Paievska was already a widely respected and well-loved figure in Ukraine long before her role in the siege of Mariupol and subsequent imprisonment brought her to international attention. Better known to the Ukrainian public by her nickname “Taira,” she first volunteered as a medic during the country’s 2013-14 Revolution of Dignity. When Russia responded to the fall of Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin government in February 2014 by invading Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, Paievska headed east as part of a vast volunteer movement that succeeded in saving the country from partition.

In the years following 2014, Paievska emerged as a symbol of the everyman ethos characterizing Ukraine’s ongoing national struggle against Russian aggression. Her release from captivity in summer 2022 was personally announced by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and sparked an outpouring of emotion across the country. When Time Magazine named Zelenskyy and “the Spirit of Ukraine” jointly as its 2022 Person of the Year, she was one of a handful of Ukrainians depicted on the cover page alongside the Ukrainian leader. Likewise, when Ukraine was collectively awarded the European Union’s annual Sakharov Prize in December 2022, Paievska was among the small delegation chosen to receive the award on behalf of her country.

Brussels is only one of numerous Western capitals Paievska has visited since her release. Regular engagement with Ukraine’s international partners has left her concerned over outside perceptions of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia. “I am not sure everyone fully appreciates how serious the situation is,” she says. “Many still seem to think that only Ukraine is in danger and refuse to believe Russia will go further. This is a dangerous mistake. We Ukrainians were also once absolutely sure an invasion was impossible and it happened all the same. In reality, Russia will go as far as we let them.”

Despite these misgivings, Paievska has been encouraged by the strength of international backing for Ukraine and says this support will likely define the ultimate outcome of the war. She acknowledges that Western arms have played a crucial role in disrupting Putin’s invasion plans but stresses that military aid to Ukraine must be urgently expanded. “We desperately need weapons, weapons, and more weapons. If we don’t receive the supplies we need, we will not be able to stop Russia, despite the courage of our troops and the resilience of our nation.”

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As the Russian invasion approaches the one-year mark, few expect hostilities to end any time soon. In recent months, Putin has mobilized hundreds of thousands of additional Russian troops and begun the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. He is now attempting to place the Russian economy on a war footing while preparing domestic audiences for the prospect of a long war.

Paievska is under no illusions regarding the gravity of the challenges that lie ahead but is confident Ukraine will eventually prevail. She sees the current conflict as part of a far longer fight against Russian imperialism stretching back centuries, and is convinced the present generation of Ukrainians have the necessary resolve to bring Europe’s last great independence struggle to a successful conclusion.

Reflecting on the historic roots of today’s Ukrainian resistance, Paievska recalls a series of atrocities that serve as grim milestones of Russian imperialism in Ukraine. Her starting point is the early eighteenth-century sack of Ukrainian Cossack capital city Baturyn by Russian imperial troops, which was accompanied by the massacre of an estimated ten thousand Ukrainian civilians. “Ukrainians have not forgotten Baturyn,” she says. “We have not forgotten the forced famines and the mass executions and the deportations. The genocide of the Ukrainian nation has been going on for more than 300 years. How much longer can this continue? How much more blood must be shed?”

Ultimately, it is this sense of historic mission that Paievska believes will help Ukraine win the war. While modern Russia remains trapped in the imperial past, she argues that Ukrainians have a clear and compelling vision of their future as an independent European democracy. “We are ready to sacrifice a lot for victory because we know we are fighting for the freedom of our children and grandchildren. We are fighting to finally end this three hundred year struggle.”

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

The bidding war for Ust-Dunaisk points to a larger trend in Ukraine’s maritime exports. Russian forces currently occupy much of the Ukrainian coastline and have imposed a blockade of Ukrainian ports that has made maritime trade virtually impossible for almost a year. While a grain deal brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in summer 2022 partially opened Odesa’s major ports once again, the Russian Navy continues to harass commercial vessels entering and exiting Ukrainian waters.

As a result, shipping companies are increasingly turning to the Danube River to export Ukrainian grain. In 2022, grain shipments through the Danube grew 42 times year-on-year to 6.1 million tons, while overall cargo nearly tripled to 14.5 million tons, reaching the full capacity of Ukraine’s three Danube ports.

With demand growing rapidly, companies are now racing to build shipping capacity on the Danube. Ukrainian agribusiness company Nibulon, which has traditionally operated mainly out of Black Sea port Mykolaiv, is working to expand its Danube River capacity in the port of Izmail to be able to process 300,000 tons of grain per month. As Ukrainian companies adapt to wartime market conditions, so too have the government’s privatization authorities. Plans are underway to privatize the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy Seaport just up the coast from Ust-Dunaisk by the end of the winter season.

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Ukraine’s port privatization push is part of a broader initiative to renew privatization efforts following suspension in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s February 24, 2022 invasion. Rustem Umerov was appointed as the new head of Ukraine’s State Property Fund in September 2022. He has vowed to simplify the privatization process and make it more accessible to foreign investors. If successful, this should help the country to partially offset the catastrophic economic impact of the war while laying the foundations for a revival in the Ukrainian economy once the fighting is finally over.

At the same time, significant concerns remain regarding Ukraine’s commitment to privatization. Since the invasion began, the Ukrainian authorities have invoked wartime laws to nationalize a number of strategically important companies. While these measures reflect the gravity of the situation in the country, they also raise questions over Ukraine’s future economic direction.

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Even if the relaunched privatization push proves effective, huge challenges still lie ahead for Ukraine as the country looks to achieve a decisive break from the discredited past. Meaningful judicial reform is only just beginning to take shape and is vital for the country’s future. Encouragingly, President Zelenskyy now appears more willing to listen to calls from Ukraine’s international partners to clean out corrupt courts. With Ukraine heavily reliant on military and financial aid, these calls will certainly be more difficult to ignore in the months ahead. Ukraine’s partners will also be encouraged by the Zelenskyy administration’s response to recent corruption allegations, which led to a flurry of dismissals and resignations.

Post-war Ukraine will need to tackle a range of other major modernization tasks while dramatically reducing the state-owned share in the country’s banking sector. The list of necessary reforms is long and painfully familiar to anyone who has been engaged in Ukraine’s notoriously patchy efforts since the country’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Nevertheless, some veterans of Ukraine’s reform drive believe the incredible sacrifices of the past eleven months have made the prospect of further backsliding intolerable and opened a window of opportunity for once-in-a-lifetime progress. The Ukrainian authorities must not miss this chance.

We may never know exactly why Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine, but fear of the country’s emergence as a fully-fledged European democracy was clearly a factor. Putin has long viewed Ukraine’s successful transformation as an existential threat and a potential catalyst for democratic change inside Russia itself. As Moscow continues its genocidal war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and subjugate the Ukrainian people, it is more important than ever to maintain the commitment to a European future that so many Ukrainians are currently fighting for. This means implementing economic and governmental reforms whenever possible, even in the most trying of wartime circumstances.

Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter @andrew_danieri.

In the discipline of global foresight, as the Atlantic Council’s Peter Engelke wrote last year, a “snow leopard” is “a known but underappreciated—perhaps even forgotten—phenomenon” that has the potential to change the world and shape its future even though appearances might suggest otherwise.

The snow leopards discussed here are not predictions, but rather prompts for us to scrutinize overlooked phenomena. A technological breakthrough, for example, may not seem world-changing when still in development. Other phenomena might be so woven into our daily lives that they’ve become invisible to us, as with the recommendation algorithms highlighted below. The actors involved also influence how much weight we give to events and trends: If a head of state were to announce a country’s economic disengagement from China, we would sit up and pay attention, but companies deciding one by one to proceed with such “decoupling” may fly under the radar.

Our next-generation foresight experts at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security brought a fresh perspective to the task of spotting the hard-to-spot. Check out their list of six snow leopards to watch closely in the year ahead.

The tightening regulation of algorithms

Algorithms are everywhere yet almost invisible, serving as the silent sifters and sorters of our lives. Their influence is baked into everything from email and smartphones to GPS and government services. On search engines and social media, “recommendation algorithms” leverage user data and history to curate information for billions of people. In their simplest form, algorithms are instructions or sets of rules—often used by computers—for completing a task. At their most complex, they drive machine learning and enable artificial intelligence (AI) to grow smarter and more sophisticated by the second.

With such sweeping capacity to shape how individuals and societies order and consume information—from the mundane recommendations of photo feeds and shopping lists to the grave amplification of extremist conspiracy theories that cause real-world terror—algorithms (and their designers) hold some responsibility for the social and political consequences of the content they propagate and the decisions they advance.

The need for AI governance, particularly to rein in algorithms, is increasing—and policymakers have demonstrated an appetite for it. This October, the White House published an AI Bill of Rights with a blueprint for addressing “algorithmic and data-driven harms” and potential remedies. Lawmakers in the US Congress have proposed legislation to limit algorithmic promotion of extremist content by holding social-media platforms liable if certain forms of amplified content lead to offline violence, with other bills on the subject under consideration as well. China implemented a law in 2022 to reduce algorithmic influence on public opinion by enabling users to decline algorithmic recommendations on websites and apps. (The law was part of China’s pursuit of “positive energy” online, under the country’s aggressive censorship.) The EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act, the first major, still-pending regulatory framework for AI that could set global standards, strives to curb algorithmic bias. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) also offers guidelines on when companies can and can’t use algorithmic automated processing for decision-making—for example, regarding who to offer a loan to or at what interest rate.

Regulating algorithms is a broad and complex challenge, and pushback by the tech industry along with legal hurdles could halt even the most ambitious regulators. The public, and even policymakers, often lack the conceptual clarity to identify, define, and classify algorithms. And because it can be difficult to prove causation between algorithmic decision-making and the behavior or opinions of individuals influenced by it, accountability is hard to track.

Further breakthroughs may happen below the national level. New York City is reviewing the use of algorithms in decision-making across its government agencies and offices. The City Council curtailed the use of AI algorithms in decisions about hiring and promotion. And these steps are just the beginning, as state houses and activists energetically join the race to shape this new frontier.

Danielle Miller, Assistant Director, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Miller worked in the US House of Representatives and was a research assistant at the University of California Berkeley’s Institute of European Studies.

The rise of preemptive corporate decoupling from China

In the days after the Kremlin launched its illegal war on Ukraine, Western companies based in Russia started fleeing the market, fearing unprecedented transatlantic sanctions, consumer backlash for continuing to do business with an invader country on an imperialist bender, and investor pressure to maintain profit margins. Now, as tensions between the West and China escalate, wary investors and multinational corporations may be starting to preemptively shift their market presence, supply chains, and investments away from China to insulate themselves from similar future impacts should the Sino-transatlantic relationship deteriorate.

Among the most interesting early developments: Apple, which has a huge production footprint in China, has decided to shift production of its iPhone 14 model to India, while some of Google’s production for the new Pixel phone will likely be heading to Vietnam. Another space to watch is pension funds, as growing concerns about political risks are prompting discussions about potentially exiting or at least reducing exposure to the Chinese market.

While it’s still early to call such decisions formal decoupling, these signs point to Western companies’ unease about the state of the Sino-transatlantic relationship, as well as a preemptive, corporate-led fragmentation of markets and supply chains in case tensions between China and Western countries bubble over. The private sector’s concerns about China’s restrictive zero-COVID policies, which have led to recurring lockdowns and disruptions at factories, may also be a factor in these developments, but the roots of these corporate moves can be traced back further to extensive tariffs and other economic tit-for-tat measures between China and the West—as well as nervousness about China’s own pursuit of self-sufficiency via efforts such as its “Made in China 2025” initiative. At stake in how these trends play out is nothing less than the future of globalization as we know it, along with the shape of the multipolar geoeconomic order, in which countries such as India will likely play an enhanced role.

Anca Agachi, Associate Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative

Previously, Agachi worked for the EU’s European Defence Agency on defense capability development projects in the information security and space domains, and served as a United Nations Youth Representative for Romania, focusing extensively on the UN 2030 Agenda and sustainable development goals.

The battery revolution that will democratize electric vehicles

The two main reasons why consumers are reluctant to buy electric vehicles? They cost a lot and can’t get very far on a charge. But a battery that could make electric cars cheaper, more efficient, and thus more popular may be on the horizon. The next breakthrough could come not by way of an updated lithium-ion battery—the kind that powers most electric vehicles on the road today—but rather by using current battery technology in different form through structural batteries built into a car’s frame. This has the effect of reducing the car’s weight (a chassis made of battery cells isn’t as heavy as a chassis plus a separate battery) and a lighter car can travel farther on a single charge. The potential benefits go far beyond increasing range. Integrating the battery into a car’s chassis could also cut down on manufacturing costs and make cars cheaper, while strengthening the body of the car as well.

Tesla has experimented with structural batteries in its Model Y cars and GM used them in the electric model of its Hummers, but their versions have yet to yield broader adoption. Yet technical development among automakers and other actors is ongoing and promising. Researchers at Sweden’s Chalmers University of Technology, for example, recently developed a more efficient structural battery that performs ten times better than its predecessors. Right now, electric vehicles are driven mostly by the wealthy: In the United States, for instance, 78 percent of federal electric-vehicle credits go to those with incomes over $100,000. If structural batteries can deliver on their promise, it will result in many more electric vehicles on the road around the world, democratizing ownership.

Imran Bayoumi, Assistant Director, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Bayoumi graduated with his master’s degree in global affairs from the Munk School at the University of Toronto where he held a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship. He also holds a BA from Queen’s University in political studies.

The early glimmers of a global, platform worker-driven labor movement

An uneven post-COVID-19 economic recovery has stoked a labor-rights movement in the United States and efforts to unionize in some of the country’s largest corporations—from Starbucks to Amazon to Trader Joe’s. Around the world, meanwhile, similar fallout from the pandemic has produced another phenomenon: Platform workers—those who work for organizations that provide services directly to consumers through an online platform—are leading efforts to create better working conditions for themselves. Strikes and other protests from Brazil to the United Kingdom to the Philippines and beyond speak to rising unrest among these workers. The causes for disputes and the types of protest vary across regions, but concerns about pay are often a primary driver of the activity.

Such developments are significant in part because platform workers are a subset of the informal economy, which encompasses economic activities that are not monitored by the state. These activities include a wide range of work—from domestic labor to rideshare driving to market stands. More than 60 percent of the world’s adult labor force operates, at least part-time, in the informal sector, and on average that sector represents 35 percent of gross domestic product in low- and middle-income countries. In many cases, particularly in emerging markets and developing economies, platform workers are not aiming to formalize their economic activities. But their budding efforts to improve their working conditions could alter the world of work for the better, more strongly linking them with government protections and helping curb global poverty and precarious employment.

Caroline Multerer, Deputy Director of Operations, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Multerer was a program associate at Jones Group International, a global consulting firm owned by General James L. Jones.

The risky promise of geoengineering

One approach to combating climate change is geoengineering, or deliberate, large-scale, technologically based interventions in the environment to mitigate some of the effects of climate change. These include removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and reflecting the sun’s rays back into space. Futuristic though it may sound, geoengineering is already here. China and the United Arab Emirates have undertaken efforts to “seed” clouds by artificially increasing the amount of precipitation they hold and creating rain. Researchers from the UAE’s National Center of Meteorology have looked into creating an artificial mountain that would induce cloud formation and rain. Other countries, including China, India, and the United States, are making steady progress in advancing their geoengineering capabilities. The 2022 federal appropriations act, for example directed the US Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop a multi-agency group for coordinating research on solar geoengineering. This form of climate engineering, where sunlight is sent back into space, seems most likely to have the biggest impact on limiting the consequences of climate change and thus most likely to be pursued.

But along with its promise solar geoengineering also brings numerous risks, including the potential alteration of regional weather patterns. There’s also the increasing likelihood that, given the pace of climate-driven impacts such as floods, droughts, severe storms, and heat waves, a country or multiple countries will attempt to geoengineer the planet unilaterally, before the underlying science is solidified and before adequate global governance mechanisms are in place.

Imran Bayoumi, Assistant Director, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

The Japan-South Korea rapprochement that could shake up the Indo-Pacific

Although Japan and South Korea normalized diplomatic relations in 1965, their relations have continued to be complicated by the legacy of Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945, memories of World War II, and disputes over how to compensate Korean women who were forced into wartime sexual slavery by the Japanese military.

Despite this history, deeper reconciliation between the two countries, while politically difficult, is not an impossibility. In one indicator of a coming thaw, a meeting between South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the 2022 United Nations General Assembly, framed as a brief, informal gathering to avoid setting off domestic opposition at home, marked the first bilateral meeting between the leaders of these nations in three years. In another sign, the Japanese and South Korean publics are coalescing around concern about China. Were such a rapprochement to occur, it would dramatically alter the geopolitical environment in Asia while delivering significant benefits to both countries. Japan and South Korea face common and acute threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. With better relations, the two countries could pursue closer bilateral military ties, reach mutual understandings of regional threats, and develop responses to crises as they emerge. South Korea, one of the world’s leading advanced economies, could get more involved in the Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. The United States would be able to count on both nations to counterbalance China’s influence in the region, while the three could promote shared values throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Imran Bayoumi, Assistant Director, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Foresight 2023

In this year’s edition of Global Foresight, the Atlantic Council’s senior experts identify the top risks and opportunities for 2023. Our foresight team spots “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2023 and beyond. And we share findings from our survey of global strategists and foresight practitioners on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade.

