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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled personally to Lithuania on Tuesday, but his last-minute intervention was unable to sway the doubters and secure the kind of unambiguous membership commitment Ukraine has long sought. “Today I embarked on a trip here with faith in decisions, with faith in partners, with faith in a strong NATO. In a NATO that does not hesitate, does not waste time, and does not look back at any aggressor,” he wrote in a carefully worded but emotionally charged post following publication of the summit declaration. “I would like this faith to become confidence; confidence in the decisions that all of us deserve and every warrior, every citizen, every mother, every child expects. Is that too much to expect?” In a social media commentary posted earlier on Tuesday, he was significantly more outspoken, criticizing NATO’s failure to state a specific membership timeline as “unprecedented and absurd.”

Others were in even less diplomatic mood. “No amount of spin will turn this into a “great” or “historic” summit. Best not even to start,” posted former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Some fellow politicians in the Baltic region clearly agreed. “This is not leadership,” tweeted Lithuanian MP Zygimantas Pavilionis. “This is appeasement that normally leads to final defeat.” In Kyiv, Ukrainian Ambassador for Strategic Communications Olexander Scherba questioned the logic behind the apparent fear among some NATO members of provoking Putin. “The strategy of “not provoking Russia” is in reality a strategy of provoking Russia,” he wrote. “That’s how it goes with bullies. Will the West ever see it?”

Eurasia Center events

John Herbst: A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Meanwhile, many in Ukraine expressed anger at the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s international partners. These feelings of frustration were summed up in a powerful post by veteran Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk: “Ukraine needs “strategic patience”. Should I patiently wait until a Russian missile strikes my apartment in Kyiv with my kids inside? Or should I patiently wait for my son to turn eighteen and go to fight in a war against the largest threat to NATO? Delays cost lives!”

Despite the undeniable mood of anti-climax in Ukraine, the country’s famed wartime spirit of resilience was also on display as Ukrainians reacted to news from Lithuania. “Disappointment but not discouragement. Next stop, Washington DC,” posted Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center think tank and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, in reference to next year’s NATO summit, which is scheduled to take place in the US capital.

Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko echoed this sentiment regarding the need to focus on securing a firm membership commitment at the 2024 summit, but warned that further delays could have grave consequences for public opinion in Ukraine. If there is no progress toward joining NATO by this time next year, he wrote, Ukrainians will ask: “So we are good enough to die for democracy and not good enough to live together with other free nations in one alliance?”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Reactions from Wednesday, July 12

Anca Agachi: A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Daniel Fried: The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

Hans Binnendijk: Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

Phillip Cornell: Energy issues took a backseat in the Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

Reactions from Tuesday, July 11

John Herbst: An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Christopher Skaluba: ‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership

Daniel Fried: Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family

Shelby Magid: Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

Rich Outzen: A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

Andrew D’Anieri: The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Rachel Rizzo: Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

David O. Shullman: The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

Ian Brzezinski: The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

There is significant overlap among the members of the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU). Four of the G7 nations are in the EU and six are in NATO. It is therefore no surprise that the general approach of the three organizations to Moscow’s war on Ukraine share similar characteristics. All three organizations have actively supported Ukraine since Moscow’s aggression began in February of 2014, and much more so when it intensified in February of 2022. All assert Ukraine’s right to enjoy the peace and stability that should be provided by the liberal international order. With the United States in the lead in NATO and the G7, both organizations have provided significant support to Ukraine, ensuring that Russian President Vladimir Putin could not achieve his goal of establishing effective political control in the country.

At the same time, again with the United States’ decisive influence, the G7, like NATO, has avoided steps that might seem overly provocative to Moscow—a clear call for Ukraine’s victory against Moscow’s aggression or decisive steps that would lead to a faster Ukrainian victory. So the best way to look at the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine issued by the G7 on July 12 in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Vilnius is as a mostly US-influenced two-step.

The NATO Summit produced an uninspiring communiqué on the Ukraine-NATO relationship that moved only slightly beyond the language of the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. The G7 Declaration was timed to the NATO Summit because the question of Ukraine joining NATO is linked with the issue of security guarantees. Both are meant to address the difficult question of how an independent Ukraine can live in peace and security alongside a hostile Russia. So it is no surprise that the G7 statement is a step forward toward enhancing Ukraine’s security but not a very large one.

The declaration affirmatively states Ukraine’s right to choose its own course, join the West, and be free from intimidation and aggression. But it does not offer collective G7 action that might provide greater protection against future Kremlin provocations; instead, it encourages bilateral arrangements between Ukraine and individual G7 states. It places emphasis on the provision of weapons to Ukraine to make it a less appetizing target for a predatory Kremlin. This is a reasonable concept, but less effective than an actual guarantee by the G7 countries to respond forcefully to future Kremlin aggression. Yet even this step is undermined by the fact that all the G7 countries—with the possible exceptions of the United Kingdom and, perhaps now, France—have been reluctant to send Ukraine the more advanced weapons it needs to deliver that decisive blow to Russian forces on its territory.

Russian commentators have dismissed the NATO communiqué as a disappointment for Kyiv, but expressed some dissatisfaction with the G7 Declaration. Their real ire, though, is aimed at Paris, after the French decision to send SCALP long-range missiles to Ukraine. This underscores France’s differences with Washington, which is still unwilling to send Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). French President Emmanuel Macron’s boldness is welcome, but no substitute for strong US leadership.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Overall, the Vilnius summit stuck the landing, and to continue the metaphor, the gymnastic feat was about as tough as it gets. This was indeed a summit of unity, as US President Joe Biden had hoped, and the breakthrough regarding Sweden’s NATO accession especially contributed to that sense. The Alliance also successfully positioned itself as a global actor that understands that the security environment has fundamentally changed, and the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are inextricably linked. The attendance of the Asia-Pacific 4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and language in the communiqué elevating the role of partners is crucial in this regard.

However, the summit’s results were mixed on a range of other issues. Despite high hopes and a strong moral argument, Ukraine was not offered the clear path and timeline it was hoping for to join the Alliance, even as its future in the Euro-Atlantic family was reconfirmed. This outcome, while not surprising, was also likely the best achievable outcome at the moment given Allied differences. This hints at a tough road for NATO in making the ambitious progress necessary by 2024, especially if Ukrainian battlefield advances slow down. Eastern flank reinforcements to brigade-level will only happen “where and when required,” and the language on China was modest in advancing proposals for action, as it was more intent on defining the challenge Beijing poses. The Alliance generally make the most important progress quietly, and here is where I saw encouraging signs: the focus on resilience and securing critical infrastructure; important mentions of Allied enablement and sustainment; and cooperation with the private sector and defense industry to deblock defense supplies.

While kicking the can down the road offers some time, Allies need to start to work with aplomb now to deliver. If anything, the NATO Summit in Washington in 2024 will be an even higher order to rise to—morally and strategically.

—Anca Agachi is an associate director and resident fellow for Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

The G7 Joint Statement on Ukraine is out. It’s no Article 5 security guarantee. It’s a framework for negotiations of bilateral and G7 arrangements with Ukraine to provide military and economic assistance, as well as unspecified security commitments for that country. It includes a promise of consultations with Ukraine in case of a future Russian armed attack that could generate military and other forms of support. For its part, Ukraine commits in the statement to continue its democratic and rule of law transformation, as well as its military reforms. Notably, the statement makes clear that it is no substitute for NATO membership but is intended to help Ukraine while it pursues that goal.

Cynics can make a meal of the statement. It provides little beyond what G7 countries are already doing. But there is another way to look at it. The big strategic question that NATO, the G7, and the United States have faced is whether Ukraine is part of the transatlantic and European family and its institutions or whether it is part of a Kremlin sphere of domination. The Kremlin claims Ukraine as its own.There are many in Europe and the United States who tacitly (or overtly) agree and would cut a dirty deal with Moscow to that end.

Happily, that’s not where NATO and the G7 have come out. The NATO communiqué’s language on Ukraine could have been stronger and the G7 statement is no security guarantee. But they both rest on the premise that Ukraine is part of the European and transatlantic family. The details of how and when have yet to be worked out. The goal is clear: NATO membership for Ukraine. The G7 statement can serve as scaffolding for Ukraine while it works to get there.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

The NATO Summit in Vilnius was a success. But its success was limited, and it will be seen more as a bridging mechanism between last year’s Madrid summit and next year’s Washington summit. At Madrid, the allies agreed on the nature of the new threats and challenges emanating from both Russia and China. Madrid’s new Strategic Concept refocused the Alliance.

Vilnius was to be an implementation summit. And it was. It recorded progress in multiple areas, from enhanced deterrence to hybrid war to climate change. But it stopped short on several key issues like Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, and managing the nuclear weapons threat posed by Russia and, increasingly, China.

The Vilnius summit took place in the midst of Europe’s most destructive war in nearly eight decades and a US effort to rebalance its relationship with China. This resulted in a degree of caution. Unity formed around lowest common denominator solutions. During the coming year between Vilnius and Washington, the bridge created this week will hopefully be strengthened enough to bear the weight that the Alliance will need to carry next year.

