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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Director

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

The post Garlauskas in USA Today and The Hill appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s tech sector is playing vital wartime economic and defense roles

David Kirichenko — Thu, 20 Jul 2023 16:35:49 +0000

The Ukrainian tech industry has been the standout sector of the country’s hard-hit economy during the past year-and-a-half of Russia’s full-scale invasion. It has not only survived but has adapted and grown. Looking ahead, Ukrainian tech businesses will likely continue to play a pivotal role in the country’s defense strategy along with its economic revival.

While Ukraine’s GDP plummeted by 29.1% in 2022, the country’s tech sector still managed to outperform all expectations, generating an impressive $7.34 billion in annual export revenues, which represented 5% year-on-year growth. This positive trend has continued into 2023, with IT sector monthly export volumes up by nearly 10% in March.

This resilience reflects the combination of technical talent, innovative thinking, and tenacity that has driven the remarkable growth of the Ukrainian IT industry for the past several decades. Since the 2000s, the IT sector has been the rising star of the Ukrainian economy, attracting thousands of new recruits each year with high salaries and exciting growth opportunities. With the tech industry also more flexible than most in terms of distance working and responding to the physical challenges of wartime operations, IT companies have been able to make a major contribution on the economic front of Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression.

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Prior to the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian tech sector boasted around 5,000 companies. Ukrainian IT Association data for 2022 indicates that just two percent of these companies ceased operations as a result of the war, while software exports actually grew by 23% during the first six months of the year, underlining the sector’s robustness. Thanks to this resilience, the Ukrainian tech sector has been able to continue business relationships with its overwhelmingly Western clientele, including many leading international brands and corporations. According to a July 2022 New York Times report, Ukrainian IT companies managed to maintain 95% of their contracts despite the difficulties presented by the war.

In a world where digital skills are increasingly defining military outcomes, Ukraine’s IT prowess is also providing significant battlefield advantages. Of the estimated 300,000 tech professionals in the country, around three percent are currently serving in the armed forces, while between 12 and 15 percent are contributing to the country’s cyber defense efforts. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s IT ecosystem, hardened by years of defending against Russian cyber aggression, is now integral to the nation’s defense.

A range of additional measures have been implemented since February 2022 to enhance Ukrainian cyber security and safeguard government data from Russian attacks. Steps have included the adoption of cloud infrastructure to back up government data. Furthermore, specialized teams have been deployed to government data centers with the objective of identifying and mitigating Russian cyber attacks. To ensure effective coordination and information sharing, institutions like the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection serve as central hubs, providing updates on Russian activities and the latest threats to both civilian and government entities.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Today’s Ukraine is often described as a testing ground for new military technologies, but it is important to stress that Ukrainians are active participants in this process who are in many instances leading the way with new innovations ranging from combat drones to artillery apps. This ethos is exemplified by initiatives such as BRAVE1, which was launched by the Ukrainian authorities in 2023 as a hub for cooperation between state, military, and private sector developers to address defense issues and create cutting-edge military technologies. BRAVE1 has dramatically cut down the amount of time and paperwork required for private sector tech companies to begin working directly with the military; according to Ukraine’s defense minister, this waiting period has been reduced from two years to just one-and-a-half months.

One example of Ukrainian tech innovation for the military is the Geographic Information System for Artillery (GIS Arta) tool developed in Ukraine in the years prior to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This system, which some have dubbed the “Uber for artillery,” optimizes across variables like target type, position, and range to assign “fire missions” to available artillery units. Battlefield insights of this nature have helped Ukraine to compensate for its significant artillery hardware disadvantage. The effectiveness of tools like GIS Arta has caught the attention of Western military planners, with a senior Pentagon official saying Ukraine’s use of technology in the current war is a “wake-up call.”

Alongside intensifying cooperation with the state and the military, members of Ukraine’s tech sector are also taking a proactive approach on the digital front of the war with Russia. A decentralized IT army, consisting of over 250,000 IT volunteers at its peak, has been formed to counter Russian digital threats. Moreover, the country’s underground hacktivist groups have shown an impressive level of digital ingenuity. For example, Ukraine’s IT army claims to have targeted critical Russian infrastructure such as railways and the electricity grid.

Ukraine’s tech industry has been a major asset in the fightback against Russia’s invasion, providing a much-needed economic boost while strengthening the country’s cyber defenses and supplying the Ukrainian military with the innovative edge to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower and military equipment.

This experience could also be critical to Ukraine’s coming postwar recovery. The Ukrainian tech industry looks set to emerge from the war stronger than ever with a significantly enhanced global reputation. Crucially, the unique experience gained by Ukrainian tech companies in the defense tech sector will likely position Ukraine as a potential industry leader, with countries around the world eager to learn from Ukrainian specialists and access Ukrainian military tech solutions. This could serve as a key driver of economic growth for many years to come, while also improving Ukrainian national security.

David Kirichenko is an editor at Euromaidan Press, an online English language media outlet in Ukraine. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

An overview of gender parity in Bahrain: Progress, challenges, and the path forward

Nibras Basitkey and Lynn Monzer — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 20:27:20 +0000

On July 12th, 2023 the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative, in collaboration with the U.S. Embassy in Manama and Bahrain FinTech Bay, held a first workshop in a series of four events for the Win Fellowship’s first cohort launched in Bahrain in June. The event, which took place both in-person at Bahrain FinTech Bay offices and virtually, focused on female leadership in the country.

The opening notes were delivered by empowerME’s chairman Amjad Ahmad. Keynote remarks were provided by H.E. Shaikh Abdulla Bin Rashid Al Khalifa, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United States, and David Brownstein, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Manama.

The event encompassed a moderated discussion featuring esteemed panelists: Jordana Semaan, Head of Human Resources (Gulf and Asia), Global Head of DEI, Investcorp; Nidal Al-Basha, Head of Public Sector Innovation, Amazon Web Services MENA Region; Hollie Griego, Global Wealth Investments North America Head of Strategy & Platforms, Citi; and Marwa Al Saad, Executive Director at Human Capital, Mumtalakat Bahrain, with Suzy Al Zeerah, Chief Operating Officer, Bahrain FinTech Bay, skillfully moderating the session.

These panelists shared profound insights on the current state of gender equality in Bahrain, the successful initiatives and strategies propelling this progress, the remaining challenges, and the influential role of corporate initiatives in endorsing gender equality and promoting women’s leadership within Bahrain’s business landscape.

Key discussion points

Amjad Ahmad, Chairman of the empowerME initiative at the Atlantic Council kicked-off the event by introducing the remarkable achievements of Bahraini women in education, workforce, and politics. Women in Bahrain make up 83 percent of tertiary school enrollments, 54 percent of the public sector workforce, and 45 percent of leadership positions in official state agencies. In the private sector, women comprise 35 percent of the workforce, hold 17 percent of board seats, and occupy 35 percent of managerial roles. The political landscape is no different, as Bahraini women made major strides. They make up 20 percent of the total members of the Council of Representatives and 25 percent of the Shura Council. Ahmad emphasized that these achievements are the result of a number of factors, including government policies that promote gender equality, the strong educational attainment of Bahraini women, and the increasing participation of women in the workforce.

In his opening remarks, Ambassador H.E. Shaikh Abdullah bin Rashid Al Khalifa expressed his strong support for the WIn Fellowship, noting its role in exposing Bahraini top women entrepreneurs to life-changing networking opportunities, mentorship, and workshops, thereby increasing their economic participation. He also highlighted the significance of the transformation brought about by the Supreme Council for Women (SCW Bahrain), which has been instrumental in implementing legislative and societal safeguards for Bahraini women. As a result of these reforms, Bahraini women account for about 43 percent of the labor force. Continued progress is being made in areas of pay equity, entrepreneurship, pensions, and the enhancement of women’s physical and psychological well-being. Furthermore, His Highness underscored Bahrain’s commitment to digital inclusion, manifested in the government’s initiatives to train women in digital skills and motivate them to pursue STEM fields.

David Brownstein expressed his support for the WIn Fellowship, asserting, “we’re incredibly proud to support the WIn Fellowship here in Bahrain. Bahrain is a place where seeds flourish when planted.” He also pointed to the shared goals between the U.S. Embassy and the Bahraini government, with both parties aiming for a peaceful and prosperous state. “Achieving this requires the active participation of all society’s members”, he noted. He also affirmed the U.S. Embassy’s commitment to supporting Bahrain’s national strategy on gender equity and addressing inequality.

The panelists all agreed on Bahrain’s success in promoting women to all levels of the workforce and representation in government and boards, attributing this to both government reforms and a workforce that acknowledges women’s potential. They also recognized persisting challenges, like widespread biases against women, underscoring the necessity of a robust peer-to-peer network of women advocating for each other.

When asked about the factors that have contributed to Bahrain’s high ranking in gender parity among Arab countries, Nidal Al Basha stated several key aspects. Firstly, he mentioned the role of encouraging women to pursue STEM spatializations, which has been instrumental in promoting gender equality. Additionally, he emphasized on the importance of a supportive work environment that grants women extended maternity leaves, ensuring a balance between their professional and personal lives. Al Basha explained that Bahrain offers additional benefits for women, such as dedicated nursing rooms in the workplace, demonstrating a commitment to meeting their specific needs. The implementation of inclusive hiring and promotional policies also plays a significant role in enabling women to succeed and advance in their careers, according to Al Basha.

Marwa Al Saad emphasized further how Bahrain recognizes the immense value of human potential, considering it as one of the most valuable and inexhaustible resources. She stated that the high gender parity in Bahrain is attributed to various factors. “There is a mindset shift in the country that prioritizes growth and development, fostering an environment where both men and women can flourish,” she explained. Bahrain has also implemented robust policy and program reforms that establish a solid foundation for the advancement of all genders. These initiatives created equal opportunities and a supportive framework for individuals to thrive in various sectors. Al Saad also mentioned an exciting new initiative; the Bahrain Defense Force, which further demonstrates Manama’s commitment to gender parity and inclusivity. This initiative showcases the country’s dedication to providing equal opportunities and encouraging the participation of all genders in defense-related fields.

Jordana Semaan, from her side, mentioned that the one lesson that other countries in the region can learn from Bahrain is the emphasis placed on women and celebrating their success stories. “The importance of representation cannot be understated, as it serves as a significant motivator for other women to enter the workforce and unlock their full potential”, she said. By showcasing accomplished women and their achievements, Bahrain inspires and encourages others to pursue their goals and make significant contributions in their respective fields.

Hollie Griego focused on the importance of allyship among women, highlighting how it empowers and propels them into higher positions within the workplace. “Citi, following a similar approach to Bahrain, recognizes the significance of recruiting, training, and retaining women in its workforce” according to Griego. She pointed to the implementation of mechanisms that create an environment where women can thrive, allowing them to strike a balance between their roles as working mothers and providing the flexibility necessary to forge a successful career path leading to long-term security. These mechanisms serve as valuable examples that any country can adopt to promote gender equality and support women’s advancement.

Additionally, the panelists discussed the changing perception towards women in tech sectors, demonstrated by the increased hiring of female engineers at Amazon Web Services. They gave the example of the vital role supportive mechanisms at the workplace play in facilitating women’s advancement into senior roles, enabling them to balance their roles as working mothers. The importance of role models was also stressed, regardless of gender.

When asked about the challenges faced by Bahraini women, similar to women globally, Semaan referred to a UNDP report stating that 9 out of 10 people hold biases against women. This bias is present in both men and women, and is a significant obstacle to overcome. Semaan explained the importance of alliances and support networks among women, highlighting their role in addressing these challenges. “In this region, there is still a cultural expectation for women to take on caregiving roles,” she pointed.

Al Saad further emphasized the importance of implementing gender-inclusive solutions to address these challenges, while Al-Basha focused onthe importance of mental health support for both women and men, as well as the significance of programs that help women re-enter the workforce after being on leave.

Griego acknowledged that while Citi is one of the few institutions with a female CEO, there is still much work to be done to address the gender pay gap at senior levels and promote women into those roles. She emphasized the significance of mentorship for women, as it plays a crucial role in guiding them through their professional journey and career growth.

Suzy Al Zeerah additionally pointed to the absence of sufficient female role models and mentors in Bahrain and in the Middle East in general.

Closing remarks

According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2023, Bahrain stands as the second highest in terms of gender parity among the Arab countries. This achievement is due to several important themes that have emerged throughout the discussion.

The commitment to supporting working women, as evidenced by extended maternity leave suggests an understanding of the importance of balanced work-life dynamics. This is also apparent in private sector policies, especially in terms of maternity leaves like in the case of Amazon Web Services, among others that are trying to create an enabling workplace for women to join. Research did actually prove that paid maternity leave increases women’s labor force participation and entrepreneurship, thus affecting the country’s’ economy in general.

An equally significant development in Bahrain’s gender equality journey is the strategic emphasis on digital inclusion and the promotion of women in STEM fields. Bahrain is a frontrunner in technological diversity in the MENA region. Digital activities contributed to 8% of Bahrain’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, demonstrating the nation’s committed efforts towards enhancing digital inclusivity. As for the digital gender disparity, it is minimal in internet access (1.1 percent), while none-existent in mobile accessibility.

Furthermore, around a third of the broader ICT workforce in Bahrain are women and approximately 20 percent of startup founders are women, higher than the global average. Given the traditionally low representation of women in the global tech sector, Bahrain’s encouragement of female participation is a drastic step towards a more balanced gender equation.

Role models and allyship were discussed during the workshop. Both are important for women’s economic advancement. Afterall “you can’t be what you can’t see”. Championing female leaders in sectors such as tech and defense can potentially disrupt existing barriers, opening doors for future generations.

Despite this progress, Bahraini women, like many in the region, continue to face a variety of legal, regulatory, and sociocultural obstacles to economic participation and leadership. Initiatives to address this discrepancy are necessary for future growth and development. These barriers highlight the need to invest in women skills, establish strong networks, and develop clear metrics to measure progress in supporting women.

The private sector plays a key role in improving the condition of women and increasing their leadership. For example, the gender pay gap in Bahrain is prominent in the private sector-US$2,300 versus US$1,700 for women compared to only US$200 in the public sector-. Institutions need to actively work towards increasing female representation in leadership, by prioritizing the recruitment, training, and retention of women, play a critical role in creating a more equitable business landscape, concluded the speakers.

The discussion overall underscored Bahrain’s commitment to gender equality and its innovative approach to tackle this issue. However, it also highlighted the persistent challenges that need to be addressed to ensure lasting progress. The workshop served to place Bahrain’s journey as an inspiring model for other nations grappling with similar issues.

Lynn Monzer is the Associate Director with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

Nibras Basitkey is the Program Assistant with Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

WIn Fellowship cohorts

Jun 14, 2023

The WIn Fellowship 2023-2024 cohort

Building on the success of its inaugural cohort, the Women Innovators Fellowship (WIn) is expanding to Bahrain and the UAE, in addition to Saudi Arabia, as it continues to empower more women entrepreneurs from the Middle East. The program is thrilled to announce this year’s eighty-six recipients of its 2023 WIn Fellowship. The participants will receive a year-long program of executive education, mentoring, and networking opportunities in collaboration with Georgetown McDonough School of Business and with the support of the United States embassies in the three target countries and PepsiCo.

Feb 24, 2023

2023 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

The WIn Fellowship roadshow is led by the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative in cooperation with Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business with support from US Embassy Riyadh, UPS, and PepsiCo. The WIn Fellowship Roadshow participants, chosen from a highly competitive cohort of more than thirty applicants, receive a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Jun 14, 2023

WIn Fellowship 2023-2024 Bahrain

The empowerME initiative is happy to present the 2023-2024 WIn fellow cohort from Bahrain. These women entrepreneurs will build on their leadership and executive skills to scale their startups to new heights.

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Putin’s biggest mistake was believing Ukrainians were really Russians

Roman Solchanyk — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 17:53:43 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was based on a series of disastrous miscalculations. The most significant of these was his belief that Ukrainians are really Russians. Putin has long insisted Ukrainians and Russians are “one people” who have been artificially separated by the fall of the USSR. For Putin, this separation has come to symbolize the perceived historical injustice of the Soviet collapse, which he has previously described as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century. In February 2022, he set out to correct this alleged “injustice,” once and for all.

Putin’s fundamental misreading of Ukraine is now plain to see. Far from welcoming Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainian nation united and rose up in resistance. What was anticipated by the Kremlin as a brief and victorious military campaign has instead become the biggest European war since World War II. But if the scale of Putin’s blunder is obvious, it is important to note that he is far from the only Russian harboring such delusions. Russia’s elites and Russian society as a whole tend to assume everything that needs to be known (or is worth knowing) about Ukraine and Ukrainians has long been known and requires no further inquiry. This helps to explain why until fairly recently, there were hardly any academic or analytical centers in Russia devoted specifically to Ukrainian studies.

Today’s Russian attitudes toward Ukraine reflect centuries of imperial Russian and Soviet nationality policy. In the former case, Ukrainians (and Belarusians) were officially viewed as components of a larger, supranational “all-Russian people” that also included the Russians themselves. Meanwhile, for most of the Soviet period, the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian republics were seen as the Slavic core and foundation for another supranational entity, the “Soviet people.”

The similarity between the imperial and Soviet views is unmistakable, albeit with one dissonant nuance: Soviet nationality policy, while doing all it could to erase Ukrainian national identity, at the same time officially recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a state entity and Ukrainians as a separate nationality. Putin has been highly critical of Lenin for this approach, and has claimed the Bolshevik leader was personally responsible for “creating” Ukraine. This line of thinking reached what may be seen as its logical conclusion with Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” By denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity, Putin brought the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood into question and set the stage for the current war.

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Russian misconceptions about Ukraine are in part due to the simplistic notion that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as well as those who express an affinity for Russian culture or share Russia’s antagonism toward the EU, NATO, and the West in general, all fall within the same “pro-Russian” category. Likewise, Many Russians have been all too ready to assume that any Ukrainian expressing nostalgia for the Soviet era is waiting to be “liberated” by Moscow. These misconceptions have been echoed by numerous commentators in the West, who have similarly treated evidence of favorable Ukrainian attitudes toward modern Russia or the Soviet past as indications of a desire for some form of Russian reunion.

In reality, being “pro-Russian” is understood one way in Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Kramatorsk, or Mariupol, and quite differently in Moscow, Omsk, or Tomsk. During the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine in April 2014, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a wide-ranging poll in the eight southeastern Ukrainian provinces (excluding Crimea) targeted by the Kremlin. This revealed that 70 percent of respondents were against separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia, while just 15 percent were in favor.

If separation from Ukraine was not on their wish list, what did they in fact want? A relative majority of 45 percent preferred the decentralization of power and greater rights for their region; another 25 percent favored a federated Ukraine, while only 19 percent were happy with the existing relationship with Kyiv. Other surveys conducted at around the same time yielded similar findings.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

State of the Order: Assessing June 2023

sodal — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 13:23:59 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Putin in Peril. Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the most serious challenge to his authority since taking office, as the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, mounted an insurrection against the Kremlin’s military leadership. With heavily armed mercenaries seizing the city of Rostov and moving within a few hundred miles of Moscow, a looming conflict was averted as Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s chief, agreed to stand down and go into exile in Belarus. But Prigozhin’s whereabouts remained in doubt, as Putin sought to reassert control over the Wagner Group and consolidate his grip on power.

Shaping the order. The sudden rebellion by Prigozhin, a longtime close ally of Putin, suggests that the war in Ukraine is placing serious strains on Russia’s political leadership. Though Putin appears safe for now, the insurrection could open the door to future challenges to his rule, with the potential to shake the global order. Moscow appears to be struggling to gain control over Wagner, which has provided a crucial source of funding for Russia’s operations in Ukraine and helped the Kremlin expand its influence across the Middle East and Africa.
Hitting home. The fall of Putin could ultimately lead to a more peaceful Russia, but political instability inside the Kremlin could also pose new risks to US security interests.
What to do. With Putin forced to shift his focus to domestic challenges, Washington should use this opportunity to accelerate weapons support for Kyiv as Ukrainian forces push forward with their critical counteroffensive.

Blinken in Beijing. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, on a trip intended to “stabilize” relations between the two nations. While China refused a US request to resume military-to-military contacts, both sides appeared to view the talks as productive. But Chinese officials reacted bitterly to President Joe Biden’s subsequent reference to Xi as a “dictator,” calling the comments “extremely absurd and irresponsible.”

Shaping the order. While it may temporarily help improve the atmospherics surrounding the US-China relationship, Blinken’s visit is unlikely to lead to a shift in the overall trajectory. Tensions will remain high in light of Beijing’s threats against Taiwan and other attempts to undermine the global order, as the US pursues efforts to shift supply chains in critical industries away from China, as part of a new “derisking” strategy.
Hitting home. Seeking to maintain stable relations with the world’s second largest economy may be beneficial for the American people, but this will also require sustained efforts to defend against potential threats.
What to do. The Biden administration should continue to coordinate with allies on strategies to counter Beijing’s assault on the global order, even as it tries to establish guardrails in the US-China relationship.

Modi’s State Visit. President Joe Biden hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House, as the administration sought to bolster economic and geopolitical ties with India. Amid media criticism of India’s backsliding on democracy, Modi was given a White House state dinner – only the third of Biden’s presidency – and invited to speak before a joint session of Congress. The two nations agreed to strengthen defense and technology cooperation, including building GE military jet engines in India and launching joint initiatives on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other areas.

Shaping the order. Washington’s warm welcome for Modi reflects a desire to cultivate a stronger relationship with India in the context of strategic competition with China. While joint concerns over China appear to be propelling the relationship forward, it remains unclear whether the two nations can reach a more meaningful strategic partnership, especially given New Delhi’s refusal to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In addition, Modi’s targeting of religious minorities and crackdown on political dissent have raised questions about the future of the relationship.
Hitting home. A stronger US relationship with India could generate new business opportunities for US companies seeking to reduce supply chain dependencies on China.
What to do. While seeking to build on the positive momentum coming out of Modi’s visit, Washington should also make clear that it sees a shared commitment to democratic norms as the foundation for closer ties between the world’s two largest democracies.

Quote of the Month

“Democracies must now rally together around not just our common interests, but also our shared values. Preserving and protecting the freedoms that are essential to peace and prosperity will require vigorous leadership…”
– US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in New Delhi, India, June 5, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

Guatemala’s ruling government sought to overturn the results of the country’s presidential elections after the results indicated that Bernardo Arévalo, a reformist candidate, gained enough votes to qualify for a run-off. The State Department warned that undermining the election results would constitute a “grave threat to democracy.”
With the support of Pakistan’s ruling government, the country’s military began implementing a broad crackdown against the media and political opposition, in the wake of national protests following the arrest of former prime minister Imran Khan.
As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a high-profile visit to Washington, US concerns over democratic backsliding in India appeared to take a back seat in an effort to cultivate closer relations between the two nations.
Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the paramilitary Wagner Group, mounted an insurrection against Russia’s military leadership, but agreed to stand down after his heavily armed mercenaries came within a few hundred miles of Moscow.
China and Cuba reached a secret agreement to allow Beijing to establish a surveillance facility on the island targeting the United States, and are in the process of negotiating a deal to establish a new joint military training facility.
A contingent of leaders from seven African countries, including South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Putin, in a bid to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, though neither side accepted the African proposal.
In a further indication of Seoul’s tilt toward a harder line on China, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol directly criticized China’s ambassador in Beijing for his comments critical of South Korea’s joining US-led initiatives.
On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

The US and Britain issued the Atlantic Declaration, a new economic framework aimed at enhancing cooperation on critical and emerging technology, supply chains, clean energy, and other issues, as a potential counterpart to the US-EU Trade and Technology Council.
The US and thirteen other members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework reached an agreement on supply chains – one of the framework’s four core pillars – that will result in several new bodies focused on advancing supply chain resiliency.
On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons (↑)

The United Nations adopted the world’s first treaty aimed at protecting the high seas and preserving marine biodiversity in international waters, which constitute over two-thirds of the ocean.
The US announced plans to rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in an effort to counter China’s growing sway in multilateral fora. After the Trump administration withdrew the US from the organization in 2017, China became one of its largest donors.
On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

French President Emmanuel Macron expressed opposition to a proposal by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to open a NATO liaison office in Japan, suggesting that the alliance should stay focused in the North Atlantic region.
On his first trip to the White House since taking office, British prime minister Rishi Sunak met with Joe Biden, as the two leaders committed to closer cooperation on a range of political and economic issues.
US-India relations appeared to enter a new chapter as Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined President Joe Biden for an official state visit in Washington.
On balance, the alliance pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Lucan Ahmad Way, in Foreign Affairs, contends that revolutionary autocracies have demonstrated remarkable staying power, even in the face of mounting challenges.
Hal Brands, in Foreign Policy, suggests that Russia, China, Iran, and to some extent North Korea constitute a bloc of adversaries more cohesive and dangerous than anything the United States has faced in decades.
Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree, in Foreign Affairs, argue that in the face of Chinese aggression, a policy of continued non-alignment will not serve India well.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that Ukraine deserves NATO membership, as well as more robust weapons support.
John Herbst and Dan Fried, in the Washington Post, suggest that the key to a Ukrainian victory in its war against Russia may lie in a successful advance to retake Crimea.
Patrick Quirk and Caitlin Dearing Scott, writing for the Atlantic Council, argue for a fully developed foreign aid strategy to help the US succeed in strategic competition with China and Russia.
Peter Engelke and Emily Weinstein, writing for the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper series, set forth a comprehensive strategy for the US and its allies to retain its technological advantage over China.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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After Tunisia expelled 1,200 Black Africans, here’s how the West can help avoid a humanitarian disaster

Alissa Pavia and Tarek Megerisi — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 14:48:22 +0000

A human catastrophe is developing on Tunisia’s borders with little international attention. On July 2, Tunisian security forces rounded up over one thousand Black Africans from the city of Sfax. Security forces claimed to have detained their racially selected targets under the pretext of protecting them from civil unrest. However, according to victims’ testimonies provided to Human Rights Watch, Tunisian authorities identified and checked their papers before smashing their cell phones, throwing away their food, violently and sexually abusing them, and expelling them at the borders with Libya and Algeria. Some of these individuals were refugees registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Others were transitory migrants, although most were laborers and students who were residing in Tunisia.

For about ten days, an estimated seven hundred people were stranded in no man’s land between the southeastern Tunisian and Libyan borders, with a further two hundred still stranded in similar circumstances along the western border with Algeria. Tunisian authorities recently resettled most of the migrants stranded on the Libyan border. However, their response remains inadequate, mainly due to the absence of guarantees that this situation will not recur. This is a significant possibility, given local demands for African migrants to be removed from the town of Ben Guerdane, the Tunisian smuggling capital near the Libyan border, where many were resettled, and the aforementioned hundreds that are still stranded at the Algerian border.

Additionally, international organizations remain prohibited from providing crucial humanitarian assistance, and fear dominates the sub-Saharan migrant community. Thus, communication with victims is limited to voice notes and messages from smuggled phones. This means conditions could be even worse—and the numbers of those stranded even greater—than currently reported. And what is known of the conditions is already bad enough; with dwindling food and water and temperatures climbing to over 104 degrees Fahrenheit, victims have reported horrific stories of pregnant women dying in labor and people being driven by thirst to drink seawater.

This catastrophe is brewing against the backdrop of increasing authoritarianism in Tunisia under President Kais Saied and a severely deteriorating economy. Since February, when Saied re-appropriated a local version of the far-right great replacement theory, Tunisia’s president has used Black and migrant communities in Tunisia as a populist scapegoat for the country’s problems. This has stoked mass anti-Black hysteria that is now manifesting as active hostility wherever migrants are settled, as seen with the response in Ben Guerdane.

President Saied has also utilized harsh counter-migration policies to leverage financial support from Europe—specifically Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—creating an incentivization structure and aura of impunity that have fed into the current crackdown.

The situation on Tunisia’s borders is not only a humanitarian catastrophe that could cause the death of hundreds of innocent people—it could also catalyze political, criminal, and diplomatic issues across the broader region. Mass arbitrary expulsions and violent abuse incited by inflammatory speeches of Tunisia’s president have already boosted the numbers of sub-Saharan refugees fleeing to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea since February. Systematic and abusive government crackdowns will exacerbate this fear and could trigger a panicked, mass exodus as Tunisia becomes palpably unsafe for Black Africans, creating a new migration crisis for Europe.

This development also bolsters the already burgeoning business of human traffickers, helping them to entrench and expand other criminal activities. Additionally, it could strain relationships between Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria, as no country wishes to claim these stranded peoples, and Tunisian authorities continue ejecting them into sensitive border zones.

It’s imperative for Europe, and especially the United States, to act to avert this catastrophe—not only for humanitarian reasons but also to protect regional stability and defend key regional interests. The United States has invested more than $1.4 billion in Tunisia’s democracy since 2011 and is invested in promoting democracies to counter China and Russia’s authoritarian systems. As a result, the United States is financially, ideologically, and diplomatically invested in supporting its European allies to stabilize an issue of extreme importance in the central Mediterranean.

A Western policy response should focus on the short-term imperative of providing protection and assistance to the stranded while stopping further expulsions. Additionally, medium-term policies to build structural safeguards can prevent this from re-occurring and perhaps even result in a healthier ecosystem for migrants and migration diplomacy in Tunisia.

Short-term solutions

In light of this ongoing crisis, European and US stakeholders have the opportunity to collaborate in preventing further deaths while simultaneously establishing a solid foundation for holistic and enduring resolutions to the migration predicament in Tunisia.

A first response should come through immediate public statements by senior officials that condemn the crackdown, highlighting Tunisia’s contravention of international conventions it has joined, such as the United Nations and African Refugee Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. All of these accords explicitly forbid the practice of refoulement and forcibly returning or expelling individuals to countries where they may be subjected to torture, threats to their lives or freedom, or other severe forms of harm.

Furthermore, Western governments should call on Tunisian authorities to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to aid the stranded.

Given that the aforementioned suggestions are immediately actionable, uncontroversial, and the most direct way to end the humanitarian crisis, they should be prioritized and enacted as soon as possible. For maximum effect, this could take the form of a joint statement made by the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union (EU), which could be supplemented by senior level phone calls between leaders who have a good relationship with President Saied, like French President Emmanuel Macron.

To create an atmosphere of maximum pressure reflecting the dire situation, further statements condemning the developments and proposing steps forward, such as allowing aid to the stranded, could be issued by the US Congress and the European Parliament—particularly committees such as the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI).

The United States and EU can also provide capacity assistance to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to help conduct voluntary resettlement for stranded Africans who had been working or studying in Tunisia and no longer feel safe, as well as those who were hoping to migrate onwards but would now rather return home. In addition, Western countries can support the home countries of these migrants by helping them provide consular assistance. In many cases, their embassies lack the personnel and resources required to respond to a crisis of this size.

The United States and EU have strong relationships with Tunisia’s defense ministry and interior ministry, respectively, and they should be leveraged. Given the difficulties of directly influencing the infamously intransigent President Saied—and that Tunisia’s security services are perhaps the only institutions retaining significant influence over the president and are the main implementers of these policies—capitalizing on these relationships represents the West’s most practical means of influencing the situation.

As a last resort, the US should communicate that by facilitating these crackdowns in violation of international conventions—the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the United Nations (UN) and African Refugee conventions, the Convention against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—that Tunisia’s security services may end up excluding themselves from further funding programs. Meanwhile, Europeans can threaten to revoke the privileges that the Tunisian interior ministry’s officer class enjoys from their close partnership with Europeans to encourage Tunisia’s security services to uphold the law, cease their participation in egregious human rights abuses, and allow humanitarian organizations to tend to the stranded. This could be further communicated in bilateral conversations between European interior ministers who have recently visited Tunisia to meet with their counterparts.

Medium-term solutions

Since February, the African Union (AU) and countries whose citizens have been victimized by the racist crackdowns incited by President Saied have condemned the situation. They also remain better placed to provide diplomatic accountability measures to try and disincentivize Saied’s regime from continuing this course of action.

Alongside the AU’s responses, the EU could provide support to replicate mechanisms trialed elsewhere—such as the EU-AU-UN Tripartite Taskforce on the Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Libya—to develop and oversee sustained policy responses to help ameliorate the worsening situation of migrants and refugees in Tunisia, and build a working relationship with Tunisian authorities that could help avert such scenarios from reoccurring.

On June 11, when announcing the new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Europe and Tunisia, European Council (EC) President Ursula Von der Leyen claimed that the migration part of the comprehensive package would be implemented in full respect of human rights and would become a model for migration deals with other countries. Considering the developments since, there should be clear stipulations added to the MoU to prevent mass arbitrary expulsions and violent abuse from being repeated, including accountability measures.

Alongside making a more focused, robust, and safeguarded migration pact, the European Parliament should more effectively leverage its role in budgetary scrutiny and oversight over EC spending to not only ensure the future deal is effectively implemented, but also look over existing funding packages given to the Tunisian border police. It is rumored that border guards are disgruntled that additional EU funding has yet to reach them in terms of increased salaries or new equipment and accuse the state of simply repurposing that money to its general budget. In this scenario, border guards are more inclined to accept money from traffickers and thereby enable trafficking instead of policing it. Moreover, this dynamic neutralizes any leverage or incentive this financing could provide to ensure that humanitarian standards are upheld. So, it behooves the European parliament to more closely scrutinize how its existing migration funding is being spent.

The importance of Tunisia’s migration policy—especially given its ability to feed into other delicate issues, such as people smuggling and general regional stability—and its relationship with European migration policy should be routinely highlighted when European and US delegations visit Tunisia. Upcoming visits by European Parliament committees are a prime opportunity to initiate conversations on migration management practices, which can be followed up by identifying robust safeguards to prevent the reoccurrence of such situations.

By implementing these short-term and medium-term policy recommendations, European and US stakeholders can work towards addressing the immediate challenges while laying the groundwork for more comprehensive and sustainable solutions to the migration situation in Tunisia.

Alissa Pavia is associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs’ North Africa Program.

Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

The post After Tunisia expelled 1,200 Black Africans, here’s how the West can help avoid a humanitarian disaster appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 20:52:09 +0000

The Wagner mutiny in late June was a brief affair, but it is casting a long shadow over Putin’s Russia. In less than forty-eight hours, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his troops succeeded in shattering the carefully constructed myth of Putin the strongman, while exposing the weakness at the heart of his regime. Although the immediate danger has passed, many now believe it is only a matter of time before the Russian dictator faces new threats to his authority. However, with all genuine political opposition inside Russia long since eliminated, the real question is: Who could realistically challenge Putin?

It is easy to understand why many observers believe Putin is currently weaker than at any time in his entire twenty-three-year reign. During their short-lived uprising, Wagner forces managed to capture one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. A column of Wagner troops then advanced across Russia virtually unopposed, coming to within 200 kilometers of Moscow before choosing to turn back. As the drama unfolded, neither the Russian establishment nor the public rallied around Putin, who was conspicuously absent. Instead, there were widespread reports of panic across the country, while crowds in Rostov actively cheered Wagner troops.

The exact nature of the deal that ended the mutiny remains unclear, but the few details that are publicly known have done little to repair the damage done to Putin’s reputation. Neither Wagner leader Prigozhin nor his soldiers have been arrested or otherwise punished for their revolt, despite the fact that they downed a number of Russian aircraft and killed Russian servicemen. Instead, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has recently confirmed that Putin personally met with Prigozhin and dozens of other Wagner commanders just five days after the mutiny. Remarkably, Peskov revealed that Putin spoke about future job opportunities during his three-hour discussion with the leaders of the mutiny.

Putin’s apparent readiness to compromise has created the impression of a vulnerable dictator who lacks both the support and the military strength to follow through on his earlier vow to “crush” the mutiny. This has led to widespread speculation that the Wagner revolt may now inspire other anti-regime uprisings. In a 9 July interview with ABC News, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested the Wagner mutiny might serve as a catalyst for further domestic destabilization in Russia. “There is a signal that there might be another mutiny in Russia, a revolution,” he noted. “More than that, there are many people who might support such a mutiny.”

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Who could lead the next uprising? One obvious candidate is Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Like Wagner chief Prigozhin, Kadyrov enjoys a high degree of autonomy and has large numbers of troops under his personal command. With the Kremlin’s blessing, he rules Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He also has a long history of clashes with Russian governmental institutions and has joined Prigozhin in criticizing the conduct of the war in Ukraine. However, Kadyrov was ultimately one of the few prominent figures to publicly back Putin during the Wagner mutiny, and also sent Chechen fighters to Rostov-on-Don.

Kadyrov’s eagerness to support Putin was telling. While he might have the manpower and independence to take action challenging Putin’s power, it is not clear that he sees any advantage in doing so. Secure in his autonomy, Kadyrov may have calculated that it would be more beneficial to preserve his place in the current system than to back a risky rebellion with uncertain prospects.

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A more substantial challenge to the Putin regime may yet emerge from within the ranks of Russia’s increasingly disgruntled military. The Kremlin’s meek response to the Wagner mutiny has exacerbated already declining morale among Russian troops and commanders currently serving in Ukraine.

For more than half a year, a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal orders and catastrophic losses have pointed to growing demoralization. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate that dissatisfaction with the Kremlin has now reached the level of senior commanders. A July 13 report in the Wall Street Journal claimed that numerous high-ranking officers including top Russian general Sergei Surovikin had been detained in the wake of the Wagner revolt. Surovikin, who formerly commanded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is reportedly still being held and interrogated in Moscow over possible links to the mutiny.

In a further sign of mounting tension within Putin’s military, a senior Russian commander in charge of forces based in southern Ukraine claimed on July 12 that he had been suddenly dismissed from his post after raising the alarm over the mismanagement of the invasion. In a recorded audio statement, General Ivan Popov accused Russia’s military leadership of “treacherously and vilely decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment.”

Popov’s explosive accusations suggest that many in the Kremlin prefer to silence critics within the Russian military rather than address uncomfortable truths about the war in Ukraine. Unless this problematic approach is abandoned, it is likely to fuel further anger among front line commanders and troops as casualties continue to mount amid Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive.

If disgruntled officers and demoralized soldiers from the regular Russian army do turn against the Putin regime, they may be joined by thousands of former Wagner fighters along with members of Russia’s many other private military companies. These mercenary formations typically enjoy a significant degree of operational independence from the Kremlin and will have noted with interest the precedent set by the apparent lack of negative consequences following the Wagner mutiny.

For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly suppressed any potential sources of domestic opposition to his rule. With the Russian media muzzled and his political opponents imprisoned, exiled, or dead, the force most capable of mounting a serious challenge to the regime is the Russian military. Putin has been careful to keep loyalists in top positions, but as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, there are growing indications of disaffection among both commanders and troops. With Russian generals now reportedly being detained and dismissed, the scale of the threat should not be underestimated. In the months ahead, this may lead to fresh challenges to Putin’s rule that will dwarf the Wagner mutiny.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

According to a recent survey conducted across twenty-one cities, between 87% and 96% of Ukrainian residents wish to remain in their cities after the war, with 39% to 62% of respondents agreeing that local officials should decide reconstruction priorities. Clearly, leaders who have managed local response systems are well equipped to identify local needs and mobilize available resources for future targeted reconstruction projects.

For this reason, it is crucial that Ukraine’s nascent reconstruction strategies incorporate local leaders and mayors as primary actors charged with directing and managing redevelopment initiatives. Although any Ukrainian “Marshall Plan” will certainly prioritize financing redevelopment projects and infrastructure repair, Ukrainian officials and the country’s international partners should also work to establish new relationships that empower leaders at the local level.

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Numerous plans to address Ukraine’s future economic and political engagement with transatlantic and other recovery institutions are already underway. During the recent Ukraine Recovery Conference in London, public and private leaders from over 60 countries pledged significant financial resources to address humanitarian needs and outline investments in Ukraine’s battered economy.

Kyiv had earlier presented a draft Recovery and Development Plan at the 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland. This plan outlined the need for approximately 850 reconstruction projects set over ten years with total costs estimated at $750 billion dollars.

In January 2023, the European Commission also unveiled its Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform, which is designed to streamline future Ukrainian international recovery assistance and establish clear, transparent, and accountable financial standards. While such initiatives help secure much-needed funds, Ukraine and its allies must also seek to utilize these global opportunities and engage Ukraine’s local leaders as vital partners in their country’s recovery.

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Expanding on Ukraine’s decentralization experience is not only a pragmatic wartime imperative necessary for distributing equipment and supplies; it will also build upon established reforms necessary for Ukraine’s democratic consolidation. Beginning in 2014 as part of the many sweeping reforms enacted after the Euromaidan Revolution, political decentralization has been an important way of reducing Soviet-style centralization in Kyiv while combating corruption.

Over the past nine years, Ukraine’s mayors have started to gain experience developing and managing public policies and directly responding to constituent needs. Over this period, more than 10,000 informal local councils were merged into officially recognized municipalities and granted formal administrative oversight and financial regulatory powers. Up until Russia’s 2022 invasion, decentralized economic and political reforms introduced unprecedented positive changes in quality of life for millions of Ukrainians; the share of citizens living below subsistence levels fell from 52% to 23% between 2015 to 2019.

Ukraine’s continued success in creating resilient local governance systems will require cooperation with national political leaders with clear expectations outlined in legal commitments. Meanwhile, examples of renewed political centralization in response to wartime demands have highlighted possible fault lines between local and national figures. This trend threatens to exacerbate tensions if left unchecked.

In the city of Chernihiv, located approximately 90 miles north of Kyiv, Mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko was removed by courts following an investigation by Ukraine’s National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) into the alleged use of a municipally-owned car by the mayor’s wife to evacuate from the city during the opening days of the war. Mayor Atroshenko himself stayed in Chernihiv to oversee the defense of the city which withstood a siege and partial occupation in spring 2022.

In the city of Rivne in western Ukraine, rumblings grow of Mayor Oleksandr Tretyak potentially being removed in relation to an NAPC investigation into the payment of bonuses to city officials in 2020. At the same time, Mayor Tretyak claims he has come under increasing pressure to move limited city budget money to the region’s civil military administration, something he has so far refused to do, claiming that the city has already fulfilled all budgetary support requirements. These examples have fueled speculation over the direction of wartime centralization and should give pause to local authorities and regional civic leaders.

Any future national reconstruction policy will be best served by building upon Ukraine’s localized leadership assets and incorporating local councils, mayors, and officials in decision-making processes. By directing incoming aid at the local level, global partners can help expand technical, strategic, and administrative capacities and ensure resources are used effectively across targeted issues. Ukraine’s dedication to continued decentralization reforms is not only necessary to achieve reconstruction goals but is also a critical component of the country’s mission to develop transparent democratic systems from the ground up moving forward.

Zachary Popovich is a senior program associate at the International Republican Institute. Michael Druckman is the resident program director for Ukraine at the International Republican Institute.

As the urgency of this issue becomes impossible to ignore, many local governments are taking action to build heat resilience. At the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock), we work closely with cities around the world to protect the people most exposed to the dangerous impacts of climate-driven extreme heat. Here are four examples.

Seville: Naming heat waves is changing the way people understand extreme heat

Seville, Spain, has been leading the charge on naming extreme heat events. So far, Seville has experienced two named heat waves: Zoe in July 2022 and Yago in June 2023.

Seville has named heat waves through a naming and categorization system called proMETEO. This system, piloted by Arsht-Rock in collaboration with the University of Seville and Seville City Council, monitors the weather forecast and categorizes heat waves into three tiers ranging from least (Category One) to most severe (Category Three).

Seville is in its second year of naming and categorizing heat waves. In addition to better protecting Seville’s residents, this project is creating important social dialogue on the harmful impacts of extreme heat, and it is serving as a model for other cities to pilot similar initiatives.

Miami: The world’s first Chief Heat Officer is tackling heat head-on

Miami, where temperatures routinely hit the high 90s, was the first city in the world to appoint a Chief Heat Officer (CHO). CHOs are officials supported by Arsht-Rock’s Extreme Heat Resilience Alliance who are responsible for unifying their city governments’ responses to extreme heat.

Miami’s CHO, Jane Gilbert, has more than thirty years of experience working in climate resilience. She has worked closely with Miami-Dade County Mayor Daniella Levine Cava to launch the Miami-Dade County Extreme Heat Action Plan, which outlines nineteen key actions to protect people from extreme heat, including cooling schools and expanding access to shade and water.

In her role as CHO, Gilbert has implemented extensive heat season campaigns to raise awareness on the dangers of extreme heat. She also manages mobile Community Resilience Pods, which empower people to prepare for climate stressors through educational storytelling.

Freetown: Outdoor market shade covers are providing relief for more than 2,300 women

In Sierra Leone’s capital, extreme heat is devastating for outdoor and informal workers, who spend long hours laboring in extreme temperatures. Many of these workers are women and girls, who face disproportionate health and social impacts from extreme heat.

Arsht-Rock has been working with Eugenia Kargbo, Freetown’s CHO, and a network of partners to address this. Through the Freetown Market Shade Cover project, Arsht-Rock installed shade covers over three outdoor markets, expanding the daily window for safe and comfortable shopping in hot conditions.

The Market Shade Cover project has given more than 2,300 market women better working conditions and economic opportunities. By minimizing the health impacts, food spoilage, and financial losses resulting from extreme heat, this intervention has benefitted entire communities dependent on the market women.

Santiago: New partnerships are protecting the most heat-vulnerable workers

Even though Chile’s capital has a cool and temperate climate, Santiago has been scorched by extreme temperatures in recent years. Local authorities are taking a wide range of approaches to build heat resilience, from advocating for workers’ protection policies to providing air-conditioned ambulances to more than twenty-five communities.

Santiago’s CHO, Cristina Huidobro Tornvall, partnered with the Chilean Security Association (ACHS), an entity representing more than one million Chilean workers, to promote heat safety measures among outdoor workers. Together, they are educating employers on how to recognize and respond to the dangers of extreme heat.

The partnership’s goal is for employers to institute practices to protect their workers and provide health coverage for workers injured on the job. To this end, ACHS is planning to monitor how often workers seek medical care for exposure to extreme heat, which will help inform worker protection policies.

Cities are a crucial part of the solution

Severe heat can arrive with little or no warning. However, there are several steps cities can take in advance to prepare for extreme heat events.

Cities can conduct baseline heat risk assessments to understand which communities and parts of the city are most vulnerable to extreme heat.

Cities can create heat action plans that identify strategies and responsible actors in advance of extreme heat events.

Cities can implement educational campaigns in advance of heat seasons to build public awareness of the dangers of extreme heat.

Arsht-Rock’s Heat Action Platform brings together diverse case studies of these solutions with guidance on how to plan for, finance, and implement projects into one comprehensive platform. The platform is designed to be a step-by-step guide for those starting out their heat resilience planning, as well as a reference guide and implementation resource for cities already well into the heat-planning process.

Local leaders are positioned to take these ideas and run with them. Cities have an urgent responsibility to respond to climate change. Billions of people are already living with the impacts of extreme heat, and even more will become more vulnerable as the world continues to urbanize. We already have the solutions, knowledge, and resources needed to protect people from heat—now, we just have to take action.

Kashvi Ajitsaria is a project associate at the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center.

The post How four cities are building resilience to extreme heat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Oleksii Reznikov: Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future

Oleksii Reznikov — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:49:23 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently initiated a national debate over the creation of a Ukrainian Doctrine that will shape the future development of the country. I am confident that defense policy will be at the heart of this national dialogue and see a number of key points that are worth underlining.

The first point to note is the global nature of Ukrainian security. For decades to come, the entire world will live by the rules established by the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to weaponize everything from energy resources and food supplies to cyberspace and social media. Moscow has engaged in nuclear blackmail, interfered with maritime freedoms, and called into question the very idea of territorial integrity. These challenges are not local or even regional in scope; they are global threats that resonate equally around the world.

How we respond to these issues in Ukraine will define the international security climate. Any attempts to address the Russian invasion on a purely local level by freezing the conflict or forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions will result in failure and will only fuel further international instability. Instead, we must acknowledge that the threats posed by Russia are global in character and demand a global response.

The second key point is the need to define Ukraine’s position in regional and global security systems. In simple terms, the desired trajectory should include security guarantees followed by full NATO accession, with internal transformations taking place in parallel that implement the best lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience and enable the country to acquire the necessary domestic defense capabilities. These processes can and must be advanced during the current active phase of the war.

The third key point is the need to develop a defense doctrine that meets the security expectations of both Ukraine and the country’s partners. It is now clear that Ukraine is capable of serving as a shield on Europe’s eastern frontier. Indeed, Ukraine is currently carrying out NATO’s core mission of defending Europe against Russian military aggression. At the same time, over the past eighteen months Ukraine has received direct and indirect military aid worth more than the country’s entire defense budget since the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Without continued external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to carry out rapid rearmament or acquire the kind of defense capabilities it needs. The best solution would be to move toward greater reliance on internal resources while maintaining strong levels of international support.

Clearly, Ukraine’s partners will be reluctant to invest in a security model that differs significantly from established NATO standards, or one that conflicts with their own military, industrial, or economic interests. Finding the right balance between strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defense sector capabilities and optimizing international cooperation will be crucial.

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Efforts to develop a practical vision for Ukraine’s army of the future have been underway since June 2022, when I ordered a capacity review. These findings, coupled with Ukraine’s unique wartime experience, form the basis of a concept paper on the transformation of Ukraine’s defense sector submitted to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at the beginning of June 2023. The next stage will involve consultations to coordinate interagency efforts required to create the right legislative framework and ensure effective cooperation between different government bodies. This synergy will be the key to success.

Russia’s invasion has underlined that defense is an investment not an expense. For instance, strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities will help guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, which secures vital income from trade. Likewise, failure to provide adequate security measures will leave Ukraine unable to rebuild and trapped in costly wartime insecurity. All of Ukraine’s security policy decisions must reflect these fundamental truths.

Complex defense capabilities revolve around three main factors: people, weapons, and financial resources. Each has their own planning specifics. Successful weapons and financing policies take years to plan; when it comes to human resources, it often takes a generation or longer to get it right.

Ukraine is now looking to coordinate the country’s defense sector transformation under conditions of extreme uncertainty. We know the current war will end in Ukrainian victory, but we do not know when this will be. This makes it difficult to begin the process of optimizing the range of weapons in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. After all, in order to defeat Russia, Ukraine needs to receive as many weapons as it can, and needs to get them as quickly as possible.

We also don’t know exactly when Ukraine’s partners will make the final decision to fully integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is fundamental. It is one thing to reform the Ukrainian military as part of a collective defense strategy in cooperation with partners; it is quite another to build defense capabilities in relative isolation with some external support.

One of my main requests to our partners is therefore to make a decision on Ukraine’s NATO accession as soon as possible. This will make it far easier for all parties to conduct long-term defense planning. If a decision is not forthcoming, Ukraine’s partners will be obliged to include the country’s security needs in their own planning on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

A further priority for Ukraine’s defense doctrine is the de-Sovietization of defense policy and planning. This needs to be addressed in a practical manner that goes beyond mere slogans. Eighteen months ago, many military analysts believed a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean a fight between a large Soviet army against a small Soviet army. In reality, it soon became clear that the Ukrainian army had undergone significant change. However, the same cannot be said for the broader state systems underpinning Ukrainian defense policy. A wide range of political, social, and economic changes are still needed.

For example, the system of registration for military service is still linked in the Soviet fashion with place of work or study. This means that entrepreneurs along with the self-employed and unemployed are often outside the system. Far-reaching changes are needed in order to establish and maintain the right kind of reserve and effectively mobilize the country’s human, material, and financial resources. Efforts to overcome quality problems with quantity must be set aside. In conditions of resource scarcity, such an approach is suicidal.

The human dimension of future Ukrainian defense is a professional army. This must be based on the transparent logic of a military career and an extensive social protection package, relying on well-trained reserves formed of all men liable for military service and of women on a voluntary basis (with the exception of those categories of women who are liable for military service).

The registration of people liable for military service should be fully digitized. This process is underway. We also need to implement separate training policies for different groups in order to create a genuine rather than nominal reserve. This should look to maximize citizen engagement by improving the motivation system.

Statements about there being seven million Ukrainians liable for military service are meaningless if the country is not capable of structuring the reserve in ways that make efficient use of these people. Similarly, declarations that anyone subject to military service must complete their compulsory period in uniform do little to help the state capitalize on existing resources. Instead, basic training should be supplemented by the development of specific groups within the country’s military reserve forces. This should include a combat reserve consisting of those with combat experience; a territorial reserve for territorial defense units; an operational reserve of military veterans without combat experience; a mobilization reserve of those who previously passed through basic training; and a general reserve register featuring individuals with no prior military training.

The development of an efficient reserve is only possible in conjuction with an effective Heroes Policy, which has been identified as a priority by President Zelenskyy. This is a good example of the need for interagency synergies and is also an area where a sense of justice must serve as a cornerstone. Meanwhile, the task of managing military registration should be taken away from the General Staff and the Land Forces Command. Instead, it is necessary to establish a separate and tailored agency within the Ministry of Defense.

Similar efforts are required for the civil reserve. Over the past eighteen months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has become clear that a significant portion of the almost one million Ukrainian men and women in uniform perform purely civilian functions. It makes no sense to bunch all of these people together with the military until the end of hostilities. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required. When society sees that the state seeks to engage people in defense tasks as rationally and reasonably as possible, we will witness a decline in negative phenomena associated with military service. After all, many of those who seek to avoid military service do so in order to escape perceived uncertainty, injustice, and abuses.

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A new mobilization and reserve policy will require a new regulatory framework. This will involve comprehensive legislative changes. The entire mobilization system for central and local authorities, enterprises, and institutions should undergo revision, with mobilization tasks in their current form abolished. In its place, the emphasis should be on practical needs and common sense. Training for reservists should be synchronized with real life requirements and skills, with citizens aware of opportunities at the level of school leaver, university undergraduate, employee, or entrepreneur.

Professional military education and career management must be developed according to NATO principles and standards to ensure interoperability. At the same time, all training and education should be adjusted to reflect Ukraine’s unrivalled combat experience. This is the country’s unique advantage and should shape Ukraine’s defense doctrine as much as possible.

Work is already underway on the transformation of Ukraine’s military education system, with a concept approved by the government in December 2022. Over the coming decade, Ukraine’s military education will be fully integrated into the broader European military education environment in terms of both form and content. A separate element here is military-patriotic education. At the moment, this is governed by two laws and a presidential decree which contain a number of apparent conflicts and contradictions. We must achieve a clearer division of tasks and harmonization.

Ukraine’s entire defense doctrine should be underpinned by solid economic foundations. At present, the Ukrainian defense industry is not capable of meeting the demands of the military, but the sector has huge potential. Indeed, if managed correctly, a highly profitable Ukrainian defense industry could realistically become a major engine driving the country toward the goal of a one trillion dollar GDP.

I have repeatedly stated my position that self-sufficiency in the defense sector is a core component of genuine national sovereignty. Moving forward, Ukraine should be aiming to produce as much as possible itself. Once again, Ukraine’s unique combat experience creates exciting opportunities in this area. In order to make the most of the country’s experience and its industrial capabilities, a new defense industry development strategy is required. This should take international defense sector trends into account while also focusing on other economic factors and Ukraine’s specific strengths.

The time has come to turn away from the old Soviet model governed by unprofitability and resource consumption. Instead, Ukraine must strive to become a global defense sector leader and an attractive international partner. This will require a unified center capable of establishing and implementing policy, with exceedingly flexible R&D assets responding rapidly to the latest requirements. Procurement should be synchronized with budget planning, while efforts must be made to move away from lingering problems relating to blurred responsibilities. Efforts in this direction are already underway and must continue.

The overall objective of Ukraine’s defense doctrine is to defend the state against any possible threat. This requires new approaches to everything from managing mobilization and maintaining an effective reserve, to reforming the defense industry and boosting domestic production at every level. The country’s needs will inevitably evolve over time. Five years after victory in the current war, will Ukraine need a mobilization reserve of 500,000 or two million? This is why scalability is so critical.

In the defense sector, Ukraine has huge untapped potential and much to offer the international community. In the drone sector alone, Ukraine is at the cutting edge of current innovations and is well-placed to remain a key source of solutions for European and other markets. This military tech prowess will help open doors to new cooperation that are currently closed. Ukraine can build on its experience and expertize to become a major player in the global defense industry, but this requires solid foundations and a strong domestic sector.

Every day, our defenders are bringing victory closer. This progress is taking place in a rapidly changing world, and is contributing to these changes. Ukraine must be ready to capitalize on the opportunities this creates in ways that guarantee the safety of all Ukrainians while enabling the country to prosper.

Oleksii Reznikov is Ukraine’s Minister of Defense.

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Nobody will have failed to notice that while Putin has continued to talk tough, he failed to crush the Wagner uprising and instead struck some kind of deal with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his mutinous troops. Putin demonstrated a readiness to compromise despite the fact that Wagner fighters reportedly shot down a number of Russian aircraft and killed numerous Russian airmen. This indicated an apparent lack of concern for the lives of Russian servicemen at a time when tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been killed as a result of Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine.

The brief Wagner uprising also revealed a remarkable shortage of Russian military strength and fighting spirit on the home front. Wagner troops were able to seize one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. Perhaps even more significantly, they were cheered and supported by crowds of locals. Wagner forces then advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before choosing to turn back.

Meanwhile, there was no surge in street-level or elite support for Putin. Instead, pro-war propagandists fell largely silent as rumors swirled of establishment figures fleeing Moscow. For a brief period, Russia looked to be leaderless and defenseless. The immediate danger has now passed, but these stunning developments have changed attitudes toward Putin and his regime in fundamental ways.

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It would appear that history repeats itself. Just as in 1990 very few foresaw the looming collapse of the USSR, Russia now once again looks suddenly fragile. Unsurprisingly, this is regarded as good news in Ukraine, where any sign of Russian instability is welcomed. Attitudes elsewhere are not so clear-cut. Many international observers are openly alarmed by the potential demise of the Russian Federation in its current form. They worry about the fate of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, and also question the legitimacy of the many new states that could potentially emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Russia.

These concerns mirror attitudes during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is often forgotten that US President George Bush H. W. Bush came to Kyiv in the weeks before Ukraine’s August 1991 declaration of independence to argue against such a move in his “Chicken Kiev” speech. Many of today’s leaders share these fears over the potential disintegration of Russia. Nevertheless, the Wagner revolt has demonstrated that the Putin regime may well collapse due to its own internal weaknesses, regardless of the Western world’s wishes.

Elements of the international community, including in the West, also cling to the idea of reaching some kind of compromise and returning to business as usual with Russia. While it is obvious to almost everyone in Ukraine and in nearby countries including Poland and the Baltic states that Russia will only stop when it is decisively defeated, there are still many observers elsewhere who believe they can turn back the clock to 2021 or even 2013. They fondly recall a time when Vladimir Putin was the respected leader of a economically strong nation at the heart of global affairs, and dream of returning to this state of affairs. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

In reality, there can be no way back to international respectability for Putin. As a result of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, he will be an enemy of the entire Western world for as long as he remains in power. Crucially for the future of his regime, Putin is also clearly no longer able to guarantee domestic security or protect the interests of the Russian elite on the international stage.

As the international community assesses the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia. Western policymakers should now be thinking seriously about how to make any future transition as smooth as possible. This means preparing for the emergence of a democratic Russia, and also exploring what a breakup of the current Russian Federation into a number of smaller states would mean for international security.

When similar processes were underway in the early 1990s, the international community prioritized stability above all else, paving the way for the eventual rise of a revisionist Russia under Putin. This time, a new Russian collapse should be managed in order to bring about a sustainable shift toward democracy. The experience of the past three decades has demonstrated that this is the only way to secure a durable peace. Today’s Western leaders must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors in order to avoid repeating them.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Kroenig and Miller in Foreign Policy on democratic renewal at home and abroad

sodal — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:40:10 +0000

original source

On July 4, Scowcroft Center senior director and vice president Matthew Kroenig and Scowcroft Center assistant director Danielle Miller penned a review of Charles Dunst’s new book, Defeating the Dictators: How Democracy Can Prevail in the Age of the Strongman, in Foreign Policy. In it, they discuss how democracies can outperform autocracies and maintain their edge.

If democracies want to maintain their edge in the global competition against autocracies… they will need to identify their own deficits and remedy them. Only when democracies are flourishing at home can they maximize their power and influence abroad—and convince the world that the democratic model is one to be admired and emulated.

Matthew Kroenig and Danielle Miler

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

Staff

Danielle Miller

Assistant Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Climate Change & Climate Action National Security

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Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

Richard Cashman, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:14:43 +0000

The attempted putsch by Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Wagner troops in late June is perhaps best understood as a symptom of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline. Much like the invasion of Ukraine itself, it is part of a broader historical process that can be traced back to 1989 and the fall of the Soviet incarnation of the Russian Empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

The minilateral moment in the Middle East: An opportunity for US regional policy?

Jean-Loup Samaan — Wed, 05 Jul 2023 13:00:00 +0000

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In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “The Minilateral Moment in the Middle East: An Opportunity for US Regional Policy,” the Atlantic Council’s nonresident senior fellow Jean-Loup Samaan analyzes how regional powers are reconsidering the multilateral balance of their foreign policy arrangements, and the emerging implications for US Middle East policy.

Over the past three years, the Middle East has experienced major intra-regional changes. After a decade of fierce competition between two blocs—one led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the other by Qatar and Turkey—both parties now seem willing to cooperate. One of the key features of this new regional environment, according to Samaan, has been the growth of so-called minilateral initiatives that regroup several countries on an ad hoc basis.

Samaan also addresses how powers outside the region have embarked on a similar path of building relationships with countries in the Middle East. Russia’s recent attempt to build a similar framework with Turkey and Iran, he argues, provides evidence of how minilateralism is increasingly considered an effective instrument of regional diplomacy.

About the author

Jean-Loup Samaan

Nonresident Senior Fellow
Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs

Senior Research Fellow
Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore

Samaan serves as a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute. Prior to that, Samaan was a policy analyst at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011, research advisor at the NATO Defense College from 2011 to 2016, and associate professor in strategic studies detached by the US Near East South Asia Center to the UAE National Defense College from 2016 to 2021.

Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

The Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative (SMESI) provides policymakers fresh insights into core US national security interests by leveraging its expertise, networks, and on-the-ground programs to develop unique and holistic assessments on the future of the most pressing strategic, political, and security challenges and opportunities in the Middle East.

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Samantha Power on the status of LGBTQI+ rights globally, from Uganda to Ukraine

Daniel Hojnacki — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 20:15:16 +0000

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USAID Administrator Samantha Power on advancing LGBTQI+ inclusive development

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on the United States’ efforts to advance global LGBTQI+ human rights and USAID’s commitment to global inclusion.

Human Rights Resilience & Society

The passage of Uganda’s law criminalizing LGTBQI+ identity is only one recent example of efforts to turn the global human-rights agenda “on its head,” said Samantha Power, administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). And “it’s not just happening in Uganda,” she warned.

Power spoke at a Pride Month special edition of Atlantic Council Front Page on Wednesday, where she discussed USAID’s role in advancing LGBTQI+ inclusive development globally.

She addressed some of the agency’s most difficult challenges when it comes to achieving its inclusive development goals, including anti-LGBTQI+ discrimination—legal or otherwise—that prevents vulnerable communities from receiving needed services. “Even where there’s not a law,” Power said, discrimination is “a deterrent” that often stops people from accessing care and assistance.

Power also discussed USAID’s efforts to promote the development of a more inclusive postwar Ukraine. “Ukraine’s work to liberalize and build checks and balances and build in human-rights protections”—including for LGBTQI+ rights—“has accelerated,” she said.

She also argued for prioritizing LGBTQI+ human rights on the global stage. If the United States “[goes] quiet,” she said, “I think we would really shortchange what is distinguishing about American foreign policy.”

Power also previewed a new USAID policy promoting LGBTQI+ inclusive development, which she said would be the “first-of-its-kind.”

Below are more highlights from the discussion on USAID’s efforts to advance LGBTQI+ human rights and inclusive development, moderated by Washington Post and MSNBC journalist Jonathan Capehart.

Steps back—and leaps forward

Uganda’s recently passed Anti-Homosexuality Act “would set back not only the health of LGBTQI+ communities,” but the health of all Ugandans, Power said. The Biden administration has publicly criticized the bill, joining leaders in thirty-one other countries in condemning the Ugandan law.
Power explained that USAID works with local actors when determining how to best oppose discriminatory laws. “It’s the communities that are going to be affected by these laws that provide cues to us on how vocal to be” against anti-LGBTQI+ legislation, the USAID administrator said. Otherwise, the United States could risk becoming the center of attention and “potentially triggering nationalism and other forces.” Such a backlash, Power said, is “just what people who would seek to repress or terrorize vulnerable communities would like to see happen.”
Despite challenges and setbacks in some countries, there are nevertheless signs that international LGBTQI+ human-rights norms are gaining ground, Power explained: Same-sex marriage legalization, as was recently accomplished in Estonia, as well as the decriminalization of same-sex relations in countries such as Barbados and Singapore indicate that “these principles are getting traction,” she said.

Inclusive reconstruction in Ukraine

Power explained that Ukraine has made progress on LGBTQI+ rights since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion; she said it is “remarkable that a country that’s fighting for its life and its people” has also managed to extend LGBTQI+ protections through legislative measures, regulations, and judicial vetting.
Power argued that Ukraine’s mission to “[integrate] into Europe,” will encourage the Ukrainian legal and social ecosystems to increase their support for LGBTQI+ communities. “The criteria that Ukraine is going to need to meet, the roadmap and so forth, is going to entail much stronger protections than have existed in the past,” she said.
The commitment to inclusive postwar reconstruction in Ukraine is in line with the Ukrainian peoples’ motivation for resisting Russian aggression, Power argued. “Part of what Ukraine is fighting for and part of what Russia is trying to squelch is liberalization, is [a] broad understanding of who human rights protections apply to,” she said.

The role of LGBTQI+ human rights in US foreign policy

Prioritizing LGBTQI+ human rights is consistent with the United States’ economic development and foreign policy interests, Power said. “It is in our interest to fight repression,” she said. “It is in our foreign-policy interest to stand up for our values.”
Power argued that the United States’ human-rights commitments obligate it to advocate LGBTQI+ rights in its foreign policy, leaving no room for neutrality on the issue, Power said. “Imagine the counterfactual,” she said. A US foreign policy that did not promote LGBTQI+ rights would “legitimate some of the [anti-LGBTQI+] rhetoric and actions and legal measures that are being put forward,” she said.
Power pushed back on the criticism that promoting global LGBTQI+ human rights abroad interferes with other countries’ affairs. She said that the United States hears such complaints about interference often from Russia—even as it invades Ukraine—as well as from countries that sell surveillance technology and spread disinformation beyond their borders. “The noninterference claim is usually made in a selective way,” she said.

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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Success is not just showing up. Blinken’s Caribbean trip needs to deliver.

Wazim Mowla — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:43:58 +0000

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to the Caribbean cannot be a wasted opportunity. The July 5-6 trip begins in Trinidad and Tobago—where heads of government and state will gather for the fiftieth anniversary of the Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM) formation—and ends in Guyana. On the surface, this is a win for US-Caribbean relations, as it comes off the back of several high-level US visits to the region.

In the past twelve months, Vice President Kamala Harris launched the US-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030, welcomed leaders to Washington, and met in person with leaders in The Bahamas. This has helped build goodwill in the region. But US visits and diplomatic engagement have yet to yield many results. Simply put, if Blinken arrives in the Caribbean with little to announce, frustration is likely to brew.

Blinken’s visit must start an action-oriented agenda for the region. He should focus on two key areas of cooperation. First, the United States should work with multilateral development banks (MDBs) to provide access to low-cost and low-interest financing to high- and middle-income Caribbean countries. Second, Washington should provide requisite tools to local private sector businesses so they can play a larger role in the region’s own development.

For the United States, the consequences of insufficient action so far are evident. Given the enormity of the challenges facing the Caribbean, the region’s leaders are seeking solutions to their problems elsewhere. Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley has taken to the global stage to overhaul MDB financing, Guyana is welcoming investment in its oil sector from all corners of the world, and Trinidad and Tobago is increasing engagement with Venezuela over shared gas reserves. Other Caribbean leaders see African countries, India, and China as attractive partners that can provide financing, investment, and aid.

