But when it comes to assessing Meloni, the transatlantic community would be well advised to do its homework and embrace her leadership. Her actions have clearly demonstrated a pragmatic and unambiguous values-based commitment to the transatlantic relationship. It is what she does that matters, not what others say about her.

On July 27, Meloni will travel to the White House to meet with US President Joe Biden. Her visit comes as Italy prepares to take up the presidency of the Group of Seven (G7) next year, a critically important role given today’s geopolitical events. So what can Biden expect from the Italian leader on the important issues of the day?

Italy backs Ukraine’s fight for freedom and democracy

Meloni has kept Italy clearly committed to the pillars of the EU and the transatlantic community. She has been unambiguous in her stance against autocracies. Even more notable, she has been vocally supportive of Ukraine and clearly holds Russia accountable for its unprovoked aggression. The clarity of her position contrasts with the sometimes more ambiguous positions of other Italian coalition parties.

Under Meloni’s leadership, the Italian government has continued to back Ukraine against Russia with military aid. Indifferent to low public support for military aid for the effort—just 39 percent of the Italian public voices support for increased military aid for Ukraine—she has underscored the just cause. During a speech in the Italian Senate in March, she said, “The Ukrainian people are defending the values of freedom and democracy on which our civilization is based, and the very foundations of international law.” She added, “military aid was needed to help a nation under attack.” Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia party, along with center-right coalition parties Lega and Forza Italia, have voted consistently in support for Ukraine, even when in opposition during the government of former Prime Minister Mario Draghi.

Will China’s Belt and Road continue to lead to Rome?

Another important area of Italy’s strategic dialogue with the United States will be the issue of transatlantic coordination on China. Italy became the first and only G7 member of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019, when it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China. The populist coalition government promised new trade and investment, a well-received message at the time, but the economic benefits have not come to fruition. 

Calling Italy’s membership in the BRI “a big mistake,” Meloni has indicated that she may not extend the agreement in 2024. With 51 percent of Italians holding a negative feeling about China, it may be easier for Meloni to join in a coordinated transatlantic decision on BRI.

The 2008 global financial crisis created massive opportunities for Chinese investors targeting stressed companies in search of technologies, innovation, and markets. In 2022, Italy was the second-largest import partner in Europe (behind Germany) for importing Chinese products, to the tune of more than fifty billion dollars. On the flip side, Italian exports to China make up less than 3 percent, or only eighteen billion dollars. Clearly, Italy’s optimistic vision for the BRI didn’t deliver.

Moreover, Meloni has been a strong voice in defending democratic values and criticizing China’s authoritarian crackdowns from Xinjiang to Hong Kong. She has criticized China’s mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic and dismissed the idea that China supported Italy during the depths of the crisis. Amid criticism of Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, she said last year that “the EU is an important market for China, that risks to be closed if Beijing decides to attack Taiwan.”

The importance of US-Italian economic relations

Beyond geopolitics, economic issues will also likely be on the agenda in the Biden-Meloni meeting. Here they have a strong base to build on. Trade between the United States and Italy has almost doubled from $52 billion to $100 billion in the last decade. Unlike with China, Italy’s trade balance with the United States has always been positive. Last year, for example, Italian exports to the United States reached $73 billion. The United States is the second-largest export market for Italy, making up 11 percent of all exports and more than 20 percent of non-EU exports. Similarly, Italy is the third-largest market in the EU and the eighth largest in the world by nominal gross domestic product; with a population of about sixty million it is the sixteenth largest export market for the United States, with significant trade and investment opportunities concentrated in high-value sectors.

Italian stock of investment in the United States has totaled more than $41 billion, supporting almost one hundred thousand American jobs. To put this it into perspective, Italian foreign direct investment in the United States is almost four times its investment in China. On the horizon, as part of the EU’s post-COVID recovery program, Italy will be the recipient of a more than $200 billion National Recovery and Resilience Plan focusing on three strategic axes: digitalization and innovation, ecological transition, and social resilience aimed at fixing structural economic challenges and inefficient infrastructure to invite serious investment from the United States. Italy ranked ninth among EU destinations for US foreign direct investment in 2022, with a stock of around $26 billion.

When Biden and Meloni meet at the White House, they will share a strong commitment to transatlantic cooperation on major geopolitical issues. The big areas of discussion will likely focus on cooperation to face global challenges, from economic growth to common security, where Italy has a very important role in North Africa and the Sahel that meets Biden’s strategy to create new diplomatic alliances in Africa and a Western alternative to China’s BRI. Strengthening economic cooperation should also be a priority, going beyond the traditional sectors in which US investments are mostly concentrated, such as manufacturing, electronics, telecommunications, and services. Washington and Rome should, for example, help facilitate new collaboration in industries working on artificial intelligence, the energy transition, and defense.

Meloni and Biden are more aligned than many observers may think. Biden should take this chance to build on her promising start.

Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and chair of strategic engagements at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

The post From Ukraine to China, Meloni and Biden are closer than you think appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The trip builds on Erdoğan’s previous visit to the UAE more than a year ago, which had opened a new chapter to bolster the two countries’ political and economic ties ahead of Turkey’s May 2023 elections.

After his re-election, Erdoğan reinstated Mehmet Şimşek as minister of finance, putting the former investment banker back in charge of the state coffers. Şimşek’s appointment signaled the return to economic orthodoxy and prioritization of market stability that provided confidence to Gulf investors about the investment climate in Turkey. This raised hopes for the Turkish economy, which faces runaway inflation, chronic current account deficits, the devaluation of the lira, and the depletion of much-needed foreign currency reserves.

Erdoğan’s re-election and his appointment of Şimşek also signaled building momentum for normalization with the Gulf region—momentum that began with reciprocal official visits in 2021. This June, Şimşek has already held high-level meetings in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to lay the groundwork for Erdoğan’s most recent visits and help promote bilateral economic partnerships.

Turkey’s developing relations with these three Gulf countries show a convergence of interests and agreement on many issues. These include agreement on their complementary comparative advantages, their eagerness to diversify trade partnerships, and their desire for strategic autonomy from the West. Reflecting their growing cooperation, Turkey announced that it had struck framework agreements for bilateral investment with the UAE that reached over $50 billion—it also announced agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar (the values of which are still undisclosed). Deepening partnerships in key sectors such as defense, energy, and transport indicate an interest among Turkey and Gulf countries to leverage financial capital, know-how, and geographic advantages for economic growth; they also indicate a realignment to share political risks in a volatile region and reduce dependence on the United States.

A solid foundation

The main rationale behind Turkey’s renewed interest in strengthening ties with the Gulf countries is to attract capital inflows and sustain Erdoğan’s legacy as a leader who delivered economic growth over the past two decades. After a brief slowdown during political upheavals between 2013 and 2020, the volume of Turkey’s trade with the Gulf has reached $22 billion, according to the Turkish government. Turkey has ambitious plans to almost triple this figure in the next five years.

The Gulf countries are also keen to scale up their footprint in Turkey. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries account for 7.1 percent of foreign direct investment in Turkey since 2020, with $15.8 billion in stock as of 2022. Qatar provided Turkey with the most foreign direct investment of the GCC countries, investing $9.9 billion. The UAE comes in second with $3.4 billion, and Saudi Arabia is the third highest, with $500 million. This amount is likely to increase two-fold to $30 billion over the next few years through investments prioritizing the energy, defense, finance, retail, and transport sectors. Previously, the UAE and Qatar provided Turkey with $20 billion in currency-swap agreements and Saudi Arabia deposited $5 billion into the central bank to support dollar liquidity.

But the new package of agreements signed during Erdoğan’s trip focus on capital investments in productive assets such as land, factory plants, and infrastructure. Abu Dhabi Developmental Holding sovereign wealth fund (ADQ) alone signed a memorandum of understanding to finance up to $8.5 billion of Turkey earthquake relief bonds and to provide $3 billion in credit facilities to support Turkish exports. Collectively, these are evidence of a longer-term vision for closer coordination between the GCC and Turkey at a strategic level.

Economic cooperation also draws Turkish investment to the Gulf, primarily toward construction and services sectors such as information technology, telecommunications, and agricultural technology. Possible joint manufacturing in the defense industry between Turkey and Gulf states, such as manufacturing of Baykar’s Akıncı and TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles, carries the potential to upgrade this relationship beyond the economic realm. Even for Saudi Arabia, which has a domestic plant to produce Turkish Vestel Karayel drones primarily for reconnaissance missions, Akıncı could upgrade drone warfare doctrine to a new level.

Mutual advantages

This evolving partnership is a clear win-win situation. Turkey and the GCC countries’ combined geography connects three lucrative subregions—the Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea—that can help the countries build their connections and enhance their interdependence, when beneficial, in a volatile world. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, which boast a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.8 trillion, have plentiful resources and tremendous comparative advantages, not only in the oil and gas sector but also in their solid legal framework, world-class infrastructure, and relative ease of doing business.

The UAE, for instance, implements social and business reforms to attract foreign investment. They also have a young, tech-savvy, and talented population open to learning and determined to make an impact on emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and robotics. Turkey, meanwhile, has comparative advantages in the defense, hospitality, and construction sectors. Turkey had traditionally been a capital-scarce, labor-intensive country that faced declining terms of trade, especially after joining the European Customs Union in 1995. But gradually, through upskilling in technology and investment in capital-intensive sectors, Turkey repositioned itself as an alternative industrial hub for the emerging markets of the Middle East. It has become a diversified, technologically advanced, and sophisticated economy as a member of the Group of Twenty.

Turkey is now more eager to expand its bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements into a multilateral agreement with the GCC. Moreover, the earthquakes in February 2023 are estimated to have cost Turkey $104 billion in infrastructural damage and economic loss—equivalent to 12 percent of its GDP—so Turkey needs to diversify and deepen its trade partnerships to recover quickly.

Nonaligned, interconnected

A major driving factor behind this rising economic cooperation is the quest to gain strategic autonomy from the West and distribute risks by hedging against changes in US policy toward Turkey and the Gulf’s neighborhood after the next US presidential elections and beyond. Turkey and the Gulf countries have emerged as nonaligned middle powers, adapting to a multipolar world as the global economy’s center of gravity shifts toward the Indo-Pacific region.

The war in Ukraine heightened Turkey’s geopolitical significance and provided it with leverage in negotiations with the United States and NATO, as witnessed at the Vilnius summit last week. Russia’s ongoing attack and consequential Western sanctions also turned countries’ eyes toward the Gulf countries in search of an alternative supplier of hydrocarbons. Windfall profits from oil and gas sales strengthened the war chests of Gulf sovereign wealth funds that are now looking to increase non-oil trade and diversify their portfolios into sustainable, long-term investments such as renewable energy, advanced technology, healthcare, tourism, and leisure.

A few major deals exemplify these diversification efforts. The Arab-China Business Conference—held in Riyadh this June—concluded with $10 billion worth of investment deals struck between Arab countries and China. Iraq is developing a $17-billion-dollar railroad, which is planned to run through Turkey to Europe, a project in which the GCC countries have also shown interest. Abu Dhabi Developmental Holding Company and the Turkey Wealth Fund launched a $300-million-dollar partnership to invest in Turkish technology startups. The UAE is also eager to invest in Istanbul’s metro and its high-speed railway to Ankara. The two countries aim to increase their trade volume from $18 billion to $40 billion in the next five years.

Ultimately, this flurry of new investments shows that the Gulf countries and Turkey view each other as mutually advantageous partners. Erdoğan’s visit to the Gulf this week further reaffirms their deepening partnership in the economic realm—with potential implications for the strategic realm in the long term.

Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu is a senior fellow in strategic studies at TRENDS Research & Advisory in Abu Dhabi.

Mouza Hasan Almarzooqi is a researcher in economic studies at TRENDS Research & Advisory in Abu Dhabi.

The post What’s behind growing ties between Turkey and the Gulf states appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While exact numbers are difficult to come by, the bulk of recent missile strikes on Ukrainian targets such as Odesa have originated in the Black Sea. One estimate put the Russian amphibious assault ship increase at the start of the full-scale invasion as equivalent of an additional one-and-a-half battalion tactical groups. Earlier this week, Russia carried out a live fire “exercise” against potential maritime targets in the northwestern part of the sea.

Russia’s daily strikes on Ukrainian targets along the Black Sea coast represent an extraordinary escalation. They mark a shift in Russian strategy toward leveraging missile batteries in occupied Crimea with Kh-22 and P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles, which typically fly at extremely high speed and, as they reach their targets, can descend to low altitude (as low as thirty-two feet) along the water or land, making them difficult to intercept.

While it’s doubtful Russia plans to decimate Odesa to the extent that it laid waste to Mariupol, the force with which it is pounding the southern port region has folks here worrying. After all, in one night alone, Russian forces launched at least thirty cruise missiles, primarily from ships in the Black Sea, according to the Ukrainian Air Force. One strike came dangerously close to the Chinese consulate and damaged a wall of the building. Some residents here in Odesa have responded by heading to safer ground in the countryside or overseas, but for the most part I’m detecting the same irrepressible resilience that was on display in the earlier months of the war. 

The Kremlin has significantly escalated tensions after torpedoing the Black Sea Grain Initiative on Monday, attacking Odesa port infrastructure and then issuing a unilateral declaration from the Russian Ministry of Defense that all Black Sea vessels sailing to Ukrainian ports will be considered potential carriers of military cargo. The statement added that no matter which flags the vessels carry, they would be considered on Kyiv’s side. 

If there are any lingering doubts about the lengths Russia will go to choke off Ukraine’s agricultural exports, just read the words of RT editor-in-chief and Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan: “All our hope is in a famine… The famine will start now, and they will lift the sanctions and be friends with us, because they will realize it is necessary.”

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry said in a Telegram post on Thursday that the move “deliberately creates a military threat on trade routes, and the Kremlin has turned the Black Sea into a danger zone.”

In a savvy retaliatory move, Ukraine’s defense ministry shot back with its own announcement that, starting July 21, it, too, will begin to consider all Russia-bound vessels as carrying military cargo. Kyiv also declared the northeastern part of the Black Sea a closed military area. That could potentially make it more expensive—if not impossible—for commercial ships bound for Russian ports, such as major oil exporting harbor Novorossiysk, to obtain insurance. 

A wild card in all of this is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, one of the few NATO leaders able to speed dial both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. While Erdoğan was unable to salvage the grain deal, he does have the ability to turn up the heat on Putin by, for example, insisting that ships sailing to and from Russia have sufficient insurance coverage. A few weeks back, Turkey made life difficult for Russian and Belarusian airlines by suspending the provision of refueling and servicing of their Boeing and Airbus aircraft at Turkish airports. Erdoğan and Putin are reportedly scheduled to meet in person in August.

Russian friends in the Middle East and Africa, such as Egypt, which relies heavily on Ukrainian grain imports, need to further step up pressure on Moscow to reopen commercial shipping lanes across the Black Sea. Ethiopia, the host country to the African Union, received almost 300,000 tons of food from Ukraine under the grain initiative—and another 90,000 tons of grain as part of a separate initiative, Zelenskyy said. Ethiopia is one of seven countries in East Africa experiencing unprecedented levels of food insecurity, according to the World Food Program. South Africa and the African Union can help stave off further hunger on the continent with sanctions against Russia should Moscow continue to blockade food exports from Ukraine. 

Meanwhile, on land, at the northern end of a 620-mile front line, Russia has been quietly amassing 100,000 soldiers at the Lyman-Kupiansk axis, according to Serhii Cherevatyi, spokesman for the Eastern Group of Ukraine’s armed forces. Cherevatyi said that the manpower buildup is almost equal to the 120,000 troops Moscow had deployed to Afghanistan during the height of Soviet invasion in 1979-1989. The Russian soldiers are reportedly being backed up with 900 tanks, 555 artillery systems and 370 multiple launch rocket systems. 

With two of Odesa’s main industries seriously hampered—the port and the tourism and hospitality sector—it is unclear how much longer Ukraine’s jewel on the Black Sea coast can endure Russia’s onslaught without stronger support from Western allies. Now that Russia has crossed yet another red line with the targeting of infrastructure crucial to the global food supply chain, Western capitals need to counter Russian aggression with fresh responses—including the deployment of armed flotillas to escort commercial ships carrying agriculture products from Ukrainian ports or providing significantly more Patriot missile batteries that can intercept incoming Russian cruise missiles. 

At the end of the day the question needs to be asked: Why is it that a small group of men in the Kremlin get to decide the fate of hundreds of millions of people around the world and whether they have food on their plates?

Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The post Dispatch from Odesa: Russia escalates its naval war against Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 21, South Korea’s Yonhap News Service used our Experts React on Korean nuclear issues as the basis for an entire article, including quotes from FD senior fellow Rob Soofer, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Thomas Cynkin, and IPSI nonresident fellow Jessica Taylor.

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense

Arms Control Defense Policy

Fellow

Thomas Cynkin

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Japan

Fellow

Jessica Taylor

Nonresident Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management East Asia

The post Our Experts React Used as Basis for South Korean News Service Article appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That means gleaning emerging lessons on preparedness from crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, even if they take years to fully understand, while also preparing for worst-case scenarios in other areas. Doing so is time-consuming and expensive, but ultimately sensible and proportionate. Ukraine, for instance, withstood Russia’s cyber aggression in the early part of Moscow’s 2022 military campaign by drawing on lessons learned from prior threats, investing in cybersecurity, and building effective international partnerships. 

Why does proactive leadership matter in a time of crisis? Preparedness and resilience—including a genuine commitment and actual follow-through—are the cornerstones of a government’s ability to address the emerging impacts of a crisis effectively while simultaneously accomplishing broader goals. Areas of crisis work such as mass fatalities management, mass evacuation and shelter, and continuity of government can feel almost fanciful or alarmist for officials who are not in the day-to-day business of understanding relative risk. And this kind of work competes for resources with more politically attractive and immediate needs. Yet, to protect societies in a manner proportionate to the risks they face, it is essential that politicians across the political spectrum, together with senior officials, consistently champion the resourcing needs of national preparedness and shepherd them through often reluctant governmental systems. Insufficient preparation and a lack of up-front investment will have severe consequences, both economically and in terms of human welfare.

No government will say it doesn’t care about these issues, but the practical steps and leadership focus on long-term improvement and innovation are often lacking. Yes, it can be a daunting task for any government. But the last few years have shown that addressing some of the fundamentals will never be a bad investment. With that in mind, here are five steps policymakers should take to build resilience for the next crisis.

1. Shore up the foundations

Now is the time to focus on the undervalued but important work of organizing systems for success. A government’s ability to assess and, crucially, to communicate relative risk lies at the heart of this. Governments with a clear national strategy that sets out priority activities for the whole of society will give themselves a solid foundation: Finland’s comprehensive security model is a good example of this, and the United Kingdom recently published its own resilience framework. The basics of governance and resourcing are especially important to ensure that key institutions locally and nationally are engaged and have the leadership, skills, resources, and facilities needed to plan for and respond to crises. 

Evidence shows that it’s a false economy not to invest in crisis preparation and resilience. Munich Re, a multinational insurer based in Germany, estimates that natural disasters in 2021 cost $280 billion globally—of which only $120 billion was insured. And that doesn’t include the unquantifiable individual and societal impacts of such events. Crisis preparation needs to be protected even when new priorities appear because stripping resources from preparedness functions inevitably results in critical gaps when future crises hit. 

In addition, governments need to place a high value on the deeply unglamorous work of putting in place structures and governance to ensure momentum and oversight to deliver a clear plan of work—the absence of which will quickly become a critical weakness. Consistent and energetic leadership together with clear accountability on resilience really matters.

2. Exploit technology wisely

Many governments have vastly underestimated and underimagined the utility of science and technology in risk management. Governments need more curiosity among leadership teams about how technology can be harnessed to assess risk and support decision makers. Challenging the status quo to develop new capabilities that fuse the best of technical knowledge with traditional risk-management expertise offers some exciting potential. 

The United Kingdom’s new National Situation Centre is a vanguard example of how data science can help officials anticipate and navigate unfolding emergencies by bringing together public and government information to answer tough questions. Fusing all-source data in this way has already proved useful in managing risks around major national events, such as the 2021 Group of Seven (G7) summit, as well as anticipating risk during periods of extreme weather. Synthetic environments could also provide safe and low-cost ways of working through crises and decisions, using data and information to simulate a crisis scenario and testing different courses of action to see what the impacts might be. In addition, recent advances in artificial intelligence can help professionals by flagging risks to consider and manage before they become acute.

3. Understand supply chains

The interdependencies of supply chains are extremely complex, and the threat of disruption is now a regular occurrence. The impacts of supply chain disruptions on national security can be severe, even life-threatening. The COVID-19 pandemic provided a salutary lesson in how medical supply chains can unravel, leaving countries struggling for basic resources to manage the critical health of the population. And much of the world’s production of key technology components happens in areas with considerable risk of natural hazards or geopolitical conflict. 

Most worryingly, the West’s adversaries often have a better understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities than Western governments do. Investing in professional technical teams to collate and exploit data will help to anticipate risk and support both governments and the commercial sector to shore up vulnerabilities before they are exposed by events or deliberately exploited.

4. Invest in practical international partnerships

The cost of preparedness for high-impact but low-probability events is huge. Investing in outreach, understanding work in other countries, and finding like-minded international partners are smart options for governments. International cooperation can create extra capacity to respond to many kinds of events. 

Why do it alone if you can pool resources such as niche medical capacities or highly specialized chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) expertise? Many countries are already doing this: for example, the European Union is coordinating its civilian aid to Ukraine through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and building CBRN equipment stockpiles in different countries. Governments should continually benchmark each other’s best practices, bilaterally or through multilateral bodies—something NATO does well. Governments could make use of guidelines and objectives developed in international fora, such as NATO’s seven baseline requirements for national resilience. In a moment of crisis, close personal contacts between crisis management officials is extremely useful; key officials need time to develop these relationships before crises hit.

5. Adopt a whole-of-society approach

There are some things only a nation-state can do to prepare and respond to crises, but that is only one piece in the jigsaw puzzle. Local governments, individuals, academia, commercial entities, and charities all play an extremely important part in underpinning a country’s resilience: supporting this at a national level is vital. 

Governments need to engage across society to develop a “preparedness mindset” that inspires everyone to understand their role and take responsibility. This means sharing as much information as possible before and during crises to empower everyone in society to make sensible decisions. It also means engaging early with parts of industry to generate solutions, something that worked well during the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of developing new vaccines in record time with support from governments. Engagement in government-led risk scenario exercises and improvements to governments’ crisis communication also are key factors in broad societal resilience in the face of serious disasters. For example, both Sweden and Finland have invested in upskilling individuals and organizations so that they can understand risk and can act in their own best interest. This reduces the burden on government, leaving officials to manage only what governments alone can handle.

Heeding the wake-up call

The COVID-19 pandemic and the horrors of conventional warfare in Ukraine should have had a profound impact on how seriously governments take the work of resilience professionals, both nationally and locally. Yet, this area of national security is still underinvested in and rarely placed center stage. Chronic risks like climate change only reinforce the need to prepare and equip the whole of society to be more resilient. Western governments cannot afford to sleep through the wake-up call that recent emergencies have sounded. 

With so many live, high-pressure issues to manage, it is hard for any government to prioritize planning for future risk. But, when severe crises inevitably arise, governments rarely regret having invested time, resources, and consistent focus in this field. Now is the time for governments to learn from the past and place resilience and preparedness at the heart of their national security strategies.

Elizabeth Sizeland is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a former UK deputy national security adviser. 

Veera Parko is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Congress and the Presidency and director of international affairs at the Finnish Ministry of the Interior (currently on leave).

The post Prepare for the worst: Five steps for leaders in an age of crises appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

Tracking narratives

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

Media policy

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

International response

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol. 

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack. 

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge. 

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.” 

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner. 

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries. 

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny. 

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August. 

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.” 

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

South African officials will likely be relieved by Putin’s decision to skip the summit. For months, they have sought to prevent a potential confrontation with the Kremlin over the issue, with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa even reportedly requesting permission from the International Criminal Court for some form of exemption in order to avoid arresting Putin during the summit. with tensions mounting ahead of the summit, South Africa Deputy President Paul Mashatile admitted in a July 14 interview that the best option would be for Putin to stay away. “The Russians are not happy, though,” he commented. “They want him to come.”

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Moscow’s earlier eagerness for Putin to attend the summit is easy to understand. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s relationship with the Western world has reached its lowest point since the Cold War. The Kremlin has sought to counter perceptions of mounting international isolation by emphasizing continued engagement with non-Western nations such as the BRICS grouping, which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With this in mind, Putin’s attendance of the August summit was seen as an important signal that Russia could not be isolated and remained a major force in global affairs.

With Russian prestige at stake, Kremlin officials reportedly pressed their South African counterparts hard over the issue. Indeed, in a court affidavit made public earlier this week, President Ramaphosa claimed any attempt to detain Putin could lead to war between Russia and South Africa. “I must highlight, for the sake of transparency, that South Africa has obvious problems with executing a request to arrest and surrender President Putin,” he said. “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting president would be a declaration of war.”

Russia’s efforts to pressure South Africa clearly failed, leading to the July 19 announcement that Putin would not be attending. This exercise in damage limitation makes perfect sense. Speculation over Putin’s possible arrest in South Africa was rapidly becoming a PR disaster for the Kremlin, drawing attention to his status as a suspected war criminal and undermining his strongman persona. Meanwhile, headlines claiming Moscow had threatened South Africa with war if the country dared to arrest Putin for war crimes did little to enhance Russia’s reputation as a credible partner. With South African officials unwilling or unable to provide the necessary assurances, the only remaining option was to cancel the visit entirely.

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This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2023

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

By Mercedes Sapuppo

With dozens of senior Russian officers reportedly detained following the Wagner revolt and a senior commander dismissed this week for criticizing the conduct of the Ukraine invasion, could Putin face a mutiny within the Russian army?

Conflict Crisis Management

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post “Pariah” Putin forced to cancel travel plans over fears of war crimes arrest appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 20, Markus Garlauskas was quoted in USA Today on US soldier Travis King who was detained by North Korea after fleeing across the border from US military law enforcement authorities. On July 18, Garlauskas explained in an article for The Hill that “Unfortunately, U.S. citizens detained in North Korea are typically used by the Kim regime as bargaining chips.”

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

The post Garlauskas in USA Today and The Hill appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While Ukraine’s GDP plummeted by 29.1% in 2022, the country’s tech sector still managed to outperform all expectations, generating an impressive $7.34 billion in annual export revenues, which represented 5% year-on-year growth. This positive trend has continued into 2023, with IT sector monthly export volumes up by nearly 10% in March.

This resilience reflects the combination of technical talent, innovative thinking, and tenacity that has driven the remarkable growth of the Ukrainian IT industry for the past several decades. Since the 2000s, the IT sector has been the rising star of the Ukrainian economy, attracting thousands of new recruits each year with high salaries and exciting growth opportunities. With the tech industry also more flexible than most in terms of distance working and responding to the physical challenges of wartime operations, IT companies have been able to make a major contribution on the economic front of Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression.

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Prior to the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian tech sector boasted around 5,000 companies. Ukrainian IT Association data for 2022 indicates that just two percent of these companies ceased operations as a result of the war, while software exports actually grew by 23% during the first six months of the year, underlining the sector’s robustness. Thanks to this resilience, the Ukrainian tech sector has been able to continue business relationships with its overwhelmingly Western clientele, including many leading international brands and corporations. According to a July 2022 New York Times report, Ukrainian IT companies managed to maintain 95% of their contracts despite the difficulties presented by the war.

In a world where digital skills are increasingly defining military outcomes, Ukraine’s IT prowess is also providing significant battlefield advantages. Of the estimated 300,000 tech professionals in the country, around three percent are currently serving in the armed forces, while between 12 and 15 percent are contributing to the country’s cyber defense efforts. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s IT ecosystem, hardened by years of defending against Russian cyber aggression, is now integral to the nation’s defense.

A range of additional measures have been implemented since February 2022 to enhance Ukrainian cyber security and safeguard government data from Russian attacks. Steps have included the adoption of cloud infrastructure to back up government data. Furthermore, specialized teams have been deployed to government data centers with the objective of identifying and mitigating Russian cyber attacks. To ensure effective coordination and information sharing, institutions like the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection serve as central hubs, providing updates on Russian activities and the latest threats to both civilian and government entities.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Today’s Ukraine is often described as a testing ground for new military technologies, but it is important to stress that Ukrainians are active participants in this process who are in many instances leading the way with new innovations ranging from combat drones to artillery apps. This ethos is exemplified by initiatives such as BRAVE1, which was launched by the Ukrainian authorities in 2023 as a hub for cooperation between state, military, and private sector developers to address defense issues and create cutting-edge military technologies. BRAVE1 has dramatically cut down the amount of time and paperwork required for private sector tech companies to begin working directly with the military; according to Ukraine’s defense minister, this waiting period has been reduced from two years to just one-and-a-half months.

One example of Ukrainian tech innovation for the military is the Geographic Information System for Artillery (GIS Arta) tool developed in Ukraine in the years prior to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This system, which some have dubbed the “Uber for artillery,” optimizes across variables like target type, position, and range to assign “fire missions” to available artillery units. Battlefield insights of this nature have helped Ukraine to compensate for its significant artillery hardware disadvantage. The effectiveness of tools like GIS Arta has caught the attention of Western military planners, with a senior Pentagon official saying Ukraine’s use of technology in the current war is a “wake-up call.”

Alongside intensifying cooperation with the state and the military, members of Ukraine’s tech sector are also taking a proactive approach on the digital front of the war with Russia. A decentralized IT army, consisting of over 250,000 IT volunteers at its peak, has been formed to counter Russian digital threats. Moreover, the country’s underground hacktivist groups have shown an impressive level of digital ingenuity. For example, Ukraine’s IT army claims to have targeted critical Russian infrastructure such as railways and the electricity grid.

Ukraine’s tech industry has been a major asset in the fightback against Russia’s invasion, providing a much-needed economic boost while strengthening the country’s cyber defenses and supplying the Ukrainian military with the innovative edge to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower and military equipment.

This experience could also be critical to Ukraine’s coming postwar recovery. The Ukrainian tech industry looks set to emerge from the war stronger than ever with a significantly enhanced global reputation. Crucially, the unique experience gained by Ukrainian tech companies in the defense tech sector will likely position Ukraine as a potential industry leader, with countries around the world eager to learn from Ukrainian specialists and access Ukrainian military tech solutions. This could serve as a key driver of economic growth for many years to come, while also improving Ukrainian national security.

David Kirichenko is an editor at Euromaidan Press, an online English language media outlet in Ukraine. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2023

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

By Mercedes Sapuppo

With dozens of senior Russian officers reportedly detained following the Wagner revolt and a senior commander dismissed this week for criticizing the conduct of the Ukraine invasion, could Putin face a mutiny within the Russian army?

Conflict Crisis Management

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s tech sector is playing vital wartime economic and defense roles appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, Atlantic Council experts explain what happened and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Markus Garlauskas: Success will require reaching beyond the officials in the NCG

Robert M. Soofer: On the agenda was the unthinkable—what to do if deterrence fails

Bee Yun Jo: The NCG was a success, even if it didn’t address all of South Korea’s security concerns

Jessica Taylor: The US and South Korea doubled down on ending the Kim regime if it uses nuclear weapons

Thomas Cynkin: Would the US trade Los Angeles for Seoul? South Koreans want to know.

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi: Watch what impact the NCG will have on Japan

Success will require reaching beyond the officials in the NCG

The inaugural meeting of the US-South Korea NCG is an important step in improving the assurance of South Korea, deterrence of North Korea, and the alliance’s military response capability. That senior representatives from the White House and South Korea’s presidential office led the delegations should signal the importance both sides place on following through with the Washington Declaration and set the stage for robust follow-through. However, the NCG’s engagement outside of high-level government channels may be even more pivotal to its success going forward.

The brief joint readout set out an ambitious and logical agenda of quarterly meetings to advance on several workstreams, which include some very practical measures focused not just on reassuring South Korea, but also on improving deterrence of and responses to a North Korean nuclear attack. Such a brief public readout, of course, cannot capture the full scope and detail of what has been and will be discussed at NCG meetings. Such meetings will inevitably touch upon issues that are politically sensitive, involve classified operational and intelligence information, or both. The unfortunate tendency by some South Korean and US officials, as a result, will be to keep the proceedings very “close hold” and the public readouts very brief and selective. Meanwhile, issues deemed too politically sensitive by one or both sides might not even make it on the agenda, for fear of derailing the meetings or that such discussions might leak to the press. Such an approach would not be helpful for the NCG’s goals.

The United States and South Korea should be as forthcoming as possible about the results of NCG discussions in future sessions, and they should engage outside experts extensively in a broader effort to advance the NCG’s workstreams. The benefits of such an approach, if executed, will outweigh the risks. The NCG’s proceedings should take a cue from Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines’s latest efforts on transparency, including the wise and bold step of publicly releasing the recent National Intelligence Estimate on North Korea. Ultimately, exchanging insights with a wider group of experts in parallel with official NCG meetings will help to reassure more South Koreans across the political spectrum, aid in getting the message to North Korean elites, and help to make the best use of the capabilities of government and nongovernment experts inside South Korea and the United States to achieve the NCG’s objectives.

—Markus Garlauskas led the US intelligence community’s strategic analysis on North Korea as the national intelligence officer for North Korea, after serving as the chief strategist at the US-South Korea Combined Forces Command. He is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security of the Atlantic Council, and tweets at @Mister_G_2.

On the agenda was the unthinkable—what to do if deterrence fails

The North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test just days prior to the inaugural meeting of the NCG must have been a poignant reminder to the participants about why they were there. North Korean belligerence and the expansion of its nuclear arsenal have been sowing doubts among South Koreans about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella. The purpose of the NCG is for the United States to satisfy its ally that it has the capabilities and the resolve to counter North Korean nuclear threats—and that Washington will take South Korean security interests into account when deciding how and when to use nuclear weapons.

On the agenda for the meeting were discussions about measures, some already in place, to share information on the nuclear threat, improve understanding about the role of nuclear weapons, and think through the unthinkable: what to do if nuclear deterrence fails and the United States and its allies are forced to respond to an initial North Korean nuclear use. Perhaps more important than the exchange of information was the establishment of protocols and processes for consultation between the two countries during crisis and conflict.

The nuclear dimension of any conflict will be unique, and how the United States responds will depend on the president and the circumstances (including the concerns of allies), regardless of preexisting plans. South Korean officials should appreciate this when they request ever-more detailed briefings of US nuclear plans that the Department of Defense does not provide even, for example, to its NATO allies. Tabletop exercises examining how the two sides could react after nuclear use are foundational, as are exercises conducted by US nuclear forces with potential South Korean conventional support.

Visits to South Korean ports by US nuclear submarines and overflights by US strategic bombers may not fully address the underlying security dilemma for South Korea, which is whether the United States would be willing to run the risk of North Korean nuclear retaliation against a homeland that is becoming increasingly vulnerable to Pyongyang’s long-range missiles. The United States today is protected against North Korean ICBMs due to the US national missile defense system, which should put South Koreans at ease. But the future of US homeland defense must share space in future NCG agendas along with nuclear and integrated strategic deterrence more broadly.

—Robert M. Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project.

The NCG was a success, even if it didn’t address all of South Korea’s security concerns

The inaugural NCG meeting was a success, highlighting substantial developments in combined efforts to thicken the United States’ nuclear umbrella. First of all, the meeting afforded a visible reaffirmation of the United States’ commitment to provide a full range of US capabilities, including nuclear. Along with reaffirmed words of commitment in the joint readout to “a swift, overwhelming, and decisive response” against “any nuclear attack by North Korea,” the United States and South Korea succeeded in coordinating the first port call of a US nuclear submarine in four decades. 

The NCG meeting was also successful in conveying the seriousness to both the South Korean and US governments in the implementation of the new bilateral consultations. Upgrading the first meeting to be held at deputy-level, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol also made a brief appearance at the beginning of the meeting. Reifying the Washington Declaration, the first NCG meeting laid out concrete steps, including the development of security and information sharing protocols, nuclear consultation and communication processes for contingencies, and the development of joint planning, operations, exercises, simulations, trainings, and investment activities, particularly on the execution of South Korea’s conventional support to the United States’ nuclear operations. 

Lastly, the NCG meeting reasserted South Korea’s commitment in nonproliferation. As Kim Tae-hyo, Seoul’s principal deputy national security adviser, stated during the joint press briefing, “There is no need for South Korea to consider separate nuclear armament.”

What the first NCG meeting achieved may not fully address South Korea’s security concerns. Disappointments and criticisms can be swift and easy. Yet, an important caveat here is that the Washington Declaration and implementation of the NCG rest on the conviction of the “importance, necessity, and benefit” of enduring maintenance of the United States’ nuclear umbrella. The implementation of the NCG and strengthening of the United States’ nuclear umbrella have succeeded in taking South Korea’s nuclear path again off the table. The combined efforts derive not from naïveté about an impermeable nuclear umbrella, but from realistic assessments on the risks, if not infeasibility, of South Korea’s nuclear path. 