The most successful element of the Vilnius summit was enhancing NATO deterrence along its front line with Russia, from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea. With Finland in and Sweden soon to be in, there is a solid line of defense against Russian aggression. There is no clearer evidence of Russia’s strategic failure. NATO’s New Force Model, agreed upon last year, will provide clarity for nations with regard to their specific wartime responsibilities and incentives to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending floor. NATO’s forward presence in eight front line states needs further strengthening to include a continuous brigade-level presence in each. And the readiness and mobility initiatives need further attention.

The greatest disappointment at Vilnius was the inability to provide a more concrete path for Ukrainian membership after the war ends. But cautious steps were taken. The NATO-Ukraine Commission became a Council, giving Ukraine a stronger voice in NATO political affairs. The Council will be used to plan for future Ukrainian membership, which was again solemnly committed to “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This shortfall for Kyiv was somewhat offset by the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, which pledges additional long-term security commitments and arrangements. Hopefully by the Washington summit, that path can be paved with more concrete.

—Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Energy issues took a backseat in Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

While the debate over membership (delayed for Ukraine, confirmed for Sweden) dominated the last-minute negotiations over the NATO Summit communiqué, the opening bulk of the document itself is rightly dedicated to reaffirming the traditional and newly relevant core tenets of NATO’s existence—collective defense, nuclear deterrence, and the production and logistics to achieve them. But about two-thirds of the way down, the communiqué turns to how the Euro-Atlantic security environment has shifted.

The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed that “emerging security challenges” (in NATO parlance) have arrived, from the weaponization of energy to the widespread “digitalization” of warfare and the importance of resilience.

Indeed, energy security and climate change are gaining renewed importance for the Alliance. Climate security issues are a personal priority of the secretary general, and a changing energy economy means that the pipeline politics of yesterday will look simple compared to the complex security implications of integrated power systems, critical digital infrastructure, supply chains for key inputs to transition, and the like. And while NATO wades into the tech innovation space with its own acceleration fund (DIANA), it has yet to grasp the power of military procurement for demonstrating, scaling, and standardizing technologies that will be key to mitigating emissions in the civilian space while also boosting military effectiveness. Meanwhile the energy transition itself will be a messy process, with pockets of volatility and economic mismatches that could directly impact political stability, popular support for a sustainable transition, and strategic relations.

The Vilnius summit is a turning point for many reasons, but perhaps the most fundamental for NATO as an institution is its shift from an internally focused bureaucracy with declining budgets fighting to justify its existence in the post-Cold War world, to one compelled to adopt a growth and ambition mentality. Where before it was simpler to ring-fence NATO’s military mission, concerns about climate change and strategic competition are imposing policy-driven global economic realignments. To fulfill its ambitions for leadership in that new environment, NATO needs the competence and reach to provide important security-related input to key decisions about infrastructure investment and managing new technology—and it needs to be convinced of its own relevance in those spaces.

—Phillip Cornell is a principal at Economist Impact and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Talk about the eleventh hour! The NATO Summit communiqué was finally released at approximately 6:40 p.m. in Vilnius, rather late for a summit document. There was a good reason for this: clear disagreement between a large number of East European, Nordic, and some Western European allies on the one side and the United States and Germany on the other about how forthcoming the Alliance should be about Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO. While the ad hoc coalition wanted clarity in hastening Ukraine’s membership, Washington and, to a lesser extent, Berlin were cautious. Given the weight Washington enjoys in NATO deliberations, this meant that the much larger number of allies could not get their preference. But given the importance of NATO unity, this meant that the United States and Germany had to move beyond their original position.

The end result was not quite inspiring. The communiqué notes that Ukraine no longer needs to meet a Membership Action Plan, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission will become a NATO Ukraine Council: small steps in the right direction. On the crucial membership issue, the communiqué states, “the Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.” This is not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.

It was no surprise that a few hours before the communiqué appeared, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted his dissatisfaction: “It’s unprecedented and absurd when [a] time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine.” This is somewhat sharp, but perhaps understandable from a man whose country is facing an aggression designed to destroy “Ukrainianness.”

While this denouement does not add luster to the Vilnius summit, there are other developments that make this a historic occasion. The main thing, of course, is the admission of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance. This greatly strengthens NATO security in the north. But also important is NATO finally recognizing that “the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests. The communiqué also directly addresses the Belarus problem: “Belarus’ support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia’s aggression. In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.”

These two items portend a further strengthening of NATO policy against the Kremlin threat and in support of Ukraine. Vilnius also foreshadows what is to come in NATO dynamics and policy. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance will be celebrated at the NATO Summit next year in Washington DC. That event will give US President Joe Biden a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president. For that to occur, he will need to listen closely to the United States’ newly active East European allies and 1) provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield and 2) move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership

The Vilnius summit is likely to be viewed as a landmark summit for two things that happened and two things that didn’t.

What did happen: The pending agreement by Turkey to ratify Sweden’s membership application will soon add a thirty-second ally to NATO’s ranks, making Vilnius, like Madrid before it, an enlargement summit. That every littoral Baltic Sea state, besides Russia, will be a member of the Alliance is a significant development for NATO’s defense of its northeastern flank. To that end, the adoption of some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for defense of NATO territory completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War.

Missing from the Vilnius communiqué, however, is any clear pathway for Ukraine’s membership. Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to “Council” status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments. But neither packs a political punch, nor will either move be viewed as real progress on the membership question. In fact, communiqué language stating “we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is as ambiguous as the infamous Bucharest statement from 2008 promising that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. It is a head-scratching and disappointing formulation. Moreover, the bilateral security guarantees that were broadly promised in the runup to the summit were missing from the final statement. The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department.

Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family

It might have and should have been stronger. Nevertheless, the NATO communiqué language on Ukraine’s accession to NATO puts Ukraine within, and not outside, the transatlantic family. The “when” and “how” of Ukraine’s accession to NATO have yet to be worked out but, critically, the Vilnius summit has decided the “whether” of Ukraine’s NATO membership in the affirmative–something that the 2008 Bucharest summit did only at a high level of generality. “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is the key sentence from today’s communiqué. It’s weakened by the gratuitous qualifier “we will be in a position to” rather than a straightforward “we will extend an invitation.” Still, this offer—any offer—of an invitation to Ukraine is a step forward, and a big one compared to where the United States and most NATO member governments were even a few months ago.

Less noticed (and less debated) was the communiqué text that makes clear, without weakening qualifiers, that “we do not and will never recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea.” That language, though it reaffirms long-held positions, helps kill the temptation by some to push Ukraine into surrendering its territory in exchange for a dubious “peace” on Putin’s terms.

While NATO has now set out the goal—Ukraine in the Alliance—much depends on continuing to provide robust military support to Ukraine to help it fight back, and win, on the battlefield. Paragraph twelve of the communiqué notes that allies at the summit agreed on a “substantial package of expanded political and practical support” for Ukraine. It doesn’t provide details, but hopefully they will be announced soon, either by NATO or separately by allies.

Zelenskyy and a number of NATO allies have pushed hard (and pushed the Biden administration) to get the most from this summit. They were right to do so. Now they need to consolidate their gains and prepare next steps, including for next year’s NATO Summit in Washington DC.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

The Vilnius summit communiqué rightly places the Russian Federation as the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area due to Moscow’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, terrorism, war crimes, and horrific violations of international law and norms.

Just as Russia deserves to be so centrally acknowledged for its role as the critical threat to Euro-Atlantic security, Belarus deserves to be right beside it. Any disregard of the role Belarus plays as a threat to regional security and an accomplice to the unprovoked war in Ukraine would be a mistake. NATO smartly recognized the threat from Belarus, condemning Belarus’s instrumental support to the Russian war effort by allowing its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces for attacks into Ukraine.

While the communiqué notes Belarus’s complicity in this aggression, it’s critical to remember these crimes are committed and abetted by the illegitimate regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The dictator, desperately clinging to power, has driven Belarus deeper into the Kremlin’s clutches. NATO’s firm declaration of concern for the situation in Belarus is in part due to Lukashenka deepening the military integration between Russia and Belarus, potentially allowing the deployment of “so-called private military companies” to Belarus (the Wagner Group), as well as (perhaps too mildly put) “malign activities” without respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, and international law; the Alliance’s declarations are an important signal and sign of hope that Belarus will not be forgotten in the international agenda.

While it is good to see the declaration about threats within Belarus itself, what will surely frustrate many in the democratic forces (along with their supporters), is that there is no acknowledgement that these actions are taken by an illegitimate regime, nor mention of the democratic forces rallying against these actions, against the war, and against any deployment of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory.