This does not mean that US presence in the region will evaporate. The Caribbean’s proximity to the United States, strong trade relations, and a large US-based diaspora ties the partners together. But US government officials must realize that the United States will no longer be the only actor with which Caribbean leaders will engage. Therefore, if the United States wants to remain relevant in the region, now is the moment to deliver real solutions to the challenges facing its Caribbean neighbors.

A plan to amplify financial instruments

The first step should be working with MDBs, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, to amplify new financial instruments to support access to concessional financing for Caribbean countries. Most Caribbean countries are classified as high- or middle-income, which means that they are not able to access low-cost and low-interest financing from MDBs to fund needed infrastructure or social programs in times of crisis. Part of this work is ongoing, with the World Bank recently announcing a debt pause on loan repayments for developing countries hit by natural disasters.

However, the pause only applies to new loans, not existing ones. Given the specific vulnerabilities of Caribbean countries, which extend beyond just the effects of climate change–induced events, the United States should work with MDBs to create a specific carve-out for small island development states such as the CARICOM countries. Hurricanes and other natural disasters pose significant risks to the Caribbean. But due to the small size and openness of their economies, so do other external events, such as pandemics, the volatility of commodity prices, and disruptions in supply chains. These external risks should be accounted for as well, because if another COVID-19 pandemic occurred today, Caribbean countries would still be on the hook for loan repayments.

Charging up the private sector

The United States should also work closer with local businesses to embolden the Caribbean private sector. Big infrastructure projects in the Caribbean, such as roads, bridges, and new buildings, are mostly led by governments. The private sector is often left out, as local banks provide only limited financing or loans with high interest rates. This creates a vast asymmetry between government and private sector resources, with governments scoring political points from new infrastructure projects, while the skills, expertise, and capital that bring these projects to fruition result in little benefit for local companies. Foreign companies, therefore, reap the benefits, with returns on projects benefitting external actors rather than populations in the Caribbean, including the business community. This creates a dependency on the state to provide jobs, resources, and skills to citizens, meaning that the distribution of these resources is tied to the government of the day.

To address this, the United States should create a US-Caribbean Public Private Partnership program that incubates small businesses in the region. The objective should be to train small businesses and transfer skills and technologies to local companies so that they can scale to a level where they are competitive in bidding rounds for upcoming projects. This is all the more important in the construction and energy sectors, as new climate-resilient infrastructure and energy systems are needed in the Caribbean now and going forward. The benefits would be twofold. First, a stronger and more robust private sector should strengthen and stabilize the region’s financial sector, making Caribbean countries less susceptible to volatility in global markets. Second, the larger the private sector, the more jobs will be available to citizens. This should stimulate domestic growth and create more diverse job opportunities outside of public service and the tourism industry—two sectors highly vulnerable to climate change and growing debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratios.

It is a consequential moment for the Caribbean—its challenges grow worse each day. To survive the next few decades, it needs the support of its partners, including the United States. High-level visits alone will not suffice. To capitalize on the goodwill the United States has built in the Caribbean, Blinken’s trip should mark the beginning of an active policy toward the region. Working with MDBs and supporting private sector growth would be a giant step forward.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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#AtlanticDebrief – What were the main takeaways from the EUCO summit? | A Debrief from Dave Keating

nlawler — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:13:48 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

What were the main outcomes from the recent European Council summit? Why are European Council summits important? How did EU leaders come together to address the latest European issues from Russia’s war in Ukraine, de-risking from China, and migration?

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Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 20:57:02 +0000

The recent Wagner mutiny in Russia was a short-lived affair but it has succeeded in exposing the myth of Vladimir Putin as a formidable political strongman who will go to extremes to achieve his goals. In reality, Putin’s failure to punish mutinous troops who seized a major Russian city and marched on Moscow has revealed him as a weak leader who is more inclined to capitulate than escalate.

This makes a mockery of longstanding international concerns over “provoking Putin” that have done so much to slow down the flow of Western military aid to Ukraine over the past sixteen months. The Russian dictator’s feeble response to the Wagner rebellion should now serve as a strong signal to increase Western support for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive.

Putin’s handling of the Wagner mutiny compares unfavorably to the conduct of his predecessor in the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin, and that of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Yeltsin famously led opposition to the failed coup in August 1991 that sealed the fate of the USSR. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Zelenskyy rejected offers to evacuate and instead announced that he was staying in Kyiv. In contrast, Putin was notably absent during the first day of the Wagner mutiny when Russia appeared to be in real danger. Subsequent attempts to minimize the damage via a series of carefully choreographed public appearances have merely served to highlight Putin’s earlier absence.

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In hindsight, none of this is surprising. Throughout his career, Putin has made a habit of backing down whenever he has found himself confronted by a determined adversary. In 2014, Putin occupied Crimea without a fight but then got cold feet when faced with fierce resistance in eastern Ukraine. Instead of pressing home his overwhelming military advantage and seizing the whole of eastern and southern Ukraine, he settled for less than half of the Donbas region. Likewise, Putin ordered no direct military response when Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015, and took no action three years later when clashes with US forces in Syria led to the heavy casualties among Russian Wagner troops.

Like a true bully, Putin only embarked on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine because he believed the country was an easy target. His intelligence agencies claimed the Ukrainian military would not fight back and assured him that most ordinary Ukrainians would welcome his invading army as liberators. Crucially, Putin was also confident the Western response would be as half-hearted as it had been in 2014 when he invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine. These miscalculations have proven extremely costly for Russia.

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Ukraine’s resolute resistance and the West’s powerful military support have placed Putin in a quandary. He has responded with empty bluster, declaring a series of meaningless red lines while refraining from any attacks on the NATO countries engaged in arming Ukraine. Throughout the war, Putin has used nuclear blackmail in a bid to intimidate Western leaders, but even this extreme measure is proving increasingly ineffective. In September 2022, he vowed to use nuclear weapons to defend recently annexed Ukrainian lands, declaring, “I’m not bluffing.” However, when Ukrainian forces called his bluff and continued to advance, he did not act on his earlier nuclear threats.

This lack of decisive leadership has contributed to the poor battlefield performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. Demoralized Russian troops have barely advanced since summer 2022, and spent more than ten months capturing the small city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin was at pains to state that his recent mutiny was against Russia’s army chiefs rather than Putin himself, but the Russian dictator must ultimately accept personal responsibility for the disastrous invasion. After all, he has stood by his failing commanders despite their obvious shortcomings, and has consistently placed loyalty above competence.

Putin’s emphasis on loyalty reflects his fear of domestic opposition. For much of his reign, he has been preoccupied with the idea of losing power through a popular uprising or palace coup. This has led to the elimination of all political opponents and the silencing of independent media in today’s Russia. It has also shaped the conduct of the current war, with Putin deeply reluctant to undertake a new round of mobilization that could further destabilize the situation inside Russia.

The Wagner mutiny demonstrated that these fears of a domestic uprising are entirely justified. Wagner troops were able to capture Rostov-on-Don without a fight and then advance virtually unopposed across Russia to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. Strikingly, thousands of ordinary Russians in Rostov-on-Don welcomed the Wagner takeover of the city and openly demonstrated their backing for the mutiny.

Meanwhile, there was little evidence of any surge in support for Putin, either among the public or within the ranks of the Russian military and security services. Putin’s obvious reluctance to hold Prigozhin or his troops accountable for their actions has now further undermined morale within the armed forces and raised the prospect of infighting engulfing Russia.

Putin’s toothless response to Prigozhin’s mutiny has sent a signal that he is far from the all-powerful ruler of Kremlin propaganda, and is in fact much weaker than previously imagined. Many within the Russian elite now recognize this reality and are growing increasingly alarmed over the fragility of the current regime. They understand that Putin has lost his legitimacy as a strongman ruler and is leading Russia toward an uncertain future of deepening domestic divisions and international isolation. Understandably, thoughts are now turning to the post-Putin era.

Western leaders should respond to the Wagner affair by doubling down on their military aid to Ukraine. Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, misplaced concerns over possible Russian escalation have served to limit weapons deliveries to Kyiv, when a more decisive approach might have already ended the war. With Putin’s weakness now on display for all to see, the time has come to provide Ukraine with everything it needs to secure victory.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

The upper echelons of the Islamic Republic were quick to respond to the events. “The Islamic Republic of Iran supports the rule of law in the Russian Federation,” noted the Foreign Ministry spokesman on June 24 without any mention of Putin, adding that the mutiny was a “domestic affair.” Russian media reported that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi spoke with Putin on the same day, but didn’t provide any details on what was discussed. Meanwhile, the Iranian foreign minister spoke with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov regarding “developments related to the situation in some regions of Russia”—a reference to the events in Bakhmut, where the rebellion came to a head. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said that Moscow would “pass this phase” and warned against “foreign interference.”

State media outlets gave a better sense of how the higher-ups interpreted the revolt. Nour News, closely tied to the Supreme National Security Council, tweeted that, although the Wagner Group could have “destructive psychological effects due to its involvement in the Ukraine war,” the group “lacks the necessary strength to challenge the Russian army.”

خلاصه جنگ روسیه و واگنرا در 19ثانیه#حسن_ختام #روسیه #کودتا #واگنر #واگنرها pic.twitter.com/zxBIwqETOp
— trader mohamad (@Shobeirinasab) June 25, 2023

Meme’d scene from Braveheart

After the Wagner Group rebellion seemingly ended, on June 25, state media outlets covered the events with front-page headlines that mostly took jabs at the mercenary leader and his forces. Hardline daily Kayhan played into common conspiracy theories blaming the West and NATO. A headline for the hardline newspaper Javan read, “Treacherous dagger did not cut it,” referring to Prigozhin stabbing Putin in the back. Even pro-regime social media users made light of the events, with one posting a meme’d scene from Braveheart, with Ukraine and the United States watching gleefully as Wagner and Russian fighters are about to clash, only to see them kiss and make up.

Reformist papers took a slightly nuanced approach. Pro-reform Hammihan newspaper published an op-ed about how the rebellion may be an “alarm bell” for Tehran not to rely solely on the East—a reference to China and Russia. Similarly, a dissenting voice came from the former head of the parliament’s National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh. He argued that “it was naturally clear that Putin cannot have a stable future” and that Russia was heading “back to the [Boris] Yeltsin period.”

None of these reactions are much of a surprise. A pro-Russia angle was expected from the Islamic Republic, given that it is one of Moscow’s main military backers.

Since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Iran has been providing hundreds of attack drones to Russia and is currently delivering materials to build an Iranian unmanned-aerial-vehicle manufacturing plant east of Moscow. The two countries are also heavily relying on one another as part of a sanctions evasion axis, having reportedly conducted $4.9 billion in trade during 2022 (up 20 percent compared to 2021).

There’s a soft power element as well, with Russian tourists making Iran a top three tourist destination (after Turkey and India). Additionally, a historical drama series named Khatoon (“Once Upon a Time in Iran”), which portrays the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran during World War II, became a point of controversy in Iran for not depicting Moscow favorably.

اجاره‌ی این گروه‌ وانگر‌‌ واسه یک هفته چقدر میشه ؟ #کودتا pic.twitter.com/28o7xkaLm2
— Daenerys 𓃬︎︎ (@Queennkhaleesi) June 25, 2023

“How much does it cost to rent the Wagner Group for a week?”

Whereas official organs of the Islamic Republic attempted to downplay the events in Russia, many Iranians joked on social media about the possibility of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei getting “orphaned if Daddy Putin falls,” while one asked how much it cost to “rent the Wagner Group for a week” in order to take out Khamenei. Another Iranian quipped that it was as if the late IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and the Supreme Leader were going head-to-head and that the former was coming to take Tehran.

That last tweet was particularly reflective of the thoughts of a portion of Iranian society, as they pondered whether similar events could play out in Iran in the near future. For years, some Iranians have held on to the idea that when the Supreme Leader eventually passes away, the IRGC would take the helm of the country in the form of a social liberal military dictatorship—something that has only intensified in recent months due to the ongoing anti-establishment protests that began in September 2022. Separately, Pahlavi, a leading Western-based opposition figure to the Islamic Republic, has repeatedly called on IRGC members who have not committed atrocities to defect and join the people to overthrow the regime (hence the meme at the beginning of the piece).

While the IRGC is no monolith and has its own external operations arm—the Quds Force, which could arguably have parallels drawn between it and the Wagner Group (the former is also state-funded but has roles in conflicts such as Libya, Mali, and Ukraine), it is best to stay clear of such comparisons.

The role of the IRGC since the 1980s was to protect the Islamic Republic from inside and outside threats, including mass uprisings, coup d’états, and foreign interventions. Consequently, the IRGC shares the ideology of the Velayat-e Faqih itself. Since Khamenei became Supreme Leader in 1989, the IRGC has played a larger role not just domestically—by controlling much of the Iranian economy, swaying elections, and crushing dissent—but also externally, with its involvement in countries in the region (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen). It is highly unlikely that the IRGC would defect in its entirety from the clerical establishment to overthrow its leadership.

What the IRGC continues to do is have its members occupy high positions in government, with the Raisi cabinet having the most positions occupied by the IRGC compared to past administrations. The Guards will continue to maintain a key role as the right hand of the next Supreme Leader whenever succession does occur.

Given the news out of Russia, like much of the international community, the security and intelligence apparatus of the Islamic Republic was watching the events closely to see its outcome. Had Prigozhin followed through with his plans and succeeded at ousting Putin, Tehran’s calculations with one of its top allies would’ve had to adjust accordingly. However, an aborted attack on Moscow is merely seen by Tehran as a nuisance for Putin in the same way that the Russian president likely views the ongoing anti-regime protests in Iran as an annoyance for the clerical establishment. In November 2022, Raisi and Putin discussed deepening bilateral ties at the height of protests in Iran, and the Russian president reportedly didn’t even bring up the unrest.

For those betting on the IRGC, perhaps the lesson of the Wagner Group’s failed rebellion in Russia—which was about a personal vendetta against an authoritarian leader more than anything—is that only the people of Iran and Russia can control their destinies.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

The post Could the IRGC pull a Wagner Group move in Iran? That’s what some Iranians are hoping for. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Egyptians aren’t racist. They’re frustrated with Western appropriation of their ancient history.

Shahira Amin — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 15:13:23 +0000

“This is the land of my ancestors,” American actor Danny Glover proudly said to a small group of journalists, including myself, in December 2006, as he kneeled and kissed the ground at the Pyramids of Giza.

I soon discovered that Glover’s conviction is shared by many other American performers of African descent, who take pride in the notion that the kings and queens of ancient Egypt are their ancestors. Many African-American musicians and artists embrace their purported connection with ancient Egyptian civilization, drawing inspiration from it for their music and art.

The idea is rooted in Afrocentrism, a cultural and political movement that originated around the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—when the colonial era ended and slavery was abolished—to counter Eurocentrism, which favors European and Western civilization over non-Western civilizations. The pushback against the colonialist ideas of supposed white superiority empowers Africans in the diaspora who—based on the Afrocentric theory—can be proud of their alleged links to the ancient kingdom that has fascinated the modern world with its art and culture.

Best known for his roles in the Lethal Weapon franchise, Glover, who also provided the voice for Jethro—Tzipporah’s father in the 1998 animated film, The Prince of Egypt—jokingly said to me that he identifies as Egyptian during a 2018 visit to Aswan to attend an African film festival.

However, as much as Afrocentrists claim that ancient Egypt was a predominantly black civilization, it has been refuted by the Egyptian government, which has been promoting ancient Egyptian civilization as the chief element of Egyptian heritage.

This was evident from the lavish parade organized by the state in 2021 to transport twenty-two royal mummies from the Egyptian museum to their new resting place—the National Museum of Civilizations—which featured a rare performance by an Egyptian soprano, who sang in an ancient Egyptian language no longer spoken today. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was on hand to welcome the ancient Egyptian mummies upon arriving at the museum.

Many Egyptians shun their Africanness, preferring to associate themselves with the Middle East and identify as Muslims and Arabs. African refugees in Egypt often complain of harassment and discrimination and claim Egyptians are “racist,” looking down on Sub-Saharan Africans as inferior. Egypt’s Coptic Christians and secularists, meanwhile, choose to distance themselves from Arabism and Islam, associating themselves with ancient Egyptian heritage instead. This is part of a xenophobic nationalism that emerged as a push back against the 2012-2013 rule of the Muslim Brotherhood as opponents of the Islamist group feared that Islamist President Mohammed Morsi would seek to “Islamize” society.

As a result, a series of recent incidents have rubbed Egyptians the wrong way, triggering accusations of “Afrocentrism” from critics and a firestorm on Egyptian social media platforms.

The latest of these is the exhibition “Kemet: Egypt in Hip-Hop, Jazz, Soul, and Funk,” currently being held at the National Museum of Antiquities in the Dutch city of Leiden. The exhibit which continues until September 3, takes visitors on “a musical journey through history,” according to its webpage. The show explores the influence of ancient Egypt in the works of Western musicians of African descent, showcasing photographs, music videos, album covers, and artworks that explain how ancient Egypt served as an inspiration to these artists and how it is reflected in their music.

The mere suggestion by the curators that “Egypt is a part of Africa” has drawn a backlash from the Egyptian government, which retaliated by banning the museum’s team of archaeologists from excavating in Saqqara. At a parliamentary session on May 2, Ahmed Belal, an Egyptian member of parliament, slammed the exhibit, accusing the curators of “distorting Egyptian identity” and “attacking Egyptian heritage and civilization.”

Joining the chorus of condemnation, many Egyptians took to social media to express their rejection of “attempts to distort our history.” Photos of a sculpture showcased at the exhibition, which depicted King Tutankhamun as black, widely circulated on social media platforms and were deemed “offensive” by critics. The backlash from Egyptians prompted the show’s organizers to publish an additional webpage that unapologetically explained the exhibition’s aim, warning that “racist” comments would not be tolerated and would be removed.

The uproar over the controversial exhibition came on the heels of an online hullaballoo over the trailer of a Netflix series portraying Cleopatra as black. The fact that a non-white actress—Adele James—was selected to play the role of the ancient Egyptian queen in the historical series Queen Cleopatra infuriated many Egyptians who accused Netflix of “deliberately erasing and reinterpreting history” and “spreading misinformation.”

Speaking to BNN Breaking, Dr. Zahi Hawas, a prominent archaeologist, insisted that Cleopatra was not black nor of African descent. He argued that she was “of Greek descent” and “resembled the queens and princesses of Macedonia.” Egyptian satirist Bassem Youssef also criticized the casting of a mixed-race actress in the Netflix series. In an episode of Piers Morgan Uncensored, he called the decision “cultural appropriation ” and “falsification of history.”

The Netflix series also spurred a lawsuit against the California-based streaming platform, which was filed by Egyptian lawyer Essam Khalaf. He demanded the Queen Cleopatra series be retracted, describing it as “historical forgery.” Another lawyer, Mahmoud El Sennary, also filed a legal complaint against the streaming service with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, accusing it of “blackwashing Cleopatra.”

The casting of James in the Netflix series and the Leiden exhibition are not the only incidents that have recently sparked controversy in Egypt.

In March, American comedian Kevin Hart had his planned show in Cairo canceled over “Afrocentric remarks” he had allegedly made.

Hart is believed to have said, “We must teach our children the true history of Black Africans when they were kings in Egypt and not just the era of slavery cemented by education in America. Do you remember the time when we were kings?”

Although it is unclear if and when Hart had made the remarks, Egyptian social media users called for the show’s cancellation, accusing him of “blackwashing” their history.

In what appears to be an attempt to appease the nationalists, the authorities decided to call off the comedian’s Cairo debut, citing “logistical issues.”

The angry reactions of Egyptians to the incidents mentioned above have raised eyebrows in the West. Many Europeans and Americans fail to understand the fuss. Why are Egyptians so touchy over any suggested links between Africans in the diaspora and ancient Egypt? A plausible explanation is that decades of looting and trafficking of Egyptian cultural artifacts have made Egyptians defensive—they fear that their heritage and culture are being hijacked. It hasn’t helped that many of the ancient artifacts that were seized during the colonialist era, such as the Rosetta Stone—seized from Egypt by forces of the British empire in 1801—continue to be in possession of other states.

Statements like the one made by former US President John F. Kennedy in 1961—that the United States had “a special interest in the civilization of ancient Egypt from which many of our cultural traditions have sprung”—are seen by Egyptians as appropriation of their ancient civilization. While Kennedy meant well—at the time he was trying to convince Congress to appropriate $10 million of US taxpayer money to rescue Nubian monuments from flooding—similar statements by other Westerners laying claim to ancient Egyptian heritage are not always made in good faith.

Although comments by some Egyptians on social media in reaction to the Leiden exhibit and the Queen Cleopatra series can indeed be dismissed as “racist,” colonialist attitudes denying Egyptians the right to ownership of their history and culture are equally abhorrent.

Perhaps the Arabic hashtag used by social media activists to criticize Netflix says it all: “Egypt for Egyptians.” Egyptians are growing increasingly frustrated with what they perceive as imperialist agendas and attempts to separate them from what is rightfully theirs: their cherished heritage. Western cultural appropriation of ancient Egyptian civilization is a pattern that has persisted since the colonialist era, and Egyptians are now responding with the same nationalist slogan used during the Urabi revolt which demanded an end to British and French hegemony over their country. It is their way of saying, “Enough is enough.”

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

The post Egyptians aren’t racist. They’re frustrated with Western appropriation of their ancient history. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How to advance women’s rights in Afghanistan

Roya Rahmani — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 15:00:00 +0000

Download PDF

Top lines

Terrorist groups and extremist ideology will fill the social vacuum created by the erasure of Afghanistan’s women.
Providing Afghan women with rights and opportunities must be at the top of the regional and global security agenda.
Shifting from humanitarian aid to economic development projects could give the West leverage over the Taliban and is better for the long-term health of the country.

Roya Rahmani and Melanne Verveer discuss Afghan women as the way forward and how the international community should engage now, nearly two years after the fall of Kabul. (Rahmani and Verveer’s biographies are below.)

Worth a thousand words

Source: SIGAR, February 2021 report on Support for Gender Equality, 40.

The diagnosis

During the twenty-year US intervention in Afghanistan, metrics gauging women’s health and education and women’s presence in local and national politics all improved.
Since August 2021, those gains are at risk of reversal. Women’s rights have deteriorated, and the international community’s efforts to engage with the Taliban and support Afghan women have been unsuccessful.
Carrots such as international recognition and sticks such as public condemnations and threats of NGO withdrawal have proven ineffective, yet these strategies are endlessly recycled.
The international community and multilateral organizations remain disengaged from strategic policymaking, passively supplying humanitarian aid without directing funding toward strategic future goals.
The West lacks both knowledge of and leverage over Afghanistan’s leadership.

The prescription

Establish a more robust forum for international consultation. Ad hoc consultations aren’t working: Regular meetings of experienced representatives need to be established. The core group should include the United States, the United Kingdom, several European Union countries, key Islamic countries such as Qatar and Indonesia, and NGO and multilateral representatives with on-the-ground knowledge.

Keep security strategy at the heart of engagement. Place the security implications of women’s oppression on every agenda of every meeting. As society disintegrates further, more room is created for terrorist groups to flourish, as shown by the growth of the Islamic State group’s offshoot ISIS-K.

Send female diplomats and delegations from Islamic countries. Bilateral engagement should feature overwhelmingly female delegations and prioritize consultative meetings with Afghan women to hear their perspectives on community needs. Furthermore, Islamic countries and organizations need to be key partners in the West’s efforts for humanitarian relief and overall engagement. Not only do they have the expertise and credibility needed to engage and advise on practical mechanisms for the implementation of programming, but direct engagement between more moderate Islamic countries and the Taliban could be influential. Qatar is a particularly important partner because of its role as an international interlocutor with access to the highest ranks of the Taliban.

Use aid as leverage by strategizing beyond immediate relief. Shifting Western aid from a focus on emergency humanitarian assistance to more sustainable, large-scale economic development initiatives reorients the sense of dependency from the people to the Taliban regime, which also creates a new potential point of leverage for the international community. Donors should craft aid distribution networks that are more local and grassroots, and use creative approaches to keep women at the center of all aid initiatives. This could mean developing aid programs specifically for widows, forming local partnerships that explicitly require the adoption of female-specific tasks.

Take advantage of the internet, and prioritize development projects that keep Afghans connected. Unlike during the 1990s Taliban regime, most Afghans have a mobile phone, internet access, and social media. These new tools must be used proactively by the international community to disseminate key information about the Taliban’s failures, coordinate mobilization, and provide educational resources. Development projects focused on connectivity and subsidizing local media will help keep information flowing into and out of Afghanistan.

Bottom lines

A personal note

“While the regime stays in power, concrete steps have to be taken within the current context to counteract urgent security threats, provide critical aid, get children back in schools after a year-and-a-half gap, and address other imminent issues. Recycling policies from 1996 will not work. After twenty years of societal transformation, Afghanistan is a fundamentally different place.

Without innovation, no progress can be made.

Similarly, without engagement, no progress can be made.

Like other Afghan women, my entire life has been shaped by one conflict after another. Born on the eve of the Saur Revolution, I lived through the Soviet invasion, the Civil War, and the Taliban’s 1990s rule. Until the intervention, each chapter that unfolded was heartbreak anew. The revival of democracy and freedom brought hope. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 was even more painful and shocking than anything before because it shattered an era that had been characterized by so much progress.

I have fought for women’s rights my whole life: the right to go to school and have an income, a voice, and autonomy. I am deeply disturbed and angered by what Afghan women are currently experiencing, and I share the instinctive desire to disengage from Afghanistan entirely given the Taliban’s inhumanity—or at the very least condition aid on women’s rights. However, this does nothing to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis. People simply suffer. Ultimately, we must be doing all that is possible to save lives. It is my hope that this report can help to make the road ahead clearer. The futures of so many Afghans—young girls banned from school, women imprisoned in their own homes, and an entire generation whose dreams have been crushed—depend on what we do now.”

—Roya Rahmani

Like what you read? Check out the full report here:

Download PDF

Ambassador Roya Rahmani has over twenty years’ experience working with governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. She currently serves as a distinguished fellow at Georgetown University’s Global Institute for Women Peace and Security, the chair of Delphos International LTD, a global financial advisory firm based in Washington, DC, and a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. Rahmani was the first woman to serve as Afghanistan’s ambassador to the United States of America and held the role from 2018 to 2021. She was also the first woman to serve as Afghanistan’s ambassador to Indonesia, serving from 2016 to 2018. She holds a bachelor’s degree in software engineering from McGill University and a master’s degree in public administration from Columbia University.

Ambassador Melanne Verveer is executive director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security, and board director at the Atlantic Council. Verveer previously served as the first US Ambassador for Global Women’s Issues, a position to which she was nominated by President Barack Obama in 2009. She coordinated foreign policy issues and activities relating to the political, economic and social advancement of women, traveling to nearly sixty countries. She worked to ensure that women’s participation and rights are fully integrated into US foreign policy, and she played a leadership role in the administration’s development of the US National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. President Obama also appointed her to serve as the US Representative to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Learn more

SouthAsiaSource Oct 20, 2022

The lionesses of Kabul & Tehran in Khorasan

By Davood Moradian

Afghan and Iranian women continue to be denied their basic human rights, and this shared struggle is built on an overlapping Iranian-Afghan history and civilizational space known as the Iranian plateau.

Afghanistan Human Rights

SouthAsiaSource Sep 26, 2022

To support Afghan women activists, prioritize local knowledge over numbers

By Sophie Mae Berman and Yelena Biberman

Though Afghan women have been included in certain peacebuilding efforts, these experiences were largely tokenist and minimally empowering.

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

SouthAsiaSource Mar 29, 2022

Let Afghan girls learn

By Nilofar Sakhi

The Taliban must be held accountable for the damage they have caused and continue to inflict upon the people–and most critically the women and girls–of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Education

Maximizing US foreign aid for strategic competition

Patrick Quirk, Caitlin Dearing Scott — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 14:30:00 +0000

Introduction

The United States has reshaped how it uses military and economic tools to compete with China, Russia, and other adversaries. The United States is increasingly adept at deploying military assets, as well as a range of financial sanctions or trade deals, to weaken China or Russia’s position and advance its own. Yet, the United States has not calibrated all statecraft tools for this competition. This includes how and where it uses foreign aid.

For more than fifty years, foreign aid has been a core form of US engagement in the developing world. To advance its interests, the United States has provided loans, technical assistance, and direct budget support to developing nations to promote economic growth and more representative forms of governance.

A fully developed strategy for using foreign aid across all sectors—economic, education, security assistance, and democracy support—can provide critical reinforcement to the military and economic pillars of strategic competition. To be sure, the United States has reorganized parts of its bureaucracy and launched new initiatives to enhance how it uses foreign aid to compete with China. The US Department of State recently launched a new Office of China Coordination, informally known as China House, to coordinate China policy. The Biden administration announced a flagship Group of Seven Plus (G7+) initiative for the advancement of strategic, values-driven, and high-standard infrastructure and investment in low- and middle-income countries. Congress initiated foreign-aid funds dedicated to countering Chinese malign influence in foreign political systems.¹ New embassies in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Tonga, among other potential locations, are welcome developments that will provide the sustained presence necessary to engage governments and push back against Beijing’s influence, as well as help identify ways to use foreign aid to compete.

These changes are necessary, but far from sufficient to maximize the impact of foreign aid to compete with China and Russia. The power of foreign aid as a tool of US influence is not lost on its adversaries. The most prevalent example is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has spent hundreds of billions of dollars for years to expand its influence in developing nations. Recently, China has increased BRI spending and shifted from its original focus on infrastructure megaprojects to the less capital-intensive, but still impactful, fields of governance (e.g., training elected officials in Beijing’s governance model); funding for academic departments to promote pro-Chinese narratives; green-energy projects; and funding for pro-China media outlets.² Under the BRI umbrella, China uses foreign aid in these and other sectors to promote policies and politicians favorable to PRC interests. The United States is, therefore, compelled to play a game of catchup.

Fully harnessing the potential of US foreign aid in this struggle requires fundamental reforms to the congressional processes involved in overseeing aid allocations and earmarks; reforms to bureaucratic agencies tasked with spending foreign aid; improvements to US modes for delivering this assistance; and a narrowing of scope to areas most critical for advancing US interests. Needed reforms include the following.

Realign spending to focus on allies and countries strategically important to US competition with China and Russia, including reconsidering assistance mechanisms based solely on income level, with an aim of investing in allies and partners that advance US interests.
Make delivering for allies and shoring up democracy core pillars guiding how the United States uses foreign aid to compete with China and Russia. Investments in strong democratic institutions—such as political parties, independent legislators, independent media, and civil society—will yield dividends in countering foreign authoritarian influence.
Invest to empower pro-democracy elements in backsliding or authoritarian countries. The United States must respond asymmetrically in countries with pervasive authoritarian capture, using foreign assistance in ways that empower individuals and institutions to expose and put pressure on the regime elements that perpetuate corruption and enable foreign influence.
Congress should pass legislation (the Non-Kinetic Competition Act) requiring the executive to submit multiyear plans outlining the US approach—harnessing all nonmilitary statecraft tools, including foreign aid—to competing with China in select priority countries.
Focus on geography and interests, rather than sectors, to ensure maximum flexibility, strategies rooted in country-specific needs, and longer-term planning.
Increase spending to expand partner-nation resilience to Beijing and Moscow coercion and cooptation. Strong democratic institutions increase a country’s ability to detect, prevent, and mitigate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence operations. Priorities should include support for independent media, parliamentary diplomacy, and educational and technical exchanges, all of which have proven effective at building democratic resilience to foreign authoritarian influence.
Empower the State Department’s Office of Foreign Assistance Resources to fulfill its mandate of aligning foreign aid with policy goals and maximizing impact. Enabling the Department of State to take the lead on foreign policy and control aid allocations will ensure that aid is appropriately leveraged to advance specific foreign policy objectives.
Lengthen the time horizon for US foreign-aid programs and objectives from a single year to ten. Democracy, rights, and governance programming—as well as initiatives in other sectors germane to competition—requires longer-term investment to develop strong and resilient institutions, political parties, and processes. US agencies and implementing partners need longer project times to maximize impact.
Limit branding waivers. The United States benefits from populations and governments knowing who provides aid, and its marketing needs to reflect as much.
Focus on advancing interests, rather than “localization” targets. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department should pursue partnership approaches best positioned to achieve US interests in the target country. In most, if not all, cases, this will involve working through international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that collaborate with and, as needed, build the capacity of local partners.

With the aim of encouraging the United States to more strategically use foreign assistance to advance its policy objectives, this paper outlines why the threat posed by China and Russia requires more than a kinetic solution, and why and how foreign aid is essential to winning this competition; the current US approach to foreign assistance—where it spends, on what, and via which bureaucratic mechanisms—and its strengths and shortcomings; historical lessons from using US foreign aid for strategic competition, principally during the Cold War, that are applicable today; and recommendations for reforming the US foreign-aid infrastructure, regulations, and approach to better position the United States to compete.

I. The authoritarian threat has no purely military solution

China and Russia are often portrayed as purely military threats that warrant entirely kinetic solutions. To be sure, US military deterrence through a strong Army, Navy, and Air Force—with nuclear capabilities as a foundation—will remain essential to strategic competition. Kinetic options are necessary, but not sufficient. Competition with China and Russia is playing out not only in the sea lanes of the Indo-Pacific or Ukraine’s battlefields, but in the halls of parliaments in developing nations, in efforts to influence the post-conflict political systems of war-torn countries, and at the United Nations (UN), where both China and Russia endeavor to reshape the liberal world order.

China’s primary threat to the United States is undoubtedly a military one. It is amassing weapons sufficient to invade Taiwan, and has expanded its blue-water navy with an eye toward rivaling, if not supplanting, US capabilities. Yet, the PRC is also using political and economic tools to expand its influence in developing states at the expense of US objectives.

The CCP is increasingly using economic leverage and elite capture to exert political influence, deploying information operations, party-to-party ties, and, in some cases, export of its authoritarian governance model to create favorable conditions in other countries that enable the PRC to advance its local and global interests. This includes extracting natural resources critical to its domestic production and economic growth, expanding military basing essential to Chinese military deterrence and expanded control, and coopting politicians who serve these ends and can be counted on to vote with China at the UN on issues ranging from criticism of human-rights violations in Xinjiang to the future of the International Telecommunications Union and global internet governance. Together, these tactics are corroding democratic governance and popularizing authoritarian governance in countries the world over.

The BRI has been the crown jewel in the CCP’s global influence campaign. Nearly one hundred and fifty countries from every region of the world have signed on to the BRI, presenting a significant opportunity for the PRC to exert economic and political influence on a regional and global scale.³ According to research conducted by the International Republican Institute looking at PRC influence across country contexts, “growing trade, financial, and business ties are the foundation of the PRC’s efforts to build influence in other countries’ politics.”⁴ The CCP strategically deploys economic dependence, leverage, and coercion, in addition to elite capture, to develop pro-PRC constituencies in partner countries and advance pro-PRC policies. Thus, the BRI fits into the CCP’s broader efforts to create a world safe for the party and its interests, which Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposes achieving via three initiatives that collectively articulate the CCP’s vision for the globe, titled the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative.⁵

The Global Development Initiative (GDI) seeks to expand the BRI to advance “people-centered” development, China’s catchphrase for its model of development that prioritizes economic advancement at the expense of human rights. The GDI—and PRC promotion of it—is explicit in its rejection of “Western” definitions of development, which incorporate human rights as a core tenet.⁶ China has been rallying countries to join the GDI, with vague promises of PRC support to help them achieve their Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, with a focus on poverty and hunger alleviation and increased access to clean energy. The PRC has established a group of “Friends of the Global Development Initiative” at the UN, which counts some sixty members.⁷ The Global Security Initiative (GSI) is the CCP’s vision for building a new global “security architecture” rooted in the CCP’s definition—and model—of security and stability.⁸ With aims to increase CCP influence at the UN through increased funding and diplomatic engagement, the expansion of PRC training programs to military and police, and an expanded role serving as an arbiter in international conflicts, the GSI signals China’s intent to return to its self-avowed rightful place at “the center for the world stage.”⁹ Without naming the United States and Europe, the CCP through GSI makes clear that it seeks to provide an alternative model of alliances or “circle of friends” to counter US interests, with a particular focus on the developing world in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Pacific islands.¹⁰

The Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) is the PRC’s new framework for promoting its governance model globally, building on the foundational work of the International Liaison Department supporting political parties around the world. Whereas such party-to-party exchanges once sought to build the legitimacy of the CCP, they are now focused on advertising the value of the PRC’s system of governance more generally. The GCI formalizes this recent trend, emphasizing the need for respect for a plurality of governance models. Speaking at the World Political Parties’ Conference, organized by the CCP in March 2023, General Secretary Xi Jinping extolled the PRC’s model of “a better social system,” noting that China’s experience has broken the myth that “modernization=Westernization.”¹¹ Implicit in the GCI, with its calls for understanding “different civilizations’ understanding of values” and models, is an attempt to popularize the CCP’s model of governance and help it realize its vision of a revised global order with a CCP-led China as the central node of globalization and global governance in the decades to come.

Collectively, these three initiatives are part of China’s overall strategy to promote authoritarian solutions to the mounting challenges facing developing democracies. They have the potential to undermine the principles of liberal democracy that buttress the extant rules-based world order. For many developing countries, PRC investment and trade are an economic necessity. They are, however, never free of conditions, despite PRC claims to the contrary. Whether the terms mandate that PRC-financed infrastructure be awarded to PRC-based companies, eschew existing environmental standards, or subvert transparency and accountability disclosure terms on the contractual arrangements, PRC entities’ business and negotiating practices often have adverse effects on the recipient countries’ finances and political systems.¹²

From a security standpoint, China’s promotion of the concept of “indivisible security,” used to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its “aims to reshape norms of international security to be favorable to China and other authoritarian regimes while delegitimizing traditional military alliances,” as the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has noted, are deeply worrying.¹³ Moreover, its proclivity to export repression beyond its borders poses a serious threat to developed and developing nations alike.

China has utilized “public security” as an entry point for establishing overseas police stations in fifty-three countries around the world, providing an entry point for PRC law enforcement to engage in transnational repression and crack down on dissent and political expression among the Chinese diaspora.¹⁴ In countries with large diaspora populations, the CCP has also relied upon triads, or crime syndicates, to intimidate its critics and further its objectives at the local level. Moreover, politically, China’s promotion of its authoritarian governance model undermines good governance globally, fueling democratic backsliding and legitimizing the rise of authoritarian actors from El Salvador to Belarus.

All of this has the potential to undermine US interests on everything from internet governance to human rights, while undermining US global leadership. These tactics have dire consequences for the United States, yet the United States cannot effectively address them with purely military or trade/sanctions solutions. Military responses, whether ship deployments or arms transfers, do not help strengthen the institutions and civil society needed for countries to be resilient to PRC influence operations, or to build an alliance of democracies to counter a growing autocratic threat.

Like China, Russia poses a threat to US interests that cannot be countered with armaments or economic tools alone. Russia is squarely focused on winning its illegal war with Ukraine. Even so, we can expect Vladimir Putin’s regime will continue using a range of non-kinetic means to advance its interests in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The Kremlin’s principal goal is to foster instability and undermine alliances that counter its influence regionally and globally. It deploys a mix of political, economic, and military tactics to divide and rule.¹⁵

In the political arena, the Kremlin directly interferes in other countries’ political and electoral processes. Russia tries to influence the political playing field to be more amenable to its interests, and to inject the Kremlin’s point of view into the political discourse. The Kremlin and its affiliated entities provide financial and other incentives to political parties and politicians willing to represent and advance favorable policies in national parliaments or international institutions. Such support can include legal and illicit campaign contributions, often made by organizations set up by Russia’s agents of influence, individuals linked to Russia and Russian businesses, or Russian organizations directly. According to a recent report by the US State Department, Russia has covertly given at least $300 million to officials and politicians in more than two dozen countries since 2014, with plans to transfer more.¹⁶

Russia also targets electoral processes. Russian hackers have been accused of interfering in many elections and electoral campaigns around the world. In the 2018 presidential election in Mexico, they were reportedly involved in the spread of false information aimed at discrediting candidates to stir up divisions and polarization among voters.¹⁷ Russia similarly deploys cyberattacks, internet trolling, social media campaigns, and intrusions into state voter-registration systems to undermine political and electoral processes and create confusion as people head to the polls.¹⁸

Economically, the Kremlin employs strategic corruption to coopt elites and create pro-Kremlin proxies in media, politics, and business to push its agenda. This strategy aims to influence debates, gain support, and shape legislation in the Kremlin’s favor. This tactic is particularly effective in countries with favorable views of Russia. It helps galvanize public support and weakens alliances that conflict with the Kremlin’s interests. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), a group of investigative journalists, recently revealed an expansive Kremlin operation to bribe politicians and businesspeople in Europe.¹⁹ The International Agency for Current Policy, an informal group connected to Moscow, is behind the bribes, arranged payments, and all-expenses-paid trips to luxury resorts for numerous European politicians and investors to encourage pro-Russian political and economic actions.

Militarily, the Kremlin is deploying proxy forces like the Wagner Group to support authoritarian governments or provoke low-scale conflict across Africa, including in Mali and the Central African Republic.²⁰ Wagner Group security deployments across the continent have been at the forefront of Russian efforts to influence African politics, and have been accompanied by disinformation campaigns to advance Russia’s political and security influence.²¹ The Wagner Group has also led Kremlin efforts to develop a pro-Russia infrastructure across Africa. This infrastructure includes the Internet Research Agency troll farm to conduct disinformation campaigns, captured antidemocratic political elites, coopted companies that exploit Africa’s natural resources, and front companies posing as nongovernmental organizations.

Russia’s influence efforts around the world are supported by wide-scale propaganda and disinformation campaigns to delegitimize independent, expert journalism—and the very concept of truth—in the eyes of consumers, exploit fissures in democratic societies and exacerbate polarization in conflicted ones, undermine support for democracy and the West, and advance pro-Kremlin narratives and policies. One approach Moscow deploys are Russian-funded media outlets like RT and Sputnik. RT, formerly Russia Today, is part of a state-sponsored propaganda corporation that masquerades as a legitimate, Western-looking news and opinion-making outlet that produces content in seven languages.²² With almost $400 million coming from Russian state subsidies in 2022 alone, the company has hired Western journalists to mislead its viewers, and to make its false content seem credible to legitimate media outlets around the world. Another tactic Russia uses is fake media outlets and social media accounts to dilute legitimate media reporting and inject messaging that serves Russia’s strategic objectives. Social media have been a particularly powerful tool for Russia, whose agents have been creating tailored content to influence the beliefs of groups of voters and sway them away from anti-Russia political forces.

The contours of this challenge—from Beijing and Moscow—make clear that military and economic tools are not enough for the United States to compete and win. Kinetic efforts cannot bolster partner countries against the malign influence of the CCP and Kremlin and the associated cooptation of elites. Military tools, either security assistance or indirect effects of deterrence, cannot shape the politics and development trajectories of partner countries so that they take forms more favorable to the prosperity of their own people and US interests.

Economic-statecraft tools are more amenable to these ends—and complementary to foreign aid—but still not sufficient. Trade deals can increase US economic competitiveness vis-à-vis China by bolstering the US industrial base through opening markets to US citizens and businesses. The United States can use trade deals as an incentive for potential allies to align with US interests over those of the PRC or Kremlin and to help countries reduce their economic dependence on China and Russia. The United States can use economic sanctions to punish countries or individuals for a range of behaviors—from repressing their citizens, as in Belarus, to invading Ukraine, as with Russia—with the aim of stopping said targets from continuing these actions. Moreover, the United States can use economic measures to build a collective economic defense against economic coercion, and to deter PRC and Kremlin economic aggression.

Foreign aid is a necessary complement to kinetic and economic tools. It cannot single-handedly address all challenges listed above, but can help lead to changes—like making a country’s governance systems more resilient to foreign interference—that benefit the United States at the expense of its rivals.

II. US foreign aid: Effective tool, dated toolbox

The United States has utilized foreign assistance to advance its geopolitical interests since the end of World War II, and introduced the Marshall Plan to secure Europe’s (and Japan’s) social and economic foundations in the face of Soviet expansionism and restive communist factions.²³ The United States continued to use foreign aid as part of its strategy of containment over the next four decades, providing valuable lessons for advancing US interests in a new age of competition.

Foreign aid (interchangeably referred to as “foreign assistance”) consists of money, technical assistance, or commodities the United States provides to another country to advance a common objective. US foreign assistance can be organized into three overarching categories based on intent of spending: economic and development assistance that addresses political, economic, and development needs; humanitarian assistance that supports disaster relief and emergency operations to alleviate suffering and save lives; and security assistance, which strengthens the capacity of the military and law enforcement in other countries.²⁴

Across these three categories, foreign-aid-funded initiatives can include training rural farmers in more sustainable harvesting techniques, helping construct roadways linking peripheral towns to urban centers, or deploying specialists to advise government ministries on economic or political reform options.

The throughline connecting the three foreign-aid types—and the variation therein—is that US taxpayer dollars spent to fund these initiatives help lead to changes in the target country that benefit US interests. For instance, spending to increase the capacity and independence of government institutions can enhance transparency and provide more favorable investment conditions for US companies.

Yet, the United States spends less than 1 percent of its discretionary budget on foreign assistance, which for fiscal year (FY) 2022 amounted to$52.76 billion.²⁵ Comparatively speaking, this is a small portion of the federal budget. For the sake of contrast, it is 7 percent of the military’s FY22 $777.7-billion budget, and is nearly the exact amount the Department of Defense paid for fewer than one hundred new aircraft in FY22.²⁶

Illustrating the overall downward trend in foreign-aid spending, the United States spends roughly 50 percent less on foreign aid today, as a portion of gross domestic product (GDP), than it did during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. The similarities in the challenges the United States faced in the 1980s and today—and the disparity in resources it is marshalling to address those threats—is stark.

The United States allocates foreign aid through several departments and agencies, with the main entities being USAID and the Department of State. President John F. Kennedy established USAID in 1961 to lead the implementation of US foreign aid. Through the 1970s, USAID provided emergency food assistance that helped avert famines and helped newly independent countries establish basic governing structures. In the 1980s, USAID assistance guided economic reforms across Latin America and other regions around the world, helping stabilize economies in the face of currency and debt crises. After the Soviet Union’s fall, USAID helped new countries transition from autocracies to nascent democracies. From 2000 onward, USAID has played a central role in combatting HIV/AIDS, addressing violent extremism in fragile states, and solidifying democratic gains from the immediate post-Cold War era. In 2004, the United States expanded the agencies responsible for allocating foreign aid by establishing the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and, in 2019, the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).²⁷ These changes that foreign aid helped enable or cause have, directly or indirectly, benefited US security and economic prosperity.

What the United States has gained in scope and scale through this range of foreign-aid entities, it has lost in not having them unified by a common directive and mission for spending. The George W. Bush administration worked to address this drift by disbanding USAID policy offices, and transferred those associated oversight and policy responsibilities to a new Office of Foreign Assistance Resources at the Department of State. This change aimed to further align foreign-aid spending with foreign policymaking, which is the State Department’s purview (USAID, per a 1988 law, reports to the secretary of state). Despite this change, the United States continues to struggle with developing comprehensive strategies for issues and countries—and harnessing all elements of US foreign assistance (in tandem with other statecraft tools, like diplomacy and economic engagement) toward a common end. Some feel USAID operates too independently, and its spending is insufficiently aligned with US foreign policy objectives.

Why foreign aid is critical to strategic competition

A solid base of rigorous research shows that foreign aid is effective across a range of sectors in contributing to changes in recipient countries that favor the United States and advantage it in its competition with China, Russia, and other rivals.

Foreign aid can lead to three primary types of impact that are beneficial to strategic competition: economic development that opens markets to US businesses, which increases US economic competitiveness with China and Russia; stronger governance and political institutions, which can serve as a robust check on Russian and Chinese attempts to undermine or coopt allies or potential partners; and more favorable views of the United States by a government and/or its people, which the United States can then leverage for cooperation on mutually beneficial interests or against China and Russia.

Foreign aid supports US economic competitiveness by helping develop new economies for US businesses and trade. It does so by promoting a country’s overall development, as well as sound, transparent regulation.²⁸ Foreign assistance increases economic potential within a state, especially when developing basic industry, improving basic infrastructure, or rebuilding an area after conflict. Today, for example, eleven of the United States’ top fifteen trade partners are previous recipients of foreign aid. Access to overseas markets matters for people at home; roughly one in five US jobs is linked to international trade, and one in three US manufacturing jobs is linked to exporting US products overseas. When considering investments overseas, US businesses need predictable regulations managed by independent institutions, which, collectively, minimize risk of loss of capital. By fostering foreign markets for US goods and businesses, foreign aid can help bolster the United States’ industrial base.

Foreign aid also helps strengthen governance and democracy in countries around the world. A study of US foreign assistance focused on “democracy promotion” programs from 1990 to 2003 found that democracy assistance had “clear and consistent impacts” on overall democratization—as well as civil society, judicial and electoral processes, and media independence.²⁹ Despite a global democratic recession from 2012 to 2022, eight countries that were autocracies actually bounced back and are now democracies in 2023—with international democracy support and protection being an important factor in securing these gains.³⁰ The benefits of these changes, enabled by foreign aid, are clear. The world is safer and more secure with more—not fewer—democracies. Democracies do not launch wars against other democracies, are more reliable allies to the United States, and are far less prone to intrastate civil conflict.³¹ By strengthening independent institutions and civil-society oversight, foreign aid can help make countries more resilient to interference from foreign rivals like China and Russia. Robust institutions and vibrant civil society make it difficult for China and Russia to exert influence and coopt elites.

Finally, foreign aid can help improve citizens’ and governments’ views of the United States, often at the expense of its principal rivals. The long-term aspect is important here. Chinese and Russian foreign-assistance programs tend to favor physical projects that advance their economic interests and solidify partnerships with authoritarian actors.³² Populations, genuinely appreciative and benefiting from such investments, look favorably upon these efforts in the short term. Over time, there is growing evidence that these projects eventually begin to erode local support for Beijing and Moscow.³³ In the case of China, this is partially due to shoddy construction work, a feeling of Chinese neocolonialism and loss of sovereignty, and discomfort with authoritarian moves by parties in power. While there is much reporting on China’s BRI and Russia’s recent use of Wagner Group mercenaries in Africa, both countries’ programs lack transparency—increasingly alienating potential local partners as long-term consequences become more apparent.³⁴

By contrast, US foreign-assistance spending is transparent, involves clear conditions guiding where and how funds are to be used, and favors working with local partners to identify real needs and inform project design and implementation.³⁵ Well-implemented, effective, and large-scale initiatives focused on addressing pressing needs of populations—like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—solve problems for local populations and generate positive perceptions of the aid provider, the United States. Several studies find that US investments in PEPFAR foreign assistance (as one example) are strongly associated with improved perceptions of the United States across the globe.³⁶ A potent mix of project transparency, exposure to US government institutional practices and customs, and an earnest desire to help recipient countries prosper underpins US foreign aid’s impact and success.³⁷

III. Looking back to chart a path forward: Lessons from the Cold War

Today’s threat landscape is not analogous to the Cold War for several reasons: China and the United States are far more intertwined economically than the United States and Soviet Union; technological advances have minimized geographical advantages; and states and citizens are more connected, with a magnitude of information access that was unthinkable in the immediate post-World War II era.

Despite these differences, the period in which the United States was grappling with a seemingly mighty Soviet Union and today’s competition with China share some similarities. Today, like then, the United States faces an array of threats across military, social, economic, and political domains from a formidable power that kinetic tools alone cannot address; as a result, the United States is looking to harness all statecraft tools to its advantage. Three key lessons from how the United States used foreign aid during the Cold War can help inform how it uses this non-kinetic tool for strategic competition today.

To maximize foreign aid’s impact, strategic patience is essential. Foreign aid can produce meaningful outcomes, but changes can take years to occur.³⁸ It took a decade for the Marshall Plan and associated US foreign assistance to transform Western European nations into the staunch democratic-minded, market-oriented partners that they are today. While US foreign aid that began in 1948 helped prevent socialist uprisings across Europe, NATO integration and rearmament took the 1950s to accomplish.³⁹ The European Economic Community only truly began to develop in the 1960s.⁴⁰ And the dismantling of European colonial empires and the move toward the US view of the liberal order took until the 1970s to be fully realized.⁴¹

Beyond Europe, US foreign assistance to African and Latin American governments highlights how approaching regions with a longer-term perspective and approach provides opportunities to augment engagement when conditions become more favorable.⁴² Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, US work in both regions haphazardly shifted between supporting anticommunist militarism, encouraging economic liberalization and development, and improving living conditions.⁴³ Moreover, post-colonial struggles in Africa and regional interference from the Cubans and Soviets in Latin America limited the overall effectiveness of US foreign-assistance programs until the 1980s.⁴⁴ Previous US engagement then allowed it to become a preferred partner as the Soviet Union began to withdraw from the “third world” and the global financial order introduced new requirements for integration and development.⁴⁵

Just as foreign assistance takes time to generate outcomes, assistance strategies should have flexibility to adapt to changes in the country or region over the lifetime of a given initiative. Identifying an end state, and methodically working toward it over the course of years or decades, allows second- and third-order effects of investments to occur.

Second, policymakers need to be realistic about what foreign aid can achieve—and avoid overpromising and under-delivering. More often than not, success has been achieved when US policymakers used foreign assistance to secure practical and realistic outcomes. While often criticized for partnering with autocrats over the course of the Cold War, the United States’ incremental investments slowly eroded the Soviet Union’s theory of victory and allowed the United States to encourage democratic progress over time.⁴⁶ US foreign assistance supported strategic aims that ultimately led to a more peaceful, prosperous, and representative world.

A final lesson is that foreign assistance works best when it is part of a broader whole-of-government strategy.⁴⁷ When the United States synchronizes foreign-aid interventions, these efforts tend to build on each other to promote long-term cultural change and alignment with US interests and policy.⁴⁸ Some clear examples of whole-of-government success are Western Europe, Colombia, South Korea, and Chile.⁴⁹ Each of these examples shares a US assistance approach and series of programs that combined security guarantees with cooperation and reform programs; economic-development packages that paired investment monies with revitalization of key industries; social initiatives intended to soften cultural cleavages while improving social determinants of health; and incentives for local governments to improve their capacity, resiliency, and responsiveness. When foreign-assistance efforts remained siloed between agencies, efforts fell short and minimized impact of taxpayer dollars.

IV. Recommendations: Maximizing US foreign aid to compete

The United States has the infrastructure and expertise to re-elevate foreign aid as a tool of statecraft and use it to help compete with China, Russia, and other adversaries. Doing so will require making changes to where the United States spends foreign assistance and on what, and reforming structures within the US government that dictate how said funds are allocated. These changes are based on lessons from the past, as well as a sober assessment of today’s threat landscape and the need to position the United States for today’s challenges.

1. Where the United States allocates foreign aid and on what

The United States should realign spending to focus on allies and countries strategically important to competition with China and Russia. Foreign aid can help lead to changes in countries that advantage the United States in that competition (e.g., by making a country’s political system more resilient to Chinese or Russian influence), as well as address other pressing challenges (e.g., by addressing causes of migration in Central America to curb flows of people into the United States). Foreign aid can also be used to help US allies or countries of strategic importance in ways that maintain or cement extant alignment of interests (e.g., via infrastructure development that benefits the government in power) or help move a country that is on the fence between cooperating with China and the United States (e.g., Pacific islands).

The current approach to, and regulations governing, allocating foreign aid is not set up to enable the United States to use funds in ways that directly and efficiently advance US interests. It forces the United States to center spending in many aid sectors on predominantly low-income countries (where the perceived greatest development needs are) and disincentivizes spending on middle-income nations (with some plans in place to phase out spending in middle-income states), disregarding how important these nations, despite their income level, might be to the United States.

The Trump administration explored realigning how the United States uses foreign assistance of all stripes—from economic aid to health assistance—to make competing with China the primary objective. This realignment did not gain traction. However, the review elements that called for revisiting stipulations to spend based on a country’s income level—and instead center decisions around a country’s importance to the United States—are welcome and worth revisiting.

The United States should make delivering for allies and shoring up democracy core pillars guiding how it uses foreign aid to compete with China and Russia. The United States has rightfully increased funding for infrastructure projects in developing nations—along and through multilateral forums—to offer an alternative to China’s BRI. These projects, from highways to hospitals, help the United States compete with China because they buy goodwill with recipient governments and—given the transparent way in which they are managed—provide important investment to support countries’ development needs. But they only address one part of the China challenge, and do not address the root causes enabling Chinese interference and influence—weak governance and political institutions.

Strong democratic institutions are the most reliable form of defense against Russian, Chinese, and other external efforts to shape a country’s domestic politics to the benefit of the external actor. Political parties channel citizens’ views into policy and law. Independent legislatures and capable executives craft and enforce legislation that makes markets favorable to foreign (and US) investment, and inhibit the type of opaque deals favored by the PRC. Independent media play a crucial role in identifying and exposing harmful authoritarian influence, while civil-society organizations (CSOs) work to push governments to take corrective action. Across borders, a diverse group of activists, media figures, religious leaders, researchers, and policymakers is collaborating to confront the challenge of foreign authoritarian influence, forming a strong and growing network of likeminded individuals committed to building democratic resilience worldwide. This network is using innovative methods to uncover and bring attention to the harmful influence of authoritarian actors, such as the PRC and Kremlin. They are devising advocacy and policy solutions tailored to the individual needs of local communities, with the goal of promoting lasting change and ensuring accountability from domestic and foreign authoritarian actors. They need US support.

Invest to empower pro-democracy elements in backsliding or authoritarian countries. In democratically backsliding or authoritarian countries, the scope and scale of elite capture by the PRC or the Kremlin—and conditions on US foreign assistance over human-rights concerns and corruption—limit the potential for political change to build democratic resilience to foreign authoritarian influence. In such contexts, it is extremely challenging to compete symmetrically with the PRC or the Kremlin, which do not impose conditions related to human rights or democracy, and routinely end up worsening both. The United States must respond asymmetrically, using foreign assistance in ways that empower individuals and institutions to expose and put pressure on the regime elements that perpetuate corruption and enable foreign influence. Ongoing investments in media, civil society, and small “d” democratic political parties and opposition movements can sustain important pro-democracy elements to effectively push back against authoritarian influence, in closed and closing countries.

2. Congressional action

Given its constitutional role of oversight and resource appropriation, Congress has an important role to play in ensuring the United States maximizes use and impact of foreign aid in its competition with China and Russia.

Congress should pass legislation (the Non-Kinetic Competition Act) requiring the executive to submit multiyear plans outlining the US approach—harnessing all nonmilitary statecraft tools, including foreign aid—to compete with China in select priority countries. Absent congressional requirements or oversight, it is unclear if the executive branch will be able to swiftly make the needed changes outlined above to where and how the United States spends aid, including ensuring whether it is part of a broader strategy for each country. To accelerate these efforts, Congress could pass legislation requiring the executive to deliver plans for select priority countries, outlining how it intends to use all aspects of US power and resources—including foreign aid, linked to diplomacy—to compete with China. The strategies should include a clearly defined goal, as well as a theory of the case. The legislation could be modeled on the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which requires the executive to deliver a strategy for preventing violent conflict and promoting stability globally, and ten-year plans for achieving these aims in select priority countries. Unlike the GFA, however, the legislation proposed here need not require the executive to publicly release plans, given the sensitive nature of the content.

Focus on geography and interests, rather than sectors. US foreign aid is largely organized around sectors (e.g., health, education) and driven by congressional earmarks. This makes it exceedingly difficult for the United States to craft geography-specific strategies (e.g., for sub-Saharan Africa) with a single source of foreign aid as an available resource. Ideally, the United States would craft a competition strategy for a given region that clearly identifies an end state, theory of the case, and associated inputs required to realize it (kinetic and non-kinetic, including foreign aid). Instead, the current system predetermines (via earmarks) how the United States spends a significant portion of foreign aid (with some exceptions), forcing planners to use aid in suboptimal ways that seldom advance country-specific strategies.

Congress, considering its increased attention to position the United States to prevail against China, should review extant earmarks, do away with as many as feasible, help the executive conduct longer-term planning, and provide greater flexibility in using foreign aid to compete. The legislation cited below could help set parameters and ensure funds are spent on the highest priorities.

Increase spending to expand partner-nation resilience to Beijing and Moscow coercion and cooptation. Strong democratic institutions increase a country’s ability to detect, prevent, and mitigate CCP influence operations, but must be coupled with other work focused squarely on detecting, preventing, and countering CCP and Kremlin interference—whether attempts by the PRC to train political parties in Kenya on the China “model” or direct Kremlin funding to political parties to influence electoral outcomes and ensure pro-Kremlin voices are voted into office. Foreign assistance in this category can fund a range of programming, from technical assistance to countries negotiating BRI deals to support for independent media in countries vulnerable to foreign influence. Priorities should include the following types of democracy, rights, and governance programming, which have proven effective in building democratic resilience to foreign authoritarian influence.

Supporting independent media: Supporting independent journalism can be a powerful tool in countering the influence of the PRC and Kremlin in the Global South. It is a wise investment of limited US resources to empower well-trained journalists in vulnerable countries, who can provide free and unbiased reporting to expose the impact of foreign authoritarian influence. Every dollar spent in this direction can make a significant difference.
Legislative dialogues: In legislatures throughout the world, a growing number of elected officials are committed to democratic resilience. From engaging with partners like Taiwan and Ukraine to exposing concerns around the domestic impacts of deepened political and economic engagement with China and Russia, these officials have been successful in advocating for measures to counteract foreign influence and building global democratic unity to confront it. Facilitating and supporting such dialogues, by both the US Congress and parliaments globally, is a critical and effective means to counter PRC and Kremlin influence.
People-to-people exchanges: China is making a significant investment in people-to-people exchanges, sponsoring fellowships, scholarships, and exchanges to showcase the China model across the Global South. This soft-power initiative is an area in which the United States has a strategic advantage; it just needs to leverage it. The exchange programs sponsored by the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs are an effective mechanism for engaging youth, students, educators, artists, athletes, and rising leaders to promote US interests—and democracy. More than 99 percent of participants in the bureau’s Sports Visitors exchange program come away expressing positive views of the United States, while its exchange programs have brought almost seven hundred officials who would go on to run their countries’ governments to the United States. However, only forty thousand international participants engage in such programming annually, given the bureau’s $777.5-million annual budget for exchanges. By comparison, in 2018, the PRC provided scholarships to sixty-three thousand students to study in China, a figure that doesn’t include party-to-party exchanges run by the International Liaison Department or journalist and parliamentary exchanges. Additional investment in this area would be a cost-effective win-win.

The United States spends a paltry amount combatting Russian and Chinese malign influence around the world, despite this being the foremost challenge of the time. The United States spends less than $325 million a year countering Chinese influence and $300 million countering Russian influence via foreign aid. In fact, the $625 million the United State spends annually on this threat from China and Russia is less than the Defense Department spends on printing each year.⁵⁰

US policymakers argue that prevailing against China is a national imperative, but have only appropriately resourced its kinetic toolkit. Foreign-aid spending focused on this aim needs to increase fourfold, to $1 billion annually. It should center on countries already exposed to CCP and Kremlin interference, at the cusp of such interventions, or likely to experience them moving forward.

3. Intra-US government structural changes

Several changes to intra-US government processes and structure would help better align foreign-aid spending with core national security interests and increase its impact in the competition with China and Russia.

Empower the State Department’s Office of Foreign Assistance Resources to fulfill its mandate of aligning foreign aid with policy goals and maximizing impact. US foreign-aid spending should directly align with, and advance, US interests in priority states, competing with China and Russia chief among them. This means enabling the Department of State to take the lead on foreign policy and control aid allocations in a way that concretely advances specific foreign policy objectives, rather than a development goal that might be tangentially related to US interests. The secretary of state should empower the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources to truly lead on foreign-aid coordination and alignment, deputizing its director to ensure aid spending aligns with policy goals. The USAID administrator should continue reporting to the secretary. The United States needs to maximize the impact of foreign aid for immediate political wins and incorporate foreign aid into longer-term planning.

Lengthen the time horizon for US foreign-aid programs and objectives from a single year to ten. The United States used foreign aid to significant effect during the Cold War. Flexibility in what and how to spend, as well as the time horizon on which success was measured (noting the struggle with the Soviet Union was the central objective) were extremely important. In the last 15–20 years, and in line with shorter-term goals (e.g., health), the time horizon for gauging success has shortened to 1–2 years. This is counterproductive. Democracy, rights, and governance programming—as well as initiatives in other sectors germane to competition—requires longer-term investment to develop strong and resilient institutions, political parties, and processes. US agencies and implementing partners need longer project times to maximize impact.

Limit branding waivers. Projects or initiatives funded by US foreign aid typically are branded as “from the American people,” and include the funding agency’s logo (e.g., that of USAID) to enable attribution for the work to the United States. Yet, the United States often allows organizations implementing foreign-aid projects to forego this branding requirement—thereby granting a waiver—on security or other grounds. For example, an NGO offering training to local farmers in an area contested by militias known to have anti-American views might request a waiver citing potential risk to personnel from said armed groups. Similar exceptions are granted for construction or other projects in areas perceived to be contested or at risk. Meanwhile, there are hospitals, schools, trainings, and so on in the same areas with “from China” branding readily visible. The United States benefits from populations and governments knowing who provides aid, and its marketing needs to reflect as much. The United States should only issue waivers when said branding could pose harm to implementers or beneficiaries, or when it is counterproductive to achieving results.

Focus on advancing interests, rather than “localization” targets. Under current Administrator Samantha Power’s leadership, USAID has articulated a commitment to the localization of US foreign assistance. This includes, but is not limited to, channeling a greater portion of US foreign assistance to local partners and taking additional steps to ensure US-funded projects build sustainable capacity of these local organizations. The United States has considered requiring international nongovernmental organizations that receive the “primary” grant from USAID to allocate a set percentage—up to 20 percent—to go directly to local partners. The rationale for this change, which the Barack Obama administration shared, is that US foreign assistance should help build local capacity to address needs. The intent is noble, but this arguably detracts from US foreign assistance achieving its actual and main intent—advancing US interests.

Rather than set aside an arbitrary amount of foreign aid for channeling to local NGOs, USAID and the State Department should pursue partnership approaches best positioned to achieve US interests in the target country. In most, if not all, cases, this will involve working through international NGOs that collaborate with—and, as needed, build the capacity of—local partners. Foreign aid should focus on building capacity and localizing aid, insofar as doing so advances US interests.

Conclusion

The United States’ overall approach to statecraft—how it forms strategy and uses tools to execute that strategy—has not caught up to the state of the world today. The current approach too often places bureaucratic prerogatives above policy priorities. The United States needs to be on high alert, shaping all aspects of government work toward its competition with China.

Patrick Quirk, PhD, is vice president for strategy, innovation, and impact at the International Republican Institute (IRI) and nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Caitlin Dearing Scott is the director for countering foreign authoritarian influence at the International Republican Institute.

The authors would like to thank Owen Myers for his research assistance.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

1 See, for example: the Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1157/text?format=txt&overview=closed.

2 Matt Schrader and J. Michael Cole, “China Hasn’t Given up on the Belt and Road,” Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2023.

3 “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative,” Green Finance and Development Center, last visited April 3, 2023, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/?cookie-state-change=1678461024145.

4 David Shulman, ed., “A World Safe for the Party: China’s Authoritarian Influence and the Democratic Response,” International Republican Institute, February 2021, https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/bridge-ii_fullreport-r7-021221.pdf; Caitlin Dearing Scott and Matt Schrader, eds., “Coercion, Capture, and Censorship: Case Studies on the CCP’s Quest for Global Influence,” International Republican Institute, September 2022, https://www.iri.org/resources/coercion-capture-and-censorship-case-studies-on-the-ccps-quest-for-global-influence/.

