The NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July is an opportunity for leaders to mitigate geoeconomic risk within the Alliance and in southeastern Europe in particular. Specifically, all allies should commit in the communiqué to the prompt adoption of investment screening legislation—particularly the Balkan nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, where legislation is largely absent. While the European Union (EU) is Europe’s lead institution on investment and trade issues, its technocratic approach has up to now failed to generate the necessary political will with all members of the Alliance to take investment security issues seriously. Putting the issue of investment screening on the wider transatlantic agenda will increase pressure on lagging allies to elevate investment security and accountability on NATO’s southeastern flank. The Alliance can look to how 5G security was put on the agenda a few years ago as a case study of how it can generate political will among allies to address gaps in national security that are notionally economic in nature.

Because the implementation of economic security regulations carries risks of abuse and corruption, NATO, the EU, and key member states from both organizations should support those nations in the development of inclusive and effective legislation that mitigates against economic risk while protecting the democratic process.

Economic security underpins military security

Members of the EU and NATO face a number of threats from authoritarian corrosive capital and critical economic dependencies. Whether originating from private or state-owned enterprises, unaccountable investments lack transparency, accountability, and market orientation. Corrosive capital largely originates from authoritarian states and exaggerates governance gaps to influence economic, political, and social developments in recipient countries. For example, authoritarian regimes, particularly China, use subsidies and other uncompetitive practices to invest in critical or other digital infrastructure that can have a dual military-civilian purpose, such as in port infrastructure in southeast Europe which could be used to transit military gear in support of NATO operations. Nontransparent investment flows, particularly in Bulgaria and the Western Balkans, undermine transparency and abet corruption. In the higher value-added sectors of the economy such as the thriving information and communications technology sectors in Bulgaria, unaccountable investments threaten the valuable intellectual property of Europe’s established firms and emerging start-ups alike. Last year, China weaponized Europe’s critical trade and supply chain dependency on the huge Chinese market to block Lithuanian imports to China, seeking to punish Vilnius for its foreign policy choices. Europe’s urgent transition in the last year away from Russian natural gas to renewable resources such as solar and wind power, which are dominated by China, risks replacing one set of strategic energy dependencies for another. 

To address these challenges, many European countries have developed new EU-wide investment screening regulations and the European Union has proposed legislation to counter economic coercion. Since 2020, EU member states are required to have an investment screening mechanism in place as part of the EU-wide investment screening coordination framework—but the details are left up to the individual countries, which are responsible for their own national security. 

NATO’s southeastern flank is the most vulnerable and least-prepared region to protect its economies from authoritarian corrosive capital. Montenegro has become famous for its “white elephant” Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Croatia is host to the Chinese Southeast European Business Association and has actively courted Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including ports and the EU-funded and China-built Peljesac bridge, the first example of subsidized Chinese firms beating out European firms for EU-funded projects in Europe. Bulgaria and North Macedonia have more pronounced links to unaccountable flows of Russian capital, including in the energy sector. 

Among these countries, only Croatia is in the early stages of exploring the development of an investment screening law, and it is doing so at a leisurely pace. Bulgaria is in an even earlier stage than Croatia, but has an opportunity with its new government to make progress. North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro also lack an investment screening mechanism, leaving NATO’s most vulnerable members and economies open to the risk of corrosive capital and unaccountable investment. These governments have largely failed to put investment security legislation and processes on the table because of a lack of political will. An initiative by key allies to put this issue on the table at NATO would help push lagging governments in southeast Europe to prioritize this issue. Yet, a push by NATO allies to close the investment security gap in southeast Europe should also be coupled with practical assistance to help those allies develop inclusive, transparent legislation on investment screening.

The risks of regulating economic activity in fragile democracies

Emerging markets in NATO’s southeastern flank, including Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Croatia, face some of the greatest challenges to equipping themselves with the tools to protect their economies from national security threats. These allies face capacity and governance challenges that will require coordinated support from NATO, the EU, and key bilateral allies to help implement effective investment screening legislation.

First, the economies of southeastern Europe are among the least developed within NATO. As a result, most business leaders in these countries are desperate for any investment they can attract and are instinctively hostile to the idea of screening any investment. Coaxing the private sector into compliance with any relevant legislation will require an intentional and transparent process of policy dialogue between government and business to reassure business that legislation will not meaningfully harm the economy.

Second, these countries largely lack governmental capacity to effectively screen foreign investments, a highly technical process requiring competent bureaucrats armed with both economic and national security data and expertise. A related challenge is the need for the bureaucracy to maintain the confidentiality of proprietary corporate data during the screening process; leaks of government deliberations to tabloids are a pervasive problem in southeast European policymaking.

Third, the democracies of southeastern Europe are by and large low-trust societies with weak public-private dialogue and an often fragile rule of law, making effective and informed policy formulation a challenge. To ensure economic fairness and guard against regulatory abuse, any new tools allowing governments to regulate economic activity will need proper transparency, checks and balances, and oversight.

NATO and the EU face a conundrum in dealing with the geoeconomic challenges to southeastern Europe’s market, particularly in Bulgaria and Croatia, which are already in the European common market. On the one hand, failure to develop screening mechanisms and other tools in these economies leaves both the EU and NATO vulnerable to economic risk that could impact the wider single market. On the other hand, given the governance and capacity challenges in these countries, a rushed or opaque policy process could result in lack of awareness and compliance by the private sector or the emergence of unintended consequences such as barriers to legitimate competition.

What the EU, NATO, and Three Seas Initiative can do

To address these challenges, NATO, the European Union, and individual allies can play complementary roles.

Through its regulatory role, the EU should take the lead in supporting these countries in developing economic security legislation. The European Commission can provide technical support to help governments align their investment screening legislation with EU standards, particularly countries that are candidates for accession, such as Albania and North Macedonia. Meanwhile, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development can provide technical support to member governments such as Croatia to help them understand the likely impact an investment screening law will have on its economy and competitiveness as an investment destination.

Because the EU leads on economic and trade issues, NATO’s role will involve helping allies assess national security implications of investment risk in dual-use economic assets that can have a military or other national security purpose. Here, planning groups within NATO’s Resilience Committee can provide guidance on how to ensure that screening mechanisms meet compliance with NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience. In the interest of building political will, the NATO summit communiqué at Vilnius could set a deadline to have investment screening legislation in place by the seventy-fifth anniversary Washington summit next year.

Finally, select allies can provide bilateral mentorship and support for these southeast European nations on best practices for securing business buy-in and compliance with screening mechanisms. A system modeled after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States may not align with the needs, economic structure, or capacities of smaller countries in southeast Europe. Smaller allies such as the Czech Republic can advise southeastern European governments on the lessons learned from their experience, perhaps bringing in chambers of commerce and business associations to share their experiences on compliance with the law. 

The Three Seas Initiative, an informal gathering supported by the Atlantic Council and including twelve Central and Eastern European member states focused on north-south infrastructure development, could also help. It could serve as a venue for members to coordinate economic-security regulations to ensure wider harmonization of economic policy. Differences in investment security regulations across countries complicate the kind of cross-border investments that the Three Seas Initiative is designed to attract and finance. The Three Seas business forums in particular can serve as a channel for business associations and chambers from within the Three Seas region and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans. The forums offer a place for parties to share their experiences, challenges, and concerns about complexities caused by differences in screening legislation within the region and to formulate recommendations on how to minimize the impact on the investment environment.

Ultimately, the national governments of Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro will have to do the hard work themselves to adopt these best practices and craft successful legislation. Governments will need to consult with the business sector before legislation is drafted to help promote understanding of these processes, incorporate recommendations to streamline red tape, and raise awareness in the business community of critical threats that can allow them to adapt their internal due diligence. But this will require a balance to ensure that economic security is not traded away for the sake of economic development. Including civil society is also essential to ensure effective transparency and monitoring of review processes to make sure they are not used for corrupt purposes or overlook key threats.

As NATO heads into its seventy-fifth year, its member states and partner institutions need to adapt to new challenges. Robust investment screening across the whole of the Alliance will help strengthen NATO against economic weapons that are increasingly central to today’s conflicts.

Jeffrey Lightfoot is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is the Bratislava-based program director for Europe at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

John Kay is a program manager at the Center for International Private Enterprise and worked previously in the Balkans with the US Agency for International Development.

The post Authoritarian investment in southeastern Europe is a security threat. Here’s what NATO can do. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

• Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for cooperation
• Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset
• Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects
• Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process
• I. Placement and access
• II. Focused understanding
• III. Options
• Targeting throughout the competition continuum
• Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process
• Data
• Sense
• Make sense
• Act
• Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict
• Shaping the environment
• Shaping across the physical and virtual domains
• Capability development
• The way forward
• Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum
• Incorporating all instruments of power
• Embracing the global nature of problem sets
• Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture
• Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards
• Conclusion
• About the authors

Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for competition

Traditional joint force deterrence is no longer sufficient: a near-singular focus on armed conflict and platform-based capability development fails to deter strategic adversaries like China and Russia from their pursuit of strategic objectives while simultaneously increasing the risk of war. Simply owning the most advanced weaponry, while ceding ground in the competitive space left of conflict, is not enough to meet US deterrence needs, nor is it sufficient to ensure the joint force prevails in conflict. Expanding the joint force’s construct for targeting and effects generation will enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to more effectively deter future conflict while simultaneously shaping the environment to the joint force’s advantage in conflict should deterrence fail.

Why the twenty-first century security environment merits an updated approach

Today’s security threats span the competition continuum, cut across theaters and domains, and are intensified through the application of emerging technologies. The joint force faces challenges spanning the full competition continuum from high-end conflict to gray zone competition, including cyber threats and economic coercion, to cooperation. Technological advancements have changed the character of threats, the types of activities that the DOD can conduct, the speed at which it can act, and expanded its notion of physical and non-physical tools and effects. Specifically, the evolution of the cyber domain has enabled the joint force to gain access to non-physical spaces and generate options to achieve effects in a matter of milliseconds. The realities of twenty-first century competition drive the need to confront adversaries across a global contact layer to counter malign activities and proactively advance US strategic objectives. In other words, actions in one theater or domain can generate options and lead to outcomes in distant corners of the globe.

Moreover, the joint force faces a far more sophisticated adversary in China—qualitatively and quantitatively—than it did in countering violent extremist organizations over the past two decades. Strategic competition requires a significant mindset shift to effectively harness the effects of multiple instruments of power in a global, multi-domain, and coherent manner. DOD doctrine acknowledges this, but the department and joint force have yet to fully operationalize it.

While many activities executed along the competition continuum can enable success in conflict, specific operations, activities, and investments are necessary to ensure joint force superiority in direct combat, especially considering the criticality of combined arms warfare with allies and partners, as well as the seamless integration of multi-domain fires and effects. joint force activities must continually pursue positional advantage across the competition continuum to achieve the necessary balance between deterrence and conflict preparation. Yet, currently, the level of attention to and investment in preparation for armed conflict inhibits the joint force from leveraging the vast data, tools, and authorities at its disposal to prevent such conflict from occurring in the first place.

How joint force operations can meet an evolving threat landscape

The joint force must update its approach to targeting and effects generation to respond to the range of security challenges at hand, else it risks losing without going to war. Success across the full competition continuum will be enabled by the joint force’s ability to effectively harness data and a wide spectrum of tools and authorities with speed, precision, and lethality. This necessitates a deeper and more informed understanding of adversary capabilities, the operating environment, the interconnected nature of the physical and virtual domains, and the range of data sources available to operators. By “expanding its competitive mindset and competitive approach”¹ —to include and integrate tools, information, and actions that span the competition continuum—the joint force can exploit this understanding to apply the right effects to the right problems at the right times, advancing strategic objectives and maintaining informational, decisional, and combat dominance. An expanded competitive mindset will allow the joint force to view competition not as an inevitable march toward future conflict, but rather as a persistent effort to gain and maintain positional advantage across all domains.

The joint force is designed to excel at crisis response; it must make a deliberate mindset shift to plan prior to impending crisis (and prevent such scenarios from occurring in the first place). However, while the urgency of evolving the joint force’s targeting framework is evident across doctrine and policy,² the joint force has not yet taken to scale an assertive approach to dominating across the competitive space. Doctrine included in the DOD’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Joint Concept for Competing, for instance, make clear that the department and joint force are thinking about strategic competition more broadly, yet operationally—through authorities, combatant commands, and collaboration with different agencies and allies—DOD and the joint force have yet to fully realize integrated deterrence.

What this report sets out to achieve

Operationally, the joint force has not adapted to an era of strategic competition, which requires targeting across theaters and domains, the entire competition continuum, and leveraging the range of data sources at its disposal. Doing so requires the joint force to stitch together the data, tools, and authorities needed to achieve global objectives—rather than viewing missions as constrained to a singular region or ends, as has been the status quo.

This report outlines a framework to leverage existing targeting models to more assertively and deliberately compete by: 1) incorporating an expanded use of military and interagency capabilities; 2) leveraging expansive public and private data and harnessing it for effect through emerging technologies; and 3) smartly balancing priorities and weight of effort related to competition and conflict preparation. The authors offer key action areas for implementation at scale.

Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset

While the Pentagon recognizes it must adopt a new mindset to prevail across the competition continuum, it continues to approach targeting and fires through a lens of armed conflict. Traditional approaches to targeting and fires still prevail across the joint force despite the recognition of a need to expand them. Traditionally, the joint force aligns “sensors to shooters” (i.e., targeting) to inflict damage on enemy personnel, materiel, or infrastructure (i.e., fires or effects generation). This sentiment is expressed through variations of the targeting cycle, whether it be the dynamic targeting kill chain (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess) or the Special Operations Forces-preferred cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate). These processes lend well to a temporal and kinetic approach to targeting and fires—exemplified by strikes on violent extremist organization (VEO) leadership networks or disabling mobile surface-to-air threats as part of a layered suppression of enemy air defenses effort—yet they are insufficient for generating the nonlethal and continuous effects necessary in today’s expansive security environment. This traditional approach to targeting and fires is incongruent with current DOD realities, given “most joint force activities occur in the context of cooperation and competition below armed conflict.”⁴

As the DOD recognizes through its integrated deterrence concept, the joint force’s tool kit expands beyond the military arsenal, and solely relying on traditional approaches for targeting and effects is limiting. As articulated in the NDS, integrated deterrence campaigning calls for the joint force—in alignment with and often in a supporting role to other instruments of power found across the interagency—to execute “logically linked” activities to advance “strategy-aligned priorities over time” in order to counter or complicate competitors’ coercion across the globe.⁵ Linking activities across global campaigns require a high level of understanding of competitors’ intent and capabilities and their underlying geopolitical realities, enabled by prolonged access across multiple domains, which creates options to leverage multiple effects in achieving desired ends. For example, developing an understanding of how China’s coercive economic activities in Africa and Latin America support its broader global ambitions can inform the breadth (and complexity) of US response options. While the joint force typically excels at responding to crises, single-purpose platforms and the constant rotation of forces often prohibit the long-duration stare that integrated deterrence requires for proactive campaigning left of crisis.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects

To achieve integrated deterrence, this paper outlines a model for operationalizing it. The joint force must meld the existing framework for joint targeting with a model that places a premium on gaining placement and access in a domain or region, enabling a focused understanding of an entity of interest, to facilitate a range of options for the joint force to execute in concert with other instruments of power, whether in a supported or supporting role. Each layer includes the concepts of persistence, local distinction, and global relevance, and can be in a near-constant state of change based on the sensing environment. For example, security cooperation with a partner in Southeast Asia requires access, understanding, and options that are: 1) persistent, to ensure ongoing understanding and to achieve effects over the long term; 2) locally distinct based on regional and local considerations; and 3) globally relevant, acknowledging that awareness and action related to one country affects global dynamics and goals. This layered model is represented in Figures 1 and 2 and further described below.

Integrated Deterrence Targeting. The figures above convey the elements of the joint targeting cycle and the dynamic targeting process (figure 1), with a philosophical and nonlinear pyramid approach to developing options for complex problems (figure 2). These two frameworks must be fused together to operationalize integrated deterrence. The joint force’s traditional targeting cycle must be informed by a foundation of situational awareness. Data, tools, and authorities are all necessary mechanisms to establish situational awareness.

Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process

Adopting this layered model is critical for two reasons. First, the complex, global, and multi-domain problem sets the DOD faces today necessitate options that are similarly sophisticated in nature and cut across the competition continuum. By prioritizing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of problem sets, the joint force is presented with a wider array of options to address key challenges. Such focused understanding is possible when the near-infinite amount of data available across the public and private sectors is transformed into usable information and, ultimately, intelligence.

Second, a new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects. The joint force has the authority to, and does, execute non-kinetic targeting, albeit insufficiently, yet it prioritizes kinetic fires as part of the traditional targeting cycle. Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict. Yet, alone, the military instrument of power is insufficient for the problem sets germane to integrated deterrence. While the joint force has significantly advanced its organic non-kinetic capabilities, it primarily leverages kinetic effects, which neglects other instruments of power, disincentivizes creative thinking, and leads to poor integration with interagency partners.⁶ A high degree of awareness of the capabilities and authorities that other instruments of power bring to the table is critical such that they can be synchronized with, or amplified by, joint force activities at all echelons.

The process of generating placement and access, focused understanding, and options is not linear, and each stage can and should inform the others over time. Specific placement and access may be generated to understand a particular problem in a sophisticated manner such that novel options can be developed. Similarly, focused understanding may drive the need for additional or alternative access to close critical intelligence gaps and inform options. Likewise, commanders may demand options to address a particular problem, which in turn will inform the planning process to generate the necessary access and understanding. Below is an overview of the three foundational elements of the pyramid.

I. Placement and access

To develop the focused understanding required for integrated deterrence, the joint force cannot stare at problems from afar. Placement and access are foundational to developing an enhanced understanding of the problem sets facing the United States. Placement and access, however, does not necessarily mean physical proximity of the military to a particular interest area—it also encompasses virtual presence and can be developed by the joint force, interagency partners, and allied counterparts. It also implies some degree of usability, sustainability, and repeatability; simply visiting a location or gaining virtual access to a network does not equate to true placement and access. Rather, that access must be repeatable if it is temporal in nature, sustainable over operationally relevant time periods, and usable for alternate purposes such as data collection, security cooperation, or reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Placement and access can be enhanced by leveraging data from a multitude of sources to enable the joint force insight into digital networks of value to access, or the nature of key partnerships required for physical access. Additionally, enhancing existing authorities and making them more flexible would allow units pursuing a mission set in one area to adapt and undertake additional mission sets that may be valuable for a broader or global mission set.

Evolving the joint force approach to placement and access will open a range of opportunities given the interconnected nature of global problem sets. For example, France’s historical security cooperation and counterterrorism activities in the Sahel region of West Africa, during the 2010s, could have also served as an access vector to increasing understanding of the growing threat of Russian private military corporations (PMC) like Wagner Group in the region. This physical proximity can enable a deeper understanding of Wagner’s activities in the region, potentially driving requirements for further physical or virtual access or informing options in line with global campaign plans to counter Russian malign influence. Critically, the joint force must explore means to creatively exploit access when mission convergences exist—units or platforms deployed for one purpose, such as countering VEO, may enable access vectors to support another mission, such as strategic competition, and vice versa. While clarity of primary and secondary objectives of missions would need to remain, the makeup of units and task forces, and the requisite authorities given to them, should be meaningfully considered to capitalize on mission convergences. Not only does this approach create efficiencies with respect to endeavors like security cooperation, but it also offers the opportunity to obfuscate strategic intentions.

II. Focused understanding

Focused understanding of an actor, environment, or relationship is required to solve complex problems, not only due to the sophisticated capabilities of strategic adversaries but also because integrated deterrence campaigns are global in nature. Transregional, multi-domain problems cannot be thoroughly addressed in compartmentalized and only localized ways. Rather, the joint force must stitch together regional understandings based on local access and conditions with broader knowledge informed by other global touch points. The roles of partners, both interagency and international, are critical in developing focused understanding. Not only do they enable multi-domain access, but they also provide unique perspectives. The vast amounts of commercial and government data can and should be harnessed and fused to improve focused understanding of actors and problem sets. While data from traditional sources is immensely valuable, open-source information—organized into actionable information—can drastically improve understanding of patterns and behavior. For example, social media data may help inform US forces of the presence of an adversarial force’s covert presence in a country that may be hard to identify or find evidence for using other means. Ultimately, the fusing of different data sources more consistently can help understanding across the competition continuum.

Building on the previous example, to address Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel, the joint force should first understand how those activities tie into Russia’s global campaign to secure influence and create instability through expeditionary PMC activities. A holistic understanding of Wagner’s activities across the Sahel, Central Africa, Latin America, Syria, and Eastern Europe presents a more informed picture of the totality of the problem, as well as the associated pressure points, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Moreover, the local US country team, elements of the intelligence community, French forces, and host-nation partners will all view the Wagner problem in different lights, which can enhance the joint force’s perspective and is necessary in developing viable options leveraging all instruments of power.

This combination of regional and global understanding, enabled by joint force and partner access and capabilities, ultimately informs a far greater range of options than is achieved strictly through a regional military lens, which has been the status quo. Critically, focused understanding better informs risk assessments at echelon, abating risk aversion frequently seen at higher levels of command authority that are farthest removed from the tactical edge.

III. Options

Senior leaders and commanders typically request a range of options to address problems, both to allow flexibility and enable sound decision-making in light of strategic priorities and risks. The Joint Concept for Competing calls for the joint force to:

While doctrinally this is clear, today’s traditional approach to targeting and competition limits the most effective suite of options from being generated. More-nuanced options may place the joint force in a supporting role to other departments and agencies: for example, conducting traditional manhunting activities (via military authorities) to enable a diplomatic action such as a démarche (via Department of State authorities). The level of sophistication required to achieve what the Joint Concept calls for, especially across activities below armed conflict, makes both risk and efficacy assessments challenging. It is far more difficult to quantify the effectiveness of a campaign to counter Chinese regional influence—for example, assessing long-duration efforts to obstruct effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to secure access, basing, and overflight—than it was to measure the success of kinetic drone strikes during the Global War on Terrorism. This challenge is met not only by prioritizing focused understanding but also by parlaying that understanding into a range of options that may be locally distinct but support global campaign plan objectives.

Ultimately, options for senior decision-makers are developed to achieve outcomes that are in service of more-aspirational objectives. Again, examining Wagner activity, a desired outcome of an operation could be to deny Wagner’s ability to securely communicate between several outstations across the Sahel. The aspirational objective is to critically degrade Wagner’s ability to conduct and sustain expeditionary activities globally.

Targeting throughout the competition continuum

This model for the generation of options for complex problems must be melded with an adaptation in the application of traditional joint force targeting processes. Joint targeting is not solely reliant on joint force tools, capabilities, and authorities; it can and should incorporate other instruments of power—by collaborating across departments and agencies—to bolster data and inform understanding, as well as “identify, develop, and affect targets to meet commander objectives.”⁸

Take, for example, a PRC network in Latin America that facilitates command and control of dual-use infrastructure. Here, data could be harnessed from the intelligence (e.g., National Security Agency) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Regional Security Office) instruments of power to identify a particular local criminal network that facilitates relevant PRC contracting activities. Host-nation law enforcement can then apply pressure on the criminal network to share information about the PRC actors with whom it engages routinely. Over time, this information can help generate several options to gain access to the objective network through Special Operations Forces-enabled cyber activities. Throughout, the military (e.g., Military Information Support Operations) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Global Engagement Center) instruments of power can expose malign PRC practices through information operations to positively shape narratives in line with strategic objectives. The joint targeting cycle could be leveraged multiple times for:

• Employing traditional manhunting techniques to find and fix specific local criminal actors of interest, develop their pattern of life, then using non-kinetic fires to register their phones with specific networks that enable intelligence access to key digital data.
• Leveraging data obtained through financial (e.g., Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control) instruments of power to target specific institutions that enable transactions between local criminal networks and the PRC. This data can be correlated with intelligence derived from the activities above, as well as populated to other portions of the joint force focused on countering PRC dual-use activities to further global understanding of their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
• Conducting intelligence preparation of the cyber environment to find and fix key nodes that are vulnerable to offensive cyber fires (e.g., US Cyber Command), as well as to bolster and amplify information operations that counter local PRC propaganda strategies.

The myriad of joint targeting activities outlined above not only enable specific tactical actions but also inform or further placement and access that continuously matures the collective understanding of the operating environment. Given the nature of strategic competitors, much of this understanding can be exported to other locations to bolster awareness and enable the linking of activities in a logical way as outlined in the NDS. At the center of this process is data, and as stated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist, “our ability to fight and win wars requires that we become world leaders in operationalizing and protecting our data resources at speed and scale.”⁹

Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process

The joint force’s ability to leverage data at speed and scale, predicated on its adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), enables this framework for targeting and effects generation. Data informs the nature of required access, feeds the focused understanding process, and enables the development of well-informed options that artfully balance desired outcomes with strategic risk. However, raw and unstructured data in isolation does not create a decisive advantage. Rather, it must be harnessed for effect, transforming data into both information and intelligence that is usable and accessible at the speed of relevance.

While the importance of data is nothing new, the joint force must grapple with the explosion of available data spanning all domains, sectors, and sources. Technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) present meaningful ways to navigate this near-infinite amount of data. The 2020 DOD Data Strategy envisions the department as a “data-centric organization that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency,” with particular focus on enabling all-domain operations, more rapid and informed decision-making, and organizational business analytics.¹¹ Moreover, AI makes determinations and finds data connections in ways humans alone cannot, encapsulating everything from making obvious connections more rapidly (e.g., using satellite data to geolocate battlefield equipment) to identifying valuable datasets overlooked by humans (e.g., how commercial shipping telemetry data can enable deeper understanding of the PRC’s fifth-generation [5G] infrastructure development in Africa).

Data

Data is obtained by a variety of automated or manual and physical or virtual means. Any entity that can obtain data is considered a sensor. Data becomes information once put into context prescribed with meaning by the observer. Often, the meaning prescribed by the observer can be adapted as understanding of the environment grows, making particular datasets more or less useful. The process by which information is transformed into intelligence is complex and combines both art and science as described in JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence:

• Intelligence fuses and evaluates information from multiple sources to provide the most accurate assessment possible of the current state of the operating environment.
• From current assessments, intelligence draws predictive estimates of the full range of potential alternative future states of the operating environment.
• To inform decisions, intelligence illuminates how the operating environment may react to different friendly options under consideration.¹²

The flow from data to intelligence—known as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) cycle—is illustrated in Figure 3, overlaid with the targeting framework from Figure 2.

The nature of today’s security environment necessitates the execution of PED at greater speed and scale than is achievable by humans alone. Particularly, the operating environment below armed conflict—which encompasses most joint force activities—places a premium on scale. To effectively compete globally and deter China and Russia, large quantities of data must be triaged and transformed into intelligence to inform transregional and multi-domain activities that are logically linked. In contrast, armed conflict—the highest-risk joint force activity—places a premium on speed. Rapidly processing and disseminating targeting data, effectively integrating kinetic and non-kinetic fires against mobile targets, and incorporating virtual capabilities that can affect adversary nodes within milliseconds would be impossible without AI/ML and human-machine teaming. The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept describes the importance of this flow from data to intelligence based on the requirement for “joint force commanders to ‘sense,’ ‘make sense,’ and ‘act’ in the operational environment.”¹³ While this paper is not focused on the JADC2 and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concepts, the employment of this paper’s updated targeting and effects process would support the more rapid implementation of JADO/JADC2 across the joint force.

The process of sensing, making sense, and acting is continuous. The speed by which this process plays out is variable based on the nature of the domain, location along the continuum, commander’s intent, and both local and global risk considerations. Deliberate planning and preparation of the operating environment, to include the establishment of relationships and infrastructure, deployment of sensors, and data architecture, and other such activities are necessary to enable this process to occur with speed downstream. In particular, active conflict places a premium on achieving maximum speed for this process, which simultaneously necessitates extensive preparation and autonomy.

Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict

Conflict preparation is the persistent, locally distinct, and global sensing of the target ecosystem. It is a dynamic process that constantly generates and updates the integrated targeting planning and execution decisions. Prevailing in armed conflict is the ultimate basis for the existence of the joint force, and places a significant premium on preparation to maintain a position of advantage, inform capability development, and hold adversaries at risk. Armed conflict exists on the far-right side of the competition continuum and represents the most consequential activity the joint force must prepare for and, when called upon, execute. While often referred to in sterilized terminology, a clear description of armed conflict—the application of violence to destroy an enemy’s will and means to resist—serves to highlight the care and attention that preparation for conflict requires. While any type of conflict requires serious attention, high-end armed conflict against a peer adversary represents the most potentially dangerous scenario for which the joint force must prepare. While the objective of integrated deterrence is to deter conflict from occurring in the first place, it is equally about shaping the environment to ensure joint force dominance should deterrence fail. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, “while commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict.”¹⁵

Conflict preparation is a balancing act. The joint force must weigh concerns of strategic risk and escalation management: “Tilting the competitive balance too far in one’s own favor will affect an adversary’s decision-making and behavior, but the effect may be vertical or horizontal escalation, not compliance.”¹⁶ Smartly preparing for conflict to create and maintain advantage over an adversary can be a campaign in its own right and must involve shaping activities as well as capability development. These activities will often nest within an overarching integrated deterrence campaign, but at times these endeavors may diverge, at which point the balance of priority and weight of effort must be considered. For example, winning a conflict to defend the Panama Canal would be a clear priority of the United States. However, preparation for such a conflict is not assigned the same weight of effort as, for example, the defense of Taiwan, which is being treated as a high-likelihood event by the Pentagon today.

The United States will not achieve a decisive warfighting advantage against a near-peer competitor through sheer mass or weapon systems alone—rather, the victor will be the military that stacks the deck in its advantage before conflict erupts. Russia’s current war in Ukraine highlights the severity of high-end armed conflict involving near-peer competitors. While great wartime effort is aimed at bolstering sustainment through industrial base and supply chain modernization, operational activities will eventually be curtailed to whatever pace can be sustained through resupply. The joint force’s future advantage will hinge on its ability to: 1) advantageously shape the environment and 2) field capabilities with greater speed, precision, and lethality than its adversary.

Shaping the environment

Shaping the environment is crucial to securing a position of advantage across multiple domains left of conflict. In the context of targeting and effects generation, activities to shape the environment must center around closing critical operational and intelligence gaps associated with a prioritized target list tied to operational plans. These activities are intended to enhance precision and lethality of engagement and shorten the kill chain once armed conflict begins. In line with the framework espoused in this report, focused understanding of the enemy’s order of battle, critical infrastructure, battle management tactics, techniques and procedures, and standard operating procedures is key to establishing and maintaining a prioritized target list. In this way, portions of the joint targeting cycle are accomplished prior to conflict, informing weaponeering recommendations across kinetic and non-kinetic effects, as well as the requirements necessary to develop new capabilities to counter enemy systems for which the joint force does not yet possess a solution.

Moreover, shaping activities can be geared toward increasing resiliency in the joint targeting process. Much attention is given to the challenges of contested, degraded, and operationally limited (CDO) environments and how they complicate traditional means by which the joint force projects combat power. Peer adversaries can contest environments in a multitude of ways such as anti-access/area denial capabilities, electromagnetic interference, countering space situational awareness, and defensive cyber operations. Shaping activities must prioritize alternate means of accomplishing warfighting functions given the potential for primary means to become denied or degraded. Ironically, the CDO nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to a much more conventional and analogue fight than anticipated. This highlights the importance of bolstering resiliency through shaping operations, as peer adversary denial capabilities may effectively cancel out one another’s high-end platforms.

Shaping across the physical and virtual domains

As is the case throughout the competition continuum, the contact layer for armed conflict is both physical and virtual. Traditional physical targets include surface-to-air missile systems, radars, maritime vessels, and command posts, and they exist in quantities of hundreds or thousands; virtual targets include network nodes tied to communication systems, power infrastructure, situational awareness, and early warning, and they are quantified in the millions. When expanding the battlefield to the virtual domain, synchronization of kinetic and non-kinetic effects can lead to significant advantages across the joint warfighting functions¹⁷ and with regard to the principle of mass.

Gaining a competitive advantage traditionally depends on availability and posture: the forces available, and on what timeline, are determined by their current posture. In the physical world, this construct presents challenging time-distance problems when considering global conflicts, raising questions for both escalation management as well as force preservation. The virtual world can alter this paradigm by enabling virtual mass, leveraging cyber operations to hold adversary networks and capabilities at risk at unprecedented speed and scale. Even modest impact on adversary capabilities executed on this scale of mass and speed can complicate the enemy’s risk calculus and mitigate some risk associated with physical force flow into theater. Given the challenges of logistics and sustainment, efficiencies gained through the employment of virtual capabilities provide a significant advantage during a protracted conflict. Saying this, virtual capabilities are not a silver bullet and effects delivered through cyberspace are insufficient in isolation during armed conflict, and often require large up-front investment in time and resources.

The evolution of virtual targeting and effects, to include the integration with physical targeting and fires, drives a greater premium on shaping the environment prior to conflict. To hold millions of virtual targets at risk instantaneously necessitates significant preparation of the environment. Indeed, a multiyear campaign built around access and understanding—by, with, and through regional allies and partners—may be necessary to simply gain access to the right adversary networks. Development and installation of cyber capabilities would be executed in parallel, with the associated development and intelligence gaps feeding back into the overall campaign approach. Shaping campaigns can provide the decisive advantage once armed conflict begins, all while informing the joint force of its own potential vulnerabilities and thus allowing for continued defensive hardening in stride.

Capability development

While fielding innovative and advanced technologies is critical to maintaining a decisive battlefield advantage, technology (whether platform or software-based) does not on its own equate to capability.¹⁸ Rather, it is the combination of technology, tactics, and training that creates a true capability—for instance, the United States sells fifth-generation fighter jets to other nations, but those nations do not instantly gain the capability to execute low-observable deep strike operations. Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations. To that end, furthering capability development is an objective for the campaigning framework outlined in this paper.

Training AI/ML algorithms often emulates or requires real-world data, further underscoring the need for capability development to harness data for effect. While great strides have been made in emulation for training, the real world offers the most significant data, which is accessible through robust campaigning activities across the joint force in concert with interagency and international partners. The integration of emerging weapon system technology such as hypersonics, lasers, and space-based fires is equally critical. Capabilities such as JADC2 seek to establish the necessary datacentric architecture for seamless integration of information and effects, which span employment times from milliseconds to hours. However, without AI/ML-driven predictive capabilities in the loop, joint force commanders will be challenged to make appropriate targeting and weaponeering decisions amid a large-scale conflict, creating significant risk with respect to sustainment, logistics, and force protection. Without a similar distribution of situational awareness, authority, and capability to the tactical edge, the joint force will not be able to field a credible combat force in a CDO environment where being disconnected from higher headquarters is the norm.

Lastly, while security cooperation is a foundational activity underlying integrated deterrence, the execution of high-end combined arms warfare with allies and partners requires a great deal of specific investment. This includes years of combined training, exercises, and rehearsals to create a dependable capability, especially when factoring in the complexity of integrating emerging technology. Incorporating allies and partners into the joint force-led scheme of maneuver will be critical to maintaining an advantage in targeting and effects generation. However, information-sharing hurdles, disparate rules of engagement, authorities, and cultural considerations must be ironed out in advance of conflict such that the full force of allied firepower can be realized. Ensuring that key allies are fielding capabilities that are JADC2 compatible will be critical to achieving the shared situational awareness required for a common operating picture. Making strides of this nature and fielding a combat-credible combined force will not be accomplished through sporadic exercises, key leader engagements, or exchanges; the joint force must train with allies and partners in the same manner with which it trains internally.

In sum, high-end conflict with a peer adversary presents the most difficult and high-risk challenge, and it requires specific attention given the gravity of its nature. When adequately prioritized, preparation for armed conflict prescribes a unique set of requirements for the joint force and its partners to execute during cooperation and competition and across multiple domains and instruments of power, which at times may overlap or diverge from deterrence. Shaping activities of this nature fall expressly within the proposed proactive targeting and effects framework given that, in the event of war, “these capabilities will shape the environment to ensure combat dominance and our ability to end any conflict on our terms.”¹⁹

The way forward

Implementing change is no easy task, especially when considering the massive scale of the joint force. Nonetheless, a tidal wave of contemporary strategies, guidance and policy documents, and service visions all speak to the urgent need for change. Culture—coupled with procedural and technological changes—will be key to enabling sustainable adoption of a new approach.

Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum

First, to deter armed conflict the joint force must adopt and operationalize the competitive mindset shift outlined in recent strategic doctrine. While armed conflict is never desirable, regardless of scale, high-end warfare between nuclear-armed peer competitors is of such gravity that deterring it from ever occurring is crucial. General Mark A. Milley’s assertion that “traditional joint force deterrence” is “less effective,” alludes to the notion that owning the most sophisticated or greatest quantity of weaponry is inadequate on its own as a deterrent.²¹ Moreover, while an adversary’s belief in the joint force’s will to act is critical to deterrence, it cannot solely revolve around direct military force given escalation concerns. Rather, adopting a more proactive and creative approach to strategic competition can simultaneously deter malign behavior while complicating, confusing, and frustrating adversary decision-making. The spectrum of views on Russia’s war in Ukraine are informative in this regard: Some highlight US and NATO success in arming Ukraine in its valiant campaign to oppose Russia’s invasion, whereas others view the ongoing war as “a direct result of the West’s lack of resolve and failure to credibly deter Russia” from waging war on the European continent more broadly, regardless of NATO borders.²² This latter sentiment pushes the force to adopt cultural change in order to deter future conflicts. Of course, the United States cannot deter all conflicts from occurring. However, well-informed global campaign plans can and should inform the prioritization of operational activities tied to certain potential conflicts the joint force deliberately seeks to deter.

Incorporating all instruments of power

The joint force need not abandon its traditional strengths; rather, it ought to smartly evolve its approaches to incorporate all instruments of power to expand access, fuel understanding, and generate a range of options regardless of location within the competition continuum. Increased training and education on the nature of authorities and tools that the various instruments of power can bring to the fight is critical for joint leaders. In this way, entities like the State Department or Intelligence Community do not simply represent “concurrence” boxes that must be checked to get military operations approved. Rather, they can be incorporated as partners that offer unique access vectors, diverse understanding, and a variety of tools to support or be supported by military actions, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. As described in this framework, adopting this change bolsters the joint force’s capability to target within any domain, and similarly expands the nature of effects, fires, and actions available to achieve desired outcomes.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) exemplify this approach and could be scaled to enable joint targeting and effects generation. Scaling a similar approach to that of the JIATF, however, requires cultural adaptation. JIATFs are tailor-built to address singular problems and combine multiple instruments of power—and their accompanying authorities and capabilities—under a single chain of command to create unity of effort. However, unity of effort does not necessitate unity of command: The joint force can lead the integrated deterrence effort without being in charge, and it often does play a supporting role to its interagency counterparts. This requires senior leaders to establish a culture that moves beyond “coordination” and “deconfliction” and toward “collaboration.” Increased organizational trust, built upon real-world operational experiences, will increase trust both across departments and in the disparate datasets produced across the instruments of power, ultimately amplifying the predictive capabilities of the AI architecture this framework is reliant upon. Moving toward collaboration is similarly critical as it pertains to enhancing the aggregate power among allies and partners.

Embracing the global nature of problem sets

The joint force must also embrace the concept of a global, multi-domain contact layer. When viewing the world solely through the lens of armed conflict, the joint force focuses narrowly on Russia in Europe and the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Targeting and effects generation in Latin America, Africa, or the Arctic are then insufficiently regarded as supporting, complementary, or niche efforts rather than as potential key components of integrated deterrence. Many operational efforts—such as security force assistance, building a partner’s combat capability, gaining access, and illuminating vulnerabilities of an adversary’s capabilities—require significant time and resource investments. Senior leaders must understand why, for example, a multiyear effort to gain placement and access in Equatorial Guinea fits within the global campaign to counter PRC malign influence; otherwise they will be less likely to resource it (in this case, Equatorial Guinea is a candidate for the establishment of what would be the PRC’s first Atlantic naval base).²³ As such, combatant commanders who lead global campaign plans, such as the global campaign plan for China, should prioritize regularly communicating their priorities to other combatant commands when activities take place in another geographic area of command. This is especially important when activity falls under the authority of a different combatant command.

Generating senior leader understanding is a by-product of cultivating a joint force that thinks with a competitive mindset. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, the United States “think[s] of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”²⁴ Altering the “peace or war” mentality to a deeper understanding of activities across the competition continuum—and adopting a strategy of proactive targeting harnessing all instruments of power—is necessary to simultaneously deter aggression and effectively prepare for conflict. Combatant command force structure changes; intergovernmental professional training, education, and exercises; and in-garrison and deployed intergovernmental cross-pollination are beyond the scope of this paper but are among concepts worth exploring to enable cultural changes at scale.

Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture

The DOD must build a robust and extensive data architecture, fusing private sector data with government data, and build frameworks and standards to harness it into actionable information. Data fuels everything from access and understanding, to options, targeting, and analysis, to predictions and recommendations. For data to be usable, however, it must first be accessible. Accessibility must occur at echelon given the nature of CDO environments and the expectation that severed links between the tactical edge and higher headquarters elements will be the norm, not the exception.

The joint force needs a data architecture in line with, and as a central component of, the JADC2 concept that aggregates data from all sensors across all domains to enable a proactive framework for targeting and effect. The architecture must encompass the tactical edge, fusing commercial and government-procured data across a spectrum of classification levels. In line with the DoD Data Strategy, such an architecture must make data visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure.²⁵ The DOD must involve the private sector in the process of building this architecture and consider how interoperability standards and technologies can be integrated and kept up to date. Not only will this help the joint force accelerate the PED cycle and act on intelligence, but it will also allow the joint force to operate across the scale of attribution to mitigate the operational and counterintelligence risks inherent to strategic competition.

Moreover, the joint force must explore how classified intelligence can safely be used to facilitate AI/ML algorithmic training. Otherwise, it may inadvertently incur risk to sources, methods, or exquisite platforms. Alternatively, with the appropriate mechanisms, AI/ML algorithms can be trained to reach similar conclusions as classified analysis using only open-source data. This will greatly enhance the joint force’s ability to export capabilities to allies and partners without concern for security-sharing agreements or classification obstacles.

Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards

DOD guidelines and standards must be updated to harness all tools of national power and to enable combatant commands to prioritize global issues alongside their regional areas of responsibility. For distribution of data to achieve the desired effect, the joint force must explore changes in the distribution of authorities, rules of engagement, and the nature of assessing risk. While a lack of authorities is frequently cited as a barrier to accomplishing operational activities, it is often the cumbersome means by which to access existing authorities that stands in the way. If a joint force commander (JFC) can exercise kinetic strike authority at their level but require permission from several echelons higher to execute information operations, the JFC will increasingly rely on kinetic effects. Authorities often lack clear processes by which subordinate commanders can quickly access them. Similarly, when authorities are reserved at the highest echelons, the approval authority is farthest removed from the problem, lacks adequate understanding, and often leads to excessive risk aversion. This plays out with the array of authorities germane to the joint force and will only become more complex and burdensome when expanding the aperture to include other instruments of power. At a minimum, when the National Command Authority delegates authorities to combatant commanders, there ought to be a standardized and coherent process by which subordinate echelons of command can access them efficiently. Additionally, an effective JADO/JADC2 operating environment that collects, disseminates, and harnesses data requires more effective coordination across the US services and manufacturers. The development of standards must be pursued to advance capabilities that are interoperable across the joint force and with US allies. Doing so will help improve the speed and precision of the targeting cycle.

Second, streamlining the approach to accessing authorities goes hand in hand with updating the joint force’s rules of engagement. These concepts help mitigate the concerns around disparate joint force elements operating with degraded or nonexistent contact with higher headquarters elements. Rules of engagement allow for commanders to lead through intent instead of specific guidance, facilitating more rapid and creative localized targeting and effects generation. Distribution of authorities and associated rules of engagement could transform a unit’s guidance from “employ electronic warfare (EW) effects against Russian ORLAN-10s” to “disrupt Russian ISR below 5,000 feet AGL.” The former is prescriptive and limiting; the latter is intent based, provides greater flexibility, and informs the necessary capabilities for the tactical edge to operate autonomously for longer periods of time.

Finally, the department must rethink the way it assesses risk in light of integrated deterrence and a global contact layer. Making informed decisions on risk management is a key underpinning of this framework. Yet, risk assessments are traditionally conducted in a temporal manner: the risk associated with a particular activity, in a particular location, with a particular target. Risks associated with strategic competition are not, however, suited to traditional ways of thinking. Competing with adversaries across a global contact layer requires considering how local risk ties into strategic risk, whether that be transregional or trans-domain. This is further complicated by the imperative to effectively prepare the joint force for combat. If, for example, a particular PRC capability presented a significant problem for the joint force’s ability to execute a contingency response plan, significant investment may be required to mitigate the threat. This may lead to a scenario in which the joint force assumes greater risk elsewhere in the globe to gain access to locations where the PRC has proliferated similar capabilities to increase understanding and develop options for use during crisis. A similar situation could arise where the joint force makes the decision to reveal a capability it would otherwise hold in reserve to complicate an adversary’s decision-making and risk calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Maturing the joint force’s ability to assess risk in this manner must begin with data-informed understanding, shared consciousness, and unity of effort across all instruments of power.

Conclusion

Cultivating a joint force that enables and supports a whole-of-government approach to integrated deterrence is a daunting yet achievable vision, requiring transformational leadership to achieve. “Humans are more important than hardware,” and how leaders harness the joint force’s enduring strategic advantage of human capital will dictate whether success is achieved.²⁶ This paper has outlined a vision to update the way the joint force conducts targeting and effects generation for an era of strategic competition. Evolving the joint force’s model for targeting and effects will require adopting a mindset shift that sees competition as key to setting the conditions for, and ideally avoiding, armed conflict. To truly operationalize integrated deterrence, the joint force must embrace targeting and effects across the competition continuum, leveraging the range of tools at its disposal across its domestic and international counterparts, and avoiding a solely military or kinetic lens. Moreover, through the power of AI, the DOD can harness data for effect and fuel the proactive, continuous, and global campaigning required for integrated deterrence.

Sponsored By

This report was generously sponsored by Lockheed Martin Corporation. The report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.

About the authors

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.)

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense

Fellow

Justin M. Conelli

Senior US Air Force Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan National Security

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, 1 September 1998, this research paper is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 19, Forward Defense director Clementine G. Starling was featured on an episode of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s podcast to discuss gray zone conflict. She was joined by David Van, who is a member of the Australian Senate for Victoria.

Starling discussed Forward Defense’s report “Seizing the advantage: A vision for the next US national defense strategy” which laid out an approach for the US address challenges across the competition continuum. She also described how policymakers think about the gray zone as a space between cooperation and armed conflict.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Starling joins Irregular Warfare Initiative podcast to discuss gray zone conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moscow has led its coercion campaign ever since pro-European Union (EU) candidate Maia Sandu won the presidential election in a landslide in November 2020—much to the Kremlin’s displeasure. Then, Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity won the 2021 parliamentary elections, paving the way for Sandu to officially apply to join the EU. A sustained effort by the Kremlin to undermine the Moldovan government’s credibility followed, and with the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this intimidation campaign moved into high gear, notably through airspace violations, energy-supply manipulation, and official comments about Moldova being “the next Ukraine.” In the most recent example of this campaign, Russian armored forces conducted unannounced military maneuvers in the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria last week.

On February 10 this year, Moldovan Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita resigned following months of protests over inflation and high energy prices, resulting from Moscow’s decision to limit gas exports to Moldova, which is almost completely dependent on Russian energy. Then on February 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin abrogated a 2012 decree that acknowledged Moldovan sovereignty in resolving questions over the future of Transnistria. That cancelation, viewed in Moldova as a hostile act, de facto signaled Putin’s willingness to use force to achieve his aims, as Russian troops in the region lost their status as “peacekeepers” and instead became more like occupation forces. It also shows the lengths to which the Kremlin will go to open a new front in its invasion of Ukraine and to advance its interests in the Black Sea.

Moldova’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is roughly $5,200 a year (one of the lowest in Europe), and its inflation rate peaked at 34 percent after Russia invaded Ukraine and reduced fuel supplies. Yet many Moldovans blame their own government, not the Kremlin, an indication of Russia’s disinformation efforts that inflame the already tense domestic political divide.

While it is landlocked, Moldovan territory includes the Prut, the Dniester, and the Danube rivers, which empty into the Black Sea. Moreover, because it borders Ukraine and is only fifty kilometers from Odesa (Ukraine’s largest seaport), instability in Moldova—especially in Transnistria, which is effectively controlled by Moscow—could directly impact its neighbor’s security. A Russian-dominated Moldova could effectively become a southern Kaliningrad, and in conjunction with Crimea, it could provide Moscow with more control over the northern Black Sea and also possibly the ability to hamper Ukraine’s maritime activities. And, should Russia gain access to more Moldovan territory and flip Chisinau in its favor, Moscow’s expanded presence would also threaten Romania’s security and put even greater pressure on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Moldova has maintained its neutrality, which it had enshrined in its constitution. Despite this sentiment, Moldova is a member of the Partnership for Peace, which allows cooperation with NATO on a variety of activities. Yet Moldova has starved its security sector for decades, hoping its neutrality and Ukraine would protect it. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, Chisinau has sought to reverse this neglect of its military; for example, it expanded its 2024 defense budget by 68 percent compared to its budget in 2022—but that’s still only an increase of approximately eighty million dollars, or 0.55 percent of its GDP.

On paper, Moldova can field a security contingent of 45,000 personnel; however, this force is poorly trained and equipped with virtually no air support. In Transnistria, Russia has 1,500 troops, mainly comprising local recruits. While Moscow might seek to augment these forces, that would be logistically difficult given its failure to take Odesa. Moscow does, however, have significant agents of influence in Moldova who could work more forcefully against the government.

Keeping Moldova out of the Kremlin’s grasp is vital to Eastern European security and NATO’s Black Sea mission. Moldova, NATO, and the West must send clear, unmistakable signals to the Kremlin:

1. The EU should approve the fast-tracking of Moldova’s EU accession, a plan for which Poland recently made the case.
2. While it would be problematic to offer Moldova a fast track to NATO membership—as the Alliance is viewed unfavorably in Moldova, and leaving the policy of neutrality is unpopular there—NATO or its members can take other actions. For example, the promise of air defense and heavy weapons and training in the case of conflict with Russia/Transnistria would be a deterrent.
3. Moldova and the West should provide Moldova’s armed forces with more training and modern equipment, ultimately to improve capabilities and interoperability. Ukraine demonstrated how a Western-oriented training program can give a smaller country’s military an edge over Russia’s armed forces. This could be accomplished without violating Moldova’s neutrality as it would not require deploying foreign forces on Moldovan territory.
4. Moldova should institute a robust strategic-communications and cyber-defense platform to counter Russian malign influence—and the West should help. A platform designed to counter misinformation and disinformation could help galvanize domestic support for greater alignment with NATO and the West.
5. Finally, Moldova is one of the world’s least energy-self-sufficient countries. While Chisinau, with the West’s support, has made progress in source diversification and sector reform, it should continue to wean itself off of Russian oil and gas and electricity from Transnistria. Moldova must build a more resilient energy infrastructure that is not dependent on Russia.

Through its energy manipulation, military intimidation, and official threats, the Kremlin is conducting a classic hybrid warfare campaign against Moldova. In comparison to early 2014—when the world stood stunned in the wake of ‘little green men’ and the effective dismemberment of Ukraine—NATO and Western allies have become more sophisticated in detecting and combating hybrid warfare tactics. Additionally, NATO members’ support to Ukraine, while belated and arguably still inadequate, has been instrumental in Kyiv’s successful defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion. The lessons in Ukraine are unmistakable and should not be lost on Western and Moldovan leadership. Strong leadership, a determined population, and NATO support are indispensable in halting Russian aggression.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.”

The post To secure the Black Sea, the West must help Moldova stand up to Russian aggression appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The general consensus is that private military companies (PMCs) like Wagner Group must be countered because they advance Kremlin interests and help the Putin regime to project Russian power internationally. But a closer look suggests the Wagner Group and other Russian mercenary organizations may ultimately be liabilities and not assets for Putin.

For Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, 2023 already looks to be a tumultuous year. He has accused senior Russian military leaders of “treason” for allegedly holding up logistical and material support to Wagner mercenaries battling for control of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, and recently complained of being cut off altogether from the Kremlin.

Some commentators believe Prigozhin’s frequent jabs at members of the Russian elite could presage a contest for political power that may reach the heights of the Kremlin towers. Indeed, Prigozhin now says that he plans to remold Wagner into “an army with an ideology,” suggesting that he seeks to officially re-brand himself as an out-and-out political operator.

For all the speculation regarding the potential threat Prigozhin poses to the stability of the Putin regime, few have explored the Wagner leader’s relationship to the power structures that Putin himself depends upon for the perpetuation of his rule. In reality, the Wagner Group is as much a product of this system as it is a tool of Kremlin foreign and military policy. Western policymakers seeking to understand the role of Russian private paramilitaries should treat them as a symptom of the institutionalized corruption at the heart of Putin’s regime and not as just another instrument in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox.

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Prigozhin has managed to carve a niche for himself by leveraging opaque corporate networks to facilitate Russian hard and soft power projection in Ukraine, Syria, and various conflict zones across Africa. This appears to be profitable work; his companies have reportedly raked in hundreds of millions of dollars from mineral extraction alone. White House officials have even claimed in recent months that Prigozhin directed Wagner fighters to capture the Ukrainian town of Soledar in order to secure access to nearby salt and gypsum mines. The notion that Prigozhin personally benefits from enabling the Kremlin’s foreign policy adventures appears to be a feature rather than a bug of Putin’s particular approach to governance.

Political scientists generally characterize Putin’s rule as a corrupt patron-client system in which elites are compensated for their allegiance with access to resources. Vladimir Gel’man of the University of Helsinki contends that Putin accepts bad governance by trusted elites to cultivate a loyal, informal power base separate from those formal institutions which might challenge his authority. Russia analyst Mark Galeotti likens this arrangement to a public-private “adhocracy” in which informal networks of enterprising business and political elites, rather than formal institutions, end up taking the initiative in divining and executing official policy.

The Wagner phenomenon reflects a political ecosystem that rewards the stewards of government policy with official as well as illicit perks in exchange for loyalty. Wagner benefits Putin by providing deniable cover for a wide range of military operations outside of Russia. In exchange, Prigozhin is allowed to pursue commercial ventures in the countries where his forces are active.

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Prigozhin’s trajectory is an indication that the Russian state’s claim to a monopoly on violence may be the next frontier to be challenged by Kremlin elites. The Wagner Group’s example appears to have encouraged everyone from Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov to Russian natural gas giant Gazprom to organize PMCs of their own, a trend that some analysts argue could portend a “descent into warlordism.” Recent reports of a company owned by longtime Putin associate Gennadiy Timchenko hiring another PMC outfit not affiliated with Wagner to secure oil and gas infrastructure in Syria further suggest that Prigozhin is not the only person vying to supply PMC services to regime insiders.

International efforts to counter the Wagner network will require many of the same mechanisms used to combat corruption more generally. This will require governments to reflect on how their own institutions play into the interests of figures like Prigozhin, who has pursued journalists through the British courts despite being the subject of UK sanctions. Critics claim transnational imbalances in financial transparency that allow offshore jurisdictions to provide a veil of corporate secrecy to American and European nationals also help to obscure the Wagner network’s operations.

Efforts by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to target Wagner-linked shell companies registered in tax havens are a step in the right direction. But Western governments should also aim to hold accountable those individuals responsible for managing the network of corporate entities behind Wagner’s more mundane business operations.

One may reasonably question why Ukraine and its allies should go after Russian PMCs at all if their continued presence has the potential to undo Putin. Why not let them multiply and further weaken the foundations of the Putin regime? While potentially tempting, such an approach would involve considerable risks. If and when Putin leaves office, this is likely to create a power vacuum in which Russia’s nascent PMC class would flourish. Such an outcome could return Russia to a state of lawlessness reminiscent of the “wild nineties,” a period characterized by a proliferation of organized crime groups whose mercenary enforcers were often veterans of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

Putin often invokes the chaos of the 1990s to justify his authoritarian rule. Tolerating the presence of PMCs like the Wagner Group in the hope that they could unseat Putin risks reducing Russia to new depths of disorder and thereby facilitating the rise of aspiring autocrats in the years to come. Combating Russia’s private paramilitaries is essential not just in order to contain Putin, but to preempt the empowerment of future Russian leaders molded in his likeness.

Allen Maggard is a Russia analyst and specialist in the intersection of Russian political economy and the defense industry at C4ADS.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2023

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

By Anders Åslund

The ICC decision to indict Putin for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad, writes Anders Åslund.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia’s Wagner Group is a feature not a bug of the Putin regime appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There are 150 million US users of TikTok, and the contrast between the creative and often viral nature of clips produced on the platform—including those defending Chew—and the stodgy nature of C-SPAN’s fixed camera positions, pre-planned talking points, and members demanding “yes” or “no” answers to their questions, made for an unfavorable contrast for committee members. US policymakers considering a ban on TikTok need to think about the very serious ramifications to people and small businesses whose livelihoods do, at least in part, rely on the app. Those Americans who use the app for professional and business purposes should have their legitimate concerns addressed by policymakers in a meaningful manner alongside any sort of ban.

But TikTok users’ usage of the social media app, even if only to generate business, does not mitigate the potential threats to US national security associated with it. In December, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines warned about the potential uses of TikTok by Beijing stemming from the data the app collects and the possibility of using it to influence public opinion. TikTok’s algorithm, for example—which experts view as more advanced than that of Facebook parent company Meta—could be used by China to create propaganda that seeks to influence or manipulate elections and the broader information environment.

TikTok’s connections to China’s government stem from it being a wholly owned subsidiary of the Beijing-based company ByteDance. Chew testified that “ByteDance is not owned or controlled by the Chinese government.” However, Article VII of China’s National Intelligence Law of 2017 makes clear the mandated responsibility for private sector companies (and any Chinese organization) to “support, assist, and cooperate” with China’s intelligence community. ByteDance, therefore, has an absolute obligation to turn over to China’s intelligence apparatus any data it requests.

There are significant reasons to be skeptical of Chew’s claims that “Project Texas”—TikTok’s effort to wall off US user data from Chinese authorities by solely storing it in the United States—will prevent China from having access to US user data in the future. Worse, even if one takes Chew at his word that “Project Texas” will accomplish this feat, it defies logic to believe that ByteDance would not—independently or compelled by China’s intelligence agencies—retain a copy of all 150 million current US users’ data.

At the same time, TikTok is just a symptom of a much bigger problem. The United States and its allies have a more fundamental issue when it comes to their citizens using China-based apps, programs, or any technology that collects their data. All China-based companies have the same obligations to provide data information to China’s intelligence services whenever requested.

What the US government can do

TikTok’s ban would mitigate the immediate threat posed by the ByteDance subsidiary, but there’s far more work that needs to be done. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has, up until now, been the most prominent tool used to prevent foreign governments, or individuals associated with them, from making investments in the United States that could be used to ultimately undermine US national security. CFIUS has a specific and meaningful role focused on investments, but nowadays it has too often become the default instrument for reconciling an increasingly broad swath of national security challenges. This is in part because it has a track record of success, but also because it’s one of the only meaningful tools available to policymakers. But it is not an ideal tool for every situation, something best demonstrated by CFIUS’s challenge in resolving TikTok’s ongoing review that has stretched on for more than two years now.

The bipartisan RESTRICT Act—which would give the Department of Commerce the right to review foreign technologies and ban them in the United States or force their sale—is a thoughtful place from which to begin discussions about additional ways to mitigate the US national security challenges related to information and communications platforms available for mass use. But that act alone would not solve the broader data challenges as they exist today.

The lack of federal regulation related to commercial data brokers, which today can and do legally collect and resell the data of millions of Americans, is a glaring gap that needs to be filled immediately. A ban on TikTok, for example, would do nothing to prevent data brokers from aggregating the same consumer data from other apps and re-selling it to commercial entities, including those in China. 

The threat posed by China to US national security, and to Americans’ individual data, is acute. The good news is the United States can deal with these challenges, but it will take more than just banning TikTok.

Jonathan Panikoff is a senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the former director of the Investment Security Group, overseeing the intelligence community’s CFIUS efforts, at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence community, or any other US government agency.

The post Banning TikTok alone will not solve the problem of US data security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Executive summary

In the year since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the conventional assault and advances into Ukrainian territory have been paralleled by a simultaneous invasion of the Ukrainian information environment. This environment, composed of cyber infrastructure, both digital and physical, and the data, networks, and ideas that flow through and across it, is more than a domain through which the combatants engage or a set of tools by which combatants interact—it is a parallel territory that Russia is intent on severing from the global environment and claiming for itself.

Russian assaults on the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, largely privately owned infrastructure, and Ukrainian defense in this space is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies providing aid and assistance. The role of private companies in this conflict seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructure they operate.

Examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine is crucial and looking forward, the United States government must also examine the same questions with regard to its own security and defense:

1. What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
2. How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
3. How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not over and similar aggressions are likely to occur in new contexts and with new actors in the future. By learning these lessons now and strengthening the government’s ability to work cooperatively with the private sector in and through the information space, the United States will be more effective and resilient against future threats.

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 held none of the illusory cover of its 2014 operation; instead of “little green men” unclaimed by Moscow, Putin built up his forces on Ukraine’s border for the entire international community to see. His ambitions were clear: To remove and replace the elected government of Ukraine with a figurehead who would pull the country back under Russia’s hold, whether through literal absorption of the state or by subsuming the entire Ukrainian population under Russia’s political and information control. In the year since the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s defense has held back the Russian war machine with far greater strength than many thought possible in the early months of 2022. President Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government, and the Ukrainian people have repeatedly repelled Russian attempts to topple the state, buttressed in part by the outpouring of assistance from not just allied states, but also local and transnational private sector companies.

Amidst the largest conventional land war in Europe since the fall of the Third Reich, both Russia and Ukraine have directed considerable effort toward the conflict’s information environment, defined as the physical and digital infrastructure over and through which information moves, the tools used to interact with that information, and information itself. This is not only a domain through which combatants engage, but a parallel territory that the Kremlin seeks to contest and claim. Russian efforts in this realm, to destroy or replace Ukraine’s underpinning infrastructure and inhibit the accessibility and reach of infrastructure and tools within the environment, are countered by a Ukrainian defense that prioritizes openness and accessibility.

The information environment, and all the components therein, is not a state or military dominated environment; it is largely owned, operated, and populated by private organizations and individuals around the globe. The Ukrainian information environment, referring to Ukrainian infrastructure operators, service providers, and users, is linked to and part of a global environment of state and non-state actors where the infrastructure and the terrain is largely private. Russian operations within the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, this privately owned infrastructure, and the Ukrainian defense is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies that are providing aid and assistance. These efforts have contributed materially, and in some cases uniquely, to Ukraine’s defense.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war, raises important questions about the degree to which states and societies are dependent on information infrastructure and functionalities owned and operated by private actors, and especially transnational private actors. Although private sector involvement in the war in Ukraine has generally been positive, the fact that the conduct of war and other responsibilities in the realm of statehood are reliant on private actors leads to new challenges for these companies, for the Ukrainian government, and for the United States and allies.