Learn more Full survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Jan 9, 2023

Welcome to 2033: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 160 experts

To survey the future, we polled global strategists and foresight gurus on our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next decade. Check out their forecasts on everything from the prospect of nuclear proliferation to the probability of great-power war to the potential for more global volatility.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Jan 20, 2023

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2023

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsize impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Dec 23, 2022

The top 23 risks and opportunities for 2023

The war in Ukraine changed the world in 2022. How will it continue reshaping global affairs in 2023 and what else looms on the horizon? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting the near future.

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The post Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Resisting Russia one artwork at a time

Melinda Haring, Jacob Heilbrunn — Tue, 17 Jan 2023 11:28:35 +0000

Here we go again. An art heist rivaling the plunder of the Nazis during World War II is taking place right now in Europe. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia has pillaged over 30 museums, stealing thousands of precious objects from oil paintings to ancient artifacts.

These thefts, as the New York Times recently reported, are not isolated episodes, but part of a wider and premediated effort by Russian President Vladimir Putin to destroy the culture of Ukraine. This is an aspiration that Moscow has repeatedly tried and failed to fulfill over the past several centuries.

“Women at War,” a new US exhibition featuring a variety of works by twelve female Ukrainian artists, is a symbol of defiance to the Kremlin’s latest attempt to expunge Ukraine’s heritage. Though a number of the artists featured in the exhibition have fled to Europe or America since the full-scale invasion began, all of the works on show were originally crafted in Ukraine itself.

Curated by Monika Fabijanska at the Fridman Gallery in New York, the exhibition demonstrates that, in contrast to Russian imperial dreams, a thriving and independent Ukrainian artistic tradition exists. Indeed, as Fabijanksa has observed, “[Ukrainian artists] have their own culture and dreams and, often, that dream is about independence and about an identity that is their own, without the threat of annexation, invasion, and annihilation.”

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This exhibition has now traveled to the Stanford in Washington Gallery, where American Purpose, an intellectually engaging online magazine devoted to covering politics and culture, held a reception on January 12 welcoming its arrival. Opening remarks from several speakers including the historian Sonya Michel, who saw the exhibition in New York and helped bring it to Washington, testified to its ability to bring home the daily indignities, humiliations, and horrors of the war. “Women at War” will remain at the Stanford in Washington campus until March 22.

The exhibition, which includes a seven-minute film by Oksana Chepelyk that is titled “Letter from Ukraine,” features various artworks ranging from cartoons of the hellishness of daily life in the Donbas to a superb life-size oil painting on canvas by Lesia Khomenko called “Max in the Army.” The solitary and solemn uniformed Max, himself an artist and the husband of Khomenko, is shown saluting and staring into the distance, offering a poignant reminder of the isolation that can accompany heading off to join the army. Was Khomenko saying farewell to him as much as he was to her?

Several drawings depict rape victims of Russian soldiers. Wrestling with such depravity could not have come easily. Dana Kavelina, who was born in 1995 in Melitopol and now lives in Germany as a refugee, took this challenging subject up in a series of searing drawings called “Communications. Exit to the Blind Spot.” She not only addresses the vile actions of Russian soldiers in Ukraine but also the “rape camps” established by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s. The drawings are never less than harrowing. One, for example, features blood spooling from several women’s bodies and men depicted with red hands. These women, as the exhibition notes, were “purposefully destroyed by repeated rapes,” but Kavelina is searching for a way to bring “subjectivity” to these victims and to bear witness to their anguish.

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Perhaps the most significant piece in the exhibition required the least overt artistry. A white linen sheet hangs at the entrance with a poem written on it in felt pen:

“May you choke on my soil.

May you poison yourself with my air.

May you drown in my waters.

May you burn in my sunlight.

May you stay restless all day and all night.

And may you be afraid every second.”

Olia Fedorova wrote these words while Russian forces besieged her home city Kharkiv in March 2022. Her text reflects the feelings of ordinary Ukrainians caught up in the horrors of Russia’s invasion. She captures the rage, helplessness, and flinty determination that outsiders can only begin to comprehend when they see the mass graves in Bucha, the hundreds of destroyed cars piled high outside Irpin, or the viral video of one girl’s birthday party in her bright yellow family kitchen just before it was destroyed by a Russian missile.

The exhibition also shines in detailing the hardships of everyday life since Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and establishment of puppet regimes in eastern Ukraine. In this regard, a series of 12 cartoon drawings by Aleutina Kakhidze is very instructive indeed. She vividly depicts the journey her elderly mother had to make to collect her paltry pension. We learn that it took her up to eleven-and-a-half hours to cross numerous military borders, with endless delays and no predictability. In the final picture, her mother’s heart gives out as she waits for her pension to be processed. While shocking, the outcome is all too common as senior citizens were often forced to stand in long lines.

The tone of the exhibition is not always grim. Consider the series of photographs by Yevgenia Belorutets entitled “Victories of the Defeated.” Her marvelously evocative four photographs introduce us to the ordinary beauty of daily life in post-industrial Ukraine in spite of all the hardships. Covered in coal soot and outfitted in large gloves and an ill-fitting jacket, one woman in a blue stocking cap stares knowingly at the camera while the female subjects in two others smile broadly and even laugh.

Far from cowering before Putin and his thugs, Ukrainians remain defiantly triumphant. As Zhanna Kadyrova explains in an accompanying note that she composed in March 2022, passivity in the face of terror is not an option. “For the first two weeks of the war, it seemed to me that art was a dream, that all twenty years of my professional life were just something I had seen while asleep, that art was absolutely powerless and ephemeral in comparison to the merciless military machine destroying peaceful cities and human lives. I no longer think so: I see that every artistic gesture makes us visible and makes our voices heard!” Yes, they do. Both the Stanford in Washington Gallery and American Purpose deserve plaudits for helping to ensure that the efforts of Ukrainian artists to thwart Russian tyranny attract the attention they so abundantly merit.

Jacob Heilbrunn is the editor of the National Interest and Melinda Haring is the director of stakeholder relations and social impact at the Superhumans Center in Ukraine. Both Heilbrunn and Haring are non-resident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Thanks to the unprecedented support of Ukraine’s international partners, today’s ambitious visions for a new Ukrainian economy are entirely feasible. This will in all likelihood be a green economy at the cutting edge of the digital revolution.

President Zelenskyy had already set Ukraine on the road to a digital future long before the horrors of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In the early days of his presidency in spring 2019, Zelenskyy identified digitalization as a national priority and vowed to create “a country in a smartphone.”

On the eve of the Russian invasion, Ukraine had already made significant progress in this direction. More than 10 million Ukrainians, or around one-third of the entire adult population, had installed the Diia app, which offered a range of public services and documents in digital format. The impact of this digitalization has been evident during the war, with Ukrainians frequently using virtual documents to identify themselves and pass checkpoints.

The tech sector had also established itself as a key engine of the economy in pre-war Ukraine. By the end of 2021, the IT industry was generating around $6.8 billion in annual export earnings, representing approximately 10% of Ukraine’s overall export revenues.

These developments are encouraging and indicate that Ukraine can seize the unique opportunities that may soon emerge. At the same time, the post-war transformation of the country will force the Ukrainian authorities and the domestic tech industry to think on a far larger scale than ever before. International investments alone will dwarf anything seen in Ukraine since the country regained independence in 1991.

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Ukraine’s IT industry certainly has the potential to rise to the coming challenges. On the eve of the invasion, there were more than 250,000 IT engineers in the country working for companies that developed advanced solutions for many of the world’s biggest brands. To harness this potential and position the country for future success, Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation must engage with the world’s leading experts to develop an effective digital transformation strategy.

This strategy must address a series of core issues such as mastering digital skills, engineering digital infrastructure, the digitalization of public services, and the digital transformation of Ukraine’s business environment. Ukraine must adapt its education system to make sure the emerging generation of young Ukrainians are equipped with the necessary English-language and tech skills to drive the country’s transformation forward. Teachers will need to have expert knowledge, while schools must have sufficient internet access and tech tools.

These innovations need to be applied evenly across the country to make sure progress is consistent and no regions are left behind. This is especially important for regions liberated from Russian occupation. Digitalization must also extend to every branch of public services including healthcare, housing, and municipal services.

Even this very brief overview highlights the vast proportions of the undertaking that lies ahead for Ukraine. The envisaged digital revolution will require the involvement of experts in a wide variety of fields including law, education, energy, medicine, and security as well as IT itself.

The experience of the past ten months leaves little room for doubt that the global community will be ready to support Ukraine’s post-war digital transformation. While the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation will have the task of coordinating the creation of a digital transformation strategy, the Ministry can call on the support of a range of national governments, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the EBRD, global development agencies, and many of the world’s largest tech companies.

Today, while Ukraine’s heroic defense against Russian aggression is still underway, it is time to create a broad coalition of allies and establish expert working groups to develop a strategy development fund. The platform for this coalition can be the Digital for Freedom initiative already put forward by the Ministry of Digital Transformation in mid-2022.

Ukraine has already demonstrated that with enough military support, it can win the war. The country’s international partners must also be ready to begin the massive task of reconstruction as soon as circumstances allow. A comprehensive and ambitious digital transformation strategy can serve as one of the foundational documents for the coordination of efforts to make the new Ukraine an example of progress for the entire world.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center, an independent institution working to develop Eurasia’s digital economy in collaboration with international financial institutions, development agencies, global tech companies, and Eurasian governments.

Ukraine’s nation-building progress spells doom for Putin’s Russian Empire

Dennis Soltys — Sun, 08 Jan 2023 23:32:18 +0000

Why did Vladimir Putin invade Ukraine? Most international commentators still insist on viewing the war through the parallel prisms of resurgent Russian imperialism and NATO’s post-Cold War expansion. However, neither of these factors gets to the true heart of the subject. In reality, the devastating invasion launched on February 24, 2022, was primarily a desperate Russian reaction to Ukraine’s historic nation-building progress.

The widespread habit of underestimating Ukrainian agency has led to misleading perceptions of today’s conflict and an over-emphasis on Great Power politics. Such thinking discounts the fact that the Ukrainian people are directly responsible for their country’s recent emergence from centuries of Russian domination and have consciously chosen a democratic, European future. This is the ultimate reason why Putin launched Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II, and it will continue to reshape the geopolitical landscape long after Russia’s criminal invasion is over.

All countries are defined by common experiences that guide them as nations and determine their future destiny. In Ukraine’s case, it is possible to identify a number of key moments and prominent trends over the past three decades of independence that have placed the country firmly on a path toward democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration.

This has brought post-Soviet Ukraine into ever more intense confrontation with Putin’s Russia, which views the current Ukrainian trajectory as an existential threat to its own brand of authoritarian imperialism. If the former imperial heartlands of Ukraine succeed in freeing themselves from the Kremlin, this would drastically undermine Russia’s influence over other neighbors such as Moldova and Belarus along with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In a worst-case scenario, Ukraine’s integration into the Western world could serve as a catalyst for the collapse of the Russian Federation itself.

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Modern Ukraine’s civilizational split from authoritarian Russia began with the country’s December 1991 referendum, which produced a landslide vote in favor of Ukrainian independence. This momentous issue was decided not by violence but at the ballot box, following extensive public dialogue. The 1991 referendum set the political tone for independent Ukraine and established peaceful transfers of power via democratic means as a core principle for the newly independent country.

Ukraine’s political climate has not always been so orderly, of course. This is especially true of the numerous occasions when Russia has sought to interfere directly. Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Revolution of Dignity stand out as particularly important turning points in the unraveling relationship between post-Soviet Kyiv and Moscow. These revolutions highlighted the Ukrainian public’s determination to prevent Russia from derailing the country’s democratic development.

Crucially, both revolutions were grassroots movements sparked by Russian interventions seeking to prevent Ukraine’s European integration and steer the country back toward a more authoritarian form of government. On both occasions, ever-widening groups within Ukrainian civil society engaged with each other and learned to cooperate, often forging ties with other regions of the country.

These people power uprisings marked the consolidation of Ukrainian civil society and highlighted the country’s capacity for collective action. As a consequence, civil society now has a high sense of self-efficacy and social capital. Independent Ukraine’s two revolutions established the democratic principle of rule by the people not only in theory but also in practice, while highlighting the diverging political paths of post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine.

Another crucial turning point in Ukraine’s nation-building journey was the annexation by Russia of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow’s subsequent armed intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. This did much to undermine pro-Russian sentiment and strengthen Ukrainian identity throughout the country.

Putin’s use of force in 2014 discredited Russia as a potential partner while serving to remove much of his traditional support base in Ukraine. With economic opportunities sharply reduced and the political climate turning decisively against Moscow, many Kremlin sympathizers in the occupied parts of the Donbas and elsewhere in Ukraine chose to relocate to Russia. Others soon became disillusioned with the realities of the Russian occupation.

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As relations with Russia have deteriorated, ties with the global Ukrainian diaspora have flourished. For decades, the Kremlin sought to portray the diaspora in dismissive terms as a reactionary force that was out of touch with contemporary Ukrainian realities. In recent years, diaspora Ukrainians have debunked these stereotypes and served as a vital bridge between the country and its international partners.

Deepening ties with Ukraine’s Western partners have played an important role in consolidating the country’s historic turn toward the democratic world. Much of the support Ukraine has received since 2014 has been conditional on social and economic reforms that have re-affirmed the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Civil society actors and government officials have come to recognize that these conditions lead to higher standards of living and a better quality of life in general. This is in stark contrast to relations with Russia, which even before the outbreak of hostilities in 2014 had long been associated with stagnation and inertia.

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s historic turn toward the West has been dramatically reinforced by the previously unimaginable horrors of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While Russian troops have killed thousands of civilians and destroyed entire Ukrainian cities, Ukraine’s Western partners have offered a wide range of essential aid and welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees. For many Ukrainians, the experience of the past ten months has fundamentally altered perceptions of both Russia and the West. While they will long remember the Western response with immense gratitude, they will never forgive Russia.

The war has also fostered national integration within Ukraine by fueling unprecedented interaction among people from different regions of the country. This integration has been happening as Russian missiles and bombs fall equally on Ukrainian citizens regardless of their region, ethnicity, or worldview. With the ferocity of the Russian invasion forcing millions of citizens to flee their homes in the Donbas, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Kherson, and numerous other provinces, a massive cultural exchange is taking place as different segments of the population are brought together and united by a common cause.

This cultural exchange extends beyond Ukraine’s borders to the country’s European neighbors. Millions of Ukrainians have sought sanctuary in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic States, and a host of other European countries. The support extended by these countries shows that they, in turn, all appreciate the sacrifices currently being made by Ukrainians in defense of European security.

The huge refugee wave since February 2022 has resulted in entirely new levels of interaction between Ukrainians and other Europeans. As a result, earlier misconceptions are being replaced by a more nuanced understanding of each other and an appreciation of how much Ukrainians have in common with the wider European community. The growing solidarity and engagement of the past ten months is laying the foundations for what promises to be decades of intensifying partnership and cooperation.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is still far from over, but it is already difficult to see how Putin can achieve his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and forcing a Russified Ukraine back into the Kremlin’s exclusive sphere of influence. Instead, the war has dramatically accelerated long-term trends and widened the civilizational divide separating Moscow and Kyiv. A reduced Russia now looks destined to spend an extended period in international isolation, while Ukraine is firmly on track to cement its position as a valued member of the democratic world.

As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the US Congress during his historic December 2022 address, “Your money is not charity. It is an investment in global security and democracy.” Indeed, at present it would appear that US support for Ukraine has been one of the most successful foreign policy investments in American history.

Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor of comparative politics living in Almaty.

Ukraine’s growing veteran community will shape the country’s future

Aleksander Cwalina, Benton Coblentz — Wed, 04 Jan 2023 16:41:16 +0000

“I never thought I’d wear this uniform, but this is my land!” This is the tagline for “Call-sign Ukraine,” an arts project that aims to highlight the role currently being played in the defense of the country by ordinary Ukrainians with no prior military background.

Ukrainian digital artist Nikita Titov partnered with the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation, which provides financial support to Ukrainian veterans, to design and promote a collection of 18 striking posters featuring soldiers from all walks of life (see article illustration). These posters serve as a powerful tribute to the determination and sacrifice of Ukrainians who have been ripped from their everyday lives by Russia’s brutal invasion.

Posters from the “Call-sign Ukraine” project have been featured worldwide. They have appeared everywhere from the Embassy of Ukraine in Japan to the Kyiv metro, where they have been displayed alongside a Ukraine Veterans Foundation campaign entitled: “No matter who you are in civilian life, we are there to support you.” These initiatives reflect growing awareness that the fate of Ukraine’s rapidly growing veteran community will help define the country’s future for decades to come.

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At the start of 2022, there were around 400,000 veterans in Ukraine who had served in the ongoing hybrid war with Russia that had raged in the east of the country since early 2014. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, this number has now mushroomed. Hundreds of thousands of additional Ukrainians will join the ranks of the country’s veteran community in the near future.

These veterans have the potential to transform Ukraine. In terms of sheer numbers and also as a consequence of the skills and experience their have acquired, they will shape Ukraine’s economy, politics, cultural life, and society as a whole. However, much work must yet be done to ensure Ukraine can provide the support they will require. “There are already problems and the situation is likely to get worse,” notes poster artist Titov. “These people are traumatized by the war, not only physically but also mentally.”

While the vast majority of future veterans remain on the front lines, the challenges that their return to civilian life will create must be addressed now. After months of brutal combat and exposure to the results of Russian war crimes, Ukraine’s soldiers will need support in the form of medical and psychological care to treat the direct effects of the conflict.

In addition to immediate care, Ukrainian veterans will also need long-term economic support to ensure they are able to provide for themselves and their families while reintegrating into civilian life. This support should include training opportunities to prepare veterans for new careers along with access to small business financing.