5 Jonathan Cheng, “China Is Starting to Act Like a Global Power,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has-a-new-vision-for-itself-global-power-da8dc559.

6 “China’s Global Development Initiative Is Not as Innocent as It Sounds,” Economist, June 9, 2022, https://www.economist.com/china/2022/06/09/chinas-global-development-initiative-is-not-as-innocent-as-it-sounds.

7 Ibid.

8 Caitlin Dearing Scott and Isabella Mekker, “How China Exacerbates Global Fragility and What Can be Done to Bolster Democratic Resilience to Confront It,” Modern Diplomacy, September 18, 2021, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/18/how-china-exacerbates-global-fragility-and-what-can-be-done-to-bolster-democratic-resilience-to-confront-it/.

9 Alice Ekman, “China’s Global Security Initiative,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, March 2023, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_5_China%27s%20Global%20Security%20Initiative.pdf; “China’s Paper on Ukraine and Next Steps for Xi’s Global Security Initiative,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 7, 2023, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/Chinas_Paper_on_Ukraine_and_Next_Steps_for_Xis_Global_Security_Initiative.pdf; “Xi Jinping: Time for China to Take Centre Stage,” BBC, October 18, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41647872.

10 Ekman, “China’s Global Security Initiative.”; “China’s Paper on Ukraine and Next Steps for Xi’s Global Security Initiative.”

11 Bill Bishop, “Xi Proposes a “Global Civilization Initiative; PBoC; Missing Bond Date; Guo Wengui,” Sinocism, March 15, 2023, https://www.sinocism.com/p/xi-proposes-a-global-civilization.

12 Shulman, “A World Safe for the Party.”

13 “China’s Paper on Ukraine and Next Steps for Xi’s Global Security Initiative.”

14 “Patrol and Persuade,” Safeguard Defenders, December 2022, https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Patrol%20and%20Persuade%20v2.pdf.

15 See, for example: Paul Stronski, “The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/return-of-global-russia-analytical-framework-pub-75003.

16 Edward Wong, “Russia Secretly Gave $300 Million to Political Parties and Officials Worldwide, U.S. Says,” New York Times, September 13, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/13/us/politics/russia-election-interference.html.

17 David Alere Garcia and Noe Torres, “Russia Meddling in Mexican Election: White House Aide McMaster,” Reuters, January 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-russia-usa/russia-meddling-in-mexican-election-white-house-aide-mcmaster-idUSKBN1EW0UD.

18 See, for example: “Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem,” Global Engagement Center, August 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf; “Disinformation: A Primer on Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns,” Select Committee of Intelligence of the United States Senate, March 30, 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm.

19 Cecilia Anesi, Lorenzo Bagnole, and Martin Laine, “Italian Politicians and Big Business Bought into Russian Occupation of Crimea,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, February 3, 2023, https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/italian-politicians-and-big-business-bought-into-russian-occupation-of-crimea.

20 Paul Stronski, “Russia’s Growing Military Footprint in Africa’s Sahel Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 28, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135.

21 “Wagner Group, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and Russia’s Disinformation in Africa,” Global Engagement Center, May 24, 2022, https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/wagner-group-yevgeniy-prigozhin-and-russias-disinformation-in-africa/.

22 “About RT,” RT, last visited April 7, 2023, https://www.rt.com/about-us/.

23 James P. Grant, “Perspectives on Development Aid: World War II to Today and Beyond,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 442 (1979), 1–12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1043475.

24 For an overview of US foreign-assistance categories, purposes, and spending, see: “About Us,” US Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, last visited June 8, 2023, https://www.state.gov/about-us-office-of-foreign-assistance.

25 Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2022 Budget and Appropriations,”Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47070.

26 “Summary of the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,”US Senate Armed Services Committee, last visited June 8, 2023, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY22%20NDAA%20Agreement%20Summary.pdf;“Program Acquisition Cost by Weapons System,” US Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, June 8, 2023, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Weapons.pdf.

27 DFC was authorized in October 2018 and officially created in 2019. Authorized by the BUILD act, DFC was formed by merging the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of USAID.

28 “The Case for Democracy: Does Democracy Cause Economic Growth, Stability, and Work for the Poor?” Varieties of Democracy Institute, May 11, 2021, https://v-dem.net/media/publications/c4d_1_final_2.pdf.

29 Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” World Politics 59, 3 (2007), https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060164.

30 “Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization,” Varieties of Democracy Institute, 2023, https://www.v-dem.net.

31 “The Case for Democracy.”

32 Kristen A. Cordell, “Chinese Development Assistance: A New Approach or More of the Same?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/23/chinese-development-assistance-new-approach-or-more-of-same-pub-84141; Gerda Asmus, Andreas Fuchs, and Angelika Müller, “BRICS and Foreign Aid,” AIDDATA, August 1, 2017, https://www.aiddata.org/publications/brics-and-foreign-aid; Axel Dreher, et al., “African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance,” Journal of Development Economics 140 (2019), 44-71, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.04.003.

33 Robert A. Blair, Robert Marty, and Philip Roessler, “Foreign Aid and Soft Power: Great Power Competition in Africa in the Early Twenty-First Century,” British Journal of Political Science 52, 3 (2022), 1355–1376, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/foreign-aid-and-soft-power-great-power-competition-in-africa-in-the-early-twentyfirst-century/55AECCCE48807135072DCB453ED492F1 .

34 Pierre Mandon and Martha T. Woldemichael, “Has Chinese Aid Benefited Recipient Countries? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis,” International Monetary Fund, February 25, 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/02/25/Has-Chinese-Aid-Benefited-Recipient-Countries-Evidence-from-a-Meta-Regression-Analysis-513160; Paul Stronski, “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party-russia-s-return-to-africa-pub-80056; Rosana Himaz, “Challenges Associated with the BRI: a Review of Recent Economics Literature,” Service Industries Journal 41 (2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02642069.2019.1584193.

35 Michael J. Mazar, et al., “Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries,” RAND, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA456-1.html.

36 See, for example: Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood, “Doing Well by Doing Good: the Impact of Foreign Aid on Foreign Public Opinion,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, December 1, 2013, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361691.

37 Daniel F. Runde, “US Foreign Assistance in the Age of Strategic Competition,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 14, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-foreign-assistance-age-strategic-competition.

38 Andrew S. Natsios, “Foreign Aid in an Era of Great Power Competition,” Prisms 8, 4 (2020), 101–119, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2217683/foreign-aid-in-an-era-of-great-power-competition/.

39 Curt Tarnoff, “The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance,”Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2018, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45079.pdf; Hal Brands, “Forging a Strategy” in The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 13–29, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv270kvpm.5.

40 Najam Rafique, “US Foreign Assistance: A Study of Aid Mechanism,” Strategic Studies 12, 1 (1988), 55–77, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45182762.

41 Brands, “Forging a Strategy.”

42 Hal Brands, “Contesting the Periphery” in The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 76–102, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv270kvpm.8.

43 “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations,”Congressional Research Service, March 31, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R47028.pdf; Keith Griffin, “Foreign Aid after the Cold War,” Studies in Globalization and Economic Transitions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372139_3.

44 Feraidoon Shams B., “American Policy: Arms and Aid in Africa,” Current History 77, 448 (1979), 9–13. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45314708.

45 Mark Webber, “The Third World and the Dissolution of the USSR,” Third World Quarterly 13, 4 (1992), 691–713, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992384.Ibid, Brands 2022.

46 Alexander R. Alexeev, “The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World,”RAND, 1983; Hal Brands, “American Grand Strategy: Lessons from the Cold War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 25, 2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/08/american-grand-strategy-lessons-from-the-cold-war/.

47 Susan B. Epstein and Matthew C. Weed, “Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations,” Congressional Research Service, July 28, 2009, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R40102.pdf.

48 Ibid.

49 Forrest Hylton, “Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 17, 1 (2010), 99–115, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590760.

50 “Document Services: DOD Should Take Actions to Achieve Further Efficiencies,”Government Accountability Office, October 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-71.pdf. Printing costs have continued to rise in the service-branch budget through FY23, based on analysis of Department of Defense budget-justification documents.

The post Maximizing US foreign aid for strategic competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

USAID’s Samantha Power: LGBTQI+ crackdowns are ‘the canary in the coal mine’ for declining freedoms

Atlantic Council — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 00:00:21 +0000

Watch the event

USAID Administrator Samantha Power on advancing LGBTQI+ inclusive development

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on the United States’ efforts to advance global LGBTQI+ human rights and USAID’s commitment to global inclusion.

Human Rights Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Samantha Power
Administrator, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Moderator

Jonathan Capehart
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, the Washington Post and MSNBC

VICENTE GARCIA: Hello. Welcome to this special Pride edition of #ACFrontPage. I’m Vicente Garcia, senior director of engagement and external affairs at the Atlantic Council, and we’re delighted for today’s conversation featuring USAID Administrator Samantha Power on a topic important to me as a member of the LGBTQI+ community, but also to the Atlantic Council in our mission to shape the global future together through US global leadership and global engagement.

Today’s conversation will be led by Pulitzer-winning journalist Jonathan Capehart, who is the host of his own show on MSNBC, serves on the Washington Post Editorial Board, and a frequent commentator on PBS, and the list goes on. We welcome participation by those here joining us today in person during our Q&A session, but also welcome those joining online by using the hashtag #ACFrontPage.

Administrator Power, thank you for joining us here today. We’re very eager to hear from you about the Biden administration’s and USAID’s priorities at addressing global LGBTQI+ human rights. And so now I’ll turn it over to Jonathan to lead our discussion. Thank you.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Thank you very much, Vicente, for the invitation to be here. Thank you all. One more thing, Vicente. As someone who reads teleprompter for a living, I really felt for you because that print is so small.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yeah, seriously. We’re just old, dude.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I know, it’s true, given the distance. But thank you very much for that introduction. And, Administrator Power, thank you very much for being here and taking the time to be a part of this important conversation.

So, as you well know, within the first month of taking office President Biden issued a memorandum that directed various parts of the US government responsible for foreign policy, such as USAID, to prioritize efforts to advance LGBTQI+ rights around the world. How are those efforts going? And what have been the biggest challenges?

SAMANTHA POWER: Thank you so much. And thanks to everybody for turning out. It’s a great energy in the room, great energy this month, and much needed, because we harness this energy to try to do this work in the world.

Well, first to say that USAID is one of fifteen agencies that is being responsive to President Biden’s direction to promote and protect and respect the human rights of LGBTQIA+ people around the world. And I’d say I feel very fortunate every day, no matter what issue I’m working on, to be at USAID, because we have this toolkit. We have programming in public health on maternal and child health. Of course we have PEPFAR, where we work with the State Department and CDC, which has, of course, made a major difference, saving twenty-five million lives and 5.5 million babies is the estimate for the good that it has done over time. And that’s had a particular effect on LGBTQIA+ communities around the world.

But beyond that, we do agriculture. We do economic growth and inclusion, livelihoods work. We’ve helped vaccinate the world. In many parts of the world, if you are LGBTQIA+, coming forward to seek social services may risk something near and dear to you, depending on the legal environment in which you’re working.

When the fallout from COVID occurred and you saw such economic devastation around the world, given the fact that LGBTQIA+ people are often working in the informal sector and may have had, in some instances, less backup, the kinds of crises that have befallen the planet have a disparate impact on marginalized communities and those that have, in a sense, faced preexisting conditions, you might say, including discrimination, stigmatization, violence, et cetera.

So we went forth. We have tripled the size of our staff. We have the great Jay Gilliam, who many of you work with, as our lead LGBTQIA+ coordinator at USAID. That position had been unfilled in the previous administration. This fiscal year we’ve had a dedicated pool of resources of around sixteen million dollars, which does everything from spot emergency assistance to people who need legal defense because they’re being rounded up in some cases or evicted to working really closely with the State Department to help identify people who would be eligible for asylum or to become refugees because of their vulnerability, because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

So, you know, I’d say you see a massive surge in programming, in attention. But for me, I think the—and the thing that Jay has helped us so much with and the team, if you believe in development in 2023—I mean, and actually seeing development outcomes that matter and reversing development setbacks that have occurred—it’s not enough to have, like, a little pot of money, or a big pot of money, even, dedicated to LGBTQIA+. All the programming we do on food security, on education, on health, needs to be—and the list goes on—needs to be attentive and intentional about going out of our way to make sure that we are not just practicing development but inclusive development.

And the biggest challenges—I’m sure we’ll get into them, and I know many in the audience are seized with them—is criminalization, and even in countries that already have criminalized LGBTQIA+ status, you know, new moves, desire to render more salient laws that may be on the books but being ignored by some communities, work in places like Uganda, because of the introduction of the anti-homosexuality act, vigilantes and citizens and others taking what’s happening in the legal space or in the parliament and getting signed into law and viewing it as license to do whatever the hell they want to vulnerable people.

And so it’s not just happening in Uganda. That’s, of course, something that has happened very recently. But we see the instrumentalization of the human-rights agenda that so many in the world aspire to see progress, that being turned on its head. And in places where anti-democratic forces are ascendant or are getting either support or abetted or at least not counteracted by authorities, you see those voices getting louder. And even when there’s not a law and that kind of legal ballast behind those voices, that, in and of itself, is terrifying and exclusionary and a deterrent, again, for these communities to come forward and access these programs at the very time where we’re really seeking to make sure that we’re leaving no one behind.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: So since you brought up Uganda and also your point about, you know, USAID has all of these programs. But there are countries where just presenting yourself to make yourself—avail yourself of these programs could put you in danger. So the question is what is the United States government doing or can it do to push back on what’s happening in countries like Uganda?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, to start—and I would start with what I consider a statement of the obvious but, nonetheless, I think does need to be said because it’s not always the way things are done, which is you start from the proposition of nothing about you without you. This question of tactics and how to prevail or how to counteract are super complicated, right.

Imagine, like, being part of the Biden administration and the tactical questions about how we moved the Inflation Reduction Act and, you know, convinced Joe Manchin to be part of the—I mean, when we’re operating in someone else’s country, you know, understanding, you know, the complex ecosystem in which we work, drawing, I should say, at USAID very heavily on the expertise of our local staff, two-thirds of—at least-two thirds of USAID staff abroad are nationals of the countries in which we work so they can be a great resource, but fundamentally it is the communities that are going to be affected by these laws that provide cues to us on how vocal to be, how much to signal in a deterrent way in advance of the movement of a piece of legislation, which risks then putting the United States at the center of a national drama and potentially triggering nationalism and other forces or some, you know, historical, you know, dynamics—let’s put it that way.

And so—but even what I’ve just said is kind of simplistic because there is no one view. I mean, even within an organization people are debating at fever pitch, you know, what the right approach is. This is just really, really hard.

But we do come in with humility and really try to be in lockstep with the groups who we may have funded in the past or may be funding currently, and in the case of the anti-homosexuality act in—that Uganda has moved forward with President Biden was very clear that the law should be repealed. Came out with a public statement. Has talked—and this is one of the approaches that we have taken not only in Uganda but in other places that are threatening to put in place similar laws—talking about the effects, Jonathan, on this incredibly successful partnership that we’ve had in combating HIV/AIDS.

There’s one report in Uganda that shows that service utilization is down by more than 60 percent since the law was introduced and that’s people who are afraid of coming forward for vital health services because they’re afraid it could lead to their arrest or it could lead to their eviction or it could lead to vigilante violence.

And so here we are, you know, trying to get this epidemic under control by 2030 and we’re part of this grand global coalition and at the same time these steps are being taken that would set back not only the health of LGBTQI+ communities but the health in this instance of all Ugandans.

And so, in a sense, you know, really looking at what the practical effects are of being seen to license community involvement in discrimination, stigmatization, and even law enforcement as you see citizens, again, taking things into their own hands but trying to find also arguments that have broad appeal in terms of services or programs that a broad swath of the societies in which we work are enthusiastic about, you know, showing the link between those—for example, private sector investment. There’s not one country in which USAID works that isn’t interested in fueling economic growth recovering from COVID, getting young people to work.

Well, what does it mean if the multinational companies that we and the Commerce Department and the State Department have been working with to try to encourage them to invest in these countries? Their own anti-discrimination policies and values are not going to make that an attractive place for investment.

So it’s a combination of, you know, the State Department taking steps now potentially to sanction individuals involved in this measure in Uganda. That’s been something that’s been messaged publicly and, again, these sort of practical effects that are going to extend practical harms, that are going to extend beyond if this law is not repealed.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And so let’s talk about another country. I was thinking when you say, in response to my question about Uganda, talking to the groups on the ground, getting their input into what USAID and what the US government should do, let’s talk about Ukraine. There’s a war going on, but hopefully at some point that war will end and reconstruction will begin. Where does the LGBTQI+ community play—come into the conversation about rebuilding? Both from making sure that they are whole in Ukrainian society, but also that their rights are protected and respected?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, this is a complex issue and a complex question, and I could come at it a few different ways. But, first, let me just say that, you know, part of Putin’s motivation, as we well know, for invading Ukraine was watching Ukrainian society, the Ukrainian government, move at really rapid pace to integrate itself into Europe. And, yes, that carries with it a lot of economic benefit for young people in Ukraine, but much of the impetus behind what was, you know, between really 2013 and last year, such a shift, right, in an orientation that went in one direction and then shifted in another direction. Much of it was values-based.

That doesn’t mean everybody was with all aspects of the European agenda, or the European program, or the European Convention on Human Rights immediately. We’ve seen that, of course. But, you know, part of what Ukraine is fighting for and part of what Russia is trying to squelch is liberalization, is broad understanding of who human rights protections apply to. Now, again, that’s a kind of general statement.

What we do—then, shall I say, of course, following Russia’s invasion Ukraine’s work to liberalize and build checks and balances and build in human rights protections, although not making headlines in the American or even the European headline, that work has accelerated. Which is, frankly, remarkable that a country that’s fighting for its life and its people can walk and chew gum at the same time. But meaning, you know, you see [LGBTQI+] protections progressing not only through legislative measures, and regulation, and as we vet—as the Ukrainians vet and we support programs to vet judges, you know, their human rights credentials being assessed in this much more comprehensive way.

But also, again, as the economy—parts of the economy actually flourish—I know this is hard to believe. But, like, the tech sector grew by, I think, seven or eight percent last year. You know, that itself, young people being out and being integrated in the world, there’s just things happening in the society that I think is going to put Ukraine, you know, and above all [LGBTQI+] communities and individuals, in a much more supportive legal and social ecosystem as the whole rationale for the war is about integrating into Europe. And the criteria by which—that Ukraine is going to need to meet, the roadmap and so forth, is going to entail much stronger protections than have existed in the past.

To your point, I think, if I understood it, about reconstruction, again, that’s incumbent on this intentionality that I was talking about. USAID is a critical partner. I was just meeting with the minister of finance yesterday talking about reconstruction out of the recent conference in the United Kingdom. You know, as we think about procurement and nondiscrimination in procurement, you know, how are those checks and those protections built in? As we think right now about health services and making sure that those are restored every place we can, even places close to the front line or as territory is liberated, how does USAID support flow in a manner where we are constantly vigilant to how inclusive those services are, and whether or not they are provided?

I mean, you know, we’ve actually managed to distribute I think it’s something like sixteen million antiretrovirals in Ukraine, you know, just since the war, you know, has started. So, you know, in terms of the mainstream PEPFAR and HIV/AIDS programs, like, those have continued. We’ve managed to be able to keep those afloat. And that took real intentionality on the part of our health team and our Ukraine team.

But I think, again, the principle that we want to bring to everything we do in terms of inclusive development is just that it’s a design feature of any program that we do that we are looking to make sure we are going out of our way, just as we would for religious minorities and on behalf of religious freedom or for women in countries where women are discriminated against, to make sure that we are reaching the full spectrum of beneficiaries, and that any kind of social deterrent or normative factors are ones that we try to circumvent to make sure that we are being inclusive because that’s going to be in the interests of all—again, all individuals living in a country economically and in terms of their ability to—in this instance, to integrate into Europe.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: So what would you—what do you say to people who question why supporting LGBTQI+ rights should be a part of American foreign policy? Because you could see there might be some people around the world, or even in our own country, who think, you know, I’m down with the community, but why make that part of our foreign policy.

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I think one way to take that question, which we do hear a lot and you might even say increasingly in certain quarters, but—is to imagine the counterfactual. You know, imagine a world in which US taxpayer resources are expended in a manner that, you know, in a sense perpetuates or deepens exclusion of individuals who are really vulnerable. I mean, that would be bad. And not only that, it would have the flavor, I think, in many of the countries we work, for a country that for all of our imperfections has long stood for human rights, it would have—it would have the effect, I believe, of being seen to kind of legitimate some of the rhetoric and actions and legal measures that are being put forward.

So, you know, there’s not, like, some place of neutrality here, right? We are the United States. We, you know, for many, many years in a very bipartisan way have stood for human rights. We have stood behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which doesn’t have exceptions or footnotes excluding particular communities. We stand for implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, which explicitly say that no person should be left behind—again, without footnotes or caveats. So I think there are really hard questions about tactics, about in some places how vocal to be to not, again, put ourselves at the center of a narrative, because that in some sense is just what people who would seek to repress or terrorize vulnerable communities would like to see happen. So, again, it’s very, very difficult on the ground to find the right balance of tools.

You know, if you look at the Anti-Homosexuality Act in Uganda, the—you know, we spoke out with thirty-one countries. We spoke out with the United Nations independent expert that US diplomacy, when I was the UN as ambassador, was absolutely critical in securing the creation of that position. And the fact that that position has been renewed three times now, including most recently last year, speaks to, again, changing norms. The fact that international instruments more and more are including—sometimes explicitly, sometimes less so—[LGBTQI+] rights as human rights, the fact that we see same-sex marriage legalized this last year in Estonia and Slovenia, but also decriminalization in places as varied as Barbados and Singapore means that these principles are getting traction.

And these international instruments—and this is a critical part of President Biden’s agenda—are really important, Jonathan, because it gives citizens in a country, you know, where on the books there’s lots of happy talk about human rights, but it gives [LGBTQI+] organizations and individuals, you know, something to hang their arguments on; something to say, look, but the United Nations Human Rights Council just appointed this individual, this individual says this. And so when we can act in company, in a coalition, I think that’s always advantageous, and that is something we seek to do.

When the norms themselves—I was part of getting the Security Council for the first time in what at that time was the seventy-five-year history of the UN to condemn the targeting of individuals on their—on the basis of their sexual orientation—that had never happened before—and hearing from around the world what it meant for the United Nations Security Council to have done that. I mean, this was something that was a consensus document; you know, the Russian Federation, a number of African governments that had laws that were not respectful of these human rights on the books went along with that.

And so, again, thinking tactically about how to do it and how these norms become more salient in international law, I think, is very important. But it is in our interest to have maximum economic inclusion that’s consistent with our economic objectives as a country and our foreign-policy interests. It is in our interest to fight repression against whomever it is being carried out. And it is in our foreign-policy interest to stand up for our values.

President Biden’s polling, I think, reflects broad approval, surging poll numbers; I think a tripling in global polls about—when the question is posed, do you think Joe Biden will do the right thing, a tripling from his predecessor. And if you talk to people around the world and sort of get a sense of why, the fact that human rights are so central to President Biden’s argument and democracy and the importance of democracy delivering, that’s a major distinguishing feature not only of this administration but really of US foreign policy from some of the big geopolitical actors who are more and more active.

So if we go quiet, just in the same way that if we were to go quiet on the rights of Christians in societies in which they are being persecuted, and just defer to prevailing, you know, what is taken as prevailing popular sentiment, I think we would really shortchange what is distinguishing about American foreign policy.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: One more question from me before we open it up to Q&A, and that’s this. Everything you say is, you know, terrific and wonderful in terms of what the administration is doing, American values. But I just wonder, when you travel around the world or talk to your counterparts, particularly those in, say, Uganda and elsewhere, how do you respond to what they might say, such as, you know, well, your own country’s, you know, no—you know, no garden party. You’ve got book bans and drag-queen story hours being banned and don’t-say-gay laws. And we’re awaiting a Supreme Court decision, possibly tomorrow, definitely by Friday, on whether a cake decorator can say, no, I’m not going to decorate your cake because your same-sex marriage, you know, goes against my beliefs.

How do you deal with that when that is thrown back in your face from foreign leaders?

SAMANTHA POWER: You know, we have a policy that Jay has helped shepherd through USAID which will be the first-of-its-kind LGBTQIA+ policy that’ll be out soon. And one of its many, I think, important features is it speaks of the importance of going forth in a spirit of humility and ally-ship. And I’ve already spoken, I think, a little bit about the ally-ship point.

But in general—you know, you didn’t mention the insurrection. You know, like—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Well, I mean, it wasn’t—

SAMANTHA POWER: There’s plenty—there’s—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: It wasn’t an LGBTQIA+ insurrection. So I figured I’d just leave—

SAMANTHA POWER: No, that’s a good point.

JONATHAN CAPEHART:—leave that out. But go on.

SAMANTHA POWER: No, but what I mean is in general we are standing up for democracy and human rights as we are facing domestically very, very significant challenges. And I’ve broadened the aperture a little bit from your question, though your question is very valid, you know, as focused on our discussion, our topic for today.

But I don’t even think we can think about LGBTQIA+ rights outside of the broader context of the anti-democratic movements that exist all over the world, including—you know, which include not recognizing results of elections, including resorting to violence, including, you know, some cases partnering with, you know, outside repressive actors who would seek to widen divisions within democracies.

So, you know, the statistics, it’s—you know, I think it’s sixteen years of freedom in decline around the world. And what we see is attacks on minorities generally—sometimes religious minorities; sometimes LGBTQI+ communities—are often the canary in the coal mine about a broader set of measures and a broader kind of consolidation of power away from the people and in the center. And certainly, a diminishment of checks and balances. I think that’s the abiding feature. And minority rights and the rights of marginalized communities fundamentally are checks on majoritarianism in our country and globally.

So, you know, I think if you go—and I’m not saying that we don’t have, you know, as you put it, kind of thrown back at us things that are happening in this country. But I think really since President Obama, and very much carried through with President Biden, we tend to kind of preempt that moment by situating the dialogue about [LGBTQI+] rights in our own struggles, and not leaving the elephant in the room, you know, over here. But to say, look, we’re—this is—we’re in the midst of, you know, many of these same challenges. There are forces in our countries—in our country that would also wish to go back to what is remembered as a simpler time.

And, you know, often I think that actually sets the stage for a more productive conversation, because it’s not a finger-wagging—you know, you may condemn something that has happened and use the leverage of the United States to demand, you know, a repeal. But it is not from a glass house that we are having conversations like this. And I was just in Africa, and I’ll be traveling again. I mean, the dialogue that we have is a humble dialogue. But it is one that has a North Star that I think can animate us both and that is rooted, fundamentally, not only in American values, at their core, but in international instruments and in universal values.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And so we’re going to open it up to questions. There is a microphone, oh, I thought it was on a stand. It’s an actual person. Thank you. Thank you very much. We’re going to go until about—if I can find my thing—until about quarter to four. So the microphone is there. Short questions, so we can get more answers in. Go ahead.

Q: Hi, Administrator Power. My name is Ryan Arick. I’m an assistant director here at the Atlantic Council. I’m really thrilled to have you here today.

I wanted to ask a question related to US development assistance to Ukraine, and specifically how we’re looking at the LGBTQI+ angle as far as our assistance during the ongoing war. I would appreciate your thoughts. Thank you.

SAMANTHA POWER: You want to go one by one, or?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Yeah.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Quickly.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK. So in brief, one of the things you’ll see, again, in the forthcoming policy, is a broad emphasis on thinking within USAID and within our humanitarian emergency programing about inclusion and about proactive outreach and services. I think there’s been—we’ve always, of course, been for an inclusive process to find and to serve beneficiaries. But to think—you know, to think that all beneficiaries will come forward equally in all communities is not accurate. And so, you know, how this plays out in any specific crisis area, you know, that’s going to be fundamentally up to our engagement with our implementing partners, like the World Food Program, like the ICRC and others. But there is a broad embrace of inclusive response and a broad recognition that gravity alone is not going to get you there.

Again, we’re quite far along in Ukraine because I think the government has every incentive—you know, not saying that there isn’t discrimination that occurs in Ukraine, or that some of those fears don’t still exist. But there are a lot of incentives pulling policy and enforcement in a constructive direction, given the European journey that they are very committed to. But imagine, you know, in other parts of the world where there isn’t that, you know, legal framework or that political will at high levels and so that’s why crisis is going to be very important.

The other thing I’d say is, of course, just continuing our HIV/AIDS work full speed ahead, any work we do in human rights, thinking—so, again, there’s the dedicated LGBTQI+ work and then there’s making sure that all of our programming in these other areas is inclusive of that.

So just—and, finally, just we’ve done a lot with hotlines. There’s so much trauma, so much need for psychosocial service and care. We work very closely with Mrs. Zelensky as well, who has really pushed mental health and so forth. So you will see both in our development programming and in our emergency humanitarian programming, provided the resources are there, which we have to work with Congress to continue to mobilize, but a very significant allocation as well to recognizing the trauma and then the unique traumas that may apply to different communities, including this one.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. We’ve got six questions, ten minutes. So what I want to really try to do is two questions at a time. And, Madam Administrator, if you could—a little more brief—to the first two, ask the questions and then we’ll have the administrator answer. Quick questions.

Q: Hi, Administrator Power. My name is Katie. I’m a graduate student at Johns Hopkins SAIS right in Dupont Circle.

And my question for you kind of revolves around the other countries we haven’t talked about. We’ve talked a lot about Ukraine, Uganda. But what should the USAID and other people in the United States what other countries should we focus on for human rights violations, especially in the community?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Great.

I’m going to get one more.

Q: Hi, Administrator. My name is Divya. I’m an undergraduate at Stanford University and I’m currently an intern at the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency.

My question for you is how and if you have handled and talked about tech governance in regards to LGBTQI+ rights and misinformation, perhaps, regarding HIV/AIDS, vaccines, and more.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Two simple questions—in nine minutes. I’m going to—I’m keeping us on time.

SAMANTHA POWER: So on the first question, I would say that there is a spate now of laws, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa but not only, that are at various stages of legislative movement. Let’s put it that way.

Now, what focus entails, again, you know, I think filtering it through what do our partners on the ground think would be most advantageous for any particular individual or entity or institution to do, as we’ve discussed, it’s—you know, figuring that out is no easy proposition. But I think the New York Times recently did a study that did a lay down of how many country—what stage of passage, you know, these laws were.

I mean, it’s kind of—it’s kicked up what’s happened in Uganda and even our response to it has kicked up, you know, more vocal leadership to push through further exacerbating criminalization measures as, by the way, have really important positive decisions that have been made in Africa.

That, in turn, has generated a backlash and we’ve seen something very similar here, of course, over many, many decades where anti-discrimination ordinances, for example, in Florida—you know, I mean, decades ago—then kicked off major—you know, very, very pronounced counter reactions, massive fundraising, et cetera. That’s happening, too, where for a step forward it then, you know, ignites, you know, certain forces and antibodies and then you see, you know, proactive moves that really can set back those rights.

So, again, the tactics I think we’d have to be very, very case specific. But, you know, where I would—especially for those of you who are in civil society or not in the government per se, the actual support for the organizations. And you’ll have the chance, as well, in this country—those of you who are active in the LGBTQI+ community—through the Welcome Corps at the State Department—this is—I’m sorry I’m going on, but this is a very exciting development that we will actually have the chance—in addition to processing people who are being persecuted on the grounds of their sexual orientation or gender identity, we will have the chance as community members to welcome these individuals. Now, that infrastructure is being built and it’s not, you know—you know, yet where there’s a number for you to call, but all of us will have a—well, there’s a number to call for Welcome Corps, but I’m saying very specifically—

SAMANTHA POWER: For—from this—OK. I was told that we were—we were still some weeks away from that. Well, what is the number that people should call, then, if they want—

AUDIENCE MEMBER: There’s a link on—

SAMANTHA POWER: What is the link?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: RainbowRailroad.org.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK. That’s the State Department program?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No.

SAMANTHA POWER: No, no, no, OK. So I’m—sorry, I was talking—

AUDIENCE MEMBER:—to Welcome Corps.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK, great. OK. So RainbowRailroad.org will refer you. I think the State Department piece we are still moving out to make sure that these partnerships can be ignited in rapid fire.

And then the second question, Jonathan, was?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I wrote in my notes tech governance.

SAMANTHA POWER: Tech governance.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Yes.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yes is the short answer. I’ve engaged them—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: We have—we have five minutes and five questions to go.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yes. I have—I have engaged them on disinformation generally, and this is a very important subcomponent. Discrimination isn’t new. Persecution isn’t new. The amount of disinformation, including deepfakes showing President Biden vilifying LGBTQI+—I mean, you know, these things are really exacerbating an already very challenging situation.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. And so we have one, two, three, four, five questions, five minutes. Lord Jesus. All right.

Here’s what I want to do. I want you each to ask your very brief question so your question at least gets articulated, and then Administrator Power will answer. Real quickly.

SAMANTHA POWER: All five.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: All five. All five. Because now we have four minutes.

Q: Thank you very much.

Very quickly, what would you say to other countries that stand on principle of noninterference, we don’t get to tell other governments how to treat their people? Very briefly. Thank you.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Thank you.

Q: Yes. My name is Bishop Joseph Tolton.

Domestically in our country, White supremacy one can argue is cradled by the far religious right in our country. These actors are also responsible for the racialization of homophobia across Africa. Are there whole-of-government conversations about how to hold these actors accountable for their racialized efforts?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Great question.

Q: Hi. David Stacy, Human Rights Campaign.

As you know, nondiscrimination is a touchstone of equality, and the administration right now is reviewing the requirements for grantees and cooperative agreements and across the foreign assistance agencies. Can you speak to the need to do that and USAID’s role in helping the other agencies do something where we’re applying it across the board with all of the agencies on an equal basis?

Q: Hi. Mark Bromley with Council for Global Equality.

You spoke about the value of both dedicated LGBTQI+ funding and integrated funding, and we’re excited that that fifteen million is increased to twenty-five million this year. But on the integration point, how are you thinking about measuring integration for LGBTQI+ persons, particularly in places where, you know, being [LGBTQI+] may be criminalized, it’s difficult/dangerous to measure? How do we make sure that’s more than lip service and that that integration is really happening? Because that is where the true value lies.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Last question.

Q: Hi there. My name is Bryce Dawson from Counterpart International.

You mentioned the difficulties of minimizing intrusion and tactically advocating for LGBTQI+ rights in other nations, as well as mentioned potential procurement policies to ensure [LGBTQI+] protections. Do you have any in the pipeline that you’re working on or anything in the future?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I want to thank everyone for their—for their questions, all five of you or seven altogether. Madam Administrator, you have two minutes.

SAMANTHA POWER: Thirty seconds.

Well, you know, I think that in general we—in our engagements on human rights issues, we hear a lot about noninterference. I mean, there’s no question. I heard about it a lot at the UN. We hear it often from, you know, countries like the Russian Federation that have invaded another country and tried to take over the other country. We hear it from countries that are providing surveillance technology, you know, to other countries, or fueling disinformation in the countries in which we are working.

So, you know, it is a shield. It is an important one to take seriously, because we also, of course, respect sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and so forth. So USAID is active across sectors and involved in these countries. And this agenda, I think, is—and, by that, it’s the human rights agenda more broadly—is central to how we believe as well that we will get the most out of the programs that we are doing across sectors.

And that brings me—and that’s the kind of conversation we have. Is, like, I was using Uganda as an example about making sure that we are also making the pragmatic case for people who are very skeptical because, again, they—there is a kind of seamlessness to the way our work across governance and human rights in citizen security and in the broad sweep of development sectors—from agriculture, to education, to health, et cetera—they do come together in service of development objectives. And that’s what the SDG’s also enshrine.

And then I’m not going to be able to do justice to the other questions in full, beyond I think the point about measuring integration is very important. You know, for those who are not making their identity known to us, that’s not going to be something that, you know, we will be able to measure in that sense. But I think these are the kinds of things that we are working through, through this policy, to make sure that this isn’t just, yes, here’s our standalone programming, and then by everything else we do, you know, operates in the way that we’ve always done it.

And so it’s not going to be, you know, instant, where everything is happening all at once. But all of our missions have to have inclusive development advisors or somebody—and this will be evident out of the policy—but somebody who is a focal point for working on LGBTQI+ rights and programming. So we’re hopeful that that, plus our new office of chief economist, will help us develop a kind of methodology that will be responsive to this concern that somehow it’s going to be invisible and not done, which is certainly our objective is for it to be done and, when appropriate, visible. And certainly, at least visible to us so we know whether we’re achieving what we’re setting out to achieve.

And then, lastly, I would just say, because it’s coming, the point about nondiscrimination among beneficiaries is just really important. And that guidance will be forthcoming, we hope, soon.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Do you have any thoughts on the other question about—I wrote it down real fast, but I know I got it wrong—about the racialized religious efforts on LGBTQI+ rights that have been happening?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I guess all I would say on that—because there are others in our government, I think, who are working on the kind of conversation that was asked about—is just this is another part of the response to the noninterference charge, is—that we do hear from people who don’t want to be engaged on human rights issues. And that is that there are a lot of actors from outside who are very active actually in pushing certain forms of legislation that would have these discriminatory, and these exclusionary, and these dangerous effects. And so, again, the noninterference claim is usually made in a selective way.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And with that, and just two minutes overtime, Samantha Power, nineteenth administrator of USAID. Thank you very, very much for being here.

SAMANTHA POWER: Thank you.

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Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 28 Jun 2023 22:06:15 +0000

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears eager to take full credit for his role in countering Russia’s short-lived but hugely significant recent Wagner rebellion. Speaking on June 27 just days after the uprising came to an abrupt end, Lukashenka provided a detailed and highly flattering account of negotiations with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin that contrasted his own strong leadership with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s apparent indecisiveness.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine.

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort.

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

With Russia’s most effective troops no longer playing a prominent role in the invasion, this will increase the options for Ukrainian commanders as they look to develop the country’s current summer counteroffensive. This may have particular significance for the frontline sector close to Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Wagner units were instrumental in securing earlier Russian gains. Ukrainian forces have already made significant advances to the north and south of Bakhmut, and will now be looking to capitalize on the destabilizing impact of the Wagner rebellion in order to push further.

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Ukraine’s military planners may also be encouraged to expand on earlier incursions into the Russian Federation itself. The Wagner mutiny exposed a shocking lack of military defenses inside Russia, with Russian army officials scrambling to assemble units and gather equipment from across the country. Prigozhin was able to seize the major Russian city of Rostov-on-Don without a fight, including the military headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. His troops then advanced virtually unopposed through the Russian heartlands before unilaterally deciding to end their march on Moscow less than two hundred kilometers from the capital city. In the space of a single day, an apparently defenseless Russia found itself on the brink of either civil war or collapse.

This remarkable state of affairs was possible because Putin has deployed the vast majority of Russia’s military potential to Ukraine. The Wagner revolt demonstrated conclusively that there are no more reserves to draw upon. Putin is already close to the maximum of his capacity and has very limited possibilities to escalate the invasion of Ukraine, even if he wished to do so.

This creates all manner of tempting opportunities for Ukraine, which has so far been careful to limit the scope of its military activities inside Russia, in part due to concerns voiced by Kyiv’s international partners. That may now change. In the weeks prior to the start of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, Ukrainian-backed Russian militias launched a number of cross-border raids from Ukraine into Russia’s Belgorod region. While these thrusts were largely symbolic, Ukraine could soon become more ambitious. With the Putin regime seemingly unable to defend itself and in no position to escalate, we may witness bolder Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory.

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Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the whole Wagner drama from a Ukrainian perspective was the obvious weakness and division it exposed within Russia. Any country fighting a major war needs unity, and today’s Russia is clearly not united. Members of the public in Rostov-on-Don and elsewhere appear to have enthusiastically backed the rebellion, while others were indifferent. The limited military presence inside Russia made no serious attempts to intervene, while there was little indication of any surge in public support for Putin or condemnation of Prigozhin. This is all a very long way from the propaganda image promoted by the Kremlin of a strong Russian state supported by a proudly patriotic populace.

The situation in Russia is not yet comparable to the mood in 1917 on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, but the Wagner mutiny is an extremely dangerous signal for Russian society. Any infighting is bad for morale, and the spectacle of Russia’s most successful military force turning against the country’s military leaders is particularly demoralizing. This will damage the fighting spirit of Russian troops in Ukraine while also seriously undermining Putin’s personal authority on the home front.

For Ukraine, the outlook is more promising. The Wagner mutiny was a brief affair, but it has led to the sidelining of Russia’s most effective fighting force while also highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of the Putin regime. This could create practical opportunities for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, and will boost confidence in the country’s ultimate ability to achieve a decisive victory over Russia.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and an advisor to the Ukrainian Government. He previously served as Ukraine’s minister of defense (2019–2020).

Meaningfully advancing the green agenda

The private sector identified the green agenda as a major opportunity, with more than half of survey respondents flagging “addressing climate change” as a top sustainable development and business priority to drive full economic recovery from COVID-19.¹ While climate action is critical on a global level, companies recognize that it is particularly pressing in LAC.

LAC is the world’s most economically unequal region and the second-most disaster-prone region in the world, highly vulnerable to climate consequences.² This vulnerability threatens to further entrench inequality and undermine the wellbeing of people and communities. Every year, between one hundred and fifty thousand and two million people in LAC are pushed into poverty or extreme poverty because of natural disasters, while as many as seventeen million people could migrate across LAC by 2050 due to climate change.³ Climate change also threatens food security, which can heavily impact rural communities.⁴ It will generate economic costs of up to $100 billion annually by 2050, which undercut growth and limit the ability of businesses to operate, prosper, and thrive.⁵

Recommendations for the private sector

Advancing the green agenda is not only imperative as a means of addressing the threat of climate change, but also as a means of unlocking massive business opportunities with the potential to drive private-sector-led economic recovery and growth in LAC. In particular, private firms have an important role to play by creating green jobs, promoting the circular economy, and partaking in green finance.

Creating green jobs: Firms can help create green jobs by adopting sustainable practices, seizing business opportunities in emerging green sectors, and providing upskilling, reskilling, and other support for workers displaced by the green transition.
Promoting the circular economy: Firms can help drive a transition to a circular-economy model by financing circular-economy efforts, supporting multistakeholder initiatives, and adopting and promoting sustainable business practices.
Partaking in green finance: The financial sector can help foster a green-finance ecosystem in the region by tightening environmental, social, and governance (ESG) requirements, aligning investments with green objectives, and nurturing green[1]bond markets in LAC.

About the author

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Pepe Zhang

Senior Fellow

China Coronavirus

Report Jun 5, 2023

Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can strengthen the hard and soft infrastructure supporting Latin America and the Caribbean’s economies, while drawing them closer together through trade, regulatory, and other integration.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 16, 2023

Accelerating digitalization and innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can improve infrastructure, foster skills, and promote adoption to help the region transform its digital potential into development gains.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 20, 2023

Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Technological, governance, and other cooperation between the public and private sectors can enhance institutional capacity, integrity, government service delivery, and regulatory quality in LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 22, 2023

Addressing multidimensional inequality

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private-sector actions to reduce gender inequality, like level the playing field between SMEs and large firms and narrow the urban-rural divide, can enable a more inclusive economy for LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1 Opportunities and Challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Private Sector Perspective,” June 2022, question 10.

2 “GHO 2023: at a Glance,” Humanitarian Action, last visited January 25, 2023, https://gho.unocha.org/appeals/latin-america-and-caribbean#footnote-paragraph-136-1.

3 Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, “A Green Recovery of Latin America and the Caribbean is Possible and Necessary,” Latin America and the Caribbean World Bank Blog, September 11, 2020, https://blogs.worldbank.org/latinamerica/green-recovery-latin-america-and-caribbean-possible-and-necessary.

4 Enrique Oviedo and Adoniram Sanches, coords., “Food and Nutrition Security and the Eradication of Hunger: CELAC 2025: Furthering Discussion and Regional Cooperation,” Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, July 2016, 74–75. https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/40355/S1600706_en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

5 Walter Vergara, et al., “The Climate and Development Challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean: Options for Climate-Resilient, Low-Carbon Development,” Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, and World Wildlife Fund, 2013, 13–14, https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/The-Climate-and[3]Development-Challenge-for-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean-Options-for-Climate-Resilient-Low-Carbon-Development.pdf.

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Short-lived Wagner mutiny will undermine Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Sun, 25 Jun 2023 23:13:23 +0000

As suddenly as it had begun twenty-four hours earlier, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s rebellion against Russia’s military leadership came to an abrupt end on Saturday evening. The details of the deal struck between Prigozhin and the Kremlin remain murky, but the Russian warlord appears to have emerged from the drama relatively unscathed, at least for now.

The same cannot be said for Vladimir Putin, who has been very publicly humiliated by the affair and now looks weaker than at any point in his twenty-three-year reign. While the mutiny itself was remarkably brief, the consequences are likely to be profound, with serious repercussions in particular for the already faltering Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The most obvious practical consequence of the Wagner mutiny is a weakening of Russia’s force posture inside Ukraine. More than twenty thousand Wagner troops reportedly withdrew from Ukraine to participate in the revolt, representing around five percent of the entire Russian invasion force. Crucially, these were by far the most effective fighting units in the Russian military and had been responsible for almost all of the advances achieved over the past year.

Depending on the exact nature of the agreement to end the mutiny, many Wagner fighters may well return to the frontlines, possibly integrated into the regular Russian army. However, their non-Wagner comrades and commanders will understandably treat them with extreme suspicion, limiting their impact on the battlefield. Whatever happens next, the days when Wagner troops led the Russian invasion of Ukraine look to be over.

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The revolt also highlighted the relative defenselessness of Russia itself. Wagner troops took almost a year to occupy the small Ukrainian city of Bakhmut but seized the nearly twenty times larger Russian city Rostov-on-Don without a fight in a matter of hours. Indeed, it is worth underlining that Rostov-on-Don is by far the biggest city captured by Russian troops since the start of Putin’s so-called “Special Military Operation” sixteen months ago. Russia’s lack of domestic defenses was further exposed by the unhindered progress of Prigozhin’s armored column, which advanced to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before deciding to turn back.

While the immediate threat of a march on Moscow is now over, drastic measures are clearly required to bolster Russian domestic security. Putin knows the watching world has noted this vulnerability. He must now urgently take visible steps to prevent another ambitious Russian warlord or Ukrainian army commander from launching a new campaign inside his unprotected borders. Where will Putin find the necessary troops and equipment for this? With the vast majority of Russia’s military currently deployed in Ukraine, the answer to this question is both obvious and awkward. Russia will have no choice but to reduce its invasion force in order to address the country’s serious domestic security issues.

Russia’s vast military and state security apparatus will also now find itself engaged in the hunt for traitors and possible turncoats, which will inevitably distract attention and resources away from the task of defeating Ukraine. Infighting between the various different military clans has been a debilitating factor throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine; this trend will now intensify as the Russian authorities look to settle scores with the many police chiefs, local officials, and military commanders who either stood aside or discreetly backed the Wagner mutiny.

Meanwhile, the mutiny has raised some fundamental questions over Putin’s continued ability to rule. He was notably absent during the initial hours of the crisis, only appearing the following morning in a brief video address to the nation. He also seems to have been sidelined in negotiations with Prigozhin, allowing Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to take the lead. These are not the actions of a strongman ruler. As Atlantic Council Eurasia Center Senior Director and former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst noted on CNN, “It’s like Prigozhin is the person who looked behind the screen at the Wizard of Oz and saw the great and terrible Oz was just this little frightened man. Putin has been diminished for all time by this affair.”

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While these factors will all undermine the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the most important impact is likely to be on morale within the ranks of the Russian military. Demoralization was already a major issue for Putin’s invasion force, with a steady stream of video addresses on social media during the first half of 2023 testifying to widespread dissatisfaction among Russian troops over “human wave” attacks and catastrophic losses. These problems will now intensify as Russian troops question the loyalties of their leaders and the entire purpose of the invasion.

On the eve of the mutiny, Prigozhin published an explosive video address in which he accused the Kremlin of deliberately misleading the Russian public over its justifications for the war in Ukraine. The Wagner chief, whom many in Russia see as one of the few credible commentators within the establishment, dismissed key elements of the official Kremlin narrative—including claims that the invasion preempted an imminent NATO-backed Ukrainian offensive against Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He also directly denied widespread Russian allegations that the Ukrainian military had been bombing eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region for eight years prior to the full-scale invasion. Instead, Prigozhin blamed the war on the personal ambitions of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and individual Russian oligarchs.

Such statements will inevitably undermine fighting spirit among Russian troops and cause many to question exactly what they are fighting for in Ukraine. This has long been an issue for the Russian authorities, who have struggled to articulate their war aims amid lurid but unsubstantiated claims of “Ukrainian Nazis” and “Western imperialists.” Prigozhin’s damning comments exposing the lies used to justify the war have now cast an unforgiving light on the Kremlin’s credibility problems and will further fuel discontent among the Russian troops who are fighting and dying on the frontlines.

The short-lived Wagner mutiny has also exposed deep divides within Russia’s military and security establishment that indicate remarkably low levels of loyalty to the Putin regime. There has been some speculation that Prigozhin received support from within the military when planning and executing his mutiny, given that he was able to capture Rostov-on-Don with such apparent ease despite the fact that the city serves as the headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. Prigozhin’s armored column of Wagner troops then travelled hundreds of kilometers through the heart of Russia without encountering any significant military resistance.

The remarkable initial success of the Wagner mutiny in seizing control of a major city and advancing on the capital has sent shock waves through Russia that will also be felt by Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine. If Russian soldiers and commanders are not prepared to defend their own country, why should troops deployed to Ukraine sacrifice themselves for such an apparently dubious cause? If Prigozhin and his private army can go unpunished for declaring war on the Russian state, why should ordinary mobilized Russians feel obliged to follow suicidal orders in Ukraine?

For obvious reasons, the Kremlin will now attempt to downplay the significance of the short-lived Wagner mutiny. In reality, however, the ramifications of this unprecedented event will reverberate for some time to come and will shape Russia’s future, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine. One year ago, Putin was boasting of returning historically Russian lands and comparing himself to Peter the Great. Today, he looks far more like Czar Nicholas II, whose military failures and weak leadership sparked mutiny and the eventual collapse of the Russian Empire.

The Wagner mutiny is further proof that Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has left Russia divided, demoralized, and weakened. With his own personal authority now rapidly evaporating, the Russian dictator may soon face domestic problems so grave that they will overshadow even the prospect of defeat in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:47:32 +0000

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Ukraine’s counteroffensive is a marathon not a blitzkrieg

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 17:44:48 +0000

Less than two weeks since he first confirmed that Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive was finally underway, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy already finds himself forced to hit back at criticism over the pace of military operations. “Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It’s not,” he told the BBC on June 21. “Whatever some might want, including attempts to pressure us, with all due respect, we will advance on the battlefield the way we deem best.”

Zelenskyy’s comments reflect frustration in Kyiv over reports in the mainstream international media and widespread claims on social media platforms suggesting Ukraine’s counteroffensive is already floundering. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak was one of many Ukrainian commentators to suggest this trend is part of a coordinated Kremlin disinformation operation. In a June 20 post, he accused Moscow of fueling media hysteria about the alleged failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in order to secure a ceasefire and “freeze the conflict at any cost.”

Kremlin-tied or Russia-friendly sources are likely to be behind at least some of the recent criticism over the initial pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. At the same time, negative assessments are also a consequence of the unrealistically high expectations that built up in the half-year period prior to the start of the campaign.

In the final months of 2022, the Ukrainian military stunned the watching world by liberating large areas of the country from Russian occupation. A lightning September offensive saw most of northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region de-occupied, while a more methodical push in the south eventually resulted in the liberation of Kherson. These successes encouraged many to expect similarly rapid progress during the current campaign. In reality, Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive represents a far greater challenge in almost every sense.

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Ukraine must overcome a vast Russian invasion force strengthened by 300,000 mobilized troops that is dug in behind successive lines of sophisticated defensive fortifications stretching for over one thousand kilometers. They must do so without air superiority and while outgunned by Russian artillery at many points along the front. Nor can they count on the element of surprise. This incredibly ambitious task would challenge the world’s most powerful militaries. Understandably, Ukrainian commanders are adopting a methodical approach to the campaign.

Progress so far has been very slow but steady. During the first few weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine claims to have liberated at least eight settlements. While most represent sparsely populated frontline villages with little strategic value, the sight of the Ukrainian flag raised in liberated communities provides all Ukrainians with a massive morale boost. Meanwhile, the big battles still lie ahead.

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For now, the Ukrainian military is focusing on probing attacks at numerous points along the front in order to identify weaknesses and thin out Russian defenses. Ukraine is also carrying out a comprehensive campaign of airstrikes against Russian military and logistical targets deep inside occupied territory. Britain’s May 2023 decision to provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles is playing an important role in these air attacks, making it possible to hit targets virtually anywhere in occupied Ukraine. For example, Storm Shadow missiles are believed to have been used in the June 22 attack on a strategically important bridge connecting Crimea with Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

These tactics are reminiscent of the early stages of last year’s ultimately triumphant Ukrainian campaign to liberate Kherson. At the beginning of August 2022, Ukraine very publicly signaled the start of a counteroffensive to free the southern port city and surrounding region. Progress was initially slow, leading to widespread criticism and pessimistic forecasts. However, Ukraine’s strategy of systematically targeting key bridges across the Dnipro River which Russian troops relied upon for resupply eventually paid off. Hemmed in and cut off, Russian commanders ordered a humiliating retreat in early November.

While the Kherson counteroffensive was on a far smaller scale than the current operation, it offers perhaps the best guide to Ukraine’s current objectives and envisioned timeline. The campaign to liberate Kherson involved tens of thousands of troops and took approximately three months to complete. Today’s counteroffensive involves hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides, with an area equal to a medium-sized European country at stake. It may be months before Ukraine’s commanders feel the conditions are right to attempt a major push to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough.

Ukraine’s international partners seem to appreciate the need for patience and are now emphasizing a long-term commitment to Ukraine that goes far beyond the current counteroffensive. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on June 21, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak reiterated his promise to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Other Western leaders have made similar pledges in recent weeks.

These statements are particularly important at a time when Russian hopes of rescuing their faltering invasion increasingly hinge on a weakening of Western resolve and a reduction in support for Ukraine. Despite the many setbacks of the past sixteen months, Putin and other senior regime figures in Moscow are apparently still convinced they can ultimately outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. European and American leaders are attempting to dampen such expectations by signaling the strength of their commitment to Ukrainian victory.

As international anxiety grows over the perceived lack of progress in Ukraine’s big summer counteroffensive, it is vital that this message of Western unity and resolution remains clear and unambiguous. The campaign to defeat Russia’s invasion is a marathon not a blitzkrieg, but it has every chance of success as long as Ukraine and the country’s partners are unwavering in their commitment.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Addressing multidimensional inequality

Pepe Zhang — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 16:00:00 +0000

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This is the 4th installment of the Unlocking Economic Development in Latin America and the Caribbean report, which explores five vital opportunities for the private sector to drive socioeconomic progress in LAC, with sixteen corresponding recommendations private firms can consider as they take steps to support the region.

Addressing multidimensional inequality

A fourth private-sector-led opportunity for accelerating socioeconomic development in LAC is tackling one of the region’s most long-standing issues: inequality. Inequality in LAC is multidimensional in that it affects a wide range of issues and population groups based on gender (recommendation 1 below), geography (recommendation 3 below), socioeconomic status, occupational sector, age, ethnicity, digital access, healthcare, and other factors.¹ Tackling these multidimensional and often interrelated inequalities can improve economic wellbeing. For example, evidence suggests that reducing gender inequality alone—in terms of lifetime earnings losses—could boost regional GDP by at least 8 percent.² Since these and other inequalities are often interconnected, mitigating them will often require a holistic approach.

Recommendations for the private sector

Tapping into the financing, expertise, and technological capabilities of private firms will be crucial to mitigating multidimensional inequality in LAC. Practical training, mentoring, capacity building, supply-chain integration, and other programs help bring new talent into the region’s workforce, expand business operations, and increase productivity in LAC. This will particularly benefit underprivileged groups such as women, SMEs, and rural populations, making LAC’s growth more inclusive and resilient against future shocks.

Addressing gender-based inequality: Companies must empower female professional advancements, e.g., by addressing constraints arising from caregiving and unpaid domestic work, or by providing skills, entrepreneurial, or other training for women.
Empowering SMEs: Larger firms can shore up SME competitiveness by facilitating access to financing, supply-chain integration, and capability-building opportunities.
Tackling place-based inequality: Public-private collaboration and investment can make rural areas more accessible to basic services (like water and Internet) and more economically productive, thus reducing the rural-urban divide.
Preparing for shocks: Employer-led relief initiatives not only serve to cushion the impact of financial, climate, and other shocks on the lives and livelihoods of employees, but fortify societal cohesion and broader economic resilience.

About the author

Staff

Pepe Zhang

Senior Fellow

China Coronavirus

Report Jun 5, 2023

Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 16, 2023

Accelerating digitalization and innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can improve infrastructure, foster skills, and promote adoption to help the region transform its digital potential into development gains.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 20, 2023

Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Technological, governance, and other cooperation between the public and private sectors can enhance institutional capacity, integrity, government service delivery, and regulatory quality in LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 26, 2023

Meaningfully advancing the green agenda

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private firms can help advance the green agenda by working to create green jobs, taking measures to promote a transition to a circular-economy model, and partaking in green finance.

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1 Pepe Zhang and Peter Engelke, 2025 Post-Covid Scenarios: Latin America and the Caribbean, Atlantic Council, April 21, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-researchreports/2025-post-covid-scenarios-latin-america-and-the-caribbean.

2 Quentin Wodon and Benedicte de la Briere, “The Cost of Gender Inequality: Unrealized Potential: The High Cost of Gender Inequality in Earnings,” Canada, Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, Global Partnership for Education, and World Bank Group, May 2018, 2, “Human capital measured as the present value of the future earnings of the labor force,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29865/126579-Public-on-5-30-18-WorldBank-GenderInequality-Brief-v13.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

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The new Ukraine will be a country worthy of its heroes

Yulia Svyrydenko — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 01:22:19 +0000

People often talk about achieving strength through adversity. In Ukraine, this is the everyday reality for millions of people. Over the past sixteen months, Ukrainian courage has stunned the world. This is not just a matter of resilience; Ukrainians know that we face destruction if we do not win.

Thanks to Ukrainian bravery and determination, almost nobody now doubts our ability to survive the war and defeat Russia’s invasion. However, many international observers are now starting to ask a new question: What will Ukraine do next?

I was recently in my hometown of Chernihiv. Russia tried to seize it in the first weeks of the full-scale war. For a period, the city was surrounded. One year later, Chernihiv is humming with activity. Ruins are gradually being rebuilt and businesses are working. During my trip, I talked to a local entrepreneur, Andrii, who owns a small store. He donates half of his profits to the Ukrainian military. Andrii asked me: “Of course, we will win, but what happens next? How will the country develop?”

I answered him and I can answer the whole world. We have a clear vision of what Ukraine must become and how to achieve it. Our plan for Ukraine has three pillars: security, freedom, and drive.

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Security comes first. All other efforts will be futile without this key ingredient. Ukraine needs a strong army to ensure the safety of our people and our economy. This is also the only way to make sure NATO’s eastern border remains secure.

Freedom is the second pillar. This is a central aspect of Ukraine’s European identity. As a nation, we stand for human rights and against international aggression. The new Ukraine will be a place where citizens and businesses have the freedom to innovate and succeed. We aim to remove unnecessary barriers to business development while ensuring inclusion and equality through social policies.

The third pillar is drive, shaping our goal for dynamic growth. We want Ukraine to become a global competitor and contributor, not a state dependent on others. By attracting investment and promoting innovation, Ukraine will become a new engine of European economic growth.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s goal is to join the Trillion Dollar Club. We need to finance a strong army of 500,000 personnel and a highly developed defense sector, as well as social services, education, and healthcare. A GDP of $1 trillion will enable ample funding for these sectors without imposing a critical burden on the budget.

At present, we see an investment potential in the region of $500–900 billion toward the rebuilding of Ukraine over the next 20 years. Additionally, replacing Russian and Chinese exports to EU and G7 countries could generate very large volumes annually.

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The construction industry and infrastructure development are top priorities. Currently, the damage inflicted by Russia on Ukraine’s residential sector alone amounts to over $54 billion. Reconstruction will require a significantly larger investment, creating unprecedented challenges and opportunities for the entire sector. We envisage a generational infrastructure upgrade that moves Ukraine away from the post-Soviet model and toward a modern European approach.

In the longer term perspective, we intend to rely on sectors where Ukraine already has proven potential and can offer globally competitive solutions. This includes food security, green transition, high-end technology, and industry.

We are committed to participating in the green transition, which is essential for Europe. This will make it possible to replace Russian energy resources. Our understanding of the green transition goes beyond energy to include the development of green metallurgy and a shift toward green logistics. Furthermore, Ukraine’s large reserves of strategic minerals position us as a major player in the production of lithium-ion batteries and nuclear fuel. The availability of resources provides an opportunity for high-tech production, opening the way for the EU to replace supplies from China.

Industrial development will generate demand for technological solutions and innovation. We expect to see a new boom in the Ukrainian IT sector, as well as the emergence of sectoral R&D centers capable of meeting the needs of other industries and the digital economy.

We are focused on technological development, but we are also very much aware that 350 million people are currently facing starvation worldwide. We aim to boost food security and become a food provider for 600 million people globally.

None of the above would be possible without the people who will make it happen and for whom all of this is intended. We aim to create conditions for millions of Ukrainians to return home and to persuade others to relocate to Ukraine by implementing attractive social policies and citizenship rules.

Simultaneously, we need to do the same for investors. The task we face is enormous. Ukraine’s record annual foreign direct investment (FDI) total remains the $11 billion received in 2007. We must attract at least that amount every single year for the next two decades.

We understand that investors need to see tangible results not just ambitious plans. Key steps include reform of Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies and courts, along with the establishment of strong and independent regulators. If successfully implemented, this will provide an institutional framework to ensure fair play and anti-corruption policies.

Setting up a business in Ukraine will become easy. We will simplify and digitize all processes involved in the creation of a new business, from construction permits and environmental regulations to turnkey utilities connections. We will reform monetary, tax, and labor policies by revising rates and tariffs and liberalizing the labor market. Ukraine will become one of the most convenient places on the planet to do business.

Ukraine’s future goes beyond sectoral growth. We envision ourselves as an integral part of the European community and a driving force for global development. We will contribute to international security, propose solutions for shared challenges, and establish good governance practices.

Over the last 10 years, Ukraine has already made significant progress toward countering corruption. Further advances are crucial as we seek to become a NATO member to protect our nation, and as we pursue EU membership to open up new business opportunities and consolidate reforms.

There is no alternative for us. Ukrainians must turn these ambitions into reality to ensure the country’s future safety and preserve freedom. Otherwise, Russia will remain a threat and will inevitably make another attempt to destroy Ukraine.

We call on all Ukrainians to return home and invite the global community to join us on this transformative journey. We invite them to invest in our resilient nation and to become shareholders in the prosperity that Ukraine’s success will surely bring. This is more than a national task; it is a global call to action. It will show how ordinary people in extraordinary times can turn adversity into strength.

Yulia Svyrydenko is Ukraine’s First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade.

In response, the Turkish government announced an ambitious plan to build 488,000 homes in the affected region within a year. It also pledged to build an unspecified number of nonresidential buildings such as schools and hospitals. The plan also includes retrofitting and strengthening the existing properties that have sustained light, nonstructural damage, as well as redeveloping infrastructure such as roads and bridges.

The plan is overseen by the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change, and the work is being assigned to the Turkish Housing Development Administration (TOKI), a government agency that has been building public housing for the last four decades. TOKI had recently reported that 134,000 of the houses it built in the earthquake zone did not suffer any structural damage. It did not, however, rule out that any of its buildings were affected.

Construction is already under way in some areas. On May 3, the outgoing minister of environment, urbanization, and climate change announced that 132,000 housing units are already under construction. The total reconstruction cost is estimated to exceed one hundred billion dollars.

Sustainable reconstruction

As long as builders follow Turkey’s earthquake codes for construction, those units and others will be built to be earthquake-resistant. Yet to capitalize on this massive investment and to reduce future risks, the planned neighborhoods and buildings should not merely be resilient to future earthquakes: They should also be rebuilt resilient to known hazards caused or intensified by climate change.

According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Southern Turkey is expected to experience more frequent heatwaves and droughts, in addition to higher temperatures and sea levels. If newly built homes become unlivable in a just few decades because builders didn’t take into account future cooling and ventilation needs, or if neighborhoods rebuilt after this earthquake suffer from congestion and pollution in the future, such large-scale investments could become stranded assets. Major reconstruction at this scale should also not only adapt to climate change but also mitigate it; cities should be sustainably rebuilt so that their damage to the environment—and contribution to climate change—is limited.

Turkish officials’ desires to reconstruct quickly is understandable given the urgency to restore normalcy. However, the benefits of rebuilding with long-term viability in mind—by taking the time to plan for more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive neighborhoods—far outweigh the short-term gains of hasty reconstruction.

In order to rebuild sustainably, builders should approach reconstruction with a wider focus on districts and neighborhoods rather than a narrow focus on individual buildings and infrastructure. These new neighborhoods should use land efficiently, with buildings that have smaller footprints, in order to make more land available for public green spaces—which offer nearby residents improved air quality, among other benefits—urban agriculture, and pedestrian and cycling paths.

Despite the availability of bus networks, cars still represent a significant share of transportation in the five most affected provinces, which contributes to air pollution and traffic congestion. Planning for future neighborhoods should mix residential and commercial areas to reduce the need for commuting. The planning should also develop reliable and sustainable transportation networks, similar to the Kahramanmaraş 2030 transportation plans. This includes measures to reduce air pollution such as encouraging residents to use public transportation and minimizing spaces dedicated to car parking.

The planning that shapes these new neighborhoods should also aim to create a more comfortable environment for residents. This includes orienting the street network and designing buildings in a way that allows for breezes during hot seasons. It also includes planting trees and vegetation and using new materials for roofs and pavements. These measures help keep the sun’s heat at bay while managing rainfall naturally to reduce flooding risk. Local ecosystems such as forests, wetlands, and agricultural lands under threat from deforestation, pollution, and climate change should also be restored.

New neighborhoods also need to be planned with future energy and water use in mind. This includes reducing peak electricity demand by designing buildings that require minimal energy to heat and cool and providing spaces for power installations on rooftops and above pedestrian walkways. Improving water efficiency is also critical given that the five most affected provinces already face high levels of water stress.

The new neighborhoods should also be planned so that they do not displace vulnerable communities and disrupt their social networks and livelihoods. These risks can be avoided by including these communities in the planning, including at the local community level, and engaging stakeholders in the decision-making process.

Leveraging international assistance

In any humanitarian crisis, the pressure on local and national decision makers to act quickly is always immense. Yet, hasty reconstruction brings many risks: inefficient land use; the increased use of energy, water, and material resources; increased carbon emissions; a higher flooding risk; increased congestion; poor air quality; limited access to public spaces; loss of biodiversity; increased vulnerability to climate change impacts; and increased social and economic inequality. The long-term cost of failing to address these issues is nothing short of a failure to protect the surviving earthquake victims and other residents from future disasters.

Being less constrained by the pressure to rebuild hastily, international donors could play a role in ensuring a more positive outcome in Turkey. The European Union pledged six billion euros in grants and loans, while the World Bank pledged $1.78 billion in initial assistance to help with relief and recovery efforts in Turkey. If those institutions and future international donors encourage Turkish policymakers to create sustainable, resilient, and inclusive neighborhoods, they could have a positive impact on the trajectory of the reconstruction efforts.

The window of opportunity to create the foundations for more sustainable and resilient cities is narrow and closing quickly. Thoughtful and inclusive planning requires additional coordination and consultation and may result in a delay of a few weeks or months. Yet it remains the only way to capitalize on this opportunity for Turkey and to address the needs of both current residents and future generations.