The United States government must improve its understanding of, and facility for, joint public-private action to contest over and through the information environment. The recommendations in this report are intended to facilitate the ability of US technology companies to send necessary aid to Ukraine, ensure that the US government has a complete picture of US private-sector involvement in the war in Ukraine, and contribute more effectively to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment. First, the US government should issue a directive providing assurance and clarification as to the legality of private sector cyber, information, capacity building, and technical aid to Ukraine. Second, a task force pulling from agencies and offices across government should coordinate to track past, current, and future aid from the private sector in these areas to create a better map of US collaboration with Ukraine across the public and private sectors. Third, the US government should increase its facilitation of private technology aid by providing logistical and financial support.

These recommendations, focused on Ukraine’s defense, are borne of and provoke larger questions that will only become more important to tackle. The information environment and attempts to control it have long been a facet of conflict, but the centrality of privately owned and operated technology—and the primacy of some private sector security capabilities in relation to all but a handful of states—pose increasingly novel challenges to the United States and allied policymaking communities. Especially in future conflicts, the risks associated with private sector action in defense of, or directly against, a combatant could be significantly greater and multifaceted, rendering existing cooperative models insufficient.

The Russian information offensive

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines information space—of which cyberspace is a part—as “the sphere of activity connected with the formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use, and storage of information and which has an effect on individual and social consciousness, the information infrastructure, and information itself.¹ Isolating the Ukrainian information space is key to both the short- and long-term plans of the Russian government. In the short term, the Kremlin pursues efforts to control both the flow and content of communications across the occupied areas.² In the longer term, occupation of the information environment represents an integral step in Russian plans to occupy and claim control over the Ukrainian population.

In distinct opposition to the global nature of the information environment, over the past decade or so, the Kremlin has produced successive legislation “to impose ‘sovereignty’ over the infrastructure, content, and data traversing Russia’s ‘information space,’” creating a sectioned-off portion of the internet now known as RuNet.³ Within this space, the Russian government has greater control over what information Russian citizens see and a greater ability to monitor what Russian citizens do online.⁴ This exclusionary interpretation is an exercise in regime security against what the Kremlin perceives as constant Western information warfare against it.⁵ As Gavin Wilde, senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes, the Russian government views the information environment “as an ecosystem to be decisively dominated.”⁶

To the Kremlin, domination of the information environment in Ukraine is an essential step toward pulling the nation into its fold and under its control. Just as Putin views information domination as critical to his regime’s exercise of power within Russia, in Ukraine, Russian forces systematically conduct offensives against the Ukrainian information environment in an attempt to create a similar model of influence and control that would further enable physical domination. This strategy is evident across the Kremlin’s efforts to weaken the Ukrainian state for the last decade at least. In the 2014 and 2022 invasions, occupied, annexed, and newly “independent” regions of Ukraine were variously cut off from the wider information space and pulled into the restricted Russian information space.  

The Crimean precedent – 2014 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not begin in 2022, but in 2014. Examining this earlier Russian incursion illustrates the pattern of Russian offensive behavior in and through the information environment going back nearly a decade—a combination of physical, cyber, financial, and informational maneuvers that largely target or move through private information infrastructure. In 2014, although obfuscated behind a carefully constructed veil of legitimacy, Russian forces specifically targeted Ukrainian information infrastructure to separate the Crimean population from the Ukrainian information environment, and thereby the global information environment, and filled that vacuum with Russian infrastructure and information. 

The Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 was a direct response to the year-long Euromaidan Revolution, which took place across Ukraine in protest of then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to spurn closer relations with the European Union and ignore growing calls to counter Russian influence and corruption within the Ukrainian government. These protests were organized, mobilized, and sustained partially through coordination, information exchange, and message amplification over social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Ustream—as well as traditional media.⁷ In February 2014, after Yanukovych fled to Russia, the Ukrainian parliament established a new acting government and announced that elections for a new president would be held in May. Tensions immediately heightened, as Russian forces began operating in Crimea with the approval of Federal Assembly of Russia at the request of “President” Yanukovych, although Putin denied that they were anything other than “local self-defense forces.”⁸ On March 21, Putin signed the annexation of Crimea.⁹

During the February 2014 invasion of Crimea, the seizure and co-option of Ukrainian physical information infrastructure was a priority. Reportedly, among the first targets of Russian special forces was the Simferopol Internet Exchange Point (IXP), a network facility that enables internet traffic exchange.¹⁰ Ukraine’s state-owned telecommunications company Ukrtelecom reported that armed men seized its offices in Crimea and tampered with fiber-optic internet and telephone cables.¹¹ Following the raid, the company lost the “technical capacity to provide connection between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine and probably across the peninsula, too.”¹² Around the same time, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Valentyn Nalivaichenko, reported that the mobile phones of Ukrainian parliament members, including his own, were blocked from connecting through Ukrtelecom networks in Crimea.¹³

Over the next three years, and through the “progressive centralization of routing paths and monopolization of Internet Service market in Crimea … the topology of Crimean networks has evolved to a singular state where paths bound to the peninsula converge to two ISPs (Rosetelecom and Fiord),” owned and operated by Russia.¹⁴ Russian forces manipulated the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)—the system that helps connects user traffic flowing from ISPs to the wider internet—modifying routes to force Crimean internet traffic through Russian systems, “drawing a kind of ‘digital frontline’ consistent with the military one.”¹⁵ Residents of Crimea found their choices increasingly limited, until their internet service could only route through Russia, instead of Ukraine, subject to the same level of censorship and internet controls as in Russia. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) monitored communications from residents of Crimea, both within the peninsula and with people in Ukraine and beyond.¹⁶ Collaboration between ISPs operating in Crimea through Russian servers and the FSB appears to be a crucial piece of this wider monitoring effort. This claim was partially confirmed by a 2018 Russian decree that forbade internet providers from publicly sharing any information regarding their cooperation with “the authorized state bodies carrying out search and investigative activities to ensure the security of the Russian Federation.”¹⁷

From March to June 2014, Russian state-owned telecom company Rostelcom began and completed construction of the Kerch Strait cable, measuring 46 kilometers (about 28.5 miles) and costing somewhere between $11 and $25 million, to connect the Crimean internet with the Russian RuNet.¹⁸ Rostelcom, using a local agent in Crimea called Miranda Media, became the main transit network for several Crimean internet service providers (ISPs), including KCT, ACS-Group, CrimeaCom, and CRELCOM in a short period of time.¹⁹ There was a slower transition of customers from the Ukrainian company Datagroup to Russian ISPs, but nonetheless, the number of Datagroup customers in Crimea greatly decreased throughout 2014. According to one ISP interviewed by Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “the Kerch Strait cable was used first of all for voice communication … The traffic capacity of this cable was rather weak for commercial communications.”²⁰ But by the end of 2017, remnant usage of Ukrainian ISPs had virtually disappeared, following the completion of a second, better internet cable through the Kerch Strait and a series of restrictions placed on Russian social media platforms, news outlets, and a major search engine by Ukrainian President Poroshenko.²¹ The combination of the new restrictions, and the improved service of Russian ISPs encouraged more Crimeans to move away from Ukrainian ISPs. 

Russia’s efforts to control the information environment within Crimea, and the Russian government’s ability to monitor communications and restrict access to non-Russian approved servers, severely curtailed freedom of expression and belief—earning the region zero out of four in this category from Freedom House.²² Through physical, and formerly private, information infrastructure, Russia was able to largely take control of the information environment within Crimea. 

A parallel occupation – 2022 

Digital information infrastructure 

Just as in 2014, one of the first priorities of invading Russian forces in 2022 was the assault of key Ukrainian information infrastructure, including digital infrastructure. Before, during, and following the invasion, Russian and Russian-aligned forces targeted Ukrainian digital infrastructure through cyber operations, ranging in type, target, and sophistication. Through some combination of Ukrainian preparedness, partner intervention, and Russian planning shortfalls, among other factors, large-scale cyber operations disrupting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, such as those seen previously in 2015 with BlackEnergy and NotPetya, did not materialize.²³ This could be because such cyber operations require significant time and resources, and similar ends can be more cheaply achieved through direct, physical means. Russian cyber operators, however, have not been idle.  

Preceding the physical invasion, there was a spate of activity attributed to both Russian and Russian-aligned organizations targeting a combination of state and private organizations.²⁴ From January 13 to 14, for example, hackers briefly took control of seventy Ukrainian government websites, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, adding threatening messages to the top of these official sites.²⁵ The following day, January 15, Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center reported the discovery of wiper malware, disguised as ransomware, in dozens of Ukrainian government systems, including agencies which “provide critical executive branch or emergency response function,” and an information technology firm that services those agencies.²⁶ A month later, on February 15, Russian hackers targeted several websites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, forcing Ukrainian defense ministry and armed forces websites, as well as those of PrivatBank and Oschadbank, offline.²⁷  Around the same time, according to Microsoft’s special report on Ukraine, “likely” Russian actors were discovered in the networks of unidentified critical infrastructure in Odessa and Sumy.²⁸ The day before the invasion, cybersecurity companies ESET and Symantec reported that a new destructive wiper was spreading across Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian networks, as a second round of DDoS attacks again took down a spate of government and financial institution websites.“²⁹ This activity centered around information—with defacements sending a clear threat to the Ukrainian government and population, DDoS attacks impairing accurate communication, and wiper malware degrading Ukrainian data—and gaining access to Ukrainian data for Russia. Although many of these operations targeted Ukrainian government networks, the attacks moved through or against privately operated infrastructure and, notably, the first public notification and detailing of several of these operations was undertaken by transnational technology companies.  

After February 24, Russian cyber activity continued and the targets included a number of private information infrastructure operators. A March hack of Ukrtelecom—Ukraine’s largest landline operator, which also provides internet and mobile services to civilians and the Ukrainian government and military—resulted in a collapse of the company’s network to just 13 percent capacity, the most severe disruption in service the firm recorded since the invasion began.³⁰ Another such operation targeted Triolan—a Ukrainian telecommunications provider—on February 24 in tandem with the physical offensive and a second time on March 9. These incursions on the Triolan network took down key nodes and caused widespread service outages. Following the March 9 attack, the company was able to restore service, but these efforts were complicated by the need to physically access some of the equipment located in active conflict zones.³¹ These attacks against Ukraine-based information infrastructure companies caused service outages that were concurrent with the physical invasion and afterwards, restricted communications among Ukrainians and impeded the population’s ability to respond to current and truthful information. 

The effectiveness of the operation is debated, although the logic of the attack is straightforward. Russia wanted to constrain, or preferably eliminate, an important channel of communication for the Ukrainian military during the initial stages of the invasion. Traditional, land-based radios, which the Ukrainian military relies on for most of their communications, only work over a limited geographic range, therefore making it more difficult to use advanced, long-range weapons systems.⁴¹ It should be expected that landline and conventional telephony would suffer outages during the opening phases of the war and struggle to keep up with rapidly moving forces.

Initially, it was widely reported that the Russian strike on ViaSat was effective. On March 15, a senior Ukrainian cybersecurity official, Viktor Zhora, was quoted saying that the attack on ViaSat caused “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of the war.⁴² When asked follow-up questions about his quote, Zhora said at the time that he was unable to elaborate, leading journalists and industry experts to believe that the attack had impacted the Ukrainian military’s ability to communicate.⁴³ However, several months later, on September 26, Zhora revised his initial comments, stating that the hack would have impacted military communications if satellite communications had been the Ukrainian military’s principal medium of communication. However, Zhora stated that the Ukrainian military instead relies on landlines for communication, with satellites as a back-up method. He went on to say that “in the case land lines were destroyed, that could be a serious issue in the first hours of war.”⁴⁴ The tension, and potential contradictions, in Zhora’s comments underlines the inherent complications in analyzing cyber operations during war: long-term consequences can be difficult to infer from short-term effects, and countries seek to actively control the narratives surrounding conflict.  

The effectiveness of the ViaSat hack boils down to how the Ukrainian military communicates, and how adaptable it was in the early hours of the invasion. However, it is apparent how such a hack could impact military effectiveness. If Russia, or any other belligerent, was able to simultaneously disrupt satellite communications while also jamming or destroying landlines, forces on the frontlines would be at best poorly connected with their superiors. In such a scenario, an army would be cut off from commanders in other locations and would not be able to report back or receive new directives; they would be stranded until communications could be restored.  

The ViaSat hack had a military objective: to disrupt Ukrainian military access to satellite communications. But the effects were not limited to this objective. The operation had spillover effects that rippled across Europe. In Germany, nearly 6,000 wind turbines were taken offline, with roughly 2,000 of those turbines remaining offline for nearly a month after the initial hack due to the loss of remote connectivity.⁴⁵ In France, modems used by emergency services vehicles, including firetrucks and ambulances, were also affected.⁴⁶

ViaSat is not a purely military target. It is a civilian firm that counts the Ukrainian military as a customer. The targeting of civilian infrastructure with dual civilian and military capability and use has occurred throughout history and has been the center of debate in international law, especially when there are cross-border spillover effects in non-combatant countries. Both the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian law require the aggressor to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. ⁴⁷ What this means in practice, however, is that the aggressor determines whether they deem a target to be a military object and a beneficial target and, therefore, what is legitimate. Konstantin Vorontsov, the Head of the Russian Delegation to the United Nations, attempted to justify Russian actions in October 2022 by saying that the use of civilian space infrastructure to aid the Ukrainian war effort may be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, thereby rendering this infrastructure a legitimate military target.⁴⁸ Similar operations like that against ViaSat are likely to be the new norm in modern warfare. As Mauro Vignati, the adviser on new digital technologies of warfare at the Red Cross, said in November 2022, insofar as private companies own and operate the information infrastructure of the domain, including infrastructure acting as military assets, “when war start[s], those companies, they are inside the battlefield.”⁴⁹

Physical information infrastructure 

In February 2022, as Russian forces moved to seize airfields and key physical assets in Ukraine, they simultaneously assaulted the physical information infrastructure operating within and beneath the Ukrainian information environment. Russian forces targeted this infrastructure, largely privately operated, by taking control of assets where possible and destroying them where not, including through a series of Russian air strikes targeting Ukrainian servers, cables, and cell phone towers.⁵⁰ As of June 2022, about 15 percent of Ukrainian information infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed; by July, 12.2 percent of homes had lost access to mobile communication services, 11 percent of base stations for mobile operators were out of service, and approximately 20 percent of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure was damaged or destroyed.⁵¹ By August “the number of users connecting to the Internet in Ukraine [had] shrunk by at least 16 percent nationwide.”⁵²

In some areas of Ukraine, digital blackouts were enforced by Russian troops to cut the local population off from the highly contested information space. In Mariupol, the last cell tower connecting the city with the outside world was tirelessly tended by two Kyivstar engineers, who kept it alive with backup generators that they manually refilled with gasoline. Once the Russians entered the city, however, the Ukrainian soldiers who had been protecting the cell tower location left to engage with the enemy, leaving the Kyivstar engineers alone to tend to their charge. For three days the engineers withstood the bombing of the city until March 21, when Russian troops disconnected the tower and it went silent.⁵³

Russian forces coerced Ukrainian occupied territories onto Russian ISPs, once again through Rostelcom’s local agent Miranda Media, and onto Russian mobile service providers.⁵⁴ Information infrastructure in Ukraine is made up of overlapping networks of mobile service and ISPs, a legacy of the country’s complicated post-Soviet modernization process. This complexity may have been a boon for its resilience. Russian forces, observed digital-rights researcher Samuel Woodhams, “couldn’t go into one office and take down a whole region … There were hundreds of these offices and the actual hardware was quite geographically separated.⁵⁵ Across eastern Ukraine, including Kherson, Mlitopol, and Mariupol, the Russians aimed to subjugate the physical territory, constituent populations, and Ukrainian information space. In Kherson, Russian forces entered the offices of a Ukrainian ISP and at gunpoint, forced staff to transfer control to them.⁵⁶

Routing the internet and communications access of occupied territories through Russia meant that Moscow could suppress communications to and from these occupied areas, especially through social media and Ukrainian news sites, sever access to essential services in Ukraine, and flood the populations with its own propaganda, as was proved in Crimea in 2014. Moving forward, Russia could use this dependency to “disconnect, throttle, or restrict access to the internet” in occupied territories, cutting off the occupied population from the Ukrainian government and the wider Ukrainian and international community.⁵⁷

The Kremlin’s primary purpose in the invasion of Ukraine was and is to remove the Ukrainian government and, likely, install a pro-Russian puppet government to bring to an end an independent Ukraine.⁵⁸ Therefore, isolating the information environment of occupied populations, in concert with anti-Ukrainian government disinformation, such as the multiple false allegations that President Zelenskyy had fled the country and abandoned the Ukrainian people,⁵⁹ were a means to sway the allegiances, or at least dilute the active resistance, of the Ukrainian people.⁶⁰ Without connectivity to alternative outlets, the occupying Russians could promote false and largely uncontested claims about the progress of the war. In early May 2022 for example, when Kherson lost connectivity for three days, the deputy of the Kherson Regional Council, Serhiy Khlan, reported that the Russians “began to spread propaganda that they were in fact winning and had captured almost all of Mykolaiv.”⁶¹ 

Russia used its assault on the information environment to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and its ability to fulfill its governmental duties to the Ukrainian people. Whether through complete connectivity blackouts or through the restrictions imposed by Russian networks, the Russians blocked any communications from the Ukrainian government to occupied populations—not least President Zelenskyy’s June 13, 2022 address, intended most for those very populations, in which he promised to liberate all occupied Ukrainian land and reassured those populations that they had not been forgotten. Zelenskyy acknowledged the Russian barrier between himself and Ukrainians in occupied territories, saying, “They are trying to make people not just know nothing about Ukraine… They are trying to make them stop even thinking about returning to normal life, forcing them to reconcile.”⁶²

Isolating occupied populations from the Ukrainian information space is intended, in large part, said Stas Prybytko, the head of mobile broadband development within the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, to “block them from communicating with their families in other cities and keep them from receiving truthful information.”⁶³ Throughout 2022, so much of what the international community knew about the war came—through Twitter, TikTok, Telegram, and more—from Ukrainians themselves. From videos of the indiscriminate Russian shelling of civilian neighborhoods to recordings tracking Russian troop movements, Ukrainians used their personal devices to capture and communicate the progress of the war directly to living rooms, board rooms, and government offices around the world.⁶⁴The power of this distributed information collection and open-source intelligence relies upon mobile and internet access. The accounts that were shared after Ukrainian towns and cities were liberated from Russian occupation lay bare just how much suffering, arrest, torture, and murder was kept hidden from international view by the purposeful isolation of the information environment and the constant surveillance of Ukrainians’ personal devices.⁶⁵ The war in Ukraine has highlighted the growing impact of distributed open source intelligence during the conduct of war that is carried out by civilians in Ukraine and by the wider open source research community though various social media and messaging platforms.⁶⁶ 

Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Russian operations against, especially transnational, digital infrastructure companies can mostly be categorized as disruption, degradation, and information gathering, which saw Russian or Russian-aligned hackers moving in and through the Ukrainian information environment. The attacks against Ukrainian physical infrastructure, however, are of a slightly different character. Invading forces employed physically mediated cyberattacks, a method defined by Herb Lin as “attacks that compromise cyber functionality through the use of or the threat of physical force” to pursue the complete destruction or seizure and occupation of this infrastructure.⁶⁷ Both ends begin with the same purpose: to create a vacuum of information between the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian people, and the global population, effectively ending the connection between the Ukrainian information environment and the global environment. But the seizure of this infrastructure takes things a step beyond: to occupy the Ukrainian information environment and pull its infrastructure and its people into an isolated, controlled Russian information space. 

Reclaiming the Ukrainian information environment 

Preparation of the environment 

The Russian assault on the Ukrainian information environment is far from unanswered. Russian efforts have been countered by the Ukrainian government in concert with allied states and with technology companies located both within and outside Ukraine. Russia’s aim to pull occupied Ukrainian territory onto Russian networks to be controlled and monitored has been well understood, and Ukraine has been hardening its information infrastructure since the initial 2014 invasion. Ukraine released its Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which laid out the government’s priorities in this space, including the defense against the range of active cyber threats they face, with an emphasis on the “cyber protection of information infrastructure.”⁶⁸ The government initially focused on centralizing its networks in Kyiv to make it more difficult “for Russian hackers to penetrate computers that store critical data and provide services such as pension benefits, or to use formerly government-run networks in the occupied territories to launch cyberattacks on Kyiv.”⁶⁹

As part of its digitalization and security efforts, the Ukrainian government also sought out new partners, both public and private, to build and bolster its threat detection and response capabilities. Before and since the 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian government has worked with partner governments and an array of technology companies around the world to create resilience through increased connectivity and digitalization. 

Bolstering Ukrainian connectivity 

Since the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, Ukraine-serving telecommunications operators have developed plans to prepare for future Russian aggression. Lifecell, the third largest Ukrainian mobile telephone operator, prepared its network for an anticipated Russian attack. The company shifted their office archives, documentation, and critical network equipment from eastern to western Ukraine, where it would be better insulated from violence, added additional network redundancy, and increased the coordination and response capabilities of their staff.⁷⁰ Similarly, Kyivstar and Vodafone Ukraine increased their network bandwidth to withstand extreme demand. In October 2021, these three companies initiated an infrastructure sharing agreement to expand LTE (Long Term Evolution) networks into rural Ukraine and, in cooperation with the Ukrainian government, expanded the 4G telecommunications network to bring “mobile network coverage to an estimated 91.6 per cent of the population.”⁷¹ 

The expansion and improvement of Ukrainian telecommunications continued through international partnerships as well. Datagroup, for example, announced a $20 million partnership in 2021 with Cisco, a US-based digital communications company, to modernize and expand the bandwidth of its extensive networks.⁷² Since the February 2022 invasion, Cisco has also worked with the French government to provide over $5 million of secure, wireless networking equipment and software, including firewalls, for free to the Ukrainian government.⁷³

This network expansion is an integral part of the Ukrainian government’s digitalization plans for the country, championed by President Zelenskyy. Rather than the invasion putting an end to these efforts, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov claimed that during the war “digitalization became the foundation of all our life. The economy continues to work … due to digitalization.⁷⁴ The digital provision of government services has created an alternate pathway for Ukrainians to engage in the economy and with their government. The flagship government initiative Diia, launched in February 2020, is a digital portal through which the 21.7 million Ukrainian users can access legal identification, make social services payments, register a business, and even register property damage from Russian missile strikes.⁷⁵ The Russian advance and consequent physical destruction that displaced Ukrainians means that the ability to provide government services through alternate and resilient means is more essential than ever, placing an additional premium on defending Ukrainian information infrastructure. 

Backing up a government 

As Russian forces built up along Ukraine’s borders, Ukrainian network centralization may have increased risk, despite the country’s improved defense capabilities. In preparation for the cyber and physical attacks against the country’s information infrastructure, Fedorov moved to amend Ukrainian data protection laws to allow the government to store and process data in the cloud and worked closely with several technology companies, including Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google, to effect the transfer of critical government data to infrastructure hosted outside the country.⁷⁶ Cloud computing describes “a collection of technologies and organizational processes which enable ubiquitous, on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources.”⁷⁷ Cloud computing is dominated by the four hyperscalers—Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Alibaba—that provide computing and storage at enterprise scale and are responsible for the operation and security of data centers all around the world, any of which could host customer data according to local laws and regulations.⁷⁸ 

According to its April 2022 Ukraine war report, Microsoft “committed at no charge a total of $107 million of technology services to support this effort” and renewed the relationship in November, promising to ensure that “government agencies, critical infrastructure and other sectors in Ukraine can continue to run their digital infrastructure and serve citizens through the Microsoft Cloud” at a value of about $100 million.⁷⁹ Amazon and Google have also committed to supporting cloud services for the Ukrainian government, for select companies, and for humanitarian organizations focused on aiding Ukraine.⁸⁰ In accordance with the Ukrainian government’s concerns, Russian missile attacks targeted the Ukrainian government’s main data center in Kyiv soon after the invasion, partially destroying the facility, and cyberattacks aggressively tested Ukrainian networks.⁸¹    

Unlike other lines of aid provided by the international community to strengthen the defense of the Ukrainian information environment, cloud services are provided only by the private sector.⁸² While this aid has had a transformative effect on Ukrainian defense, that transformative quality has also raised concerns. Microsoft, in its special report on Ukraine, several times cites its cloud services as one of the determining factors that limited the effect of Russian cyber and kinetic attacks on Ukrainian government data centers, and details how their services, in particular, were instrumental in this defense.⁸³ In this same report, Microsoft claims to be most worried about those states and organizations that do not use cloud services, and provides corroborating data.⁸⁴ Microsoft and other technology companies offering their services at a reduced rate, or for free, are acting—at least in part—out of a belief in the rightness of the Ukrainian cause. However, they are still private companies with responsibilities to shareholders or board members, and they still must seek profit. Services provided, especially establishing information infrastructure like Cloud services, are likely to establish long-term business relationships with the Ukrainian government and potentially with other governments and clients, who see the effectiveness of those services illustrated through the defense of Ukraine. 

Mounting an elastic defense  

Working for wireless 

Alongside and parallel to the Ukrainian efforts to defend and reclaim occupied physical territory is the fight for Ukrainian connectivity. Ukrainian telecommunications companies have been integral to preserving connectivity to the extent possible. In March 2022, Ukrainian telecom operators Kyivstar, Vodafone Ukraine, and Lifecell made the decision to provide free national mobile roaming services across mobile provider networks, creating redundancy and resilience in the mobile network to combat frequent service outages.⁸⁵ The free mobile service provided by these companies is valued at more than UAH 980 million (USD 26.8 million).⁸⁶ In addition, Kyivstar in July 2022 committed to the allocation of UAH 300 million (about USD 8.2 mil) for the modernization of Ukraine’s information infrastructure in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital transformation.⁸⁷ The statements that accompanied the commitments from Kyivstar and Lifecell—both headquartered in Ukraine—emphasized each company’s dedication to Ukrainian defense and their role in it, regardless of the short-term financial impact.⁸⁸ These are Ukrainian companies with Ukrainian infrastructure and Ukrainian customers, and their fate is tied inextricably to the outcome of this war. 

As Russian forces advanced and attempted to seize control of information infrastructure, in at least one instance, Ukrainian internet and mobile service employees sabotaged their own equipment first. Facing threats of imprisonment and death from occupying Russians, employees in several Ukrtelecom facilities withstood pressure to share technical network details and instead deleted key files from the systems. According to Ukrtelecom Chief Executive Officer Yuriy Kurmaz, “The Russians tried to connect their control boards and some equipment to our networks, but they were not able to reconfigure it because we completely destroyed the software.”⁸⁹ Without functional infrastructure, Russian forces struggled to pull those areas onto Russian networks.  

The destruction of telecommunications infrastructure has meant that these areas and many others along the war front are, in some areas, without reliable information infrastructure, either wireless or wired. While the Ukrainian government and a bevy of local and international private sector companies battle for control of on-the-ground internet and communications infrastructure, they also pursued new pathways to connectivity.

Searching for satellite 

Two days after the invasion, Deputy Prime Minister Fedorov tweeted at Elon Musk, the Chief Executive Officer of SpaceX, that “while you try to colonize Mars — Russia try [sic] to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand.”⁹⁰ Just another two days later, Fedorov confirmed the arrival of the first shipment of Starlink stations.⁹¹  

Starlink, a network of low-orbit satellites working in constellations operated by SpaceX, relies on satellite receivers no larger than a backpack that are easily installed and transported. Because Russian targeting of cellular towers made communications coverage unreliable, says Fedorov, the government “made a decision to use satellite communication for such emergencies” from American companies like SpaceX.⁹² Starlink has proven more resilient than any other alternative throughout the war. Due to the low orbit of Starlink satellites, they can broadcast to their receivers at relatively higher power than satellites in higher orbits. There has been little reporting on successful Russian efforts to jam Starlink transmissions, and the Starlink base stations—the physical, earthbound infrastructure that communicates directly with the satellites—are located on NATO territory, ensuring any direct attack on them would be a significant escalation in the war.⁹³

Starlink has been employed across sectors almost since the war began. President Zelenskyy has used the devices himself when delivering addresses to the Ukrainian people, as well as to foreign governments and populations.⁹⁴ Fedorov has said that sustained missile strikes against energy and communication infrastructure have been effectively countered through the deployment of Starlink devices that can restore connection where it is most needed. He even called the system “an essential part of critical infrastructure.”⁹⁵   

Starlink has also found direct military applications. The portability of these devices means that Ukrainian troops can often, though not always, stay connected to command elements and peer units while deployed.⁹⁶ Ukrainian soldiers have also used internet connections to coordinate attacks on Russian targets with artillery-battery commanders.⁹⁷ The Aerorozvidka, a specialist air reconnaissance unit within the Ukrainian military that conducts hundreds of information gathering missions every day, has used Starlink devices in areas of Ukraine without functional communications infrastructure to “monitor and coordinate unmanned aerial vehicles, enabling soldiers to fire anti-tank weapons with targeted precision.”⁹⁸ Reports have also suggested that a Starlink device was integrated into an unmanned surface vehicle discovered near Sevastopol, potentially used by the Ukrainian military for reconnaissance or even to carry and deliver munitions.⁹⁹ According to one Ukrainian soldier, “Starlink is our oxygen,” and were it to disappear, “our army would collapse into chaos.”¹⁰⁰

The initial package of Starlink devices included 3,667 terminals donated by SpaceX and 1,333 terminals purchased by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁰¹ SpaceX initially offered free Starlink service for all the devices, although the offer has already been walked back by Musk, and then reversed again. CNN obtained proof of a letter sent by Musk to the Pentagon in September 2022 stating that SpaceX would be unable to continue funding Starlink service in Ukraine. The letter requested that the Pentagon pay what would amount to “more than $120 million for the rest of the year and could cost close to $400 million for the next 12 months.” It also clarified that the vast majority of the 20,000 Starlink devices sent to Ukraine were financed at least in part by outside funders like the United States, United Kingdom, and Polish governments.¹⁰²

After the letter was sent, but before it became public, Musk got into a Twitter spat with Ukrainian diplomat Adrij Melnyk after the former wrote a tweet on October 3 proposing terms of peace between Russia and Ukraine. Musk’s proposal included Ukraine renouncing its claims to Crimea and pledging to remain neutral, with the only apparent concession from Russia a promise to ensure water supply in Crimea. The plan was rejected by the public poll Musk included in the tweet, and Melnyk replied and tagged Musk, saying “Fuck off is my very diplomatic reply to you @elonmusk.”¹⁰³ After CNN released the SpaceX letter to the Pentagon, Musk seemingly doubled down on his decision to reduce SpaceX funding at first. He responded on October 14 to a tweet summarizing the incident, justifying possible reduced SpaceX assistance stating, “We’re just following his [Melnyk’s] recommendation,” even though the letter was sent before the Twitter exchange. Musk then tweeted the following day, “The hell with it … even though Starlink is still losing money & other companies are getting billions of taxpayer $, we’ll just keep funding Ukraine govt for free.”¹⁰⁴ Two days later, in response to a Politico tweet reporting that the Pentagon was considering covering the Starlink service costs, Musk stated that “SpaceX has already withdrawn its request for funding.”¹⁰⁵ Musk’s characterization of SpaceX’s contribution to the war effort has sparked confusion and reprimand, with his public remarks often implying that his company is entirely footing the bill when in fact, tens of millions of dollars’ worth of terminals and service are being covered by several governments every month.  

The Starlink saga, however, was not over yet. Several weeks later in late October, 1,300 Starlink terminals in Ukraine, purchased in March 2020 by a British company for use in Ukrainian combat-related operations, were disconnected, allegedly due to lack of funding, causing a communications outage for the Ukrainian military.¹⁰⁶ Although operation was restored, the entire narrative eroded confidence in SpaceX as a guarantor of flexible connectivity in Ukraine. In November 2022, Federov noted that while Ukraine has no intention of breaking off its relationship with Starlink, the government is exploring working with other satellite communications operators.¹⁰⁷ Starlink is not the only satellite communications network of its kind, but its competitors have not yet reached the same level of operation. Satellite communications company OneWeb, based in London with ties to the British military, is just now launching its satellite constellation, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine required the company to change its launch partner from Roscosmos to SpaceX.¹⁰⁸ The US Space Development Agency, within the United States Space Force, will launch the first low earth orbit satellites of the new National Defense Space Architecture in March 2023. Other more traditional satellite companies cannot provide the same flexibility as Starlink’s small, transportable receivers.

With the market effectively cornered for the moment, SpaceX can dictate the terms, including the physical bounds, of Starlink’s operations, thereby wielding immense influence on the battlefield. Starlink devices used by advancing Ukrainian forces near the front, for example, have reported inconsistent reliability.¹⁰⁹ Indeed CNN reported on February 9^th that this bounding was a deliberate attempt to separate the devices from direct military use, as SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹¹⁰ The bounding decision, similar to the rationale behind the company’s decision to refuse to activate Starlink service in Crimea, was likely made to contain escalation, especially escalation by means of SpaceX devices.¹¹¹

But SpaceX is not the only satellite company making decisions to bound the area of operation of their products to avoid playing—or being perceived to play—a role in potential escalation. On March 16, 2022, Minister Fedorov tweeted at DJI, a Chinese drone producer, “@DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a partner in these murders? Block your products that are helping russia to kill the Ukrainians!”¹¹² DJI responded directly to the tweet the same day, saying “If the Ukrainian government formally requests that DJI set up geofencing throughout Ukraine, we will arrange it,” but pointed out that such geofencing would inhibit all users of their product in Ukraine, not just Russians.¹¹³

While Russia continues to bombard the Ukrainian electrical grid, Starlink terminals have grown more expensive for new Ukrainian consumers, increasing from $385 earlier this year to $700, although it is unclear if this price increase also affected government purchasers.¹¹⁴ According to Andrew Cavalier, a technology industry analyst with ABI Research, the indispensability of the devices gives “Musk and Starlink a major head start [against its competitors] that its use in the Russia–Ukraine war will only consolidate.”¹¹⁵ Indeed, the valuation of SpaceX was $127 million in May 2022, and the company raised $2 billion in the first seven months of 2022.¹¹⁶ For SpaceX, the war in Ukraine has been an impressive showcase of Starlink’s capabilities and has proven the worth of its services to future customers. The company recently launched a new initiative, Starshield, intended to leverage “SpaceX’s Starlink technology and launch capability to support national security efforts. While Starlink is designed for consumer and commercial use, Starshield is designed for government use.”¹¹⁷ It is clear that SpaceX intends to capitalize on the very public success of its Starlink network in Ukraine.

Reclaiming Territory 

The Russian assault is not over, but Ukraine has reclaimed “54 percent of the land Russia has captured since the beginning of the war” and the front line has remained relatively stable since November 2022.¹¹⁸ Videos and reports from reclaimed territory show the exultation of the liberated population. As Ukrainian military forces reclaim formerly occupied areas, the parallel reclamation of the information environment, by or with Ukrainian and transnational information infrastructure operators, follows quickly. 

In newly liberated areas, Starlink terminals are often the first tool for establishing connectivity. In Kherson, the first regional capital that fell to the Russian invasion and reclaimed by Ukrainian troops on November 11, 2022, residents lined up in public spaces to connect to the internet through Starlink.¹¹⁹ The Ministry of Digital Transformation provided Starlink devices to the largest service providers, Vodaphone and Kyivstar, to facilitate communication while their engineers repaired the necessary infrastructure for reestablishing mobile and internet service.¹²⁰ A week after Kherson was recaptured, five Kyivstar base stations were made operational and Vodaphone had reestablished coverage over most of the city.¹²¹

Due to the importance of reclaiming the information space, operators are working just behind Ukrainian soldiers to reconnect populations in reclaimed territories to the Ukrainian and global information environment as quickly as possible, which means working in very dangerous conditions. In the Sumy region, a Ukrtelecom vehicle pulling up to a television tower drove over a land mine, injuring three of the passengers and killing the driver.¹²² Stanislav Prybytko, the head of the mobile broadband department in the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, says “It’s still very dangerous to do this work, but we can’t wait to do this, because there are a lot of citizens in liberated villages who urgently need to connect.”¹²³ Prybytko and his eleven-person team have been central to the Ukrainian effort to stitch Ukrainian connectivity back together. The team works across a public-private collaborative, coordinating with various government officials and mobile service providers to repair critical nodes in the network and to reestablish communications and connectivity.¹²⁴ According to Ukrainian government figures, 80 percent of liberated settlements have partially restored internet connection, and more than 1,400 base stations have been rebuilt by Ukrainian mobile operators since April 2022.¹²⁵

Key Takeaways 

The information environment is a key domain through which this war is being contested. The Russian government has demonstrated for over a decade the importance it places on control of the information environment, both domestically and as part of campaigns to expand the Russian sphere of influence abroad. Yet, despite this Russian focus, the Ukrainian government has demonstrated incredible resilience against physical assaults, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns against and within the Ukrainian information environment and has committed to further interlacing government services and digital platforms.  

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war means that private actors are necessarily enmeshed in the conflict. As providers of products and services used for Ukrainian defense, these companies are an important part of the buttressing structure of that defense. The centrality of private companies in the conduct of the war in Ukraine brings to light new and increasingly important questions about what it means for companies to act as information infrastructure during wartime, including:  

1. What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war? 
2. How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?  
3. How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature? 

Incentives 

The war in Ukraine spurred an exceptional degree of cooperation and aid from private companies within Ukraine and from around the globe. Much of public messaging around the private sector’s assistance of Ukrainian defense centers around the conviction of company leadership and staff that they were compelled by a responsibility to act. This is certainly one factor in their decision. But the depth of private actor involvement in this conflict demands a more nuanced understanding of the full picture of incentives and disincentives that drive a company’s decision to enter into new, or expand upon existing, business relationships with and in a country at war. What risks, for example, do companies undertake in a war in which Russia has already demonstrated its conviction that private companies are viable military targets? The ViaSat hack was a reminder of the uncertainty that surrounds the designation of dual-use technology, and the impact that such designations have in practice. What role did public recognition play in companies’ decisions to provide products and services, and how might this recognition influence future earnings potential? For example, while their remarks differed in tone, both Elon Musk on Twitter and Microsoft in its special report on Ukraine publicly claimed partial credit for the defense of Ukraine.  

As the war continues into its second year, these questions are important to maintaining Ukraine’s cooperation with these entities. With a better understanding of existing and potential incentives, the companies, the United States, and its allies can make the decision to responsibly aid Ukraine much easier.  

Dependencies 

Private companies play an important role in armed conflict, operating much of the infrastructure that supports the information environment through which both state and non-state actors compete for control. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the willingness of private actors, from Ukrainian telecommunications companies to transnational cloud and satellite companies, to participate as partners in the defense of Ukraine. State dependence on privately held physical infrastructure is not unique to the information environment, but state dependence on infrastructure that is headquartered and operated extraterritorially is a particular feature. 

Prior to and throughout the war, the Ukrainian government has coordinated successfully with local telecommunication companies to expand, preserve, and restore mobile, radio, and internet connectivity to its population. This connectivity preserved what Russia was attempting to dismantle—a free and open Ukrainian information environment through which the Ukrainian government and population can communicate and coordinate. The Ukrainian government has relied on these companies to provide service and connectivity, working alongside them before and during the war to improve infrastructure and to communicate priorities. These companies are truly engaging as partners in Ukrainian defense, especially because this information infrastructure is not just a medium through which Russia launches attacks but an environment that Russia is attempting to seize control of. This dependence has not been unidirectional—the companies themselves are inextricably linked to this conflict through their infrastructure, employees, and customers in Ukraine. Each is dependent to some degree on the other and during times of crisis, their incentives create a dynamic of mutual need. 

The Ukrainian government has also relied on a variety of transnational companies though the provision of technology products or services and information infrastructure. As examined in this report, two areas where the involvement of these companies has been especially impactful are cloud services and satellite internet services. Cloud services have preserved data integrity and security by moving information to data centers distributed around the world, outside of Ukrainian territory and under the cyber-protection of those cloud service companies. Satellite services have enabled flexible and resilient connectivity, once again located and run primarily outside of Ukraine. These companies can provide essential services within the information environment and the physical environment of Ukraine, but are not fundamentally reliant on the integrity of the country. This dynamic is heightened by the fact that cloud service providers like Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, Google, and satellite internet service providers like Space X’s Starlink are operating within a market with global reach and very few competitors. While these companies and others have made the laudable decision to contribute to Ukrainian defense, the fact is that had they not, there are only a few, if any, other companies with comparable capabilities and infrastructure at scale. Additionally, there’s very little Ukraine or even the US government could have done to directly provide the same capabilities and infrastructure.  

Coordination 

Built into the discussions around dependency and incentives is the need for government and the private companies who own and operate information infrastructure to coordinate with each other from a more extensive foundation. While coordination with Ukrainian companies and some transnational companies emerged from sustained effort, many instances of private sector involvement were forged on an ad hoc basis and therefore could not be planned on in advance. The ad hoc approach can produce rapid results, as seen by Minister Fedorov’s tweet at Elon Musk and receipt of Starlink devices just days later. While this approach has been wielded by the Ukrainian government, and the Ministry for Digital Transformation in particular, to great effect, this very same example illustrates the complexity of transforming ad hoc aid into sustainable partnerships. Sustainability is especially important when states are facing threats outside of open war, across the continuum of insecurity and conflict where many of these capabilities and infrastructures will continue to be relied upon. Security and defense in the information environment requires states to work in coordination with a diverse range of local and transnational private actors. 

Recommendations 

Key recommendations from this paper ask the US government, in coordination with the Ukrainian government, to better understand the incentives that surround private sector involvement, to delineate states’ dependency on private information infrastructure, and to improve long-term public-private coordination through three pathways: 

• Define support parameters. Clarify how private technology companies can and should provide aid 
• Track support. Create a living database to track the patterns of technological aid to Ukraine from US private companies 
• Facilitate support requests. Add to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment by facilitating US private aid.  

Define support parameters 

Private information infrastructure companies will continue to play a key role in this war. However, there are a number of unresolved questions regarding the decisions these companies are making about if, and how, to provide support to the Ukrainian government to sustain its defense. A significant barrier may be the lack of clarity about the risks of partnership in wartime, which may disincentivize action or may alter existing partnerships. Recent SpaceX statements surrounding the bounding of Starlink use is an example, at least in part, of just such a risk calculous in action. The US government and its allies should release a public directive clarifying how companies can ensure that their involvement is in line with US and international law—especially for dual-use technologies. Reaffirming, with consistent guidelines, how the United States defines civilian participation in times of war will be crucial for ensuring that such actions do not unintentionally legitimize private entities as belligerents and legitimate targets in wartime. At the direction of the National Security Advisor, the US Attorney General and Secretary of State, working through the Office of the Legal Advisor at the State Department, should issue public guidance on how US companies can provide essential aid to Ukraine while avoiding the designation of legitimate military target or combatant under the best available interpretation of prevailing law. 

Track support 

While a large amount of support for Ukraine has been given directly by or coordinated through governments, many private companies have started providing technological support directly to the Ukrainian government. Some private companies, especially those with offices or customers in Ukraine, got in touch directly with, or were contacted by, various Ukrainian government offices, often with specific requests depending on the company’s products and services.¹²⁶ 

However, the US government does not have a full and complete picture of this assistance, which limits the ability of US policymakers to track the implications of changing types of support or the nature of the conflict. Policymakers should have access to not only what kind of support is being provided by private US companies, but also the projected period of involvement, what types of support are being requested and denied by companies (in which case, where the US government may be able to act as an alternative provider), and what types of support are being supplied by private sector actors without a significant government equity or involvement. A more fulsome mapping of this assistance and its dependency structure would make it possible for policymakers and others to assess its impact and effectiveness. This data, were it or some version of it publicly available, would also help private companies providing the support to better understand how their contributions fit within the wider context of US assistance and to communicate the effect their products or services are having to stakeholders and shareholders. Such information may play a role in a company’s decision to partner or abstain in the future.

The US government should create a collaborative task force to track US-based private sector support to Ukraine. Because of the wide equities across the US government in this area, this team should be led by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy and include representatives from USAID, the Department of Defense’s Cyber Policy Office, the National Security Agency’s Collaboration Center, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. This task force should initially focus on creating a picture of public-private support to Ukraine from entities within the United States, but its remit could extend to work with allies and partners, creating a fulsome picture of international public-private support.

Facilitate support requests 

Tracking the technical support that is requested, promised, and delivered to the Ukrainian government is an important first step toward gaining a better understanding of the evolving shape of the critical role that the private sector is increasingly playing in conflict. But closer tracking, perhaps by an associated body, could go further by acting as a process facilitator. Government offices and agencies have long been facilitators of private aid, but now states are increasingly able to interact with, and request support from, private companies directly, especially for smaller quantities or more specific products and services. While this pathway can be more direct and efficient, it also requires a near constant churn of request, provision, and renewal actions from private companies and Ukrainian government officials.  

Private organizations have stepped into this breach, including the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaboration (CDAC), founded by Greg Rattray and Matthew Murray, now a part of the US-based non-profit CRDF Global. CDAC works with a number of US private technology companies, as well as the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian think tank Global Cyber Cooperative Center, to match the specific needs of Ukrainian government and state-owned enterprises with needed products and services offered by companies working in coordination.¹²⁷

The growth and reach of this effort demonstrate the potential impact that a government-housed, or even a government-sponsored mechanism, could have in increasing the capacity to facilitate requests from the Ukrainian government, decreasing the number of bureaucratic steps required by Ukrainian government officials while increasing the amount and quality of support they receive. In addition, government facilitation would ease progress toward the previously stated recommendations by building in clarity around what kind of support can be provided and putting facilitation and aid tracking within a single process. As discussed above, this facilitation should start with a focus on US public-private support, but can grow to work alongside similar allied efforts. This could include, for example, coordination with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) program, which “enables Ukrainian agencies to access the services of commercial cybersecurity companies.”¹²⁸ Crucially, this task force, helmed by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would act as a facilitator, not as a restricting body. Its mission in this task would be to make connections and provide information.  

In line with tracking, US government facilitation would enable government entities to communicate where assistance can be most useful, such as shoring up key vulnerabilities or ensuring that essential defense activities are not dependent on a single private sector entity, and ideally, avoiding dependency on a single source of private sector assistance. A company’s financial situation or philanthropic priorities are always subject to change, and the US government should be aware of such risks and create resilience through redundancy.  

Central to this resilience will be the provision of support to bolster key nodes in the Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure network against not just cyber attacks but also against physical assault, including things like firewalls, mine clearing equipment, and power generators. Aiding the Ukrainian government in the search for another reliable partner for satellite communication devices that offer similar flexibility as Starlink is also necessary, and a representative from the Pentagon has confirmed that such a process is underway, following Musk’s various and contradictory statements regarding the future of SpaceX’s aid to Ukraine back in October.¹²⁹ Regardless, the entire SpaceX experience illustrates the need to address single dependencies in advance whenever possible. 

A roadblock to ensuring assistance redundancy is the financial ability of companies to provide products and services to the Ukrainian government without charge or to the degree necessary. While the US government does provide funding for private technological assistance (as in the Starlink example), creating a pool of funding that is tied to the aforementioned task force and overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would enable increased flexibility for companies to cover areas of single dependence, even in instances that would require piecemeal rather than one-to-one redundancy. As previously discussed, many companies are providing support out of a belief that it is the right thing to do, both for their customers and as members of a global society. However, depending on whether that support is paid or provided for free, or publicly or privately given, a mechanism that provides government clarity on private sector support, tracks the landscape of US private support to Ukraine, and facilitates support requests would make it easier for companies to make the decision to start or continue to provide support when weighed against the costs and potential risks of offering assistance.

Looking forward and inward 

The questions that have emerged from Ukraine’s experience of defense in and through the information environment are not limited to this context. Private companies have a role in armed conflict and that role seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructures they own and operate. Companies will, in some capacity, be participants in the battlespace. This is being demonstrated in real time, exposing gaps that the United States and its allies and partners must address in advance of future conflicts.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has created an environment in which both public and private assistance in support of Ukrainian information infrastructure is motivated by a common aversion toward Russian aggression, as well as a commitment to the stability and protection of the Ukrainian government and people. This war is not over and despite any hopes to the contrary, similar aggressions will occur in new contexts, and with new actors in the future. It is crucial that in conjunction with examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine, the US government also examines these questions regarding its own national security and defense.

The information environment is increasingly central to not just warfighting but also to the practice of governance and the daily life of populations around the world. Governments and populations live in part within that environment and therefore atop infrastructure that is owned and operated by the private sector. As adversaries seek to reshape the information environment to their own advantage, US and allied public and private sectors must confront the challenges of their existing interdependence. This includes defining in what form national security and defense plans in and through the information environment are dependent upon private companies, developing a better understanding of the differing incentive structures that guide private sector decision-making, and working in coordination with private companies to create a more resilient information infrastructure network through redundancy and diversification. It is difficult to know what forms future conflict and future adversaries will take, or the incentives that may exist for companies in those new contexts, but by better understanding the key role that private information and technology companies already play in this domain, the United States and allies can better prepare for future threats.

About the Authors 

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, within the Digital Forensic Research Lab, and leads the team’s work studying conflict in and through cyberspace. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace that is useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department and also attained her BA in International Relations & History from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 

Sean Dack was a Young Global Professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative during the fall of 2022. He is now a Researcher at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where he focuses on the long-term strategic and economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Dack graduated from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in December 2022 with his MA in Strategic Studies and International Economics. 

Acknowledgements 

The authors thank Justin Sherman, Gregory Rattray, and Gavin Wilde for their comments on earlier drafts of this document, and Trey Herr and the Cyber Statecraft team for their support. The authors also thank all the participants, who shall remain anonymous, in multiple Chatham House Rule discussions and one-on-one conversations about the issue.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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Security

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Tracking narratives

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

International response

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

On January 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed its forces had taken control of Soledar and could encircle Bakhmut, threatening Ukrainian supply lines. In the statement, the MoD praised the efforts of aviation, artillery, and airborne troops, but did not mention the notable role Wagner played in securing Soledar.

Moscow’s announcement highlighted a long-simmering tension between Wagner and the official structure of the Russian MoD. On January 17, an old letter written by Valery Gerasimov, commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, re-circulated online. The letter, dated December 29, 2022, stated that Wagner is not included in the structure of the Russian armed forces. Gerasimov wrote the letter in response to an inquiry to the Russian MoD made by Evgeny Stupin, a lawyer for the Moscow City Duma. On January 15, President Vladimir Putin also attributed the Soledar success to the MoD.

On the day that Russia claimed Soledar, military bloggers affiliated with the Kremlin claimed there was an ongoing conflict between the MoD and Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. On January 15, Prigozhin awarded medals to Wagner soldiers for the capture of Soledar. On January 16, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dispelled reports of an ongoing conflict between Prigozhin and Russian army command, claiming the reports are “products of information manipulation.” Later in the day, when asked about Peskov’s comments, Prigozhin also dispelled the reports, saying, “I see no reason not to trust Peskov.”

On January 19, Prigozhin said that Wagner soldiers were concentrating on taking the suburban city of Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. This information has yet to be confirmed by the Russian MoD.

Elsewhere, on January 14, Ukrainian officials reported that Russia conducted fifty missile and three air strikes against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, and other settlements in West Ukraine. Ukrainian forces said that Russia used S-300 and S-400 systems against ground targets in Kyiv in the morning and later launched high-precision weapons, including twenty-eight cruise missile strikes using Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-59 guided air missiles and the sea-based 3M-14 Kalibr.

In Marinka, the Ukrainian army repelled renewed Russian attacks on January 17 and 18. Russian forces have been storming the settlement since last March, resulting in widespread destruction. The Russian forces also conducted raids in the area of Bilohorivka in Luhansk oblast and Krasna Hora, Bakhmut, Klischiyivka, Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pobieda in Donetsk oblast.

Chechen volunteer forces have become increasingly active in the fight around Bakhmut. There are at least two battalions of Chechens—the Sheikh Mansur Battalion and Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion—fighting for the Ukrainian army on the Bakhmut frontline. On a tactical level, the Chechen battalions are working together in some areas, like in Opytne, where they attacked Russian positions. The Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion also maintains a reconnaissance unit, “Adam,” currently located in Donetsk oblast.

On January 16, a Russian rocket struck a civilian building in Dnipro, killing at least forty-five people, including six children, marking the single deadliest civilian attack since the war began. Ukraine said it does not have air-defense systems that can intercept Russian KH-22 missiles; to ward off future missiles would require Western partners to donate advanced air defenses such as the US MIM-104 Patriot missile system.  

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

On January 18, Russian shelling intensified on the southern frontline in Ukraine, which stretches from Kamianske in the Zaporizhzhia region to Vuhledar in the south of Donetsk oblast. After a night of heavy shelling, videos and photos emerged online showing that the Russian army had used what appears to incendiary ammunition in city of Kherson and nearby Beryslav.

The morning after the strike, videos and photos shared online showed the resulting damage. A local Kherson newspaper reported that a religious youth center had burned down as a result of the shelling. The DFRLab geolocated the youth center and confirmed that it was along the pathway of the airstrike but cannot confirm whether incendiary munitions were involved.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Fragments of a Russian missile targeting Ukraine fell on Moldova territory on January 14 in the town of Larga, Briceni district. According to Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, a warhead fueled with approximately eighty kilograms of explosive material was also discovered among the debris. The next day, authorities reported that specialist teams had carried out controlled detonations of the remaining explosives. The Ministry of Defense noted that the army’s aerial surveillance system did not record a violation of Moldovan airspace, however.

Authorities in Chisinau have strongly condemned the attacks on neighboring Ukraine. “This is the reality of war, imposed by the aggressor, right here in our region,” stressed Moldovan President Maia Sandu. “The missiles reach Moldova as well—the fragments discovered yesterday in the Briceni district testify to this. We strongly condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Attacks on urban infrastructure and the killing of civilians are war crimes; they have no justification.”

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also condemned Russia’s January 14 missile attacks on Ukrainian cities. “There is no political, historical, and even more so moral justification for killing civilians and attacking the infrastructure that ensures the survival of the population,” she said. “I express my deep indignation at the new massive attack on Ukraine. I express my support for the heroic Ukrainian people and our support for the victims of Russia’s barbaric attacks.”

This is the third time missile fragments have landed in Moldova, which is not a member of the European Union or NATO. On December 5, Moldovan border police discovered a missile in an orchard, also in the Briceni district. In October 2022, a Russian missile shot down by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft system fell in the village of Naslavcea, located along the border with Ukraine, shattering windows of several residences as a result of the explosion.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

An animated video showing a Wagner operative helping West African countries defeat zombie French soldiers began circulating on social media and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels this week. While the origin of the video is currently unknown, it appears to have first shown up on Twitter on January 14th, then migrated to alternative video platforms before being shared across pro-Russian Telegram channels.

By depicting Wagner forces as heroes, the video promotes a pro-Russian, anti-French narrative that has spread in recent years across West African social media. The animation depicts Wagner soldiers assisting local militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso in removing French forces, represented in the animation as hordes of zombies and a giant cobra. In Mali, a Wagner operative parachutes into the zombie horde and provides ammunition to a Malian soldier who is subsequently able to defeat the undead, while in Burkina Faso, Wagner provides a rocket-propelled grenade to kill the French cobra.

Russia’s involvement in West Africa does not come in the form of simple weapons deliveries, however. Recent reports indicate that since Russia’s deployment in Mali more than one year ago, violence against civilians has significantly increased, and extremist forces have grown stronger.

The video ends with Wagner forces heading towards Côte d’Ivoire, where French zombies overwhelm an Ivorian soldier. The imagery implies that Wagner aims to send forces to the coastal country.

This is not the first time Wagner has created animated propaganda. In another animation, France was represented as a rat killed by Wagner. And in a comic strip spread in Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner operatives are again depicted fighting zombies, however in the case of CAR the zombies do not represent the French.

Support for France has declined significantly in Francophone Africa, while calls for Russian assistance to fight jihadists has increased.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

On January 18, a helicopter crash in Brovary, near Kyiv, killed sixteen people, including three children, Ukraine’s interior minister, his deputy, and the ministry secretary. The helicopter crashed near a kindergarten. Ukrainian security services investigating the crash are considering three possible scenarios, including a violation of flight rules, a technical malfunction, or intentional sabotage. In the meantime, pro-Kremlin sources are already sharing conflicting narratives about the incident.

One of the first narratives to emerge suggested that Ukraine’s air-defense systems shot down the helicopter. The claim was amplified by pro-Kremlin TV host Olga Skabeyeva on her Telegram channel. Another pro-Kremlin Telegram channel added more details to the claim, saying that “unofficial Ukrainian sources” said the aircraft was shot down by the Stinger or Igla air-defense systems. The claim was also shared on Twitter by a pro-Kremlin account, spreading the narrative to English-speaking audiences. At the time of writing, the English tweet had more than one million views.

Other sources took the claim further. The pro-Kremlin Russian outlet Regnum hypothesized that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was behind the crash, publishing a story with the headline, “The crash of the helicopter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Brovary – executed by Zelenskyy?”

Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin reporter Sasha Kots reported that European countries had suspended the helicopter model, either a Eurocopter EC225 Super Puma or a H225M, after a 2016 crash in Norway. While it is true that the European Aviation Safety Agency grounded both aircraft type after the Norway crash, it allowed flights to resume roughly six months later. Helicopters of this type are used by both military and civilian operators in France, Brazil, Vietnam, and many other countries. Kots also claimed that after the two models were grounded, France sold its supply to Ukraine, implying that France is also responsible for the tragedy.

In December 2021, Romania and Ukraine entered into an agreement to upgrade five of these helicopter models.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

On January 16, the state-controlled TV channel Belarus 1 reported that Belarusian security services had arrested Georgian citizen Giorgi Zirakishvili for allegedly trying to enter Ukraine via Belarus to fight against Russia. Belarus 1 reported that the Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia had advised Zirakishvili to travel from Georgia to Ukraine through Belarus. The broadcaster also claimed that Zirakishvili had planned to meet Igor Kizim, Ukraine’s ambassador to Belarus, upon arrival to receive instructions on how to reach Ukraine and join the Georgian Legion, a paramilitary unit mostly comprised of ethnically Georgian volunteers who fight for Ukraine. Belarus 1 also broadcast an alleged recording of a phone conversation in which Zirakishvili believes he is speaking to representatives from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. However, Belarus 1 reported that Zirakishvili was actually speaking to representatives from Belarusian security services, who discovered Zirakishvili’s alleged intentions and connected with him by impersonating Ukrainian embassy staff. The report also contains a video recording of Zirakishvili’s meeting with representatives from Belarusian security services, who he apparently believed were representatives of the Ukrainian embassy.

Belarus 1 did not provide any concrete evidence that Zirakishvili had communicated with anyone from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. Despite this, the report claims that Kizim is actively recruiting foreign fighters to send to Ukraine. The ambassador responded to the allegations, saying the Belarus 1 story was “nonsense” and “lies, manipulation, and hypocrisy.” He added that the Ukrainian embassy was in contact with the Belarusian foreign affairs ministry regarding the matter.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

A January 17 Telegram post published on Yevgeny Prigozhin’s press channel claimed that Wagner forces tracked down and killed a Ukrainian member of the French Foreign Legion in Donetsk. The channel also shared identity cards belonging to a YevheniiKoulyk, including a Ukrainian driver’s license, a French military card, and a French train card.

The post was reshared by the Telegram channel WarDonbass and the pro-Russian news outlet DonbassInsider. The Russian press agency TASS also reported on the claim. Several Russian-owned media outlets and Telegram channels shared the post, garnering at least 647,000 views at the time of writing.

The story was then picked up by the Russian news outlet Argumenty I fakty (Arguments and facts), which claimed Koulyk was a NATO agent. One VK post suggested Koulyk was a foreign mercenary and accused Ukraine of not disclosing the number of foreign soldiers killed in the war. The author compared Koulyk’s death to that of Hryhorii Tsekhmystrenko, a Ukrainian-born Canadian volunteer reported killed in Ukraine this week.

According to French journalist and military expert Philippe Chapeleau, the French Foreign Legion allowed its Ukrainian-born fighters a period of leave so they could safely resettle their families in neighboring countries. Those who did not return would be considered deserters. According to that same source, Koulyk had been missing since August 2022 and was therefore considered a deserter.

Koulyk’s death was previously reported as early as January 12. As of January 19, there were a total of 189 posts across news outlets and social media discussing Koulyk.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

In a TV interview on January 16, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic criticized Wagner Group for its attempts to recruit Serbian citizens to participate in the Ukraine war. Vucic slammed Wagner, saying, “Why do you do that to Serbia? Why do you, from Wagner, call anyone from Serbia when you know that it is against our regulations?” He also noted that Serbian legislation prohibits its citizens from participating in foreign armed conflicts and denied recent allegations that Wagner has a presence in Serbia. On January 17, Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that there are no Serbian citizens active in Wagner and that Wagner has never been active in Serbia. The DFRLab previously reported on claims made by Wagner that it was establishing a presence in Serbia.

Vucic also condemned a Wagner advertisement published by the newly established Serbian arm of RT. On January 5, RT Balkan reportedly published an article with the headline, “Wagner published an ad for volunteers, the conditions are more than tempting.” The article, which is no longer available on RT Balkan’s website, allegedly said that Wagner was looking for volunteers ages twenty-two to fifty who are not citizens of Ukraine or any EU or NATO member states. Volunteers were required to be physically healthy, interested in learning, patriots, and strong in spirit; in turn, “everything else will be taught by Wagner members.”

A Google search for the original headline, “Vagnerovci objavili oglas za dobrovoljce, uslovi više nego primamljivi,” retrieved an article with the same title, but the original URL now leads to a different article about Russian prisoners who joined Wagner, fought in Ukraine, and peacefully returned to Russia, where all charges against them were dropped.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Ukraine will receive an unspecified number of Archer systems from Sweden, with Swedish media reporting that Kyiv will receive twelve units. Stockholm will also send fifty CV90 vehicles. Latvia will deliver another military aid package to Ukraine that includes Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters, small arms, and drones.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced on January 10 that the country would donate more NASAMS air-defense systems to Ukraine. These systems will enable Ukrainian forces to enhance ground protection around troop deployments and civilian infrastructure. Canada will also transfer another two hundred armored LAV ACSV Super Bison vehicles to Ukraine.

According to the New York Times, the Pentagon is tapping into a stockpile of US ammunition in Israel to help meet Ukraine’s need for artillery shells. The arms and ammunition stockpile is typically reserved for the Pentagon to use in the Middle East. Meanwhile, on January 19, the Pentagon announced a $2.5 billion security package for Ukraine, including for the first time ninety Stryker armored personnel carriers. These mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles could help infantry advance further into the frontlines. Additionally, the US will provide energy equipment to help Ukraine deal with energy shortages. The $125 million support pack would include turbines, backup power banks, and high-voltage transformers.

On January 14, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and announced that the United Kingdom will send Ukraine fourteen Challenger 2 battle tanks and artillery systems. As of 2021, the British army possessed 227 battle tanks. Sending additional tanks is likely to increase pressure on Germany to send its own Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, though Germany’s defense minister said Friday that Berlin has not yet decided on the Leopard 2.