—Bee Yun Jo is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an associate research fellow in the Defense Strategy Division at the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

The US and South Korea doubled down on ending the Kim regime if it uses nuclear weapons

A US soldier’s crossing into North Korea and subsequent detainment significantly complicates matters for the US-South Korea alliance and a Korean Peninsula that is experiencing a precarious ratcheting up of tensions. The soldier’s crossing comes amid South Korean and US efforts to strengthen deterrence through its new NCG, and it follows North Korea’s most recent launching of an ICBM. As this situation unfolds, the US-South Korea alliance will have to face the delicate balancing act of strengthening deterrence and assuaging tensions while also hoping to renew dialogue. Notably, despite the NCG and the deployment of the USS Kentucky nuclear submarine being planned for months, media coverage tied the events to North Korea’s missile launch rather than tying alliance actions to the evolution of Pyongyang’s capabilities. Thus, alliance actions pose the risk of being interpreted as retaliatory and escalatory if not properly communicated.

What was also notable about the NCG readout was the alliance’s doubling down on the threat to end the Kim regime in the event of any North Korea nuclear use. This would have to mean that the alliance intends to possibly further escalate a conflict even in the event of North Korean low-yield nuclear use. By making this threat, the alliance restricts its freedom of maneuver to de-escalate a conflict. 

While the US-South Korea alliance at this time likely intends to make good on that threat, it is questionable whether this promise will hold for subsequent US and South Korean administrations. Polarization in both US and South Korean politics make for a questionable trajectory as both countries have pivotal elections in 2024. South Korea’s legislative election in April 2024 has the potential to significantly derail Yoon’s ability to further his foreign policy approach toward North Korea and strengthen the alliance. If the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea were to, for instance, gain a supermajority (as they did in 2020), then it’s likely that the party will move to thwart Yoon’s approach to North Korea for the remainder of his one-term presidency.

Likewise, the outcome of the US presidential election is far from certain. The election has the potential of leading to another Trump administration or an administration with similar views about alliances. Notably, there has been diminishing support among US Republicans for NATO over the course of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This phenomenon will likely further international concerns surrounding the endurance of other US alliance commitments, particularly amid potential conflict escalation scenarios. 

But in the near term, we are likely to see an increasingly recalcitrant North Korea amid US-South Korean efforts to strengthen the alliance. Ahead of the seventieth anniversary of the Korean War armistice on July 27, a robust US-South Korea military exercise schedule, and the 2024 elections in South Korea and the United States, and with the complication of a US citizen now detained in North Korea, Pyongyang is unlikely to be swayed to change course without substantial concessions on the US-South Korea side. Both Seoul and Washington will likely vehemently oppose any such concessions ahead of their elections.

—Jessica Taylor is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Taylor has served in the US Department of Defense in both military and civil service capacities for nearly twenty years.

Would the US trade Los Angeles for Seoul? South Koreans want to know.

The Washington Declaration, which reaffirmed the strength of the US nuclear umbrella covering South Korea, was further reinforced this week with strong signals in the form of the NCG and a rare and highly visible port visit by a US nuclear submarine to South Korea. While these moves were welcome, they did not represent a significant shift in US policy. Rather, they were a more concrete and visible manifestation of existing US extended deterrence policy and related US-South Korea strategic stability consultations. They were aimed as much at building confidence among the South Korean public in the US nuclear deterrent—and ameliorating domestic pressure within South Korea to “go nuclear”—as at deterring North Korean aggression.

With the growth of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, now comprising enough fissile material for an estimated forty-five-to-fifty-five nuclear weapons and an expanding arsenal of missiles, North Korean capability to hold US cities at risk is increasing and the credibility of the US strategic deterrent is concomitantly being corroded. French President Charles de Gaulle famously asked US President John F. Kennedy whether the United States would trade New York for Paris. Similarly, Yoon and the South Korean public must be questioning whether the United States would trade Los Angeles for Seoul. Exercises in confidence building are useful but insufficient to resolve such doubts.

Moreover, deterring a North Korean attack is critical but not the only issue. North Korea’s capacity to sell nuclear materials, missiles, components, or even nuclear weapons poses a grave proliferation threat. Also, as the North Korean nuclear threat continues to grow, so will the pressure on regional countries, including South Korea, to go nuclear themselves. While the Washington Declaration and connected developments are a useful step, they are no substitute for a fundamental review of existing US strategy to actively contain North Korea in the face of the shifting strategic balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula.

—Thomas Cynkin is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the practice lead, Japan and Northeast Asia, of the Transnational Strategy Group, a global consulting firm operating at the nexus of policy and business.

Watch what impact the NCG will have on Japan

The inaugural NCG meeting focused much on confirming the details of how the group will operate, including the formation of workstreams to make the United States and South Korea more effective in their deterrence and response readiness against the threat posed by North Korea. The meeting was also packaged well to express the United States’ strong bilateral commitment to extended deterrence, timed with the port call by the USS Kentucky to Busan. 

Indeed, there is still much to see regarding the actual effects produced going forward, which pivots on how the United States and South Korea operationalize and execute the workstreams to prove that the NCG is essential, effective, and mutually beneficial. Moreover, there are also questions concerning the group’s sustainability considering the delicate domestic politics—particularly in South Korea, where the strategic debates and security dilemmas are still real. Should the NCG prove to be merely symbolic, this could very well boost the arguments for indigenous nuclear armament in South Korean. 

Another key area to watch going forward will be the impact the NCG has on Japan. While the NCG has to focus on making the bilateral framework effective, the continuously growing nuclear threats in the region and any proven success of the NCG will underscore the need to expand the group to a trilateral framework, or at the very least to establish a separate US-Japan NCG.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, an assistant professor at the University of Tokyo, and a research fellow at Pacific Forum.

The post Experts react: South Korea embarks on a new nuclear era. How will it play out? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 18, Michael Allen and Connor Pfeiffer co-authored a Wall Street Journal piece making the case for the United States’ ability to simultaneously counter Russia and China. Citing the US’ strengthened defense industrial base, partly bolstered by the war in Ukraine, the pair contend that the US is equipped to both provide continued support for Ukraine, as well as deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, in order to maintain this position and “remain the arsenal of democracy”, the US must continue to invest in expanding its industrial capacity.

Fellow

Michael Allen

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

China Cybersecurity

The post Allen in the Wall Street Journal on US efforts to simultaneously deter Russia and China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This apparent lack of concern mirrors the Kremlin position over Finland’s NATO membership, which was confirmed in April 2023. On that occasion, Russia also downplayed the significance of the news while making vague commitments to strengthen its own military posture in the region. Indeed, in the fourteen months since the two Nordic nations first announced their intention to join the Alliance, Moscow has done almost nothing to protest or obstruct this process, despite having a vast array of military, cyber, economic, informational, and diplomatic tools at its disposal. If Putin genuinely believed the NATO Alliance posed a security threat to the Russian Federation, he would at the very least have increased the Russian military presence close to the Finnish border. Instead, Russia reportedly reduced its troop deployments in the region by approximately 80%. These are obviously not the actions of a nation under siege.

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Russia’s remarkably relaxed reaction to the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden stands in stark contrast to the hysteria over Ukraine’s far less substantial ties to the military alliance. In the months leading up to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin and other Kremlin leaders told the world that the escalating crisis was due to years of provocative NATO expansion, while warning that deepening ties between the Alliance and Ukraine represented a red line. In reality, however, Ukraine in early 2022 was not even remotely close to joining NATO. Far from pursuing Ukraine, the Alliance had repeatedly sidestepped appeals from Kyiv for a Membership Action Plan, refusing to offer even a clear signal regarding future accession. On the eve of Russia’s invasion, the most optimistic forecasts indicated that Ukraine’s dream of joining NATO was still decades away.

It is hard to see any military logic behind the dramatically different Russian reactions to NATO’s Nordic enlargement and the Alliance’s involvement in Ukraine. After all, while a theoretical future NATO presence inside Ukraine could pose a range of major headaches for military planners in Moscow, the recent accession of Finland has already doubled the length of Russia’s shared border with the Alliance overnight. Swedish membership will arguably be even more consequential for Russia, transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. If Russia is so apparently unconcerned by these very real military challenges, why was Putin prepared to launch the biggest European war since World War II over the far more distant prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership?

It is clear from Putin’s own actions that he understands perfectly well NATO will never attack Russia. This should come as no surprise. Indeed, the entire notion of NATO invading Russia is recognized as absurd by all but the terminally swivel-eyed. This does not mean Russian objections to NATO’s post-1991 enlargement are entirely insincere; on the contrary, the growing presence of the Alliance in the former Eastern Bloc over the past thirty years is perhaps the leading source of geopolitical bitterness and resentment throughout the Russian establishment. However, it is critical to clarify that this indignation has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. NATO is not a threat to Russian security; NATO is a threat to Russian foreign policy because it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, NATO enlargement is no more or less provocative than a burglar alarm is to a thief.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

None of this has prevented Putin from using the NATO issue as a smokescreen for his imperial ambitions. For years, he has skillfully exploited anti-Western sentiment and widespread international suspicion of US foreign policy to distract from Russia’s own acts of international aggression. This tactic has proved remarkably successful; in the seventeen months since Russian troops began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of academics, commentators, and politicians around the world have all echoed Putin in blaming NATO for provoking the war. They have continued to do so even as Putin himself has compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth-century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The fact that so many prominent personalities remain ready to accept Russia’s dishonest NATO narrative is evidence of fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the Alliance and the nature of its post-Cold War enlargement. NATO is routinely depicted by critics as an expansionist military institution seeking to impose Western dominance, but this is entirely at odds with the growth of the Alliance over the past three decades. Nobody has ever been forced to join NATO; instead, every single new member since 1991 has asked for membership and has been obliged to meet a series of strict standards in order to qualify. Indeed, the loaded term “NATO expansion” may itself be misleading, as unlike Russia, the Alliance only ever expands on a voluntary basis. It is also worth underlining that while Putin plays the victim card and complains of being encircled, fear of Russian aggression has been by far the leading cause of all new membership applications.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now approaching the one-and-a-half-year mark, it is time to retire the NATO narrative. Putin has demonstrated that he is not at all threatened by the growing presence of the Alliance on Russia’s northwestern border, and is increasingly open about his imperial agenda in Ukraine. It is this Russian imperialism that poses a grave threat to international security, not the defensive guarantees offered by NATO.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2023

Disappointed but not discouraged: Ukrainians react to NATO summit

By Peter Dickinson

The 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius failed to produce a breakthrough toward Ukrainian membership but did underline international support for Ukraine in the fight against Russia’s invasion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2023

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

By Mercedes Sapuppo

With dozens of senior Russian officers reportedly detained following the Wagner revolt and a senior commander dismissed this week for criticizing the conduct of the Ukraine invasion, could Putin face a mutiny within the Russian army?

Conflict Crisis Management

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was never about NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s fundamental misreading of Ukraine is now plain to see. Far from welcoming Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainian nation united and rose up in resistance. What was anticipated by the Kremlin as a brief and victorious military campaign has instead become the biggest European war since World War II. But if the scale of Putin’s blunder is obvious, it is important to note that he is far from the only Russian harboring such delusions. Russia’s elites and Russian society as a whole tend to assume everything that needs to be known (or is worth knowing) about Ukraine and Ukrainians has long been known and requires no further inquiry. This helps to explain why until fairly recently, there were hardly any academic or analytical centers in Russia devoted specifically to Ukrainian studies.

Today’s Russian attitudes toward Ukraine reflect centuries of imperial Russian and Soviet nationality policy. In the former case, Ukrainians (and Belarusians) were officially viewed as components of a larger, supranational “all-Russian people” that also included the Russians themselves. Meanwhile, for most of the Soviet period, the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian republics were seen as the Slavic core and foundation for another supranational entity, the “Soviet people.”

The similarity between the imperial and Soviet views is unmistakable, albeit with one dissonant nuance: Soviet nationality policy, while doing all it could to erase Ukrainian national identity, at the same time officially recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a state entity and Ukrainians as a separate nationality. Putin has been highly critical of Lenin for this approach, and has claimed the Bolshevik leader was personally responsible for “creating” Ukraine. This line of thinking reached what may be seen as its logical conclusion with Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” By denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity, Putin brought the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood into question and set the stage for the current war.

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Russian misconceptions about Ukraine are in part due to the simplistic notion that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as well as those who express an affinity for Russian culture or share Russia’s antagonism toward the EU, NATO, and the West in general, all fall within the same “pro-Russian” category. Likewise, Many Russians have been all too ready to assume that any Ukrainian expressing nostalgia for the Soviet era is waiting to be “liberated” by Moscow. These misconceptions have been echoed by numerous commentators in the West, who have similarly treated evidence of favorable Ukrainian attitudes toward modern Russia or the Soviet past as indications of a desire for some form of Russian reunion.

In reality, being “pro-Russian” is understood one way in Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Kramatorsk, or Mariupol, and quite differently in Moscow, Omsk, or Tomsk. During the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine in April 2014, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a wide-ranging poll in the eight southeastern Ukrainian provinces (excluding Crimea) targeted by the Kremlin. This revealed that 70 percent of respondents were against separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia, while just 15 percent were in favor.

If separation from Ukraine was not on their wish list, what did they in fact want? A relative majority of 45 percent preferred the decentralization of power and greater rights for their region; another 25 percent favored a federated Ukraine, while only 19 percent were happy with the existing relationship with Kyiv. Other surveys conducted at around the same time yielded similar findings.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2023

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

By Mercedes Sapuppo

With dozens of senior Russian officers reportedly detained following the Wagner revolt and a senior commander dismissed this week for criticizing the conduct of the Ukraine invasion, could Putin face a mutiny within the Russian army?

Conflict Crisis Management

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin’s biggest mistake was believing Ukrainians were really Russians appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 16, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig was featured in Foreign Policy’s 2023 Summer Reading List, recommending Niccolò Machiavelli’s Art of War. Despite it being published in the 16th century, Kroenig argues that it has contemporary relevance in its discussion of emerging technologies that will revolutionize security, militaries, and war. After all, the famed political thinker faced the same issues surrounding firearms and artillery that modern militaries face with artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and hypersonic missiles.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Foreign Policy on Machiavelli’s Art of War appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 14, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig was featured in Marketplace discussing the House of Representatives’ recent authorization of an $886 billion defense bill. Kroenig argues that, atypical of most defense bills, the 2023 bill includes various amendments and provisions pertaining to social issues that are completely unrelated to defense or security.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Marketplace discussing the recent defense bill appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month’s topline events

Putin in Peril. Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the most serious challenge to his authority since taking office, as the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, mounted an insurrection against the Kremlin’s military leadership. With heavily armed mercenaries seizing the city of Rostov and moving within a few hundred miles of Moscow, a looming conflict was averted as Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s chief, agreed to stand down and go into exile in Belarus. But Prigozhin’s whereabouts remained in doubt, as Putin sought to reassert control over the Wagner Group and consolidate his grip on power.

• Shaping the order. The sudden rebellion by Prigozhin, a longtime close ally of Putin, suggests that the war in Ukraine is placing serious strains on Russia’s political leadership. Though Putin appears safe for now, the insurrection could open the door to future challenges to his rule, with the potential to shake the global order. Moscow appears to be struggling to gain control over Wagner, which has provided a crucial source of funding for Russia’s operations in Ukraine and helped the Kremlin expand its influence across the Middle East and Africa.
• Hitting home. The fall of Putin could ultimately lead to a more peaceful Russia, but political instability inside the Kremlin could also pose new risks to US security interests.
• What to do. With Putin forced to shift his focus to domestic challenges, Washington should use this opportunity to accelerate weapons support for Kyiv as Ukrainian forces push forward with their critical counteroffensive.

Blinken in Beijing. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, on a trip intended to “stabilize” relations between the two nations. While China refused a US request to resume military-to-military contacts, both sides appeared to view the talks as productive. But Chinese officials reacted bitterly to President Joe Biden’s subsequent reference to Xi as a “dictator,” calling the comments “extremely absurd and irresponsible.”

• Shaping the order. While it may temporarily help improve the atmospherics surrounding the US-China relationship, Blinken’s visit is unlikely to lead to a shift in the overall trajectory. Tensions will remain high in light of Beijing’s threats against Taiwan and other attempts to undermine the global order, as the US pursues efforts to shift supply chains in critical industries away from China, as part of a new “derisking” strategy.
• Hitting home. Seeking to maintain stable relations with the world’s second largest economy may be beneficial for the American people, but this will also require sustained efforts to defend against potential threats.
• What to do. The Biden administration should continue to coordinate with allies on strategies to counter Beijing’s assault on the global order, even as it tries to establish guardrails in the US-China relationship.

Modi’s State Visit. President Joe Biden hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House, as the administration sought to bolster economic and geopolitical ties with India. Amid media criticism of India’s backsliding on democracy, Modi was given a White House state dinner – only the third of Biden’s presidency – and invited to speak before a joint session of Congress. The two nations agreed to strengthen defense and technology cooperation, including building GE military jet engines in India and launching joint initiatives on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other areas.

• Shaping the order. Washington’s warm welcome for Modi reflects a desire to cultivate a stronger relationship with India in the context of strategic competition with China. While joint concerns over China appear to be propelling the relationship forward, it remains unclear whether the two nations can reach a more meaningful strategic partnership, especially given New Delhi’s refusal to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In addition, Modi’s targeting of religious minorities and crackdown on political dissent have raised questions about the future of the relationship.
• Hitting home. A stronger US relationship with India could generate new business opportunities for US companies seeking to reduce supply chain dependencies on China.
• What to do. While seeking to build on the positive momentum coming out of Modi’s visit, Washington should also make clear that it sees a shared commitment to democratic norms as the foundation for closer ties between the world’s two largest democracies.

Quote of the Month

“Democracies must now rally together around not just our common interests, but also our shared values. Preserving and protecting the freedoms that are essential to peace and prosperity will require vigorous leadership…”
– US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in New Delhi, India, June 5, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• Guatemala’s ruling government sought to overturn the results of the country’s presidential elections after the results indicated that Bernardo Arévalo, a reformist candidate, gained enough votes to qualify for a run-off. The State Department warned that undermining the election results would constitute a “grave threat to democracy.”
• With the support of Pakistan’s ruling government, the country’s military began implementing a broad crackdown against the media and political opposition, in the wake of national protests following the arrest of former prime minister Imran Khan.
• As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a high-profile visit to Washington, US concerns over democratic backsliding in India appeared to take a back seat in an effort to cultivate closer relations between the two nations.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

• Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the paramilitary Wagner Group, mounted an insurrection against Russia’s military leadership, but agreed to stand down after his heavily armed mercenaries came within a few hundred miles of Moscow.
• China and Cuba reached a secret agreement to allow Beijing to establish a surveillance facility on the island targeting the United States, and are in the process of negotiating a deal to establish a new joint military training facility.
• A contingent of leaders from seven African countries, including South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Putin, in a bid to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, though neither side accepted the African proposal.
• In a further indication of Seoul’s tilt toward a harder line on China, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol directly criticized China’s ambassador in Beijing for his comments critical of South Korea’s joining US-led initiatives.
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

• The US and Britain issued the Atlantic Declaration, a new economic framework aimed at enhancing cooperation on critical and emerging technology, supply chains, clean energy, and other issues, as a potential counterpart to the US-EU Trade and Technology Council.
• The US and thirteen other members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework reached an agreement on supply chains – one of the framework’s four core pillars – that will result in several new bodies focused on advancing supply chain resiliency.
• On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons (↑)

• The United Nations adopted the world’s first treaty aimed at protecting the high seas and preserving marine biodiversity in international waters, which constitute over two-thirds of the ocean.
• The US announced plans to rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in an effort to counter China’s growing sway in multilateral fora. After the Trump administration withdrew the US from the organization in 2017, China became one of its largest donors.
• On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

• French President Emmanuel Macron expressed opposition to a proposal by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to open a NATO liaison office in Japan, suggesting that the alliance should stay focused in the North Atlantic region.
• On his first trip to the White House since taking office, British prime minister Rishi Sunak met with Joe Biden, as the two leaders committed to closer cooperation on a range of political and economic issues.
• US-India relations appeared to enter a new chapter as Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined President Joe Biden for an official state visit in Washington.
• On balance, the alliance pillar was unchanged. 

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Lucan Ahmad Way, in Foreign Affairs, contends that revolutionary autocracies have demonstrated remarkable staying power, even in the face of mounting challenges.
• Hal Brands, in Foreign Policy, suggests that Russia, China, Iran, and to some extent North Korea constitute a bloc of adversaries more cohesive and dangerous than anything the United States has faced in decades.
• Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree, in Foreign Affairs, argue that in the face of Chinese aggression, a policy of continued non-alignment will not serve India well.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that Ukraine deserves NATO membership, as well as more robust weapons support.
• John Herbst and Dan Fried, in the Washington Post, suggest that the key to a Ukrainian victory in its war against Russia may lie in a successful advance to retake Crimea.
• Patrick Quirk and Caitlin Dearing Scott, writing for the Atlantic Council, argue for a fully developed foreign aid strategy to help the US succeed in strategic competition with China and Russia.
• Peter Engelke and Emily Weinstein, writing for the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper series, set forth a comprehensive strategy for the US and its allies to retain its technological advantage over China.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing June 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 14, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest article, Kroenig and Ashford extensively debate the NATO Summit in Vilnius, providing inputs on the Alliance’s communique, Turkey’s decision to support Sweden’s bid for NATO membership, and more. Specifically, the pair debate if an “Israel model” would work for Ukraine.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate the potential of NATO membership for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer four pressing questions about what just happened and what to expect next.

1. Why did Russia pull out of the deal?

Moscow’s notification to the UN, Kyiv, and Ankara that it was suspending participation in the grain deal and would not renew the deal further is part of a negotiating strategy to loosen sanctions and gain more freedom of maneuver. Russian standard practice is to make humanitarian measures conditional upon concessions that serve its military, economic, and political interests—as it has with earlier negotiations on the grain deal and numerous times over relief and aid deliveries in Syria. 

Specific demands in this case include readmitting the Russian agricultural lender Rosselkhozbank back into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) mechanism, allowing Russia to import repair parts for agricultural machinery, and unfreezing other assets. Moscow claims that the deal, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, has not delivered on points that were to benefit Russia, but this round of pressure is certainly about more than the letter of the deal; it is about easing sanctions pressure.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

2. What’s the next move for Ukraine and its Western partners?

In October 2022, Russia left the grain deal, actually suspended its participation, and there were only three parties left: the UN, Turkey, and Ukraine. The grain corridors at that time functioned well, in part because the Russian inspectors had been disrupting the grain deals from inside. The most rational way to react to this withdrawal is to proceed in the trilateral format with the UN, Ukraine, and Turkey. I don’t think Russia has a lot of options now. In the northwestern part of the Black Sea, Russia lacks capacity to inflict any major damage. Since Ukrainian armed forces retook Snake Island last year, the maritime area has been largely controlled by the Ukrainian side. So there is little possibility for a major disruption by Russian vessels in this part of the Black Sea.

Russia could say that continuing the deal in a trilateral format crosses a “red line.” But if Russian forces attack a vessel transporting grain, it could trigger a major reaction that Moscow would not want to face, depending on which country the vessel belongs to, who is the owner, and who the sailors are. I would not be surprised if after a meeting or phone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the next few weeks, Russia rejoins the grain deal.

Meanwhile, messages from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have been very clear that there has been no deal between Ukraine and Russia. The deal is among Ukraine, Turkey, and the UN. What Putin undermines now is his agreement with the UN and Turkey, not with Ukraine. Russia’s halt of its participation in the deal will likely further increase insurance costs, but in June the Ukrainian government approved a maritime compensation scheme so that vessels calling at Ukrainian ports will be compensated if they are damaged due to Russian military activity. So, from the Ukrainian side, there is readiness to proceed with the deal.

While trying to keep the grain corridors functioning, it’s also important to step up efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, a basic principle of international law. Crimea must be de-occupied and should not become a bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow, because Russia will continue to use Crimea to threaten security in the Black Sea and global food markets for as long as it is allowed to do so.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a former foreign-policy adviser to the Ukrainian prime minister. 

In practice, the deal had pretty much collapsed some time ago when ships started to disappear from the horizon off of Odesa’s Black Sea coast. Normally, up to a dozen bulk carriers are waiting to be loaded; in the past couple weeks, one or two at best—indicating things weren’t working well at the joint clearance center in Istanbul. (Ukrainians have blamed Russian inspectors for deliberately slowing down clearance procedures.) 

So what happens next? The UN and Western nations should not succumb to the Kremlin’s blackmailing tactics. Russia should not be given another chance to weaponize food—nor be given sanctions relief in exchange for allowing ships carrying food to sail through international waters.

A global food emergency should be declared and, as I told BBC World News this morning, arrangements made for ships to sail under armed escort through the Black Sea. Of course, such a measure would never get past Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council. So creative diplomacy is required, perhaps with the European Union taking the lead.

In the near term, Ukraine should also be assisted with moving grain transport onto alternative arteries such as the Danube River and onto trains and trucks. Poland can play a key role by alleviating the days-long waits truck drivers currently face entering Poland from Ukraine. 

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center based in Odesa, Ukraine.

3. What are the prospects for getting the deal back, and what could the UN and Turkey do right now?

The deal will likely survive because Ukraine, Turkey, and Europe more broadly, as well as a number of developing nations, benefit from it, which likely makes modest concessions to the Russian position acceptable to the leaders of those countries. Given the disinclination of either the Turks or NATO to directly intervene in the conflict, it is unlikely that there will be direct military escorts for grain ships rather than a negotiated deal. Nor do the Russian forces appear ready for a major naval escalation in the Black Sea, so there is a fair chance they will settle in the end. The reputational and economic costs of a prolonged end to grain shipments will hurt Russia, too, so I do not expect a prolonged or permanent cancellation of the deal.

—Rich Outzen

4. What impact does this have on the developing world?

The threat to global economic landscape and food security—especially in Africa and other developing regions—is hard to overstate. While once soaring food prices amid pandemic supply chain disruptions and Russia’s war had begun to stabilize, thanks in large part to the more than thirty million tons of wheat exported from Ukraine under this deal, the situation remains volatile. Down from its peak of 160 in March of 2022, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Food Price Index was at 122 in June, still a third higher than June 2020, when it was 93. Globally, food price inflation remains higher than 5 percent per year in more than 60 percent of low-income countries and nearly 80 percent of lower-middle-income and high-income countries. Real food inflation is as high as 80 percent in Zimbabwe, 30 percent in Egypt, and 14 percent in Laos. And within countries, women and already vulnerable communities tend to be hardest hit. In just the last two weeks, the World Bank reported that wheat prices had decreased by 3 percent globally—gains Monday’s announcement are all but certain to reverse.

—Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and global head, inclusive economic growth at Abt Associates.

The post Russia just quit a grain deal critical to global food supply. What happens now? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Western powers are now more united with the Baltic nations than ever before. After months of diplomatic delays, Sweden can now join NATO—a genuine triumph for the Biden administration. This development has enormous geostrategic implications for the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies, a board of trustees member of International Crisis Group, and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and Global Board of Advisors at The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem.

The post Charai in the National Interest: Sweden’s NATO Accession Limits Putin’s Options appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the June 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the complexity of recovering manned spacecraft from orbit and landing them on other bodies in the solar system.

Fellow

Marco Tantardini

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Italy Space

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Tantardini in Longitude on the future of human spaceflight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anna Wieslander was interviewed on how Sweden will contribute to NATO’s collective security and the reaction from Russia.

“Sweden has a modern and professional Armed Forces and an advanced defense industrial base. weden possesses a highly advanced air force, with the Swedish JAS Gripen fighter aircraft at its core. In addition, Sweden’s significant naval power, including its submarine fleet, adds to the military strength. With a history of operating submarines in the Baltic Sea since 1904, Sweden has extensive regional experience in submarine warfare.”

“Now, with Turkey’s approval for Sweden, the Kremlin has stated that it will respond with measures similar to those proposed for Finland. The specific nature of these measures remains unclear, but it is conceivable that Russia could resort to hybrid tactics, such as cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns, as part of its response.”

The post Wieslander interviewed by Spanish La Razón appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But that wasn’t the case this week. The NATO Summit in Lithuania will be remembered both for the public fireworks over Ukraine’s aspirations for Alliance membership and outcomes that included a breakthrough on Swedish membership, the most detailed and robust defense plans since the Cold War, and unprecedented Group of Seven (G7) defense commitments to Kyiv.

Let’s start with the fireworks, unusual in a consensus-driven Alliance that values decorum and discretion, and end with the historic outcomes.

Tensions began simmering long before the summit among Biden administration officials and other NATO allies—with Ukraine lobbing arguments from the outside—over just how far to go in committing the Alliance to a time-linked invitation and roadmap for Ukraine’s membership.

For the Biden administration, it was a matter of geopolitical prudence to oppose any fixed timeline for an invitation for fear it would draw NATO, and hence the United States, into a direct conflict with Russia. With one eye on the 2024 US presidential election and the other on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear capabilities, why take the risk, particularly as full Ukrainian membership wasn’t likely to come before the war ended anyway?

For Ukraine’s more impatient supporters—particularly, but not exclusively, those geographically closer to the Russian threat—it was a matter of strategic imperative and moral obligation to draft language that provided more clarity on the pathway and potential timing of a NATO membership invitation than Washington considered acceptable. Several of those supporters had previously been occupied and repressed by Moscow, so they understand the value of NATO security guarantees.

Even if membership itself wouldn’t come for some time, they wanted to demonstrate maximum common cause for a people who miraculously and at enormous human cost are countering Russia’s war and revanchist ambitions.

The behind-the-scenes simmer boiled over when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, apparently having read a draft of the summit communiqué about to be released, threw a Twitter bomb into the negotiating room.

What he objected to was text at the end of paragraph eleven, which read: “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met.”

Zelenskyy shot back before the draft could be released:

“It’s unprecedented and absurd when time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine. It seems there is no readiness neither to invite Ukraine to NATO nor to make it a member of the Alliance. This means that a window of opportunity is being left to bargain Ukraine’s membership in NATO in negotiations with Russia. And for Russia, this means motivation to continue its terror. Uncertainty is weakness. And I will openly discuss this at the summit.”

Before long, word spread in Vilnius that at least one ally had “broken silence,” which in NATO-speak means that during an agreed period after the communiqué has been finalized and before it is publicly released, any ally may come back with an objection and reopen negotiations.

Though it’s unclear what transpired next, officials involved in the negotiations described scenes during the summit in which US President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stood over the document and hand-drafted changes. In the end, the US stance on Ukrainian membership proved immovable, even resisting attempts by at least one other ally to at the very least state that it was NATO’s intention to explore ways to invite Ukraine to join the Alliance as soon as the seventy-fifth-anniversary summit in Washington next July.

Given all that, there was more than a little buzz when Biden, in his fiery speech in Vilnius—in which he hailed the “unbroken” Ukrainian people—neglected to mention or encourage their NATO  membership aspirations. 

Even after NATO made the communiqué public, tensions still simmered.

At the NATO Public Forum, (a side event for the summit that the Atlantic Council co-hosted), Daria Kaleniuk, a Ukrainian anti-corruption activist, provocatively asked Sullivan how to explain to her young son, who is sleeping in their corridor due to air raids, that Biden isn’t ready to accept Ukraine into NATO. She suggested it might be “because he is afraid of Russia, afraid of Russia losing, afraid Ukraine winning,” or even suggested, “because there are back-channel negotiations with Russia” that ostensibly had Ukraine’s NATO hopes as a bargaining chip.

Sullivan was warm but firm to his questioner, acknowledging that the world stands in “awe” at the way Ukrainians have made sacrifices with “hell raining down from the skies” around them. At the same time, he scolded Kaleniuk for making “insinuations” that were “unfounded and unjustified” and asked that those insinuations “get checked at the door, so that we can talk to one another in goodwill and good faith.”

Beyond that, Sullivan added, “I think the American people do deserve a degree of gratitude” from both the US government and the rest of the world “for their willingness to step up” to provide such plentiful military assistance to Ukraine.

With tensions high, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace hit a similar theme, “providing a slight word of caution” that Ukraine should express more appreciation to its supporters.

When asked by reporters for his response to Wallace, Zelenskyy replied, “he can write to me about how he wants to be thanked.”

Were it not for the fireworks, the world’s focus would have been more singularly on the summit’s results.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dropped his objections to Sweden’s membership, opening the way for it to join the Alliance. That leaves Putin facing a bigger and more unified NATO, strengthening defense in the Baltic states and the High North.

Real progress also came through a pledge by G7 countries (all in NATO except Japan), although it is not binding, to provide Ukraine “enduring” support—which each country will determine individually—including more defense equipment, increased intelligence sharing, and expanded training, dramatically reducing the likelihood of eroding resolve.

There was plenty more in the NATO Summit communiqué on defense plans, strengthened commitments to defense investment, and deeper global partnerships, particularly with leaders on hand from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea; there was also robust language on China and warnings not to provide lethal support to its Russian friends for their Ukraine war.   

By summit’s end, and by the convening of the renamed and reconstituted NATO-Ukraine Council, tempers had calmed some and diplomacy had intervened on the Ukraine issue, though some bad blood will likely linger.

Zelenskyy went home not with a NATO invitation but with family photo-like pictures alongside NATO leaders, as mentioned in my Inflection Points column last week, and a dramatically different tone than his earlier missive, as shown in a video he tweeted from his train ride home to Kyiv:

“We are returning home with a good result for our country and, very importantly, for our warriors… For the first time since independence, we have formed a security foundation for Ukraine on its way to NATO. These are concrete security guarantees that are confirmed by the top seven democracies in the world. Never before have we had such a security foundation, and this is the level of the G7… Very importantly, during these two days of the [NATO] Summit, we have put to rest any doubts and ambiguities about whether Ukraine will be in NATO. It will! For the first time, not only do all the allies agree on this, but a significant majority in the alliance is vigorously pushing for it.”

At a closing session for the NATO Public Forum, I asked Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis how history would remember the Vilnius summit.

“Strategically, we won,” he said. “We committed ourselves to Ukrainian membership in NATO.” Unlike the 2008 commitment at the Bucharest NATO Summit that had no follow up, Landsbergis said the Alliance and Ukraine this time won’t waste another day, because of the urgency that Putin’s war had placed on everyone.

The Vilnius summit “was not the last stop,” he said. “We have to see it as a bridge. And the next stop is Washington. So, we have a full year. Lots to do…. Washington can actually be even more historic than Vilnius.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 NATO’s promises to Ukraine mark real progress
ECONOMIST

The Economist reports that although NATO allies could have done more at this week’s summit in Vilnius, they dealt a number of blows to Putin that went far beyond Ukraine.

“Putin’s first defeat was over a different expansion of NATO,” the Economist writes. “Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said he is dropping his objections to Sweden’s membership, enabling it to follow its Nordic neighbor, Finland, into the alliance. That will strengthen the Baltic states and the High North, and tie up more of Putin’s resources should he attempt mischief against NATO anywhere along its frontier.”

Further, with increased military assistance from G7 countries, it will become harder for Putin to maintain his resolve. “The G7 members promise that this will be an ‘enduring’ commitment, and that each country will, individually, craft its own security guarantees for Ukraine that will give it a ‘sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future.’… This matters because it helps disabuse Putin and his elites of the belief that Western resolve will crumble if only Russia clings on.”

Although delaying Ukraine’s NATO membership process until after the war will likely give Russia incentive to prolong the war, the Economist argues, the additional military assistance should prevent that from happening. “That is where the summit made real progress.” Read more →

#2 The ‘Israel Model’ Won’t Work for Ukraine
Eliot A. Cohen | ATLANTIC

In this important Atlantic piece, Eliot Cohen argues that the “Israel model”—in which the West would arm Ukraine to the teeth to guarantee its ability to defeat any credible military threat—is a poor policy choice based on flawed reasoning.

Cohen writes that the main difference between 1973 Israel and 2023 Ukraine is that Israel had a military edge over its neighbors, which Ukraine currently lacks over Russia. “Israel staged bombing raids against targets deep in Syria and Egypt, including their capitals, from the 1960s forward, and unlike the Ukrainian drones flying to Moscow, these were not mere symbolic strikes. The Six Day War, in 1967, was an overwhelming Israeli victory, which involved the annihilation of its neighbors’ air forces and the advance of Israeli armor and infantry across the de facto 1949 border. The 1973 war similarly ended with Israeli forces within artillery range of Damascus and on the verge of destroying half the Egyptian force that had crossed the Suez Canal.”

Most provocatively, Cohen writes about the difference between an Israel with a nuclear arsenal and a Ukraine that gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 in a deal under which Moscow promised to safeguard its sovereignty and security. “Unless, of course,” Cohen warns in his conclusion, “[Biden] prefers to be the father of the Ukrainian atom bomb.” Read more →

#3 Russia’s Nuclear Option Hangs Over Ukraine and NATO
Robbie Gramer | FOREIGN POLICY

To gain an understanding of how fears of nuclear conflict played into this week’s decision, read Robbie Gramer in Foreign Policy.