Karim Elgendy is an urban sustainability and climate expert based in London. He is an associate director at Buro Happold, an associate fellow at Chatham House, and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington. Elgendy is also the founder and coordinator of Carboun, an advocacy initiative promoting sustainability in cities of the Middle East and North Africa through research and communication.

The post A blueprint for Turkey’s resilient reconstruction and recovery post-earthquake appeared first on Atlantic Council.

‘Any nationality just not Syrian’: Refugee deportations surge in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey

Arwa Damon — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 16:11:25 +0000

“Bring me any nationality, anything, just not Syrian,” joked the Jordanian work permit processing official to Yousef, the Syrian man standing in front of him.

Yousef is not his real name. We’re not disclosing his identity nor additional details due to the precarious nature of his current circumstances. He has been in his profession for nearly ten years, operating an organization in Amman. Yousef’s career has been progressing remarkably. But none of that carries any weight in this instance.

“I’m sorry, there’s nothing I can do. No Syrians,” the official reaffirmed.

The clock is running out on Yousef’s temporary visa in Jordan, necessitating his exit. But where is he to go?

“I felt like walls were closing in on me. I couldn’t breathe,” He confides in me. “I’m out of options.”

He’s not the only one. Facebook private chat groups for Syrian in Jordan are filled with confusion and anxiety. Questions fly back and forth: “Does anyone know if there is a new procedure?” “Is there a way to prolong deportation?” “What happens if I’m stopped on the street?”

Going back to Syria carries the risk of potential detention risk despite the regime’s continuous claims of amnesty for returnees. No one I have spoken to trusts the regime’s claim, and all know that detention in Syria most likely ends in death.

But it’s not just Jordan where Syrians must fear deportation. Living in Turkey has become increasingly difficult as well. Even Syrians who own property in Turkey are getting their residencies rejected. Lebanon is a non-starter.

It’s a terrifying situation to be in. It’s a sort of fear that doesn’t dissipate, and a different one to the sort that drove Syrians out of their homes and into this wretched existence, where they’ve been branded as refugees—rejected and unwanted seemingly everywhere.

I get a message from a mother I know in Lebanon:

“Arwa, please, you have to do something. They are not going to renew our papers. You have to save us.” Umm Mohammed’s voice is cracking, breaking, desperate.

Umm Mohammed and her family fled Syria ten years ago. Her youngest children were born in Lebanon, and her eldest daughter is in university. While life in Lebanon has grown increasingly unbearable for them—the hatred they receive for being Syrian forces them to rarely venture out—at least they encountered no issues with their yearly permit That is, until now.

A relative who knows the family said he was informed through an official that their papers would be stamped “deport/leave”.

“We can’t go back. We just can’t. Our house was destroyed after we left. It was bombed. We have nothing.” Umm Mohammed is begging and begging. “My kids’ lives are here. They are all in school. I haven’t been able to tell my husband yet. He will have a stroke.”

Umm Mohammed and her family registered with the United Nations (UN) in 2013 as refugees. Umm Mohammed says that five years ago, they were called in twice for asylum interviews. Such hope they had! But then they got a phone call from someone who told them they were rejected while failing to provide a reason. Umm Mohammed says they’ve called the numbers on their papers to try to understand why, but no one even answers the phone. They personally visited the offices in their area and in Beirut. However, they could not even get through the front door.

She doesn’t understand what is happening in her life; how everything is just so out of her control. Two of her siblings who interviewed at the same time as her family were resettled in other countries years ago. One is in Norway, and the other is in the United States.

“Please, please just do something to try and see if you can get an answer; if there is anything we can do to get our file moving again.” Umm Mohammed pleads to me. “Our lives are in your hands. My children’s lives are in your hands.”

I called the number on the paperwork she provided me numerous times but received no answer. I’ve reached out to people I know to see if they can point me in the right direction or to the right person. This is hardly the first time I’ve heard about Syrians struggling to get in touch with the UN in Lebanon or to get updates on their status.

The Arab League’s decision to “normalize” relations with the government of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has pushed a fast-forward button on making life harder for Syrian refugees in the region through deportations and rejections of residencies. But it’s hardly anything new.

While Syria’s neighboring countries have long been struggling to host their Syrian refugee populations, with many, like Lebanon, being in a complete crisis of their own, the sheer lack of care provided to refugees is inhumane. This should not be regarded as a “Syria” problem. This is one of the core problems in the overall approach toward managing Syrian refugees. Neighboring countries need to be provided with the support—which has never fully materialized despite pledges—to host and treat their refugee populations with humanity.

Ahmed al-Reems’ story is especially jarring. He arrived in Turkey in 2019, settling in a village around 40 km from the heart of the capital, Ankara. Late last year, Turkish security forces came for him, his wife, his two-year-old son, and his four-year-old daughter in the middle of the night.

“We didn’t understand what was happening, it was 4 am, and they were banging on the door shouting police! police!” Ahmed tells me over the phone. “They said we just want to take you to the immigration department. I asked them to let me pack a bag, at least take diapers for my littlest one. He told me don’t worry about it; you will be back home in a bit.”

When his family boarded the bus, they realized that it was packed with other Syrian families from their same area. Eighteen families—around sixty people in all—had been rounded up at the same time.

They were held for twenty-four hours in a detention facility. There were no blankets nor food, and the conditions were filthy. Ahmed says he and his family were then boarded on another bus and told that they were going to another area in Ankara. Instead, they were driven for hours to Gaziantep (which is close to the border with Syria), given papers, and ordered to sign them.

“I said no at first, but they insisted. I didn’t want to create problems, so we did. I still thought I had a chance of going back home,” Yousef recalls, his voice utterly dejected. “At 6 am, they took us to the border crossing and just shoved us away.”

The presence of Syrian refugees was central to the recent elections in Turkey. The opposition party spouted hateful anti-refugee rhetoric and vowed to rid the country of them. While less vocal about their intentions, the government coalition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who won the presidential vote, has been deporting Syrians for years. However, generally speaking, expulsion had been reserved for those who had not renewed their papers, traveled outside of their permit zone, or incurred other minor infractions.

“It might have been because of the elections,” Ahmed speculates, “but I still don’t understand. I had my residency; we were all legal. I didn’t do anything wrong. I’ve never had any problems.”

In Turkey, they had managed to build a home again. Not exactly the same as the one they had fled from when the bombs arrived in their town in Syria, but it was still a home, filled with their personal belongings and the children’s toys. It’s all gone again. They are back to living in a tent in Idlib.

“I still feel like I’m going to wake up from this nightmare,” Ahmed says. “I feel like I am a dead man.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. She is also the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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Western companies are still financing the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Nataliya Popovych — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 11:39:15 +0000

Despite tremendous business interest in Ukraine’s reconstruction and development, a large number of Western companies continue to undermine Kyiv’s efforts by contributing to the Kremlin’s war chest. This ongoing corporate complicity must be stopped if Ukraine’s meaningful recovery is to happen any time soon.

The recent destruction of the Kakhovka dam is one of over 90,000 suspected Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Clearly, no reconstruction of Ukraine can succeed unless Russia is completely deprived of the resources to continue its invasion. The international community cannot have a meaningful conversation on recovery or reconstruction unless international companies that continue to feed Putin’s war chest cease their business operations in Russia entirely.

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When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began in February 2022, some Western businesses demonstrated swift and early exits from the Russian market, putting values over profit. While these often high profile departures generated a lot of media coverage, in reality the majority of Western firms have chosen to remain in Russia.

According to data from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), out of 1,361 Western companies with Russian subsidiaries at the start of the full-scale invasion, only 241 (17%) have completely exited Russia. The remaining Western companies generated $136 billion in revenues during 2022, thus helping the Kremlin to finance the war in Ukraine.

Perhaps even more staggering than these numbers are the excuses used by the leadership of Western multinationals to justify their continued presence in Russia. The most common justifications for persisting with “business as usual” in Putin’s Russia primarily revolve around the provision of essential goods. This argument is widely cited despite the fact that it is rarely supported by the nature of the businesses in question.

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It should be crystal clear by now: All western companies that have not left the Russian market since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost seventeen months ago are complicit in the Putin regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. In a very real sense, Western businesses that refuse to leave Russia are silent enablers of Putin’s invasion. Any meaningful conversation about Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction should start by shedding a bright light on the issue of corporate complicity.

Ukraine’s true recovery can only happen when international businesses realize this is not just a war against Ukraine. They must acknowledge that this is a Russian war against the entire rules-based international order. It is a very deliberate Russian attack on the peace and stability that Western businesses have greatly benefited from over the years.

International efforts to advance Ukraine’s recovery are absolutely vital. Priorities should include rebuilding Ukrainian human capital and upgrading Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to set the country firmly on the path toward a green energy future. International companies have a tremendously important role to play in this process, but actions and values must also align.

By countering Russia, Ukraine is providing an invaluable service to the entire free world. Ukrainians who are risking their lives want to deal with international businesses that are ready to sacrifice part of their profit. We do not want to deal with war profiteers, but with those who understand that there is more at stake than just the bottom line. This is what the new era of corporate social responsibility is all about. In Ukraine, any company’s commitment to corporate social responsibility is measured by its willingness to accept a drop in revenues in order to disable the Russian war machine.

The flooding that resulted from the recent dam destruction in southern Ukraine is flushing down the reputation of companies still doing business with and in Russia. Western businesses carry an important responsibility in places where they operate, especially in conflict-ridden areas. Such companies can no longer afford to sit on two sides of the same fence. Either they are part of Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery efforts, or continue to support the destruction of its physical and human capital by feeding the Kremlin’s war chest.

Nataliya Popovych is a co-founder and steering committee member of B4Ukraine and the founder and president of One Philosophy.

Beyond the battlefield: Why we should invest in Ukraine’s democratic future

Peter Erben, Gio Kobakhidze — Mon, 19 Jun 2023 12:31:50 +0000

With all eyes on Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive aimed at liberating the country from Russian occupation, there is also much talk throughout Ukraine and beyond on what happens next. This will be one of the main issues on the agenda at this year’s Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC), which the United Kingdom and Ukraine will host jointly in London in late June. The forthcoming conference will bring together leaders from the international community, international financial institutions, the private sector, and civil society to mobilize international support for Ukraine’s postwar economic and social stabilization.

International support will unquestionably continue to be critical for Ukraine’s ability to withstand and prevail in the face of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, as it will be for Ukraine’s further recovery and reconstruction. In this vein, it is crucial to acknowledge that Ukraine’s commitment to democratic resilience, both during the war and in the post-war phase, is essential to maintaining and expanding these much-needed investments.

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Prior to the February 2022 full-scale invasion of their country, Ukrainians already had a long history of fighting hard for their rights and freedoms. During the decades following the Soviet collapse, independent Ukraine saw significant progress toward mostly free and fair elections and other basic human rights. The nation also decentralized political and budgetary powers, brought greater transparency to government spending, overhauled its banking sector, and made headway on improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, many of which are slated for privatization.

Despite the horrors of the Russian invasion, a number of current indications suggest Ukraine is ready for further progress. The Ukrainian military is now one of the most powerful in Europe. An influential civil society and a relatively free press are among the stronger pillars of this vibrant democracy. The technology sector is thriving and is helping to dismantle what had been a stifling bureaucracy, one of many hangovers from the Soviet Union. But much work remains.

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Today, military victory is obviously Ukraine’s top national priority. At the same time, any Ukrainian will tell you that one of the many realities separating them from Russia is that Ukrainians have a clear military objective and, unlike Russia, know what they are fighting for: freedom. The steps needed to achieve this freedom will extend beyond the battlefield and will include further advances in decentralization, political pluralism, press freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, and democratic elections.

It will, for example, be critical for Ukraine to ensure free and fair elections when the country returns to party politics following the end of armed hostilities with Russia. For this to happen, time will be needed to ensure that necessary legislative amendments are passed in an open manner; that political competitors have reasonable and equitable access to the media; that the electoral infrastructure is ready; that financial reporting for political contestants resumes; and that voter registration lists are up to date. As the international community gathers to plan support for Ukraine’s recovery, it is essential that Ukraine’s allies stand ready to support this critical aspect of the nation’s future.

Just as Ukraine has surpassed all expectations in its courageous fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion launched 16 months ago, the nation must also outperform reform expectations once it defeats Russia’s military. After all, this embodies what the nation is fighting for. Further reform measures are also critical as a means of securing continued and expanding support from the country’s international partners, including for recovery and reconstruction.

Ukraine’s heroic resistance to Russia’s war of aggression is the story of a progressing democracy’s resistance to autocracy. The free world is providing military, economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine because most view Ukraine’s struggle as their own. In this sense, Russia’s full-scale invasion is not only a criminal assault against a sovereign country, but against democracy everywhere. The world needs to see Ukraine’s recovery in the same light as a chance to advance shared democratic values.

Peter Erben is Principal Advisor at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (global) and Senior Country Director at IFES Ukraine. Gio Kobakhidze is Deputy Country Director at IFES Ukraine.

How the international community can help Iraq on a path toward democratic stability

Sarkawt Shamsulddin — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 19:03:19 +0000

Iraq’s political landscape has undergone significant transformations over the years, shifting from a constitutional monarchy to a republic and, later, to a federal parliamentary system. Now, calls for constitutional reforms are raising the prospect of another shift—to a presidential system.

However, the core issues in Iraq lie not within the country’s political structure but rather in the quality of its leadership. Effective governance and stability require democratic leaders and a robust civil society. The international community, particularly the United States and Europe, must play a constructive role in guiding Iraqi civil society toward a more democratic and stable future.

Iraq faced immense challenges during its monarchy era, from 1924 to 1958. Political instability, limited representation, socioeconomic inequality, regional tensions, foreign interference, and inadequate development plagued the country. The monarchy’s dominance hindered democracy, while socioeconomic disparities and regional divisions fueled unrest. Insufficient infrastructure, education, and healthcare further impeded progress.

In 1958, public discontent led to the monarchy’s overthrow. During the subsequent republic era, from 1958 to 2003 and under leaders like Saddam Hussein, Iraq witnessed a transition to a presidential republic. Divisions, instability, foreign conflicts, and crippling sanctions revealed the limitations of both systems. Iraq’s journey towards stability and effective governance remains an ongoing struggle.

The US-led invasion in 2003 brought about a new constitution and transformed Iraq’s political system into a federal parliamentary republic. The parliament emerged as the most powerful government branch, with the authority to vote in or out the president and prime minister, pass the budget bill, ratify international conventions, and approve cabinet and ambassadorship positions. The parliament, which is known as the Council of Representatives, is one of the most diverse elected councils in the Middle East; Iraqi groups, particularly women and minorities, are represented proportionally. Despite obstacles and the influence of money and weapons, Iraq has managed to hold national elections regularly every four years. This has resulted in peaceful transitions of power, a significant achievement that was lacking in Iraq prior to 2003.

Recently, in his Foreign Policy article, former Iraqi President Barham Salih called for what is essentially a presidential system. This call harkened back to the message of the Tishreen protest movement, made up of Iraqis taking to the streets in October 2019 to demand political reform. Multiple Shia political figures have also expressed their support for a presidential system.

While some argue that a shift to a presidential system—with a balanced legislative branch and a president elected through popular vote—could help overcome Iraq’s sectarian divide and facilitate reforms, what really matters is the quality of leadership and the resilience of civil society. There is a misperception among the Iraqi youth as well as the elite that only a strongman can fix Iraq’s many problems while the issues are way more complex than that. The current constitution, despite its shortcomings, provides the necessary tools that Iraqi leaders need to establish a stable, prosperous, and democratic country. For example, the Iraqi Political Party Law of 2015 provides legal tools to establish new parties—currently, there are hundreds of new parties registered in Iraq. This may lead to chaos, but it defuses political disagreement among various groups. Additionally, the constitution gave significant executive power to a prime minister to rule the country, while giving the parliament strong oversight.

What Iraq truly needs are democratic leaders who prioritize the nation’s interests over personal gain. For example, Iraq needs leaders that will prioritize job-creation reforms, rather than channeling public wealth to buy votes. Iraq also needs a strong civil society capable of uniting Iraqis on crucial matters. Leaders must be willing to make necessary compromises, embrace diversity, and treat citizens based on democratic principles rather than sectarian or ethnic identities. The achievement of democracy and stability relies on democratic leadership and a vibrant civil society that effectively mobilizes people towards shared national goals.

Unfortunately, Iraq currently lacks a robust civil society capable of nationwide mobilization and unity. Furthermore, the existing political party structure fails to embrace Iraq’s diversity, favoring specific sects, ethnicities, or religious groups. Although the October 2019 demonstrations showed promise in uniting Iraqi youth across ethnic and sectarian lines on economic and justice issues, their aspirations were not fully realized in reshaping the political landscape.

How the international community plays a role

Iraq’s current parliamentary system faces significant obstacles, such as sectarianism, ethnic division, political fragmentation, corruption, weakness in its institutions, security concerns, and socioeconomic and development issues. Tackling these issues requires a concerted effort to strengthen institutions and, in those institutions, promote inclusivity, combat corruption, foster reconciliation, and ensure effective governance. But efforts to take on these challenges shouldn’t focus solely on institutional change—they should also focus on investing in the current and future leaders of the country.

The international community, particularly the United States and Europe, has made significant investments in Iraq’s democratic system. Unfortunately, corruption and sectarianism have undermined these investments over time, highlighting that it’ll take an extensive and holistic strategy to improve democracy in Iraq.

That strategy should first include investments in Iraqi youth, as they will ultimately shape the country’s future. The United States and European Union should specifically prioritize empowering Iraqi youth, developing their leadership abilities, and creating a sense of national unity. By investing in education, creating opportunities for civic participation, and providing platforms for dialogue and cooperation among the diverse communities within Iraq’s borders, international support could foster a new generation of democratic leaders that prioritize all Iraqis’ interests over individual interests.

Additionally, the international community should increase its financial support for civil-society organizations in Iraq, as these play an instrumental role in reconciling ethnic divisions while promoting democratic principles among younger people.

By supporting the development of Iraqi youth and promoting a robust civil society, the international community can help invest in Iraq’s democratic future, unify all Iraqis, and lead the country towards peace, prosperity, and democratic stability.

Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and was a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021.

The post How the international community can help Iraq on a path toward democratic stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mezran and Melcangi in Decode39: Italy, US, and the Saied dilemma

mvahdati — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 15:01:00 +0000

Original Source

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Less than half of 1 percent of human trafficking victims are identified. That needs to change.

John Cotton Richmond — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 13:36:22 +0000

Human trafficking victims suffer because governments lag behind. On Thursday, the US Department of State published its annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP report), and the facts should shock us all. Traffickers operate with impunity, forced labor sustains global supply chains, predators rent children for commercial sex, and governments fail to implement strong enough action plans, laws, and treaties to stop them.

One of the most glaring examples of governments’ poor performance is the egregiously low number of victims governments identify—a problem I routinely faced over the last two decades working on this issue as a federal prosecutor, nongovernmental organization leader, and US ambassador. The United Nations (UN) Protocol to Combat Trafficking in Persons is one of the most widely subscribed instruments of international law, under which governments commit to identifying the people whom traffickers exploit. According to the latest TIP report, however, governments around the world reported identifying only 115,324 human trafficking victims in the last year. This number comes from data governments provide to the US State Department about the number of victims whom law enforcement or nongovernmental organizations identify and who receive protection services. Although this number is higher than last year’s number, it is slightly lower than the high of 118,932 victims identified in 2019.

The UN estimates that traffickers are compelling 27.6 million people into forced labor or sex trafficking.

Meanwhile, the estimated number of human trafficking victims is increasing. Compare the number of victims that governments reported identifying with the UN estimate based on surveys and data modeling. The UN estimates that traffickers are compelling 27.6 million people into forced labor or sex trafficking.

If 27.6 million victims exist and governments are only identifying 115,324 victims, then the world only identifies less than half of 1 percent of the estimated victims (0.4 percent). This means that 99.6 percent of victims remain trapped by their traffickers, unable to decide where they work or who touches their bodies.

Sex trafficking dominates the discussion of governments’ lackluster victim identification efforts. Forced labor has received less attention, but in this year’s TIP report governments identified a higher number of forced labor victims than in any prior year: 24,340. This improvement, along with governments prosecuting the largest number of labor traffickers, is encouraging. However, when the victim identification statistics are isolated for just forced labor, governments are only identifying 0.1 percent of the total estimated forced labor victims.

Victim identification is made even more difficult due to state-sanctioned human trafficking. The TIP report found that in eleven countries, the governments themselves trafficked people. These offenders include Cuba, North Korea, Eritrea, and China, where millions of Uyghurs are forced to work in Xinjiang reeducation camps. It is especially odious when the government charged with identifying victims is, in fact, the perpetrator.

Without effective victim identification, governments cannot hold traffickers accountable, and people of goodwill cannot offer tailored, trauma-informed services to trafficking survivors. Society cannot address what it cannot identify. Victim identification is the prerequisite to successful prosecution and prevention of this crime. Yet, governments’ rate of victim identification is appallingly low.

It is time for governments to match their rhetoric with their resources and dramatically increase funding for prevention efforts, investigators, prosecutors, service providers, and trauma-informed care. Specialized investigative units should no longer be paper tigers. Survivor leadership should no longer be an ornamental add-on. Holding companies and individuals accountable for committing human trafficking crimes should no longer be elective. Human trafficking victims should no longer be prosecuted for the unlawful acts their traffickers compel them to commit.

Improvement and success must begin with increased victim identification. There are several practical steps that concerned citizens should ask their governments to take:

Mandate that educators and health care providers become mandatory reporters.
Invest in specialized investigative units and prosecutors focused on stopping traffickers.
Create pathways for survivors to rid themselves of criminal records caused by their traffickers.
Ensure companies are not using forced laborers to produce solar panels, electric vehicles, apparel, tomatoes, and batteries.
Fund trauma-informed services for survivors.
Elevate and center survivors in the fight to put traffickers out of business.

Traffickers thrive in an ecosystem where mere intentions and underfunded public justice systems are their only challenges. It is time for leaders to arise and become champions for freedom. Millions of victims count on governments, civil society, and faith communities to do more than merely care about their plight, designate awareness days, and think good thoughts. Survivors need the world to accelerate its strategic investment and meaningful action to increase victim identification.

John Cotton Richmond is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, chief impact officer at Atlas Free, president of the Libertas Council, and former US ambassador-at-large to monitor and combat trafficking in persons.

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How the Saudi Pro League transformed from being unknown to inescapable

Hezha Barzani — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 13:34:17 +0000

Cristiano Ronaldo, Lionel Messi, Karim Benzema, Sergio Ramos, N’Golo Kanté, and many more of international soccer’s biggest stars are either now playing or have mulled over the possibility of joining the Saudi Pro League (SPL)—Saudi Arabia’s domestic soccer league.

Those players are soccer legends, playing at giant European clubs and winning multiple team and individual accolades. They’ve gone from competing in World Cup and Champions League finals to now playing in, or seriously considering playing in, Saudi Arabia. How did the SPL go from a virtually unknown entity to one of the hottest soccer topics in the world?

Outside its homegrown SPL, Saudi Arabia entered the international soccer scene when its Public Investment Fund (PIF) purchased Newcastle United in 2021 for 300 million pounds (over $405 million). At the time of their purchase in the middle of the 2021-2022 season, Newcastle was ranked second to last in the English Premier League (EPL). After having spent around 250 million pounds (nearly $310 million) on new players, Newcastle’s Saudi owners have completely changed the trajectory of the English club in one season, with the team finishing fourth in the EPL this season, a remarkable achievement that secures them a spot in Europe’s top competition next year: the Champions League.

But that’s not all for the PIF’s big soccer investments. At a June 5 announcement, the PIF unveiled its Sports Clubs Investment and Privatization Project, which includes transforming four Saudi clubs—Al Ittihad, Al Ahli, Al Nassr, and Al Hilal—into companies, each of which is 75 percent owned by the PIF and 25 percent owned by different respective nonprofit foundations.

The transformation of these clubs into companies signals the beginning of a broader privatization project, as SPL clubs were formerly under the control of the Saudi Ministry of Sports, with the SPL teams heavily relying on the ministry for financial support. According to a tweet by the PIF, this privatization process would allow soccer and other sports to grow through the attraction of new investments and sponsorships, including from the private sector.

Why is Saudi Arabia spending billions of dollars on sports investments? Some believe that it has to do with the kingdom wanting to diversify its economy and increase tourism, aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030; others believe that Saudi Arabia is “sportswashing”—using these investments to boost its reputation in the Western world. It could be argued that both of these reasons are true, since investing in soccer—the most popular sport in the world—makes financial sense, with the added bonus of offering countries the opportunity to improve their global image.

Grabbing headlines

The SPL’s first significant move was the ground-breaking signing of Ronaldo, one of the greatest soccer players of all time, in December 2022 to Al Nassr for the “biggest salary” in soccer history worth close to 200 million euros (nearly $250 million) a year. Not only did this move surprise the world, but it also set a precedent for future enormous contracts, like Benzema’s three-year, $643 million deal with Al Ittihad and Messi’s rumored one-billion-dollar deal over two years to play for Al Hilal. Although he ultimately decided to join US Major League Soccer team Inter Miami, Messi has well-known ties to Saudi Arabia in his role as a tourism ambassador, a role under which he visits the kingdom frequently.

Since the SPL is not under the rule of the Union of European Football Associations, there are no spending rules, meaning there is no limit on the salaries that Saudi clubs can offer players. The absence of those rules gives SPL clubs an unbelievable advantage in securing talent from Europe, mainly because the PIF’s privatization plan provides the mechanisms for large companies, like Saudi Aramco, to invest in the league.

While the SPL is making international headlines with its big-name signings, these headlines haven’t shied away from calling out Saudi Arabia on its controversial human-rights record. “Sportswashing” often tops articles discussing Saudi Arabia’s, Russia’s, and China’s soccer and other sports ventures. Numerous prominent human-rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch, have been shedding light on the “sportswashing,” most recently highlighting FIFA’s controversial decision to award Saudi Arabia’s state tourism authority sponsorship of the 2023 Women’s World Cup despite its history on women’s rights.

Concerns with the Saudi Pro League

The SPL business model relies on big-name signings to increase the overall value and competition of the league, with an ambitious goal for the SPL to be among the top ten leagues in the world, according to Saudi state news agency SPA. With that being said, this lofty goal for the SPL to become a top-ten league is nowhere near an easy task. For reference, the SPL is currently ranked the fifty-eighth highest-quality league in the world, according to the Twenty-First Group.

Although the SPL is attracting some of soccer’s greatest names, these players are no longer in their prime, with the SPL being perceived by some as a “retirement league.” The real challenge will be if the SPL can attract young talents, such as Kylian Mbappé and Erling Haaland, to leave Europe and play in Saudi Arabia during their prime years. This drastic change would be extremely unlikely, as Europe solidly remains the international soccer hub, with the world’s major competitions taking place on that continent.

While the reputation of being known as a “retirement league” will be hard to shake for the SPL, the impact of securing aging talent can be seen in Ronaldo’s impact. When Ronaldo joined Al Nassr, the Saudi club had 864,000 followers on Instagram; Al Nassr currently has fifteen million followers on Instagram. While there are doubts about securing high-level youth talent to play in Saudi Arabia, what is clear is that signing aging legends like Ronaldo and Benzema still has significant upsides by securing millions of new fans—who then will travel to watch these legends play, growing the Saudi tourism industry—and increasing merchandise and TV revenue, among other benefits.

Looking to the future

Saudi Arabia is levying its soccer investments both at home and abroad as its main push to make a bigger splash in the international sports world; but it’s not stopping at soccer. One of its major investments, which uses a similar business model to the SPL by securing top-level talent with insane contracts, is the LIV Golf league—another initiative backed by Saudi’s PIF (which has already invested two billion dollars). LIV Golf is attracting renowned golfers like Phil Mickelson, who is reportedly being paid two hundred million dollars to participate in the series. On June 6, a major announcement was made as the Professional Golfers’ Association Tour, the leading US professional golf organizer, agreed to merge with LIV Golf, ending a year-long litigation battle that heavily impacted the sport.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia has offered to pay for new sports stadiums in both Greece and Egypt in an effort to join the two nations’ 2030 World Cup bid. The kingdom is already hosting the 2029 Asian Winter Games and has showcased an interest in potentially hosting the 2036 Olympics.

When looking to the future, it’ll be important to keep an eye on Saudi Arabia’s Gulf neighbors—specifically Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—who have also invested considerably in international soccer and the sports industry. Seeing the large expansion of Saudi’s soccer investments could cause Qatar and UAE to also ramp up their domestic soccer leagues and increase other sports-related expenditures.

All of this is a sign that Saudi Arabia is disrupting the international soccer world, which has traditionally been controlled by Europe and the West. While these bold investments into soccer and other sports are for economic and social purposes, they also convey Saudi Arabia’s ability and willingness to disrupt other sectors and fields as it attempts to grow its international power.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

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Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

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Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

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Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

State of the Order: Assessing May 2023

sodal — Tue, 13 Jun 2023 14:31:25 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

G7 Unites on China. At a G7 summit meeting in Hiroshima, Japan, President Joe Biden and other democratic leaders came together on China, pledging to “derisk” without “decoupling” from China’s economy and agreeing on a coordinating mechanism to counter economic coercion and an initiative to diversify supply chains. The G7 also called out Beijing’s militancy in the Indo-Pacific and political interference in democracies, while making clear it was prepared to “build constructive and stable relations” with China. With European allies eager to calm tensions, Biden also indicated he expected a thaw in relations with Beijing, as US officials began a new round of bilateral meetings with their Chinese counterparts.

Shaping the order. The summit’s success in projecting a common front on China could set the table for meaningful policy coordination between the US and its allies, particularly on economic issues. The prospects of a more unified approach appear to have garnered concern in Beijing, which summoned Japan’s ambassador to rebuke the G7’s effort to “smear and attack China.” But as highlighted by French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to Beijing, the US and its allies still have a ways to go to coordinate efforts on engaging with the world’s second largest economy.
Hitting home. America’s economy will be more secure over time if the US and its allies are able to reduce dependence on Chinese products in critical industries and limit Beijing’s ability to engage in economic coercion.
What to do. Building on the momentum generated by the summit, the Biden administration should seek to formulate a common allied strategy for how to deal with China over the longer term.

Ukraine Gets F-16’s. With Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky traveling to Japan to join the G7 leaders summit, President Biden indicated that the US had agreed to allow allies to deliver US-built F-16 fighter planes to Ukraine and will participate in a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots. The move comes as Russian forces appeared to take full control of Bakhmut, ending a monthslong battle for the eastern city and constituting Russia’s first battlefield victory in nearly a year. But the success may be fleeting, as Ukraine prepared for the launch of a major counteroffensive operation.

Shaping the order. Biden’s decision on F-16’s marks another major shift on weapons support that could substantially bolster the ability of Ukrainian forces to push back Russian forces, though it will be several months before Ukrainian pilots will be able to use the planes in combat. More broadly, Zelensky’s appearance at the G7 summit served as a further demonstration of democratic solidarity and an indicator for how significantly relations with Russia – once a member of the G7 (then the G8) – have deteriorated.
Hitting home. Americans will be safer if Ukraine succeeds in standing up to Russia’s aggression and flagrant assault on its democratic neighbor.
What to do. The Biden administration should work with allies to expedite the training of Ukrainian pilots and facilitate the delivery of the F-16’s, while also reconsidering its position on providing ATACMS, the longer range missile system that could also bolster Ukraine’s ability to succeed.

Arab League Welcomes Assad. After years of diplomatic isolation following his use of chemical weapons and commission of widescale atrocities against civilians to crush a popular uprising, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was warmly received by Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Sultan and other Arab leaders at an Arab League Summit in Jeddah. The move comes as Assad continues to consolidate his grip on power, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states enter a rapprochement with Iran.

Shaping the order. The Arab League’s normalization of relations with Assad – a murderous dictator responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians – is a demoralizing setback for efforts to advance a rules-based, democratic order. Assad’s resurrection appears to be part of a global trend of welcoming authoritarian leaders back from the cold, as Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro was invited by Brazil to participate in a South American leaders summit, sending the message to autocrats that violent repression ultimately pays dividends.
Hitting home. The rehabilitation of autocrats like Assad undermines American values and US interests in a stable and prosperous world order.
What to do. The US and its democratic allies should stand together in opposing Assad’s reintegration into the international community, and maintain sanctions and other efforts to ensure that Assad is ultimately held accountable for his actions.

Quote of the Month

“Russia’s aggression against Ukraine… has shaken the international order… [Japan] has a mission to uphold the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and to demonstrate to the world its determination to fully defend peace and prosperity.”
– Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, speaking at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, May 21, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was given a warm welcome at an Arab League Summit in Jeddah, after years of diplomatic isolation following his use of chemical weapons and commission of widescale atrocities against civilians.
After facing his biggest election challenge in over two decades, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan won re-election amidst a campaign process marred by pro-government media bias, limits on free speech, and other obstacles on the opposition.
Venezuela’s authoritarian leader Nicolas Maduro was invited to participate in a summit of South American leaders in Brazil, as Brazilin president Lula de Silva joined Maduro in criticizing US sanctions against Venezuela.
Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

President Biden agreed to allow NATO allies to deliver US-built F-16 fighter planes to Ukraine, while pledging US participation in a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots.
The US signed a new defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea – the largest island nation in the Pacific – that will deepen security ties between the two nations, as Washington seeks to counter China’s rising influence in the region.
In a show of solidarity, Chinese President Xi Jinping told visiting Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin that Beijing will maintain “firm support” for Moscow’s “core interest.”
The US accused South Africa of secretly supplying arms to Russia, despite the country’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine – a claim South African leaders initially denied and then promised to investigate.
Russia and Belarus signed an agreement formalizing the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, a move that appears intended as a warning to the West as it steps up support for Ukraine.
On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

The US and its G7 partners agreed to establish a new coordinating mechanism to counter economic coercion and launch a new initiative to diversify supply chains away from China, while pledging to “derisk” without “decoupling” from China’s economy.
The US and Taiwan reached a trade and investment agreement in an effort to liberalize and deepen economic ties between the two nations.
China signed a free trade agreement with Ecuador, as Beijing looks to deepen its economic ties and influence in Latin America.
G7 leaders agreed to new economic sanctions against Russia for its war in Ukraine, and the US announced a slate of new measures to restrict Russian trade. The UK followed suit, announcing a ban on Russian diamonds.
On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons ()

G7 Leaders released a Clean Energy Action Plan, providing commitments across seven specific areas, including promoting clean energy technologies, with goal of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
A joint report by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme contends that, unless immediate action is taken, acute food insecurity will likely be exacerbated over the next six months.
The World Health Organization declared an end to the COVID-19 global health emergency, marking an end to one of the most deadly and devastating pandemics in modern history.
On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

Meeting in Hiroshima, President Biden and his G7 counterparts reaffirmed their solidarity to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky joined the summit in-person. G7 leaders also came together on China, pledging to counter economic coercion and voicing opposition to Beijing’s militarization of the Indo-Pacific.
President Biden joined leaders of the Indo-Pacific Quad – US, Australia, India, and Japan – for a summit in Hiroshima, resulting in a joint pledge to cooperate toward a region where “where all countries are free from coercion” – an indirect reference to China.
US Secretary of State Tony Blinken traveled to Oslo for a NATO foreign ministers meeting to discuss potential security guarantees for Ukraine, including the possibility of NATO membership, though allies remain divided on the issue.
Overall, the alliance pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Liza Tobin, in Foreign Policy, argues that US policy toward China should be reoriented to achieve what should be American’s long-term goal of a democratic China.
Emile Hokeinam, in Foreign Affairs, suggests that Syrian president Assad has turned a weak hand into a winning one, and that the Arab embrace of Assad will only encourage more brutality.
Soner Cagaptay, in Foreign Affairs, opines that President Erdogan’s victory in the Turkish elections could solidify Turkey’s shift from an illiberal democracy to a Putin-style autocracy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that the drama of US debt ceiling negotiations underscores the enduring promise of America’s global leadership and the growing perils of its decline.
Dan Fried and Aaron Korewa, in the New Atlanticist, explore the potential for Poland to serve as a leader in Europe amidst the ongoing political turmoil.
Ash Jain was quoted in Foreign Policy on US efforts to win over countries in dealing with China, by not talking about China.
Joslyn Brodfueher and Zelma Sergejeva, writing for the Atlantic Council, highlight the potential to fortify NATO’s unified front against Russian aggression as the alliance prepares for its upcoming summit in Vilnius.
Matthew Kroenig, in Foreign Policy, suggests that even Machiavelli preferred democracy over tyranny, because democracies have stronger political institutions that provide the source for greater national power and influence.

__________________________________________________

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 23:31:15 +0000

As Ukraine’s long awaited counteroffensive gets underway, a new survey has found that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are ready to continue the war beyond the summer campaign if necessary in order to complete the liberation of the country. The poll, conducted in late May and early June by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), found that 84% of Ukrainians opposed making any territorial concessions to Russia, even if this means prolonging the war.

In line with other surveys of public opinion in wartime Ukraine, the KIIS poll identified strikingly similar attitudes across the country, with 75% of respondents in eastern Ukraine ruling out any territorial concessions compared to 84% in central Ukraine and 86% in both the south and west. This illustrates the unifying impact the Russian invasion has had on Ukrainian public opinion, and underlines the significance of the ongoing war as a major milestone in modern Ukraine’s nation-building journey.

Until very recently, international media coverage of Ukraine often depicted the country as deeply divided between pro-Russian east and pro-European west. This was always an oversimplification and is now clearly no longer the case. Instead, attitudes toward key issues such as the war with Russia and membership of NATO have converged, with strong support for Euro-Atlantic integration evident in every region of Ukraine. Meanwhile, pro-Russian sentiment has plummeted to record lows, especially in the predominantly Russian-speaking regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have witnessed the worst of the fighting.

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This latest poll is an important data point that confirms Ukrainian resolve to achieve the complete de-occupation of the country. It also highlights the problems of viewing the current counteroffensive as a make-or-break moment in Ukraine’s war effort.

Some commentators have argued that failure to achieve a major military breakthrough in the coming months would cause a sharp decline in international support for Ukraine and force Kyiv to accept the necessity of some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. In reality, however, the Ukrainian public is staunchly opposed to the kind of land-for-peace deal that would likely form the basis of any negotiated settlement. As long as Ukrainians remain determined to fight on, few Western leaders will be prepared to abandon them.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seems to have a good grasp of the public mood in wartime Ukraine. He has consistently stated that Ukraine’s goal is the liberation of all regions currently under Russian occupation. This uncompromising position has attracted some international criticism, with China pushing for the resumption of peace talks and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva urging Ukraine in April to cede Crimea to Russia in order to end the war.

Ukraine’s Western partners have been far more supportive, providing growing quantities of vital military aid while emphasizing that it is up to Kyiv alone to define what would constitute an acceptable peace. Following some initial hesitation, most Western leaders now also recognize the need for Russia’s invasion to end in a decisive defeat, and acknowledge that anything less would have disastrous consequences for international security.

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It is easy to understand why so many Ukrainians reject the idea of striking a deal with Moscow, despite the terrible toll of the war and the inevitability of further trauma.

Perhaps more than anything else, this determination to liberate the whole of Ukraine reflects an acute awareness of the genocidal agenda underpinning Russia’s invasion and the horrors taking place in Russian-occupied regions. Every time the Ukrainian army advances and liberates territory, officials uncover the same grim evidence of war crimes including summary executions, torture, abductions, sexual violence, and mass deportations. For the vast majority of Ukrainians, the idea of condemning millions of their compatriots to this fate is simply unthinkable.

Many in Ukraine are also convinced that attempts to strike a bargain with the Kremlin are both futile and dangerous. Opponents of a compromise settlement note that the current war is no mere border dispute requiring minor territorial concessions, and point to Russia’s increasingly undisguised commitment to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. They warn that Russian leaders would view any negotiated peace deal as a pause in hostilities, which they would then use to regroup before launching the next stage of the invasion.

Based on Russia’s own actions over the past sixteen months of full-scale war, it is difficult to see how any kind of compromise would prove workable. Putin himself has openly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and in September 2022 announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions representing around 20% of the entire country. If he is not decisively defeated on the battlefield, he will almost certainly seek to go further and attempt to seize more Ukrainian land.

A further factor fueling Ukraine’s commitment to complete de-occupation is the strong desire to free the country once and for all from the historic threat of Russian imperialism. This reflects widespread Ukrainian perceptions of the current war as the latest episode in what is actually a far longer history of imperial aggression that stretches back many hundreds of years.

For centuries, Russian imperial influence has shaped Ukrainian history in ways that have caused untold suffering to generations of Ukrainians while keeping the country trapped in a state of arrested development. Unless Russia is defeated and forced to withdraw entirely from Ukrainian land, this bitter cycle will continue. Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding the high price of victory, but most feel that the price of a premature peace would be far higher, and refuse to pass this burden on to their children and grandchildren. Anyone seeking to end the war without Russian defeat must first reckon with this resolve.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The case of Syrian NGOs calls for further study. Since the 2011 civil war began, they emerged in abnormal circumstances under conflict, developed very quickly, and had to deal with the absence of a government response and the vast needs resulting from military operations and forced displacement waves. Despite such realities, these NGOs were somehow able to quickly address the effects of the earthquake while being one of the parties most affected by the disaster.

Syrian NGO offices are mostly concentrated in areas where the earthquake struck, such as Turkey’s Gaziantep and Hatay provinces. Some NGO employees and their families ended up becoming victims as a result. Others suffered from instability. Despite this, they arranged their affairs within a short period and designed the required response for the affected people in northern Syria.

However, notwithstanding their brave efforts, there were many gaps in their response due to faults in organizational structure, policies, and management. It may seem harsh to make criticisms in these circumstances, but introspection is necessary to learn from these mistakes and avoid repeating them. The Syrian humanitarian NGOs’ responses reflected many gaps that are supposed to be remedied in their structure, policies, and management. It was evident that there was a lack of expertise and qualified cadres to deal with disaster situations, who had access to courses—offered by the international community—that did not focus on this aspect effectively.

The cadres of international NGOs—particularly the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA —were not in a better position. Emergency responses were absent from these offices, which were located on the other side of the border, and aid was delayed for days—something that is considered to be a crucial flaw in a rescue operation. Moreover, the assistance provided—food and tents—did not initially include items of priority, such as heavy equipment to clear rubble, specialized teams to assist in rescue missions, and medical aid to treat the wounded.

When comparing this poor United Nations response to that of the Haiti earthquake in 2010, the differences are evident, although the conditions are similar. The OCHA office in Haiti was heavily impacted, yet the staff was mobilized with the help of the international community and its NGOs to support the three-month response. In addition, adequate humanitarian action was taken, exhibited by the collection and disbursement of funds three days after the earthquake occurred and the arrival of hundreds of organizations.

Thus, an important question arises: Why did the response of the UN cadres not live up to expectations despite their field experience and previous recommendations to develop disaster responses?

Chaos and poor response

From monitoring the forms of humanitarian response the Syrian NGOs took, I identified chaos as the prominent feature, especially in the first week. For example, the NGOs completely failed to activate the existence of local humanitarian networks, which include dozens of international NGOs. Each organization designed its response individually and launched the same activities without having a clear strategy regarding the utilization of available resources, leading to duplication and waste in providing in-kind assistance and meals. Communication and coordination to improve the response took a long time in these critical hours.

The powerful collaboration between Syrian humanitarian local networks did not emerge except in advocacy activities and via political pressure. As a result, this showed the actual effect of networks in coordinating work on the ground and managing dozens of new volunteer teams that launched humanitarian activities without having any of the required experience.

The earthquake response caused a decline in Syrian NGOs’ reputations. People were divided between those who supported the NGOs’ work and praised their experience and those who questioned the NGOs and demanded that donors deliver their donations directly to people in need. Although this division came to the fore due to this natural disaster, it is not new and cannot continue to be ignored. That is why this case needs to be studied in greater depth. It is imperative that we restore the Syrian public’s confidence in these organizations.

The disaster also revealed other flaws, according to my evaluation. The risk management of humanitarian organizations and international donors extended to nothing more than warehouses storing foodstuffs. There was an acute shortage of rescue machinery and equipment, specialized medical materials, and fuel, and the process of securing and purchasing aid was confusing during this chaos. Moreover, the absence of prior preparation and the lack of experience in dealing with this type of calamity caused a lot of improvisation and uncertainty.

Lessons learned from the disaster response

It is often the case that the focus during and after a natural disaster is on losses or physical destruction, while the weaknesses of the society in question, which surfaced during the event, is ignored. This creates the potential for new disasters that will intensify the disadvantages of a society and exacerbate the problems in its aftermath mainly due to the weakness and fragility of government policies.

The international community and its NGOs bear a large part of the responsibility for the losses incurred by the earthquake in northwest Syria. They have led a cross-border humanitarian response since 2014 and possess the expertise and qualifications to help local communities and NGOs get out of the aforementioned weakness cycle. During these eight years, relief and in-kind aid—such as cartons containing foodstuffs, clothes, or hygiene baskets—have plunged these communities into new levels of vulnerability, by increasing their dependence without helping them to reach self-sufficiency or building their capacity. The international responses have exhausted local authorities, councils, and professional syndicates from emergency response procedures instead of investing in building their capabilities and training them effectively, thus producing cadres with insufficient experience and tools. Consequently, the local councils were highly unprepared to take the initiative, manage responses, and reduce the chaos of the disaster.

On the other hand, the response of the UN, international NGOs, and Arab countries was shameful, as they sided politically with the Bashar al-Assad regime and ignored the most fragile and needy areas. These actors delivered the majority of aid through the regime and the organizations founded by the security apparatus of the Syrian regime. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights’ report, 90 percent of the aid intended for earthquake victims was stolen.

Such corruption, which ignored opposition areas and left them mired in cycles of weakness and need, could stir up the conflict again and renew military operations. The financial and diplomatic activities that occurred under the guise of “disaster diplomacy” have broken the Assad regime’s international isolation and secured funding that it can use to regain control of northwest Syria.

From these mistakes, it is clear that humanitarian response planning in Syria requires a full review process that reconsiders existing approaches and involves local partners while listening to their experiences. A good place to start would be to redesign the risk management training provided to NGOs and local communities, as well as providing them with capacity-building projects. This way, those on the ground will be empowered to carry out their own affairs, enhance their own stability, and break out of the cycle of weakness to stand prepared for any disaster that may come.

Kenda Hawasli is the director of the social unit at the Syrian Dialogue Centre based in Istanbul, Turkey.

The post I work in Syrian civil society. There were gaps in our performance after the February 6 earthquake. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s failing Ukraine invasion is exposing Putin’s many weaknesses

Anders Åslund — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:29:11 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine is exposing all of his personal weaknesses as a ruler. It is also casting an unforgiving light on the extensive damage he has done to Russia.

In the early 1990s, I encountered Putin several times at international meetings in St. Petersburg, but I never really met him. I talked to the city’s friendly mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, and his first deputy Alexei Kudrin, but Putin, whose background in the KGB was well known, hid on the sidelines and did not really talk to anybody. He was perceived as a secretive nuisance.

Based on this early impression of Putin, I have always been surprised by his remarkable rise to the pinnacle of Russian politics. My view is that he was simply lucky and owed his many promotions to a handful of people close to Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin. Putin’s main benefactors were Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana and last two chiefs of staff, Valentin Yumashev and Alexander Voloshin, along with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who trusted his loyalty while Yeltsin was too sick to rule in 1998-99.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

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Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

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Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

Lesia Dubenko — Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:58:10 +0000

As Ukraine’s long anticipated counteroffensive gets underway, international attention is firmly fixed on military developments. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are able to achieve significant advances, the authorities in Kyiv will also be faced with the challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived for more than a year, and in some cases over nine years, under Russian occupation.

The obstacles to successful reintegration should not be underestimated. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Moscow has prioritized control of the information space and has subjected the population in occupied regions of Ukraine to relentless propaganda. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the communities living in occupied Ukraine can be successfully reintegrated following liberation if the right policies are adopted.

Much to the Kremlin’s disbelief, Ukrainian national identity has proven far stronger than anyone in Moscow anticipated in 2014. Similarly, it should now be abundantly clear that the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian in their daily lives or embrace aspects of Russian popular culture is in no way indicative of political loyalty to the Kremlin.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

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Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

Saudi Arabia is requiring companies to establish headquarters in the kingdom. That strategy may pay off.

Stefanie Hausheer Ali — Fri, 09 Jun 2023 17:41:50 +0000

In 2021, Saudi Arabia issued an ultimatum to international companies: they will no longer be eligible for government contracts starting in 2024 unless they have a regional headquarters (HQ) in the kingdom. There are minimal exceptions to this new policy and, according to experts I consulted, the HQ requirement may eventually impact contracts with state-owned enterprises as well. Some companies are also concerned that the government could shift the goalposts and require more executive presence or include more stringent criteria down the road.

Saudi Arabia’s goal is to get 480 companies to open regional HQs by 2030, believing that this will ensure their sustained presence and retain more corporate expenditure in the kingdom. This will also help achieve the objectives of Vision 2030 and grow the Saudi economy.

Already, eighty companies have been granted licenses to establish headquarters in Saudi Arabia, with companies like PepsiCo leading the way. Other companies are resigned to the fact that they must open an HQ in Saudi but are assessing loopholes, such as how many executives and employees must work from the Saudi-based HQ, what percentage of Saudi citizens need to be hired, and the tax implications.

Albright Stonebridge Gulf Cooperation Council Regional Manager Imad Al-Abdulqader explained to me that: “The government sees this as a long-term effort, and wants to shift decision-making personnel to Saudi Arabia because it believes that if senior company leaders live there, this will allow them to see the opportunities and grow their business in a way that benefits the companies and the country instead of what is seen currently as a transactional relationship for many companies that have benefited from government procurement for decades despite hardly any economic footprint in the country.”

This policy is also a deliberate move to upend the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) monopoly on hosting multi-national company headquarters, particularly since Saudi Arabia is the top market for most.

In 2021, Saudi Arabia hosted less than 5 percent of regional company headquarters in stark contrast to the UAE, which currently hosts the regional HQ for 76 percent of companies on the Forbes Middle East list. Although the UAE’s GDP is half the size of Saudi Arabia’s, the UAE has received more foreign direct investment since 2013. This lopsided business preference in favor of the UAE is primarily due to the ease of doing business in the country and its liberal social policies, which have appealed to expats.

Saudi Arabia’s desire to change this dynamic is generating competition between these “frenemies” that is good for the region and good for business, as venture capital investor and Atlantic Council empowerME Chairman Amjad Ahmad has written. Both countries have made significant reforms. The UAE has announced a Monday to Friday work week, introduced a ten-year “golden visa” for foreigners, and is implementing a new corporate tax this month—the lowest in the region besides Bahrain’s—that will eliminate the current fee structure.

For its part, Saudi Arabia launched a Quality of Life Program in 2018 that is rapidly developing more “cultural, entertainment, sports, tourism, and urban activities” to make Saudi cities rank “among the world’s top livable cities.” The kingdom has also streamlined its tourist visa process, boosted women’s labor force participation from 18 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2020, and curtailed the influence of the religious police.

Dana Alajlani, head of public affairs for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at Sanofi, explained to me: “The rapid pace of change in Saudi Arabia is inspiring, and the eagerness of the young generation to drive the transformation is palpable. I would encourage executives and investors to visit the country to see for themselves how much the country has transformed and the myriad of business opportunities that exist.”

Yet, some companies may lack an understanding of the new reality in the kingdom.

Business executives I’ve spoken to are often shocked by the rapid and profound change in Saudi Arabia. Mickey Stewart, the deputy CEO of Saudi consulting firm AEI Saudi, told me: “Riyadh is an exciting and rapidly developing city, with many emerging lifestyle opportunities for relocating expats. Nonetheless, a handful of businesses have described to us the [Regional Headquarter] initiative as a tax for doing business.”

The Saudi government recognizes this, which is why the HQ program is an ultimatum rather than a bushel of incentives. Expats accustomed to life in the UAE or elsewhere may view a move to the kingdom with dread, imagining religious police, a ban that prevents women from driving, and other relics of Saudi Arabia’s recent past. However, Saudi Arabia has become a much more appealing place to live.

Creating jobs for Saudis

Above all, the HQ program is designed to create more jobs for Saudis as part of the government’s push to diversify the economy through Vision 2030.

Two-thirds of the country’s approximately thirty-five million people are under the age of thirty-five, which represents an opportunity and a challenge. When the oil wells run dry, and as the world begins to shift to greener energy sources, alternative sources of revenue are essential for the country.

In 2022, Saudi Arabia’s non-oil sector grew by over 6 percent. Since 2011, oil rent has comprised less and less of the kingdom’s GDP, although it is still a significant source of revenue.

The Saudi government requires foreign companies to reinvest some of their profits in society, as well as train and transfer knowledge to locals. As former US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley explained to me: “Companies that want to be successful in Saudi Arabia need to make sure their plans align with the objectives of Vision 2030 in terms of creating jobs and training people, because that’s what the country’s leadership is looking for. Fortunately, this is something American companies are very good at.”

The challenges of operating in the kingdom

Today, Saudi Arabia has the energy and ambition of a startup: it’s trying to build the plane while flying it. This presents challenges though.

There is tension between the main incentive offered to companies for setting up a regional HQ—a ten-year exemption on quotas for hiring a certain percentage of Saudis for jobs—and the overall goals of the plan to create more jobs for Saudi citizens. As AEI Saudi Deputy CEO Mickey Stewart puts it: “AEI are both advocates and practitioners of the government’s strategic policy of Saudization (Saudi jobs for Saudi people). While there is some incredible local talent, the pace and scale of transformation means demand versus supply of talent remains a challenge for the immediate future.”

The UAE’s population of roughly ten million is nearly 90 percent expats. Saudi Arabia is not seeking to emulate the UAE in this regard. In fact, it cannot afford to because the country needs jobs for its citizens.

Key details, such as how company taxes will be assessed, will be announced soon, according to government officials. This could alleviate concerns about taxation in more than one jurisdiction. Saudi Arabia also plans to permit foreigners to buy commercial, residential, and agricultural real estate, going beyond a 2021 reform that allowed non-Saudi legal residents to buy property with some conditions.

The cost of living in Saudi Arabia is another challenging factor. Housing, water, electricity, gas, and other fuels rose over 6 percent in 2022, with housing costs in some of Riyadh’s most desirable areas rising as much as 40 percent.

As American Chamber of Commerce KSA Women in Business Committee Chairwoman Jamila ElDajani told me: “Living in Saudi Arabia can be affordable, but to get like for like as you would elsewhere in the region, it can be costly. School, utilities, gas, clothes—costs have increased significantly in the last few years, and options can be limited. With that said, this reflects the amount of opportunity available to entrepreneurs and foreign investors, as they can address the rise in demand for projects that improve quality of life. For those who have a long-term outlook, there couldn’t be a better time to be setting up a business in the kingdom.”

In 2020, Saudi Arabia tripled its VAT tax from 5 percent to 15 percent, which Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said was temporary. However, the Saudis I spoke to are skeptical about the VAT being reduced. Saudi Arabia has also reduced its domestic subsidies on electricity, gas, and water, with consumers feeling this year’s price increases of 54 percent, 333 percent, and 2,307 percent, respectively, as compared to 2015 prices.

Saudi Arabia is also working to open more private schools in Riyadh to support the demand caused by expats moving into the kingdom. These new schools are part of the International School Attraction Program—a partnership between the Ministry of Investment and the Ministry of Education that “aims to contribute to the transformation of the capital into one of the world’s most competitive and livable cities by 2030.” I hear mixed reviews about schools from expats living in Riyadh: some say the quality of the schools and the staffing levels are not yet adequate while others think the situation is no different than any other major city like London or New York where parents may struggle to find the right fit for their children.

There are also risks that hold some companies back from investing in the kingdom. In Saudi Arabia, the government’s Vision 2030-related efforts are improving many people’s daily lives. However, as Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow Steven Cook put it recently: “This is the case even though reform is entirely from above, activists demanding change from below are dealt with harshly, and societal surveillance has intensified.”

Business deals are proliferating and are likely to continue

Despite the challenges associated with the Regional HQ program and with doing business in Saudi Arabia, the reforms underway are attracting companies to the kingdom:

In March of this year, Saudi Arabia announced a $37 billion deal with Boeing to sell airplanes to Saudia Airlines and the new Riyadh Airlines.
HSBC is on a hiring spree and wants to increase global banking and markets headcount in the kingdom by ten to fifteen percent.
Cigna has plans to expand.
Accenture won a major digital consulting contract with Aramco.
Oracle has announced plans to invest $1.5 billion.
China is reportedly considering moving Huawei’s MENA HQ to Saudi Arabia.

More big deals can be expected if the kingdom continues to accelerate its development, but Saudi Arabia must continue pro-business reforms to attract and retain top companies. The Saudi government should also continue to invest in education reform and re-skilling efforts to ensure that the next generation of Saudis are ready for future jobs.

If Saudi Arabia is successful, it should be able to end its Regional HQ requirement in the next five years. By then, most foreign companies will already have or desire a strong presence in the largest regional market, especially if the downsides to living and working there continue to decrease. The regional HQ mandate seeks to accelerate this shift because Saudi Arabia has no time to waste in its sprint to achieve its ambitious Vision 2030 goals.

Stefanie Hausheer Ali is a director at the international strategic advisory firm Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC.

The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC.

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Could Russia be held accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam?

Danielle Johnson — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 20:48:50 +0000

In the early hours of June 6, the Kakhovka dam spanning the Dnipro River in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine collapsed, sparking a major humanitarian and ecological disaster in the surrounding area. The unfolding catastrophe has been labeled as a war crime and an act of ecocide, but holding anyone legally accountable will likely prove challenging.

The sheer scale of the disaster in southern Ukraine remains difficult to grasp. Floodwaters have already displaced thousands of people. Many more are trapped or at risk, including elderly or ill residents who were unable to leave the area earlier on in the war. Initial reports indicate that the authorities in areas under Russian occupation have restricted access to emergency services while preventing residents from leaving. There have also been widespread reports of the Russian military shelling evacuees and rescuers.

Dozens of towns, cities, and farms have been or will be destroyed as the waters continue to rise and move downstream, while large numbers of people throughout a vast area face a lack of access to clean drinking water and essential services. Much of the surrounding farmland is now unusable, which will impact the livelihoods of thousands of Ukrainians and potentially undermine global food security.

There are additional concerns over a potential nuclear disaster as the reservoir behind the collapsed dam supplies the cooling water for the nearby Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Floodwaters are also thought to have dislodged significant numbers of mines, creating further potential for civilian casualties.

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While the Kremlin has denied blowing up the dam and has instead accused Ukraine, initial analysis strongly suggests Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused it to collapse.” Only Russian forces could have carried out such an explosion.

Many have also questioned the credibility of Moscow’s counterclaims suggesting the dam was destroyed by Ukrainian missile or artillery fire. Independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

Russia also has a clear military motive and a long record of attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. At the time of the dam collapse, Russian forces were preparing to face a long anticipated Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. The widespread flooding produced by the disaster effectively ruled out the possibility of Ukrainian troops attempting a river crossing along an entire section of the 1000-kilometer front. Meanwhile, Russia spent much of the winter and spring seasons conducting a methodical nationwide bombing campaign designed to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and freeze the country into submission. While the destruction of a major dam would mark an escalation in this campaign, it would clearly not be unprecedented.

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Despite the likelihood that Russia is responsible for the dam collapse, in legal terms it is still too early to hold anyone directly accountable. First, there would need to be incontrovertible proof that this was actually an attack rather than some kind of horrible accident, miscommunication, or mistake made amid the “fog of war.” Then, the issue of attribution would have to be dealt with. This means that Russia’s responsibility for the attack would need to proven beyond doubt.

If it can be established that Russia intentionally carried out an attack on the dam, there are many potential pathways to justice. For example, Ukraine could pursue accountability through its own domestic courts; international actors could establish a regional tribunal; the International Criminal Court could investigate and potentially indict a responsible individual; or countries could choose to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute Russia for its actions.

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to overcome in pursuing accountability through these mechanisms. History has shown that the wheels of justice are excruciatingly slow in international war crimes cases. Prosecutors and Ukrainians alike would have to show extraordinary patience in waiting for these approaches to pay dividends. It would also be difficult to prove who ordered the attack and get that person in the dock, barring unlikely regime change within Russia itself. These are neither fair nor easy circumstances for Ukrainians to accept in the face of such trauma.

Furthermore, there are still huge information gaps. There would need to be a committed fact-finding effort, starting in the immediate present, to fill these gaps for a case that might not be prosecuted for many years or even decades. Ukrainians have shown an unprecedented ability to document abuses in real time throughout the current war. The onus would be on them to identify the individual Russian units and commanders responsible for blowing up the dam.

The challenges are even greater if Ukraine or the international community wants to pursue specific accountability for ecocide. Although there has been a lot of momentum in this direction, ecocide is not yet codified as a crime under international law (although it is under Ukrainian law). Even if this were to be accomplished in the near future and ecocide came to fall under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, there would still be enough ambiguity and lack of legal precedent to potentially deter prosecutors from pursuing the charge of ecocide in the Kakhovka dam case. There would also need to be an extensive investigation, which would not be easy given bureaucratic and financial barriers along with the fact that many affected areas remain under Russian control or are heavily mined.

In light of these obstacles, what can be done in the short-term to help hold Russia accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and its devastating consequences? First, the international community needs to broaden its view of what might constitute justice beyond the courtroom. This means listening to and supporting local civil society in Ukraine. It also means investing in Ukraine not only in the short-term, but in sustainable ways that bolster the country’s longer-term recovery and reconstruction, quite possibly by using frozen Russian assets to finance it. This requires helping the Ukrainian authorities combat corruption and build the capacity of the country’s own judicial system to pursue accountability.

In the pursuit of justice for Ukraine, the most meaningful steps are those that ensure Russia’s decisive defeat. Accountability will be much more difficult to achieve if the conflict becomes protracted or frozen. In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever face prosecution over the destruction of Kakhovka dam. Ultimately, the only way to achieve a just and durable peace is through Ukrainian victory.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Kakhovka dam collapse threatens Europe’s largest nuclear plant

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 20:06:08 +0000

The blowing up of the Kakhovka dam in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine in the early hours of June 6 has produced a range of catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences. The resultant draining of the Kakhovka reservoir also creates significant risks for the nearby Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The plant, which is the largest in Europe, is not believed to be in any immediate danger, but rapidly dropping water levels in the reservoir will make it difficult to access the water necessary to cool the plant’s six reactors.

Nuclear power plants work by splitting atoms to create tremendous heat, which turns turbines to generate electricity. The heat created is so extreme that advanced cooling systems are required to keep temperature levels under control and prevent a meltdown. The Fukushima disaster was the result of a cooling system failure when a tsunami caused by a major earthquake disabled the Japanese nuclear power plant’s cooling system and three reactors melted down from their own heat. By contrast, the 1986 Chornobyl disaster in Soviet Ukraine was due to human error that caused the graphite reactor cores to burn.

The Zaporizhzhia plant features VVER-1000 pressurized light water reactors. This means that a Chornobyl-style meltdown is not possible as there is no graphite to burn, but the risk of a cooling system failure is a grave concern. The plant has been carefully monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since it was first captured by Russian troops in March 2022 during the early weeks of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly struck the transmission lines that power the plant’s cooling systems, necessitating the use of back-up generators to keep the cooling system operational. Despite regular alarms over the close proximity of combat operations and the deployment of Russian troops at the plant, the risk of a nuclear disaster has been seen as present but never pressing due to numerous residual safety features. For example, the plant can run on its own power for short periods of time if power grid access and generators simultaneously fail. So far, this hasn’t happened.

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The Kakhovka dam collapse has now increased the risk of disaster. In addition to electricity, the plant needs large quantities of water to run its cooling system. The plant was built in the 1980s, decades after the Kakhovka dam was constructed, and features a design that relies on reservoir water for its cooling system. And although the plant’s six reactors have been turned off for more than eight months to reduce the likelihood of wartime nuclear accidents, it will still be a decade before the reactor fuel rods are cool enough to be moved into dry storage.

Water levels in the reservoir have plummeted since the blast on Tuesday morning. At this stage, nobody can say with any certainty how far the water levels will eventually drop before leveling out. The IAEA commented on June 7 that if water levels fall below 12.7 meters, the lowest level at which water can be pumped upstream to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, there are alternative options that can be used to source cooling system water. One day later, this point was reportedly reached. With the Kakhovka dam beyond repair and no clear way to stop it hemorrhaging water from the reservoir, it seems likely that external water sources will be necessary.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

At present, IAEA officials say there is “no immediate risk” to the plant, while officials from Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom have stated that water supplies stored close to the facility are sufficient for the next few months. However, others have noted that summer heat could speed evaporation and exhaust existing reserves far sooner.

The destruction of Kakhovka dam is widely viewed as the latest and most reckless in a series of attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost sixteen months ago. While Moscow has officially denied destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” Meanwhile, independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

In addition to the heightened risk to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the destruction of the dam has also unleashed an ecological disaster throughout the region. Tens of thousands of local residents whose homes have been flooded are in urgent need of care and shelter. Significant quantities of oil and chemicals have poured into the Dnipro River and must be contained, along with munitions. These are the most immediate challenges facing the Ukrainian authorities.

The risks posed to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant by the loss of access to reservoir water must also be addressed without delay before the situation becomes critical. Beyond this pressing logistical issue, the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam is also fueling speculation over whether Russia may be prepared to adopt similarly drastic measures at the Zaporizhzhia plant itself. With this in mind, the international community must send a clear message to Moscow that it will be held accountable for any further attempts to intimidate the world with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 15:41:08 +0000

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

Our Digital Forensic Research Lab is convening top tech thinkers and human-rights defenders at RightsCon to collaborate on an agenda for advancing rights globally.

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Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Tracy Chou
Chief Executive Officer, Block Party

Julie Inman Grant
eSafety Commissioner, Australian Government

Neema Lugangira
Member of Parliament, Tanzania

Fernanda Martins
Director, Internet Lab

Moira Whelan
Director, Democracy and Technology, National Democratic Institute

MOIRA WHELAN: Hi, everybody, and thanks for joining us [for] a conversation about women’s political participation and the consequences of harassment. And before we get started today and I introduce our fantastic panelists, I just wanted to express my thanks to Access Now but especially also to DFRLab, who is cosponsoring this panel in particular. And what we’re going to do today is we’re going to walk through a short introduction, I’ll open the conversation to our participants, and then we’re happy to take your questions online.

So just to get us started, I first wanted to acknowledge that this panel is really a representation of a lot of the incredible work that’s been going on in our community for a really long time. And I would point to organizations that we’ve worked with such as DanishChurchAid, Internews, Policy, and many, many others. Here at RightsCon, there are more than thirty sessions happening to address these issues of online violence against women in politics.

And you know, so first acknowledging that others are doing the work. And then, saying that, some of the organizations that we work with—and I think an expectation we now have—is that if we’re doing this work, we face that harassment and that abuse as a community and as an organization, and that goes along with including the organizations that have helped organize this panel.

So first I want to say a little bit about NDI and how we came to this work. NDI is a democracy organization that trains women around the world to help them run for office, help them prepare for their life in civil society and the public sphere. And this issue has become blinking red for us. The number of women who are self-censoring, who are pulling out of politics, who are deciding another path is probably the biggest threat to democracy that we face today.

So we really started down the path of using our traditional models of working on information—on the information space and bringing actors together to address this issue. But we also believe it’s a solvable problem and I want to note that part of what we’re talking about today and the reason we’ve talked about building the community we want to build with our guests is because we want to talk about solutions but also some of the setbacks.

So without further ado, our panelists are Julie Inman Grant, who is the eSafety commissioner of Australia; and also Tracy Chou, who is the founder of Block Party and also an entrepreneur and is—we’re really thrilled to have her; as well as Fernanda Martins, who is the director at Internet Lab; and, finally, Neema Lugangira, who is a member of parliament from Tanzania.