Russian citizens living in Bulgaria donated three pickup trucks to the Ukrainian army. They will be used by the Freedom of Russia Legion, a battalion made up of Russian citizens who defected to fight for Ukraine’s Foreign Legion.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

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TO: US National Security Community

FROM: Atlantic Council’s Gray Zone Task Force

DATE: December 22, 2022

SUBJECT: Scoping the gray zone: Defining terms and policy priorities for engaging competitors below the threshold of conflict

In October, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice convened current and former practitioners and other experts for a private workshop under its Adding Color to the Gray Zone project, which seeks to advance a US and allied strategic framework for hybrid conflict. Participants discussed what actions should and should not be encompassed by the term “gray zone,” the value in defining the gray zone and hybrid conflict, and the most pressing issues for the United States to address in this realm.

Strategic context

Through hybrid conflict or warfare, US adversaries are blurring the lines between peace and war, in a space often referred to as the gray zone. Without firing a single bullet, US adversaries are striking at the fibers of US and allied societies, economies, and governments to test confidence in systems that underwrite both the US constitutional republic and the US-led, rules-based international order. Gray zone competition is a critical and practical element of twenty-first-century security. The ability of the United States to defend against gray zone threats and leverage its advantages for national imperatives will affect its competitive edge in the coming years. There is much debate, however, around what the gray zone and hybrid conflict or warfare signify. While reaching agreement on this terminology is a critical first step for any strategy, it serves only as the early pages of any strategy, and US adversaries are chapters ahead in their respective playbooks.

The value of defining key terms

While definitions for the gray zone and hybrid conflict or warfare are critical for stakeholder synchronization and coordination, reaching consensus on such terminology is neither practical nor worth the effort beyond a common critical mass accomplished through working definitions versus absolute ones. This analysis adopts the following working definitions:

• The gray zone is the space in which defensive and offensive activity occurs above the level of cooperation and below the threshold of armed conflict. Gray zone operations, activities, and actions (OAA) are often, but not always, clandestine, covert, unofficial, or outside accepted norms of behavior. Gray zone OAA are aimed at undermining the security of the target entity or projecting the national or organizational interest of the initiator but without triggering active armed conflict. While the gray zone can be thought of chronologically (i.e., after peace, before active hostilities), it is referred to spatially to reflect that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, gray zone activity can occur during active armed conflict between actors.
• Hybrid conflict (also referred to as hybrid warfare) is a subset of statecraft that uses the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) levers of national power across the competition continuum, including cooperation, competition (including gray zone OAA), deterrence, and armed conflict for the purposes of achieving national security objective(s) against a state or non-state actor(s). DIME has expanded to include financial, intelligence, law, and development levers, with acronyms such as MIDFIELD and DIMEFIL created to account for this. The continued use of DIME bridges the gap between past and present generations of practitioners and remains consistent with the security community’s default verbiage.

These working definitions are meant to offer a meeting point for further discussion, as the task force recognizes and welcomes debate about what is and is not considered gray zone OAA or hybrid conflict. Providing an 80 percent solution allows us to go beyond definitions and begin tackling the tougher and more substantive question of how the United States and its allies and partners act and respond in the gray zone.

According to these definitions, one might argue that few methods do not fall under the gray zone; everything from political speeches and economic policies to legal agreements and information operations, all the way up to arms sales and active armed conflict, may fall under the umbrella of hybrid conflict. This broad lens, however, deliberately offers a strategic shift in the way in which security threats are viewed. Given that security today is shaped by conventional military threats as well as unconventional military and nonmilitary threats, it compels us to redefine what is meant by conflict and consider it as a spectrum persisting well beyond the physical battlefield, threatening not just the lives of American warfighters but also the American way of life. In a sense, the gray zone can be viewed as a distinct (and limitless) domain, with hybrid conflict the activity that falls within this realm. This does not indicate a novelty in the nature of warfare so much as how war is characterized.

This characterization is another area where a strategic competitor like China is ahead of the United States. Chinese doctrinal literature like Unrestricted Warfare and concepts such as the “Three Warfares” have characterized conflict with the United States in this way for nearly thirty years. It is also consistent with theater campaign plans, which provide guidance to US geographic combatant commanders for coordinating Phase Zero activities shaping the battlespace, and ironically, with Sun Tzu’s quote that “every battle is won before it is ever fought.”

Putting definitions into context

What falls within the gray zone? Put simply, it depends. Gray zone activity persists in a delta of norms, wherein the United States, its allies, and its adversaries are all playing by distinct sets of rules and thus work under different thresholds for conflict.

Beyond lexicon, policymakers need to consider the real-world applications of the gray zone terminology, recognizing that target (who or what is being targeted) and intent (what end state the actor is aiming to accomplish) are two key variables in the gray zone equation, and they affect whether actions are characterized as gray zone activity or ordinary statecraft. Identical policy actions might be classified differently depending on whether they intentionally coerce or deter a specific target. For example, when is policy categorized as purely economic versus coercive? While US government investment requires promise of at least breaking even, China subsidizes its private sector even when a deal is projected to lose money—the former policy satisfies economic interests, whereas the latter points to an ulterior motive.

Furthermore, whether an act is classified as hybrid often depends on where one sits: The US government commonly views its own actions as statecraft while cataloging the same or similar actions conducted by adversaries as hybrid conflict. For example, the 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes only competitor approaches as falling within the gray zone, even while referencing comparable US and allied methods. Similarly, the enemy always gets a vote, and while the United States may consider certain actions as operational preparation of the environment, competitors may view them as acts of aggression, hostility, or even war. In parallel, the way in which the United States defines and acts in the gray zone affects whether allies and partners follow suit. Definitional and values-driven consensus can ensure like-minded nations and organizations are on the same page when it comes to hybrid conflict.

Key priorities in the gray zone

Countering Chinese and Russian malign activities and deterring aggression. Specific priorities in the gray zone should be framed around the broader strategic goal of preventing and responding to Chinese and Russian hybrid threats. China and Russia are the United States’ key strategic competitors, and nowhere is this more evident than in the gray zone. China leverages hybrid activity to protect its brand of authoritarianism (for example, power projection through its Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects), whereas Russia aims to weaken NATO and command its near abroad (e.g., the use of unmarked “Little Green Men” to seize Crimea in 2014). Both China and Russia have long leveraged gray zone activity to inflict significant information, influence, intelligence, and technical losses on the United States and allies. How they manifest hybrid conflict, however, differs: Russia fuses military and nonmilitary methods to sow chaos, while China’s approach is far more pervasive and employs continuous nonmilitary operations to offset US military superiority. The United States’ recognition of a broadening paradigm from legacy traditional deterrence of its adversaries to increased focus on information and influence is central to the integrated deterrence mandated by the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

Adapting to the information age. Emerging technologies continue to revolutionize how people and nations receive and consume information, necessarily changing the way in which information activity is conducted in the gray zone. Technological advancements are transforming both the hybrid threats facing the United States and the tools at its disposal. For example, for all its good, technological innovation has also caused supply chain sensitivities vulnerable to adversarial exploitation including through industrial espionage, intellectual property theft, and cyberattacks. US entities need to become more creative in anticipating such threats and solving for them, such as through obfuscating data and reducing an adversary’s confidence. Another example is found in open-source intelligence (OSINT). With the proliferation of social media, OSINT can be just as critical as classified sources and methods of intelligence—yet the US government’s traditional bias toward classified intelligence is hindering its ability to stay ahead in the information domain. This space is ripe for public-private partnership, as vulnerabilities are not necessarily housed in US government entities but rather in assets and infrastructure not traditionally or organically protected by the government or military (e.g., social media platforms).

Involving economic policies and institutions. Any discussion of the gray zone is incomplete without adequate consideration of economic policies and their key stakeholders. Economic strategy is a key component of strategic competition, with industrial policy, debt financing, and sovereign debt policy being among the policies leveraged by China and Russia to meet their own strategic ends. Furthermore, US adversaries are targeting the commercial sector, shifting much of the impetus for action on economic and private sector actors that should play a leading role in the gray zone. Civil and commercial partnerships will be a cornerstone of a US response in the gray zone, and the private sector must be strengthened against economic coercion and intellectual property theft or risk weakening the US strategic approach.

The way forward

Gray zone threats are a whole-of-nation problem and should prompt a whole-of-nation response. While the United States currently views the gray zone largely through a military or intelligence framework, and a defensive one at that, other US departments and agencies, commercial stakeholders, and international entities have a major—in some cases leading—role to play.[1] A cohesive US strategy, perhaps coordinated by an entity independent of practitioner equities, is necessary to synchronize and optimize US government and commercial actors and their efforts in this space.

Such a strategy must be well resourced and well articulated. The United States should look past traditional military personnel to build out its hybrid response, creating new paradigms that do not necessarily adhere to the legacy system(s) but involve relevant stakeholders who can view the adversary without political and/or military bias. Moreover, the United States should update the training of its diplomatic corps to ensure its cadre understands the inner workings of key institutions central to their job description. Additionally, communicating with and educating a public audience will be a foundational requirement for gray zone efforts, as society at large must recognize that the United States is routinely fighting in the gray zone and citizens must understand the ways in which they play a role. This approach has precedence in World Wars I and II, and even the Cold War. Consistent and synchronized messaging across the government will help maintain the effectiveness and credibility of the messaging needed to deter adversaries from using hybrid methods.

The Atlantic Council’s Gray Zone Task Force consists of technical and policy experts, former government officials, and private sector executives. These individuals leverage their deep knowledge and extensive experience in impacted and impactful industries to examine adversarial acts in the gray zone and determine how the United States and its allies and partners can leverage hybrid tactics to meet their own strategic ends.

Explore Adding Color to the Gray Zone

Adding color to the gray zone: Establishing a strategic framework for hybrid conflict

Investigating nontraditional and hybrid threats across the competition continuum, proposing a US and allied approach to acting, reacting, and prevailing in the gray zone throughout an era of strategic competition.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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1. What exactly does the Pentagon mean by activities in the gray zone?

The NDS defines gray zone methods as “coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for US military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the US government.” That definition acknowledges that strategic competitors are increasingly taking the fight off the physical battlefield and using unconventional and nonmilitary means to undermine US and allied security. Adversaries such as China and Russia are not solely—or even primarily—targeting military assets, but rather they are fueling societal and cultural fissures, shaping the information domain, and disrupting economic markets and trade. This is not a new concept: China’s and Russia’s use of nonmilitary means of warfare dates back to Operation Desert Storm, wherein the United States walked away celebrating a decisive battlefield victory while US adversaries began visualizing a future fight in which they could compensate for unparalleled US conventional power through hybrid means.

The DOD’s definition of gray zone activities can be interpreted as purposefully broad, implying that a discussion of modern warfare today is incomplete without discussing threats permeating from the gray zone. However, it is notable that the NDS opted to characterize only competitor or adversary methods as falling within the gray zone, even while mentioning comparable US and allied capabilities and approaches.

Overall, this NDS’s definition of gray zone methods broadens the US defense community’s understanding of who is being targeted in the gray zone and thus who should be implicated in the DOD’s response—and more significant than the definition itself is the prioritization placed on the gray zone. However, this is only one step in the right direction, as different US agencies and departments are currently working under different understandings of what does and does not fall within the gray zone. This lack of consensus or coordination, coupled with an overall lack of direction as to whether and how the United States should fight in the gray zone, hinders an effective whole-of-nation response to a whole-of-nation problem.

—Julia Siegel is an assistant director with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice.

2. How do gray zone activities fit into the DOD’s integrated deterrence concept?

Integrated deterrence is, at its heart, about shaping behavior to “convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities far outweigh any possible benefits,” as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin explained. Integrated deterrence ultimately relies on a full spectrum of incentives, disincentives, messaging, and negotiation, underwritten by credible deterrents of conventional and/or strategic military action. Unsurprisingly, a good amount of the spectrum below the threshold of active armed conflict will reside in the gray zone.

The United States must react to adversarial activity in the gray zone, especially in areas that adversaries perceive as important, to reduce their efficacy; that will require responses that are appropriate, proportionate, and effective. Equally important, the United States must engage proactively in the gray zone to shape competitors’ behavior. Some of the capabilities needed for engaging in the gray zone exist within the DOD, with many housed within US Special Operations Forces core activities, as well as theater security cooperation activities and those at a national level that transcend a single geographic combatant command such as coordination with Five Eyes partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) across the globe. Other capabilities, while not organic to the department, are at its disposal through effective partnerships with the intelligence community, other departments (e.g. State, Treasury, and Commerce), and alliances and partnerships. Improving the way the DOD leverages partnerships can potentially result in better outcomes than replicating the partners’ capabilities.

A critical part of integrated deterrence will be how the United States articulates its so-called “red lines,” or adversarial actions that trigger a US military response. In order to effectively shape behavior that supports US and allied interests, US strategy and execution must erase any doubt that such limits and consequences do exist, while simultaneously reducing adversary confidence about their knowledge of precisely where those red lines lie. That deliberate ambiguity keeps adversaries from thinking that everything up to the red line would be “fair game,” and avoids inviting lower-level malign activity. It also avoids the optics of a United States’ “bluff” being called, in part, to avoid walking back on pronounced lines. Lastly, engaging in the gray zone will buy the maneuver time and space required to maintain its competitive edge and deter aggression in the future—the United States cannot waste this advantage with denial, handwringing, and partisanship—especially when it comes to China.

—Arun Iyer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and leads its project Adding Color to the Gray Zone. 

3. The NDS differentiates between China as the pacing threat and Russia as an acute threat. What does that look like in the gray zone?

The NDS correctly notes that China and Russia pose unique challenges to the United States. The two countries differ in how they impact the United States and in how long their threats last. China’s advances in technology, access to third-country governments and resources, and role as a key global manufacturer means that the United States and allied countries face a strategic, long-term competition against China. All-out war against China would devastate the global economy and cripple US-owned multinational businesses. In contrast, Russia lacks the reach of its Soviet Union days and its impacts on global markets are mostly limited to petrochemicals. As highlighted in its efforts in Ukraine, the Russian military’s decline has been noticed in the waning professionalism of its forces, reliability of material, and overall investment and research and development. Russia would struggle to project traditional military power much outside its border areas.

China, despite recent economic troubles, is a nation on the rise and one that feels it deserves a place at the top of the world order. Although its population is forecasted to decline in the coming years, China will be a global force for decades to come—and its network of businesses, investments, and expatriates provide the country unique access to capabilities that it can leverage both in the gray zone and to meet traditional military goals. For example, TikTok may offer China the ability to push specific anti-US government content to users of the app in North America or in locations where there are ongoing US or NATO military operations. China’s continued investment in technology, education, and international relationships means that the country will continue to build this access in business, academia, and local politics in countries around the world—levers that can be pulled to meet China’s goals without the use of traditional military operations.

In contrast, Russia’s gray-zone capabilities are limited outside of its use of the paramilitary Wagner Group, information manipulation in the digital space, and traditional diplomatic efforts which include foreign intelligence operations to project power and contribute to paramilitary, influence, and harassment operations. As the political elite focuses on ways to make the domestic Russian audience feel powerful during a period of population and economic decline, gray-zone efforts will likely focus on meeting specific needs such as port access or supporting international political leaders. The Kremlin will aim to look strong to domestic and regional audiences, especially in Eastern Europe and South Asia, where Russia typically has influence. Moscow’s overarching threat to global interests will be its use of information operations to sow discord, clearing entry ways for Russian intelligence and business leaders to access locations of interest and providing localized support to fighting parties where political interests align.

—Jennifer A. Counter is a nonresident senior fellow within the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

4. Deterrence is inherently a messaging game. What does this NDS say about the DOD’s approach to information operations?

Deterrence depends on the adversary’s perception of the United States’ capabilities and intent to use them. It also depends on an impression that if the adversary were to present a challenge, the United States would be able to cause enough damage to outweigh any gain for the adversary and its interests. Gauging an adversary’s perception, therefore, is necessary to understand the current deterrent threshold. Moving the threshold, if necessary, is dictated by how well a military manages the information domain. If a deterrent threshold is evaporating or degrading over time, then adjustments must be made to capabilities and perceived intentions, and then adequately conveyed to the adversary to restore the value of the deterrent. The NDS highlights the Pentagon’s aim to enhance its ability to operate in the information domain as a necessary component of this strategy.

Yet questions remain. The NDS highlights several new features with significant information elements to help organize and subsequently execute military activities across the entire conflict spectrum. First, the NDS’s focus on integrated deterrence calls for improvements across domains, agencies, and countries to better manage conflict in the information domain. Second, campaigns that cover the entire conflict spectrum—overlayed with the increased demands of implementing integrated deterrence—will require significant additional resources for all information components of the DOD. Who will manage a global information campaign in which all departmental information resources must be coherent, synchronized, and operationally relevant? Will the president’s budget for fiscal year 2024 reflect the need for additional resources to adequately coordinate campaigns that are overlapping and will run simultaneously across agencies, partners, and allies? Finally, is the department adequately organized to elevate information operations as a preeminent component of national power needed to implement integrated deterrence? The NDS is a good step forward, but organization and resourcing leading up to fiscal year 2024 will determine whether it can be implemented.

 —Robert J. Giesler is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

5. How can the US government and private sector complement traditional military efforts?

In roughly eighty pages, the 2022 NDS references economic tools fewer than a dozen times. While not surprising given that the document sets forth the DOD’s strategy, which consists primarily of non-economic tools, this underscores the importance of relying on other government agencies and departments to address what the NDS refers to as “economic coercion” carried out by the China against the United States and its allies and partners. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the shining example of this coercion, as it forces recipient nations to forfeit direct or indirect control over key strategic assets (such as a ports, airports, rail lines, and highways) if they fail to pay commercial loans. However, myriad other examples of economic coercion exist, including currency manipulation, technology transfer requirements (i.e., China requiring foreign firms to transfer technology to local firms in exchange for market access), and punitive tariffs.

So how can the United States combat economic hybrid warfare? The NDS acknowledges that DOD ought to rely on other agencies to take the lead on economic matters in the gray zone, stating that in many cases, tools such as economic measures “conducted by other US departments and agencies may prove more effective” than DOD’s military tools. This is where the panoply of US trade agencies—in conjunction with the Treasury and Commerce departments—can play a key role by establishing consistent, cross-agency policies regarding foreign investment, credit finance, trade policy, and sanctions to protect US defense interests and regain economic advantage. Still, DOD plays a significant role in advising these agencies on how to prioritize geographic focus areas and in evaluating where the greatest economic threats to US national security exist.

—David Fogel is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

6. How should the DOD change its approach to counterintelligence (CI) under the integrated deterrence framework?

Integrated deterrence ought to include the use of CI capabilities resident within DOD’s authorities via Title 10 of the US Code, which outlines the DOD’s role in conducting military activities; Title 50 of the US Code, which grants the DOD and the intelligence community the authority to conduct intelligence and CI activities; and Executive Order 12333, which initially laid out the DOD’s intelligence and CI responsibilities. As the NDS notes, the United States can strengthen deterrence by conducting actions that raise an adversary’s cost with respect to the “perceived benefits of aggression.” One of the ways this can be accomplished is through synchronized messaging, complemented by real-world open activities and actions that utilize offensive CI operations in concert with the DOD planning community. For example, the DOD might use CI assets to pass information about a policy intent that complements a stated White House or State Department decision, all while moving DOD personnel and material into the theater to reinforce the United States’ overall intent.

Similarly, leveraging CI capabilities can help improve the resiliency of the vital networks and critical infrastructure supporting the cyber and space domains, as they utilize the same personnel, equipment, networks, and supply chains feeding into CI. The first order of business should be securing US supply chains in line with the Pentagon’s vision of delivering uncompromised, which is a DOD program aiming to bolster security across the entire defense enterprise by ensuring that foreign intelligence entities haven’t compromised technology (for example with insider threats or compromised chips) in the manufacturing process, which would assist with building enduring advantages throughout the defense ecosystem. To do so, the United States must move the manufacture of critical components back onshore to the United States and then use the tools and tradecraft of CI to ensure that the personnel, networks, intellectual property, and manufacturing processes associated with these “can’t lose” technologies are both vetted and protected.

—Thomas Ferguson was a member of Forward Defense’s Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force before assuming a position in government.

7. How can the Pentagon better leverage domestic and international partners, and the capabilities they own across domains, to fortify its integrated deterrence?

The NDS mandate to leverage every capability and advantage at DOD’s disposal, particularly to use advantages that DOD does not organically own, is astute and could not come at a better time for the United States. The two-decade war on terror provides a strong precedent for cross-government cooperation, which is potentially still applicable even as the US government shifts its focus from counterterrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia.

As a former Central Intelligence Agency leader, I saw first-hand the development, implementation, and impact of what was nicknamed “Title 60”—the portmanteau of titles 10 and 50 of US code—wherein the DOD and intelligence community (IC) worked seamlessly on the counterterrorism mission. This integrated cooperation between exquisite capabilities is the textbook example of what the NDS calls for, particularly in addressing competition in the gray zone. For example, both the IC and Special Operations Forces worked together to become experts at man-hunting in the war on terror, fusing signals intelligence, human intelligence, and overhead capabilities to ensure few places globally were out of reach in conducting “find, fix, finish” missions against terrorist targets. Such capabilities can similarly be used against today’s strategic competitors—why not merge joint talents to find hostile foreign intelligence officers working against US interests across the globe?

In sum, successes in the US war on terror were critically dependent on bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Both the IC and DOD deeply understand the value of partners, justifying integration on many levels such as intelligence sharing and (at times) cross-training. To meet the NDS remit to address gray zone threats, the DOD must build on these relationships and lessons and not let a new issue set cause formerly integrated capabilities to atrophy.

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

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On September 21, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Nonresident Senior Fellow William Evanina testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In his testimony, Evanina discussed the growing cyber threat posed to US business and academic institutions.

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Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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While the document’s strategic prioritization is clear, what remains uncertain is how this strategy will ultimately be implemented across DOD. Defense leadership recognizes this, as the document states that “this strategy will not be successful if we fail to resource its major initiatives or fail to make the hard choices to align available resources with the strategy’s level of ambition.”

How can DOD meet the strategic priorities laid out in the 2022 NDS? The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s military fellows—active-duty officers who are serving a one-year rotation at the Atlantic Council—weighed in, addressing potential gaps between budgets and strategy, force employment mechanisms, sustainment and logistics, and security partnerships. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied here are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of DOD or any other US government agency.

Investing in security partnerships: The US should take larger risks to bolster Taiwan’s defense

Security cooperation has long played an essential role in US defense policy, but this NDS amplifies its role in competition for the next decade. The 2022 NDS states that “mutually beneficial Alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage—and they are a center of gravity for this strategy.” The decisions to defend treaty allies have already been adjudicated, but the decision to support security partners such as Ukraine and Taiwan remains foggy. Overall, this NDS implies that DOD will likely need to take more significant risks to support Taiwan and to prevent a Chinese invasion. 

The current war in Ukraine provides a case for security cooperation. Had the United States and NATO invested more heavily in Ukraine before Russia’s February 2022 invasion, they may have deterred Russia from attacking in the first place. In the past several months, the United States has invested approximately $17.6 billion in security assistance for Ukraine. In comparison, it only invested $2.7 billion from 2014 until February. The United States’ concerns about escalation with Russia were pervasive early in the Ukraine crisis, but along with NATO it has since taken much greater risks to help Ukraine survive and to contain Russia. US and NATO leaders are now likely pondering whether it may have been smarter and cheaper to invest earlier to prevent the war than to help Ukraine fight it.

When the United States invests in alliances and partnerships, it invests directly and indirectly to prevent (and, if necessary, respond to) any potential crisis. For instance, Operation Desert Storm (1990-91) included a coalition of thirty-nine countries worldwide. Desert Storm’s success relied heavily on a NATO alliance that was built for the Cold War threat but trained and ready for a crisis in the Middle East. US leadership in NATO has helped deepen the capability and willingness of European countries to cooperate in support of Ukraine. After Russia invaded, the speed and unity of the US, NATO, and European Union response were exemplary. The rate of armament shipments, funding supplied to Ukraine, sanctions on Russia, and the response to the humanitarian crisis should all serve as blueprints for coordination among allies and partners in the future. Enhancing US investments in Indo-Pacific alliances and partners will improve resilience for a potential conflict scenario in Taiwan or elsewhere.

The United States should implement an audacious strategy to help build Taiwan’s self-defenses and strengthen other Indo-Pacific allies and partners to help surge in a crisis. According to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Taiwan is a security partner. The TRA places Taiwan a tier above Ukraine in terms of US commitment to its security. The additional ten billion dollars over four years in Foreign Military Financing for Taiwan proposed in the 2023 NDAA could further solidify US commitment to the partnership. Ideally, a US funding increase would spur other Taiwan security partners to increase their support and potentially create a NATO-like framework for deterrence.

The West will likely never know for certain whether heavily arming Ukraine pre-invasion would have caused Russian escalation or prevented the invasion entirely. However, given that Russia has repeatedly threatened red lines since invading and the West has routinely surpassed them, the United States and NATO likely could have been more aggressive without triggering a broader war. US defense leaders should use the lesson of Ukraine to push the limits of investment in Taiwan—along with other Indo-Pacific allies and partners—to prevent an invasion.

—COL Benjamin Johnson is the 2022-2023 senior US Army fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

Follow the money: DOD is betting on research but not sending the right signals to industry

At every opportunity, DOD leadership has sought to highlight the linkages between the 2022 NDS and the president’s fiscal year 2023 (FY23) budget request. Yet, while this strategy and budget were developed concurrently, fiscal constraints lead to necessary tradeoffs across programs.

Consistent with the NDS, DOD cut costs from the current force structure to make significant investments in building enduring advantages. The Defense-Wide funding request increased significantly when compared to projections in the Trump administration’s final budget request (9 percent compared to an overall DOD increase of 5 percent), with these accounts containing the offices of the undersecretaries of defense for research and engineering, and for acquisition and sustainment. Notably, these two offices will execute the increases to building enduring advantages programs, to include $3.3 billion for microelectronics, $1.1 billion for artificial intelligence, and $700 million for submarine industrial-base resiliency. Such investments were partially funded by reductions to current force structure, including the retirement of sixteen Navy battle force ships before their estimated service life, a reduction of twelve thousand regular Army troops, and 102 Air Force aircraft early retirements. 

Moreover, the FY23 budget contains the largest research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTE) request in DOD history, with funding requests of $130 billion for RDTE and $146 billion for procurement. Focusing too much on RDTE at the expense of procurement contributes to the “valley of death”—or the arduous journey commercial companies take to win DOD contracts—further underscoring that DOD does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. To field cutting-edge technologies, more funds ought to shift toward procurement over future budget cycles.

However, while all eyes are on the current budget year, the out-year funding projections in the Future Years Defense Program are concerning, as they result in real growth of -1.2 percent in FY25, -0.6 percent in FY26, and -1.4 percent in FY27 (using a projected 2.2 percent inflation rate, which is far below what we’ve seen lately). This demonstrates that additional force structure reductions may be required in future budget cycles, and that heavy RDTE investments may not necessarily lead to transformational technologies in the field—if there won’t be enough money for production. The NDS prioritizes a resilient defense ecosystem and healthy industrial base, but out-year projections do not send a demand signal to industry for sustained investment and will impact NDS implementation in the long term.

Now, Congress has the next move: Work remains ongoing to finalize the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act and appropriations bills. Throughout committee mark-ups, there has been strong bipartisan support for additional FY23 defense funding.

—LCDR Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

Something old and something new: Force employment modernization must match an ambitious strategy

As outlined in the NDS, the “principal approach to advancing these priorities is integrated deterrence,” which is a whole-of-government approach to deter aggressive and malign actions by US adversaries, gain and maintain advantage throughout the competition continuum, and mitigate risk in advance of potential conflicts. 

As discussed above and articulated by others, there appears to be a gap between NDS objectives and budgetary realities. However, much of what is discussed as new within the NDS bears strong resemblance to strategy and guidance that has existed for several years. It can be argued that the 2018 NDS, 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, and the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the NDS already created the necessary strategy framework to drive the department toward the strategic ends outlined in the 2022 NDS. What has remained constant, however, are the mechanisms by which joint force employment is planned and executed. The new points of emphasis—in particular the reliance on campaigning, as well addressing gray-zone activities simultaneously with conflict preparation—require a modernization of joint force employment concepts. 

The NDS explicitly states that “campaigning is not business as usual,” but rather a more sophisticated approach to “aggregate focus and resources” to ensure that operations, activities, and investments are linked to the stated priorities, while critically incorporating “feedback loops” ostensibly to course correct in the midst of dynamic long-term campaigns. Devising a long-term strategy to deter Chinese and Russian malign influence globally is decidedly more complex than a campaign to dismantle a violent extremist organization in a single theater. Integrated deterrence campaigns require a high degree of focused understanding about US adversaries, the effects of military operations in concert with other instruments of power, and mitigation of strategic and escalatory risks. 

However, current force employment mechanisms are more conventionally rigid, generally tying expeditionary forces to operating locations and adjudicating objectives years in advance of action, making it difficult to incorporate feedback loops and adjust to adaptive adversaries. Similarly, the rotational model employed by the military often caps the amount of time a particular problem can be focused on by expeditionary units or joint task forces, which can limit understanding and ultimately the options presented to commanders. As opposed to executive branch organizations that often focus on specific problems for decades, military units may shift from divergent problem sets over several years. Given the premium the NDS places on coordination and collaboration with not only the executive branch but also allies and partners, DOD must allow more flexibility in how it aligns multi-domain capabilities against priority operational problems.

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is critical to the ways and means in which force employment supports the strategic objectives outlined in the NDS. The military speaks in the language of requirements, which are specific and tangible activities that capability owners can use to develop operational concepts. Requirements and intermediate military objectives are defined in campaign plans, and the JSPS directs the development of Global Campaign Plans (GCP), Functional Campaign Plans, and Combatant Command Campaign Plans. In particular, GCPs “address the most pressing transregional and multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains… are global in scope and focus on integrating activities oriented against specific problems designed to achieve unity of effort for day-to-day activities,” according to the JSPS. Each GCP has a designated Coordinating Authority (CA) who has overall responsibility for the planning and execution of their associated GCP, and it is in this area where modernization is needed. Competing with Russia and China is a global endeavor, thus CAs must be armed with a global understanding of the problems sets to ensure that their campaign plans logically connect with each other and can be resourced and adjusted dynamically. The department should look to devise cross-functional teams from across the executive branch as well as key allies to provide CAs with holistic understanding of these global problem sets to better inform the development and modernization of the GCPs. 

The NDS makes it clear that the United States should not look at Russia as solely a problem in the European theater, nor China as solely an Indo-Pacific issue. Nonetheless, the force employment modernization to foster global deterrence campaigning must also account for the necessary preparations for regional conflict. Creative leadership is the key, as the NDS states that “we must not over-exert, reallocate, or redesign our forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to preparedness for our highest strategic priorities.” This means that the department and CAs should encourage operational activities that satisfy requirements related to conflict preparation, as well as the ability to fight in the gray zone. Often referred to as “two-fers,” these types of operations can allow for a more efficient force employment model that can be scaled as required depending on prioritization. 

—Lt. Col. Justin Conelli is the 2022-2023 senior US Air Force fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

The Iron Triangle: Tradeoffs and challenges in building a sustainable, survivable logistics infrastructure

The 2022 NDS prioritizes a future force logistics capability able to operate in a contested environment and withstand attack from an adversary. Sustainability and survivability are key elements of effective logistics support, but current US sustainment, throughput, and distribution information technology (IT) systems are optimized toward neither. The pace at which the United States addresses these gaps, and the resources put toward closing them, will have an outsized impact on the nation’s ability to execute campaigns as outlined in the NDS.

Referred to as the “Iron Triangle,” the “good, fast, and cheap rule” encapsulates the tension between quality, speed, and investment in meeting stated priorities. Better understanding the tough choices confronting modernization of sustainment systems better informs the risk calculus of tradeoffs between effectiveness, speed, and cost, potentially closing the gap between possibility and probability.

The 2018 NDS made mention of logistics only insofar as to state a need for resiliency and agility “while under persistent multi-domain attack.” In contrast, the 2022 NDS’s call-out for a modernized sustainment and logistics capability is a step in the right direction in confronting changes within the operating environment. Investing big (or not) is a critical choice if the United States’ intent is to operationalize DOD’s role in strategic deterrence, maintain the edge within a campaigning construct, or buy decision space in order to maintain strategic options. Doing any of these things without aggressively resourced, suitably reinforced logistics IT systems will result in an inability to deliver effective sustainment as a means to generate combat power during enemy disruption or attack, or to credibly enforce strategic deterrence.

However, US IT logistics systems are unclassified, lacking interoperability, and multi-domain incapable, making them ill-suited to effectively support the joint force in a contested environment. While these capability gaps are nothing new, they are increasingly prime for exploitation within a competitive environment as vast as the Indo-Pacific theater. Numerous upgrade options exist across the commercial sector—to name a few, Amazon, Walmart, Maersk, and FedEx all leverage artificial intelligence, predictive algorithms, and myriad tech advancements in support of throughput/distribution models. These commercial systems capitalize on speed and quality in terms of delivering products on time and on target, possessing the elements of flexibility and resiliency long sought by DOD. Sure, ordering and receiving a personalized beer koozie within twenty-four hours is wildly different from large-scale sustainment operations in a maritime campaign—and these commercial systems are not yet wartime tested—but they are available now, offering a starting point from which to build.

Done right, the logistics systems modernization called for in the 2022 NDS will not come cheap, and developing and integrating commercially available systems will incur risk in areas that are left without funding as a result. Historically, logistics and sustainment do not compete well with high-end, exquisite tech capabilities. While a necessary function, logistics is often considered mundane and does not capture the imagination in the same way as the high-end technological advancements set out in the NDS. For now, the services are responding to the realities of logistics system limitations by experimenting with how to leverage current resources and new methods of employment. As an example, the Marine Corps, in concert with our naval counterparts, continues to develop and implement expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), a form of expeditionary warfare involving mobile, low-signature naval expeditionary forces whose express purpose is to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment in an austere, contested maritime environment. In sum, the United States will get what it is willing to pay for in logistics and sustainment, and its urgency in mitigating the gaps will reflect the choice to (or not to) invest heavily.

Sustainment is indeed a warfighting function, but it is often resourced as a supporting effort. The results are as one would expect when the investment is “cheap.” Setting the force specifically for operational plans looks different than multi-domain logistics when operating in the gray zone. Adapting a proactive approach to sustainment as a warfighting function, similar to intelligence and more recently communications and information in the targeting cycle, will enable effective campaigning, allowing the US to preserve strategic options and decision space in the changing security and operational environment.

—Lt. Col. Michelle Melendez is the 2022-2023 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

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Advancing the dialogue on how the United States and its allies and partners can deter, fight, and win future wars.

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

FREDERICK KEMPE: Some of you in the audience know me: This is not only the first day in my life I’ve worn batik; it is the first time that any president of the Atlantic Council in our sixty-year history has worn batik, and so we do that in your country and in honor of you.  

Starting as a businessman and mayor in your home city, Surakarta in 2005, President Jokowi entered politics with the aim to work for the people. He devoted himself to eradicating poverty, reducing crime, paying spontaneous visits to poor neighborhoods and marketplaces, always ready to hear people’s voices from up close. Your refusal to accept salary for public work and your competence in transforming the city into a vibrant tourist destination won the population of Surakarta’s heart, and you were re-elected as mayor in 2010 with more than 90 percent of the vote.  

Your determination to serve continued throughout your career, and you became the governor of Jakarta, and then the president of Indonesia in 2014. You were the first Indonesian president without a military or elite political background, and your victory symbolized the victory of democracy—the victory of democracy in this country of over 17,000 islands, 300 ethnic groups, and 273 million people and counting.  

We will all witness your leadership here at the G20, as you bring countries together at a particularly difficult moment in the world community, in solving the most pressing challenges today in health, climate change, economic recessions, and geopolitical tensions that have us all on edge—to recover together and to recover stronger.  

To make this G20 summit a success, it needs a chair of extraordinary talent and capability and heart; and someone who enjoys the trust of all parties involved. And you started becoming chair of the G20 far before you came here and launched this week; We’ve been watching your travels, we’ve been watching your meetings.  

President Widodo is not just a man of the people of Indonesia, he’s also become a global citizen who embodies the spirit of global cooperation, a catalyst for collective prosperity and peace, and that is why the Atlantic Council and its jury voted to honor you with our highest honor. It’s now my pleasure to present the [2022] Atlantic Council Distinguished Global Citizen Award. President Joko Widodo of Indonesia, a man of the people, a global leader, a global citizen president. 

PRESIDENT JOKO WIDODO: First of all, I would like to extend my highest appreciation for this award, the Global Citizen Award, from the Atlantic Council. I have never thought earlier that I would receive this award. So far what I’ve done… I’m doing my best. I’m working and doing my best with full responsibility, to uphold the values of humanity. Living in Indonesia, consisting of more than 17,000 islands, hundreds of ethnic groups, 162 local languages, Indonesia upholds the values of tolerance, peace, unity, and cooperation.

As a leader, I love visiting villages, I love visiting rural areas, and I also love visiting traditional markets. And since I was a child, I was taught being humble, to live modestly. And I’ve seen some people living in village or rural areas living in difficult situations, and therefore, I keep trying to do my best for the interests of common people and also for the interest of the state. The world should be built with tolerance, respect toward each other. The presidency of Indonesia in [the] G20 this year, and also we have [received] the [chairmanship] of ASEAN starting from next year. Ladies and gentlemen, once again, I would like to thank you for this Global Citizen Award that has been awarded to me. This will continually motivate me and also the government of the Republic of Indonesia to hold our responsibilities as part of the solution for the global world. 

Watch the remarks

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Let’s see, I want to make sure you can hear me OK. So, look, we’re going to have a panel that’s—this is going to be a pragmatic panel. We’re going to talk about what has to be done, what has to be done now, and what we’re going to as best we can demand that the G20 address.

So, without further ado, I would like to bring in the other members of the panel.

We’ll start with His Excellency the Minister of Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia, Mr.—or, His Excellency Syahrul Yasin Limpo. Mr. Minister, welcome. Please.

Next will be Ambassador David Merrill, former US ambassador to Indonesia. Long career in the US Agency of International Development. Next, please.

Next will be the Honorable Kira Rudik, who is the vice president of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, people’s deputy of Ukraine. Welcome, Kira.

And on the screen with us we should have—yes, we have—Dr. Seth Meyer, the chief economist, the—probably one of the most—foremost experts in the world on agricultural economics and technology. And, Seth, we’re delighted to have you with us. Thank you. I’m sorry you’re not here in person. And we’re looking at you continuously, but don’t let that make you nervous. We’re going to watch you the whole time.

OK, let’s get right to it. So I want to start with the deputy from Ukraine. And, Kira, I want to ask you this. You know, we were talking about this being a crisis. So we’re in a crisis. This war is not over. Of course, we’re happy that Ukraine has recovered Kherson, but we don’t know what’s going to happen next. So the odds are that we’re going to have another disrupted planting season in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s one of the breadbaskets. What can you tell us that we should ask the world to do for the farmers of Ukraine right now to give us the greatest output of grain for the world?

KIRA RUDIK: Hello. Thank you so much for having me. It’s a pleasure being here.

So when we are talking about the next harvest season and how to make sure that we prepare for it the best and most effective way, we should look at it with a business approach. So in business, when you are in crisis, the first thing is you need to fixate the losses. So right now we need to make sure that there is no more destruction or at least it’s minimized. So, for that, we need air force protection systems. And we are asking our allies—United States, European countries, United Kingdom, all countries from all over the world—to provide us with air force protection systems to protect infrastructure from further destruction. This is the first one.

Second one is, of course, de-mining. The de-mining efforts need to happen right now. They are happening, but at a very small scale because, basically, all the lands that are supposed to be agricultural lands right now partially or fully are mined. And they are not going to be able to be used to plant the harvest.

Third thing, of course, we need to fix infrastructure and use these five months before the next planting season to fix the infrastructure. As of right now, 40 percent of energy infrastructure in Ukraine is destroyed. So when the cities are experiencing electrical outages, when there is no running water, it will be very hard to continue on the commitment that we have in terms of the agriculture. So we need from the international community support on going through the winter and also fixing the infrastructure.

Fourth thing is commitment on the fuel. We understand that right now Ukraine is purchasing fuel and this, of course, has an impact on the price of the harvest on the grains, on all the products. So we need to make plans and commitments for the next year for the fuel and for the price of it. And of course, it’s a painful subject for everybody.

And the last but not the least, and a critically important point, is the grain deal. The grain deal is a temporary agreement between the United Nations, Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey that the ports where the grains are exported from are being not neutral, but the ships can go in and out easily. So the price of the harvest depends on the price of the insurance that the companies have to put on the ships that are going in and out of the warzone, basically. So having a written commitment or the general commitment so it will seem safely or look safely or be more safe for the companies to ship the grains in and out of Ukraine would decrease the price of insurance and the price of transportation.

As of—as for Ukrainian people, we want the war to be over. We are a technological and agricultural country. We want to make sure that we continue being a breadbasket for the whole world. This is one of our missions. This is what we want to do. And I can tell you part of my family are farmers. It’s sacred. It’s almost religious for us to be able to provide life, to create life instead of death. And this is critically important, and this is why we are fighting so hard to win the war, to end the war, and to make sure that we return to the safe operation where we are able to build prosperity for everyone and contradict all the crises.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Kira, thank you very much. You’ve given us some very clear guidelines, and we’ll make sure those get reflected in what we pass on to the White House and also to the—to the G20 here.

And I’d like to turn next to Minister Limpo. Minister, General Prabowo gave us this incredible presentation today that shows this progress that’s been made in Indonesia. There must be many countries all over the world who look at the example of Indonesia and say: We could do this. We would like to do this. I know we have representatives here from several African countries, and I’m sure they will be anxious to listen to your experience and your guidelines on how was this accomplished. The rice, the palm oil, the technology with cassava, how was this done? What is Indonesia doing that’s bringing it to the forefront in this way?

MINISTER SYAHRUL YASIN LIMPO: Yeah. Thank you, General.

Distinguished resource persons, ladies and gentlemen, from discussions which we have had and for the last one year, we have heard the huge challenges and issues that we are facing concerning climate change, wars, and also the impact of COVID-19 pandemic. We have talked about this in many forums.

And talking about food, food is the most strategic issue. And this issue requires the attention of states, nations, and the global citizens, as well as peace and public order. We might be able to delay other issues, but we can’t delay the issue of food. Food issue is the most essential, the most fundamental, and it has multidimensional aspects. Therefore, our president, Mr. Joko Widodo, has determined that food is a top priority, and it shall be discussed in detail.

In our countries, we look at our provinces, regencies, and sub-regencies, and also the states. And then we look at the regions. And we divide our areas in Indonesia into production regions. In two, three areas, we are dividing our areas in Indonesia into areas that have surplus in stocks, regions which have limited stocks, and which may get in trouble in a crisis if a crisis strikes. And there are also areas which have shortages. Likewise, in the global level there are countries facing shortages of food, and there are also countries having limited stocks, and there are also countries having abundant stocks. Therefore, in facing this global crisis, the food crisis, what we may do, among others, like what we do in Indonesia under the leadership of our president, is mitigate and adapt ourselves with issues including climate change, including the global supply chain, and food logistic aspects. This should be anticipated, and proper adaptation should be made by all food producers as well.

Second of all, subnational cooperation. Subnational cooperation should be promoted and regulated by the state. No subnational region should restrict its trade, fulfilling its own need only, or even close itself because it may affect the trade ecosystem as a whole. And this pattern is the same with the global pattern. We need to look at the flow of food to where it needs. We should look at the flow of supply chain, from which area does it flow.

And in Indonesia, we have dealt with food crisis. For the past three years, we have had a surplus in food reserve, especially rice, which we have used to deal with shortages in wheat because there is a problem with supply from India, Russia, and Ukraine. Therefore, we must prepare measures to substitute the wheat in the event of wheat shortage issues. So we prepare our sago, our cassava, and our sorghum to prepare for any shortages. Currently, there is no problem. This year, we are OK. We don’t have issues with wheat. But what about next year? What about the regulation? And will the regular shipping of this commodity return to normal? And what if the stocks are concentrated in a particular area? If this happens, what we need to do is to substitute such commodities.

We also have issues with cattle, which we have imported 1.2 million cattle. Therefore, in the event of shortage, what we need to do is to prepare our land, chicken, and ax supply. What I meant is handling this food crisis is a must. And there is no single country that has an ability to restrict itself because this will result in a global issue.

And as for cooperation, in the G20 agricultural ministerial meeting last time in Bali there were three points.

First, promoting the agricultural and food system that is resilient and sustainable, which includes the incorporation of technology, food variety, cooperation, and collaboration in science.

Second, promoting open, just, predictable, transparent, non-discriminative trade to ensure affordability and availability of food. Food is human rights, and therefore there shall be no country in G20 itself to restrict its trade or to protect its internal interests only because we are part of the global community of G20. And this is what we have agreed upon in the G20 agricultural ministerial meeting.

Third of all, we have had an agreement that for all countries with the agreement in Washington with G20 finance ministers and agricultural ministers, all countries should put food on the top priority. It should be on top. Therefore, we are talking about the global context—or the countries that have issues of food shortages. We need to take measures. We have to know the issues and also the target and also the methodology that we are using in dealing with and helping those nations that are facing food shortages.

We are having a surplus of 10.2 million tons of rice. Our president has prepared an adequate reserve for certain countries to help them, including African countries. The point is whenever a country has a surplus or has been able to exceed the national needs, they should plan for using the excess they have for global interests. Therefore, to me, the global cooperation should be enhanced [to include] how to monitor follow-up actions in the level of implementation in fulfilling the needs. Therefore, our strategy in Indonesia, we need to look at regions having emergency needs, including countries having conflicts, yeah, like happening between Russia and Ukraine.

What is our step? Are there any temporary measures? In Indonesia, we have prepared two years, yeah, to prepare ourselves in the event of issues. We are the fourth-largest country after China, India, and the US, followed by Pakistan. Therefore, we need to ensure that in, for example, the past two years, we didn’t have any acute food shortage issues. Then cooperation for a permanent system indicates that food security becomes important and there shall be no countries harming the trade ecosystem which we have built so far.

I think that’s all. Thank you.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I know that there will be many countries studying what Indonesia’s doing, and we’re going to come back with some follow-up questions on that shortly.

Now I’d like to turn to Dr. Meyer, who’s with us on the screen. And Dr. Meyer, I’ve been bragging at this conference about some of the US innovations in agriculture and especially about improvements in things like bushels per acre of corn, and also talking about the role of agricultural extension services that the various states have and the Department of Agriculture. So when you look at the food security issue in the world, how do you see—what do you see as the right things for the United States to do? What would you be recommending right now if we could put you in front of the G20 in person and have all those heads of state lined up and you’d be able to tell them, one two, three, I want this done? What would you tell them?

SETH MEYER: Yeah. So I think the first place to start is in the US we’ve been incredibly productive in terms of growth in US agricultural production. You know, when I look to say, you know, what should we be doing around the world, when we look at the application of technology in the United States and what we’ve done to improve productivity, I think we did this, you know, from a three-point approach in the United States now. Which is, you know, we want not just to execute and pull every single bushel out of every acre if that’s not environmentally sustainable; or, we don’t want to apply technologies or activities which don’t make producers money.

So, again, you know, we think about this in terms of sustainable productivity growth in the United States. It’s got to make money for the farmer. It’s got to produce food that is affordable for consumers. It’s got to be environmentally sustainable. This isn’t something that you can produce for a few years and then you do damage to your system or the climate and you can’t continue to produce. So, you know, I think the US sees itself as being a reliable producer on the global market.

One of my other hats that I’ll put on here quick is the G20 has an initiative, the Ag Market Information System, and one of the—AMIS. One of the principles of AMIS is, you know, providing market information and avoiding unnecessary disruptions in the global market. So when I say the US being a reliable supplier, part of that is not putting export controls on. Part of that’s not putting export controls on, being a reliable supplier, and providing it to the rest of the world.

And in the US, you know, when we take our look at technology and sustainable productivity gains in the United States, there’s also a big interest in the United States in sharing that technology, sharing the adaptation practices from our climate hubs in the United States and taking that internationally. The secretary of agriculture mentioned that at COP27 today. So taking the lessons we’ve learned.

You’re right about our domestic Extension Service, but we’re pushing that to the next level. We’re pushing that into our Climate-Smart Commodities programs, where we’re going to—you know, we’ve put in $3 billion to experiment how to produce commodities in an environmentally friendly way, that producers can extract money and income from and yet meets the demands that the consumers want for these sustainable goods.

So, you know, what’s our principle in the United States? I think it’s to be—continue to be productive, to be productive in a sustainable way, and to share all those experiences about how we’ve done it with the rest of the world, as well, too. Because we can do lots of things in the United States, but we’re not going to achieve this goal of global food security without sharing this information which is very specific to countries’ own situations. So we’ll share our experiences with the rest of the world. I think that’s how we do it.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you very much, Dr. Meyer. And we got a couple follow-up questions for you here if we’ve got time on some of the specific technologies we’re doing on carbon sequestration and other things, and maybe even on intellectual property.

So at this point I’d like to turn to Ambassador David Merrill, former ambassador here in Indonesia. And David, you must be really impressed by the progress Indonesia has made—it’s remarkable—in your time and experience here.

DAVID MERRILL: There’s no question about it.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: But I want to ask you, we haven’t talked that much about international institutions.

DAVID MERRILL: That’s right.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: So when you think about, as we’re looking at the G20 here, and we’ve got the minister’s experience in Indonesia—

DAVID MERRILL: Sure.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK:—we’ve got the immediate guidance from the member of parliament in Ukraine, we’ve got the willingness of the United States to share, but what about these international organizations like FAO and World Food Programme? Are they really tuned up to help us move forward?

DAVID MERRILL: Yes.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Or do we need to do more with them?

DAVID MERRILL: Yes. General Clark, thanks for that question.

I just am struck by the poignancy of this moment. I mean, here we are sitting in Bali just ahead of the G20. We are mainly NGOs. We are some government officials. We don’t know what form the G20 communique or statement or any other document on food security will take, at least I don’t know. I don’t think any of us know. But we have an obligation to use the NGO channel to address the G20 and give them our ideas.

Now, one of them is on what international institutions can do. There are the MDBs, the World Food Programme, the FAO, even the WTO. USAID has done a lot of work over the years. Other government aid agencies have done a lot. So they can work on national and local distribution schemes. They can work on internationally coordinated food emergency reserves, which I haven’t heard being done yet. They can work with NGOs and private charities.

The idea is, as you have said, to coordinate the mobilization of adequate finance, repurpose—there’s about $800 billion a year of agricultural support going through multilateral and bilateral agencies, maybe just multilateral alone. That can be taken a look at. It could be repurposed for the needs of this particular food crisis. Balance of payments and budget support. Debt relief. Adequate IFI financing, even expanded. Emergency food reserves. So that’s one.

And we want to refrain from trade restrictions on fertilizer trade that would make things worse.

We want to guarantee the affordable supplies of staple foods—physical supplies, access via trade, access via income and livelihood support, social protection programs.

And I’ll wind up with later a possible G20 forum for food security dialogue that would continue after the current G20. It doesn’t have to be another international institution. It can be a place for things related to food security to be discussed under the aegis, perhaps, of Indonesia.

The improving supplies and distribution of fertilizers is key. There are trade barriers. There are subsidy schemes that have to be revisited; redoubled efforts to improve the efficiency of fertilizer use to help farmers do more with less, to save costs, to reduce nutrient loss to the environment. There needs to be improved productivity of smallholders growing staple food crops, closing the yield gaps. There’s a gentleman from Israel here who’s using micro water injections to improve food productivity. It doesn’t even have to be fertilizer; it could be fertilizer plus no-fertilizer technology. So the resilience and sustainability of food production, there’s a lot that can be done.

And as General Prabowo said and as the Chinese say, out of crisis comes opportunity. So here’s a dilly of a crisis, but it’s also a big opportunity. And we can even change the—make at least some changes in the world’s system for dealing with this as a result of this crisis: improving the nutritional quality of diets, progress for women and children, increased use of micronutrients.

What about agricultural research? We’ve been doing that for 40 years. Taking a look at the agricultural research that’s being done, see what improvements can be made, make crops more resilient to climate change, more sustainable, higher yields on less land.

Now, it wasn’t too long ago—it was only in April or maybe March—that the G20 itself was grappling with did it even need to be concerned with the Ukraine food crisis. They said, hey, this is a political crisis. This is for other agencies of the UN. And most of us went around saying, no, this is an economic crisis. OK, it started with politics. It started with war. But if people are starving to death, isn’t that a concern of the G20? Fortunately, it took only about two, three weeks for the G20 to say that’s exactly right. So the G20 can make equally impressive leaps in the next couple weeks and years.

Now, the one thing that we have talked about is the creation of a G20 forum for food security, trying to bypass the resistance that we would encounter for setting up yet another international institution. Don’t need to. Indonesia’s in a great position because of its posture on the world stage and because it’s leading the G20 to serve as a I don’t want to say clearinghouse necessarily, but a forum for discussion of ideas on food security.

And Indonesia has a very good track record on food security. If you go back to 2008, there was a severe rice crisis and Indonesia was one of the primary—probably the primary leader on solving the regional and global rice crisis in 2008. Indonesia’s going to be chairing ASEAN. So let’s let Indonesia within ASEAN at least deal with the rice part of food security, which it’s already shown it can do a good job.

So, in sum, I think we should write up the recommendations of this conference in some form with some people designated and get them post haste to the people in the G20 that are deciding whether to have some kind of statement and what that statement should be. It’s the least we can do to make our input. That’s my suggestion.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you very much, Ambassador. Those are some really great ideas and we’ll try to incorporate them.

OK. So we’ve got about 10 minutes. I’m going to try to do a couple of let’s call them lightning rounds and then I’m going to come back to the minister to ask another follow-up question. So the first lightning round I want to ask each of our panelists this question. When we look at classical economics, we talk about land, labor, and capital. And in agriculture, of course, there’s agricultural land, there’s the farm labor, there’s the mechanization of labor which has helped us tremendously, but capital—the world is awash in capital. We had no idea 50 years ago that capital would be so plentiful in the world. What can capital do—financial firms, investment firms, firms that want to talk about how to improve mankind? I deal with these firms in London all the time. I hear it in New York. What is our specific ask of the financial community in dealing with this world food crisis?

And I’d like to start and ask—I mean, you don’t—you may not have an answer to this, but if you do I’d like—I’d like you to come up and tell me what you think about it. And let’s talk about the Ukraine crisis first. What can the international capital leaders do? They’ve got billions of dollars of resources. What are they going to do with it to help us right now in Ukraine?

KIRA RUDIK: First of all, to secure the investments into agriculture for the next year. I think all of us, we realize that generally there has been a huge flow back of the investment into Ukraine, and this is understandable because of the war. So we need that to come back.

On all the investment forums with all the investors/bankers, we are saying we all remember the lessons of the war: The one who is coming first will get the big—the big buck. And so this is why it’s time to invest right now. The risks are high, but the output will also be extremely high. This is how fortunes are made. So this is why, if the argument of the risks and the output would not work, we will just ask saying do it as a humanitarian way, invest into Ukraine right now into agricultural sector.

Then we are coming back again to cleaning up the mines because this is—the de-mining efforts are critical right now and will require tremendous investment. Just for everyone to understand, de-mining is basically going through every field and checking and processing the certain level of the ground. So it’s just like another agricultural work, basically, and it’s an incredibly important and hard and complicated process that needs to happen. But the output of it will be extremely productive because it will give us back the very fertile land.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: OK. So I’m going to—I’m going to jump in. I’m going to say I’ve got two suggestions, OK, and you tell me if you like them, you take them back to Ukraine, we’ll go to Dr. Meyer and he’ll push them through US Department of Agriculture and get them up there.

One is farmers in Iowa have done amazing things with putting tile underneath their farmland. They have rich, deep, dark earth just like Ukraine does. It promotes drainage so you can get into the land sooner, you can take out the pockets that hold water, you can have uniform crop. Suppose we gave Ukrainian farmers no-interest loans to improve their land in that way so that they would get more productivity per hectare?

Number two, there’s been a lot of destruction and theft of agricultural equipment in Ukraine. Suppose Ukrainian farmers got no-interest loans to replace that agricultural equipment. Would that be helpful? If you like that—

KIRA RUDIK: Yeah, I do like that.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: OK, good.

KIRA RUDIK: It’s a fantastic suggestion.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Dr. Meyer, can we do that?

SETH MEYER: Well, and we’re already doing some of that—

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: All right.

SETH MEYER:—when it comes to the US government support for farmers.

So I’ll even take a step back. My Iranian—my Ukrainian colleague’s talking about infrastructure and delivery of grain. I’ll even take a step back and say we’re figuring out ways to try and help the agricultural producers to be able to afford simple things like cash flow, getting that crop planted, getting the crop stored as they work on their infrastructure. So things like temporary storage, the big silo bag. So instead of having a large barn, you have a very long, long, long plastic tube, essentially, where you’re storing grain temporarily. I think there are things that need to be done on the ground in Ukraine now for these producers to cash flow for this next crop, put that winter wheat in the ground or plant spring crop.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: That sounds good. Remember, I’m focusing on finance. Put the money in. Get the farmers the money they need at no-interest loans. They can improve productivity.

Now let me turn to the minister. Sir, I want to ask you this question. I know you’ve had a lot of foreign direct investment in agriculture in Indonesia, these palm-oil plantations and other things. But what more can the international financial community do to promote sustainable agriculture in Indonesia? What could we do to—what do we need to advertise?

And you’re the pacesetter for so many tropical environments. What do we need the bankers in London and New York to know about your needs for finance?

MINISTER SYAHRUL YASIN LIMPO:Agriculture does not only concern food. It also involves employment and a fundamental economic system to support industries, including pharmaceuticals industry. So, when it comes to agriculture, there are opportunities for investment in the agricultural cultivation stage as well as post-harvest, and there are also opportunities in agricultural industries. And the third one is the marketing of agricultural products. So there are three agendas, three segments which can be tapped into in investment. And we, on the order of our president, are working on this.

Agriculture must be the answer. And this year, after three years since Indonesia’s agriculture has been the mainstay of the Indonesian economy, other sectors have been hit hard by COVID-19, but our agriculture went up by 16.42 percent. Our global exports rose to 38.2 percent. And this is a sign that agriculture has not been much affected by the conditions and weather, except for war because we need fertilizers. Sodium and phosphate fertilizers are in Ukraine and Russia, and this is a challenge for the whole world.

Therefore, where is the investment? The investment can be made in the three areas, General. And talking about agriculture, we are a tropical country consisting of 17,000 islands. There are areas which can be invested for this in coastal and marine areas. And there are already investments that can be made. We produce a lot of tuna, up to 18 million tons a year. We can grow crops on the coastal areas, as well, with the technology that was presented by our American colleague. We have crops that are resilient against water-related challenges, can survive in swamps and can survive in salty seawater. Indonesia has many hills and mountains, and we still have enough land available to invest.

Currently, the president of Indonesia, Mr. Joko Widodo, is trying to focus several areas to be made into Food Estates called integrated farms where the large land consists of plantations, animal husbandry, and even freshwater fish cultivation, as well as horticulture. All of this requires technology, requires experts, and requires machines in order to become a product that the world needs. Therefore, agricultural products, after reaching the industrial stage, will be part that we are waiting for.

We have enough land for sugar factories. We have sugar in Indonesia in large quantities, but we still import some of it. So which bank is willing to invest?

Finally, agriculture needs capital, and this is one of President Joko’s successes in preparing a large enough budget to be accessed by small farmers in the form of people’s business loans. Its value is approximately a hundred trillion. Our farmers two years ago used these funds, around 55 trillion. The NPL was only 0.03 percent. Our farmers are honest and don’t want to be in debt.

Last year, we used 85 trillion people’s business credit funds based on government policies. It is not a subsidy, but a loan with low interest. With low interest, this can be good working capital to use. And the NPL is 0.6 percent, and that is in agricultural cultivation stage. Now, in post-harvest it’s on how micro, small, and medium enterprises can access agriculture loans.

Therefore, finally, there are five points that has become our focus from these investment funds.

First, they encourage the opening and creation of agricultural businesses, both small, medium, and large investments. I have given the example of sugar. We have sago palms in an area of 5 million hectares, and this can be used as flour, which can substitute wheat. If there is a bank that wants to invest, we will show you the place.

Second, we support young entrepreneurs to become Millennial farmers in agriculture. We focus on giving access to young farmers who want to try. We have trained more than 300 farmers using people’s business credit funds of approximately 2 trillion rupiahs. The acceleration is very fast because the younger ones have a faster network, strong motivation, and WhatsApp groups. And this works quite well.

Third, provide assistance for agricultural businesses for export. For exports, we assist them. Therefore, we bridge between buyers from one country and buyers from other countries. And the G20 must be able to bridge the assistance from the United States and what we can facilitate with the current conditions. Conducting training and assistance in the development of agricultural businesses requires experts. Even an entrepreneurial system is needed for our agriculture because our agriculture involves global matters. Our oil production is large. But does everything have to be with big industries? No, the president wants this to be done by people’s industry, and this requires capital to be facilitated so that the products can be exported to the global market at a lower price. Then, of course, we enhance our national products so that they are competitive compared to those of other countries.

I think agriculture is the answer to the global crisis and the world economic crisis in the future. If we can maintain our agriculture properly, it will be very much helpful, as everyone needs agriculture.

Thank you.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Great lessons. Great lessons. That’s great.

So, look, we’re trying to do a lightning round here and I’m going to get struck by lightning if I don’t move this thing alone. So I’d like to open up this next question to anybody who wants to do it. But in the military, we always have dreams about what technology we might have in the future. You know, we’ve always thought better communications, higher resolution imagery, those kinds of things. If you’re in the—thinking about the food problem in the world, what do we need to think about in the way of technology? What’s the—what’s the opportunity that we just need to put the resources on to really move us forward to the next level? How do we do it? Anybody. Who wants to take it? David? Seth, want to take it here from the—what do you say from the United States about it?

DAVID MERRILL: It’s a combination of international institutions and the private sector. I believe there still is an international institute on wheat research. I think it’s called CIMMYT. I have no idea what it’s been doing, but it better be doing something right now. So that’s one.

The other was the idea that Minister Prabowo said about getting private investment started. He’s doing a good job. So are others. And I think that’s equally worthy, if not more worthy, than the government programs.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Dr. Meyer, what do you say? If you could have your silver bullet here to fix this, what would it be?

SETH MEYER: I think it would be two very different things.

So, on the pure science and technology side, we’re making huge advancements in things like gene editing. So taking genes within the plant—not introducing new genes; just turning things off and on or letting the plant express genes which are already there. So impressive technology to help us do more with less, you know, ways to avoid putting—you know, rationalize better things like fertilizer use, which is both good for producers in terms of lowering cost and good for the environment.