While the communiqué’s comments on Belarus could have been stronger, there is hope NATO leaders and experts in Vilnius have listened in on conversations featuring the democratically elected leader of Belarus and Lukashenka’s rival in the widely disputed 2020 election, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who has been boldly speaking in Vilnius in side-events calling for commitments to Belarus and reminding the world that the Lukashenka regime does not represent the Belarusian people.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

The communiqué presents a clear-eyed snapshot of the Alliance in an era of great power rivalry and strategic competition. Russia receives thorough and excoriating attention as the shatterer of peace and a continuing threat. China is called out for challenging the norms, interests, and security of the Alliance and its members. New and prospective members in the room or at the doorstep (Finland, Sweden, and on a farther horizon, Ukraine) were appropriately hailed, as were Asian partners Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. NATO member Turkey will be pleased by paragraphs four and five, which appreciate Turkish support to Sweden’s accession process and mention Ankara’s preferred language on terrorism as a threat “in all its forms and manifestations” to the Alliance. Hard power, conventional deterrence, and readiness are key focal points, though emerging and nontraditional threats are treated as well. Surprisingly, energy security makes an appearance only in paragraph sixty-eight. All in all, though, the document shows energy, focus, and seriousness appropriate to the geopolitical moment.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Much of the conversation immediately ahead of the NATO summit in Vilnius focused on whether the allies would take concrete steps toward Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. On Sunday, Biden dumped cold water on Ukraine imminently joining NATO, but whispers in expert circles in Washington suggested that an intermediate initiative toward membership might make a splash at Vilnius. In fact, the communiqué itself caused barely a ripple: a new NATO-Ukraine Council that will formalize consultations between Brussels and Kyiv on Ukraine’s “aspirations for membership in NATO.”

A NATO-Ukraine Council is certainly a net positive step toward Ukrainian accession, but the fact that this was the centerpiece of the communiqué suggests it was the bare minimum step upon which allies could agree. The Alliance should have gone further and instead established a defense and deterrence partnership to provide Ukraine lethal aid and training (the renewed Comprehensive Assistance Package will help Ukraine become more interoperable with NATO, but provisions only five hundred million euros for nonlethal aid).

The signers also left open the question of when Ukraine will join the Alliance, writing only that Ukraine will be invited “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This ambiguity may help prevent Russia from blocking specific preconditions to Ukraine’s accession, but it could also create further indignation in Ukraine and in the Baltics if allies continue to disagree on whether Ukraine is “ready” for NATO.

Pressure will grow on the White House and Western European capitals to elucidate their conditions for Ukraine’s membership, at least in private channels, as Kyiv no doubt campaigns for an invitation at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC.

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

For many, the July 11 communiqué was along the lines of what was expected coming out of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. For others, hope was high that NATO allies would rally around Ukraine and show some clear steps not just in terms of whether the country will eventually join NATO, but exactly how and exactly when. NATO allies didn’t (and couldn’t) go that far, which shows continued disagreement at the highest levels as to Ukraine’s future relationship with the military alliance.

But it’s not all bad news—NATO allies were able to reaffirm their statements in the 2008 communiqué that Ukraine’s future is, indeed, in NATO. The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road. The communiqué language basically says that Ukraine can join when all allies agree and when conditions are met. That leaves a lot of room for interpretation. My sense is that in the future—whether it’s in a year at NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, or five years from now, or ten—NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

While the communiqué naturally reflects NATO’s laser focus on the war in Ukraine and the proximate threat from Russia, it also confirms the Alliance’s renewed strength and growing attention to China and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Much attention will understandably be paid to the communiqué’s hedging on Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership. But for China, this week’s summit underscores that the war unleashed by its friends in Moscow has single handedly revitalized NATO, which Beijing only recently had viewed (happily) as sinking into irrelevance. This development throws a large wrench into China’s plans to dismantle the US-led alliance network, carve out a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific, and transform the rules-based global order.

The document reiterates language in last year’s Strategic Concept on China’s threat to NATO’s “interests, security and values;” “malicious” hybrid and cyber operations; disinformation; and efforts to control key tech sectors, critical minerals, and supply chains. The communiqué also builds on last year’s warnings about China’s “deepening strategic partnership” with Russia to call on Beijing to abstain from all forms of support for Russia’s war against Ukraine—particularly the provision of any lethal aid.

The call for China to condemn Russia and adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter—paired with a clear refusal to recognize Russia’s illegal annexations—throws cold water on any hopes that Beijing would be welcomed to facilitate peace negotiations based on Putin’s terms.

Beijing will be pleased that the document does not include a reference to the opening of a proposed NATO office in Japan, reflecting a lack of consensus on NATO’s role in Asia. But language on the importance of the Indo-Pacific to security in the Euro-Atlantic and specific praise for the contributions of the four Indo-Pacific countries whose leaders are present in Vilnius—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—reflect NATO’s growing recognition that the regions’ fortunes are linked. NATO cannot ignore the threat of war over Taiwan and, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently put it, “China is watching to see the price Russia pays, or the reward it receives, for its aggression.”

—David O. Shullman is senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council and former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council.

The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

NATO fell short of placing Ukraine onto a clear track to Alliance membership, but that cause for membership gained unambiguous momentum at the Vilnius summit. The assertion in the summit communiqué that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” frustratingly provides no more clarity than the 2008 Bucharest declaration in which NATO first declared Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. While the Alliance dropped the requirement for Ukraine to jump through the hoops of a membership action plan (MAP)—as was done for the fast-tracked accession of Finland and Sweden—the communiqué states that Ukraine must implement “additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required” which infers an unnecessary de jure MAP.

What we must not overlook or underestimate is the fact that allies brought to the Vilnius summit unprecedented support for Ukraine’s membership aspirations. The warmth with which Zelenskyy was greeted demonstrated how Ukraine is regarded as part of the transtatlantic community. While full allied consensus—a requirement in NATO decision-making—was not achieved, the Biden administration found itself largely alone blocking efforts to provide Ukraine that roadmap to NATO. Even Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that “without a doubt, Ukraine deserves to be in NATO.”

The key now is to ensure that Ukraine defeats Russia’s invasion quickly and decisively, and to build on the expanded and significant allied support behind Kyiv’s membership aspirations, leveraging the fact that Ukraine today meets the requirements. These are mutually reinforcing goals. Their achievement will make Europe more secure and NATO more powerful. The progress made in Vilnius should make us all the more determined to secure Ukraine’s accession to NATO at the Alliance’s 2024 Washington summit.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The post Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 23:08:40 +0000

Now that’s an opening act. On the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, and after more than a year of twists and turns, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Monday that he would push forward Sweden’s accession into NATO. The announcement came after a meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, with NATO agreeing to enhance its counterterrorism work to address Turkey’s security concerns and Sweden agreeing to back Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership bid. Erdoğan, for his part, agreed to push for ratification of Sweden’s accession in its legislature. With Hungary expected to follow suit, the path to Sweden’s entrance into the Alliance could soon be clear.

Below, Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Defne Arslan: Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

Rich Outzen: Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

Anna Wieslander: Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Christopher Skaluba: Don’t spike the football just yet

Rachel Rizzo: Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

Daniel Fried: Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

Ian Brzezinski: Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

On July 10, Erdoğan committed to send Sweden’s NATO membership ratification to the Turkish parliament. The news was welcomed by all NATO members heading into the NATO summit in Vilnius—and will prove beneficial to Turkey, a major ally with a key role in the Alliance’s southern flank, from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. The announcement also came right after Erdoğan demanded long-sought EU membership for Turkey in return for Sweden’s accession, in addition to Sweden taking Turkey’s security concerns seriously. Sweden eventually took steps on adopting an anti-terrorism law in June. Additionally, language regarding terrorist organizations, which pose an existential threat to Turkey, appeared in the NATO communiqué. These were important gains for Turkey. It is also encouraging to see that NATO will be establishing a terrorism coordination mechanism for the first time.

What will be the timeline for Sweden’s ratification in the Turkish parliament? It is important to note that apart from Erdoğan’s remarks, there has not been any official announcement from the Turkish side regarding Sweden’s accession yet. This tells me that Erdoğan will wait for the next steps both from Sweden and NATO, as well as from the EU before he sends the protocol to the Turkish parliament.

Erdoğan also announced on July 12 in Vilnius that Sweden’s accession will move forward once the Turkish Parliament opens in October, but not before. As the parliament opens, the ratification needs to be discussed and adopted at the parliament’s foreign affairs committee first, before it goes to the floor.

Erdogan’s move on July 10not only took the pressure off of Turkey during the summit, but also gave the president more time to monitor the developments in Turkey’s favor. From the EU side, a customs union revitalization and update, as well as visa liberalization will be beneficial for Turkey, and if things move fast enough, there is always a chance that Sweden’s ratification can happen in September. That said, I also would like to underline that this announcement in Vilnius will also bring obligations to Turkey to meet its side of the agreement.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program.

Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

I am mildly surprised that this comes before and not during the Summit, which convenes Tuesday, but overall it makes sense. It is a typical Erdogan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands.

It’s the wrong question to ask, “What pushed Erdogan to do this?” Because it underestimates the degree of strategy he and his advisors have applied—and misreads their original intent. Erdogan and the Turks have long said publicly and privately that they favor NATO enlargement. They have supported Ukraine and Georgia in the past, approved Finland this past year, and would like to see Sweden in—if the notoriously lax Swedish counterterror laws, now amended, are fully implemented. Turkey wants a big NATO because by NATO structure and bylaws Erdogan gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization—as do all members. The bigger the better. Yet the nature of the enlargement matters greatly for a country with a serious terrorism threat. So the better question is: Did Erdogan get what he thinks he needs on his own security needs, regarding the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and a potential F-16 fighter jet deal with the United States, to advance Sweden’s candidacy? What was the quid pro quo?