The dramatic growth of Ukraine’s veteran community will add new impetus to the ongoing reform of the country’s veteran policies. Until relatively recently, Ukraine’s system of veteran services was dominated by a Soviet approach that provided subsidies and cash payments instead of direct services. Gaps in the system were often filled by civil society. In 2018, Ukraine established a Ministry of Veteran Affairs with the goal of throwing off the Soviet legacy.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has backed these efforts, stating in August 2022 that the country must seek to create one of the world’s leading veteran support models. The objective should be to allow veterans to contribute “not only to the defense of our state on the front lines but also to the post-war development of Ukraine,” he commented.

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Much work now lies ahead in order to translate Zelenskyy’s vision into reality. Hundreds of thousands of veterans across the country will require access to a range of medical and psychological services. They must also be provided with the kind of economic opportunities they so richly deserve.

The Ukrainian government is already working to make access to services easier. This includes creating an online service portal and easing access to psychological help by creating a new register of providers. In August 2022, the Ministry of Veteran Affairs signed an agreement with local authorities in Ukrainian cities to improve the provision of services. The Ministry has also established the Ukraine Veterans Foundation to serve as a platform to develop opportunities for veterans returning to civilian life.

Ukraine itself must undergo a physical transformation in order to become a more welcoming place for the veteran community. At the most basic level, this means improving accessibility to buildings and public spaces for all those who have experienced life-changing injuries during their service. Every aspect of Ukrainian daily life must be accessible to people living with limited mobility or other physical restrictions.

At present, the best way for the international community to back Ukraine’s veterans is by helping them win the war. They can do so by sending the weapons needed to defeat Vladimir Putin’s invasion and providing the financial support to keep the war-ravaged Ukrainian economy afloat.

Victory will create a whole new reality as hundreds of thousands of teachers, managers, civil servants, entrepreneurs, and IT specialists return to civilian life and seek to build futures for themselves in post-war Ukraine. This future is clearly full of potential. The task is to make sure Ukraine can capitalize on the opportunities that lie ahead. Ukraine’s veteran community should become a major asset for the country. To what extent will depend on the environment the authorities are able to create and the support provided by Ukraine’s international partners.

Despite the horrors of the war, there is still plenty of optimism about Ukraine’s prospects. Titov’s posters, with their bright and colorful style, reflect this faith in a future shaped by a generation who have taken up arms to defend their homeland. “Ukraine will win,” says the artist. “The new Ukraine will be a very strong country that the whole world will be proud of.”

Aleksander Cwalina and Benton Coblentz are program assistants at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Digitalization and transparency are vital for Ukraine’s reconstruction

Oleksandra Azarkhina — Mon, 02 Jan 2023 18:47:43 +0000

When you have become used to constant power cuts, regular air raid alerts, and the empty evening streets of Kyiv, a business trip to the United States can feel like being transported to another dimension entirely. However, when I visited Washington DC in the final weeks of 2022, I soon found that the situation in Ukraine was high on the local agenda.

During my brief time in the US, I held over 30 meetings with government officials as well as representatives of the defense, financial, and non-profit sectors. All were deeply immersed in the challenges facing Ukraine and were ready to offer genuine support. Topics of discussion included efforts to boost Ukrainian food exports, strengthen the country’s air defense systems, and facilitate the future reconstruction of Ukraine.

Every conversation also featured an anti-corruption component. This is essential in order to build the kind of transparent and effective partnerships that will help Ukraine move forward. Success will depend on a combination of the right systems and suitably qualified personnel.

Digital tools can play a key role in this process. Ukraine’s reputation as a digital innovator is already recognized across the Atlantic. Two years ago, Ukraine became the world’s first country to grant legal status to electronic passports for domestic use. Hundreds of public services for private citizens and businesses can already be accessed online. More recently, Ukraine occupied second place in Europe for data openness in the 2022 Open Data Maturity ranking.

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Ukraine’s digital progress can serve as a solid basis for the country’s recovery. While in the US, I had the opportunity to present plans for a Digital Reconstruction Management System (DRMS), which will serve as a comprehensive online platform that will ensure successful simultaneous implementation of multiple projects across Ukraine. The DRMS will make it possible to manage every stage of Ukraine’s reconstruction projects while providing real-time online information including spending data.

The concept is based on the principle of maximum transparency and the publication of open data in accordance with international norms such as the Open Contracting Data Standard. This digital solution will drive the development of an entire ecosystem. It will create opportunities for businesses around the world to participate in procurement tenders for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Additional tools will make it possible to monitor contractors, while NGOs will be able to analyze data and create risk indicators. This approach will make the coming reconstruction of Ukraine a model of open governance and open contracting for the entire world.

Ukraine’s digital reconstruction system is set to be launched in early 2023. This initiative is the result of cooperation between the Ukrainian authorities, civil society, and international institutions. It is being implemented together with RISE Ukraine, a coalition of international and Ukrainian NGOs.

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Personnel choices will also play a key role in the further evolution of Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture. Appointing the right people will be critical to this process. In the months and years ahead, Ukraine should look to recruit from within the ranks of the country’s armed forces.

There are currently more people than ever in uniform defending Ukraine. This includes men and women from a variety of professional backgrounds, including many who took up arms following successful careers as civil servants and human rights defenders. According to my friends who are currently serving in the trenches, this experience fundamentally changes a person’s worldview and civic position.

Military veterans will be highly motivated to safeguard Ukraine’s development and the country’s democratic institutions. That is why it is so important for Ukraine to receive support from the US and other international partners for initiatives that will make it possible to integrate veterans into the country’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts.

The provisional idea is to select people with the relevant educational and professional background for training in the most effective approaches to combating corruption. Successful candidates can then join Ukrainian law enforcement and the country’s anti-corruption institutions.

I am confident that by combining digital transparency with a targeted approach to personnel, it will be possible to achieve historic change in Ukraine. This message clearly resonated with our American partners during my recent visit to the United States. Our pursuit of a common goal is a source of inspiration and one more reason to believe Ukraine will win the war.

Oleksandra Azarkhina is Ukraine’s Deputy Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development.

2022 REVIEW: Russia’s invasion has united Ukraine

Taras Kuzio — Wed, 21 Dec 2022 17:05:20 +0000

Ever since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Western coverage of the country has tended to exaggerate regional differences, creating the impression of a weak state with divided loyalties. Misleading portrayals of Ukraine as a nation split between pro-Russian east and pro-European west have had a profound impact on outside perceptions, leading many international observers to believe that much of the local population in eastern Ukraine would actively support Russia’s 2022 invasion or at least remain neutral.

Such thinking can be traced back to Russia, which has long promoted the idea of modern Ukraine as an artificial state with a large ethnic Russian minority in need of Moscow’s protection. For years, Vladimir Putin denied Ukraine’s right to statehood while insisting Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). He openly accused Ukrainians of occupying historically Russian lands and declared Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

These distorted perceptions of Ukraine’s history and national character meant that few expected the country to survive against the full might of the Russian military. On the eve of this year’s invasion, there was general agreement in Moscow and most Western capitals that Ukraine would be defeated within a matter of days. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not seen as a credible wartime leader and was widely expected to abandon Kyiv. Likewise, the military prowess of the Ukrainian army and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian nation were also underestimated.

Inside the Kremlin, it appears that Putin’s decision to invade was influenced by a combination of faulty intelligence and over-consumption of his own anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The Russian dictator seems to have genuinely believed myths about an oppressed pro-Russian minority in Ukraine who would welcome his invasion and rise up in support of the advancing Russian army. Rarely in international affairs has anyone ever been so mistaken.

In fact, no Ukrainian region welcomed Putin’s invading army. While instances of collaboration have been recorded throughout the occupied regions of southern and eastern Ukraine, these have proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the number of people prepared to collaborate has been dwarfed by the sheer scale of Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian occupation. Russian troops who were told they would be treated as liberators have been shocked and distressed to find themselves acting as occupiers in hostile territory. Meanwhile, Ukrainians from all regions have been brought together by the common cause of defeating Russia. An invasion that was meant to extinguish Ukrainian statehood has inadvertently united the country.

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Ukraine’s nation-building journey did not begin overnight with the advent of this year’s Russian invasion, of course. A modern Ukrainian national identity has been gradually evolving throughout the three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Key milestones in this journey include the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, and the shock waves caused by the subsequent Russian invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the significance of the changes that have taken place within Ukrainian society since February 24 cannot be overstated. Crucially, attitudes toward key issues of national identity and foreign policy have become aligned throughout the country.

The biggest changes have taken place among Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have suffered most from Russian aggression. It is one of the bitter ironies of the invasion that the devastation inflicted by Putin’s troops has fallen disproportionately on the regions of Ukraine that Moscow claims to be protecting. The Russian army has reduced dozens of towns and cities throughout southern and eastern Ukraine to rubble and killed thousands of civilians. Millions more have been subjected to a brutal occupation regime marked by executions, abductions, terror tactics, and forced deportations.

Until 2022, these Ukrainian regions had traditionally been more sympathetic to the Soviet past and tended to favor pro-Russian politicians. Many openly embraced Soviet myths of Russians and Ukrainians as “brotherly peoples.” However, the horrors of the invasion have forced a radical rethink and led to the widespread rejection of Russia.

The rift caused by the current invasion has moved beyond far politics. Following the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, most Ukrainians expressed negative views of Russia’s leadership while remaining largely positive toward the Russian people. This is no longer the case. Ukrainians have noted that the vast majority of ordinary Russians appear to support the war or at least refrain from criticizing it. Millions of Ukrainians with Russian relatives have experienced this phenomenon for themselves in painful telephone conversations.

As a consequence, most Ukrainians no longer draw any meaningful distinction between the Russian state and the Russian people. An August 2022 poll conducted by Ukraine’s Rating Agency found that only 3% of Ukrainians held positive views of Russians while 81% regarded Russians negatively. This negative rating was almost double the 41% recorded just four months earlier. Ukrainian antipathy towards Russians will only deepen as the war takes a greater toll in civilian lives, military casualties, and physical destruction.

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Ukraine’s fundamental break with Russia has impacted every aspect of the country’s social, cultural, and religious life. The Russian language is now noticeably in decline among Ukrainians because it is negatively viewed as the language of military aggression. Many Ukrainians who grew up predominantly speaking Russian are becoming bilingual or switching to speaking Ukrainian.

There is growing public support across the country for policies of de-Russification. Almost three-quarters of Ukrainians (73%) back the idea of renaming streets and public places commemorating Russian historical figures and events, including two-thirds of respondents in eastern Ukraine. By weaponizing Russian history and using it to justify the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has convinced millions of previously sympathetic Ukrainians to view symbols of the Russian imperial past as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing attack on Ukrainian statehood.

Support for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine has also plummeted, with recent polling indicating that only 4% of Ukrainians currently identify as adherents. This is hardly surprising, given the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the principal cheerleaders of Putin’s invasion. Recent searches of Russian Orthodox Church premises in Ukraine have netted an array of Russian passports, imperial symbols, and literature denying the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Converging Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia are immediately apparent in relation to the peace process and foreign policy. A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey conducted in July 2022 found almost no difference of opinion between Ukrainians who identified as Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking on the issue of a potential land-for-peace deal to end the war, with 85% of Russian speakers opposed compared to 90% of Ukrainian speakers. Likewise, there was no longer any evidence of a significant regional split, with 83% in eastern Ukraine and 85% in the south opposing any territorial compromises with the Kremlin.

The same shift toward greater national consensus is evident on foreign policy matters. Regional differences over the country’s future geopolitical direction were long seen as the most obvious indication of a divided Ukraine. However, since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, successive surveys have found that clear majorities in all regions of Ukraine now support Ukrainian membership of NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, enthusiasm for deeper integration with Russia or membership of the Moscow-led Eurasian Union has evaporated.

By invading Ukraine, Putin hoped to reverse the verdict of 1991 and bring Ukrainian independence to an end. Instead, Russia’s attack has backfired disastrously. The full-scale invasion which began on February 24 has served to accelerate Ukraine’s nation-building progress and unite the country in ways that would have been difficult to image just one year ago. The trauma and sacrifices of the past ten months mean that these changes are in all likelihood irreversible and will continue to shape Ukraine’s development for decades to come as the country strengthens its sovereignty and moves further away from Russia.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

The second half of 2022 was marked by a series of spectacular Ukrainian victories. Russian troops were routed in the Kharkiv region and forced to retreat from the strategically important southern city of Kherson, the only Ukrainian regional capital to be occupied by Russia. The withdrawal from Kherson was a personal humiliation for Putin. Just weeks earlier, he had hosted a lavish annexation ceremony in the Kremlin and proclaimed that Kherson had joined Russia “forever.”

Unable to make progress on the battlefield, Putin changed tack in October and ordered the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Waves of airstrikes featuring missiles and kamikaze drones have since plunged Ukraine into darkness while depriving millions of Ukrainians of heating, water, and electricity. This bombing campaign is causing great hardship but does not appear to be undermining Ukraine’s fighting spirit.

While the Russian dictator’s dreams of an historic victory have failed to materialize, he is not yet ready to admit defeat. In September, Putin announced his country’s first mobilization since World War II, allowing him add a further 300,000 men to his depleted invasion force. Additional waves of mobilization are possible in the coming months. On the home front, the Russian economy is being prepared for the rigors of a long war. Nor is there any sign of significant domestic unrest. Polls indicate that most Russians continue to support the invasion, while those who do not have largely remained silent or chosen exile over protest.

There is currently no end in sight to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin officials insist Moscow will achieve its objectives, while Western leaders are equally adamant that Russia must not be allowed to succeed. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Ukrainians see the war as a fight for national survival against an openly genocidal enemy. This leaves little room for negotiations or a compromise peace.

With fighting set to continue into 2023, the Atlantic Council invited a range of experts to share their observations of the war so far. Why has Putin’s Ukraine invasion gone so disastrously wrong?

Daniel Fried, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council: What went wrong? Lots of little things but two big things in particular: Russia’s failure to understand Ukraine and its failure to understand its own system. The Kremlin seems to have believed its own propaganda that the Ukrainian nation does not exist except in subordination to Russia. In this view, a Ukrainian nation that insists it has separate identity and national existence is merely a fascist deformity that must be destroyed by fire and sword. Those familiar with Russian and Soviet imperial thinking can discern the antecedents: Nineteenth century Russian reactionary nationalism and its Soviet counterpart that attempted to identify any Ukrainian patriotism exclusively with its right-wing expression during WWII.

The Kremlin seems not to grasp how deep Ukrainian patriotism runs and how it has taken shape in a more liberal, multi-ethnic, and pro-democratic form, partly in revulsion against Putinism and its malign values. This spirit of patriotism, personified but not created by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has so far enabled the Ukrainian military to maintain its morale and helped Ukrainian society stand firm in the face of terror and deprivation.

In contrast, Putin’s corrupt system fueled by theft and deceit has hollowed out the Russian military and left Russian society generally cynical. Russian state television features bloodthirsty commentators while thousands of Russian young men flee the country to avoid military service. The sacrifices Ukrainians are willing to make as they fight for their lives and their country seem foreign to Putin’s Russia. Like the Czarist regime in the early twentieth century, Putin seems to have believed a “short victorious war” was just the tonic his system needed. But Russia’s failure in the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War merely exposed the rot at the heart of the empire.

Tyrannies often turn out to be weaker than the image put forth by their strutting leaders. Democracies often turn out to be resilient in ways that can astonish those who look no further than their messy politics or peacetime pettiness. So it seems with Russia and Ukraine, with the battle still in the balance.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: With Russian atrocities continuing, it is still far too soon to declare that Putin has failed in his effort to make Ukraine sorry for not wanting to be Russian. At the same time, it’s certainly clear that he is not winning. This failure to win is rooted in Putin’s own lack of understanding that Ukrainians are not Russians. Obviously, this is most immediately evident in Ukraine’s willingness to fight in order to avoid being forcibly subsumed into Russia.

On a deeper level, Ukrainians have demonstrated emphatically that they differ from their Russian neighbors in terms of the national character they have displayed during the past ten months of war. The innovation, work ethic, and commitment to country over self shown by Ukrainians are all qualities that, if they previously existed in Russia, Putin himself has worked hard to erode.

Since February, Putin has found Ukraine a very a different opponent compared to the country he expected to face. Ukraine’s aptitude for teamwork and ability to rapidly change tactics are factors that he simply has no answer for. And it is these same Ukrainian qualities that will ensure the country eventually rebuilds and rebounds.

Steve Pifer, William J. Perry Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University: Several reasons help explain why Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has gone so badly. First, the Kremlin and Russian General Staff greatly underestimated their foe and did not expect the Ukrainians to resist with such tenacity, skill, and courage. It is astonishing that they so badly misunderstood their neighbor. It was clear to Western observers that Ukrainians would fiercely resist, as they see this as an existential fight.

Second, the Russian military has not mastered certain complex tactics such as combined arms operations and suppression of enemy air defenses. For example, armored columns entered urban areas unsupported by dismounted infantry, while Russian air power stays largely over Russian-controlled territory for fear of being shot down by Ukrainian air defense. This adds to other problems endemic in Russia’s military such as poor leadership, poor morale, and poor logistics.

Third, the Kremlin has discovered that the defense sector is not immune from the corruption that pervades Russian society. Moscow is not getting the results it expected from the hundreds of billions of US dollars spent on modernizing the Russian military over the past 15 years. For example, the Russian military received precision-guided weapons that often miss targets or otherwise fail, while some tanks have explosive reactive armor plates filled with rubber rather than explosives.