“The nuclear question is an existential one for the alliance,” he writes, “one that’s driven Washington’s calculations on what military aid to send to Ukraine and when, and it has also influenced the debate on when and how to allow Ukraine to join the military alliance as a full-fledged member.”

According to Gramer, US and allied officials are divided over the validity of Russian threats. “Some US and other NATO defense officials believe there could be an increased risk of Russia launching a limited nuclear strike with a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon to stave off a major battlefield defeat if its forces look to be on the verge of a rout, or if Ukraine appears poised to capture Crimea and large swaths of occupied territory in southern and eastern Ukraine. Others say that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling won’t go further than that, and bowing to such threats will only embolden Russia to use such ‘nuclear blackmail’ in the future.”

“At the same time, Ukrainian and Western officials also fear that Russia could mount an attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to attempt to trigger a major radiological event, irrespective of whether it launches a nuclear strike—though it’s unclear how successful those efforts would be.” Read more →

#4 Biden Pledges Long-Term Backing for Ukraine, but a U.S. Election Looms
Zolan Kanno-Youngs | NEW YORK TIMES

For insight into the role of US domestic politics on the NATO summit and Biden’s decision making, look no further than Zolan Kanno-Youngs’s reporting in the New York Times.

“Despite Biden’s repeated promises of staying by Ukraine’s side in its war against Russia, questions about the shelf life of support among American people and lawmakers hung over the summit of Western allies,” Kanno-Youngs writes. “Even as the US president was giving a long-term commitment, a group of far-right Republican lawmakers in Washington was pushing legislation that would scale back aid to Ukraine, exposing fractures in the Republican Party and raising doubts about its commitment should it capture the White House next year.”

According to Kanno-Youngs, to sway domestic public opinion to favor providing aid to Ukraine, Biden has framed the war as an existential battle between democracy and autocracy. In Vilnius, Biden was determined to address the doubts about continued US support for Ukraine. “We will not waver,” Biden said. “I mean that. Our commitment to Ukraine will not weaken.” Read more →

#5 Should Ukraine Negotiate with Russia?
Dmytro Natalukha; Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried; Angela Stent; Samuel Charap | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In dialogue with Samuel Charap, who previously urged the use of diplomacy as a tool to end the war with Ukraine, Dmytro Natalukha, Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried (an Atlantic Council distinguished fellow), and Angela Stent argue that negotiations with Russia are bound to fail. Read this multifaceted analysis to understand the pros and cons of negotiation with Russia.

Natalukha claimed that the only way to secure Ukraine’s future is to remove Putin from power. “If the goal is to prevent Russia from threatening democracies around the world, allowing it to reach an armistice with Ukraine won’t do much good,” he writes. “Ukraine and its allies must aim to make Russia less anti-Western. Regardless of what happens at the negotiating table, therefore, Putin cannot remain in power.”

Polyakova and Fried believe that although negotiation will most likely happen, the battlefield is Ukraine’s best position from which to win the war: “A military stalemate is indeed possible. And at some point, negotiations with Russia will be needed to end this war. But Ukraine should start negotiating only when it is in the strongest possible position; it should not be rushed into talks when Russia shows no interest in any settlement terms other than Ukraine’s surrender. Starting negotiations now would mean accepting Putin’s maximalist terms. If Russia suffers further setbacks on the battlefield, however, talks could proceed from a better starting place.”

Polyakova and Fried continue, “The most important point, which Ukraine’s allies agree on, is that Ukraine must define the right moment for negotiations. That may or may not be when all of Ukraine’s territory is liberated. The key is for Ukraine to maintain flexibility in its decisions about its territory and the path toward a just peace.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jul 11, 2023

Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts decode the summit’s implications for Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s approach to China, and more.

Belarus Central Europe

UkraineAlert Jul 11, 2023

NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated

By Peter Dickinson

The 2023 NATO summit failed to deliver on hopes for a clear commitment on future Ukrainian membership, leaving many in Ukraine deeply frustrated by the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s allies, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Corruption

New Atlanticist Jul 10, 2023

Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Europe & Eurasia European Union

The post Dispatch from Vilnius: Inside a NATO Summit of high drama on Ukraine—and historic opportunity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander explains that she worked on NATO standardization in the 1990s at the Swedish Ministry of Defence. There she was responsible for the work on the partnership that Sweden entered into with the alliance. “Nevertheless, for various reasons, the countries have chosen to make national solutions and variants of a lot of different things, and this is now showing up in Ukraine when they receive weapons from all sorts of places that have to work together in real life.”

The post Wieslander interviewed by Svenska Dagbladet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“If Turkey had not given Sweden the green light, the Vilnius meeting could not have been considered a success. The negotiations between Sweden and Turkey were difficult and required diplomatic efforts. Ulf Kristersson’s government worked hard on them, alongside the allies and also Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,” Wieslander told Finnish news outlet YLE.

The post Wieslander interviewed by Finnish YLE appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sweden’s journey to accession seems to be playing out along Turkey’s preferred timeline, coming one month after Sweden’s tougher anti-terror laws came into force and having been affirmed at the Alliance’s marquee gathering for maximum effect. Recent developments—including fresh pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) demonstrations and a Quran burning in Sweden—threatened to derail the process, but Turkey should be credited for not giving in to these provocations.

The agreement is the latest and greatest signal that Turkey has decided to align more with the West. Other notable signals came in the form of Turkey’s hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (during which Ankara reiterated its longstanding support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and angered Moscow by releasing Azov battalion commanders) and the reiteration of the value it places on European Union membership. All these signals happened in a span of three days. The developments stand in stark contrast to speculation—that has arisen since before Turkey first raised an issue with Sweden’s accession—that Turkey, under Erdoğan, is pivoting toward Russia and the East.

Two months ago, when in the heat of a tough re-election campaign, Erdoğan accused Western countries (including the United States) of colluding with the opposition to remove him from power. At that point, the trajectory of Turkey’s relations with transatlantic allies appeared much less clear. Once Erdoğan won the presidential elections and the parliament became distinctly more nationalist, there were fears an emboldened Turkey would move toward the East. The first hint that this would not be the case, and that the president’s pragmatism would once again emerge, appeared in the selection of the post-election cabinet, which broadly elevated several pro-Western voices—including widely respected Mehmet Şimşek, who was brought back as minister of treasury and finance—and sidelined the most outspoken transatlantic skeptics.

Analysts close to the Turkish government were quick to assert that Turkey’s moves constitute not so much a pivot to the West but a push to balance relations and mend troubled relationships in line with a course Turkey has been pursuing for many years. On the other hand, there is speculation that part of the impetus lies in the perception of a weakened Russia following the Wagner Group mutiny in June and its aftermath. What is clear is that a weaker Russian President Vladimir Putin renders Moscow a less reliable partner for Turkey. Particularly since the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan’s government, Turkey-Russia relations have been driven from the top down by leader-to-leader chemistry. While Turkey and Russia’s deep economic relations are unlikely to be interrupted or curtailed, the idea or illusion of Russia as a balance or alternative to the West in any kind of strategic sense will begin to fray.

This move from Erdoğan is a major win for Sweden, Turkey, and the whole Alliance. It’s also a big win for the Biden administration and for NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who both worked very hard behind the scenes to make the agreement possible.

The breakthrough followed soon after a phone call between the US and Turkish presidents and after a flurry of contact between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and their counterparts. A major, yet unofficial, sweetener to the agreement appears to be the United States’ assurance, issued one day after Erdoğan’s agreement, that it will sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, which Turkey first requested in October 2021 (after its ejection from the F-35 program) but has been thus far blocked by Congress.

In a pre-NATO Summit interview over the weekend, Biden alluded to boosting support for both Greece and Turkey’s defense capabilities simultaneously as a way to push the F-16 deal through Congress. That hearkens back to how the United States has historically balanced its two key allies in Southeastern Europe through aid dating back to the Truman Doctrine, which laid the groundwork for the eventual inclusion of both in NATO. It also underlines the importance of Turkey’s warming of ties with Greece in the wake of the devastating earthquake this February. These factors may play a role in overcoming the concerns of key members of the US Congress, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who confirmed that he is in talks with the Biden administration on the F-16 sale.

Finalizing Sweden’s NATO accession—which still needs to be ratified by Turkey’s parliament (as well as Hungary’s)—and completing the F-16 deal would be big steps toward rebuilding trust between Turkey and its transatlantic partners. In a speech on July 12, Erdogan announced that Turkey’s parliament will take up ratification after the long recess in October, in line with the parliamentary calendar. 

One grievance from Turkey regarding its troubled transatlantic relationship is the perception that its Western allies have never fully appreciated Turkey’s security concerns. Despite officially designating the PKK—Turkey’s number one security threat—as a terrorist organization, the United States and Europe have not shown Turkey the deference that it feels due on this issue. This is in part due to the United States’ cooperation with the PKK’s Syrian affiliate to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Turkey’s temporary block on Sweden afforded Turkey the opportunity, in high-stakes fashion, to remind the Alliance that its concerns need to be taken more seriously moving forward. 

One way to read Turkey’s post-election foreign-policy posture is a willingness to improve its relations with the West. Over the past three years, Turkey has aggressively pursued and concluded rapprochements with many countries in its neighborhood including Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. While Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies never deteriorated as much as they did with the aforementioned countries, there is without question room to improve. Turkey, Sweden, the United States, and NATO have all committed to win-win moves that would contribute to a more positive and productive atmosphere. Now, they all need to follow through.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

The post With re-election behind him, Erdogan is turning toward the West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer the most pressing questions about Germany’s new China strategy and what it will mean for relations between Europe and Asia’s largest economies. 

1. Much has been made of the Zeitenwende prompted by Russia. Are we seeing a similar shift in German thinking on China?

Those expecting a Zeitenwende in Germany’s China policy from the country’s first-ever comprehensive China strategy will be disappointed. For China hawks in Washington, Germany’s new strategy will offer too much evolution and not enough revolution in Berlin’s approach to Beijing. The product of a contentious interagency process and partisan divergences in a complex three-way coalition, the new strategy starts with a familiar balancing act between calling out a more aggressive China and keeping Germany’s options open to continue its economic relationship with Beijing. It still tries to square the triangle of China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. The strategy acknowledges that “China has changed” and, along with it, German policy toward China must change, but fails to translate this into sufficiently specific or ambitious policy proposals. The document picks up European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s “de-risking” approach but also rules out decoupling. Throughout, it touts a coordinated approach at the European Union (EU) level—something China hawks among fellow member states might throw back at Berlin, which is seen by some as slow-walking a tougher approach to China in Brussels.

At the same time, a closer look reveals some important progress. Berlin’s China strategy avoids some of the biggest mistakes of its recently released national security counterpart. Most notably, it makes a more explicit assessment of the strengths and assets Germany can bring to bear in a more contentious Sino-German relationship. These are inevitably intertwined with EU competences, from the leverage the European single market affords Germany, to a proposed anti-coercion instrument and the new foreign subsidies regulation, to competition policy tools, tech regulation, and raw materials initiatives. Reflecting a recent government drive toward greater diversification, the document dedicates a separate chapter to “global partnerships”—from Africa and Central Asia to Latin America—and a proactive EU trade policy. In contrast to the national security strategy, it also makes explicit efforts to improve whole-of-government coordination, installs a regular (if somewhat vague) reporting mechanism on the strategy’s implementation, and highlights the need to strengthen expertise on China in the government and policy community more broadly.                

—Jӧrn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

With this strategy, Germany has put the Merkel-era naiveté toward China to rest. It highlights the need for Germany to become more resilient, invest in greater China competence, defend the global order, and engage with like-minded partners in order to outcompete China. The strategy also has a particular European component and takes a whole-of-government approach by increasing intergovernmental coordination on China. Not everybody in government, business, or academia will agree with the strategy, but it cements the slow shift that has taken place in German strategic thinking, which hopefully will continue.

—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow in the Europe Center and the director of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels.

The document confirms Germany’s adoption of a tougher approach toward a “changed” China under Xi Jinping. It underscores that Berlin will reduce dependencies and better protect its interests in the bilateral relationship even as Germany values continued engagement with Beijing to tackle global challenges. The question is whether this unvarnished take on the need for a transformed German approach to China will be matched with actionable government policies.  

Notable elements include the conclusion that Beijing seeks to leverage economic and technological dependence on China to achieve political ends and that Berlin, in coordination with its EU partners, must commit to a “de-risking” strategy to reduce vulnerabilities across critical sectors and supply chains. Beijing has made clear its distaste for the “de-risking” terminology first employed by von der Leyen in March and which US and European leaders have since adopted, viewing it as just another version of “decoupling” that US allies may find more palatable to the ear. Indeed, the Chinese embassy in Berlin responded today that “forcibly ‘de-risking’ based on ideological prejudice and competition anxiety will only be counterproductive.” 

—David O. Shullman is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia.

2. How involved militarily is Germany in the Indo-Pacific now, and what does this strategy tell us about how that will change?

The strategy takes an incredible leap forward! This is a welcome change from the national security strategy, which hardly mentioned the Indo-Pacific at all. In the China strategy, Germany is starting to take a “one-theater” approach to China, linking the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. On several occasions, the strategy notes the challenge posed by the Sino-Russian relationship and explicitly mentions that “developments in the Indo-Pacific can have a direct impact on Euro-Atlantic security.” In this context, Germany wants to increase its presence as a security actor, aiming to expand military cooperation and arms exports in the Indo-Pacific.

—Roderick Kefferpütz 

3. How does Germany’s China approach compare with that of its European neighbors and the United States?

One notable aspect of Berlin’s new strategy is how extensively and explicitly it’s tied into the EU’s overall approach to China, signaling to Chinese leaders that they may be facing a less favorable environment—at least in Berlin—for trying to create divisions within the EU and undermine a stronger and more unified approach toward China. Germany’s strategy uses multiple sections to lay out how its approach is embedded within a broader EU strategy and articulate a vision for strengthening the EU’s capacity for contending with China. 

Many of the elements of Germany’s strategy for dealing with China as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival” echo the recommendations that von der Leyen laid out earlier this year, such as enhancing domestic economic competitiveness and resilience and strengthening coordination with like-minded partners.

—Colleen Cottle is the deputy director of the Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency official.

The released strategy suggests divisions within the government over what role the transatlantic relationship plays when it comes to China. Earlier versions of the strategy mentioned the transatlantic relationship roughly twice as much and stated that the transatlantic partnership “plays a decisive role in a successful China policy.” This has been artificially toned down and reworded to “coordination with Germany’s closest partners is fundamental to our foreign policy; this also applies to our policy-making with and vis-à-vis China. Both the transatlantic alliance and the close partnership built on trust with the United States, including in the G7, is of tremendous importance for the EU and for Germany.”

The earlier leak also highlighted that “Germany, the EU and our valued partners are in a global systemic competition with China,” while the published version says “China has entered a geopolitical rivalry with the United States,” indirectly suggesting that Germany is standing on the sidelines. But this is not the case, as the strategy makes clear.

Germany takes a leadership role in this strategy by taking a networked, allies-based perspective. The strategy notes that its China policy is part of a joint EU policy on China, aims to Europeanize Germany’s approach to China, and even highlights that countries wishing to join the EU should align their approach to China with the bloc’s. Germany defines the China challenge in the context of different regions of the world and at the level of global institutions, regularly identifying valuable partners in this regard.

—Roderick Kefferpütz 

4. What do we expect the reaction to be in Beijing?

Chinese leaders will note the call for German companies to “internalize” risk calculations as they consider current and future investments in China—indicating that the government may not bail them out in the event of geopolitical events, such as a crisis over Taiwan. The strategy includes language on the role that export controls and investment screening play in ensuring economic engagement with China does not bolster its military capabilities—highlighting concerns around Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy—or “encourage systematic human rights violations in China.”

Beijing will also take note of the strategy’s call for stepped up engagement with Taiwan and welcoming of its greater participation in international fora, albeit while still reaffirming Germany’s one-China policy. The strategy mentions Germany’s growing security role in the Indo-Pacific, along with the need for differences over Taiwan to be settled peacefully. Importantly, the document also highlights that China is a “systemic rival” that seeks to upend the rules-based international order.

Chinese leaders, however, will remain hopeful that the strategy’s tough rhetoric will not be matched by government action. The lack of specifics on binding requirements to curtail German economic dependence on China, restrict outbound investment, or adopt tougher export control measures will bolster such hopes. Beijing will view the document’s reiteration of the need for continued economic engagement, combined with the fact that China remains Germany’s top trading partner and companies like BASF and Volkswagen have pledged to expand investment in China, as indicators that it retains leverage to prevent Berlin from aligning with Washington’s more hardline China policies. Beijing will also be attentive to the apparent daylight between those in government advocating for a tougher China policy and Scholz himself, who visited Beijing in November accompanied by a sizable business delegation and recently expressed the view that the government has a limited role in any de-risking policy.  

Beijing is betting that, despite the strong rhetoric here, government inaction and economic realities in Germany will offer opportunities to steer Berlin back toward the more pro-China position of years past. 

—David Shullman

Beijing will be watching closely to see how this strategy translates into concrete action. It will also be looking for opportunities to try to soften or slow roll any disadvantageous measures by leveraging German companies’ continued strong reliance on the Chinese market—a shortcoming identified in this strategy—and Berlin’s desire for continued cooperation with China in areas like climate change, sustainable development, global health, and broadly defined “economic and trade relations,” as laid out in the strategy. 

—Colleen Cottle

The post Is Germany shifting its approach on China? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Shahbazi’s confession is quite detailed. He reveals his alleged chain of command and the name of the agent who recruited him. Shahbazi says that he was put in touch with several IRGC contacts in Cyprus who had taken part in assassination operations before (Israeli media have reported these to be Pakistani nationals.) According to his account, Shahbazi entered the island by flying from Turkey to Northern Cyprus (a breakaway state only recognized by Ankara) and then smuggled himself into the Greek-majority southern part of the island. In contact with his handlers in Iran via WhatsApp, Shahbazi was preparing to kill the target—reportedly an Israeli businessman—when he found out that the police were on his tail and was told to bury his weapons and flee. Shahbazi reportedly followed the instructions and made it to Tehran via Istanbul.

Mossad’s history in Iran

Unlikely as it may sound, it’s not the first time Mossad has claimed to have undertaken such an operation. In fact, this is the third such case in the last eighteen months. In April 2022, Israeli media reported on an alleged Mossad operation on Iranian territory. Israeli intelligence agents had reportedly detained and questioned Mansour Rasouly, a fifty-two-year-old IRGC agent, in his residence in Iran, where he had confessed to a plan to assassinate an Israeli diplomat in Turkey, an American general stationed in Germany, and a journalist in France. The Israeli media published an audio file of Rasouly’s confession without revealing their source.

Months later, in July 2022, London-based diaspora satellite channel Iran International claimed that Mossad had interrogated another IRGC official, Yadollah Khedmati, in Iran, publishing the footage of his confessions about the transfer of weaponry to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

In each of the three cases, the Islamic Republic has come back with a different form of denial. In the two cases from 2022, they confirmed that the interrogations had taken place and claimed that they were done by a group of local criminal thugs recruited by Mossad. But in the case of Rasouly, they declared he was a farmer in northwestern Iran with no military connection. However, in the case of Khedmati, they confirmed that he was an IRGC figure (without naming him) but said that he had been forced to confess to untruths under “torture and threats.”

With Shahbazi’s case, state media outlets have taken a different path. They claim that Mossad has fabricated the entire story to overcome its panic following the recent alleged busting of its networks in Iran. In late May, judicial officials had claimed to have nabbed fourteen members of a “terrorist team” with ties to Israel. Par for the course with such claims, no evidence was given to support the charge.

As proof of their allegations about Shahbazi, regime outlets published pictures of tickets and flight manifests that show him to have taken a flight from Tehran to Baku on May 15, implying that the confession was staged and not recorded in Iran. Claiming this to be a smoking gun makes no sense. Shahbazi would have had plenty of time since May 15 to have returned to Iran from Baku and could have traveled later to Cyprus.

The regime outlets also tied the Shahbazi affair to an incident in May, in which the capsizing of a boat in Lake Maggiore in Italy led to the death of Erez Shimony, a fifty-four-year-old former Mossad agent. They went as far as implying that Shimony’s death might have been revenge for another killing that had happened almost exactly a year before: the assassination of IRGC’s Colonel Hassan Seyed Khodaee right outside his home, which, according to a report by the New York Times, was done by Mossad.

But, just as the IRGC downplays Shahbazi’s confession, some sources claim that Iran is working hard for his release by Israelis. According to the London-based and Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, Iran is requesting a prisoner exchange from Israel: Shahbazi’s release in return for that of Elizabeth Tsurkov, a Russian-Israeli scholar who was kidnapped in Iraq in March by an Iran-backed Shia militia.

The ongoing shadow war

For years now, Iran and Israel have been engaged in a shadow war involving intelligence operations, assassinations, and attacks on land and sea. When facing Israel, Iran has the benefit of using its vast network of allied militias in the region. Alongside the operations, a war of narratives also rages on and there is no surprise that both sides employ a game of cloak and daggers.

Nevertheless, even if not all Israeli claims were to be believed, there is no doubt that the ease with which they operate inside Iranian territory is astonishing. Since 2009, Israelis have helped assassinate many officials linked to the IRGC or the country’s nuclear program. Its last major hit was the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a leading figure of the IRGC, in November 2020, which took place on a road using a robotic machine gun. Prior to that, in January 2018, Mossad was able to raid the Iranian nuclear archives in a village outside Tehran, gaining access to 55,000 pages of documents and 183 CDs.

On the other side, the Islamic Republic has never been able to retaliate on anything close to a similar scale. This was clearly evident in June of 2022, when Israel worked closely with Turkey to stop an Iranian plan to kill or abduct Israeli civilians in Turkey. Israel went as far as asking all of its thousands of citizens traveling in Turkey to stay in their hotel rooms and not even open the door for food delivery. In the same week, Hossein Taeb, the powerful head of IRGC’s Intelligence Department, was finally dismissed following years of controversy. Taeb had headed the organization from its very inception in 2009 and had come under increasing criticism for all the Israeli operations that kept happening under his watch. The leaking of the Turkey-related plans seems to have been the last straw.

Given the long list of operations that Israel has been able to conduct in Iranian territory, it’s pretty clear that the clerical establishment has failed in its basic task of defending the country. It’s not hard to see why that’s the case. The country’s security forces dedicate most of their energy to oppressing ordinary Iranians and taking random foreign citizens—artists, academics, and journalists—hostage in the hope of using them as bargaining chips. Extracting forced confessions by torture helps the regime with its propaganda purposes but is not a tool for effective counter-espionage.

This was on full display in 2019, when Maziar Ebrahimi, an Iranian businessman based in Iraqi Kurdistan, revealed how he had been tortured into confessing to a role in the assassination of nuclear scientists. Arrested in 2012, Ebrahimi had, under duress, even confessed to traveling to Israel to receive military training. When all of this later turned out to be false, he was released and left the country before sharing his story with BBC Persian.

The amateur methods used by the regime are often so buffoonish to be believable. In 2012, following the execution of Majid Jamali Fashi, an Iranian athlete charged alongside Ebrahimi, the Iranian state broadcaster published an image of his alleged Israeli passport. But journalist Fereshte Ghazi was quickly able to show the source of this image: a Wikipedia template of an Israeli passport had been used with Majid’s picture inserted into it. The basic information on the passport from the Wikipedia template was not even changed.

Thus, the track record of the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus is clear: they can frame and torture their citizens to extract forced confessions but cannot stop numerous Israeli operations on Iranian soil.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar based at New York University. He is the author of “The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions.” Follow him on Twitter: @arash_tehran.

The post The ‘Tehran’ series isn’t far-fetched. Israeli agents are operating with ease in Iran. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It is easy to understand why many observers believe Putin is currently weaker than at any time in his entire twenty-three-year reign. During their short-lived uprising, Wagner forces managed to capture one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. A column of Wagner troops then advanced across Russia virtually unopposed, coming to within 200 kilometers of Moscow before choosing to turn back. As the drama unfolded, neither the Russian establishment nor the public rallied around Putin, who was conspicuously absent. Instead, there were widespread reports of panic across the country, while crowds in Rostov actively cheered Wagner troops.

The exact nature of the deal that ended the mutiny remains unclear, but the few details that are publicly known have done little to repair the damage done to Putin’s reputation. Neither Wagner leader Prigozhin nor his soldiers have been arrested or otherwise punished for their revolt, despite the fact that they downed a number of Russian aircraft and killed Russian servicemen. Instead, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has recently confirmed that Putin personally met with Prigozhin and dozens of other Wagner commanders just five days after the mutiny. Remarkably, Peskov revealed that Putin spoke about future job opportunities during his three-hour discussion with the leaders of the mutiny.

Putin’s apparent readiness to compromise has created the impression of a vulnerable dictator who lacks both the support and the military strength to follow through on his earlier vow to “crush” the mutiny. This has led to widespread speculation that the Wagner revolt may now inspire other anti-regime uprisings. In a 9 July interview with ABC News, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested the Wagner mutiny might serve as a catalyst for further domestic destabilization in Russia. “There is a signal that there might be another mutiny in Russia, a revolution,” he noted. “More than that, there are many people who might support such a mutiny.”

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Who could lead the next uprising? One obvious candidate is Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Like Wagner chief Prigozhin, Kadyrov enjoys a high degree of autonomy and has large numbers of troops under his personal command. With the Kremlin’s blessing, he rules Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He also has a long history of clashes with Russian governmental institutions and has joined Prigozhin in criticizing the conduct of the war in Ukraine. However, Kadyrov was ultimately one of the few prominent figures to publicly back Putin during the Wagner mutiny, and also sent Chechen fighters to Rostov-on-Don.

Kadyrov’s eagerness to support Putin was telling. While he might have the manpower and independence to take action challenging Putin’s power, it is not clear that he sees any advantage in doing so. Secure in his autonomy, Kadyrov may have calculated that it would be more beneficial to preserve his place in the current system than to back a risky rebellion with uncertain prospects.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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A more substantial challenge to the Putin regime may yet emerge from within the ranks of Russia’s increasingly disgruntled military. The Kremlin’s meek response to the Wagner mutiny has exacerbated already declining morale among Russian troops and commanders currently serving in Ukraine.

For more than half a year, a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal orders and catastrophic losses have pointed to growing demoralization. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate that dissatisfaction with the Kremlin has now reached the level of senior commanders. A July 13 report in the Wall Street Journal claimed that numerous high-ranking officers including top Russian general Sergei Surovikin had been detained in the wake of the Wagner revolt. Surovikin, who formerly commanded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is reportedly still being held and interrogated in Moscow over possible links to the mutiny.

In a further sign of mounting tension within Putin’s military, a senior Russian commander in charge of forces based in southern Ukraine claimed on July 12 that he had been suddenly dismissed from his post after raising the alarm over the mismanagement of the invasion. In a recorded audio statement, General Ivan Popov accused Russia’s military leadership of “treacherously and vilely decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment.”

Popov’s explosive accusations suggest that many in the Kremlin prefer to silence critics within the Russian military rather than address uncomfortable truths about the war in Ukraine. Unless this problematic approach is abandoned, it is likely to fuel further anger among front line commanders and troops as casualties continue to mount amid Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive.

If disgruntled officers and demoralized soldiers from the regular Russian army do turn against the Putin regime, they may be joined by thousands of former Wagner fighters along with members of Russia’s many other private military companies. These mercenary formations typically enjoy a significant degree of operational independence from the Kremlin and will have noted with interest the precedent set by the apparent lack of negative consequences following the Wagner mutiny.

For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly suppressed any potential sources of domestic opposition to his rule. With the Russian media muzzled and his political opponents imprisoned, exiled, or dead, the force most capable of mounting a serious challenge to the regime is the Russian military. Putin has been careful to keep loyalists in top positions, but as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, there are growing indications of disaffection among both commanders and troops. With Russian generals now reportedly being detained and dismissed, the scale of the threat should not be underestimated. In the months ahead, this may lead to fresh challenges to Putin’s rule that will dwarf the Wagner mutiny.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

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By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Taras Kuzio

With the short-lived Wagner mutiny exposing Vladimir Putin’s weakness for all to see, the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to provide the country with everything it needs to secure victory, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite widespread recognition that Ukraine’s future must be as part of NATO, member states were unable to reach a consensus on the crucial issue of a membership invitation. Instead, the summit declaration featured vague references to future membership “when allies agree and conditions are met,” leading to considerable frustration and talk of missed opportunities.

While no NATO invitation was forthcoming, Ukraine did secure confirmation that the country would not have to go through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) stage of the accession process. The summit was also marked by the inaugural session of the NATO-Ukraine Council, a new forum designed to intensify cooperation while helping to prepare Ukraine for future membership. Additional positives included a series of significant announcements on military aid, and a joint declaration from the G7 nations pledging long-term security assistance for Ukraine.

Many in Ukraine expressed frustration over the failure to secure a clear signal over NATO membership, but others argued that expectations had been unrealistically high and noted that the annual gathering in Lithuania brought plenty of good news for Ukraine. The Atlantic Council invited a number of Ukrainian commentators to share their assessment of the Vilnius summit.

Danylo Lubkivsky, Director, Kyiv Security Forum: The NATO summit in Vilnius calls for sober assessment. The alliance has clearly failed to seize the strategic initiative or achieve a political breakthrough. Naturally, this has provoked a wave of disappointment and concern.

Unlike the Ukrainian military, NATO leaders still appear to trapped in defensive thinking. This is unfortunate as Western caution only encourages the enemy. Gradual provision of arms prolongs the war and increases the number of casualties. Far from protecting NATO members, ambiguity over Ukraine’s future membership serves to undermine the alliance’s international authority.

Despite these reservations, I do not think there was much for Russia to cheer in Vilnius. The summit demonstrated that while there is no consensus over Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, the entire Western world remains firm and unwavering in its support for the Ukrainian war effort. This message will have been well understood in Moscow.

Attention must now turn toward next year’s summit in Washington DC. This jubilee summit marking 75 years of NATO will take place against a backdrop of the 2024 US presidential election campaign. The historic nature of the summit may work in Ukraine’s favor, creating a climate for historic decisions. After Vilnius, it is clear that the Ukrainian authorities must work consistently with all partners to secure a positive outcome next summer. Ultimately, much will also depend on the Ukrainian military and its ability to create the conditions for NATO accession by succeeding on the battlefield.

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Olena Halushka, Board Member, Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC): Many practical steps were taken during the Vilnius summit to strengthen Ukraine’s war effort. These included new commitments to supply weapons, F-16 jet fighter training for Ukrainian pilots, and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council.

However, Kyiv’s key goal was to receive an official invitation to join NATO. Based on the understanding that full NATO membership would not be possible as long as hostilities continue, Ukrainians saw no legal or practical obstacles to issuing an invitation and beginning the accession process. Instead, the summit declaration made vague references to membership “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This was disappointing but not discouraging. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called this year’s Vilnius summit historic for Sweden. We now hope next year’s summit in Washington DC will finally make history for Ukraine, too.

Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity Party: This was definitely not an historic summit from a Ukrainian perspective. While Ukraine dominated the summit agenda, NATO leaders chose not to take the bold step of officially inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. It is somewhat ironic that 15 years ago at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the United States was leading the push to offer Ukraine membership. This year, the roles were reversed.

The language adopted in the summit communique was not strong enough. This was a big mistake as the only language Vladimir Putin understands is strength. Instead, NATO leaders opted for the language of caution and hesitation.

There were also some reasons for optimism in Vilnius. The communique included the word “invitation” and also acknowledged that Ukraine can sidestep the Membership Action Plan (MAP) stage of the accession process, which is good news. We must now focus our efforts on securing an historic breakthrough at next year’s summit in the US. Further failure could have a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian public opinion at a time when Ukrainians overwhelmingly back the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I did not have high expectations for the summit and did not think it was likely to become a breakthrough moment in Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, so I cannot say I was particularly disappointed. At the same time, it is clear that the wording of the final communique was not good. It was reminiscent of the vague language used in Bucharest back in 2008, and reflected the widely acknowledged lack of agreement among NATO allies over Ukrainian membership. Some of the passages from the communique, such as the references to interoperability between Ukraine and the alliance, gave the impression that the dramatic events of the past year and a half had not happened at all.

Having said that, my main concern was that tension over the NATO membership issue could damage ongoing military, political, and financial support for Ukraine in its war of liberation. This did not happen. There was some evidence of emotions flying high, with President Zelenskyy’s angry tweet on the way to the summit provoking a defensive reaction from some allies, but the overall mood was one of constructive cooperation and partnership.

Iuliia Mendel, former press secretary to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrate their commitment to Ukrainian democracy and independence every day as they defend the country along the front lines of the war with Russia. This NATO summit was an opportunity to send a positive signal to them that their sacrifices are acknowledged and appreciated. Unfortunately, the summit communique was too vague to send a clear message.

Instead of decisive action, I saw a lot of bureaucratic discussion. This was frustrating, especially as an invitation would not have meant immediate Ukrainian accession to NATO. It would not have triggered Article 5 or plunged NATO into a war with Russia. Ukrainians find this approach hard to stomach. For us, NATO is a matter of national survival, not a box-ticking exercise.

There are two main reasons for the diplomatic compromises we witnessed in Vilnius. Firstly, some Western leaders are still concerned that issuing Ukraine with an invitation to join NATO could lead to an escalation and expansion of the current war. Secondly, there are also legitimate reservations over Ukraine’s readiness for membership, particularly in terms of the country’s domestic reform agenda.

Despite the disappointment of the Vilnius summit, I remain confident that Ukraine has earned the right to join NATO and will achieve membership sooner or later. Nevertheless, there is no denying that an important opportunity to demonstrate international support for Ukraine has been missed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 6, 2023

Wagner fallout: Time to begin preparing for a post-Putin Russia

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

As we assess the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Disappointed but not discouraged: Ukrainians react to NATO summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russian military chief makes first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny

War crimes and human rights abuses

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

Russian military chief makes first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny

Russian forces continue to conduct offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk, with Ukrainian armed forces reporting thirty combat engagements between July 10 and 11 near Hryhorivka, Syeverne, Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka. According to the same report, Russian forces shelled villages and towns in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, Lyman, Kupiansk, and Kherson. Ukrainian Telegram channels also reported explosions on the morning of July 11 in Novooleksiivka, Kherson Oblast.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive advanced slowly amid heavy fighting along well-fortified Russian positions. On July 8, a video posted by RFE/RL’s Ukraine service showed how fighters from the 47th Separate Mechanized “Magura” Brigade, alongside soldiers from the Zaporizhzhia Brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces, occupied elevated Russian army positions in the direction of Zaporizhzhia near Novodarivka. However, Russia’s use of remote-controlled landmines has made it difficult for Ukraine to advance. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced on July 10 that Ukrainian forces had taken control of elevated positions around Bakhmut, allowing them to establish fire control over Bakhmut. Russian military bloggers have expressed fears that Ukrainian forces could encircle Russian forces in Bakhmut.

The Russian Ministry of Defense published footage on July 10 of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, his first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny. In the footage, Gerasimov receives reports about alleged Ukrainian attempts to strike Russian targets in occupied Crimea, Rostov, and Kaluga. The ministry published the footage the same day the Kremlin acknowledged President Vladimir Putin’s June 29 meeting with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

On July 11, the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant reported that Ukraine had used British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike a Russian army post near Berdyansk. The strike killed Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District. On the same day, explosions were reported in occupied Tokmak, Skadovsk, and Berdyansk. Also that day, the Russian army shelled Sofiivka, Kherson Oblast, with Grad multiple rocket launcher systems, killing at least one person and wounding another.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army is increasingly using equipment created by volunteers and local engineers in an attempt to diversify its supplies. On July 9, a team of Ukrainian engineers known as Immaterium reported that a first-person view (FPV) drone destroyed a Russian observation tower located nine kilometers from the departure point. Immaterium also claimed that the drone strike set a distance record for an FPV drone developed and produced locally. 

Elsewhere, Armin Papperger, head of the German defense company Rheinmetall, said on July 10 that an armored vehicle repair plant would open in Ukraine within twelve weeks. Papperger added that he hopes to increase Rheinmetall’s production of shells within one year so the company can provide Ukrainian forces with up to 60 percent of their needs. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Minister for Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin said construction was underway on a new plant to produce Bayraktar drones in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s defense ministry announced on July 8 that five former Azov commanders who fought in the battle over Mariupol were released from Turkey and returning to Ukraine alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey, Vasily Bodnar, said that Turkey did not put any conditions on Ukraine for the return of the Azov commanders. Bodnar added that their release was preceded by months of detailed diplomatic work. The commanders ended up in Turkey as a result of a prisoner swap brokered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The commanders participated in the Azovstal steelworks plant siege, regarded by Ukrainians as a heroic effort to resist Russian advancements. Russian forces eventually captured the commanders, among the highest-profile fighters to be captured. The commanders have vowed to return to the battlefield. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine and Turkey had “violated” the prisoner exchange agreement.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

On June 9, Ukraine’s interior ministry posted footage on Telegram showing the aftermath of a Russian air strike on a humanitarian aid delivery point in Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The attack reportedly killed at least seven people and injured thirteen. Cross-referencing the shared footage with images posted on Google Maps, the DFRLab determined the location of the incident to be Communal School No. 3, located on the corner of Myru Street and Pokrovska Street. Initial damage analysis, via the images, indicates that the strike destroyed two-thirds of the school’s facilities.