But then I think that there are some other, you know, not cutting-edge science that really has potential for food security. And that is translating a lot of this technology and practices—some of them used by US producers—into smallholder farms or even let’s talk about the ability of women to gain capital and their productivity gaps. And even steps here where we could bring, you know, women, make them as productive. And it’s not because they’re not productive; it’s access to capital and technology. There is a huge gap that could help us close in productivity. Simply providing technology and capital to women farmers would do a tremendous amount for food security. So I think we’ve got amazing science we can apply, but we got to bring that science down to producers to fix those productivity gaps around the world.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you.

Now, look, here’s what we’ve done in the last 35 or 40 minutes up here. We’ve looked at the immediate crisis in Ukraine. We’ve come up with some concrete suggestions that have to be done right away. We’ve taken Indonesia as the example of a tropical country that has done marvelous work and has so many lessons to share with the world, and we congratulate Indonesia for this. We’ve listed the international institutions and a number of changes that can be made. We’ve talked about international finance. We’ve talked about the future of technology and the role of the United States still as a leading agricultural country to develop that technology, share it, and push it out. I think it’s—this is a time to come out of the crisis and look to the future with hope.

Thank you all. Let’s give our panel a big hand here. Thank you.

Watch the panel

MATTHEW KROENIG: Well, thank you, General Clark and our panelists, for a really rich discussion. I enjoyed that. I hope you did as well.

My name is Matthew Kroenig. I’m the acting director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. We’re leading the Atlantic Council’s food security work as part of our mission of developing sustainable nonpartisan strategies for addressing the most important security challenges facing the United States and its allies, including food security.

So we’ve had a terrific discussion this morning. As you’ve probably noticed, we’re running a little bit behind on our schedule. And so my team and I have updated the schedule. We’re on track to finish on time at three p.m.

What we’re going to do now is go ahead and take a break for lunch. I know some of you have been out there already, but now we’ll take a break, 30 minutes. So be back here at 1:30 and we’ll continue our discussion at that time.

And as you’re going away to lunch, it’s my pleasure to introduce a video from Congressman Pat Ryan of New York’s 19^th District. So as you’re going to lunch, enjoying your lunch, you can listen to this message from Congressman Ryan. Ryan is on the House Armed Services Committee, so he understands very well the links between food security and national security. So enjoy the video, enjoy your lunch, and we’ll see you back here in 30 minutes. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE PATRICK RYAN (D-NY): Good morning, everyone. Congressman Pat Ryan here. I want to start with a thank you to the Atlantic Council for organizing this forum, and a special thank you to Gaurav and your family foundation for hosting and convening such a timely and important conversation.

This is a topic that doesn’t always get its due, but I will say it plainly to begin: Food security is important not only for its humanitarian consequences, but also because it is inextricably connected to national security. We’ve seen this in Russia’s illegal and reprehensible war in Ukraine, but also in conflicts around the world from Nigeria and Syria to where I served in Iraq. And there is a direct linkage between food insecurity and these hostilities. In the former example, food security was a literal weapon of war used to inflict economic and human casualties. And of course, in the latter examples it deteriorates civil situations within countries and fosters environments ripe for extremism, for terrorism.

And this is a topic where I have direct frontline experience, having served two combat tours in Iraq as an Army intelligence officer. What I saw and what I really remember was a people driven to war with their own neighbors really by a lack of access to the basic necessities of everyday life: food, water, shelter—and what may come as a surprise to many of you, oil. People often overlook the complex but critical interdependence of global food systems with energy markets, even in countries like Iraq that sit on huge crude oil deposits. Proper refining capacity, shipping routes, supply lines are just as important as farming itself, and we have to make sure our solutions address this dynamic.

Right now I have the honor of serving the eighth-most rural—of 435, the eighth-most rural district in the United States; also the region that raised FDR, who tried to put the world on a path to food security almost 80 years ago. And even here we struggle with access to modern agricultural techniques. We have our own supply-line struggles.

So with both of those experiences in mind—both combat and my own community—I’ve come to Congress with an immediate focus on food security. We have to ensure that the United States is a strong voice and a strong leader in strengthening food systems, improving agricultural productivity. And we cannot underestimate the importance of energy markets in this puzzle.

What’s encouraging to me, what I’m happy to report, is that this is one of the last remaining bipartisan endeavors. Look no further than the recent Global Food Security Reauthorization Act, providing billions of dollars every year for the federal government to partner with food-insecure countries to get on a path to self-sustainability. Because of this legislation’s Feed the Future program, 5.2 million more families no longer suffer from hunger. And this is a bill that’s been led by my Democratic and Republican colleagues in both houses in true bipartisan fashion. I see this as an issue that can and should transcend a lot of the traditional economic and military alliances. It’s an opportunity for real cooperation that brings everyone to the table.

Ultimately, I am so excited to work with everyone gathered here today as we combat world hunger, as we bolster our supply chains, and increase security and safety across the globe. Thank you so much.

Watch the keynote

The post Global Food Security Forum day two: How countries should address the food crisis in the short term appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

AMADEUS DRIANDO AHNAN-WINARNO: Greetings. How many of you know tempe? How many of you like tempe? How many of you believe that tempe could be a potential solution to global food security problems?

I’m Driando, co-founder of the Indonesian Tempe Movement. Please allow me to walk you through why I absolutely believe that that is the case as a food scientist and technologist. I’ll make three points: why we should look into tempe in the first place, what the science says about tempe, and what the future holds for tempe.

I look into science of tempe because of three personal emotional reasons.

Cancer is running in my family. My grandpa had to perform a surgery to remove the breast cancer tumor of his own mom at his own garage. That’s why he switched to food science.

And looking into cancer is deeply related to malnutrition/overnutrition. But there’s also this other side of malnutrition, which is undernutrition, that unfortunately hits very hard to the eastern part of Indonesia, including my friends.

But not only health concern; environmental concern also hit me quite hard. I live not too far away from, unfortunately, the world’s number-one most polluted river in the world, Citarum. It got me thinking: What could we do to preserve and conserve the environment? And could we even make high-quality food if you don’t take care of the environment?

And that’s why, with the mission of the Indonesian Tempe Movement that my grandpa, my mom, and I created eight years ago as food scientists, we want to give people more access to nutritious, sustainable, and affordable food. We believe that people don’t have to be rich to live, like, a healthy and more sustainable life. And what makes us truly believe that this is the case is because of science.

So, scientifically, compared to beef in terms of nutrition, tempe contains similar amounts of energy, protein, and iron; significantly higher levels of fiber and calcium; and significantly lower levels of salt and saturated fat. Sustainability-wise, tempe could produce the same amount of protein compared to beef with four times less energy and 12 times less emission to be emitted to the atmosphere. In terms of affordability, tempe could be eight times cheaper than beef for the same amount of protein in Indonesia.

But what many people don’t know yet is that tempe is not just this food made using fermented soybean originated in Indonesia 300 years ago. Tempe is a fermentation process that we can apply to so many—almost every grain not legume bean around the world. Here I have mombin tempe, kidney bean tempe, black bean tempe, almond bean tempe. It’s a process. And not only these raw ingredients; my grandpa used to eat tempe made using tofu industry byproduct, okara, in the form of tempe gembus because he couldn’t afford the whole bean tempe. It was fancy.

And I wonder, like, how many of you wonder how the tempe fermentation works. For today, I have this tempe fermenting necklace to show you how easy tempe fermentation is. So the idea is that you want to make the baby mushroom rise up as happy. You want to serve them with tender and warm foods. You want to mate them with a food and to get them into the bedrooms. The bedrooms could be leaves, could be plastic bags, could be petri dish if you work in the lab. And in just two days you’ve got your own naturally nutritious food.

So if you look at this simple but sophisticated process, we’re just looking at the tip of the iceberg of the whole movement. After eight years of running the movement, I’ve seen beautiful, beautiful new kinds of tempe from all around the world. We’re talking about white bean tempe burger from Brazil, buckwheat tempe soba noodle from Japan, fava bean tempe wat in Ethiopia, bambara nut tempe fries from Tanzania, vegan meat made using lupin bean tempe in Europe.

Now, to end my talk, one thing that I learned from the movement is that the naturally nutritious foods that we have now were not just inventions of the past. The naturally nutritious food revolution is happening now, and I believe the tempe fermentation is a big part of it. But also, tempe is just one out of so many foods in which the R&D process has done by our ancestors years ago that are waiting for us to dig into as treasures, as the future foods that we need to feed the people, to feed us, to feed the planet in most sustainable ways possible. Thank you very much.

Watch the keynote

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage Professor in Faculty of Agricultural Technology, University of Jember, Dr. Achmad Subagio.

ACHMAD SUBAGIO: Thank you. First of all, I would like to thank the committee to provide time for me for presentations, small presentations.

What I would like to introduce is about cassava. Maybe you know about these papers. You know also about toilet papers. You know also about biodegradable plastics. You know also about our fabric. All of these thing contain of cassava. Maybe we don’t know about that one.

But we believe that cassava right now is in our living time. All of our goods contain of cassava. That’s why I always promote cassava, because of that plant actually is very, very effective photosynthesis, two time more corn and also better than the other crops, including wheat.

And as you know, that right now, Indonesia, we have populations, as Mr. Prabowo said before, that about 273 million of people. That’s a lot of mouth and they need food. And of course, when we calculate, we need about 32 million ton of rice—that is only rice, not carbohydrate. When we calculate the carbohydrate, it’s about 45 million ton. That’s a huge amount of carbohydrate.

So when we calculate that one, of course our land is not enough when we only plant rice, because rice need a lot of waters, need a lot of fertilizers, and other thing. Not so many land can be planted by using rice, but cassava, we can grow cassava very well in sub-optimal land. We can grow cassava only if the water is about three or four months. That’s more than enough.

So, ladies and gentlemen, what I think is that we have to try to increase the cassava, the use of cassava, and of course the production of cassava. And for the consumptions, there is some problem that always people say that cassava is food for the poor people, always like that. But through our technology right now, we can provide very, very good materials from cassava. We can mix with many kind of ingredient and to be very, very good food. And this is the reality.

I think for 10 years more we need to grow about 5 million hectares of cassava because to that one we can provide a lot of food for the peoples and also feed, and also we can grow something like—we can develop something like we call bioindustries, including monosodium glutamate, sorbitols, lecithin, everything is come from cassava, because cassava can provide stats, and from stats we can provide sugar, and from sugar we can provide energies for a lot of function of bioindustries.

So this my point. And again, I encourage all peoples let’s do cassava. Thanks a lot.

Watch the keynote

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome back to the stage Gaurav Srivastava.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you. It’s been a long day.

Excellencies, members, sponsors, supporters, and my dear friends, the incomparable author, poet, civil right activist Maya Angelou remained a beacon of enduring hope even in her darkest of days, her eloquent voice and practical truths as relevant today as the moment she first shared them. Angelou said: “During bad circumstances, which is the human inheritance, you must decide not to be reduced. You have your humanity, and you must not allow anything to reduce that. We are obliged to know we are global citizens. Disasters remind us we are world citizens, whether we like it or not.”

It is really important to remember that while it is important to think about global issues, it is also important to address issues at home. It is important to worry about issues that are happening in Indonesia. It is important to remember that there is still a family at home. In the morning, during the speech of the minister of defense, he had poignantly mentioned that he needs to feed 5 million newborn Indonesians. This is a really important subject. But it is also important to remember that there is a hungry child at home, and for a mother and father it is most important to feed that child.

The issues that we talk about today, these are political issues. They are not only—but they are issues that require collaboration between industry, between business and policymakers. And that is important to keep in mind as we leave this room today.

As citizens of this Earth we are more interconnected than ever before, linked as social beings, innovators, artisans, and dreamers bound by a birthright as old as time: an inherent claim to inviolable human rights to freedom, dignity, and equality. As members prepare for this week’s and arguably the most critical G20 summit, they will consider the grave complications of our times. They will reflect on the important strides we have made, the disappointment and setbacks we have endured. They will commit themselves and their colleagues to an even greater investment in universal responsibility and to the safety and sanctity of our one human family. It is important to remember that it is one human family, but at the end of the day it is about the children at home. It is a legacy that we all have to preserve. It is important to think about issues on a global scale, but important to remember that it starts at your home.

As always, the United States of America stands ready to lead this charge both at home and abroad, delivering aid, promoting economic growth, enacting comprehensive health and food security initiatives. We will continue to fight hunger, malnutrition, and the senseless atrocities that have stolen the innocent lives of so many. We will heed Mother Nature’s warning, abating her tears with strong and steady push towards a timely transition to clean and renewable energy while responsibly acknowledging the interwoven, intricate, and dependent relationship between modern agriculture and oil, working diligently on a stopgap measure that will feed hungry, reward our collaborators discourage our detractors, and most importantly maintain national security.

I am so incredibly heartened by the invaluable insight and generous support conceived at and throughout this forum over the last two days. I share these blessings with my incomparable wife, Sharon, and with the brightest guiding lights of my heart and soul, my children. I implore you all to continue the quest for more answers and better solutions toward realizing global food security. We know all successes begin on the smallest of levels. The best ideas are cultivated when foundation and governments build partnership with the neighborhoods that need assistance, embracing community leaders as an irreplaceable pillar of this endeavor.

After my conversation with Fred from the Atlantic Council, I am also pleased to announce that we plan to hold our second security conference on the sidelines of the G20 in India, hopefully. I hope you will join us all again as we gather to reflect on the strides that have been made, the humanistic grounds that have been gained with your support and the implementation of actions gleaned from the dialogue we have shared at this forum. I have the greatest confidence that the momentum we have earned will be plentiful. Remember, there is nothing more human than morality.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, class is dismissed. We all have some very important homework to do. I would remember to keep one thing in mind, that we started this event with let there be bread.

Now I would like to invite the president of the Atlantic Council, Mr. Fred Kempe. Thank you for coming. God bless.

FREDERICK KEMPE: What a wonderful day. What a wonderful two days. And I have a few people to thank and a couple of things to say, but I will be brief.

So Bakur Kvezereli, the CEO of Ztractor, talked about two loud wakeup calls, COVID and the war, that have made us pay attention to food security in a way that we hadn’t. We do face the greatest food security crisis in modern history, says the World Food Programme. My own view is we should never let a crisis go to waste, so we are at work here not letting that crisis go to waste.

And then Max Peterson on the last panel talked about how, with food security, failure is—Max Peterson from AWS, a great strategic partner of the Atlantic Council, talked about how when it comes to food security failure is not an option.

So thank you, Gaurav, for your powerful final remarks, and to Gaurav and Sharon so much for being not just co-hosts of this forum but really giving it the vision, lending your friendship, and your generosity. So thank you so much. And please, everybody, thank them.

To speakers and audience members who joined us throughout the course of the conference, thank you for your valued insight and ideas.

I want to thank General Clark, Minister Prabowo, and his ministry; Minister Luhut and his ministry.

Pak Hashim, thank you so much for all your partnership through this.

We’ve heard from so many important global voices—perspectives from the Global North, the Global South, government, industry, civil society, brilliant students, seasoned experts.

I also want to thank people who are a little bit more behind the scenes and you didn’t see them as much on the stage: Matt Kroenig and his Scowcroft Center team; Iveta Kruma and her production team; Vicente, overseeing so much—or, Vicente Garcia, one of the great brilliant leaders of the Atlantic Council overseeing so much of the entire project, bringing it all together; our friends from Nouvelle Productions, and you’re going to see more from them tonight at the concert; from Edelman; from Viva Creative. Other sponsors: EMP, Unity, Harvest Commodities, Abt Associates, Arsari Group. Our media partners: CNN Indonesia, Kompas TV.

What’s clear for me from the last two days is how many of us in this room and joining online stand united in our commitment to combating food insecurity and hunger and serving as catalysts for change of the G20 and beyond. But too often, the private sector, the public sector, people all over the world don’t galvanize in this kind of setting, and I’m glad we were able to do that.

As we’ve seen and heard, food security remains a complex and multisectoral political, economic, scientific, and security challenge. Peter Engelke, who with Jeff Cimmino was leading the intellectual work that was behind this conference, will distill what we’ve learned over the last two days, put it in recommendations to the G20 and beyond, and you’ll be able to read that on our website tomorrow or the next day, Peter? Pretty soon? We’ll turn it around as quickly as we can.

What we know and what we heard from Gaurav is that the—at its core, the food security crisis and issue is a humanitarian one. It’s about that basic need for sustenance, food and water, and how they are met with dignity. We saw that powerful chart in the powerful keynote address of Minister Prabowo. And I’ll just remember FWE—food, water, energy—and the interlinkages of the three.

This is about building more sustainable food systems to better protect the planet we live on, the planet that nourishes us all. It’s about taking care of one another across communities and countries while we still have the chance. And as I said this morning, this inaugural edition—and Gaurav and I are able to reach decisions relatively quickly, and so we are going to go ahead and we’re planning on going ahead in India next year. But this inaugural edition of the Atlantic Council Global Food Security Forum marks the beginning of what we hope will be the Atlantic Council’s leadership in the global food security space alongside the Srivastava Foundation. And I look forward to continuing to convene similar forums along the G20 each year starting from India next year. That would be our hope and our plan.

I also look forward to engaging with our Indonesian partners and you all on our shared goals. This is our first major convening in Indonesia. It will not be our last. And we look forward to working with your country of 273 million people, the third-largest democracy, fourth-largest population. Just an incredible country where the US bilateral relationship will grow deeper and deeper. And as we heard from your minister this morning, this link right back to the days of your independence needs to be refreshed, deepened, and expanded.

I do want to thank again the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment once again for co-hosting this forum for us. To show up with that kind of partners on the margins as an official sideline event of the G20, what a wonderful way to enter this wonderful country.

Watch the closing remarks

The post Global Food Security day two: The role of tempe and cassava in a food-secure future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: And welcome back from lunch. Now we’re going to have some more information here and some more greetings from our friends in the United States, so I’m here to present them to you.

So first you’re going to hear from Dr. Cary Fowler. Cary is the special envoy for global food security at the US Department of State. He is right now at COP27, so he’s going to join us this way. Now, he’s been a food security leader both in government and in the nonprofit space as former executive director of the Global Crop Diversity Trust. In his current role with State Department, he coordinates regional, bilateral, and multilateral US diplomatic engagement on food security systems and nutrition. So he’s our top guy in State Department in the United States looking at this food security issue. We’re going to hear from Cary Fowler.

And then you’re going to hear from Ambassador Cindy McCain. Cindy is the US permanent representative to the US Mission to the UN Agencies in Rome. In her role, Ambassador McCain represents the US at Rome-based United Nations food agencies and around the world, really, all the effort that the UN is making to combat global hunger and expand food access to those in need.

So I hope you’ll enjoy their presentations, and we’ll be following that, then, with another panel. We want to fold their ideas into what we’re taking to the G20. OK, let’s roll it. Let’s hear from Cary Fowler

CARY FOWLER: Thank you for this opportunity to visit with you for a few minutes today.

I know all of you are aware of the frighteningly high numbers of food-insecure people in the world—that’s 828 million—of the 50 million who are facing starvation in 45 countries around the world.

And we all know that this food crisis that we’re in the midst of is caused by multiple factors. It’s caused by climate change. We’re having a severe drought in the Horn of Africa as we speak. It’s caused by COVID, which is disrupting supply chains. And also by conflict. Most of the people in the world that are food-insecure today are living in zones and countries that are experiencing conflict.

But we’re also finding that fertilizer prices are high, fuel prices are high. There have been trade restrictions that some countries have imposed. All of these factors are contributing to the kind of crisis that we have today, and that makes this particular world food crisis a unique one.

In the past, such global crises have typically been caused by one or two major drivers. This one has four or five; just count. And that means a couple of things. It means that it’s going to be difficult to come to grips with and to solve this particular crisis because we can’t just fix one aspect, one problem; we’re going to have to address all of them. And that’s a complicated business, as you well know. And it doesn’t come easily, doesn’t come cheaply, and it doesn’t come quickly.

And that’s the other point that I want to make, and that is that this food crisis, I’m sorry to say, is going to persist for some time. We’re looking at 2023 being a pretty difficult year. And I think we all should be aware of that and we should all be planning for it.

So the message that I want to leave you with today is a pretty simple one: Let’s hunker down and realize that we need to be in—that we are in this for the long haul. We need to be, of course, looking at meeting immediate humanitarian needs, but we also need to be addressing the long-term drivers of this particular crisis so that we don’t face this year after year after year.

That’s where I believe the G20 comes in and has an important role to play. The major countries of the world really need to be coming together now to collaborate and coordinate their actions, and ensure that we start to build the kind of food systems that we want for the future to ensure that all countries in the world and all people are, indeed, food secure.

Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR CINDY MCCAIN: Hello, everyone. I’m so glad you are here today to discuss the most important issue of our time, food security. Thank you to the Atlantic Council for hosting this important conversation.

We find ourselves in urgent times: ongoing armed conflict, especially Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine; COVID-19 and climate change continue to strain global food systems; rising costs for food and agriculture inputs impact everyone, especially the poorest and most vulnerable around the globe. As always, America is answering the call to help, and I’m extremely proud of our response. Congress moved quickly to allocate billions of dollars in emergency food assistance. This is on top of the roughly $4 billion the US taxpayer regularly provides each year to the three UN food and agriculture agencies to provide lifesaving humanitarian aid and invest in medium- and long-term resilience.

Throughout my travels, I’ve seen the effects of conflict, increasing water scarcity, and extreme weather conditions from Kenya and Madagascar to Guatemala, Honduras, and Sri Lanka. Building resilience makes our food systems more sustainable, producing more with fewer resources. This is the challenge before us and it demands a united global front. As global leaders look for climate solutions in Egypt right now, it is clear to me that we must leverage science, technology, and innovation in agriculture to feed a growing population in a sustainable manner while generating economic opportunity.

Forums such as this are important occasions to discuss the top global concern of our time, food security. We must continue this discussion. And together, we can give a voice to the voiceless and achieve a world where no one goes to bed hungry.

Thank you.

Watch the keynote

The post US special envoy for global food security: Time to ‘hunker down’ because this crisis ‘is going to persist for some time’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage founder of the Srivastava Family Foundation Sharon Srivastava.

SHARON SRIVASTAVA: Hi. Our world is riddled with inconsistency. Why do some go hungry and others have more than enough is something that I’ve thought about for as long as I can remember. Many circumstances beyond one’s control play a critical role: your postal code, your ability to get an education, your support system, your gender, your race, your economic status.

I’m Sharon Srivastava, and my husband, Gaurav, and I founded the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation. It is because of my husband’s unwavering commitment and service that we’re here today. And we’re honored to have partnered with the Atlantic Council, Fred Kempe, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia, my dear friend Anie and her husband, Pak Hashim, on this most important forum about the state of global food security. Thank you for attending and for being part of the conversation with us.

As an American, I live in part of the world which thrives on abundance. We pride ourselves on equality and on philanthropy. But sadly, we do still have millions who go hungry every single day.

In Los Angeles, where I live with my husband and our children, we have astronomical rates of hunger. Neighborhoods have become food swamps with people unable to find accessible, affordable, and nutritious food choices. And we’re talking about one of the wealthiest cities in the wealthiest country in the world.

Nearly 30 million American children rely on their school lunch as their sole nutrient-rich meal of the day, and while great programs have been implemented to ensure that they get fed at school, one meal a day is not enough for a developing child.

When my children come home from school each day and make a dash to the fridge, I know it’s stocked with healthy options for them. But I know that for far too many mothers that’s not the case. So many mothers and fathers are forced to make the impossible choice every day of buying food or letting their kids go hungry so that they can afford other basic necessities—food or health care, food or transportation to work—and it shouldn’t be an either/or scenario.

Food insecurity is everywhere, and regardless of location, the impact on a child and a family can’t be overstated. I have seen children unable to attend school or to get an education that could help lift them and their families up out of poverty simply because they don’t have enough food to fuel their bodies and their brains. Far too many children and adults don’t know when their next meal will come.

Nearly a hundred years ago a covenant was created. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 established food as a basic human right. It was intended to ensure that our nations protect people from hunger, from starvation. And that’s nearly 80 years ago that our nations united to speak in one voice and say food is a human right.

Yet still these impossible choices between food or other necessities are being made by parents around the world each and every day. So what are we going to do about this?

Today we are called upon to have these difficult conversations, and I implore you, as you are doing through these panels and conversations, to reflect on what we have done to help achieve food security and on what we, as a collective, must do to move forward.

And with that, it’s my distinct pleasure to now introduce Christopher MacLennan, Canada’s deputy minister of International Development, and personal representative of the prime minister for the G20 summit to the stage to offer his insights as to how Canada has been stepping up as a global food security leader and where its food and humanitarian priorities lie ahead of the G20 summit and beyond. Thank you.

Watch the remarks

CHRISTOPHER MACLENNAN: Thank you. Thank you very much, and thank you very much to the foundation, to the Atlantic Council for inviting—actually you didn’t invite me; you invited the prime minister. My deepest apologies. I am a very poor stand-in, but the prime minister will be arriving a little bit later as we all know, in advance of the G20, the leaders summit which begins in two days.

So, as all of you know, we are facing an unprecedented global food crisis. Global food prices are at historic highs, and hunger and malnutrition have been on the rise since at least 2015. It is estimated—and I’m sure you’ve heard lots of numbers today and you will hear many more—it is estimated that 828 million people were facing hunger in 2021. A heartbreaking 345 million people now live with acute food insecurity, and 50 million are on the brink of famine.

A number of factors have led to this increase in the rate of hunger; notably conflicts, climate change, and COVID-19. All these factors have been inducing more and more vulnerability into already strained food systems and are reducing the likelihood of achieving the sustainable development goal of reaching zero hunger by 2030.

Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated this crisis. The invasion has driven the cost of food, fuel, and fertilizer to record highs, which the United Nations Global Crisis Response Group is calling the largest cost-of-living crisis of the 21st century.

High food prices are affecting everyone in the world, but it’s the poorest and most vulnerable who are disproportionately affected as they spend most of their income already on food and other basic needs. This is especially true in Sub-Saharan Africa where the numbers of hungry and malnourished are growing faster than anywhere else. This food crisis is expected to worsen in the next year as agricultural productivity declines, driven largely by reduced fertilizer affordability alongside climate and conflict.

In these challenging times, we are also deeply concerned by Russia’s continued disinformation over the causes of global food insecurity and their use of energy, food, and fuel as weapons of war. It is unacceptable that Russia prevents food from reaching markets and then spreads disinformation that sanctions are to blame while, in fact, no sanctions address food, fertilizers, or foodstuffs.

As one of the breadbaskets of the world, Canada has a long history of being on the forefront of solutions to world hunger and is committed to doing its part to address the global food crisis. Today, in 2022, Canada has allocated a record amount of more than 615 million for humanitarian food and nutrition assistance. This funding is essential for saving lives and alleviating the suffering.

However, humanitarian assistance is not designed to address the root causes of hunger and malnutrition. This immediate support must be accompanied by critical investments to strengthen the resilience of global food systems in the longer term. This is why Canada provides support for agricultural development and food system transformation to developing countries, disbursing over 600 million in 2021.

Now in 2020, the Series 230 Initiative estimated that governments and donors would need to double their levels of investment in development assistance for agriculture and food systems, and spend an additional 33 billion US per year to achieve zero hunger by 2030.

As we step up to address the global food crisis, I would like to highlight a few priority areas for the government of Canada in our efforts globally. First, we need to ensure sufficient nutritious food is produced in a climate-smart way; sustainably increasing domestic production in countries where agricultural productivity has been underrealized; ensuring farmers, particularly women, have access to land, seeds, and essential inputs is fundamental to these efforts. Fertilizer—and we’ve heard a great deal about fertilizer already; I enjoyed the panel—is a vital input to many agricultural systems, and it’s at its least affordable levels since the 2008 food crisis. High prices can reduce use and undermine future harvests. We heard General Wesley Clark mention just the increases in Iowa alone on corn. Improving access to and sustainable use of fertilizers alongside sustainable soil health choices must be a priority.

Second, we need greater diversification and a better flow of goods along agrifood value chains. In the past, food systems and value chains have been designed primarily for economic efficiency. However, given all of the disruptions we are seeing—unforeseen, foreseen and increasing—they must be redesigned for resilience. This can mean diversifying import sources; diversifying the staple crops that are grown; having strong local, regional, and export-oriented value chains, or diversifying diets through expanding nutritious food options.

When shocks do arise—and they will—and we know there will be more shocks, implementing effective and coordinated responses to maintain the flow of goods is key. We’ve seen the importance of efforts like the Black Sea Grain Initiative to get grain moving out of Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. We saw these efforts reduce global food prices for all, as well as to ensure humanitarian shipments get to the poorest and the most vulnerable.

Third, we must listen to and work with our partners in the Global South. We must prioritize country-led, locally-owned, and participatory approaches to ensure that actions are informed by local realities and needs, and contribute to strengthening local capacities. I was very happy to hear General Clark, as well, mention the importance of not undercutting local markets with food—with food exports. This includes working with women, indigenous peoples, and other marginalized groups in the decision-making processes on food.

Fourth, we should do more to help directly poor and marginalized farmers maintain their operations in the face of shocks through risk-sharing tools like credit and crop insurance.

Finally, as a fundamental priority across all of these actions, we underscore the need to take gender-transformative approaches if we are to build resilience in our food systems at all. Women and girls are disproportionately affected by food insecurity and malnutrition. In fact, 60 percent of the world’s malnutrition are—malnourished are women. At the same time, women are key players as both consumers and producers of food, making up nearly half of all the world’s smallholder farmers. Canada recognizes that women are powerful agents of change and can actively contribute to advanced, climate-smart agriculture and improve food security and nutrition. This is why our Feminist International Assistance Policy aims to recognize and address the barriers that limit women’s success in agriculture and food production.

As we help build more resilient food systems, we need to take a gender-transformative approach that disrupts the current ways of working and puts those most impacted in the driver’s seat. Only then can we hope to reach zero hunger by 2030.

On a final note, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to speak today and to share how Canada is focusing our efforts in response to the crisis. I look forward to the continuing discussions that are taking place today. I think, quite honestly, a year ago food security was not on the G20 agenda, not at all. I was at last year’s G20 in Rome. It is a fantastic sign that groups like the Atlantic Council are pulling together—with the help of the foundation, pulling together conversations like this because these types of conversations are what underpin the policy and political discussions that need to take place to respond so critically and so quickly as we’ve needed in responding to the food crisis. So thank you very much.

Watch the keynote

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs of Indonesia Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan.

MINISTER LUHUT BINSAR PANDJAITAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Bali and welcome to Global Food Security Forum. I’m glad we can gather here in Bali to discuss how can—how we can solve food security problems and create a solution to achieve food security and resilience.

Amid the current worsening condition with the pandemic, the peak of global inflation, Ukraine-Russia conflict, it affect the significant increase of food and energy prices. Crude oil prices are expected to be above $120 a barrel in the remainder of 2022. Previously, only $42 a barrel in 2020 and $70.42 a barrel in 2021. On average, in July 2022, compared to January 2022, energy like coal prices increased by 91.26 percent, natural gas by 40.5 percent, and crude oil by 25 percent. On average, in July 2022 compared to January 2022 food prices, such as corn, increased by 1.5 percent, soybean by 14.75 percent, and wheat by 7.26 percent.

[There are] several challenges in the agriculture sectors. First, global warming make the climate even more unpredictable and cause crop failure. To mitigate future courses, Indonesia enhanced national determined contribution target, national policy in departments, climate change adaption policies, and transparency frameworks in the agriculture sector. This way, it leads Indonesia back toward net-zero emission by 2060 or sooner and is able to reduce greenhouse emission from a business-as-usual scenario by 31.89 percent unconditionally and 43.20 percent by 2030.

Second, insufficient of supply chains due to the highly fragmented industry with many intermediaries producing supply-demand mismatches. Also, infrastructure has not yet been established evenly throughout the remote areas. Processing facility is also far from the farming areas.

Third, the low interest of younger generation farmers due to the cost of farming in Indonesia and the low yield. The fertilizer price is high due to an interrupted supply chain. Farming technologies and machinery are expensive compare, so Indonesia farmers still do the operation manually.

To this matter, the government of Indonesia is formulating a presidential resolution for national food security… top priority commodities such as rice, corn, soybean, shallot, tea leaf, garlic, and sugarcane. The government of Indonesia also continuously improving several key factors. First, increase the land area for these commodities. Pursuing cultivation research and development in superior seed. Forming innovation in technology and food processing. Improving the supply chain through an integrated Food Estate program and necessary infrastructure so we can cut costs and deliver a better product. Boosting the interest in farming in the younger generation and continuously enhancing formal and informal training.

In addition, we have established a Food Estate program where there will be an integrated ecosystem and a good collaboration between the government, farmer, investors… The government will provide essential infrastructure surfaces, machinery, mechanization equipment, permit, and farmer partnership with investors…. Investor will provide the working capital for the farmers based on the agreed-upon cost analysis between farmers and investors. And there will be a profit-sharing scheme between investor and farmers.

As a pilot project, we have established Food Estate in Humbang Hasundutan, North Sumatra, where approximately 12,000 hectare cultivate horticultural plants starting from potato, shallot, and garlic. We also integrate the project with science and technology park for herbal and horticulture. There will be genomic sequencing research… produce superior seed cultivation and understand herbal and horticulture profiles in Indonesia. This project is an integrated hub with the collaboration between private and international experts and companies, local and government universities, and local farmers. We hope this project can also contribute to economic development to ensure economic equality in the surrounding area as it provides a new employment opportunity and a vocation for local people. Next, we will build Food Estate in Central Sulawesi and Central Kalimantan focusing on crops such as corn, sugarcane, cocoa, and cassava.

Ladies and gentlemen, we can indeed participate in securing global food security. Start from you contributing to your community. It contributes to your country and the world. I’m sure that today all Global Food Security Forum participants will have a fruitful and productive event.

I would also like to thank to the Atlantic Council and Ministry of Defense for co-hosting this event, and I hope through this forum we can create a solution to achieve Sustainable Development Goal to end hunger, achieve food security, and improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. Thank you and enjoy Bali.

Watch the remarks

The post Global Food Security Forum day two: How Canada is taking on world hunger appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning to everyone. It’s so wonderful to see such a full crowd. And good morning to all of you, ladies and gentlemen, honorable guests. It’s such a pleasure to be with you all today.

Mr. Minister, it’s great to have you here. Thanks to you, Minister Prabowo. Thank you to the Defense Ministry. And thank you to the Indonesian government.

This is a multilateral gathering, this is a multinational gathering, but we decided to start in this fashion to honor our bilateral relationship within this multilateral relationship—to honor our host country and to all—with the US Air Force Band honor the country that’s visiting. But with the presidential band here, that’s a special treat for us to start in this manner.

Thank you for those joining us in person and for the thousands tuning in virtually as we kick off day two of the Atlantic Council inaugural Global Food Security Forum in Bali, Indonesia, an official sideline event of the G20 summit which is, of course, coming in just a couple of days. What a stunning venue this is, surrounded by Bali’s natural beauty, rich cultural life, and traditions, and friends and partners from across Indonesia and the world. I was able to travel a little bit around this beautiful Bali area to get to know your culture a little bit better, to visit with your people a little bit more. And it’s just been a rich experience being here, a few days ahead of this forum, so that I could acquaint myself even more closely with this extraordinary country and culture.

I want to start by extending by thanks officially to the Indonesian government. Thank you, again, to Minister Prabowo, and the Ministry of Defense. Thanks, as well, to Minister Luhut and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment for your collaboration and for your hospitality in the lead-up to and throughout the forum.

Congratulations to Indonesia for assuming the G20 presidency this year. We wish you good luck as the summit approaches. I most profoundly want to thank Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Foundation. Thank you, Gaurav and Sharon.

Without the two of you, without your foundation, we quite literally would not be here and be able to do this work. Gaurav and Sharon, your steadfast commitment to combatting world hunger and food insecurity rests at the heart of this forum’s mission. I can’t stress enough how much I appreciate your vision, your leadership, and your friendship.

Thank you also to our sponsors, Abt Associates, Arsari Group, EMP, and Harvest Commodities, and our media partners, CNN Indonesia and Compass Group. And finally, I want to acknowledge The Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security—so capably led by Matt Kroenig and his team—for spearheading this weekend’s programming—of course, the rest of The Atlantic Council team that’s traveled so far to make this work.

We gather today at a critical juncture for global food security. It might have taken Putin’s war in Ukraine to highlight it for us, but it was sitting there in front of us in any case. Later this week, world leaders will convene here in Bali for the G20 Summit bringing together major developed countries and emerging economies to discuss the international economic and financial landscape and identify areas ripe for multilateral engagement.

Food security is becoming a bigger and bigger one of those areas, and it cannot be separated from energy security. It can’t be separated from military security. It can’t be separated from national or international security, and that’s the point of doing this.

The United States is a food security champion. The United States is the largest international food assistance donor in the world, providing hunger relief and support to those most in need, including in response to COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

In September, the US convened a Global Food Security Summit with world leaders to mobilize global food security action. This is all for good reason. Threats to global food production, supply chains—distribution and access—are mounting by the day.

Near-term shocks like COVID-19 pandemic have—and the war in Ukraine have rattled global food supply chains in some of the most critical regions of the world. Ukraine, Europe’s breadbasket, earlier this year faced a Russian blockade of its Black Sea ports that halted grain exports to global detriment, and we’re lucky that that blockade is not there any longer because one third of the world’s wheat supply—one third of the wheat supply comes from Russia and Ukraine together.

In recent months, fertilizer prices have skyrocketed as the cost of raw materials and gas have gone up, and Russian fertilizer exports face serious disruptions. Food prices have continued to soar. Long-term risks of climate change, extreme weather, rising seas, and a sustained conflict pose further destabilizing threats, as acute food insecurity escalates, and hunger hotspots intensify.

The United Nations estimates that 800 million new people in the world face food insecurity coming out of the ripples from the war in Ukraine, and 300 million are in severe distress of food insecurity and hunger—300 million new.

But amid these challenges opportunities abound for progress and solutions, and that’s what we’re here for. Yesterday, as part of our first day of programming, we convened a series of closed door sessions with global food security experts from across government, business, and civil society to explore immediate and future food security trends and solutions—most of all, solutions.

We discussed the nexus between food security, energy security, and hard security, and how solutions are needed to address the overlapping vulnerabilities on these fronts. Energy crises become food crises. Conflict drives food insecurity. Food, then, becomes a weapon of war.

We stressed how important it was for the global community to recognize that food cannot be weaponized the way it has been—the way it has been recently. We discussed leveraging technologies as a critical tool for agricultural modernization and resilience, from investing in climate smart tech enterprises to educating and empowering young tech savvy farmers to make farming cool, paying particular attention to including women, who are often the backbone of farming communities.

The future of food security and sustainability requires innovation, and we spoke of streamlining access and accountability to food finance to ensure lines of credit flow to countries and people in need. Food security requires financial security at both the community and at the global level.

As the G20 showcases, there is potential for enhanced international cooperation. But governments and on these critical sets of issues cannot do it alone. Achieving food security and ending world hunger will also require robust public-private partnerships—robust public-private partnerships and wide-ranging innovation across the agricultural sector, technology, finance, and policy.

So, from identifying root causes of food insecurity and malnourishment around the world to envisioning more resilient food chains—food supply chains and agricultural technologies of tomorrow, we gather today to take this multifaceted challenge head on and, as you can hear, we got—we made some progress yesterday. We’re going to hope to make even more progress today.

Indonesia, with its dynamism, with its growing prosperity, and its food security interests is a promising place to launch our efforts. I hope you find today’s programming productive and that it will serve to inform and supplement the upcoming G20 summit agenda and sustained food security initiatives to follow.

At the end of this form we will be distilling insights from our sessions and collecting them into a memo with concrete recommendations for G20 leaders and, of course, for far beyond.

We’ll stick with this issue, galvanized by this moment, to continue working on it over the years. Our challenge to all of you—to all of you here in the room is to help us identify solutions that, together, can turn our ideas into policy action.

So now I would like to turn to a set of video keynote remarks from the Honorable Chuck Schumer, United States senator from New York, and Senate majority leader. It’s an honor that Senator Schumer took time for this. Having the Senate majority leader speak to this conference is an apt way to kick us off.

SENATOR CHARLES SCHUMER (D-NY): Hi, everyone. It’s Senator Chuck Schumer, and thank you all so much for the chance to join you at this year’s Atlantic Council Global Food Security Forum.

Now, as we all know, the past two and a half years have been some of the most disruptive in modern history—a global pandemic, a warming planet, and on top of it all the tragic bloody war in Ukraine.

These crises have produced terrible consequences around the world and, above all, it’s made an awful food shortage even worse for tens of millions of people—the poor, the elderly, far too many children.

This global food crisis is unacceptable, it’s immoral, and it is on all of us to work together to find solutions for the hungry and the food insecure. As Senate majority leader, I believe Congress has to play a role in fighting this crisis, and the issue should transcend partisan politics because it’s about basic justice for all human beings.

So we need government leaders, the private sector, and advocates working together. I pledge to you to do all I can to make sure Congress stands with you as allies in this effort.

Thanks for leading this crucial conversation because no issue is more important than making sure everyone has enough to eat so each person can grow and thrive in the 21st century.

Thank you all, thanks for what you’re doing, and my very best.

FREDERICK KEMPE: The fact that Senator Schumer sent that special message to you in the middle of our midterm elections where it was unclear whether he would remain Senate majority leader, and right now it’s still in play and we’ll know in a few days but it looks better for him than it did a couple of weeks ago. So, Senator Schumer, from here we thank you for doing this.

Now I’d like to turn over to Gaurav Srivastava, the founder of the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation for his remarks. Gaurav, over to you.

Watch the welcome remarks

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Excellencies, honorable members, and representatives, ladies and gentlemen, esteemed colleagues and guests, it my great honor and privilege to stand before this distinguished assembly of brilliant minds and renowned policymakers at a time when our global community is at its most urgent need for unity, cooperation, and common purpose.

This extraordinary forum, live-streamed around the world, represents the exhilarating realization of a longstanding vision of my wife, Sharon, and I have shared passionately for many, many years. We are everlasting partners in a devoted enterprise of international hope and inspiration, co-conspirators in a fervent advocacy of comprehensive social change and universal accountability, and doting parents committed to the brightest future imaginable for our children, for your children, and for all of humanity.

Together we offer our deepest gratitude to our gracious Indonesian hosts and friends; to the minister of defense, Republic of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto. Thank you. Coordinating minister for maritime and investment, Luhut Pandjaitan. Thank you. To Anie and Hashim Djojohadikusumo, thank you very much. You all have been instrumental in the realization of this global food security summit. Thank you and God bless.

Our sincerest appreciation is extended to Fred Kempe, Matthew Kroenig of the Atlantic Council, and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Thank you very much. To our American policymakers and their international counterparts, and we thank the people of the world for their faith and fortitude as we reaffirm our solemn pledge to deliver both equity and equality to those who have been so woefully deprived.

A recognition of food as a human right was established nearly 80 years ago. President Roosevelt, as well as leaders of 48 other nations, convened in Hot Springs, Virginia, for the United Nations Conference of Food and Agriculture. This conference was particularly unlike the ones we are all participating in today. The outcome: a universal declaration of human rights. Within that declaration, not only is the right to food proclaimed, the right to adequate food as an essential facet to an individual and family standard of living is stated.

In the near century, since this crucial mandate and cornerstone of the FAO, 192 member nations and organizations have stood side by side, linked in a tireless battle against the insidious plague of food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition, guided by the enduring motto, Fiat Panis—Let There be Bread. Towards that moral imperative there have been meaningful strides made, critical lessons learned, transformative policy enacted, cutting-edge technology developed, and a salient goal set to end hunger by 2030.

But as history has proven time and again, we exist in a rapidly changing and unpredictable world. The processes established to successfully transport food to where it needs to go before the COVID-19 and before the invasion of Ukraine no longer work. Over the last three years, these concerted efforts and best intentions to stem the tide of global undernourishment have stalled. They continue to grow stagnant against the prevalence and extremes of climate change, the spread of protracted regional conflict, and the economic impact of the pandemic, and the carnage and chaos currently ravaging parts of Eastern Europe. The harsh truths and painful realities of these calamitous setbacks are glaring. And 828 million people worldwide will go to bed hungry tonight.

How can it be that in the United States, the wealthiest nation in the world, one in every eight children still go to bed hungry every single night? In my own home city of Los Angeles every one in five people experience food insecurity, unsure of when or from where their next meal will be. Globally, 45 million children under the age of five are suffering. They are suffering from acute malnutrition, their small bodies chronically deprived of essential nutrients stunting physical, cognitive, and social development, and making them especially vulnerable to infectious disease and drastically elevated mortality rates. They face educational limitations, behavioral problems, lifetime earnings reductions, and a perpetuation of the same vicious malnutrition cycle passed on to their own children.

The numbers are staggering, the trends and projections alarming, and the insidious endurance of this most pervasive and devastating human affliction—of which no country or region is immune—remains wholly and unconscious—consciously and utterly indefensible. Socioeconomic detriments of health explain the cycle. Poverty, race, ethnicity, gender, employment status, education, immigration status are all notable factors. The direct link between these factors and food security is undeniable. Try as some might, there can be no reasonable debate over the breadth of this humanitarian crisis, no credible arguments to be made against the merits of immediate action, no partisan interpretations, conflicting ideologies, or wavering convictions. We must all agree that no man, no woman, and no child should ever suffer through or die from hunger again.

Yet, as we all know, there is no quick fix. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Food security is a complex puzzle of mismatched and missing pieces. The complete picture is an interconnected web of contributing factors explained by the socioeconomic determinants of health, each fraught with significant issues of their own.

Currently, the greatest world crisis hindering food security is the war in Ukraine. It has affected and impacted the globalized agricultural and energy markets at a time when supply chains were already reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic. Every day I track and appraise the innumerable impacts this war has had business of global exports. Exports of vital nutrients have been interrupted, future harvests been put in jeopardy, the energy markets sent reeling, fertilizer prices sent soaring, and the cost of wheat continuing to skyrocket. Russia and Ukraine, two world breadbaskets, major producers and exporters of vital commodities in energy, engaged in a conflict that threatens to push many millions and more into poverty and food insecurity.

Establishing food and energy security is an urgent issue affecting us now, but the future forecasts are sobering. At this rate, the dire ramification will continue to grow exponentially. The systems that we put in place and the choices we make now will determine the security of our children and our grandchildren will inherit.

Like many of you in the audience, I have tasted the horrors of war, choked on the repugnant stench of violent death and destruction. My work through my company, Unity Resources Group, has taken me to hotspots around the world where I have borne sad witness to the heroism and self-sacrifice of young men and women slaughtered in the blink of an eye before their earthly journeys had ever begun. I have seen whole families erased, three generations decimated in the wake of a contemptible missile strike on civilian targets. And I have watched helplessly as tormented mothers weep over the broken bodies of their murdered children, soaked in their blood, praying for merciful relief from a living nightmare that will never come.

I stand by you—before you today as a proud American devoted to the venerated principles of my country, valuable and human in an imperfect world. I am humbled by the education I have received, the experiences I have had, and the many blessings God has given me. I count each one with eternal gratitude, none more absolute than my ability to consistently put food on my table, to ensure the health and well-being of my beloved family, a luxury of which countless parents around the world are so cruelly deprived. I appeal and relate to you as an anxious father deeply troubled and guilt-ridden over an inexcusable legacy of widespread confusion, conflict, and chaos all of our children will likely be forced to inherit. I implore you as a member of the human race mortified by the unnecessary suffering of even a single brother or sister, furious over the goals we have missed, the priorities we have misplaced, the opportunities we have squandered, but still greatly emboldened by the prospect of providing my children, your children, and the children of the world—children of the world with the well-deserved birthright of dignity, security, and essential rights to work together collectively to propose solutions to this long-lasting issue we are facing.

To accomplish this mission to bring food and comfort to those most in need, we must delay the procrastinations, abandon the rhetoric, and accept unpopular truths as a call to action and not an excuse to passivity. In an ideal world where socioeconomic factors existed in harmony void of biases, inequities would be reduced and chronic illnesses caused by malnutrition’s many forms would be mitigated. But that beautiful dream still stands as a tall order.

At the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, we will assist in the creation of a new paradigm between food and fuel to the body and energy as the fuel to the food production system, a new perspective that will drive a propulsive shift to a nutritionally nourished world. We must understand and embrace the symbiotic relationship between food and energy, an unavoidable reality we must bear is that our current food systems are even more reliant on energy than ever before. As a foundation, we are doing our concerted part to illuminate the intersection of food and energy, adding a voice to a crucial conversation about the necessity of energy production to deliver the food to those in need.

While we all dream of a near future in which clean and renewable energy is not just a lofty ambition, about the everlasting law of the land, I implore you today to entreat to welcome the notion that lines of food production cannot exist isolated from the energy that propels the productivity. It is our human obligation to focus our efforts on the problems we are facing here and now. It is our universal imperative to take immediate action to relieve the men, women, and children who are suffering today—not tomorrow, not next week, and not in 50 years.

While our days of fossil-fuel dependence are numbered, we also agree that the immediate and complete eradication of oil reliance is still beyond our grasp. Modern agriculture runs on oil. Commercial farmers need tractors, irrigation pumps, harvesters. The fertilizers that feed the crops, the pesticides that preserve them, the packaging that protects their quality are all produced using oil. From seed to harvest, packaging to storage, containers to ship, trucks to roads, these supply chains lead to food, the focus of conservation today—food that cannot be brought to the homes of hungry families so that the mothers and fathers never have to ration their children’s food and hear the cries of their hungry child or give up their own meal so their child doesn’t have to experience the pangs of hunger. These are harsh realities.

As we diligently march towards a gradual decarbonization, fossil fuels remain our most realistic and expeditious improvisation to addressing the most advanced food system lines to ensure food security. This is the physical, literal realistic change to be able to deliver on the promise established 80 years ago on the right to adequate food.

The United States has always been looked as a shining beacon of hope, a gateway to humanity’s future founded on the unimpeachable virtues of liberty, equality, and steadfast in the ethical imperatives of welfare, justice, and dignity, and driven boldly to lead by example. By expanding the scope of our Feed the Future Initiative, our President Biden has reaffirmed our unfaltering commitment.

It is a time for all of us, as we collectively represent the world’s 20 largest economies, to work together and build on the progress we have already made. We must fearlessly continue the copious work that still lies ahead of us. It’s time to show our citizens, our foreign neighbors, our fellow man and woman that our promises are not empty, that our outrage is real and conviction is unwavering, just like the superheroes our children imagine us to be.

This forum, these conversations, and the discourse to follow today, I mark this as a compelling watershed in our struggles. But we cannot forget that at this very moment across America single parents are shopping for groceries forced by insufficient budgets to choose between fresh vegetables and lean proteins that will feed their children for two days, or boxes of far less nutritious pasta that provide for an entire week—a heartbreaking plight nobody should face—not in 2022, not ever.

These are difficult choices to be made, sobering concessions to digest, and a pragmatic roadmap to be plotted, that prioritize grace and humanity over politics and caustic saber-rattling. These are discussions we need to have today to influence that parent’s ability to not to choose between aiding short-term hunger or choosing long-term health for their family. It’s very basic.

We must devise alternative plans to keep the energy flowing, to stabilize market shocks, to mitigate a deepening energy crisis, and re-open the plentiful grain gates of Russia and Ukraine to the world. Plans conceived with redundant safety nets, oversight and adaptability, born with a spirit of pragmatic neutrality, intended as a less aggressive, non-interventionist proxy, to the imposition of price gaps that do not work.

We need a program that can be managed and maintained through clear and transparent reporting mechanisms with banking support from trustworthy institutions and multifaceted administrative superiors—a program that needs to be crystalized, that in short order will adequately feed the hungry, comfort the afflicted, and dramatically rebuke the all too comfortable warmongers and profiteers, who pose the greatest threat to peace and security on a global scale. And most importantly, we need a confident first step in the right direction—a bridge towards progress and resolution, a gleam of contagious hope that every living soul on this planet is urgently in need of.

My wife, Sharon, and I are blessed with two young children, our divine inspiration. We watch them play in wonderment, interacting harmoniously with all other children—the ones that look and speak like them, and the ones that don’t.

They are the future, our legacy, and our source of tremendous clarity and reflection. Their unconditional love and universal acceptance humbles me, and sometimes makes me embarrassed to be a grown-up.

Sharon and I firmly believe that the answers we seek are simple and infinitely achievable, we just have a history of making the journey unexplainably complex. All of us in this room and on this planet must commit to a solemn covenant, impervious to race, gender, social economic, geographical divides, an unbreakable promise to all generations that have and will come to be—that every human citizen on this Earth will soon be guaranteed the dignity and respect they inherently deserve.

On the question, where do we go from here, the inspirational leader and civil rights visionary Martin Luther King declared: our world is bruised and battered by a universal blight that knows no boundaries, an epidemic that does not discriminate, an abomination that won’t be solved without compromise, compassion, and undivided resolve.

We must steel of conviction, draw our strength from a higher power, and learn from our children that we must from now on until the very end of time. It is our only hope. Thank you. Thank you.

Now it is my distinct pleasure to introduce a true champion of defense and security, an Indonesian patriot, an emissary of global peace and unity, a bridge builder towards the abolishing of all food insecurity, and a brave line front warrior in the battle against the grave threats that undermine health, prosperity, and wreak havoc on the very fabric of society, the minister of defense, Republic of Indonesia, and my dear friend, Prabowo Subianto.

MINISTER PRABOWO SUBIANTO: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished participants of the Global Food Security Conference organized by the Atlantic Council.

I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to speak to give some remarks on this topic.

Since yesterday, I took note that a lot of participants coming from many parts of the world with their impressive background and expertise in the field of agriculture, food security, and, I’m sure, by the brief moments I was here, I am very confident that all the contributions, all the remarks, all the comments, the suggestions, recommendation will, of course, I understand, be compiled. And I think this will be a very valuable contribution to finding solutions for the threat of global food insecurity that is facing our planet.

Actually, I would like to thank and commend the initiators of this conference, Mr. Fred Kempe and Atlantic Council General Wesley Clark, Mr. Gaurav—I call him Mr. G. because sometimes a bit difficult to pronounce your surname. It’s also difficult to pronounce my surname.  I think my surname is longer than your surname.

I would like to thank the initiators for this effort. In fact, in my opinion, the main topic of the whole G20 summit should be about food security.

In my opinion, food security or, shall we say, the threat of food insecurity is an existential threat to humankind because without food there is no civilization. There is no humankind.

Because of the experts standing here, I do not pretend or aspire to give an expert’s perspective. I will give overview—an overview of the Indonesian perspective on this issue and, perhaps, this can help contribute to our general understanding.

First of all, food, energy, and water actually is one cycle that is interrelated. To secure food we need water. Water is the essence of life, and to secure food the speakers before me have emphasized the importance of energy.

In this cycle, which in front of us has proven to be a threat—a threat of scarcity—this is compounded by more threats that compound this existential threat.

First, whether we like it or not, there is a population explosion. Maybe this is sensitive. There are part of the global elite, still very influential, still very powerful in—even in my country that do not like for us to talk about population explosion.

But if we are a real leader sometimes leaders must say unpleasant things. This is a dilemma. It’s a paradox, especially for politicians. Especially for politicians who want to get elected.

Fortunately, the Indonesian general election and the presidential election is still rather in the future.

This is the dilemma of people in leadership position. If we warn about a danger coming they accuse us of being pessimistic. My president, President [Joko Widodo] this year alone, I think, has spoken maybe 25 times more in public, warning the Indonesian people that we are facing difficult times.

Next year will be very difficult, and there are people who accuse him of spreading pessimism. And I understand maybe some people cannot accept the necessities of how do we face this population explosion.

For instance, Indonesia, our increase in population every year is 1.9 percent. That is 5 million new babies every year, 5 million new mouths—5 million, the size of Singapore. Every year in Indonesia, there is a new Singapore. You see, Indonesians, when they face adversity, they laugh. Indonesians are happy people. Sometimes we don’t know what’s ahead of us. Maybe we will—we will go somewhere happily.

What I’m saying is this: Every 10 years, a new Malaysia. What government in the world, what expert in the world can consider feeding five more—5 million more mouths a normal and an easy challenge? My friend Mr. G has said he’s very proud of feeding his family. A leader of Indonesia must think of feeding 5 million babies every year—every year. Anybody who wants to run for president of Indonesia I think should consult his psychoanalyst, I think.

The challenges in front of our government is not an easy challenge, but this is not something that we must be afraid of. As a former soldier, you know, they say former soldiers—old soldiers never die. They just fade away. General Clark has faded away today. He’s supposed to be here in front of me. But you know, many old soldiers, like myself, like General Clark, you know, old soldiers never die, they just fade away, that is somewhere. But in Indonesia, old soldiers never die and they never fade away. Until the Almighty God calls us. Then not only do we fade away; we are called away very fast.

So this population explosion is something in front of us—5 million jobs, 5 million new spaces in schools, in hospitals. This is the dimension of our challenge.

Climate change, we feel it. Jakarta is—the sea level is increasing 5 centimeters every year. And during one of my visits to the coastal area of Tanjung Priok, families, the water is in their living room. They are sleeping in their bedroom with the seawater in their bedroom. Climate change is not some theory; it is in front of us.

In Karawang—which is maybe, what, one hour from here—the sea has come in maybe already at least three, four kilometers—three, four kilometers, maybe more. Karawang—you are from Karawang, are you? (Speaks to audience member)

So climate change for Indonesia is real. Can you imagine four kilometers times 200 kilometers long, 300 square kilometers? How many hectares have we lost from productive land, from arable land, from our rice bowl? Karawang is the rice bowl of Indonesia.

And of course, in front of us, geopolitical conflict. I just would like to reiterate, you know, Indonesia, our traditional foreign policy is one of friendship to all countries. We respect all countries. We respect all great powers. We are free and active in our relationship. We always try to maintain equal—equal in our respect and relationship. We call ourselves—we consider ourselves by history—Indonesia was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. I would like to reiterate this because, although we consider United States as a very good friend and strategic partner of Indonesia, the United States having many times assisted Indonesia in our darkest moments—the United States have supported our war of independence. So we acknowledge this friendship. But as a good friend, sometimes we have to be courageous enough to remind our friends, remind our close friend who we admire, who we want to emulate—I think the top Indonesian intellectuals, educated leaders, most of them are educated in Western countries. I think many of our leaders understand and have read your Declaration of Independence. We also aspire to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That is our goal also for our people. But this is important: In any geopolitical conflict, there are always two sides to a story. And each side is convinced they are right. Each side is willing to die for what they consider to be right. I have to remind everybody there is always two sides to a conflict.

The important thing is, do we want to resolve the conflict or not? If we do not want to resolve the conflict, we are entering a very dangerous region and a dangerous zone of time. A few days ago, I was listening to a remark by a very senior former United States military leader, Admiral Mullen. I think three days ago. I think Admiral Mullen was the former chairman of the US Joints Chiefs of Staff, if I’m not mistaken. Is that correct? Please correct me if I’m—he was the former chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reminded everybody—it’s on the YouTube—we are in danger of a nuclear war. We are in danger of a nuclear war. We hope, we pray that the leaders of the world will be wise and enlightened.

But we have seen in history many great conflict, many great explosion/conflagration happen out of accident. Wars happen because of accident. Sometimes wars happen because of one lieutenant or one captain who start firing because he was afraid. Therefore, what we talk about is compounded by these threats. Geopolitical conflict on all matters, in our opinion, the situation of the world, the fact that our planet is getting smaller, we need wisdom. We need compromise. We need patience. We need the courage to go halfway.

Zero-sum game victories I don’t think is feasible in the current state of the world. We can be right, but are we doing it in the long-term interest of our people? Without food, energy, and water, economic crisis, social unrest, civil war, failed state. Therefore, food, energy, and water is existential.

Indonesia, we are—we have been blessed the last three, four years with very consistent and very big rainfall. However, now we have to be prepared. After the phenomenon called La Nina, we have to be prepared for El Nino, and when El Nino comes, we have to be prepared for several years of dry weather.

Therefore, it’s also part of our initiative, the Indonesian defense community, we are working very hard to secure water. We are exploring for water in the dry parts of our country. I think over the last two, three years our military we have—we have drilled and we have made pumps, energy in something like 700 sites, and within this month, our defense university—we have sent survey teams, and we drill, I think, another 120 water pumps.

And also, what is very interesting is there is a new geological phenomenon, actually. The experts tell us there are underwater rivers flowing to the coasts of many of our islands, and this is very, very, very prevalent in volcanic islands. And we are, I think, the largest island—island groups with volcanoes.

There are many underwater rivers flowing every day to the coast. And now, our mission is to find where it goes out, and then to trap them in flexible pipes, and bring by pumps this freshwater to the land, inland to the villages. So, actually, the existential threat, there are solutions in front of us, and solutions which are not technologically very difficult for us.

It flows every day, every hour. We have also big rivers that are flowing to the sea, and with water management, with water engineering, we can make very, very good use of the water that’s available. The key is the will to find solutions.

When we talk about food security, there’s some things, again, that’s unpalatable to be spoken of, but I will say it anyway… How do we deal with food insecurity? To be very frank, if the political elites of all countries have cohesion, are united, do not fight amongst their lead—who wants to be what—and the elite are informed, want to learn, want to study, and the elite will not be swayed, will not be influenced by traders.

I want to make it clear. I am not against traders. I was—before going into politics, I was a trader myself. Trade—that is what fuels human growth and human enterprise. But in this matter of food security, sometimes the traders think short term. The political leaders must think long term. The traders think of annual profit. It’s not their fault; they are traders. They think of annual profit; political leaders must think five years, 10 years, 25 years ahead.

But sadly many countries, including my own country, sometimes our elites are near-sighted, uninformed, sometime do not want to be informed. I have been talking about food security in Indonesia I think for the last—I don’t know—20 years. When I retired from the military, I was elected as a chairman of the farmers association, and after that I was elected also as the chairman of the small market traders association. Maybe many of them come here to listen to me.

We have, what, now something like 16,000 traditional markets—16,000—and always the challenge is between the big supermarkets and the small, traditional markets. How do we reconcile that they live together, not killing—the big guys absorb all the profit and the small guys die because of lack of oxygen. This is the challenge again.

And many of our elites also—now after we see the conflict in other parts of the world, after the FAO, the WHO remind us, then now everybody talk about food security. But let me say very frankly, maybe three years ago many of our elite do not even want to address the matter of food insecurity. So I think this is something that we must take note of, and therefore, events like this is very important as part of the educating the elite. Solving hunger, solving food insecurity, yes, is about seeds, about technology, about this and that, and yes, but more important is the unity, the cohesion, the ability amongst national elites and international elites to work together. To cooperate—to cooperate, and this is easier said than done. I do understand that.

So our goal must be, as all the experts say, feeding 8 billion people. The problem is availability and affordability. The problem is some of the countries have secure supply of calories and secure supply of protein. And that is the challenge how we can reach zero hunger, which is SDG number two, the Sustainable Development Goal that we must all aspire to.

Here we see the dark green; those countries, secure calorie supply. And the dark blue, secure protein supply.

Food security, the essential thing is also trade, food trade. We see many countries that are reliant on calorie imports. We thank the Almighty God that Indonesia, actually, we need not be reliant on calorie import. We are now self-sufficient in rice. We are also able to produce maize on our own and we have alternatives to wheat.