Fourth, Though not moving as rapidly as they could and should, Western arms deliveries have given the Ukrainian army additional military tools to sustain its fight.

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Kristina Hook, Assistant Professor, Kennesaw State University: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine will be studied as one of the era’s biggest political, military, economic, and moral failures. Years of corruption and bad governance weakened Russia’s military and institutional capabilities. The personal nature of Putin’s authoritarianism encouraged pilfering over policy planning and selective law enforcement over meritocracy, while creating neo-imperial blind spots that prevented key members of the Putin regime from understanding the historic nature of the changes taking place in neighboring Ukraine.

Many Russians simply underestimated the talent and tenacity of Ukrainians, who used the last eight years of armed conflict in the east of the country to carry out crucial military reforms and develop civil society. Ugly stereotypes about Ukraine continue to undermine Russia’s ability to accept and learn from their military defeats at the hands of the Ukrainian army.

While credit for stalling Russia’s war machine belongs primarily to Ukraine’s defenders, citizens, and state, Putin also badly underestimated the West’s commitment to a rules-based global order. Despite Russian nuclear saber-rattling and erroneous assumptions of the democratic world’s readiness to abandon Ukraine, West military aid has continued to expand and diversify.

Looking ahead, the genocidal nature of Russia’s war implies that we must prepare for Putin to double down on his failures. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently painted a sobering but realistic view of the military support still needed in order to protect civilians and prevent Russia from achieving its goals. Now is the time to continue demonstrating how ill-advised Putin’s miscalculations are.

James Sherr, Senior Fellow, International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn: In Russia, the absolute imperative of absolute victory is never deflected by anything so trivial as error. Between February and May, those who believed that the Russian military system had insulated itself from the venality, mendacity, and servility of the Putin system found themselves pleasantly or rudely surprised. But we see once again that just as Putin is on the point of losing one game, he starts another. The withdrawal of strike groupings from Kyiv was the prelude to the Donbas offensive, then to mobilization and reinforcement, and now to the crippling of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which has become indistinguishable from the wholesale destruction of the country. The latter enterprises are abetted by the appointment of the mercilessly competent Russian General Sergei Surovikin and Iran’s de facto entry into the war.

It is time we understood that as long as Putin remains in power, the war will continue. If, as is now possible, Russia forces a halt to Ukraine’s offensive momentum, this need not be long in duration nor disadvantageous to Ukraine. Russia’s military commanders are capable of learning lessons and are learning them; but the military system has limited capacity to absorb these lessons. In contrast, Ukraine’s capacity for adaptation, innovation, and renewal are unmatched and indestructible. Ukraine’s Western partners must draw a lesson of their own. Time favors Ukraine. But it must be used to deny Russia the sanctuaries it requires to shape the parameters and rules of this conflict.

Diane Francis, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Putin’s invasion has failed so far because of several miscalculations. Crucially, he believed his own propaganda about Russia’s unassailable military might. He was also convinced that Ukraine was not a nation but a mere province of Russia. He believed NATO would remain ineffective. And he never dreamed that US President Joe Biden would help unite Europe and launch massive sanctions along with an unprecedented program to arm and support Ukraine’s defense.

Putin’s first military mistake was to launch an unprovoked invasion with just 150,000 troops compared to the 600,000 soldiers sent in 1968 to crush anti-Soviet protests in Czechoslovakia, a country one-fifth the size of Ukraine. He also misunderstood the cultural shift in Ukraine toward the West and underestimated the leadership and communication skills of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has harnessed the intelligence, resilience, patriotism, and unity of the Ukrainian nation.

Ten months into Russia’s invasion, Ukraine has gained the initiative thanks to a combination of battlefield courage and strategic skill along with massive Western help and favorable world opinion. Putin cannot reverse this. He has threatened a possible escalation to nuclear weapons but would do so at the peril of his nation. As he murders more civilians, bombs more infrastructure, and plunges Ukrainians into freezing darkness this winter, Putin is a reviled figure and is increasingly seen as a failure. Meanwhile, Ukraine is honored and celebrated across the globe.

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Solomiia Bobrovska, Ukrainian MP, Holos Party: The main reason Putin is failing is because he was too late. If he had struck in 2014 when the Ukrainian state was weak, the army was almost non-existent, institutions were unstable, and the opposition had much less influence on national affairs, his chances for success would have been much higher. However, Russia did not seize this opportunity and Ukraine was able to strengthen. The country’s strategic course toward the EU and NATO was enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution, while the Ukrainian army underwent vital reforms that resulted in significantly increased quality.

The second reason behind Putin’s difficulties is the fact that the Russians did not expect to encounter broad civilian resistance in Ukraine. This reflects deeply entrenched Russian misconceptions about the nature of Ukrainian society, and is also due to the Kremlin’s massive financial investment prior to the invasion to weaken and corrupt Ukraine from within. However, all regions of Ukraine united to resist Russia’s invasion.

A third key factor was the initial military assistance provided by partners such as the US, UK, Poland, and the Baltic states in the months immediately preceding the Russian invasion. These weapons deliveries helped Ukraine to keep fighting during the critical first weeks of the war and convinced the democratic world to begin sending more advanced and diverse arms supplies to the country.

Alexander Motyl, Professor, Rutgers University: The Russian invasion has gone badly for several reasons. The Russians came awfully close to capturing Kyiv during the first weeks of the invasion but the Ukrainians fought hard and managed to stave off the immediate assault. Once that happened and the shock of the attack began to wear off, the Ukrainians rallied, while the Russians reverted to business as usual. That meant poor leadership, poor logistics, poor tactics, and poor strategy. These are all products of a modern Russian military system that squanders resources, ignores modernization, and promotes corruption.

Above all, the Russian performance has been undermined by Vladimir Putin’s constant interference in military affairs. Inevitably, his inexperience and arrogance have resulted in a series of poor decisions. The internal rot within the Russian armed forces thereby came to the fore and has been amply demonstrated throughout the war.

Western support has also been crucial. Once a Russian victory no longer seemed inevitable, once the Ukrainians proved they would fight and could survive, and once the Ukrainian military demonstrated that it knew how to fight effectively, the West overcame its initial skepticism and began to supply Ukraine with significant amounts of weapons and other resources.

Ultimately, of course, the underlying cause of Putin’s failing invasion is Russia’s chronic underestimation of Ukraine and Ukrainians. This is a cultural predisposition that manifests itself in the view that Ukrainians are incompetent and inferior, and are thus incapable of any kind of successful military campaign.

Miriam Kosmehl, Senior Expert Eastern Europe and EU Neighborhood, Bertelsmann Stiftung: Vladimir Putin simply did not understand the strength of Ukrainian national identity or the durability of the state the Ukrainians had built. Due to his own fear of domestic uprisings against his rule, Putin has created a strong personal power vertical but not a strong Russian state. He made the mistake of assuming Ukraine was the same.

From the very beginning, Putin badly underestimated Ukraine. When preparing to invade, he failed to recognize Ukraine’s deep-rooted commitment to the country’s independence and democratic future. Russia observed President Zelenskyy’s falling approval ratings along with the constant flow of criticism from Ukrainian civil society and drew the false conclusion that most Ukrainians would welcome change. This was a fundamental misreading of the situation.

For years prior to the invasion, the Russian security services had been preparing the ground by penetrating Ukrainian local government structures and recruiting Ukrainian officials to switch sides at the decisive moment and aid a Russian takeover. However, with the survival of the Ukrainian nation at stake, the vast majority of Ukrainians fought back. Russia completely misjudged this readiness of individual Ukrainians to fight for their country. When the full-scale Russian invasion began, huge numbers of Ukrainians flocked to join the army or territorial defense forces. Similarly, Moscow expected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to be a weak wartime leader. In hindsight, this may have been the biggest miscalculation of all!

Putin’s disastrous failure to understand the realities of today’s Ukraine was accompanied by similarly unrealistic expectations regarding the West’s likely response to a Russian invasion. Based on the muted Western reaction to earlier Russian invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Putin believed he could count on a similarly underwhelming response. Instead, the West imposed tough sanctions and began unprecedented arms shipments to Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Major changes in Saudi Arabia impacting women in recent years:

Jamila El-Dajani highlighted the changes in Saudi Arabia that allowed women to gain freedom and independence while providing new opportunities for them in terms of employment, entrepreneurship, and business leadership. She shared one example: “The kingdom just announced seven hundred new licenses for women lawyers, bringing the total to 2,000, which is a rapid shift from a decade ago.”
Mae Saleh Almozaini highlighted women’s freedom of mobility since they’ve been permitted to drive. She noted that women’s participation in the workforce in Saudi Arabia increased from “17 percent to 36 percent,” underscoring their increased ability to make contributions to the economy over the past five years.

Areas where change to support women’s inclusion in workplaces is needed:

Zina Janabi emphasized the necessity of transformational change at organizational and individual levels for women in the workplace. She highlighted the dual approach that some organizations are using to create a culture where women can thrive while providing policies and programs that allow them to move up the workforce ladder. Furthermore, Janabi explained on a personal level that it’s essential for women or any minority to support one another when experiencing barriers in their careers.
Bara’a Al-Khateeb said, “I don’t think what women face in terms of challenges in KSA [Saudi Arabia] is far different than what women face globally.” She added that women worldwide sometimes encounter unhelpful stereotypes. She noted that studies show that when companies promote employees to a leadership position, women are considered 15 percent less than men for these promotions due to stereotypes. Al-Khateeb contended that women have underrated social intelligence, which is a vital skill for leaders. She added that women are also often paid up to 35 percent less than males.
Hanaa Almoaibed highlighted that the dual burden for working mothers increased due to the pandemic’s various challenges while stating that Arab societies lack a culture of professional childcare, such as nannies. She stressed the need for women to create “better care facilities” that will provide a vital support system for working mothers.
Al-Khateeb stressed the lack of opportunities for leadership, mentorship, and coaching for women. She added that women wish to pursue leadership roles; however, these challenges and the cultural barriers can make women’s full participation or rise to a leadership role much more difficult.
Almoaibed stressed the need to train teachers to help students with practical 21st-century skills in schools and essentialize extracurricular activity. She suggested institutionalizing structured career guidance in schools for every student in the kingdom from an early age to build proper research and negotiation skills that will link with “realistic job training” for them in the future.
Almozaini addressed a major concern in Arab societies: raising women to be shy and reserved, which can affect their confidence in the future. Women need to become more assertive and outspoken, Mae emphasized, adding the importance of providing a mentorship program for women to be guided throughout their career path.
Al-Khateeb highlighted that while adding female workers rewards companies with the flexibility of hiring employees from various nationalities, women’s presence has positively impacted dollar value and increased team collaboration. She encouraged people to raise awareness of women’s effectiveness in leadership roles and business.

Opportunities for women entrepreneurs and startups in Saudi Arabia:

Almoaibed explained that more and more people in Saudi Arabia are starting companies; however, she pointed out that “risk is still the most significant barrier to going into an entrepreneurial adventure” and “seventy percent of people who consider forming a private business back out because they fear the project’s failure.”
Al-Khateeb emphasized the importance of flexibility to women; she noted that startup companies sometimes have more agility and willingness to do this. She stressed that providing employees with flexibility will help more women take on leadership roles. She shared her personal story, explaining that during her hiring interview at Foodics, the male interviewers asked what would make the role more attractive for her, and she requested to work remotely because she was pregnant with her third child. She wasn’t expecting them to agree, but they told her she would be Foodics’ first remote employee. Their willingness to provide flexibility had a significant impact on her as a working mother.
Al-Khateeb also shared her insight as a recruiter, highlighting that women are applying to a wide range of positions in Saudi Arabia, despite the challenges that come with these roles such as traveling requirements or working long hours.
Almozaini highlighted that the G20, which was hosted in Saudi Arabia two years ago, reported that investing in targeted training for Saudi women will generate $400 billion in return on investments to the country’s GDP by 2030. Therefore, promoting women’s inclusion in the workforce is a business necessity, not just a moral imperative.

Nour Alhajjeh is a Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East & Middle East Programs.

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Fresh challenges threaten to reverse Ukraine’s judicial reform progress

Mykhailo Zhernakov, Nestor Barchuk — Mon, 12 Dec 2022 14:12:14 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was fueled by fears that the emergence of a democratic and European Ukraine could act as a catalyst for similar change in authoritarian Russia. So far, Ukrainians have defied the odds and inflicted defeat after defeat on Putin’s invading army. However, far from the battlefield, the judicial reforms that hold the key to Ukraine’s transformation into a nation governed by the rule of law are at risk of unraveling.

Judicial reform was identified as one of Ukraine’s top reform priorities when the country received official EU candidate nation status in summer 2022. Within the judicial reform agenda, key institutional focuses are the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) and the High Council of Justice (HCJ). The former is responsible for the selection of judges, while the latter deals with appointments, dismissals, and disciplinary issues.

It is fair to say that Ukraine made significant progress last year when MPs passed two important draft laws on the reform of the HCJ and the HQCJ following much prompting from Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners. However, this progress is now under threat.

In line with current legislation, Ukrainian judges are responsible for appointing the largest quota of members to the HCJ. There are concerns that they will not do so by the end of January, which would prevent the HCJ from becoming operational for several months and make it impossible to impose disciplinary measures against judges accused of collaborating with the Russian occupation forces. Moreover, the judicial reform component of European integration would be postponed for at least a year.

Ukraine’s judges have a long and troubling history of sabotaging judicial reform, but civil society representatives complain that the government has yet to take this threat seriously. This could have far-reaching consequences. Once selected, the HCJ and HQCJ will be tasked with filling somewhere between 2500 and 3000 vacant positions, representing almost half of the Ukrainian judiciary. If these two bodies remain under the influence of vested interests within the judiciary, Ukraine’s rule of law problems will potentially persist for decades to come.

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The G7 Ambassadors to Ukraine have already called for clarity on the issue of judicial appointments. It is important for President Zelenskyy to address this issue as both a central pillar of Ukraine’s democratic transformation and a security measure to reduce opportunities for Russian influence in the country.

This fall, RFE/RL journalists reported that Bohdan Lvov, who heads the influential Commercial Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine, has held Russian citizenship since 1999. The President of the Supreme Court soon expelled Lvov from the Supreme Court. However, Lvov may be able to return to his position with the help of the controversial Kyiv District Administrative Court, a court with extensive jurisdiction that has long been accused of anti-Ukrainian rulings. Despite calls for President Zelenskyy to react, he has yet to do so.

There are similar concerns over the Kyiv District Administrative Court itself, whose president Pavlo Vovk was recently sanctioned by the US. Almost two years ago, Zelenskyy sent a draft law to parliament to disband the court. However, this draft law is gathering dust and has yet to be considered by MPs. This is particularly troubling as journalists and Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksii Danilov have claimed that the Kyiv District Administrative Court was engaged in February 2022 in efforts to create a legal framework for the return to power in Ukraine of fugitive ex-president Viktor Yanukovych.

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The latest challenge to Ukraine’s judicial reform comes from an unexpected source: the country’s international partners. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe recently issued an urgent opinion on the draft law for the reform of Ukraine’s Constitutional Court that some experts have attacked as potentially disastrous.

In its latest opinion, the Venice Commission has reversed a number of earlier recommendations. Previously, it had highlighted the problem of political appointments to the Constitutional Court and recommended that any appointments should take place only after the introduction of a transparent and competitive selection procedure. For this purpose, an independent commission should be created to check candidates for integrity and political impartiality.

However, the Venice Commission now states that the decisions of this monitoring body should not be binding. The Venice Commission also reversed its support for the participation of civil society representatives in the selection process. Instead, the Commission recognizes that including government representatives in the selection process may lead to politicization, but argues that this can be permitted in light of the “special circumstances” currently facing Ukraine. Without additional safeguards, this means that only government-friendly candidates can be appointed to the Constitutional Court.

Ukrainian MPs are now preparing to vote on a revised law that incorporates the Venice Commission’s latest recommendations. If passed, it will hand the current Ukrainian government instruments to potentially secure a majority of Constitutional Court judges for at least nine years.

Efforts to support Ukraine as it fights against Putin’s invasion are both welcome and necessary, but enabling any one political force to gain control of the Constitutional Court could seriously undermine the country’s democracy and future European integration. This can be seen in the negative experience of numerous Central European EU member states. In order to keep Ukraine’s judicial reforms on track, Ukraine’s international partners must push for a Constitutional Court selection process that will guarantee independent candidates. This is crucial in order to secure the kind of free and fair future Ukrainians are currently fighting for.

Defeating Russia on the battlefield will prove futile if post-war Ukraine remains stuck with the same corrupt system. While military matters are naturally the number one priority, it is also crucial to prevent backsliding on existing reforms in order to lay the foundations for a better Ukraine. The existential nature of the current conflict and the clear objective of European integration create greater leverage for historic reforms than at any other time in Ukrainian history. It is up to both the current authorities and Ukraine’s international partners to make sure this momentum is not lost.

Mykhailo Zhernakov is chair of the board of the DEJURE Foundation. Nestor Barchuk is international relations manager of the DEJURE Foundation. They tweet @DEJURE_UA.

To those who have made the last eight years awesome, thank you.

Yevhen Hlibovytsky, my tutor, driver, fellow nosy social scientist, and beloved friend, your spirit infuses my work and love of country. I can’t wait to show you the eccentric parts of America. There are a lot of them! Duzhe, duzhe dyakuyu.