Reports from several Russian-speaking news outlets on Telegram confirmed that the school was converted into a humanitarian aid delivery point. Russian opposition media outlet Doxa indicated that a Russian jet may have dropped two guided bombs to attack the delivery point, though this information is not confirmed. According to the office of the prosecutor-general of Ukraine, the attack occurred around 1:30 pm local time.

The following morning, Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration head Yurii Malashko shared additional photos from the incident, including one featuring what appears to be a damaged canvas sign featuring the logo for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The Zaporizhzhia Regional Prosecutor’s Office has launched an investigation into the “violation of the laws and customs of war, combined with intentional murder.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Russian airstrike hits humanitarian aid station appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 12, Kyoko Imai was interviewed by CNBC Asia to discuss Japan’s participation in the NATO Summit and subsequent EU-Japan Summit. She argues that while some question Europe’s ability to juggle both the war in Ukraine and an Indo-Pacific strategy, all existing and potential conflicts have global ramifications.

Staff

Kyoko Imai

Assistant Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Politics & Diplomacy Japanese

The post Imai on CNBC appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This has proven catastrophic for Armenia, which has maintained close security ties with Russia since joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1992. In September 2022, Azerbaijan launched what the European Parliament called a “large-scale military aggression” against Armenia and, according to Armenia’s foreign minister, took over 150 square kilometers of Armenian territory. But the CSTO—to which Azerbaijan does not belong—refused to intervene on Armenia’s behalf. Washington stepped in to broker a ceasefire, and the European Union (EU) followed suit by sending a monitoring mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, much to Russia’s and Azerbaijan’s discontent.

The Putin-Aliyev partnership has also spelled disaster for the breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, whose remaining 120,000 ethnic Armenians live under Russian protection after Azerbaijan’s 2020 offensive to reclaim the territory. Forty-four days and thousands of deaths later, Russia brokered a ceasefire stipulating the five-year deployment of 1,960 Russian armed peacekeepers along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and in control of the “Lachin Corridor,” the only road linking it to Armenia. At the time, analysts opined that Putin’s imposition had cemented Russia’s role in the region. According to the decree authorizing the deployment, Russia’s reason for sending peacekeeping troops was to “prevent the mass death of the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh.”

But the deployment has not prevented Azerbaijan from continuing to try to expel ethnic Armenians from what’s left of Nagorno-Karabakh. Last December, a group of Azerbaijanis set up a roadblock along the Lachin Corridor claiming to advocate for environmental rights in the region. But the roadblock in effect slowed the flow of goods into Nagorno-Karabakh, creating a humanitarian crisis. The United States and the EU, as well as Human Rights Watch and others, have called for Azerbaijan to unblock the Lachin Corridor. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ordered Azerbaijan to do the same.

Instead, Azerbaijan solidified the blockade by installing an armed checkpoint at the mouth of the Lachin Corridor, thus effectively seizing control over it. The move was further condemned by the United States and EU, and led Armenia to seek renewed intervention from the ICJ. Russia issued tepid statements and then replaced its peacekeeping force commander in Nagorno-Karabakh. But such a fundamental change in the regime over the Lachin Corridor could not possibly exist without approval—however tacit—from the Kremlin. Video footage taken last month purports to show Russian peacekeepers accompanying Azerbaijani forces to install a concrete barrier near the checkpoint and hoist an Azerbaijani flag in adjacent Armenian territory.

Since the blockade began, traffic along the Lachin Corridor has been reduced to an all-time low. This makes it more difficult for essential humanitarian aid to pass into Nagorno-Karabakh. In the last seven months, Nagorno-Karabakh has turned into an open-air prison, with ethnic Armenian inhabitants increasingly deprived of food and medicine, and energy resources almost entirely drained. They may soon be forced to flee their ancestral homeland for good just to survive.

What the United States should—and shouldn’t—do

In May, Aliyev demanded the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, suggesting that he might offer them amnesty should they accept Azerbaijani rule. Oddly, the US State Department praised Aliyev’s remarks on amnesty, glossing over other parts of his speech in which he threatened violence if the authorities did not surrender: “[E]veryone knows perfectly well that we have all the opportunities to carry out any operation in that region today… Either they will bend their necks and come themselves or things will develop differently now.”

But Washington’s seemingly tactful acquiescence to Azerbaijan’s growing aggression against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in fact hurts US efforts to curb malign Russian influence and end Moscow’s war on Ukraine. The Russo-Azeri pact provides for enhanced economic ties, including in the gas and energy sectors, and has proven successful in helping preemptively circumvent Western sanctions against Russia. A deal between Baku and Brussels in July 2022 to double the flow of gas to Europe to wean it off Russian gas was soon followed by a deal in November 2022 between Baku and Moscow to increase gas imports from Russia to enable Azerbaijan to meet its new obligations to Europe.

In May, Russia and Iran agreed to complete a railroad that would link Russia to the Persian Gulf through Azerbaijan, thus providing a route through which Iran can directly send Russia more weapons and drones. One week later, during a summit of the Eurasian Economic Union, in which Aliyev participated as a guest for the first time, Putin stated that cooperation on developing this North-South railway is carried out “in close partnership with Azerbaijan.” Baku knows it can play both sides because it has backing from Moscow, while the West is blinded by non-Russian energy imports and dreams of regional stability.

If the West seeks to reduce tensions in the South Caucasus, it needs to step up its pressure on Azerbaijan. In the short term, this might include the threat of sanctions in response to further military action against Armenia and the continued refusal to unblock the Lachin Corridor, as well as lending support to Russia. By law, Azerbaijan cannot receive US military or foreign assistance unless it eschews military force to solve its disputes with Armenia, but the White House keeps letting Azerbaijan off the hook by waiving Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act and sending millions of dollars in military aid to Baku. Washington should treat Baku’s actions against Armenia as attempts at coercion, just as it does with Russian aggression against Ukraine.

For its part, Armenia has sought to unwind some of its security arrangements with Russia. Yerevan has refused to host CSTO military drills, send a representative to serve as CSTO deputy secretary general, sign a CSTO declaration to provide defense aid to Armenia, or accept the deployment of a CSTO monitoring mission in lieu of the EU-led mission. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has even threatened to terminate or freeze Armenia’s CSTO membership.

Even so, the West cannot reasonably expect Armenia to leave the CSTO and break with Russia without significantly helping Armenia diversify and mitigate its security, energy, and economic reliance on the Kremlin. As part of this, the United States may want to consider inviting Armenia to become a Major Non-NATO Ally. Washington should provide training and equipment to enhance Armenia’s defense capabilities and help it develop a more robust and independent security apparatus. The United States could also push forward on the prospect of building a small modular nuclear power plant in Armenia, providing an incentive for Armenia to decide against partnering with Russia on energy.

The West has stepped up its diplomatic efforts to facilitate a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is good, but these efforts should not come at the cost of abetting the unfolding humanitarian disaster in Nagorno-Karabakh. Now is the time to compel Baku to cease its bellicose rhetoric and consent to an international presence in Nagorno-Karabakh to mediate dialogue with residents there and promote a more meaningful transition from war to lasting peace.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and former legal advisor to the United Nations. She is currently a senior fellow in international law at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia.

The post Why deepening Russia-Azerbaijan ties should worry the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 12, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Tom Cynkin was mentioned in Radio Free Asia discussing NATO’s eastward expansion into the Indo-Pacific. He highlights China’s concern about the growing interest by European countries to participate in Asian security issues.

Fellow

Thomas Cynkin

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Japan

The post Cynkin on Radio Free Asia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Tue, July 11, 2023 • 9:00 am ET

NATO Public Forum

On the margins of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, the Alliance’s leaders and experts from across the transatlantic community gather for the NATO Public Forum on July 11 – 12. At a time of unprecedented public interest in the Alliance and the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic area, the NATO Public Forum brings together leading experts and decision-makers from around the world to reflect on these issues and provide perspectives on the Summit’s agenda.

Europe & Eurasia NATO Security & Defense

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Andriy Yermak
Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine

Gabrielius Landsbergis
Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moderator

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Mr. Yermak, how wonderful to see you; Minister Landsbergis. Because the [NATO-Ukraine Council] is about to start and because of the bravery and courage that you’ve shown Ukraine, we actually think we’re going to throw protocol to the wind and turn first to you.

And I wonder if you could talk about—I was with you not so long ago, a few weeks ago, with President Zelenskyy in his office during a time of attacks, and President Zelenskyy said if he didn’t get what he wanted at the NATO Summit, that he wouldn’t come because he would consider it a betrayal to the Ukrainian people. So he came. He hasn’t gotten entirely what we wanted. We read that in his Twitter feed. Give us your feeling of why he decided to come.

And then some people argue the communiqué was a prudent outcome. NATO doesn’t want to go to war with Ukraine. Others call it a missed opportunity. I’d love to have your view.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Thank you very much.

First of all, of course President Zelenskyy, president of Ukraine, [came] to Vilnius because it’s important to be here and to be the partners, to be the alliance. And first of all, the unity of NATO and the support which we really received during [the] more than five hundred days of this war, it’s a very, very strong signal to the aggressor that—first of all, that [the] Alliance and partners not just believe, they’re sure about our victory. The second, let’s see, it’s [that] today, it’s not finished. And we are looking for some very serious results of the summit.

And of course, our president, he’s a very principled person. And of course, everything which he said before and our estimate and our feelings you can listen, you can see he is very honest, he is always very clear, declared on the position of our country. But let’s see. We really will have in several minutes starting this very important, the—I think the maybe most important for Ukraine—meetings with the NATO alliance in which we will discuss, first of all, of course, the [continuation] of the military aid, which [is] very important for us to win this war, and of course we will continue—and I hope it will be today—one very important moment for the security guarantees for Ukraine and the way to be a member of NATO.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And just a quick follow-up, then, on that. In this balance between prudent outcome/missed opportunity, are you saying it all depends on how things go from now? Because if you had listened to President Zelenskyy’s or read President Zelenskyy’s tweet from yesterday where he’s calling the language about Ukraine and NATO absurd, it seems to me that this is a movement in another direction, though.

ANDRIY YERMAK: I hope that this summit [will not] be the missed opportunity, but once again you can… listen and see in the result of this day. We have very positive bilateral [meetings] already with some partners and… the positives of the results from this summit.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you. And then just finally, how has it been received in Ukraine thus far?… This summit and the outcomes, how are Ukrainians receiving this and responding to it inside Ukraine?

ANDRIY YERMAK: You know, we have more than [five hundred] days of war. And you know, all [of] us in Ukraine, we are living in very specific reality, the reality of the war. And of course, Ukrainians looking for this summit and for the results, very concrete things. And of course, you know in these seconds, these minutes, our heroes continue to [fight]. For us, sometimes these days it’s [a] very special atmosphere because here at peace, here the silence, here is not you listen—not listen the sirens. And you personally and my colleague and friends personally can see this reality in Ukraine.

But you know, our nation [shows] all these five hundred days how we are brave, how it’s possible to not be afraid, how it’s possible to fight for independence, for freedoms. And of course, we hope that today’s results of this summit will be more inspired and give not just emotional, some very practical support of our people for our soldiers to go forward.

And I’d like to say very important things: that we [are] not stopping our [fight]. No [forces] exist [that] can stop us until we [liberate] all our territories, we back all our people, and really win this war. And I absolutely sure that this will be our joy and victory.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Mr. Yermak, I think that’s a great transition to the prime minister. Having been with you recently in Kyiv, I slept a lot better at night because of Patriot missiles. Here I can sleep well at night not because of the Patriot missiles that are out there right now for your airport.

Minister Landsbergis, I followed your history [for] a long time. I was here when you were in the Warsaw Pact and in the final days and at the time of the Vilnius 10 ahead of your 2004 membership. Talk about this summit in the context of history, but also how you think history might remember this summit.

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Well, that’s an excellent question. We tend to look at Vilnius and Vilnius summits in a way that they sometimes do not offer a tactical change, but they offer strategic opportunity. And it happened in 2014, when tactically at that day, some of us felt that we might not have won the day, but at the end we won Ukraine and Ukraine has won.

I believe that something of that [sort] is happening these days, that quite a lot of those here in this room and in this country expected more that happened today. But I think that in strategy—strategically, we won. We committed ourselves to Ukrainian membership in NATO. That’s the biggest achievement, I would say, strategically.

Now, where the problem lies. The way that I look at history, the promise in Bucharest, it was a strong statement: Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO. It was a strong statement. The problem was not with the statement itself; it was with our lack of commitment afterwards. We did not come back. We came back to the statement three invasions later. That was a problem. So now I’m quite sure that we are committed that we won’t waste another year, another month, and another day staying on the question and doing everything in our power so that we stay true to the meaning that we put into the declaration.

And that means that Vilnius Summit was not the last stop. We have to see it as a bridge. And the next stop is Washington. So we still have a full year. Lots to do. And I count on every single one of you to do your part so that Washington can actually be even more historic than Vilnius.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that. And it being the seventy-fifth anniversary, I hope that’s true.

A follow-up question on that. Some say the actual communiqué language, because of how conditional it was made, is weaker than 2008 in Bucharest. But am I interpreting weaker language but stronger commitment toward the goal?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Yeah. I was not there in the room in 2008, unfortunately, so I’ve just read about it and I was told about it. I think that the way it is being presented, that the consensus in 2008 was weaker, it was not there. Now it’s much wider, definitely. You don’t see an objection, you know, from the people in the room who would say Ukraine should not be part of NATO, we cannot commit ourselves to that idea. There is nobody saying that. So that is a step forward.

Again, you know, coming from [the] eastern flank, we tend to see the situation a tiny bit different. And for us, actually, the history has changed since the last year. That’s why our wording is stronger. That’s why our stance is stronger. That’s why our support to Ukraine, you know, is more vocal, because for us the history runs a different course right now.

And I tend to use the example of [the] Berlin Wall. I think it’s a very monumental time in European history, in world history, in 1989. So for us, last year the wall [was] rebuilt or it’s being rebuilt. So basically, in that principle, we’re back into—for us, it’s cold war. For Ukraine, it’s hot war. But we’re back in 1989 and going backwards.

So this is where our mentality is. This is how we see the situation. And therefore, we are building on a different reality than it was in 2008.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we all know that an alliance has to balance the long term and the short term. We also know that—and Jake Sullivan was talking about that earlier today—unity doesn’t mean you don’t disagree. And press reports have it that at least eight countries of the thirty-one were fighting very hard for different language, stronger language toward invitation for Ukraine… Where is the alliance unified? Where is it un-unified? What is the crux of the differences in the room?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I would say in some cases there is difference in horizon. We tend to see that problems that we are trying to solve, the way that we’re helping Ukraine, the way that Ukraine should be helped, we’re talking decades of a new reality in Europe and decades of Putin, who’s still in power, who will be a dangerous neighbor, who might attack again, who might assault other neighbors, even try Article 5, how that works. We are thinking in this term. It might not happen next year. In some cases, the horizon is way shorter—way, way shorter. We’re talking years; in some cases, it’s months. How do we survive this month? How do we survive until next year? How do we survive until the next election?…

FREDERICK KEMPE: One more question for you, then I want to go back to Mr. Yermak. The Baltic aerospace agreement, in all the reporting about everything else, very little has been [placed] on this. And then put that in the context of Swedish membership. Obviously, this was the big success of this week, in many respects unanticipated. Put together this Baltic aerospace agreement, the Swedish membership; how does that change your region? How does it change security around the Baltics and Lithuania?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Well, I think that Swedish membership is monumental, definitely. If we, you know, remain on the example of a bridge, so it’s a pillar, definitely. It’s a very strong pillar.

And you know, the way that we frame it currently, the promise of swift accession—Swedish swift accession has been made, and now we’re very much looking forward to it. But it changes the situation in the Baltic Sea dramatically. It affects defense plans that are being voted for, that were adopted, but it changes them as well. Sweden is a very strong element in all of our defense—not just Lithuania, but also Poland, also—I mean, I’m not even talking about Sweden itself, but also Finland, also Estonia. The whole Baltic Sea, you know, becomes a different, different concept. That’s a very strong thing.

When it comes to the air defense, we’re saying that, look, we have to talk about the content. Things don’t happen overnight. So it’s a very strong step forward, but now we—will be looking for, you know, how it will be materialized.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that.

Mr. Yermak, so not a prudent outcome, not a missed opportunity, but a bridge. What would you like to see this week’s events in Vilnius be a bridge to on behalf of Ukraine? You talked about Washington. What do you hope will happen between now and Washington?

And obviously, we have a spring offensive we’re talking about at the same time. So there are two battles, one of them very real and on the frontlines for Ukraine against the aggressor, Putin’s troops, and the other is the bureaucratic contest in NATO of where we want to land by next summer in Washington.

ANDRIY YERMAK: First of all, I hope that during this period of time we will win this war. This is—will be, first of all, the most important for us, and I’m sure will be very important for all the world.

The second, of course, as we are looking this way and to the Washington summit, of course, we will receive the fixed security guarantees, because security guarantees to Ukraine is the [guarantee] of the security of the whole Europe. And as I said, we hope that just today we will have very important stage of issue of the security.

And of course, I [agree] with my colleagues that we are looking [at] a bridge and we hope that—you know, during these five hundred days Ukraine a lot of times surprised everybody in the world.

First of all, we [were] surprised, when it started, this [invasion], and somebody gave us three days, one week, one month. We [were] surprised and we still not just defended, we liberated our lands.

The second, you remember [how] then President Zelenskyy, the speaker of the parliament, the head of the government [sent] the documents for the candidate states. Many people [were] very skeptical. We already received this status. We [were] talking about coalitions of our jets. We [were] talking about coalitions of tanks. We [were] talking about the coalitions of air defense. Already, it’s reality.

And I think that we try everything from our side to surprise in Washington. And of course, we are looking, finally, as how said President Erdoğan in his—in the last meeting with President Zelenskyy in Istanbul, that Ukraine [has] everything to be a member of the NATO. And of course, we believe in it.

And I’m glad that today we—I think nobody in the world don’t think that it’s happened. Of course, we’re looking for the prospective, for the future, but not hesitation that it’s happen.

And about—I’m sorry, about your second part of the—of the—I mean the reforms. And you know, in the beginning when Volodymyr Zelenskyy [went] for the presidential campaign in 2019, one of his [priorities] was the [reforming] of Ukraine. I can say it’s in our blood. And of course, I can say that [it] may be, will be difficult to find another country in the world who just, in the circumstances of this terrible war, [is] not stopping any reforms, and we go forward. And I think many people, and Ursula von der Leyen, and the European leaders many times said how really impressed by the reforms, which we continue doing just during this war.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So final question. We’ve run out of time, so final question for each of you, Mr. Yermak and then Minister Landsbergis. You have said, President Zelenskyy has said that strategic commitments can’t replace NATO membership. Do you still believe that? Strategic support.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes, of course. Yes, of course. Of course, it’s—you know, we are living in so region of life that immediately back to Ukraine we continue to do all the best from our side. That—just if somebody [has] some hesitations in the colleagues, there is [none], and to do and go forward and not stopping, because this is the goal and this is the [decision] of Ukrainian society. Today, more than 90 percent of Ukrainian [support] and believe that very soon Ukraine will be the members of the NATO.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Yermak.

Minister Landsbergis, the bridge, Vilnius to Washington. How should that bridge be built?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I think that there are some very practical steps that could be taken and should be taken. First of all, there was a discussion about the need for additional reforms in Ukraine. At least this is what allies agreed upon. And Ukraine has shown a tremendous, unbelievable capacity to reform under duress. This has happened on the path to EU. So I think that if concrete requirements are being presented to Ukraine, I’m absolutely 100 percent convinced that Ukraine will deliver on those so that we could have, you know, to show up for the allies that—because the statement goes that when allies agree and the conditions are met. So I’m sure that Ukraine can deliver on part of [the] conditions.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So an invitation in Washington would be potentially possible, would be possible?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I’m convinced that it could be historic, not just because of the years.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I think that’s a good spot to end on. So let me thank Mr. Yermak not just for being here, but for the courage of your country. And please send our best wishes to President Zelenskyy and all Ukrainians.

And then, Minister Landsbergis, what wonderful hosts you’ve been. And what an incredibly well-executed and organized summit. We’ve been taken care of so well here by every citizen of this country.

Watch the event

The post Ukraine’s Andriy Yermak and Lithuania’s Gabrielius Landsbergis on the path ahead for Ukraine to join NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Studio Ett

The NATO summit in Vilnius is coming to an end. What promises will Ukrainian President Zelenskyy take home with him? Sveriges Radio speaks to Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe.

“Stoltenberg said that there is a new chapter between NATO and Ukraine. Is it that new?”

“‘No, you can understand the Ukrainian disappointment. What they wanted in the first place was an invitation. Already in 2008, NATO said that Ukraine would become a member, so in that way it is nothing new. Now various steps have been taken so that Ukraine can work closer to NATO, but the timing is still uncertain”, says Anna Wieslander.

“What does NATO’s inability to provide greater support to a country in Europe that is at war, tell us about NATO as an organization?”

“It reflects the fact that there is a relatively large division within NATO regarding Ukraine and the future”, says Anna Wieslander.

The post Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hutchison in the Dallas Morning News appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On Tuesday, July 11, Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe, participated in SVT Aktuellt, to discuss Turkey’s statement about letting Sweden into NATO.

“NATO membership requires a change in strategic culture for Sweden. On the military side, it is about going from planning everything nationally to entering a collective system. In addition, it is about the political side, where we of course are used to cooperating within the UN and the EU, and we are happy to be an active player, but in defense and security we have been quite cautious. Accordingly, there will also be a change to perhaps take on this active role that others probably see that Sweden often has internationally”, says Anna Wieslander.

Anna Wieslander can be heard at minute 29:30.

The post Wieslander interviewed on SVT Aktuellt appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sweden’s role in NATO’s new defense plan

“‘Sweden is not part of the plans now. But when we become members, new demands will be placed on the Swedish Armed Forces. (…) Sweden should provide a brigade for NATO operations outside of Sweden, that is the stated expectation’, says Anna Wieslander, Director of Northern Europe.”

“‘Another expectation of Sweden as a member is political’, says Anna Wieslander. According to her, Sweden is perceived as a solid democracy with a strong economy, a leading Nordic country that has been successful in the UN, one that can both provide solutions within the NATO circle, as well as act as a bridge builder between NATO and the EU. ‘Therefore, we cannot think: We have been non-aligned for so long, now we will just sit and look around. We are expected to perform differently.'”

The post Wieslander interviewed in Aftonbladet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Wieslander interviewed by BBC News from Vilnius appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The war in Ukraine exposed bluntly once more the appalling state of European defense capabilities—as seen in former Yugoslav republics in the late 1990s—and how Europe still depends on the United States to fight a war on its own continent.

Under US President Joe Biden, Washington has demonstrated its indispensability to NATO and European security at the very moment of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the present situation is unsustainable.

To stay safe against Russian and other aggression in the future, Europe will need a convincing conventional and nuclear deterrent of its own, and Germany will be key. The invasion of February 24, 2022 opened many eyes, but the biggest awakening took place in Germany.

Moscow’s assault on a European neighbor caused an epiphany in Berlin’s decades-long, complacent foreign and energy policy, as well as in its free-riding security and defense posture under Washington’s nuclear and NATO’s conventional umbrella. Chancellor Olaf Scholz understood the urgency for his country as he declared in his famous speech a Zeitenwende (time for change) for Germany’s foreign, security, defense, and energy policy, which was well received in Europe and the United States. Scholz pledged a one hundred billion euro special fund to rebuild the German armed forces that had decayed under the sixteen-year-long chancellorship of his predecessor, Angela Merkel. Berlin’s selfish post-1989 mantra—essentially “make peace without spending money for weapons”—became history almost overnight.

Today Germany is one of Ukraine’s biggest weapons providers after the United States. It is about to increase its defense budget of fifty-one billion euros to fifty-three billion euros. But Berlin needs to understand that the moment of truth has arrived for the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies.

After the US presidential election next year—no matter who makes it into the White House—Europe will need its own capabilities to defend European territory and borders from an outside aggressor. If Donald Trump returns to the White House or another Republican president takes office, we could see a shrinking of defense support for NATO, as the US military may concentrate its forces toward Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Former US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis admitted during his confirmation hearing in 2017 that the US military is not strong enough to meet the challenges it faces around the globe. Or in the words of Elbridge A. Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, “if we have to leave Europe exposed, so be it… Asia is more important than Europe.”

Therefore, to make Europe safe for peace and democracy in the future, NATO needs to strengthen its conventional and nuclear pillars. Russia’s aggression today against Ukraine and tomorrow perhaps against Poland or the Baltic states makes the Europeanization of NATO imperative. In the words of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: “Europe has to play a special role in American thinking… But I could understand in a modified arrangement that Europe could play a more important role in some areas. I am not offended by autonomy in my definition of it.”

For the past twenty years, US presidents from both the Democratic and Republican parties have been asking European allies to take burden-sharing seriously. Here are four ways to start: 

1. It is imperative to strengthen the competitiveness and innovativeness of Europe’s military technological and industrial complex and to harmonize its procurement base. Buying off-the-shelf US equipment can go hand-in-hand with buying European equipment—and this should apply to all NATO members.
2. Not only must NATO forces be interoperable—allowing them to use each other’s platforms seamlessly while fighting alongside each other—but this should extend to potential future NATO members like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. 
3. For the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, a permanent increase of their defense spending to beyond the NATO target of 2 percent of gross domestic product should be seen as an obligation. Emerging from the Vilnius summit, where a new push is under way to get all allies beyond 2 percent, it is the responsibility of the biggest European economies to upgrade their conventional forces in order to protect European soil—when Washington might be too busy in Asia.
4. Europe needs a credible nuclear deterrent of its own, under NATO command. Only a trilateral British, French, and German nuclear umbrella, combined with a US umbrella, all under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) will be a credible deterrent for Russia. This would require that France and Germany find a solution for equipping their joint Future Combat Air System—a new generation of advanced fighter jets—and the German F-35 dual capable aircraft with French nuclear weapons. Germany would not have its own nuclear weapons, so this arrangement would not violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NATO command structure must be tailored in such a way that Europe can fight a conflict in which neither Americans nor Canadians may wish to get involved, while taking advantage of NATO commands and systems. To this end the deputy SACEUR has to be European, and a headquarters-based Combined Joint Task Force must serve as his or her operational command.

Today it is clear that the main threat to European security does not come from Russia’s conventional forces, but from its tactical nuclear weapons and its sophisticated hybrid warfare. For Germany to be a full and equally strong part of a new European pillar of NATO, it needs to break the ultimate taboo and accept that a wider shared European nuclear deterrence should now be part of Berlin’s Zeitenwende defense thinking.

Of course, an outcry will arise: A stronger nuclear role for Germany will sound unthinkable to many. But so was Russia’s full-scale invasion and war in Europe only last year.

There have been strategic debates in Bonn since the 1950s about whether the Article 5 joint defense pact would really be implemented by Washington in case of an attack—whether a US president would sacrifice New York for Berlin or New Orleans for Munich. Today 62 percent of Germans are in favor of spending more money to modernize the Bundeswehr properly so that it can defend its country. Meanwhile, 47 percent of Germans agree with their government’s heavy support of the Ukrainian military—with another 16 percent wanting it to go further.

This, then, is the moment to start a debate in Berlin, Paris, and London about a trilateral French, British, and German nuclear European Defense Initiative, and the responsibility of those three powers to protect Europe if Article 5 is invoked in a worst-case-scenario.

Adm. Jacques Lanxade was joint chief of staff of the French Armed Forces and served as a defense advisor to French President Francois Mitterrand.

Denis MacShane is a former UK minister of Europe and a former UK delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO.

Margarita Mathiopoulos is a defense expert and professor emerita of US foreign policy and international security at Potsdam University. She also served as a foreign policy advisor to the former chairman of the German Free Democratic Party, Guido Westerwelle.

Gen. Klaus Naumann served as chairman of the military committee of NATO and joint chief of staff of the German Armed Forces. 

A German language version of this article first appeared in Handelsblatt. It is printed here with the authors’ and publisher’s permission.

The post Europe needs a nuclear deterrent of its own appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This vague wording represented modest progress but fell far short of Ukrainian expectations. In the run-up to the summit, Ukraine and many of the country’s international allies had been calling for a clear signal from NATO regarding future Ukrainian membership. However, while a number of countries have publicly backed Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, there is no unanimity on the issue among the 31-nation alliance. On the eve of this week’s meeting in Lithuania, US President Joe Biden said Ukraine was not ready for membership and claimed it was “premature” to start the accession process in the middle of a war.

Supporters of Ukraine’s bid to join NATO see it as the only way to end Russian aggression against the country and achieve a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe. Anything less, they say, will merely result in a pause before a new Russian invasion as Moscow seeks to achieve its overriding foreign policy goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and returning the country permanently to the Kremlin orbit. Skeptics have responded by noting that the promise of fast-track Ukrainian NATO membership after the war would be likely to convince Putin of the need to prolong hostilities indefinitely. This lack of consensus resulted in what was an underwhelming NATO summit outcome in Vilnius.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled personally to Lithuania on Tuesday, but his last-minute intervention was unable to sway the doubters and secure the kind of unambiguous membership commitment Ukraine has long sought. “Today I embarked on a trip here with faith in decisions, with faith in partners, with faith in a strong NATO. In a NATO that does not hesitate, does not waste time, and does not look back at any aggressor,” he wrote in a carefully worded but emotionally charged post following publication of the summit declaration. “I would like this faith to become confidence; confidence in the decisions that all of us deserve and every warrior, every citizen, every mother, every child expects. Is that too much to expect?” In a social media commentary posted earlier on Tuesday, he was significantly more outspoken, criticizing NATO’s failure to state a specific membership timeline as “unprecedented and absurd.”

Others were in even less diplomatic mood. “No amount of spin will turn this into a “great” or “historic” summit. Best not even to start,” posted former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Some fellow politicians in the Baltic region clearly agreed. “This is not leadership,” tweeted Lithuanian MP Zygimantas Pavilionis. “This is appeasement that normally leads to final defeat.” In Kyiv, Ukrainian Ambassador for Strategic Communications Olexander Scherba questioned the logic behind the apparent fear among some NATO members of provoking Putin. “The strategy of “not provoking Russia” is in reality a strategy of provoking Russia,” he wrote. “That’s how it goes with bullies. Will the West ever see it?”

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Meanwhile, many in Ukraine expressed anger at the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s international partners. These feelings of frustration were summed up in a powerful post by veteran Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk: “Ukraine needs “strategic patience”. Should I patiently wait until a Russian missile strikes my apartment in Kyiv with my kids inside? Or should I patiently wait for my son to turn eighteen and go to fight in a war against the largest threat to NATO? Delays cost lives!”

Despite the undeniable mood of anti-climax in Ukraine, the country’s famed wartime spirit of resilience was also on display as Ukrainians reacted to news from Lithuania. “Disappointment but not discouragement. Next stop, Washington DC,” posted Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center think tank and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, in reference to next year’s NATO summit, which is scheduled to take place in the US capital.

Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko echoed this sentiment regarding the need to focus on securing a firm membership commitment at the 2024 summit, but warned that further delays could have grave consequences for public opinion in Ukraine. If there is no progress toward joining NATO by this time next year, he wrote, Ukrainians will ask: “So we are good enough to die for democracy and not good enough to live together with other free nations in one alliance?”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 29, 2023

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

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With the short-lived Wagner mutiny exposing Vladimir Putin’s weakness for all to see, the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to provide the country with everything it needs to secure victory, writes Taras Kuzio.

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Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

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As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s a fast track with a slow start. NATO leaders meeting in Vilnius today released their summit communiqué, in which they said that Ukraine no longer needs to complete a membership action plan to join the Alliance—but that an invitation would only be extended “when allies agree and conditions are met.” In the meantime, the allies pledged to work closely with Kyiv through a newly established NATO-Ukraine Council. With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s biggest request—a timeline for membership—unfulfilled, have allies truly bolstered Ukraine’s security as it battles against Russia’s full-scale invasion? What else did the Alliance agree to regarding Russia and Ukraine? Our experts, who are all at the center of the action in Vilnius, decode the communiqué.

• John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
• Rachel Rizzo (@RachelRizzo): Nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center
• Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department

Roadmap or roadblock?

• John tells us that the communiqué’s conditional language and lack of timeline amounts to “not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.”
• That’s remarkable given that the 2008 language, which also encompassed prospective Georgian membership, “has been derided for years for placing both Georgia and Ukraine in the worst strategic position possible,” Rachel observes, with multiple Russian invasions of both countries occurring in the intervening years. “The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road.”
• “Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to Council status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments,” Chris adds. “But neither packs a political punch or will be viewed as real progress on the membership question.”
• There was also no mention in the communiqué of security guarantees for Ukraine “that were broadly promised in the run-up to the summit,” Chris notes. “The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.”

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DC drama

• John relays that the communiqué’s release was delayed due to the “clear disagreement” between the United States and Germany on one side, and Nordic, Eastern European, and some Western European allies on the other with regard to Ukraine’s membership. Both sides had to bend a bit to get to the final consensus language. “The end result was not quite inspiring,” he says.
• But inspiration could always strike: The Alliance will celebrate its seventy-fifth anniversary next year with a Washington summit, which offers US President Joe Biden “a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president,” John argues. To make that happen, he adds, Biden will need to “provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield” and “move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.”
• Rachel fears more disappointment ahead, whether at the Washington summit or ten years from now, when “NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality.” 

Defensible moves

• John welcomed the communiqué’s labeling of Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to the Alliance. “This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests,” he explains.
• Chris points out that on the positive side, the Vilnius gathering will be remembered as another “enlargement summit” because of Monday’s deal with Turkey paving the way for Sweden’s accession.
• Flying under the radar, the allies also agreed to adopt “some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for the defense of NATO territory,” Chris says. This move “completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War. Heady stuff.”

The post The NATO Summit’s underwhelming support for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, our experts decode all the goings-on in Vilnius—and what they mean for Kyiv’s path to NATO membership, the war in Ukraine, Sweden’s forthcoming accession, the Alliance’s growing focus on China, and more.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Reactions from Wednesday, July 12

John Herbst: A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

Anca Agachi: A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Daniel Fried: The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

Hans Binnendijk: Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

Phillip Cornell: Energy issues took a backseat in the Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

Reactions from Tuesday, July 11

John Herbst: An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Christopher Skaluba: ‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership 

Daniel Fried: Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family 

Shelby Magid: Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

Rich Outzen: A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

Andrew D’Anieri: The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Rachel Rizzo: Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

David O. Shullman: The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

Ian Brzezinski: The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

There is significant overlap among the members of the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU). Four of the G7 nations are in the EU and six are in NATO. It is therefore no surprise that the general approach of the three organizations to Moscow’s war on Ukraine share similar characteristics. All three organizations have actively supported Ukraine since Moscow’s aggression began in February of 2014, and much more so when it intensified in February of 2022. All assert Ukraine’s right to enjoy the peace and stability that should be provided by the liberal international order. With the United States in the lead in NATO and the G7, both organizations have provided significant support to Ukraine, ensuring that Russian President Vladimir Putin could not achieve his goal of establishing effective political control in the country.  

At the same time, again with the United States’ decisive influence, the G7, like NATO, has avoided steps that might seem overly provocative to Moscow—a clear call for Ukraine’s victory against Moscow’s aggression or decisive steps that would lead to a faster Ukrainian victory. So the best way to look at the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine issued by the G7 on July 12 in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Vilnius is as a mostly US-influenced two-step. 

The NATO Summit produced an uninspiring communiqué on the Ukraine-NATO relationship that moved only slightly beyond the language of the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. The G7 Declaration was timed to the NATO Summit because the question of Ukraine joining NATO is linked with the issue of security guarantees. Both are meant to address the difficult question of how an independent Ukraine can live in peace and security alongside a hostile Russia. So it is no surprise that the G7 statement is a step forward toward enhancing Ukraine’s security but not a very large one. 

The declaration affirmatively states Ukraine’s right to choose its own course, join the West, and be free from intimidation and aggression. But it does not offer collective G7 action that might provide greater protection against future Kremlin provocations; instead, it encourages bilateral arrangements between Ukraine and individual G7 states. It places emphasis on the provision of weapons to Ukraine to make it a less appetizing target for a predatory Kremlin. This is a reasonable concept, but less effective than an actual guarantee by the G7 countries to respond forcefully to future Kremlin aggression. Yet even this step is undermined by the fact that all the G7 countries—with the possible exceptions of the United Kingdom and, perhaps now, France—have been reluctant to send Ukraine the more advanced weapons it needs to deliver that decisive blow to Russian forces on its territory.