It’s important to remember that Erdogan’s announcement was not approval of the bid; it was a statement of intent to pass the question of approval to the Turkish parliament, which Erdogan’s party controls. Thus he retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror implementation, or if the United States reneges on the F-16 deal. So all in all, he has lost no real leverage, but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.

This removes the question of Swedish accession from the summit’s main agenda, and places it in the category of “business successfully managed.” Thus the summit can focus on two more pressing issues: how to support Ukraine and how to implement NATO’s revised security concept. I would expect that on the first topic (Ukraine) we will see a roadmap or statement of principles that lays out robust military support for Ukraine’s defense, amounting to a security guarantee, but carefully calibrated not to constitute a near-term prospect of accession, an escalation, or an engagement of NATO as an organization in the current defensive war against Russia. On the second topic (security concept), there will be technical progress on how to divide responsibilities and resources more equitably, but this will likely be of less interest to general audiences.

I think this has less to do with the mutiny of Yevgeniy Prigozhin and perceptions of Vladimir Putin’s standing than with the leverage game vis-a-vis NATO allies and how to ensure that if European NATO problems become Turkish problems, Turkish problems become European NATO problems. Ankara will continue to conduct a balancing act by which it maintains trade, diplomatic relations, and occasional strategic cooperation with Russia—while ensuring that together with other NATO powers Turkey disabuses Russia of its dreams of imperial revanche. Putin, Prigozhin, Wagner—in Turkish eyes these are all just layers of the Russian Matryoshka or Maskirovka, deceptive games that obscure a fairly direct power play. The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security.

As to quid pro quo, for Turkey, it can be only two things—counter-PKK commitments by Sweden, and agreement on F-16s (and perhaps broader strategic engagement) by Washington. Anything else is peripheral, and if these are not obtained, the deal is a bad one for Ankara. Of course there is an escape hatch—Erdogan passed the ball to the Turkish parliament and approved nothing directly—but the pieces are in place now for a good transactional deal that helps NATO, Sweden, and Turkey in a stroke.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Finally Sweden got its green light from Turkey to join NATO. Late in the evening in Vilnius, Stoltenberg called July 10, 2023, “a historic day.” The agreement between Sweden, Turkey, and NATO that was signed on Monday evening means that Sweden will join the Alliance as its thirty-second member “as soon as possible,” given that the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments need to ratify the accession protocol.

It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance. Sweden´s military and political adjustments toward NATO membership can proceed with full speed, which is beneficial not only for Sweden, but for the defense of Northern Europe, in which Sweden could play a crucial role.

The green light also facilitates Finland’s integration as a new member, since the security and defense of the two Nordics is heavily interlinked. As Finnish President Sauli Niinistö stated: “Finland’s NATO membership is not complete without Sweden.”

For NATO, the deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start. As twenty-nine allies already have ratified Sweden’s accession, NATO otherwise faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak. Lack of progress could put the credibility of NATO’s “open door” policy at risk, since the Alliance also has to make some tough decisions on Ukrainian membership.

Turkey managed to push Sweden and NATO to take a step forward on counterterrorism measures, and in the end, Erdoğan also put the EU into the mix. Sweden’s decision to support Turkish ambitions to get the European Commission to restart the accession process appeared to seal their NATO agreement. Whether Turkey will also get to purchase the long-sought F-16 fighter jets from the United States remains to be seen. But then, the summit has not even started and US President Joe Biden has yet to arrive.

—Anna Wieslander is the director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council’s Northern Europe office in Stockholm.

Don’t spike the football just yet

While my instinct tells me that it would be difficult for Erdoğan to backtrack on an agreement he has seemingly made in good faith, recent history provides a cautionary tale. Just over a year ago on the margins of the Madrid Summit, glasses were clinking on what most observers assumed would be a straightforward process for admission once Turkey joined consensus in inviting Finland and Sweden to become members. Yet Erdoğan knew he had a second bite at the apple. He took the accolades in Madrid, only to run Sweden through the paces for another year before another dramatic set of negotiations in Vilnius, where he once again demanded the spotlight before conceding. If he moves with alacrity to push the ratification through the Turkish parliament, skeptics can be reassured. But there is non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again. I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

For months, NATO leaders have been working behind the scenes to broker this agreement between Turkey and Sweden. It’s important to tip our hats to Stoltenberg, Biden, and other leaders who exerted diplomatic pressure to see this through. This is a classic example of a geopolitical tit-for-tat: Erdoğan using his strategic position—as a member of NATO but also straddling the East and West—to extract concessions from Sweden that both bolster his power at home and demonstrate to the broader NATO Alliance that they need him. It also gives both sides something they want: Erdoğan gets to look like a statesman, and Sweden appears on track to finally get its NATO membership. It will be interesting in the coming days to follow reports of what took place behind closed doors over the last few weeks, days, and even hours, and what was actually on offer for Erdoğan to create this shift. He wouldn’t have changed his tune if he didn’t see this move as in his interests. Next up: Be sure to watch the US-Turkey F-16 space closely.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

While it’s only speculation, the Prigozhin mutiny and the Kremlin’s uncertain response (Prigozhin at liberty in Russia, not in exile in Belarus; Prigozhin’s meeting with Putin) suggest regime weakness. Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages. Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.

We won’t know what the United States might do with respect to F-16 or other military sales to Turkey. If there were an understanding, the details will become clear in coming weeks. Whether a possible deal is a good deal depends on the details. But the practice of international relations is not an art for the purist. Erdoğan’s decision to support Sweden’s (and Ukraine’s) NATO accession is a big deal and worth advancing. If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.

Sweden will bring to the Alliance military capacity (though it will need to build more), political savvy, and good geography. Sweden will help with the defense of NATO’s eastern flank countries and the Baltic Sea. Having worked with Swedish diplomats for many years, I believe they will also be excellent partners in forging NATO consensus and a sustainable, strong policy toward Russia.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Assuming Erdoğan’s announcement is followed by expeditious approvals from the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments, it will be one of the key substantive and geopolitically significant deliverables of NATO’s Vilnius summit. Sweden’s accession will bring to the Alliance real military capability, reinforce its transatlantic outlook, and above all, bring into the Alliance’s ranks a new member determined to fulfill its military responsibilities. Sweden’s membership will complete the transformation of the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake, thereby strengthening the security and military stability of North Central Europe.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The post Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

South Asia’s climate challenges are transnational. Its climate solutions must be, too.

Ahsan Butt — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 20:08:25 +0000

This northern summer has highlighted the transnational nature of the climate challenge. Wildfires in Canada have rendered air in the United States unbreathable, while heatwaves have killed citizens on both sides of the Rio Grande. South Asia is no stranger to such phenomena: Cyclone Biparjoy was, at one point, forecast to almost perfectly bisect Indian and Pakistani territory, albeit lands that are generally sparsely populated.

By luck or providence—even secular Karachiites, half-jokingly, repeatedly invoked the spirit of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in the week before the cyclone was to hit—Pakistan was spared the worst of Biparjoy. And while India was not so lucky as to avoid it completely, the damage it meted out was considerably less intense than initially predicted.

The cyclone highlighted the negligible level of cooperation between the Indian and Pakistani governments on climate issues. Despite its geographic trajectory, the days before the cyclone made landfall saw no communication, collaboration, or coordination between Islamabad and New Delhi, or even among the state governments most likely to be affected—Sindh and Gujarat. And while it is notable that Pakistan used data from the Indian Meteorological Department, which is better equipped than Pakistan’s, neither side acknowledged this help. More importantly, had the cyclone hit more densely populated border areas, each country would have handled its own disaster response.

This siloed strategy for dealing with Biparjoy is emblematic; the lack of a joint approach to climate disaster management reflects a wider lack of climate cooperation across South Asia, whose two billion people share plenty of problems but few solutions. Governments and officials in the region almost never talk about floods and droughts, nor heat plans for cities, nor data on river flow and glacial melt, nor farming techniques. Notwithstanding limited efforts by multilateral organizations such as the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development or the World Bank (through its One South Asia program), it is not controversial to claim that South Asia features the least amount of transnational climate cooperation of any region in the world, a travesty of epic proportions when one considers the region’s vulnerability to climate change.

The reason South Asia lags well behind other regions in transnational climate cooperation is simple: the geopolitical strife between India and Pakistan. In an alternate universe, where the pair had a normal, productive relationship, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation would be the venue for tackling the species-threatening challenge of climate change. Instead, the organization is a moribund joke, not even managing to hold a meeting in almost a decade.

In the same alternate universe, there would be high-level delegations from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh regarding the water cycle and changes in the monsoon, common air sheds that trap heat and pollution, negotiations over the next generation of water treaties, crop burning and air pollution, trade in electric vehicles, and, potentially, the construction of a region-wide renewable energy grid. Instead, in the real world, even Track II meetings—where information, ideas, and conversations were once exchanged by activists, journalists, and experts—have, since 2018, ground to a halt.