When I became the editor of UkraineAlert in 2015 I was woefully under-qualified. Dr. Alina Polyakova convinced John Herbst to hire me over a more pedigreed man. Peter Dickinson, Christian Caryl, Uri Friedman, Amanda Abrams, and Larry Luxner, you reshaped my underdeveloped stories and encouraged me countless times.

My co-conspirator, editor, and debating partner Jacob Heilbrunn makes every piece 1000 times better, but please do not tell him. And while we are on that subject, please don’t tell John Herbst that I didn’t write any of the titles that gave the communications team heartburn. That was my brilliant husband. Thank you, Daniel!

Ambassador John Herbst, you are the Atlantic Council to me. You made the fight fun, the debate delicious, and every conversation convivial, and you made me a better person. I will be in your debt until they bury me in Kyiv.

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Before I sally forth, I relish the chance to explain why Ukraine has captivated me for more than fifteen years.

It was not love at first sight. In 2006, I went to Ukraine as part of a disastrously organized election observation mission. I found Kyiv forbidding but was quickly put on a train to Crimea to observe in Simferopol, an ugly but otherwise unremarkable post-Soviet city. The leaders of our election team soon vanished and we were left with two older gentlemen from the Canadian diaspora, who graciously volunteered to hastily assemble maps and organize our mission.

I took the work seriously and I almost got into a fistfight as a result. When I saw violations, I duly noted them. At one polling station, a large man was voting outside of the ballot box. Voters have a right to privacy, and in a place like Crimea that overwhelmingly votes for one party, privacy is key.

As a diligent election observer, I took a picture of the man. He came at me demanding to know what I was doing. A crowd quickly gathered as the situation escalated. I insisted I had the right to take photographs and note violations. The head of the precinct, with the unnatural burgundy hair you only see in the former Soviet Union, called Kyiv for guidance. “Unfortunately, this young woman has the right to take pictures,” she announced with a scowl. The crowd heaved a disappointed sigh and dispersed. As we exited the polling station, I was shaken and scared the big man might be waiting for me. What a country.

I never intended to come back. At the time, I had landed a dream job at Freedom House. I was giving Saudi Arabia hell for its gross and innumerable human rights violations, but my boss was impossible and the task felt hopeless. I feared it would take Saudi Arabia decades to change.

Fast forward. My boyfriend at the time landed a Fulbright scholarship to Kyiv and was having the time of his life. I was miserable and decided to join him. I soon found a job in Ukraine teaching English. The initial Skype interview went swimmingly and the Ukrainian trainer was both charismatic and lovely. At first, I only intended to stay for six months and then enter boring middle-aged American life. Instead, I found my calling and have never looked back.

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Sergiy Gusovsky, one of Kyiv’s most beloved restaurateurs and among the finest people you could wish to meet, often remarks that once a Westerner falls for Ukraine, they are hooked for life. That’s exactly what happened to me.

In January 2007, I made the big move to Ukraine. It was beyond cold. Even with my ankle-length wool coat and eighteen Alaskan winters under my belt, I could barely take it.

The American English Center rented space in ordinary schools. I taught mostly college students daily from 4pm to 10pm. The beginner students couldn’t understand a word I said, but the advanced students got me and were soon demanding harder and harder words. Hour after hour, we talked about Ukraine’s social structures, the economy, the country’s endlessly frustrating politics, its painful history, and society’s ridiculous expectations of women. There was no subject that was off limits.

Within six months, I had decided I never wanted to leave. Kyiv is the world’s most underrated city. Not only is it extraordinarily beautiful, especially during the spring months, but the spontaneous and generous nature of everyday life also appealed to me. The Kyivite focus on the here and now is the inverse of Max Weber’s Protestant ethic which I had imbibed far too deeply by age 18. Being in the Ukrainian capital helped me rediscover by natural equilibrium.

Plus, it was dirt cheap. My $400 per month apartment overlooking the golden domes of Pechersk Lavra Monastery was a sensational place to live. Meanwhile, Kyiv’s location at the center of Europe enabled me to visit 10 countries in six months. Leaving wasn’t an option.

Although I did eventually move back to the US, I never really left. Ukraine has remained with me. For the past eight years, I have been privileged to lead and build the biggest, loudest, and most effective program on Ukraine in North America at the Atlantic Council together with Ambassador John Herbst.

I often find myself answering the same peculiar question: “Why are you, a girl with a German surname and no discernible connection to Eastern Europe, so taken with Ukraine?”

Normally I give a canned answer. I grew up in Kenai, a small village in Alaska with a Russian Orthodox Church. When I was in the sixth grade, the Berlin Wall fell and Russians poured into Alaska. Regional flights were set up between the Russian Far East and Alaska, and the local business community got very excited about linking the two frontier lands. Closer to home, Miss Tatiana appeared in my school and I began studying Russian. I became mesmerized by the language and by the sight of golden samovars.

Recently I’ve realized that the true answer to this question is actually deeper. Much deeper.

Ukraine’s unquenchable thirst for freedom and justice inspires me endlessly. Even when the picture there looks hopeless, which it often does, my courageous warrior friend Vitaliy Shabunin reminds me to take the long view. “There are thousands of people like me. We are going to change Ukraine. It’s only a matter of time,” he says. May it be so, Vitaliy, and may it be so soon!

Thank you for your love, your trust, and your support over the last eight years! Все буде Україна!

Melinda Haring is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She tweets @melindaharing.

everges — Thu, 01 Dec 2022 19:42:18 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On November 30, IPSI Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts appeared on Complete Intelligence to discuss the origins and context of the protests in China. Roberts highlights “the deep economic malaise,” in addition to frustrations over COVID-zero, as key factors that contributed to the protests. Moreover, he remarks on the significance of a sense among young people in China that the Chinese Communist Party and Beijing are not infallible.

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

The post Roberts Discusses China Protests on Complete Intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig on Fox News Sunday discussing North Korea and Iran

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Nov 2022 19:26:55 +0000

Original Source

On November 27, Scowcroft Center acting director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed by Jennifer Griffin on Fox News Sunday discussing North Korea’s latest missile test and protests in Iran.

The [North Korean nuclear] threat continues to grow. The right [US] approach is a pressure and engagement campaign. Increase the diplomatic, economic, and political pressure on North Korea so long as it pursues these destabilizing policies, but hold out the possibility for engagement and negotiations if Kim Jong Un is willing to come talk.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Offside: Watch the World Cup alongside the Atlantic Council

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 21 Nov 2022 21:59:32 +0000

The most watched sporting event in the world is underway, and the global viewers for this year’s World Cup will be watching much more than the action on the pitch in Qatar. Fans are also closely scrutinizing what unfolds on the sidelines of the controversial tournament, as concerns about Qatar’s human-rights record and FIFA’s corruption scandals have come to the fore in recent months and years.

Geopolitics are also playing out on the pitch, as players from the thirty-two teams competing in the tournament look to make a stand against human-rights abuses and discrimination. Our experts will be tracking it all—and handing out cards where they see fit.

The latest from Qatar

The long-term impact of Morocco’s magical World Cup run

Morocco’s triumphs signal a new world order in more than soccer

No politics… except Palestine

Where is the UAE?

In Rabat, unprecedented unity behind the Atlas Lions

Gulf neighbors get cozy

DECEMBER 15, 2022 | 10:01 AM WASHINGTON | 6:01 PM QATAR

The long-term impact of Morocco’s magical World Cup run

The world abruptly woke up from the roller-coaster ride of a dream that was Morocco’s miraculous World Cup run on Wednesday when the Atlas Lions lost 2-0 to defending champion France in the semifinals. But Morocco nonetheless succeeded by inspiring millions of children from Africa and the Middle East, uniting much of the world during an uncertain time with its historic performance.

Not only was Morocco the first African and Arab nation to ever reach the semifinals of the World Cup, but it accomplished that feat with a roster in which fourteen out of twenty-six players were born abroad, mostly in Europe. While this phenomenon can be attributed to the failure of some European nations to assimilate migrants from North Africa, it has implications for the future of international soccer teams in African and Arab nations. Children in the region and in the diaspora have seen the successes of Morocco and could now be inspired to play for the nation of their cultural roots over the country where their family may have emigrated. Western nations are known for having powerhouse teams made up from immigrants, most notoriously France’s 2018 World Cup-winning team, in which twelve of twenty-three players had African roots, spanning nine different nations. Therefore, this shift in which nation a player chooses to represent could cause a seismic shake-up in the international soccer hierarchy, with more African and Middle Eastern teams potentially rising in rank from a generation of youth that have been inspired by the 2022 Atlas Lions.

Off the field, it could be argued that Morocco’s World Cup run was more successful in bringing together the Arab and African community than traditional diplomatic routes—showcasing the overwhelmingly positive impact that soccer and other sporting events can have. With Africa and the Middle East having large youth populations, governments in the region and international organizations should seize this positive momentum by building infrastructure and programs to support inclusive sporting opportunities for young people.

From kids running around with a soccer ball at their feet in the historic streets of Marrakech, to neighboring nations such as Tunisia celebrating the victories of Morocco’s team like their own country had won, to internally displaced people’s camps in northern Syria tuning into the matches, the Middle East and Africa stood and cheered in unison behind the Atlas Lions and the beautiful game. Although their inspiring World Cup run is over, this special group of Moroccans has forever etched their names into history and changed the future of soccer and the region for the better.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

DECEMBER 10, 2022 | 2:18 PM WASHINGTON | 10:18 PM QATAR

Morocco’s triumphs signal a new world order in more than soccer

Soccer has proven to be much more than a simple sport. It is a powerful diplomatic tool, an avenue for national branding, and a potent apparatus for symbolic power in the Bourdieusian sense. When an underdog with a 0.01 percent chance to win the 2022 World Cup at the start of the tournament advances to the semifinals and eliminates football legends such as Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, it is undeniably added symbolic capital to the regional and international credit of the Atlas Lions.

With a stunning, intense victory over Portugal on Saturday, Morocco became the first Arab country and the first African country to make the World Cup semifinals. The kingdom’s wins were perceived as symbolic redemption for defeats and deceptions of MENA and African countries in modern times, as well as an act of metaphorical revenge against Western colonizers and imperialist legacies. African and Middle Eastern populations have been fervent supporters of this tournament’s dark horse, as they can identify with its tenacity and resilience vis-à-vis teams four times its market value (based on the transfer value of each team’s players).

Although the Moroccan team relies heavily on diaspora players, with fourteen out of twenty-six team members born abroad—mostly in European nations such as France, the Netherlands, or Spain—these double nationals chose to play under the colors of their country of origin. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a failure of European integration and assimilation of migrants from North African nations. These phenomenal footballers couldn’t identify with their host countries and continued to pay allegiance to the Arab Islamic kingdom where their families emigrated from.

Players who prostrate to pray after each win and wave the Palestinian flag, alcohol-free matches, and high-level competition in an Arab land are all peculiar and novel sights for global spectators. These symbolic elements could be signs of a changing world order where euro-centric value systems are no longer dominant, and a more diverse football culture is being established. Similarly, European teams such as Italy and Germany that were disqualified early could also be a symbolic reflection of their own countries’ post-pandemic woes. Could France be next?

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

DECEMBER 7, 2022 | 1:54 PM WASHINGTON | 9:54 PM QATAR

No politics… except Palestine

FIFA and Qatar have diligently worked to silence issues deemed too political, from rainbow flags and attire in support of LGBTQ rights to t-shirts commemorating the death of Mahsa Amini and demanding rights for Iranian women. Stadium security and police have forced fans to hand over their items or have taken fans away from the stadium areas. Those instances have circulated widely on social media and fan group chats. Too frequently, security has made an issue where one really did not exist, resulting in more attention, not less, on the fan advocate.

In contrast, support for Palestinians is prominent across the World Cup, with Palestinian flags and chants everywhere: matches, the souq, public transportation, and even social media platforms. In Morocco’s win over Spain, players and fans donned the flag for photos, and fans sang pro-Palestine songs. Fans from elsewhere in the world who are not well versed on the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict are learning; some fans are even now becoming converts to the Palestinian cause. Examples of fans donning the Palestinian flag are more and more common each day in malls, television interviews, and the many fan areas in and around Doha.

One lasting outcome of the World Cup could well be that fans who were disinterested in the issues surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict are now at least interested and remain aware of happenings in the broader Levant. The world may also see more Palestinian flags at international matches moving forward as World Cup fans continue to commemorate their attendance in Qatar by raising the flag that they were gifted–and commentators would be forced to acknowledge the change in fan behavior.

—Jennifer Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is attending the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar.

DECEMBER 6, 2022 | 2:11 PM WASHINGTON | 10:11 PM QATAR

Where is the UAE?

Noticeably absent from the Gulf’s neighborhood block party is an Emirati presence. This unique tournament has Arab culture and societies on display—whether they qualified for the World Cup or not. Unlike the Qatari, Saudi, and Palestinian flags found everywhere, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) flag is noticeably missing from the fan zones and stadiums. Plus, UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan only came to Doha on an official visit on December 5, well after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) initial visit to Qatar to take in the spectacle. And unlike MBS and his informal family visits with the Qatari royal family, the UAE leader’s visit was short and formal. Despite lingering trust issues between Qatar and the UAE in the post-blockade period, the lack of Emirati presence is somewhat surprising during the first-ever Middle East-hosted World Cup. Arguably, Abu Dhabi appears to be taking its relationship with Saudi for granted as MBS, on behalf of Riyadh, soaks up the love from Qatari leaders.

DECEMBER 6, 2022 | 1:55 PM WASHINGTON | 9:55 PM QATAR

In Rabat, unprecedented unity behind the Atlas Lions

You want drama? Heart-pounding, nerve-wracking drama? Join a sports bar full of Moroccan fans desperately cheering on their beloved underdog Atlas Lions in a scoreless draw against mighty Spain. And you want a heart attack? Have it go to penalty kicks. You want an explosion of joy? Morocco, three-nil.

A busy street in Rabat during Morocco’s World Cup match. And the hotel sports bar. pic.twitter.com/vX49AfVDZb
— Dan Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro) December 6, 2022

Here in Rabat, the work week might as well be over. Delirious Moroccans are pouring into the streets, honking, dancing, singing their hearts out.

The Moroccan squad played with the pluck, modesty, and unity that characterizes this nation. Morocco is a leader in Africa and the Arab world, but does not flaunt its weight. It is used to not being in the room with great powers. It looks after its own interests, is a good partner to those it chooses as its friends (the United States, and now Israel, among them), and rarely makes much of a fuss.

But it is also a society that feels deeply proud of its ancient history, cultural diversity, and the broad consensus in support of the royal leadership. A quiet, humble self-confidence expresses itself in cultural pride and legendary hospitality.

Tonight, Moroccans are more unified than ever. As the exhausted players tossed Bono, the hero goalkeeper, into the air, the happy din in the streets was already rising.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is the director of the N7 Initiative.

DECEMBER 5, 2022 | 9:22 AM WASHINGTON | 5:22 PM QATAR

Gulf neighbors get cozy

Saudis make up the third-largest group of ticket purchasers behind Qataris and Americans. After a shocking win against Argentina, the Saudis came out of their proverbial shell. They wore their flag proudly around their shoulders, bought up green scarves with their national symbol, and could be spotted at Saudi matches and even non-Saudi matches in their team’s jerseys. Saudis and Qataris could be seen partying at the Saudi House, a pavilion set up on the Corniche, or the main thoroughfare along the Doha waterfront. In short, it’s now “cool” to be Saudi at the World Cup.

With this newfound status, the Saudis have embraced the atmosphere and have actively engaged with fans from around the world. By fixing thobes and ghutrahs (robes and headscarves) of foreign fans embracing the local culture, joking in social media posts asking “Where’s Messi?!,” and simply striking up conversations with other fans, no matter where they are from, the Saudis are a key fixture in this World Cup. In many ways, they have made the tournament their own, playing host alongside the Qataris, to ensure fans from other parts of the world have fun and begin to see that Gulf Arabs are not as often portrayed in Western media according to stereotypical representations.

Along with the strong representation of Saudi fans, senior leaders from both Qatar and Saudi Arabia took part in the tournament’s opening ceremony and attended matches. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s seat next to FIFA President Gianni Infantino on the ceremony stage was no coincidence: It was a clear overture from the Qatari emir that it was time for the two countries to put the blockade, which was in effect from 2017 to 2021, behind them and start anew. Similarly, attendance at matches, and sharing of the royal box, by senior members of both Qatari and Saudi ruling families is a sign that the countries are looking forward.

At a more grassroots level, under a program established for the tournament, Qatari families are hosting fans, which has enabled them to reconnect with families, friends, and colleagues. Many Qataris are hosting multigenerational Saudi families, solidifying deep connections based on their time together and shared experiences attending matches. To ease congestion on roads and infrastructure during the World Cup, Qatar closed its schools, meaning that Qatari children are home and likely spending significant time with their guests—meaning the connections they build are likely to result in future communication and travel between the two countries.

DECEMBER 2, 2022 | 1:02 PM WASHINGTON | 9:02 PM QATAR

Saudi Arabia lost at the 2022 World Cup. But its sports sector is winning.

The Saudi Arabia versus Argentina match during the 2022 World Cup resulted in one of the biggest upsets in Argentina’s history, with the two-time champions experiencing its first defeat in thirty-six matches. The day of the November 22 match, Saudi ministries, government agencies, schools, and universities were directed to end working hours early so that people could watch the game. After Saudi Arabia’s victory, King Salman declared the next day a national holiday.