Russian commentators have dismissed the NATO communiqué as a disappointment for Kyiv, but expressed some dissatisfaction with the G7 Declaration. Their real ire, though, is aimed at Paris, after the French decision to send SCALP long-range missiles to Ukraine. This underscores France’s differences with Washington, which is still unwilling to send Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). French President Emmanuel Macron’s boldness is welcome, but no substitute for strong US leadership.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Overall, the Vilnius summit stuck the landing, and to continue the metaphor, the gymnastic feat was about as tough as it gets. This was indeed a summit of unity, as US President Joe Biden had hoped, and the breakthrough regarding Sweden’s NATO accession especially contributed to that sense. The Alliance also successfully positioned itself as a global actor that understands that the security environment has fundamentally changed, and the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are inextricably linked. The attendance of the Asia-Pacific 4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and language in the communiqué elevating the role of partners is crucial in this regard.

However, the summit’s results were mixed on a range of other issues. Despite high hopes and a strong moral argument, Ukraine was not offered the clear path and timeline it was hoping for to join the Alliance, even as its future in the Euro-Atlantic family was reconfirmed. This outcome, while not surprising, was also likely the best achievable outcome at the moment given Allied differences. This hints at a tough road for NATO in making the ambitious progress necessary by 2024, especially if Ukrainian battlefield advances slow down. Eastern flank reinforcements to brigade-level will only happen “where and when required,” and the language on China was modest in advancing proposals for action, as it was more intent on defining the challenge Beijing poses. The Alliance generally make the most important progress quietly, and here is where I saw encouraging signs: the focus on resilience and securing critical infrastructure; important mentions of Allied enablement and sustainment; and cooperation with the private sector and defense industry to deblock defense supplies.

While kicking the can down the road offers some time, Allies need to start to work with aplomb now to deliver. If anything, the NATO Summit in Washington in 2024 will be an even higher order to rise to—morally and strategically.

—Anca Agachi is an associate director and resident fellow for Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

The G7 Joint Statement on Ukraine is out. It’s no Article 5 security guarantee. It’s a framework for negotiations of bilateral and G7 arrangements with Ukraine to provide military and economic assistance, as well as unspecified security commitments for that country. It includes a promise of consultations with Ukraine in case of a future Russian armed attack that could generate military and other forms of support. For its part, Ukraine commits in the statement to continue its democratic and rule of law transformation, as well as its military reforms. Notably, the statement makes clear that it is no substitute for NATO membership but is intended to help Ukraine while it pursues that goal.

Cynics can make a meal of the statement. It provides little beyond what G7 countries are already doing. But there is another way to look at it. The big strategic question that NATO, the G7, and the United States have faced is whether Ukraine is part of the transatlantic and European family and its institutions or whether it is part of a Kremlin sphere of domination. The Kremlin claims Ukraine as its own.There are many in Europe and the United States who tacitly (or overtly) agree and would cut a dirty deal with Moscow to that end.

Happily, that’s not where NATO and the G7 have come out. The NATO communiqué’s language on Ukraine could have been stronger and the G7 statement is no security guarantee. But they both rest on the premise that Ukraine is part of the European and transatlantic family. The details of how and when have yet to be worked out. The goal is clear: NATO membership for Ukraine. The G7 statement can serve as scaffolding for Ukraine while it works to get there. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

The NATO Summit in Vilnius was a success. But its success was limited, and it will be seen more as a bridging mechanism between last year’s Madrid summit and next year’s Washington summit. At Madrid, the allies agreed on the nature of the new threats and challenges emanating from both Russia and China. Madrid’s new Strategic Concept refocused the Alliance. 

Vilnius was to be an implementation summit. And it was. It recorded progress in multiple areas, from enhanced deterrence to hybrid war to climate change. But it stopped short on several key issues like Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, and managing the nuclear weapons threat posed by Russia and, increasingly, China.

The Vilnius summit took place in the midst of Europe’s most destructive war in nearly eight decades and a US effort to rebalance its relationship with China. This resulted in a degree of caution. Unity formed around lowest common denominator solutions. During the coming year between Vilnius and Washington, the bridge created this week will hopefully be strengthened enough to bear the weight that the Alliance will need to carry next year.

The most successful element of the Vilnius summit was enhancing NATO deterrence along its front line with Russia, from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea. With Finland in and Sweden soon to be in, there is a solid line of defense against Russian aggression. There is no clearer evidence of Russia’s strategic failure. NATO’s New Force Model, agreed upon last year, will provide clarity for nations with regard to their specific wartime responsibilities and incentives to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending floor. NATO’s forward presence in eight front line states needs further strengthening to include a continuous brigade-level presence in each. And the readiness and mobility initiatives need further attention.

The greatest disappointment at Vilnius was the inability to provide a more concrete path for Ukrainian membership after the war ends. But cautious steps were taken. The NATO-Ukraine Commission became a Council, giving Ukraine a stronger voice in NATO political affairs. The Council will be used to plan for future Ukrainian membership, which was again solemnly committed to “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This shortfall for Kyiv was somewhat offset by the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, which pledges additional long-term security commitments and arrangements. Hopefully by the Washington summit, that path can be paved with more concrete.

 —Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Energy issues took a backseat in Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

While the debate over membership (delayed for Ukraine, confirmed for Sweden) dominated the last-minute negotiations over the NATO Summit communiqué, the opening bulk of the document itself is rightly dedicated to reaffirming the traditional and newly relevant core tenets of NATO’s existence—collective defense, nuclear deterrence, and the production and logistics to achieve them. But about two-thirds of the way down, the communiqué turns to how the Euro-Atlantic security environment has shifted. 

The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed that “emerging security challenges” (in NATO parlance) have arrived, from the weaponization of energy to the widespread “digitalization” of warfare and the importance of resilience. 

Indeed, energy security and climate change are gaining renewed importance for the Alliance. Climate security issues are a personal priority of the secretary general, and a changing energy economy means that the pipeline politics of yesterday will look simple compared to the complex security implications of integrated power systems, critical digital infrastructure, supply chains for key inputs to transition, and the like. And while NATO wades into the tech innovation space with its own acceleration fund (DIANA), it has yet to grasp the power of military procurement for demonstrating, scaling, and standardizing technologies that will be key to mitigating emissions in the civilian space while also boosting military effectiveness. Meanwhile the energy transition itself will be a messy process, with pockets of volatility and economic mismatches that could directly impact political stability, popular support for a sustainable transition, and strategic relations.

The Vilnius summit is a turning point for many reasons, but perhaps the most fundamental for NATO as an institution is its shift from an internally focused bureaucracy with declining budgets fighting to justify its existence in the post-Cold War world, to one compelled to adopt a growth and ambition mentality. Where before it was simpler to ring-fence NATO’s military mission, concerns about climate change and strategic competition are imposing policy-driven global economic realignments. To fulfill its ambitions for leadership in that new environment, NATO needs the competence and reach to provide important security-related input to key decisions about infrastructure investment and managing new technology—and it needs to be convinced of its own relevance in those spaces.

—Phillip Cornell is a principal at Economist Impact and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Talk about the eleventh hour! The NATO Summit communiqué was finally released at approximately 6:40 p.m. in Vilnius, rather late for a summit document. There was a good reason for this: clear disagreement between a large number of East European, Nordic, and some Western European allies on the one side and the United States and Germany on the other about how forthcoming the Alliance should be about Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO. While the ad hoc coalition wanted clarity in hastening Ukraine’s membership, Washington and, to a lesser extent, Berlin were cautious. Given the weight Washington enjoys in NATO deliberations, this meant that the much larger number of allies could not get their preference. But given the importance of NATO unity, this meant that the United States and Germany had to move beyond their original position. 

The end result was not quite inspiring. The communiqué notes that Ukraine no longer needs to meet a Membership Action Plan, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission will become a NATO Ukraine Council: small steps in the right direction. On the crucial membership issue, the communiqué states, “the Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.” This is not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.  

It was no surprise that a few hours before the communiqué appeared, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted his dissatisfaction: “It’s unprecedented and absurd when [a] time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine.” This is somewhat sharp, but perhaps understandable from a man whose country is facing an aggression designed to destroy “Ukrainianness.”

While this denouement does not add luster to the Vilnius summit, there are other developments that make this a historic occasion. The main thing, of course, is the admission of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance. This greatly strengthens NATO security in the north. But also important is NATO finally recognizing  that  “the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests. The communiqué also directly addresses the Belarus problem: “Belarus’ support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia’s aggression. In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.”  

These two items portend a further strengthening of NATO policy against the Kremlin threat and in support of Ukraine. Vilnius also foreshadows what is to come in NATO dynamics and policy. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance will be celebrated at the NATO Summit next year in Washington DC. That event will give US President Joe Biden a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president. For that to occur, he will need to listen closely to the United States’ newly active East European allies and 1) provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield and 2) move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership 

The Vilnius summit is likely to be viewed as a landmark summit for two things that happened and two things that didn’t.

What did happen: The pending agreement by Turkey to ratify Sweden’s membership application will soon add a thirty-second ally to NATO’s ranks, making Vilnius, like Madrid before it, an enlargement summit. That every littoral Baltic Sea state, besides Russia, will be a member of the Alliance is a significant development for NATO’s defense of its northeastern flank. To that end, the adoption of some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for defense of NATO territory completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War.

Missing from the Vilnius communiqué, however, is any clear pathway for Ukraine’s membership. Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to “Council” status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments. But neither packs a political punch, nor will either move be viewed as real progress on the membership question. In fact, communiqué language stating “we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is as ambiguous as the infamous Bucharest statement from 2008 promising that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. It is a head-scratching and disappointing formulation. Moreover, the bilateral security guarantees that were broadly promised in the runup to the summit were missing from the final statement. The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department.

Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family 

It might have and should have been stronger. Nevertheless, the NATO communiqué language on Ukraine’s accession to NATO puts Ukraine within, and not outside, the transatlantic family. The “when” and “how” of Ukraine’s accession to NATO have yet to be worked out but, critically, the Vilnius summit has decided the “whether” of Ukraine’s NATO membership in the affirmative–something that the 2008 Bucharest summit did only at a high level of generality. “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is the key sentence from today’s communiqué. It’s weakened by the gratuitous qualifier “we will be in a position to” rather than a straightforward “we will extend an invitation.” Still, this offer—any offer—of an invitation to Ukraine is a step forward, and a big one compared to where the United States and most NATO member governments were even a few months ago.

Less noticed (and less debated) was the communiqué text that makes clear, without weakening qualifiers, that “we do not and will never recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea.” That language, though it reaffirms long-held positions, helps kill the temptation by some to push Ukraine into surrendering its territory in exchange for a dubious “peace” on Putin’s terms.

While NATO has now set out the goal—Ukraine in the Alliance—much depends on continuing to provide robust military support to Ukraine to help it fight back, and win, on the battlefield. Paragraph twelve of the communiqué notes that allies at the summit agreed on a “substantial package of expanded political and practical support” for Ukraine. It doesn’t provide details, but hopefully they will be announced soon, either by NATO or separately by allies.

Zelenskyy and a number of NATO allies have pushed hard (and pushed the Biden administration) to get the most from this summit. They were right to do so. Now they need to consolidate their gains and prepare next steps, including for next year’s NATO Summit in Washington DC.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

The Vilnius summit communiqué rightly places the Russian Federation as the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area due to Moscow’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, terrorism, war crimes, and horrific violations of international law and norms.

Just as Russia deserves to be so centrally acknowledged for its role as the critical threat to Euro-Atlantic security, Belarus deserves to be right beside it. Any disregard of the role Belarus plays as a threat to regional security and an accomplice to the unprovoked war in Ukraine would be a mistake. NATO smartly recognized the threat from Belarus, condemning Belarus’s instrumental support to the Russian war effort by allowing its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces for attacks into Ukraine.

While the communiqué notes Belarus’s complicity in this aggression, it’s critical to remember these crimes are committed and abetted by the illegitimate regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The dictator, desperately clinging to power, has driven Belarus deeper into the Kremlin’s clutches. NATO’s firm declaration of concern for the situation in Belarus is in part due to Lukashenka deepening the military integration between Russia and Belarus, potentially allowing the deployment of “so-called private military companies” to Belarus (the Wagner Group), as well as (perhaps too mildly put) “malign activities” without respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, and international law; the Alliance’s declarations are an important signal and sign of hope that Belarus will not be forgotten in the international agenda.

While it is good to see the declaration about threats within Belarus itself, what will surely frustrate many in the democratic forces (along with their supporters), is that there is no acknowledgement that these actions are taken by an illegitimate regime, nor mention of the democratic forces rallying against these actions, against the war, and against any deployment of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory.

While the communiqué’s comments on Belarus could have been stronger, there is hope NATO leaders and experts in Vilnius have listened in on conversations featuring the democratically elected leader of Belarus and Lukashenka’s rival in the widely disputed 2020 election, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who has been boldly speaking in Vilnius in side-events calling for commitments to Belarus and reminding the world that the Lukashenka regime does not represent the Belarusian people.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

The communiqué presents a clear-eyed snapshot of the Alliance in an era of great power rivalry and strategic competition. Russia receives thorough and excoriating attention as the shatterer of peace and a continuing threat. China is called out for challenging the norms, interests, and security of the Alliance and its members. New and prospective members in the room or at the doorstep (Finland, Sweden, and on a farther horizon, Ukraine) were appropriately hailed, as were Asian partners Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. NATO member Turkey will be pleased by paragraphs four and five, which appreciate Turkish support to Sweden’s accession process and mention Ankara’s preferred language on terrorism as a threat “in all its forms and manifestations” to the Alliance. Hard power, conventional deterrence, and readiness are key focal points, though emerging and nontraditional threats are treated as well. Surprisingly, energy security makes an appearance only in paragraph sixty-eight. All in all, though, the document shows energy, focus, and seriousness appropriate to the geopolitical moment.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Much of the conversation immediately ahead of the NATO summit in Vilnius focused on whether the allies would take concrete steps toward Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. On Sunday, Biden dumped cold water on Ukraine imminently joining NATO, but whispers in expert circles in Washington suggested that an intermediate initiative toward membership might make a splash at Vilnius. In fact, the communiqué itself caused barely a ripple: a new NATO-Ukraine Council that will formalize consultations between Brussels and Kyiv on Ukraine’s “aspirations for membership in NATO.”

A NATO-Ukraine Council is certainly a net positive step toward Ukrainian accession, but the fact that this was the centerpiece of the communiqué suggests it was the bare minimum step upon which allies could agree. The Alliance should have gone further and instead established a defense and deterrence partnership to provide Ukraine lethal aid and training (the renewed Comprehensive Assistance Package will help Ukraine become more interoperable with NATO, but provisions only five hundred million euros for nonlethal aid).

The signers also left open the question of when Ukraine will join the Alliance, writing only that Ukraine will be invited “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This ambiguity may help prevent Russia from blocking specific preconditions to Ukraine’s accession, but it could also create further indignation in Ukraine and in the Baltics if allies continue to disagree on whether Ukraine is “ready” for NATO. 

Pressure will grow on the White House and Western European capitals to elucidate their conditions for Ukraine’s membership, at least in private channels, as Kyiv no doubt campaigns for an invitation at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC. 

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

For many, the July 11 communiqué was along the lines of what was expected coming out of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. For others, hope was high that NATO allies would rally around Ukraine and show some clear steps not just in terms of whether the country will eventually join NATO, but exactly how and exactly when. NATO allies didn’t (and couldn’t) go that far, which shows continued disagreement at the highest levels as to Ukraine’s future relationship with the military alliance.

But it’s not all bad news—NATO allies were able to reaffirm their statements in the 2008 communiqué that Ukraine’s future is, indeed, in NATO. The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road. The communiqué language basically says that Ukraine can join when all allies agree and when conditions are met. That leaves a lot of room for interpretation. My sense is that in the future—whether it’s in a year at NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, or five years from now, or ten—NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality. 

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

While the communiqué naturally reflects NATO’s laser focus on the war in Ukraine and the proximate threat from Russia, it also confirms the Alliance’s renewed strength and growing attention to China and the broader Indo-Pacific region.  

Much attention will understandably be paid to the communiqué’s hedging on Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership. But for China, this week’s summit underscores that the war unleashed by its friends in Moscow has single handedly revitalized NATO, which Beijing only recently had viewed (happily) as sinking into irrelevance. This development throws a large wrench into China’s plans to dismantle the US-led alliance network, carve out a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific, and transform the rules-based global order.

The document reiterates language in last year’s Strategic Concept on China’s threat to NATO’s “interests, security and values;” “malicious” hybrid and cyber operations; disinformation; and efforts to control key tech sectors, critical minerals, and supply chains. The communiqué also builds on last year’s warnings about China’s “deepening strategic partnership” with Russia to call on Beijing to abstain from all forms of support for Russia’s war against Ukraine—particularly the provision of any lethal aid. 

The call for China to condemn Russia and adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter—paired with a clear refusal to recognize Russia’s illegal annexations—throws cold water on any hopes that Beijing would be welcomed to facilitate peace negotiations based on Putin’s terms.  

Beijing will be pleased that the document does not include a reference to the opening of a proposed NATO office in Japan, reflecting a lack of consensus on NATO’s role in Asia. But language on the importance of the Indo-Pacific to security in the Euro-Atlantic and specific praise for the contributions of the four Indo-Pacific countries whose leaders are present in Vilnius—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—reflect NATO’s growing recognition that the regions’ fortunes are linked. NATO cannot ignore the threat of war over Taiwan and, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently put it, “China is watching to see the price Russia pays, or the reward it receives, for its aggression.” 

—David O. Shullman is senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council and former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council.

The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

NATO fell short of placing Ukraine onto a clear track to Alliance membership, but that cause for membership gained unambiguous momentum at the Vilnius summit. The assertion in the summit communiqué that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” frustratingly provides no more clarity than the 2008 Bucharest declaration in which NATO first declared Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. While the Alliance dropped the requirement for Ukraine to jump through the hoops of a membership action plan (MAP)—as was done for the fast-tracked accession of Finland and Sweden—the communiqué states that Ukraine must implement “additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required” which infers an unnecessary de jure MAP.

What we must not overlook or underestimate is the fact that allies brought to the Vilnius summit unprecedented support for Ukraine’s membership aspirations. The warmth with which Zelenskyy was greeted demonstrated how Ukraine is regarded as part of the transtatlantic community. While full allied consensus—a requirement in NATO decision-making—was not achieved, the Biden administration found itself largely alone blocking efforts to provide Ukraine that roadmap to NATO. Even Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that “without a doubt, Ukraine deserves to be in NATO.”  

The key now is to ensure that Ukraine defeats Russia’s invasion quickly and decisively, and to build on the expanded and significant allied support behind Kyiv’s membership aspirations, leveraging the fact that Ukraine today meets the requirements. These are mutually reinforcing goals. Their achievement will make Europe more secure and NATO more powerful. The progress made in Vilnius should make us all the more determined to secure Ukraine’s accession to NATO at the Alliance’s 2024 Washington summit.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The post Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Podcast Gräns

When Turkey makes demands and delays Sweden’s membership, there is a risk that NATO appears weak and that the principle of open doors is challenged. Sveriges Radio speaks to Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council. “The process has taken longer than I expected”, she says.

The post Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sweden poised to strengthen Nato’s northern defences

Membership of alliance marks historic shift for non-aligned country, precipitated by Russia’s war against Ukraine. Swedish membership will help Nato bolster its defence of the entire Nordic and Baltic regions and reinforce its presence in the Arctic. Its forces, logistics, airspace and maritime areas can now be fully integrated into Nato operational planning.

“Anna Wieslander, director for northern Europe, said Sweden would need to develop a ‘strategic culture’ among its top commanders and political decision makers. As a non-aligned country, albeit one active in multilateral institutions such as the EU and UN, it had the ability to hold back and sit on the fence. ‘Moving from national defence planning to a more collective defence planning process is a quite a big shift both practically and mentally,’ she said. ‘The expectations will be that Sweden will be an active member of Nato but that will be quite a challenge.’”

The post Wieslander quoted in Financial Times appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Sweden’s Path to NATO Membership Has Been So Rocky

“Why is Sweden not already a NATO member?”

“‘Sweden had to withdraw from Northern Europe’s power politics around 1809. We got a new French king, Bernadotte, and we withdrew because we were too weakened,’ Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council, tells TIME. ‘Since then, we have kept that stance but it was never treaty bound for Sweden. It was always about navigating and maneuvering in European politics.’”

“What happens next?”

“’When you have disagreement on which allies to include in NATO, that weakens NATO politically and benefits Russia,’ says Wieslander.”

The post Wieslander quoted in TIME appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Rich Outzen joins CNN International to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Rich Outzen joins TRT World to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anna Wieslander is at the NATO summit in Vilnius, where Turkey yesterday night said yes to Sweden joining Nato.

Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe states: “Turkey’s EU demands were introduced in the last minute.”

“It was about bringing everything to an end”, she says.

The post Wieslander interviewed on Expressen TV appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey’s president agrees to back Sweden’s request to join the western military defence alliance NATO – but what will it mean when Sweden becomes part of the alliance?

Anna Wieslander spoke with BBC’s World Service about the Turkey-Swedish deal and a possible Ukraine membership.

Anna Wieslander can be heard at minute 28:30.

The post Wieslander on BBC World Service appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The wait is (nearly) over. After more than a year of ups and downs since Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has agreed to back Stockholm’s bid to become the Alliance’s thirty-second member. The announcement came on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius after Erdoğan, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson held a lightning round of negotiations. Erdoğan agreed to advance ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession to Turkey’s legislature, with Hungary expected to follow suit to complete the process. What changed Erdoğan’s mind? What’s next for the Alliance? Our experts on the ground in Vilnius and beyond share their insights.

• Rich Outzen (@RichOutzen): Nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, former US State Department official, and former US Army foreign area officer
• Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
• Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department
• Anna Wieslander (@AnnwieAnna): Director for Northern Europe and secretary-general of the Swedish Defence Association

How done is this deal?

• The joint memorandum from Monday’s meeting spells out increased counterterrorism efforts by NATO to address Turkey’s security concerns and fresh support from Sweden for Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, among other provisions—and came as a surprise, following Erdogan’s skeptical comments in recent days about the prospects for an agreement.
• “It is a typical Erdoğan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands,” Rich tells us.  
• Not (yet) in writing is a looming deal for Turkey to buy F-16 fighter jets from the United States, a likely carrot for Turkish approval of Sweden’s membership. “The practice of international relations is not an art for the purist,” says Dan. “If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.”
• Chris, who’s in Vilnius, notes that Erdoğan is only sending the decision on Sweden’s NATO accession to the Turkish parliament, which his party controls, so this is not a done deal. Erdoğan made a show of lending his support to an invitation for Finland and Sweden to join NATO a year ago in Madrid before drawing out the process until now. “There is a non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning [in Sweden]) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again,” he says. “I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.”  
• With the action now moving to the Turkish legislature, Erdoğan “retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror” measures that Turkey wants or if an F-16 deal doesn’t materialize, Rich adds.
• Nevertheless, there was a palpable sense of celebration and relief in Vilnius. “It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance,” Anna tells us from the summit.

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The Wagner factor

• Erdoğan’s turnabout comes two weeks after mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived mutiny in Russia—and on the same day that news broke of Russian leader Vladimir Putin meeting with Prigozhin in the days after the revolt—developments that “suggest [Putin] regime weakness,” according to Dan.
• “Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages,” Dan adds. In choosing to advance Sweden’s efforts to join NATO, “Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.”
• Rich argues that the Prigozhin drama was not much of a factor, since this agreement was all part of a long-term push for NATO to help address Turkish security concerns such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): “The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security.” 
• If its security concerns are addressed, Turkey actually favors a bigger NATO with countries such as Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia, Rich tells us, “because by NATO structure and bylaws” Turkey, like other Alliance members, “gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization.” So “the bigger the better.” 

All for one

• “The deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start,” Anna says, as the Alliance “faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak” with its members not yet fully united around Sweden’s NATO membership. Now focus turns to a possible membership roadmap and security guarantees for Ukraine, where “tough decisions” await, she says. 
• Erdoğan also gets to bask in the limelight. “He has lost no real leverage,” Rich notes, “but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.”

The post What’s behind Erdogan’s backing of Sweden’s NATO bid? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Defne Arslan: Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

Rich Outzen: Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

Anna Wieslander: Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Christopher Skaluba: Don’t spike the football just yet

Rachel Rizzo: Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

Daniel Fried: Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

Ian Brzezinski: Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

On July 10, Erdoğan committed to send Sweden’s NATO membership ratification to the Turkish parliament. The news was welcomed by all NATO members heading into the NATO summit in Vilnius—and will prove beneficial to Turkey, a major ally with a key role in the Alliance’s southern flank, from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. The announcement also came right after Erdoğan demanded long-sought EU membership for Turkey in return for Sweden’s accession, in addition to Sweden taking Turkey’s security concerns seriously. Sweden eventually took steps on adopting an anti-terrorism law in June. Additionally, language regarding terrorist organizations, which pose an existential threat to Turkey, appeared in the NATO communiqué. These were important gains for Turkey. It is also encouraging to see that NATO will be establishing a terrorism coordination mechanism for the first time.

What will be the timeline for Sweden’s ratification in the Turkish parliament? It is important to note that apart from Erdoğan’s remarks, there has not been any official announcement from the Turkish side regarding Sweden’s accession yet. This tells me that Erdoğan will wait for the next steps both from Sweden and NATO, as well as from the EU before he sends the protocol to the Turkish parliament.

Erdoğan also announced on July 12 in Vilnius that Sweden’s accession will move forward once the Turkish Parliament opens in October, but not before. As the parliament opens, the ratification needs to be discussed and adopted at the parliament’s foreign affairs committee first, before it goes to the floor.   

Erdogan’s move on July 10 not only took the pressure off of Turkey during the summit, but also gave the president more time to monitor the developments in Turkey’s favor. From the EU side, a customs union revitalization and update, as well as visa liberalization will be beneficial for Turkey, and if things move fast enough, there is always a chance that Sweden’s ratification can happen in September. That said, I also would like to underline that this announcement in Vilnius will also bring obligations to Turkey to meet its side of the agreement.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. 

Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

I am mildly surprised that this comes before and not during the Summit, which convenes Tuesday, but overall it makes sense. It is a typical Erdogan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands.  

It’s the wrong question to ask, “What pushed Erdogan to do this?” Because it underestimates the degree of strategy he and his advisors have applied—and misreads their original intent. Erdogan and the Turks have long said publicly and privately that they favor NATO enlargement. They have supported Ukraine and Georgia in the past, approved Finland this past year, and would like to see Sweden in—if the notoriously lax Swedish counterterror laws, now amended, are fully implemented. Turkey wants a big NATO because by NATO structure and bylaws Erdogan gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization—as do all members. The bigger the better. Yet the nature of the enlargement matters greatly for a country with a serious terrorism threat. So the better question is: Did Erdogan get what he thinks he needs on his own security needs, regarding the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and a potential F-16 fighter jet deal with the United States, to advance Sweden’s candidacy? What was the quid pro quo? 

It’s important to remember that Erdogan’s announcement was not approval of the bid; it was a statement of intent to pass the question of approval to the Turkish parliament, which Erdogan’s party controls. Thus he retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror implementation, or if the United States reneges on the F-16 deal. So all in all, he has lost no real leverage, but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.

This removes the question of Swedish accession from the summit’s main agenda, and places it in the category of “business successfully managed.” Thus the summit can focus on two more pressing issues: how to support Ukraine and how to implement NATO’s revised security concept. I would expect that on the first topic (Ukraine) we will see a roadmap or statement of principles that lays out robust military support for Ukraine’s defense, amounting to a security guarantee, but carefully calibrated not to constitute a near-term prospect of accession, an escalation, or an engagement of NATO as an organization in the current defensive war against Russia. On the second topic (security concept), there will be technical progress on how to divide responsibilities and resources more equitably, but this will likely be of less interest to general audiences. 

I think this has less to do with the mutiny of Yevgeniy Prigozhin and perceptions of Vladimir Putin’s standing than with the leverage game vis-a-vis NATO allies and how to ensure that if European NATO problems become Turkish problems, Turkish problems become European NATO problems. Ankara will continue to conduct a balancing act by which it maintains trade, diplomatic relations, and occasional strategic cooperation with Russia—while ensuring that together with other NATO powers Turkey disabuses Russia of its dreams of imperial revanche. Putin, Prigozhin, Wagner—in Turkish eyes these are all just layers of the Russian Matryoshka or Maskirovka, deceptive games that obscure a fairly direct power play. The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security. 

As to quid pro quo, for Turkey, it can be only two things—counter-PKK commitments by Sweden, and agreement on F-16s (and perhaps broader strategic engagement) by Washington. Anything else is peripheral, and if these are not obtained, the deal is a bad one for Ankara. Of course there is an escape hatch—Erdogan passed the ball to the Turkish parliament and approved nothing directly—but the pieces are in place now for a good transactional deal that helps NATO, Sweden, and Turkey in a stroke.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. 

Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Finally Sweden got its green light from Turkey to join NATO. Late in the evening in Vilnius, Stoltenberg called July 10, 2023, “a historic day.” The agreement between Sweden, Turkey, and NATO that was signed on Monday evening means that Sweden will join the Alliance as its thirty-second member “as soon as possible,” given that the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments need to ratify the accession protocol.  

It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance. Sweden´s military and political adjustments toward NATO membership can proceed with full speed, which is beneficial not only for Sweden, but for the defense of Northern Europe, in which Sweden could play a crucial role.   

The green light also facilitates Finland’s integration as a new member, since the security and defense of the two Nordics is heavily interlinked. As Finnish President Sauli Niinistö stated: “Finland’s NATO membership is not complete without Sweden.”

For NATO, the deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start. As twenty-nine allies already have ratified Sweden’s accession, NATO otherwise faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak. Lack of progress could put the credibility of NATO’s “open door” policy at risk, since the Alliance also has to make some tough decisions on Ukrainian membership. 

Turkey managed to push Sweden and NATO to take a step forward on counterterrorism measures, and in the end, Erdoğan also put the EU into the mix. Sweden’s decision to support Turkish ambitions to get the European Commission to restart the accession process appeared to seal their NATO agreement. Whether Turkey will also get to purchase the long-sought F-16 fighter jets from the United States remains to be seen. But then, the summit has not even started and US President Joe Biden has yet to arrive. 

—Anna Wieslander is the director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council’s Northern Europe office in Stockholm. 

Don’t spike the football just yet

While my instinct tells me that it would be difficult for Erdoğan to backtrack on an agreement he has seemingly made in good faith, recent history provides a cautionary tale. Just over a year ago on the margins of the Madrid Summit, glasses were clinking on what most observers assumed would be a straightforward process for admission once Turkey joined consensus in inviting Finland and Sweden to become members. Yet Erdoğan knew he had a second bite at the apple. He took the accolades in Madrid, only to run Sweden through the paces for another year before another dramatic set of negotiations in Vilnius, where he once again demanded the spotlight before conceding. If he moves with alacrity to push the ratification through the Turkish parliament, skeptics can be reassured. But there is non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again. I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.  

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

For months, NATO leaders have been working behind the scenes to broker this agreement between Turkey and Sweden. It’s important to tip our hats to Stoltenberg, Biden, and other leaders who exerted diplomatic pressure to see this through. This is a classic example of a geopolitical tit-for-tat: Erdoğan using his strategic position—as a member of NATO but also straddling the East and West—to extract concessions from Sweden that both bolster his power at home and demonstrate to the broader NATO Alliance that they need him. It also gives both sides something they want: Erdoğan gets to look like a statesman, and Sweden appears on track to finally get its NATO membership. It will be interesting in the coming days to follow reports of what took place behind closed doors over the last few weeks, days, and even hours, and what was actually on offer for Erdoğan to create this shift. He wouldn’t have changed his tune if he didn’t see this move as in his interests. Next up: Be sure to watch the US-Turkey F-16 space closely.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

While it’s only speculation, the Prigozhin mutiny and the Kremlin’s uncertain response (Prigozhin at liberty in Russia, not in exile in Belarus; Prigozhin’s meeting with Putin) suggest regime weakness. Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages. Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.

We won’t know what the United States might do with respect to F-16 or other military sales to Turkey. If there were an understanding, the details will become clear in coming weeks. Whether a possible deal is a good deal depends on the details. But the practice of international relations is not an art for the purist. Erdoğan’s decision to support Sweden’s (and Ukraine’s) NATO accession is a big deal and worth advancing. If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.

Sweden will bring to the Alliance military capacity (though it will need to build more), political savvy, and good geography. Sweden will help with the defense of NATO’s eastern flank countries and the Baltic Sea. Having worked with Swedish diplomats for many years, I believe they will also be excellent partners in forging NATO consensus and a sustainable, strong policy toward Russia.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Assuming Erdoğan’s announcement is followed by expeditious approvals from the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments, it will be one of the key substantive and geopolitically significant deliverables of NATO’s Vilnius summit. Sweden’s accession will bring to the Alliance real military capability, reinforce its transatlantic outlook, and above all, bring into the Alliance’s ranks a new member determined to fulfill its military responsibilities. Sweden’s membership will complete the transformation of the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake, thereby strengthening the security and military stability of North Central Europe.

—​​Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The post Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moldova simply cannot afford to delay reforming its gas sector any longer. It is completely dependent on imports to keep itself heated and lit. Landlocked between Ukraine and Romania, 99% of oil is imported, along with 100% of natural gas. That gas fuels heating and the country’s lone power plant, located in Kremlin-controlled separatist region Transnistria.

This alone would be a recipe for energy disaster (and has been). Additionally, the country’s gas sector is almost entirely controlled by a monopoly called Moldovagaz, which is 51% owned by Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom, with a 36% share owned by the Moldovan government and 13% by Transnistria. Moldovagaz’s wholly owned subsidiaries dominate all of the various subsectors of the energy industry. For example, Moldovatransgaz runs 98% of the distribution network.

This arrangement has afforded Moscow decades of informal control over Moldova. Indeed, allegations of Russia’s manipulation, coercion, and malign influence over the tiny country as exercised through Moldovagaz are too extensive to illuminate in full. A few highlights are the 2006 and 2009 gas shutoffs by Gazprom, which left tens of thousands of Moldovans without heating in the dead of winter. There have also been several rounds of brutal gas supply negotiations that have left Moldova with deeply disadvantageous gas contracts.

The most recent contract was signed in October 2021 and committed Moldova to another five years of Gazprom supplies. At the same time, President Maia Sandu’s new government, its lawyers, and its Western supporters are struggling with the fact that either pro-Russian actors in the former government or Moldovagaz officials appear to have wiped the files necessary to untangle several of the legal instruments that keep the country in its unhappy marriage with Gazprom.

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Modovagaz also faces various accusations of accounting shenanigans. These include claims that it supplies Transnistria with gas that the breakaway region doesn’t pay for, and then charges the debt to the Moldovan government. Coupled with sometimes dubious debts Moldova has incurred buying gas, Gazprom claims the government now owes it $9 billion. This represents $760 million in purported Moldovan government debt, and $8.24 billion in debt tied to Transnistria. For comparison, Moldova’s GDP is under $14 billion.

Meanwhile, during October 2021 negotiations with Gazprom, Moldovagaz committed “not to carry out a forced reorganization” until this debt is settled. Critics believe this is a further indication that unbundling would be good for Moldova and bad for Russia. Signed in the midst of the mounting energy crisis of late 2021 and with Moldova running entirely out of gas, this agreement has been widely branded as an example of inappropriate Russian influence over the Moldovan energy sector.

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The obvious solution to break Russia’s energy dominance over Moldova is for the authorities to finally implement the unbundling of the gas sector and vertically de-integrate Moldovagaz. The EU Third Energy Package requires the three tiers of a natural gas market (upstream/production, midstream/transmission, and downstream/distribution) not be controlled by the same entity. In practice, this means separating the gas transmission system operator, Moldovatransgaz. The original deadline for unbundling was in 2016, with extensions then granted until January 2020, and then February 2021. In 2021, EU officials opened infringement proceedings against Moldova for its continued failure to unbundle Moldovagaz. In June 2023, the Ministry of Energy announced it was “determined” to complete Moldovagaz unbundling by September 2023. We shall see.

What form any unbundling will take also remains unclear. The Moldovan government may believe it lacks the capacity to manage Moldovatransgaz and the transmission system and may look for an external company to operate it. This would be a major mistake because giving critical infrastructure assets over to foreign entities would be repeating the same error as with Gazprom and Moldovagaz. It would also preclude Moldova’s learning to be self sufficient, a key aspect of energy independence and security. Another theoretical option is privatization, but that requires finding a buyer. Given Moldova’s history of defaults and disputes with private investors, there’s close to zero chance of that happening.