The other essential element of food security, as everybody has mentioned, of course, is synthetic fertilizer. Half of the world is reliant on synthetic fertilizer. Also, the reserves of potash and phosphate is also not distributed equally around the world. It’s concentrated in Canada, Russia, some parts of the world. This will affect global food production.

And therefore, once again let us not be morally upset about the use of food as weapon. Food has always been a weapon throughout the history of mankind, thousands of years. Wars have erupted to secure food, to secure land, to secure water. So let us be very realistic, ladies and gentlemen. That’s why leaders must always calculate the entire spectrum of the threat.

As a former military officer, we learned that war is not just the beginning or the war start with the firing of a shot. No, war is already a spectrum. Trade competition is war. Financial war, we can destroy a nation by destroying their currency. So, once again, leaders must always think the entire spectrum.

Because, as I said, a conflict has two sides. One side may be strong in this area. The other side may be strong in the other area. And two conflict sides, they want to win. They want to survive. Therefore, they will use all weapons at their disposal. That is the lesson of history.

Fertilizer will be strategic because of the source of fertilizers, source of the ingredients of fertilizer. We must be prepared for daunting challenges ahead.

We all know everybody’s talked about the vicious—the cycles that are emerging: food price increasing, oil very high. The price of natural gas is already 10 times higher than two years ago in Europe. Cost of maritime trade, three times pre-pandemic average. Interest rates rising. Price of fertilizers increase. And this results in cost-of-living increase, real incomes falling down, the ability of to cope small families farmers decreasing. The financial power of several countries decreasing. What is the result? We have to be prepared for social and political unrest in many parts of the globe.

Some more figures. Wheat price have risen 200 percent in two years, palm oil nearly 200 percent in two years. Indonesia, very fortunate, we are the largest producer of palm oil. And at one time we were embargoed by Europe, our palm oil, but it turned out perhaps to be a blessing in disguise. Because we could not go to the European market, we are forced to use our palm oil for biofuel, for biodiesel. And now we have bio-gasoline. Sometimes threat, sometimes adversity result in opportunity.

So we… maize, sugar, soybean. We understand also the components of food, that energy very strong component. A lot of people have spoken about this. Corn, high component. Soybean, what, I think nearly 40 percent—38 percent components energy. Rice, not so—not so high. Peanuts, not so high.

Protein, protein crisis. In the next 25 years, the demand for protein will rise quite significantly, from now around 324 tons—324 million tons of a year to nearly 600 million tons, 80 percent increase in the next 25 years. And like it or not, I think we have to reassess the propensity or our habit of eating a lot of meat from cattle, from chicken, from pork because the input for one kilogram of body weight meat we need for cattle is 31 kilograms of input. For pork, it’s 10 kilograms. For chicken, it’s four kilograms. The most efficient is fish, two kilograms and some even 1.7 kilograms. So the future is actually aquaculture to provide our protein needs. This is force of nature.

Those who adapt, those who want to learn, those who want to invest will survive. And actually, the resources are in front of us. Once again, Indonesia is blessed by the Almighty God. We have many challenges, but we have a lot of sea. I think we have one of the largest—the longest coastline in the world. I think maybe Canada and Chile more than us. But Indonesia is—maybe we are second to Canada, I think, the longest coast.

Can you imagine how many hectares of aqua farms we can have on the coast and off the coast? We have now 23 million hectares of arable land. But we have also 120 million hectares of forest. Sad to say, about 80 million hectares of our forests are degraded—are already degraded.

So what is our vision? What is my strategy which I propose to my president that the degraded forest we convert to productive land to create food and energy?

They are already degraded, but before they supported forests. That means the land is fertile. By the greed of many short-term—how can I say that in an audience that’s a lot of Americans here, you know? Because, right.

But I would say that many capitalists are very greedy. Even some capitalists they are proud. They say greed is good. That is the essence, I think, of neoliberalism, right. There are capitalists that say greed is good. Let me be richer and richer, and I don’t care what happened to the poor and the hungry, you know.

Once again, I do not criticize capitalism, per se. But I’m saying we have suffered. It’s not anybody’s fault. It’s our collective fault. Whenever God has given so much blessings to people, sometimes the people become complacent and the people become negligent in protecting their resources and their future.

So, can you imagine if the 80 million hectares or 88 million—I think the data is there—if we convert only 16 million—16 million of those 80 million degraded. If we convert this to food production, we can be the breadbasket of the world.

So this existential threat and this, let us say, ecological or environmental disaster, we can turn around to be environmental and food opportunity for the world. It does not—we do not need too much technology. We do not need—the nature has given us this, let us say, comparative advantage.

Sixteen million hectares. Let us say 8 million for food and 8 million for energy. We can produce renewable energy, clean energy. Buy your energy from a lot of plants, from palm oil, from Iran, palm sugar, from cassava.

We also—we are in a tropical climate. We can have three crops a year. Three crops a year with good management, good technology. Good management—can you imagine the increase in production?

We also have 225 million hectares of marine territory. We also—within that area there’s 23 million hectares of marine protected area. This is the breeding ground where our fish—the fish of the world come to Indonesia to breed and to lay their eggs.

The fish of the world breathe in Indonesian waters, lay their eggs in Indonesian waters.

So Indonesia’s current role, we are now number-one grower of palm oil. We are now number-five grower of cassava, without the additional 16 million hectares of land.

We are now the number-two producer of captured fisheries. But we have a vacuum. We have a need for 40,000 fishing boats, of 300 grow stand to 500 grow stand. We have a need of 40,000 fishing boats. This is not including the aqua farm that we plan to build.

By the way, if any of the participants are still here on the 15th or on the 16th, I will be visiting fish aqua farm. If any of you would like to join me, I will be very honored if you would like to see that this is not a dream. In the future, we already—some of our entrepreneurs are already cutting this out and, by the way, making a lot of money.

But that is the risk. High risk high gain. To be the pioneer is always very courageous, need courage. We are the number-one grower of seaweed. Healthy, protein, antioxidant, is against cancer. And we are now already—self-sufficient in rice production.

So I think joining Jokowi in this government, I think, was the correct decision on my part. I’m proud that I joined much too many opposition from my own party.

But, as I said, that’s the challenge of leaders, right. Sometimes we have to have the guts to choose unpopular positions. At that time, it was popular, it was—at that time it was unpopular in my own party. But now they come to realize, oh, yeah—that guy is not that stupid.

You know, sometimes soldiers, we have the reputation of having no brains, especially infantry. I was in the infantry, you know. The smart guys in the army they always go to the engineers and the artillery. Those of us who are average they send to the infantry.

But now the developments in a certain part of the world where there is now open conflict—I will not say where. It’s somewhere in Europe. The development of war tactics now they say it is the return of the poor bloody infantry.

One infantry man can destroy a bank with a rocket which costs only maybe $100,000 can destroy a bank which costs $5 million. So I think I made the correct decision also at that time when I was young joining the infantry. And as a former soldier, I realize the importance of food.

I come now to a topic—my favorite topic, actually, is cassava, but this is also Bill Gates’ favorite crop. I think cassava will prove to be the savior crop of the world.

Indonesia, I think, can become the foremost producer of cassava, and cassava is the most efficient in the need for input, for water, et cetera, et cetera. If you see here, the input for cassava is quite efficient. It produces 250,000 calorie, but only need 65—what’s that—cubic meter of water per metric ton… the rice 1,139; wheat 954; maize 815. Very efficient.

Cassava is now a strategic food crop. It can produce the replacement for wheat, for pasta and noodles, et cetera, bread. Here I’ve examples.

This is already in production by our entrepreneurs. We are producing pasta from cassava; instant noodles, cassava. This Korean beef mushroom, cassava. We can produce bioethanol. We can produce alcohol, vitamin, other products, bioplastics, glue, explosives, feed for cattle. Cassava, very efficient. We have seen that. Health benefits—100 percent gluten-free, low glycemic index, high in iron and calcium.

I continue. I think I’ve taken a lot of time. Cassava products already in the Indonesian market. Here, we also see we already have the patents for modified cassava. We call it mocaf. We also have the intellectual property rights for the industrial processes. There’s already a factory producing cassava.

I hope the inventor of mocaf, Professor Subagio, please stand up. He’s the cassava professor—I think the foremost in the world—working many years in Nigeria in many parts of the world, and we see they’re producing processes. There’s also Mr. Fidriento, an entrepreneur—a courageous entrepreneur who pioneered the industrial production of mocaf. So we also now starting producing our logistics strategic reserve.

So let me conclude by how I see Indonesia’s future role. I think we will be the number one exporter of wheat flour equivalent—mocaf from cassava. We will also be the number one exporter of sustainable marine ecoculture production.

We are also—we will be the number one exporter of sustainable shrimp, aquaculture production. We do not want to deplete the natural fish. We have to preserve it because we are the breeding ground for many of the fish of the world.

We will also be the number one exporter of sustainable lobster aquaculture production. So we will be in the forefront to produce protein and calorie in the world. We want to be a factor in solving global insecurity threat. And we invite partners from all over the world to join in. Can you imagine 16 million hectares how many combined harvesters, how many tractors, how many silos, how many railroads, how many harbors, how many technologies, how many scientists, how many water engineers that we can accept and we can absorb?

So we are open. We invite all partners from around the world—that I think we can be a factor for growth. Indonesia can perhaps be an additional factor in the growth of the world economy, and in really providing solutions to overcome world hunger.

In conclusion—you see, they do not give coffee here for me. If they give coffee, maybe I speak for another two hours.

It is my opinion that I hold very strong to successfully handle the challenge. We need global peace, and we need global partnership. We have to work together. If we can come to this, if we can reach out to our adversaries, if we can overcome past mistakes, if we can admit to ourselves that perhaps we have made some mistakes, and we can work in a global partnership, I think we can solve the problem.

But, as I mentioned, in any country without the cohesion, without the unity, without compromise, without cooperation amongst the national elite, there can be no national prosperity. To have prosperity, we need peace. That is the lesson of mankind history. I was a former soldier. I know the ravages of conflict. There is no benefit to war and conflict.

Sometimes we are forced to, but as a former soldier, I realize we must avoid conflict. That doesn’t mean that we must be defenseless. No. Apparently humans as a species are very prone to domination and to take what is in front of them that is not protected and defended. That’s the human nature.

I think that concludes my remarks. Let us work together to achieve understanding, compromise.

Hopefully in this G20 in Bali—Bali—the name of Bali, of the Balinese people is pulau dewata, the island of the Gods.

So we hope that there will be magic and miracles in the island of the Gods. Let us work for peace and prosperity. Thank you very much.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Mr. Minister, that was a tour de force. That was just amazing. In a moment you’ll hear the minister on a panel with General Clark and with Gaurav.

For the moment, I just wanted to make one announcement. We want you all back here this evening 7:30/8:00 for our concert. We have John Legend, the great singer. We have Sandhy Sondoro. And we have the US Air Force Band back with us again.

We’re not going to take—because we’re a little bit over time, we’re not going to take the coffee break. So if you need a break, please take your break as you can grab it.

And with that, I want to turn your eyes to the screen to see Senator Stabenow, another message from the United States, the chairwoman of the Agriculture Committee.

Watch the keynote

SENATOR DEBBIE STABENOW (D-MI): Hello to everyone taking part in the Global Food Security Forum. Whether you’re in Bali or joining remotely from home, thank you for being here to discuss the incredibly important issue of global food security.

As chairwoman of the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, food security at home and abroad is a top priority for me. And we’re facing a truly unprecedented hunger crisis, as we know. Many factors have caused the rates of food insecurity to skyrocket, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate crisis, and Putin’s war in Ukraine. Some countries are experiencing historic drought, while others are faced with record levels of flooding. These extreme weather events harm farm and livestock production, and displace people from their homes and communities, as we know.

The World Food Programme estimates that as many as 828 million people go to bed hungry every night. And about 50 million people are at risk of famine. This should be completely unacceptable to all of us. Farmers play a critical role in providing US-grown food for those in need, in the form of commodities and ready-to-use food that can save a child’s life. But it’s also critical to help build local markets and invest in development projects so that local communities and economies can be more resilient and withstand shocks. It’s important that we use all of the tools in the toolbox to respond, because each situation throughout the world is unique.

In Congress, we’re staring consideration of the five-year farm bill, a process to reauthorize the food and farm programs in the United States. This includes programs like Food for Peace, the McGovern-Dole Program, and the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, which are critical to address global hunger. The Senate Agriculture Committee has a long history of bipartisanship, particularly in supporting international food aid. I’m working with Senator John Boozman, the top Republican on the committee, to advance a strong bill that protects and enhances these programs.

Congress acted this year to provide additional resources to respond to the extraordinary levels of food insecurity we’re facing, but we know that more must be done. Thank you for joining in the fight to ensure that we tackle global food security in a way that benefits all of those we represent around the world. I look forward to working with you as we tackle this important issue.

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage senior anchor of CNN Indonesia Desi Anwar.

Watch the keynote

DESI ANWAR: Hi, everybody. OK. Well, welcome to the next session, which is hopefully a fireside with three very distinguished speakers, two of whom you’ve actually heard today. But if everybody can please settle down. And I know that we’re very, very late this morning. OK. If everybody would please find their seat, we do have three very distinguished speakers coming up and including our minister of defense, Prabowo Subianto, and also General Wesley Clark, and also Gaurav.

I mean, we’ve—wow. What can I say? I mean, Fred, Atlantic Council, I’m speechless. I mean, what an amazing lecture we’ve just heard there. And I’m just, you know—it’s incredible, the breadth and the substance. And I think we can all agree that we learned a lot from Minister Prabowo’s lecture and I think his only Atlantic Council forum. I mean, this has encapsulated everything about food security. And you know, what can I—well, let’s—I hope he’s coming back to join the session.

And I’ve been asked to stall for time here, so forgive me. Things have been very weird, somewhat, this morning.

Anyway, food security. We’ve listened to the keynotes this morning and we know that food security—global food security is very much present-day challenges. And of course, our food supply system, our global—the entire global food system rests on the premise of global security. If there is a disruption in the global security, it will affect food security. And the reason being is that we are now such a globalized world. We’re so interdependent with one another, particularly for our food supply, there’s not one single country in the world that can actually feed their own people without importing food, without getting food supply from other countries. And then once this supply chain is disrupted, obviously, this is a real threat. And we have had terrible, terrible global shocks recently, what with the pandemic, which actually brought the world to a halt. We’ve had—you know, we are in the middle of a war in the Ukraine which is, obviously, affecting food supply and also trade. And we are also in the middle of an economic—global economic crisis: rising food prices, inflation, energy crisis.

And of course, this must—these are something, global challenges, that need to be resolved on a global basis. Global problems need global solutions. And I think this G20 forum, this G20 summit is a very, very good opportunity for world leaders to actually gather together and find solutions for these problems.

Now, I would now like to invite my three panelists to the stage.

I’ll start with General Wesley Clark, chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark and Associates. It’s a consulting firm. And General Clark is—big hands, please. How are you, sir? Please take a seat. And, General Clark, welcome to Bali. Welcome to Indonesia. General Wesley Clark is a former NATO supreme allied commander of Europe and a retired four-star general. And it’s interesting when we talk about food security we are turning to our military experts to help solve some of the problems. Once again, welcome, sir.

And our next speaker, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, the man of the moment, Minister Prabowo Subianto. Hello, sir. How are you? I just want to say, very impressive. Like I said, I was telling Fred and our friends from the Atlantic Council, I mean, I’m speechless. That was an excellent—that was a really good, long lecture. But I also would like to remind you, 2024 is still, what, two years away. OK.

Last but not least our—well, we’ve listened to his keynote speech before, very impassioned speech—Gaurav Srivastava, founder of Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation—also chairman of various groups, such as Harvest Commodities, Apraava Energy and Commodities, and Unity Resources Group. Gaurav, thank you for joining us again.

And let’s have a big hand for everybody, for our speakers.

DESI ANWAR: Ok, let’s start with you. If you don’t mind, Minister, let me start with General Clark. After hearing your incredible lecture—we learned a lot, obviously—just your thought on food security. I mean, General Clark, you were the former, you know, NATO allied commander for Europe. And there’s, obviously, some of the things that was mentioned, the idea of food security is very much tied with global security, with hard security. And just your thoughts on our minister’s speech. And also, how do these two interlink in your perspective?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: So, first of all, I thought—I think Indonesia’s really setting a very, very high standard for approaching the issue of food security. And I’m very impressed by the technology, by the work on cassava especially. And you know, this is the way we have to move forward. Just like we discovered fish farming about 30 or 40 years ago and it spread around the world, cassava may be the miracle—it may be the miracle carb of the 21^st century. And I think Indonesia’s got a leading role in this, so I think that’s really impressive.

I think when you look at food security, I agree with what Minister Prabowo has said. It is about more than food; it’s about water, it is about energy. I do think we have to be sure we’ve got the right balance. When we talk about food security, it’s about availability, it’s about affordability, those things. But it’s also about taste. Everybody grows up with a comfort food and tastes change over time.

Now, my wife, her comfort food is a baked potato. I don’t care that much for baked potatoes, but she likes it. I like spaghetti and meatballs. That’s my comfort food. People have these—it’s partly what you grow up with. It’s partly changing tastes as you mature. But we have to take account of expectations that people have.

And the protein map that you showed, Minister Prabowo, was really interesting to me, because when you look at people in Africa and you look at the amount of protein they can get, the amount of calories they can get, of course, that’s the first thing you go with. But when these people come to London sometimes or Paris, they might be looking for McDonald’s. And so it is about expectations. It’s about availability. It’s about affordability.

I think we have to harness the best of government leadership and private-sector leadership in this space. I think—what I’ve learned in my—I studied economics of underdevelopment at Oxford. I looked at it in Vietnam. I worked it in—as best I could in Bosnia and looked at how they could recover. And for the last 22 years, I’ve traveled around the world and looked at countries. Look, you have to use the profit motive.

It’s just like what the minister mentioned about cassava, this man who has engineered the best way to do it. Has to be profit in it. So it’s the balance between government leadership and vision and the private sector picking up the step, having the right incentives and signals to unleash creativity and technology.

DESI ANWAR: OK. So the partnership is, obviously, very, very important between government and the private sector.

But let me just put it back to, you know, food nutrition, obviously, is very, very important, but let’s frame it back to food security. As we know with, you know, what’s happening in the war in the Ukraine, I mean, even Indonesia, we were affected, you know, because we still import a lot of wheat, for example, and fertilizers. General Clark, what would you see as the—as the biggest challenge? What is the state of our food security at the moment with what’s going on in the world and your own definition of food security? Because we are completely interdependent when it comes to, you know, the food system is very global. And then once you have these blockages and once you—you know, the supply side is disrupted, I mean, how can we mitigate that? And where do you see, you know, the challenges of food security—

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think we have—

DESI ANWAR:—as a global security?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Look, we have to elevate consideration of food security. It’s grown in importance each year over—and each decade, really.

But in order to import things that countries need, they have to export. And governments have to help set the incentives for this. So if Indonesia wants to import, let’s say, cellphones and electronics from China or the United States or someplace, then how does it get paid for? And all of this has created in the area of food this incredibly complex network, and so it becomes something that—what COVID has taught us, what the Ukraine war has taught us is this must be a higher priority in all international discussions. We’ve got to strengthen these supply chains, listen to what our people need all over the world, and then governments have to work together to meet those needs.

DESI ANWAR: And on the global security side of it, I mean, obviously, if we have global security problems, it would impact food security, vice versa. And we have, for example, you know, climate change issues. And sometime in the future, if not already, fight for resources and diminishing resources will be a big problem as the world is trying to feed, you know, over 8 billion people.

And the other thing is that we have a very unequal world. In some areas of the world like you mentioned, Gaurav, we have oversupply of food. And in some parts of the world, you know, people go to bed hungry. How much of a threat do you think is food security to global security, especially seeing that what we need is global stability in order to get food security?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think what we are experiencing is one of these moments in history where mankind—humankind goes up or down. We have 8 billion people. We’re in an incredibly complicated world. We still have old aspirations, old ideas like some people think of the world as a chessboard. You know, this is my country, that’s your country, I want your country. We have to get rid of these old ideas of nationalism and move together toward a new understanding of our responsibilities for humanity. It’s a step-by-step process. It’s a generational process. And along the way, we’ve got to let go of some of the anger and hurt from previous generations. This is true in Europe. It’s true in Africa. It’s true in Asia. And it’s true in my country. We’ve got to look toward the future. There’s incredible technology opportunities. So it’s a make-it-or-break-it time for humanity.

DESI ANWAR: But do you think—is food security a real threat to global security?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Right. Well, food security has been brought to the fore by the war in Ukraine. So this is the moment, as Fred Kempe was saying yesterday, we’ve got a crisis. Use it. Make something different out of the way the world is structured today.

You know, we’ve had the Food and Agricultural Organization for 70 years. It’s great. We have the World Food Programme. It’s fine. Now, look at the current situation and let’s move forward. What’s the next step we need? How do we harness the strengths of government, the vision of government with the initiative and technologies of the private sector? This should be a principal issue at the—as Fred was saying earlier—at the G20, and we hope they’ll really tackle it.

DESI ANWAR: Gaurav, I mean, let’s pick up on that—you know, your idea, what is food security, the definition of food security. Where are we now? Are we at the critical, you know, junction when food security is threatening our global security? And also—like you also mentioned—you know, very impassioned in your keynote speech about, you know, putting—every child should not go hungry anywhere around the world. So how do you see this?

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: I think it’s one thing to talk about these global ideas, but at the end of the day what matters is what we are doing back home. And being in conflict areas you start understanding that food, and energy, and oil, and water—these are national security issues. For far too long they have been considered not to be, and I think that narrative has to change.

Given today the conflict in Ukraine, given today the COVID-19 pandemic, given where we just came from, I think this thing has been [thrown] in our face. Indonesia, which has several hundred million people… there are so many people, and the choices are they need food to eat, they need to fill their cars with gas. And the choices they are being asked to make is should they—to take sides in a conflict.

And I think it goes back to what the minister said, is this policy of remaining as a nation that is neutral and cares about Indonesia first I think is important. And I think while it really important on global issues, it is also important to understand that the issues are local because if there is lack of food, then it is cause for serious security issues. And the conversations that are now being had back home in the United States, I think a lot of those conversations have to be in that direction.

It is also important to remember that the government is not the one who is buying and selling oil or buying and selling food. It is traders. It is private businesses, and I think it requires industry, requires talk leaders, requires government to work together in conjunction with traders to see what works; not impose policies that ultimately do not work. And that’s—that is the—that’s what I think.

DESI ANWAR: So it’s very important, you know, the partnership between the government and the private—public-private partnership.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Public-private partnership.

DESI ANWAR: I think the important point is also, because we are so globalized, we are so interdependent for our food supply, our whole global food system is so entwined. So how do you see this going forward for countries to actually not only just increase their resilience, but within the countries themselves, there’s inequality when it comes to access to affordable, you know, nutritious food. What is the best way to address it because it’s not just an international or global issue, but it’s also—within the national itself, there is great inequality when it comes to food security.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: There is a short-term issue and then there are long-term issues. I think the short-term issues which need to be addressed is how do you deal with this imbalance. And yesterday we were talking at a roundtable, and we discussed ways of setting up special licensing programs to be able to work together and allow trade to flow.

And the other point is, at the end of the day, country needs to be self-sustainable. And in several conversations with the minister, his key idea of making Indonesia independent, taking issues that are security—whether it is defense, whether it is food, or whether it is energy—and making sure they are independent is key.

And that’s—so I think there is a short-term objective, which we—which we can—which we look working on this program, and then the long-term objective is creating self-sustainability. That’s what I think.

DESI ANWAR: OK. Minister Prabowo, actually, Indonesia, for the last couple of years, we didn’t import rice. We actually got an award from the International Rice Research institution for rice self-sufficiency. But we do still import other things like, for example, wheat and fertilizer.

Just, you know—just very quickly, I mean, we know what the—you talked about the strategy of Indonesia, creating a food resilience, national resilience, self-sufficiency. But given that Indonesia has the G20 presidency, now what would you actually like to see, the concrete outcomes from this summit when it comes to food security and creating global food security for everybody?

MINISTER PRABOWO SUBIANTO: I think when you notice the remarks of the speakers before me, also my remarks, I mentioned that there is food insecurity problem, but this problem has been compounded by—as I mentioned—population explosion, climate change, and geopolitical conflict. Climate change needs political wisdom and leadership from all countries. Population explosion needs wisdom, leadership, courage from the national elites. But geopolitical conflict, as I mentioned, needs statesmanship, needs leaders with a historical vision and a realistic—a realistic approach. I think this is what we hope from the G20. Here we are very happy, we hear that President Xi Jinping of China and President Biden of the United States will meet. This is—this is a—I think a very optimistic event. By meeting, by communication, by interaction, these two global powers must show global leadership, global statesmanship, global wisdom. So this is our hope from the G20.

So the problems of food security, hunger, is current a clear and present danger because we understand 300 million people are already starving basically; another 500 million on the verge of starvation, but this is all related to geopolitical reality. We understand 30 percent of wheat comes from Ukraine and Russia. We understand potash, phosphate is a resource very scarce. Fertilizer dependent on potash, dependent on phosphate, so yes, you ask me what we hope from the G20. We hope statesmanship with wisdom to overcome this.

DESI ANWAR: OK, the G20 itself, we’ve come in in a very, very challenging sort of environment, not just because it’s post-pandemic, but there’s a war in the Ukraine, a global economic crisis, and inflation. And of course, you know, tension between China and the US for example. So it’s, you know—and of course there is the Russia situation, but are you—how optimistic are you that, you know, world leaders can actually sit down, you know, with that wisdom and statesmanship that you are talking about?

And the other thing is Indonesia—this is our presidency. You know, what can we offer as a country to address and also to maybe, you know, facilitate the path to global food security as well as global security?

MINISTER PRABOWO SUBIANTO: OK. In my opinion, there are, let us say, optimistic goals, yeah. Idealistic goals. There are also realistic and modest goals.

I prefer to have realistic and modest goals. Indonesia, in my opinion, our contribution to the international geopolitical situation is that we succeed in making or taking care of our own house. We must keep our house—our own house in order.

We need—Indonesia needs peace, stability. And with peace, stability, we can provide solutions.

As I said in my presentation that with a little bit of investment, with a little bit of rearranging some of priorities, we can be the breadbasket of the world. This is not something impossible.

This is mathematics. We have already 80 million degraded forest. We must take care of this with our planning agency calculating 60 million hectares. If we convert this, this can be the breadbasket of the world.

So we can be a solution to the world.

Number two, energy. We have to go to renewable clean energy, green energy, to cut down global warming. That’s number two. This is, in my opinion, realistic.

We take care of our own house. We are peace, prosperity, smart investment. We can be the source of protein through the world, source of calories to the world. That is our contribution.

In the real sense, we are nonaligned. We are friendly with all the major powers. So we can be the intermediary. We can promote dialogue and friendship.

So I think, in my opinion, that is our, let us say, modest goals and idealistic goals.

DESI ANWAR: Yeah. And this is also an opportunity for Indonesia to showcase what we have and what we’re doing is very well displayed in this morning’s lecture.

Now, General Clark, your thoughts, please? You know, do you agree? What kind of leadership can Indonesia, you know, give in this circumstances? And also, for the US as being the global security power, what can the US do in order to promote global food security and make sure that, you know, everything’s—

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think the United States can do several things.

Now, we’re going to hear later from some American experts on this and so I don’t want to say that I’m an expert on this.

But I have looked at it and I think, you know, there’s—first, there’s the role of the American dollar. And so we have to be very aware in the United States that when we use interest rates to deal with domestic American inflation, it has worldwide consequences.

I know we are sensitive to that, but we just have to remain sensitive to it because countries all over the world rise and fall based on how the Federal Reserve system responds to, in some cases, US domestic economic concerns.

So that’s the first thing.

Secondly, I think the United States has done a remarkable job with the technology of agriculture for things like row crops. So I’ve done a lot of work with the corn farmers in the United States, and you look at the productivity of corn. Now, I’m going to use the term acre instead of hectare. There’s about two and a half acres to a hectare.

But back when I was growing up, if you got maybe 60, 80 bushels of corn per acre, you were a great farmer in Iowa. In the 1990s, we were up to 90 bushels. Now the average in recent years has been 170, 180 bushels of corn per acre. And some—in some cases, we’re getting 350 bushels of corn per acre.

Why is this? A combination of factors. It’s private sector, farmer ingenuity, government leadership in terms of agricultural extension. So I think if we look at these principles and try to help countries all over the world with technology, some financing to get it started, sharing our systems on how we look at farmland, how we evaluate its need for nutrition, how we use what’s called precision agriculture, taking advantage of GPS to know for each meter of land what exactly are the nutrients that are needed for each crop. If we look at some of the Israeli technologies on drip irrigation, for example, we can do amazing things.

And so I think the United States has to lead. But I think the United States has to be very careful in doing this because we have a spirit of generosity in America, but we have something called Public Law 480 which enables us to take surplus US agricultural commodities and ship them abroad in times of need as a measure of relief. Sometimes in doing that we’ve actually undercut domestic agriculture in those countries that have been the beneficiaries, so I think we have to be careful.

You know, it’s what—the old joke is if you are in bed with an elephant and it turns over, you can be crushed. And so the United States, for—starting really a hundred years ago, became the elephant in world finance in so many areas and in food. And we have to be very careful about this because, as Minister Prabowo was saying, there’s so much potential in Indonesia, in Nigeria, in DRC, elsewhere in the world. We don’t have to rely on row crops in the United States. So we’ve got to use our leadership wisely.

DESI ANWAR: OK. Well, just very quickly, what would you like to see the outcome of this G20? What concrete results, maybe what, you know, maybe agreement? Or, you know, what kind of things would you like?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think what we’ll see is—already in President Biden’s talking points he’s elevated the issue of food security. And one of the things we’re going to do from this conference, I hope, is give talking points to the White House so we’ll get further intensification of this focus on food security. It really is a fundamental, and I think the White House is coming to understand this.

It’s not something about getting farmers to vote for a particular political party so, therefore, you’ve got to be nice in Iowa. It’s much bigger than this. And in the United States, we’re fortunate because we don’t really have to import food. We do like shrimp, get some of it from here, but—and tuna. But we don’t have to. It’s a matter of taste. So in the American discussions, we’ve misunderstood and underestimated the issue of food security. We have to change our appreciation of priorities.

DESI ANWAR: And, OK, Gaurav, I mean, the general mentioned about innovation and technology. Obviously, you know, food—it’s important to have innovation as well as technology. And more importantly, actually, is to energize people to care about food production. What are your solutions to, you know, achieving greater food security by strengthening, for example, the farmers or involving the young people, women and, you know, all sectors of society to focus on this?

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Now, I was talking to one of my friends from Africa and they mentioned that the US is kind of the head of the kite. And once there is tailwinds at the head of the kite, the effect is felt all the way at the back and there is a big lag that happens.

It is important to understand that for the reasons that we have been the elephant that turned left or right, the reasons are we need to be really careful and work together and understand that working with our partners like Indonesia and with other nations is the way to build alliances. By providing maybe financing through institutions like DFC, working with policymakers—and we have had several conversations—General Clark and I had several conversations with folks at the White House, folks in Congress, in the Senate on these critical issues as to the role that the US can play. And it’s important to understand that we cannot—cannot—put countries like Indonesia in that impossible spot to make a choice, because the realities of what we are facing back in the US and the realities here in Indonesia or other countries are too separate, and the basic sustenance needs of working together is essential.

The war in Ukraine is an essential—is an essential conversation to talk about. And I was in New York right around the time when we had the Citizens Award, October 19, and I had conversations with one of the members from the U.N. And they showed—and she told me of this large discrepancy between the support that goes to the issue of Ukraine and what’s happening in Africa, what’s happening in Asia. The value of human life is the same, whether it is a child in Ukraine or whether it is a child in America, child in Africa, or child here. It’s all the same. And the conversation that behooves us today is how do you create a program that prioritizes food security, energy security, and national security as one issue. And hopefully, we will be able to achieve that with—

DESI ANWAR: This is what you’d like to see come out from this G20 summit, OK.

We’ve run out of time, but let me just ask a final question to Minister Prabowo, or maybe you’d like to read your notes first. All right. In your presentation, I mean, there was a lot of gloom and doom about, you know, the threat of nuclear war. I just want to ask how, you know, the—how critical is a—I mean, do you think there will be soon at some point wars due to climate change and when food supply gets disrupted and when, you know, people are fighting for diminished food resources, energy resources, water resources? Is this something that, you know, in your—do you visualize, do you foresee this as something that is the threat that keeps you awake at night?

MINISTER PRABOWO SUBIANTO: Well, you know, I—of course, you know, I—basically, deep down in me I am an optimist. Yeah. But as someone who has to deal with security/defense, we have to deal with reality. And of course, our reference are to the players, the big players. So when I hear very senior US former military leaders saying they’re worried about nuclear war, when I hear many strategic thinkers like Professor Kissinger—Henry Kissinger, when I hear very important academics who are—whose life is about studying geopolitical conflict like Professor Mearsheimer or Professor Jeffrey Sachs or many of the leaders of this—of the world powers, when they talk that they’re worried about nuclear conflict, that—I’m worried, you know, because we are basically—we are—we don’t see the logic of a major world conflict in this time and age. Ideology-wise, every country can choose their own way to prosperity.

Every country has their own right, you know? The West have been very successful in democracy, but some other countries have succeeded. You cannot—you cannot deny that China has succeeded in their economic growth. They have succeeded in eliminating extreme poverty. We cannot hide this. We cannot denigrate this. So the success of the West, yes. But we have to see the success of China and the aspirations of other countries—Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa.

So what I’m saying is that I base my assessment on the assessments of the big powers—of the strategic thinkers of the big powers. When they say they are worried, well, I think it’s also logical that I’m worried.

DESI ANWAR: OK. Not to end on a pessimistic note. Thank you very much. Minister Prabowo, for that remark.

Well, let’s hope this G20 summit will be, you know, the path to global collaboration, will the way to world peace, because this is what we all want, right? OK, big hands, please. General Clark, Minister Prabowo, and also Gaurav, thank you very much for an interesting fire chat side. And I would now like to give the program back to the next session. Thank you.

Watch the fireside

The post Indonesia’s minister of defense: ‘the threat of food insecurity is an existential threat to humankind’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

PETER ENGELKE: Well, good morning, everyone. I hope we’ve all had a productive and enjoyable conversation this morning. I know I’ve learned a lot myself.

As stated, my name is Peter Engelke. I’m with the Atlantic Council, and we’re going to be exploring on this panel for the next 45 minutes the state of global food security—not a small—not a small topic, but really looking into what we consider to be the primary challenges facing the world when it comes to the question of food security and beginning to explore some of the solution sets as well.

So joining me on the stage I have an illustrious panel, and—of experts and officials who really run a gamut, I think, both geographically and in terms of their areas of expertise, and I’d like to introduce them for you.

So to my left is Ambassador Vasyl Hamianin, who is the ambassador of Ukraine to the Republic of Indonesia. Welcome, sir.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: To his left is Bo Holmgreen, who is the founder and CEO of Scholars of Sustenance, which is an organization focused on food waste in Southeast Asia and also here in Indonesia.

Then we have—then we have Dr. Michał Kurtyka, who is the former minister of Climate and Environment for Poland, and I believe you are also a brand-new non-resident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center, which is a sister center here at the Atlantic Council. And I would like personally to welcome you to the Atlantic Council family.

MICHAŁ KURTYKA: Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: And then to his left we have Guy Margalith, who is the principal deputy foreign policy advisor at US Indo-Pacific Command.

And then at the end today we have Laksmi Prasvita—I hope I did that correctly—who is the head of Communications, Public Affairs, Science, and Sustainability, for Bayer Indonesia. Welcome.

LAKSMI PRASVITA: Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: And then I see that we do in fact have on screen, joining us virtually, is Maria Teresa Nogales, who is the founder and executive director of Fundacion Alternativas, which is located in Bolivia. And so there she is right there, yes. M.T., can you hear us?

MARIA TERESA NOGALES: I can. Good morning.

PETER ENGELKE: Welcome. Well, welcome to you all.

So as I said before, we only have—unfortunately—45 minutes for this incredibly important conversation, and really a diverse set of perspectives we’re going to be hearing from this morning. So let’s get into the—into the questions.

So really what I want to do first is ask all of you to answer the same question if you will, which is basically—specifically I should say—what do you see as the most pressing current challenges to global food security? A big question, and if you can all find a way to squeeze your answer into a couple of minutes if you can.

So, Ambassador, to you first, please.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: Thank you very much. It’s a great honor to be here and to speak to the gathering. Thank you.

Well, it will be a difficult task to answer it within two minutes, but I’ll try.

PETER ENGELKE: Sure.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: So I would not be repeating what is going on in the food security globally but because we had a lot of speakers, we know what happens actually. But I would say that the biggest challenge in food security issue is that we should watch it and receive it as a complex. That’s very important because food security is not just about a grain going from somewhere to somewhere. It’s not just one link; it’s a complex of problems that—coming from the seeds and then, you know, diesel fuel, and then chemicals, and then fertilizers, then labor force, et cetera, et cetera. And after that is trade and logistics.

So now when one link is undermined, then everything else is undermined, too, and now food security is in grave danger, so we—main thing I would say that we have to view this as a complex problem. And to deal with this problem it’s very important to go through a few stages like first thing is to see the roots—what is the root of the problem?

Now—when we are talking about Ukraine, right, because there are many other factors, but Ukraine—as people used to say, war in Ukraine, we identify the root as war in Ukraine. Next stage is to recognize it and on this stage of recognition, I think we have to speak very bravely. It takes a lot of courage to identify this, to acknowledge that this is Russian aggression against Ukraine, so we are not dealing with the war in Ukraine; we’re not dealing with Ukraine basically. The subject is Russia.

Third, we have to identify the instruments how to deal with this, how—basically how to deal with Russia, with Russian aggression, with the regime that made it possible. And the last one, to take action. So basically this is the algorithm, and I think the world is stuck on the—well, globally, stuck on this second stage of acknowledgement that, you know, it’s not a conflict in Ukraine; it’s a Ukrainian crisis. It’s not like war in Ukraine, like nameless war in Ukraine. But it’s Russian aggression against Ukraine. See the roots, cut the roots, cure the disease.

Second one, this problem is accumulative. What I mean is that it’s like a traffic jam. It takes ten minutes to get a jam, and then it takes like one hour to get it, you know, resolved.

So to mitigate the consequences of the food crisis, it will take maybe months, maybe years after what happens. And every day, every week of the aggression will get one month, two month, maybe years to get it resolved. So we have to look at it globally, we have to be responsible, and we have to be very much courageous and brave to acknowledge—to say, A—what is A? A. What is B? B. So a very important thing is that the world should unite to face it.

It’s not a good thing to deal with 50 crises at the same time. It’s like, you know, pouring the water from the spoon onto the fire when you can use the fire extinguisher and just extinguish the fire in a couple of minutes. So rather than to deal with 50 different problems—food security, logistics security, energy security, whatever it is—we would rather deal with one problem, and the name we know. It’s a Moscow fascist regime.

So basically I would say that if we are united we are stronger. If we are united we can resolve everything, and I would say that in this situation we can—like a global community, be a global community, be leaders, and use the rule of law rather than rule of force.

Last one—just last one. I personally don’t understand why and how it happened that a little man confronts the 10 billion of the global population, and everybody is trying to say that, well, everybody is afraid of this man. I mean, he is one, and we are the global community.

Thank you very much.

PETER ENGELKE: Thank you, Ambassador.

So Bo, same question to you.

BO HOLMGREEN: Yes.

PETER ENGELKE: You work in this region of the world. From your perspective here, how do you see sort of the—what do you think is the most important or most pressing challenge related to food security from the perspective of your work?

BO HOLMGREEN: Well, I come at it from a different way. We have spent a lot of time—I’m an engineer, so I use a lot of statistics to focus us. And basically in 2016 we analyzed the entire farm-to-fork concept, and we decided the best place we could have the biggest impact on food security right now—and fastest—was by going—when it falls off the fork—food waste, right? And in fact, we cannot rescue what’s on the fork, so it’s right before—it’s everything that doesn’t go on the fork, from supermarkets, and hotels, and so on. We rescue that, inspect it, get it safely in our cool chain technology to people.

But what we found then and what focused us so much was stunning. There were two facts that made us go, why we do this and where we did it. And the first one was—we back then called it 10-7-1, but now it’s 10-8-1 that tells you how fast it goes, and I totally admired General Clark yesterday for the observation on going from two billion to eight billion people, and we can still make food. But the best part of it is we are indeed almost eight billion people in the world, but today this fantastic food supply chain makes more than enough food—actually more than enough food for 10-plus billion people.

So you would think with all that extra food that everything would be good. Yet eight billion people, more than 10 billion food, one billion of us goes to bed hungry every night. So we simply have a distribution problem, and that is best seen in the old adage—you have heard this a million times—don’t give people fish; teach them how to fish.

Well, our slant on that is that’s true, but until then, let’s at least eat the fish that’s already out of the ocean. And that’s where we come from. So we need to simply fix this distribution problem, right? We have a very high level—we call it food equity where we hope one day to change access to good nutrition to not be based on just money in your hand, but also based on desperation and need. So we have to go to a better way of looking at our food supply chain because there is enough of it.

The other reason why we are now doing it in Southeast Asia is that more people in Southeast Asia than anywhere else in the world is coming out of poverty into middle class, and what happens then? Then they will start throwing the same amount of food away. And sadly, that food waste is just going to explode.

So we came to Asia for that purpose, and if we can rescue all that food waste from those who are now in the middle class and get it to the still poor people, then we are getting the nutrition cycle around. And the whole reason for doing it is not just for food and getting food to people, and so on, but it is the circular economy, and get the circular economy going, especially in countries like here, and Thailand, and Philippines. It’s immensely exciting because the populations are so huge, and if you can get the circular economy to work, we can go very far.

And then, of course, the final thing is that every kilo of food that would have been thrown away—because we are focused only on surplus food—every kilo of surplus food that doesn’t go to the landfill will not create methane gases, and will not hurt the environment so, you know, again, being an engineer, we measure everything down to the CO2 kilos that we save the world for, and so on—and emissions.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. Thank you so much, Bo.

Michal.

Same question—easy question to ask; hard one to answer. But do you have a top-line answer to the question what are the—how do you see the most pressing challenge facing the world when it comes to food?

MICHAŁ KURTYKA: Thank you very much.

And let me get a little bit earlier in our history. In 1709, 600,000 French people died out of starvation. Eighteenth century; it’s basically a climate change but the other way around. The temperatures actually declined, and so there was less and less food available. And in 1783—to be more exact, the 6th of June 1783, a volcano erupted in Iceland. Twenty percent of people died of starvation in the following year, and then all hunger spread over Europe, and many historians right now consider that one of the main element, trigger of French Revolution, was this problem.

But interestingly, on the 5th of October 1789, when people in Paris ran to Versailles, it was not because they lacked food, but because they have learned that the day before in Versailles there was a sumptuous banquet, and so what was the problem? It was inequalities.

And so we are right now facing a world which is entering into a period of chaos, and inequalities will be playing a very—difficult tricks to us. And we must foresee a world in which—there could be a domino effect, you know—starvation, social disorder, political problems.

And let me right now take my hat off—COP24 president—so I was presiding over climate summit in Katowice in 2018, operationalizing the Paris Agreement. And I right now come back from Sharm El Sheikh where COP27 is happening. And so let me put my environment and energy hat and add to that, that in today’s intertwined world—and thank you very much, ambassador from Ukraine for reminding us that Russian aggression against Ukraine is sending tectonic waves on the world in terms of energy prices, gas prices, food prices, inflation, insecurity. That’s an important element.

But the other important element is the equivalent of volcano erupting in Iceland in 1783—today’s energy technologies. They are polluting, they are not preserving water, pesticide, plastics—all that is making us living in an intertwined world, and what is going on in Ukraine is impacting Indonesia; what is going on in Indonesia is impacting the US.

So we must tackle this problem together, and that’s the challenge: how to tackle insecurities of today’s world all together, and then how to build a world in which we will be having a different set of values. The growth will not be based only on the push of—if I may say profits and productivity which is bringing a lot of benefits out of globalization, but also out of respect for our planet and out of engagement of people.

PETER ENGELKE: Thank you. Thank you so much, wonderful comments.

So, Guy—so you are with US Indo-Pacific Command. From your perspective, how do you see the challenge? I suspect your perspective is unique but very important.

GUY MARGALITH: Thank you very much, and it’s an honor to share the stage with this distinguished panel.

Specifically I want to echo something that the ambassador said about Russia’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has led to substantial food insecurity. It has led to disruptions in food, fuel, and fertilizer, as the ambassador mentioned, as other individuals at this forum have mentioned. And this is something that we focus on very clearly because it sends a very important lesson. The lesson is that conflict, that war has severe impacts on global food security, and that’s why a major focus of the US Indo-Pacific Command—Admiral Aquilino, every single day, says his number one focus is to deter conflict. It’s to practice what the secretary of defense calls integrated deterrence, to use all forms of national power in collaboration with our allies and our partners in a multilateral, whole-of-government approach to deter conflict.

But one thing I want to emphasize is that when we think about security and deterrence, it’s not just about the absence of war. It’s not just about deterrence—deterring conflict. It is about the prosperity and the livelihood of people. That’s what it comes down to at the end.

And I think we need to expand our focus of what we define security as, and that’s something that we think about every day at INDOPACOM. It’s about how do we promote a human-centered approach to security because that is ultimately the way that we are going to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that respects the rules-based international order.

If I could just highlight a few key statistics. In the US Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility there are 36 countries. Thirty-two of them are either island countries, archipelagic countries, such as Indonesia, or countries that have a coastline. Those countries rely extensively on maritime trade for their food security. A lot of countries, specifically in Oceania—20 to 30 percent of their imports are food imports. It is absolutely critical that the rules-based international order be respected because it is the lifeblood of these countries. In Fiji it’s 20 percent, in Timor-Leste it’s 30 percent, so just a few examples.

And at INDOPACOM we have a few key lines of effort that we are focused on to promote the rules-based international order. If I could, I’d like to highlight just three of them. One is our Women, Peace, and Security programs. We collaborate on a gender-focused approach because we recognize that a gender-focused approach is a key way to promote resilience, and resilience is a key part of food security.

Two, as we collaborate with our allies and partners to fight illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing—IUU fishing—this is a key area of focus because so many countries in Oceania and the region rely on fishing for their livelihood.

And lastly, climate change has a huge impact when it comes to food security or food insecurity. Our Center for Excellence, Disaster Management partners with our allies and our partners to include Indonesia, to include our other allies and partners in the region, to look at the impacts of global climate change, and to see how we can partner and work together to deter some of the biggest impacts.

So again, bottom line, we need to deter conflict, we need to promote the rules-based international order, and that’s how we’re going to achieve food security.

Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: All right, thank you so much.

And Laksmi, so same question: how do you see the challenges facing us in the world today when it comes to food?

LAKSMI PRASVITA: Yeah, OK. Thank you.

And I would like to greet my minister, minister of agriculture. And we have also the secretary-general of the minister of agriculture.

Please allow me to sit here and talk about the food security, and I will talk about the food security in Indonesia. So if we take a look—have a look at the global food security index in 2022, actually Indonesia is improving. Yeah, we are green in the food security, so congratulations to us. We can weather the storm of this global supply chain disruption.

But if we zoom in detail into the global food security index, the highest score is in the food affordability. So it is affordable. The government is doing really good in managing the inflation in Indonesia. However, if we take a look in more detail at the lowest point is the food availability, so that is the lowest point in the index of food security in Indonesia. The food availability, having the lowest score is because of—due to the supply chain—the global supply chain disruption, the access to the farming technology, the access to the farming R&D, and those are the things that we need to put our attention if we want to improve the food security index of Indonesia, yeah—so the importance of the access to the technology to the farmer, the availability of the input, and the access to the global supply chain infrastructure.

So I stop there. Maybe we discuss more about what’s the solution then from the private sector view on this global—on this pressing issue of security.

PETER ENGELKE: OK, thank you so much.

And M.T., I hope you can still hear me.

MARIA TERESA NOGALES: I can.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. And it’s so nice to see you virtually.

Same question over to you. You are working in Bolivia, and you see the world from that perspective and from other perspectives. From that geographic region as well as from your own experience, how do you see this equation?

MARIA TERESA NOGALES: Sure, I mean, I think we can all agree that we’re facing a set of compounding factors: climate change, the loss of biodiversity, degraded and contaminated natural resources, economic insecurity, energy insecurity, rising inflation, urbanization—I think is a subject that’s not touched upon sufficiently, which is definitely changing not only our production, but also our diets. Certainly war and conflict, which has been put on the table on several occasions throughout this forum, high food prices, the high cost of fertilizer, food export bans—all of this is, you know, presenting a very challenging scenario in terms of being able to guarantee people’s right to food.

But in addition to all of this, I would like to highlight two factors: one, the invisibility of all those people who work and are part of our food systems. So the people who are producing our food, or transporting our food, or commercializing our food are often not really taken into account in decision making processes. And I think that that influences our ability to really come up with effective solutions because if the actors whose livelihoods are involved in our food systems on a daily basis are not a part of the conversation, then we additionally are not able to understand the challenges that they face in order to ensure that we can have enough food and that that food is available to all.

So in this regard, I think one of the great weaknesses that we’re facing are governance challenges within our food system. And I’ll stop there so that we can delve into some additional questions.

PETER ENGELKE: All right, well, thank you so much, M.T.

So I see that we have roughly 19 minutes left, and we’ve gone through the first set of questions, and so I think that leaves us time for one more round robin. I’ve heard a lot of themes put on the table, and they are all enormous and all important. And we talked about war and conflict and the importance of unity. Urbanization is another one that we just heard about. We’ve heard about food waste. So there’s a lot to cover here.

And what I’d like to do maybe is to go to each of you and have you talk maybe a little bit more about your own—your own area of expertise as well as how you see, if you will, the solution sets. And so because we have—we have so many panelists and so limited time, it’s always unfair to the people who go last in the sequence, so I want to make sure that I balance that out a little bit. And let me start by going last to first for this round.

So M.T., you said—your last word was probably governance, I think was what I heard. So let me turn to you first and ask you how do you see the governance piece as a critical—maybe even the critical piece when it comes to solving the problems that you focus on?

MARIA TERESA NOGALES: Sure. Thank you.

And, yeah, I mean, I think at the end of the day governance is what sets the rules on how things are going to function. And so in this light, you know, in terms of food system governance, we’re talking about an absence of a normative framework country-to-country, region-to-region. Additionally, as I was mentioning, most of the actors that are involved in our food systems and that make, you know, food available in our households and in our communities are actually operating in the informal sector. They are very vulnerable to system shocks, and they do not participate in decision making processes.

So certainly, in terms of finding solutions to the challenges to food security, they need to be part of decision making processes, which means that our processes need to be very participatory. They need to be transparent, they need to be inclusive. And in addition—and this was put on the table earlier by one of my colleagues—is this concept of the rule of law. We need to make sure that our countries are strengthening the mechanisms that ensure that the rule of law is sustained, and that’s especially important when we are talking about generating guarantees for private sector investment because if our countries cannot guarantee, you know, private sector investment, then those are not going to come into fruition.

And finally—and I would say this is a huge problem in Latin America—is the absence of data. And without data, we cannot make informed decisions. And so I think there’s a lot of work that needs to be done in terms of governance and decision making processes, and ensuring that we have sufficient data to make appropriate decisions to make wise investments that can actually help us improve infrastructure, and logistical systems, and supply chains, and production.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. Thank you so much.

Laksmi, maybe I can turn to you next because you were—yes, you—you were fifth on the list and I want to make sure we come to you sooner rather than later so that we’re fair.

LAKSMI PRASVITA: Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: You said something in your remarks about, you know, the private sector, and obviously that’s the sector you are in and you come from. So I wonder if you might speak a bit to this sort of business model or models that might be applicable to solving some of the problems that you are focused on.

LAKSMI PRASVITA: Yeah, thank you for the questions, yeah.

So what is the private sector view on this food security challenge, and how do we sort it out? So at the heart of the agriculture or the food production—at the heart of it is the farmers, and we know exactly that most of the producers of the food in this world is smallholder farmers, yeah. About 80 percent of the food production in the world is produced by the smallholder farmers; 70 to 80 of the agriculture land is in the process by them.

So it’s very important that we empower them—we empower the smallholder farmers, we give them the access of technology, the most—if possible, the most advanced technology as fast as possible to the smallholder farmers so that they can get all the opportunity, the best opportunity they can have to produce more food, yeah?

So the government of Indonesia has been very open with this access to technology by allowing the latest technology of the biotech to enter Indonesia and to be used by the smallholder farmers to improve their productivity.

However, it’s not enough, I mean, the training to the smallholder farmers and equip them with the technology itself is not enough because when they produce lots of foods, where do they sell these—the harvest. This is very important.

So not only we empower the smallholder farmers, which is very important at the center of the food security, but also how to get the farmers into the supply chain of agriculture, into the business supply chain. And this is where it gets more complex, yeah, because we need to create an ecosystem of business on rural level, not only involving the smallholder farmers, but also the local, the rural entrepreneurs, so that the ecosystem of agriculture in that rural, you know, can have a viable business model. And only with this viable business model we can then sustain the food production, yeah, to weather all of the disruption in the supply chain.

And so what we do as the private sector is we develop a public-private partnership approach to develop the business model, what we call as the close-look business model where we lined up—lined up all of the actors along the supply chain from the smallholder farmers, the bank, the insurance, the agro input providers, and then the off-taker itself.

So that—the risk of the business is distributed evenly along the supply chain and all of the—everyone in the supply chain bear the risk. And this model will be very—it is—for the bank to give a safety—for the bank and financial institution to pour the money into the supply chain. So it is, I think, an effective model that we can try to scale up to make it bigger and also to replicate in the other area.

So with the empowerment to the smallholder farmers, with the most advanced technology, include them in the supply chain of the agriculture, and also include—being inclusive as well to the local entrepreneur, yeah, the small agriculture kiosk in the village, for example, into the supply chain. And it will zoom out more macro to the more global level to include this as MSM—either micro, small, or medium enterprise into the local supply chain, regional supply chain, and then global supply chain with—by creating this business model all together—all of the public and the private sector together, I think we can have a bright future in the food security.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. Thank you so much for that answer.

Guy, you are next on the list. So you spoke about—among other things, right—the roles and responsibilities that your organization has in sort of the area of freedom of navigation—in the current challenges, of course. But over the longer run, what do you think the keys are to sustaining a world wherein we have freedom of navigation in most if not all places that count, including places in this part of the world? Yeah, if you could just maybe give us your thoughts on that piece.

GUY MARGALITH: Sure. Thank you, Peter.

I think it’s not just freedom of navigation, but freedom writ large—a free and open Indo-Pacific, freedom of commerce, freedom of aviation—all the freedoms that we rely on as part of the rules-based international order. So freedom of navigation of course is critical because so many of the countries in this area rely on maritime trade specifically. But it’s not just that.

And it’s not just the United States either. We need to act together with our allies and partners, with all of the agencies of our governments, and that’s a key focus that we have over at INDOPACOM.

I just want to highlight perhaps just two initiatives that the United States has focused on, and first, Indonesia, as part of its G20 presidency, just last month convened the finance and agricultural ministers for the first time in the G20 to focus on issues regarding food security, which I think emphasizes the fact that this requires a multilateral approach.

Two, APEC—Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation—will be hosted by the United States next year, and APEC is the premiere forum to discuss issues such as these because free and fair and open trade underpin our rules-based international order. It underpins our food security. So just a couple of the things that we are focused on at INDOPACOM and the things that we are looking forward to, to work with our allies and partners as part of our defense of the rules-based international order. Thanks.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. Thanks—thanks so much for that answer.

And I guess I want to turn next to Michal, and you—there are few things that struck me besides I’m also, by the way, a historian so I love the references to the 18th century and 19th century and so forth.

But among other things, you talked about the importance of developing unity, right, in our responses to various crises—climate crisis, food crisis, other crises—as well as formulating a different set of values. And I wonder if you might—if you would be interested in deepening and extending those remarks, and particularly when it comes to the piece of how unity is associated with values and what that might mean practically for solving the climate crisis as well as the food crisis—again, a very simple question with a complex answer, and you have about 2-1/2 minutes.

MICHAŁ KURTYKA: Thank you very much. That’s an excellent question, and that’s a very difficult one because we are entering into a very fragmented world. So it’s much more difficult to develop practical ways of translating this unity into something tangible.

But my answer would be at two levels: global and local. At the global level, I believe that we need to develop new sets of clean and water-saving technologies because you remember what minister of defense referred to, the three elements—energy, food, and water security. So I believe that we should develop a level of global community, and that’s an effort of science, that’s an effort of enough scale for these technologies to develop. We need to develop water savings, pollution-free, emission-free technologies.

But then how to link this with what you spoke about—local families—because that’s the challenge. Yes, the change is happening locally, so how to provide these global technologies at local—at the level of local communities.

And I believe that in today’s world it will be extremely complicated to develop financial tools. Why? Rich North is basically out of money; South is disillusioned after COVID for any support of Western countries. So we need to develop new forms of solidarity, and I believe that if we, let’s say, go for a global fund of technology where you locate IPs, then you can also provide these technologies at local level.

Now let me take an example of Indonesia. I like very much because Indonesia is champion in geothermal energy. World’s biggest resources of geothermal lies here in Indonesia because of volcanos, et cetera. But this is extremely water-consuming technology, yes? You need to extract the heat with water from deep of the ground.

But there are right now research in California—an example for our American friends of solidarity—of deep water-free geothermal. So why not to put the disposition of Indonesia this water-free geothermal technology so that local communities can develop their own energy sources, and they can become resilient in terms of their ability to produce not only energy, but also out of this cheap energy also food and safe water.

PETER ENGELKE: Thank you. Thank you so much.

So Bo, the problem of food waste is enormous globally, right?

BO HOLMGREEN: Yes.

PETER ENGELKE: But you’ve been running a very successful non-profit here in the region that has made, I think it’s fair to say, significant inroads into addressing this problem. I wonder if you might draw from that experience and talk about how scalable this solution set you found is to the rest of the world.

BO HOLMGREEN: Right. Well, it’s certainly scalable and that’s why it’s so important that we do the right research, and we get lots of people on board to create a lot of little SOSs around the world, and so on, right?

But we looked at the supply chain, right, and we’ve heard these two days about everything from fertilizer to not having war, and so on, right? So I’m going to go back to my walk in Kyiv, of all places, right. And I was creating SOS at the time, and I had never heard of the Ukrainian holocaust before. I must admit I was uneducated on that, right? But I went down to those big rocks where they have the carved letters, and I was standing there reading for an hour. It was cold, but I was so fascinated because this was when Stalin simply took all the food away from Ukraine and brought it to Russia. And I don’t know how many millions of people died from starvation, right?

So we can optimize society—that’s what we’re doing with circular economy. We’re optimizing everything we can to make it the best possible world for all of us. But if you have crazy people that just do things like that, as you talked to, there is little we can do. So government has to come into it. Government needs to work together, but governments also need to do their own thing.

The first thing that happened in America, which was great, was something called the Good Samaritan law. You know, everybody sues each other in America, right, but the Good Samaritan law is that I can give you food, and if I don’t have any reason to believe it’s bad, even if it was bad and somebody gets sick from it, you cannot sue me, right?

The other good thing that comes now from America is this focus on not having an expiration—no, a best-by date, right? A real expiration date, that’s OK, but a best-by date—so many people look at that and throw it away far too early, right, and that’s where we have to come with the… chain trucks and pick all this stuff up, and recycle it same day out, right?

And there are just some things where government can do, and the last thing governments really need to do—and I love the fact—if we are actually going to send a strong message to the G20 leadership, it has to do with the environment, right? Like I said, for every kilo of food we can save, the world is a better place in the emissions and so on. So tax benefits, financial motivation to have carbon reduction is essential.

If I could, you know, issue a certificate to all the hotels and whatever we pick up food from, and they could have a tax benefit, now we would have them lining up, right, so government really needs to step up in all these countries. And I will say it is happening. I mean, we now work with a prime minister in Thailand, and they are very excited about our food banks up there, and Cloud Food Bank, and whatever we call it. But we have to show the vision and then get the support from the governments, and that’s fortunately happening, so it will be better but still a long ways to go.

PETER ENGELKE: A ways to go, but a hopeful message.

BO HOLMGREEN: Yes.

PETER ENGELKE: And I think that’s fitting to end this panel with the ambassador. We began with you, and your country is going through some—obviously, some very difficult times this year. But your message was also hopeful. You were one of the panelists who stressed the theme of unity, and I’d like maybe to have you discuss—I think it would be remiss of me not to have you, as the ambassador, to talk about how you are working with our host country, Indonesia—how Ukraine is working with Indonesia in the area of food security. And maybe you can leave us with some hopeful words about the constructive relationships that exist in this part of the world and your part of the world that will move us forward on this really critical topic that we’ve been spending two days now talking about.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: Yeah, thanks. Well, good question again—not for five minutes, but I’ll try.

PETER ENGELKE: OK.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: Well, in a nutshell, this is a very challenging market, and in terms of it’s a big country with big consumption. And, you know, I guess the—all the exporters of the world are fighting for this market like they fight for like say for Chinese or Indian markets. That’s why it’s challenging for me, but I’m very optimistic. I’m always an optimist so after we defeat the enemy in the nearest future and everything will gradually get back to normal, we’ll have a plan about developing the agricultural business and the trading business between Ukraine and Indonesia, and at large with the region of ASEAN because, well, good news is that two days ago my minister signed the agreement—TAC agreement, so we became partners with ASEAN so there will be a bigger market and integrated market. We’d like to integrate more on that.

Then, well, optimistic news is that, you know, we are talking about farm to fork, right, and it’s not about just make people eat enough; it make people eat quality food and diverse food, right, so I think Ukraine is not about just a wheat bucket, as we also talk about.

PETER ENGELKE: Right.

AMB: HAMIANIN: It’s also about the diversity, food technologies, processing technology, et cetera.

So my goals will be three, and I hope the businesspeople here will listen, and—I will be very open for communication on that. I will be concentrating on three things. First is the diversity. It will be not just wheat or corn or something; it will be—it will be all sorts of things. Actually I’ve explored the market—it’s fruits and vegetables and everything, and the products.

Second is added value. It must be—it must be like processed food.

And third is, you know, following the trends because the market is always changing so we can follow the trends, follow the technologies, stick with the technologies and like, you know, create joint venture or whatever.

So it will be a challenging business, but I’m confident—looking confidently. Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: Thank you.

So I am going to bring the panel to a close. Could you all please join me in applauding our panelists here today?

And once again, thank you all for attending this conference. As a representative of the Atlantic Council, we are delighted that every one of you is here, and we look forward to a robust afternoon of conversations.

Thank you so much.

Watch the panel

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage Global Head, Inclusive Economic Growth, Abt Associates and Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council Dr. Nicole Goldin.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Great. Well, thank you. It’s such a pleasure to see you all. This has been a really deep and tremendous couple of days of conversation, and our job is not an easy one. We want to take what we’ve heard, especially on solutions, and try to unpack that just a little more, add a little bit more concreteness and specificity, and really, I think, make it practical so that we can inform the G20 agenda and take some of these great ideas and solutions forward. We’ve been hearing about technology. We’ve been hearing about finance. We’ve been hearing about the food-water-energy intersection, if you will. We’ve been hearing about supply and demand, which, as an economist, is of course music to my ears. So we’ve got a lot of talk to talk about.