The Saudi victory brought euphoria not just to Saudis but also the entire region, with social media users from other Arab countries sharing videos of their reactions to the Saudi national team victory. As journalist Sarah Dadouch put it: “The Arab world in particular witnessed a rare moment of shared ecstasy.”

The outcome of the game was not a coincidence. As Saudi Sports Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Turki Al Faisal stated, the team had been preparing for that moment for three years. The ministry’s significant efforts to promote and support soccer reflects its overall direction and goals.

The sports sector is one of the vital pillars of Saudi Vision 2030 and the Ministry of Sport’s dedication is tangible in Saudi Arabia, where one can witness the enhanced facilities and increased citizen participation in sports. This change did not occur overnight, and it is partly the result of the widespread public support for sports and entertainment and a desire to compete at the international level.

—Lujain Alotaibi is a project coordinator at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. Follow her on Twitter: @LM_Otaibi.

MENASource

Dec 2, 2022

Saudi Arabia lost at the 2022 World Cup. But its sports sector is winning.

By Lujain Alotaibi

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

NOVEMBER 25, 2022 | 9:08 PM WASHINGTON | 5:08 AM QATAR

The ties that bind the US and England

The relationship between the United States and England is uniquely close; it’s appropriate, perhaps, that the two teams drew when they played in Qatar. The connections are very strong: Nine of the twenty-six-man US squad play in UK leagues, the same number that play in the United States (the remainder play in Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey). Some even play in the same club teams.

It goes deeper. US defenders Antonee Robinson and Cameron Carter-Vickers were born and raised in England. Midfielder Yunus Musah lived in England in his teenage years, went through Arsenal’s players’ academy, and even played for the English youth national team—before making the decision to play for the United States. “It was very difficult because, as I’ve said, I had such a great time in England. They did a lot for me in that country,” he said recently. The United States “obviously took one of ours, which we weren’t very happy about,” said England coach Gareth Southgate laconically earlier this week.

Friday’s draw means England has yet to beat the United States in the World Cup. They have played only three times at that level, and the United States won the first encounter in 1950, shocking the world’s oldest footballing nation; the second and now the third were draws.

—Andrew Marshall is the senior vice president of engagement at the Atlantic Council.

NOVEMBER 23, 2022 | 1:24 PM WASHINGTON | 9:24 PM QATAR

A World Cup for all Arabs, but…

By Sarah Zaaimi

Qatar and its leadership are aggressively branding the 2022 World Cup as an event for all Arab countries: The first event of the sport hosted by an Arab and Muslim-majority country, they claim. The rest of the Arab states, however, may feel differently about such a statement, given the contentious nature of pan-Arabist discourse in an undeniably racially, religiously, and linguistically hybrid region and Qatar’s interventionist records in many regional conflicts.

The ongoing World Cup actively included contributions and elements from across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Moroccan artist RedOne produced the official music and designed the launching event; the official cup balls were created in Egypt; and Arabs from various countries are providing security for the event, sculpting the iconic globe trophy, or participating in the dozens of artistic performances on the agenda. Doha is also a hub for Arab expatriates who constitute a core component of Qatar’s workforce, operating primarily in the government, media, business, and hospitality industries. Despite their tremendous contributions, these migrants possess no pathway toward Qatari citizenship, according to the laws in place.

Beyond the buoyant façade reflected at the launching event, where Arab leaders from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan came together to celebrate the kick-off of the World Cup, many structural differences persist between the MENA brothers. It is essentialist and reductionist to label all countries with Arabic-speaking majorities or Arab cultural elements as “Arab.” The region is much more complex and has undergone serious revisionist identity quests since the pan-Arab ideology of the fifties and sixties. For example, countries like Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, with significant Amazigh communities, find it insulting to be reduced to one component of their complex and multi-layered heritage. Other communities in the region must feel the same, like Kurds, Assyrians, Nubians, etc.

On the political front, Qatar, in its pursuit to widen its geostrategic reach and overcome its “small state syndrome” ended up upsetting many fellow MENA countries. The healing process from the schism with other Gulf Cooperation Countries hasn’t been completed yet, especially with the UAE. Qatar’s financial and ideological meddling in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is still fresh in the memories of the citizens of these countries. At the same time, Al-Jazeera and Qatari media continue to upset multiple MENA regimes and undermine the territorial integrity of certain sovereign states. A World Cup for all Arabs, yes, but…

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 12:03 PM WASHINGTON | 8:03 PM QATAR

Money talks. And Saudi Arabia’s World Cup squad was screaming today.

By Hezha Barzani

Saudi Arabia just defeated one of the World Cup favorites—Lionel Messi led Argentina, with the Saudis breaking the third-highest ranked FIFA team’s thirty-six game unbeaten streak. This game is already being regarded as one of the most shocking upsets in World Cup history, but it is also just one piece of an enormous economic and cultural focus placed recently on the sport by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Last year a Saudi Arabia-led consortium, led by the Saudi sovereign wealth fund (the Public Investment Fund), purchased Newcastle United for over £300 million (over $405 million). This purchase was significant from an economic standpoint, as Saudi Arabia joined Gulf neighbors Qatar (ownership ties with Paris-Saint Germain) and the United Arab Emirates (ownership ties with Manchester City) in the lucrative European soccer investment arena. This purchase also aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, which includes revamping the nation’s tourism sector and branding the Kingdom as a “football loving nation.” In addition to the massive purchase of Newcastle United, it is clear that economically, Saudi Arabia has long-term commitments to the sport, with its sovereign wealth fund recently announcing more than two billion dollars in soccer sponsorship deals.

A large portion of these deals involves the development of Saudi Arabia’s domestic soccer clubs. From a cultural perspective, Saudi Arabia getting involved in European soccer will have a profound impact on the Saudi youth population and overall development of their soccer talent. With the Cup being played in neighboring Qatar, Saudi soccer academies are expecting an enrollment spike, while the government is simultaneously promoting more physical activity, showcasing how the Kingdom is laying plans for long-term international success.

With Saudi Arabia bidding to co-host the 2030 World Cup, it is making a strong play to become the capital of the soccer world in the Middle East. This decisive win against Argentina further cements its claim, but only time will tell if this victory was luck or the first sign of an emerging soccer powerhouse—thanks to the government’s economic and cultural investment.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 10:18 AM WASHINGTON | 6:18 PM QATAR

How China stands to win from Western attacks on Qatar

By Ahmed Aboudouh

Western media has launched a campaign to criticize World Cup host Qatar for its abhorrent record on LGBTQ+ rights and migrant labor, mainly of Asian origin. While justified, the campaign has been widely castigated as selective, hypocritical, and indicative of a double standard. China has found a chance to exploit this apparent Western grudge against the first Arab and Muslim country to host the World Cup. In addition to a Chinese construction company building Lusail Stadium, which will host the World Cup final, other firms supplied the tournament with everything “made in China”—from LED big screens, a solar power plant, and clean energy shuttle vehicles, to flags and throw pillows.

China knows how this feels. It has been chastened in the past while hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics with diplomatic boycotts and a similar media crusade for its “genocide” against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. There is no doubt that the reasoning behind such campaigns is entirely just. But going soft on hosts with even worse human rights records, as was the case with Russia in 2018, while scolding Qatar is mindboggling.

These kinds of media campaigns can be self-harming at best for two reasons. First, they signal that Western countries, especially Europeans, will seek to maintain hegemony over soccer by wielding prejudice. Second, they encourage China (and other rivals) to score geopolitical points by doubling down on smaller countries’ grievances toward those over-the-top media offensives and positioning China as a viable alternative and trusted leader of the Global South. Years of backbreaking diplomatic work to confront China’s soft power expansion in the Middle East is now at risk.

— Ahmed Aboudouh is a nonresident fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and a senior journalist covering world affairs at the Independent newspaper in London.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 8:39 AM WASHINGTON | 4:39 PM QATAR

Watch for the Iran team’s small acts of defiance to continue

By Masoud Mostajabi

In the history of the World Cup, Iran has qualified a total of six times—five under the Islamic Republic. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranians across the globe have agreed on little. But when it has come to supporting Team Melli (“the nation’s team”), all have cheered—until now. At the 2018 Cup, Iran’s win over Morocco provoked celebration among the likes of exiles and diaspora communities, then Islamic Republic President Hassan Rouhani, and former heir apparent to the throne Reza Pahlavi—an outpouring stemming from a shared membership in a national family.

However, for the first time in memory, this year many Iranians have soured on the team, thanks in large part to Team Melli’s meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi before traveling to Qatar—which came amid the deadly crackdowns by Raisi’s security services against protesters. The team’s silent protest by refusing to sing the national anthem on Monday was widely seen as too little too late. Iranians expect more from a team they consider a representative of the people. In a country losing its youth, a loss or win in a tournament is meaningless. Unlike most fans enjoying the games, Iranians are in mourning.

However, these players are themselves part of this generation of youth, having grown up watching heroes such as Ali Daei and Ali Karimi, vocal supporters of today’s protests. Many of the players have commented in support of the protestors, changed their social media profile photo to black, or covered up the national emblem. It’s early in the tournament, so the world can watch for these small acts of defiance to continue—with Friday’s match against Wales the next major opportunity.

—Masoud Mostajabi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter @MMostajabi1.

NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 10:22 AM WASHINGTON | 6:55 PM QATAR

Why Iran’s subtle stance is being seen as “meaningless”

By Holly Dagres

Since antigovernment protests began in Iran on September 16 after Mahsa Jina Amini was murdered by so-called “morality police,” many Iranian athletes competing in international competitions have taken clear stances that show solidarity with the protesters. But one group of athletes that has disappointed Iranians is Team Melli, the Iranian men’s national soccer team. Except for heaving worn black jackets over their kits during a World Cup friendly with Senegal on September 27, Team Melli has not taken a notable stance.

However, what has caught the attention of many Iranians is that Team Melli met with hardline President Ebrahim Raisi last week and took celebratory photos of their World Cup entry. Photographs of both incidents have gone viral, and not for a good reason, as these events took place while protesters were being fatally beaten with batons or shot by security forces. As a result, many Iranians see Team Melli not as their team, but rather as the team of the Islamic Republic. This was best captured by a banner hanging over a bridge in Tehran that read “don’t let your foot slip on the blood,” referring to the blood of both protesters slain since September 16 and those being killed by security forces while the match between England and Iran took place. Right before the game began, Team Melli finally took a subtle stance by remaining silent during the Islamic Republic’s anthem. While their silence and stony faces may seem significant to an outsider, it’s a belated gesture that many Iranians interpret as meaningless given how little Team Melli has done to show solidarity with their international platform.

—Holly Dagres is editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs. She also curates The Iranist newsletter. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

NOVEMBER 20, 2022 | 4:15 PM WASHINGTON | NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 12:15 AM QATAR

Focus on Qatar’s human-rights record is justified—but why have other hosts been left unscathed?

By Joze Pelayo

Despite the loud beats of FIFA anthem “Tukoh Taka,” World Cup watchers can still clearly hear the outrage against Qatar.

The significance of the first World Cup in the Arab world has been overshadowed by legitimate criticism about the country’s track record on minority rights and treatment of migrant workers. Serious abuses need to be addressed.

But Western coverage so far has been based on double standards and selective outrage; were the calls for a boycott of Russia’s World Cup in 2018 and the Beijing Olympics in 2022 this loud? The Biden administration had announced a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing event due to China’s ongoing genocide against Uyghurs. Russia used its 2018 World Cup, and also its 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, to sportswash and distract the world from Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Crimea—a prelude to today’s invasion—and the Russian leader’s increasingly imperialistic ambitions. Where was the outrage from European critics then?

Qatar is the first Arab and Muslim-majority country to host the World Cup—so one wonders whether that is the variable that makes Qatar the target of critical countries. Or, will countries critical of Qatar this year similarly scrutinize the 2026 host countries—Canada, the United States, and Mexico—regarding migrants’ rights?

Qatar’s mistreatment of predominantly South Asian workers is deplorable, and criticism is justified. But the selective outrage shown mainly from some countries in Europe is also borderline arrogant and racist.

On a brighter note, the United States’ Nicki Minaj, Colombia’s Maluma, and Lebanon’s Myriam Fares are bringing the Arab-Latin relationship and a shared passion for soccer to a new level with “Tukoh Taka,” which features English, Spanish, and Arabic lyrics. The song briefly reached number one in iTunes in the United States, making it the highest-charting FIFA World Cup song ever—and Fares the first Arab artist to reach such a spot in the United States.

—Joze Pelayo is an assistant director at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative/Middle East Programs.

The post Offside: Watch the World Cup alongside the Atlantic Council appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia defends ‘traditional values,’ criminalizes LGBTQ ‘propaganda’

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 18 Nov 2022 16:43:52 +0000

Poland and NATO say missile hit that killed two Polish citizens was not an “attack”

On November 15, a missile hit Polish village Przewodów in Lubelskie Voivodeship, located about five kilometers away from the border with Ukraine. The missile struck a grain drying and sorting center around 3:40pm local time; two Polish citizens were killed as a result of the explosion. Polish Radio Zet also reported a second explosion, which allegedly took place few hundred meters away from the village in a field and did not cause any serious damage.

Photo and video footage of the damage started to circulate in the internet within hours of the incident. Twitter users posted a video that allegedly showed the aftermath of an explosion in Przewodów, and the New York Times geolocated the place from where the video was filmed. Lubiehrubie.pl website published photos depicting a wide crater, a damaged tractor, and missile debris, which @projectowlosint geolocated as the same location.

Explosion at Przewodów, Poland
50.474590, 23.923253
GM: https://t.co/Q1PknnpSgE

Geolocated by the team at @projectowlosint
Painted by @fdov21

Sources and pictures from:https://t.co/U5iqDqZjUP https://t.co/nyStIeqnoq pic.twitter.com/rBjRAxNskX
— fdov (@fdov21) November 15, 2022

Ukraine Weapons Tracker and other OSINT weapons researchers wrote on Twitter that a visual analysis of missile fragments indicated that they belonged to Ukrainian S-300 surface-to-air missile system designed to combat air targets and tactical ballistic missiles. Kyiv Independent reporter Illia Ponomarenko tweeted that Russia tried to destroy the Dobrotvirska power plant in Western Ukraine, but a Ukrainian air defense missile unfortunately failed to self-destruct before crashing in Polish territory.

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1592629251161075712

Following the incident, Polish President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki called an emergency meeting with the government’s national security and defense affairs committee. Officials stated after the meeting they were considering if there were grounds to launch the Article 4 procedure of NATO Treaty. Poland also increased the combat readiness of some military units and the security services. Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying a “Russian-made missile” hit Poland, and the ministry had summoned the Russian ambassador to Poland to provide a “detailed explanation” about the incident. However, Russia’s Ministry of Defense vehemently denied that Poland was hit by Russian missile and argued that Russia launched high-precision attacks “only at the targets located in Ukraine and no closer than 35 kilometers from the Ukrainian–Polish border.”

Despite mounting evidence suggesting the missile was a Ukrainian defensive weapon, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy argued that he was convinced that the munition was a Russian missile, based on reports he received from the command of Armed Forces of Ukraine. He assessed it as “a Russian missile attack on collective security” and “a very significant escalation.” By November 17, however, Zelenskyy softened his position while insisting, “We can’t say specifically that this was the air defense of Ukraine.” Poland and Ukraine also announced a joint investigation of the explosion site with participation of Ukrainian experts.

That same day, Jakub Kumoch, secretary of state in the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, noted there were many indications that a Ukrainian air defense missile had targeted an incoming Russian missile but missed, falling on Polish territory after failing to self-destruct. Polish government spokesman Piotr Müller added that materials collected by Poland indicated that the explosion was the result of Ukraine attempting to defend itself from a Russian missile attack. According to Ukrainian authorities, Russia fired 100 missiles on November 15, making it the largest missile attack in a single day since the war began in February.

Tomasz Szatkowski, Polish ambassador to NATO, reported that NATO radar systems had tracked the missile. CNN also reported that NATO patrolling aircraft flying in Polish airspace also tracked the missile. This triggered a discussion whether NATO anti-missile defense systems could have neutralized it before it hit Poland, but NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, the missile “didn’t have the characteristics of a deliberate attack against NATO territory,” and that NATO air defense systems are set up to defend against attacks.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian attacks target critical infrastructure

On November 15, Russian armed forces expanded its missile and air attacks, as Ukrainian air defense were activated in Zhytomyr, Khmelnytsky, and Vinnytsia, among other cities. As noted previously, Russian forces launched about 100 missiles, including Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles, at critical infrastructure targets across Ukraine. The attacks are the latest in a series that have knocked out electricity in parts of the country, with the European Commission noting that Ukrainian energy infrastructure had reached a “critical point.”

On November 17, Russian missile attacks were reported in Kyiv oblast, as well as Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipro. According to Ukraine’s head of the Donetsk regional military administration, 60 percent of Bakhmut’s infrastructure is damaged or destroyed, and only one of the sixteen schools local authorities have rebuilt in the city since 2019 remained intact.

Meanwhile, in Russian-occupied Dzhankoi, the Russian air defense systems were activated late on the evening of November 16. The reports indicate a possible strike on a military airfield near the city, located in northern Crimea. Ukrainian shelling was reported by Russian accounts on the night of November 17 in Belgorod and Belaya Berezka, Bryansk oblast. A drone reportedly exploded at a substation near Feodosia, Crimea. According to Russian reports, the Ukrainian army launched the drone and unsuccessfully targeted a power facility.