Above this structural baseline of regional connectivity, or lack thereof, Pakistan suffers disproportionately. India’s preponderant geopolitical position vis-à-vis Pakistan, especially economically and diplomatically, and its stated mission to isolate Islamabad, (which even manifests in India’s cricket team refusing to visit Pakistan for international tournaments), leaves Pakistan worse off than the typical South Asian country when it comes to tapping into regional networks of climate cooperation. In interviews I conducted in Pakistan this summer, some environmental activists allege that the country tends to be excluded from even multilateral, technocratic ventures run by outside actors such as the World Bank or the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and that Pakistan is suffering a “blackout of sorts.” This is before one even considers bi- or trilateral climate cooperation between national governments.

One illustration of Pakistan’s isolation is the electricity deal poised to be struck between India, Bangladesh, and Nepal. The agreement will allow India’s neighbors to trade surpluses in energy production to each other through India’s grid. This is a landmark achievement that, once formalized, has a great deal of potential to alleviate energy anxiety and promote clean energy throughout the region. But Pakistan is conspicuously absent from these discussions, which feature not just the three signatories but also the likes of Bhutan and Sri Lanka.

While the costs of this marginalization mostly accrue to Pakistan, the rest of South Asia also loses what it could gain from collaboration with Pakistani officials, activists, lawyers, scientists, mayors, farmers, and journalists. Pakistan’s experiences, for instance, with its reforestation of mangroves, widely lauded as one of the world’s most successful such efforts, may prove valuable to others. Even more checkered initiatives, such as Imran Khan’s ballyhooed Billion Tree Tsunami, can furnish important lessons, both in their successes and failures. One of my interviewees, a policy expert with experience throughout Asia, favorably rates Pakistan’s efforts with a carbon market, which outpace the likes of Sri Lanka’s or Nepal’s.

The fundamental reality is that, for South Asia, cooperation on climate change is not a nice-to-have, but a need-to-have. The best case for all concerned would be for India and Pakistan to resolve their geopolitical differences. But even absent such optimistic scenarios, cooperation on climate, easily the biggest political challenge of the twenty-first century, cannot be held hostage to twentieth century disagreements. Climate change is simply too extreme in its impacts, and its nature—transnational, viciously complex in its distributional effects across and within borders, and multifaceted across water, ice, air, heat, and soil—means that cooperation is not just necessary, but existentially urgent.

Given Pakistan’s present distraught and destabilized state, and the uncompromising mood in New Delhi on all matters Pakistan, one should not expect even a minor diplomatic thaw any time soon. Some analysts put hope in the 2024 elections in India, after which, the story goes, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will have more room for maneuver for a breakthrough with Pakistan, and Pakistan itself might become a more stable and less dysfunctional polity able to deliver on whatever agreement the two countries reach.

If all that happens, fantastic. But waiting for intergovernmental cooperation on this score would be wrongheaded. There is a deep reservoir of potential in people-to-people contacts drawn from civil society, the academic and research communities, metropolitan authorities, and those who work in agriculture. Such meetings should be encouraged and institutionalized, preferably at a distance from the sharp glare of ministries, personalities, and government offices for whom, no matter how small the meeting or event, the political stakes will always be too high. Moreover, multilateral organizations devoted to tackling climate change in South Asia, including but not limited to UNEP and the World Bank, must do more to include Pakistan, even if this contradicts the goals of Indian foreign policy.

Ahsan I. Butt is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and an associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.

SouthAsiaSource Apr 12, 2023

The geopolitics of the energy trilemma in South Asia

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

South Asian countries are being subjected to the consequences of China and Russia’s efforts to expand their influence in the region. In this complex geopolitical context, expanded US and G7 clean energy efforts are needed.

Bangladesh Climate Change & Climate Action

SouthAsiaSource Sep 9, 2022

Experts react: Catastrophic flooding in Pakistan

By South Asia Center experts

More than one-third of Pakistan is underwater amid catastrophic climate change-induced flooding. South Asia Center experts provide their analyses of the situation.

Climate Change & Climate Action Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource May 23, 2022

South Asia’s climate crisis: Policymakers need to feel the heat

By Erum Haider

Few things unite South Asia more urgently right now than the climate crisis. We can only hope that policymakers are listening.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Southasiasource Blog

The next European Union member is…

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 14:22:51 +0000

July 1 marks ten years since Croatia joined the European Union (EU)—and no country has done so since. It’s the longest duration without a new member for the EU and its predecessor institutions going back to 1973. Below, the Europe Center’s Frances Burwell explains the current complex political debate within the EU over enlargement, then eleven experts share their insights on potential new members—official candidates as well as a couple wild cards.

Hard lessons about EU enlargement

During the ten years since the last enlargement of the EU, some hard lessons have emerged for the existing twenty-seven member states. Contrary to expectations, these lessons have little to do with the reform of EU institutions and processes. Instead, they are rooted in political vulnerabilities in both “old” Europe and “new” Europe. Above all, the existing member states fear the emergence of new members—and especially a large new member, such as Ukraine—with serious rule-of-law failings, à la Poland or Hungary.

When the EU decided to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidacy status in June 2022, it was a political decision motivated by the desire to show unity in the face of Russian aggression. Neither country would have qualified for candidacy status under normal circumstances, nor would the existing member states have been willing to make such an exception. But both countries have worked hard, and the question now is when to open negotiations on specific regulations. Prospective members from the Balkans present a more mixed picture, with some governments making progress and others even seeming unconvinced of the value of membership. As the EU enlargement debate begins to heat up, keep in mind four key lessons:

The institutions can adapt. Every enlargement round has been accompanied by calls for institutional reform and treaty change. No way, it was said, can the EU operate at fifteen, at twenty-five, or twenty-seven. Yet, the EU institutions continue to function. Indeed, during the COVID-19 pandemic and in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made more difficult decisions more quickly than at any time in its history.
The accession process offers too many opportunities for existing members to settle historical scores with potential members, slowing the process. Too often, this is due to niche historical grievances exploited by member state politicians; see Bulgaria’s efforts to slow down the accession of North Macedonia or Spain’s failure to countenance Kosovo’s bid.
Rigorous benchmarking of regulations does not prevent democratic backsliding. The twelve mostly postcommunist states admitted in 2004 and 2007 had to meet much higher standards of regulatory cohesion than earlier entrants. Yet today, members of the class of 2004 Poland and Hungary face charges that they have strayed from basic EU values on the rule of law, especially regarding the judiciary and media. Other member states have also had questions raised about the state of their democracies.
The biggest lesson of them all is that politics is the key element in the accession process. What will be the reaction of the radical left and extreme right that has become such a factor in EU domestic politics? Will ratification of each accession by existing members be too high of a hurdle? Ukraine and Moldova have benefited from politics so far, but as the accession process moves forward and membership seems closer, the politics—especially among the current member states—will only get harder.

—Frances Burwell is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

United Kingdom

Albania: Strong momentum to overcome rule-of-law concerns

Albania was granted EU candidate status in June 2014. The EU grouped Albania’s accession bid with North Macedonia’s (which was stalled due to a dispute with Greece over naming issues), and it wasn’t until July 2022 that Albania had its first intergovernmental conference with the EU to actually launch negotiations officially.

Albania’s greatest progress toward accession thus far has been its substantial judicial reform, which is unprecedented in its ambition in the Western Balkans. The reform, which implemented serious vetting of the judiciary, led to the dismissal of more than 60 percent of judges and prosecutors across the country who were found to have criminal ties, concealed wealth, or otherwise unprofessional behavior.

Despite this initiative, Albania still has a long way to go on rule-of-law reform to meet EU standards. With so many judges and prosecutors dismissed, there is a serious shortage of officials available to deal with continued criminal cases. And while the reform is strong on paper, international assessments find Albania to still suffer from significant corruption (even compared to other Western Balkans countries) and needs to strengthen its record on indictments in high-level corruption cases, prioritize anti-money laundering initiatives, and increase transparency in consolidating property rights.

But Albania has the drive to continue with these reforms: EU membership remains incredibly popular and is supported by nearly 96 percent of Albanians according to a 2022 Euronews Albania poll. The same poll showed that more than 35 percent of Albanians think the country will join the EU by 2027. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has consistently expressed his willingness to keep the country on track to meet EU reforms and he has been transparent in his appeal for pre-accession EU funds to enable the country to meet EU benchmarks. Within the region, he’s an ardent supporter of regional cooperation opportunities such as the Berlin Process and Open Balkan Initiative that would allow for the movement of people and trade throughout the region as a good exercise to prepare for future EU membership.

Although Albania had a late start in the EU accession process, its substantial judicial reforms, clear messaging from its leader on the value of EU membership, and overwhelming popular support for the effort have given it unique momentum within the region to continue on its path toward joining the bloc.

—Lisa Homel is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bumpy accession progress leaves an opening for Russia and China

Twenty years ago, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was promised EU membership at the Thessaloniki Summit. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU entered into force in June 2015, and BiH applied for membership in February 2016. Candidate status was granted six years later, in December 2022, as result of a new geopolitical situation in Europe, propping up the EU’s renewed engagement with the Western Balkans as vital for European security.