And I’ve got a great panel here to help me do that.

Immediately on my left is Qingfeng Zhang. He is the chief of rural development and food security at the Asian Development Bank.

To his left we have Bakur Kvezereli. He is the CEO of Ztractor, which I’m sure you’re all excited to learn more about.

Then we have Max Peterson. He is the—he is the vice president of worldwide public services at Amazon Web Services—excuse me, Amazon public sector.

And then we have Mr. Erez Fait, the co-founder and president of Agrinoze.

And I believe we have—yes, we have Dr. Arif Husain, chief economist at the World Food Programme.

And we’re lucky to be joined by His Excellency Oleksandr Kubrakov, minister of infrastructure in Ukraine.

So welcome. Thank you.

I’d like to get right to it. We’ve heard and we’ve been talking about how conflict, COVID-19, and climate change have exacerbated the situation and the food security crisis. So let me go first to your excellency the minister to ask: How has the food security situation in Ukraine changed since the war began? And maybe you can speak a little bit more about the grain deal and what that has done to the situation.

MINISTER OLEKSANDR KUBRAKOV: OK. Thank you very much for this opportunity.

And from the first days of full-scale mobilization, Ukraine infrastructure become one of the main targets for the enemy. And according to the World Bank report, the damage caused to the transport sector of Ukraine, it’s about 30 billion US dollars and losses reach 26 billion of US dollar. Since the beginning of Russian mobilization, all Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea and Azov have been forcibly closed to the entire—to the entry and exit of ships. The seaports of Berdiansk, Mariupol, and Skadovsk are under occupation and they’re closed until control is to be resolved. And before the full-scale mobilization, Ukraine supplied more than 15 percent of world’s corn export, more than 10 percent of wheat, and more than 50 percent of sunflower oil, and many other products of agriculture and industry. About 70 percent of Ukrainian products [are shipped] by sea, mostly by Ukrainian seaports on Black Sea.

So after just due to military mobilization, traditional supply chains were lost and at least 70 million people around the world are at risk of starvation for the moment. And it was very important for us to start Black Sea Grain Initiative because in peril we started—I mean, at the beginning of the war we started development of alternative channels of export of our product. It was, first of all, our seaports on Dnieper River, our railway lines in direction to European Union, and a lot of activities were performed where realized in cooperation with European Union with increased capacity of existing border cross checkpoints. We did—we did a lot of projects with our neighboring countries and solidarity lanes. It was important step in direction to fight food crisis and economic crisis as well. Thanks.

Important step was Black Sea Grain Initiative. It was signed on 22 of July. From that moment, from the first of August, we already exported about 10.3 million tons of agricultural products. Mostly, it’s Africa and Asia. European countries as well, but again, key regions historically was Asia and Africa, especially during the last years. More than 20,000—200,000 tons of agricultural export—of agricultural products were exported in cooperation with United Nations World Food Programme. And again, Black Sea Grain Initiative thanks to our allies, thanks to United Nations, Turkey, I think we know very well, I mean, how it’s important, how this initiative influence on global food prices. Each crisis during working of the initiative, we see how prices is growing 5, 7, 8 percent and then again, while initiative started working, prices became lower and lower, so—on the same 5, 7, and 10 percent. So on our side, we are doing our best in order to prolong.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Hopefully we’ll be able to get you back momentarily.

But it’s a good segue. We’ve heard from other Ukrainian colleagues as well as a number of experts that have spoken in our panels that the food crisis and the compounding conflict, climate change, COVID has had a disproportionate impact on women, on children, in some regions on indigenous communities. So I wanted to turn to—first to you, Qingfeng, to talk about what are some of the strategies and how are you thinking about addressing those most at risk.

QINGFENG ZHANG: Thank you so much, Nicole. And thanks for the Council invite Asian Development Bank attend this very important session immediately before the G20.

Again, I just follow the conversation by our Ukraine minster of the infrastructure. After the Ukraine—the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, you can see the so many countries suffering in the Asia-Pacific. At least 13 countries relying one of the three key essential commodities from the Russia or the Ukraine. But you know, the—in addition to the supply chain disruptions by the COVID and also this war, climate change was severely effect the Asia-Pacific. Just thinking about this year, the floods in the Pakistan and heat wave in India, and also the droughts in the Yangtze River, basically involved 4 billion, you know, populations, over 40 percent of this world populations.

So with this severe challengings, Asian Development Bank, as one of the key efforts in the region, we formulate 14 billion US dollars from the 2022 to 2025 to address the food insecurity, covering both the immediate responses and also the long-term measures to build up the resilience. This year, we’re going to deliver 3 billion US dollars immediate in response, provide the working capital to the small SMEs, mitigate the fertilizer shortage, and more importantly also try to supply financing facility to address supply chain disruptions.

And as for the long-term measures like the three years 2023-2025, we are already programming about 10.7 billion US dollars focused on three key areas. One is small agriculture. Very much it supports the participation of the women and also the small farmers. Second highlights digitalization of agricultural value chain, highlights financial inclusion, find out the way to reach out to the small farmers and also to help this microfinance, to help the—our process quickly lead to our farmers. Lastly, you know, these two days we discuss about the fertilizer, natural-based solutions. We are going to introduce innovative financing facility to scale up capital investment, nature-based solutions, including the payment for ecological services…

Probably let me just pause here and then we can come back, discuss about the concrete, you know, measures. Thank you.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Fantastic. Thank you so much.

Arif, I’d like to come to you on a similar question. Qingfeng, you know, talked a bit about using or working through small- and medium-sized enterprises as one strategy to get at those that are often marginalized who also kind of dominate the landscape, right, of the economy in the market systems. In your work with the World Food Programme, how are you thinking about addressing and meeting the needs of those most at risk?

ARIF HUSAIN: Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity. Really happy to be here and I think this is an excellent question. I can tell you that I’ve been in this work for about 20 years now and what we are seeing this year, it’s, in fact, terrible.

You know, one thing which we talk about is that, you know, when the World Food Programme is setting records, it’s not necessarily a good thing for the world, right? And what we have been doing is we have been setting records since 2020. We fed 115 million people in 2020, 128 million people in 2021, and this year we plan to feed 150—more than 150 million people. So you can see that this is a, you know, gradual increase in the number of people who need assistance.

And coming to your question, the vast majority of the people we work with, they are essentially in rural areas. They are women and children. They are in agriculture. So on one side it is critically important to save lives, right? In 21^st century, if you are talking about 50 million plus people a step away from famine in hunger emergencies in upwards of 45 countries, I mean, that’s telling. That should be unacceptable.

And if we are going to deal with this, obviously, we need to deal with the root causes. First and foremost, still it’s the wars. It’s the conflict. Then, obviously, it’s the climate. And then it is economic marginalization, right? And these are not just words; this is what we are seeing out there.

So, first and foremost, we need to save lives. And after that, we need to start talking about changing lives. And that is where we are focusing a lot.

What is also very different is that we have learned very quickly that extreme points, they don’t work. So if you’re pure humanitarian, it doesn’t work. If you’re pure development, it still doesn’t work. And we are seeing that there is this recognition of this fact. And when you now look at IMF or you look at World Bank, they are coming into the space of where people FCV—fragility, conflict, and violence. At the same time agencies like mine, who is mainly humanitarian, they’re moving towards enabling people, changing lives, and trying to meet them in the middle. And if we can do that, and if we can bring the private sector into this, maybe we get out of this.

One other thing I wanted to mention following the Ukrainian minister, this Black Sea Initiative. This has saved a lot of lives. But you know, this is—initial deal was for 120 days, which is going to come to an end on November 19, essentially a week from now. This needs to continue. This needs to continue beyond till this war is done and trade comes back to normal. And if that happens, we at least dampen—slightly dampen the impact which we are seeing around the world, and that’s—that must happen going forward.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you very much. We are going to come back on some of those governance points that you raised.

And I’m glad you mentioned the private sector. We’ve got three great representatives from the private sector. So let me turn to you, Bakur, to Matt, and to Erez and ask each of you to just tell us about, again, as concretely as you can how your product or the application of your product is disrupting the food security system—positively disrupting, I would say, or helping communities to adapt to climate change or to some of these situations. Bakur, why don’t we start with you.

BAKUR KVEZERELI: Thank you. Thank you.

I think we had great speakers these two days and great messages which should be carry over the G20 discussions. I think there has been a consensus in this room, in this forum that, you know, next three decades we will need to produce 70 percent more food with less water available for farming, with less soil available for farming, with less labor force available for farming. And I believe that—and unpredictable weather is contributing to all this. I don’t want to sound very Silicon Valleyish kind of approach that technology can fix everything.

Of course, we will need the policies, we will need financing, and everything. But I believe—it’s my personal position, not our company, in this case—that automation and autonomy, which will allow us to farm with less labor force, indoor farming or vertical farming where one acre of the facility we can produce the vegetables of the, I don’t know 20, 30, 40 acres.

Of course, electrification will play its role in machinery electrification, which is our message which we work on, to electrify agriculture in general. But with agricultural machinery will play its role on dependence on energy, obviously.

And alternative proteins. We cannot ignore the alternative proteins are nice to have. We are relying on very few protein sources. We talked about that yesterday, today. And we need to increase—diverse the proteins which we can use for food processing or production and so on.

I think that’s our perspective of a startup or technologies on that perspective, is to introduce more tech and, on top of that, digitalize agriculture as much as possible, which will bring transparency, which will bring predictability, and we can plan better. And our partner in this game is Amazon with their beautiful products in AWS, which supports a lot of robotics companies in our field, I think, that all synergy between very established corporations which have a great experience of digitalizing other sectors can be brought to agriculture and we can fix significant portion of the problems.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Fantastic.

And very quickly, for those that may not have heard you talk about Ztractor, just, you know, how does that fit in and what exactly is for those that might not be aware?

BAKUR KVEZERELI: We are manufacturing autonomous electric tractor. It’s completely unmanned. There is no seat for a driver on it. And we did it by purpose. We did some research before we started to design this tractor. Our belief is that with many, many tractors around the world we can connect them on one cloud and do the real-time data gathering from the machines, which will improve efficiency and give us better predictability of which crop is produced where—what will be the yield of almonds in California and Spain—and then the traders—we’ve met a few commodity traders here—can do better deals on futures. And—

NICOLE GOLDIN: So that’s a great segue to Max—

BAKUR KVEZERELI: Exactly.

NICOLE GOLDIN:—to talk about not only with Ztractor, but in general how is cloud computing changing and disrupting positively—

MAX PETERSON: Well, I’m super excited just listening right here to what one company is doing to reimagine how they deliver scale to farming. And I listened both to Qingfeng, who talked about the importance of small farmers, a really interesting example of how you approach automation. At Amazon, we believe that our responsibility is to be able to provide the sort of enabling technology that lets all of these solutions come to life.

I also agree with the gentleman from the World Food Programme. It’s not one thing. It’s not development activities in isolation. It’s not humanitarian aid in isolation. It’s not technology in isolation. We’ve got to find the ways to make all of these things work together and be used in the appropriate areas around the world because it’s—there’s going to be different solutions that are based locally.

I’ll give you one specific example because you—Nicole, you wanted specific examples. In India, we work with a company called Cropin who deployed something called SmartFarm. And India is an economy with a lot of small farmers, and so it was not important only just to focus on the food-production piece but also on the economic viability of all of these small farmers. And what Cropin used was they used a combination of technology running on Amazon. They integrated satellites. They integrated overhead Earth observation. They integrated Internet of Things types of sensors. They integrated open public datasets like the Amazon Sustainability Data Initiative. And they’re able to bring precise insights to the farmers on the ground, over 7 million farmers covering about 16 million acres of land, and they can help them understand precisely how to apply, you know, different technologies to—you know, to produce the crops in the most effective way for them, providing both food and livelihood.

NICOLE GOLDIN: What a fantastic example. And we’re going to carry on with the specifics, and that’s great.

We’ve heard a lot, Erez, of conversation around water and that linkage between water, food security, the impact of drought and of climate change and reducing water. So tell us how autonomous irrigation and Agrinoze is positively disrupting and bringing new solutions to the table.

EREZ FAIT: So, first of all, we are Indonesian. And before the food security became topic, the minister of defense was already thinking about it—before COVID, before the Ukraine war. So he gave us challenge to bring here the technology and to implement it in Indonesia. And we made the plan to send people to do the training. Apparently, two weeks after we started COVID came and block everything. So we manage with two people—which one is Wija, one is Yuza, that they were one of the project management—everything through Zoom to train and to make the system up and running until today. And this system shows that technology can overcome barriers.

So we are using the technology how to, I would say, fix or help the challenges that were discussed here. Because in all the discussions here, I heard about problems—water, finance, fertilizers, knowledge, scale-up, all those things that are challenges for the humans—but we are coming from technology solution, so we know how to take technology and to solve problems.

So, first of all, so we have to think—to know that the minister had this vision long ago, before it became topic. And that reason, in Indonesia we are most prepared compared to other place in the world. Although now we work in California and other countries, but still we have a base of people locally that know how to use the technology and they grow things that they never think can be grown in sea level.

Now, how we do it? We do it by automation and autonomous and taking all the data into algorithm with machine learning, which actually nursing the plant like baby in incubator. Because baby in incubator, it doesn’t cry. The sensors knows in advance what he needs, not like outside. So we develop a solution that is on the roots zone and manage the zones 24/7, even not exist in nature. You can take, like, hydroponic in the soil. So the roots are always efficient and produce.

In countries like Indonesia, which is the Equator, 24/7 means because the temperature is always correct. And we eliminate the depend on rain and climate. So once we have the soil and we have the ability to cultivate, everything is possible.

So the other thing that I want to mention—because the minister is the vision—is to think about what we call mobile farming, because we create kind of Ikea kit that could connect all the needs in one system. So, because Indonesia is big, we said let’s make a system that we can ship on a truck, put in a place, put the hose or the dripline, and start to work. This is counter of another problem.

The other thing is local production. In Indonesia, one of the thing is how to—it’s a big country. Logistic is big. Shipping the hose or the dripline, it’s very expensive because it’s mostly air. So we have a plan. And will discuss with agencies they are looking to contribute, like the DFC, because they want to enable the food security and the health and women and youth. So, actually, in our activity in Indonesia, we have young people that do crowdfunding in order to start this kind of initiative. And this shows that there is a need and it make people interesting and make people excited.

And then what we think is how to expand small villages. So because the technology is kind of centralized, we enable small farmers that have one, two hectares that one system can irrigate their plots and they just do the cultivation. So this is in general what we do.

Sitting next to me, the Amazon. Amazon is a big cloud, but we need to make the cloud give rain and the right rain. So I challenge him: How do we take this cloud and make it available to the people to make it useable? So this discussion between us later on.

NICOLE GOLDIN: It’s a great point and it speaks to kind of a quick follow-up for the—for the three of you in particular before we come back on some governance, which is: Where does partnerships come in, right? We’ve been talking about, we’ve heard about the scale. The scale of this challenge requires urgent action and it requires long-term thinking as well. So you mentioned partnerships. You mentioned sort of B2B. What are the challenges of scale? And when you think about partnerships—at Abt Associates, you know, we found in our work implementing projects for Feed the Future in Cambodia and Egypt of the US government that partnering with government, with local private sector, with the small- and medium-sized enterprises, and with civil society is really critical, especially for that inclusion aspect.

So, Bakur, maybe we’ll come to you first, and then we’ll go to Erez and then Max for your thoughts on scaling and partnerships.

BAKUR KVEZERELI: Thank you. I think, to go back to what was discussed for two days here, I think we received two loud, long wakeup calls, which are COVID and the war. And it’s not only food community; it’s everyone, logistics, all businesses, and society in general. And I think this will force collaboration because we need to find fast solutions yesterday. It’s already past due to solve basic issues in, let’s say—I don’t want to point to any particular problem, but there are issues where we can collaborate with government, with corporations, with other industries which are never been involved in agriculture like aviation. Aviation has the best sensors. We use two sensors on our tractor from aviation. They’re expensive, but they are fixing the issues no one have applied to agriculture before, right? And I think because of the circumstances, which are unfortunate, but we need to learn from this and make it—make the decisions now.

NICOLE GOLDIN: I love that example of cross-industry and thinking outside the box, and it goes back to the data point that both you and Erez mentioned and how you’re bringing data into it. And I’m going to come back to you, Erez, on this kind of scalability and partnerships. And then, Max, we’ll come to you.

EREZ FAIT: So first of all, scale means knowledge and team. So we have now in Indonesia about six project that we are planning already to start using the crowd finance and local entrepreneur. And although some of them are approaching a huge area—five 1,000 hectare—we start only with one because part of it is education, to build a local capacity. So this is the way that we can easily expand in each area, putting the seed. Later on, it’s only expansion.

So, again, it’s important to understand the people that help us are not farmers. They’re coming from defense and the economy, but they understand how to scale up because, in the end of the day, the issue is scale up. And it means how to educate the people, make the technology available.

So part of our solution now is mobile application where the farmer can, in a way, have direct relation with the plant through our system. So it’s not anywhere—any more blind because today they are blind. They don’t know, there is a disease, what to do. There is something happen, they don’t know what to do. So part of our solution, because it’s online using cloud, we enable to close the circle. Like today in Jakarta there is a problem, we know the problem before they know because when they sleep and there is a leak we get alarm. So all these things are available today.

So the issue, how to connect all the dots of the agencies that has the money, the agencies they have the needs. So, actually, the model that we have in Indonesia we are now copying to Uzbekistan, to Vietnam, to all those countries we have discussion with. And I’m going from here to UAE, and over there they don’t have employees. So I’m going to make people train here to work over there. So you can see that we are looking at the global problem as one problem and solving it the same way.

NICOLE GOLDIN: So, Max, I’m sure Amazon Web Services has some interesting thoughts on scale and scalability. I’d love to hear them.

MAX PETERSON: Well, actually, yeah. Good call. Amazon actually created a new leadership principle just about a year and a half ago called success and scale bring broad responsibility.

And I want to shift, though, from talking about the technology partnerships to talk about people partnerships, because part of the way that we’re going to all improve is to innovate out of this. And there is—I mean, I’m sitting next to two people who I just got the opportunity and met who are driving incredible innovation. At AWS, we recognize that we need a place to bring these sorts of innovations together. You need to include universities and research organizations and government and nonprofits and NGOs and industry.

And so we created something called cloud innovation centers. We do these in combination with universities around the world. We’ve currently got a dozen of these cloud innovation centers in operation around the world and they do exactly that. They serve as a place to bring together all of the people with incredible innovative ideas with the data that they need to make good data-driven decisions and with some technology from Amazon to be able to come up with these ideas.

And by the way, those 12 cloud innovation centers just so far in 2022 have done over a hundred innovation projects. And so we create these innovation challenges. They could be food security. They could be health. They could be anything that’s relevant to the local community. And it’s a phenomenal way to build the partnerships that you talked about.

NICOLE GOLDIN: That’s such a great example, and I don’t think we hear enough or talk enough about the importance of the academic community and that research piece. And it’s great to see you bringing that innovation and that academics.

We talked about sort of technology as an enabling factor, and another aspect of the conversation these last couple days has been about governance and the importance of governance, both at the national and in the multilateral context, to support aligning incentives, to support innovation, investment, and inclusion as well. And so I want to come back to you, Qingfeng, to ask you to kind of speak briefly about multilateral governance. You mentioned some models in particular on the financing side. We haven’t gotten at that. What are some specific aspects of models of multilateral governance that you can—that you could speak to?

QINGFENG ZHANG: Thank you so much, Nicole. Again, I—you know, if we’re talking about the difference between this crisis and also 2008 crisis, you know, good news is that—our colleagues in this panel already mentioned about it—we know the crisis much better than before and we have a good tools in our hand—you know, the technology, digital technology, you know, remote sensing and many other tools in our hand—to address the crisis. But at same time, we also know that the scale and also the complexity of the crisis much bigger than the 2008 crisis, so it requires cooperations between the international organizations and also the governments.

So this time we learned the lessons from the 2008 crisis, so immediately after the Russia invasion of the Ukraine and then in May all of the IFIs—international financial institutions; ADB, World Bank, African Development Bank, IFA—all of them get together, formulate, and they launch action plan to address food insecurity. Basically, we agree to adopt coherent strategy focused on five key areas.

Number one is the support the vulnerable people.

Two, promote the open trade.

Three, mitigate the fertilizer shortage.

Four is support the small farmers and also productions.

Finally, focus on long-term resilience…

So after that, of course, is the G7 hosted by Germany where we are—you know, establish sort of the global alliance on the food security. Just a few days ago, under the COP27, we jointly launch what we call is a food security dodgeball. So that means we’re going to watch what happening in agricultural market information, but at the same time also track our financial… and how to address the most vulnerable people.

Again, I’m not saying this is perfect. So many things need to be addressed. But again, compared to the 2008 crisis, I think the international community responded much quicker, much more, you know, coordinated, you know. And then they—I think going to be also effective.

Let me just pause here.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you. It’s a good example and it’s one I will bring back to my colleagues at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center as we’re thinking about reforming and what the Bretton Woods 2.0 will look like as we think about World Bank and IMF reforms.

And I want to come to you—back to you, Arif. Again, thinking about multilateral, you’re operating in—within the UN system. What are some of the aspects of the work? And what have you seen work well at the multilateral level in terms of multilateral governance and also in the financing aspect?

ARIF HUSAIN: Right. So excellent question.

First and foremost, I mean, you know, what we are seeing is that there is a consensus on the problem statements. You have IMF, World Bank, WTO, World Food Programme, FAO doing joint statements on what’s at stake. And on that side, essentially three things come to mind as the problem statements.

First one is that, as bad as it is right now, you can call this affordability crisis, meaning food is available but it may not be at the right place or it might not be at the right cost. But it is available. But if we don’t sort out the fertilizer issue and sort it out now, today’s affordability crisis will turn into tomorrow’s availability crisis, which means even higher prices. And I don’t think we can afford that in 2023. That’s one side.

The second one where we are coming together is basically about which countries are in trouble. What are the characteristics of countries which are in trouble? And what I can say is that if you’re a poor country, if you have high debt, if you happen to import your food, your fuel, and your fertilizer, you are in trouble. So what is the solution on that side? We need to start talking about debt relief or hunger relief, meaning instead of poor countries making their debt payments they could use the same resources to import their food and their fertilizer. This is something which needs to be considered. There is a precedent in the sense of there is debt relief for climate. Why not debt relief for hunger relief?

The third thing where there is consensus building is about, you know, our export bases for our staple commodities are extremely, extremely thin. What I mean by that is that less than 10 countries make up 70, 80 percent of our export base for wheat, corn, rice, soybean, even fertilizer. And, worse yet, less than five countries hold stocks of these commodities at 90 percent level. That kind of situation means that whenever a shock happens to any one of these countries you feel the pain all around the world, and war in Ukraine is just the latest example of that. So we need to sort of sort out the diversification problem going forward.

Now, very last thing on that is that, frankly, we have the money, we have the technology, we have the—it’s not about those things. At the end of the day, it is about staying the course because many of these things, if we are going to solve them, it’s going to take time. That requires political will and staying with the problem till it’s done, and that’s something which we have been missing. We missed it in 2008. We missed it in 2011. Hopefully, this time around we stick with the problem till it is resolved.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you. I’m glad you reiterated and brought the debt issue back into the conversation. That’s something that we talked a little bit about earlier and yesterday as well. And it really is critical to keep that in context, especially to your point about as we go into the G20 and the finance ministers are meeting, and that is something that I know is on the agenda, and there is certainly a clear linkage, especially right now.

Believe it or not, we only have a few minutes left. Time has flown by. So I’m going to ask you all one last question. We talked about our successes and what is working, but sometimes we can learn as much if not more from talking about what hasn’t worked or what we haven’t tried yet and why. So in just about a minute, I’ll ask you all for a kind of final thought what you are excited to see moving forward, a key lesson learned within your own company, within your own product, or just something you’ve seen in the community that you think we can do better. And I will start with Bakur because you just raised your hand. And we’ll have just one minute each. Thank you.

BAKUR KVEZERELI: Thank you. Thank you.

So the—my thoughts—all this, again, going back to the discussions—is that there is—there are different agreements like Madrid agreement on one topic, there is the Paris agreement on climate. We don’t have a food agreement so far. There are multiple, but not as global and as powerful as—we don’t have targets. We don’t know what our target as a globe in food. And I think that Bali, Indonesia agreement in the next two days or three days will be a good start, good base for a future moving forward, just to agree on target what we need to achieve in grain production, in meat production, and so on and so on, right? I think that’s where we failed and now we need to do that type of agreement so everyone knows what’s our vision and what we want to achieve in what time period.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Great. Excellent suggestion. Thank you.

Erez, coming to you.

EREZ FAIT: So, first of all, I would like to refer to Ukraine because it’s on the cloud, Ukraine. So because of our experience of doing things remotely, we are working now with some Ukraine farmers that moved the agriculture from the area that was captured by Russia into the other side of Ukraine in order to provide food. So the ability to send a system remotely and just explain what to do, it’s part of our activity here. So this is the advantage of technology.

The other thing is how to make a small move in order to make a bigger move, because everybody speak about the problems and the thing is how to start to open this dam to bring the results to everybody now. Because, as you said, the availability is now and the issue of challenges is now, and we cannot delay food delivery. That’s the problem. We can delay things like luxury, but not food. So these are the challenges now.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Very inspirational. Thank you.

Arif, coming to you for a final thought, an inspired failure, or something that we can all take forward or do differently.

ARIF HUSAIN: Look, I mean, you know, there is a lot of hope. And frankly, this is—hunger is a solvable problem. It’s not just saying that; it really is when you look at it.

My final thought just is that, you know, we are always talking about whenever there is a project offered or something is offered, you know, we always talk about, you know, how much is it going to cost to do that. Maybe we need to turn this question on its head and start asking: What if we don’t do it, what is the cost? What is the cost of inaction? And if that answer scares you, you better do it. And if it doesn’t, it’s fine.

Right now, the cost of inaction of not dealing with food security in terms of destabilization, in terms of terrorism, in terms of migration out of destitution is huge. It’s just that we don’t pay it right away; we pay it a few months or a few years later. And I think we need to start thinking about that very, very seriously when we are making financial decisions and political will about solving many of these problems because they come to our doorsteps as well. Thank you.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you. It’s such an important point. The counterfactual can be really powerful, and I think that also speaks to the importance of research and data. And maybe that’s something, as well, that we as a community haven’t been doing as good a job as we need to. And it comes back to that inclusion point.

Qingfeng, final thought? And then we’ll come to you, Max, to wrap this up.

QINGFENG ZHANG: Thank you so much.

Again, I stay hopeful. I also say G20 is a great platform to really enforce in term of the governance… That very, very effective to really reduce risk of the food insecurity. Now is the time for us to think how we introduce innovations in the G20, reinforce the declarations. Again, you know, since March of this year, at least 20 countries in this area is introduce trade restrictions, really make the market as very panic. So I think this G20 is an opportunity to review what works, what doesn’t, and then they incorporate the lessons and they release new declaration. I think that is our hope.

Thank you.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you.

Max?

MAX PETERSON: I will quickly wrap it up, just say I’m incredibly inspired by all of the people on the panel here and the sharing that they had. And one thing that we try and do is encourage people to think big. And there’s a lot of really big thinking here. The challenge with thinking big, however, is if you’re thinking big enough you’re going to fail. But what you need to do is you need to realize that food security is—failure is not an option. And so we just look at ways that we can help people fail, learn, improve, and move faster, and I’m very encouraged by all of my panelists here that we can—that this is solvable and that we can solve it. We just have to think big and take action.

NICOLE GOLDIN: And fail, fail, fail. So thank you and learn from it. Please join me in thanking this fantastic panel. We could have talked all day. Thank you very much.

Watch the keynote

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Please take your seats so we can begin. It’s pretty much a follow-on from the session that my friend and former colleague Adam Schwarz just moderated. He ended up talking about a few solutions. What I’d like to do today—and first of all, let me just introduce myself. My name is Michael Vatikiotis. I’m reasonably well-known in Indonesia because I lived here before as a journalist. I now work for the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. It’s a Geneva-based conflict-resolution and mediation organization. We’ve become involved in food security in quite a big way with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

But I’d also like to use this opportunity—and I firmly believe that, as has been said already in the room today, the G20 conference meeting of leaders is an excellent opportunity to focus global attention not just on the problem, but also on action and solutions. And so what I’d like to do with the session today—because we will continue this discussion tomorrow—is to kind of draw up a list of ideas where they can be outline or in detail that we can perhaps hope to get the attention of the participants in the G20, and in particular I believe the Indonesian government, which is the host of the conference, if only because I know that President Jokowi himself has a real interest in the issue of food security. And I think it would be a real opportunity for him to say something meaningful and for us to be able to contribute to, at least in a small way, a couple of initiatives that could be put on the table for discussion and end up being agreed upon. So that’s an ambitious goal.

But I would like to start by highlighting one of the things that I think has now become much more evident in terms of food security. And before I open the discussion, I’ll just make this point because, as we’ve heard already today, there’s a lot of discussion about the supply of wheat and grain. But now I think what’s become very evident is that fertilizers are a key issue. According to figures that I’ve seen, even in a conservative scenario the high cost of nitrogen fertilizers is threatening the global production losses of up to 66 million tons of staple crops such as maize, rice, and wheat. And this will affect at least 50 of the most food-insecure countries, reducing the amount of crops they’re able to grow—including here in Indonesia, not necessarily food-insecure but definitely reliant on fertilizers. So that’s, I think, one issues that we should really try to bring to the attention of people here at the G20.

In addition to that, we’ve heard earlier today the importance of trying to draw a closer link between water, food, and energy. I was recently in Jordan, a country that is now increasingly facing water stress. Syria, a country already in conflict, severe water stress that’s generated huge numbers of cholera cases, it’s linked to water but also to food and to energy. And so I think one of the other things we might try to do is talk about how to strength—or, define and strengthen that nexus.

And in that connection, also, we might also want to look at, as we’ve already begun to, the two other issues that are floating around and hovering around food security, which is pandemic preparedness—because in the COVID pandemic there was this move, as we’ve heard already in the room, to impose export restrictions as a sort of knee-jerk reaction. And there perhaps needs to be a mechanism to address that in the future. And then, finally, climate security, which everyone tends to see as a sort of medium- to long-term problem which is already upon us, especially in the African continent.

So, with that, can I begin, please, with fertilizers, since it is an issue that has not been given a lot of airing? And I think it’s an opportunity here at the G20 to really put that on the table. So I would like to first turn to my old friend, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, because he’s into organic fertilizers, which of course is one solution. But I would like him to perhaps help us frame the issue and maybe look at some of the solutions. Hashim.

HASHIM DJOJOHADIKUSUMO: Thank you, Michael. It so happens that I had an interesting conversation with our colleague Pak Kasdi, who earlier addressed us with his remarks. And Pak Kasdi is the secretary general of the Ministry of Agriculture. And he just gave, you know, some tidbits—interesting tidbits about our fertilizer situation. I think Pak Kasdi said that Indonesia actually requires 25 million tons of chemical fertilizer, but we only have an allocation in our budget for 9 million tons, Pak Kasdi. So we actually have a budget shortfall for 60 million tons for chemical fertilizers.

I was aware of this problem about 10 years ago and I got very interested in actually starting some green sustainable solutions, and one of them is actually the production of organic fertilizer. And organic fertilizer from degraded forests, Michael, from biomass, from woody biomass. Actually, my colleague Dr. Willie Smits is the one who got me interested in this. But there are other solutions, as well. And one of the other solutions is the production of fertilizer from maggots. You know, this—maggots, from black soldier flies feeding on waste—and feeding on waste, feeding on garbage, but also feeding on the residue from, let’s say—well, General Clark mentioned about the production of cassava. You know, only 35 percent or 28 percent, I think, of cassava actually becomes tapioca, and the balance 70 percent is waste, General Clark. That waste can actually be the feedstock, Michael, for black soldier flies, which in turn produce maggots, which in turn produce very lucrative, high-quality liquid fertilizer from, dare I say, the urine from the maggots, OK? I know I was a bit squeamish as well thinking about this, but actually, there are many nature-based solutions, as Willie and Pak Kasdi actually mentioned—nature-based solutions to the problem.

Yes, we have a major problem, but there are solutions. And I am optimistic. I am optimistic because there are the greatest force all over the world—not only in Indonesia, but elsewhere; and we’re talking about Africa, we have friends from our African colleagues who were here earlier from the African Ex-Im Bank. There is room for optimism, I think, ma’am. And that is that nature-based solutions, I am convinced, is the wave of the future.

Michael.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Pak Hashim. So perhaps one of the things to perhaps sort of put on the radar of leaders is to start to explore those solutions immediately.

I’m conscious, also, that the immediate problem, of course, is the supply of particularly natural gas and ammonia nitrate, which is actually causing the production of fertilizers to decline drastically and for the price to go up. So I’d like to once again turn to Kira Rudik from Ukraine to talk about—because one of the keys to the supply and reduction of the price would be for a pipeline that actually runs from Russia to Ukraine and out to the—to the Black Sea. So perhaps, Kira, if you could give us a bit more detail on that.

KIRA RUDIK: So I would like to make a general comment and support my colleague, Vasyl, Mr. Ambassador, in terms of us tackling certain problems.

When we are talking about the pipeline and about the fertilizers, we are talking about a small part of the potential solution to the problem that would not fix itself. When we are talking about the issues that will arise in Africa, in all over the world, we for some reason omitting inevitable statement. There is war in Ukraine that was started by Russia, and it would not end by itself. It will just not. It will continue creating more and more issues for the whole world. And, yes, there would be sanctions and we will insist on them being stronger because these are people who are coming to my land to kill my people. And, yes, we will be working against all the transportation of ammonium through our land because we want to weaken Russia, because we want them to stop coming and killing our people, our children, raping our women, and destroying everything that is there to survive.

We are right now in this grain deal, which is a temporary very virtual agreement between many parties—it’s United Nations, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia—that the transportation of the grains through Ukrainian ports and transportation of the fertilizers through Ukrainian pipeline continue. This is as fragile, as I have already spoken to you before, for so many reasons. Just two weeks ago, Russia decided that they will exit the grain deal, just by the one side, just—early in the morning they said, well, we are exiting.

And as of right now, same as was the general question of the security, we are facing one question that we do not have answer to, is: Who or what in the whole world is organization or a leader that can make Russia stick to their words? It goes same with Ukraine and war in Ukraine. It goes same with keeping up with the energy supplies. It was—it’s going same way with the food supplies. And because there is nobody right now, there are no resolution. There are no security guarantees that could be put in place so there could be a peace deal. There is no way for the grain deal to be put in place and be signed by all—by all the parties. You know why? Because neither U.N. nor Turkey nor anybody else can force Russia to execute to the word that they have given. And this is why inside Ukraine the deal is perceived as very virtual and something that would not last long.

I think everybody at these tables understand how essential for the world food security this ability is. And I want to stress again how fragile every single path of every single ship now is. It depends on the emotion, on the word, on unreliability of the country that is an aggressor and has been acknowledged a terrorist state by so many other countries. So when we are talking about resolving food security crisis, we must not close our eyes on the point that we must resolve security crisis first, because everything else that we will be doing—all the plans that we will be putting together—will be dropped by this one question: What or who will pressure Russia to keep their part of the bargain?

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Kira. And do you think that—and let me just follow up with a question. Do you think that actually comes down to, as—because it’s, obviously, in Russia’s economic interest—to payments to—I mean, in order to—this issue of how to keep their word—to essentially assuring and ensuring the payments?

MS. RUDIK: For the last eight years—and I want to again inform everybody that war in Ukraine started eight years ago. Right now is just a full-scale escalation. For the last eight years, the strategy of the leaders of the world was let’s have economic ties with Russia the way that they would be happy, that they would be satisfied, that they would be fed up, and then they would not have any intention or any logical reasons to attack. And they—then we will just make it too expensive for them to fight.

Unfortunately, this strategy failed. So the economic ties with Europe and the reliance of European countries on Russians’ energy and the billions of dollars that every single day are being paid by European countries to Russia did not stop them from attacking. Same way having money flowing in and having payments being on time and open to them would not stop them from anything. And again, I’m talking from the history and I have proofs to that. Every single day right now is a proof to that. Two weeks ago, when they dropped out of the grain deal, is a proof to that. But nobody can give me the proof of otherwise, that if they will have this assurance that they will continue going on and on on this deal.

We should not be emotional here, but be very logical and act with the historic facts. So, as of right now, all the historic facts I’m using as arguments to prove my point. Economic feeding the tiger and having the economic ties with it does not help and stop the empire of fulfilling on its imperialistic mission, expanding and destroying other nations.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Kira. And I think that actually encapsulates what the challenge will be for the G20 leaders because there will be this argument on the table. But it still leaves the problem, which is of course the price of inputs is rising and is going to cause severe problems for food production in the coming year.

So I’d actually like to turn now and get a perspective on this from Rahmad Pribadi, who is involved in the fertilizer industry, and you know, to give it some perspective on exactly what is likely to happen, if he’s—if he’s here. Yes, he’s over there. Sorry.

RAHMAD PRIBADI: Thank you, Michael. First of all, let me introduce myself. My name is Rahmad Pribadi. I’m the CEO of Pupuk Kaltim, which is the fifth-largest urea producers in Asia-Pacific.

So let me speak—allow me to speak from the perspective of fertilizer producers. The issue in fertilizers is more on affordability rather than availability. Of course, availability is still an issue that we have to carefully watch what’s going on with some export restriction from some countries, but I think the key is affordability.

The affordability of fertilizer has worsened in 2022 because some issues in geopolitics and many other things.

Just to give you a perspective, in—if you prepare pre-crisis and 2022, the urea price has increased about 250 percent, whereas rice—the price of rice remained stable. Price before crisis and after crisis remained the same. So we are seeing now fertilizer becoming more and more expensive for farmer to purchase. And for that reasons, we’ve seen the decline of fertilizer consumptions. Globally, it is about 5 percent. But if you look at Asia, East Asia and South Asia, that number is even higher. That is 6 to 7 percent. That, I think, something that we—everybody has to be concerned about, like what, Michael, you have mentioned. The decrease in consumption of nitrogen fertilizer will immediately impacting food production.

So I guess, to that perspective, I would like to probably propose, if there is any initiatives that this forum can take, I think we all have to work together to make sure that fertilizer price remain affordable for the farmer, especially in Asia where most of the farmer are small farmers. That can be done, I think, through subsidy, which Kasdi has mentioned. But again, Hashim mentioned that the amount that is needed and the fiscal capacity of the government does not match, so that is something that we have to look for the solution.

For a country that—an agricultural country like Indonesia, who is at the same time also gas producers, probably we have to also look at reducing the feedstock price. Natural gas price for fertilizer industry has to be maintained low so that the price of fertilizer, especially for small farmers, can be maintained at a level where it is more affordable. And I think when we are talking about export restrictions on agricultural product, which Mr. Kasdi has mentioned in the previous sessions, I think that also has to include into fertilizers. I think the forum should push for removal of any export restrictions on fertilizer. Hopefully, by doing so fertilizer will be more affordable and the availability can be maintained.

Thank you, Michael.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: So, if I read you correctly, a price-support mechanism for fertilizer. Given the political obstacles to ensuring a more natural supply, then perhaps this is something that requires special attention here at the G20.

And I want now to actually turn to Ambassador Dave Merrill because, you know, earlier today—earlier, in the first session, he talked about the need for the G20 to actually consider mechanisms to provide these kinds of solutions on a collective basis in ways that perhaps have not happened before. And I’m remined that, of course, in one of the earlier G20 meetings, during an economic crisis of 2008, there was a fund established, you know, to address the economic crisis. And I’m wondering if we might want to look at ways in which the G20 could agree to special mechanisms or forums in which these kinds of things could be done.

But, Dave, over to you.

DAVID MERRILL: Well, thank you—is it on? Yeah. Thank you, Michael. You’ve asked me to elaborate a little bit more, and I want to elaborate even more tomorrow so I want to save a little bit for tomorrow. But here are some specific things that we think can be done.

We had an in-depth session on this at the US-Indonesia Society—USINDO—September 9. We had experts from around the world.

Now, one is, of course, the financing of emergency food reserves and distribution. There was something done on that in some G20 meeting that took place this summer. I think it was among the finance ministers. And they, as you would expect, agreed that the multilateral development banks, WFP, FAO, WTO, et cetera should do more. There are some kinds of facilities that they have in mind and we’d like to hear more about what they intend to do. If there were a communique, which we don’t know, we would think that would be part of it, building on what they did this summer with the finance ministers.

There need to be national and local distribution schemes, internationally-coordinated food emergency reserves. I don’t know what they did about that, but you would think that something would be done about that.

And of course, encouraging NGOs and private charities. We’re going to be talking about that tomorrow afternoon. Now, the NGOs and private charities can only do what they can do with what they’ve got, but if the world can get them a little more to work with then they can do more.

It’s been mentioned about fertilizers several times. The fertilizer use is a problem. The fertilizer prices are a problem. We need to minimize trade barriers on fertilizer. We need to improve the liquidity of small and medium enterprises and national fertilizer value chains in lower middle income countries. We need to revisit security schemes for fertilizer—subsidy schemes, sorry—subsidy schemes for fertilizer to make them financially more viable, increase their impact, and improve the efficiency of fertilizer use to assist farmers to do more with less. There’s a lot of technology going around to achieve more with less fertilizer, more efficiency of fertilizer. In fact, there’s even one technology going around—I think there’s a representative here – that does—from Israel—who does productivity increases with no fertilizer—with no fertilizer, just through selective application of water at the right time. So there’s all kinds of technology—increased fertilizer, no fertilizer, the need to be redoubled, retripled, everything else.

Improving the productivity of smallholders growing staple food crops, that more or less goes without saying. But what should be done about that? What should be done to increase the yield—close the yield gaps for smallholders with sustainability? If you can’t have more wheat, you can increase the nutritional quality of diets—programs for women and children, micronutrients, and so on that can make what foods you do have go further. These are fairly obvious prescriptions, but I don’t think they’ve been written down.

Promoting agricultural research. A lot of us has been involved for decades in agricultural research—crops that would be resistant to climate change, higher yields on less land, and so forth.

Now, guaranteeing affordable supplies of staple foods would have to be looked at either by the G20 or by someone else. Physical supplies—make sure that there’s access via trade, and what we think there should be is some kind of G20 forum for food security dialogue. We’re not saying that Indonesia has to be the automatic chair of it, but Indonesia is in a good position to chair a forum. It’s not meant to be a new international agency but a place to discuss these things going forward. And we think Indonesia, with its more or less neutral position internationally has found itself in a great position to exert moral suasion and position itself to get the most out of the international community.

The other thing that Indonesia has done in the past is rice. There was a rice crisis in 2008, I believe, and Indonesia acquitted itself well in the rice crisis. And so countries that eat rice—I know it sounds uncharitable—but if they ate more rice and less wheat, then the demand for wheat would be less, and then the price of wheat could ease up.

And it shouldn’t be impossible for, let’s say, the Filipinos and the Indonesians to eat more rice. It’s not objectionable to them. Of course there are some that want wheat in their noodles, and maybe they have to pay more for the wheat in their noodles if they want the noodles that badly. But if countries who eat rice—I’m not sure where China comes out on this because they eat rice and wheat—but if countries who eat rice traditionally can be encouraged to eat more rice, at least temporarily, it would ease the international demand for wheat and the price of wheat, in addition to whatever can be done with getting the ships out of Ukraine and everything on that front.

So these are some of the ideas that we think should be encouraged by the G20. Now in the form of it, I don’t know. It’s opaque to us. It may be opaque to everybody, maybe it’s not opaque to some of you. But how the G20 can do this, whether through moral suasion, whether it’s through a communique—it doesn’t have to be a communique. If they can’t have a communique, they can have something. They can have a speech. They can have a declaration of principles, or all kinds of things can—there are plenty of minds in this room that can devise the title of the document.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you. Thank you, David.

Hashim, go ahead. And let’s keep the discussion—and then Gaurav afterwards, yeah.

HASHIM DJOJOHADIKUSUMO: I do want to say I’m a good friend of David, and just a devil’s advocate, David—I mean, just to illustrate how complex the situation is—I don’t want to diverge too much from the theme, which is food security, but I think we have a problem if you are asking people to eat more rice. There are two implications. One aspect is the health aspect—diabetes. Me, I love eating rice. I eat—in fact, I had Nasi Goreng this morning. You know, it’s—but I think we have to admit that eating more rice, with its glucose in the rice, is a major driver of diabetes in China, India, and Indonesia. I mean, we’re—so that’s one.

Now another—the second one is the climate change aspect. I’ve been told by experts—maybe Pak Kasdi and others can enlighten us all—is that actually rice paddy cultivation is a major producer of methane into the atmosphere. And it’s a contributor—a net contributor of emissions to the atmosphere.

So, you know, it’s very—the whole thing is very complex, you know, and I just wanted to say that because I don’t know whether increased rice consumption is the answer, frankly. Thank you.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you. Gaurav.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you, David, and thank you, Hashim.

You know, it’s important to remember. You know, my wife and I—she is Japanese-American, I am Indian-American. Culturally we are coming from multiple cultures, and that’s the beauty of the United States, is that you can come from anywhere and still be American.

I think we’re here to acknowledge the cultures and be able to work together, and as we are having this conversation, the more pressing question is people are hungry right now. They’re not going to go to bed tonight with a full meal. We’re going to have a coffee break with a couple of watermelons and decide whether we want some more cantaloupes in it. It’s a bit of a misnomer.

So the question is what do we do today, what do we do right now, and yes, the conversation today is Russia, and Ukraine, and the invasion. And it’s a pertinent topic to be discussed. But Indonesia’s philosophy, which David mentioned, of being neutral is because Indonesia has a population that is—that they have to feed. They have to run their cars, they have to run their bikes. They require oil, they require food, and how do you regulate that?

I think, as we have—as we convene here, the question is the mechanisms that are being put in place by the government today, do they regulate with what is needed in Africa, as the lady from the African EXIM Bank said before, and does suggestions like the price gap that we have today—does it work? I think that’s the more imperative question because it is OK to sit and pontificate on what’s going to happen in 50 years, but the question is I’m hungry right now. And I know—and I think Sharon can say if I get hungry this is—it becomes—even for me it becomes very difficult.

Imagine a kid who hasn’t eaten. So we have to really think about what do we do as top leaders as we convene here to work from a policy point of view and from a business point of view. I think that’s my—that’s what I think.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Absolutely. I mean, one statistic that grabbed me was that, just in September, food prices in Kenya increased 15 percent. And that’s already translated into insecurity and rising criminality. So it’s the impact on human security—not just stomachs but also, you know, physical violence.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: I mean, it is important to remember, you know, as we are sitting here, if the population is hungry, that is what gives rise to violence—violence that can destabilize whole nations.

So how do we work together with the two bread baskets of the world; that is Ukraine and Russia, in a program that is regulated whereby which the flow continues but it is better monitored under a system. I think it’s something to think about.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Yes, and, you know, we’ve already got two nice ideas that are on the table that could immediately make some impact: one is the idea of financing for emergency food reserves—of emergency food reserves, and then also this idea of a food-security-focused dialogue at the high level, between governments because that actually drives to the immediate needs for action.

I’d like to come back actually, if possible, to our friend from the African EXIM Bank because I thought she gave a very good perspective on the practical, you know, challenges of ensuring supply and affordability. So if you could come back again and give us some idea of what you think is needed and what could be—and what could be put on the table in this meeting over the next few days.

Q: Thank you. The name is Gwen Mwaba. Yeah. So, I mean, one of the things that we are doing for the African continent beyond the statements that I made around the immediate solutions is we’ve developed an Africa Trade Exchange whose purpose is really to aggregate the needs of Africa for grains and fertilizers so that we can approach supplies on a pooled procurement basis. We did the same for COVID-19 vaccines during the time when there was scarcity for vaccines, so adopting the same model, we believe that we can bring the cost of logistics down through aggregation, and also the supply, because of the volume, will be higher than individual African countries importing by themselves.

So this exchange is up and running. Now the exchange primarily is meant to support the implementation of the AfCFTA, and so the idea is that African producers of fertilizer would be supplying African buyers. And our statistics show that there is adequate production of the key fertilizers and their derivatives on the African continent; however, the supply doesn’t always end up in Africa, and part of that reason is because the supply is being purchased by countries outside of the continent.

So when we spoke to some of the larger suppliers in Morocco, in Egypt, and other African countries, one of the things they said is yes, we have production, but we’re tied into contracts of a year to 18 months. So one of the things we need is for some of those contracts to be released so that that fertilizer can be redirected to Africa so that, for the next farming season, they can be, you know, adequate at production and increased production if we can’t get fertilizers from the Black Sea region where Africa is a big importer.

In addition to that, obviously our institution will finance a lot of that production and supply of fertilizer, and we already have—we initially had $4 billion, which has already been consumed, so we need other international DFIs to come to the table to provide the financing that is needed to make these supplies available to the African continent.

And I think the other points were made in my earlier intervention around what we might be able to do around sanctions immediately. But basically so any support to the Africa trade exchange is very welcome.

And finally, even though this exchange was set up primarily to facilitate the implementation of AfCFTA, during the crisis that we’re facing because of the Russia-driven war, we are also reaching out to international suppliers globally—Western countries included—to participate on the Africa Trade Exchange where there are supplies available for both greens and fertilizers which can then be supplied onto the African continent. Thank you.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you very much.

Actually, I’d like to come back to the ADB on this because, you know, it might be something that could be—if you could follow up on that discussion on trade exchange and what could be done multilaterally in this region. Thank you.

Qingfeng. Yeah.

QINGFENG ZHANG: Yes, thank you so much, Michael.

Again, I—after the Russian invasion of the Ukraine war, actually this in May, while the international financial institutions we generally formulate the action plan to try to address this food insecurity, one of the key action is mitigating fertilizer shortage… and also the variability issues. That is a key issue because the last three years fertilizer price triple already, so the price will be high.

So I—one of the immediate actions, while helping Sri Lanka, the country or the crops in terms of the financial stability, so while we did these, we said… together we are quickly provide the social protection measures and also the budget support to help them to produce the fertilizer as quickly as possible. Of course, we also provide to those SMEs to help them to procure the fertilizer.

I think a second measure is very, very critical to how to translate this challenge into the opportunity to say—because of, you know, we too much rely on the chemicals. Probably in the future translated you know, this policy change to the more subsidy to encourage the efficient utilization of fertilizer.

And the same time, our colleague from Indonesia was mentioning about the nature-based solutions.

Finally, I have to say we’re also talking about in the future probably not necessarily relying too much on the natural gas as a raw material of the fertilizer. We need to use probably hydrogen as a source of fertilizer as a way out.

So we have a number of the solutions. So again I want to emphasize the smooth supply of fertilizer probably is a defining factor for the length, also, the—of this food crisis. So it’s very critical for the G20 have an agreement to ensure this smooth and the free trade of the fertilizer. That is very critical.

Let me just pause here. Thank you.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you. Just as a—General, go ahead—because I want to then go back to innovation and technology, but go ahead.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK (RET.): Well, I’d like to offer three specific suggestions starting on the technology side. Ten years ago the United States Agency for International Development was in Africa, in South Sudan, and Tanzania, and pushing two technologies. One was a cassava that did not have to be cooked to be eaten. Normal cassava was 20 years’ supply in the ground; this only lasts a couple of years, but now you don’t have to cook it. So it made it much more accessible.

Secondly, the introduction to Africa of yellow sweet potatoes as opposed to white sweet potatoes—now USAID was pushing this. What I don’t know and what I haven’t—maybe there are experts here who know this. Did it result in anything? Is there widespread, worldwide understanding that there’s cassava that doesn’t have to be cooked to be consumed, and that there should be no more white sweet potatoes in Africa? You need yellow sweet potatoes for Vitamin A.

So I don’t know whether these—I don’t know if we’re propagating agriculture advancements correctly, and this takes me to the idea of agricultural extension services. In Angola, the Israelis brought their agricultural extension service to bear on a project in an abandoned Portuguese valley, and brought in Israeli experts to talk about drip irrigation, to talk about how to price and develop for the markets, and it produced some exceptional results.

But that system is not in place in many African countries is what I’m afraid of. So I’m wondering whether one of the suggestions we can make to the G20 is that there should be a lot more emphasis on agricultural extension services. This is what has really produced America’s innovation in agriculture. It’s done by all the universities, land grant institutions do it.

Now the second thing, though, about it is some innovations are protected by intellectual property. There was a lawsuit a few years ago against a farmer in Indiana—you may have seen this—where he kept the grain from the previous harvest and replanted it. And then it turns out, no, he can’t do that because he has to buy fresh seed each year, and this was upheld by the US court system.

Obviously, there is some concern about if you take away intellectual property protections you undercut innovation. But do we have the balance right? What’s happened in the agricultural innovation market is firms have consolidated, and so Monsanto, for example, has a huge impact on corn and other grain innovation. Is there too much consolidation in this market at the expense of what’s good for the public?

And the third thing is the idea of strengthening the financial support for the World Food Programme so World Food Programme can provide reinsurance coverage for the kinds of grain deliveries to countries at risk or in cases of conflict zone so they can get in there and assure the owners of the vessels and the factors that they can be protected.

So those are three ideas. I just throw them out on the table. I’m not an expert in it, but I’ve worked in the system enough to know I think there’s something here and I would invite the group to tailor this or accept it, reject it, or refine it in some way specifically. OK.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, General.

Can I come back? Let me take two of these, at least, and maybe expand on them—the first on agricultural extension services.

I mean, I was going to ask Erez Fait because, you know, one of the things about nature-based solutions and technology related to that is the speed with which things can be conveyed to the farmers on the ground, and I see that as a problem because in many parts of the world it’s actually quite difficult to convince people to abandon their traditional practices.

So, please, could you—

EREZ FAIT: OK. First of all, you’re right. It’s like almost changing religious, almost, because farming, going from experience of their ancestors, and actually farming doesn’t change almost 10,000 years. Only technology improve. We have people, drip lines, but the practice is the same. So we apply the same amount of water and same amount of fertilizer.

We came—and, thank you, General, for mentioning some of the technologies, but we are coming from a different approach as a company of education the farmer because technology without education improving doesn’t work. People need to adapt.

So we started in Thailand. The minister of agriculture invited us to take one hectare of abandoned paddy that was meant to grow only rice and we managed to grow almost seven to 10 type of crops.

Next to me sitting Widja, that he is a local partner that actually managed a project that started by minister of defense three years ago. And the minister was practical, make decision, let’s do—let’s not talk and to move forward, and we established a five-hectare project where we grow more than 30 type of crops indoor/outdoor and we prove locally the new practice of growing rice only with 20 percent amount of water. No swamp, no methane, no weeds, and no germination replanting. And we did the same for corn and other crops.

And the beauty is that everything was run by a local team that was trained remotely because of the COVID, and we have the same in California, the same in New York, the same in Morocco now.

So when we speak about government, like, government provide health and provide education, and education/health doesn’t have ROI on the other side because it’s usually obvious that government need to provide health and education and security.

So I think—I’ve seen it also in Vietnam. I recently have meeting with Vietnam and they provide the farmers with the infrastructure because they understand that if they will build the greenhouses and provide the water and electricity, education, the farmers grow more and they pay tax, and by paying tax this become instead of vicious circle it’s become a positive circle.

And we can continue and I would like to give Widja, that he is coming from different field. He is coming from defense, from other background, and now we join together to change this ecosystem for good by doing it available.

And, again, it’s not more expensive. It’s less expensive because we are talking also with DFC and the US government to build locally the technology. If it’s a drip line, if it’s the facility, and then the logistic is much easier.

So government can finance the infrastructure to the farmers and then from the tax that they’ll pay you can deduct it.

Widja?

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Please go ahead.

WIDJAJANTO: OK. Thank you, Erez. Thank you, Michael.

I would like to resonate three things, Michael, if I may speak on behalf of this G20 discussion.

Let’s promote our G20 communiqué and global food security solution by having—one is about technical proficient. I learned a lot from Israeli company from my colleague here, Mr. Erez, from the project initiated by Mr. Prabowo, my minister of defense.

But the problem is this technology is only available in his country whereas our country doesn’t have diplomatic relations. So I have to go around third country, fourth country, fifth country. You know the result? Transshipment more costs.

So we need to find a solution…

Number two, for the TikTok generation and also about the farming practices that you mentioned, in our area, I’m the oldest. I am 52. The rest is young people. They do the farming with their phone. They do the farming—the control—with internet. So we make it sexy. We make it more hype for the TikTok generation. You’re right. So if you come to my farm, you will no longer see an old farmer, Michael, but young people, I promise you.

The third is financial inclusion. I would like to promote also because the problem is when I went tocentral Java, most of the farmer doesn’t have big land part. Small portion—0.5, 0.2. How do we incorporate this?

The nice guy here from ADP, they must have learned from some type of municipal here in Indonesia to promote also this kind of initiative, having strong support from a financial institution like ADP. G20, I believe, is a good opportunity by Michael to talk about this.

Last, but not least, about incentive, or I call it less import restriction. In my experience, to import agriculture technology stuffs the bank is crazy, let alone the fertilizer. So we need to tell the government: Don’t only impose tax for us. You can grab another revenue from the selling of the harvest, as Mr. Erez just mentioned, in other countries.

So this four angle I would like to propose to be discussed further tomorrow. I believe Erez has his session tomorrow. Be more than happy to do the testimony. Thank you, Michael.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Pak. That is very useful input.

Now, I mean, we have two—in a way, we have the technology side and my concern there is the speed with which technology can be used to alleviate the problem.

But then we have, as we just heard from—earlier about the question of financial support for WFP, and on the question—I mean, finance, it seems, is the short-term solution. and I’d like to ask Niels again to comment on this because you have a very practical experience.

And then, Gaurav, I’ll come back to you.

NIELS TROST: Yeah. Thank you, Adam.

I think it’s important to take the discussion back a little bit to what we can do immediately, and I think it’s great hearing possible solutions in the field of innovation, which is all great. But I think that will bring solutions in five years from now, 10 years from now.

But, today, we have people starving—literally starving—in Africa. And I think Kira made an interesting comment about Russia pulling out of the grain deal and one has to wonder why did Russia pull out of the grain deal.

My understanding was that they were unhappy with the fact that many of those shipments did not end up in the country—in the continent that needs it most, which is Africa. So then we have to ask the question why do these shipments not go to Africa and the reason is that the grain prices—it’s affordability again. The prices are too high for Africa to be able to pay it and Europe can pay those high prices.

And the second issue is that financial institutions are not willing to finance these shipments from Russia because of self-sanctioning reasons, and I think if we want to look at an immediate solution we have to take this discussion beyond geopolitics and really look at practical solutions.

Even though it may be difficult to accept morally, I think we may have to come to the conclusion that we have to cooperate with the largest food producer in the world—the largest food and energy producer in the world, which is Russia.

Now, that may be morally a very difficult decision to take. But I do think as world citizens we have that responsibility and look at how can we practically help, for example, the African continent.

And I think, for me, one of the practical solutions is to look at self-sanctioning. You know, why are we self-sanctioning and should we be self-sanctioning? Do we not have a moral obligation to help those in need?

So that’s one thing that I wanted to focus on. And I think if we can convince the financial institutions that are part and parcel of this industry, the fact of the matter is we cannot as shipping companies finance these cargoes ourselves. The financial requirement is simply too large. We need the banks to start opening letters of credit again. We need the banks to say yes, we do have a moral obligation to bring food and energy to the world.

And the same applies to the insurance companies. Same applies to the shipping companies.

One of the comments that was made is about the importance of fertilizers and the affordability of it. Affordability, of course, is price. The largest fertilizer producers are based in Belarussia and Russia, and we have been sanctioning some of those producers and also self-sanctioning.

So I think, again, we need to address that. We need to look at that. Do we really want to do that? If we want to bring the price down the fact is you have to increase exports. It’s as simple as that. And, again, these are difficult decisions to take morally. But we do have—again, I like to stress it—we do have a wider, a bigger responsibility to bring fertilizers to the world and bring energy prices down.

Again, fertilizer prices are closely linked to energy prices. So if we want—if we really want to bring prices down and make food and fertilizers more affordable, we have to look at increasing energy exports and reducing self-sanctioning.

So these are just the points that I wanted to emphasize.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Niels, and I know that a lot of people want to—some people want to put more proposals on the table, which is great.

Sharon, I think you wanted to speak. We need a microphone over here as well.

Sorry. Sorry. Just while we’re getting ready, you know, Niels, that’s a very good point. To your point about the moral, you know, and Russia being the largest producer, surely that’s a question of leverage as well. There needs to be a tradeoff here where supply, but it comes with leverage and in terms of, you know, making sure—holding to the agreement and who has that leverage.

But we’ll come back to that.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: I think the question is there is—we just—we need to find a solution on how to work with two breadbaskets, given the interconnectivity of food and energy.

But there’s another issue which I would like to circle, which is we’re talking about agriculture, and in most countries in Asia and Africa agriculture is done by women, and women and children are the ones who bear most of the flak for this—with the conflict in Ukraine with what’s going on now.

And maybe, you know, Sharon wanted to say a few things about—on that.

SHARON SRIVASTAVA: Thank you.

You know, just in sitting here and listening to everything, I see it as, like, there’s a current situation, which was the reason why we wanted to hold this in the first place because we saw how fragile the energy and food connection is because of these breadbaskets being held up in the world.

So I think a good way to look at it is that’s the current immediate situation that we need to think about how to deal with.

and then there’s the future solutions and situations, which include the new technologies—you know, the TikTok agriculture—and that comes down to the agency of human spirit, I believe, which is what someone here mentioned.

How do we think about empowering individuals in their own countries to grow their own food and how do we enrich the soil for those endeavors? Someone mentioned roots—fungus growing on roots and other solutions to being less dependent on exports and imports for their nations.

I think that the other point to your point is, as Nicole mentioned, there’s a disproportionate effect that food insecurity has on women and young people, and we’ve, certainly, seen that in our travels in Asia and Africa where women are really at the forefront of trying to feed their families.

So one thing we can think about are what are the laws that are in place that either support them to building, you know, food security for their communities or that disadvantage them.

Can they own their own land? You know, what are the inheritance laws around farming? Can they get business loans? I think someone brought up, you know, the loans—Ex-Im Bank. How do we think about empowering those women who are really at the forefront, in many ways, of feeding their communities?

And, of course, education, you know, because even if we do have the new technologies and we invest in those new technologies, how do we educate these women? And a lot of them are female farmers. Like, that is the reality, and how are we thinking about that? I think it’s a really important thing to think about in our discussions.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Sharon, for bringing it down to that very human and vital level. Thank you.

Fred, you had a proposal.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So I think of these things more from a geopolitical standpoint. So I’d make two proposals for the G20 or maybe—in general, maybe this is even for the United Nations.

But it seems to me that we should—and this goes back to what General Clark said in the first session, which has been tweeted out and is getting some traction—your quote, General Clark, “A nation cannot invade another nation and jeopardize the food security for the entire world. It’s simply impermissible.”