So welcome, all of you, and, Neema, I want to start with you. The thing that we have noticed in doing this work is that it’s very rare for active female politicians to speak up because you don’t want to make, to use your words, this is not the agenda, right. You have other issues as a parliamentarian you want to address.

So I wonder if you can walk us through your personal experience of being so outspoken on the harassment you face and also what that’s done for your political experience.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you very much. I, first, want to sincerely thank yourself, Moira, and NDI Tech for facilitating and enabling me to be here at RightsCon. So thank you, once again.

As you rightly said, that being a female in politics, unfortunately, the more outspoken you are, the more popular you are and well known the more abuse you get, and oftentimes you find on social media platforms the abuse that we tend to get it’s a group of people who want to disqualify you, discredit you, belittle you.

So instead of focusing on the issue that you’re presenting, instead of focusing on their agenda, they shift the issue and start focusing on the gender and, unfortunately, being a female politician what they do is they sexualize the issue. So they will sexualize everything that you’ve presented. If it’s a photo they’ll sexualize that. If you happen to take a photo with a guy in a meeting they’ll probably change the backgrounds so just to shift the narrative and to kind of belittle you and kind of shut you up.

And what that has done is, unfortunately, in Africa—and I believe it’s probably the same even in the Global North—is that the number of women in politics or female members of parliament who are active online is very, very minimal.

For example, in Tanzania we have about 146 female MPs and probably less than 5 percent active on social media, using social media for their work, and what that does—what that does very quickly it has a huge detrimental effect because, one, it limits our own visibility and if you’re not visible as a politician it limits your own reelection.

But it also takes a step back. You know, organizations like NDI are making strides to increase the number of women in politics but young women, aspiring women, they see us women in politics who are supposedly in power but we are being abused and we’re helpless and nobody comes to the defense of women in politics.

Like, I’ve seen it over and over again when a female in politics is being abused nobody comes to their defense. Actually, more people mob attack. It’s almost it comes—it comes kind of with the territory.

And just to sum up, I decided that since we’re a group that nobody speaks for us so I’m going to speak for members of parliament. I’m going to speak for women in politics, and as a result of that, yes, it brings about more abuse but then some of us have to go through it so that we can address this issue because I want to see more women in politics visible so that we can strengthen their visibility because we are doing a lot of incredible work and it needs to be seen.

MOIRA WHELAN: I couldn’t agree with you more and I think, quickly, I want to shift to you, Julie, because, you know, there is that issue of full participation and it’s something you’ve really focused on at eSafety in Australia and getting to sort of moving us from the research that we’ve worked on to the solutions.

I wonder if you can walk everyone through here this sort of example of addressing some of the concerns that Neema has raised in Australia.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: [For those] who don’t know what an eSafety commissioner is, we’re the first national independent regulator for online harms and online safety. And we were established in 2015, and so there is an Online Safety Act that enables me to take action when Australians report all forms of abuse to social media platforms, gaming sites, dating sites, you name it, and it isn’t taken down. So we serve as that safety net to advocate on behalf of our citizens when things go wrong online. We know tons fall through the cracks. And so we can bridge that inherent power balance that exists.

So I deal with everything from child sexual exploitation to image-based abuse, the non-consensual sharing of intimate images and videos. And I can say that recently we’ve been getting reports of deepfake videos of female politicians and other prominent women. We have a cyberbullying scheme for youth, and an adult cyber abuse scheme, which is at a much higher threshold to make sure that freedom of expression isn’t undermined. But we all realize here that targeted misogynistic abuse is designed to silence voices. And, as you say, women will self-censor.

Now, we—beyond these laws, we focus on prevention, in the first instance. Protection, through these regulatory schemes. And then what I call proactive change. So part of that has to do with putting responsibility back on the platforms themselves through initiatives like Safety by Design. You know, AI is a perfect use case as to how these—the collective brilliance of the technology industry should be used to tackling this at scale and preventing hateful, and misogynistic, and homophobic content from being shared.

So on the prevention side, well, first of all, I should say all of these forms of abuse are gendered. Ninety-six percent of the child sexual abuse material we look at—which happens, sorry to say, at toddler age—96 percent are of girls. Eighty-five percent of our image-based abuse are from women and girls. And then when you get more to the pointy end, we know that 99 percent of women experiencing domestic and family violence are also experiencing an extension of that, be it through technology-facilitated abuse, in 99.3 percent of cases.

So 89 percent of our adult cyber abuse cases are from women, and many of whom are either being cyber-stalked and doxed as [an] extension of domestic and family violence, or by perpetrators who specifically target women. And as Neema said, the way that online abuse against women manifests is different versus men. It’s sexualized. It’s violent. It talks about rape, fertility, supposed virtue, and appearance. It just manifests in very, very different ways. So I’ve had so many politicians say to me, you know, their male counterparts will say: Well, just toughen up, sweetheart, this is politics. Well, it is different.

So I actually tried to start a program called Women in the Spotlight to provide social media self-defense to women politicians, to journalists, to anyone in the public eye. And I was told by a previous government, we can’t fund that. That’s protecting privileged women. So I set up the program anyway, and started to do the training. And we can’t keep up with demand for social media self-defense training. And I don’t need to tell any of you that if being a woman receiving misogynistic abuse isn’t enough, if you’re from a—you have a disability, you end up—you identify as LGBTQI+, or you’re from a diverse background, that kind of abuse is compounded.

So again, I think we’ll continue to persevere. We need these prevention programs. We also know that the average professional woman in Australia is receiving online abuse. So one in three women. And 25 percent of them won’t take a job opportunity or a promotion if it requires them to be online. So we’re starting to see normalization of this kind of abuse across the population. And that’s why I’m trying to use my powers much more strongly to send a message that you cannot abuse people with total impunity. And this also involves penalties and fines for perpetrators, as well as the platforms themselves that refuse to remove content. We always try and work informally first, but I have used my formal powers. And if the platforms don’t comply, I can take them to court and to fine them as well.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and we are going to wing our way to Silicon Valley when we get to Tracy, but I wanted to stop in Brazil first and give Fernanda a chance. Because I think one of the things you said, Julie, was really about the intersectional issues as well that are linked to this. But also, the successes that you’ve had as civil society at Internet Lab, first having to prove to governments that this is a problem; second, getting them to pay attention and to work through the process. And I’m wondering if you can tell us a little bit about your involvement working with the government of Brazil.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Yeah, sure. Thank you, Moira, for this question. And thank you, DFRLab, for organize it.

I think Internet Lab, we have been working to improve the way that political gender-based violence is treated by governments independent of the government at the moment. So at this moment also it’s different because we have a progressive government, but at the same time we have parliamentaries that is not defenders of human rights. So the context is our fragile democracy, yet so we have these challenge to understand how we can contribute to this issue in Brazil.

So at this moment we have the fake news bill to trying to address the problems related to platforms, but it is important to mention that in the bill don’t have any mention to gender, any mention to LGBTQAI+ community, and a brief note about the law, political violence law and racism law in Brazil. But it’s like we are running in parallel avenues. It’s not connected. So we are trying to talk to government, talk to private sector, and understand how we can mix different social sectors to address the problem. And I think we have the law approved in 2021 addressing political violence, but we started the enforcement of the law in the last election and it was really weak. We need to just expand more the comprehension and not focus only on banal answers. We need education and other things in this context.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and I think that’s really important, especially as Julie was talking about so much the value of implementation and needing to see that it’s not just legal frameworks that are going to get us there.

But all of you have talked about the platforms. All of you have talked about tech. And I want to turn to Tracy now because I do have to tell you a story. Tracy was with us when DFRLab hosted us in Brussels to really introduce this issue and to really put it on the center stage, literally. And we’re big fans of Block Party. But, Tracy, we have a different panel here today. So we were here celebrating the success of Block Party, but I think you should maybe tell us about the current status.

TRACY CHOU: Yes. So, hi, everyone. I’m Tracy. I’m the founder and CEO of Block Party. We build technology to fight harassment online and make the internet safe for everyone. Until last week, our flagship product was available on Twitter to combat harassment, and it is now sadly on hiatus thanks to platform changes.

Before we get to that, maybe some context. I started my career as an early engineer at social media companies that are now very big platforms—at Facebook, Pinterest, and Quora—so I kind of understand how platforms are built and what are their incentives not just at the high levels for the companies, but also for individual people working at those companies.

And separately, I became an activist for diversity, equity, and inclusion in the tech industry, seeing how the people that are in the room really matter for the product that we’re building. That led to me getting a lot of harassment, and so I set out to solve that problem blending together the different parts of my experience…

So what we built on top of Twitter was something to solve my own problem, essentially a sort of spam folder where you can choose who you want to hear from. Everything gets filtered into that folder that you don’t—you might not want to see. You can review it later and take action later, involve your community for help. And it works really well. Like, it was great for me.

Silicon Valley talks about “dogfooding” your own products, building things that you use yourself. And it was great for me to experience the mental health impact of not having to see all of that terrible stuff. It’s not just me. It’s a lot of other folks that we’ve already heard from on this panel, people who are working in politics, people who are activists, academics. It’s been really sad to see that we’ve had to shut down—or, hopefully just put in hiatus. We’re really hopeful that we can bring it back in some capacity in the future. We’re already seeing the outpouring of folks who are who are using our product on Twitter really sad to see it go. There are people who are tweeting every day now saying, like, I miss Block Party, literally every day, because I’m now getting all this harassment that is no longer filtered. So lots more to share on that. That is the current status.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, Tracy, I’m not going to—I’m going to stay with you for a second, because you should know that here in this room, I have heard repeatedly people saying they miss Block Party. We wish you could be here with us so that you could feel it directly, but we’re sending it to you virtually, because we need products like this. And I think the other aspect of this story that we would love if you could—if you could share it, if you can channel your rage into helping this room help you. You’re an entrepreneur. You’ve been building.

And yet—and it should be very obvious to all of us the business case for creating safe spaces for all people to fully participate online. And yet, your experience in Silicon Valley had been decidedly different. And I wonder if you can just kind of give us an insight into the experience of going with your fundraising rounds, and when you walked into rooms with funders. Because I think people here need to know just how challenging the environment is from beginning to end. It’s not just about fixing the existing giant platforms. We have a fundamental challenge here.

TRACY CHOU: Yeah. First, I might back up a little bit and talk about the decision to create Block Party as a for-profit entity. And that was because I believe that there is a business case, and that also that in order to align the incentives going for a capitalist approach, which is building solutions for people who pay for the value that they’re getting, is the best way. In order to build really compelling technology as well, be able to hire the best people in technology for a design and product engineering, also requires being able to pay those salaries. And so VC money, venture capital money, made the most sense to me, as aligning all of those things together. There’s a big opportunity there. And we need that initial capital to get going to build the technology.

So when I went out to raise I felt like, so I have, like, a pretty good shot at making this case. I’m a technical founder, with deep experience in top companies. I have two engineering degrees from Stanford, where I graduated with top honors. Like, this is a good resume that Silicon Valley typically likes. I’m solving my own problem, which they also talk about as a great thing. Like, if you know the problem intimately, because you experience it then you’re very motivated to solve it, and you know all the ins and outs of it. Again, usually something that’s very positive.

I did not have a good experience. There were a lot of people who were skeptical. You might imagine the typical demographic of VC, very white, very male. People were dubious that there was a market. So I was told that this was very niche, and also that it’s already a solved problem, and it will be solved by machine learning, the platform’s already addressing it, so, like, no issue anymore. I suspect some of this has to do with the fact that there’s a lack of diversity in the VC industry and even though our products are for everyone, they do disproportionately serve women and people from marginalized communities, who are more targeted by abuse.

I think there’s also the latent sexism in there, where even the people who thought that there might be a market here told me that they didn’t think that I could solve it, which is very frustrating. By comparison, I saw a number of men trying to tackle the same problem. Fewer credentials, building poor copycats of my product, raise exorbitant sums of money. In some cases, ten times as much. I talked with some of these founders and they would say things like, oh, well, just because, like, I used to work at Google and so, you know, I had the credibility. And I would just have to call myself and say, well, I worked at Google, and Facebook, and Pinterest, and Quora, and also have engineering degrees. But I guess that doesn’t matter when I’m a woman.

So very frustrating experience. Had to power through that. Ultimately did raise money. So very glad that I was able to raise the seed round last year and can actually hire people to keep tackling these problems. But I guess to the point that Moira’s trying to draw out here, there are really systemic issues. If we want to be able to solve these problems, we also need the funding to be able to do so. And when there’s systemic biases in the funders and they don’t believe that there is a problem here, we’re going to have additional challenges in trying to create these solutions.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, thank you for that, Tracy. And I can’t say, again, you know, when we talk about the thing we’ve all been told of putting on a thicker skin, really, does it get any thicker than Tracy’s, having walked through that?

And Julie, I want to talk about these systemic issues, right? We actually had a question come in on Slido, so please all participate. But it gets to the next question I wanted to ask you, which was around the barriers. And is one of the barriers freedom of expression and where we allow freedom of expression and what is abuse? And I think, you know, you’re at the forefront of, like, how we define the digital experience for people, and I wonder if you can talk a little bit about: Is that a barrier? And then my second part is: Why aren’t more countries doing what Australia’s doing, and how do we help them?

JULIE INMAN GRANT: No, that’s—thank you so much.

And I want to thank Tracy for her perseverance. I’ve been watching her journey from afar, all this stuff about funding and tech bros. And this just shows you how gender inequality can manifest in so many different ways and at so many different levels, and we have to support technologists and entrepreneurs like Tracy to create, building these incredible products. Because I can say, having worked at Microsoft and Twitter and Adobe, that not enough is doing—being done inside and safety is always an afterthought. I mean, even if you look at the patterns of layoffs happening at companies like Twitter and Meta and Microsoft, the trust and safety people go first.

But I guess one thing that we have learned is that we’ll never regulate or wrest our way out of online harms with the speed, the scale, and the volume of content online. It’s always going to be a game of Whac-a-Mole, I guess, or Whac-a-Troll if you will.

But we are also talking about fundamental human behavior and societal ills that work underneath. And that was my experience at Twitter. I joined right after the Arab Spring with the belief that it was going to be a great leveler and people would be able to speak truth to power, but what I started to see very clearly is that women and those from marginalized communities were being silenced. So if you don’t draw a line about what constitutes online hate and online harm and you allow it to fester, then you’re actually suppressing freedom of expression. So it’s a—it’s a difficult line to tread.

Our parliament in Australia, online safety is very bipartisan. And there are different approaches that, of course, different parties would want to take, but collectively the government decided that they wanted to draw a line; and if online speech turns into online invective and is designed with a serious intent to harm, to menace, or harass, that we would draw a line and that we would have an investigative process, that there’d be lots of transparency and accountability, and multiple ways to challenge any decision I make. That’s the right thing. Never been challenged by any decision. And we’re actually helping to remediate harm of individuals.

So the good news is there are more countries coming onboard with online harms regulators. Ireland and Fiji both have online safety commissioners now. Of course, the online safety bill in the U.K. is pending, but that again is a much more polarized debate. Canada’s looking at this. I’m not sure where we’ll get to in the United States.

But we do want tech companies to start stepping up and protecting, empowering, and supporting people online. And that’s why five years ago we started the Safety by Design Initiative with industry to ask them to start providing the tools to do just that—to think about the design process, the deployment, the development process, the maintenance and the refresh process rather than retrofitting safety protections after the damage has been done. There will always be room for specialist tools like Block Party and [Privacy] Party, and we want to facilitate that—you know, let thousands of innovative flowers bloom so that we can all have safer, more positive experiences online.

We also have to keep an eye out in the future. I’m very concerned about the power of generative AI and these large language models and, you know, conversational models with the ability to manipulate—to manipulate young people for extortion, for grooming, for, you know, deep fakes and misinformation and disinformation. We need to think about immersive technologies and the Metaverse.

When we’re, you know, in high-sensory, hyper-realistic environments, the online harassment we’re feeling now will be much more extreme and much more visceral. Think about with haptics and headsets that are picking up, you know, your retinal scans and flushing, what that technology can tell these major companies about you. Neuro technology—you bring that into a toxic mix.

If we don’t start putting the onus back on these technology companies to be thinking about the risks and how their technologies can be misused and have them doing this at the forefront we’re never going to be able to get ahead of this.

So I do hope that more governments come on board. We’ve just established a global online safety regulators network with members who are independent statutory authorities who can demonstrate a track record on human rights and independence. But we’re also making room for observers for governments and other organizations that want to consider best practice in terms of setting up online harms regulators.

And with the DSA and other developments, I expect in the next five or ten years we will have a network of online harms regulators and we will no longer in Australia feeling like we’re at the head of the peloton going up [a mountain] with no one drafting behind us.

I think governments need to get together with the civil society sector and start to counter the stealth, the wealth, and the power of the technology industry. It’s the only way we’re going to get ahead this.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and I couldn’t agree more and I should say I think we all want to live in Julia Inman Grant’s internet. You know, that’s definitely the space we want to go.

I’d also point to the global partnership that Australia, the United States, and others have founded to address online abuse that NDI is very happy to support and we like the direction it’s going. But I think you made one really important point and that was the really clear leadership of civil society in both identifying this issue, making it a global issue instead of a personal issue that each politician is facing.

And you had, Fernanda, talked a little bit about the barriers you were facing. So you talked about tech versus government and I wonder if you can expand on that a little bit and tell us, like, where do you spend your time. How do you prioritize both of those needs and who needs to change first? Who needs to change in what way to—you know, this is what civil society does. You put yourself in the middle and you change it.

Please tell us a little bit more about how you’re doing that in Brazil.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Yeah. Sure. It was great to hear from Julie because I was thinking in similar things here and we know—we live at this moment a shift of violence concept and in less years ago when you talk to platforms about gender-based violence online we are talking mainly about dissemination of [non-consented materials].

And now when we try to talk about political violence it’s like we are tension the relationship between freedom of expression and the limit that needs to exist. So it’s interesting to note that when we look at the Brazilian context, in the legislative context we have some laws directed to domestic violence. And when we talk to platforms, they told us about the necessity to protect women related to these issues and violence that is targeted by ex-partners, for example.

But it’s difficult. It is a challenge made—government made platforms and everyone involved in this issue—that we are in public is fair. And not just women; we are talking to marginalized groups in general. So our effort at this moment is to demonstrate that, OK, we demonstrated before that the violence exists, so now what we can do inclusively when we talk about difference what needs to be excluded in platforms, what to be—have flagged that there is content here, it is an insult; but we have—we have, too, platforms that have the policy that public figures need to be more tolerant to attacks and insults, as Meta’s platform. So how we can educate society in general if the example on platforms is, say, women candidate could be attacked, the other could be attacked—women, LGBTQI+ community.

So we need to change the policies, and we need to—we need strong—make strong our laws and their relationship globally. So I think it is a little what we’re trying to do.

MOIRA WHELAN: And I think it’s an excellent point. When you were working with NDI on our program to identify interventions, we identified twenty-six. We have colleagues at Web Foundation, at CG, at other places that were coming up with theirs. We just did an inventory, and we have, like, 450 identified opportunities for changes.

But I want to turn us to Neema, because it all comes back to politics, right? A lot of those changes weren’t just with platforms. They weren’t just with governments. They were also within political parties. How media outlets, you know, cover it. Because even though we’re talking about these major global issues, as a politician that’s still a very personal experience and it’s still very—you know, it’s hard to look at fixing the whole tech system when you’re going through this every day. And I wonder if you can talk about—bring us a little closer to home, and what we need to do, and what are the barriers getting in the way of fixing it, for your own political experience?

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you. I think one of the things—there are different moving blocks. The first one is the social media platforms. And exactly like what she just said, in the sense is that it is expected because we’re in politics we should have thick skin. But why should I have thick skin? Why should I tolerate abuse? If you’re not able to abuse me online, why should you abuse—if you’re not able to abuse me offline, why should you abuse me online? So the challenges on the social media platforms is although Julie said a positive feedback on AI, at the same time artificial intelligence also has an issue.

In the sense that we have—myself, and my colleagues—we have reported on a number of times, you report on abuse, and it’s written in Kiswahili, for example, or the local language, and you try to even go further and translate it. But still, someone replies and says: This doesn’t violate our rules. And you’re thinking, what rules? This violates every kind of rule. So on the social media platforms, there’s a lot of work that needs to be done. And I think one of the things through organizations like NDI is to give us the opportunity also as the women in politics to be in the same room with the decisionmakers at the social media platforms. Because we need to tell them these issues, and they need to hear these issues from us. Not from someone else, but they need to hear these issues from us.

Secondly, when it comes to media, in a lot of countries, unfortunately, media—the way the media do the gender profiling of women in politics also results into abuse. You may find that maybe you’ve been in a meeting. There were several pictures that they were taken—that a particular media took of you. And they decide to use the picture that shows some parts of the body accidentally. You know, maybe your dress went a little bit down, so your shoulder is showing, or the cleavage is showing. And they would use that picture and say: Maybe Honorable Neema said such and such, such a brilliant thing. But because the image they chose to use, it totally shifts the issue and it results into abuse. So sometimes the gender profiling is also an issue.

But the other thing that I’m currently working on in Tanzania is to try and see—there are a lot of laws that are existing that talk about bits and pieces of online abuse. But none are more, like, specific for women in politics. So I’m trying right now in Tanzania to push that we should have a regulatory reform on our political parties act and election acts, so that these two acts recognize online abuse as an offense. Because there’s a number of offenses in political parties acts whereby if you can be proven—let’s say you’re a male, and you have—you’re vying for a position. If it can be proven you’ve done a GBV offense, you can be taken off the candidates list.

So I’m trying to push that online abuse should also be recognized for women in politics, because a lot of the abuse that we get is also related to politics. So that can also reduce a certain group, a group of people, at least those who are aspiring to get into politics. And it can give us the power to now start documenting this. And if you hear, maybe, I don’t know, Gregory has been nominated for something, you can go and use that particular law and say: This person has been abusing women online, kind of thing. So trying to push the political parties act and the election act to do so.

But at the same time, I set up an NGO called Omuka Hub. And what we are trying to do is to strengthen online visibility of women in politics and continentally we are trying to do that through the African Parliamentary Network on Internet Governance, again, to strengthen the visibility of women in politics. But to do that, organizations that have funding or that are talking about digital development, digital gender gaps. Oftentimes they don’t remember that there’s a group of women in politics. So I would like to stress that whenever we are having interventions, we should have funding also allocated to support the training and the capacity, exactly like what Julie said. A lot of us are online, but we don’t know how to protect ourselves.

Very recently, I experienced the most horrific abuse through WhatsApp. Like, I have—I have experienced it a lot on other platforms, but it was the first time experiencing it in WhatsApp. So these are people I know in an WhatsApp group. And it went on for, like, four days. I didn’t want to leave the group, because I didn’t want to be seen like I’m running away, but it didn’t want to be seeing them. And you can’t help it, because they’re there. And I actually got to learn that you can archive the group, so you don’t see it. I just learned this, like, two weeks ago. So I can tell you.

But that was about, like, three or four days of excruciating, like, emotional rage. And you can’t do anything about it. You want to respond, but people are calling you, you know, you’re an MP. Don’t respond. So you’re keeping quiet. At the same time, you have to show up in Parliament, do your contributions. You have to show face and do all of that. But why should I be doing that? Why should I have to do that, you know?

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely. I want to back up to one thing. We’re going to go to two things. We have, like, less than five minutes, and I want us to do two things. One, we got a question from online. And I think one of the things we really tried to do here was show the completely different environments that we’re dealing with, right? We have Australia, we have Brazil, we have Tanzania.

And we got a question asking, we’ve all cited social media regulation as an opportunity here, but that’s a challenge, right? How do you regulate social media from all different perspectives and from all different countries, recognizing cultural challenges, recognizing the responsibilities they have to localize platforms? So I don’t know who wants it—who wants to pick up on the—on the regulation. Maybe Julie and Neema, quickly.

And then after that, what we’re going to do is you have a captive audience. We have the entire digital rights community here. We need to send them out with something to do. We’re all good at that. We’re going to give them a job. So be thinking quickly about what your job is for everyone in this room. But, Neema, and then Julie, and then we can kind of go around.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: So very quickly, in terms of the regulation, I think one is we cannot avoid regulating social media, but the issue is how to regulate because we still want the environment—you don’t want it to be stringent. And we can learn from other countries who have done it. But the bottom line is, especially for Global South countries who don’t have that muscle that Global North have, what I would like to say is when Global North are negotiating with social media companies, getting into agreements, they should insert requirements that the same behavior they do in their bloc—in the EU or the US, Canada, Australia—they should also behave the same way in Africa. We’re seeing the same thing with data protection. They are doing a great job in the EU, horrible job in Africa.

MOIRA WHELAN: That’s a good point.

We’re going to flip it over really quick to Julie and then, Tracy, you’re up with your pitch. So go ahead, Julie, if you want to jump in on that one.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: I was just going to say, you know, the challenge is that laws are national and local and the internet is global.

Moira, you’re aware that we just issued a number of mandatory codes and are working on standards that will apply to eight different sectors of the technology industry. This has to do with illegal and harmful content, specifically child sexual abuse material and terrorist and violent extremist content. But it isn’t very easy for these global technology companies to sort of quarantine their activities just to Australia, and that applies to safety as well. So the hope is as—you know, and like the European Commission deploying the Digital Services Act and possibly the AI Act, as we’ve seen with GDPR there should be systemic changes and reforms that happen.

But again, the really important thing in bringing different countries together with different needs, different levels of resourcing and funding, and even different political systems and approaches to regulation is going to be challenging. And one of the reasons we set up this global network is to prevent a splinternet so that countries coming onboard can learn from what is best practice.

You know, we did not have a playbook. We had to write it as we went along, and we’re happy to share those learnings. And there will be others who will engage and will try to something different that will be successful. So, again, it has to be a whole-of-society approach to tackling this.

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely.

So, Tracy, you have, ironically, like a tweet level because we have less than a minute and we’re going to try to get around. So Tracy, then Fernanda: What’s the pitch for everybody here?

TRACY CHOU: I actually want to comment on the regulation side, which is that regulation can also create the space for more solutions. So it doesn’t just have to be about the content or behaviors that are happening. The reason why Block Party had to shut down our classic product on Twitter was that there was no openness in the APIs, these programming interfaces. And what regulation can do here is require that openness such that we can have these consumer solutions. There’s a bill in the New York State Senate introduced this legislative session, S.6686, which introduces this concept. So just want to put that pitch out there for on the regulation side what we can do.

The other one-line pitch is Block Party has a new product called Privacy Party, and this is making it so that we are teaching people what they should do to be safe online and also helping to automate that. So we have automated playbooks for you to lock down your social media settings. Check it out. Give us feedback. And we want to keep building these tools to help keep people safe.

MOIRA WHELAN: Thank you so much, Tracy.

And Fernanda, last word.

FERNANDA MARTINS: I think the next step is to change the way that we are looking at indigenous, women, Black people, and LGBTQAI+ community because we are—we have been seen as a problem to solve, but we are part of the solution. So we need to be included. The digital rights field need to be include these people, these communities to solve the problem together.

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely. And I would also say none of us have mentioned it, but we need more male allies. So any of you are out there, we need men in all of these companies, in government, in civil society joining us in this conversation. So we hope to see—that’s a mantle I would take.

So thank you all for joining us today. Have a great RightsCon. Really appreciate everyone being so brave to share your individual stories.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Thank you.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: Thank you.

TRACY CHOU: Thank you.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you.

The post The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 21:00:33 +0000

Is Ukraine’s hotly anticipated counteroffensive finally underway? That is the question dominating much of the international media this week following reports from both the Ukrainian and Russian sides of a significant upswing in activity along the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine.

This speculation is understandable; after all, expectations have been mounting since early 2023 over an offensive that is being widely billed as a potential turning point in the sixteen-month war. It may be more helpful, however, to view Ukraine’s counteroffensive as a rolling series of local probes and thrusts rather than a single big push to penetrate Russian defenses and secure a decisive breakthrough.

Talk of a coming Ukrainian counteroffensive began following the liberation of Kherson from Russian occupation in late 2022. In the six months since that last major military success, Ukraine has sent tens of thousands of fresh troops for training in NATO countries and received unprecedented amounts of Western military aid including modern battle tanks, cruise missiles, armored personnel carriers, and enhanced air defense systems. With these newly trained and equipped formations now believed to be largely in position, observers have been watching for indications that the offensive is indeed underway. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy added to the sense of anticipation by declaring in a June 3 interview with the Wall Street Journal: “We are ready” for the counteroffensive.

Anyone expecting to witness major battles is set to be disappointed, at least for the time being. While the long lines of opposing trenches and emphasis on artillery duels has led many to compare the fighting in Ukraine to the horrors of World War I, few expect the Ukrainian military to begin its counteroffensive by going “over the top” and attempting to smash through Russian lines with their newly formed brigades. Instead, Ukrainian commanders will likely seek to test Russian defenses at a number of locations along the length of the 1,000-kilometer front in a bid to stretch Vladimir Putin’s invasion force and identify weak points to exploit.

A series of recent cross-border incursions into the Russian Federation conducted by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias may be part of these efforts. While militarily insignificant in terms of size or territorial gains, the raids have proved a major personal embarrassment for Putin and could force Moscow to reduce its military presence in Ukraine in order to bolster the badly exposed home front.

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As they look to advance, Ukraine’s troops will face formidable obstacles. Russia has not sat idly by during the past half-year; it has created a defense in depth in anticipation of Ukraine’s coming attack that includes several lines of trenches and other fortifications.

Russia appears to have provided an indication of its resolve early on June 6 by blowing up the Kakhovka dam and power plant on the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine. While Moscow officially denies destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A June 7 New York Times article referencing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a deliberate explosion inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” The ensuing ecological disaster has flooded the surrounding area, virtually ruling out a Ukrainian thrust across the river toward Crimea.

Moscow’s preparations for the Ukrainian counteroffensive certainly look impressive, but questions remain over the morale of Russian troops, with a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media in recent months indicating widespread demoralization among mobilized Russian soldiers complaining of poor conditions, suicidal tactics, and heavy losses. In contrast, Ukrainian morale is believed to be high, despite the large numbers of casualties incurred during intense fighting over the winter and spring months around the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.

Crucially, Ukraine’s troops are defending their homes and have a clear vision of what they are fighting for, while Russia has struggled to articulate its war aims or define what a potential victory could look like. In the heat of the coming summer counteroffensive, this morale factor could play a critical role.

Eurasia Center events

Human rights must be central in the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Most commentators agree that the primary military objective of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is to cut the land bridge running across southern Ukraine that connects Russia itself and the occupied Donbas region with the Crimean peninsula. If this is achieved, it would isolate large numbers of Russian troops in Crimea and south Ukraine while dealing a painful blow to Russian prestige.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s stated goal remains the liberation of Crimea itself, which has been under Russian occupation since 2014. A successful advance toward Crimea would leave the peninsula exposed to Ukrainian airstrikes and could spark a political crisis inside Russia. The military failures of the past sixteen months have already led to significant infighting among different elements within the Russian establishment; if Crimea itself is threatened, the international community must brace for a major escalation in Putin’s nuclear threats as he attempts to ward off what would be a catastrophic defeat.

Many believe a showdown over the fate of Crimea will serve as the end game of the entire war. But before we approach that point, Ukraine must first deploy its fresh forces effectively and overcome Russia’s deeply entrenched army on the mainland. This will involve much maneuvering and diversionary attacks before any major advances are attempted.

Ukraine’s successful 2022 campaigns may offer the best indication of what to expect from the summer counteroffensive. In August 2022, Ukrainian officials loudly trumpeted a counteroffensive in the south to retake Kherson. When Russia duly dispatched many of its best units to meet the expected Ukrainian attack, Ukraine struck instead in the thinly defended east and liberated most of the Kharkiv region. With Russia still reeling from this defeat and scrambling to hold the line, the Ukrainian military then renewed its southern offensive and forced Russia to abandon Kherson.

This masterclass in the art of military deception rightfully won Ukraine considerable plaudits. Ukrainian commanders will be looking to spring some similar surprises in the months ahead. Their stated goal is the complete liberation of Ukrainian territory, but they will aim to keep the Russians guessing as to exactly how they plan to achieve this.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 20:21:18 +0000

Will the world’s human-rights defenders be able to match the pace of quickly moving technological challenges arising from artificial intelligence, information wars, and more?

Rights activists, tech leaders, and other stakeholders are meeting at RightsCon Costa Rica on June 5-8 to collectively set an agenda for advancing human rights in this digital age.

Our experts at the Digital Forensic Research Lab are coordinating part of that effort, with a slate of RightsCon events as part of their 360/Open Summit: Around the World global programming. Below are highlights from the events at RightsCon, which cover digital frameworks in Africa, disinformation in Ukraine, online harassment of women globally, and more.

The latest from San José

Rethinking transparency reporting

Day two wraps with a warning about dangerous threats, from militant accelerationism to violence toward women

What’s behind today’s militant accelerationism?

The digital ecosystem’s impact on women’s political participation

Day one wraps with recommendations for Africa’s digital transformation, Venezuela’s digital connectivity, and an inclusionary web

What does a trustworthy web look like?

Mapping—and addressing—Venezuela’s information desert

Where open-source intelligence meets human-rights advocacy

Rethinking transparency reporting

On Day 3 of RightsCon Costa Rica, Rose Jackson, director of the DFRLab’s Democracy & Tech Initiative, joined panelists Frederike Kaltheuner, director for technology and human rights at Human Rights Watch, and David Green, civil liberties director at Electronic Frontier Foundation, for a panel on rethinking transparency reporting. The discussion was led and moderated by Gemma Shields, Online Safety Policy Lead at the United Kingdom’s Office of Communications (Ofcom).

Shields opened the session by describing the online safety bill currently making its way through the UK parliament and the role of Ofcom in its implementation. The bill will give new powers to Ofcom to test mandatory platform transparency reporting requirements. Through these efforts, Ofcom hopes that “good, effective meaningful transparency reporting might encourage proactive action from the platforms,” Shields explained.

During the discussion, the panelists discussed what will be central to implementation of the online safety bill, including what effective transparency reporting looks like. Kaltheuner emphasized the complexity of defining meaningful transparency when the use cases vary across end users, regulators, civil society, journalists, and academics. Green underscored the importance of centering user needs in the conversation and the need to tailor reporting mandates to specific platforms.

Jackson noted that it is a strategic imperative for the UK government to consult experts from the global majority and consider how regulations and norms could be potentially used for harm by non-democratic actors. As Jackson put it, “what happens in the most unprotected spaces is the beta test for what will show up in your backyard.” She also highlighted the importance of global civil society engaging with the UK Online Safety Bill and European transparency regulations, such as the Digital Services Act, because these policies are first movers in codifying more regulation, and future policies will refer back to these efforts.

Human rights must be central in the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy

The DFRLab gathered stakeholders from the policy-making, democracy, rights, and tech communities across the African continent to discuss the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. Participants compared notes and identified opportunities for increasing the strategy’s human-rights focus as it approaches its mid-mandate review. Participants also agreed that trusted conveners, such as watchdog agencies within national governments, can play a critical facilitating role in ensuring effective communication between experts, users, and civil society on one hand and policymakers and elected officials on the other. Discussion of particular concerns with the Strategy or recommendations to increasingly center human rights in it will be continued in future gatherings.

Day two wraps with a warning about dangerous threats, from militant accelerationism to violence toward women

The DFRLab kicked off day two at RightsCon with a conversation on how Russian information operations, deployed ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, were used to build false justifications for the war, deny responsibility for the war of aggression, and mask Russia’s military build-up. The panel also highlighted two DFRLab reports, released in February 2023, that examine Russia’s justifications for the war and Russia’s attempts to undermine Ukraine’s resistance and support from the international community.

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

Mapping the last decade of Russia’s disinformation and influence campaign in Ukraine

By Atlantic Council

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has continued its information operations, targeting more than just Ukraine, say speakers at a RightsCon event hosted by the Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Disinformation Russia

While at RightsCon, the DFRLab participated in a discussion on militant accelerationism, its impact on minority communities, and how bad actors can be held accountable. The event, hosted by the United Kingdom’s Office of Communications and Slovakia’s Council of Media Services, featured panelists who discussed the ways in which policy can hold all voices, including those of the powerful, accountable. During the panel, DFRLab Research Fellow Meghan Conroy discussed how such violent narratives have become increasingly commonplace in some American ideologies and how extremist individuals and groups sympathetic to these narratives have been mobilized.

To close out the day, the DFRLab and the National Democratic Institute co-hosted a panel featuring global experts from civil society, government, and industry on how the threat of violence and harassment online has impacted the potential for women to participate in politics. As noted by the panelists, abuse suffered online is meant to strictly intimidate and silence those who want to get involved, and it is, therefore, all the more important that these very women, and those already established, stand up and speak out so as to serve as role models and protect diversity and equity in politics, tech, and beyond.

What’s behind today’s militant accelerationism?

By Meghan Conroy

While at RightsCon, I—a DFRLab research fellow and co-founder of the Accelerationism Research Consortium—joined an event hosted by the UK Office of Communications and Slovakia’s Council of Media Services on militant accelerationism.

My co-panelists and I provided an overview of militant accelerationism and an explanation of the marginalized groups that have been targets of militant accelerationist violence. I discussed accelerationist narratives that have not only permeated mainstream discourse but have also mobilized extremists to violence. Hannah Rose, research fellow and PhD candidate at King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, zeroed in on the role of conspiracy theories in enabling the propagation of these extreme worldviews.

Stanislav Matějka, head of the Analytical Department at the Slovakian Council of Media Services, delved into the October 2022 attack in Bratislava. He flagged the role of larger, more mainstream platforms as well as filesharing services in enabling the spread of harmful content preceding the attack. Murtaza Shaikh, principal at the UK Office of Communications for illegal harms and hate and terrorism, highlighted the office’s work on the May 2022 attack in Buffalo, New York. He raised that these attacks result, in part, from majority populations framing themselves as under threat by minority populations, and then taking up arms against those minority populations.

Attendees then broke into groups to discuss regulatory solutions and highlight obstacles that may stand in the way of those solutions’ implementation or effectiveness. Key takeaways included the following:

Powerful voices need to be held to account. Politicians, influencers, and large platforms have played an outsized role in enabling the mainstreaming and broad reach of these worldviews.
Bad actors will accuse platforms and regulators of censorship, regardless of the extent to which content is moderated. As aforementioned, they’ll often position themselves as victims of oppression, and doing so in the context of content moderation policies is no different—even if the accusations are not rooted in reality.
Regulators must capitalize on existing expertise. Ahost of experts who monitor these actors, groups, and narratives across platforms, as well as their offline activities, can help regulators and platforms craft creative, adaptive, and effective policies to tackle the nebulous set of problems linked to militant accelerationism.

This conversation spurred some initial ideas that are geared toward generating more substantial discussion. Introducing those unfamiliar with understudied and misunderstood concepts, like militant accelerationism, is of the utmost importance to permit more effective combatting of online harms and their offline manifestations—especially those that have proven deadly.

Meghan Conroy is a US research fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The digital ecosystem’s impact on women’s political participation

By Abigail Wollam

The DFRLab and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) co-hosted a panel that brought together four global experts from civil society, government, and industry to discuss a shared and prevalent issue: The threat of digital violence and harassment that women face online, and the impact that it has on women’s participation in political life.

The panel was facilitated by Moira Whelan, director for democracy and technology at NDI; she opened the conversation by highlighting how critical these conversations are, outlining the threat to democracy posed by digital violence. She noted that as online harassment towards women becomes more prevalent, women are self-censoring and removing themselves from online spaces. “Targeted misogynistic abuse is designed to silence voices,” added panelist Julia Inman Grant, the eSafety commissioner of Australia.

Both Neema Lugangira (chairperson for the African Parliamentary Network on Internet Governance and member of parliament in Tanzania) and Tracy Chou (founder and chief executive officer of Block Party) spoke about their experiences with online harassment and how those experiences spurred their actions in the space. Lugangira found, through her experience as a female politician in Tanzania, that the more outspoken or visible a woman is, the more abuse she gets. She observed that women might be less inspired to participate in political life because they see the abuse other women face—and the lack of defense or support these women get from other people. “I decided that since we’re a group that nobody speaks for… I’m going to speak for women in politics,” said Lugangira.

Chou said that she faced online harassment when she became an activist for diversity, equity, and inclusion in the tech community. She wanted to address the problem that she was facing herself and founded Block Party, a company that builds tools to combat online harassment.

Despite these challenges, the panelists discussed potential solutions and ways forward. Australia is leading by example with its eSafety commissioner and Online Safety Act, which provide Australians with an avenue through which to report online abuses and receive assistance. Fernanda Martins, director of InternetLab, discussed the need to change how marginalized communities that face gendered abuse are seen and talked about; instead of talking about the community as a problem, it’s important to see them as part of the solution and bring them into the discussions.

Abigail Wollam is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how.

By Atlantic Council

At RightsCon, human-rights advocates and tech leaders who have faced harassment online detail their experiences—and ways the international community can support women moving forward.

Disinformation Resilience & Society

.@rightscon Day 2 in the books! Stay tuned, still more to come with @DFRLab #360OS. pic.twitter.com/V8KapT1PVb
— DFRLab (@DFRLab) June 7, 2023

Day one wraps with recommendations for Africa’s digital transformation, Venezuela’s digital connectivity, and an inclusionary web

This year at RightsCon Costa Rica, the DFRLab previewed its forthcoming Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web report and gathered human-rights defenders and tech leaders to talk about digital frameworks in Africa, disinformation in Latin America and Ukraine, and the impact online harassment has on women in political life, and what’s to come with the European Union’s Digital Services Act.

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

The European Commission’s Rita Wezenbeek on what comes next in implementing the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act

By Atlantic Council

At a DFRLab RightsCon event, Wezenbeek spoke about the need to get everyone involved in the implementation of the DSA and DMA.

Disinformation European Union

The programming kicked off on June 5 with the Digital Sherlocks training program in San José, which marked the first time the session was conducted in both English and Spanish. The workshop aimed to provide human-rights defenders with the tools and skills they need to build movements that are resilient to disinformation.

On June 6, the programming opened with a meeting on centering human rights in the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. The DFRLab gathered stakeholders from democracy, rights, and tech communities across the African continent to discuss the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. Participants compared notes and identified opportunities for impact as the strategy approaches its mid-mandate review.

Next, the DFRLab, Venezuela Inteligente, and Access Now hosted a session on strengthening Venezuela’s digital information ecosystem, a coalition-building meeting with twenty organizations. The discussion drew from a DFRLab analysis of Venezuela’s needs and capabilities related to the country’s media ecosystems and digital security, literacy, and connectivity. The speakers emphasized ways to serve vulnerable groups.

Following these discussions, the DFRLab participated a dialogue previewing findings from the Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web. The DFRLab’s Task Force is convening a broad cross-section of industry, civil-society, and government leaders to set a clear and action-oriented agenda for future online ecosystems. As the Task Force wraps up its report, members discussed one of the group’s major findings: the importance of inclusionary design in product, policy, and regulatory development. To close out the first day of DFRLab programming at RightsCon Costa Rica, the task force notified the audience that it will be launching its report in the coming weeks.

What does a trustworthy web look like?

By Jacqueline Malaret and Abigail Wollam

The DFRLab’s Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web is charting a clear and action-oriented roadmap for future online ecosystems to protect users’ rights, support innovation, and center trust and safety principles. As the Task Force is wrapping up its report, members joined Task Force Director Kat Duffy to discuss one of the Task Force’s major findings—the importance of inclusionary design in product, policy, and regulatory development—on the first day of RightsCon Costa Rica.

In just eight weeks, Elon Musk took over Twitter, the cryptocurrency market crashed, ChatGPT launched, and major steps have been made in the development of augmented reality and virtual reality, fundamentally shifting the landscape of how we engage with technology. Framing the panel, Duffy highlighted how not only has technology changed at a breakneck pace, but the development and professionalization of the trust and safety industry have unfolded rapidly in tandem, bringing risks, harms, and opportunities to make the digital world safer for all.

Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web

The Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web will chart a clear and action-oriented roadmap for future online ecosystems to protect users’ rights, support innovation, and center trust and safety principles.

The three panelists—Agustina del Campo, director of the Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression; Nighat Dad, executive director of the Digital Rights Foundation; and Victoire Rio, a digital-rights advocate—agreed that the biggest risk, which could yield the greatest harm, is shaping industry practices through a Western-centric lens, without allowing space for the global majority. Excluding populations from the conversation around tech only solidifies the mistakes of the past and risks creating a knowledge gap. Additionally, the conversation touched on the risk of losing sight of the role of government, entrenching self-regulation as an industry norm, and absolving both companies and the state for harms that can occur because of the adoption of these technologies.

Where there is risk, there is also an opportunity to build safer and rights-respecting technologies. Panelists said that they found promise in the professionalization and organization of industry, which can create a space for dialogue and for civil society to engage and innovate in the field. They are also encouraged that more and more industry engagements are taking place within the structures of international law and universal human rights. The speakers were encouraged by new opportunities to shape regulation in a way that coalesces action around systemic and forward-looking solutions.

But how can industry, philanthropy, and civil society maximize these opportunities? There is an inherent need to support civil society that is already deeply engaged in this work and to help develop this field, particularly in the global majority. There is also a need to pursue research that can shift the narrative to incentivize investment in trust and safety teams and articulate a clear case for the existence of this work.

Jacqueline Malaret is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Abigail Wollam is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Mapping—and addressing—Venezuela’s information desert

By Iria Puyosa and Daniel Suárez Pérez

On June 6, the DFRLab, Venezuela Inteligente, and Access Now (which runs RightsCon) hosted a coalition-building meeting with twenty organizations that are currently working on strengthening Venezuela’s digital information ecosystem. The discussion was built on an analysis, conducted by the DFRLab, of the country’s media ecosystems and digital security, literacy, and connectivity; the speakers focused on ways to serve vulnerable groups such as grassroots activists, human-rights defenders, border populations, and populations in regions afflicted by irregular armed groups.

The idea of developing a pilot project in an information desert combining four dimensions—connectivity, relevant information, security, and literacy—was discussed. Participants agreed that projects should combine technical solutions to increase access to connectivity and generate relevant information for communities, with a human-rights focus. In addition, projects should include a digital- and media-literacy component and continuous support for digital security.

Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Daniel Suárez Pérez is a research associate for Latin America at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

What a great first day for @DFRLab’s #360OS at @rightscon Costa Rica! We’ll be in San José all week so stay tuned for more great content. pic.twitter.com/JGzIzp4sKD
— DFRLab (@DFRLab) June 5, 2023

Where open-source intelligence meets human-rights advocacy

By Ana Arriagada

On June 5, the DFRLab hosted a Digital Sherlocks workshop on strengthening human-rights advocacy through open-source intelligence (OSINT) and countering disinformation.

Learn more about the Digital Sherlocks program

The Digital Sherlocks program convenes a global community of researchers to build resilience against disinformation. Each semester, the program offers more than thirty free online trainings, ranging from basic to advanced levels, to cohorts drawn from universities, civil society, journalism, and academia. Through the Digital Sherlocks program, the DFRLab has trained at least 2,300 people in over 130 countries.

I co-led the workshop with DFRLab Associate Researchers Jean le Roux, Daniel Suárez Pérez, and Esteban Ponce de León.

In the session, attendees discussed the worrying rise of antidemocratic governments in Latin America—such as in Nicaragua and Guatemala—who are using open-source tools for digital surveillance and are criminalizing the work of journalists and human-rights defenders. When faced with these challenges, it becomes imperative for civil-society organizations to acquire and use investigative skills to produce well-documented reports and investigations.

During the workshop, DFRLab researchers shared their experiences investigating paid campaigns that spread disinformation or promote violence or online harassment. They recounted having used an array of tools to analyze the origin and behavior of these paid advertisements.

DFRLab researchers also discussed tools that helped them detect suspicious activity on platforms such as YouTube, where, for example, some gamer channels spread videos related to disinformation campaigns or political violence. The workshop attendees also discussed how policy changes at Twitter have made the platform increasingly challenging to investigate, but they added that open-source researchers are still investigating, thanks to the help of available tools and the researchers’ creative methodologies.

The workshop also showcased the DFRLab’s work with the Action Coalition on Meaningful Transparency (ACT). Attendees received a preview of ACT’s upcoming portal launch, for which the DFRLab has been offering guidance. The new resource will offer access to a repository of transparency reporting, policy documents, and analysis from companies, governments, and civil society. It will also include a registry of relevant actors and initiatives, and it will allow users to establish links between entries to see the connections between organizations, the initiatives they are involved in, and the reports they have published.

The workshop ended with the DFRLab explaining that social network analysis— the study of social relationships and structures using graph theory—is important because it allows for investigating suspicious activity or unnatural behavior exhibited by users on social media platforms.

Ana Arriagada is an assistant director for Latin America at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

The post Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is a key moment but long-term resolve remains crucial

Tennyson Dearing — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 20:23:12 +0000

For the past few months, international anticipation has been building over Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive. But great expectations can be dangerous. Even after the spectacular military successes of 2022, the Ukrainian military will face major obstacles as it seeks to overcome a large Russian force that still occupies just under 20% of the country and is deeply entrenched along a front line stretching over 1000 km.

First, offensive warfare is hard. It’s even harder when done in towns and cities. According to John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, this is because cities are tactically constraining. Built up areas offer plenty of ready-made cover above and below ground. Used well, defenders can surprise attackers with close range ambushes, turning single buildings into deadly fortresses.

This should ring alarm bells for Ukrainian military planners. True, open steppe and trenches have hosted much of the fighting in recent months. But from Donetsk and Luhansk in the east to Melitopol and Sevastopol in the south, the path to the complete liberation of Ukraine is thick with occupied cities. Russia will likely use these urban areas to dig in. And though Ukraine can control the tempo and direction of its counteroffensive, Ukrainian troops will still likely need to engage in urban warfare at regular intervals.

Ukraine still has good chances of advancing, of course. Its armed forces are nimble and highly motivated, and they’ve made a habit of surprising both Western analysts and their Russian adversaries. The Russians also face problems of their own. In defending occupied cities, they can be cut off from support and supplies. Ukrainians have been training to exploit these weaknesses. But even with larger troop formations and Western hardware, they will be swimming against the current.

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Second, as well as tactical constraints, Ukraine has tighter than usual policy constraints. This is easy to forget. More than fifteen months since Russia’s full-scale invasion began, Ukraine’s balance sheet is a tally of hard-earned battlefield successes. However, these have come despite a handicap. Unlike Russia, Ukraine is fighting on home soil; this limits its capacity to make war.

This has a lot to do with civilians. In urban battles, attackers can lessen their casualties by bombarding defended buildings before boots-on-the-ground assaults. Yet unlike jungles or deserts, cities are not neutral. The presence of civilians changes what attackers may be prepared or permitted to do.

International law plays a role here. Under the Geneva Conventions, which both Ukraine and Russia are party to, warring states must take constant care to protect civilians and civilian objects. This doesn’t mean that collateral damage is always illegal, but losses should be in proportion to an expected military gain and not the work of indiscriminate targeting. Russia has ignored these laws on a scale that many regard as part of a wider genocide. Ukraine has not. This is a key reason why Ukrainian forces have not engaged in the wholesale shelling of occupied cities, and has also repeatedly warned civilians to take precautions, such as during the campaign to liberate Kherson late last year.

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The high potential for civilian casualties will impact Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive. This will be particularly challenging in densely populated areas. While many local residents of affected towns and cities may choose to evacuate, some will inevitably stay put. Faced with a Russian adversary positioned behind or alongside significant numbers of Ukrainian civilians, Ukraine will be constrained in terms of how it attacks and maneuvers.

Russia has already forced Ukraine to accept war as the price of freedom, but it will not succeed in erasing Ukraine’s humanity. Military planners in Kyiv are therefore tasked with the gut-wrenching calculus of places and populations. They must decide where to fight and what it might cost. For now, these are guarded secrets. Yet it will surely be harder to liberate Ukraine than defend it.

With this in mind, international resolve is more crucial than ever. Since February 2022, support from Ukraine’s allies has played a key part in the fight against Russia’s invasion. Ongoing diplomatic efforts, intelligence sharing, and military assistance remain vital and must not be tied to short-term objectives. This is why any signs of overconfidence in the summer counteroffensive are troubling, because disappointment too easily leads to disillusionment.

In reality, a decisive Ukrainian military victory may still be far off. It will also be costly, but not nearly as costly as a premature peace. With many in the West already keen to see a return on investment, and with talk of a “high-water mark” for US aid gaining ground in some quarters, Ukraine needs systematic backing that stays the course. The coming Ukrainian counteroffensive is an important moment in the war, but it should not be seen as Ukraine’s last chance to achieve victory.

Tennyson Dearing is a policy officer at the Australian Department of Defence based in Paris. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Australian government.

Grand examines what happens when autocratic rule corrodes and what pushes it to ultimately crumble. Under what circumstances do kings and queens, emperors and caliphs, cease to rule — either because their throne is transformed into a more ceremonial post or because they lose power entirely? For the eight remaining Arab monarchs, the downfall of their former global peers offer critical insights and parallels.

The issue brief examines these topics and provides strategies for managing challenges to power, as well as a series of lessons for Arab monarchs to consider.

About the author

Stephen R. Grand

Nonresident Senior Fellow
Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs

Executive Director, Network for Dialogue
Instituto Affari Internazionali & PAX

Grand was director of the Project on US Relations with the Islamic World (housed within the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings), where he wrote the book Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Else- where Can Teach Us about the Prospects for Arab Democracy (2014). Other prior positions include director of the Middle East Strategy Group at the Aspen Institute, director of programs at the German Marshall Fund, professional staff member for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and founding executive director of the Civic Education Project. He has also served as a visiting or adjunct professor at Georgia State University (current), Utrecht University, the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Erasmus University in Rotterdam, American University’s School of International Service and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.

Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

MENASource May 19, 2023

Experts react: Assad gets warm reception at Arab summit. Where does that leave the US and its allies?

By Qutaiba Idlbi, Gissou Nia, Michel Duclos, Emadeddin Badi

Atlantic Council experts react to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s attendance at the Arab League summit in Jeddah and explain its significance below.

Human Rights Middle East

MENASource May 10, 2023

Saudi Arabia should consider the ‘Just Do It’ strategy for normalizing ties with Israel

By Richard LeBaron

Acting on one’s terms when pursuing national interests is always a better strategy. Saudi Arabia is completely capable of dealing with Israel on its own.

Israel Middle East

New Atlanticist Apr 21, 2023

Is Saudi-Iran reconciliation threatening the future of Israeli normalization?

By Sarah Zaaimi

The recent rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran could signal a sea change in Arab-Iranian relations and pose practical hindrances to Arab-Israeli normalization.

Iran Middle East

The post How monarchies end appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Only 11 percent of finance ministers and central bank governors are women

Jessie Yin — Fri, 02 Jun 2023 14:52:18 +0000

“We can no longer consider it normal that 50% of our population is not present,” Spanish Minister of the Economy Nadia Calviño said after refusing to take a promotional photo at the Madrid Leaders Forum, where she was the only woman in the line-up. Calviño promised last year that she would no longer participate in events if she was the only woman present, to draw attention to the lack of equal representation in economics and business.

While some of the most powerful economic institutions in the world are led by women at the moment, Calviño is unfortunately right. With Kristiana Georgieva at the International Monetary Fund, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala at the World Trade Organization, Christine Lagarde at the European Central Bank, and Janet Yellen at the US Treasury, we’re given the impression that women are at the helm of economic policymaking. However, this success has not translated into broad representation. Structural barriers continue to prevent many women from reaching top roles in finance and economics—and the problem is more pronounced than in other areas of policymaking.

A leaky pipeline

Of the 190 member countries of the IMF, 26 have women as finance ministers and only 17 have women as central bank governors. That means just 11.3% of policymakers in those two roles are women. The average proportion of women serving as cabinet ministers globally is meaningfully higher, at 22.8%. What is it about the economic portfolio that results in such a drop off?

The reasons for this disparity can be attributed to a variety of factors, such as male-dominance in the study of economics, barriers that prevent women from being promoted, and social perceptions of women’s abilities. These structural and social barriers create a “leaky pipeline,” where small gender gaps in participation at early stages can accumulate over time to result in large disparities at the top of institutions.

Economics requires mathematics and quantitative skills. However, girls often receive the message that they are not as competent in these areas from a young age. The lower participation of women and girls in STEM-related activities is well-documented, and similar patterns are present in economics. Across major US and European academic institutions, women represent around 35% of PhD candidates in economics. Women also tend towards more social research areas such as health, education, and labor while men dominate areas like economic theory, macroeconomics, and finance—the subfields from which top policy leaders are often drawn from. There is nothing preordained about these trends in specialization. They are driven by social expectations, gender biases, and a lack of role models.

However, educational differentials don’t fully explain the disparity. After all, while the role of finance minister or central bank governor requires experience with economics, that doesn’t have to include a PhD. We can look to US Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell and ECB President Christine Largarde (both lawyers) as examples of such exceptions.

Women are also held back by an array of barriers to promotion in big economic and financial institutions. Men are more likely to be promoted than their female counterparts with comparable qualifications. For example, the US financial sector employs around 9 million workers, with women comprising the majority of the entry-level workforce but holding less than a fourth of the top leadership positions. Women are impacted by the “motherhood penalty” caused by gendered expectations around parenting and work. This penalty can be exacerbated by a lack of parental leave, but even when leave is available, women use it more than men and are stigmatized for it. The promotional gap makes it more difficult for women in economics and finance to achieve the caliber of resume that candidates for finance minister or central bank governors usually have.

Finally, there is an unconscious bias against women’s ability to effectively conduct economic research and policy. As a whole, both men and women rate male applicants higher for positions that require quantitative skills, and female financial advisors are punished more severely for misconduct. Surveys in the US found that when central bankers were introduced without their credentials in a media announcement, people were more likely to doubt the commitment and ability of the Federal Reserve to balance inflation and employment if a woman was the spokesperson. Another study found a correlation between countries with high inflation and a lack of female central bank governors, and suggested that women are hindered by a bias that men are more “hawkish” and therefore more committed to fighting inflation.

Not a quick fix

In 2013, after over two years without a woman sitting on its six-member Executive Board, the ECB committed to a gender diversity action plan. At the time, only 14% of senior managers were women. The ECB’s action plan includes up to 20 weeks of paid parental/adoption leave for either parent and a target of a minimum 50% women in new hires across all levels of staff. As of the end of 2022, 38% at the senior managerial level are women. While 38% is not parity, it does represent a real increase as a result of the ECB’s diversity policies.

As President Lagarde said, “Being surrounded by men is not something new, but it is something that is always disappointing.” The barriers that women face aren’t new and neither are the suggested solutions. There is no magic pill for improving gender representation. Instead, there are a myriad of policies that tackle the different aspects of the “leaky pipeline.” From improving opportunities in education, to committing to equitable hiring practices, the approach to gender equality in economics must be holistic.

Jessie Yin is a Young Global Professional with the GeoEconomics Center.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post Only 11 percent of finance ministers and central bank governors are women appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The fight against courtroom corruption continues in wartime Ukraine

Olena Halushka — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 15:30:28 +0000

The head of Ukraine’s Supreme Court, Vsevolod Kniaziev, was detained in mid-May on corruption charges based on an alleged $2.7 million bribe. The charges were brought by Ukraine’s leading anti-corruption bodies, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). This landmark case reflects the considerable progress made in Ukraine’s struggle against corruption within the judiciary, while also highlighting the key issues that must still be addressed in order to create a rule of law environment that will allow Ukraine to prosper.

The charges against Kniaziev are not entirely unprecedented. In the three-and-a-half years since the creation of Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court, 23 judges have been convicted. Anti-corruption investigations have also led to changes in Ukraine’s judicial infrastructure, such as the liquidation of the controversial Kyiv District Administrative Court, which had long been a focus of major anti-corruption probes.

In summer 2022, Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts received a boost with the appointment of Oleksandr Klymenko as new head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in line with Ukraine’s obligations regarding EU candidate country status. Klymenko’s appointment was widely seen as a watershed moment that signaled an end to the collective sense of impunity within the Ukrainian establishment. The recent arrest of the Supreme Court head has confirmed that earlier reform failures are not irreversible. It is now important to draw the right conclusions as Ukraine looks to finalize the reform of judicial governance bodies and repair the country’s Constitutional Court.

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The relaunch of Ukraine’s Supreme Court was one of the initial efforts to reform the country’s widely discredited judiciary in the initial aftermath of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. However, it did not produce the desired results as a number of factors robbed the court of true independence. Unreformed judicial governance bodies were tasked with hiring Supreme Court judges, with civil society offered a superficial role in the selection process and Ukraine’s international partners largely standing aside. As a result, civil society observers assessed that around a quarter of all selected candidates were questionable.

The creation of the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2017-2019 was a more positive experience, with all candidates scrutinized by an independent panel composed of international experts. This paved the way for the cleansing of two judicial governance bodies, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges, with foreign experts once more playing a crucial role.

In January 2023, Ukraine appointed eight new members to the country’s key judicial governance body, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), thereby enabling it to resume its work. On June 1, the HCJ appointed new members to the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), which is another significant step forward. However, it is important to highlight that no agents of change from civil society were appointed, while two of the new members have questionable reputations. The next challenge is for the HQCJ to finish qualification assessments and hire judges to fill more than 2,500 vacancies. In addition, further measures are also expected in order to restore public trust in the Supreme Court.

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The next big issue on the path toward rule of law and EU accession is the selection procedure of Constitutional Court judges. EU candidate country status has opened up an historic opportunity to repair the Constitutional Court, which has long wielded effective veto power over any reform efforts in Ukraine. Reforming the Constitutional Court is widely seen as the most politically challenging element of judicial reform for the Ukrainian government to implement.

Additionally, some anti-corruption initiatives that were justifiably put on hold following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion must now be revived. This includes asset declarations for all state officials. The recent bribery charges brought against the head of the Supreme Court underline the urgency of a return to the asset declaration submission and verification process. Concerns regarding this issue have recently been voiced by the International Monetary Fund and EU Ambassador to Ukraine Matti Maasikas.

An independent judiciary and the rule of law have long been recognized as vital pillars for Ukraine’s future success. As the country looks toward the post-war recovery period, these factors are now more important than ever. During the rebuilding process, Ukraine’s partners will demand transparency and security for all state and private sector investments. Additionally, judicial reform has a central role to play in Ukraine’s further EU integration. Crucially, creating a fair legal environment free from corruption is also a key demand of Ukrainian society, including the hundreds of thousands currently defending the country against Russian invasion.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Today, the Diia ecosystem offers the world’s first digital passport and access to 14 other digital documents along with 25 public services. It is used by more than half the Ukrainian adult population. In addition to consumer-oriented functions, the system collects information for the national statistical office and serves as a digital platform for officials. Diia is widely seen as the world’s first next-generation e-government platform, and is credited with implementing what many see as a more human-centric government service model.

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In today’s increasingly digital environment, governments may find that they have a lot of siloed systems in place, with each system based on its own separate data, infrastructure, and even principles. As a result, people typically suffer from additional bureaucracy and need to deal repeatedly with different official organizations. Most e-government initiatives are characterized by the same problems worldwide, such as technical disparity of state systems, inappropriate data security and data protection systems, absence of unified interoperability, and inefficient interaction between different elements. Ukraine is pioneering efforts to identify more human-centric solutions to these common problems.

One of the main challenges on the path to building sustainable e-government is to combine user friendliness with a high level of cyber security. If we look at the corresponding indices such as the Online Services Index and Baseline Cyber Security Index, we see that only a handful of European countries have so far managed to achieve the right balance: Estonia, Denmark, France, Spain, and Lithuania. Beyond Europe, only Singapore and Malaysia currently meet the necessary standards.

Ukraine has a strong record in terms of security. Since the onset of the Russian invasion, the Diia system has repeatedly been attacked by Russian cyber forces and has been able to successfully resist these attacks. This is an indication that the Ukrainian platform has the necessary reserve of cyber security along with a robust and secure digital public infrastructure.

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The success of the IT industry in Ukraine over the past decade has already changed international perceptions of the country. Instead of being primarily seen as an exporter of metals and agricultural products, Ukraine is now increasingly viewed as a trusted provider of tech solutions. The Ministry of Digital Transformation is now working to make Diia the global role model for human-centric GovTech. According to Samantha Power, the Ukrainian authorities are interested in sharing their experience with the international community so that others can build digital infrastructure for their citizens based on the same human-centric principles.

USAID has announced a special program to support countries that, inspired by Diia, will develop their own e-government systems on its basis. This initiative will be launched initially in Colombia, Kosovo, and Zambia. Ukraine’s Diia system could soon be serving as a model throughout the transitional world.

As they develop their own e-government systems based on Ukraine’s experience and innovations, participating governments should be able to significantly reduce corruption tied to bureaucratic obstacles. By deploying local versions of Diia, transitional countries will also develop a large number of their own high-level IT specialists with expertise in e-government. This is an important initiative that other global development agencies may also see value in supporting.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

On the rare occasions when Putin has traveled abroad since launching the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, his interactions with other heads of state have tended to underline his reduced status. For years, Putin was notorious for making world leaders such as Angela Merkel, Donald Trump, and Pope Francis wait while he arrived hours after the appointed time. With his position seriously undermined by the disastrous war in Ukraine, Putin is now the one doing the waiting. During a September 2022 conference in Uzbekistan, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, India, and Kyrgyzstan all left Putin standing as they arrived fashionably late for bilateral meetings.

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Putin’s geopolitical isolation looks even uglier when compared to the remarkable recent international ascent of his nemesis, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In recent weeks, Zelenskyy has been lionized during high-profile visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London; he has grabbed the headlines at the Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia and was the center of attention at the G7 summit in Japan. While everyone apparently wants to be seen alongside the Ukrainian leader, very few appear eager to stand with Putin.

This is not just a problem for Putin alone. Indeed, the toxicity engulfing his personal reputation has also led to Russia’s international ostracism. When the owner of popular dating apps Tinder and Hinge announced its departure from the Russian market in May 2023, company officials made clear that they could not afford the reputational damage of association with Vladimir Putin. “It’s not a good look for a trusted brand to be continuing operations in a nation where the head of state has been indicted by the International Criminal Court,” commented Match Group executive director Jeff Perkins.

Dating apps are only the tip of the iceberg, of course. A long list of global brands including McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Nike, and Starbucks have exited or begun the process of leaving Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. European countries have pivoted away from Russian energy imports, leading to an historic loss of market share for the Kremlin. Russia is also finding it increasingly difficult to source the spare parts it needs to keep its war machine rolling due to chronic shortages caused by the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the West over the attack on Ukraine.

None of this was anticipated by Putin when he first gave the order to invade Ukraine early last year. Based on his prior experience of Western weakness following the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin fully expected the democratic world to respond to his latest act of international aggression with vocal protests and symbolic sanctions before getting back to business as usual. This was an extremely costly miscalculation that has left Russia more isolated than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution one hundred years ago.

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As something of an amateur historian, Putin must be painfully aware that he has brought his own country to one of its lowest points in centuries. He has long been preoccupied with his place in Russian history and has authored a number of lengthy historical essays that have been carefully crafted to justify his own deeply revisionist worldview. This obsession with the past has defined Putin’s entire reign and lies at the heart of his fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has consistently expressed his bitterness over the perceived historical injustice of the Soviet collapse. This has fed a vicious contempt for Ukrainian statehood, which he has come to view as the primary obstacle to his sacred mission of reuniting “historical Russia.” Putin is notorious for claiming Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has called Ukraine “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.” In February 2022, he resolved to settle the matter once and for all.

From the very beginning of Russia’s invasion, the baleful influence of Putin’s historical baggage has been abundantly clear. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged this on day one of the war, when he reportedly quipped that Putin only has three advisors: “Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great.” Speaking months later in summer 2022, Putin confirmed the accuracy of Lavrov’s observation by publicly comparing his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Czar Peter.