The long and bumpy EU integration process, lack of sustainable reforms in the country, dysfunction in the government, ethnic divisions, weak economic development, and systemic corruption of ethno-political elites controlling institutions have increased apathy and skepticism in BiH. EU membership is supported by half of the population, but when it comes to expectations of citizens, 35 percent believe that the country will never join the EU. The risk of competing visions for the future of the country is increasing, and the EU’s strategic competitors, Russia and China, are gaining more space. Young people have opted for the easier way to join the EU, through massive emigration into Western Europe. Migration and brain drain have become new security challenges, as BiH is among the countries that have lost the largest share of their population since the early 1990s (33 percent).

The new government in BiH has prioritized EU integration, and the main focus should be on implementing the fourteen priorities of the European Commission, dealing mostly with the functionality of the government focusing on the rule of law and judiciary reform and by creating a clear division of competencies between different levels of government. To be successful, the EU’s higher focus on fundamentals and stricter conditionality and accountability should be paired with earlier access to structural funds to promote socioeconomic convergence and a gradual phasing-in of candidate countries in various sectors of the EU market.

—Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Georgia: Backsliding and Russian influence put the EU in a bind

In June 2022, the European Commission decided not to grant Georgia candidate status, unlike Moldova and Ukraine. Instead, the Commission granted it a “European perspective” and provided twelve recommendations for issues that the country must tackle first. Despite widespread agreement in the West that the government has been backsliding in key indicators such as independence of the judiciary and state institutions, the Commission’s June 2022 decision was questionable because Georgia has completed far more of the legislative and technical requirements for candidate status than Ukraine or Moldova and has a vibrant, if tenuous, democratic system. In a March 2023 International Republican Institute poll, 89 percent of the Georgian population said it supports the country joining the EU. Widespread public protests erupted that month when the government attempted to introduce a foreign agent law, modeled on a similar Russian law, that was undemocratic and in direct conflict with the Commission’s recommendations. The government withdrew the bill in response.

The EU now finds itself in a bind, as the Georgian government has not implemented many reforms addressing the most serious problems and its commitment to this Western course is somewhere between fickle and self-sabotaging. The EU is in a position where if it grants candidate status now, it risks rewarding a government that is backsliding in terms of democratic reform. Conversely, if it refuses to give candidate status, it risks consigning Georgia to a bureaucratic gray zone where it could find itself increasingly unable or unwilling to counter Russian influence. However, so far, the country remains an imperfect but spirited and pluralistic democracy with a population deeply committed to a European future.

—Laura Linderman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Kosovo: Progress is stalled as the Serbia standoff continues

Kosovo signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2015 and submitted its application for candidate status in 2022. Although 85 percent of Kosovars want to join the EU, Kosovo faces the unique obstacle of not being able to advance further in EU accession because five EU member states do not recognize its independence (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain). A key precondition set by the EU for Kosovo to move forward has been the conclusion of the normalization agreement with Serbia, which has effectively stalled since 2015. A recent European proposal on normalization agreed to in principle by both sides is also on the brink of failure due to tensions in Kosovo’s Serbian-majority north.

The deterioration in the security situation and Kosovo’s stagnant EU accession process undermines the country’s recent progress in democratic reforms and in tackling corruption. The lack of clear EU prospects for Kosovo and the Western Balkans in general—especially many years of delays in approving visa liberalization for Kosovo (it comes into force in January 2024)—have fueled frustrations with the EU and brought anti-EU narratives to the mainstream of public discourse.

—Agon Maliqi is an independent analyst and researcher from Kosovo working on security and democracy issues in the Western Balkans.

Moldova: Corruption and Transnistria remain challenges

In June 2022, the European Council announced it would grant Moldova and Ukraine candidacy status—almost eight years to the day since Chisinau earned an association agreement with the EU in 2014. Candidacy was a major symbolic boon for Moldova, which had endured a maddeningly stop-start progression toward EU reforms and candidacy. But pro-European president Maia Sandu has her country on the right track: She is tough enough to enact real reforms and as a former International Monetary Fund official, has the right combination of technocratic and diplomatic skills to lead Moldova toward Europe.

Yet Moldova faces major roadblocks to pass through before its eventual accession. The EU’s June 2022 announcement carried with it nine political conditions before accession talks, compared to seven for Ukraine. With a population of less than three million people, Moldova lacks the capacity of Ukraine but faces similar challenges of outside influence. Chisinau continues to battle corrupt politicians and oligarchs who consistently threaten to blow Sandu’s reform drive off course. Moldova will also likely need to solve the fate of Transnistria, the Russia-dominated statelet that broke away in 1992. EU countries will rightly want to strengthen border controls with a Russian client statelet.

Greater EU diplomatic engagement with Chisinau and technical support for market and judicial reforms can help shore up Moldova’s capacity to make meaningful progress on EU conditions. Additional Western sanctions on Shor, Plahotniuc, and their proxies can mitigate their malign influence in Moldovan politics and help consolidate the country’s democracy.

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Montenegro: A stable political coalition is necessary for progress

Montenegro started negotiations for EU membership eleven years ago. So far, Podgorica has opened all the chapters but has only closed three. The negotiations came to a halt in 2018 when Brussels made it clear that progress in the EU accession process would be directly conditioned by advancements in the rule of law and democratic institutions. Since the former regime of President Milo Đukanović turned Montenegro into a so-called captured state, with a corrupt judiciary and police and where organized crime thrived, the EU accession process has de facto been slowed down, if not halted.

The process of forming a new government is underway in Podgorica. The winning party in the recent elections is the Europe Now Movement (PES). The main challenge for PES leader Milojko Spajić, the likely prime minister in the future government, will be to form a stable coalition capable of executing necessary reforms which would unlock Montenegro’s path to the EU.

The biggest problems in Montenegrin society are organized crime and corruption. They cannot be resolved without appointing new prosecutors and judges and adopting and implementing reforms in the judiciary and police. While Russia’s influence in Montenegro exists, it is limited. The pro-Russian sentiment among certain segments of Montenegrin society, which dates back to the eighteenth century, is often mistakenly interpreted as a result of Russian influence rather than historical heritage.

Public support for Montenegro’s accession to the EU consistently ranges between 70 and 80 percent, indicating that this is one of the few issues in the country with a fairly broad consensus. Therefore, the implementation of the so-called EU agenda is a crucial tool in forming a new government and creating a stronger parliamentary majority.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

North Macedonia: Amid delays, public support for EU membership is plunging

North Macedonia’s perspective on EU membership has drastically shifted in the past two decades, replacing initial enthusiasm with caution and diminished optimism. Despite obtaining candidate status in 2005, the country has endured eighteen years of uncertainty, waiting for the European Commission recommendations to translate into official negotiations from the European Council. The Prespa Agreement, considered a significant compromise five years ago, failed to deliver on its promise of faster progress toward EU membership, further dampening hopes.

In November 2020, Bulgaria’s blockade on North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations, demanding constitutional changes for the Bulgarian minority, worsened the situation. The opposition’s refusal to join votes for the necessary constitutional changes, requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority, has led to an impending political crisis. Trust has eroded, significantly undermining the EU’s credibility compared to sentiments held two decades ago.

To tackle this challenge, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed an effective strategy: immediate and generous allocation of pre-accession funds to facilitate North Macedonia’s transformation and benefit other Western Balkan countries. However, the specific amount of funds remains unspecified, leaving room for uncertainty.

The forthcoming Balkan Barometer report from the Regional Cooperation Council reveals a diminishing perception of EU membership in North Macedonia, once a fierce supporter. In 2019, 70 percent of citizens viewed EU membership as a positive development, but the 2023 Balkan Barometer shows that only 50 percent of respondents consider it a positive prospect, with 34 percent neutral and 13 percent negative.

These survey findings serve as a wake-up call for North Macedonian leaders, EU officials, and US policymakers. Urgent measures are necessary to address citizens’ concerns and doubts. Open dialogue, trust-building, and effective communication about the advantages and opportunities of EU membership are crucial. Specific challenges must be tackled, aligning the EU integration process with citizens’ expectations. Mere promises and kind words will not suffice to reverse the current gloomy narrative. Boosting the local economy through investments and improving standards of living would be a highly welcomed step, revitalizing the path to EU membership and restoring faith in the process, ultimately bringing back hope to the citizens for the once-promised European future.

At this critical juncture, Bulgaria must refrain from employing vetoes or placing undue pressure on North Macedonia and should foster a constructive and cooperative relationship free from unnecessary obstacles. Additionally, the EU member states should collectively exert pressure on Sofia, urging responsible actions based on European values towards its neighbor.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

Serbia: ‘Sitting on two stools’ means no movement toward EU

For most Serbs, EU membership increasingly seems like a mirage, and certainly the prospect does not have the power and gravitational pull that it had in the years immediately following the wars of Yugoslav succession. Serbia officially applied for membership in December 2009, and all governments since that time have professed pro-EU sentiments. But over the last decade, Serbia has not made progress on reforms necessary for accession and has continued its reputation as trying to “sit on two stools” (claiming commitment to a Western course while remaining closely tied to Russia). Moreover, the current leadership has been deft at looking to other sources of support and investment (China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Gulf states) for visible development projects even as the EU provides the overwhelming amount of its foreign assistance. And in certain areas, such as press freedom, Serbia has a way to go to achieve EU standards.