So why not weaponize—why not make it an international crime to weaponize food security and hunger?

Now, calling things an international crime has done nothing to stop Putin so far. But, on the other hand, for it to be there to make clear that this is beyond the pale of what the international community can accept, I think, would be useful.

The other thing is countries, because of the fear of rising prices and food insecurity, applied export bans, which made the food insecurity worse—India on wheat, others on palm oil, others on fertilizer products.

So I think the G20 could agree that they would, as a group of 20 countries—leading countries of the world—agree not to engage in agricultural export bans.

And so I think these two geopolitical factors, because let’s not kid ourselves, the reason we are where we are right now, which is the World Food Programme called it the worst food crisis in modern history. The last one was 2008-2012. We’ve got 300 million people on the edge of disaster, 800 million people in food insecurity that weren’t there before the war in Ukraine.

And so I think it’s really—at a time like this, never let a crisis go to waste. This is the time for the G20 to put some signals in the ground of a geopolitical nature.

And then I really liked Hashim’s nature-based solutions, which didn’t get on anybody’s list. And so I think nature-based fertilizer solutions—I mean, this is a little bit beyond the geopolitical issues but I would put that on there as well.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Fred.

Yes? At the back there. Thank you.

Q: Yeah. Thank you. Yeah. I just want to add on the point of empowering women on the farmer because I think that is very, very important, especially in Africa. If you look at how farming are done in the traditional way, the issue or the challenge that people are facing there is huge in term of capacity, also access to finance. Access to finance is a big issue because in many cases finance are not there and bank are not there to support to those farmers, especially the small farmers.

And also, in term of capability, they do not have much capability to really improve the productivity of their land. You know, they have limited—and most of them are doing it manually. So the technology, the capability are not there, and also support are not there.

So one of the things that, when we look at what we can do quickly to really see the impact of those people, I think, is about empowering them in term of technology, in term of access to finance. That’s very, very, very important.

In this respect also, I think, when it come to policymaker, the policymaker has a big role in term of how a country is willing to support the agriculture—how the country is willing, really, to eradicate the food insecurity. And those are the things that, you know in term of quick win that we can implement and do it. Thank you very much.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you.

Q: Yes. I’m from East Africa and I just wanted to add on the point that Niels brought on the table talking about the impact on Africa.

So, obviously, Africa is a continent of 1.2 billion people, and the impact on food security has been huge. Just going back to the point that Niels made, the geopolitical nature is that you have a double whammy where not only does Africa not have the supply side of the food—you know, the wheat, the rice, everything—and you know, because of the sanction—the self-sanctioning that was talked about, Africa is not able to access not just food, but fertilizers as well. I can tell you that I am personally involved right now in trying to get fertilizer into Kenya. In Kenya, they have the short rains that come in December and right now they weren’t able to access the fertilizers because—one, because of the sanctions on getting fertilizers from Russia; and, two, the credit lines. You know, the financial institutions aren’t willing to provide the credit lines to bring these fertilizers and the food into Africa.

And the third aspect of that, obviously, is you then have a drought. You’ve got the environmental aspect of it, which, obviously, nobody’s talking about here because we’re talking food security and we’re talking about energy. But you know, you’ve got a huge drought, you know. The wheat that went into Djibouti and Ethiopia, there’s thousands and thousands of people starving, you know, who don’t have access to food. Now, when you talk about the fertilizer problem, not only don’t you have that food coming into Africa, but now the farmers who were going to actually grow food—talking about the short rains that I talked about that are coming in December—we won’t have that fertilizer in December. So, again the food—you’ve got the food that should have been grown locally not being available for people to eat, creating even more hunger.

So I think this is a very, very important forum to bring these particular issues to and see if, you know, some of the talent that we have in this room are able to bring this to the G20 and specifically talk about this problem in Africa. Thank you very much.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you. Before I—I mean, before I sort of begin to sort of summarize some of these proposals, I think we had one more over here and then I’ll turn to Matthew. Then I’ll summarize, and then you can close.

Q: Great. Yes. I’ll be quick.

Just picking up on some of the comments that have been made about financing and financial inclusion. And a contextual/should have proposal—policy proposal point is—it didn’t come up this morning—is, predominantly in the aftermath or exacerbated by the pandemic is the issue of debt. We are seeing increased debt at the sovereign level, at the country level, as well as at the corporate level and even at the SME level. The IMF has warned of nonperforming loans and a debt crisis, really, at all levels. So when we think about the financing solutions and the financing challenge and the access to credit and opening up those credit lines and even financial inclusion and microfinance supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises and smallholder farmers, I think we need to keep that context and what that means as far as thinking about innovative financial solutions that are also operating and can address that debt issue and that reluctance, whether that’s debt swaps, whether that’s thinking about blended finance, and even getting into some of those microfinance. So just wanted to make sure that we’re linking in the debt agenda, which is on the G20, and when we’re bringing the food security and climate finance into it as well that we are linking to that overall kind of sovereign and macro debt crisis, because that will be on the agenda of the G20 as well. And we can tap into that, into those solutions.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you. That’s useful.

Matthew.

MATTHEW KROENIG: Two possible solutions, one short term and one longer term.

We heard from several of our colleagues in the private sector that one of the challenges here is that banks are unwilling to provide financing because they’re afraid of falling afoul of Russia sanctions. And so I think one solution is education. You know, there’s always humanitarian carveouts in US and international sanctions. But educating the private sector about that, that they can facilitate flows of food without falling afoul of sanctions, that’s something that think tanks or universities, others around this room can contribute to.

Longer term, in the last section I said that part of the problem, I think, is we’ve become too dependent on too few suppliers providing too few food sources. It seems like a lot of what we did talk in the second session was about diversifying sources of food supply: providing financing, providing technology to, you know, increase domestic production—African fertilizers, for example—introduce new food types like yellow sweet potatoes. And so—and it’s not a concrete solution, but in terms of a strategic framework it seems like diversifying sources of supply so you’re not so dependent on any single source is an important part of the solution.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Matthew.

Hashim, quickly, and then—yeah. Please go ahead, Hashim—Pak Hashim.

HASHIM DJOJOHADIKUSUMO: Yeah. I think—I think one of the things that we haven’t really found a solution or perhaps a proposal for a solution, on the payments problem. We’re talking about nature-based solutions. Thank you very much, Fred. I mean, that’s medium to long term, right? But as Niels and Gwen and our friend from Kenya, East Africa, you’re facing an immediate problem. December you need fertilizers, right? And the problem is there’s a lot of money which wants to go and send to Russia, but banks don’t want to facilitate the transfer of payments. That’s a problem. And so I think what we can do is maybe—this is a short-term solution—perhaps there is somebody from the Inter-American Development Bank, maybe from the African Development Bank. Can those multilateral institutions, can they guarantee the LCs without fear of retribution from AFAC, right, from the Treasury Department? I can tell you for a fact that Indonesian banks are deathly afraid of phone calls from the US embassy, you know? I mean, they’ve told me they’ve had phone calls from the US embassy representing AFAC from the Treasury Department making sure that Indonesian banks don’t open LCs to Russia, OK?

So this is something that I think has to be—maybe we can address it in a few days’ time at G20. Maybe the multilaterals can open the LCs. Maybe the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development can open the LCs. Maybe the European Investment Bank can open the LCs? So I think maybe that’s the short-term solution, a neutral multilateral institution and not too phased by nefarious activities by the Russians. At least it’s for humanitarian we open and they open the LCs to Russia, just purely on humanitarian grounds. Nothing—you know, I mean, not as a bias for the Russians or otherwise. That’s a short-term solution, maybe. I don’t know. But maybe our friends from the multilateral institutions can tell us.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you.

Gaurav.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: I think, you know, Hashim, you made a very important point here. And the crisis here is immediate and it needs to be addressed.

But while we are having this conversation, it is also important to remember that we’re not condoning anything here, but it is more to create accountability and let the trade flow. Let accountability happen under a proper program where systems can be put in place so that self-sanctioning doesn’t happen, so that the governments can work together. And that’s really what this is about, and it’s about creating a program of accountability between all the stakeholders. It is Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and other—and other members of the G20 that can work together to find a solution that makes everyone accountable for better solutions. I think that’s the goal.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you.

General, I know you wanted to quickly jump in, and then I have to summarize.

GEN. CLARK: What Gaurav and Hashim and Niels are pointing out is absolutely essential. We don’t want to self-sanction in such a way that we’re depriving the world of food because of Russia’s military action. However—however—while we argue against self-sanctioning, if we’re going to call for that I think we have to stand forward and say Russia should pull out now. I mean, if we don’t say it on the—in the basis—in the name of food security, who’s going to say it? This is not really about US-Russia.

I’m sorry. I’m a former general. I know you probably think, ah, here he is trying to get mad at Russia and stuff. I’m not. I’m just observing a very obvious point. The immediate cause of this crisis, as we’ve all said, is a Russia—Russian unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. It is impermissible. And I would just like to humbly make the suggestion the first finding of the conference should be: Russia, stop the invasion. Pull out. Let Ukrainian farmers plant their crops, de-mine, et cetera, and then we can also resolve the sanction…

So I think, you know, before we go after self-sanctioning, we have to state the obvious. This is on Russia.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you.

So I know we’ve sort of run out of time, but I did promise that what I would so is try to summarize and capture, rather, some of the suggestions that were put on the table at this session today that we might want to take forward in the—in the stakeholder discussion tomorrow in more detail. And as I saw them—heard them—I think it comes down to five or six suggestions.

First, financing of emergency food reserves. And I think, you know, I’m going to try and put emphasis here on the immediate needs. So that’s the idea that there should be a mechanism for financing emergency food reserves. And that sort of falls, I think, on many of the governments in the G20 and the multilateral organizations. The UN will be there.

The second would be a G20 forum for food security dialogue, which doesn’t obviously address the immediate problems but begins to create a mechanism for anticipating. These kinds of problems are going to be with us for some time and need special attention.

The third, which I thought was very nicely put by Gwen from the EXIM Bank, which is the idea of a trade exchange to aggregate the needs so that the costs can be brought down. And I think this is an idea that perhaps should be extended to many other parts of the world, as well, particularly in this part of the world.

And fourthly, agricultural extension services. This gets into the realm of something a bit longer term, but obviously vital. And under that would come the whole raft of innovations and nature-based solutions. I mean, as someone who has been recently working in East Africa on some of this—climate change related issues, one of the problems is actually persuading communities that are rather isolated of—and it really is about extension—of the need to, for instance, grow crops in a different way to address and mitigate the impact of climate change. So it’s very, very important; it’s just not immediate. But it has to be done.

And then we come onto the very important issue of finance. We heard one suggestion, financial support for WFP and grain delivery. But I think I do hear in the room a lot of voices calling for a better way to mobilize in this very complex and sensitive geopolitical context some way of finding the financing for obtaining the vital inputs to agriculture. And I very much—and I’ll just sort of capture it in one sort of phrase—I like the idea of this humanitarian mobilization of payment facilitation. And it makes sense to me as someone who’s worked in the humanitarian field that we do all sorts of things to bend—no, to adapt to difficult circumstances in the humanitarian field. Well, why not do payments as well? You know, and it’s something to think about.

And at that point—at this point, I will hand over to Matthew. And I hope this has been a useful discussion. Thank you very much.

MATTHEW KROENIG: Great. Well, thank you very much, Michael. I’d just like to say a few words to adjourn the session today and conclude the first of two days of the Atlantic Council’s Global Food Security Forum.

I was introduced earlier. I’m Matthew Kroenig. I’m the acting director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. We lead the Atlantic Council’s work on food security because we do see it as a real security challenge.

And it’s been a pleasure joining you today for this rich set of discussions on global food security challenges and opportunities. I learned a lot. I found it useful. I hope you did as well. We talked about some of the challenges—climate, COVID, conflict; some of the solutions—global governance, financing, technology. Michael did a brilliant job of summarizing those for us just a moment ago.

But this is just the first step. As you know, we’re going to come back tomorrow for a large public conference. We invite you all back here at 8:15 a.m. Bali time 7:15 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, for the second day. And we’re going to continue to build on some of the solutions we’ve identified today.

So we have a terrific lineup for tomorrow. Experts and officials to appear include Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, Ambassador Cindy McCain, Desi Anwar from CNN International, and many more. So we hope to see you back here tomorrow.

Let me again thank our forum co-hosts, the Ministry of Defense and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia, Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava. Thank you, Sharon and Gaurav, for making this possible.

And thanks to the moderators of our session, Michael and Adam, who did a terrific job.

And thanks to all of you who came to participate today. Thanks to all of you, the hundreds of you watching online.

And to those of you who are here in person, you don’t need to go home. We’re going to have a reception to immediate follow in the Cucina restaurant just downstairs. So if you’re interested in joining us, just find the staff with the black lanyards and we can lead you to the reception. We look forward to continuing the conversation over drinks and, again, to seeing you tomorrow.

So, again, thank you. Thank you very much and we’ll see you back here bright and early tomorrow morning.

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

FREDERICK KEMPE: It’s my pleasure today to kick off our first day of programming at the Atlantic Council’s first-ever Global Food Security Forum as an official sideline event of the G20 summit here in Bali.

So the Atlantic Council’s mission for sixty years has been to galvanize constructive US leadership alongside partners and allies to shape the future. The mission is old, but the relationship for us in Indonesia is new.

The Atlantic Council in many ways is a misnomer geographically because we’ve been the global Atlantic Council for some time, with programs and centers that span interests around the globe wherever we have partners and allies working to shape the future.

We’re known as a think tank. I’ve never liked the term. We’re more of an action tank. We like actors, practitioners, scholars like you who want to come here not just to hear speeches, but to come up with ideas, come up with recommendations, come up with solutions for a better world, and in this case particularly with food security.

And so I’m delighted, in that spirit, to convene such an accomplished group of local, regional, and international leaders across government, business, civil society, media for today’s series of roundtable discussions on global food security. For those that are joining us virtually—and this is an on-the-record session; we also have a virtual global audience—this will also be recast for people at sometimes better hour for their region. But we welcome you all, and you can follow along with the hashtag #AtlanticCouncilFoodSecurity. So the hashtag on Twitter, #AtlanticCouncilFoodSecurity. We’re still using Twitter. We’re not sure we’d invest in it.

But the—I’d like to first acknowledge and thank our forum co-hosts, including the Ministry of Defense and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia, for their partnership and hospitality in organizing this conference. So a huge thanks to Minister Prabowo Subianto and Minister Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, who will speak to us tomorrow in sessions tomorrow, in keynotes tomorrow.

I most of all want to thank, sitting to my left, my seat next to me and the seat next to him, Gaurav Srivastava of the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Foundation, our forum co-host and underwriting partner. So, Gaurav and Sharon, thank you for your friendship. Thank you for your vision. Thank you for your generosity. We quite literally would not be here without you, so thank you so much for that.

I also want to salute someone I’ve just respected for many years for his service to our country and for his intellectual leadership, General Wes Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, of NATO, and member—and the senior member attending this conference of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors. He is here as our board leader and was a driving force between this impressive conference—where are you, Wes? Here we go. General Clark.

I briefly—I’m very briefly going to preview what you expect over the next two days. Today we’ll engage in two roundtable discussions on the state of global food security and challenges involved. These sessions will allow us to delve into the topic deeply and in a little bit more of an expert manner, drilling a little deeper than perhaps we’ll do tomorrow, and lay the groundwork for tomorrow’s programming which will feature a diverse set of keynotes, fireside chats, and panel discussions expanding on the topics we address today. Not only will we have Minister Prabowo and Minister Luhut, we’ll also have the US Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, joining us virtually; a couple of members of Congress, so it’s going to be a very strong day.

And then lastly—and we hope you will all be here for the close tomorrow evening—we’re going to close the conference with an exclusive concert for those who are attending our conference with the celebrated singer/songwriter, John Legend, who has—they call him an EGOT-awarded singer/songwriter. That means he has won the Emmy, he has won the Grammy, he has won the Golden Globe, he has won the Oscar, he has won the Tony. It’s extraordinary that we’ll have him tomorrow playing beside songwriter/singer—Indonesian singer/songwriter Sandhy Sondoro. I think all of you from Indonesia know him well. And the US Air Force Band of the Pacific which you heard up behind us today. So it’s truly an extraordinary way to conclude these two days.

Global food security sits at the nexus of the world’s most pressing challenges as food security rises threatened by near-term shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic, Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine, and long-term risks of climate change and sustained conflict. Ending world hunger will require enhanced public-private cooperation and wide-ranging innovation in agriculture, technology, finance, and policy.

Putin’s weaponization of food security in the last year has underscored that food security has got to be discussed together with energy security, with military security, with all aspects of international and national security. One cannot deal with it separately.

Today’s workshop, roundtable serve as a venue for and driver of this cooperation. The goal of these discussions is to allow all of you an opportunity to delve into food security challenges and solutions in this more—in a smaller setting than tomorrow, laying the groundwork for our second day.

At the end of the conference, we will be distilling insights from our meetings and collecting them into a memo and concrete recommendations for leaders of the G20 summit and beyond. So as you make your comments, as you make your statements, as you raise your questions, keep in mind what in there might be a notion that we might want to put a pin in as an idea for action. Our challenge to each of you is to help us identify these concrete solutions and recommendations that we today can turn to policy action, so an action tank; not a think tank.

I want to remind everyone that this session is on the record and is being live-streamed for a public audience. If you wish to speak or provide comments, raise your hand and we will pass you a microphone. And now before we get started, I’d like to turn to Gaurav for a few remarks. And let me thank you once again for your vision and your support of this wonderful gathering.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you.

Thank you, Fred.

Excellencies, members, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon and warmest greetings. On behalf of our devoted planners, partners, facilitators, and my courageous wife and life partner, Sharon, we welcome you. We welcome you with open arms and optimistic hearts. I am emboldened to see so many familiar faces—friends, colleagues, and my extended global family and cherished community united in a singularly imperative mission to end the pain and suffering of all human beings, a mission that must succeed.

I would like to thank the Atlantic Council, Fred Kempe, and his unrivaled team. Thank you. Their perseverance, resolve, and commitment to making this momentous event a reality.

I would like to thank our other partners—the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia—for making this forum possible.

I would also like to thank my dear friend Pak Hashim for making this event possible. Thank you.

There are innumerable challenges facing our planet, our citizens, and our way of life –obstacles that threaten to breach and undermine our most basic core human values; to overshadow our proudest achievements; to completely replace peace, love, and benevolence with war, hate, and indefensible cruelty—an affront to everything as we as human beings are. Time and time again, it’s been said we cannot and we will not let this happen. And still, as we gather today, desperate men, women, and innocent children from all four corners of the globe are facing food insecurity—driven to the brink of starvation; suffering; robbed of dignity, respect, and hope.

But the question is: How can this be? How can this abomination, this seismic crisis of inhumanity continue to blight the existence of even one global citizen? We know the contributing factors far too well: the social and economic root causes; the vicious cycles of poverty, inequity, and bloody conflicts which only serve to divide and destroy. These unrivaled problems need expedited solutions. These complex questions demand pragmatic answers. And that’s why we have come from far and wide to shoulder the burden of blame together, to share the responsibility of rectifying our wrongs, to harness the conviction and tenacity of our most brilliant minds and leaders, and tirelessly work together to restore the sanctity of the human race to ensure peace and prosperity for everyone.

This forum, these workshops, are about discovery and discourse, about difficult conversations that must be had. The conflict in Ukraine, the ramifications of COVID-19, the catastrophic market shocks, and the critical interconnectivity of food and energy, that reminds us we must work together.

Ladies and gentlemen, the goal is clear, the stakes immeasurable, the mandate divine. Thank you and god speed.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Adam Schwarz. I’m a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy at the Atlantic Council and CEO of Asia Group Advisors, a public affairs firm focused on Southeast Asia. I’d like to add my welcome to that of Fred’s and Gaurav’s to everybody here to join us on this opening panel of the Global Food Security conference, and thank Fred and Gaurav for pulling us all together today on this very important topic.

I want to just spend a little time just kind of on a format for today. As you can see, we’ve got quite a large group today. We don’t have any prepared remarks or opening remarks planned on the schedule, so what I’d like to do is start with a few questions and then we’ll open it up to questions. Feel free to raise your hand. I’ll do my best to keep track of the sequence in which the hands were raised. Given that we do have such a large number of people in the room, I would ask if people could keep their remarks relatively brief—two or three minutes, if you can—and we’ll try to give as many people an opportunity to speak as we can.

In terms of sequence, as Fred was saying, what we’d like to do with this opening panel is to lay out a number of the challenges—and there are obviously quite a few—with food security at the moment, and then—and then move into a discussion of solutions and recommendations to be sort of added to the list that we hope to get to by the end of this two-day conference.

So let me—let me then, if I may, start with Pak Hashim, who has done so much to make this event happen. And, Pak Hashim, let me just sort of ask you your thoughts. You know, what sort of drove you to bring this event here? Why is it so important for us to have this event here on food security in Indonesia at this—at this stage?

HASHIM DJOJOHADIKUSUMO: Adam, thanks very much for addressing your remarks to me and addressing your question to me. I think the major reason for my involvement in this forum and the efforts to bring this about is because—it’s because of Indonesia’s increasing interdependence on global markets.

You know, I think many, many people are very surprised, especially Europeans and North Americans, as to the effect of the Ukraine crisis, the Ukraine war, on countries as far away as Indonesia. But one statistic it comes out very glaringly, is the fact that Indonesia imports, I think this year, 14 million tons of wheat—14 millions of tons of wheat. Indonesia produces very, very little wheat. I think it’s zero tonnage. And therefore, anything that happens in faraway places such as Ukraine has a direct impact on the livelihoods of Indonesians.

And I understand—and somebody asked me, why is the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia involved in this forum. It is because many of Indonesia’s 500,000 soldiers depend on what is—what we call Indomie, which is the instant noodles, for their food supply every day. So any negative impact on prices would have a direct impact on the soldiers of the Indonesian armed forces and the wider population.

So this is, you know, the primary reason why I got involved. And any impact on wheat prices has another impact on other commodities, other food—corn, sorghum, rice—and has, you know, a knock-on impact. So that’s primarily the reason why I got involved.

Thank you, Adam.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you very much, Pak Hashim.

And let me now turn—given that, obviously, the—what’s been happening in Ukraine is such an important part of this discussion we’re having today, I’d like to turn to Kira Rudik. If you would—maybe just ask you kind of the same question. In your view, just lay out for us in your—why you think this is—this is such a critical issue for us to deal with today.

KIRA RUDIK: Hello, everyone. I am Kira Rudik, member of Ukrainian parliament, leader of the liberal party, Golos. And it’s my pleasure to being here today.

It’s nine months since the full-scale invasion by Russia in my country started. And it may seem as literally another side of the Earth from here, but one of the things and one of the lessons that this world teaches us is how connected we are to each other, how dependent we are on each other, and how fragile are the connections that are between us.

Before the war started, my country was top five world’s largest exporters of wheat, grains, sunflower oil, tomatoes, and corn. Right now, my country—who’s one of the missions is to feed the world—has so much complications in doing so. The ability to provide to the whole world is essential and critical for us, and the war would definitely affect the food security not only in the countries that have the direct connections with Ukraine but all the countries in the whole world.

Since the beginning of full-scale invasion, the food prices, the grain prices have gone up 30 percent. And the issue is that it is not only this year that would be affected because you can imagine that it is very hard to plant—to plant wheat during the bombarding and to get the harvest during the bombarding. To have the territory of Ukraine, our huge lands, mined, and where we were supposed to provide for the life, there is death right now. And this is killing us. This is killing us as people of purpose, as people who are there to continue being the breadbasket of the whole world.

There is a grain deal, an ability to export the grains from Ukraine using the ports. It is incredibly important because one of the worst thing that could be for a farmer—and you can imagine that—is to see grains rotting in the siloes. So that’s a fantastic one, but it is such a fragile agreement. Every single moment the ship is going in and out, it’s so many people having fingers crossed or praying because you never know if it’s going to reach its destination. So what kind of food security is there if it’s absolutely not secure?

So, for any discussion about security and about the ability for my country to continue to provide for the whole world, we should start with the question of peace. We should start with the question of victory. We should start with the question of predictability. We should start of the question of security because food security comes as add-on to the general security.

And the impact of what is going on right now we will see moving further down the road because even during the war Ukrainian farmers were able to get onto 80 percent of the suggested harvest, but we do not know what will happen next year and the year after. We will do our best because this is one of the missions of my country. But would we be able to do so? That depends on the support of the international community that we are asking for. Help us help you. Help us to provide to you. Help us complete our mission: feed the whole world.

Thank you and glory to Ukraine.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So I just wanted—I just wanted to say, first of all, thank you for your heroism and thank you for the heroism of the Ukrainians.

We also, at the Atlantic Council, want Russia to find its way into a Europe whole and free over time. That is our goal. We did invite Russians to attend today and we regret that they aren’t here.

But in any case, Kira, that’s a wonderful statement, and thank you for putting this into context. Russia and Ukraine together provide a third of the world’s wheat. And so Pak Hashim talked about wheat. That’s where it comes from, so much of it.

So let me pass back to Adam to continue the moderation, and I think we have a special guest.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Fred, thank you very much.

I would like to acknowledge Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, who has just joined us. Welcome, sir. And if I may ask you to say a few words to the group, obviously, defense is—and the security implications of the food crisis. Would you prefer to talk tomorrow? Yes, sir. Very good. We’ll –

PRABOWO SUBIANTO: Yeah, I just want to listen.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Very good. We’ll continue on, then.

So what I thought we might turn to next, after talking about the specific country level that we just talked about, was talk a little bit kind of the regional differences on how the food security challenge is impacting different parts of the world. And I’d like to ask two people to sort of address that. The first is Qingfeng Zhang from the Asian Development Bank and the second would be General Wesley Clark. So, Mr. Zhang, could I ask you to begin, please? Well, I’m going to start with Qingfeng.

QINGFENG ZHANG: Yes. Thank you so much, Adam. First, we are honored by you guys invite Asian Development Bank to attend this very important forum.

In terms of the regional difference of food security, three things I want to highlight. Even before the Russia invasion of the Ukraine, this region already suffering from the political conflict, including, like, Afghanistan, Myanmar. The very, very deep food insecurity already taking place.

And also, this region, of course, before the Russia invasion of Ukraine, climate change also have the big impact in this region. You just look the floods, droughts… affect the food insecurity. And you look at what happened in Pakistan this year, the floods, and also droughts and the heat wave in India, and of course, you know, the droughts in the Yangtze River was a significant affect the food security.

And again, just like our Indonesia counterpart just mentioned about it, the Russia invasion of Ukraine basically escalate, you know, the food insecurity risk many of our countries. And these 13 countries heavily rely on import of the wheat, fertilizer from Russia and also the Ukraine.

So when we come to the what we need to do, I think it’s no single blueprint. But three things are very, very important. Number one, you know, is demand-side management. Two is supply side. Third is the logistics.

So I want to just quickly share, you know, in September ADB just announced 14 billion US dollars food security plan to address those three issues. Of course, the first one, short term we’re going to provide the social protection, social safety net, address and support the vulnerable people. As a second, of course, is for long term from the supply side to support the… agriculture, digitalization of value chain, and then the natural-based solutions. Thirdly, one thing we need to learn from the 2008 food crisis; that’s, you know, we need to keep the trade flowing and open. But unfortunately, this year you can see even in this region about the treaty countries is they are introduce trade restrictions. So I think through this group of discussions we need to continue promote the open trade and regional cooperation, particularly for fertilizer.

Probably let me just stop here, I think, today. Tomorrow, we will have the chance to continue the discussions. Thank you, Adam.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you very much, Qingfeng.

General Clark, your sense of how the food security challenge is impacting different parts of the world?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK (RET.): Well, thank you, Adam.

First of all, I think the problem between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the consequent shutdown of exports from Ukraine through the Black Sea has brought global attention to the food security issue. But it’s overdue attention. This is not a problem of one event. This is a problem that has been building for several decades now.

To the immediate issue, of course, those shipping routes need to be opened in the Black Sea and they need to stay open. The farmers in Ukraine need to be able to plant, to fertilize, to harvest, and market. At the same time, Russia also must export grain and fertilizer and get the world agricultural system back in check.

But as Pak Hashim noted earlier, this is a deeper problem because, really, populations have grown, consumer preferences are evolving. And as the Global South increases in development, it wants to eat the same food as the Global North, and yet these lands don’t support the same crops. So Pak Hashim, you were mentioning the 40 million tons of wheat being imported. Yes, and this is representative of the problem all across the Global South. We’ve enjoyed the chocolates and coffee that come from tropical countries, but they could be producing millet and other grains. They could be subsisting and living on cassava, which can be grown there rather than importing wheat. But the global economy has knitted us together in such a way, through these global supply chains, population growth, and changing consumer preferences, that we’ve built a system that is so interconnected, it’s so efficient in terms of just-in-time delivery that any shock causes perturbations; perturbations like rising prices, and of course that hits the lower income the most—the most difficult.

It hits countries in North Africa and East Africa the hardest because they need the grain imports the most right now, but it really is a global issue. It’s hitting people in South America. It’s hitting the American consumer. It is exacerbated by energy because when the price of natural gas rises, then the price of fertilizer rises. When the price of oil rises, then the costs of shipping go up. So everything is connected here.

Thomas Malthus, over 200 years ago, predicted population would explode geometrically, but food production could not keep up. And every few decades, someone reinvents Malthusian economics and says it’s over.

So when I was a young man growing up, the world population was two billion. People said it can’t possibly support five billion. I was at the Milken Conference ten years ago when we crested seven billion—seven billion—and now we’re at eight billion. And yet what’s happened is technology has enabled us to provide food and even better nutrition, but we’ve done so with the metrics of international finance. And now even international finance is an issue for us because, for over a decade, since the financial shocks of 2008-9, we’ve had very, very low credit costs. So it was easy to borrow money, create your letters of credit, finance international trade.

Well, now the cost of money is going up. It is being driven by the United States’ own Federal Reserve System. Now maybe we’re going to see it capped at a 4 percent, 4-1/2 percent fed rate. We don’t know yet. But we do know that the financial implications of this are worldwide in terms of what it does to rates of exchange for currency, and what it does for the cost of imported food in countries around the world.

So it’s a very, very complicated, interrelated system, and where it ties in to me, especially, in my lifetime, is with the issue of instability and conflict. So we can look at what happened in Syria in 2010. We know that was related to land reform. It was related to an increasing inability of people to buy the food they needed for subsistence as they became urbanized. It was also related, of course, to another factor that we’re driving, and that’s climate change.

So between Syria, the Sahel in Africa, Somalia, and East Africa, changing rainfall patterns, everything is in the mix. So what we hope—what I hope we’ll be able to do, Adam, in this workshop is the various experts here will jump in, give us their particular points of view, and then we’ll use this to make sure that in the upcoming session tomorrow and for the G20 we don’t let political leaders skate over the problem. These are problems; they have to be addressed realistically—not in campaign pledges, but with real programs, real technology, and real financing.

Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Let me, if I may, now turn to Ibu Nani Hendiarti from the Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment. Ibu Nani, for your—if you will share some thoughts with us from the variety of portfolios that you cover, how is this looming food security issue impacting those portfolios? Thank you.

NANI HENDIARTI: Thank you, General Wesley. Very good afternoon excellencies, ladies and gentlemans. I think I would to thanks for this very good even where we see the issue on the food securities is very important, beside water and energy.

So in our national program priority, we said that this food security is at a low priority, so—and then we have several programs to support these priority—national priorities. So we understand. I think we really see that agriculture specifically is impacted by two issues. One of this in context of the climate change, where they have also different impact to the both sides… And then also the—in terms of the adaptation of the climate change, but also in terms of the mitigations where we understand the methane is also part of this agriculture sector that we need to give specific attentions.

So I think in the context of this we would like to highlight also that this issue will also connect with the rising of the global population and also incomes, as well as the urbanizations, are also driving strong and… grow in the food.

So beside also that link with the food, I think water is also other essential element of our existence. For example, in Java, islands in Indonesia, it’s the most populated island with about almost 150 million of people. So the rapid urbanization in Java boosts water demand for the household and also the industry. That is creating also competition with irrigations in important water-scarce agriculture region.

So I would like—then we would like to also rising this issue so the… connection between the three is important, especially food and water, I think. Yeah. Thank you very much. Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you, Ibu Nani.

So let me move now to—not as if the food security challenge is not a significant enough one as it is, but given that we are hosting this conference while COP27 is ongoing, I did want to open the floor and ask a few questions about the intersections of food insecurity and the problems—the logistics problems that we are having globally with the parallel and climate change challenge.

And I’d like to begin with Willie Smits, the chief science officer at Arsari Group. Willie, thank you. Can we get a mic in the middle there? Thank you.

WILLIE SMITS: Thank you, Adam. Long time that you came to see the orangutans in East Kalimantan… Yeah, I’m more on the solution-based side of the equation, looking at how we can overcome the problems. So maybe I’d like to go into depth that there is actually hope. We are looking at indeed the interconnections between climate and food security. We see shifting climate zones. We see forests dying off in Siberia, in Canada, and as a result we have very big emissions of CO2, and we have land-use changes. So all of those are also going to impact what crops can be produced where, what diseases, what pests will be impacting the agricultural productivity. So on a worldwide scale, these interconnections are more than obvious with the shifting climate zones that we are facing.

But there are also local solutions that need to be sought in the tropics. Here in the tropics we have the most stable climatological conditions so we can create agroforests, and agroforests, they can provide all the services that the people need. They can provide the food security, they can provide materials, they can provide energy, they regulate the local climate, they absorb vast amounts of CO2. We can produce biochar from all the waste materials that can be absorbed into soil in quantities that are much, much higher than what we face at the moment in the atmosphere. So we can actually reduce the risk of fires, we can create more jobs, and that way we can reduce the impact upon the remaining forests. We can increase biodiversity.

But those systems are not turnkey because they are complicated. People need to know how, people need to integrate various technologies and plans. But if you understand about nature and you see how nature has regenerated soil, then it is possible to do so. There’s things like the fungi on the roots of the trees that produce a substance called glomalin and that can fix the soil, prevent erosion, store again carbon.

So really, those are the ways to go. We should go away from this monoculture attitude which is actually gambling and is much more susceptible to pests and diseases and as they are influenced by climate change worldwide.

So I think more attention for the mixed systems and the real solutions. Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Very good. Thank you very much.

Let me—and that’s a good beginning segue into the solution part of our conversation, but before we get there, I didn’t want to table one or two other issues or challenges, and perhaps we could now turn to sort of the politics and geopolitics.

We have with us today Peter Engelke—I hope I’m pronouncing that correctly—and Nicole Goldin, who have been looking at this issue from the Atlantic Council from both a political and an economic perspective.

I’d like to ask each of you to sort of share your thoughts from those different perspectives—how you see these emerging and probably increasing implications from the food security challenge that we are facing.

Peter, can we start with you?

PETER ENGELKE: Sure, great. Thank you so much. And thank you, everyone, for joining with the Atlantic Council here today and tomorrow. We’re delighted that this event is upon us.

So I run our Foresight practice at the Atlantic Council which means that we take the idea of sort of longer time scales. We take that seriously, and so to answer the question about sort of where are we headed when we look at food and its relationship to geopolitics, I mean, it might be appropriate to look at where we’ve been historically.

And where we’ve been, frankly, is that in the long sweep of human history is that if you look at city-states, nations, empires, et cetera, that food and geopolitics have been incredibly intertwined over the longer sweep of our history through cities, states, nations, empires trying to secure supplies of food—stable supplies of food through domestic production, through trade and diplomacy, but also through—and this is the critical point, I think—through conquest and through warfare, and that food has been both a source and a consequence of conflict and warfare for much of our species’ history. States have sought to deny their rivals access to food as well as the territory upon which the food is produced.

And as a result of that, of course, individuals have suffered greatly. We’ve already heard about that this morning. Hunger and famine have been, of course, the twin results of that conflict over time.

If you flash to the world that we live in now, you flash forward, we have been living in a really pretty benign relationship, if you’re talking about geopolitics on the one hand and food on the other, since really the end of the Second World War. Until not that long ago, we could make a claim that the modern global food system has been a real improvement over the history that I just described. I mean, we have had, as we’ve heard this morning, an open global trading system plus a very tech- and energy-intensive system. That has meant that we’ve been able to dramatically increase the amount of food that we can produce globally. This is per General Clark’s point earlier about how we can get from feeding 2 billion people to now 8 billion people in the world, and therefore defeat Malthus in the process.

This system, of course, is not perfect. Never has been. There’s all kinds of problems with it, as we’ve also heard this morning. But nonetheless, that linkage between food and geopolitics is—has been a little bit more sedate in the post-Second World War period.

Then we come to this year, right? We come to 2022 and we see, of course, the impact of the war in Ukraine, which, as we’ve already heard this morning, that conflict can, in fact, have real global repercussions on the question of food and the relationship, therefore, between food and sort of power in the world. It also reinforces, as we’ve also heard this morning, that the global food system that we’ve built, upon which we’ve relied—also a point that General Clark made earlier about the efficiency of that system—that efficiency of that system is highly vulnerable to disruption. There are only a relatively small number of breadbaskets in the world. And if you choke off one or more of those through drought, through flooding, through warfare, you can actually have real and unfortunate impacts on the world, in addition to the high dependence that we have on energy and the energy system.

And if you add to all of this what I call ecology’s long shadow—which is not just climate change; it’s biodiversity and the problems that come with both of those things—we’re entering into a world that I would characterize as more geopolitical risk surrounding food rather than less. And that I don’t think has characterized the world that we’ve inhabited for a very long time. So if we look ahead, we’re looking at sources of risk between the relationship between food on the one hand, geopolitics on the other that arise from climate shocks, right, that the severe drought and flooding, heat waves, et cetera that we’ve seen in the world over the last few years, that are—it’s becoming more common. It’s going to continue to be more common in the future.

The impacts, of course, are going to be negative on food production. And as a result, therefore, you’re going to get impacts on fragility—state fragility around the world, and therefore you’re going to get the spillover consequences from that. You’re going to get more conflict in localized areas. You’re going to get forced outmigration in more.

And then, of course, you’ve got a series of geopolitical shocks that arise from—arise from all of this, including the increased risk of hoarding and protectionism even by major states in the system. And of course, the specter, frankly, of conflicts over food between states, which has—we’ve been largely spared from in the—in the post-Second World War period.

And then the last source of risk I would—I would point out would be really the risk that the global governance system is not going to keep up with the demand for solutions, right? We know, looking at the interstate system, that it’s not easy to arrive at global solutions through world—through global agreements. And as a result, there is a real possibility that, despite the scale of this challenge, that, like, for example, thus far with climate change, we may run the risk of not being able to solve—to address this problem through multilateral solutions.

And then, on top of all of this, I think it’s also important to point out that we’re trying to decarbonize the energy system at the very same time, that very same energy system that we’re—that feeds, quite literally, the global food system.

And I know that I—I don’t want to go too much longer, but I want to say that the future is not lost, despite what I just said. There is quite a bit of room for optimism. We’ve heard that from a number of speakers. And that’s why we’re all here, because we believe in that.

The first is, of course, there is enormous space for innovation. We’ve been innovating our way out of the Malthus trap for two centuries, and that’s going to continue. We have speakers here at this conference who are going to be speaking directly to the ways in which we can innovate, not just through technology but through approaches to how we harvest food and grow food.

The second, of course, is that there is, in fact, always cooperation for global governance, including at forums like the G20, right—that human beings possess agency and states possess agency, and that we need to remember that. It may be hard. It may be difficult. It may be really difficult to tackle so-called wicked problems. But it can be done.

And then, finally, we can, in fact, diversify the production challenges that we just heard about to make the global food system more resilient by geography—in other words, create more breadbaskets around the world; by commodity, to reduce our dependence on just a few small numbers of seed varieties in the world; and then by type of production, in other words to go to these kinds of solutions involving agro-forestry, more creative sort of aquaculture, and the like.

And with that, I’ll stop. Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Nicole? And if I could ask you to keep it a little bit brief because I want to move us into our solution part of our conversation. Thank you.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Absolutely. Thank you. I’ll just make a couple of additional points and add on to all that Peter and some other folks have said already on what I would say are the geopolitical economy dynamics at play.

And just picking up a little bit on some of the things we’ve heard about population hitting 8 billion and some of the demographic issues and how those play into the geopolitical economy, is that in addition to thinking about these at the kind of country and the broad macro level, it’s also really about people, right, at the community and even in the household level. And so when we think about those geopolitical economy dynamics, I think we also want to make sure that we’re getting into the solutions conversation, that we’re recognizing that not all people and not all places are affected equally.

So we talked a little bit about some of the regional distinctions, but we would, I think, be remiss if we didn’t acknowledge and bring into the conversation the fact that women and young people are particularly often disproportionately impacted by the food crisis, women and children in particular. And so how we think about that in terms of household dynamics, I think, is really critical.

We talked a little bit about region. I was pleased to hear the coordinator bring up urbanization because, again, those urban food-insecurity issues are often not as prominent in the conversation or in the solutions conversation. So we really need to think about those rural-urban linkages and those dynamics, particularly as they come back to play in terms of that conflict and stabilization, right, and getting back to those young people who are more than half the world’s population and how they are impacted by these at the individual level and how those kind of aggregate up into community and national issues.

So I’ll stop there. I know we’re short on time. But thank you and look forward to continuing.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you, Nicole.

So I’d like us now to sort of begin to slide into the—what I’ve been thinking of as or describing as the solution part of the conversation. Obviously, it’s an equally complex and broad conversation as is the challenges.

I’d like to ask David Merrill, the president of the US-Indonesia Society. David, you ran, actually, a large food security conference in Washington I believe last month. Maybe we could ask you to kind of set a framework here for what are the different parts of the solution set that the world is looking at to sort of begin to meet this challenge. Thank you.

DAVID MERRILL: Well, first of all, I’m going to agree with General Wesley Clark. It’s always a good idea anyway, and he happens to be right.

It’s excellent to discuss the troubled state of global food security, but the task is: What is the world going to do about it? We have come a long way. In the spring of this year, the G20 wasn’t even sure that it wanted to deal with global food security. It said this is a political issue; this is not an economic issue. And it took about four or five weeks for the G20 to come around to say this is an economic development issue no matter how much it’s related to war.

At this moment maybe someone knows—I don’t know—whether there will be a G20 food security communique. First of all, it has to be no objection by any member of the G20, so that alone means we don’t know for sure unless someone knows. But there are things that can be in it.

First of all, the international organizations have to agree to do what they can—the multilateral development banks, the World Food Programme, the FAO, the WTO, and others. I think progress is being made on that. I think it was made on that this summer during the multilateral meetings held here in Bali.

On fertilizers, I don’t know whether there will be specific recommendations on fertilizers. There should be, on increasing fertilizer supply, on the kind of fertilizer, on how they should be used efficiently, and so on. There are many people in this room who are experts on that. Whether their ideas will be translated into G20 recommendations…

Domestic supply response needs to be cultivated.

And there should be, I think and others do, some kind of mechanism created out of the G20 itself for some kind of forum for discussion of global food security, possibly chaired by Indonesia. This does not have to be an organization that will dictate to others, but it has to be, in my view, an organization that can continue to examine and bring about solutions coming out of this G20 meeting.

So I think that we need to build a bridge. There are those of us here who probably know how to do that, if it’s not too late, to the G20 food security communique. Here we are in Bali. The meeting is taking place tomorrow or this week. And there’s a lot of talent in this room. The principle that NGO suggestions should be looked at by official bodies is well-accepted. So I encourage us to do everything we can to produce some recommendations for food security for the G20. Thanks.

ADAM SCHWARZ: David, thank you very much.

Since you mentioned fertilizer as a key issue, which it most certainly is, I’d like to ask Michael Vatikiotis, to my right here, who’s a senior advisor for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and has been involved in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, on the issue of fertilizer to maybe bring to the group a few of the ideas and initiatives that you’ve been working on. Thank you.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Adam. Thank you, Adam.

First of all, just to echo Dave Merrill’s very, very important points there, that the G20 is an extremely good opportunity to actually bring forward ideas for supportive mechanisms on some of these key issues.

I think, first of all, just to—because there’s a lot of concern about the fallout from the uncertainty around the Black Sea Grain Initiative. I mean, let’s first of all just say what it is. I mean, the main assumption was that if sufficient grain, you know, and agricultural products were able to move into the world markets from, as we’ve heard earlier, a part of the world where most of it comes from or a good part of it comes from, then global wheat prices—not so much just supply, but global wheat prices—would come down. This, in turn—this, in fact, turned out to be true. In the—in the weeks ahead of the actual agreement on July 22 and then actually following the agreement, the price rises that we’d seen after the invasion of Ukraine, in fact, stabilized. And these gains were erased by July. So that was the good news.

Now, the difficulties were markets. Markets are always jittery. And with the current agreement, even as Russia has come back into the agreement, the expectation of the market was that grain supply would be resumed fully or at least efficiently, but that’s not been the case. And of course, now there’s the expectation or the worry that the agreement could be interrupted again or its—or its rollover and renewal affected by the situation on the ground. So prices are still the issue. There’s been a lot of discussion about the fact that the grain supplies themselves have not necessarily been going to less-developed countries. It’s all about the price.

And that brings me on to fertilizers, because, of course, the global price of fertilizers and the supply of fertilizers has been severely impacted. Seventy percent of Europe’s fertilizer production is now at a standstill, and that supply needs to be resumed. And that means ammonium nitrate from Russia through to Ukraine, also potash from Belarus.

But I will just make a larger point, if I may, Adam, about, you know, the—speaking to what we just heard from Dave about the need for support mechanisms for these kinds of solutions. I also feel—and I hope that in the following session, after 2:45, which—after 3:00, which I’ll be moderating, we can begin to put some ideas down for consideration by the G20. It seems to me that many of these solutions are contingent and have not yet been well-linked or coordinated.

So the Black Sea Grain Initiative is great. But as we’ve heard in the room today, there are all these other issues that are affecting world food prices as well. A question I would ask is: Is the WTO, UNCTAD, the FAO, and the WFP, are they all arranged in line to address the problems in a coordinated way? And that, I think, speaks to Dave’s very good suggestion that perhaps there should be a mechanism for global food security.

Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Michael, thank you very much.

So there’s a lot of interesting commercial innovation around the table that has been focused on addressing this challenge, and I’d like to begin to turn our conversation into that direction. I’d like to begin with Gaurav Srivastava. Your foundation has been looking at this—these issues quite intensively. Can I ask you to kind of begin with your thoughts on that subject?

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Yes. Thank you very much.

It is—you know, it was a very important point you brought about price. And especially we are here in Indonesia, where it is a price-sensitive market. The important thing to remember, as we have heard, is food security and energy security is national security. And I think the tremendous work from the minister of defense making Indonesia an independent nation and also on the security has been tremendous.

We’re talking about two of the breadbaskets of the world, Russia and Ukraine, right? And at the foundation, we have been looking at the correlation between energy and food, right? And it’s important to remember while we are working on these renewable energy solutions, which are critical and which I think will address the needs in the future, there is a transition period. That is just the reality of it. And we have to regulate the energy that fuels the ships, that the fuels the tractors, that fuels the cars, that—or that will basically reduce or make the price more manageable.

The other issue, which is an important issue—and I would like to turn to Pak Hashim after this—is the difference how does the commercial industry work and how do policymakers work. And there is sometimes a disconnect between that. And given Pak Hashim’s background in the commodities sector, I would like you to shed some light on that. And after that, maybe, Niels, you can say a few words, if that’s OK. Is that OK?

ADAM SCHWARZ: Yes. Sure.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Pak Hashim?

HASHIM DJOJOHADIKUSUMO: Right. Gaurav, thanks very much.

Yes, I just want to say just a few words, actually, you know, just in support of what Michael Vatikiotis said and David Merrill, that we are discussing food security but actually maybe the next time we should have it combined with energy. Because, as you both said and Gaurav also said, they’re intertwined, you know? Food and energy is intertwined, right? Higher energy prices impact food prices and impact the fertilizer and so forth.

So I think—I think that’s basically what I want to say. I mean, it’s—I think some of the folks here on my left mentioned the impact on North Africa, on East Africa, and we talked about climate change. One small little aspect that I just want to add to what all of you folks have said. I think there’s a demographic challenge in the future. We’re talking about the near-term challenges, but there is a medium- and long-term challenge, and that’s the demographic—I would call a demographic challenge.

It’s that, Indonesia, agriculture is not a particularly popular profession for young people. And if you notice in this island of Bali, most of the farmers are over 50—50 years old, 60 years old, even, you know, approaching my age, 68. And if you notice, most of the young people in Bali and I would say also in Java, they prefer to have—work in factories, work in hospitality and restaurants, and not particularly enticed by agriculture. So I think it’s a long-term problem that we have, and I think it’s not only Indonesia. I think it’s other parts of the—you know, the developing world.

There’s one statistic that some of you may know or may not know. It’s that, actually, Indonesia today is a majority-urban society. Fifty-six percent of Indonesians live in what are called urban areas—56 percent. Only 44 percent of Indonesians live in rural areas. And even then, young people are going to the cities because they’re more excited by city life and so forth. So there is a movement in Indonesia to what they call the digital agriculture. It’s to make agriculture more appealing to the TikTok generation, you know, to the people—and you know, a lot of Indonesians are much more familiar and much more comfortable with the digital economy, the TikTok generation. And there is a movement in Indonesia to try to get agriculture to be more appealing. But it’s going to be—it’s a challenge. And I think, as we go from 8 billion to 9 billion to 10 billion, it’s going to be a bigger challenge. So how do we keep the rural population in the rural areas, right, producing the food?

OK. So that’s—sorry, it’s a long—a long answer.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you.

Niels, do you want to say something?

NIELS TROST: Yeah. Thank you, Pak Hashim. Thank you, Gaurav.

I think we heard a lot about how we need to solve the food crisis and address the food insecurity in future, and whether that is through technology or, like Pak Hashim said, getting the TikTok generation interested in the agricultural sector. I think we also need to look at solutions that we can implement today.

You know, I happen to be in the fortunate position—or unfortunate, maybe, today. My company’s active in both energy and agricultural commodities. And we see—and we spoke about this a lot now—we see a clear correlation between energy prices and food prices. It’s been said by several people. We also see a clear correlation between increasing food prices, a shortage of food, and how that leads to uprisings and destabilization of our economies and our democracies. So we do have a responsibility to address that.

Now, food security, in my view, at the end of the day means food supply. We need to do something about increasing the supply and keeping the supply that we have today flowing to the market. And that brings us to the question of: How can we get the actors in the industry to all work together? We have practical problems today that we need to address.

The other day, General Clark and myself, we looked at supplying rice to an East African country. Everything is lined up, the transportation and everything, but we face an issue. That particular African country cannot open letters of credit. There is no financing available. And I think that’s an issue that we really need to address.

You know, my company exports corn from Ukraine and wheat from Russia, but we face a practical problem. We’d like to bring this wheat to Sudan, to Yemen, to Uganda. Some of our friends from Uganda and Zimbabwe and DRC are here. We face a very practical solution. The ship owners do not want to load grain and wheat from Russia. The banks do not want to finance it. So it means that we have to finance it ourselves, and that brings us to a certain limitation. We can only do so much with our own funding.

And that’s the problem we face today. It’s great to talk about future solutions, but today we have a solution already. And that means we need to get the industry actors to recognize that we all need to work together, that we need to make some difficult decisions. You know, Treasury, the US government, has been very clear: the oil and the food needs to flow to the market. There are no sanctions on food and energy exports from Russia. But yet, the industry is self-sanctioning, and that has contributed to the shortage that we—that we see today. I think that’s an issue that we really need to address.

And I hope that in the next two or three days we can all come to an understanding that we need to make the difficult decision—even though maybe politically we don’t like it—but from a practical aspect we need to say we need the food and the energy to continue to flow. How do we do that? By getting the ship owners, the banks, the insurance companies to recognize that we have a bigger responsibility than—how can I say—our morals, our moral ethics.

We have—maybe we—the biggest victim in all of this is, for example, Africa. We haven’t spoken a lot about Africa. Every barrel of oil that now goes to Europe because Europe can pay these higher prices, every grain—cargo of grain that goes to Europe because Europe can afford to pay these higher prices does not go to Africa. That is an issue that we need to address, and we can only address that if we get the industry to accept that we need to finance these cargoes, we need to insure these cargoes. The ship owners need to be willing to go to the Black Sea ports.

That’s one thing that I’d like to throw into the group for us to think about.

Another aspect that I think we need to recognize is that food and energy, as has been said many times now, are related. We need to address the high energy prices. Again, prices are dictated by supply and demand, so we need to do something about increasing the supply. The quickest way to bring prices down is to increase supply. It’s very simple.

How do we do that? By finding a mechanism to facilitate increasing oil exports. The G-7 community has come up with the idea of maybe facilitating supply by introducing a price cap, and I think it’s—it will be an interesting discussion to see if there are maybe better alternatives to a price cap. There’s all kinds of reasons why price caps may not necessarily be the solution. And I think it’ll be—it’ll be good to see over the next couple of days if there are people in this room that can come up with better alternatives to a price cap.

I think I’d like to leave it at this for now.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Niels, thank you very, very much for that.

Well, I want to just reiterate what I said at the very top, is that while we’re sort of going around the room kind of picking people, I do want—if anybody does have a question, please do—or wants to make a comment—please do feel free to raise your hand and I’d be happy to recognize you.

Oh, General Clark.

GEN. CLARK: At the risk of coming in again, I want to thank Niels for his very practical comments because what we have to, I hope, come out of this session with are the specific ideas that we’re going to ask the G20 to take account of and hold nations accountable for.

What the crisis in Ukraine—what Russia’s invasion has shown is that the world has changed today. A nation cannot invade another nation and jeopardize the food security for the entire world. It’s simply impermissible and we need to say that very clearly.

But we also have to go to the captains of finance and industry and say it’s no longer business as usual. It’s not simply about your fiduciary responsibilities to your investors. As Niels was saying, there’s a higher—this is what government should be about. Government should be about regulating, helping, foreseeing issues, and setting the conditions in which the private sector can work to maximize its profits within those constraints. And those constraints need to be modernized because we’re in a total global system here on food security. We’re just seeing the first indication of it.

So geopolitically, just to follow on something Peter was saying, in the United States—and I’m sure in Asia—people are very concerned about the future of Taiwan. Now, what could happen with Taiwan, shipping the South China Sea, where a third of the world’s commerce goes through? Imagine what the impact of that will be on global food security.

So I think, you know, it’s a wakeup call now between—in this war in Ukraine. It’s a wakeup call for the international community to really look at the consequences of globalization, of how it’s affected each of us. And it’s no longer sufficient, in my view, to say, well, it’s up to the private sector. We’ll let the Rothschilds decide, you know, how much credit they’re going to give to the Prussians on whether they’re going to get to invade France again. No. We’re past the eighteenth and nineteenth century. This is the whole point of global governance. We’ve got to move toward a greater appreciation of responsibilities.

Now, I hope—and, Niels, building on what you—we’ll get other people here who are the experts to come up with their specific suggestions so we can take this forward and have something the G20 can really sink its teeth into on food security. Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: General Clark, thank you for those remarks.

I did promise to get back to some of the kind of agricultural innovations that are—that are happening and some of the—some of the very exciting ones to deal or be a contributor to meeting the challenge of food security. Bakur Kvezereli and Erez Fait are both sort of in this space. And, Erez, maybe I could ask you to start.

BAKUR KVEZERELI: OK. I will start. I’m Bakur Kvezereli, founder of Ztractor. It’s a Silicon Valley startup.

I would say, like, we need to invest more in startups. One way to approach the technology, because startups have an advantage over the corporations to implement innovation and innovate, as we don’t have a switch in cost. We don’t have existing business model. We don’t need to adopt our business model. We are starting these companies from scratch and we have an advantage over the corporations to introduce smarter solutions, let’s say.

Another thing I would like to mention is that, you know, we are building autonomous electric tractors for agriculture. We want to build 25,000 tractors a year coming—starting from 2025 and build—on top of the tractors, build a network which will connect these tractors where we will be able to collect real-time data. And the real-time data, we see the benefits of real-time data in industries like aviation. Aviation is much safer, much more predictable with the real-time data collection. We see that real-time data in the postal and mailing services, which is convenience and efficiency and transparency. And we see the real-time data in weather forecasting, right? We believe that the future of—I mean, we can fix many problems in agriculture field by introducing real-time data collection from the field, which is from tractors, from weather stations in the field, and so on. In this way, we can—it can serve as early alert system. We can predict the future of yield. We can predict the crisis. We can predict the outbreak of the different pests and insects and so on.

I think focusing on startups can be one angle of not completely solving this problem, but addressing the problems we are facing today. Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you, Bakur.

Erez, over to you, please.

EREZ FAIT: Good afternoon. So far, we heard about the problems. I would like to talk about solutions.

So we started about six years ago with developing autonomous system that irrigate the fertigate the crops based on the crops’ needs. You can think like a baby incubator. And because we believe that food security means self-independent production in every country, because we found out that the logistics become an issue—COVID, war, et cetera.

And we have a later-on session, but I would like to mention that the only way that we think to overcome the issue of education and the issue of knowledge is by technology. And I can say that the minister of defense left, but he was in action about three years ago and we establish a farm in Indonesia before the COVID. It was implemented during the COVID, remote control. It’s still active and it’s produced more than 30 type of crops, indoor/outdoor, with great results. In parallel, we work in California, where there is drought, and we manage to grow things with no fertilizer and less water, et cetera.

So we think that the way of solving the issue of agriculture is produce locally all the things that agriculture needs. And this will shorten the cycle of logistics because cost of logistics and distributing the knowledge to the remote area, like Mr. Hashim said, is the main issue. And we are working here, together with the farmers, together with the universities, how to adopt this technology and bring back the youth to the circle of the production of the food. And the idea, especially in countries around the Equator like Indonesia, is to grow food all year round independent of the rain and other climate issues. This is something that later on we can share to see how we can help solving these kind of challenges.

Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Erez, thank you very much for that.

We’ve got about 10 or 15 minutes left, and I want to just sort of encourage anybody who has a—has a comment to raise your hand. Before I could say it, ma’am, over to you, please. Can we have a mic in the middle of the left-hand row, please?

Q: Thank you very much and good afternoon. My name’s Gwen Mwaba from the African Export and Import Bank.

And I’d really just like to first start by commending Niels for those comments that you made, which were top of mind for me. We are, indeed, facing serious issues with payments to Russia, where grains and fertilizer are coming from. And even though the sanctions clarify that they’re exclusions, the self-sanctioning is a real problem. So, for example, an African development finance institution such as the Afreximbank, if we try to make payments to Russia through our Western correspondent banks, they freeze those payments. So I’m wondering whether there’s need to emphasize or clarify these sanctions, or for those sanctioning countries to issue notices which we can share with our Western correspondent banks so that they don’t exclude payments that are related to food and fertilizers. That’s one point.

And then the second point is, again, the capacity of financing to African counterparties has been curtailed or canceled altogether, as is usually the case when there’s a crisis. And I think somebody had mentioned that it’s not business as usual. So it’s important that Western financial institutions in times of crisis like this don’t pull back things like confirmation lines, because the price of energy and of fertilizer and grains has gone up, trebled and quadrupled, so that means there’s more financing capacity in a—in a trade flow where there’s already an existing trade financing gap of billions of dollars. So we need that support from the West.

And then my final point was really even as we solve the problems—the immediate problems to get grains to these vulnerable countries, what do we do about the medium to long term? I think we also need to encourage investment into Africa for more production of food, but in order to produce more food you need fertilizer. So perhaps investors should also look at partnering to set up fertilizer production plants on the African continent so that there’s more or less self—dependence on other nations, and I think in the longer term there will be more food security for the continent. Thank you.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you very much. I’m sure that’s a topic that will be picked up in the following session. Thank you. Thank you for raising it.

Matt Kroenig, you—I think you raised your hand. Matt from the Atlantic Council.

MATTHEW KROENIG: Great. Well, thank you very much, Adam, and this has been a fascinating conversation. I’m learning a lot.

I wanted to offer a framework for thinking about this challenge because as I’m listening it’s occurring to me that food security is not unique. A lot of these challenges we’re facing are the same challenges we’re facing with semiconductors, with energy, with PPE, with rare-earth elements. And it seems to me that the common theme is that after the end of the Cold War we built a global economy designed for efficiency, not for security. And that worked in a globalized, frictionless post-Cold War world, but now that geopolitics has returned we realize that doesn’t work. We need secure supply chains. And so, you know, when you look at, you know, energy, Europeans were too dependent on Russia, and in the post-Cold War world that worked. Now it doesn’t. We were dependent on China for PPE. That no longer makes sense. Dependent on China for semiconductors.

And it seems the same when you look at the global food supply. You know, 75 percent of human calories come from nine food sources. We have a few breadbaskets like Russia and Ukraine producing. The rest of the world is importing.

And so as we look towards solutions, it seems to me like some of the solutions here may be similar to the solutions in other areas. Diversifying supply chains. So instead of, you know, importing everything more local production—millet in India, urea fertilizer in Africa, the diversity in terms of more biodiversity.

So I’m not an expert in this area but I’m seeing patterns, and I think maybe some of the solutions we’re looking at in other areas of reshoring and allyshoring may make sense here as well.

Thanks.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you very much.

You know, as we sort of begin to—without stealing too much thunder from the session to come, begin to think through what is it that we want this conference to contribute to the findings of the G20, perhaps I could ask the ambassador of Ukraine to Indonesia if you had some thoughts as to what—from Ukraine’s perspective, what would you like the G20 to have to say on this food security issue, which will come up in a couple days?

Thank you.

VASYL HAMIANIN: Thank you very much.

Good afternoon, everybody. Actually, I was not preparing to speak in this panel. But since you asked, right, I’ll just make some very, very brief remarks on what I think on that.

First of all, I would believe that the—if the you talk about the crisis—right, food crisis, whatever, logistic crisis—first of all, we have to identify the roots of the crisis to deal with it efficiently, and, otherwise, it will be like, you know, giving remedy to a person—instead of giving remedy to a person, like, contaminated with something just give painkillers, and the crisis will develop and the human body eventually dies.

So instead of giving painkillers we must give the proper remedy after identifying what is the key problem, and we know what is the key problem for all the crisis. To put it in other words, rather than repeating that it is the Russian aggression, I would say that this is the global crisis of trust and diplomacy.

We failed. United Nations failed, like League of Nations many years ago. So, now, after U.N. is paralyzed, it’s very important for the world to identify the group or, whatever, global leaders—global leaders—who can work out the instruments and mechanisms of how to deal with the problem efficiently and from the roots—starting from the roots, right.

So I see—I hope, right, it’s not—it’s something I can know. But it’s my hope that leaders of the world must act like leaders. They not only have the rights to decide the destiny for the world economy and society and the directions for development.

They also have duty to protect security, peace, development, prosperity of the world, and this is a heavy duty. And in this situation, the world leaders—what I mean, acting by leaders? They don’t have to just discuss and trying to see—you know, give the painkillers. Let’s talk about the food crisis and don’t talk about the war. No.

If you act like leaders, you have to identify the problem and take immediate measures to nip it in the bud. To clean the body of a virus this is essential.