With the war now in its sixteenth month, it is fair to say things have not gone according to plan for the would-be conqueror. Putin originally envisioned a blitzkrieg campaign that would rapidly extinguish Ukrainian independence and mark the dawn of a new Russian Empire. Instead, his soldiers have suffered a string of humiliating defeats that have shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower, and stand accused of sickening war crimes that have horrified the watching world.

For now, Putin remains defiant and insists his war aims will eventually be achieved, but it is difficult to see how Russia can hope to repair the damage done to its international standing. Instead, the decision to invade Ukraine looks set to be remembered as one of the greatest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. It has left Russia shunned and greatly diminished on the world stage, while earning Putin himself a place in infamy alongside history’s greatest criminals. He dreamed of emulating Peter the Great, but he has become Putin the Pariah.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Marika Theros is a non-resident senior fellow at the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and the Institute for State Effectiveness. She also serves as a Policy Fellow with the Conflict and Civicness Research Group at LSE, focusing on Afghan peace processes, and the director of the CEP.

Part of our approach focuses on the process of convening and linking together a diverse group of Afghan experts and activists, creating a space for informed dialogues across a range of Afghan actors to deliberate on key issues and principles and engage in collective problem solving and action, and thus, help to enhance Afghan capacity to reduce tensions and develop a shared vision for the future.
Sahar Halaimzai and Marika Theros

SouthAsiaSource Dec 6, 2022

A reframed engagement with Afghanistan

By Annie Pforzheimer

Some form of engagement is important to ensure that Afghanistan’s people are not forgotten and can sustainably recover from the economic shocks of drought, COVID-19, and lost international assistance associated with the NATO presence.

Afghanistan Human Rights

SouthAsiaSource Oct 20, 2022

The lionesses of Kabul & Tehran in Khorasan

By Davood Moradian

Afghanistan Human Rights

Report Sep 27, 2022

Afghanistan under the Taliban: Regional recalibrations, challenges, and ways forward

By Hameed Hakimi

Despite the spectacular and unprecedented events following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the global spotlight steadily shifted away from the country.

Afghanistan Economy & Business

More about our expert

Fellow

Sahar Halaimzai

South Asia Center

Civil Society Human Rights

Fellow

Marika Theros

South Asia Center

Security & Defense Politics & Diplomacy

The post Halaimzai & Theros in PeaceRep: Establishing the Afghanistan Research Network appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian narratives ignore real reasons for Western support of Ukraine

Richard Cashman — Thu, 25 May 2023 20:02:54 +0000

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev gave a lengthy interview to Russian publication Izvestia in early May that read like a script for Russian officials and sympathisers seeking to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Patrushev’s arguments should not be taken lightly; he is one the most influential figures in today’s Russia, perhaps the second most powerful person in the country after President Putin himself.

Ukraine and its partners ought to push back against and debunk many of Patrushev’s assertions and theories. In particular, Patrushev made several references to British geographer Halford Mackinder and his so-called “Heartland Theory” of geopolitics, which the Russian official identified as the inspiration behind NATO’s eastward enlargement since 1997 and its support for Ukraine since 2014.

In his 1904 article The Geographical Pivot of History, Mackinder conceived of a global struggle between sea powers and land powers, with Britain, the United States, and Japan representing the foremost sea powers, and Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary the leading land powers. Mackinder ascribed a special importance to the area approximating to modern Ukraine, Belarus, and Western Russia, which he called the Heartland within the Eurasian World Island, and which he said was largely impervious to coercion by the sea powers. Who controls the Heartland, argued Mackinder, controls the World Island, and therefore the world.

Mackinder’s ideas have long held a fascination for those inclined to deterministic and reductive interpretations of international history. For most serious historians and foreign policy practitioners, however, his ideas are far too simplistic and doctrinaire to explain the full gamut of reasons for events in the past, or to facilitate realistic policy formulation in the present.

Mackinder’s arguments were very much of their time, especially in respect of the early twentieth century’s pervasive imperial thinking. His conclusions also reflect the military technologies then available. Attitudes toward imperialism have radically altered since Mackinder was writing, and technological development has generally acted to undermine many of his core assumptions.

Moreover, with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact following World War II, Moscow did establish control over Mackinder’s Heartland, which it then enjoyed for several decades. However, this in no way enabled the Kremlin to dominate the rest of the world.

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Far from being a story of Euro-Atlantic sea power moving to dominate the Heartland, NATO enlargement since 1997 has overwhelmingly been a response to dynamic lobbying by former Warsaw Pact members. Some, such as Poland, immediately sought sanctuary without waiting to see what sort of country the new Russian Federation might become. Others made applications once Putin and the clan which captured the Russian state at the turn of the millennium revealed their intention to reverse rather than manage Russia’s imperial decline.

In most cases, applications were met with initial skepticism by existing NATO members. Yet Patrushev ignores this and wholly removes agency from what he terms as the small states of Eastern Europe when he implies that NATO membership was imposed on them.

Overtures toward Moscow at the end of the Cold War that might have been read as condoning a sphere of influence were made in the expectation that the Russian Federation would develop into a democratic and rule of law-based society. Indeed, many of the applications to join NATO by former Warsaw Pact nations would not have been made if Russia had evolved meaningfully in that direction. Instead, Russia’s unreconstructed imperial mindset has been instrumental in persuading countries in Central and Eastern Europe that NATO membership is the only way to guarantee their national security.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Patrushev promotes a conspiracy-driven view of the world that is all-too-common in today’s Russia. In reality, strong international support for Ukraine derives not from outdated geopolitical dogmas or anti-Russian agendas, but from a principled and realistic assessment of what is at stake for democratic, rule of law-based societies around the world should Russia prevail in its aggression. In other words, it is the gallantry of Ukrainians in defending the principles they have chosen, not the space Ukraine occupies on the map, which begets such broad support.

Patrushev’s interview contained a number of other idiosyncratic and occasionally lunatic assertions, which any countries engaging with Russia would do well to take note of when deciding how to calibrate their relations with Russia and Ukraine. His arguments may often appear absurd, but similar claims are regularly repeated by other Russian officials when addressing both domestic and international audiences.

Broad-based support for Ukraine and its Euro-Atlantic integration is far more about ideas and values than about early twentieth century geopolitical abstractions or other obscure theories. Indeed, it is Ukraine’s adoption and defense of core democratic principles which lie at the heart of Moscow’s fear and loathing.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Universal jurisdiction trials

One of the few accountability tools currently employed for Syria is the framework of universal jurisdiction, which enables domestic courts to try atrocity crimes committed outside of their borders based on the premise that the crime is so grave that it threatens the international community as a whole. Many countries only allow cases to proceed if a suspect is present within their borders, and thus there have been a limited number of cases on Syria. Many of these cases have focused on terrorism charges and only a few have been against Assad regime–linked perpetrators.

With normalization, Assad and his regime’s senior leadership may increasingly travel outside of Syria and the region. Any country wanting to support Syrians’ demands for accountability should ensure they have the laws and resources available to arrest, investigate, and prosecute any suspected war criminal who ends up on their soil.

Most perpetrators will likely avoid traveling to countries in Western Europe that oppose normalization and are known for bringing universal jurisdiction cases, such as Germany and France. However, universal jurisdiction laws extend outside of Western Europe, to Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and even some countries in the Middle East. While most of these countries have rarely or even never used their universal jurisdiction laws, concerted advocacy by civil society in Syria and the relevant country, combined with support or resources from countries with more practice on universal jurisdiction cases, could help change the tide.

Where perpetrators are found in countries that fail to try them under universal jurisdiction frameworks, countries could also follow the example set by Belgium in seeking to prosecute former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. This could include issuing arrest warrants under their universal jurisdiction laws, following up with extradition requests wherever perpetrators are found, and bringing cases at the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals to ultimately ensure trials.

Trials of senior leadership in national courts

While universal jurisdiction trials typically require the presence of a perpetrator, some civil law countries allow for certain trials to proceed in absentia, provided there are sufficient safeguards to protect a defendant’s fair trial rights. For example, France can hold in absentia trials when the victim is a national of that country. French authorities are using these laws to try three architects of the Assad regime’s detention and torture apparatus—Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdel Salam Mahmoud—for their alleged role in arbitrarily detaining, torturing, and killing a father and son who were French-Syrian dual nationals. This trial will not result in the imprisonment of the accused if they are found guilty, at least for now. It will, however, serve as a powerful moment for Syrian victims and lawyers to present evidence against those responsible for designing and ordering atrocity crimes in Syria.

To help close the justice gap for Syria, countries with authority to hold in absentia trials should explore opportunities that may be available and fill strategic gaps in the Syria accountability space. For example, this might include cases against high-level perpetrators who may be less likely to travel to countries with universal jurisdiction trials but whose cases may have significant symbolic importance for victims.

While universal jurisdiction trials are proceeding slowly for Syria, many countries have been eager to bring universal jurisdiction cases related to Ukraine. In the past year, Germany, Canada, and other countries have opened structural investigations to begin building universal jurisdiction cases against Russian perpetrators. These countries should proactively investigate links between the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria to ensure that any future trials related to Ukraine also incorporate relevant links to Syria. For example, a Russian commander responsible for atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have committed those same crimes in Syria. Officials liable for the use of Iranian drones to facilitate atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have done the same in Syria. Or Syrian soldiers reportedly recruited to Ukraine may have committed atrocity crimes in Syria.

Whenever an apprehended perpetrator is suspected of committing crimes in both Ukraine and Syria, both sets of crimes should feature in a universal jurisdiction trial.

Ensuring reparations for Syrian victims

One element of justice, in addition to trials determining legal responsibility for crimes, is reparations for victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, countries have eagerly explored legal avenues to seize Russian assets and use the proceeds to ensure reparations and reconstruction in Ukraine. As recently as May 17, the Council of Europe established a register of damages for Ukraine as a first step toward ensuring compensation for Ukrainian victims. Lest countries want to support selective justice, they should explore the application of these legal tools to ensure that Syrian victims also receive reparations for the harm they have suffered.

Normalization will ensure that individuals connected to the Assad regime have increasing access to global financial markets. These perpetrators could attempt to purchase properties overseas or place their money in foreign banks. This, in turn, would increase legal pathways to seize assets and repurpose them as reparations for Syrian victims.

Countries could also fund reparations for Syrian victims using existing pools of funding obtained as a result of violations in Syria—for example, the $778 million judgment against the French industrial company Lafarge for violations in Syria, or proceeds from sanctions violations, or the assets of Bashar al-Assad’s uncle Rifaat al-Assad, which France seized after finding him guilty of corruption.

Cases at the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is not investigating crimes committed in Syria because Syria is not a member state of the ICC and because Russia and China vetoed a United Nations Security Council referral to the ICC. However, Syria does not fall entirely outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Using the precedent established for Myanmar in 2019, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan could open an investigation into crimes committed in Syria that resulted in forced deportation to Jordan, an ICC member state.

The ICC is a particularly important accountability avenue to activate for Syria. An ICC investigation would, for example, make available additional resources to investigate and build cases. It would also send a message to Assad because the ICC can issue arrest warrants for and try sitting heads of state. National courts do not have this authority under international law. Thus, while Assad is still in power, the ICC is virtually the only avenue to secure his arrest and subsequent trial. And the modern era of accountability has seen relatively high success for ensuring that heads of state or major military forces who are subject to arrest warrants or indictments face accountability.

Khan has received multiple requests to open an investigation into Syria but has thus far failed to do so. A referral of Syria by an ICC member state would significantly increase the likelihood of an investigation. Dozens of countries were motivated last year to refer Ukraine to the ICC and should consider doing the same for Syria.

Cases at the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also can ensure accountability for Syria by hearing a case against the state (in contrast, the ICC tries cases against individual perpetrators). The Netherlands and Canada are preparing to bring the first ICJ case against Syria for violations of the Convention Against Torture.

Countries could bring other cases against Syria at the ICJ, for example, for violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since Syria acceded to the convention in September 2013—a month after carrying out a sarin gas attack near Damascus that reportedly killed 1,300 people—the Assad regime has been accused of hundreds of chemical weapons attacks. Any member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention that wishes to support accountability could bring a case against Syria at the ICJ.

The trend towards normalizing relations with Assad was not inevitable. Normalization is happening now because states have failed to use existing accountability tools to bring Assad and his regime to justice. But the tools are still available, and some opportunities to use them may be increasing. Justice for the horrors experienced by millions of Syrians is long overdue, and more concerted efforts by countries to pursue justice may help counter the trend in normalization.

Elise Baker is a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. Previously, she worked at the United Nations International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria and led Physicians for Human Rights’ Syria Mapping Project, which documented attacks on Syria’s health care system.

The post How to hold the Assad regime accountable, even as countries normalize relations with Syria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Does the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review make the grade?

Atlantic Council — Wed, 24 May 2023 21:26:30 +0000

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard:
Does the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review make the grade?

On April 20, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the third Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). DHS calls the QHSR its “capstone strategy document,” setting out the short- and medium-term direction for the US government’s third-largest cabinet department. By law, the QHSR is a “review,” not a “strategy,” and so it devotes much of its ninety-two pages to a summary of DHS’s current activities and recent accomplishments, more than a pure strategy would contain. With these caveats in mind, experts with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program read the 2023 QHSR and offered their assessment of its depth and importance for our latest scorecard.

Thomas Warrick

Senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; director, Future of DHS Project

Given DHS’s size and the breadth of its missions—counterterrorism; law enforcement; cybersecurity; aviation, border, and maritime security; immigration; and infrastructure protection—the QHSR should be considered one of the most important strategic documents put out by a major US cabinet department. The QHSR, while subordinate to the Biden administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy, should, in theory, be comparable to the Department of Defense (DOD) National Defense Strategy (NDS), which gets enormous attention in Washington and around the world.

The QHSR’s reality is rather different. No major news outlet covered the QHSR’s release on April 20. Only specialized news sites and a few others reported on it or on Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas’s speech the next day announcing the QHSR’s release along with DHS’s ninety-day “sprint” focusing on US nonmilitary vulnerabilities to China and establishing a DHS task force on uses and threats from artificial intelligence.

One reason for this lack of coverage may be that the QHSR, being a “review,” is more of a summary of DHS’s current activities and recent accomplishments. Lists of accomplishments seldom make news in today’s contentious Washington political scene. While the QHSR should educate the public about what DHS does, the people who need educating the most about DHS are probably the least likely to read ninety-two pages of government prose, even with pictures. Nevertheless, the QHSR is an important strategic road map to where the Biden administration and Mayorkas want to go.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

This QHSR is distinctive in three ways. First, it exists—the Trump administration did not release a QHSR during its four years between January 2017 to January 2021. While the Trump administration never produced a QHSR, it had a coherent—and divisive—approach to immigration and domestic terrorism, much of which was led from the White House, not DHS. Second, the Biden administration promised during the campaign and afterwards a break with many of the Trump administration’s homeland security policies, especially on immigration and domestic terrorism, and the QHSR makes this very clear. Third, this QHSR intentionally returns to the tone and structure of the two Obama administration QHSRs, released in 2010 and 2014, with three changes from the Obama QHSRs:

showing how the threat landscape has changed since 2014,
highlighting the importance of partnerships to the Biden administration’s and Mayorkas’s model of the homeland security enterprise, and
recognizing a new mission area for DHS: combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims.

DHS has long fought crimes of exploitation—this QHSR elevates the importance of this work and explicitly aligns DHS with the victims of such crimes. This will make it hard for future administrations to backslide from protecting exploited victims.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Just as the National Defense Strategy is primarily, though not exclusively, focused on military threats to the United States, the QHSR should bring equal focus and vigor on the nonmilitary threats to the United States. The third QHSR provides a good summary of today’s dynamic terrorism threats (both international and homegrown), the challenges and strains on what it calls our “broken” immigration system (Mayorkas goes so far as to call it “completely broken;” his critics would no doubt agree), cyber threats from criminals and hostile nation-states, crimes of exploitation, the threat from fentanyl and transnational organized crime, natural and man-made risks to critical infrastructure, and other challenges to homeland security. Of particular importance is elevating fentanyl, transnational organized crime, and crimes of exploitation to the strategic level—no longer are they issues of only crime. The third QHSR wants the United States to see these as strategic threats, requiring a more strategic response.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

A sound strategy needs to define what “victory” looks like. In DOD’s mission space, victory is understandable: the goal is victory in war, coupled with deterrence and maintaining the peace at all other times. It’s a lot harder to define the end state in homeland security, and this QHSR, like many national security strategies of previous administrations of both parties, often uses phrases like “preventing and mitigating active threats” and “continue advancing national efforts” that give the direction but leave the ultimate goal fuzzy. There are few concrete end states against which this QHSR’s success or failure can be judged, but this is not unique to this QHSR or this administration.

For example, no responsible counterterrorism strategy would publicly set itself the goal of “no successful terrorist attacks.” The difficulty of detecting lone violent extremists and their ability to get semiautomatic assault rifles, coupled with political realities in the United States, mean that the QHSR needs—rightly—to point toward other approaches like community programs (see QHSR numbered page 8) needed to reduce active shooter events well below their levels in recent years, which would be a worthy goal. In cybersecurity, the QHSR describes the many innovative programs that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has undertaken in the past two years, but mentions only at the end of the cybersecurity section (QHSR numbered page 35) the truly transformational National Cybersecurity Strategy’s effort to shift fundamental risks from end users to the tech companies that are best situated to build security into their hardware and software. This will fundamentally change the future of cybersecurity and is a worthy goal.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of activities?

The third QHSR, like its predecessors, makes clear which DHS components are responsible for which missions and lines of effort. Unlike DOD’s military services, which encompass different domains but serve a (mostly) unified strategic mission, DHS’s eight components are organized functionally, and thus contribute differently to the QHSR’s six mission areas:

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to aviation security (part of mission 1, counterterrorism and threat prevention).
CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to land border security (mission 2, border security, but also part of mission 1) and immigration (mission 3).
The US Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP to maritime security (part of missions 1 and 2).
CISA, ICE, TSA (for pipelines), USCG (maritime cybersecurity) and the US Secret Service (USSS) to cybersecurity and fighting cybercrime (mission 4).
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and CISA to infrastructure protection and resilience (mission 5); however both CBP and USCG have a part of mission 5.
ICE, CBP, USSS, and USCIS to law enforcement (mission 6, combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims, but also part of other missions).

While this QHSR, like its predecessors (and like similar strategic summaries of DHS’s missions during the Trump administration), contains extensive descriptions of DHS activities, this QHSR proves the aphorism that—unlike DOD, where missions end when a war is over and the military pivots (for example) from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific—at DHS, missions never go away. In this respect, the “new” mission 6 of combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims is not at all new—it is the recognition of a mission DHS has had almost since its inception in 2003.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The QHSR is not a budget, but any DHS report on its missions raises the question whether DHS has the resources to succeed in those missions. Alignment between policy and resources is one of DHS’s greatest challenges.

After the October 2022 National Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in March 2023 that DOD’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 budget request was “the most strategy-driven request we’ve ever produced from the Department of Defense.” DOD is asking for $842 billion in FY 2024, $26 billion more than in FY 2023. A look at the China and Russia section of the NDS shows the link between DOD’s strategy and its budget request.

DHS cannot say the same thing about the third QHSR and DHS’s FY 2024 budget, which calls for a 1.1 percent increase over FY 2023. DHS officials understand this. The QHSR calls for more efforts and resources on cybersecurity; border and immigration security; community-based programs to prevent future mass shootings as happened in recent years in Uvalde, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and elsewhere; and to head off threats to critical infrastructure from natural causes and nation-state adversaries.

The third QHSR does not have to quantify the resources required to achieve its goals, but it has rightly laid out this secretary’s road map for where DHS and the homeland security enterprise need to do more. One of the third QHSR’s most important benefits should be to focus a much-needed debate—inside the administration and with the Congress and the American people—over whether the United States is spending enough on homeland security.

Brigadier General Francis X. Taylor (ret.)

**Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security**

Overall, DHS’s QHSR sets forth a comprehensive review of the challenges facing the homeland security enterprise. The program initiatives outlined in the report, if successful, will improve the security posture of the homeland. There are some concerns about whether there is sufficient political and popular support for the initiatives outlined in the report. In addition, DHS should consider an annual review of outcomes that have resulted from its initiatives to give US citizens a sense of how effective the department has been in improving security of the homeland. This report is a good start but needs annual reiteration that reflects sustained improvement in the United States’ overall security posture.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The QHSR sets forth in clear detail the myriad of threats that face the homeland and the challenges for the homeland security enterprise to effectively address those threats. The world continues to evolve, as does the threat environment since the creation of DHS and this QHSR reflects the complexity of the threat environment and DHS’s initiatives to address that environment in new and innovative ways.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategic context of the QHSR is sound and does not underplay the seriousness and challenges of the threat that faces the homeland security enterprise. The emphasis on partnerships to meet the challenges is an important underlying principle for DHS. Never has it been more important for DHS to strengthen and broaden its partnerships as the threat environment continues to change.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The QHSR clearly defines the programs undertaken to address each mission area to address the threats that face the US homeland, but the mere implementation of programs does not ensure effective outcomes.

Clear lines of effort

There are clear lines of effort that are identified in the QHSR. The core mission areas are addressed effectively, but it is not clear that the programs initiated are yet effective in achieving the goals of DHS. Time will tell what outcomes are achieved and how effective DHS has been in mitigating the threats to the homeland.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The QHSR fundamentally outlines the challenges that DHS must address to keep the homeland safe. It is not clear that there are sufficient resources to execute this mission as outlined in the QHSR. Congressional support of these initiatives and funding will be critical to DHS’s success.

Seth Stodder

**Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security**

Like any strategy or planning document produced by a federal bureaucracy, the report on the 2023 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review inevitably provokes some trepidation from a potential reader, as such documents produced by Washington bureaucrats rarely last five seconds in an email inbox and never touch a printer.

But in all seriousness, this year’s QHSR is somewhat of a page-turner. It is the first one since 2014—almost a decade. And what a decade it has been! ISIS and Al Qaeda, while still threats, have taken a back seat to AR15-wielding white nationalist extremists in the minds of counterterrorism professionals. The sense of operational control of the border that US officials felt they had in 2010 seems like a quaint bygone era, as compared to the massive challenges the United States faces today at the US-Mexico border. The cyber threats are much more varied, with the rise of catastrophic ransomware attacks and the drumbeat of cyber threats to our critical infrastructure and our electoral system. Meanwhile, emerging technology presents opportunities and threats like nothing before—from the rising concerns about social media invasions of privacy, disinformation campaigns, and deep fakes, to the threat of quantum computing and the potentially civilization-altering challenge presented by artificial intelligence. Nation-state threats to the homeland from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have become far more serious since 2010. On the other hand, the ultimate challenge to the US homeland may be environmental, as the force and impact of global climate change and the likelihood of more deadly pandemics have become ever more severe.

The 2023 QHSR—and the evolving mission of DHS—aptly reflect the tectonic shifts happening in the global security environment overall and its implications for US homeland security. To be sure, the original five homeland security missions from the first QHSR Report in 2010 are still there: (1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security; (2) securing and managing US borders; (3) enforcing and administering US immigration laws; (4) safeguarding and securing cyberspace; and (5) ensuring resilience to disasters. But so many of the characters in the play have changed, or assumed greater or lesser prominence.

Suffice it to say, DHS has its hands full—with a sprawling and ever-more important set of missions, all of which requiring close partnerships with other federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal agencies, the domestic and global private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and the millions of Americans and other nationals who interact with DHS every single day. And this new QHSR ably reflects this massive and growing responsibility.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The key theme is the steadily evolving and, in some cases, radically changing and ever more complex threat picture, and the need for DHS and its components to evolve its missions and focus accordingly. This is expressed forcefully in the document. Unsurprisingly, most of the missions are the same—with one addition—as those stated in the previous QHSRs. But that does not necessarily warrant any effect on its score here as the missions of DHS and homeland security are what they are. Rather, it is the threat and broader strategic environment that has, in some cases, radically changed. And the 2023 QHSR articulates this extremely well.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The 2023 QHSR is extremely clear on the security environment facing the United States and, specifically, the US homeland. The QHSR also effectively nestles DHS and its six core missions neatly within the Biden administration’s broader strategic framework for the United States, as expressed in the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and other key documents. The analysis here is sound, and it does not rest on any specious or unfounded assumptions—either about the threat or the missions and capabilities of DHS.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The 2023 QHSR clearly sets forth various goals, backed up with various vignettes and descriptions of ongoing or past programs, initiatives, and other actions reflecting efforts in furtherance of goals. That said, the goals are for the most part relatively vague (e.g., “DHS must be a leader in the responsible use and adaptation of emerging technologies” or “DHS remains committed to facilitating and expanding naturalization pathways for new Americans”), without specifying any particular measurable outputs against which one might assess success or failure. However, one could argue the point of how does one know when the border is actually “secure” or under “operational control,” or when the asylum system is processing claims “fairly” or “efficiently?” And, from a fiscal standpoint, is there a way of knowing when increasing budgets hit a point of diminishing returns—where an additional dollar invested in, say, detection equipment or in efforts against drug smuggling might be better invested elsewhere, such as public health or education? It is hard to clearly find measurable goalposts for these from the QHSR.

Clear lines of effort

The QHSR—and previous DHS documents—have outlined the key missions and lines of effort, and the DHS operational components and management offices have (for the most part) worked out relatively delineated areas of focus meant to maximize unity of effort within DHS, while minimizing interagency conflict and rivalry. As is the nature of this kind of beast, the QHSR does have a bit of the whiff of a laundry list (or lists) of various component activities and success stories (albeit clean laundry, thankfully), but the lists are placed within an intelligently articulated framework of clear priorities. Again, as discussed above, it is difficult to discern measurable outputs or where the signposts are toward achieving mission goals and objectives—but the lines of effort are clearly stated.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

This is somewhere between an unfair question and an incomplete one—in the sense that the QHSR is not meant to be a budgetary document, and indeed there is no sense here as to whether resources are remotely adequate to achieving the goals. Moreover, as noted above, some of the goals are so vague or total (e.g., “preventing labor exploitation”), that it is hard to assess—judging solely from the QHSR—exactly how these goals might be achieved, how success or progress toward the goals could be measured, or at what point diminishing returns might be reached for additional spending. So, it’s hard to grade this one—but it surely isn’t a perfect score.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

This article is part of the Future of DHS Project by the Forward Defense program with financial support from Deloitte.

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Tue, 23 May 2023 16:37:45 +0000

As the Ukrainian General Staff prepares for its much-heralded counteroffensive, retaking Crimea is at the top of the operational wish list. Some experts, including senior US officials, consider this an unrealistic aim. To be sure, there are many challenges. Attacking Crimea from the Kherson region would likely involve an opposed crossing of the Dnipro river, intense fighting to reach the narrow Perekop isthmus, and then essentially frontal attacks against heavily mined barriers to breach successive lines of Russian defenses, all in the face of strong Russian artillery. Ukraine will be hindered by its lack of air power and long-range fires, as well as an absence of amphibious or airborne platforms, making a frontal assault almost the only option.

Nevertheless, while daunting, the task is far from impossible. From the Huns and the Mongols to the British, the Bolsheviks, and the Germans, many invading armies have managed to conquer Crimea. Furthermore, Ukrainian morale, generalship, and combined arms capabilities all exceed Russia’s, while the fielding of up to eleven fresh brigades with excellent Western equipment has greatly strengthened Ukraine’s ground forces.

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What might a Crimean offensive look like? The Ukrainian military may well conduct sophisticated shaping operations using drones, artillery strikes, and special operations forces. A successful crossing of the Dnipro and advance to the isthmus would also shake the resolve and fighting spirit of Russian defenders.

There may, however, be a better way. Past invasions, while successful, often proved extremely costly. The British and French lost 165,000 men during the mid-nineteenth century Crimean War, for example. Given its high losses to date, Ukraine will seek to achieve its strategic objectives while preserving as much of its armed strength and physical infrastructure as possible. Bitter fighting on the Crimean peninsula would also take a heavy toll on civilians. Accordingly, cutting Crimea off from Russia and starving it of military support could achieve Ukrainian war aims at much lower cost.

This approach would see the bulk of Ukraine’s new mobile brigades massing near Dnipro, a major road and rail hub in southeastern Ukraine well outside Russian artillery range, before rupturing the front and driving for Zaporizhzhia. From there, the operational objective would be the capture of Melitopol and the severing of the land bridge from Russia to Crimea.

The open, flat terrain of southern Ukraine and the region’s relatively good road network create favorable conditions for mobile operations and logistical resupply. Supporting efforts would include maintaining pressure on Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine to hold Russian forces in place there.

If a thrust to sever Russia’s land bridge proved successful, two options could then be considered. One would be to wheel westward and isolate Russian troops in the Kherson region. Alternatively, Ukrainian forces could turn to the east and attempt to recover Mariupol, which has been occupied by Russia since May 2022.

In either case, seizing Melitopol would cause a crisis among Russian political and military leaders, as Russian forces in the south and east would be cut off from each other, rendering a coherent defense at the operational level impossible. This would dramatically undermine Russian morale and encourage further international support for Ukraine.

If mounted in June, Ukraine’s counteroffensive could potentially be concluded by summer’s end, leaving the Crimean Bridge as the only remaining option for ground resupply of Russian forces in Crimea. Campaign success, however, would bring Ukrainian long-range missiles within range of the bridge, which would also be vulnerable to drone attacks.

Meanwhile, resupply of Russian forces in Crimea by air and sea would become precarious, as ports and airfields would now be vulnerable to drone, missile, and rocket artillery strikes. In short, Crimea would be effectively isolated. Regained Ukrainian control of the North Crimean Canal, Crimea’s principal water supply, would only add to Russia’s logistical woes.

If Ukraine’s counteroffensive makes good progress in the south, the Russian Black Sea Fleet will likely find that it cannot remain in Crimea. With its home port of Sevastopol in range of Ukrainian rocket artillery, the fleet would be forced to withdraw to Novorossiysk on the Russian Black Sea coast, a much poorer anchorage with fewer facilities for naval units.

Putin would probably react to such unprecedented setbacks by reviving threats to respond with nuclear weapons, while simultaneously demanding international intervention in the form of diplomatic pressure on Kyiv for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement that would leave him in possession of at least some Ukrainian territory. However, Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling has lost much of its impact through overuse, and because China has made it clear that nuclear weapons must be off the table.

As for salvation through diplomacy, major Ukrainian advances on the ground this summer could bring ultimate victory within sight and encourage Ukraine to carry on. If Ukrainian troops are making progress, the country’s leaders will not be in the mood to negotiate and throw away hard-won success at the conference table, however much pressure comes from outside. Allies and partners like the British, the Poles, the Nordics, and the Baltic nations can be counted on to offset other dissenting voices and to reinforce Ukrainian battlefield gains.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Are the Ukrainian armed forces capable of bringing this off? A number of variables will come into play. Adequate quantities of fuel, spare parts, artillery, and air defense munitions along with other classes of supply must be available.

As with the Kharkiv offensive in September 2022, operational security and successful deception operations will be critical. The Ukrainian General Staff must be capable of true operational art. They must be able to sequence combined arms battles and engagements in time and space and across multiple domains to achieve decisive battlefield results. The Russians, too, must cooperate by continuing to demonstrate flawed generalship, low morale, and an inability to synchronize combat power at points of decision.

In war, of course, the future remains uncharted territory. But all signs point to a clear opportunity for the Ukrainian counteroffensive to succeed. In spite of heavy casualties, continuous combat, and an unending rain of missiles on its civilian infrastructure, Ukraine has managed to generate fresh, well-equipped, and well-trained reserves in large numbers. Talented commanders have come to the fore, vetted by years of experience fighting the Russians.

The Ukrainian General Staff is not likely to accept the risks inherent in major operations of this sort without confidence that its logistics are in place and its planning is sound. Furthermore, Ukrainian commanders must be encouraged by what they see across the front lines. Facing them are a shattered Russian army that has taken enormous losses in tanks, troops, and munitions; an ineffective Russian air force; and a Russian Black Sea Fleet that can do little but shelter in its anchorage. No outstanding Russian commanders have emerged from the carnage of the past 15 months. One must assume the Russians are currently waiting for Ukraine’s attack with low confidence and a sense of foreboding.

Subsequent phases of the campaign will seek, through diplomacy, continued sanctions, and military force, to liberate Ukraine entirely. Recent moves, such as the UK’s provision of Storm Shadow cruise missiles and other long-range munitions, are changing the military calculus. So, too, will the long-delayed decision to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 fighter jet. Putin is counting on support for Ukraine to degrade as allies and partners tire. In fact, Ukraine grows stronger while Russia increasingly turns to obsolete equipment and ever-more reluctant conscripts.

As we are often told, no plan survives contact with the enemy. There will likely be the occasional tactical miscue or operational hiccup during the coming counteroffensive, but a careful assessment suggests the odds are heavily in favor of Ukraine. More savage fighting lies ahead, but the end of the war may gradually be coming into view, and it looks very promising from Ukraine’s perspective.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

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In recent months, China has sought to play an active role in efforts to negotiate a peace between Russia and Ukraine. However, many in Kyiv and throughout the West remain skeptical of China’s apparently contradictory views on the peace process. Critics have accused China of publicly supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity while also indicating the need for Kyiv to cede land as part of any potential settlement.

While stopping short of outright support for Russia’s invasion, China has adopted a public position that could be termed as Kremlin-friendly neutrality, and has accused the West of provoking the war. This posture is unsurprising. Beijing shares Moscow’s goal of challenging Western dominance and replacing it with what they see as a more multipolar world. China fears that if Russia loses the current war, it will greatly strengthen the West while undermining the global standing of China and other authoritarian regimes.

More specifically, a Russian defeat would considerably complicate any future Chinese efforts to invade Taiwan. If Western military aid helps Ukraine to secure victory over the once vaunted Russian army, this will increase the chances of similar Western support for Taiwan against possible Chinese aggression. The disastrous performance of Putin’s army in Ukraine has already undermined Russia’s claims to military superpower status and significantly boosted Western confidence. China is not eager for this unwelcome trend to gain further momentum.

On Russia’s western border, Belarus has emerged as something of a captive partner in the attack on Ukraine, with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka serving as the single most vocal backer of Russia’s war while also allowing his country to be used as a platform for the invasion. Russian troops flooded into northern Ukraine from Belarus on the first days of the war in February 2022; Russia continues to launch airstrikes on Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory.

Lukashenka has little choice but to back Putin. He only remains in power because Russia intervened in 2020 to prop up his regime in the wake of pro-democracy protests over a fraudulent presidential election. Lukashenka’s brutal Kremlin-backed crackdown against the Belarusian protest movement left him internationally isolated and heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would likely reignite domestic unrest inside Belarus and would almost certainly spell doom for the Lukashenka regime.

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While the failure of Putin’s invasion could lead to regime change in Belarus, some in Armenia sees the prospect of a Russian defeat in Ukraine in starkly existential terms. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reportedly warned Armenians recently: “If Russia loses the war in Ukraine, I have no idea what will happen to Armenia.”

Many Armenians remain heavily invested in the traditional view of Russia as a protector of the country against the perceived threats to national security posed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. This thinking has shaped Armenian politics and foreign policy for much of the post-Soviet era. The country is a founding member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and backed out of an association agreement with the EU a decade ago following Kremlin pressure, instead joining Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia maintains military bases in Armenia and has dominated efforts to regulate the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan’s concerns are unsurprising but short-sighted. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would potentially allow Armenia to pursue a more independent foreign policy while expanding economic and political ties with the European Union. Alarm over the threat of renewed hostilities with Azerbaijan is understandable, but there is little prospect of Armenia itself being invaded, especially if US and EU-brokered talks produce a peace treaty that recognizes the Armenian-Azerbaijani border while providing satisfactory guarantees for Karabakh’s Armenian population.

As a staunch opponent of the West and critic of perceived Western influence over global affairs, Iran shares China’s geopolitical motivations for supporting Russia’s invasion. Many in the Iranian leadership are also fearful that a Russian defeat in Ukraine could increase demands for democratic change inside Iran itself and fuel a new round of domestic protests.

There are additional practical reasons for Tehran’s pro-Russian stance. Faced with tightening international sanctions and cut off from Western technologies, Russia has turned to Iran as an alternative source of military assistance. In exchange for Iranian drones and other supplies, Moscow is believed to be providing Tehran with everything from fighter jets to air defense systems, while also assisting Iran’s nuclear program.

This burgeoning military partnership between Russia and Iran is proving deadly for Ukraine, with Iranian drones regularly used to strike civilian targets across Ukraine. It also poses a significant threat to Israeli national security and has sparked heated debate over Israel’s apparent reluctance to provide military support to Ukraine. If cooperation between Moscow and Tehran continues to intensify, Russian air defense systems could limit Israeli operations in Syria and complicate any future preventative strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, there appears to be little chance of an outright Russian victory of the kind envisaged by Putin when he first gave the order to invade in February 2022. Instead, the most likely scenarios are now either some form of stalemate or a Ukrainian military victory.

If Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the consequences will reverberate around the globe. China is powerful enough to survive such a shock but would be geopolitically weakened. The Belarusian and Iranian regimes would face a far more uncertain future and might not survive. Meanwhile, Armenia may find that despite its current misgivings, the defeat of Russia could allow Yerevan to return to the path of European integration.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

#AtlanticDebrief – How has Poland’s support for Ukrainian refugees helped Ukraine’s war effort? | A Debrief with Oksana Nechyporenko

jbatchik — Tue, 23 May 2023 12:37:08 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

How has Poland’s support for Ukrainian refugees helped Ukraine’s war effort? What’s the situation on the ground in Kyiv?

On this special Warsaw Week episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Aaron Korewa sits down to discuss the humanitarian aspect of the war in Ukraine with Oksana Nechyporenko, Head of the Board, GoGlobal NGO, Co-Founder Masha Foundation & savED Foundation, and Former Crisis Center Coordinator at the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw.

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Jones and Stefanini in The Guardian discussing the need for continued support to Ukraine

sodal — Mon, 22 May 2023 20:00:09 +0000

original source

On April 17, Atlantic Council Executive Chairman Emeritus James Jones and Transatlantic Security Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Stefano Stefanini, along with other experts, co-authored an article for The Guardian arguing for democratic cooperation and unity in providing support to Ukraine.

The co-authors make the case that a Russian victory in Ukraine would be disastrous for the liberal world order, setting a dangerous precedent for territorial conquest by other autocratic regimes, specifically China. To counter Moscow and Beijing, the transatlantic Alliance must back up its rhetoric with decisive action: including issuing continued military aid to Ukraine, forging strong relationships with nations outside of the transatlantic community, increasing NATO defense spending, and more.

Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the erroneous belief that Ukraine would be defeated within a few weeks. More than a year later, Ukraine’s unity and resilience in the face of Russia’s aggression have shown the country’s remarkable strength… To continue its fight for freedom and defeat Putin, however, Ukraine needs more support. Ukraine’s partners have to step up; when freedom is better equipped than tyranny, its victory is assured.

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The State Department is fumbling its approach to Iran. It’s time for an overhaul.

Holly Dagres — Mon, 22 May 2023 19:45:38 +0000

“It is clear to us that the meaning of diplomacy means compromising with the clerics of the Islamic Republic—if they didn’t have backing like you, they wouldn’t have survived,” wrote an Iranian in response to a quote by President Joe Biden posted on April 10 on the official Persian language US State Department Instagram (@usabehfarsi).

Even without knowledge of Persian, anyone can click “see translation” to read the frustration and slew of insults in the replies of the account with over 684,000 followers. Some might dismiss these comments as belonging to members of the diaspora or even bots, but many appear to be real Iranians living inside Iran.

Many Iranians, whether in the diaspora or inside the country, are angry and dissatisfied with the United States’ policy toward the Islamic Republic. Since taking office in January 2021—and particularly since the mid-September 2022 anti-establishment protests that occurred after the murder of Mahsa Jina Amini—the Biden administration has imposed countless sanctions, covering everything from terrorism to human rights abuses. Meanwhile, the State Department’s social media accounts—which are run by the Office of Iranian Affairs—have taken the safe route. They repost official US government statements and share Iranian holiday greetings. Most of all, they continue to make soft power gestures, such as posting messages about Women’s History Month and Space Diplomacy Week.

These messages are innocuous, but they don’t resonate with Iranians, as the content doesn’t match with what’s happening on the ground. It lacks empathy and misses the serious concerns of Iranians, who feel the world has forgotten their plight. The US State Department should adopt a new approach by overhauling its current messaging strategy.

Eighty-four percent of Iranians over the age of eighteen use social media and messaging apps—many of which have to be accessed through circumvention tools like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The photo-sharing app, Instagram, is the most popular among Iranians and one of their primary forms of information gathering. With that in mind, @usabehfarsi should not just focus on official US government statements but highlight the human rights situation on the ground, such as the alarming rise in executions across the country in recent weeks; ongoing mass poisonings of school girls; the plight of imprisoned dissidents like rapper Toomaj Salehi; and the families under pressure to remain silent after their children were murdered, like nine-year-old Kian Pirfalak, who was gunned down by security forces.

While the international news cycle focuses its attention elsewhere, the protests in Iran are not dead. In fact, they have been going on continuously since mid-September 2022. The clerical establishment is walking through a minefield of public anger and resentment, and it’s only a matter of time before it makes another wrong move and people pour back into the streets en masse. There’s no going back to the days when mass protests were a once-in-a-decade anomaly, such as the 1999 student uprisings or the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement. Iranians are fed up with the status quo and want the Islamic Republic gone, and their protests have become normalized as a result.

Some may raise concerns that the US government will be seen as meddling in Iranian affairs by turning its focus to the situation on the ground. But, regardless of what the United States does, it always gets the blame. Take Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s Nowruz address on March 20, in which he dismissed the ongoing anti-establishment protests as “riots” that are part of a “global conspiracy” led by the United States. More importantly, the strength of the “meddling” narrative has long faded among many Iranians going back to the 2009 Green Movement, when protesters chanted, “Obama, Obama—either you’re with them [referring to the clerical establishment] or you’re with us.” It’s also worth noting that, at every opportune moment, Iranian officials have regularly weighed in on what’s happening in the United States, such as the Black Lives Matter movement.

Messaging doesn’t just pertain to social media. It’s also essential that the State Department has a representative that is regularly at the disposal of Western and Persian language diaspora media outlets to take questions and engage with Iranians of all stripes on social media and in the diaspora on an array of Iranian issues.

The mandate of Robert Malley, the US Special Envoy for Iran—which operates separately from the Office of Iranian Affairs—was to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that the Donald Trump administration withdrew from in May 2018 (despite Tehran not violating the multilateral nuclear deal at the time). But priorities and times have changed. The revival of the JCPOA hasn’t happened for an array of reasons, starting with Tehran not coming to the table since August 2022. It isn’t likely to happen, either, given Iran’s provision of armed drones to Russia for the Ukraine conflict and their brutal crackdown on anti-establishment protesters. It’s time that Malley be replaced with a fresh face—preferably someone who focuses on an array of issues beyond the nuclear file, that may also speak Persian, and whose reputation isn’t built on the revival of the JCPOA alone.

The Biden administration’s approach must be more forthright to demonstrate that they are hearing the people of Iran and won’t forget them. There are embers of anger burning in Iran and the last thing any US administration would want to do is suggest that they aren’t paying attention when it spreads like a wildfire again. The United States must be on the side of the people of Iran. Otherwise, Iranians won’t forget who was on the wrong side of history when change does come.

This article was updated on May 22, 2023 to clarify that the State Department’s Office of the Special Envoy would not have jurisdiction over Persian-language social media messaging, which is under the Office of Iranian Affairs.

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Experts react: Assad gets warm reception at Arab summit. Where does that leave the US and its allies?

Qutaiba Idlbi, Gissou Nia, Michel Duclos, Emadeddin Badi — Fri, 19 May 2023 18:55:39 +0000

Twelve years after Syria’s dismissal from the Arab League, President Bashar al-Assad was reintroduced to the regional institution with open arms on May 19. Assad is responsible for widespread destruction, the suffering of the Syrian people, and the displacement of nearly half the population, leading to the country’s ostracization from its regional counterparts and much of the international community. However, the recent February 6 earthquake—which further devastated the Syrian people—was utilized as an opportunity for Assad to regain support from his neighbors, as was the Saudi-Iran normalization deal. These events ultimately resulted in the welcoming back of Syria to the Arab League. The Syrian dictator’s attendance at the summit in Saudi Arabia this week demonstrates the turning of a new leaf for the Assad regime.

Atlantic Council experts react to this new development and explain its significance below.

Qutaiba Idlbi: Biden administration contributed to this regional shift

Gissou Nia: There must be new efforts to hold Assad accountable through bold initiatives

Michel Duclos: The West must not enter unconditional normalization with Assad

Emadeddin Badi: Assad’s red carpet treatment captures the flaws of US foreign policy in the region

Yaseen Rashed: Syria’s youth, who paid the highest price of the conflict, are left behind

Biden administration contributed to this regional shift

Efforts to normalize relations with Syria and bring Bashar al-Assad back to the Arab fold materialized after the deadly earthquake of February 6. But Assad’s coronation is a culmination of years-long efforts by many Arab states to normalize relations with Syria, and reposition themselves as balanced entities to the United States on one hand and Russia and China on the other.

For years now, the US has centered its Syria investment in the northeast. The Joe Biden administration is increasingly focused on supporting the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to sustain itself—in the absence of a political settlement—through economic development, investment, and institution building. Meanwhile, it continues to minimize the risks for its troops by repositioning them in the ‘East-East’ security zone to reduce the ability of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Iranian militias to attack US troops in the area directly.

Washington’s increasing “if you touch it, you own it” approach, in which the US sees itself responsible only to parties it was directly involved with in northeast Syria, leaves a vacuum in other parts of the country, where Arab states look to Russia and Iran—and Assad as an extension—as their partners to shape their Syria policies. Along with its de-prioritization of Middle East policy, the Biden administration is contributing to this regional shift that subsequently accelerated the reintegration of Assad.

Not much will change in Syria or across the region for now, but keeping Assad isolated would not be as easy as before, especially as he eyes recognition from the West followed by the removal of sanctions and funding for reconstruction.

Qutaiba Idlbi is a nonresident fellow at Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs where he leads the Syria project.

There must be new efforts to hold Assad accountable through bold new initiatives

After more than a decade of conflict that resulted in half a million killed and 14 million Syrians forced to flee their homes, the warm reception of the Arab League of Assad is an affront to justice and accountability.

The attempts to rehabilitate a mass murderer sends a dark message to not only Syrian victims and survivors, but victims and survivors of atrocity crimes everywhere—from Ukraine to Myanmar to Iran.

Countries that believe in human rights and redress for victims should not act passively. They should recharge efforts to hold the Assad regime accountable through bold new initiatives. Steps could include setting up a global or regional victims fund to give reparations to Syrian victims and survivors of the conflict—many of whom have yet to be made whole; expanding current investigations into alleged Russian perpetrators in the Ukraine invasion to include Vladamir Putin’s crimes in Syria; supporting the pending complaints to the International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor to open up investigations into crimes against humanity in the Syrian conflict committed by the Assad regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Russian forces; and refocusing efforts to target business links to the Assad regime in Spain, France, and elsewhere.

Rather than accept normalization and the futility of efforts for justice, like-minded states should support victims and survivors by doubling down on efforts for justice where possible and reject complacency amid mass atrocities.

Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

The West should not enter unconditional normalization with Assad

The Arab governments are making a terrible mistake. They cannot expect Assad to deliver on their key expectations. They are whitewashing a mass criminal with no gains whatsoever and no prospects of limiting Iranian influence in Syrian affairs. The Western countries should not enter into the logic of unconditional normalization with Assad. They should hold firm on not lifting sanctions. They should also focus their energy on stabilizing the Syrian northeast to better counter the jihadist threat, find an arrangement with Turkey, and obtain some kind of autonomous status for the Syrian Democratic Forces.

In that respect, Western powers should discuss with the main Arab countries some sort of give and take. For instance, they could help their Arab partners with a major concern for them: to cut the production of Captagon by the Syrian regime. In exchange, they could request their regional partners to support them in the stabilization and autonomization of the northeast.

Michel Duclos is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. He previously served as ambassador of France to Syria from 2006-2009.

Assad’s red carpet treatment captures the flaws of US foreign policy in the region

The official return of Assad to the Arab League is explicitly meant to telegraph the triumph of authoritarianism. The move, rationalized by its proponents as pragmatism, is nothing but. In fact, it epitomizes the solidarity between aging dictators in the region and their collective doubling down on tyranny over any meaningful governance and reforms. For the cohorts of young people from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the optics and messaging around this Medusa moment are intentionally meant to silence and frustrate. The youth’s overwhelming feelings of powerlessness are meant to breed an apathetic society, and their desperation is weaponized to disillusion them into accepting injustice and repression as the new status quo.

For the United States, Assad’s red carpet treatment today captures the flaws of US foreign policy in the region: selectively standing for “democratic principles” is akin to not standing for anything. US policy on Syria is a case in point. Failing to deter Assad and his allies is the by-product of American milquetoast responses, parochialism, and unenforced red lines. American administrations self-sabotaged and lost credibility by violating their stated policy and gradually eroding their leverage. Doubly ironic is the fact that states that have spearheaded Assad’s rehabilitation—forcing the Biden administration into silent acquiescence in the process—are US allies.

Today, the world watches as a war criminal poses for photo ops at a regional summit after displacing half of his nation. An added shade of desolation is his re-inclusion officially represents the nail in the coffin of a forgotten global commitment to center the Responsibility to Protect populations. Even if this depressing canvas isn’t a wake-up call for US policymakers to shift course and revisit their actions and assumptions—one can be sure the injustices therein will one day spark the anger of the region’s battered populations.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs

Syria’s youth, who paid the highest price of the conflict, are left behind

The final nail in the coffin of the 2011 youth-led Arab Spring was hammered in today with the warm reception of Syria’s dictator in Jeddah for the Arab League summit. It follows a line of precedents set by the failed revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. The movement that sought to bring about political agency to its youth seems far removed from the possibilities under Assad’s new Syria, one legitimized by regional hegemons.

As normalization negotiations center around repatriating Syria’s refugees and limiting Iran’s influence in the region, Syria’s youth—who have undoubtfully paid the highest price in the conflict—are left behind. Since protests began in 2011, over 30,000 children have been killed in attacks by regime forces across the country. Furthermore, over 47 percent of the 5.5 million refugees residing in neighboring countries are under the age of twenty-five, and more than a third do not have access to education. Their hopes for a safer, more democratic future—the same hopes that initially ignited the 2011 revolution—are no longer possible in Assad’s Syria.

The memory of the 2011 Arab Spring remains ever-present in the region’s leadership. Fearing yet another wave of uprisings due to bubbling economic frustrations, Arab League member states are looking to scapegoat refugees for misdirected frustrations rooted in governance, accountability, and transparency issues. Using Syria’s youth as political bargaining chips to maneuver domestic pressures is no surprise and will inevitably not fix the structural challenges regional governments face. As Assad calls for “Arab unity” at the summit, it’s clear he is calling for the unity of despots in the region to bolster and legitimize each other’s grip on power.

Instead of supporting these efforts, the Biden administration must prioritize the people of Syria, specifically the country’s vulnerable youth population. The US should leverage its privileged relationship with Arab League member states to champion accountability and justice efforts for victims of Assad’s ongoing aggression. Welcoming Assad back to the international stage without any accountability for his war crimes waged against civilians sends a message to autocrats everywhere: If you play your cards right, you can get away with upending the lives of millions to maintain your place on the playing field.

Yaseen Rashed is a Media & Communications Program Assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs

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Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes

sodal — Fri, 19 May 2023 14:06:14 +0000

original source

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

Failing to address the democratic deficiencies of hybrid regimes sets up the United States for long-term strategic failure and hinders American economic prosperity. To avoid these outcomes, the United States must carve out a new path forward that preserves near-term US interests while also pressing these States to make democratic progress.

Patrick Quirk

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Patrick Quirk

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Ukraine’s growing defense tech prowess can help defeat Russia

Mykhailo Fedorov — Thu, 18 May 2023 18:41:08 +0000

For as long as humans have waged war, technology has played a key role. New military technologies determine the form and manner of warfare while offering undeniable advantages to those who possess them. Today, the rise of AI, drones, and autonomous control systems is changing the face of warfare and shifting the battlefield to the technological realm. Ukraine is at the cutting edge of this process.

Since February 2022, Ukraine has been defending itself in a major war against an enemy that enjoys overwhelming superiority in both conventional weapons and manpower. But while Russia relies on the brute force of artillery bombardments and human wave tactics, Ukraine is waging an innovative form of warfare that utilizes a range of highly creative and often improvised tech solutions. This emphasis on defense tech has been instrumental in many of Ukraine’s most striking military successes of the past fifteen months. Given the right support, it can help secure victory over Russia.

The Ukrainian military has already demonstrated its ability to use everything from drone technologies to satellite communications to effectively manage the modern battlefield. These technologies help save the lives of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians while also dramatically enhancing the effectiveness of combat operations.

At the same time, it is important not to underestimate the enemy. Russian army commanders recognize the increasing importance of defense tech and are working hard to close the gap in areas where Ukraine has established a lead. To stay ahead, it is vital to constantly innovate. This requires a systematic approach to the development of Ukraine’s defense tech sector.

Ukraine’s immediate goal is to create a fast track for defense tech innovation that can make a powerful contribution to the defeat of Russia’s invasion. We must create an environment where startups flourish and innovative products can move rapidly toward mass production. Creativity must be tailored to the specific needs of the military, with the necessary expertise and state support readily available to turn great ideas into military advantages.

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This was the thinking behind the Brave1 defense tech cluster, which was launched by Ukraine in late April. A joint initiative of Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, Defense Ministry, General Staff, National Security and Defense Council, Ministry of Strategic Industries, and Economy Ministry, Brave1 is designed to serve as a hub for the country’s defense tech industry. It is a platform to optimize cooperation between individual defense tech companies, the state, the Ukrainian military, investors, and other potential partners.

The scope of Brave1 is necessarily broad. Ukraine is seeking to promote new developments in a wide range of defense-related tech segments including supply and logistics, unmanned aerial vehicles, cybersecurity, navigation, and medical care. We have designed the initiative relying on international experience, though in the end, we have quite a unique Ukrainian story. Brave1 includes partner accelerators and incubators, investor engagement opportunities, and educational courses.

The Brave1 Defense Innovation Council is headed by Mark Lennon. Mr. Lennon has held senior leadership positions at Apple, Gartner, and in the US government, and has also served for 24 years as a US Naval Officer. His background and credibility will enable Brave1 to become a powerful platform capable of generating war-winning technologies.

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The long-term objective is clear: Ukraine must become one of the world’s leading defense tech countries. This is entirely realistic. After all, Ukraine is already acquiring unique wartime experience on a daily basis and boasts a very large number of highly skilled IT professionals and engineers. Moscow’s full-scale invasion has turned Ukraine into a testing ground for new military technologies. It is also transforming the country into a defense tech superpower.

This process has the potential to profoundly impact Ukraine’s national security and the country’s economy. I am confident that in the coming years, we will witness the emergence of powerful Ukrainian defense tech companies worth billions of dollars. The growth of this sector will play a critical role in Ukrainian defense policy for decades to come and will remain a top national priority.

All that lies ahead. The task now is to defeat Russia. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin is unlikely to end soon. Instead, it should be viewed as a marathon. Ukrainians must be ready for a long fight. We must play to our strengths as a tech-savvy nation of innovators, and must do everything to maximize effective cooperation between creative minds, state bodies, and the military. Ukrainians have already demonstrated to global audiences that they are some the bravest fighters on the planet. They must now confirm that are also among the smartest.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for Innovations, Development of Education, Science and Technologies, and Minister of Digital Transformation.

New Bernard Henri-Lévy documentary challenges Ukraine fatigue

Melinda Haring, Jacob Heilbrunn — Thu, 18 May 2023 16:06:51 +0000

For anyone seeking to make sense of Russia’s war in Ukraine, viewing French public intellectual Bernard Henri-Lévy’s new feature-length documentary “Slava Ukraini” (“Glory to Ukraine”) isn’t an option. It’s a must. A gritty, intense, and probing examination of the impact of the war, it offers what is surely the ultimate antidote to Ukraine fatigue.

As he pondered the course of the war, Henri-Lévy came to the conclusion that the best way to combat the West’s mounting impatience with the 15-month war and counter the push for preliminary negotiations was to show rather than tell. Instead of writing an essay, the 74-year-old French filmmaker and philosopher took to the road to illuminate the bravery of ordinary Ukrainians against what he calls the “master terrorist” in the Kremlin.

The film, which carefully traces Henri-Lévy’s journey across Ukraine, is about far more than jerky shots of the Frenchman and his crew dodging bullets and drone attacks. It is about Ukraine’s defiance of Putin’s attempt not simply to wage a war of territorial conquest, but to efface the idea of Ukrainian nationhood itself. “If I dare to give a certain logic to this crazy war, it is in the logic of the denial of Ukrainian identity,” he says. “This barbarity matches the logic of denying the very existence of Ukraine.”

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As he journeys from Ukraine’s capital to the east, Henri-Lévy captures the dignity of the Ukrainian people through short vignettes that remain with you long after the credits roll. The Frenchman focuses on ordinary Ukrainians like the elderly woman who appears in the documentary engaged in the quotidian task of stirring a steaming pot of borscht and pleads for an end to the constant violence that has upended her life. She hopes to make it to her seventieth birthday, she says.

In Kyiv, after another Russian air strike hits a woman’s apartment, she apologizes profusely to Henri-Lévy for wearing a dirty black coat. Her kitchen is unusable after the bombing and her crockery is battered, but she’s more focused on the state of her appearance. She takes the French filmmaker to her makeshift bed, a chair inside a bathroom tub where she waited out the aerial assault, and smiles with pride at her ability to snatch a few hours of sleep.

Another scene captures everyday life for those who couldn’t leave cities and towns that Russia has pounded relentlessly in the east. A man who appears to be approaching pension age tries to chop wood with an axe, complaining that it’s warmer outside than inside.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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In Pavlograd, the French filmmaker dons a hard helmet and overalls to cover his black designer suit and spotless white shirt as he descends below ground to watch Ukrainian miners drill iron ore. The precious ore is eventually made into bullet-proof vests for soldiers at the front. After the steel miners are done for the day, they carry on packing care boxes of food and medicine for displaced families.

Henri-Lévy observes that every steelworker is a hero, just like the brave men and women on the front lines. In one of his characteristic meditative asides, he observes that the Greeks and Romans admired heroes in part because they were so rare. “In Ukraine, heroes are everywhere,” he says. The Frenchman confesses that he keeps coming back to Ukraine because it is rare in history to see so many people embody heroism in one place.

The documentary also features moments of exhilaration. Henri-Lévy captures joyous scenes from recently liberated Kherson, where hundreds mill in the main square, some searching for power to recharge their phones and tell their loved ones they are still alive. Perhaps the hardest and most powerful scene comes when Henri-Lévy visits a torture cell that still has fresh blood on the floor. The Russians never actually appear on film, but their depraved conduct casts a dark shadow over the documentary.

This film is anything but neutral and Henri-Lévy makes no attempt to disguise his sympathies. “I am partisan. I don’t give five minutes to the Jews and five minutes to the Nazis,” he says.

The Frenchman has consistently refused to engage in bogus moral hand-wringing when it comes to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, he is clear about which side he’s on, as viewers of “Slava Ukraini” will no doubt recognize. “I want the Ukrainians to win,” he commented on May 11 at a screening of the documentary at the E Street Cinema in Washington, DC.

Melinda Haring is director of stakeholder relations and social impact at the Superhumans Center. Jacob Heilbrunn is Editor of the National Interest. Haring and Heilbrunn are both non-resident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. “Slava Ukraini” was shown at a series of screenings in May organized with the Ukrainian American charity Razom. It can be viewed on Apple TV and YouTube.

How the international community can help Libya’s political deadlock, according to local civil society actors

Ali Alaspli, Farah Ali, and Mohamed Salem — Thu, 18 May 2023 14:40:10 +0000

Libya is in its twelfth year of political turmoil. After almost a decade of civil war, the country currently faces the daunting challenge of selecting a representative government that can unite people from both the East and West of the country. The United Nations (UN)-backed Interim Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh, governs over Tripoli and the West, while General Khalifa Haftar rules Libya’s East. Despite the UN’s pursuit of a mediated solution, there has been little success. Ultimately, the Libyan people suffer the most from the power vacuum and have yet to exercise their fundamental democratic right of electing their representatives through free and fair elections. What comes next for Libya? Can the international community make a tangible contribution to forming a rights-based democracy in Libya?

The Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program is collaborating with Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL) to provide a platform for Libyan civil society. The hope is to amplify the voices of those working to support the Libyan people and to help restore justice for those who have suffered and continue to suffer severe human rights violations.

In this piece, three Libyan civil society representatives give their take on the international community’s role in Libya.

‘Accountability and redress are the first steps toward some kind of solution’

There can’t be an international solution given how the world deals with Libya. The international community is divided and politicized and the priorities of decision-makers shift depending on the circumstances. For example, since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Libya hasn’t been on the world’s agenda. Instead, it’s been on the back-burner as all energy is focused on Ukraine. In just a year of that conflict, there have been resolutions, sanctions, and even an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against a head of state: Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, the conflict in Libya has lasted for nearly thirteen years and there’s no real will to resolve the crisis.

For example, when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Mahmoud al-Warfali, a former Libyan general indicted on war crimes of murder and ordering the murder of non-combatants, there was a noticeable drop in the rate of abuses. Libyans stopped seeing video clips of mass executions and many militia leaders in the East disappeared. The warrant made Haftar and the groups led by al-Warfali anxious. This shows that an arrest warrant was all that was needed from international actors. It was a simple deed that had a major impact and saved many lives in Libya.

I strongly believe that accountability and redress are the first steps toward some kind of solution; without them, there will be none. The international community should start by prioritizing Libya and working seriously to put an end to human rights violations, strengthening accountability, ending impunity, restoring the ruined judicial system, and setting up a mechanism or an independent court to bring people who have committed atrocities in Libya to justice. This could be the start of a solution. There can be no solution without transitional justice and redress for the victims.

Ali Alaspli, president of Libya Crimes Watch.

A solution must be overseen by the United Nations

Given the state of political deadlock, insecurity, and division in Libya over the past twelve years, it has become almost impossible to reach a solution domestically. This means that the solution must be an international one overseen by the United Nations—not one simply determined by the interests of individual states.

Interference by foreign actors—Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and others—have had a negative impact on the Libyan crisis and directly or indirectly drawn it out. Certain states have stoked the conflict by providing warring parties with weapons, materiel, ammunition, and/or military vehicles. This is in clear violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of 2011 which imposes a complete arms embargo to and from Libya, as well as Article 6 of the Berlin Conference Conclusions of January 2020, in which participants committed “to refraining from interference in the armed conflict or in the internal affairs of Libya” and called on all international actors to do the same. The international community should ensure the arms embargo is upheld.

Putting an end to corruption should also be one of the international community’s key priorities regarding Libya right now. Corruption is widespread across most of Libya’s institutions and is a major factor in prolonging the conflict. Currently, militias and warring parties are struggling for control over state resources and institutions to seize as much public money as possible. The UN Convention Against Corruption is a key international treaty that should be used to tackle corruption in Libya. The convention aims to promote and facilitate international cooperation in the battle against corruption through information sharing, preventative measures, asset recovery, and fighting money laundering. This convention could be a key deterrent to corruption within and outside Libya if states stepped up their efforts under UN auspices.

Farah Ali*, Lawyers for Justice in Libya partner and human rights advocate.

Civil society must play a genuine role in the process

The international community should put pressure on all sides of the conflict—political and military—to start the process of holding elections and abide by their results. But, firstly, any political agreement among Libyan actors should include clear provisions to ensure civil society has a genuine role. This can be done by giving it a major voice in dialogue aimed at reaching a political solution.

It is clear that there has been a distinct lack of proper communication between the international community and Libyan civil society. Most importantly, it must be noted that the situation of Libyan civil society is deteriorating by the day. It has become increasingly more dangerous for civil society actors to continue their work. Simply working for a civil society organization can result in serious accusations, such as “spreading moral deviance” in society or spying on the Libyan state on behalf of foreign powers. This line of thinking has become widespread on the official level and among the public. Correcting it will require enormous effort.

The international community must guarantee the presence of Libyan civil society actors in political dialogue meetings. This would help give civil society a say in future political agreements. The international community should stipulate that civil society should be strengthened and protected in future agreements and compel the Libyan authorities to respect such agreements. This would, in turn, strengthen civil society and make it more effective.

Finally, the international community must support a mechanism for direct communication between civil society and the Libyan authorities when abuses are committed against civil society actors. This would allow the international community to obtain information about the abuses and seek an end to them.

International support in Libya should not be limited to ad hoc or short-term projects. Instead, they should be strategic and based on long-term, cohesive plans.

Mohamed Salem,* Lawyers for Justice in Libya partner and human rights advocate.

*Name changed to protect identity.

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The Arab League thinks readmitting Syria will push out Iran. They’re wrong.

David Daoud — Tue, 16 May 2023 20:25:44 +0000

Readmitting Syria to the Arab League is a strategic mistake. On paper, the logic behind such a move appears sound. For the better part of the last decade, most of the Arab world hoped that Syria’s uprising would dislodge Bashar al-Assad’s regime. As the dust has begun to settle on that conflict, it is apparent that those hopes were misplaced. In short, Assad won.

The most obvious objection to readmitting the Assad regime into the so-called Arab fold—and the halls of the Arab League—is a moral one. Assad’s crimes over the past decade set him apart from other living Middle Eastern autocrats. They demand that he remain a pariah—not be slowly renormalized as a legitimate international actor. After all, Assad emerged victorious in the Syrian Civil War by slaughtering hundreds of thousands of his people, wounding and torturing scores of others, and displacing millions more. His blood-bought victory has visited immeasurable pain upon the Syrian people and the effects of this could last for decades.

However, reality and history rarely allow for statecraft to be so morally neat. In formulating his concept of raison d’état, Cardinal de Richelieu, France’s chief minister from 1624-1642, declared that “Man is immortal, his salvation is hereafter. The state has no immortality, its salvation is now or never.” In other words, states receive neither credit nor reward in this life nor the next for making the morally correct choice. They are only rewarded for doing what is necessary.

To a degree, that holds true regarding Syria. Reality—and the outcome of the Syrian Civil War—presented the Arab world with two choices: the first is to permanently boycott Assad and allow Iran’s dominance over Syria to continue growing. In the interim, this diplomatic isolation—coupled with a financial siege in the form of US-led sanctions—would prevent Syria’s resurgence or reconstruction. The Syrian people would then continue to suffer from Assad’s dictatorial rule and the various shortages and deprivations brought about by his destructive war, which would be further compounded by sanctions. Alternatively—and that is the path being chosen by the Arab world—attempts could be made to lure this particular fly away from Tehran with honey, begrudgingly reestablishing ties with him to create a counter to unchecked Iranian influence.

However, the logic underpinning the second option—drawing Assad back into the Arab orbit—is unsound, founded on the faulty premise that there remains such a thing as an independent Syrian regime and Assad to woo back from Tehran.

The Syrian dictator can now be effectively considered the glorified “Mayor of Damascus,” merely ruling that fiefdom at Iran’s pleasure. No matter how much Arab backing he has, Assad cannot ask Iran to leave his country willingly. Ensuring Syria does not proverbially fall into enemy hands is an existential matter for Tehran. High-ranking Iranian officials have described Syria as Iran’s “Thirty-Fifth Province” to emphasize that they view anti-Iranian activity in Syria on par with domestic unrest. The Iranians simply don’t trust Assad to be able to hold the country without their presence and control.

Additionally, Iran has invested too much blood, treasure, and political capital in Syria to ever leave the country without a fight. Nor can Assad forcibly eject them, with his Syrian Arab Army having been decimated by defections during the civil war and fighting. As far back as 2016, Hezbollah and Iran’s other proxy militias bore the brunt of fighting opposition forces and assumed control on the ground. By contrast, the Syrian Arab Army assumed a symbolic and secondary role.