So even as 65 percent of Serbs support EU reforms, only 43 percent are actually in favor of joining the EU. The fate of Russia’s attack on Ukraine may have an impact on the leadership and public opinion in Serbia, but for now, there is great “EU fatigue” and a lack of confidence that membership in the union is anywhere near. Finally, relations with Kosovo will be key to Serbia’s prospects in the EU, and recent events have not been encouraging there, despite the best efforts of the transatlantic community.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center and a former US ambassador to Serbia.

Turkey: Rule of law and Cyprus hamper a long-stalled process

Turkey’s EU accession history goes back a long way, starting in 1959 when it applied for associate membership to what was then known as the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey officially applied for full membership in the EEC in 1987, and Turkey became eligible to join the EU in 1999. The same year, during the Helsinki European Council, the EU recognized Turkey as a candidate and official negotiations for accession began in 2005. However, progress has been slow and to date, only sixteen of thirty-five accession chapters have been opened, and only one has been completed. A total of fourteen chapters are blocked due to the decisions of the European Council and Cyprus. Meanwhile, the war in Syria led to a refugee crisis for the EU—with Turkey on the front line. In the 2015 and 2016 EU summits, burden-sharing in migration management was a major topic between Turkey and the EU. As a result, currently Turkey hosts almost four million Syrian refugees under temporary protection status.

The most important step for overcoming this period and helping to normalize relations was the Turkey-EU summit in March 2018, in Varna, Bulgaria, which was beneficial to reestablishing confidence in Turkey-EU relations. But just three months later, the General Affairs Council stated that “Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union. Turkey’s accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen.”

The 2022 enlargement report released by the European Commission offered an assessment of where things stand now: “The Turkish government has not reversed the negative trend in relation to reform, despite its repeated commitment to EU accession,” the report reads. “The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who just won another term to rule for the next five years, is pushing for membership less than he did in his prior twenty years leading the country. However, Erdoğan recently called for increased communications for Turkey’s EU membership. According to a 2022 poll by the German Marshall Fund, 59 percent of Turks support EU membership. The big issues Turkey needs to overcome before being admitted are the rule of law and a resolution to the Cyprus dispute with the EU. Despite these issues, Turkey has stepped up recently to de-escalate tensions with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially after Turkey’s devastating earthquake early this year, which led to a warm earthquake diplomacy between the two countries.

—Alp Ozen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program.

Ukraine: As reforms advance, accession talks could begin this fall

The dramatic events of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity made clear to the world the Ukrainian people’s desire to pursue the path of European integration. Now, the Ukrainian people are fighting an existential war to protect that vision against a full-scale Russian invasion.

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine was officially granted EU candidacy status in June 2022. Brussels set out seven conditions before accession talks could begin. In June 2023, the EU reported that Ukraine had satisfied two of these conditions, made good progress in one other area, and made some progress in the remaining four. The two conditions already met relate to the judiciary and media, while Ukraine must still pass laws regarding the Constitutional Court, anti-corruption efforts, anti-money laundering efforts, de-oligarchization, and the protection of minority rights in order to align its legislation with EU standards.

Ukraine could begin accession talks as soon as this fall, once all seven conditions are fulfilled. That process will be a long and technical one, but Ukrainian officials and the Ukrainian people have demonstrated their strong commitment to the process. The February 2023 visit to Kyiv by von der Leyen and fifteen EU commissioners to meet with their Ukrainian counterparts underscored the leaders’ commitment, while the people’s commitment was resounding in a recent poll finding that 92 percent of Ukrainians want the country to join the EU by 2030, with all regions of the country squarely in support: 88 percent, 94 percent, 93 percent, and 91 percent in the east, north, west, and south, respectively.

—Benton Coblentz is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where he facilitates the center’s work on Ukraine and the wider Eurasia region.

United Kingdom: A post-Brexit reexamination of the relationship is underway

Few slogans have been as effective in British politics as “Get Brexit Done,” which helped carry Boris Johnson to victory in the 2019 general election after three years of uncertainty about whether or not the United Kingdom would actually leave the European Union. However, the mood in Britain suggests that Brexit—if understood to mean a stable, fixed, relationship with the bloc outside the EU—is anything but done.

Two trends are pushing toward a reexamination of the relationship. Firstly, a growing number of Britons regret the decision to leave by a margin as wide as 60 percent to 40 percent. In addition, as many as 20 percent of those who voted to “leave” now signal to pollsters that they would have chosen to “remain” instead. Secondly, the opposition Labour Party, a “remain” spirited party, is now seeing poll leads as high as 25 percent. The chances are that Britain will be led by a Labour government by the end of 2024, with strong public support for a closer relationship with the EU.

That doesn’t mean Britain is on the verge of rejoining the EU. Opposition leader, and probably soon-to-be prime minister, Keir Starmer has committed the party not to rejoin the EU’s single market or customs union, which are the arrangements as far as trade is concerned, but to push for better ties beneath that. The EU and its supporters in the United States need to start paying attention to what Labour is saying. David Lammy, the shadow foreign secretary, has proposed a “security pact” between the EU and the United Kingdom as a first step to rebuilding the relationship.

This should be encouraged but more needs to be done. With the European economy in general in such a bad way, Washington should encourage Britain and the EU to go for the most ambitious form of new relationship politically possible within Starmer’s constraints—with economics and trade at the heart of it. Throttled trade benefits nobody, and the failure of Brexit in practice means the EU can afford to be generous. No other EU country is keen to copy what made the United Kingdom “the sick man of Europe.”

—Ben Judah is director of the Europe Center’s Transform Europe Initiative and the author of “This is Europe.”

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Pavia joins BBC World Service to discuss potential outcomes as EP’s committee visits Lampedusa for a search and rescue fact-finding mission.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:47:32 +0000

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Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

Diane Francis — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 00:15:34 +0000

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is still in its early stages but concerns are already mounting that Russia may eventually resort to desperate measures in order to stave off defeat. At present, fears are focused primarily on Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, which is expected to escalate as the counteroffensive unfolds.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently warned that Moscow may intend to blow up the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden acknowledged on June 19 that the threat of Putin using nuclear weapons is “real.” Days later, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov accused Russia of mining the cooling pond used to control temperatures at the Zaporizhzhia plant’s reactors. Clearly, an occupied nuclear plant that is blown up becomes a nuclear weapon.

Preventing this from happening should be an international priority. The fallout from a detonation at the plant would spread across many countries in a matter of hours. In addition to Ukraine itself, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia would all be at serious risk, according to analysis by Ukraine’s Hydrometerological Institute.

Russia has occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant since the first weeks of the invasion. Last summer, the Kremlin allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its operational safety remotely. But in April 2023, IAEA officials began warning of growing risks and calling for additional measures to protect the plant. With Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive now underway, alarm is mounting.

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Zelenskyy’s claims that the Kremlin is planning to orchestrate a nuclear disaster in Ukraine are not at all far-fetched, given how Putin’s forces have been purposely laying waste to the country for the past sixteen months. The invading Russian army has planted landmines across an area the size of Switzerland, displaced more than ten million people, and destroyed dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities. Countless residential apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals have been reduced to ruins. A comprehensive and methodical nationwide bombing campaign has targeted the country’s civilian infrastructure.

In recent weeks, Russia is suspected of having blown up the Khakovka dam in southern Ukraine, causing an ecological catastrophe. However, even this unprecedented act of ecocide failed to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With Russia’s military predicament expected to become increasingly grim in the weeks and months ahead, the likelihood of further extreme measures will grow. “They constantly need destabilization here. They want the world to put pressure on Ukraine to stop the war,” commented Zelenskyy.

Putin has been making nuclear threats since the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, he very publicly placed his nuclear forces on high alert. With the invasion in danger of unravelling in September 2022, he again hinted at a possible nuclear response while warning, “I’m not bluffing.”

Not everyone is convinced. Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, who resigned after last year’s invasion, told Newsweek in early 2023: “today [Putin is] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation. If you’re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins.”

Others warn against possible complacency. The recent destruction of Kakhovka dam has caused many observers to reassess their earlier skepticism over Russia’s readiness to go nuclear in Ukraine. Putin has also crossed another red line by vowing to place nukes in Belarus. The Russian dictator is currently holding all Europeans hostage with the threat of a deadly explosion at the continent’s largest nuclear plant, and is moving nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe.

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The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

In over forty years, many realities have changed. US imports of Gulf energy supplies declined. By contrast, US exports to the region have expanded many times over. The parties and conditions that would likely pose a threat to US trade and other relationships with the Gulf are now largely located within the region. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it was the Iraq-Iran War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Recently, it has been nonstate terrorist groups and Iran.