That’s why—by the way, I was pleasantly surprised that this food security—Global Food Security Forum is on the auspices of Atlantic Council and the minister of defense, which is very meaningful.

If you want to resolve the crisis, like, you know, grain deliveries, as my colleague and friend, I would say, Ms. Kira, mentioned, we are facing demining of the lands, we are facing the rebuilding of infrastructure, and we are facing the physical problem of protection of the farmers and of the deliveries, right. And this is the point where we apply something real. We apply the convoys for protecting the vessels, we apply the demining, and we apply the air defense to protect the actual siloes and warehouses from the attacks, right.

So this is very meaningful, and this is the point where the practical instruments can be applied. I’m in the military. Unfortunately, living in the 21st century, the—having the small world where all the processes are happening, like, fast. Anything happens, someone sneezes in the Latin America, someone, you know, coughs immediately in Australia, right, it’s like—it’s seconds, right.

So whatever we do it will influence the world, not just the region or not just whatever country. That’s, basically, what I said. Act as leaders and try to be practical, not just theoretical.

Thank you very much.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Ambassador Hamianin, I thank you very much for those remarks, and sorry to put you on the spot there

Just I wanted to give the last word, again—actually the same question but to some of our Indonesian academic colleagues who are here with us today in terms of your view of what you’d like to see come out of this conference in terms of food security from an Indonesian perspective.

And, again, I’m putting people on the spot here, which I apologize, but I want to at least give the opportunity to Rachmat Pambudy at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture or Eni Harmayani at Gadjah Mada University, the faculty of ag technology.

Again, don’t feel obliged, but if either of you would like to comment we would be happy to hear from you.

Is there—they’re not taking that opportunity because they’re not here. So we’ll pass here.

Oh, yes, please?

ENI HARMAYANI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Eni Harmayani from Gadjah Mada University.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you.

ENI HARMAYANI: I think, for the past years, there has been significant progress in boosting agricultural production.

However, this has hardly reduced the number of hungry people and malnutrition. So I think eradication of hunger and malnutrition is an achievable goal if community at the local efforts are empowered. And, also, as you asked what is the output of this G20 in terms of food security, I think the international community must support the ability of each region to feed itself and to invest in local production so the problem of globalization can be minimized because the regional area can produce their food by itself.

So support by international community for the region to feed itself, I think, it’s very important, and combination of technology and also local wisdom is very important because human is the center of the development.

Thank you very much.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you very much.

I’m going to now give the last word to go Gaurav. Maybe start us off, and I’d like you to maybe give us a few concluding remarks from your end.

Thank you. Oh, please, sir, can we get a mic? I understand we do have a few more minutes. Thank you.

KASDI SUBAGYONO: Thank you very much. I’m Kasdi from the Ministry of Agriculture. Yeah.

So I would like, because one colleague has raised about the result of the Agriculture Working Group here in Bali for several months ago. So the G20 Agriculture Working Group just concluded and come up with twenty-two paragraphs of the communiqué, but, unfortunately, only one communiqué—one paragraph is not consensus by all the members regarding the geopolitical tension of Russia and Ukraine.

But, substantially, in fact, that we are going to come up with three priority issue.

First is how we can promote sustainable and resilient agri food system within the situation is not, you know, unpredictable here and in global situation. So agri food system, dynamic behavior, we have to—concern on that.

So, secondly, is about the—how we can promote an open, fair, transparent, nondiscriminative of the agriculture trade, and this is all member agreed that all the countries, especially who the center of the food production, is not allowed to restrict of export. This is very important because if you do that, so the country within the very insecurity in food there will be troubles. This all member agree with the export restriction should be avoided.

The third is how to promote innovation. Everybody talk about the technology promotion but we are focused on agri partnership, especially for millennial people, that’s just mentioned by Dr. Hashim that is right here in Indonesia. But we are now start how to train the millennial people in term of the technology because they are very friendly in the technology. This is why transformation of agri food system is very important.

So in terms of experience in Indonesia here, so we are now facing the global food crisis. So Indonesia start with a policy and program how to secure on that. First, how to increase the production capacity of your food. This is very important, especially for us here in Indonesia. We still imported 11 million tons of wheat from all over the world—11 million tons. So that with 9 million tons of food, 2 million tons for feed.

So it’s very, very, very—and one very—I’m very glad to see that one of our colleagues raised about the cassava. So we are now focused on cassava, on sagu, on sorghum. Should be substitute from the how big of food that wheat, for example, to import it. So we substituted to reduce of our import on the wheat.

So, secondly, is how to develop of substitutions of meat, for example, so not only of cattle but we also develop of poultry and so on. So that means that we have to try to find another alternative if you don’t have any source of food on this country. So that is very important.

The third priority is about, well, in terms of the conclusion of Agriculture Working Group in Bali that export restrictions should be avoided, so we try to have increasing production of any of commodity because we have very diversified commodity here—horticulture, food crop… and the livestock as well.

So we try to have—when we have more we have to export it. So this is the—so we have five strategies here in Indonesia. So especially one that I mentioned already—how to increase our capacity production, promote the local best food diversification. It’s not only rice because now we’re increasing our production of rice. We have surplus already. Ten point two million ton we have stored of rice right now. Right now. So we have tried to export it from that.

So, secondly, is how to promote—sorry, to strengthen food reserve and logistic system. This is very important. Certainly, modernization of agriculture, as everybody mentioned about the mechanization, machinery is very important because you can reduce losses.

Here in Indonesia losses is 11 percent to 12 percent of our harvest. If you do mechanization, we can reduce until 5 percent. So, I mean, you raise of 7 percent. Our production is 54 million tons of rice. So, I mean—so when compared to the rice that is… yeah, we have 32 million ton. Every year, we surplus about 2 million ton.

So this is why our focus is how to increase production capacity. Diversify product. It’s not only the rice but also the other source of food.

Thank you very much.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Kasdi, thank you very much. It’s a very useful way to end this session and move us on to the next one with that emphasis on food resilience. Thank you very much.

Gaurav, did you want to just close it off briefly?

Thank you.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you. Hello?

ADAM SCHWARZ: Got you. There you go.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you.

I think the underlying theme of the conversation so far is we’re all connected. Every—all these events—food security, energy security—is all connected to, ultimately, national security and the stability of human beings. And the ambassador from Ukraine, he—you know, he very well described the plight in Ukraine because of the conflict.

We can take it one step further and remember that while the—we see the physical impacts of what’s going on these are multi-generational impacts because once there is weapons on that land that land may not ever be able to plant again. They may not be able to grow any more crops again.

And it goes back to remembering that countries in Asia, countries in Africa, their challenges are immediate and we need to regulate those, and the risk is if it is not regulated the business that is—that is will go underground and that creates the—a larger issue, which is it puts money in the hands of bad state actors like, you know, Iran and Venezuela, and we definitely do not want that.

But I’m—but thank you so much for shedding the light on this conversation, and I think as we talk through this I hope we can find a solution. And it is important to remember that we are the custodians of blessings and be able to pass it on from one generation to the next.

So thank you very much.

ADAM SCHWARZ: Thank you, Gaurav.

Well, that brings us to the end of Panel I of the Global Food Security Conference.

Watch the full event

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On October 11, an article by Thomas Warrick appeared in Natural Gas World. The article discussed the hybrid warfare threat Russia poses to Norwegian natural gas exports to Europe.

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

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Anna Wieslander spoke at two sessions at the Warsaw Security Forum. First, the roundtable “European Security and the Baltic Sea: Self-Defence or Collective Defence?” where she addressed threat perceptions vis-à-vis Russia with Suzanne Raine, Cambridge Centre for Geopolitics; Robert Pszczel, NATO Public Diplomacy Division; Gen. (ret.) Mark Carleton-Smith, UK Chief of the General Staff; and Catherine Ashton, Woodrow Wilson Center and former EU HRVP.

Secondly, the high- level panel Late or Just in Time? A new NATO at Dawn of Global Competition,” where she spoke on how Sweden would contribute to the Alliance – both politically and militarily – and how will this contribution along with Finish membership would impact security in the Baltic Sea. Panelists included NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy Baiba Braže and Estonian Minister of Defence Hanno Pevkur.

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The United States has a massive intelligence ecosystem that gathers more information on more issues than any other country in the world. The true value of this vast amount of information lies in how it is curated, analyzed, and presented to policymakers. To aid in this vital process, the US government has a guide—the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)—to identify intelligence priorities and assist agencies and departments with where to focus their efforts. 

During the Cold War, the NIPF focused on political, economic, and proliferation issues related to the Soviet Union and its allies, from the performance of the Soviet economy to details about new fighter jets being developed by Moscow and deployed to other countries. In a post-September 11 world, the fight against terrorism took center stage, with an emphasis on determining where the next attack against the United States or its allies could come from as well as gleaning the goals of various organizations and locations of their leaders. 

The world is now in another new era, one in which information—and what is viewed as truth—is a central national-security concern. As such, the NIPF needs to include requirements that push analysts to discover how adversaries manipulate the information environment to meet their goals. It should task the Intelligence Community with assessing where, how, and to what extent states and organizations weaponize propaganda, mis- and disinformation, as well as political and social manipulation. While conversations on this issue date back to the mid-1990s, the day-to-day impact of such influence campaigns—combined with the technological capability to spread them quickly—means the United States must finally act.

Tweets, Facebook posts, and YouTube videos are not disparate pieces of content, but rather puzzle pieces that, when combined, reveal to intelligence analysts what their adversaries are working toward. From the actors actually carrying out these influence campaigns across the digital media space to the entities that oversee their strategic implementation, the entire system is akin to a completed piece—one which analysts and policymakers alike need to see in order to fully understand an adversary’s goals and objectives.

Understanding what adversaries plan to do in the short (one-year) and medium (three-year) term is vital to building domestic defenses. That’s why the following questions should serve as a starting point for developing new NIPF requirements: 

• What are the strategic goals of an adversary’s use of influence campaigns? 
• Who are the targets of influence campaigns, and why were they chosen? 
• What are the objectives of influence campaigns against the United States and its allies, and are there any specific timelines?
• Who is responsible for crafting each adversary’s influence strategy? 
• What fiscal allocation is provided to those programs? 
• What government and non-government ministries, offices, or groups are responsible for conducting influence operations? How and why are they selected?
• How are influence activities validated, measured, and evaluated? 
• What training is provided to tactical- and operational-level influence staff? 
• What tactics are used in influence campaigns? How are they selected based on target audiences? 

Though by no means comprehensive, these basic influence-related requirements in the NIPF can compel the Intelligence Community to allocate resources toward building out a more robust understanding of how adversaries approach influence campaigns and exactly who is calling the shots. Understanding how influence is being used against the United States and its allies could also help the government better position all its agencies—from the State and Commerce departments to members of the Intelligence Community—to build offensive influence campaigns that persuade key audiences of Washington’s own goals and objectives. 

Servicing NIPF priorities is no longer exclusively the domain of human-intelligence collectors at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense, the signals-intelligence collectors at the National Security Administration, and counterintelligence agents at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Open Source Enterprise and similar US government organizations can use their open-source intelligence (OSINT) resources—both human and technology-based—to support the effort. Because foreign-influence operations often play out in the public domain, they can usually be identified, traced, and evaluated to determine their effectiveness against the targeted audience. Experts can piece together the goals and objectives of a specific campaign through OSINT, saving scarce resources such as a CIA operations officer’s time for higher-level collection on those who are actually conceiving, managing, and implementing influence campaigns.

Currently, the US government does not have a lead organization to manage offensive or defensive influence activities. As the Department of Homeland Security recently found, how a government entity frames intelligence-gathering on adversarial actions against US and allied audiences is politically fraught. Americans are culturally sensitive to any suggestion that the government could manipulate their views on issues or their access to information—from traditional news to social media content. A recent effort to establish a government office that works to limit Americans’ exposure to mis- and disinformation was viewed across the political spectrum as untenable and inappropriate. 

But that does not mean the task is unnecessary or in violation of American civil liberties. Establishing a multi-agency task force of experts could be a viable first step: It would act as a manager tasking intelligence collection to better understand foreign influence operations; as a consumer of the newly gathered intelligence; and as an analyst producing formal reports for policymakers, as well as educational pieces for the US public to understand what it is seeing and hearing in the media, within social movements, and across politics. The goal would be to understand the “how” and “why” of foreign-influence campaigns and identify offensive campaigns in response that could advance US foreign-policy goals.

Difficult decisions need to be made around what is and is not included in the NIPF. Although there are only so many resources available to collect and analyze intelligence, prioritizing foreign-influence activities is vital. The information space is now at least as important—if not more so—than what happens on the physical battlefield.

Jennifer Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Unfortunately, that decree has been inadequately enforced, and Afghanistan’s drug trade is booming under Taliban rule. 

It will be hard, if not impossible, for the regime to stamp out an industry which provides so many poor Afghans with a livelihood, especially amid the extreme economic and humanitarian crisis which has overtaken the country since last August. Afghanistan’s drug economy expanded dramatically after the US- and NATO-led invasion in 2001. The amount of land under poppy cultivation almost tripled between 2002 and 2020, and the country also started to produce cheap methamphetamine using an abundant local plant—ephedra. 

So, how has Afghanistan’s drug trade evolved under the Taliban regime?

Skyrocketing poppy production

According to the United Nations, in 2020, Afghanistan accounted for about 85 percent of global opium production. Under the former Republic, the drug trade was Afghanistan’s largest economic sector, providing full-time employment to over half a million people. The most infamous component of this drug trade—poppy production—was so prosperous that experts doubted the Taliban’s ability to deliver on its promise to ban drugs without immiserating large numbers of Afghans and fomenting resistance against their regime.

To the last point, while the Afghan economy began spiralling shortly after the Taliban takeover due to sanctions, the freezing of central bank assets, and removal of foreign aid—thus depriving farmers of many alternatives to opium cultivation—the economic crisis also robbed the Taliban regime of resources to fight drugs, exacerbated by the withdrawal of foreign law enforcement agencies which had assisted the previous Republic’s efforts. 

True, the Taliban movement managed to prohibit narcotics in 2000 during their previous spell in power. But it took the regime several attempts to stop opium cultivation. And the ban, when it came, angered rural Afghans, and was already at risk of unravelling by the time of 9/11. In this context of economic collapse and quickly-evaporating state resources, it came as little surprise when reports emerged in late 2021 that the Taliban didn’t act against the poppy crop. Drought also made opium more appealing to farmers, as it can produce a yield even in dry conditions when the wheat crop might fail.

“Both imagery and reports from the ground indicate there was widespread cultivation, particularly in the southwest, with the potential for a sizable crop in 2022,” said David Mansfield, an independent consultant on illicit economies and an expert on the Afghan drugs trade, while speaking to me this month.

After the decree in April the Taliban tried to give off the impression that it was engaged in aggressive drug control, posting a photo in May of a tractor that was apparently destroying poppy in Helmand province. There were also reports of eradication in other parts of southwestern Afghanistan, suggesting this was more than a mere publicity stunt. But the poppy being targeted was the second opium crop of the season, which is much smaller than the first. Wiping it out thus makes little difference and throws into doubt the Taliban’s intentions to actually ban cultivation.

Methamphetamine: The new drug on the block

Though less discussed than the poppy trade, the methamphetamine industry has also intensified in Afghanistan. Recent satellite imagery revealed an expansion of the Abdul Wadood bazaar, southwest Afghanistan’s major meth hub, and more than 250 mounds (or an estimated 11,886 cubic meters) of ephedra.

Indeed, there was so much supply that, by early November, prices for ephedra had fallen drastically, from $1.80 per kilogram in 2018 to $0.63 per kilogram. But then, the Taliban imposed a little-noticed ban on the plant in December, and prices shot up. The decree was limited to a few provinces and came too late to affect the harvest, which had just ended. Most importantly, though, it actually benefited ephedrine and meth producers by boosting their profits, while increasing revenues to the Taliban who fined those transporting ephedra.

Yet again, the “bans” appeared to be more talk than walk.

Afghanistan is well connected to regional and global drug markets

Meanwhile, the trafficking of drugs via major highways out of Afghanistan remains high. Along the Balkan Route from Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey to Europe, heroin and meth continue to flow in large quantities, supplying markets throughout and outside Afghanistan’s immediate region.

South Asia
At Torkham on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, customs reportedly seized an “unprecedented” amount of drugs in late 2021 and early 2022, including a record 130 kilogram haul of heroin. October also saw one of the biggest meth busts in Peshawar’s history. A Pakistani law enforcement official told me in January that trafficking had increased since the Taliban took over, having said in November that a “huge quantity” of narcotics was “reaching the coastal belt of Balochistan and Karachi.”

Seizures in that area have indeed been sizable. In May alone, Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force made a massive bust of more than one ton of opiates and 255 kilograms of meth in the province of Balochistan, while the Pakistani Navy intercepted 4.5 tons of drugs in the northern Arabian Sea.

Furthermore, Pakistan is not only a transit country for methamphetamine leaving Afghanistan, but also a large market for the drug, which is popular in educational institutions. Pakistani drug treatment professionals told me that meth abuse was becoming rampant in the country. 

Afghanistan-origin drugs also make their way across South Asia. Sri Lanka, where there have been repeated maritime hauls since the Taliban takeover, seized 325 kilograms of heroin and meth in April this year. In July, Nepal recorded an unusually large heroin bust which authorities suspect came from Afghanistan, pointing to a further expansion of the trade.

India is perhaps the most concerning part of the regional trafficking picture. With a massive population and a large number of opioid users, the country is highly susceptible to Afghanistan-origin drugs. In January, the Director-General of India’s Narcotics Control Bureau S.N. Pradhan told me that the Taliban takeover could lead to a rise in drug-trafficking which already occurs along established smuggling routes via Punjab (sometimes using drones) or by sea to India’s west coast. 

Indeed, there have already been a series of drug seizures at Indian ports, most notably a vast haul of almost three tons of heroin at Mundra in Gujarat last September which allegedly originated in Kandahar, Afghanistan, before being trafficked to Iran and then on to India. In 2021, Gujarat police seized the highest amount of drugs in the history of the state, at least eight-hundred times more than the previous year. And the seizures have continued this year: in April, 260 kilograms of heroin were intercepted at Kandla port, and seventy-five kilograms from a container near Mundra in July.

Iran and Turkey
Narcotics trafficked from Afghanistan to Europe often travel through Pakistan and then Iran, where there have been massive busts in the southeast near the Afghan border. More than one hundred tons of drugs were seized in the area in the last eight months of 2021, according to local authorities. 

Big hauls have continued this year. Only recently, over one ton of opium was grabbed in the southeast and a record-breaking 1.1 tons of meth found hidden in tankers entering from Afghanistan. An Iranian official said that seizures of Afghanistan-origin meth and heroin had increased. From Iran, narcotics enter Turkey. Traffickers are reportedly exploiting unprecedented refugee flows to smuggle drugs across the border. Turkish authorities have also reported large seizures, including more than a ton of liquid and crystal meth intercepted in Istanbul in May and another large bust in July.

And, the results of this are profound. Meth has reached every single Turkish province, the government claims, and was second only to cannabis as the most widely-used substance in Istanbul, according to wastewater analysis. It is therefore no surprise that Ankara is prioritizing meth and increasing its efforts to combat trafficking. In 2021, Turkey intercepted 5.5 tons of the drug, up from 4.1 tons the previous year. Notably, this is double the amount seized in Europe as a whole.  

The broader Middle East and Central Asia
Afghanistan-origin meth has not only been flowing in large volumes to Iran, but also elsewhere in the region. There was an increase of “seizure events in the Near and Middle East” from 2020-2021, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Iraq has long been a destination for drugs smuggled from Iran, and in December reported a rise in drug-related arrests on its eastern border. Crystal meth accounted for 60 percent of the country’s drug trade in 2021, feeding a growing problem of domestic misuse.

Then there is the Gulf, where the United Arab Emirates announced in June that crystal meth was one of the most commonly seized drugs, with large hauls such as a mammoth bust of more than one ton in Dubai last April. Oman has also intercepted meth this year. 

Central Asia has not escaped the narcotics problem, either. According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, drugs are smuggled through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and both have reported increased seizures this year. Tajikistan recorded a 52 percent rise in drug seizures during the first half of 2022, with its anti-narcotics chief stating that trafficking had increased since the Taliban took power. In Kyrgyzstan, about six tons of illicit drugs were intercepted in the first six months of 2022, 60 percent more than in the same period last year.

Continued trafficking from Afghanistan has also been noted by Russia—a key destination for drugs smuggled through Central Asia—whose foreign ministry lamented in November that the “drug threat” was still a “pressing problem” and that “the situation has not changed after the Taliban came to power.”

Sub-Saharan Africa
Then there is the Southern Route through Pakistan and Iran to Africa. Recent years have seen heroin and meth from Afghanistan seized in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean as it is trafficked to Mozambique or Tanzania and then on to South Africa and other countries. Last November, alone, there were eight separate drug interdictions along this trafficking route by international maritime forces, which in 2021 seized a record amount of heroin and three times more meth than any year since 2016. 

At the start of this year, the Britain’s Royal Navy intercepted more than a ton of Afghanistan-origin heroin, hashish, and crystal meth in the Gulf of Oman, followed by another ninety kilograms of heroin in May. 

Farther afield, in South Africa, police seized seventy-five kilograms of heroin and meth in July and arrested a suspect allegedly connected to an Afghanistan-based drug gang, further evidence that Afghan drugs had penetrated African markets. 

The Taliban’s narcotics “ban” is smoke-and-mirrors

The record so far strongly suggests that the Taliban has not enforced its narcotics ban. Drug production and trafficking have remained at high levels or increased since the change of regime in Afghanistan. Furthermore, given that these problems are international in nature, a regional effort is needed to combat them. India, for one, has stepped up its anti-drug diplomacy with Iran, attending three days of meetings in Tehran this summer. But old rivalries undermine a comprehensive approach. India convened a meeting of national security chiefs to discuss drugs and other issues in Delhi last November, but Pakistan and China were absent.

While Afghanistan’s drug trade is indeed a global phenomenon, that should not distract us from the apparently rising levels of substance abuse in the country as desperate and impoverished Afghans try to lose themselves in narcotics. Many addicts are apparently left to die in public. And, on those occasions when the Taliban does try to do something, its approach has been brutal, rounding up drug users, shaving their heads, and beating them or dousing them in water. 

The new government does seem to have boosted revenue by rigorously enforcing border controls, according to a new report by David Mansfield. But imports are subject to more stringent checks than exports, Mansfield told me this month. And there is no evidence that the Taliban’s crackdown extends to drug-trafficking, nor sign of a shortage of drugs along the main trafficking routes out of Afghanistan. Far from it: large seizures point to high volumes of smuggled narcotics. 

The long-term consequences of these factors remains yet to be seen

The future, however, is uncertain. According to Mansfield, the price of meth, and to a lesser extent opiates, remains elevated, reflecting concerns about prohibition. He also told me this month that the Taliban—facing sanctions and looking to attract development assistance—could potentially move against ephedra (targeting meth production) without causing widespread unemployment.

But it would be much harder for them to rein in the opium industry without plunging hundreds of thousands of Afghans into deeper poverty. For that reason, a sweeping drugs ban would be very difficult to sustain. And, even if the Taliban did stamp out opiates, that could cause additional problems if countries tried to substitute heroin with opioids such as fentanyl, which happened in North America with devastating consequences. There are already signs of synthetic opioid use in Afghanistan, where pills known as “Tablet K” have been found that contain tramadol. In Pakistan, fentanyl seizures increased last year, too. India must also be considered particularly vulnerable to such a scenario, seeing as it has large numbers of opioid users and a massive, poorly-regulated chemical and pharmaceutical industry to supply them.

Whatever happens, South Asia’s drug problems are here to stay.

Rupert Stone is an independent journalist working on drugs, security and geopolitics in Asia.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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On July 11, Scowcroft Center nonresident senior fellow Patrick Quirk and International Republican Institute (IRI) president Daniel Twining published Fighting Back: How Democracies Can Check Authoritarian Aggression in the National Interest. In the piece, they assert that the democratic world must take action and execute a long-term and sustainable campaign against transnational authoritarianism that the Kremlin and CCP have been exporting in recent years. To do this, the United States and its democratic allies should support democratic activists abroad, counter authoritarian influence in multilateral institutions such as the IMF and UN, and strengthen formal and informal alliances and partnerships among democracies.

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On July 7, Forward Defense nonresident fellow Irina Plaks was mentioned in O’Dwyer’s, referencing her recent New Atlanticist article, where she discussed opportunities to counter Russian propaganda in the war in Ukraine.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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On June 29th, Director for Northern Europe Anna Wieslander spoke at the NATO Public Forum in Madrid on the panel “Ambiguous Threats, Determined Responses: Countering Hybrid Threats against NATO Allies.” Ms. Wieslander discussed Sweden’s total-defence strategy along with panelists Lieutenant General Hans-Werner Wiermann, Director General for NATO International Military Staff and Irene Fellin, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Women, Peace and Security at NATO. The session was moderated by Lili Bayer, Senior Reporter at POLITICO Europe.

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This section is part of the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s Stronger with Allies series, which charts the course forward for the Alliance in conjunction with the 2022 NATO Summit.

At the upcoming NATO Summit in Madrid, the Alliance’s attention will be on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked and illegal war is transforming how the Euro-Atlantic—not to mention global—community views its security environment. The war is having a profound effect on NATO’s strategy, which is due for a refresh at the summit with Alliance members set to agree on their new Strategic Concept—a critical document that will guide NATO’s political and military development for the foreseeable future

Yet even before the invasion, NATO faced a dramatically changing security landscape. The systemic challenge from China, the existential threat of climate change, the emergence of disruptive technologies, the use of cyberattacks as a core instrument of power, supply-chain problems, democratic backsliding among allies and partners, questions about adequate defense investment, and more all combine to present a complex and unsettling future for the Alliance.

NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept will need to grapple with all of these issues while finding commonality among the diverse perspectives and priorities of its thirty members (with two more likely on the way).

So we asked our experts: With so much happening in the global arena, what critical but underappreciated topics will be featured in the Strategic Concept—and how should NATO think about addressing them?

Natasha Lander Finch is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former advisor on countering weapons of mass destruction to the US Department of Defense.

As NATO reconceptualizes its role to focus on defense and deterrence while also addressing non-traditional challenges such as emerging technologies and climate change, the Alliance should look for opportunities to strengthen climate and technology cooperation with partners, especially with its closest partner states and like-minded international organizations.

NATO’s network of partners extends to forty states around the world, and it includes some of the most innovative economies and global leaders in addressing climate change. According to the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization Global Innovation Index, eight of the top twenty most innovative global economies are NATO partners. And according to the MIT Green Future Index, which evaluates countries’ ability to transition to a low-carbon future, six of the top twenty states are also NATO partners.

The Madrid Strategic Concept will redefine the Alliance’s core tasks. The focus will be on defense and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic, but cooperative security and relations with partners are still relevant given the myriad non-traditional challenges posed by climate, technology, and authoritarianism. Cooperative security is a means of strengthening the Alliance’s relationships with these global innovation and climate leaders, and leveraging their strengths and experiences to help shape and sustain the rules-based international order. 

Lisa Aronsson is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a research fellow at National Defense University.

Brett Swaney is an associate research fellow at National Defense University focused on NATO, Europe, and the Baltic Sea region. The views expressed are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has helped to sharpen the focus on the threat posed by the Kremlin, but it is not the only security challenge confronting NATO. To discern the diversity of allied threat perceptions and how the next Strategic Concept should address them, we studied the security strategies (produced before Russia’s war in Ukraine) from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United States, and the United Kingdom to see what the word count in each strategy might say about each country’s perceived greatest threats (e.g. words like China and cyber) as well its priorities (e.g. words like Europe/European and NATO).

The regional divergence was somewhat offset by similar perceptions of the primary challenges with cyber issues featuring across the board. Terrorism and societal resilience to terrorist attacks remains a prominent issue. The rise of authoritarianism and concerns about the strength of democratic societies are shared by many, but such concerns are not mentioned by Poland— not a surprise considering its own democratic backsliding. Nearly all the documents, especially the more recent ones, assert the challenge to the “liberal international order” and call for reinforcement and support for global norms and international law. Nuclear weapons proliferation is a worry for some but not all, and migration featured in the documents of countries that expressed more concern with instability in NATO’s near abroad.

Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and director of the international relations program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

Natalie Petit is a graduate student in international relations at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. 

Moscow’s war against Ukraine has altered the European security environment. As allies reorient NATO’s focus back toward collective defense in the Strategic Concept, it is time for the Alliance to get serious about defense spending and move the discussion beyond rhetoric and toward measurable contributions to defense and deterrence. As this graphic indicates, though a number of allies already spend above 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, if all allies were to meet or exceed the pledge (agreed to in 2014), they would have nearly one hundred billion dollars more to invest where it’s needed most: readiness, capabilities, and capacity. Not to mention what Finland and Sweden can bring to the Alliance.

Numerous current and future allies have renewed the 2 percent pledge and already committed substantial new resources to defense. Yet allies have far more capacity to act, and the Strategic Concept must both reassert this pledge and clearly prioritize for a public audience where these new resources should be spent. With a substantial and focused increase in defense investment, NATO could enhance European defense and deterrence by responding to the increased Russian threat with essential readiness, capability, and capacity upgrades. NATO allies must summon the will to respond to the new security environment Putin has created. Spending at the 2 percent level should be considered a floor, and not a ceiling, as we move toward the new NATO Strategic Concept. At this moment, NATO must lay out a clear level of ambition to realign national defense programs to the actual needs of transatlantic security.

Wayne Schroeder is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for resource planning and management.

It is a common saying among cyber practitioners that there are two types of victims: “those who know that they have been hacked and those who have, but don’t know it yet.” Attribution of an attack through cyberspace requires technical information and the willingness to name names. Attribution can be tricky, though it happens with increasing frequency in hints and outright statements from governments as well as a sea of claims from private sector firms. To establish attribution, analysts might try to determine if the cyberattack looks like—or originated from similar places in cyberspace—as attacks on other targets, if the software program used in the attack shares similarities with others, or even the language and time zone of the program (as simple as that may sound).

While cyberspace has taken its place firmly with air, land, sea, and space as one of the domains of modern warfare, the ease of connecting digitally across borders, significant role of the private sector, and a host of other factors can make cyberspace a challenging domain to manage. This is especially so when attacks are so common and, seemingly, useful to attackers. Until the United States and its NATO allies either increase the risks or lower the rewards for such attacks, Russia has no incentive to change course.

Paul Gebhard is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a vice president at the Cohen Group in Washington, DC.

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The current Russo-Ukrainian War represents the next major milestone in our rapidly developing understanding of cyber security. It is now becoming increasingly apparent that the invasion unleashed by Vladimir Putin on February 24 is the world’s first full-scale cyberwar.

It will take many years to fully digest the lessons of this landmark conflict and assess the implications for the future of international security. However, it is already possible to draw a number of preliminary conclusions that have consequences for individuals, organizations and national governments around the world.

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The current war has confirmed that while Russian hackers often exist outside of official state structures, they are highly integrated into the country’s security apparatus and their work is closely coordinated with other military operations. Much as mercenary military forces such as the Wagner Group are used by the Kremlin to blur the lines between state and non-state actors, hackers form an unofficial but important branch of modern Russia’s offensive capabilities.

One month before the current invasion began, hackers hit Ukraine with a severe cyber-attack designed to weaken government structures and prepare the ground for the coming offensive. Critical infrastructure was targeted along with private data in a bid to undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

Again and again during the first few months of the conflict, we have witnessed the coordination of cyber operations with more conventional forms of warfare. On one entirely typical occasion, a cyber-attack on the Odesa City Council in southern Ukraine was timed to coincide with cruise missile strikes against the city.  

Just as the Russian army routinely disregards the rules of war, Russian hackers also appear to have no boundaries regarding legitimate targets for cyber-attacks. Popular targets have included vital non-military infrastructure such as energy and utilities providers. Hospitals and first responders have been subjected to cyber-attacks designed to disrupt the provision of emergency services in the immediate aftermath of airstrikes. As millions of Ukrainian refugees fled the fighting during the first month of the war, hackers attacked humanitarian organizations.

Individuals are also targets. Every Ukrainian citizen is potentially at risk of cyber-attack, with hacked personal data providing the Russian security services with opportunities to gain backdoor access to Ukrainian organizations and identify potential opponents or prepare tailored propaganda campaigns.

The scale of the cyber warfare currently being conducted against Ukraine is unprecedented but not entirely unexpected. Large-scale attacks began during the 2013-14 Euromaidan protests and initially enjoyed considerable success. This was followed by more ambitious attempts to hack into the Ukrainian electricity grid and spark power blackouts. Then came the Petya and NotPetya international cyber-attacks of 2016-17, which centered on Ukraine and caused huge global disruption.

It is clear that Russia’s current cyber offensive involves cybercriminals working in cooperation with military personnel while enjoying access to official intelligence data. This approach is relatively cheap, with cybercriminals often able to finance their operations using standard cyber fraud techniques. The idea of collaboration between the state and criminal elements is also nothing new. However, it is noteworthy that in this case, the state in question has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. 

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Perhaps the single most important outcome of the cyberwar so far is that we now have a much better picture of the enemy. We are able to see the threats posed by Russia and also assess Moscow’s limitations. Just as naval threats are countered by missiles and mines, cyber security is achievable given sufficient knowledge and resources.

Ukraine has come under unprecedented cyber-attack on a daily basis for more than a quarter of a year, but the Ukrainian authorities have managed to maintain basic utility services for the vast majority of the country. Even more striking is the fact that mobile communications and internet connection disruption has been minimal. In many instances, Ukrainians have been able to access online information while under Russian bombardment. 

One key lesson from the past few months is the need for everyone to take responsibility for their own cyber security. This applies to individuals and organizations alike. Neglecting cyber security risks creating weak links in wider systems which can have disastrous consequences for large numbers of people. Likewise, businesses should not rely on the state to take care of cyber security and should be prepared to invest in sensible precautions. This can no longer be viewed as an optional extra.

International cooperation is also vital for strong cyber security. Ukraine has received invaluable support from a number of partner countries while sharing its own experience and expertise. Much as the internet itself does not recognize national boundaries, the most successful cyber security efforts are also international in nature.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has underlined the expansion of the modern battlefield to include almost every aspect of everyday life. The rise of the internet and the increasing ubiquity of digital technologies means that virtually anything from water supplies to banking services can and will be weaponized.

For years, the Kremlin has been developing the tools to carry out such attacks. The international community was slow to recognize the true implications of this strategy and is now engaged in a desperate game of catchup. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the military functions performed by hackers and the centrality of cyber-attacks to modern warfare. Restricting Russian access to modern technologies should therefore be viewed as an international security priority.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is the world’s first full-scale cyberwar but it will not be the last. On the contrary, all future conflicts will have a strong cyber component. In order to survive, cyber security will be just as important as maintaining a strong conventional military.

Yurii Shchyhol is head of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection.

Further reading

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By abandoning all pretense and comparing himself to Peter the Great, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has confirmed that he is waging an old-fashioned imperial war of conquest with the goal of annexing Ukrainian land.

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On June 14, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos was quoted in Le Monde, where he discussed Havana Syndrome and his long career in public service.

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Irina Plaks

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On June 13, Forward Defense Deputy Director Clementine Starling and Program Assistant Julia Siegel were featured in Real Clear Defense for their recent op-ed on the imperative for the Biden administration to address competition below the threshold of armed conflict in forthcoming national strategies.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Starling and Siegel in Real Clear Defense on gray zone conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After decades of relying on its conventional power, the United States lacks a comprehensive strategy to align gray-zone activities with the national goals it aims to achieve. More complicated still, this term is ill-defined—if even acknowledged—in US and allied strategies, creating an obstacle to further dialogue and policy action. Current efforts are uncoordinated across the executive branch and relevant stakeholders, and the desired end state is unclear. 

The Biden administration, for its part, acknowledges the strategic imperative to effectively compete in the gray zone with concepts like integrated deterrence, which is aimed at integrating all instruments of power “across the spectrum of conflict.” Now, the forthcoming National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) provide an opportunity to unite national efforts to deal with these nonmilitary security challenges.

But those documents must articulate how acting in the gray zone will advance national objectives, and how US government entities can better coordinate to deter aggression in nonmilitary spaces.

Adversaries at work

China and Russia have long integrated gray-zone operations into their strategies. 

In 1999, for example, two Chinese military strategists penned a paper called “Unrestricted Warfare,” proposing the continuous use of nonmilitary operations to compensate for US military superiority. That was followed in 2003 by “The Three Warfares,” which zeroes in on information-related warfare using psychological, public opinion, and legal means. And in what has been described as the Gerasimov Doctrine, Russia fuses military and non-military means to spur chaos. This was on display before and during Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russian hackers targeted Ukrainian government and private sites with malware and distributed denial-of-service attacks.

It is important to note the different approaches and goals of the United States’ two main adversaries in the gray zone: While China hopes to make the world safer for its brand of authoritarianism, Russia aims to weaken NATO and command its former Soviet “near abroad.” 

Yet both routinely leverage many forms of statecraft to undermine the rules-based international order, setting the tone for future contestation in the gray zone. These activities directly and intentionally strike pressure points within the target state’s society and across their alliances. When Moscow meddled in the 2016 US election, for example, it exploited fault lines in American democracy; and when nations adopt Huawei 5G, they compromise their own physical and digital infrastructure. 

More broadly, the gray zone blurs the otherwise clear-cut distinction between threats at home and abroad, underscoring the reality that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary—at least in non-physical spaces such as the cyber and information domains. While the United States’ geographic location has proved historically advantageous—bordered by allies and flanked by international waters that protect it from attack—digital and physical infrastructure advancements and enhanced global connectivity have rendered these barriers obsolete when attacked by non-physical means. 

Gray zone attacks can (and have) challenged international stability while simultaneously hitting closer to home, exploiting societal cleavages and domestic vulnerabilities. If the United States continues to view homeland defense and global interests separately, it leaves a blind spot for competitors to exploit.

Coordinate to win

With the Biden administration set to publish the unclassified versions of its NSS, NDS, and QHSR—the strategic documents that will guide US government policy for the next few years—now is the time to coordinate national gray-zone activities across agencies. The devil, however, is in the details: The executive branch must clearly articulate the objectives of its gray-zone and counter-gray-zone activity and how this fits within broader national-security goals (as well as identifying who has authority over what).

The 2021 Interim National Strategic Guidance, a prelude to the NSS, recognizes a need to “develop capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions” within the defense budget. Additionally, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) newly released fact sheet, which previews the 2022 NDS, calls for unified action across “the spectrum of conflict” and the need to leverage “other instruments of U.S. national power.” 

The administration’s attention to non-military tools provides a viable starting point for deliberate coordination in the gray zone, embracing the changing character of warfare and the need to compete off the physical battlefield. But coordination across US departments is critical to responding to threats in the gray zone, and the seemingly disjointed drafting of forthcoming strategies—including Biden’s NSS, NDS, and QHSR—represents a missed opportunity for doing so.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States recognized the need to unify fragmented intelligence and counterterrorism functions to deal with the violent extremist threat. Today, it faces a similarly fragmented picture of gray-zone threats that, if left unresolved, could create critical security gaps. The United States cannot wait for a crippling cyberattack or a pronounced disinformation campaign before laying the groundwork for coordination. Many US agencies and departments have authorities in the gray zone: DoD houses offensive unconventional military and cyber capabilities, while the Intelligence Community possesses a nuanced picture of the threat environment. The Department of Homeland Security harnesses regulatory abilities, the Department of State houses diplomatic tools, and the departments of Commerce and Treasury wield sanctioning authority. 

But to align efforts and goals, an official coordination mechanism is required. This authority should sit within the National Security Council and be tasked with managing gray-zone activity across the executive branch. This includes responsibility for pulling together information from—and promoting intelligence-sharing across—disparate US agencies, yielding a holistic intelligence picture, and centralizing command and control. Moreover, the coordinating mechanism should include military and civilian decision-making authority to respond to gray-zone threats and be trusted with evaluating US efforts.

The US government must better define who does what, when, and how—lest it fail to provide the comprehensive response needed to thwart malign activity in the gray zone. A changing security landscape requires the United States to radically rethink its competition with Russia and China. National strategies like the NSS, NDS, and QHSR are the right places to start—but gray-zone conflict is a whole-of-nation problem, and the United States’ ability to prevail will hinge on coordinating and executing a whole-of-nation response.

Clementine G. Starling is a resident fellow and deputy director of the Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Julia Siegel is a program assistant with Forward Defense.

The post The future of US security depends on owning the ‘gray zone.’ Biden must get it right. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 9, Christopher Preble and his co-hosts discussed the Pacific Islands on the Net Assessment podcast. Beijing has sought, but thus far failed, to strike a deal with 10 of the islands. Meanwhile, US leaders are promising to devote more time and attention to the region. What is at stake? Can US leaders deliver on their promises to the region? 

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Christopher Preble

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The post Preble on Net Assessment: Competition in the Pacific appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 7, Senior Air Force Fellow Lt Col Tyson Wetzel was quoted in Task and Purpose describing what US military systems might be targeted in a future near-peer conflict.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The post Wetzel in Task and Purpose on targeting in future conflicts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 7, an article co-authored by Mathew Burrows was published by the Wilson Center’s New Security Beat, which discussed the dangers of a growing cohort of youth who feel disillusioned by political failures.

“Failing to examine youth engagement trends may be a serious blind spot— and thus a threat to democracy. It is a question that merits closer examination. When youth disengage, they are often saying they don’t have a high level of confidence or trust in existing economic, political, or social entities,” said Burrows and his co-author, Steven Gale of the US Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning.

“They may also want to “opt out” because they perceive that their generation is not being heard or treated fairly. Whatever their reasons, youth disengagement will ultimately have negative impacts beyond democratic engagement with potential shockwaves on social stability, the well-being and mental health of individuals (youth and their families), and individual and country-level economic productivity and quality of life.”

The post Burrows in New Security Beat: Youth disillusionment as a danger to democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

21^st Century Security is really about… connecting and moving data.

James Taiclet

On April 29, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense (FD) practice hosted Lockheed Martin Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer James D. Taiclet for a conversation on “Understanding the Challenges of US & Allied Defense Innovation.”

This was the inaugural event of the new Forward Defense Forum, designed for defense visionaries to put forth creative ideas for the future of US and allied security. The Forum is part of FD’s recently launched project on “21^st Century Security,” generously supported by Lockheed Martin, which will advance the dialogue on how the United States and its allies and partners can deter and, if necessary, fight and win future wars.

As the leader of the world’s largest defense contractor, Taiclet has a unique perspective on emerging security and defense challenges. He joined Forward Defense in conversation with Courtney Kube, a national security and military correspondent with NBC News. They discussed how the United States and its allies and partners can integrate existing weapon systems and sensor networks to deter and defeat adversarial aggression.

Read on for some key takeaways from the Forum:

The US is taking notes on the Russia-Ukraine war.

Advanced, expendable weapons play a critical role in warfare.

The Javelin has become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance, proving essential to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian tanks and get within range of Russian troops. The dramatic impact of Javelins and similar fire-and-forget munitions, such as kamikaze drones, has underscored the notion that cheaper yet advanced weapons can have a sizable impact on the battlefield.

Military power hinges on aerospace dominance.

Ukraine has also demonstrated the importance of mobile, layered air defense, utilizing potable Stingers, short-range Tor surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and long-range S-300 SAMs to deny the Russian Air Force. In anticipation of greater demand from the United States and its allies, and to replenish stores depleted by the war, Lockheed is ramping up production of Javelins and air defense systems, such as THAAD and Patriot missiles.

Integrated defense is key.

On a larger scale, the war in Ukraine has also underlined the importance of integrated defense: optimizing the sensor-to-shooter pipeline by connecting existing technologies. To achieve integration, the defense enterprise will need to make use of 5G network speeds, predictive artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, satellite constellations, and advanced weapons. This open architecture Internet of Military Things (IoMT) will connect the dots in existing systems and lay the groundwork for US and allied deterrence.

COVID-19 exposed core supply chain vulnerabilities.

Over two years since the start of the pandemic, defense contractors are still recovering from chip shortages. Even before the war on Ukraine began to drain weapon stockpiles, COVID-19 was already effecting shortages in microprocessors—that is, computer chips that allow modern weapons systems to function. As the number one chip producer, Taiwan remains critical to the US defense supply chain—but Chinese aggression could threaten access to Taiwanese chipmakers in the future, underscoring the need to secure the supply chain today to protect 21^st century security challenges tomorrow.

China is the big picture threat.

While Russia poses an acute threat, China remains the pacing challenge to the United States. In addition to Javelins, Stingers, and other affordable, portable weapons, Lockheed also anticipates rising demand for more complex, advanced weapons systems—such as the Patriot and THAAD missiles, F-16 multi-role fighter aircraft, counter-battery radars, sixth-generation aircraft, and other capabilities with lengthy production timelines. For the time being, however, networked systems of existing capabilities can help bridge the divide, multiply, and set the stage for the long play. Integrated, networked defense, in coordination with allies and partners, will be critical to the United States’ ability to combat simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

The key to secure networks is partnering with the private sector.

So we can apply this concept of really bringing together the Newtonian world, the technologies that the defense and aerospace industry’s really good at, and this digital world, where companies like Microsoft and Verizon and AT&T and others [excel]—and let’s bring them together and solve national problems.

James Taiclet

Private companies will always have the edge over public defense contractors, in their ability to attract talent and innovate at speed. Partnership between the commercial and defensive realms can help accelerate defensive capabilities and solve sticky problems. Rather than innovating separately, defense contractors can team up with private industries to bring cutting-edge technologies and security to national defense. In other words: connecting the “Newtonian” and digital worlds.

21^st century security is more than just defense.

Connecting platforms across domains is a concept that can be applied to more than just defense: in fact, 21^st century security means integrating technologies across industries, to safeguard national interests at every level. Taiclet defines 3 key areas of focus:

Defense

21^st century defense connects fifth-generation fighters with advanced missile batteries, cutting edge radar systems, and human operators. Integrated defense is a force multiplier for the Department of Defense because it amplifies existing technologies in order to meet current and future threats from competitors and adversaries.

Climate

Climate change is an emergent challenge to national security: it threatens citizens, property, and utilities. Taiclet brought in the example of wildfires: right now, it takes around twenty- four hours for fire commanders to receive updated thermal infrared satellite data on a fire. Using airborne, ground-borne and spaceborne sensors, it is possible to predict, prepare for, and monitor fires—but that information is not getting where it needs to go, because of a lack of data infrastructure.

Space

Finally, Taiclet identifies latent opportunities in space, where 21^st century security concepts can help reinforce US interests on the next frontier of innovation. Combining autonomy, battery life extension, next-generation communications, and artificial intelligence, a lunar rover would be able to operate independently between astronaut missions. Satellites can secure communications on earth, increase data speeds, and enable other technologies. Innovation in space feeds into scientific discovery, but also rolls back into defense, and reinforces the entire national security pipeline.

The bottom line

As competition creeps into new spheres, 21^st century security will help protect US citizens and interests against a broad spectrum of growing threats. The US defense-industrial base must leverage existing technologies, develop future capabilities, and reach across the aisle to work with commercial enterprise, in order to fend off simultaneous threats and edge out multi-fronted competition. 

Caroline Steel is a Young Global Professional with the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Understanding the challenges of US & allied defense innovation: A conversation with James D. Taiclet

President, Chairman, and CEO of Lockheed Martin James D. Taiclet discusses the urgent need for the United States and its allies to innovate or fail on the future battlefield for the inaugural Forward Defense Forum.

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The Forward Defense Forum is designed for defense visionaries to put forth novel ideas for how the United States and its allies and partners can adapt, innovate, and win on the future battlefield. Built for creative thinking, this interactive public forum provides a space for the defense community to engage on issues core to the future of US and allied security.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On May 25, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative Senior Advisor Tom Warrick was interviewed on Newsy. Warrick discussed the US Department of Homeland Security’s response to the Uvalde, Texas shooting.

“[The Border Patrol Tactical Unit] are among the best qualified, best trained personnel that DHS has.”

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Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On May 16, Forward Defense assistant director Christian Trotti authored an op-ed published in the National Interest titled “Swarming to Victory: Drones and the Future of Great Power Competition.” Trotti recommends that the US military heavily invest in drones as an affordable yet effective solution to gain the advantage in the Indo-Pacific.

Drone casualties will never be as consequential as human casualties, but if drones are to have any deterrent effect through their presence alone, they need to be backed by greater implicit resolve.

Christian Trotti

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Trotti in the National Interest on drones appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin knows there is a special terror associated with chemical and biological weapons. Ukrainians have good reason to fear their use: the effects are awful. But delivering chem-bio weapons is difficult and dangerous even for well-trained professional soldiers. There is little to suggest Russian troops would be successful.

Chemical weapons like nerve, blistering, and choking agents are designed to kill or maim victims. For example, Russia used Novichok nerve agent in an attempt to murder political opponents in Salisbury in 2018. Biological agents like ricin and botulism are deadly or incapacitating toxins or diseases. For example, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, an unknown assailant sent weaponized anthrax through the US mail in an unsuccessful effort to kill members of Congress.

I experienced the fear of chemical attack firsthand while examining suspicious unexploded shells during the 1991 Gulf War, and while invading Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. I never quite knew if my chemical suit or mask were fitted just right, or if a tiny gap had opened up that might have exposed me to unspeakable suffering. Luckily I experienced nothing but false alarms. But even those unfounded fears were sobering.

Others have not been so lucky. Saddam used poison gas to kill thousands of Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq War. He also deployed chemical weapons to murder thousands of his own people. More recently, Syrian civilians experienced deadly chemical attacks launched by their own Russian-backed government.

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Russia almost certainly retains a sizable store of chemical and biological weapons. Moscow’s commitments to destroy the last vestiges of its Soviet-era stockpiles are no more believable than any random story on Russian state media. But having these terrifying weapons and putting them to effective use are two different matters. I see at least three reasons why the use of chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine could go badly wrong for the Russians.

There is little doubt that direct attribution would be unavoidable for any Russian chemical weapon attack in Ukraine. Experts on chem-bio weapons and Russian tactics assume the Russians would try to use a false flag operation to deny responsibility for their attack. They might attempt to make it look like the Ukrainians attacked their own civilians in an effort to discredit Russia, or they might even try to pin the blame on NATO.

This could still be an effective tactic for the Russian domestic audience, but the days of gaslighting Western leaders and reporters are over. Advanced Western surveillance, detection, and forensics will not allow Russia’s armed forces to secretly deploy chem-bio weapons. Russia’s failure to cover up even its most highly classified assassination attempts suggest it would fail even more spectacularly to cover up much larger battlefield attacks.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The chance of grave errors in chemical weapon delivery would be very high. Delivering chem-bio weapons is a complicated task best left to well-trained and practiced professionals. It is highly unlikely that Putin’s air, ground, or missile forces have retained the skills necessary to ensure safe and effective delivery of these deadly weapons from storage to target.

First, they must transport the weapons without mishap. Some containers, bombs, and shells are so old that their often caustic payloads may be leaking. Next, they have to prepare the weapons for delivery by airplane, missile, or artillery strike. This involves careful handling by soldiers trussed up in head-to-toe protective gear, a fraught prospect even under ideal conditions. Even before they launch their attacks, Russian soldiers would be at high risk of catastrophic failure.

It is important to note that Russian ground forces are not prepared to capitalize on chem-bio attacks. Launching these weapons can cause terror, injury, and death. But chem-bio attacks are not magical. They will not kill everyone they affect, and weaponized gasses cannot seize or hold territory. Simply firing these weapons into civilian areas like Kharkiv or Kyiv is likely to harden rather than weaken Ukrainian and Western resolve.

Chemical weapons are used most effectively to soften up targets for follow-on ground attack. Troops wearing protective gear must push forward into the contaminated zone riding in protected vehicles supported by decontamination trucks while carrying lots and lots of extra protective supplies. Given the present state of Russian forces in Ukraine and the probable lack of advanced chem-bio training, this would be all but impossible. If the Russians try to push their own troops into a chem-bio environment they are likely to suffer much the same fate as their victims.

The Russian military can certainly attack Ukraine with chemical and biological weapons. But they probably cannot do so effectively or without significant risk to their own forces. Russia will be caught out and, in keeping with its overall strategic failure in Ukraine, achieve little more than increasing international opprobrium and isolation. Putin would be wise to leave his chemical and biological weapons safely tucked away in cold storage or, better yet, to destroy them as promised.

Ben Connable is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University.

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On May 5, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades released his latest report titled “Small Satellites: The Implications for National Security.” Since then, Eftimiades’ report has been cited in a variety of news outlets including Defense Daily, SpaceNews, and Executive Gov. The articles highlight how the US government needs to adopt small satellites to maintain its space superiority over China and enhance its resiliency in space.

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Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On May 12, Preble joined his co-hosts on the Net Assessment podcast to discuss space policy and to what extent cooperation on space governance is feasible at this point in time. 

“People all over the world are ever-more dependent on assets in space for normal activity in their daily lives, but there are few rules of the road in place to manage space behavior. Will it be possible to develop a system of cooperation that allows for freedom of movement in space but also protects the economic and national security of all countries? Should we be concerned about the rapid growth of private satellites and related equipment in space? Secretary of Defense Austin said that ‘Space is already an area of great power competition.’ Given the interests of China, Russia, and the United States in space, are we heading into a space arms race?

“Chris has an attaboy for a thrilling victory at the Kentucky Derby, Zack remembers a friend who has departed too soon, and Melanie doubles down on America.”

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Christopher Preble

Former Co-Director, New American Engagement Initiative

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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The post Preble on Net Assessment: Threats from out of this world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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On April 29, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos was quoted in a New York Magazine article titled, “Havana syndrome’s newest mystery: who gets paid?” Polymeropoulos, who experienced a Havana syndrome-style attack in 2017 while in Moscow, and has lobbied on behalf of victims previously, notes that victims will face a “messy” uphill battle. 

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On April 29, Emma Ashford appeared in the American Prestige podcast to discuss the Blob (Washington DC’s foreign policy establishment), the war in Ukraine, and the future of liberal internationalism.

“(The war in Ukraine) came as a real shock to many inside DC who were pivoting towards China. It’s my understanding that some of the key national security documents like the National Defense Strategy basically had to be rewritten to accommodate the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The notion that America might have to start paying attention to Europe again came as a surprise to a lot of folks. But that doesn’t necessarily man that the US is actually going to go back into Europe. There’s still a lot of pressure on the China front.”

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Christopher Preble

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On April 28, Emma Ashford appeared on BBC to explore Russia’s potential role in explosions that recently occurred in Moldova. 

“I think at this point we can’t say for sure exactly what happened. We know the Russians have blamed the Ukrainians, the Ukrainians have blamed the Russians, the Moldovan government has blamed what they call ‘pro-war elements,’ which could be separatist groups inside the country. So it’s really too soon to say, but I think many people are assuming this is related to Russia in some way, and it may be designed to undermine the Moldovan government at a difficult time.”

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Christopher Preble

Former Co-Director, New American Engagement Initiative

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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On April 21, Laura Resnik Samotin co-authored a Foreign Affairs article with Michael Horowitz and Lauren Khan. They argue that the United States is unprepared for strategic competition over AI development, and lay out a framework to safely and quickly operationalize the technology.

“The United States, then, faces dueling risks from AI. If it moves too slowly, Washington could be overtaken by its competitors, jeopardizing national security. But if it moves too fast, it may compromise on safety and build AI systems that breed deadly accidents. Although the former is a larger risk than the latter, it is critical that the United States take safety concerns seriously. To be effective, AI must be safe and reliable. So how can Washington fund a sort of Goldilocks zone for innovation? It can start by thinking of technological development in terms of three phases: invention, incubation, and implementation. Different speeds are appropriate for each one. There is little harm from moving quickly in the first two phases, and the U.S. military should swiftly develop and experiment with new technologies and operational concepts. But it will need to thoroughly address safety and reliability concerns during implementation.”

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New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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The post Samotin in Foreign Affairs: A high-reward, low-risk approach to AI military innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 18, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Hill article titled, “Five deadly weapons Russia is accused of using in Ukraine.” Kroenig assesses that unconfirmed allegations of Russian chemical attacks in Ukraine could be part of a Russian “salami-slicing” strategy to test US response.

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On April 18, Grieco was interviewed by the Decisive Point podcast about applying her concept of the “air littoral” to the air war in Ukraine.

“This convergence of new threats to air superiority in the air littoral meant that we need to update doctrinal conducts. In the past, air superiority was either won or lost in the ‘blue skies.’ This is where high-end fighters and bombers typically operate. And if you won that battle for the blue sky, it typically conferred control at all altitudes. But what we’re seeing increasingly is that even if you win in the blue sky, it doesn’t mean that you’re going to have control of low altitude airspace. As a result, we really need to update doctrinal concepts about air control, and not just think of it as being localized in time and lateral space, but also think about vertical control as well,” Grieco argued.

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New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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On April 14, Kelly Grieco was featured in Inkstick’s Adults in a Room series on the topic of gray zone conflict.   

“Before Feb. 24, 2022, Russia had earned a reputation in the West as a master of the so-called gray zone for its activities in Crimea. President Vladimir Putin had used a combination of cyberattacks, covert actions, propaganda disinformation campaigns, and a mix of proxy forces and Russian troops — almost everything short of full-scale war — to gain control of Crimea and undermine the Ukrainian government in 2014. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicates that Russia’s gray-zone operations and tactics largely failed.”

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New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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On April 11, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was quoted in a Newsweek article titled “Fraud lawsuit raises questions about Chinese activities in U.S. Fintech and SPACs.” Eftimiades explains that China uses economic espionage and warfare to gain influence over the US commercial sector.

U.S. industries along with federal law enforcement and counterintelligence organizations lack the expertise and resources to counter this large-scale offensive [Chinese espionage].

Nicholas Eftimiades

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On April 8, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Kyle Atwell co-hosted an episode of the Modern War Institute’s Irregular Warfare Podcast titled “Dynamite to drones: The diffusion of lethal technology to terrorists and insurgents.” Atwell attempts to answer how nonstate actors use low-end technologies to their advantage and how the government can counter this proliferation of dangerous technologies.

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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But how serious are the chemical and biological threats, and what exactly should NATO do to prepare?

The West is right to be concerned. Russia used nerve agents from the Novichok family of chemical weapons to target a former Russian intelligence officer, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter in the United Kingdom in 2018 and prominent opposition leader Alexei Navalny in Siberia in 2020. These attacks—predictably denied by Moscow—contradicted Russia’s claims that it destroyed the remnants of its chemical weapons program in 2017.

Russia has also propped up a Syrian regime that repeatedly used chemical weapons in its brutal civil war, as well as wielded its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto to shield Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and other responsible individuals in his government from justice. This impunity has set a dangerous precedent that could tempt Russia: If Damascus could get away with it, why can’t Moscow?

Meanwhile, Russia has also circulated disinformation about a purported biological weapons program in Ukraine backed by the United States—and even brought these false claims to the UNSC in March (they were swiftly dismissed). Related conspiracy theories have taken off on platforms such as Twitter and Telegram, received air time on US television channels, and were parroted by China. These allegations could set the pretext for a false-flag attack involving chemical weapons that Russia could use to expand its invasion or justify additional military action against Ukraine. 

While sanctions have destabilized the Russian economy and shrunk the resources available for President Vladimir Putin’s war efforts, he likely already has what he needs to mount chemical attacks in Ukraine. 

Moves, not just messaging

To preempt Russia’s use of chemical or biological weapons, the United States and its NATO allies must publicly demonstrate that the West takes this threat seriously and are prepared to respond. 

In the past few weeks, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Department of Defense spokesperson John Kirby have done just that, raising these issues on social media and during press conferences. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made clear that any use of chemical or biological weapons would violate international law, while citing worries that the effects of biological or chemical agents would be felt in Ukraine’s neighboring countries (several of which are NATO members).

And just as it “pre-bunked” potential Russian false-flag operations before the invasion began, the United States should also aggressively and proactively debunk Russian misinformation about chemical and biological weapons.

Additionally, NATO should update its strategy for countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats was last updated in 2009 and does not account for the numerous developments in the international security environment. For example, the document references cooperation with Russia as a key element to curbing WMD proliferation, which is clearly untenable today. Russia has also shown its willingness to flout international norms and use CBRN weapons—so NATO’s new policy must place a corresponding emphasis on the ability to defend against such weapons. 

The Alliance is set to release its next Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June; by referencing a more relevant CBRN policy in that document, NATO would send a clear message to Moscow that CBRN threats remain top of mind.

Messaging, however, is not enough. Words must be backed up by tangible actions. NATO has sent forty thousand troops to allied nations close to Ukraine; they should be reinforced with CBRN defense capabilities. NATO’s top military commander, US Air Force General Tod Wolters, has already activated the Alliance’s Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force, putting it on alert in case it is required to deploy. It can respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack with reconnaissance, sampling, protection, and decontamination capabilities, among others. Deploying this task force to support other military reinforcements along its eastern flank would demonstrate NATO’s practical preparedness to respond to contingencies that could involve CBRN weapons used by Russia.

Finally, the US Department of Defense should sustain its support of Ukraine via the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which was established after the fall of the Soviet Union to secure and destroy Soviet WMD materials. The CTR program has a long history of working with Ukrainian officials to reduce WMD threats by destroying nuclear delivery systems and improving biological safety and security. US efforts can benefit from CTR’s long-standing relationships with Ukrainian government partners to quickly deliver additional supplies and equipment, which could include supporting other US government efforts to provide Ukraine with protective gear in case of a chemical attack.

Through coordinated efforts that incorporate public messaging and tangible action, NATO might have a chance to dissuade Russia from escalating the conflict in Ukraine to chemical warfare. But to do that, Moscow needs to know that the use of chemical weapons will not help its ill-fated invasion and will not be tolerated. 

Natasha Lander Finch is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.

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On April 5, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Max Brooks co-authored an article in the Washington Post with Lionel Beehner and John Spencer, titled, “Opinion: Ukrainians should be on the lookout for a new battlefield enemy: Disease.” The authors discuss the threat of disease outbreak and biological warfare in Ukraine, and recommend emergency sanitation supplies and hygiene manuals to build up resilience.

If we want to help the Ukrainian resistance, we shouldn’t be sending them only Javelins and body armor. 

Max Brooks, Lionel Beehner, and John Spencer in the Washington Post

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On April 5, Atlantic Council senior vice president and Scowcroft Center director Barry Pavel was quoted in a Vox article titled, “Why experts are terrified of a human-made pandemic — and what we can do to stop it.” Pavel warns that acts of bioterrorism will become more frequent as technology progresses and barriers to entry decrease.

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On March 31, Christopher Preble joined his co-hosts of the Net Assessment podcast to discuss information security, both in the US government and private sector, asking the question of whether we are striking the right balance between keeping government secrets secret and ensuring that private information about customers and users is well protected.

“Chris and Zack are joined by special guest co-host, Emily Harding of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The three review the Biden administration’s latest responses to the crisis in Ukraine before turning to the issue of information security, both in the U.S. government and in the private sector. What information is, and should be, classified? And are we striking the right balance between keeping government secrets secret, and ensuring that private information about customers and users is well protected?”

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Christopher Preble

Former Co-Director, New American Engagement Initiative

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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