That is why this effort to cajole Assad back into the Arab fold—floated by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as early as 2016, but now enthusiastically led by Saudi Arabia since late March 2023—is unlikely to succeed. There’s little left of an independent Syria to work with. Nor can Arab intervention in Syria remedy that shortcoming, since it is unlikely to be as deep nor as intrusive in the country’s internal affairs as Iran’s.

Recalling a 2021 conversation between myself and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on the matter, he said: “We don’t get involved in a country’s internal affairs.” But Iran does.

The Gulf States are, effectively, leading the Arab world into replicating their old approach to Syria’s neighbor, Lebanon, which has also failed to produce any results. This is despite Iran’s influence—through its proxy Hezbollah—being more diluted in Beirut than in Damascus, owing to the Byzantine nature of Lebanese politics. If anything, Hezbollah exploited the stability provided by the Gulf’s assistance to Beirut to grow inside Lebanon. Iran can be expected to do the same in Syria, particularly if reconstruction aid manages to enter the country.

Assad is likely acutely aware of this situation and unlikely to attempt to break away from Iran or undermine its interests willingly. Tehran’s history of dealing with rebellious subordinates is certain to deter him. Assad risks being liquidated for stepping out of line, with Tehran blaming his death on Israel—as Hezbollah did with Rafik Hariri’s—for failing to offer enough concessions. Or they could opt for the route chosen by Houthi proxies in regard to Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, where they declared him a traitor deserving of death.

Russia, the other actor with influence in Syria, cannot be relied on to erode Iran’s control over the country. Since Tehran will not leave the country willingly, that would require Moscow to relitigate the entire Syrian Civil War. But this time, they would have to fight against an adversary in Iran that is more formidable than the Syrian opposition. In fact, even prior to its entanglement in Ukraine, Russian forces repeatedly backed down in the face of Iran and its proxies in Syria, demonstrating who had the upper hand on Syrian soil. Moscow would have to embark upon this task even though its interests in Syria—Assad’s survival, Russia’s armed presence in Syria, and maintaining Damascus as a military client—have been secured.

The absurdity of betting on Russia to restore Assad’s independence from Iran is further compounded by the fact that, to do so, Moscow would have to divert its ground troops away from a war it views as existential in Ukraine—where the Russian army is now bogged down—to fight Iran, an actor that has been acting as its indispensable ally in that war.

Assad’s victory in the Syrian Civil War must not be his ticket to readmission into the family of civilized nations, including in the Arab world. He achieved his victory by mercilessly slaughtering hundreds of thousands of his people. Reestablishing ties with him will not alleviate the suffering of those Syrians who remain under his regime. The ultimate benefit will accrue not only to Assad, but to the power that controls and keeps him in the presidential palace: the Islamic Republic of Iran.

David Daoud is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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Syrian refugees fear normalization with Assad. Because it means they will have to return—and not by choice.

Arwa Damon — Tue, 16 May 2023 18:49:54 +0000

“We would always hear talk about how Lebanon would start forcing Syrians to go back,” Safa, a twenty-year-old Syrian refugee in Lebanon, tells me. “But we never took it all that seriously. Not until now. Now it’s a rollercoaster.”

The news of the Arab League bringing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad back into its fold after a decade of civil war has exacerbated a constant, almost paralyzing fear that Syrian refugees have felt for years. No one who lived through this era can forget the barrel bombs indiscriminately raining hell down on civilian neighborhoods; the roar of Syrian and Russian fighter jets bombing schools and hospitals; the massacres of entire families—including children slaughtered for no apparent reason other than evil itself—and the months-long sieges of neighborhoods that left populations so hungry they ate grass.

But it would seem that it’s now in the interest of Arab League nations to move past these crimes. They argue that Assad’s isolation did little to alter his behavior and that re-opening communication is the best way to tackle the threat of terrorism, the growing drug trade flowing through Syria, and the headache caused by Syrian refugees. After all, if Syria is no longer a pariah state in the eyes of Arab nations, then surely its citizens can return. It’s a prospect that terrifies Syrians who fled.

They fear that this “normalization” of ties between the Arab League and Syria will boost the narrative that “Syria is safe now,” giving further justification to governments, politicians, and citizens of countries who have wanted to rid themselves of their Syrian refugee population for years. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 5.5 million Syrian refugees live in its neighboring countries. This does not count those who fled and made it to Europe, where many countries would like to—and in some cases have already—sent them back home.

The “Syrians can go back home” narrative is nothing new—it has been parroted for years. This action by the Arab League will potentially give any country wanting to deport Syrians the smokescreen it needs to justify its actions.

Safa is a university student who has lived as a Syrian refugee in Lebanon longer than she has lived in her homeland. As a child, she lived with the fear of being forced to go back home. As a young adult, it now permeates every aspect of her existence, growing by the day, and launching her into a constant state of anxiety.

“It’s crazy what is happening now,” she laments. “Imagine, they have a curfew for us now. As Syrians, we’re not allowed outside after 7 pm in my village in the south. They say it’s for the security of the Lebanese.”

The Lebanese army has been carrying out increasing raids across the country in areas inhabited by Syrian refugees, detaining and deporting hundreds, according to Amnesty International and other rights organizations.

Individuals detained are dumped straight into the hands of Syrian authorities, where enough are reportedly arbitrarily detained, forcibly conscripted, or just disappeared that it sends waves of fear through the refugee population.

Lebanon’s caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati has already cited a “decline in intense military tension in many areas” in Syria, as he called on the international community to facilitate a new approach to rid Lebanon of Syrian refugees, whether it be sending Syrians back home or to a third country. Lebanon has been increasingly scapegoating its refugee population, leading to a stunning increase in aggression and hatred.

Safa and her family live in fear within their own home. They recently moved towns and were visited by the Lebanese security forces, who informed them that they must register with all their documents or be deported immediately.

It’s not just fear of the possibility of deportation, even though their papers are in order. It’s the hatred that serves as an equally strong driver of the fear: “How secure is my life here?” It permeates every aspect of Safa’s life to the point that her insides clench each time she steps outside. She’s a university student working after class to help support her studies and her ten-person family.

“Our neighbors, even my friends at school, my boss at work, you feel their hatred of Syrians,” she explains. “They say things like, ‘Oh, you came, and now you’re leeching off of us. Go back to your country. Half of you are thieves.’”

Anti-Syrian refugee sentiment has been snowballing lately, especially in the two countries that host the largest number of refugees: Lebanon—where Safa lives—and Turkey—where the refugee crisis is in the top three concerns driving voters in Turkey’s razor-thin presidential elections, which are going to a run-off scheduled for May 28.

“I cried, I cried, and I asked my father about all of this.” Weam, a twenty-seven-year-old Syrian woman living in Turkey, explains to me. “First, it was Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and even Turkey is talking about it.”

The Assad regime killed Weam’s brother, uncle, and grandfather. She can’t erase the memory of seeing her brother’s lifeless body in an ambulance on her laptop; of knowing, at that moment, that she would never get a chance to say goodbye. Weam will never forget the way that her family found her grandfather’s scorched corpse after regime forces burned down his home, knowing that he was still inside.

“I am angry, frustrated,” Weam says, her voice shaking with emotion. “Twelve years of fighting, being displaced within Syria and outside of Syria. All of this, just to be erased, to go back to normal ties?”

The pain is coupled with the uncertainty of the fate of those she loves. Weam is among the Syrians who successfully pursued a path to citizenship in Turkey. Her sisters are still waiting.

“They are terrified,” Weam says. “They are just waiting to see what will happen after the elections.”

Weam is unsure who to vote for or if she should even vote at all.

“Safe repatriation” of Syria’s more than 3.5 million refugees in Turkey is the rhetoric swirling around and is an openly-stated pledge of the opposition candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. But it’s worth remembering that talks were started with the Syrian regime by the government of the incumbent, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Add to that Syria’s ascension into the Arab League, and the argument of “Syria is safe, people can go back home” takes on a new life no matter who wins.

“Me as a Syrian, I have no hope in the Arab League,” Malik, a thirty-year-old Syrian refugee in Turkey, who has been waiting for his citizenship to go through, explains. “I was more upset by the rapprochement between Syria and Turkey. And, now, if it’s the party that says it supports refugees that wins, there will be a backlash against us, and they will have to do something. And if it’s the party that wants to kick us out, they will have to demonstrate that they are doing that. We don’t know how it’s going to materialize.”

For many, going back to Syria is a non-starter. Safa’s family, for example, is seriously considering having her take the deadly journey to Libya and then to Italy. It’s not something she wants to do, but her family is pressuring her to try, thinking that it might lead to a chain of events that will allow them better and safer prospects.

Safety for those who fled is not just defined by whether bombs and bullets are falling. Much more terrifying than that is the fear of disappearance; fear of regime forces that arrive in the dead of the night to whisk someone away; fear of being stopped at a checkpoint and disappearing only to languish in Assad’s prisons; fear of saying the wrong thing to the wrong person only to be recuperated by loved ones as a corpse; fear of all of the factors that were the drivers of the revolution in the first place. None of that has changed.

It’s why Syrians who fled endure the misery of being in Lebanon. It’s why internally-displaced Syrians stay in a tent rather than return to their cities and towns. It’s why Syrians in Jordan would rather live in limbo than return. And it’s why Syrians in Turkey will suffer the blatant racism, aggression, and politicization of their plight.

No global power, no politician, no population has ever really understood what it is to be a Syrian refugee. Their life and suffering is merely rhetoric to be manipulated. What better way to manipulate the Syrian refugee “crisis”—to justify sending Syrians back home—than to be able to point to the Arab League’s acceptance of Assad and say, “But, look, things are going back to normal, relations are normalizing, things are fine. You can all go back home.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. She is also the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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State of the Order: Assessing April 2023

sodal — Tue, 16 May 2023 15:37:00 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Macron China Flap. Accompanied by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, French President Emmanuel Marcon traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. With a delegation of some sixty business leaders, Macron’s visit raised eyebrows after his comments on Taiwan, suggesting that Europe should not get “caught up in crises that are not ours,” and on relations with the US, advising that France should avoid becoming a “vassal” in the service of a larger power’s agenda. France later joined a G7 statement warning Beijing against “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion” regarding Taiwan.

Shaping the order. With China seeking to leverage the promise of greater commercial engagement to keep outside powers from interfering on Taiwan, Macron’s visit and subsequent comments did not sit well with allies and risked playing into Beijing’s efforts to drive a wedge within the transatlantic alliance. But the diplomatic fallout may be limited, as French officials later sought to downplay the comments and von der Leyen and other European leaders continue to press for a more assertive strategy to stand up against the threats to the rules-based order posed by China.
Hitting home. As China seeks to expand its global influence, the American people would benefit from closer cooperation with allies and partners to defend shared values and interests.
What to do. The Biden administration should prioritize efforts to develop a common strategy with key European and Asia-Pacific allies on China to deter a potential attack on Taiwan and limit Beijing’s ability to undermine the rules-based order.

Russian Offensive Stalls. A much-touted Russian military offensive in the Donbas region of Ukraine that began in late winter stalled, as Russian forces failed to make any significant gains around the town of Bakhmut despite a heavy investment of military resources and troops. Armed with more advanced Western weapons, the Ukrainian military began preparing to launch a strong counteroffensive, though US officials have reportedly expressed concerns that Ukraine may also end up falling short. Separately, Xi Jinping spoke for the first time since the war began with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and offered to help negotiate a settlement to the crisis.

Shaping the order. Despite suffering heavy casualties, Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown no signs of backing down, seemingly convinced that a war of attrition will eventually accrue in Russia’s favor, if Ukrainian forces are worn down and political support for Ukraine in Western nations begins to dissipate. While China’s proposed peace plan has so far failed to gain traction, diplomatic pressure toward a ceasefire is beginning to build. A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive is likely to dampen such pressure and could provide a boost of momentum for Ukraine to sustain the fight.
Hitting home. Americans have a strong interest in Ukraine’s success, as the US would be more secure in a world where aggressive dictators cannot get away with attacking other nations.
What to do. The Biden administration should work closely with NATO allies to deliver as quickly as possible the advanced military equipment that Ukraine needs to succeed in its forthcoming counteroffensive.

Biden’s Global Economic Plan. In a series of major speeches, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and US national security adviser Jake Sullivan laid out a new global economic strategy that aims to reduce dependence on China by investing in domestic capacity and working with allies to promote diversified global supply chains in certain strategic sectors. Echoing European Commission president von der Leyen, the US plan calls for “de-risking and diversifying,” rather than decoupling, with China. But the speeches received mixed reactions from US allies concerned about rising protectionism and among many economists, who suggested the plan could lead to higher inflation and create new economic risks as the government tries to pick winners and losers.

Shaping the order. Biden’s new economic plan represents a pivot from the past several decades of US global economic policy, which was premised on reducing trade barriers and integrating authoritarian powers such as China and Russia into the global economy, in the hopes that it would lead to a more open and peaceful world. In this effort to build a new economic order or a new “Washington Consensus,” as Sullivan called for, liberalizing trade is taking a back seat to establishing more stable and reliable supply chains and seeking to expand the domestic benefits of global trade.
Hitting home. While some US businesses may be negatively impacted, at least in the short-term, America will be economically more secure over time by ensuring that critical economic sectors are not dependent on China.
What to do. Building on Canadian deputy prime minister Chrystia Freeland’s proposal for an economic alliance of democracies, the Biden administration should create a new ally shoring framework that outlines a common approach for reorchestrating supply chains and managing trade with Russia and China.

Quote of the Month

“We will together embrace the future of the [US-Korean] alliance, undergirded by our shared core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights…The alliance will not only ensure the security and prosperity of both countries, but also contribute to the peace and security in the Indo-Pacific and of the world.”

– South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, speaking at the White House, April 27, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

The FBI arrested two men on charges that they helped establish a secret “police station” in New York on behalf of the Chinese government – part of a series of US prosecutions in recent years to disrupt Chinese efforts to surveil and harass individuals from China who are critical of Beijing.
Tunisian security forces arrested Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the main opposition party, as part of President Kais Saied’s escalating crackdown against political dissent and representing a further setback for a nation once seen as a rising example of democracy in the Arab world.
A Russian court sentenced democratic opposition leader Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in prison, in what appears to be the longest sentence imposed for political activity in post-Soviet Russia. The move came just days after Russian authorities detained a Wall Street Journal reporter for allegations of spying, an action strongly condemned by US officials.
On balance, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↓)

China conducted its second major live-fire exercise in eight months targeted at Taiwan, including drills for “sealing off” the island, in response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California.
China has reportedly begun to construct a military base in the United Arab Emirates, as part of an ambitious campaign to build a global military network that includes at least five overseas bases and 10 logistical support sites by 2030.
South Korea pledged to not develop its own nuclear arsenal and will be given an increased role in any potential decisions on US nuclear retaliation against North Korea, as outlined in a new Washington Declaration issued by President Biden and South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol. Separately, Pyongyang claimed it had successfully tested a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time.
With the potential to cause serious damage to US diplomatic and intelligence efforts, an American national guardsman leaked dozens of highly classified documents revealing information ranging from Ukrainian military capabilities to collaboration by US allies in the Middle East with Russia and China.
Xi Jinping spoke with Ukrainian President Zelensky by phone, in their first known conversation since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Beijing sought to position itself as a potential peacemaker in the ongoing conflict.
On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

While meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing, Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula de Silvia pledged to boost economic cooperation with China and called for an alternative BRICS currency to replace the US dollar to finance trade between the two nations.
Japan began purchasing Russian oil above the $60 per barrel price cap imposed by the G7, after being granted an exception by the US and other participating nations to meet its energy needs.
The Biden administration set forth a new global economic strategy that aims to reduce dependence on China by investing in domestic capacity and promoting diversified global supply chains in certain strategic sectors.
Overall, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

G7 energy ministers, meeting in Japan, committed to boosting the adoption of renewable energy and set ambitious new targets to expand offshore wind and solar power capacity by 2030.
According to the World Meteorological Organization, European glaciers lost a record amount of mass over the past two years due to the combined effects of global warming and below-normal snowfall.
Given the implications of the UN climate report, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

President Biden hosted South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol for a White House state dinner, as the two leaders met to discuss shared challenges. Yoon also vowed to strengthen bilateral security and economic ties with Japan.
In an effort to repair relations frayed under the leadership of former president Rodrigo Duterte, Philippines President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. met with President Biden at the White House. The visit came just days after the two nations held joint military exercises in the South China Sea.
Meeting in Japan, G7 foreign ministers stood united in criticizing China’s coercion of Taiwan, and agreed to intensify sanctions against Moscow for its war on Ukraine.
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen chaired a meeting of the “Five Eyes” finance ministers, including Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the US, to discuss challenges stemming from the war in Ukraine and potential Chinese economic coercion.
Overall, the alliance pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, in Foreign Affairs, write that while the United States has become less dominant over the past 20 years, it remains at the top of the global power hierarchy, safely above China and far above every other country.
Anne Applebaum and Jeffrey Goldberg, in The Atlantic, contend that the future of the democratic world will be determined by whether the Ukrainian military can break the existing stalemate with Russia.
Tom Malinowski, in Foreign Affairs, recalls numerous successes of US democracy promotion efforts over the past decades and argues that the US must maintain a foreign policy that is true to its ideals.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, suggests that outcome of the war in Ukraine will depend on what sacrifices the United States and its allies are willing to make now to secure the future.
In an Atlantic Council Memo to NATO heads of state, Alexander Vershbow and Ian Brzezinski argue that the alliance should use the upcoming leaders’ summit in Vilnius to begin the process of integrating Ukraine into NATO.
Dan Fried, in Just Security, argues that Congress can investigate the Biden Administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan without compromising the State Department’s vitally important Dissent Channel.
Imran Bayoumi, in Foreign Policy, makes the case for a democracy-first approach to Haiti and other vulnerable states that prioritizes building democratic institutions and promoting economic development.
In the New Atlanticist, Emma Verges, Markus Garlauskas, and Joseph Webster argue that China’s support to Russia is vital to sustaining Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine.

__________________________________________________

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing April 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive

Olivia Yanchik — Mon, 15 May 2023 13:51:14 +0000

The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group has launched a series of outspoken attacks on the country’s military leadership in recent weeks that point to mounting internal divisions within Putin’s invading army as it prepares to face a potentially decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In one of his most recent rants, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Russian Defense Ministry claims of a “redeployment to defensive positions” near to the hotly contested city of Bakhmut and warned that in reality, the front was in danger of collapsing. “The Defense Ministry’s attempts to cover up the situation will lead to a global tragedy for Russia,” he stated on May 12. “They must stop lying immediately.”

This was the latest in a series of public statements by Prigozhin accusing the Russian army and defense ministry of failing to provide his Wagner troops with sufficient front line support. He had earlier threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut altogether due to alleged ammunition shortages.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

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Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Andriy Yermak: Italy is defending common European values in Ukraine

Andriy Yermak — Fri, 12 May 2023 23:29:37 +0000

Thirty years ago, I was a young Ukrainian lawyer who visited Italy for the first time and fell in love. A lifelong passion was born for the songs of Mina and Celentano, the films of Fellini, Vittorio De Sica, and Sorrentino, dishes like risotto alla milanese and cannoli siciliani, the Italian people, and the many cities of breath-taking beauty with glorious history speaking from every stone. Anything “Made in Italy” was a treasure beyond price for someone who had grown up in the Soviet Union.

In time, I became a consultant to the Italy-Ukraine Association and an adviser to many Italian conglomerates interested in business with Ukraine. Today, I have never felt closer to my Italian friends. Italy reminds me very much of my motherland. Like Italian, the Ukrainian language is one of the most melodious in the world; similar to Italians, for Ukrainians family is the biggest treasure; even Italy’s Accona Desert reminds me of Oleshky Sands, a desert in southern Ukraine that is currently under Russian occupation.

I live a different life now. As head of the Ukrainian President’s Office, I assist in fighting the invader. We have experienced great hardship and sorrow since Vladimir Putin launched his unprovoked assault on Ukraine last year. But there have also been moments of joy as our friends have rallied to help us.

It is hard to adequately describe the sustained effects of missiles exploding across my homeland. This war completely changed our lives. Just imagine walking to your office and seeing the cafe where you used to drink coffee every morning destroyed by a missile. Young men and women giving their lives to fight back criminal conquerors, many of whom are mercenaries caring nothing for international law or human decency. By now, most of us are aware of the horrors that have accompanied Putin’s aggression; the bombing of civilian targets, the massacres of Ukrainians, the theft of our children.

We have lived with this war for over a year. Nobody wants it to end more than we do. We quite understand that some of our friends should worry about the lack of progress towards a clear conclusion. Yet we also live with questions that continue to haunt us. Should we simply give up our territory and abandon our responsibility for those who live there? Should we allow Putin any kind of reward for invading our country and slaughtering our citizens? How do we decide to erase a part of our national identity?

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Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni got it absolutely right back in February, upon seeing the Kyiv suburb of Bucha: helping us defend our country is about freedom and justice, about our common values. Anyone doubting it can visit the now safe Kyiv suburb, where the invaders murdered 400 residents in the early days of the all-out invasion, and see for themselves. Life is returning to Bucha, but death, too, is reluctant to leave, and one can see its traces everywhere.

Recently, Prime Minister Meloni laid out in the plainest of terms where responsibility for the conflict lies. “Do you think anyone likes war?” she asked. But negotiations on peace required certain conditions. She demanded answers from her critics: “We should or should not ask Russia to cease hostilities and withdraw troops from Ukrainian territory? Do you think we should review the borders of Ukraine, and how? Do you think that the occupied territories should be given to Moscow? That is what I would like to hear if we are seriously talking about peace. Otherwise, it’s just propaganda at the expense of a sovereign nation, of free people, and international law. And that’s irresponsible.”

To hear an Italian Prime Minister declare her support in such forthright terms is just as important as the efforts that Italy makes not only to help Ukraine win this war, but also to rebuild our country.

Eurasia Center events

Zelenskyy says Ukraine preparing for “new events” as Transnistrian official asks for increased Russian troop presence

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

In April, I had a fruitful and warm conversation with my friend Adolfo Urso, Italian Minister of Enterprise and Production. We talked about how Italy can help in supporting the promotion of Ukrainian manufacturers on the European market. Adolfo assured us of Italy’s support. We are proud of our business and believe that soon “Made in Ukraine” will sound as proud and eloquent as “Made in Italy.”

On April 26, a bilateral Ukrainian Reconstruction Conference was held in Rome with the participation of the prime ministers of the two countries together with 600 Italian and 150 Ukrainian companies. We are grateful to Italy for its incredible support in weapons, in words, and in deeds.

The Italian business community in Ukraine has always been a success story, from furniture and fashion to engineering and consulting. And now it can become even more so. We need not just to reconstruct, but to build back better. And the Italian spirit of entrepreneurship could find a beneficial way to help us recover. Having once visited Ukraine, my numerous Italian friends felt and still feel at home in our country. No doubt, numerous Italian companies will follow suit and come to stay as partners.

We believe that soon we will be even closer to Italy, in one big family, as full-fledged members of the European Union and NATO. The Ukrainian people realize that only Ukraine’s membership in NATO will prevent a recurrence of this terrible war, and we believe that our Italian friends will support us here as well, just as they did when promoting Ukraine’s EU candidacy. Before Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, Italy, like our other partners, could become a guarantor of Ukraine’s security so that long-lasting peace prevails in Eastern Europe.

When I fell in love with Italy all those years ago, I had little idea how much Ukraine would one day be grateful to your country or how close and familiar our nations would become. It is brave of the Italian people and government to support our cause so unequivocally. For that, I can only say “Grazie mille cari amici!”

Andriy Yermak is the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President. An Italian-language version of this article was originally published in Corriere della Sera.

Tracking narratives

Prigozhin accuses Russian defense ministry of creating “shell hunger” in Bakhmut

Russian city organizes Victory concert on riverbank facing Estonia

Interference on satellite imagery suggests Russia is increasing its means to surveil border activity

A May 6 satellite image caught by the Sentinel-1 satellite of the European Space Agency revealed an interference pattern that was recorded stretching 172 kilometers in north-eastern Ukraine. This pattern almost exactly covers the border between the Russian city of Belgorod and Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second most populous city. The interference was cast as a result of electromagnetic emissions caught within the 5Ghz range, also known as the NATO C-band. Open source researcher Brady Africk first reported the pattern.

Radar interference captured along the Ukraine-Russia border. (Source: @Bradyafr/archive)

The imagery shows several layers of pink straight lines, which are different from patterns usually observed by analysts. In a January 2023 edition of the Russian War Report, the DFRLab reported an interference pattern with bulkier interferences that was attributed to a potential anti-air defense missile system deployed in the Krasnodar Krai region.

Additionally, similar patterns were recorded throughout April 2023. The DFRLab compiled imagery data from April 14 to April 21 that shows how Russia may have increased its deployment of military radars and anti-air defense systems in the region. The April 29 drone attack against an oil depot in Crimea also indicates that Russia could have been building up its defense systems in the southern occupied territories of Ukraine.

A map based on the aggregated Sentinel-1 imagery over the Azov Sea showing several interference patterns. (Source: DFRLab via ESA Sentinel-1)

The May 6 interference pattern resembles the one cast over mainland Crimea in April, suggesting similarity in the type of devices or equipment responsible for its emission. This assessment indicates that Russia could be transitioning towards further deployments of defense systems and military-class radar monitoring on its borders with Ukraine and in occupied territories.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Zelenskyy says Ukraine preparing for “new events” as Transnistrian official asks for increased Russian troop presence

The Russian army carried out a large-scale missile and drone strike over Ukrainian territory in the early hours of May 8. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported on May 8 that Russian forces launched sixteen missiles at Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa, and that Ukrainian troops shot down all thirty-five launched Shahed drones. A drone appears to have hit a tall building in Kyiv, possibly after being shot down. There were also reports that falling debris caused other damage. The drone strike is one of the largest attacks on Kyiv since February 2022.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on May 7 that Ukrainian forces are preparing for “new events” in May or June 2023, an indication that Ukrainian forces may be preparing to conduct counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian military sources said that Russian forces continue to transfer equipment, ammunition, and supplies to prepare for defensive operations.

Footage from Bakhmut on May 5 shows the possible use of incendiary shells against the remaining areas held by the Ukrainian army. The footage suggests ammunition is available, despite Wagner’s Yevgeny Prigozhin claiming the group does not have enough ammunition in Bakhmut.

Footage from Bakhmut on May 5 shows the possible use of incendiary shells against the remaining areas held by the Ukrainian army.

Meanwhile, the evacuation of civilians from Russian-occupied frontline towns in the Zaporizhzhia region has led to fuel shortages, problems with ATMs, and connectivity issues, according to Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov. He added that Russian forces have reportedly removed medical equipment from the city’s hospital, asked patients to evacuate, and closed several hospital wards.

Elsewhere, conflicting reports are emerging from the Orikhiv region. The city is in north Zaporizhzhia Oblast, eight-five kilometers from Melitopol. On May 3, Russian media claimed that Ukrainian forces were trying to attack Orikhiv. On the same day, Vladimir Rogov, a member of the Zaporizhzhia occupation administration, told the media that the situation in the direction of Orikhiv was under control, adding that Ukraine’s army is conducting surveillance. The Zaporizhzhia region is critical to Russia because of its proximity to Melitopol. On May 9, Russian Telegram channels reported their belief that the Ukrainian army had completed preparations for a counter-offensive and that Orikhiv would be among the areas that would come under pressure. In addition, reports emerged that the Russian Volunteer Corps, fighting for Ukraine, is conducting attacks against Russian forces in Orikhiv. The Russian Volunteer Corps is a paramilitary unit that claimed responsibility for an attack in Russia’s Bryansk region in March 2023. The same unit published a video on May 9 claiming they are actively fighting against Russian forces in Orikhiv.

The Russian government does not recognize that Russian actors are fighting on the side of Ukraine, shifting responsibility for the attacks to Ukrainian forces. The strengthening of such military units is a trend that likely causes concern within the Russian command structure. Moscow will likely continue to deny the participation of Russians in the battles against Russian forces. However, as Ukraine prepares a possible counter-offensive, the Russian command could use the presence of Russian volunteers as propaganda, creating a state of paranoia and suspicion to attack opposition groups within Russia. The video footage of the Russian Volunteer Corps received attention among Russian opposition groups, like Rospartizan, who on May 9 attacked the liberal opposition for not taking arms against the Russian government.

Lastly, Leonid Manakov, Transnistria’s representative in Moscow, asked Russia to increase the number of Russian forces in Transnistria due to claims of “terrorist risks.” His request follows reports that Moldovan authorities detained members of the pro-Russian Shor party in April and May. US officials warned in March that individuals linked to Russian military intelligence were planning staged protests against the Moldovan government. Russia is unlikely to increase its military presence in Transnistria, especially when considering a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive. However, the risk of infiltrations and attempts to destabilize Moldova remains, including through disinformation and fear-mongering, which would serve Russia’s military goals in the Odesa region and western Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Prigozhin accuses Russian defense ministry of creating “shell hunger” in Bakhmut

In a press release published on May 6, Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin revealed more details about the group’s ongoing dispute with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Prigozhin said that in October 2022, in cooperation with Sergei Surovikin, General of the Russian Armed Forces, Wagner launched “Operation Bakhmut Meat Grinder” to provoke Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into sending as many Ukrainian forces as possible to defend the city. Prigozhin argued that taking control of Bakhmut was not a key objective of the operation; rather, the primary goal was “grinding the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” to allow the Russian army respite to restore its combat capability. Prigozhin stated that Wagner killed about 50,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Bakhmut and prevented Ukraine’s counter-offensive.

The statement claimed that Wagner has successfully managed to occupy 1,500 square kilometers of Ukrainian land and seventy-one settlements, while the Russian MoD has suffered setbacks and defeats on the frontlines. Prigozhin purported that the Russian army faced a lack of control and discipline, was embroiled in mobilization scandals, and had supply problems. He asserted that to compensate for their failures and envy towards Wagner, the MoD took counter-actions against Wagner, prohibiting it from recruiting Russian prisoners as volunteers and reducing the supply of ammunition to 30 percent of the amount Wagner required, followed by a further decrease to 10 percent. Other measures reportedly taken by the Russian MoD included suspending issuing orders and medals to dead Wagner fighters, denying personnel transfers from Africa to Ukraine, and disabling special communication systems.

Prigozhin added that to impose a complete “shell blockade” on Wagner, the Russian MoD fired Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev, who led the siege of Mariupol in 2022 and later became deputy ninister of defense overseeing logistics and supplies. After leaving the MoD, Mizintsev reportedly joined Wagner as a deputy commander. Prigozhin said that most of Wagner’s fighters and commanders left the Russian army to join Wagner because they had lost confidence in the MoD. Due to this, he ruled out the possibility of Wagner integrating into the MoD.

After seven months of carrying out “Operation Bakhmut Meat Grinder,” Prigozhin concluded that Wagner has lost its combat potential. He claimed that between October 2022 and May 2023, Wagner received 38 percent of the ammunition requested from the MoD and 30 to 40 percent of the tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles required for combat missions. He added that Wagner currently has 30,000 soldiers on combat missions in Bakhmut, while Ukraine has around 35,000 troops in the area, and its numbers would need to be three times higher to achieve success. He suggested that “shell hunger” resulted in two-thirds of Wagner’s losses and killed “tens of thousands” of Russian soldiers.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian city organizes Victory concert on riverbank facing Estonia

The Russian city of Ivangorod, separated by a small river from the Estonian city of Narva, organized a May 9 Victory Day concert for residents of Narva, a predominately Russian-speaking town with a large Russian population. This is the first time Ivangorod has organized a May 9 concert on the riverbank, opposite the Narva Museum. In response, the Narva Museum hung a large poster on the exterior of the building depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin with blood-like spatter over his face and the text “Putin War Criminal.”

The decision to host the “large format” concert on the Narva riverbank for “Narva inhabitants to see” was made at the “federal level,” according to Aleksandr Sosnin, head of the Ivangorod administration, during an April 12 press conference.

Videos shared online show that scores of people gathered in Narva to listen to the concert. LenTV24, a pro-Kremlin regional infotainment YouTube channel, reported an altercation between a younger man carrying a Ukrainian flag–more than five hundred Ukrainian refugees reside in Narva–and an older man who attacked him. The altercation was captured on video and spread on Telegram and Facebook. Zhanna Ryabceva, a member of the Russian Duma, shared the video on Telegram. It was then shared approximately one thousand times, including by sixteen public Telegram groups and channels, according to Telegram monitoring tool TGStat. Later, the video, with a caption identical to the one used in Ryabceva’s post, was published by at least three Facebook accounts that identified as being based in Russia. One of the accounts, Ruslon Bely, was previously involved in amplifying a Secondary Infektion influence operation targeting Denmark with a forged letter that alleged Greenland was seeking independence and closer cooperation with the United States.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Russia wages an invisible war with radar waves and Russian music across borders appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eight months into anti-regime protests, Iran’s women show creativity as they press on ‘full of anger’

Nick Fouriezos — Fri, 12 May 2023 15:12:27 +0000

Watch the full event

Public Event Thu, May 11, 2023 • 11:00 am ET

Woman, Life, Freedom: Eight months of ongoing protests in Iran

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – An in-depth conversation examining the ongoing anti-government protests in Iran following the murder of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini, and the decades-long fight for gender equality and social justice in the country.

Human Rights Iran Middle East Women

The people of Iran have faced unprecedented violence from their own government in the eight months since protests arose after the death of a twenty-two-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman at the hands of the so-called “morality police.”

But rather than let injustices ranging from beatings to executions quiet them, the Iranian people continue to showcase their bravery while speaking out against these abuses and others, with Iranian women and girls exhibiting particular courage.

As they do, Iranian women and girls not only tap into a more than century-old history of protest in Iran, but also show new resilience and creativity in their fight for change.

“This is full of energy. This is full of anger. This is different, but with some of what had been before,” Mehrangiz Kar, an Iranian women’s rights lawyer and writer, said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday.

She, along with Iranian women’s rights advocate Azam Jangravi and Iranian actress/writer/activist Nazanin Nour, gathered in Washington to accept the Atlantic Council’s 2023 Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award on behalf of the women and girls of Iran who are fighting for freedom and equality.

Read on for more highlights of the discussion with Kar, Jangravi, and Nour, moderated by PBS NewsHour correspondent Ali Rogin, about the reality from the ground and how the world can support the Iranian people.

The ingenuity, and bravery, of protest

Amid the poisoning of thousands of schoolgirls and other threats of violence, Iran’s girls have made an undeniable mark while engaging in creative dissent, including recording themselves tearing and burning photos of Iran’s supreme leader—which typically mark the beginnings of their textbooks and the walls of their classrooms. “Gen Z is very adept at using TikTok and Instagram, and figuring out how to make things trend and go viral,” Jangravi said.

On International Women’s Day, five Iranian girls danced unveiled while participating in the “Calm Down” challenge that riffs on the hit song by Nigerian singer Rema and American artist Selena Gomez. The forty-second video gained global attention from mainstream outlets and garnered millions of views online. “We have never seen that level of social media activity to move a movement forward when it comes to Iran,” said Nour, who has used her own platform as an actress and writer to speak out about what’s happening in the country.

Taking their protest online has also underscored the risks Iranian women face as they speak out. In the case of the “Calm Down” video, the girls were later detained and made to give a forced apology. Many Iranians believe the schoolgirl poisonings have been at the very least tolerated by the Iranian government as punishment for their activism. “It’s very difficult for anybody to believe that a regime that uses facial recognition technology to send tickets to women who aren’t wearing their hijab properly cannot find out who is behind these poisonings,” Nour said.

It’s a reminder that, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the women of Iran have put their lives on the line while seeking gender equality and basic human rights. “Women have used activist campaigns, NGOs, to protest the violation of their rights and demand justice and equality. However, they have paid a heavy price for their activism, including suppression, threats, imprisonment, and mental and physical torture,” Jangravi said.

Searching for new solidarity

All three women said more attention is necessary from the international community to force change from the Islamic Republic and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “Now [the world] can understand that it’s not enough that human rights institutions work to remove gender discrimination in Iran. We can understand that all Western governments should work with human rights institutions,” Kar said.

Some four million Iranians now live abroad, and that diaspora has grown its economic, political, and social clout. “Now we have seen the diaspora rally around the people of Iran. I had never seen that level of unity,” said Nour, who is herself the daughter of Iranian immigrants and was born and lives in the United States.
Even the “smallest action,” such as female officials refusing to wear headscarves while meeting with Islamic Republic officials, helps. “Overall, the global community needs to condemn the actions of the Islamic Republic, not legitimize them,” Nour said, criticizing how the United Nations (UN) gave Iran a leadership role on at the UN Human Rights Council 2023 Social Forum on Wednesday: “It’s an absolute slap in the face to Iranians.”
That decision came just days after two men, including a dual Swedish-Iranian citizen, were executed for running a Telegram group criticizing Islam. “The government is trying to create real fear among the people through execution,” Jangravi said. The actions of those two men, and a number of Iranian women who have joined the protests, including choosing to wear shorts as a form of civil disobedience, showcases how people “from all levels of society” have come together to create change.

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of experience reporting around the globe.

The post Eight months into anti-regime protests, Iran’s women show creativity as they press on ‘full of anger’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Charai in The National Interest: Kissinger at 100: A Legacy with Lessons for Us All

Atlantic Council — Fri, 12 May 2023 14:44:26 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

How can America continue to lead the world without leaders who can combine high theory and grounded pragmatism, as Kissinger does?

To be sure, Israel will continue to coordinate with the Gulf countries on intelligence and air defense. The United Arab Emirates and other gulf states see an alliance with Israel as an additional security guarantee, now that America’s strength is questioned in U.S. troops withdrawn from Afghanistan, a chaotic end to America’s longest war.

Ahmed Charai, 2022

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies, a board of trustees member of International Crisis Group, and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and Global Board of Advisors at The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem.

The post Charai in The National Interest: Kissinger at 100: A Legacy with Lessons for Us All appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 2023 Distinguished Leadership Awards: Honoring the women shaping the global future

Katherine Walla, Daniel Malloy — Fri, 12 May 2023 03:24:25 +0000

From Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine and gender oppression in Iran to widespread energy and food crises, the past year has been one of global upheaval. And the pivotal problem-solvers in these crises are often women—who are making a historic difference on battlefields, in protests, and in boardrooms.

In recognition of this reality, the Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Leadership Awards in Washington, DC on Thursday evening honored an all-female slate of awardees who embody “the rising role of women’s leadership in shaping a better world,” as Atlantic Council Chairman John F.W. Rogers put it.

World Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is the first woman to serve in her role, leading the trade body as it has navigated unprecedented challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and global instability. US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines is also a path-paver. As the first woman to oversee the US Intelligence Community, she has steered its work to address escalating global threats.

Nasdaq Chair and CEO Adena T. Friedman, the first woman to lead a major US stock exchange operator, has focused her tenure on modernizing and diversifying Nasdaq. And General Laura J. Richardson, commander of US Southern Command, has used her passion for global security to promote the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Rounding out the roster are the brave Iranian women and girls who have stood up, despite enormous risks, to fight the Iranian Republic’s discriminatory laws, drawing support and attention from across the world.

“This group is a representation of how far we have come,” Richardson said as she accepted her award, “but also a reminder of how much work there is to be done.”

Below are more highlights from the gala.

Laura Richardson: “A solution to these complex challenges… starts with the United States”

The four-star general issued a call to action for Latin America and the Caribbean: “Our partners are struggling to deliver for their people,” she warned.
The region, Richardson explained, is getting hit by the effects of poverty, crime, climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic. “This desperate situation allows the Chinese Communist Party to step in,” she said, adding that China presents its Belt and Road Initiative to Latin American countries under the guise of wanting to invest. But it’s “really to extract countries’ critical infrastructure,” she explained, with China providing “its debt traps of loans, shoddy work, cost overruns, and bribery of senior officials.”
In addition to that, Russia’s “prolific disinformation campaign”—delivered through media companies with audiences in the tens of millions in Latin America—“only further exacerbates” the difficulties these countries face, said Richardson.
Solutions for Latin America and the Caribbean’s challenges start with the United States, Richardson argued. “Team USA is committed to democracies across the globe,” she said, explaining that the United States is bringing together all elements of national power to help: diplomatic, economic, military, and informational. “This region is our shared neighborhood, and good neighbors take care of each other,” she said.
Richardson noted that women, peace, and security—a policy framework that calls for the participation of women in peacebuilding and conflict resolution—is “a critical component of successful democracies.” Shaping the global future together will take a community, she explained. So “we must be intentional about recruitment, retention, training, and [the] advancement of women,” she said, “because if we take our eye off the ball, we risk losing an entire generation.”

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: “Support strategic interdependence, not overdependence”

Okonjo-Iweala spoke of trying to find the positives in “a world of doom and gloom.” And one place to do that is multilateral organizations such as her own. “We need places where nations can come together,” the WTO head said. “And truly interact even when they disagree—in fact, especially when they disagree.”
Okonjo-Iweala pointed out that at the WTO, geopolitical rivals such as the United States and China can sit down and talk trade to the benefit of their citizens. “We need to shore up the multilateral institutions we have instead of taking for granted the services they provide,” she said.
Okonjo-Iweala nodded to the many criticisms of the WTO and acknowledged that multilateral institutions “need to be reformed to be fit for purpose for the twenty-first century.” While there were job losses in recent decades, she added, not all were due to trade—technology and other factors played a role.
Meanwhile, Okonjo-Iweala added, “our biggest successes go almost unnoticed.” One she called out was the Information Technology Agreement, a 1996 agreement that has grown to eliminate tariffs on what Okonjo-Iweala said was nearly three trillion dollars in trade in 2021.
“So if we let multilateral fora wither, if we fail to preserve what they are doing well and improve what needs improving, the costs will be high,” Okonjo-Iweala said. “Support strategic interdependence, not overdependence.”

Avril Haines: “Success of our mission depends on our ability to work with others”

In accepting her award, the director of national intelligence recalled how in its annual threat assessment—published in February—the US Intelligence Community identified two strategic challenges to national security: competition among great powers, rising regional powers, and nonstate actors for influence over the international system; and challenges that transcend borders such as climate change, health, and security.
“The intersection of these challenges [underscores] the importance of working together with partners and allies, private industry, and organizations like the Atlantic Council,” explained Haines, “which bring us together and raise the standard of our work… with the belief that through civil discourse, we can advance our common cause.”
That underlying common conviction, according to Haines, is “that a healthy transatlantic relationship is fundamental to the strength and quality of an international system that is capable of addressing today’s challenges.”
In guiding policymakers with valuable intelligence, the Intelligence Community must interact with people outside of the community who can test hypotheses, provide alternative perspectives, and challenge biases and underlying assumptions, Haines explained. “The success of our mission depends on our ability to work with others across a range of fields and disciplines,” Haines said, “and it requires us to engage with diverse voices and perspectives from all backgrounds and walks of life.”

Nazanin Nour: “Stay the course on equal rights for all“

Iranian-American actress and activist Nazanin Nour joined Iranian women’s rights lawyer Mehrangiz Kar and Iranian women’s rights advocate Azam Jangravi on stage to receive the Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award on behalf of the women and girls of Iran. (Mahnaz Afkhami, CEO of the Women’s Learning Partnership, received the award in absentia.) Despite “great personal risk,” Nour said, the women and girls of Iran “are pressing for a brighter future.”
Nour explained how after the 1979 revolution, new leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini banned women from holding jobs, obtaining an education, accessing contraceptives, and more. “To this day, the clerical leadership of the Islamic Republic has hinged on the repression of women,” Nour argued. “Time and again, the regime’s response to women’s calls for greater freedom has been swift and brutal. But the extraordinary women of Iran have persevered.”
Those women have not only persevered, Nour added, but they have also “been in the vanguard demanding change” and learning from the rest of the world about how to secure rights and freedoms. She pointed to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which surged following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. “Today, women and men are marching side-by-side in support of a revolution that was launched by women and girls,” Nour noted.
Nour described the movement as “modern… in its language, slogans, and approach,” as women and girls have disseminated their message worldwide by using social media. That, Nour said, has helped create “a truly global movement which, at this moment, is in dire need of collective action; and we can all agree on that.”
Nour encouraged the audience to “publicly condemn” the United Nations Human Rights Council’s decision to appoint the Islamic Republic of Iran as chair of its Social Forum. “The Islamic Republic and human rights is an oxymoron, and it’s a slap in the face to the people of Iran that have been brutalized, oppressed, and tortured.”
“It is easy for the sacrifices of the protestors to disappear from the headlines,” Nour noted. “I implore you to continue your solidarity. I implore you to support democracy. I implore you to stay the course on equal rights for all.”

Adena T. Friedman: “When faced with global challenges, we must find global solutions”

In line with the Atlantic Council’s mission to advance global prosperity, Friedman noted that “markets are foundational to strong economies and to vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystems.”
“When faced with global challenges, we must find global solutions,” Friedman said. Nasdaq, she explained, aims to use its expertise and technology to “help build trusted market infrastructure all over the world.”
Nasdaq has a role to play not only in established markets, but in emerging markets as well, Friedman said. “We can support their efforts to bring in more foreign investment through well-functioning, high-integrity, and vibrant capital markets,” she explained.

The global fight for freedom

Almar Latour, the CEO of Dow Jones and publisher of the Wall Street Journal, implored attendees in a special address to cast their thoughts to a Russian prison, where Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich remains detained six weeks after he “was unjustly arrested,” Latour said, “on false charges of espionage.” 
But while Gershkovich is the highest-profile journalist persecuted for doing his job of late, he’s not the only one. Latour noted the kidnapping of journalist Austin Tice in Syria, the arrest of publisher Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, and the arrest just last week of Nicaraguan journalist Hazel Zamora. “Dictators around the world are determined to stamp out independent reporting,” Latour said. “And we cannot allow them to succeed… The world is watching. It’s watching how the US and democracies around the world respond to this assault on the press. The world is watching how we in this room are responding.”
Russia’s war in Ukraine is “a historic inflection point of breathtaking significance,” said Atlantic Council CEO Frederick Kempe.  “Some people say we have to separate the war in Ukraine from China and China’s challenge. I think the challenges are inseparable. This is not a time for half measures. The future of the global order is at stake. Its institutions, its principles, its values, as imperfect as they are, are worth defending. And that is what motivates the Atlantic Council.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Daniel Malloy is the deputy managing editor at the Atlantic Council.

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Full transcript: 2023 Distinguished Leadership Awards celebrate the game-changing role of women in the world

Atlantic Council — Fri, 12 May 2023 01:35:51 +0000

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JOHN F.W. ROGERS: I’m delighted to be with all of you tonight as we salute the recipients of the Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Leadership Awards. Each year, we recognize a select few who represent the best pillars of our transatlantic relationship, whether as political or policy leaders, business executives, military officers, or artistic and humanitarian champions. What they have in common is that each honoree has made an indelible impact on our world, both in their personal and professional accomplishments, and in their vision for creating a better future with our friends and allies.

Tonight, as chairman of the Atlantic Council, it’s a privilege to be able to say that, for the first time in the Council’s history, we are recognizing a group of all women honorees. And we’re calling attention to the rising role of women’s leadership in shaping a better world.

Now of course, as we gather to celebrate, we do so at a time when such leadership has seldom, if ever, been as crucial as it is today. And while just last week the director-general of the World Health Organization declared that COVID-19 was over as a global public health emergency, new challenges continue to emerge.

A year to the day since we awarded the people of Ukraine a special Distinguished Leadership Award, the war in the Ukraine rages on, shaping a new era of global competition, exposing fragility in international trade ties, and furthering geopolitical uncertainty. It is innocent people who pay the price for war. Their suffering must not be forgotten. What’s more what’s more, with the souring of the US-China relationship, increased tensions and potential systemic threat to world order, the post-World War II sense of stability has never been more threatened.

The task now before the Atlantic Council is not just to diagnose the geopolitical moment in which we find ourselves, but also to inspire the United States and its partners to enhance their collective efforts to shape a better, more prosperous world. As an Atlantic Council community, we can be encouraged by how our organization is rising to the moment. We have provided action-oriented solutions for protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and freedom, and we have made clear why this war and the US-China rivalry are struggles over what forces, principles, and practice will determine our global future.

As we recognize each honoree at this evening’s historic all-female lineup, we do so in [an] era increasingly in search of role models for women and girls. So tonight, we celebrate not just what each of these extraordinary women have done individually to shape our global future, but what they have done collectively for other women to ensure a better future.

So in considering my remarks this evening and where words can sometimes fall short of the physical and the visual expression in terms of rising to the moment, I was transported to an exhibit that was unveiled a few years ago at the Venice Biennale by a Nigerian artist, Peju Alatise. She is a Nigerian artist, poet, and writer. You’ll see her exhibition here.

Now in her cultural and sculptural installation, “Flying Girls,” she has called for a more just future for girls and imbued the girls with an immense transformative ethos and power in her moving exhibit. We see a striking collection of eight life-size figures of girls united in a circle, adorned with wings, and surrounded by birds and butterflies shaping a pattern that appears to be a murmuration. That’s a large group of birds that all fly together, and then they change direction together. You’ve seen this when you look up at the skies as birds switch their line and move.

Notably, the butterflies are seen surrounding the figures on the ground, suggesting a metamorphosis as they emerge from their cocoons and prepare to take their first flight. And we seem to be witnessing a powerful collective transformation of sorts coming from within these girls and future women, preparing them for their first flight with a momentum from the ground up. Using this artistic expression to guide the future, the artist—she transports us to a future where identity is shaped rather than predetermined.

This is the same transformation that we are witnessing here tonight, a movement embracing and driven by women and girls globally. In “Flying Girls,” the murmuration is a winding upward spiral, not only enveloping the girls but also empowering them. The shape is especially significant as the paths of women in leadership roles itself, because those have never been linear—a befitting segue to the personal and professional stories of our honorees this evening.

So for tonight’s distinguished leaders, it’s not just how far they have traveled but the way they have traveled along their past, not weighted down by obstacles or cynicism about what’s possible; instead, buoyed by a single-minded resolve in their vision for what the future can be.

One of our honorees, the honorable Avril Haines, whom we are awarding the Distinguished International Leadership Award, is the US Director of National Intelligence. She is the first woman in our nation’s history to lead the US intelligence community. And given Director Haines’ and given Director Haines’ significant national-security experience obtained through her service in all three branches of government, a commitment to building a more resilient, inclusive nation through innovative intelligence, few are more deserving of our recognition.

Avril grew up in an apartment in Manhattan’s Upper West Side; her father, a biochemist. Her mother was a painter. And her mother became seriously ill when she was twelve years old. And still a child herself, she spent four years as her mother’s principal caregiver, up until the moment of her passing.

Left without her own mother as a role model, a young Avril did not let her grief defeat her. She gathered her strength. She changed directions and she deferred college for a gap year. She went to study Japanese, martial art, judo, at Tokyo’s Kodokan Institute, where she achieved an incredible feat, rising to a brown belt in just one year.

Later, as a student of theoretical physics, Avril pursued a dream project of restoring a second-hand plane and flying it into Europe. With her flight instructor, she found a 1961 Cessna and she rebuilt the navigation, communication and other electronic systems. Not long into their flight, however, they had an emergency landing. But one upside to the failed adventure at that point was that Avril found a lifelong travel companion in her flight instructor, whom she is married to today.

Our next honoree, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, whom we are awarding the Distinguished International Leadership Award, is the director general of the World Trade Organization. She is the first woman to serve in that capacity, the first African in history to serve in that role. Her more than thirty years of public service includes a remarkable career at the World Bank and serving as finance minister of Nigeria, where she navigated intense personal institutional challenges to implement far-reaching economic reforms.

I can say, on a personal note, when we started at Goldman Sachs our 10,000 Women program, it was Ngozi who herself said to us that we don’t have a program; we have a movement. And for the last fifteen years, her idea has impacted our work on behalf of women and girls across the world.

She was born in the Delta state in Nigeria, where her father was the obi, or king, of the Obahai royal family, which makes her a princess. Now, our cultures often assign a narrative that portrays women waiting for a prince to bring some kind of glass slipper to decide if they are fit. Well, she rewrote this, if not demolished that narrative for herself and future girls. She did not wait for a glass slipper. Instead she shattered the glass ceiling. And along the way, she made sure to create the same opportunities for all girls, especially those who do not come from a royal background, to have this path of economic empowerment.

Our third honoree, Adena Friedman, whom we are awarding the Distinguished Business Leadership Award, she’s the chair and CEO of Nasdaq. Adena went from working as an intern at Nasdaq to making history as the first woman to lead a global exchange. However, this path this path from intern to CEO was not a straight line. And after eighteen years of working at Nasdaq, she left to join the distinguished Carlyle Group. She became the chief financial officer and managing director, and played an integral role in taking the company public during her time there. She returned to Nasdaq three years later, served as its president and chief operating officer, and then she was named the CEO in 2017. And now she serves as chair and chief executive.

And as a student, Adena, she was educated at an all-girls private school. And given the stereotypes at the time, she didn’t see herself on a path to finance. After watching Sally Ride become her first American woman to go into space, she dreamt of flying high into space and becoming an astronaut. But closer to home, she found a role model in her own mother. Originally a stay-at-home mom, her mother later followed her own calling, and went to get her law degree, and became the first woman named at her law firm. Later in life, as a mother herself, Adena had a similar moment of awakening. And after years of taking her two sons and husband to martial arts classes, she decided to follow her interest and pursue classes herself. And similar to all our other panelists but particularly to Avril, Adena rose to a black belt in Korea taekwondo which she now credits for helping her become more fearless in business. And fearless she is. And I can tell you firsthand she’s quite fearless.

And tonight’s fourth honoree, General Laura Richardson, whom we are awarding the Distinguished Military Leadership Award. She’s the commander of the US Southern Command. And General Richardson became the first woman Army officer to officially hold the position of deputy commanding general of Forces Command and the only second time that a woman four-star has led a combat command. With a more than thirty-year storied career in the United States Army, her command is the largest in the US Army, responsible for training and preparing active, Reserve, and National Guard troops to meet the requirement of commanders around the globe.

And as a student, Laura was an all-American swimmer. Her path in life has seen her thrive on land and on sea and in the air, because when we talk about flying girls, General Richardson got her pilot’s license at the young age of sixteen—a literally flying girl, joining, I suppose, her copilot here tonight, Avril Haines. So between the martial arts and the air travel, we see some common central themes emerging, if not symbolic of the empowerment and the uplifting of all women and girls.

And then, finally, ladies and gentlemen, tonight we pay special tribute to the women and the girls of Iran.

We are awarding the Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award by honoring a delegation of Iranian female activists. The tragic death of a twenty-two-year-old, Mahsa Jina Amini, in the custody of Iran’s so-called morality police has brought the Islamic Republic of Iran’s gender discriminatory laws into clear focus, and the subsequent women-led uprising has stirred the international community.

It’s a privilege to recognize the vast efforts of the activists who will accept this award this evening: Dr. Mahnaz Afkhami, the former Iranian minister of women’s affairs and president and CEO of the Women’s Learning Partnership, who unfortunately herself fell ill and couldn’t be with us tonight; Azam Jangravi, one of the Girls of the Revolutionary Street who was arrested for protesting against Iran’s laws requiring women to wear a hijab in public; Dr. Mehrangiz Kar, Iran’s women’s rights lawyer and writer; and Nazanin Nour, Iranian actress, writer, and activist.

The bravery of Iranian women and girls in risking their safety to achieve change is unquestionable. And together, this delegation’s advocacy, utilization of their public platforms to raise awareness of the circumstances in Iran has been crucial to accountability efforts. In their honor, I wanted to offer just a closing piece, a closing art piece—intentionally using a double entendre on the word “piece” as the artistic expression is meant as a global peace offering.

The picture that you see here is by an Iranian artist, Shirin Neshat as part of a collection of black-and-white photographs of women symbolizing Iranian women’s involvement in efforts to improve women’s education, increase representation in government, securing new legal rights, and expanding their economic opportunities. In this particular detail, the women’s hand, its gesture suggests prayer. And the handwritten calligraphy on the edge of her white veil translates from Farsi: “Give a hand so I can hold a hand.”

Now, this message—“give a hand so I can hold a hand”—conveys a peaceful and powerful message of unity that symbolizes tonight’s event, its theme, and all of our women honorees. It calls out to our global community, especially poignant in this pandemic-recovery era, to reconnect our hands literally and figuratively.

So, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for all being here to celebrate these remarkable women. On behalf of the Atlantic Council, our co-chairs for this evening, I just want to take this moment to offer our hands in celebration of their honors. Thank you.

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STEPHEN J. HADLEY: Avril Haines, deputy—director of national intelligence, assistant to the president and principal deputy national security adviser, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The first woman to hold each of these positions. Two decades of service in all three branches of the federal government. This is the official record of Avril Haines’ life as a public servant and her enormous contribution to the safety, security, and prosperity of our nation.

But there is another story here of a truly remarkable person. For this story, we must turn to the unofficial record of her life as contained in a Newsweek article dated June 26, 2013. The picture here is of a person with a flair for adventure, an appetite for risk-taking, and an ability to overcome adversity.

Some examples. From age twelve through fifteen, caring for a critically ill parent. After high school, as John mentioned, taking a year off to earn a brown belt at an elite judo school in Tokyo, Japan. Studying theoretical physics at the male-dominated and unwelcoming Physics Department of the University of Chicago. While in college, working as an auto mechanic helping to rebuild Subaru internal combustion engines. Fighting her way back from a serious biking accident between her sophomore and junior years of college. The following summer, taking flying lessons in Princeton, New Jersey. Rebuilding the avionics of a 1961 twin-engine Cessna 310 aircraft and outfitting it with extended-range fuel tanks. Taking off in that rebuilt airplane from Bangor, Maine, to cross the Atlantic Ocean; losing one engine, then the other to North Atlantic ice; and through fog making an emergency landing at a small airport in Newfoundland. After graduating from college, moving to Baltimore, Maryland; buying at auction an old bar in a then-transitional neighborhood; and turning it into an independent bookstore and café. Becoming a community activist and pursuing a law degree at Georgetown Law School. Graduating, clerking for a federal appellate judge, and then working in the State Department’s Legal Advisor’s Office. A two-year stint working for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under then-chair Joe Biden. And in 2011, becoming deputy legal counsel to the president for national security affairs. And, as they say, the rest is history.

An unusual route to the top, but then Avril Haines is an unusual and extraordinary person. All of this by someone described as having a sweet personality, humility bordering on shyness, and a deep empathy for others. Or, as Denis McDonough, President Obama’s then-White House chief of staff, is quoted as saying, “She is as caring and decent a person as I’ve ever had the blessing to work with, full stop.” A person of humility, intellect, integrity, judgment, and a strong work ethic.

Tonight, it is a privilege for the Atlantic Council to be able to honor the director of national intelligence, Avril Haines. Please join me on the stage.

DIRECTOR AVRIL HAINES: All right. That was utterly terrifying. I am just—Steve, it is genuinely overwhelming to be honored alongside, first of all, such an extraordinary group of female leaders by an institution that I have so much respect for and whose leadership, in the form of all of you and the many remarkable board members who are here tonight in particular, embodies the best of what I aspire to in public service. It does not feel quite real, to be honest.

I also realize that this award is really more of a testament to the work of the intelligence community that I have the privilege to represent and the many thousands of officers who, day and night around the world, relentlessly work to advance our and our allies’ national security, of which there are many, many women who are just, I think, looking out today at the extraordinary awardees who I am put up against, which I have no business to be, but nevertheless, and are inspired by them.

To the Council and the board, thank you so much for this honor. But even more so, thank you for the years of extraordinary service that all of you have engaged in, based on our common conviction that healthy transatlantic relationship is fundamental to the strength and quality of an international system that is capable of addressing today’s challenges in a way that is consistent with our values.

And Fred, you recently noted in testimony that we’re living in an inflection point in our history where US leadership alongside allies and partners will have global and generational consequences. And I quite agree with that perspective. In our annual threat assessment, we talk about two sets of strategic challenges that are intersecting with each other and existing trends to intensify their national-security implications in today’s world.

First, great powers, rising regional powers, and an evolving array of non-state actors are vying for influence and impact in the international system, including over the standards and rules that will shape the global order for decades to come; and second, challenges that transcend borders, including such issues as climate change and global health security and transnational criminal activity, are intensifying as the planet emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic.

And further compounding this dynamic is the impact that rapidly emerging technologies such as generative AI are having on governance, economies, and communities around the world. And the intersection of these challenges [underscores] the importance of working together with partners and allies, private industry, organizations like the Atlantic Council, which bring us together and raise the standard of our work on a nonpartisan basis with the belief that through civil discourse we can advance our common cause.

And much like you, we in the intelligence community are trying to understand and reflect on the world around us and to provide policymakers and operators with insights that will help them make better decisions. But we know the interactions with those outside our community, who will test our hypotheses, provide alternative perspectives, identify our biases and challenge our underlying assumptions, are absolutely critical to our success.

We know that the success of our mission depends on our ability to work with others across a range of fields and disciplines, and it requires us to engage with diverse voices and perspectives from all backgrounds and walks of life—voices and perspectives that are here tonight—as a hallmark of what the Atlantic Council represents, demonstrating the degree to which you can and do enrich our daily work.

In short, thank you for your tremendous dedication to global cooperation and for bringing together the right people to solve some of the world’s most pressing problems. And thank you again for this incredible honor. And congratulations to the other recipients, all of whom really outclass me. Thank you.

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ADRIENNE ARSHT: It’s really such a pleasure to be here to present this next award to someone whose life and career have been dedicated to the protection and prosperity of each of us here tonight.

Now let me provide a bit of context for you. How and when did I meet General Richardson? I attended the change of command at SOUTHCOM in October of 2021 to celebrate the retirement of the SOUTHCOM commander, Admiral Craig Faller. And thus I met the incoming chairman—commander, Laura Richardson. And as a footnote, Craig Faller has become a distinguished fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security here at the Atlantic Council.

General Richardson has served in the United States Army for the past thirty-seven years. She leads by example, showing others—in particular, men—that it’s possible to forge a path many would deem impossible.

From an early age, General Richardson set goals that few would think achievable. She earned her private pilot’s license by the age of—I was told fifteen; John said sixteen—but you get it. Don’t you love it that two honorees were pilots before they could vote?

And if you think she spent all of her time in the air, think again. She was also an accomplished competitive swimmer, and I might say, like Christine Lagarde, who was equally a synchronized swimmer in France.

It’s easy to see why the Army was eager to recruit a person with such gumption, and it certainly makes sense that her accomplishments wouldn’t have stopped there. From commanding an assault helicopter battalion in combat in the 101st Airborne Division, to serving as the chief of Army Legislative Liaison to the US Congress, and now, as a decorated four-star general, she has consistently earned accolades for her contributions.

Obviously, it’s particularly special to me that General Richardson has had such extraordinary accomplishments across South and Central America, and the Caribbean. As you know, that’s my wheelhouse.

In addition to strengthening military relationships with our neighbors to the south, General Richardson has maintained a steadfast US presence in Latin America and the Caribbean by providing COVID-19, climate, and humanitarian crisis relief, focusing on how to impede the illicit drug trade, and prioritizing twenty-first century security challenges.

Now more than ever, General Richardson’s role in working with regional partners across the Americas will be pivotal in building a more secure, equitable, and prosperous future for the region. Simply put, she is a beacon of leadership for women and girls who wonder if a career in the military in a cockpit or in a room often filled only with men is a career worth pursuing. She is an undeniable example of leadership, integrity, and determination.

And now it is my great honor to present the Atlantic Council Distinguished Military Leadership Award to my friend, badass General Laura Richardson.

GENERAL LAURA J. RICHARDSON: Well, good evening and thank you. I’m deeply humbled to be here this evening. And I’m honored to serve this great nation in uniform and to represent the men and women of America’s armed forces.

Adrienne, thank you for introducing me tonight. I, like many others, are so grateful for your example and your life’s work in giving back. Everything you do through the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center [makes] this world a better place. Thank you for your leadership and your friendship.

To the Atlantic Council, I am enormously grateful to receive this award this evening. A special thank you to Chairman John Rogers and CEO Fred Kempe for your exemplary leadership and the amazing work the Council does day in and day out to provide in-depth analysis on overwhelming, complex issues across our globe.

As the thirty-second commander of the United States Southern Command, I can tell you that we have benefitted immensely from the in-depth analysis for six decades that the Atlantic Council provides. I’m proud to say that US SOUTHCOM will celebrate its sixtieth anniversary on the eleventh of June this year.

Latin America and the Caribbean is a vast region of thirty-one countries with twenty-eight likeminded democracies, and US Southern Command works very closely with their military and public security forces on security cooperation initiatives. All of this is based in human rights, the rule of law, and the professionalization of their forces.

But now this region requires a call to action. All of our partners are struggling to deliver for their people. There is suffering from the devastating impacts from COVID and the 170 million people that were thrown into poverty. This is a vicious cycle of insecurity and instability that transnational criminal organizations create. They are more powerful, they’re violent, and they have diversified their portfolio. They not only traffic drugs; they traffic humans. They conduct illegal mining, illegal logging, deforestation, and illegal fishing. This, combined with climate change, severe droughts, extreme storms, and seven million Venezuelans who have fled into an already-desperate Western Hemisphere, is causing people and families to leave their homes for a better life in historic numbers of irregular migration.

If that weren’t enough, this desperate situation allows the Chinese Communist Party to step in with its Belt and Road Initiative under the disguise of investment, but really to extract the country’s critical infrastructure. With its debt traps of loans, shoddy work, cost overruns, and bribery of senior officials, countries have no other choice other than to turn to the CCP to try and show some sort of progress for their people. And Russia, with its prolific disinformation campaign delivered through Russia Today Español, Sputnik Mundo, teleSUR, with over thirty-one million followers in Latin America, it only further exacerbates the situation, and especially during presidential elections.

But there is a solution to these complex challenges, and it starts with the United States because team USA is committed to democracies across the globe, bringing together all of the elements of national power in a strategic-focused effort at the same time to form team democracy and assist struggling democracies to overcome these challenges and so they don’t have to rely on a communist government such as the CCP for help. It’s diplomatic by having our US ambassadors confirmed and in the seat; economic through our private-sector investment, which we need to bring to bear and showcase; military, which I represent with US Southern Command; and informational by flooding the information space and capturing the narrative with what team democracy is doing for partner democracies in the region.

As you can tell, I’m very passionate about this topic and about this hemisphere. President Biden says that this—that in his National Security Strategy that no region impacts the United States more than the Western Hemisphere. I agree. And this region is our shared neighborhood, and good neighbors take care of each other.

I’m honored to accept this award on behalf of United States Southern Command, and on behalf of the twenty-eight democratic Western Hemisphere military and public security forces who are working overtime every day on the stopwatch to deliver safety and security for their people.

And what a privilege to be recognized tonight alongside such amazing women who have accomplished so much. This group is a representation of how far we have come, but also a reminder of how much more work there is to be done.

Tonight I stand in awe of the courage and the resilience of all Iranian women and girls.

Women, peace, and security is a critical component of successful democracies, and it’s a key part of all the engagements that I do in the hemisphere. We must be intentional about recruitment, retention, training, and advancement of women, because if we take our eye off the ball we risk losing an entire generation.

As we set out to shape the global future together, none of us can do it alone. We need a community like the Atlantic Council and everyone here tonight. I’ve been fortunate to have a great community of support made up of family, friends, and colleagues. I’d like to thank my husband, Jim, who served in the Army for forty years and spent thirty-five of it married to me—our daughter Lauren, and my granddaughter Anna who are here with me tonight for all the love and support they provide.

Thank you, Atlantic Council. And, ladies and gentlemen, I just want to thank everyone and really appreciate everything that the Atlantic Council does, Adrienne Arsht and all of you here this evening. Thank you very much.