Lastly, Donetsk People’s Republic military commander Aleksandr Khodakovsky said that Russian forces had planned to attack the area around Vuhledar from at least two directions, but he and other officers realized that the poor training of newly arrived troops and their inability to contact brigade commanders made such plans impossible. According to Khodakovsky, the brigade commanders changed plans and committed the forces to attack Pavlivka, which was taken on November 14.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia defends “traditional values” as a national security matter, criminalizes LGBTQ “propaganda”

On November 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive order enacting “The Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values.”

The presidential decree states that “Russian traditional values” are the matter of the national security. It defines seventeen principles:

“Life, dignity, human rights and freedoms, patriotism, civic consciousness, service to the homeland and responsibility for its fate, high moral ideals, strong family, constructive work, prioritization of the spiritual over the material, humanism, mercifulness, fairness, collectivism, mutual assistance and respect, historical memory and continuity of generations, unity of the peoples of Russia.”

According to the decree, the leading threats to traditional values include “terrorist and extremist organizations, certain mass media and mass communications, activities of the United States and other unfriendly countries, a number of transnational corporations and foreign non-profit organizations, as well as certain organizations and individuals in Russia.” It further notes that the destruction of traditional Russian family with “the propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” has caused negative ideological and psychological impacts among the Russian populace. The Kremlin plans to counter these “threats” through educational reform, as well as working with youth and media outlets, among other measures.

According to Russian publicist Boris Yakemenko, the Russian constitution does not include an article on official state ideology, so the latest presidential decree is likely a first step towards “formation of the country’s ideology.”

The decree comes in the wake of Russian lawmakers unanimously passing a legislative amendment regarding “the prohibition of propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations.” A previous version of the anti-LGBTQ law banned the spread of “gay propaganda” to minors; the amendment expands the prohibition to all age groups. The restriction applies to advertisements, movies, and other media. People found guilty of violating the ban face a fine of 400,000 rubles (USD $6,600) while legal entities could be penalized upwards of five million rubles (USD $82,000).

Russia has already targeted individuals and entities for “propagating non-traditional sexual values.” Some of the latest instances include opening three cases against TikTok, as well as investigating controversial Russian TV personality Ksenia Sobchak.

Over the summer, Russia revealed plans to construct an online surveillance system that could hunt down “homosexual propaganda,” among other “prohibited data.” In addition, Runiversalis – the Russian analog of the internet encyclopedia Wikipedia – announced that it will not allow “homosexual propaganda” on its platform.

Russia has long attempted to justify its efforts to defend Russian “traditional values” against Western values, employing the narrative to justify and whitewash its invasion of Ukraine.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian anti-war groups launch petition to demobilize

Sixteen anti-war groups in Russia launched a petition demanding that Vladimir Putin demobilize all recently mobilized Russian men. At the time of writing, the petition had gained more than 40,000 signatories.

Additionally, a group of mothers of disabled children asked Putin to exempt their husbands from mobilization in a video posted to YouTube.

In Astrakhan, the regional governor reported that a group of mobilized men had returned home on the grounds that their families were raising three or more children.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Ukrainian forces discovere “torture chamber” in Kherson as signs for torture emerge in Kupianks-Vuzlovyi

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) announced on November 16 it has discovered another “torture chamber” allegedly used by Russian forces during the occupation of Kherson. According to the SBU report, Kherson residents were interrogated and tortured at the location. The SBU also added that law enforcement officers found evidence that directly indicated signs of torture during the inspection of the chamber. The report has not been independently verified.

Meanwhile, the bodies of four civilians exhibiting signs of torture were found in Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, Kharkiv oblast. The settlement was liberated by Ukrainian forces back in September.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Czech Republic will train Ukrainian soldiers as Israel gives “green light” for systems to Ukraine

The Czech Republic plans to train around 4,000 Ukrainian soldiers next year, Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced in a statement. The training program will begin with an initial batch of troops before the end of 2022 and will eventually be incorporated into the planned European Union training scheme for Ukraine, in which EU foreign ministers agreed to create a mission to train around 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers. The Czech Republic will also send fifty-five soldiers as instructors or members of command structures. Bulgaria will train military orderlies under the same program.

Meanwhile, as the US reportedly runs low on certain high-end weapons systems and ammunition available for transfer to Kyiv, Israel announced that it had given NATO member states permission to deliver Ukraine military systems that include Israeli components. It also agreed to purchase “strategic materials” for Ukraine’s armed forces.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Russia defends ‘traditional values,’ criminalizes LGBTQ ‘propaganda’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kherson euphoria highlights the folly of a premature peace with Putin

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 17 Nov 2022 14:26:51 +0000

Last week’s liberation of Kherson produced some of the most iconic scenes since the beginning of the Russian invasion. The arrival of Ukrainian troops in the city sparked wild celebrations from a civilian population brutalized by eight months of Russian occupation. “This is what liberation looks like. This is what liberation feels like,” commented CNN’s Nic Robertson in one of many memorable reports from the city. Sky News correspondent Alex Rossi described the atmosphere as “euphoric” as he was mobbed by joyous locals cheering Russia’s retreat.

Despite harsh conditions and a lack of basic amenities in Kherson, the party began almost as soon as news of the Russian military withdrawal was confirmed. Speaking to AFP, one Kherson resident summed up the mood in the liberated city. “We have no electricity, no water, no heating, no mobile or internet connection. But we have no Russians! I am extremely happy. We can survive anything but we are free.”

This footage should be compulsory viewing for anyone who still believes in the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Putin’s Russia. Despite overwhelming evidence of the Kremlin’s genocidal agenda in Ukraine, opinion pieces continue to appear with depressing regularity in the international media arguing that the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to pressure the country into peace talks.

The authors of such articles typically acknowledge Russia’s criminality before emphasizing the alleged inevitability of compromise. The wave of emotion that swept Kherson following the city’s liberation is a timely reminder for advocates of appeasement that compromising with the Kremlin actually means condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of Russian occupation.

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At this point, it is no longer possible for any honest observer to deny knowledge of Russian war crimes in occupied Ukraine. In every single liberated region of the country, Ukrainian forces have encountered the same grim revelations of mass graves and torture chambers along with accounts of abductions, executions, sexual violence, and forced deportations involving millions of victims.

Meanwhile, the methodical Russian bombardment of cities such as Mariupol is believed to have killed tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians. Attempts to document these atrocities are still at an early stage, but United Nations inspectors have already confirmed that Russia has committed war crimes against the Ukrainian civilian population.

Russian occupation forces have also made no secret of their desire to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity. Wherever the Kremlin has established control, the Ukrainian language has been suppressed and the Ukrainian currency phased out. Access to Ukrainian media has been blocked. Teachers have been brought in from Russia to indoctrinate Ukrainian schoolchildren. At the same time, Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have explicitly declared their intention to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and proclaimed their genocidal denial of Ukraine’s right to exist. This is the ghoulish reality that so-called foreign policy realists believe Ukraine must be made to accept.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia currently occupies around 20% of Ukraine. Any peace agreement reached in the near future would inevitably involve ceding some or all of this territory to Moscow for an indefinite period. Millions of Ukrainians would then face a desperate future. Many would make the agonizing choice to flee their homes for free Ukraine, leaving behind their former lives and worldly possessions. Those who remained would be forced to adopt a Russian imperial identity or risk savage repression if they continued to resist.

Despite the risks involved, resistance would likely continue. The outpouring of emotion in liberated Kherson highlighted the strength of Ukrainian national feeling in occupied areas of the country and made a mockery of the idea that Moscow enjoys the support of the local population. Just weeks before Putin’s troops retreated from Kherson, the Kremlin claimed 87% of residents had voted in favor of joining Russia. The widespread public jubilation that greeted Russia’s withdrawal vividly illustrated the absurdity of that figure.

Nor is it clear exactly what everyone is so afraid of. Ukraine has already shattered the myth of Russia’s military invincibility and has successfully liberated more than half the territory occupied since the invasion began nearly nine months ago. Putin’s once vaunted army is demoralized and decimated, while the Russian dictator himself is an international pariah. His energy weapon has been partially disarmed and he has recently been forced to distance himself from earlier attempts at nuclear blackmail following rebukes from China and stern warnings from the United States. It makes no strategic sense whatsoever to offer Putin a face-saving peace deal at this point.

For now, there is little public indication that Western leaders are listening to calls for a return to negotiations. Instead, they remain insistent that any decision to resume diplomatic efforts can only be made by Ukraine. However, as the war drags on and the economic costs for Ukraine’s partners continue to mount, the voices currently pushing for Ukrainian concessions will grow louder.

As the war enters a potentially decisive period, it is vital to keep in mind that any compromise would come with crippling costs. For Ukraine, it would mean betraying and abandoning millions of citizens. For Western leaders, it would mean empowering Putin while sacrificing the foundational values of the democratic world. The problems posed by an aggressive and revisionist Russia would be unresolved, but the West’s position would be significantly weaker.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. Their country has been devastated by Russia’s invasion and their population left deeply traumatized. Thousands have been killed and millions have been forced to flee. Nevertheless, Ukrainians also understand that Putin must be defeated before peace can return to Europe. All they ask for is the continued support of their international partners. One way to demonstrate this support is by ending unhelpful appeals for a premature peace.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Although there were no legal grounds for the removal of Catherine, her continued presence often sparked political conflicts within Odesa society and on the national stage. This tension reflected growing demands to reassess the nature of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia as a new generation of Ukrainians increasingly questioned the imperial dogmas established by centuries of Czarist and Soviet official histories.

Many also objected specifically to Catherine and pointed to her personal role as a key figure in the subjugation of Ukraine. While the Russian empress is known internationally as Catherine the Great, significant numbers of Ukrainians object to this title and regard her instead as a notorious tyrant. They note that Catherine extinguished the broad autonomy of the Ukrainian Cossacks and oversaw the aggressive colonization of Ukraine.

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Catherine’s eighteenth century reign is closely associated with the imperial myths that now serve as historical justification for Vladimir Putin’s campaign to reconquer Ukraine and destroy Ukrainian statehood. Under Catherine, Russian imperial power expanded into southern Ukraine and Crimea, with the Czarist authorities posing as pioneers and founders of towns and cities such as Odesa that in reality had already existed in one form or another for centuries.

It was during this period that Catherine’s favorite, Grigory Potemkin, is said to have erected the infamous “Potemkin Villages” along the banks of Ukraine’s Dnipro River in order to create the false impression of a prosperous and happy colony for the visiting empress. Some historians now believe the legend of the Potemkin Villages may itself be a fabrication, but critics of Catherine nevertheless see it as fitting that her oppressive conquest of Ukraine is associated with one of history’s most notorious political deceptions. To them, she is anything but “great.”

Despite this challenging legacy, Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument was broadly popular among residents of the Black Sea port city until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022. This popularity was not based on support for her actions against Ukrainian statehood or Cossack autonomy; instead, Catherine served as a symbol of the imperial identity that many in Odesa embraced following the Soviet collapse. She embodied the sense of pride Odesites felt over the prominent place occupied by their hometown in Russian imperial history.

Attitudes have changed dramatically since February 24. The shock and trauma of Russia’s invasion has convinced many Odesites to abandon their previous enthusiasm for the city’s Russian imperial heritage and has sparked a surge in public demands for the removal of Catherine.

It is not hard to see why. From the early days of the invasion, it has been clear that Odesa is one of the Russian army’s primary objectives. The city’s port has been blockaded by the Russian Black Sea fleet, with the nearby coastline fortified in anticipation of a possible Russian amphibious landing. Inside the city itself, Odesites have grown used to the daily terror of missile airstrikes and kamikaze drone attacks.

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For Putin, Odesa has enormous strategic and symbolic importance. Capturing the port city would allow him to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea altogether and strangle the Ukrainian economy. Most analysts agree that without Odesa, Ukraine would no longer be economically viable as an independent state. The city could also serve as an excellent launch pad for the Russian occupation of Moldova.

Odesa’s place in the Russian imagination also makes it a particularly valuable prize. Many of Putin’s compatriots view Odesa as a sacred Russian city and bitterly resent its present status as the southern capital of independent Ukraine. They regard Odesa as even more deeply entwined in Russian national identity than Crimea or Kyiv and sincerely believe the city’s return to Kremlin rule would help correct the injustice of the post-Soviet settlement.

Crucially, Putin has harked back to Catherine the Great in his attempts to provide historical justification for the invasion of Ukraine and the capture of Odesa. Likewise, Kremlin officials and regime proxies have actively revived the term “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”), which was coined during Catherine’s reign to refer to her imperial possessions in southern Ukraine. In areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces, Catherine’s legacy has been used to legitimize the Kremlin’s claims. This is part of a conscious attempt to change the optics of the invasion and portray Russia as liberator rather than an aggressor.

Unfortunately for Putin, Odesites have shown little interest in being liberated by him or his soldiers. On the contrary, they have rallied to the defense of their city and have loudly condemned the Russian invasion. One of the many ways in which Odesites have expressed their opposition to Russia’s imperial aggression is by demanding the removal of the city’s Catherine the Great monument.

The Odesa authorities were initially hesitant to bow to public pressure, with Odesa City Council refusing in September to support a proposal to dismantle the Catherine monument. However, following an online public vote, Odesa Mayor Hennadiy Truhanov announced on November 5 that he would now back calls for the removal of the statue. On day later, the monument was fenced in and a notice from the municipal authorities appeared announcing that it would soon be dismantled.

Skeptics caution that the saga of Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument may still be far from over and warn that recent steps could simply be a stalling tactic to ease tensions and prevent further embarrassing acts of vandalism. However, the symbolism of Odesa’s boarded up Russian empress is already undeniable and reflects the city’s decisive turn away from the imperial myth-making that Putin has tried so hard to exploit.

The Kremlin has sought to win Odesites over with a highly sanitized and largely mythical version of history, but Moscow’s appeals to imperial nostalgia have clearly fallen flat. While Putin’s Russia remains trapped in the past, today’s Ukraine is building its identity around a compelling vision of the country’s future as an increasingly self-confident European democracy. This has proved far more persuasive to Odesites than the authoritarianism, isolation, and endless aggression offered by the Putin regime.

For decades, Odesa was arguably Ukraine’s most Russophile city. However, the current invasion has made Russia so toxic that even formerly sympathetic Odesites no longer want anything to do with Moscow’s imperial agenda. Putin claims to be waging war in order to return “historic Russian lands,” but in reality he has only succeeded in convincing Ukrainians that there is no place for Russia in their country’s future, and no place for Russian Empress Catherine the Great in a free Odesa.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

In a March 2022 resolution, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva agreed to establish a commission to investigate violations committed during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A subsequent resolution examined the deteriorating human rights situation in Ukraine stemming from the invasion. This led to a report by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine addressing events during late February and March 2022 in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions of northern Ukraine.

Evidence continues to mount indicating tens of thousands of war crimes committed by Russian forces acting under command responsibility, as distinct from occasional rogue elements. This evidence includes official statements, actions, and systemic politically-driven campaigns with clear genocidal intent, including widespread ethnic cleansing, deportations, and repeated large-scale missile and artillery targeting of civilian populations and vital civilian infrastructure.

For a comparatively minor territorial gain, Putin has sacrificed Russia’s reputation and socio-economic well-being. Even worse, the ricochet effects have also surged around the world creating food and energy insecurity, escalating inflation, and widespread impoverishment. There would never have been a good time for such willful misadventure, but coming in the wake of the Covid pandemic, the timing could hardly be worse.

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The increasing mendacity of the Putin regime is now so severe that members of the elite cannot even trust each other, with key figures close to the Kremlin engaging in public attacks on the leadership of the Russian military. As battlefield failure and international isolation continue to erode Putin’s authority, his entire model of government is now under threat. Russia’s prospects today are the dimmest they have been since World War II, with a range of possible dangers now emerging including deepening internal divisions and the potential collapse of the country.

While it is important to rule out any interference in the internal governance of the Russian Federation, the West can and should call for full compliance with Russia’s international obligations to defend the human rights and legitimate aspirations of Russian citizens. At this stage, the inclusion of Russian local governments and municipalities in the global effort to tackle climate change and pandemic recovery could be an opener to the de-concentration or leveling of power. When President Trump pulled the US out of the Paris Accord on Climate Change, several US states and municipalities strengthened their commitment to it.

We may already be witnessing the early warning signs of a degradation in the Russian state as sanctions and military defeats take their toll and warlords like Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov openly question Putin’s leadership of the war. Members of the Russian elite need to take stock of this decline and move beyond today’s misguided imperialism with a view to harnessing the energies of Russian society and thoroughly reforming the country’s institutions.

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The real Russia is deeper and richer than today’s stolen billions in assets and the forfeited lives from Putin’s genocidal wars against the country’s neighbors. The real Russia, including its repressed civil society and talented Russian communities around the globe, can strive to optimize broad-based outcomes that uplift the people of Russia and enhance their lives whilst restoring international partnerships and global respect. This will only be possible through the openness, transparency, and accountability of elected leaders divorced from the power of money, media, and mania. Multiple networks of Russians abroad need to coalesce around a reform agenda that looks to a post-Putin Russia and ushers in a new era of benign leadership that puts the well-being of the Russian people before the narrow predatory interests of the country’s current kleptocratic leadership.

The international community should therefore focus their attention and resources not only on enabling Ukraine to win the war but also to encourage a process of reconciliation and convergence that unites all the various and often conflicting elements of the Russian opposition both internally and in the diaspora. This would not be unprecedented. It was the unifying of the Serbian opposition that led to the overthrow of Milosevic regime.