The best option is almost certainly finding a different government entity other than Moldovagaz to take control of Moldovatransgaz. This would replicate how Ukraine unbundled its gas monopoly, Naftogaz, by spinning off the transmission system operator into a separate entity controlled by a different ministry. There is some tangential precedent: Using a revolving EBRD credit of €300 million, the gas trading team at state agency Energocom, led by Maciej Wozniak, has pushed Gazprom out of the Moldovan market. Along the same lines, another state agency could step into the distribution business. This would have the added benefit of being more efficient because nothing new would need to be created; the unbundling would be a matter of paperwork.

There has probably never been a better time for Moldova to get serious about this; the cessation of gas transit from Gazprom into Europe means Russia has already played its energy trump card and has relatively little leverage left.

At the same time, Western interest and willingness to support Moldova during the transition should help cover any gaps. Politically, Moldova taking control of assets ultimately owned by Russia is good optics for Sandu’s government. And the political turmoil in Moscow coupled with the Kremlin’s distraction from its stalled war in Ukraine could make Moldovan maneuvers less likely to elicit an aggressive response. If everything goes right, becoming the supplier to Transnistria could even forge something of a path to national reconciliation. There’s never been a better moment to try, and there’s no time to waste.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert Jun 25, 2023

Short-lived Wagner mutiny will undermine Russia’s Ukraine invasion

By Peter Dickinson

The short-lived Wagner mutiny was over in less than two days but it will have a long-lasting consequences for Russia, for a weakened Vladimir Putin, and for the already faltering invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jun 29, 2023

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Taras Kuzio

With the short-lived Wagner mutiny exposing Vladimir Putin’s weakness for all to see, the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to provide the country with everything it needs to secure victory, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Now the Czechs have joined the swarm. On June 28, the government in Prague approved a new national security strategy, replacing the previous strategy from 2015. Though perhaps less weighty than papers presented by major European powers, it is worth paying attention to the Czech strategy. As highlighted by Martin Povejšil, the Czech foreign ministry’s director general for security and multilateral issues, the new document is “addressing threats and risks in the most open and direct way, compared to other countries.” This directness offers a refreshingly realistic assessment of the current security environment and helps to explain the ongoing European strategizing momentum.

Drafting the thirty-seven-page document took nine months, and the work was coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), leaving a clear mark on the text. There were discussions in the past about whether the MFA should be the penholder, considering that an important part of the document dealt with internal security and also the defense ministry does the work in France and some other countries. The increasing impact of external factors on internal security has assuaged these doubts. Still, it appears to have been a thoroughly intergovernmental effort that included a number of ministries and collected inputs from parliament, the president’s office, and nongovernmental organizations.   

The security strategy has a twofold purpose: First, it is meant to be the starting point and binding guidance for further work on security for the whole public sector, from ministries to municipalities. Second, the strategy should also become a “StratCom” tool to communicate major security-related messages to the Czech population, as well as to Czechia’s friends and adversaries. The language, structure, and content of the document reflect this purpose.

There are four distinctive features of the new national security strategy to note.

1. ‘Czechia is not secure’ 

The document is built on the foundational acknowledgment that “Czechia is not secure,” not due to an internal threat but because of the deteriorating international context. The text gets as far as admitting the possibility that the country “could become part of an armed conflict.” Some may consider this statement overblown, yet it’s deliberate. The risk of open aggression against Czechia remains low but is currently the highest since the end of the Cold War. An effective defense against new security challenges starts with admitting them and forsaking the state of security unconsciousness. 

The new strategy wants to contribute to the strategic awakening, the whole of society becoming conscious of current threats. When Karel Řehka, the chief of the general staff of the Czech army, stated in February that he can’t rule out a war between Russia and NATO, which would lead to a partial mobilization, he shocked many of his compatriots. This document puts additional weight behind the seriousness of the situation for Czechs.

2. It’s direct about Russia and China 

Compared to previous Czech security strategies (2003, 2011, 2015), the current one is more direct in pointing out the threats and risks.

If the strategy from 2015—which is still partly oriented by the post-9/11 paradigm of the war on terrorism—speaks indirectly about some states seeking the revision of the existing international order, the current document, reminiscent of the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, denotes Russia as “the biggest immediate and long-standing direct threat to the security of Europe and to the international rules-based order.” And it will remain so—one can read a few lines lower—“unless Russia goes through a fundamental and deep transformation, political as well as social, no matter what outcome the war in Ukraine may have.” Czechia and its neighbors have a particular reason to worry, given the assumption that Moscow “continues to treat Central Europe as its natural sphere of influence.” That’s why it’s important for the EU to engage in a serious reconsideration of its relations with Russia, which some member states are still reluctant to support.  

China is described as a country that represents “a fundamental systemic challenge globally and is attempting to change the existing international order.” There were reportedly some discussions about whether to explicitly designate China as a “threat.” In the end, the text avoids creating a new precedent and keeps closer to the language used by the EU and NATO allies. The document highlights that Beijing “continues with massive arming… engages in cyber espionage, seeks to control global data flows, and uses diverse forms of socio-economic coercion and other hybrid interference tools.” One can easily identify Beijing where the text describes—without attribution—other major dangers and risks. Interestingly, the paragraph after China­’s portrayal begins as follows: “Yet another long-term threat comes from…” Logically, what was discussed just before—China—could be interpreted also as a long-term threat. 

Other threats mentioned are North Korea’s nuclear program, Iran’s malign activities in the region, lasting conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, and uncontrolled migration. The document also points out the security challenges related to climate change, instability in the Western Balkans, and—importantly—the risks of declining democracy and rule of law in any EU member state.

3. A whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is needed

The new strategy is distinguished by its holistic approach to security. The country’s defense is no longer just the responsibility of the military and a few other relevant government bodies. The document advances the idea that all the ministries and the public sector should be involved, along with business and civil society. Indeed, all citizens should be somehow engaged, as they are not only security consumers but its contributors and creators. It’s the government’s role to prepare people for this task.

To paraphrase a French anthropologist Marcel Mauss—one of the godfathers of modern sociology and anthropology—national security appears here as “total social fact,” even if different players are engaged at different levels.

Given the whole-of-society dimension of national security, the strategy makes an effort to present an easy-to-read text accessible to the broader public, hoping to generate a public debate. Czechia’s more integrated approach appears to have more in common with the German strategy, compared to, for example, France’s 2022 strategic review, which is more focused on the military (and a military-minded audience). On the other hand, Prague’s new security strategy is closer to the French strategy in that both seem unified and clearer in their priorities compared with the German document, in which one can easily identify different voices of the three coalition partners, making it a bit more of a patchwork. 

4. The focus is unity, not autonomy

If the new strategy is realistic in the assessment of threats, it also reflects the values-based policies Czechia is now championing. There’s now a broad consensus in Prague toward restoring former President Václav Havel’s legacy of values-consistent foreign policy, from Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s coalition government to new President Petr Pavel and the leaders of both chambers of parliament. 

The strategy repeatedly emphasizes Czech NATO and EU membership as key to ensuring the country’s security, especially while the “role of the [United Nations] as a protector of the order keeps losing traction.” The document alludes to the need for reinforcement of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy while highlighting complementarity with NATO and the Alliance’s key role in collective defense. 

Those following the debate about EU “strategic autonomy” won’t be surprised that the concept, put to the forefront by French President Emmanuel Macron, isn’t mentioned. Instead of “strategic autonomy,” which can imply greater European separation from the United States, Prague prefers to talk about “strategic unity” within the EU and, importantly, across the Atlantic.

There’s more to come

The new Czech security outlook will be complemented by other strategic documents, including a defense strategy, foreign policy concept, and reviews of approaches toward China, Russia, and energy security. This should be done by early 2025, when the foreign ministry, in coordination with the national security adviser, will review the implementation of the current security strategy, as stipulated by the relevant government resolution. 

Yet, even the new strategy alone makes it clear Prague is taking a bolder approach to national security, and it presents yet another indicator of a tectonic shift in Europe’s politics. It likely won’t be the last. Expect more countries in Central and Eastern Europe to step up and take on a more proactive approach as well. As an appetizer, one could refer to Lithuania’s bold Indo-Pacific strategy, released July 5.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East, and transatlantic relations. He previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC. His views are his own. 

The post Four big takeaways from the new Czech national security strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

NATO has been negotiating new defense spending targets.¹ In 2014, the allies agreed to a Defense Investment Pledge (DIP) comprised of two related burden-sharing commitments. The DIP committed each ally to work toward spending the equivalent of 2 percent of their gross domestic products (GDPs) on defense and 20 percent of their defense budgets on acquisition and related research and development (R&D). Allies gave themselves ten years to achieve these goals. With the end of this timeframe just around the corner, some allies like the United States, Poland, and Estonia are pushing for more ambitious defense spending targets while others would be content to see the DIP disappear altogether.² Clearly, the negotiations have been difficult.

Burden-sharing disagreements within the Alliance are nearly as old as NATO itself. Today, though, transatlantic tension regarding burden-sharing is heightened by a complex security landscape. Increased Russian aggression since 2014 has required reinvestment in conventional military capabilities, while asymmetric threats including cyberattacks, global warming, pandemics, mass migration, and terrorism continue to threaten allied security. Equitable burden-sharing among allies is not only a matter of principle, but also has operational and even tactical implications. Without equitable burden-sharing, the allies will quickly prove unable to meet their security commitments.

The latest allied defense spending figures show that while progress has been made on both elements of the DIP, not all allies will achieve the 2 percent and 20 percent goals by 2024. How then can the United States and like-minded allies successfully negotiate even higher targets? They might start by agreeing to portray NATO burden- and risk-sharing more accurately, as a way of ameliorating the naming and shaming that comes with not achieving the 2 percent and 20 percent goals. Although some argue that “inputs” like defense spending tell us a lot about “outputs” like contributions to Alliance operations, recently available data indicate this is not necessarily the case. If burden- and risk-sharing could be portrayed more accurately, those opposed to increasing the input targets might be more willing to reconsider their opposition. Even if they do not, improving how NATO depicts burden- and risk-sharing would benefit lawmakers, analysts, academics, and the public.

This issue brief begins by examining whether defense inputs really do tell us much about defense outputs, particularly contributions to allied operations. The brief does this first qualitatively by analyzing allied troop contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2011, at the height of the troop surge. It then employs a statistical analysis to examine allied troop contributions to not just ISAF in 2011 but also to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission in the Baltic states. The issue brief concludes with recommendations on how NATO might more accurately depict burden- and risk-sharing, as a way of ultimately reaching higher DIP targets.

What do defense inputs tell us?

NATO relies on eleven metrics to measure burden-sharing.³ Two of the metrics focus on so-called inputs and nine focus on outputs. Inputs refer to the funds that member states allocate to defense, and these formed the basis for the 2014 DIP. The DIP was noteworthy not because allies had committed to the 2 percent/20 percent targets—in fact, the 2 percent target had existed for many years prior—but rather because the commitments were made by Alliance heads of state and government. In the past, Alliance defense ministers were the ones who had committed to the defense spending targets.

Regarding burden-sharing outputs, most of the data on these NATO metrics are classified for a variety of political and operational reasons. For example, publicly acknowledging that some Alliance forces are not as ready to respond to a crisis as claimed could prove politically embarrassing, provide adversaries like Russia with useful intelligence, and undermine deterrence. However, the fact that not all burden-sharing metrics are public leaves some decision-makers, legislators, experts, and allied citizens without a complete picture of who in the Alliance is doing their fair share.

Some experts argue that the inputs correlate “a lot” with defense capabilities and capacity and hence provide a good enough picture of the outputs.⁴ This may appear somewhat intuitive—you get what you pay for. However, such claims are problematic on at least two counts. First, these claims ignore risk-sharing, an important yet often overlooked component of the broader concept of burden-sharing. The examples of Greece and Denmark illustrate this point well. Greece routinely spends more than the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense and recently it has spent well above 20 percent of its defense budget on equipment and related R&D (38.8 percent in 2021). Greece, therefore, may appear to be a model ally. In contrast, Denmark routinely spends less than the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense, averaging just 1.23 percent since 2014, and less than 20 percent of its defense budget on equipment, averaging 13.8 percent since 2014. Clearly, the Danes appear to be burden-sharing laggards.

However, during NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, Danish forces operated in southern Afghanistan, a region that saw some of the heaviest fighting. As a result, the Danes had one of the highest per capita casualty rates of allied troop-contributing countries.⁵ Meanwhile, Greek forces served primarily at Kabul’s international airport and in allied medical facilities in Afghanistan. These troops performed important, necessary missions, but they did not face the same risks as Danish troops.

The second reason to doubt claims that NATO’s defense input measures tell us most of what we need to know about defense outputs is that merely possessing capabilities is no guarantee that those capabilities will be used in allied operations, regardless of the risk-sharing factors noted above. Again, referring to the cases of Greece and Denmark, the contributions of the former to Alliance operations in Afghanistan⁶ (1.2 percent of all allied troops during the 2010-12 surge) and Kosovo⁷ (2.8 percent of the total Kosovo Force as of August 2022) were and are somewhat low, given that Greek troops constitute 3.34 percent of total NATO forces. In contrast, at the height of the surge in Afghanistan, Denmark had deployed 0.56 percent of all allied troops even though its forces constituted just 0.51 percent of total NATO forces in 2011. Similarly, today Denmark contributes 0.93 percent of all allied troops in Kosovo even though its troops constitute just 0.52 percent of total NATO forces. In other words, when it comes to sending troops into harm’s way, Denmark appears to do more than what might be expected of it.

It is possible, though, that the cases of Greece and Denmark constitute idiosyncratic burden- and risk-sharing behavior. To explain, perhaps most allies at or above the 2 percent/20 percent thresholds make contributions that are what would be expected of them or greater—given their relative sizes within the Alliance. Conversely, it may be the case that most below the 2 percent/20 percent thresholds make undersized contributions, again relative to their sizes within the Alliance.

This can be tested by looking at three recent NATO operations—the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2011; the Kovoso Force over the last decade; and the Enhanced Forward Presence mission in the Baltic states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) from 2017 until the present.⁸ These three operations were selected for two reasons. First, they are primarily land operations, and nearly all allies have land forces that could play a role in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe. This permits a more broad-based analysis than, for instance, examining NATO’s Baltic air policing operation, since not all allies have fighter aircraft. Second, the operations represent a good mix of typologies—crisis response/counterinsurgency (ISAF), peacekeeping (KFOR), and defense/deterrence (eFP)—even if the needs of the Alliance today likely skew toward defense and deterrence.

The specific time periods for each operation were selected for the following reasons:

• NATO’s presence in Afghanistan was at its height in 2011, during the surge of allied forces there. Allies were under pressure from both Washington and Brussels to participate.
• KFOR is a long-term peacekeeping operation and examining it over the last decade includes the period when NATO was consumed with Afghanistan, the period when NATO was increasingly focused on deterring and defending against Russia, and the few years in between.
  
• The eFP mission in the Baltics is tied to the very heart of the Alliance—the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the NATO treaty—especially since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

By examining each ally’s contribution to the three operations relative to that ally’s military forces within the entire Alliance, one can get a sense of whether the success in achieving the goals of the DIP really does yield better burden-sharing.⁹ For example, if a particular ally met either the 2 percent or 20 percent threshold, and if inputs tell us a lot about outputs, it is reasonable to expect that that ally would contribute a proportional share of its military forces (relative to its forces within the Alliance) to the three operations.

Table 1 shows the data for ISAF in August 2011. Although the Defense Investment Pledge would not be made for another three years, the second and third columns indicate whether allies were above or below the 2 percent and 20 percent thresholds at the time—cells are highlighted green when above either threshold and red when below. Table 1 then shows a comparison between, on the one hand, each ally’s contribution to ISAF as a percent of all ISAF forces and, on the other hand, their military forces as a percent of NATO’s total military forces. (The figures on defense spending as a percent of GDP and the figures on percent of defense spending dedicated to equipment and R&D are lagged by three years because it takes time for money spent to have impact on capabilities.)

Table 1: NATO in ISAF, August 2011

If defense inputs tell us a lot about defense outputs, one might presume that if a country has sufficient inputs (i.e., it spends at least 2 percent on defense and meets or exceeds the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D), it would contribute a percentage of ISAF’s forces proportionate to its share of total NATO forces. The last column of the table shows whether and to what degree allies’ contributions to ISAF were over (positive number) or under (negative number) their proportion of the Alliance’s total military forces. If an ally failed to spend 2 percent on defense and failed to meet the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D, we would expect this number to be negative—that is, it fielded a percent of ISAF’s total force at a level below that which its forces represent within NATO more broadly. Conversely, if it spent more than 2 percent on defense or crossed the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D, we would expect this number to be positive—that is, it fielded a percent of ISAF’s total force at a level above that which its forces represent within NATO more broadly. Exceptions—either over or under expectations—are highlighted in yellow. Of the twenty-four allies listed,¹⁰ eight did not contribute troops in a way one might expect, either positively or negatively, while sixteen did. More specifically, seven out of twenty-four allies met all or part of the DIP and yet failed to meet expectations for providing defense outputs in ISAF at the height of the surge.

Seven laggards out of twenty-four is not too bad. If roughly 70 percent of the time allies met expectations, it may be fair to conclude that defense inputs result in expected outputs, at least in terms of contributions to current operations. However, when analyzed statistically and when considering other operations like KFOR and eFP, the evidence of correlation between defense inputs and outputs is more mixed.

Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations among non-US allied defense spending as a percent of GDP, equipment spending as a percent of overall defense spending, “other” spending (which includes operations and maintenance, or O&M) as a percent of overall defense spending, and each ally’s defense budget as a percent of NATO’s overall defense spending on the one hand and the percent of ISAF troops on the other. Pairwise correlations allow for comparisons between a pair of variables, to shed light on whether a linear relationship exists between them. The results of a pairwise correlation analysis are expressed as correlation coefficients, ranging from -1, meaning a perfect negative correlation, to 1, meaning a perfect positive correlation. The closer the correlation coefficient is to either end of the scale (-1 or +1), the closer the relationship between the two variables. If, for example, a correlation coefficient between two variables is 0.75, this means that 75 percent of the time, if one of the variables moves in one direction (e.g., increasing), we can predict that the other variable moves in the same direction (e.g., also increasing). In social sciences generally, a coefficient from 0.7 (or -0.7) to 1 (or -1) indicates a strong positive (or negative) correlation; 0.3 (or -0.3) to 0.69 (or -0.69) indicates a moderately positive (or negative) correlation; and coefficients between 0.29 (or -0.29) and 0 indicate a weak or no positive (or negative) correlation.¹¹ Note that correlation does not mean or imply causation.

In the case of ISAF in 2011, the percent of troops contributed is poorly correlated with most key defense spending input measures, including the DIP and the percent of defense spending on O&M.¹² The only variable that shows any strong correlation with the percent of troops contributed to ISAF is each ally’s defense spending as a percent of total NATO defense spending.¹³

Table 2: Correlations among Defense Input Measures and ISAF Troop Contributions, 2011

Moreover, statistical analyses of non-US troop contributions to other Alliance operations show similarly mixed correlations at best or no correlation at all. Table 3 features a similar pairwise correlation analysis for KFOR from 2012 through 2020. Given the nine-year timeframe considered here, the analysis includes over 240 data points. As seen in the table, there are no strong or moderate correlations, positive or negative, between any of the inputs addressed here.

Table 3: NATO in KFOR, 2012-2020

Table 4 features statistical analysis of non-US allied contributions to eFP from 2017 through 2022. The table is based on data for allied contributions to eFP in the eight host countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland from 2017 to the present, and Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia since 2022. Data here include contributions from non-US allies each year from 2017 through 2022, resulting in 140 data points. As with the case of ISAF, the only defense input strongly correlated with percent of troop contributions to eFP is the percent of total allied defense spending. It is unclear why percent of total NATO defense spending is the only defense input that strongly correlates to both ISAF and eFP contributions, but it may reflect differing allied attitudes toward those operations on the one hand versus attitudes toward KFOR on the other.

Table 4: NATO in EFP, 2017-2022

Alternative measures, or just repackaging?

If defense inputs do not tell us much about the outputs, and if NATO does not make public the nine output measures it tracks, how can legislators, academics, other experts, and average citizens understand whether burden-sharing within NATO is fair? NATO burden-sharing is an inherently subjective and political issue. Given this, allies will likely try to manipulate whatever figures or data are used to measure burden-sharing to depict themselves in the best light. In short, no set of measures nor burden-sharing assessment process is perfect.

Nonetheless—and although it may be impossible to keep countries from using burden-sharing assessments as a way of burnishing their images—NATO can and should do more to include outputs in its publicly accessible annual reports. Doing so may offer all allies a fairer depiction of whether and how they are sharing burdens and risks, which could help lessen opposition from some allies to increasing the defense spending targets.

To achieve this, NATO should better leverage the data it already has available publicly—this will be far easier than trying to convince allies to declassify other information. For example, the Alliance should include in its annual defense expenditures report the troop contributions of each ally to ongoing operations. Information on allied contributions to particular operations is already publicly available, but it is not aggregated with the annual defense spending figures. This is sure to displease allies that contribute to other, non-NATO military missions in Europe and beyond including European Union or United Nations operations. To appease these allies, their contributions to non-NATO missions ought to be at least acknowledged, assuming those non-NATO operations are deemed to contribute to security in the transatlantic space.

Additionally, NATO should consider recrafting how it depicts the data it already makes public. For example, the Alliance staff charged with portraying the annually collected fiscal data should add an average trend line for all defense spending categories in its annual defense expenditures report. This is especially important for the personnel, infrastructure, and other (O&M) spending categories, which are not currently part of the DIP. Although there are no recommended minimum spending allocations for these categories, as there is for acquisition and related R&D (20 percent), simply showing a NATO average across all spending categories would provide a sense of which allies may need to recalibrate their spending.

Finally, the Alliance should think about ways to better portray risk-sharing. For instance, the Alliance should consider including per capita casualty figures in its reporting on current operations. For example, none of the “placemats” that the Alliance makes available for its operations in ISAF, KFOR, or eFP list casualty figures. This is politically risky and of course there have been few, if any, casualties in KFOR or eFP, given the nature of operations in Kosovo and across Eastern Europe. Additionally, the Alliance should continue to produce and release maps depicting in gross terms where allies (by country flag) are deployed in a particular operation. For instance, with an understanding that Alliance operations in southern Afghanistan were generally more challenging and dangerous than those in the north, a map depicting Danish, British, Canadian, Romanian, and American flags in the south provides a good sense of which allies are bearing greater risk.

Conclusion

The burden-sharing inputs used by NATO, specifically the Defense Investment Pledge agreed to at the 2014 Wales summit, do not correlate well or sometimes at all with one of the most important outputs—namely, relative troop contributions to NATO operations. Moreover, the inputs tell us nothing about risk-sharing, an important yet often overlooked component of broader burden-sharing considerations.

All of this means that those outside closed-door Alliance meetings—such as the general public but also most legislators—have little insight into whether allies are sharing responsibilities equitably. As the Alliance debates whether and how to replace the 2014 DIP, it should also consider ways to more accurately report on and portray burden- and risk-sharing. Doing so would permit a better informed transatlantic discussion on how allies should equitably share responsibilities, may lessen opposition toward increasing defense spending targets, and would ultimately improve transatlantic security in an era of strategic competition.

Dr. John R. Deni is a research professor of security studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a nonresident associate fellow at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed are his own. The author would like to thank Matthew Woessner, Jordan Becker, and two anonymous peer reviewers for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. Additionally, the author is grateful for research assistance from Chelsea Quilling, Nate Forrest, Max Haseman, and Sean Sanko.

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The questions surrounding the June 23-24 events—which, were it not for the nuclear warheads and the casualties, would easily merit the qualification of vaudevillian—have multiplied. One is particularly relevant: What are the consequences for the war in Ukraine? More specifically, how does this plot twist affect Europe’s security? 

If one imagines matryoshka dolls (Russian stacking dolls) as a symbol of Russian politics, the Wagner organization has existed because of—and for—Russian President Vladimir Putin. It depended—with all the ambiguity the term implies in the context of the whims of an all-powerful tsar and the personalistic nature of power—on three institutions also apparently controlled by the president: the Russian armed forces, its military intelligence (GRU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Notably, the intervention of these institutions in the rebellion—if any—was unclear. 

The structure built by Putin has become a snake pit. Perhaps a “house of cards” is a more fitting term. Having previously refrained from sanctioning Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the ruthless leader of the Wagner paramilitary group, Putin spoke following the mutiny of punishing his enemies, even if such efforts are complicated by Wagner’s penetration into the Russian elite. The first arrest related to these consequences (still unconfirmed) appears to be that of Russian General Sergey Surovikin. 

Prigozhin had been engaged in a power struggle with the military leadership for some time. Specifically, his attacks have targeted Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The confrontation was exacerbated after last February’s invasion by the increasing relevance that the head mercenary and his followers have gained. Their relative effectiveness compared to the regular Russian army—which collapsed in the early onslaught of the war—brought Wagner into the spotlight inside and outside of Russia. In addition to its military actions, the group’s cruelty went viral on social media, as did its sermons in the courtyards of the prisons Wagner forces toured, recruiting convicted criminals of all kinds.

The mercenary leader’s strong connection with the great leader—a connection forged during the murky stage of the president’s public debut in Saint Petersburg in the 1990s—seemed to give Prigozhin a blank check. He first emerged on the scene as “Putin’s chef,” a nickname earned from managing the catering service of someone well acquainted with the dangers at the table, himself being a master in the use of poison as a political weapon. 

Before the insurrection, the outspoken warrior had been making accusations of all kinds of irregularities, misconduct, and mistreatment against his two enemies: that they had claimed credit for Wagner’s victory in Bakhmut, that men were dying so they could “get fat in their mahogany offices,” and that they had denied his fighters necessary ammunition and support. And, most importantly, that they had deceived Putin about the progress of the military campaign. 

The speech that kicked off the mutiny goes even further. No one had dared to question Putin’s justification of the invasion based on a victim mentality incessantly fed to the Russian people. The few in Russia who dared to dissent, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, immediately found themselves behind bars. 

Thus, Prigozhin’s words should be considered inflammatory: a qualified member of the establishment dared to openly and boldly denounce the falsehood of “the story that there was insane aggression on the part of Ukraine, and they were going to attack [Russia] together with the entire NATO bloc.” Careful not to mention the president by name, he stated that, contrary to Kremlin messaging, the war served “not to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine,” but rather “it was launched for completely different reasons.” He implied that the disaster was orchestrated by high-ranking military officials (driven by economic greed and vanity), in combination with “some oligarchs.”

Putin’s response was not long in coming. In his televised address on June 24, he labeled the uprising as “a stab in the back of [the] country and [the] people.” His references to the Russian Empire—a frequent topic of his outdated musings—were to be expected, but his implicit identification with the ill-fated Tsar Nicholas II was surprising. 

He equated the situation triggered by Prigozhin to the prelude of the upheaval of 1917, which led to the collapse of the system. Was he seeking, in his association with the tragic figure, a symbolic reincarnation of the tsar—in his case, having made the right decisions to avoid falling into the black hole of violence that characterized those years when “Russians killed Russians, brothers killed brothers”? It was a diatribe made with his citizens in mind, who retain a collective memory of that terrible period and who found their livelihoods crushed during the 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 

During the uprising, the lack of response was salient, both from the siloviki (the economic and political elite) and the common people. There was no notable support of—or clear opposition to—Putin, who exploits the fact that people cling to the status quo out of fear of the unknown. 

Prigozhin has nonetheless proven to be a torpedo aimed at Putin’s narrative. He punctured the myth of a war of necessity, of an inevitable war for historical justice. He undermined Putin’s explanation of an existential struggle against US aggression disguised as NATO. Furthermore, the turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail. This thesis has justified the countries’ stinginess in sending to Ukraine certain equipment classified as offensive and the West’s delay in accepting stark realities, such as the urgent need for full operational readiness in the air. 

The Euro-Atlantic community must move away from the habit of delaying decisions based on speculation about the consequences of its actions for third parties. It needs to look beyond the pipe dream of an immediate peace negotiation based on the stalemate on the front or a Kremlin-asserted “right” to subjugated areas. NATO allies’ opportunity to demonstrate determination when facing Russia will come soon—on July 11 in Vilnius at the NATO Summit. 

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain (2002-2004) and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

The post Prigozhin was a torpedo to the idea that the West must not humiliate Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since Moscow’s invasion began in February 2022, cities across Ukraine have experienced significant destruction from Russia’s frequent artillery bombardments, drone attacks, and missile strikes. Ongoing fighting around Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine is a reminder of how cities remain central battlefields in the war.

Local officials and mayors have courageously stepped up to the challenge of wartime governance, with citizens increasingly turning to them to address emergency humanitarian and security challenges. Ukrainian mayors often serve as primary lines of defense responsible for processing medical aid, engaging directly with international organizations, and repairing damaged infrastructure.

According to a recent survey conducted across twenty-one cities, between 87% and 96% of Ukrainian residents wish to remain in their cities after the war, with 39% to 62% of respondents agreeing that local officials should decide reconstruction priorities. Clearly, leaders who have managed local response systems are well equipped to identify local needs and mobilize available resources for future targeted reconstruction projects.

For this reason, it is crucial that Ukraine’s nascent reconstruction strategies incorporate local leaders and mayors as primary actors charged with directing and managing redevelopment initiatives. Although any Ukrainian “Marshall Plan” will certainly prioritize financing redevelopment projects and infrastructure repair, Ukrainian officials and the country’s international partners should also work to establish new relationships that empower leaders at the local level.

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Numerous plans to address Ukraine’s future economic and political engagement with transatlantic and other recovery institutions are already underway. During the recent Ukraine Recovery Conference in London, public and private leaders from over 60 countries pledged significant financial resources to address humanitarian needs and outline investments in Ukraine’s battered economy.

Kyiv had earlier presented a draft Recovery and Development Plan at the 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland. This plan outlined the need for approximately 850 reconstruction projects set over ten years with total costs estimated at $750 billion dollars.

In January 2023, the European Commission also unveiled its Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform, which is designed to streamline future Ukrainian international recovery assistance and establish clear, transparent, and accountable financial standards. While such initiatives help secure much-needed funds, Ukraine and its allies must also seek to utilize these global opportunities and engage Ukraine’s local leaders as vital partners in their country’s recovery.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Expanding on Ukraine’s decentralization experience is not only a pragmatic wartime imperative necessary for distributing equipment and supplies; it will also build upon established reforms necessary for Ukraine’s democratic consolidation. Beginning in 2014 as part of the many sweeping reforms enacted after the Euromaidan Revolution, political decentralization has been an important way of reducing Soviet-style centralization in Kyiv while combating corruption.

Over the past nine years, Ukraine’s mayors have started to gain experience developing and managing public policies and directly responding to constituent needs. Over this period, more than 10,000 informal local councils were merged into officially recognized municipalities and granted formal administrative oversight and financial regulatory powers. Up until Russia’s 2022 invasion, decentralized economic and political reforms introduced unprecedented positive changes in quality of life for millions of Ukrainians; the share of citizens living below subsistence levels fell from 52% to 23% between 2015 to 2019.

Ukraine’s continued success in creating resilient local governance systems will require cooperation with national political leaders with clear expectations outlined in legal commitments. Meanwhile, examples of renewed political centralization in response to wartime demands have highlighted possible fault lines between local and national figures. This trend threatens to exacerbate tensions if left unchecked.

In the city of Chernihiv, located approximately 90 miles north of Kyiv, Mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko was removed by courts following an investigation by Ukraine’s National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) into the alleged use of a municipally-owned car by the mayor’s wife to evacuate from the city during the opening days of the war. Mayor Atroshenko himself stayed in Chernihiv to oversee the defense of the city which withstood a siege and partial occupation in spring 2022.

In the city of Rivne in western Ukraine, rumblings grow of Mayor Oleksandr Tretyak potentially being removed in relation to an NAPC investigation into the payment of bonuses to city officials in 2020. At the same time, Mayor Tretyak claims he has come under increasing pressure to move limited city budget money to the region’s civil military administration, something he has so far refused to do, claiming that the city has already fulfilled all budgetary support requirements. These examples have fueled speculation over the direction of wartime centralization and should give pause to local authorities and regional civic leaders.

Any future national reconstruction policy will be best served by building upon Ukraine’s localized leadership assets and incorporating local councils, mayors, and officials in decision-making processes. By directing incoming aid at the local level, global partners can help expand technical, strategic, and administrative capacities and ensure resources are used effectively across targeted issues. Ukraine’s dedication to continued decentralization reforms is not only necessary to achieve reconstruction goals but is also a critical component of the country’s mission to develop transparent democratic systems from the ground up moving forward.

Zachary Popovich is a senior program associate at the International Republican Institute. Michael Druckman is the resident program director for Ukraine at the International Republican Institute.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 29, 2023

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Taras Kuzio

With the short-lived Wagner mutiny exposing Vladimir Putin’s weakness for all to see, the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to provide the country with everything it needs to secure victory, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jun 19, 2023

Beyond the battlefield: Why we should invest in Ukraine’s democratic future

By Peter Erben, Gio Kobakhidze

Western military aid has helped Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s full-scale invasion, but the West must also support Ukraine’s efforts to consolidate the country’s democracy, argue Peter Erben and Gio Kobakhidze.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 26, 2023

How Ukraine can pin down Russia in Crimea without a land campaign

By John B. Barranco

Many analysts believe Ukraine must liberate Crimea in order to win the war, but it could be possible to render the peninsula strategically irrelevant for Russia without launching a major land campaign, writes John B. Barranco.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Why local officials must participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Rich Outzen joins TRT World to discuss what to expect from the NATO Vilnius Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“It is unclear what kind of agreement will be reached in Vilnius.”

“‘I think it will be some kind of political declaration. You can put it on paper or you can just express it. The best thing now is to put the declaration in the form of a statement rather than conditioning things on paper’, says Anna Wieslander.”

“What happens to Sweden’s application if there is no clear sign in Vilnius?”

“Anna Wieslander fears that the ‘energy of the process’ will lose momentum.”

“‘The imminent issues surrounding Ukraine will take over even more. The risk is that NATO loses its commitment and does not know how to proceed with the issue with Sweden’, she says.”

The post Wieslander interviewed in Dagens Nyheter appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins TVP World to discuss Zelenskyy’s visit to Turkey and why Ukraine expected invitation to join NATO at the Vilnius Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“The summit has only one essential outcome,” Doug Lute, a former US ambassador to NATO and member of the Atlantic Council’s board of directors, told me.  “Whatever the agreements on supporting Ukraine, this year it is essential that Zelenskyy be in the photo, capturing vividly that NATO has his back and reminding the world that Russia has no such support.”  

Beyond that, if the Ukrainian leader is photographed standing among the thirty-one NATO heads of state, Zelenskyy more than likely got enough of what he needed to make the trip to Lithuania. When I met with him recently in Kyiv, as part of an Atlantic Council delegation, he said anything short of security guarantees and a clear roadmap to NATO membership for Ukraine would be seen as a betrayal of Ukrainians’ sacrifice.

If Zelenskyy doesn’t come to Vilnius, allied leaders will have missed a crucial opportunity to signal to Ukrainians and the world their unflinching commitment to defeating Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s criminal war and revanchist designs in Europe—at a crucible moment in the five-hundred-day-old war.

Zelenskyy was in Turkey on Saturday as part of a pre-summit European tour, shoring up support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is still withholding his support for Sweden’s membership in NATO. Regarding Kyiv, however, Erdoğan said: “There is no doubt that Ukraine deserves NATO membership.”

Though much still could change before the summit opens on Tuesday, Central European alliance members say that the Biden administration has led the recalcitrance to a stronger, time-linked roadmap to NATO membership for Ukraine.

One Central European senior official, who asked that his name and that of his country not be named, compared the tone coming from the White House to that of Jacques Chirac in 2003, when the French president lectured Central Europeans who were supporting the United States on Iraq that they had “missed a good opportunity to shut up.”

What’s on the table for Ukraine thus far in Vilnius is, among other measures, the renaming of a NATO consultative group to give it more weight, security assurances similar to those the United States has with Israel, and the removal of the bureaucracy of a membership action plan (MAP)—though US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on Friday that Ukraine “needs to take additional reforms,” hinting that it will still face a MAP-like process. Zelenskyy told us in Kyiv that such moves would be insufficient given his country’s service to democracies everywhere.

To be sure, the Biden administration deserves high praise for its handling of Russia’s war thus far, starting with its early leaking of intelligence predicting the invasion so that Ukraine and Europe were forewarned (not to mention China). Without concerted US military and financial support, Ukraine likely would have failed.

 At the same time, if Ukrainians had received the weaponry and equipment they wanted faster and in greater quantities, thousands of Ukrainians would still be alive and the battlefield gains would have been greater.    

Softening the potential blow of a disappointing summit outcome for Ukraine, the Biden administration cleared the way this week to provide Ukrainians with the cluster munitions they have long sought, prompting Zelenskyy to praise Biden’s “decisive steps.”