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DAVID M. RUBENSTEIN: Over the years I’ve made a number of personnel decisions at Carlyle. I hired a young man out of Harvard Business School, Glenn Youngkin, and he was OK. I don’t know what he did. He decided to leave. I hired another person out of government, Jay Powell. He decided to leave also. I don’t know what he’s doing either. But in some of my personnel decisions, I’ve made some pretty good decisions and some pretty bad decisions. I’ll let you judge whether those decisions were good.

But there was one person I interviewed once who was simultaneously the best personnel decision I made and the worst personnel decision I made, and that was Adena Friedman. And let me explain.

Carlyle was looking for a chief financial officer. And we interviewed a number of people, weren’t happy with any of the people we saw. And then I interviewed Adena Friedman, and in 10 minutes I said excuse me, I called my partners, and said: Stop all the interviewing. I’ve just spent 10 minutes with a person. This is the perfect person. She’s smart, experienced, hardworking, and she really knows finance. And perfect. And so we immediately hired her and she served as our chief financial officer at a period of great growth for our firm, and she helped us go public in 2012.

At that time, I thought she would—you know, if she stayed she would wind up probably running the company someday, and she was extremely talented. But she told me that she had an offer not too long after to go back to the place she’d previously been, Nasdaq, where once she did some interim job she would wind up most likely as the CEO, which she did in 2017. And the worst personnel decision was we let her go, in the sense that we should have said: Become the CEO of Carlyle now. The founders, get rid of us. Put her in. If we put her in, the company would be much more valuable today than it is and would be doing much more successfully than it is.

That was my worst personnel decision, is letting her go back to Nasdaq, because let me tell you what she’s done at Nasdaq. When she took over at Nasdaq, the market capitalization was roughly $11 billion. Now it’s roughly about $28 billion, so it’s up about 146 percent. Their stock is up about 144 percent, or 15 percent a year. And honestly, Carlyle has not gone up 15 percent a year. So many times at night I think about what a mistake I made to not let her be the CEO right away, but she’s done better things and she’s done a terrific job and she has a great future.

I thought she should be the secretary of treasury in the beginning of this administration. I thought and I told a number of people we should finally have a woman be secretary of the treasury. Finally time. They found another woman who was available. And Adena was not really interested in leaving, and she was really interested in continuing to run Nasdaq. And she’s done a great job there but there are other great things in her future, there’s no doubt, because she’s so smart, talented, knows how to get along with people. And what she’s done for Nasdaq has not only increased its market value, but she’s made it more than an exchange.

Many of you who are not in the business world may think it’s like the New York Stock Exchange. It’s not. It does have an exchange element to it, but it provides enormous amounts of technology to exchanges around the world and it has technology relating to cyber technology and cybersecurity that is really second to none. So she’s really modernized the exchange, she’s made it global, and she made it one of the most-admired companies in the financial service world.

So, as I’ve said to some of you before—perhaps you’ve heard me say this—it is a strange situation that in our country, when we only had—we only had—we had about 3 million people in this country we produced George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton. Now we have 330 million people in the country. Where are the George Washingtons and the Thomas Jeffersons and the James Madisons? Well, I’ve often thought they were in private equity. But actually, there is one person who is not in private equity who is as good as the people that I just mentioned, and that is Adena Friedman.

Now, wouldn’t it be wonderful if we had a president of the United States someday who would be, you know, a great financial executive, somebody who’s run a company, knows how to get along with people, very smart, respected all around the world? And so someday I think that Adena Friedman will be the first female to be president of the United States, which would be a good thing.

Now, the principal problem with that is she’s about four decades too young. You need to be about seventy-five to eighty to be taken seriously as president. So she’s got a long way to go. But mark my words. At some point we will have a female president, and I think her first name is going to be Adena.

Adena, thank you for everything you’ve done for Carlyle, and thank you for what you’ve done for our financial-service system around the world. Could you please come up and accept the award?

ADENA T. FRIEDMAN: Well, that was unexpected. Good evening, everyone. What a great honor it is to be recognized tonight as a recipient of the Distinguished Leadership Award. I am truly humbled to be among this amazing and incredible group of accomplished and groundbreaking leaders receiving this award tonight.

It’s also an honor to be recognized by the Atlantic Council, an organization that recognizes a fundamental truth about the moment that we’re living in, when, faced with global challenges, we must find global solutions. And this is, in fact, the ethos at Nasdaq. We know that markets are foundational to strong economies and to vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystems. And that’s why we’re committed to using our expertise and our technology to help build trusted market infrastructure all over the world.

In addition to serving our own markets, both in the United States, and we also own many of the markets in the Nordics, with our technology and expertise, our technology powers mission-critical operations at more than 2,300 financial institutions and 130 marketplaces worldwide. Our marketplace clients rely upon us to help them build vibrant capital markets within their countries, which then serve as the underpinning of their economies.

Additionally, our bank clients turn to us to help them eradicate criminal activity within their banking networks with our world-class anti-financial-crime technology solutions. While our technology serves many economies in the established market, such as Switzerland, Japan, Singapore, to name a few, we are very proud in the emerging markets as well. We serve markets in places like Indonesia, Thailand, Chile, just to name a few as well. We have many markets in the emerging world.

And there we can support their efforts to bring in more foreign investment through well-functioning, high-integrity and vibrant capital markets. And that kind of reach and that kind of responsibility is what makes our team at Nasdaq really excited to get up every single day, come to work, and to power markets for the future. It’s also what drives our commitment to becoming the trusted fabric to the global financial system.

So I want to thank all of you here. I want to thank John Rogers. You have been such a supporter and a friend over many years. I also want to thank my husband, Mike. And my best friend Nancy is here tonight. It’s so nice of them to join me for this. And I want to thank all of you for this great recognition.

Thank you very much.

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FREDERICK KEMPE: How exciting it is to be here yet again. Avril Haines, you know, what you represent—thank you so much for mentioning my own testimony to the House Intelligence Committee. It is a historic inflection point. Our leadership as a community is absolutely to how this turns out, but thank you for your leadership.

General Richardson, we heard about a lot of your firsts from Adrienne Arsht, but I want to mention another first, which is this is the first time we’ve had an awardee who has come here with three generations of family: her daughter Lauren, her six-year-old granddaughter Anna. I met them both before we began this evening. You may be very respected—impressed by military leadership, and her leadership, but a six-year-old girl at a dinner like this, any of you who have had children, that is real leadership.

Adena Friedman and David, this is the first time we’ve had a presidential nomination at the Atlantic Council dinner.

I really want to salute our chairman, John Rogers, for his inspiration at the beginning of the evening putting all of this in context, and thank you, as well, for your leadership as chairman of the Atlantic Council.

As John said at the outset of this evening, we provided our greatest honor last year—for the first time ever collectively—to an entire people: the people of Ukraine. President Zelenskyy accepted the award by video, telling the stories—harrowing stories of several individual heroes.

Said Zelenskyy, and I quote, “Behind the courage and wisdom of our people, there are thousands of real stories, names and heroic feats.” Fifteen months later, that Ukrainian courage and historical unity of its democratic allies has held thus far. As we brace for a potentially decisive spring counteroffensive, the response to Russian aggression has been remarkable thus far. But it has thus far also remained insufficient to turn the tide.

At this historic inflection point, we stand with Ukraine. We are resolute in our commitment to this generational fight for freedom, democracy, national sovereignty, and a global system based on the principles, institutions, and values that the Atlantic Council has defended for more than sixty years.

As we affirm our commitment to Ukraine tonight, and as we head into the dinner break, I am honored that we are joined by a remarkable Ukraine pianist, Myroslav Mykhailenko, who will perform for us as we prepare for our break. He was born in Kyiv and began studying piano at the age of six. In 2017, at age thirteen, he and his family moved to the United States to continue his studies.

In the years since, Myroslav has gone on to receive high honors and critical global acclaim. He will perform Melody, the greatest piece by the Ukrainian composer, Myroslav Skoryk. It was scored for a heavily censored Soviet war film in 1982, and the very piece of music was meant to find a way—and a better way—toward freedom.

So with that, Myroslav, it’s our honor to hear you play this remarkable piece of music.

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FREDERICK KEMPE: We’re about to have a special message regarding the reporter Evan Gershkovich of the Wall Street Journal, who was arrested in Russia just doing his job.

And we have here to give you that message Almar Latour, the CEO of Dow Jones, the publisher of the Wall Street Journal. I’ll say a little bit more about him in a second.

The famed American basketball coach John Wooden, who as you know is a very famous transatlanticist—that’s actually not true, but he is a famous basketball coach—but the famous basketball coach John Wooden once said, quote, “The true test of a man’s character is what he does when no one is watching.” Perhaps it is Almar Latour’s character that I most admire about him. His personal decency, his integrity, his humility, his consistency of devotion to the First Amendment and to our journalistic craft has been unflinching, whether as a young reporter or as one of global journalism’s most influential executives at Dow Jones and the Wall Street Journal.

Oh, yes, I think I should reveal my bias. Almar in 1995 was my intern. He worked as my intern in Brussels when I was the managing editor of the Wall Street Journal Europe.

A prime case study of Almar’s character is how he is now championing the ongoing global response to the imprisonment last month of Evan, the Wall Street Journal reporter in Europe. Almar’s been on the front lines as a reporter. I’ve been on the front lines in various warzones as a reporter. If you’ve done that, you feel even more deeply that you would otherwise about what it takes to defend the First Amendment and then what it takes of all of us to respond in a moment like this.

With great pleasure, and great affection, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the stage my friend—and also an Atlantic Council Board director—Almar Latour.

ALMAR LATOUR: Well, Fred—I believe Fred made clear one thing: always be nice to the intern. So thank you, Fred, and thank you, Atlantic Council, and thank you, everybody here for your brief attention. And congratulations amazing honorees.

There’s probably no group gathered in one room together that’s as committed to freedom as all of you are. You have dedicated your professional lives to that, and I know many of you have put your actual lives on the line for freedom, so thank you.

Tonight I come to you to talk about a shared commitment to freedom. As Fred mentioned, six weeks ago, our colleague, Wall Street Journal reporter, Evan Gershkovich, was unjustly arrested in Russia. He remains today incarcerated in a Russian prison on false charges of espionage.

Ever since, we are so grateful for the outpouring of support from colleagues and partners around the world; from the US administration, including the White House and State; and from all of you here today. And just today, actually here in Washington, we saw more bipartisan support for Evan as seventy members of Congress wrote a letter to Evan directly condemning the time that was stolen from his life and vowed to continue fighting for his release.

As all of you know, there was no espionage. He was merely doing his job. Evan is an accredited reporter dedicated to explaining the evolving story of Russia to the world. Not only did Russia take away one man’s freedom, but his arrest is also an assault on a broader freedom, and that’s the freedom of the press. And as we all know in this room, there is no free society without free press.

Sadly, Evan’s case is the latest in a long and very disturbing trend. Reporter Austin Tice was kidnapped in Syria almost eleven years ago and remains missing today. More recently, publisher Jimmy Lai remains in prison today in Hong Kong, and just last week, Nicaraguan journalist, Hazel Zamora, was arrested and charged with spreading false news. She now faces up to ten years in prison.

All in all, a record number of journalists—363 of them—were imprisoned in 2022 alone, and that figure has nearly doubled since 2015. So we all know this: journalism is under attack. Like Vladimir Putin, dictators around the world are determined to stamp out independent reporting, and we cannot allow them to succeed.

Evan’s arrest is a symbolic reminder of the fight that we find ourselves in today. It’s autocrats versus the power of the pen; disinformation versus reliable information as the bedrock of free society.

The world is watching. It’s watching how the US and democracies everywhere respond to this assault on the press. The world is watching how we, in this room, are responding.

As defenders of freedom in this room, we have to form a united front. We cannot rest until press freedom is secured. We will not rest until Evan’s freedom is secured. He and others like him need to come home now.

The fight for their freedom ultimately is a fight for all of ours. So please keep Evan at the forefront of your conversations and do what you can in your position of responsibility to make sure that the strongmen the world over know that this room will not let freedom whimper away.

Thank you again for all that you are doing every single day, and God bless.

MR. KEMPE: Thank you for that, Almar. It’s an incredibly important message. There’s so much we have to do on the front lines of freedom now. I know it surprised a lot of you who know me well that Almar was my intern since we look pretty much the same age.

But thank you all for a remarkable first half of the evening. As always, thank you to Luke Frazier and the American Pops Orchestra. Big round of applause, please. And also to the remarkable Robert Pullen and Nouveau Productions for the staging, and to the breathtaking Atlantic Council team that put all this together.

Thanks as well to Markus Dohle of Penguin Random House for the books you will see in your gift bags as you leave; Markus Dohle, a member of our International Advisory Board. He always gets a big round of applause from the crowd here. Don’t forget to take your bags. The books are always one of the highlights here.

Most of all, thank you for gathering tonight as a community of common cause—550 of you from more than forty countries, including former heads of state, cabinet ministers, members of Congress, CEOs and business executives, civil society, media leaders, artists, and previous Atlantic Council honorees, including Adrienne Arsht, Lord George Robertson and Luis Alberto Moreno, who are all here this evening.

Thank you for being here.

It was nearly forty-three years ago this summer that I arrived in Poland at the beginning of the Solidarity strikes as a young correspondent, as a very young correspondent, covering a story that would change Europe and I believe would also change the world for the better.

I was sent to Poland by my employer at the time, Newsweek Magazine, to cover rapidly spreading national labor unrest of the Solidarity movement that united not only ten million members, but all of that country of thirty-nine million, and then millions more across the entire Soviet bloc that were looking for sparks of freedom and hope to change a long period of oppression.

I only came to appreciate the freedoms that were my American birthright, as the son of German immigrants, when I witnessed close up an entire country that was risking everything—their freedom, their jobs, their safety—to attain the freedoms that I had taken for granted. It was a time for me, at a very young age, of dark foreboding, fear of Soviet invasion and even worse oppression, but also it was a time of opportunity and ultimately would bring about the collapse of one of the most oppressive systems history has seen.

I feel that same sense of foreboding and opportunity today as we watch Putin’s war, Russia’s war, in Ukraine. I also feel a similar sense of gratitude that I felt then to the Polish people to the Ukrainian people to remind me once again of what it takes to defend freedoms we take for granted.

Yet, in Poland the trick was stopping an invasion and then ultimately attaining freedom that was not theirs. In Ukraine, it’s defeating the invader that is trying to rob the freedom that has been spreading and to reverse a period of hope that was set off by the triumph at the end of the Cold War. It is a historic inflection point of breathtaking significance.

Putin’s war in Ukraine has shone a bright light on the fragility of the post-World War II order that has sustained peace and stability on the global stage for nearly eight decades. Against that backdrop, China’s rise as a global superpower poses an even more significant challenge to that world order, which has guided our community for decades. It’s a time for common cause—not for war, not for violence; for common cause to reestablish our belief in our values and what it takes to defend them, and then to adjust to a new period of time.

Some people say we have to separate the war in Ukraine from China and China’s challenge. I think the challenges are inseparable. This is not a time for half-measures. The future of the global order is at stake. Its institutions, its principles, its values, as imperfect as they are, are worth defending.

And that is what motivates the Atlantic Council and our mission and our purpose of, quote, “shaping the global future together with our partners and allies.” And I hope that’s why many of you are here tonight.

These headwinds have produced a stronger, more relevant, and more global Atlantic Council, as our chairman, John Rogers, said earlier this evening. So, first and foremost—and this is the time of the night where we get to salute all of you who are participating in this community.

I would like to ask the following groups to stand. Atlantic Council board members, please stand. Atlantic Council international board members, please stand, and International Advisory Board members, please stand. And Atlantic Council staff, please stand. Please join me in applauding this remarkable group. God, I’m so lucky to have my job.

As is our tradition, I also want to salute tonight’s co-chairs who are in attendance and whose generosity allows us to do our work. Please stand as I call your names, but I also ask the audience to hold its applause until I conclude.

Adrienne Arsht; John F.W. Rogers; Airbus, represented by Jeff Knittel; Blackstone Charitable Foundation; Bradley, represented by Jon Skeeters and Karl Hopkins; Georgetown Entertainment, represented by Franco Nuschese; Chevron, represented by Colin Parfitt…; Ahmed Charai; Edelman, represented by Gurpreet Brar…; FedEx, represented by Gina Adams; Hunt Consolidated, represented by Paul Schulze; Kirkland & Ellis; John and Susan Klein; KNDS, makers of the Leopard, represented by Bob Schultz and Ron Phillips; Krull+, represented by Alexander Mirtchev; Leonardo DRS, represented by William Lynn; Mapa…; William Marron; Nasdaq, represented by Adena Friedman; OneAmerica Bank, represented by George Lund; Ahmet Oren; Penguin Random House, represented by Markus Dohle; Charles O. Rossotti; SAIC, represented by Nazzic Keene and John Bonsell; Thales, represented by Alan Pellegrini; a round of applause, please, to everyone.

And finally, please applaud yourselves, 550 people from forty-one countries, for being here at this historic time to salute these remarkable honorees and to support our work. Thank you so much to all of you.

With that, ladies and gentlemen, please turn to your screens again for the next element of our program, our Distinguished International Leadership Award.

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SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL: Thank you. It’s an honor to be here. I am particularly proud to celebrate the first all-women slate of Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Awardees.

I have had the honor of knowing Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala for over two decades. We first crossed paths when she was the finance minister of Nigeria and I was working at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and we collaborated to improve health and increase economic well-being on the continent of Africa and beyond. And since then, we’ve had the opportunity to work together on many other economic and health issues. And over the course of our friendship, I have been lucky to bear witness to her dedication to service, her incredible range of abilities and talents, and her warmth as a human being.

Ngozi and I recently sat down together for a discussion at AU School of International Service, and during our conversation she reflected on her childhood growing up in Nigeria raised in her early years by a grandmother who taught her that our worth in life is defined by how we serve our community. She shared how this belief has always led her to ask this one simple question before taking on a new task: How will this help others?

Ngozi has carried that commitment to community through her time when she first came to the United States as a teenager to go to school through to her work as a two-time finance minister in Nigeria and foreign minister—the first female in both positions.

Her twenty-five years of impact and record-breaking at the World Bank included the $49-billion International Development Association replenishment of concessional resources to assist poor countries, her contributions to United Nations and Group of Twenty commissions as chair of the Board of Gavi, her many academic achievements, and her role as a mother and grandmother, and now as the director general of the World Trade Organization.

As the leader of the WTO, she is committed to ensuring that the preeminent global trade organization works to enhance living standards, to help create employment, and support sustainable development. She is a global visionary who believes that trade can help women and other marginalized populations beat inequality and that the WTO has an important role in increasing economic wellbeing for all.

It is truly my honor to present my friend, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, with the Atlantic Council’s 2023 Distinguished International Leadership Award. Welcome.

NGOZI OKONJO-IWEALA: Well, good evening, everyone. And thank you, Sylvia. That was really beautiful. You yourself, you are a prime example of the kind of leader that women and girls look up to.

I want to start by thanking my family, because I wouldn’t be here today without their love and support. And I have today my sister Dr. Njide Udochi, my son Uchechi Iweala, and my indefatigable adviser Nicole Mensa. Thank you for being here with me today.

Chairman Rogers, President Kempe, dear Fred, thank you so much for this recognition by the Atlantic Council. Thank you for the work you do to make the world a better place. And thank you in particular for the work you are doing in Africa with Rama Yade, trying to look at the glass half full rather than the glass half empty, at the innovation, the creativity and the wellspring of knowledge in the continent.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it’s wonderful to be here tonight. And when I see familiar faces like Luis Alberto, like Melanne, it really makes me feel at home. Thank you for this immense honor. I’m humbled to share this podium with the sterling cast of women that we’re seeing today.

I don’t know if Avril Haines remembers, but when I was competing for the job of WTO, I had the occasion to ask her for advice. I was introduced to her by someone. And she was absolutely supportive and helpful. Thank you.

We live in what feels like an era of unending crises. When I talk to young people, they’re on edge. Instead of hope, there is fear—fear for a future of uncertain jobs, climate crisis and geopolitical tensions that could escalate into catastrophe.

In this kind of world, we all need to sit up and take action. We must believe that there is still reason and room for hope, that there’s a more prosperous, more sustainable future for people everywhere. In a world of doom and gloom, we must remember the positives.

So my message to you this evening is that, in an uncertain world, we need multilateralism more than ever. We need places where nations can come together and truly interact, even when they disagree—in fact, especially when they disagree. The World Trade Organization is one such arena, a platform where nations, including the United States and China, are able to engage on the trading relationships that deliver benefits to and connect the lives of billions of people each day.

We need to shore up the multilateral institutions we have instead of taking for granted the services they provide. Yes, of course, these multilateral institutions, WTO included, need to be reformed, to be fit for purpose for the twenty-first century. But we must bear in mind the good they’ve done for three-quarters of a century. This cannot be wished away.

The WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, helped deliver seventy-five years of what, by historic standards, has been an era of peace and unprecedented prosperity. Over a billion people were lifted out of poverty, not only in China but elsewhere. Trade helped deliver decades of disinflation for central banks and brought a wider selection of more affordable goods to consumers in the US and around the world.

Yes, there were job losses, but not all were due to trade. Technology played a large part, as did the failure in some countries to deploy active labor-market and social policies on the necessary scale to deal with dislocation.

At the WTO, some of our biggest successes go almost unnoticed. For instance, our Information Technology Agreement, which is very popular with the business community, especially the semiconductor industry, has eliminated tariffs on what in 2021 was close to three-trillion-dollars worth of trade in products like service, manufacturing equipment, computers and mobile phones. The physical goods and capital investment that power the digital economy would be significantly more expensive without it.

So if we let multilateral fora wither, if we fail to preserve what they are doing well and improve what needs improving, the costs will be high. From our trade perspective, some of these costs are quantifiable. For instance, WTO economists estimate that if the world economy decouples into two isolated trading blocs, it would reduce long-term global GDP by at least 5 percent from the current trend. That’s a much bigger hit to output than what advanced economies sustained after the global financial crisis. And we know how that played out. Poor countries and their development aspirations would be hit hardest.

So my message to you today is to support multilateralism. Support strategic interdependence, not overdependence. Back the WTO to complete the reforms it’s now undertaken to be fit for the twenty-first century. And the multilateral trading system, underpinned by a reformed WTO, can continue to deliver for the world. I want to thank the members of the WTO for their work, my staff in Geneva, and all of you, for making this possible today. Thank you. Thank you so much from the heart.

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MELANNE VERVEER: What a glorious celebration this is this evening of women’s leadership. Thank you, Atlantic Council. And congratulations to all of the honorees.

I also want to thank the Atlantic Council for the impactful work the Council does every single day and the difference it makes around the world. And one of the many places in the world our focus needs to be is on Iran.

Last September a young Iranian Kurdish woman, Mahsa Jina Amini, died after being held by the brutal morality police for, in their eyes, wearing the mandatory hijab improperly. Her death sparked an unprecedented protest movement across Iran that continues to this day. Young women were on the front lines of the massive peaceful demonstrations, and they were quickly joined by students and university communities, by men and women of all ages from all walks of life. They joined together for an end to the repressive regime and its dictatorial rule.

They have been willing to risk their lives for a cause bigger than themselves. Thousands of protestors have been detained. School girls have been poisoned for their activism. Many others have been assaulted, imprisoned and killed, and executions are increasing.

The women of Iran continue to be catalysts for change. In fact, they have been on the front lines for decades. Their demand for woman, life, and freedom cannot be extinguished and has challenged the very foundation of the regime.

We stand in solidarity with these brave and resilient women, and many around the globe have been doing what they can to raise their voices. Some, for example, have recently joined the call to remove Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of Women given the regime’s draconian restrictions on women’s rights and imposing egregious limits on their freedom and human rights. Thanks to a worldwide effort, the UN vote was successful.

And tonight we stand together with the women and girls of Iran. And to accept this award on their behalf are courageous women leaders in their own right.

Azam Jangravi is a human rights advocate and former political prisoner. She is primarily known for being one of the so-called Girls of the Revolution Street during the 2017 Iranian protests against the compulsory hijab.

Dr. Mehrangiz Kar is recognized globally for her defense of women’s rights and human rights in Iran. She is truly a giant in her field, a lawyer, widely published author, scholar, and activist. And she, too, has been persecuted by the Iranian regime for her efforts to promote equality and to end discrimination against women.

And Nazanin Nour, an Iranian American who has used her platform as an actor and writer to advocate for—advocate for human rights in Iran. And she has been a champion for women and girls there, active on social media as well. And in a recent post, she wrote: I know there is an absurd and depressing amount of terrible things happening in the world at any given moment, but please don’t leave the Iranian people to fight this regime alone. And you will hear from her shortly.

May I ask the women to please come up on the stage?

NAZANIN NOUR: Good evening. Dr. Afkhami was not able to join us this evening, as she is a bit under the weather. However, I would like to read to you her acceptance remarks on our collective behalf.

Thank you to the Atlantic Council for the tremendous honor of this Leadership Award representing the women and girls of Iran who are fighting for freedom and equality. Distinguished guests, it is a privilege for me to accept this award on behalf of the millions of mothers, sisters, and daughters in Iran who, at great personal risk, are pressing for a brighter future.

The seeds of Iranian women’s liberation were planted over a hundred years ago. In 1906, Iranian women took an active part in shaping the constitutional revolution that transformed governance and political participation in the country and in the region. Over the next seven decades, Iranian women helped move Iran to a democratic, participatory system that was inclusive of religious, political, socioeconomic, and other minorities.

In 1963, Iranian women—many of whom were choosing to delay marriage, enter a profession, even attend college—were granted the right to vote. In 1966, Iranian women successfully launched one of the most influential and powerful national women’s organizations in the world. The Women’s Organization of Iran would influence Iran’s leadership at the 1968 UN International Human Rights Conference and the establishment of INSTRAW, the UN’s Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women.

In 1975, Iran passed the Family Protection Law, which remains to this day one of the most progressive and comprehensive in the Middle East and in much of the world. Among its reforms were women’s rights to divorce, guardianship of their children, and childcare for working women, among others.

In 1979, exactly two weeks after Khomeini came to power, his very first decree was to nullify the Family Protection Law. He then also banned women from many jobs and from obtaining college degrees in over forty disciplines. He banned contraceptives and brought back polygamy, forced veiling, and segregation of women and men.

To this day, the clerical leadership of the Islamic Republic has hinged on the repression of women. Time and again, the regime’s response to women’s calls for greater freedom has been swift and brutal. But the extraordinary women of Iran have persevered. From the One Million Signatures campaign in 2006, where activists went door to door gathering signatures in favor of women’s equality, to later pushes for employment opportunities and fair elections, women have been in the vanguard demanding change.

Sparked this time by the senseless death of Mahsa Jina Amini, calls for women, life, freedom are still blazing across the nation. Today, women and men are marching side by side in support of a revolution that was launched by women and girls.

And I’m going to pause right here for a second. I’m going to go off-script because of a recent development yesterday, and I would like to inform the room of this, that the Islamic Republic was appointed chair of the United Nations Human Rights Council Social Forum. This year’s theme is technology and the promotion of human rights.

This comes in the midst of the United Nations Human Rights Council fact-finding mission where they’re investigating human rights abuses and atrocities committed by the Islamic Republic against their own people from September of 2022, when this revolution began. It comes amongst internet shutdowns and throttling of internet so that the world cannot see the atrocities that are being committed by the Islamic Republic. It comes as the Islamic Republic uses technology to surveil women using facial recognition technology, to send fines to anybody that is seen wearing improper hijab. This comes among two young men, Yousef Mehrad and Sadrollah Fazeli Zare, who were executed on charges of blasphemy and apostasy for using technology and a social media app to discuss religion and atheism.

I respectfully implore everybody in this room to use platforms that you have to publicly condemn the UN’s position in appointing the Islamic Republic to this Social Forum. The Islamic Republic and human rights is an oxymoron. And it’s a slap in the face to the people of Iran that have been brutalized, oppressed, and tortured for them to sit on this forum.

This is the first revolution in history to be initiated by women and supported by men. It is the result of the work of the thoughtful, dedicated women who a century ago were open to learning from each other and from the rest of the world about rights and freedoms and how to achieve them. Their history shows a worldview that is worthy of the fact that women are half of the world’s population, and that they train and raise the children of both genders. Their unique success is based on a holistic approach that reflects the reality of the lives of the majority of the people of the world, and that allows for dialogue and interactive decision-making. The success of this revolution, which is modern in its goal and in its language, slogans, and approach, promises that with the expansion of communications technology Iranian women’s latest struggle finally brings the promise of a truly global movement, which at this moment is in dire need of collective action. And we can all agree on that.

As the protests in Iran continue, from a distance one day’s events can be hard to distinguish from those of the next. It is easy for the sacrifices of the protesters to disappear from the headlines. On their behalf and on behalf of individuals fighting for freedom everywhere, including here in the United States, I implore you to continue your solidarity. I implore you to support democracy. I implore you to stay the course on equal rights for all. In doing so, you fuel the memory of Mahsa Jina Amini and the continued dream of freedom and equality for Iranian women and girls. Thank you.

Watch the remarks

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Melanne, for that introduction. Thank you, Azam; thank you, Dr. Kar; thank you, Nazanin, for that wonderful message.

A couple of you have come up to me tonight and said: So, why did the Atlantic Council decide to do an all-women honoree cast for the first time in its history? We have a wide-ranging nomination process—many of you are involved in it. We have a selection committee that’s very discerning. The simple answer is it just turned out that way. These were the best leaders we could possibly identify.

Thank you for the honorees for inspiring us. Thank you for all of you for supporting us.

Now the breathtaking Nova Payton, internationally acclaimed recording artist, Broadway star, will bring us home. Please listen to her every note.

Watch the performance

The post Full transcript: 2023 Distinguished Leadership Awards celebrate the game-changing role of women in the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How the women and girls of Iran have fueled their ‘unprecedented’ protests: Bravery, solidarity, and innovation

Atlantic Council — Thu, 11 May 2023 18:23:49 +0000

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Public Event Thu, May 11, 2023 • 11:00 am ET

Woman, Life, Freedom: Eight months of ongoing protests in Iran

Human Rights Iran Middle East Women

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Azam Jangravi
Iranian women’s rights advocate and a Girl of Revolution Street

Mehrangiz Kar
Iranian women’s rights lawyer and writer

Nazanin Nour
Iranian-American actor, writer, and activist

Moderator

Ali Rogin
Correspondent, PBS NewsHour

Introductory remarks

Holly Dagres
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs;
Editor, MENASource and IranSource

HOLLY DAGRES: Good morning, everyone. My name is Holly Dagres, and I am a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and I’m honored here to give remarks for today’s Atlantic Council Front Page event.

Zan, zendegi, azadi—“women, life, freedom”—the slogan heard across the globe. Contrary to the lack of media coverage, this month marks eight months of ongoing protests in Iran against the Islamic Republic. Protests that are taking place in various ways, from street gatherings, rooftop chants, graffiti, to public displays of not wearing mandatory hijab. This continuity is unprecedented. The clerical establishment is in a tinderbox situation, and it’s only a matter of time before the protesters pour into the streets en masse because the people of Iran have had enough. They want the regime gone.

As I speak over thirteen thousand schoolgirls have been poisoned at schools across the country. Many believe this is a punishment for their participation in anti-establishment protests. Additionally, in the past two weeks there have been an alarming rise in executions, with over fifty-seven executed. Human rights organizations widely believe that these wave of executions are an effort to instill fear and silence dissent. Every day, women remain defiant against mandatory hijab, by appearing in the streets without the veil. And even in some cases, dresses and shorts, items of clothing only seen at home, behind closed doors, ordinary freedoms we here take for granted.

The world admires and applauds the bravery of the people of Iran, but especially their women and girls. As an American of Iranian heritage, I’m absolutely thrilled to introduce this incredible cohort of Iranian women who will be accepting the 2023 Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award on behalf of the women and girls of Iran at tonight’s Annual Distinguished Leadership Awards… which I should note will be livestreamed.

Dr. Mehrangiz Kar is a human rights lawyer and an activist. She was one of the first women attorneys to oppose the Islamization of gender relations following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Kar has been an active public defender in Iran’s civil and criminal courts, and has lectured extensively both in Iran and abroad.

Azam Jangravi is an Iranian paralegal, human rights advocate, and former political prisoner, residing in Canada. She is primarily known for being one of the girls of revolution street during the protests against compulsory hijab in 2017. Jangravi was taken into custody in 2018 after removing her headscarf in protest on Enghelab Street, standing atop an electricity transformer box, and waving it above her head. She was later released temporarily on bail and fled from Iran to Turkey, before relocating to Canada.

Nazanin Nour is an Iranian-American actress, writer, and activist. She has appeared on shows such as Netflix’s “Big Mouth,” “Madam Secretary,” and “Persia’s Got Talent,” and can currently be seen in the film “A Thousand Little Cuts” on Showtime. Nour could most recently be seen on stage in Washington starring in the studio theatre production of “English.” She is one of several Iranian Americans in the public eye speaking out on the ongoing situation in Iran.

I’d like to also note that Dr. Mahnaz Afkhami is sick with COVID-19 and was unable to attend, but she is recovering.

Finally, I’m delighted to introduce our brilliant moderator, Ali Rogin, of PBS NewsHour. Ali, over to you.

ALI ROGIN: Holly, thank you so much, and welcome to everybody in the room today and to all our viewers tuning in online, and I’m honored to be joined by these three incredible women.

As Holly mentioned, we are here today to discuss the state of women’s rights and human rights in Iran from prerevolution all the way to the current zan, zendegi, azadi movement and we can do all that in forty-five minutes. That is a very steep task but I know that this is a very well-equipped group to do just that. So let’s get right into it.

The first question I’m going to ask and, parenthetically, before I do I want to note I’m going to ask a few questions and then we’re going to open it up to questions from the audience here and online. So please submit your questions in the format that’s already been presented to the group, and for this panel each of the questions I’m going to ask, the first one will be open-ended, and then each one will be directed to one of you specifically. But I invite anybody to weigh in as well.

So the first question—as Holly mentioned, the Islamic Republic is doubling down on its repressive tactics. It’s increased. There have been thirteen thousand schoolgirls that have been poisoned. Hangings are at a historic high. So what do these oppressive measures tell you about the state of the regime and whether or not it is under pressure from these protests? Whoever would like to begin. Maybe we go down the line.

Dr. Kar?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: OK. As you know, in this movement regular women, students of university, students of high school, all labor and they are involved with that, and in zan, zendegi, azadi all Iranian women from all layers of the society, they are—they were working and now they are working in some other style.

And something that you asked about that, like poisoning, poisoning daughters in high schools, we think the—you know, the reason is because they were working a lot in the movement. And one of their activity was—because probably you don’t know that in schoolbooks, the first page is a picture of Khomeini and the second page is a picture of Khamenei, and the students of high school, sometimes they—you know, they taking out these pictures from their schoolbooks and simply removing—removing—

ALI ROGIN: And they’re removing [them] from the—from the walls?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yeah, removing, in front of the camera—in front of the camera. And these, you know, film and video posted to some media outside the country, and that’s the reason.

I think they are very against the against daughters in high school. And we think that now this is some kind of revenge sometimes… and the government doesn’t care about that and doesn’t say anything and doesn’t investigate—very serious investigate in that, and they don’t say what is this. Sometimes, they say something that is not true… They say that this is not true. This is something that, you know, they pretend that there is nothing, there is no poison.

And this is something that the people in Iran, now they are very angry with that because the students of—women students, daughters and students of high schools, they don’t have any safety, any security. And the parents now, they are very angry. And they go around the high schools, and they say: If the government cannot guarantee our daughter’s life and our daughter’s security, we will go around the high school and we will, you know, find something that they poison them, and this is our duty if the government doesn’t do their duty.

ALI ROGIN: So that’s going to be a big test.

But I’m curious to get all your thoughts—and I apologize; we didn’t discuss this in advance—but who do you think is behind these poisonings?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: The government.

ALI ROGIN: Is it the government?

NAZANIN NOUR: I mean, everybody believes it’s regime—the regime is complicit, because this is also a regime that has eyes and ears everywhere. They’re able to—they kidnap dissidents abroad, and bring them back to—for execution. They have intelligence on dissidents abroad. There was the, you know, kidnapping that was—that the FBI foiled the plot against a leading voice, Masih Alinejad. So, it’s very difficult for anybody to believe that a regime that uses facial recognition technology to send tickets to women who aren’t wearing their hijab properly, cannot find out who’s behind these poisonings. So, everybody believes that the regime is actually behind this.

And it’s been going on since November of 2022, so that’s months now that this has been happening. And there’s countless videos on the internet from activist groups within Iran that are showing girls in hospitals, you know, with oxygen masks. They can’t breathe, they smell tangerine in the air, or rotten fish in the air. So, it’s very real.

And I know that the regime tries to downplay it, but, you know, it’s also very difficult to kind of loiter around a girls’ school in Iran. And so, again, it’s—again, that’s why it’s very difficult for anybody to believe that the regime is not complicit in this. Parents that have gone to ask questions are met with brute force by regime forces. So, not only are no answers being given, this is still continuing as of just a few days ago, we saw videos from other poisonings. And it’s across all cities and provinces in Iran, too. So—

ALI ROGIN: So, what I’m—what I’m curious about is—Azam, is this an example of the regime really feeling the pressure, that they are taking these steps of poisoning young girls?

AZAM JANGRAVI: Actually, I don’t know. It’s really complicated. But it might be the regime is behind of this situation.

Mehrangiz and Nazanin mentioned about poisoning, and I want to talk about executions. Well, the government is now trying to create fear among people by increasing executions. In the past ten days, over fifty-five people have been executed in—from in which twenty-six Baloch citizens executed. And I think—this by the suppression of Islamic Republic of Iran.

But the protest is ongoing in Balochistan, and every Friday they shut down the internet. And I think we have to talk about Balochistan and Kurdistan and—because the suppression in that areas every time increased by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

ALI ROGIN: That’s a very, very important point.

Azam, I want to stay with you and ask, let’s take a step back and let’s talk about the factors that led to this round of protests.

AZAM JANGRAVI: The protests that begin in mid-September were unprecedented in their scale and duration. People from all level of society, including women of various cities and social classes, came together to demand change.

A key point of contention was the mandatory hijab laws, which require all Iranian women to cover their hair. And although the protests were initially led by women, they soon expand to include men as well. The government attempt to suppress the protest with violence and repression, but the movement continued to grow and gained momentum. People from different backgrounds joined in—driven by a shared sense of frustration with the current government. While there have been some reports of misinformation circulating about the government’s intention, most people understand that the issue of mandatory hijab is just one of the many issue that need to be addressed.

It is clear that until there is real change in Iran, people will continue to demand change and speak out against the injustices in Iran. As I said, the government is now trying to create really fear among people by execution. Two men were executed in the past week, Yousef Mehrdad and Sadrollah Fazeil Zare were executed for just running online group criticizing Islam. Dual Swedish-Iranian citizen also executed last week. Additionally, more than eleven individuals are currently on deaths way—on death row in connection with the now recent protests. The world has been outraged by these killings and has called on Iran to stop them. We need to act now and raise our voices and call on the Islamic Republic to stop their executions.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin, to Azam’s point about the need to raise your voice, we’ve seen some really interesting subversive ways that protesters, especially the young women and girls in Iran, are using social media. They’re using just formats that the regime is not familiar with to register their dissent. So does that add a new dimension that we haven’t seen before in previous iterations of these protests? And how is that affecting how this message is being communicated to the regime?

AZAM JANGRAVI: Yeah, absolutely. Social media’s been a huge help actually in this movement. It’s the first time that we’ve seen it. Gen Z is very adept at using TikTok and Instagram, and figuring out how to make things trend and go viral. An example of that is the video of the girls of Ekbatan. I don’t know if everybody saw that video, but there’s a song by Rema, a popular Afrobeats artist, with Selena Gomez. And they have a song called “Calm Down.” So these young girls made this dance video, and then they were detained afterward, of course, and had to give a forced apology video.

But that went viral. And that caused everybody around the world, from various countries—I mean, this—it was, like, trending billions in hashtags on TikTok. And it raised awareness for people to understand what’s actually happening in Iran. It gives people outside of Iran a connection to those inside showing, hey, we’re actually more similar than you might think, because a lot of people don’t have information on what Iran was like prior to 1979 either. And so social media’s been a really huge tool in pushing this forward.

And this is also—the Gen Zers are the ones who were at the forefront of all of this. And as Dr. Kar and Azzi said, this is—these poisonings seem to be a retaliation for the fact that they have been ripping up pieces of the supreme leader, they’ve been setting fire, there’s countless photos now that are iconic, that Time replicated, with the girls with their backs to the camera with the middle finger. So all of these things that they’re doing, they’re very smart. They know exactly how to get the attention of people across the world, and it’s—we have never seen that level of social media activity to move a movement forward when it comes to Iran.

ALI ROGIN: And it’s fascinating because it really does seem to be techniques using forums that are just completely unfamiliar to especially the conservative clerics.

So Dr. Kar, for you, you have—for a long time, part of your scholarship has been about tracking the divisions between the moderates, the reformers within the government, and the hardliners, looking from the 1990s to now. So can you get us up to date on what is the balance, what is the tension currently in the regime between moderates and conservatives? Is there any tension there, or is it just completely overrun by conservatives? How do you see those tensions playing out now, versus in previous decades where there was a bit of a reformist element?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: At the beginning I would like say that I practiced as a lawyer twenty-two years in Islamic Republic of Iran, so when I started to practice as a lawyer in Iran I was very young, and immediately we had Islamic—the revolution, Islamic Revolution and victory of Khomeini in this revolution. So I had been in a very complicated situation, not because I was a lawyer but because I was a woman and lawyer. I think two criminal in their eyes, because they—immediately they said that women cannot be judge, so they removed all female judge from judiciary system. And we were not sure that they give us permission to continue work as a lawyer, but they did, and they said because everybody is able to choose a lawyer, probably a mad lawyer, a crazy lawyer, and this is—and Islam—Islam doesn’t care about that. This is something that the people—

ALI ROGIN: If you want to choose a female lawyer, that’s your choice.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yes, is your choice; if you want to choose a mad, you know, lawyer, that is your choice. And that’s why we could survive. This was the reason, the base of our job.

So I can say that since Khomeini ordered for mandatory hijab, this movement started in Iran and continued. But sometimes it was very slow, it was very hard; sometimes it was getting clear and obvious. I can say that in first decade we were very, very active for mandatory hijab. And for something that is full of, you know, our penal code and family law after they came on power are full of discriminations against women, gender discrimination, and we can say this is some kind of gender apartheid. But we cannot have demonstration. Just somebody like me started talking and writing about these legal discriminations.

After that, the second we had involved with a very bad war between Iran and Iraq, and eight years we had been involved with that. And that’s why everything was closed about women’s rights and human rights, and nobody could talk about that in any other country that is involved with war. So we can say that during the time everything was slow or nothing. Nothing was active in that.

After war, after eight years that the war was over, Hashemi Rafsanjani was on power as president and he ordered open very small, very small opportunity for writing and talking about something, but under control—under very heavy control.

ALI ROGIN: And remind us, this is in the 1990s?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: 1990s, yes. And because I should make short everything, this is history and it is not easy—

ALI ROGIN: No, it—you’re doing a great job.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: After 1990, we reached 1996. And 1996 is very important period of revolution history started because the name is reformism movement. And the president, Khatami, and the people—most people of Iran, for the first time they voted to a president of this system, this political system. After that, because the slogan was different like rule of law and like we should—we should have civil society, it was very important because he ordered and the reformists ordered that women can have independent NGO. And it was very helpful for women. It was the first time that something like that happened in Iran.

But either during this time they didn’t give me permission because it—

ALI ROGIN: How interesting, during the reformist era.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: No, yeah, everything was under control. And they said: No, no, you cannot. You cannot have any NGO. And I do have all documents of that.

But some of young Iranian women, they could register and they could be active as NGO. This was something that started, you know, another kind of—

ALI ROGIN: Activism, or another kind of activism, or—

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yes, yes, yes, as NGO.

ALI ROGIN: Yeah.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: And it—and they could be very active.

And then, after that, we had some campaign like one million signature and no to stoning and something like that. And Iranians—some part of Iranian women, they came to streets and it was very important. They came to public area, and they were talking and they were giving a slogan against discriminations, not against political system.

But after that, step by step, Ahmadinejad came and stopped everything and suppressed all women activists. And you know, they—most of them, they left Iran, and now they are all over the world. And after that, everybody thought that everything is stopped and never—you know, never be active about women’s rights. But as you know and as you see now, everything is full of energy and started a movement: Mahsa; and zan, zendegi, azadi. This is full of energy. This is full of anger. And this is different with some other that we had been before that.

ALI ROGIN: And to—Dr. Kar, to your point about how many activists left Iran, so now the diaspora is very rich, very, very vocal. And so, Nazanin, I’m curious to get your sense of what is the state of the diaspora now? Are they united around these protests, any more so than perhaps the cohesion was in previous years?

NAZANIN NOUR: Yeah. I want to say, just to that point too that you brought up of differences in the government, reforms, et cetera, that the people—the information coming out of Iran and people I talk to on the ground, most people don’t see any difference between any—they all think it’s the—you know, they’re all cut from the same cloth. So it’s a regime that’s irreformable and irredeemable in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of Iranians.

To the diaspora, yes, I remember in 2009 I was actually in Iran. I got there two days before the election, the Green Movement elections. And I witnessed what happened afterward, which was the violent suppression and oppression by the state to quash those protests. And I remember that it must have been like a blip in the American media. Maybe it was in a forty-eight-hour news cycle, and then it was gone. And so—and we’ve had protests that have built up in Iran since—you know, for the last twelve to thirteen years. But if you just want to go back, 2017, 2018, 2019. There was bloody November in 2019, fifteen thousand protesters got killed within a few days and it wasn’t on the news at all.

And now we saw that actually, yeah, the diaspora rallied around the people of Iran. I had never seen that level of unity in the entire time that I’ve lived in this country, as far as, you know, giving a spotlight and attention to Iran. There’s protests and rallies that have been held in—major protests and rallies held in cities and countries all over the world ever since September. Most of them are happening in cities every weekend.

And while we would love more media coverage, and attention, and a spotlight kept on Iran and all the atrocities—the poisonings, the executions, the fact that the people want this regime gone—the unity that I’ve seen and the level of attention is something that I’ve never seen before. And it’s absolutely necessary and vital to keep, you know, because their internet gets cut off. They don’t have the means, a lot of the times, to get the messages out. So it is up to the people in the diaspora to continue to amplify their voice and make sure that the world hears what they’re saying and what’s actually happening inside of the country.

ALI ROGIN: Absolutely.

Let’s take a couple questions from the audience. I invite anybody who has a question. While you’re thinking of your questions, I’d love to ask, Azam, you were one of the kind of, as we say, OGs of the anti-hijab movement. You stood on an electric transformer, as we said. You’re a girl of revolution street, which is where these protests were happening. So what does it mean to you to see these women and young girls in the streets now?

AZAM JANGRAVI: The fight for women’s rights in Iran has been ongoing for over forty-four years, as Mehrangiz says. One of the first protests against mandatory hijab in Iran occurred on March 8, 1980, where women have used various campaigns, activist groups, NGOs, to protest the violation of their rights and demand justice and equality. However, they have paid heavy price for their activism, including suppression, threats, imprisonments, and mental and physical torture.

In 2018, when I decided to protests against mandatory hijab, there were already ongoing protests against the regime in Iran. The Iranian public was expressing their anger in the protests with a wide range of chants directed towards the regime and its leadership. In the same days, Vida Movahed performed a symbolic act of taking her scarf off and putting it on a stick to peacefully protest hijab laws—a brave move that followed forty years of women’s activism. And this is important because the forty-four years ongoing activism, you know? And I also wanted to be part of these forty-year-old movement and raise my voice against mandatory hijab laws.

As an Iranian woman, I had experienced a lot of problems in my life, particularly when I decided to separate my ex-husband. And these difficulties made me more aware of inequality and separation that Iranian women have to endure. This made me think about what was happening to Iranian women. Then I felt compelled to protest against such cruelties, you know. I believe that each woman in Iran has explained it and said similar problems as this is a year of separation.

My hope was to be part of the activists who cared about creating more awareness in society. And on the day I protested, no one stood by me or supported me when I was arrested, you know. And right now we have seen every man stand for women. This is the more important things. I think this learning and becoming aware process has done so that men are now standing by women, fighting for human and women rights.

ALI ROGIN: To that point—and I’m so sorry to cut you off, Azam, but I do want to get to some audience questions. And somebody asked something that I think ties into this, which is the solidarity that we’re seeing, is that translating to internationally.

Somebody asks, how do you see the influence of regional solidarity among women. Is it active in places like Afghanistan? Are they giving each other energy and support as needed? So let’s broaden it out and look at the regional solidarity that’s happening. What are you all seeing? Whoever wants to take that. And I think, unfortunately, that may be our last question of the session.

NAZANIN NOUR: I mean, there were videos of women in Afghanistan that were marching with signs in solidarity with the women of Iran as well. I mean, they’re neighbors and, you know, African women are under terrible suppression and oppression themselves.

And I feel like there has been a global outcry but there needs to be more. There’s actions that have been taken by various countries. At the U.N. there’s a fact finding mission that was created. You know, people banded together and got the Islamic Republic kicked off the Commission on the Status of Women, for example.

But I still feel like there hasn’t been the amount of solidarity that there needs to be and the amount of support for—it’s a human rights issue. It’s a human rights crisis. It’s a women’s rights crisis. So we need people from around the world in various countries that also believe in women’s rights and human rights to also stand up for the women, girls, and the people of Iran.

ALI ROGIN: Excellent. And somebody else asks a question. With all that is going on we see regional neighbors like Saudi Arabia normalizing ties with Iran. What does this mean for the protest movement? Are there any implications with other countries in the region normalizing ties with Iran?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: You mean the relationship—the new relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

ALI ROGIN: Yes. Yes. Are there any implications there for the protest movement?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: … We cannot predict the future of these negotiations because a lot of, you know, challenges are between Iran and Saudi Arabia and I don’t believe that everything could be. But we know Saudi Arabia that we—everybody knows is very serious, serious with Islam and with limitations and the discriminations, gender discrimination.

But now we are—you know, we are hearing that something has changed either in Saudi Arabia and this is something that Iranian people they are watching that and they think why they are—you know, they are pushing to a very bad situation, war situation, and Saudi Arabia is going toward and this is something that Iranian women know and they think about it but they don’t compare themselves with women in Saudi Arabia because we had a very different background during shah, during Pahlavi. Pahlavi changed a lot of things in Iran, like women’s rights.

ALI ROGIN: Right.

NAZANIN NOUR: But also anything that—like, anything that legitimizes the government is not going to be a good move. Anything, you know, that emboldens them is not going to be a good move, or solidifies their status.

But it’s not deterring people in Iran from protesting in their own ways. They still do come out to the streets. It might not be to the same effect as it was a few months ago, but the fact that women are taking off their hijabs, men are supporting them—also by wearing shorts, by the way, because that’s not allowed. So, that’s one way that people are dissenting, using civil disobedience. So those types of things are continuing to happen, and they’re not going to stop. And schoolgirls, university students in general, boys and girls, have been protesting for the last few weeks, as well.

So, I don’t believe that that is going to stop what has already started in Iran. There’s no going back, is what the people of Iran say.

ALI ROGIN: In the time that we have left, I’d like to go around. And in a few sentences, can you tell me what you would like to see from the international community, to give the support that this movement needs?

Dr. Kar, would you like to begin?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Now we can understand that it’s not enough that human rights institution, international human rights institution, work for removing gender discrimination in Iran. Now we can understand that all Western government, they should work with human rights institution because, as my friends mentioned about execution, now it’s very important if they can stop it. Because if everybody is getting crazy in Iran by this situation, and either us that are outside Iran, when we get this news we cannot—we cannot—what could we do?

ALI ROGIN: Right.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Because six others, they do one execution in Iran now. And all of them that call it an investigation, it is not justice. They don’t have lawyer. They don’t have lawyer. And the lawyer is coming from government and it is related with government.

So we can say that international community can do a lot of work for Iran, but so far we cannot see any results of that in this movement that now it is our focus.

ALI ROGIN: Azam.

AZAM JANGRAVI: As an internet security researcher and digital security trainer, my concern is about internet, because the Islamic Republic of Iran, when it wants to suppress the people of Iran, they shut down the internet. And it would be good for Iranian people if the international community find a way to help people for internet, and—especially VPNs, especially, you know, support us for helping people, for internet shutdowns.

ALI ROGIN: Right, we’ve seen that the sanctions don’t really seem to discriminate between uses for speaking out, and for doing business with the regime.

AZAM JANGRAVI: Exactly.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin.

NAZANIN NOUR: I just think overall, the global community needs to condemn the actions of the Islamic Republic, not legitimize them. Even the smallest action, like heads of states, when they meet with Islamic Republic officials—women not wearing the headscarf. You know, it’s not obligatory; they don’t have to do it.

I think things like, you know, the U.N. just appointed the Islamic Republic to a commission that’s overseeing human rights. And it’s an absolute slap in the face to Iranians, because they just executed two people two days ago, simply for running a social media channel that was questioning religion. So, the world needs to stop doing things like that, because all they’re doing is solidifying and emboldening the regime.

They need to pass legislation and do things that support the people of Iran, instead of emboldening the regime. They need to hold them accountable for human rights abuses. They need to, you know, list—the EU can list the IRGC as a terrorist organization. The US can pass the MAHSA Act. There’s a lot of things that can be done that haven’t been done yet. And I hope to see that.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin Nour, Mehrangiz Kar, and Azam Jangravi, thank you so much for being here today. This has been a fascinating conversation, and congratulations tonight on the award that you are receiving from the Atlantic Council. It is so well deserved.

I think we can all join in a round of applause for this incredible panel.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Thank you. Thank you for having us.

AZAM JANGRAVI: Thank you.

ALI ROGIN: So that concludes the program. Thank you so much for joining us.

NAZANIN NOUR: Thank you. Ali.

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Deciphering Vladimir Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message

Alexander Motyl — Thu, 11 May 2023 18:16:14 +0000

During the Cold War, Kremlinologists would famously attempt to decipher the mood within the Soviet elite by studying the seating plans on public holidays for hints of who was politically in favor and who was potentially on the way out.

This half-forgotten art is now once again in demand as analysts seek insights into the equally impenetrable Putin regime. A look at the seating arrangements during this week’s Victory Day parade in Moscow provides some indication that despite the military setbacks of the past fifteen months, Vladimir Putin is doubling down on his goal of subjugating Ukraine.

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At first glance, Russia’s annual Victory Day parade on May 9 was a non-event at best and an embarrassment at worst. Putin’s short speech held no surprises, while the presence of just one antique tank during the military parade itself could only be interpreted as evidence of the dire state of the Russian armed forces.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the event was the identity of the people selected to sit directly alongside Putin on the Red Square podium. While Victory Day marks the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Adolf Hitler, neither of the elderly gentlemen sitting alongside Putin actually fought against Nazi Germany. Instead, they were both veterans of the Soviet security services who had respectively participated in efforts to suppress Ukraine’s independence movement and crush Czechoslovakia’s 1960s anti-Soviet uprising.

To Putin’s right sat the 98-year-old Yuri Dvoikin, who volunteered for the Red Army during World War II but never actually made it to the front lines. Instead, after training as a sniper in 1944, he was dispatched by the Soviet secret police to Lviv in western Ukraine, where his job was to assist in the liquidation of the Ukrainian nationalist underground. The campaign against Ukraine’s independence movement was particularly brutal, with the Soviet authorities employing terror tactics and large-scale deportations. Although the Ukrainians were able to inflict significant casualties on Soviet forces, they were ultimately defeated by the early 1950s.

On Putin’s left sat the 88-year-old Gennady Zaitsev, who, like Dvoikin, never served in what Russia still refers to as the Great Patriotic War. He was drafted into the Red Army in 1953 and joined the KGB six years later after completing his military service. In 1968, he helped suppress the Prague Spring by, among other things, capturing the Czechoslovak Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the 1970s, KGB chief Yuri Andropov appointed Zaitsev to lead the elite Alfa anti-terrorist unit.

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Putin did not have to sit between these two former secret policemen. Indeed, on Victory Day of all days, it would have been far more natural to appear alongside veterans of the war against Hitler’s Germany. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin’s choice of neighbors was a deliberate and symbolic move.

For many within the Russian and Ukrainian elites, Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message would have been crystal clear. The Russian dictator was signaling that despite widespread criticism of the Federal Security Service and its bungling role in the invasion of Ukraine, he continues to value his secret police and sees them as the linchpin of his authoritarian regime.

Putin was also signaling to Ukrainians and domestic critics of his invasion that he is willing to do whatever it takes to win. Soviet forces committed innumerable crimes in their suppression of the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1968, they had no qualms about crushing a country that, like today’s Ukraine, sought to go its own way. By sitting alongside decorated veterans of these two criminal Soviet campaigns, Putin was indicating his approval of their actions and his readiness to embrace similar methods.

The good news is that Putin does not currently appear capable of replicating the bloody Soviet-era crackdowns in western Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. This was all too evident on Victory Day, with the lone T-34 tank rumbling across Red Square serving as the perfect metaphor for Russia’s reduced military might after suffering catastrophic losses in Ukraine. However, the Russian dictator remains defiant and is clearly keen to signal that he has no intention of backing down.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

Speaking at the event, the group pledged unity and said they would publish a charter of demands within a month. However, when this document, known as the Mahsa Charter, was finally published on March 13, it had already lost the support of Karimi—a firm supporter of Pahlavi—and Farahani, who made no explanation for their absence. This was the beginning of a process of losing supporters that quickly led to the group’s disintegration.

Cracks were visible from the outset, with much of the division revolving around Pahlavi’s persona. Some in the Iranian opposition have been long skeptical of his ambition. While Pahlavi has attempted to espouse broadly liberal democratic politics, many of his right-wing supporters are said to be chauvinistic, aggressive, and opposed to working with others.

Within hours of the charter’s publication, many supporters of Pahlavi went on social media to attack the coalition, christened the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI), and its new charter. Much of their complaints ranged from vague to conspiratorial. Some complained that the phrase “the Iranian nation” had not been used even though the text spoke of “the people of Iran” and committed itself to the country’s territorial integrity. Some complained about the clenched fist logo used by ADFI, claiming it signaled a hidden leftist agenda.

On April 4, Pahlavi declared that he had asked his coalition partners to include new figures in the ADFI. Less than a week later, he claimed the group had failed to “come to a consensus” on the inclusion of these figures and added that he won’t “limit [himself] to one group.” Pahlavi seemingly, in effect, torpedoed the coalition with one tweet. Under the barrage of personal attacks launched by many Pahlavi supporters, Boniadi temporarily deactivated her Twitter account (she came back on May 1).

The group’s demise was confirmed on April 16 when Pahlavi declared a momentous trip to Israel, where he was hosted by Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel. In Israel, Pahlavi met twice with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and once with President Isaac Herzog. He also took part in Israel’s Holocaust Memorial Day ceremonies at Yad Vashem, prayed at the Western Wall, visited the Baha’i gardens in Haifa, and also met with members of the Israeli-Iranian community.

The trip wasn’t necessarily controversial for many Iranians. Most major forces in the Iranian opposition—including center-left and far-left groups—advocate for the normalization of relations between Iran and Israel and oppose the regime’s anti-Israel and anti-Semitic policies. Alinejad openly supported the trip, and none of the ADFI figures opposed it. However, the fact that Pahlavi had gone on the trip solo showed (in addition to his previous tweets) that the sun was setting on a coalition that was only a few weeks old.

On April 21, Esmaeilion declared that he was leaving the coalition due to “pressures from outside, pressed via undemocratic methods.” Pahlavi had resisted demands for the formation of a more structured organization for ADFI, Esmaeilion said. On April 26, Alinejad, Mohtadi, Boniadi, and Ebadi effectively published the obituary of ADFI, declaring it had come to an end while pledging that they were committed to working together in future joint efforts. The new coalition, which had given hope to many, had come to an ignominious end in less than two months.

In media interviews, Esmaeilion insisted that Pahlavi’s trip to Israel had nothing to do with his decision to leave the ADFI. In fact, Esmaeilion said he had deliberately postponed leaving the group so that he could wait for Pahlavi’s trip to finish. As expected, pro-regime media in Iran salivated over the news of the coalition’s collapse and covered it widely. Mehdi Chamran, a conservative head of Tehran’s city council, gleefully declared that “their coalition [had] collapsed, which shows that non-believers in Islam will never reach any results.”

Diversity of the opposition

For as long as the Islamic Republic has existed, it has faced efforts to unseat it by opposition groups based abroad. In the 1980s, just as it massacred thousands of opposition supporters inside the country, the Islamic Republic assassinated dozens of opposition leaders around the world. The victims included leaders of all hues, including former regime loyalists, nationalists, and Marxists. In the decades to come, these opposition organizations remained small, divided, and without much significance to Iranian politics. While the Iranian diaspora has had an immense cultural and social influence on Iran, its political influence has been small. Instead, groups and activists inside Iran have driven change even at the cost of relentless repression by the regime.

In the past few years, with the total sidelining of even the meekest domestic political opposition, some hoped that the opposition abroad could break this pattern and lead to change inside the country. There were many odds in their favor. Millions of Iranians get much of their news from satellite stations based in London and Washington, which give an enviable platform to the opposition, who can benefit from a diaspora that boasts millions of young and talented Iranians around the world. Yet the opposition has repeatedly failed to build any significant political organization.

Beyond the failure of attempting to build a broad front like the ADFI, no single political camp has been able to organize its own supporters either. Most ‘political parties’ abroad consist of, at most, a few dozen people, usually above the age of fifty. As a result, any significant change will likely come from inside Iran.

That being said, there have been positive developments in the diaspora. On April 22, hundreds of Iranian leftists gathered in Germany for a meeting that signaled support for a Charter of Minimum Demands published by twenty organizations in Iran, including trade unions and feminist bodies. The meeting had been endorsed by dozens of organizations, ranging from socialist and communist groups to LGBTQ+ bodies and more than one thousand activists. It also heard solidarity messages from people inside Iran, such as Reza Shahabi, the leader of Tehran’s Bus Workers Union, who is currently in Evin prison. Such meetings show the diversity of the Iranian opposition scene abroad and its many links to those inside the country.

At the same time, an inspiring show of the persistent relevance and strength of domestic opposition was on display at a virtual meeting held on April 22 and 23, but it was covered much less widely than the ADFI and its dramas. Inspired by the call for fundamental change from Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi, the 2009 presidential candidate and former prime minister under house arrest since 2012, the Saving Iran summit brought together leading lights of civic movements inside the country and in exile.

Former member of parliament (MP) Alireza Rajayi called for structures that could give leadership to the movement. California-based sociologist Nayere Tohidi called for “national solidarity against the tyrannical government,” which should include a wide range of people, from Pahlavi to those like Mostafa Tajzadeh, former deputy interior minister under reformist President Mohammad Khatami, who has been in prison since before the protests began. From their prison cells in Tehran, Tajzadeh sent a message to the gathering, as did Faezeh Hashemi, a popular former MP and daughter of late President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The latter is known for her outspoken critiques of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Underscoring the event’s influence, the regime quickly arrested three people who had spoken there.

Pahlavi at a crossroads

The spirit of solidarity evident in the Women, Life, Freedom movement seems to be miles away from the acrimonious scene witnessed around the Iranian opposition abroad or on social media. Esmaelion’s departure came after relentless abuse was hurled at him by some supporters of Pahlavi. Such behavior isn’t limited to cyberspace. In a recent demonstration in London on April 30, supporters of Pahlavi, some of them masked, attacked Esmaeilion with foul slogans.

Pahlavi represents a figure with many contradictions. In his public pronouncements, he espouses a tolerant and liberal view and claims Martin Luther King and Gene Sharp as role models. Addressing a leadership summit by the Anti-Defamation League in Washington DC on April 30, Pahlavi sounded like an inspiring statesman, as he recounted the oppression meted out by the regime to Iran’s religious minorities while also paying homage to those like Shia Muslim Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who resisted the tyranny of the regime.

Although Pahlavi’s trip to Israel came with its own risks, it brought him gravitas and wall-to-wall coverage. While Iran’s foreign ministry declared the trip unworthy of comment, state-backed media covered it relentlessly, attracting comments and attacks by state broadcasters and clerics, showing his continued relevance.

However, critics say Pahlavi hasn’t done enough to distance himself from many of his chauvinistic supporters who don’t practice the liberal message he preaches. Some supporters predictably claim this to be a case of some “bad apples.” But the evidence doesn’t support this view.

This isn’t just about masked protesters and online trolls. Some of Pahlavi’s vocal supporters have repeatedly made divisive moves. His wife, Yasmine Pahlavi, once shocked many by sharing a message on her Instagram stories that wished “death” to “mullahs and leftists.” Some prominent supporters openly praise Parviz Sabeti, a notorious official of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, which was known for the gruesome torturing of opponents. Pahlavi speaks of a need for national reconciliation and even welcomes former members of the IRGC. Yet, some of his prominent supporters preach a far-right nationalism that is aggressively exclusionary to those they call the “1979ers,” which seems to include all of Iran’s leftists and republicans.

The collapse of the ADFI also showed Pahlavi’s difficulties in working with others inside an organized structure. This is more jarring when recalling his previously failed projects. In 2013, he launched the National Council of Iran with much fanfare. However, the organization withered on the vine and he resigned from its presidency in 2017. Pahlavi is, thus, at a crossroads. Does he want to be an inclusive national figure that brings together a broad coalition of pro-democracy forces against the Islamic Republic? If so, he needs to decisively break with the brewing far-right faction around him.

On the other hand, the recent troubles of the opposition and the collapse of the ADFI could also be a moment of crisis that leads to positive change. If—in political competition with Pahlavi and one another—opposition figures attempt to organize their supporters and build effective structures, Iranians will get some nascent practice at democratic politics, which they have been deprived of for years. In the absence of such organized efforts, it is unlikely that the Iranian opposition abroad can break out of its decades-long pattern of political irrelevance.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar based at New York University. He is the author of “The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions.” Follow him on Twitter: @arash_tehran.

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Putin’s embarrassing one-tank parade hints at catastrophic losses in Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 09 May 2023 21:58:17 +0000

It would be hard to image a more fitting symbol of Russia’s declining military fortunes than the sight of a solitary Stalin-era tank trundling across Red Square during the country’s traditional Victory Day celebrations on May 9. For the past two decades, Vladimir Putin has used Victory Day to showcase modern Russia’s resurgence as a military superpower, with dozens of the very latest tanks typically taking part in each annual parade. This year, however, the only tank on display was a T-34 model dating back to World War II.

Inevitably, the embarrassing absence of tanks at this year’s Victory Day parade has been widely interpreted as further evidence of Russia’s catastrophic losses in Ukraine. Social media was soon buzzing with posts poking fun at the Kremlin. “Modern Russian military equipment can be found much more easily at Ukrainian military trophy exhibitions than at the Victory Parade in Moscow,” noted the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s official Twitter account. Others were less subtle. “There was one tank at the parade in Moscow! We laugh all over Ukraine,” posted Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko. “There are farmers in Ukraine with more tanks than that,” quipped another Twitter user.

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Tuesday’s one-tank parade was the latest in a series of blows that had already cast a shadow over preparations for this year’s Victory Day celebrations. In the month preceding the holiday, more than twenty cities across Russia canceled plans to hold military parades. While security concerns were officially cited, these cancellations fueled speculation that Russia simply doesn’t have enough military equipment available to stage regional parades, with the vast majority of tanks and other vehicles having already been sent to Ukraine.

The complete cancellation of this year’s Immortal Regiment marches was an even bigger blow. This mass participation event, which sees members of the public marching through Russian towns and cities while displaying portraits of family members who served in the Red Army during World War II, has become an integral part of Russia’s Victory Day rituals over the past decade and has been endorsed by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the Kremlin decided to ban marches this year amid fears that family members of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine may seek to participate. With Russian officials still in denial over the disastrous consequences of the Ukraine invasion, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was for thousands of grieving relatives to gather in public and draw attention to the scale of the tragedy.

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