A recognition of the dilemmas and internal stresses that Russia is facing, as distinct from but in addition to the harm caused to Ukraine and the world at large, warrants attention at the forthcoming G20 summit. The stifling of civil society and dissent has deprived the people of Russia of their rightful freedom of expression. Despite various Russian opinion polls indicating majority support for the invasion of Ukraine, this cannot be credibly authenticated. By its behavior and utterances alone, the Kremlin has disqualified itself from international relations. It is time for world leaders to acknowledge that a change of tack in Moscow is essential.

In order to advance toward the goal of peace, the international community must act to help empower alternative Russian voices. The global networks, institutions, and methods that can enable capacity for mediation and negotiation in conflicts around the world, are a vital resource to foster engagement with Russian civil society, which is largely silenced internally but not abroad, and can also be approached virtually at the local level. Getting Russian civil society to converge on peaceful alternatives and a different narrative than the Kremlin’s is the key to de-concentrating political power in Russia and incubating real participatory reform. It may also be the best way to achieve a sustainable peace.

Ambassador Francis M. O’Donnell (Ret.) is the former UN Representative in Ukraine (2004-2009)

That defiant spirit was on abundant display on October 18 at the Kennedy Center during a well-attended benefit concert for Ukraine. It was organized by the Chopivsky Family Foundation and featured the New Era Orchestra of Kyiv together with the celebrated violinist Joshua Bell. The New Era Orchestra, which was founded in 2007 by its artistic director Tatiana Kalinichenko, reunited at the Kennedy Center after being dislocated by the Russian attack on Ukraine. It is the foremost chamber ensemble in Ukraine (similar in size to the Chamber Orchestra of Europe) with all its musicians under the age of 42. It has performed with stars such as Sarah Chang and at the “Septembre Musical Montreux-Vevey” in Switzerland. But the orchestra’s closest association is with Bell, who has performed three times together with the ensemble in Ukraine.

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The program itself was astutely selected by maestro Kalinichenko. It opened with Beethoven’s seventh symphony, which he composed at the Bohemian spa Teplitz and which Richard Wagner called the “apotheosis of the dance.” As Ukrainian Ambassador Oksana Markarova noted in her introductory remarks at the Kennedy Center, the work has special significance for Ukraine today. It was premiered by Beethoven in 1813 in Vienna at a benefit concert for Austrian and Bavarian soldiers who had been wounded at the battle of Hanau during one of Napoleon’s last victories.

Beethoven, who, like a number of his compatriots, initially admired Napoleon as a revolutionary only to become disillusioned with him, saw himself as something of a freedom fighter in the cultural sphere. In his letters to his music publisher, he even puckishly referred to himself as a “Generalissimo.” In places, the seventh symphony has a martial aspect to it. Beethoven, for example, really lets it rip in the final fourth movement as the tympani pounds away right at the outset. It was a real pleasure to hear the New Era Orchestra play it with such verve and vigor.

Beethoven symphonies are often played by larger ensembles, but the smaller scale of the New Era Orchestra meant that it was possible to hear the interplay between the various orchestral sections quite distinctly, in particular the fine performance of the woodwind section which Kalinichenko drew out well. Beethoven’s optimistic spirit and his quest for liberty and independence were unmistakable throughout. The German composer was as defiant a figure as they come, prompting the philosopher Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, after meeting him in Teplitz, to record that he was “an utterly untamed personality.” Perhaps the musicologist William Kinderman has put it best in his instructive book Beethoven: An Political Artist In Revolutionary Times: “As an antidote to cynicism, his forward-surging idealism and restless quest for insight into complexity are indispensable.”

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Two brief pieces by Ukrainian composers followed, the first by Valentyn Silvestrov entitled “Evening Serenade From Silent Music,” and Myroslav Skoryk’s “Melody.” These were no mere musical palette cleansers, but rewarding in their own right. Silvestrov’s contemplative serenade prompted thoughts of Samuel Barber’s “Adagio for Strings” and Vaughan Williams’ “A Lark Ascending.” The elegant simplicity of the work endowed it with a transcendent character.

Silvestrov, who was born in 1937 and got into hot water with the former Soviet authorities for his music and political stances, is Ukraine’s most famous living composer. Following the Russian invasion this past February, he fled to Berlin, where he continues to compose. In a recent interview with Deutsche Welle, he did not mince his words about the true nature of the Russian regime: “Who supports Putin? Criminals, people for whom mother tongue means ‘flush someone down the toilet.’ He recruited these criminals and put them in elegant suits.”

The highlight of the concert, of course, was Bell’s performance of Bruch’s Concerto No. 1 in G Minor. Whoosh! It was as though rocket fuel had been injected into the proceedings; Bell’s vigorous, dynamic playing, coupled with his sumptuous tone, propelled the orchestra itself, boosting it to another level. At times, Bell would turn around to face the orchestra, nodding vigorously and making eye contact with certain musicians, as though he was on the verge of assuming the conducting duties himself. (His eagerness to jump in reminded me of watching the legendary pianist Rudolf Serkin performing a Mozart concerto at Oberlin College and stomping his feet as he played to exhort the student orchestra to move more briskly.)

Once the concert concluded, Bell explained to the audience that he fervently hopes to play again soon with the orchestra in Ukraine itself. His admiration for the New Era Orchestra’s determination to uphold the battle for Ukrainian liberty and culture offered a moving reminder that the resistance to Russia’s criminal war isn’t faltering. It has just begun.

Jacob Heilbrunn is the editor of The National Interest. He tweets @JacobHeilbrunn.

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Ukraine has rarely been out of the news in recent years, but the headlines seldom show that the country has made significant democratic strides since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This was a watershed moment that drove Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from power for his turn away from Ukraine’s European, democratic path.

Ukrainian democracy has advanced amid occupation and continued aggression by an authoritarian neighbor who fears that Ukraine’s progress will serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia. Vladimir Putin sees democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and legitimate elections on his borders as existential threats to his own personal survival. Ukraine has come to embody all of these threats.

While Ukraine’s post-war democratic recovery and progress must indeed be multifaceted, one aspect will need particular attention: post-war elections. Competitive and honest elections are essential to democracies. For some nations, they are a means to a democratic transition. For others, they are a bellwether for the health of long-standing democratic traditions, systems, and institutions.

Ukraine’s most recent transitions of power, namely the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019 and local elections in 2020, were regarded by international observation missions as demonstrating significant progress. Moreover, these elections and the electoral reforms that preceded them were recognized by the European Parliament, Freedom House, and the annual Democracy Index produced by The Economist as core indicators of the nation’s advancement. These achievements in political pluralism further enhanced Ukraine’s standing as an example of what is possible for the region and beyond.

While Ukraine should be commended, continued vigilance is essential to ensure that the nation can sustain and even expand its success after the war. Safeguarding, institutionalizing, and expanding Ukraine’s electoral progress is pivotal to realizing the nation’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions, and is a foundational prerequisite for all other democratic reforms. Progress in this area will strengthen international confidence in Ukraine and prove that democracy is sustainable even in wartime and during the post-war recovery period.

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Ukraine must not only win the war, but also win the peace. The integrity of its post-war elections will be closely watched for a range of performance indicators such as whether lawmakers advance pending electoral reforms in a timely and inclusive manner. These reforms include enhancements to the unified election code, a new political party law, and restoration of political party financial reporting, a key condition that previously led to Ukraine-EU visa liberalization.

Attention will also be paid to the level of transparency and timeliness around transitions from military to civil administrations throughout Ukraine, and the development of a mechanism along with clear and objective criteria for canceling elections due to security concerns. Likewise, it will be crucial to make sure any restrictions on individuals and groups running in elections and joining election commissions are reasonable, objective, and timely.

Post-war Ukraine must maintain the positive progress achieved following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This includes guaranteeing stability within the country’s independent electoral institutions and making sure the election management body is able to complete its full term. New election technologies must prioritize integrity and security, while the enfranchisement of Ukraine’s internally and externally displaced communities will also be important.

Ukraine faces a torrent of elections in the post-war period. The road ahead will be arduous, but Ukraine must not go it alone. Ukraine has reminded the free world of who we are and what we believe in. It has also reminded us of what we must fight for and what we must fight against. To achieve an even stronger Europe based on the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values, Ukraine’s partners must redouble support not only for Ukraine’s military goals, but also its democratic ambitions. This increased support must happen now in order to lay strong foundations for continued democratic progress after victory.

Public trust in the foundation was evident in early October when Prytula raised more than nine million dollars in just 24 hours to purchase kamikaze drones following a series of Russian airstrikes in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Prytula had earlier demonstrated his fundraising potential during summer 2022 when he led the “People’s Bayraktar” project, a crowdfunding effort to buy three Bayraktar drones for the Ukrainian military.

When Turkish defense company Baykar offered to send the drones for free, Prytula decided to use the funds raised to buy a satellite instead. His foundation contracted one of the most advanced commercial satellite providers to help the Ukrainian military get high-resolution images of Russian formations more quickly in daylight, at night, and through cloud cover.

Prytula tells UkraineAlert that the satellite decision reflected Ukraine’s military needs. “Bayraktar is a well-known brand here in Ukraine. Many people understand how well these drones work so we thought that we could raise money for them,” he says. Indeed, Bayraktar drones have proved highly effective against Russian armor, with Ukrainians even singing wartime songs in their honor. But when Baykar said they would provide the drones free of charge, Prytula turned to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. “We had a meeting with Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov, who asked us to check on the possibility of buying a satellite. So we did.”

Ukraine’s frontline military units rely on small reconnaissance drones and satellite imagery to find and target Russian positions. But most drones are prone to Russian electrical jamming, while satellite image-sharing from Western countries often arrives too slowly to be of immediate use. According to Prytula, his foundation’s satellite can cut the image-sharing transfer time from two days to three or four hours, making it much more useful. Most importantly, the Ukrainian military controls the satellite now and can decide for itself where to look.

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While Prytula has been civically engaged since his university days, the 41-year-old spent much of his career as a TV presenter and comedian. He made his name as a Ukrainian-speaking comic on the stand-up show Comedy Club Ukraine, before hitting the big time with Ukraine’s Noviy Kanal (New Channel). Prytula earned a reputation as one of Ukraine’s most versatile comic presenters, hosting the nation’s favorite morning TV show “Wake up” and a number of game shows.

He tried his hand at politics in the 2019 parliamentary elections as a candidate for the pro-European Holos party. The elections yielded 20 seats for Holos, but at 30th on the party list, Prytula did not enter parliament. Instead, he ran for mayor of Kyiv in 2020 and came in third with eight percent of the vote. In 2021, Prytula left Holos and later announced that he would form a new political party.

When asked if he still has plans to create a political party of his own, Prytula’s tone hardens. “We have no politicians in Ukraine these days. You cannot be a politician when your country is under fire. I have no other plans now except to stay alive and do everything that I can for our victory.”

There is a certain logic to this position. Since February 24, Ukrainian politicians have largely avoided the pitched partisan battles that have often poisoned the country’s politics. Even so, wartime public opinion polling regularly shows Prytula among the country’s most well-known public figures. Meanwhile, his foundation ranks among the most recognizable charities in Ukraine.

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If he does go back into politics, Prytula has a good chance of rapidly establishing himself as one of Ukraine’s rising political forces. He has the name recognition to gain traction in the country’s personality-driven politics and also boasts humanitarian credentials that set him apart from many of Kyiv’s current elite.

The former showman is not convinced he will continue in his TV career. “I had a lot of different TV shows, but you can only be a good entertainer if you feel inside yourself that you have something to celebrate every day. But Russians have burned out this feeling inside of me,” he says. Instead, the last eight months have given Prytula a new calling. “I feel empowered now only to help the Ukrainian army, to unite people.”

Unity is central to the Prytula Foundation’s crowdfunding initiatives and to his vision for Ukraine’s future. The foundation has raised tens of millions of dollars since February 24 for military supplies alone, mostly in private donations. Funds have come in from Ukraine, Europe, and North America, often from Ukrainian diaspora communities.

The foundation is hoping to encourage more donations from Europeans by making a cost-saving argument. “Every dollar donated to the Armed Forces of Ukraine through the Serhiy Prytula Foundation saves ten dollars that would be spent on supporting Ukrainian refugees in Europe,” Prytula explains.

He believes this is a timely message and notes that donations have slowed in recent months. This could spell trouble for both Europe and Ukraine, warns Prytula. “The Ukrainian economy is in bad shape. Many people in Ukraine lost their jobs. That’s why we really need help with military aid and money, otherwise we could have millions more Ukrainian refugees.”

Prytula acknowledges that there will be huge issues to address at home once Russia’s invasion of Ukraine finally ends. Eventually he would like the millions of Ukrainians currently seeking safety abroad to return and help rebuild their country. Reconstruction itself will be a significant challenge, but Prytula has another task in mind for his compatriots. “I will be happy when our society develops new skills and learns to think more critically. I want Ukrainians to change the way they think, because we have paid a big price for our old way of thinking.”

Ukraine renewed many of its institutions and strengthened its sense of national identity in the years following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Many believe Russia’s 2022 invasion will serve as a catalyst for further societal development. Prytula hopes to be part of this process.

We ask Prytula if there’s anything else he thinks Western audiences should know about his work or about Ukraine. His press secretary chimes in off camera before he can answer. Prytula laughs, nods, and turns to us to translate. “Tell them that when we unite, we are invincible.”

Andrew D’Anieri is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He tweets @andrew_danieri. Oleksii Antoniuk is a third-year student at Yale University, born and raised in Ukraine. Find him on Twitter at @OleksiiAntoniuk.

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Third, help Ukraine rebuild now. Private charity can change lives while the US government and others dither with complex reconstruction plans. Russia President Vladimir Putin’s latest missile strikes on civilian infrastructure including schools, parks, playgrounds, and apartment buildings are a constant reminder that nowhere is safe in Ukraine.

Only four weeks ago, Kyiv felt shockingly normal and open for business. To help Ukrainians retain some normalcy during what will inevitably be a difficult winter, consider giving to the Kyiv School of Economics’ campaign to reopen schools. All schools in Ukraine must have a bomb shelter in order to re-open, and many schools cannot afford the expense, so children are forced to take online lessons yet again.

Kyiv School of Economics has set a $1 million target to remedy this situation, and bomb shelters in villages cost as little as $15,000. All donations are tax deductible for US citizens and Kyiv School of Economics will pair would-be donors with schools so that children in the US and in Ukraine can form pen pal relationships.

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Fourth, make no mistake about it, the coming winter will be very hard and very cold. Putin’s recent missile strikes hit more than 10 Ukrainian cities, intentionally targeting heating and power facilities, leaving thousands without electricity and internet. “This is going to be a difficult winter for us,” said President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Yalta European Strategy conference on September 10.

Ordinary Ukrainians need sleeping bags, thermal underwear, warm socks, generators, and heaters. Americans can send these goods to Help Center Ukraine, an outstanding distribution site run by Ukrainian businessman Andrey Stavnitser and a close friend. I personally have visited his distribution warehouse in Lublin, Poland, and Andrey’s team will ensure that all donations reach needy Ukrainians across the country. Help Center Ukraine has distribution sites in New Jersey and Lublin, Poland, and will be opening another warehouse in the United Kingdom soon.

Fifth, Ukrainian families already living in the United States have real physical needs. One family from Kyiv needs a used car. Others need help figuring out how to transfer their degree credentials. Volunteer in your community and if you have space, invite a family into your home. If taking a family in for a spell is too much, invite them to share an upcoming holiday with you.

Sixth, as the holidays approach, find ways to bring Ukraine into your preexisting traditions. My family and I carol every year, and this year will be no exception. The new twist is that we will sing the Ukrainian song “Shchedryk,” a magical composition that was later adapted into the English Christmas carol, “Carol of the Bells.”

Russia’s war of choice in Ukraine shows few signs of ending soon, so it is incumbent upon all freedom-loving people to find creative ways to keep support for Ukraine robust as long as it takes.

Melinda Haring is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She tweets @melindaharing. Editor’s note: The Chopivsky Family Foundation is a donor of the Atlantic Council.

In the early days of the Russian invasion, President Zelenskyy signaled his intention to defy the Kremlin by officially applying for EU membership. This was an important gesture that helped to frame the war as a fight for independence against a resurgent Russia that refused to accept Ukraine’s departure from the Kremlin orbit.

While Moscow sought to crush Ukrainian statehood and reverse the verdict of 1991, Ukraine’s European aspirations symbolized the country’s resistance to Russian authoritarianism. This helped focus the minds of politicians across the continent. In June, Ukraine was duly granted official EU candidate nation status.

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The intensification of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU has reshaped the wider geopolitical landscape in a number of ways. For example, with Ukraine and Moldova now both recognized as EU candidate nations, the existing Eastern Partnership format comprising Ukraine and Moldova together with Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan no longer makes sense. As a result, Brussels is in the process of rethinking the EU’s entire Neighborhood Policy for the region.

The changes currently taking place create the potential for a more stable European neighborhood in the post-war period. This would be welcomed in both Brussels and Washington DC. Ukraine’s former position in the geopolitical gray zone on Europe’s eastern flank left it vulnerable to Russian imperial interference and made the country a constant source of instability. Clarifying Ukraine’s status as a member of the Western world is in EU and US interests. In addition to reducing the scope for future Russian aggression, a fully integrated Ukraine can make a meaningful contribution to the EU’s own security and defense policy.

The EU and US also share common goals when it comes to the reform agenda in Ukraine. Both seek to strengthen the rule of law and establish capable Ukrainian institutions while consolidating the country’s democracy. US support for Ukraine’s further EU integration can serve as a powerful engine for these reforms.

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