A form of air-dropped or ground-launched explosives that release smaller submunitions, cluster munitions have been widely used by Russia but are outlawed by many allies, though not by the United States. With Ukraine running low on 155 mm artillery shells, which are in low supply globally, cluster munitions are the fastest, most plentiful way to flush out dug-in Russian positions that are blocking the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The Biden administration’s green light for cluster munitions has followed a pattern: The White House at first blocks the provision of certain weapons, from High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Abrams tanks to Patriot air defenses, only to agree to their provision months later. The administration’s go-slow approach to Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations reflects that caution, born of a desire to defend Ukraine without provoking greater Russian escalation, including tactical nuclear weapons use.

All NATO summits have to balance the longer-term needs of the Alliance with immediate demands. However, officials from non-US NATO member countries who I spoke to last week said there are several reasons why Ukraine’s immediate needs should take on greater priority:

1. Mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion in June underscored both the fissures in Russia’s leadership and the low morale and discipline of its military. It’s thus an ideal time to double down on support for Ukraine, recognizing that only significant ground gains can force useful negotiations.
2. Despite the economic and military cost of supporting Ukraine, the costs will grow exponentially if Putin prevails, and the threats go beyond Ukraine. One Biden administration official told me that the geopolitical importance of Ukraine to Washington is far greater than either Afghanistan or Iraq ever was, yet Ukraine can stop Russia at far lower cost and without risking American or other allied soldiers.
3. To argue that NATO membership for Ukraine can only come after the war ends and Russia leaves Ukrainian territory only provides Moscow an incentive to continue the war. Holding back due to concern about Russian nukes rewards Putin’s nuclear blackmail—and will encourage other unsavory leaders to acquire nukes as well.
4. Much is said about why Ukraine needs NATO, but not enough is said about why the Alliance needs Ukraine, now one of the strongest and most battle-hardened militaries in the world. The lesson of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe is that it brings stability to its neighbors and more peaceful and secure relations with Russia. The countries that Russia invaded—Georgia and Ukraine—were gray zones outside any military alliance. “Gray zones are green lights” for Putin, argues former US ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker.
5. Putin thus far has been wrong to count on Ukrainian failure and Western fatigue, but the dangers will grow in 2024 when the United States and much of Europe face elections. Bold decisions that can be made in 2023 will be much more difficult to achieve next year. Ukraine’s biggest threat might be the election year of 2024, and not just in the United States.

“We don’t any longer have the luxury of time,” one senior European official told me. “We certainly don’t have the luxury of getting it wrong. The stakes are too large—they are generational and go far beyond NATO’s borders.”   

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 The war in Ukraine shows how technology is changing the battlefield
ECONOMIST

The Economist breaks down the lessons of the Ukraine war and what they mean for the future of warfare. Read the whole report to gain a deep and nuanced understanding of the implications for future military planning.

“[T]he paradox of the war,” the Economist writes, “is that mass and technology are intimately bound together. Even the artillery war shows this. Weeks before the invasion, America sent Ukraine Excalibur shells. Inside each was a small, rugged chip that could receive GPS signals from America’s constellation of navigation satellites. Whereas Russia often relied on barrages over a wide area, Ukrainian gunners could be more precise.”

This, the Economist argues, portends a shift towards the defensive, analogous to the late nineteenth century. “Precision warfare can counter some advantages of mass: Ukraine was outnumbered 12 to one north of Kyiv. It can also complement mass. Software-based targeting saves around 15-30% in shells, according to sources familiar with the data. But what precision cannot do, says Michael Kofman of the Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA), a think-tank, is substitute for mass.” Read more →

#2 Ukraine wants and expects an invitation to join NATO. Allies are not sure.
David L Stern, Emily Rauhala, and Isabelle Khurshudyan | WASHINGTON POST

For an understanding of what Ukraine seeks at the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius, what might happen, and what the Ukrainians are worried about, read this excellent piece of reporting from David Stern, Emily Rauhala, and Isabelle Khurshudyan in the Washington Post.

“With or without membership,” they write, “Ukrainian officials are looking for security commitments by Western nations ‘without delay and as soon as possible,’ which would potentially encourage Moscow to withdraw its forces. Many analysts say Russian President Vladimir Putin is counting on Ukraine’s Western supporters to grow exhausted and halt the expensive flow of weapons and economic aid they have been sending to Kyiv. Such security guarantees could also serve to deter Russia from any major acts of aggression in the future. ‘I am sure that if the regime in the Kremlin does not change in the coming years, even after our victory, there will be — in their heads — a desire for revenge,’ [Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii] Reznikov said.” Read more →

#3 Putin’s Real Security Crisis
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

For another angle on the implications of Prigozhin’s failed coup, read this smart analysis of the failure of the Russian security services during the coup and Putin’s apparent non-response to that failure.

“Then, as Wagner forces made their move,” Soldatov and Borogan write, “both the FSB and Russia’s National Guard, the main body assigned to maintain internal security and suppress unrest in Russia, failed as rapid response forces. The National Guard made every effort to avoid a direct confrontation with Wagner; for its part, the FSB—which also has several elite special forces groups—did not appear to take any action at all. Instead, the most powerful security agency in the country issued a press release calling on Wagner’s rank and file to stay out of the uprising and to go arrest Prigozhin—on their own.”

And yet, they note, no one has yet been punished.

“This lack of repercussions for the security services is particularly startling in view of the FSB’s performance in the crisis. When Prigozhin captured the headquarters of the Southern Military District—where he spoke to [Deputy Minister of Defense Yunus-Bek] Yevkurov and [First Deputy Head of the GRU Vladimir] Alekseyev—it looked almost like a hostage taking of several of Russia’s top military commanders. Yet according to sources in the FSB, in response to the arrival of Wagner forces, the FSB agents in Rostov-on-Don simply barricaded themselves in their local headquarters… While a column of Wagner mercenaries marched toward Moscow, taking down helicopters and shooting into the houses of civilians on the way, these brave generals failed to show up—not at the scene or in front of the public at all.” Read more →

#4 Multilateral Man Is More Powerful Than Putin Realized
Anne Applebaum | THE ATLANTIC

In this must-read profile of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Anne Applebaum makes a powerful case for why Stoltenberg’s brand of quiet multilateral leadership will ensure Ukraine’s long-term integration into Europe from behind the scenes.

“[A]lthough historians will argue about whether NATO countries could have done more to deter Russia, they did much more to help Ukraine than Putin expected once the war began. Putin not only underestimated Ukraine; he also underestimated Multilateral Men—the officials who, like Jens Stoltenberg and his counterparts at the European Union, helped the White House put together the military, political, and diplomatic response. Putin believed his own propaganda, the same propaganda used by the transatlantic far right: Democracies are weak, autocrats are strong, and people who use polite, diplomatic language won’t defend themselves. This turned out to be wrong. “‘Democracies have proven much more resilient, much stronger than our adversaries believe,’ Stoltenberg said. And autocracies are more fragile: ‘As we’ve just seen, authoritarian systems can just, suddenly, break down.’” Read more →

#5 Evan Gershkovich, Detained for 100 Days
WALL STREET JOURNAL

As a former Wall Street Journal reporter and longtime advocate for press freedom, I remain determined to do what’s possible to end the Russian imprisonment of WSJ reporter Evan Gershkovich, which is now at one hundred days and counting. I urge Inflection Points readers to follow the WSJ’s guide on what you can do to support Evan and his family.

Writes Emma Tucker, the WSJ’s editor-in-chief, “In the days since Evan was arrested we have been inspired by the support that you, our readers, have provided. It has helped us to keep Evan’s plight at the top of the news agenda. As we reflect on this difficult milestone, we encourage you to continue sharing Evan’s reporting and the latest updates on his situation. Journalism is not a crime, and we will not rest until Evan is released.”

Amen. Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jul 5, 2023

Here’s the ‘concrete’ path for Ukraine to join NATO

By Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Christopher Skaluba

The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius should establish a High Level Group to design a roadmap for Ukraine’s fast-track membership.

Conflict Crisis Management

New Atlanticist Jul 6, 2023

Ukraine needs NATO membership, not an ‘Israel model’

By Ian Brzezinski

Granting NATO membership to Ukraine is critical to ensuring it wins the war against Russia quickly and decisively.

Israel NATO

New Atlanticist Jul 6, 2023

Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny

By Jeffrey Cimmino

What will be the long-term aftermath of Russia’s Wagner mutiny? Here are four possible paths for Russia’s future the West should consider.

Belarus Crisis Management

The post Dispatch from Vilnius: Will Zelenskyy show at the summit? It depends on whether Biden listens to frontline NATO allies. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the 2022 summit, Finland and Sweden signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding outlining a path for accession through progress on Turkey’s security concerns. After Finland officially became a member country on April 4, 2023, the United States and other NATO member countries started to exert pressure on Turkey to accelerate approval for Sweden prior to the Vilnius summit. Sweden, with two hundred years of military non-alignment, and Finland, neutral throughout the Cold War, applied for membership only after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February last year. Enhancing Ukraine’s security is high on the agenda at the NATO Summit, necessitating attention to direct support for Ukraine’s defense, Alliance enlargement, and effective cooperation in the Black Sea region.

For Ankara the primary consideration in approving Sweden is tougher enforcement of counter-terror laws against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an internationally recognized terrorist group, and its offshoots. Washington has dangled possible approval of Turkey’s proposed purchase of F-16 fighter jets and upgrade kits in attempts to influence Ankara’s calculation. Ankara, which is a long-time F-16 producer and user, desires reasonable compensation for its earlier expulsion from the F-35 program, after it went ahead with the purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system which also led to the imposition of US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Both the United States and Turkey see Turkish air power as a NATO anchor in the Black Sea region.

Securing the Black Sea

Alongside Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey is the largest of three NATO member countries in the Black Sea region and controls access to it under the Montreux Convention. With the Alliance’s second largest military and unique geographic positioning, Turkey has been a crucial player in the Russia-Ukraine war both diplomatically and militarily. Turkey has managed to maintain trade and diplomatic ties with Russia while providing vigorous support to Ukraine’s defense, and it has built a record of frustrating Russian military ventures in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Securing NATO’s interests in the Black Sea depends on a strong Turkey. Ukraine understands this, leading its officials to consider Turkey as one of the few potential security guarantor countries.

Turkey has provided support to NATO maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, and most recently agreed to sell Bayraktar drones to Romania. Yet Turkey’s ability to deter Russia depends in part on the health of its F-16 fleet—the third largest in the world but feeling its age. Ankara’s request for forty new F-16s and upgrade packages for its seventy-nine existing fighters to sustain its air capabilities has made little headway over the past two years, and members of the US Congress have added Swedish accession as a new condition to the frozen sale. At the same time, many members of Congress have indicated that Turkey agreeing to Sweden’s accession will not be enough for them to approve Ankara’s F-16 request.

Ironically, Turkey is not an ordinary F-16 buyer. It has been an important F-16 manufacturer through Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) established in 1984, according to the company, as a “Turkish-U.S. joint investment company to carry out the manufacture of F-16 aircraft, integration of on-board systems and flight tests” following the initial Turkish decision to acquire F-16s. Working with US defense giants such as General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and General Electric, TUSAŞ manufactured and tested almost all of the Turkish F-16 fleet—nearly three hundred aircraft in various configurations.

Additionally, TUSAŞ produced forty-six F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995, and helped modernize the F-16 fleet of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. In short, Turkey has been a critical partner in the F-16 program for decades—and a further sale remains in the mutual interest of Ankara, Washington, and NATO.

A de facto arms embargo?

In February 2023, the US Senate NATO Observer Group co-chairs, Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), presented a bipartisan letter to President Joe Biden requesting that “F-16 fighter jet sales to Türkiye should not begin until the NATO protocols [for Finland and Sweden] are ratified.” This followed, according to a report in Defense News, multiple congressional holds of US arms sales to Turkey starting in 2018 or earlier.

Turkey has not added any new F-16s to its inventory since 2012 as the country was expecting to receive more than one hundred F-35 jets, for which it has already paid $1.4 billion. After Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program in March 2020, Ankara requested F-16s in exchange for the amount it had already paid.

The Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries also remains sanctioned by the United States under CAATSA. There has been a sustained campaign by congressional opponents of Turkey to deny major new arms sales to Ankara, spearheaded by the Hellenic and Armenian caucuses. Ironically, 1970s-era congressional sanctions against arms sales to Turkey catalyzed the drive for defense industrial autonomy that drove Turkey’s rise as a defense exporter. The ongoing replay of similar resistance from the US Congress is only reinforcing Turkey’s view that the United States is not a reliable arms provider in the long run. The resulting drive for self-sufficiency has increased the domestic share of Turkish defense production from roughly 20 percent to 80 percent and established the Turkish arms industry as a major international player.

Defense industrial decoupling

Consequently, Turkey has dropped from the seventh-largest US arms importer between 2013-17 to the twenty-seventh largest between 2018-2022. Meanwhile, Turkey’s defense exports skyrocketed by 69 percent during the same period, making the country the twelfth largest exporter of arms globally. In 2022, it set a new arms export record of $4.3 billion—an increase of nearly 37 percent from the previous year. 

In order to produce a national fighter aircraft that can replace the aging F-16, the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries signed a contract with TUSAŞ in 2016 to develop the fifth-generation National Combat Aircraft. The first successful taxi test of the prototype was completed in March this year, and it is expected that the first Kaan (previously known as the TF-X) will join the Turkish air force by 2030. 

In the medium to long term, defense industrial decoupling of Turkey from the United States would seem to suit both sides. Ankara will be free from the strings that come with US systems, and Congress will be able to satisfy select constituencies that it is not complicit in Turkish military actions. Bilateral relations can move on to happier and less complicated storylines—like the drive towards one hundred billion dollars in bilateral trade. Turkey will continue to partner with countries with a more streamlined defense cooperation model, such as the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

In the short term, a deal on F-16s could restore a modicum of mutual trust, meet the needs of the Alliance, and close the chapter of US-Turkish defense cooperation on a positive note. For those reasons, far more than to spur Swedish accession, US and Turkish leaders continue to push for progress.

Approval of Swedish accession before the Vilnius Summit is unlikely not because of F-16 haggling, but due to the early stage of implementation of Sweden’s new counter-terror laws. The arrest and conviction of a PKK financier in Stockholm in early July, a first of its kind under Sweden’s newly strengthened anti-terror laws, could mark a new phase of progress. It is unlikely that enough can be done in a few days to conclude the process. More likely, and encouraging nonetheless, would be positive signals out of the summit that real progress is being made: in counter-terror implementation, in F-16 talks, and in eventual Swedish accession. Vilnius probably will not mark the completion of these processes, but it could mark the start of a decisive and positive stage toward their conclusion.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Pınar Dost is a historian of international relations with a PhD dissertation on the history of US-Turkey relations (Sciences Po Paris). Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

The post A looming US-Turkey F-16 deal is about much more than Sweden’s NATO bid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“‘Another important reason for NATO to include Sweden is political’, as Anna Wieslander points out.”

“‘Sweden is a solid old democracy, we have a strong economy and we are members of the EU. Politically, we are a reliable country because NATO is based on democratic values with respect for the rule of law and individual freedom. From that point of view, we are an asset’ says Anna Wieslander”.

The post Wieslander quoted in Dagens Nyheter appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 30, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest piece, the pair debate the international rippling effects caused by Prigozhin’s revolt in Russia. Will this incident spotlight Russia’s internal turmoil, revealing the weakness of Vladimir Putin and his security forces? Or, does the mutiny inadvertently prolong the war in Ukraine?

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate the global consequences of Prigozhin’s revolt appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 2, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig co-wrote with Rebeccah Heinrichs a piece for the National Review challenging the notion of “Asia First” policy proposals, noting that they are based on the flawed and misguided premise of American decline. In a renewed era of strategic competition, Kroenig and Heinrichs argue that the United States and its allies and partners can – and must – counter China and Russia simultaneously.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the National Review refuting “Asia First” foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The first point to note is the global nature of Ukrainian security. For decades to come, the entire world will live by the rules established by the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to weaponize everything from energy resources and food supplies to cyberspace and social media. Moscow has engaged in nuclear blackmail, interfered with maritime freedoms, and called into question the very idea of territorial integrity. These challenges are not local or even regional in scope; they are global threats that resonate equally around the world.

How we respond to these issues in Ukraine will define the international security climate. Any attempts to address the Russian invasion on a purely local level by freezing the conflict or forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions will result in failure and will only fuel further international instability. Instead, we must acknowledge that the threats posed by Russia are global in character and demand a global response.

The second key point is the need to define Ukraine’s position in regional and global security systems. In simple terms, the desired trajectory should include security guarantees followed by full NATO accession, with internal transformations taking place in parallel that implement the best lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience and enable the country to acquire the necessary domestic defense capabilities. These processes can and must be advanced during the current active phase of the war.

The third key point is the need to develop a defense doctrine that meets the security expectations of both Ukraine and the country’s partners. It is now clear that Ukraine is capable of serving as a shield on Europe’s eastern frontier. Indeed, Ukraine is currently carrying out NATO’s core mission of defending Europe against Russian military aggression. At the same time, over the past eighteen months Ukraine has received direct and indirect military aid worth more than the country’s entire defense budget since the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Without continued external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to carry out rapid rearmament or acquire the kind of defense capabilities it needs. The best solution would be to move toward greater reliance on internal resources while maintaining strong levels of international support.

Clearly, Ukraine’s partners will be reluctant to invest in a security model that differs significantly from established NATO standards, or one that conflicts with their own military, industrial, or economic interests. Finding the right balance between strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defense sector capabilities and optimizing international cooperation will be crucial.

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Efforts to develop a practical vision for Ukraine’s army of the future have been underway since June 2022, when I ordered a capacity review. These findings, coupled with Ukraine’s unique wartime experience, form the basis of a concept paper on the transformation of Ukraine’s defense sector submitted to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at the beginning of June 2023. The next stage will involve consultations to coordinate interagency efforts required to create the right legislative framework and ensure effective cooperation between different government bodies. This synergy will be the key to success.

Russia’s invasion has underlined that defense is an investment not an expense. For instance, strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities will help guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, which secures vital income from trade. Likewise, failure to provide adequate security measures will leave Ukraine unable to rebuild and trapped in costly wartime insecurity. All of Ukraine’s security policy decisions must reflect these fundamental truths.

Complex defense capabilities revolve around three main factors: people, weapons, and financial resources. Each has their own planning specifics. Successful weapons and financing policies take years to plan; when it comes to human resources, it often takes a generation or longer to get it right.

Ukraine is now looking to coordinate the country’s defense sector transformation under conditions of extreme uncertainty. We know the current war will end in Ukrainian victory, but we do not know when this will be. This makes it difficult to begin the process of optimizing the range of weapons in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. After all, in order to defeat Russia, Ukraine needs to receive as many weapons as it can, and needs to get them as quickly as possible.

We also don’t know exactly when Ukraine’s partners will make the final decision to fully integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is fundamental. It is one thing to reform the Ukrainian military as part of a collective defense strategy in cooperation with partners; it is quite another to build defense capabilities in relative isolation with some external support.

One of my main requests to our partners is therefore to make a decision on Ukraine’s NATO accession as soon as possible. This will make it far easier for all parties to conduct long-term defense planning. If a decision is not forthcoming, Ukraine’s partners will be obliged to include the country’s security needs in their own planning on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

A further priority for Ukraine’s defense doctrine is the de-Sovietization of defense policy and planning. This needs to be addressed in a practical manner that goes beyond mere slogans. Eighteen months ago, many military analysts believed a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean a fight between a large Soviet army against a small Soviet army. In reality, it soon became clear that the Ukrainian army had undergone significant change. However, the same cannot be said for the broader state systems underpinning Ukrainian defense policy. A wide range of political, social, and economic changes are still needed.

For example, the system of registration for military service is still linked in the Soviet fashion with place of work or study. This means that entrepreneurs along with the self-employed and unemployed are often outside the system. Far-reaching changes are needed in order to establish and maintain the right kind of reserve and effectively mobilize the country’s human, material, and financial resources. Efforts to overcome quality problems with quantity must be set aside. In conditions of resource scarcity, such an approach is suicidal.

The human dimension of future Ukrainian defense is a professional army. This must be based on the transparent logic of a military career and an extensive social protection package, relying on well-trained reserves formed of all men liable for military service and of women on a voluntary basis (with the exception of those categories of women who are liable for military service).

The registration of people liable for military service should be fully digitized. This process is underway. We also need to implement separate training policies for different groups in order to create a genuine rather than nominal reserve. This should look to maximize citizen engagement by improving the motivation system.

Statements about there being seven million Ukrainians liable for military service are meaningless if the country is not capable of structuring the reserve in ways that make efficient use of these people. Similarly, declarations that anyone subject to military service must complete their compulsory period in uniform do little to help the state capitalize on existing resources. Instead, basic training should be supplemented by the development of specific groups within the country’s military reserve forces. This should include a combat reserve consisting of those with combat experience; a territorial reserve for territorial defense units; an operational reserve of military veterans without combat experience; a mobilization reserve of those who previously passed through basic training; and a general reserve register featuring individuals with no prior military training.

The development of an efficient reserve is only possible in conjuction with an effective Heroes Policy, which has been identified as a priority by President Zelenskyy. This is a good example of the need for interagency synergies and is also an area where a sense of justice must serve as a cornerstone. Meanwhile, the task of managing military registration should be taken away from the General Staff and the Land Forces Command. Instead, it is necessary to establish a separate and tailored agency within the Ministry of Defense.

Similar efforts are required for the civil reserve. Over the past eighteen months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has become clear that a significant portion of the almost one million Ukrainian men and women in uniform perform purely civilian functions. It makes no sense to bunch all of these people together with the military until the end of hostilities. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required. When society sees that the state seeks to engage people in defense tasks as rationally and reasonably as possible, we will witness a decline in negative phenomena associated with military service. After all, many of those who seek to avoid military service do so in order to escape perceived uncertainty, injustice, and abuses.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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A new mobilization and reserve policy will require a new regulatory framework. This will involve comprehensive legislative changes. The entire mobilization system for central and local authorities, enterprises, and institutions should undergo revision, with mobilization tasks in their current form abolished. In its place, the emphasis should be on practical needs and common sense. Training for reservists should be synchronized with real life requirements and skills, with citizens aware of opportunities at the level of school leaver, university undergraduate, employee, or entrepreneur.

Professional military education and career management must be developed according to NATO principles and standards to ensure interoperability. At the same time, all training and education should be adjusted to reflect Ukraine’s unrivalled combat experience. This is the country’s unique advantage and should shape Ukraine’s defense doctrine as much as possible.

Work is already underway on the transformation of Ukraine’s military education system, with a concept approved by the government in December 2022. Over the coming decade, Ukraine’s military education will be fully integrated into the broader European military education environment in terms of both form and content. A separate element here is military-patriotic education. At the moment, this is governed by two laws and a presidential decree which contain a number of apparent conflicts and contradictions. We must achieve a clearer division of tasks and harmonization.

Ukraine’s entire defense doctrine should be underpinned by solid economic foundations. At present, the Ukrainian defense industry is not capable of meeting the demands of the military, but the sector has huge potential. Indeed, if managed correctly, a highly profitable Ukrainian defense industry could realistically become a major engine driving the country toward the goal of a one trillion dollar GDP.

I have repeatedly stated my position that self-sufficiency in the defense sector is a core component of genuine national sovereignty. Moving forward, Ukraine should be aiming to produce as much as possible itself. Once again, Ukraine’s unique combat experience creates exciting opportunities in this area. In order to make the most of the country’s experience and its industrial capabilities, a new defense industry development strategy is required. This should take international defense sector trends into account while also focusing on other economic factors and Ukraine’s specific strengths.

The time has come to turn away from the old Soviet model governed by unprofitability and resource consumption. Instead, Ukraine must strive to become a global defense sector leader and an attractive international partner. This will require a unified center capable of establishing and implementing policy, with exceedingly flexible R&D assets responding rapidly to the latest requirements. Procurement should be synchronized with budget planning, while efforts must be made to move away from lingering problems relating to blurred responsibilities. Efforts in this direction are already underway and must continue.

The overall objective of Ukraine’s defense doctrine is to defend the state against any possible threat. This requires new approaches to everything from managing mobilization and maintaining an effective reserve, to reforming the defense industry and boosting domestic production at every level. The country’s needs will inevitably evolve over time. Five years after victory in the current war, will Ukraine need a mobilization reserve of 500,000 or two million? This is why scalability is so critical.

In the defense sector, Ukraine has huge untapped potential and much to offer the international community. In the drone sector alone, Ukraine is at the cutting edge of current innovations and is well-placed to remain a key source of solutions for European and other markets. This military tech prowess will help open doors to new cooperation that are currently closed. Ukraine can build on its experience and expertize to become a major player in the global defense industry, but this requires solid foundations and a strong domestic sector.

Every day, our defenders are bringing victory closer. This progress is taking place in a rapidly changing world, and is contributing to these changes. Ukraine must be ready to capitalize on the opportunities this creates in ways that guarantee the safety of all Ukrainians while enabling the country to prosper.

Oleksii Reznikov is Ukraine’s Minister of Defense.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 22, 2023

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is a marathon not a blitzkrieg

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive has barely begun and already some are dismissing it as a failure due to lack of immediate progress. In reality, the unfolding campaign is a marathon and not a blitzkrieg, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jul 6, 2023

Wagner fallout: Time to begin preparing for a post-Putin Russia

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

As we assess the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Oleksii Reznikov: Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On Wednesday, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson met with US President Joe Biden in Washington DC, followed by a meeting between Swedish, Finnish, and Turkish foreign ministers in Brussels on Thursday. The central message: Sweden is ready to become an ally—immediately.

For several months, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has kept Sweden and NATO allies on the edge of their seats over Swedish extraditions of individuals connected to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Stockholm and Ankara have been at an impasse, trading arguments over due process and terrorist threats. Enflaming the whole process has been a series of Quran burnings, something which Kristersson has said is legal, but not respectful.

Just like at the NATO Summit in Madrid last year, Erdogan has placed himself in the role of kingmaker. All allies except Turkey and Hungary have ratified Sweden’s membership, and Hungary is widely considered to be following Turkey’s lead.

In the symbolically important meeting with Kristersson this week, Biden sent a clear signal to Ankara: The United States is committed to welcoming Sweden into NATO as soon as possible. Kristersson reiterated that Swedish membership would contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole. “No country knows this better than the United States,” he said. 

The trilateral meeting in Brussels showed, however, that Turkey is still not on board. Swedish NATO membership is “within reach,” Stoltenberg said. He added that everyone is working toward a positive outcome in Vilnius and leaders will meet again on Monday, one day before the start of the summit.

Potentially paving the way for a successful outcome is this week’s conviction by a Swedish court of a PKK member for the crime of terror financing, the first use of the country’s new anti-terror laws that entered into force in June. The four-and-a-half-year sentence followed by a possible extradition is exactly the type of implementation Turkey has wanted to see from Sweden. Moreover, former Foreign Minister Ann Linde admitted this week that Sweden had not taken the threat posed by the PKK seriously enough in the past. Swedish police are now prioritizing the issue and deeper cooperation with Turkish authorities on combatting terrorism is expected to continue. Public opinion is also shifting, with a majority now in favor of banning the burning of religious texts. Hate speech laws, though not part of the trilateral memorandum, are additionally under review. All the while, rumors continue to swirl of the US Congress ending its roadblock on F-16 fighter jet sales to Turkey, a prospect that could help push the process across the finish line. 

At stake in Vilnius is not only the security of Sweden and the Alliance as a whole, but NATO’s open-door credibility. With twenty-nine allies already having ratified Sweden’s membership, failure to fully admit Sweden undermines unity within the Alliance and makes NATO look weak and fragmented. As Stoltenberg correctly pointed out on Thursday, only Russian President Vladimir Putin and the PKK profit from continued delay. 

Anna Wieslander is director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council and head of its Northern Europe office in Stockholm. She is a former official at the Swedish Defence Ministry and Swedish Parliament.

Eric Adamson is project manager at the Northern Europe office.

The post Will eleventh-hour diplomacy get Sweden into NATO by the Vilnius summit? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

Tracking narratives

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Media policy

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments. 

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.  

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia. 

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame. 

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.  

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.  

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.  

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”  

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.  

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election. 

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania. 

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.” 

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 3, Markus Garlauskas, Business Development Associate Director Nicholas O’Connell, and Kyoko Imai were published in a coauthored article, “A comprehensive approach to enhance Europe’s role in Indo-Pacific security” for the Italian defense magazine AirPress. They argue that Europe must establish a greater role in Indo-Pacific defense by leveraging European institutions, pursuing bilateral and trilateral defense initiatives across the two regions, expanding European military engagement in the region, and establishing closer defense cooperation between Europe and key Indo-Pacific partners.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

Staff

Nicholas O’Connell

Associate Director, Business Development

Civil Society Elections

Staff

Kyoko Imai

Assistant Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Politics & Diplomacy Japanese

The post Garlauskas, O’Connell, and Imai in Italian defense magazine AirPress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The run-up to the July 11-12 summit in Lithuania has revealed both continuity and chaos: Continuity in that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg will now stay on in his role for another year, after he had earlier said he would step down in the coming weeks; chaos in the fascinating but incomplete coup d’état in Russia. But at this juncture of history—with war raging in Ukraine, uncertainty complicating relations with China, and shifting internal political landscapes in some member states—the Alliance has more work to do to ensure that the international rules-based order remains relevant and potent. 

Ukraine’s desire for a firm commitment on joining NATO is likely to hover over the summit. The secretary general and other national leaders have expressed reservations about taking any groundbreaking action on the issue, tempering the expectations of Ukrainians and their most vocal supporters. Yet there is still time to formulate consensus language that goes beyond the empty narrative of the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which only said that Ukraine would become a member at some point.

Assessing the threat picture

Defense spending is a perennial focus at these summits. Since the Alliance’s founding seventy-four years ago, the issue of Europe’s underspending on defense and security has haunted the halls of NATO. While the current ambition to set 2 percent of gross domestic product as a floor is a step in the right direction, success remains far-fetched: Only seven of the then thirty allies met the guideline in 2022 (before Finland’s accession). At the same time, success is very real in strengthening the cyber pledge and the official launch of the NATO Innovation Fund, the first-of-its-kind one billion euro multi-sovereign venture capital fund. Good things can happen in Vilnius.

The question is, will those good things include welcoming Sweden to the Alliance? The puzzle of the Turkish hayir, or no, on Sweden’s accession initially seemed like a misunderstanding, later evolved into a national election issue, and now, unfortunately, has become an example of allied disunity. The same goes for Hungary’s unacceptable drag of the ratification. Yes, allies argue all the time, and NATO offers a forum to align on all the important issues. Democracies know how to deal with these disagreements without compromising members’ security. Without Sweden, NATO is weaker, the Baltic Sea is less secure, and Turkey and Hingary, too, will be less secure.

Taking a step back and looking at the threat picture—and at the elevated volatility due to Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine—one cannot help but ask: What do allies need to do to ensure that NATO remains relevant in deterring aggression against the Alliance and beyond? Are NATO members sufficiently protecting its most vulnerable members and its vast geographic boundary to the east? Does “tripwire” deterrence still work? Can deterrence succeed without proper defense? 

Last year, NATO leaders in Madrid made huge promises to be specified and agreed in due course—kicking the can down the road?—on strengthening the eastern perimeter with more troops and better readiness. In other words, the initial enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalions no longer seem to suffice for effective deterrence on the eastern flank. The same goes for reinforcements, which had been signaled as up to 300,000 troops (and now 400,000 troops), yet whose deployment requires both logistical support and prepositioned equipment and armaments for their deterrent role. All of the above is to be underscored by NATO’s new defense plans, which are in the works.

A speed-and-scale mindset

To make deterrence and defense credible, NATO must make key decisions to act at relevant speed and scale. “Tripwire” deterrence is, hopefully, outmoded thinking—and the realization that defense is a key element of deterrence is slowly setting in. To be fair, it took three years for NATO to set up its eFP in the form of multinational forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Can the Alliance be taken seriously if it continues to build its defense at this pace? 

The same goes for scale. Will the “brigade-per-country” principle become obsolete in a year or two? A piecemeal approach to defense yields great public relations benefits, many pats on the back, and self-congratulatory speeches. But at the end of day, when an adversary moves further, allies are left scrambling precisely because they underdelivered. 

Speed and scale call for more allied troops in place, more prepositioned equipment and ammunition, and swift reinforcement—plus the autonomy of NATO’s supreme allied commander. Essentially, it is a resource question, yet it is affected by how urgently the Western public views the existential threat. If the military and economic support the West has provided to Ukraine so far is a gauge of its threat perception, then there is something to be proud of. Yet much more could have probably been done and faster. 

The test in Vilnius will be this: Can leaders adopt a speed-and-scale mindset for a stronger deterrence?

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as the assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO and as the deputy minister of defense of Lithuania in charge of capability development, defense acquisition, industry, and technology partnerships.

The post The view from Vilnius: NATO needs speed and scale to ensure deterrence  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Peterson in Real Clear Defense: Ukraine War Highlights a New Threat to the American Homeland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Season 1, Episode 5 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by two guests. She speaks with Cameron Hudson, the former US government expert on Sudan, about the mercenary pedigree of one of the two main belligerent parties, the Rapid Support Forces, and the determinative impact this has had on the current conflict in Sudan. By fighting as mercenaries in Libya, and especially Yemen, the RSF secured a cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army, it forged regional relationships that are now central to its resupply, and it has committed crimes and abuses in the conduct of the war which represent a detached mercenary mindset.

Alia also chats with Professor Munzoul Assal of the University of Khartoum about the danger of two parallel governments emerging in Sudan along the lines of the bifurcation in Libya; the presence of RSF fighters at the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic where the Wagner Group is deeply entrenched; and the clear and alarming possibilities of a regional conflagration.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

Further reading

MENASource Jun 28, 2023

The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?

By Mark N. Katz

The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

MENASource Jun 1, 2023

Is Egypt planning a full-scale invasion of Sudan? 

By Shahira Amin

With the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are that an Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent.

East Africa Middle East

MENASource May 11, 2023

Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here

By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Africa East Africa

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

Explore More

The post Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Key terminology
• The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning
• The sources of the problem
• Problem definition
• Key issues shaping problem solution
• Recommendations
• First recommendation: Establish a new assistant secretary of the navy
• Second recommendation: stand-up the navy strategy cell
• Third recommendation: Stand-up the force planning directorate
• Resourcing the recommendations
• Conclusion
• About the author

Key terminology

This paper uses five key terms. The first two, force design and force development, are precise US Navy terms that are not interchangeable.

Force design is the innovation and the determination of future Navy ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept for a twenty-year and beyond timeframe. Force development is the adaptation and modernization of Navy in-service ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept within a two-to-seven-year timeframe. The difference between these two official Navy terms may seem arcane: force design is all about the future force, and force development is all about the current force. However, both address Navy requirements based on an appraisal of US security needs, and then choose naval capabilities (along with a warfighting concept) to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations.

The following terms are also important for the reader’s comprehension.

• Force planning is the more commonly understood term—used in place of force design and force development—and is used across Congress, defense media, academia, and industry. While force planning is not an official Navy term, the term is used in this paper to encompass both force development and force design.
• Force structure is used by the Congress to mean the number and types of combat units the Navy can generate and sustain, as well as to represent the Navy’s combat capability.
• Budget is an informal and shortened expression to encapsulate all Navy activities in the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, especially the programming activity.

The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning

The US Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning in 2023 is not working. Strategy development is on life support and force planning uses an incremental approach of buying marginally better and more expensive versions of the same platforms the Navy has relied upon for decades. In effect, it is producing the Navy’s force structure one ship class at a time, without reference to an overall Navy strategy and force plan to field an integrated, aligned, and synchronized “Navy fighting machine.”¹ Moreover, this approach is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time. Proposals for developing new capabilities are viewed as threats to in-service platforms and programs, thereby blocking innovation.

Congress, defense media, defense analysts, the Defense Department, and independent US government agencies have all found fault with the US Navy’s strategy development and force planning. Most notably, Congress has expressed its dissatisfaction.

In December 2017, Congress mandated a Navy with 355 crewed ships, a goal based on the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and, in February 2020, Representative Joe Courtney (D-CT) complained to then Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper about, “the lack of a shipbuilding plan and the [Donald] Trump administration not delivering a strategy to build a 355-ship Navy.”² In December 2021, Congress mandated the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report on its force structure plans for the near, middle, and far terms to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements using Defense Department-approved scenarios.³ However, Congress reacted with little enthusiasm for the Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2023 (FY2023), despite its being the first such report from the Navy to Congress in more than three years, and was similarly unimpressed by the following year’s iteration. This has led Congress to mandate the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy in December 2022 to determine the size and force mix of the fleet by mid-2025.⁴

This litany of events—particularly the unprecedented direction for the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report, the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, and the assignment to the commandant of the Marine Corps of sole responsibility to develop amphibious warfare ships requirements—indicates Congress’ displeasure with Navy force planning. Moreover, the inability of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy leaders to consistently state how many ships the Navy needs to meet its requirements may be a driving factor in Congress’ decision to legislate these unprecedented mandates. During the first seven months of 2022, DoD leaders suggested five different targets for the objective size of the Navy—316, 327, 367, 373, and five hundred.⁵ In addition, the use of three options in both the FY2023 and FY2024 thirty-year shipbuilding plan—rather than a single projection—handicaps congressional understanding of the Joe Biden administration’s goals concerning the future size and composition of the Navy, and assessing the Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding budget, five-year shipbuilding plan, and thirty-year shipbuilding plan. Moreover, to follow its mantra of providing best military advice to civilian leadership, the Navy must have a preferred option for what it needs to get the job done, and, most importantly, must assess the risk to the United States if it does not get the resources it needs (see Table 2).

As Dr. Scott Mobley pointed out in his November 2022 Proceedings essay, the Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.”⁶

Navy force planning uses a piecemeal approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.⁷ Navy force planning almost always occurs in a resource-constrained environment imposing a zero-sum approach, in which proposals for new capabilities are frequently viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. At the end of the day, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite similar to what is already in the fleet.

The preponderance of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) platform and capability staffs each focus on a single platform or capability. No one looks at all the platforms and capabilities as an integrated, collective whole. No single staff entity ensures all these individual platform and capability staffs are integrated by a well-articulated, comprehensive strategy and warfighting concept to achieve the required strategy-force match.

The Navy cannot create a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget in that order. OPNAV cannot conduct its business “with strategic intent” at all times in its key processes. Because it operates within the Defense Department’s mandated five-year Future Years Defense Program and is focused on the budget, OPNAV tends to concentrate on numerous process-centric products, which, coupled with cascading short-term urgent projects, frequently sees its strategic guidance displaced, or even lost, in the sausage making.

The continuing need to reconcile the interface between the Navy’s strategy with its mid-range to long-range forecasts, and between the Navy’s budget and its short-term timelines and all-consuming fiscal pressures, has eluded OPNAV. Numerous OPNAV reorganizations since the early 1980s underscore this observation. As a 2010 Center for Naval Analyses study highlighted: “successive CNOs have sought to make [OPNAV] responsive to their needs—chief among which is usually construction of a balanced and integrated program and budget.”⁸ They failed and, as a result, the Navy continues to address its force requirements incrementally, which frustrates innovation, alarms Congress, and delivers fewer, more expensive, and almost always bigger platforms. The various uncrewed surface vessels and aircraft may break the bigger-is-better paradigm, yet they are arriving too slowly.

The sources of the problem

The causes of the Navy’s problem with its approach to strategy development and force planning are numerous and diverse.

Divergent CNO proclivities prevent strategic consistency

Effective force planning suffers from insufficient strategic consistency between chiefs of naval operations (CNOs). The historical record suggests these service chiefs seem to believe they must differentiate themselves from their predecessors, with their own distinct, separate strategy—or what is typically a strategic, aspirational plan rather than a strategy with ends, ways, and means. As Dr. Peter Haynes explained in his book, Toward a New Maritime Strategy:

Assuredly, senior Navy leaders would agree that, regardless of who is the CNO, the Navy has enduring institutional objectives and the benefits of consistency would be enormous for strategy development and force planning. There would be: assured continuity of strategic direction over the fielding of major platforms and weapons systems; no requirement for an incoming CNO to craft a “new” Navy strategic direction from whole cloth; unity of effort on the Navy’s way ahead based on organizational agreement hammered out at four-star updates; a consistent Navy message for strategic communications; and reduction in false starts and nonproductive efforts (see Table 1).

The service needs each CNO to build upon what has gone on before so that the Navy can benefit from continuous unity of effort over time. The service also needs a consistent planning process, and not a completely new version to accompany the incoming CNO’s new strategy. The challenge is to sustain consensus in a planning and acquisition process that runs a decade or more, and is instigated by a CNO who typically serves a four-year tenure.

OPNAV’s budget process dominates strategy and force planning

OPNAV remains focused on the budget as its overarching and defining process, believing strategy can be generated during the budget process. This narrow focus constrains the development of long-range strategies and plans to address transcendent challenges and opportunities. There is an irreconcilable difference between the needs of the budget process and the strategy-development process.

In a 2021 interview, a former deputy director of the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8), Irv Blickstein, provided an explanation of why the budget process dominates. First, it is impossible to follow literally the linear prescript of strategy, requirements, and budget. If a strategy is unaffordable, then capability trade-offs must be made. The budgeteers knew that just opining about strategy would not carry the day for funding. Instead, the Navy needed analysis to show the effectiveness of its programs and the validity of its arguments. As deputy programmer in OPNAV in the early 1980s, Blickstein noted:

In June 2015, the Naval Postgraduate School published a report on strategy’s role to drive the Navy’s budget process. The report’s principal findings stated that the “Navy has failed to ensure that strategy and policy priorities drive [budget] development and execution.” Specifically, within OPNAV, the budget process “eclipses strategy” and “is substituted for, and is often equated to, strategy.”¹¹ The report noted that the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate, a directorate that acts essentially as OPNAV’s Chief Financial Officer, “wields most of the intra-bureaucratic authority and power when it comes to the making and implementation of strategy” and that the Operations, Plans, and Strategy Directorate (OPNAV N3/N5), with its strategy staff, does not “play meaningful role in strategy development and execution.” During his tenure as CNO (2015–2019), Admiral John Richardson attempted to change this attitude. His efforts did not succeed.

Currently, there are significant alignment issues among the budget process, strategy development, and long-range planning processes. The budget process focuses on a five-year period and emphasizes the application of quantitative analysis, which is effective for near-term resource decisions. However, with no clear-cut beginning or end to its annual cycle, the budget process dominates all OPNAV planning activities and “tends simply to encourage the continuation of programs already under way” and discourage “the development of fresh new alternatives.”¹² The Navy needs to avoid defaulting to budget execution to develop its strategy. All strategies are shaped and informed by available resources, but the budget should serve the strategy—not the other way around.

Currently,the responsibility to manage the Navy’s force-planning ecosystem is dispersed throughout OPNAV. The Warfighting Development Directorate (OPNAV N7) addresses force design. The Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8) addresses the quantitative means to support force design and development, and the Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities Directorate (OPNAV N9) addresses force development and force design. The CNO’s Commanders Action Group provides the terms of reference—strategic guidance—for force design and force development. The Naval Warfare Development Center produces warfighting concepts, such as the current Distributed Maritime Operations (See Figure 1).

Each of these responsibilities must occur, but they are uncoordinated. No directorate integrates these force-planning efforts along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons to produce a unified Navy fighting machine. As a result, decisions about production of new forces and modernization of in-service forces directly shape decisions about determining future platforms and capabilities, and vice versa. This interrelationship among force development, force design, and the production of new platforms and capabilities demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive process—not as individual platforms and capabilities—along with a shared understanding of the future security environment and a common warfighting concept to deter and defeat future adversaries in specific time periods.

Furthermore, this dispersion of force-planning responsibility has harmful consequences. In February 2022, OPNAV sponsored a workshop, titled the Force Design Sprint, to assess the Navy’s force-design posture. At the conclusion, a senior N7 leader informed the author that the workshop determined, “everyone in OPNAV was in charge [of force design], but no one was in charge.” It was an astonishing discovery for a military service to declare no one in OPNAV actually held responsibility for force design, with its focus on future ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with warfighting concepts for the twenty-plus-year time horizon.

Insufficient strategic guidance misdirects force planning

The Navy lacks sufficient and coherent guidance to ensure strategy shapes its budget and warfighting concepts. It has no classified strategy to facilitate an unambiguous expression of its ends, ways, and means. It has no codified assessment of both the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of them and set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development. Another missing document is a warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe. The result is that, in 2023, specialized N9 staffs are planning the next-generation platforms without the benefit of a common set of capstone strategic guidance. (See Figure 1a)

Navy platform communities distort force planning

Internecine warfare by the Navy’s three platform communities (its surface, aviation, and submarine communities) severely unbalances the Navy as a whole. Expected in theory to rise above their individual platform advocacy and warfare concerns, the communities are all too susceptible to pressures and rivalries from the others. Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document with little regard for how the other communities interact and cooperate to generate a unified Navy fighting machine.

Problem definition

In response to this criticism, CNO Admiral Michael Gilday reassigned force-design responsibilities to N7 and focused its efforts on 2045, as outlined in the CNO’s 2022 Navigation Plan.¹³ However, the Navy has largely already decided upon a 2045 force design and, moreover, the Navy is full speed ahead on its implementation. The year 2045 is only about twenty years away, well within the service life for the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. CNO Gilday has approved the Navy’s future direction for its next generation of platforms and capabilities, which N9 has developed with the priority order of acquisition as the next-generation aircraft first, the next-generation destroyer second, and the next-generation attack submarine third.¹⁴ This prioritization seems to cement the aircraft carriers as the Navy’s warfighting center of gravity, rather than precision weapons launched from a variety of air, surface, and subsurface platforms.

The long-term problem confronting Navy strategy development and force planning is larger than reassigning force-design responsibility to N7. The Navy needs to address the problem of how it conducts and organizes for strategy development and force planning in toto, not as disparate processes. Based on this paper’s assessment of the Navy’s strategy development and force planning posture, the Navy faces a three-part problem.¹⁵

• Part one: How does the Navy produce “a force structure, now and in the future, of the right size and the right composition (force mix) to achieve the nation’s security goals, in light of the security environment and resource constraints” and avoid a strategy-force mismatch?¹⁶
• Part two: How does the Navy ensure its strategy—based upon codified current and future assessments of the security environments, along with associated warfighting concepts—drives force-planning decisions in its budget process, and not have those decisions made by default?
• Part three: How does the Navy ensure its force-planning activities include revision of existing warfighting concepts and development of new ones that fully integrate all platforms to produce a single, lethal Navy fighting machine?

Key issues shaping problem solution

Several key issues significantly influence the formulation of recommendations to improve Navy strategy development and force planning.

Organizing OPNAV for effective strategy development

Given the enduring nature of developing, maintaining, updating, and iterating capstone strategic guidance, a dedicated strategy staff (to include responsibility for long-range planning) must have continuity and longevity. Because this guidance is so central to the Navy’s future, their production cannot be an on-again-off-again process. The key is for the CNO to select its director and have confidence in its staff. Once a strategy staff is up and running, the Navy needs to keep it in place. If the CNO is unhappy with its product, he or she should certainly bring in their own selectee to run the show, but the organization itself needs to retain its role, rather than being shoved aside and replaced with a new, favorite staff group.

Avoiding a federated organization to conduct force planning

OPNAV is using a federated organizational construct, which is problematic for conducting force planning. This construct attempts to achieve simultaneously decentralization of responsibilities and unity of effort. It supposedly unites, under a central entity, diverse responsibilities along with distinctive, associated processes, but with the responsibilities still controlled by different and independent entities. It is aspirational and relies on goodwill to meet mission in lieu of a hierarchical structure with authorities to make hard decisions and not focus on achieving consensus. Given the importance of successful force planning to the Navy, the organizing model to follow is a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO, such as the Navy Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion, which, respectively, have cradle-to-grave responsibility for sea-launched nuclear-deterrent capabilities and for the Navy’s nuclear propulsion. The Navy needs to borrow a page from these two organizational successes and establish a dedicated, single entity responsible for all matters pertaining to force planning. The CNO’s force-planning responsibilities are so vast in scope, so complex, and so critical, that the Navy cannot disaggregate them across the OPNAV staff or employ a federated construct. It needs to establish a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO.

Providing CNO’s direct oversight of force planning and strategy

Only the CNO and the vice chief of naval operations (VCNO), with the authority vested in their offices, can ensure OPNAV maintains a strategic focus. They alone can focus the staff to keep the Navy’s strategic direction front and center, to drive force planning and the budget. The vice admirals who are the deputy chiefs of naval operations leading the seven major functional directorates cannot do it individually; they are challenged enough to meet the urgent demands of the budget process and the press of their daily business.

Understanding defense-analysis limitations to support force planning

Quantifiable defense analysis makes a strong contribution to force planning, especially in the near and middle terms, by understanding trade-offs among platforms and weapons systems. Defense analysis—operations research, campaign analysis, and systems analysis—has restricted relevancy to force planning with its long-range focus of twenty or more years into the future. Defense-analysis methods require certainty of data before they can productively yield reliable certainty in answers. The Navy’s current force-structure assessment methodology, which uses these quantifiable defense analysis tools, will be hard pressed to generate useful data about the long term. Its processes require data for modeling that are simply unavailable twenty years from now—hence, the need for a strong component of risk analysis, wargames, red teams, and alternative-futures work.

Incorporating net assessment capability to support force planning

Force planning requires long-range comparative assessment of trends, key competitions, risks, opportunities, and future prospects of Navy capability. Net assessment provides this comparison of red-blue interaction, using qualitative and quantitative factors across alternative future scenarios. The Navy cannot predict the future with certainty. However, net assessments generate a spectrum of needed capabilities for the Navy to draw upon. The Navy needs this capability because its reliance on campaign analysis, systems analysis, and operations research is grossly unbalanced. The Navy needs to conduct force planning based upon an assessment of the future security environment, and then use tools such as strategic wargames, emulations, expert-panel reports, and net assessment to build a strategy and a warfighting concept, and derive required capabilities. Once that is done, the quantifiable tools can refine the types and number of capabilities.

Clarifying N7 and N9’s force-planning roles

Force planning encompasses force design (i.e., the future fleet) and force development (i.e., the current fleet). CNO Gilday reassigned force-design responsibility from N9 to N7 in July 2022. In reality, N9 will likely continue to conduct force-design responsibility as it determinines the next generation of platforms for operational employment in the 2040s. Given all the approved and funded N9 force-design activity to plan the 2040s Navy, N7’s force planning responsibilities are far from clear.

Incorporating the secretary of the Navy into force planning

Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has signaled caution and unease with Navy force planning, and wants a realistic approach to understand the total cost and impact of the next-generation destroyer, attack submarine, and crewed/uncrewed aircraft. He wants to test new technologies for these platforms before any production. Given the Navy’s uneven track record in planning and delivering surface ships, along with the issue of affordability to fund an immense recapitalization, his caution is warranted.

Evaluating new technologies and concepts for force planning

The Navy is replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions, with the exception of uncrewed platforms. This is significant because strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and warfighting concepts. More importantly, such a possible attitude may prevent the Navy from understanding the changing character of war at sea. For example, because of the convergence of technologies, by 2045 the air and surface domains might become so significantly transparent that, in the competition between the “finder” and the “hider,” the finder might well dominate. If this is correct, surface ships and even aircraft will be increasingly vulnerable to continuous enemy tracking, targeting, and long-range attacks, thereby ending their role—or, at a minimum, severely limiting it—as the principal means of conventional naval power projection. Such an outcome has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet.

Communicating Navy force-structure requirements

Given the December 2022 establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy and the new reporting requirement for a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report in December 2021, the Navy’s strategic-communications capability appears to have had little effect in countering the criticism of its force-planning efforts. The Navy’s strategic communications require an adjustment.

Recommendations

The overarching intent of these recommendations is to link OPNAV’s strategy, analysis, and budget processes. This is a challenge, as the work among the budgeteers, analysts, planners, and strategists is so different. Producing a budget is incremental work that “involves a great deal of analysis and negotiation, over and over again, year after year” and requires “orthodox bureaucratic labor.” Conversely, producing a strategy or a warfighting concept demands “unorthodox leaps of thought—of drawing exceptional inferences from exercises, war games, technology, intelligence, and events.”¹⁷

Historically, with a few notable exceptions, effectively linking these two groups has eluded OPNAV. Consequently, the recommendations address eliminating this gap by consolidating force-planning functions under the direct and strategic oversight of the CNO and VCNO to ensure the linkage between these two groups is maintained. In effect, force planning becomes OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the production of the budget in support.

The logic behind these recommendations is straightforward. The recommendations are governed by an overarching objective to ensure that the Navy’s strategy and policy priorities drive its force planning and budget, not the other way around. The Navy needs to build its forces and capabilities to implement the CNO’s recommended strategy. Force planning begins with that strategy, but the force-planning staff does not create that strategy; the origins of that strategy reside in the CNO’s personal domain, drawing upon higher-level guidance such as the National Defense Strategy. Using the CNO’s strategy, the force-planning staff determines the naval tasks required, and the problems and impediments—such as geography and the adversary’s capabilities—in the current and future security environment that must be surmounted. This activity, in turn, drives the development of warfighting concepts, which leads to the discovery of required naval forces and capabilities and their associated attributes (i.e., operational requirements). Finally, force planning calculates the number and mix of forces and capabilities required to achieve the strategy.¹⁸ The following recommendations make this logic a reality.

The eleven primary documents written by the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and the Force Planning Directorate would not be carved in stone and immutable like the Ten Commandants. In the final analysis, they would be the CNO’s documents. Vitally, they would be developed through the active participation of the Navy’s four-star leadership to identify the biggest challenges to the service’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them, which the Navy senior leaders would hammer out and support. The purpose of this effort is to define how the Navy will move forward over successive five-year increments of the budget-planning process, with its senior leaders sharing and agreeing to a common approach. It is all about institutionalizing a force-planning process that can endure over decades from first inception to acquisition to initial operational employment, all managed by relatively short-tenured senior leaders.

Obviously, as the threat, budget, technology, and higher-level policy change, the CNO would update these documents on an annual basis, such as the process the Navy employed in the 1930s with at least nineteen major iterations to its War Plan Orange, and in the 1980s with several successive versions of the Maritime Strategy. Full participation of serving four-star and selected three-star admirals in this process will be vital, because, without question, one of these flag officers will become the next or subsequent CNO. If this participation does not occur, the probability for false starts and radical course changes will greatly increase as CNOs change.

First recommendation: Establish a new Assistant Secretary of the Navy

The secretary of the Navy should establish an assistant secretary of the Navy for strategy, concepts, and capabilities (ASN/SC&C) to assist the uniformed Navy (See Figure 2). The standing up of this position would deliver that assistance without needing another management layer. Instead, it offers enormous, impactful benefits by providing the secretary of the Navy the means to ensure:

• Alignment of both Navy and Marine Corps resources, activities, and capabilities with the strategic military objectives and force planning goals of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy;
• Synchronization of Navy and Marine Corps force planning by integrating their efforts at the service-chief level, as well as at developmental level between the Navy’s Naval Warfighting Development Center and the Marine Corps’ Warfighting Laboratory;¹⁹
• The establishment of a strategy-focused counterpart to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition (ASN/RDA), and a vital interface with the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities (ASD/SPC);²⁰
• The development of a single Navy Department strategy, vis à vis the three separate strategies of the department, Navy, and Marine Corps;
• Reform of Navy force-planning activities, reinvigoration of Navy strategic expertise, and the promotion of a strategy-centric culture in both the secretariat and OPNAV; and²¹
• A resolution of protracted issues and problems bedeviling Navy strategy development and force planning.

The final benefit has immense implications, and requires elaboration. The number of issues and problems confronting Navy strategy development and force planning seem almost enduring, foster significant congressional concern, and underscore the compelling need for great secretariat and OPNAV integration. On its own, the Navy has been unable to solve, correct, or mitigate these issues and challenges. Examples of such issues and problems that substantiate the services of a new assistant secretary are as follows.

Increasing affordability of platform

In June 2021, then acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Harker signed a memo addressing Navy funding priorities in its fiscal year 2023 planning cycle to match fiscal guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

However, it was not until January 2023 that the Navy explicitly admitted that it could not afford all three major acquisition programs simultaneously, when the Navy announced that the order of acquisition as first is Next Generations Air Dominance (NGADS), then Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer program (DDG(X)), and finally the Next-Generation Attack Submarine program (SSN(X)).²³

Navy platforms keep getting bigger and more expensive

Strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and concepts, and consequently replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions. Navy force planning uses an incremental approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.²⁴

Proposals for new capabilities can be viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. Quite often, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite familiar to what is already in the fleet. The DDG(X) is the large surface-combatant replacement for the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers, currently still being procured by the Navy. A November 2022 Congressional Budget Office report on the Navy’s FY-2023 thirty-year shipbuilding plan states, “the Navy has indicated that the initial [DDG(X)] design prescribes a displacement of 13,500 tons,” about 39 percent greater than the 9,700-ton Flight III DDG-51 design.²⁵ There are media reports that actual displacement may be closer to fifteen thousand tons, which would make them comparable to a World War II heavy cruiser.

Technological developments are changing the character of warfare.

The principal means of conventional naval power projection are transforming, and this has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet. According to US strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., a disruptive shift is occurring from “precision-warfare regimes” to an emerging one based on “a new military revolution” incorporating “artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology, and quantum computing, as well as military-driven technologies, including directed energy and hypersonic weapons.”²⁶ Krepinevich cautions that, too often, the US military gets the cart before the horse by fielding capabilities based on new technologies and not addressing “how these new capabilities would maintain their effectiveness” as a technological revolution matured, as was the case with the Navy’s next-generation cruiser.²⁷ Unfortunately, as of May 2023, such strategic-planning documents do not exist for the US Navy.

Ineffective strategic communications

The Navy’s poor strategic-communications practices are exemplified by its annual, unclassified thirty-year shipbuilding plan.²⁸ The plan fulfilled its purpose, but it was devoid of even a summary of a rigorous, unclassified, analytical rationale to make the case for a larger, more lethal Navy. With that, political leadership could understand the Navy’s defense role and support its claims upon the nation’s resources. It was a missed opportunity to strategically communicate the Navy’s case for resources to one of the Navy’s most important audiences.²⁹ The Navy does not know how to communicate its force requirements consistently. The best construct for Navy strategic communications is to use platforms. Right now, the Navy is using platform attributes—such as “Ensure Delivery,” which conjures images of Domino’s Pizza or Amazon delivery services—to communicate its requirements to Congress and the American people. Aircraft and ship types are not abstract; they are real things that people can easily visualize when they hear their names—submarine, destroyer, aircraft carrier, and jet fighter, among others.

An a-strategic Navy culture

Strategy is not an institutional Navy value; the service values operational and technocratic expertise above all. Indeed, one telling example illustrates this attitude. Unlike the five other armed services, the Navy does not formally board its selectees to attend the war colleges as students; in effect, the Navy assigns whoever is available. The Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy, while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.³⁰ Regrettably, the Navy has become, “a technocracy—a technologically centered bureaucracy,” with the CNO and OPNAV staff acting as the “Navy’s lead programmers and budgeters, incentivizing a career system that rewarded officers who acquired the technical skills needed for these roles,” but not incentivizing a career path for strategists.³¹

A prescient 1984 US Naval Institute Proceedings essay encapsulated the Navy’s astrategic culture: “The finest personal accolade an officer can receive is, ‘He’s a great operator.’”³² However, the essay identified a major shortcoming these “great operators” have: they experience, “great difficulty comprehending or even identifying—long-term problems” and are, “convinced that only short-term problems are real, and that continued solutions to each in turn will eliminate or indefinitely postpone the distant ones.”³³ As a consequence of this attitude, the Navy cannot determine a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget, in that order. On its own, the Navy cannot sustain its strategy enterprise over the long haul. Underscoring this assessment is the current lack of capstone strategic and force-planning guidance. The Navy does not have:

• A classified version of a combined “2020 Advantage at Sea” and “2022 Navigation Plan” to facilitate a clear and unambiguous expression of Navy ends, ways, and means along with such topics as strategic assumptions, risk, capacity, concepts, and threats;
• A classified assessment of the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of operating environments, setting conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development;
• A classified warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe;
• A classified red-blue net assessment at the strategic level;
• A classified description of a red-blue war; and
• A classified Navy long-range plan.

Competition among the Navy platform communities

The internecine warfare between the Navy’s three platform communities (the surface, aviation, and submarine communities) can severely unbalance the Navy as a whole. For example, the aviation tribe focuses on strike from the air; the submarine tribe on strike from the subsurface; the surface tribe on strike from the surface; and the amphibious tribe on strike across the beach. All the while, it is unclear if anyone is asking two fundamental questions: “What are we trying to do? And how can we accomplish this in a far more effective way than we can at present?”³⁴ Invariably, there is a competition among tribes for manpower and funding, resulting in disagreements over strategy and the allocation of resources. Reaching consensus among them has always been difficult, and remains a fundamental service chief responsibility.

As defense secretary, Mark T. Esper rejected the Navy’s force plans.

Esper wanted more attack submarines and a mix of light aircraft carriers (large-deck amphibious ships with F-35B aircraft) for more operational choices and affordability.³⁶ He did not want a plan bounded by past warfighting constructs and irrelevant to a future fight with China.³⁷ Because the naval-warfare tribes could not give him what he wanted, he directed Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist in the spring of 2020 to lead a new force-structure assessment study to maintain naval dominance.

Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document—the aviation community has Navy Aviation Vision 2030–2035, the submarine community Commander’s Intent 4.0, and the surface community has Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge. Each document, for the most part, encompasses community strategy, planning, policy, and vision topics about operations, capabilities, and personnel. There is little in each document about how that community interacts and cooperates with the other two to generate a unified Navy fighting machine. The lack of stated cooperation among the aviation, surface, and submarine-warfare communities in these documents is palpable. The three communities act like a true team of rivals whose intra-service actions have contributed substantively to the establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy.

To resolve these and other such issues and problems challenges, the secretary of the Navy’s role in strategy development and force planning needs to be strengthened by the services of this new assistant secretary.

Second recommendation: Stand up the Navy strategy cell

The CNO should repurpose his Commander’s Action Group as the Navy Strategy Cell to produce the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance and to monitor its implementation by this one, central, and empowered staff entity reporting directly to the CNO (See Figure 2).

All CNOs understand that their most important responsibility as a service chief is to identify the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them. This fundamental role serves as the basis for this recommendation. A 2010 Center for Naval Analyses report bluntly stated that developing and implementing such guidance “for the Navy is the CNO’s number 1 job.”³⁸ Indeed, from what many senior OPNAV veterans have privately communicated to the author, if this responsibility is not “totally owned by CNO,” OPNAV has no strategic focus. They believe the CNO most important responsibility is identifying the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and devising a coherent approach to overcoming them.

Already working directly for the CNO, the Commander’s Action Group produces strategic documents such as the annual posture statements, congressional testimony, keynote speeches, and the 2022 Navigation Plan. Building upon this foundation, the proposed Navy Strategy Cell would be uniquely positioned to describe preferred outcomes for the whole Navy. OPNAV’s seven directorates, on the other hand, tend to focus on the outcomes of individual supporting programs. With expansion, empowerment, and augmentation, the Navy Strategy Cell would:

• Enable the CNO to break away from the budget and programming processes that dominate so much of OPNAV’s time and thinking, and increase his or her focus on realistic and effective strategies and concepts for fighting at and from the sea;
• Strengthen the CNO’s ability to align and coordinate the activities of Navy organizations; communicate with a single Navy voice to external and internal audiences; and assess Navy policies, budgets, plans, and programs, and the resultant allocation of scarce resources; and
• Ensure capstone strategic documents reflect a consistent and aligned set of principles, concepts, and tenets regarding the Navy’s fundamental role in implementing national policy, as well as the CNO’s direction.

This recommendation mirrors what most corporate chief executive officers do, which is to make their capstone strategy functions a direct report to the chief executive officer. Consequently, this is no longer a lead role for N3/N5. Every CNO requires the direct support of a staff to provide a coherent, contemporary, authoritative body of Navy strategic thinking—comprehensive in scope—that they can use to help conceptualize, develop, coordinate, maintain, communicate, refine, and assess their thinking. The CNO needs to be optimally assisted and supported by a small, dedicated strategy staff, which is a corporate best practice. The production of capstone strategic guidance and other strategic documents requires a close relationship and physical proximity to the CNO, with no interlocutors. It is a one-on-one relationship between the CNO and, in effect, their “chief strategist” residing in the Navy Strategy Cell. The one-on-one relationship is needed to:

• Implement explicit CNO guidance, not guidance altered by OPNAV directorate agendas;
• Provide unfiltered advice, especially alternative views to CNO; and
• Do it quickly and with a minimum of interference from others.

Capstone strategic guidance describes how CNO intends to overcome “the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security”³⁹ across different timeframes and security environments. These documents require significant CNO involvement, visibility, and signature. They provide overarching direction to the service for planning, programming, and budgeting future forces, force planning, and operational employment, and convey fundamental principles about the application of naval power to achieve national policy goals. They drive all subordinate force-planning efforts and connect the Navy’s annual budget submissions and investment plans with the Navy’s key priorities. These documents are truly primus inter pares. They are consequential and substantive, must be derived from national and joint policy and strategy, and reflect a comprehensive, global view informed by the Navy’s current and future capabilities. The Navy Strategy Cell would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified versions of these four documents that comprise the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance (i.e., its “crown jewels”).

• Assessments of Current and Future Security Environments (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
• The Navy Strategy (classified version does not currently exist).
• Navy Long-Range Plan (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
• CNO’s Annual Budget Guidance (classified).

Third recommendation: Stand up the force-planning directorate

The CNO should consolidate all OPNAV force-planning responsibilities into a new Force-Planning Directorate under a vice admiral reporting to the VCNO and disestablish N7 (See Figure 2).

The unprecedented wakeup call from Congress, when it established an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, is sufficient reason to consolidate Navy force-planning efforts under one roof and reform them.

The Navy’s current federated organizational construct to force planning is ineffective. It is unclear in 2023 what OPNAV staff element acts as the central entity to coordinate all OPNAV force-planning efforts conducted by decentralized and independent staff elements. The functions of force planning are expansive, complex, and critical, as Congress just reminded the Navy. In recognition of the weakness of the federated approach, the Navy should follow its own successful examples of non-federated entities reporting directly to the CNO—the Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion—and consolidate all matters pertaining to force planning into a new and dedicated single entity.

This single, dedicated Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, staffing, and analytical means, to align, integrate, and synchronize the force-planning efforts into a comprehensive whole-of-Navy strategic plan. The relationship among force development and force design, as well their connection to the production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive force-planning blueprint.

This Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, personnel, and analytical means to align, integrate, and synchronize all force-planning efforts to produce a Navy fighting machine. The new directorate would assess and integrate the future operational environment, emerging threats, and technologies to develop and deliver concepts, requirements, and future force designs, and support delivery of modernization solutions. Most importantly, it would position the Navy for the future by setting strategic direction, integrating the Navy’s future force-modernization enterprise, aligning resources to priorities, and maintaining accountability for modernization solutions.

The budget dominates all OPNAV activities. The only way to guarantee the budget supports and serves the needs of Navy strategy and force planning is to ensure the CNO or VCNO has direct oversight via a dedicated senior leader who has no other writ. The director of the new Force-Planning Directorate should report to the CNO via the VCNO. A Force-Planning Directorate addressing force design with its long-range time horizons and long-range results will not survive in an environment dominated by short-term results unless OPNAV clearly understands that the Force-Planning Directorate is working directly for the CNO, and that the OPNAV directorates have a supporting relationship to this new staff. As the Navy historical record documents, anything less than a direct report will repeat OPNAV’s past mistakes and failed attempts.

The Force-Planning Directorate would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified version of these seven documents.

• Warfighting concepts (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not exist for the 2045 timeframe. A classified version for the current timeframe exists (i.e., distributed maritime operations), but not an unclassified version. The Naval Warfare Development Center would support the development of these service-level concepts.
• Red-blue net assessment: Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
• Description of a red-blue war (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
• Force Structure Assessment: Unclassified versions do not currently exist. The June 2023 Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report will provide a classified version.
• Navy force planning blueprint (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
• Thirty-year shipbuilding plan: An unclassified version exists.
• Battle force ship assessment and requirement report: A classified version exists. The June 2023 version of this report could potentially serve as a classified Force Structure Assessment.

The Warfighting Concepts would establish a baseline understanding to set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed force planning, in order to produce a Navy Force Planning Blueprint. It would be based on a common understanding of the current and future security environments and a shared articulation of how the Navy fights as a whole, and not merely as a collection of individual classes of platforms. It would be the Navy’s comprehensive plan—not a strategy—to integrate, align, and synchronize all its force-planning efforts, including the efforts of force development and force planning along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems to produce the Navy fighting machine (i.e., a unified combination of air, surface, and subsurface Navy lethality). Figure 2a depicts the consolidated production of the Navy’s eleven key strategic guidance documents from numerous OPNAV organizational elements to just two.

Establishment of this new Force-Planning Directorate topples the budget process as OPNAV’s dominant process. Force planning would become OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the budget in support, and no longer the other way around. It turns over the proverbial apple cart, with force planning reporting directly to the CNO and leading a strategic-centric staff dialogue, as opposed to a budget-centric dialogue. This reversal will generate strong resistance from N8 and N9 in particular. Because the Force Planning Directorate will be the primus inter pares, and as the other OPNAV directorates are all headed by a vice admiral, the new Force-Planning Directorate must likewise be headed by a vice admiral or else be doomed to failure.

This new Force-Planning Directorate requires the capability to conduct Navy net assessments for strategic analysis of red-blue interactions for informed and realistic plans. Net assessments (along with defense analysis) are diagnostic means, whereas force planning is a prescriptive means. The two belong together; if not, dysfunction will continue to hamstring efforts. This capability does not currently exist in OPNAV, and would require new personnel resources.

Resourcing the recommendations

The resources to make these recommendations real are readily available; it is just a matter of resetting priorities. The Navy is under heavy congressional fire for its strategy-development and force-planning efforts. Correcting this situation for the long term is surely one of the Navy’s highest priorities.

Given these circumstances, can the Navy say, for example, that the large number of officers assigned to the front office of its three-star leaders is more important than staffing its capability for strategy development and force planning? Again, it is a matter of priorities. If staffing these front offices is more important than retrieving control of force planning from the National Commission on the Future of the Navy, then so be it. It is simply a matter of priorities, and making the tough choices that many leaders say they like to do. Here is another opportunity.

For the reasons presented in this paper, leadership of the Navy Strategy Cell and Force-Planning Directorate requires senior flag officers. Disestablishing the N7 directorate would provide the vice admiral billet to lead the Force-Planning Directorate and a rear admiral billet to head the Navy Strategy Cell. The majority of N7’s functions can return to OPNAV N3/N5 and a portion of N7’s functions can relocate to staff the Navy Strategy Cell and the Force-Planning Directorate.

While there are no perfect organizational frameworks, there are organizational frameworks that better align a greater number of common functions, as outlined in these recommendations. A strategy office reporting to the corporate chief executive officer—in the Navy’s case, the CNO—is a proven practice, and a direct-report senior leader responsible for all Navy force planning is no different than having the Naval Nuclear Propulsion and Nuclear Weapons Program/Strategic Systems Programs as direct reports.

The emphasis of the proposals in this white paper is on strategy-development and force-planning reinvigoration and reasonable consolidation of similar functions, given the centrality of Navy strategy and force planning to all other OPNAV responsibilities. Force planning, if done properly with strategy in the lead and with its capstone strategic-guidance documents, will generate enormous benefits.

Conclusion

Congress has lost patience and confidence in the Navy. There is no way to sugarcoat this action. It is nothing less than a strong condemnation of the Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning. When US Representative Rob Wittman (R-VA) in December 2022 penned his scathing commentary in Defense News, he was on target in stating, “if the Navy refuses to learn lessons from this year, it will be doomed to repeat them.”⁴⁰

The warning signs have been evident for years. However, much like the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance’s stubborn, twenty-one-month resistance in World War II to correct three major defects of the Mark 14 torpedo, the Navy since the end of the Cold War has neglected its strategy enterprise and resisted effective force planning.⁴¹ It has repeatedly failed to understand and act on the mismatch between OPNAV’s robust organization for building the budget and its ineffective organization for developing and implementing Navy strategy.

The Navy needs to think and act like it did in the 1920s and 1930s, when it prepared to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy. The US Navy’s strategy, future security environment, and warfighting concept were all reflected in nineteen iterations to its War Plan Orange and updates to the Rainbow series of war plans. The Naval War College focused its curriculum and wargames throughout the 1930s on defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy, and almost every Navy flag officer was a war-college graduate. While far from perfect, the Navy of the past shared a common view of what a war with Imperial Japan entailed and clearly understood logistics were a top-tier priority for warfare across the vast distances of the Pacific. Likewise, in 2023, the Navy needs the same level of focus and preparation as its predecessor, and the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and Force Planning Directorate will help ensure it is ready for whatever lies ahead.

The author would like to be more of an optimist than a realist, but the Navy continues to allow mistakes to go uncorrected decade after decade. It is, like Winston Churchill stated, a “long dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind.”⁴² It is foolish to believe that the Navy will change on its own to conduct more effective strategy development and force planning.⁴³ The only way the Navy will change is for Congress to direct it, or else the Navy will continue with its flawed ways.

About the author

Bruce Stubbs

As a member of the Senior Executive Service for the Department of the Navy, Bruce Stubbs served on the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff from June 2011 to September 2022 as the Director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts (OPNAV N7), the Director of Strategy (OPNAV N3/5), and the Deputy Director of Strategy and Policy (OPNAV N3/5). Prior to those assignments, he served on the Secretary of the Navy’s immediate staff from June 2008 to May 2011 with responsibility for the coordination and implementation of Maritime Domain Awareness programs, policies, and related issues across the Defense Department.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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