In addition, the countries with which the United States has friendly relations don’t depend on the United States to do the job of Gulf security for them. These countries do want Washington to be a reliable partner in support of their individual and collective defense efforts. This is also the goal of the United States. Through diplomacy and through working with the US private sector, Gulf countries’ militaries have been connected to military contacts with US companies and joint exercises conducted by the US Central Command. That fits what the Arab countries in the region need, and it fits what the US political system can accept.

This takes me back to the Iranian attacks on tankers and other commercial vessels in the final years of the Iran-Iraq War. I was the US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates at the time. Together with other US envoys to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, I was called back to Washington in early 1987 for consultations at the US State Department.

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The Kuwaiti government had formally requested that the United States put its flags on Kuwaiti oil tankers in order to gain the protection of US naval warships. The Kuwaitis promised to reimburse the United States handsomely for the flagging operation and to steadfastly maintain it was merely a commercial arrangement. Kuwait wished to shun any overt military alliance with the United States; for example, it did not even welcome US Navy ship visits. Indeed, the United States only had a small contingent of warships in the Gulf at the time, homeported in Manama, Bahrain. The answer from Washington was negative. The Kuwaitis then redirected their request to the Soviet Union.

When the group of US envoys and I gathered in the State Department, it was clear that the White House and top US politicians were still disinclined to make a major commitment to protect neutral-flag shipping in the Gulf, despite the unanimity among those of us coming from our posts in the region—we were in favor of some kind of positive response. After a half day of talks, we were told that then US President Ronald Reagan did not want to allow an opportunity for the Soviet Union to bring its military force into the Gulf. So, for that reason (however flawed it may be), Operation Earnest Will was born.

The United States committed to sending a military presence sufficient to protect neutral-flag commercial shipping without spending time quibbling over whether the GCC countries were actually neutral in the Iran-Iraq War. When I returned to Abu Dhabi, I received a warm welcome from Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who was then the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and soon after from the rulers of the UAE’s other six emirates and from Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the minister of defense. At the time, the UAE was a confederation that granted only limited federal powers and separated military commands across Dubai and several other northern emirates. Even without actual authority outside Abu Dhabi, a young rising star in the Abu Dhabi military command, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, along with Dubai’s Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, eventually became key contacts for me as the United States ramped up its military presence in the Gulf.

When I had arrived at my post in September 1986, the United States was limited to a mere four visits per year by its Navy warships and had very limited military relationships with the UAE emirates. By the time I left in October 1989, the United States had a large number of Navy ship visits, refueling and even making critical ship repairs at the large (and, at the time, new) port of Jebel Ali, as well as at established ports from Abu Dhabi to the city of Fujairah. The United States was also on its way to becoming a major supplier of military aircraft to the UAE. The rulers of the seven emirates were seeking joint military exercises as well as ship visits. Moreover, the leaders of these individual emirates had responded to the crisis of the tanker wars and various other demands by strengthening federal powers.

Because the United States responded to the GCC countries during their time of need (the so-called Tanker War), a strategic partnership formed—one that became the foundation for cooperation to reverse the Iraqi military occupation of Kuwait in 1990. The success of Operation Desert Storm gave the United States political credibility to bring GCC countries and other Arab countries to the Madrid Conference, a peace conference geared toward reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, at the end of 1991. Those talks between Israel and the United States built upon peace between Egypt and Israel negotiated with the help of the United States at Camp David in September 1978 and the peace treaty between those two former military adversaries in March 1979. Camp David, the Madrid Conference, and Israel’s growing relationships with countries ranging from the UAE in the east and Morocco in the west laid the foundation for normalization. In a shrewd move, the Trump administration labeled this growing interaction as the “Abraham Accords.” The Biden administration has continued to play a role as a convenor and mediator.

As the Biden administration continues to play this role, it and Congress will find that the Arab countries of the GCC want to do their part when it comes to Gulf security. They are not expecting the United States to be the policeman of their neighborhood. Along with other key Arab and global leaders, they will welcome the United States as a partner in facing shared strategic interests.

Defense coalitions have historically been tricky, requiring skill and mid-course corrections. As the United States continues to work with the Gulf on security, expect blips, such as the report of a UAE withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces, a US-led maritime coalition. But if the United States shows that it is ready to work together with Gulf countries, Washington can get this partnership back on course. Read more about improving Gulf security frameworks in our latest report here.

David Mack is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and a former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

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Mezran and Melcangi in Nouvelles du monde on President Saied’s Economic Dilemma

mvahdati — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 15:03:56 +0000

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Mezran and Melcangi in Formiche on President Saied’s Economic Dilemma

mvahdati — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 15:02:17 +0000

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The G7 can take NATO-EU climate cooperation to the next level

Francis Shin, Rachel Rizzo — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 23:37:57 +0000

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, decarbonization has emerged as an increasingly high priority for the transatlantic community. The European Union’s (EU) early discontent with the US Inflation Reduction Act also demonstrates that transatlantic policy consensus will be essential to the success of any decarbonization strategy. In January, NATO and the EU released their latest joint statement on how the two organizations plan to cooperate in the years ahead, including expanding and deepening cooperation on “the security implications of climate change.” This is good news. Unfortunately, the same issues that impede increased EU-NATO cooperation on other projects will continue to affect deeper cooperation on climate and decarbonization strategies. However, the Group of Seven (G7) could be a good platform to help inform each institution on ways to better coordinate their individual strategies and work together where able.

In recent years, NATO has become much more active in identifying global warming as a threat and focusing on how it can do its part to combat climate change and bolster energy security. Following NATO’s Madrid Summit last year, it released its Strategic Concept, in which it proclaimed “NATO should become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.” Furthermore, NATO policymakers have recognized that there is a potential danger of redundant replication of climate projects between the climate policies of NATO and member states that would not have additional value toward addressing climate change. The Strategic Concept does partially account for this, as it argues that NATO should strengthen its cooperation with the EU to accelerate the development of NATO’s climate strategy.

In contrast to NATO, the European Union has been a significant player in climate action dating back to as least 2001, when it issued Directive 2001/77/EC, which promoted renewable electricity generation. Moreover, some EU member states had already attempted to “mainstream” climate policy into NATO strategy. For example, some German senior officials hoped that the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) program, established in 2017, would introduce climate change as a challenge for NATO to face. Despite such efforts, these attempts with PESCO have had mixed success at best.

Likewise, NATO-EU cooperation is regularly hampered by the Cyprus dispute. Turkey, which is the only state that recognizes the breakaway republic of Northern Cyprus and has stationed military forces in its territory, is a NATO member but not an EU member, whereas Cyprus is an EU member but not in NATO. Turkey justifies its opposition to NATO-EU cooperation on the basis that doing so would imply its recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. In fact, following the aforementioned NATO-EU joint declaration, Turkish diplomats reportedly expressed discontent with the declaration and distanced themselves from it. As the Cyprus dispute is unlikely to be resolved soon, further NATO-EU cooperation on climate action beyond vague declarations is doubtful under existing channels.

On the surface, it might seem like NATO-EU cooperation should be easy (despite the Turkey/Cyprus issue) given that, for example, the two organizations are just a few miles from each other in Brussels. Unfortunately, when speaking with employees at both organizations, it’s always surprising at just how lacking the overlap and coordination truly is. Hence, any effort to develop, say, a NATO- or EU-led policy steering body to develop strategies to address climate change will likely run into the same issues most other NATO-EU cooperation projects run into.

To avoid this, the G7 could potentially act as a primary steering platform for NATO and the EU to develop climate strategies before being disseminated to NATO and EU member states to implement or deliberate further.

How would this work?

To start, the G7 could provide a permanent guest invitation to the NATO secretary general to attend G7 meetings, much like how the G20 provides permanent guest invitations to several intergovernmental organizations. This would ensure that the NATO secretary general has a direct means of communication with the European Commission and the United States simultaneously, which would help in preventing transatlantic discord like that seen over the US Inflation Reduction Act. It would also reduce chances of a NATO-EU impasse developing over the Cyprus dispute before consensus is reached at the most senior policymaking levels of NATO and the European Union, as neither Turkey nor Cyprus will be present in this channel.

Discussing climate change from a security perspective will not be a matter of ‘mission creep’ for the G7.

Beyond its membership structure and distance from the Cyprus dispute, the G7 is a suitable vehicle for NATO-EU cooperation because of its existing security and climate agenda, which is increasingly aligned with that of NATO’s. Except for Japan, every member of the G7 is a NATO ally, and the European Union is represented at the body by the European Commission. And, although it was originally formed as an informal forum to discuss economic policy following the 1970s energy crises, the G7 has put security on its agenda as far back as 1980 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It has also addressed global warming since 1985. Discussing climate change from a security perspective will not be a matter of “mission creep” for the G7.

Additionally, the G7 has already incorporated a commitment to achieving net zero carbon emissions since 2015 and recognized climate change as an existential security risk in 2022. The same year, the G7 launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to assist with global climate financing and introduced the G7-led Climate Club to tackle climate change, with membership open to all countries. Climate is a high priority for the recently concluded G7 Summit in Hiroshima as well, with the G7 ministers of Climate, Energy and the Environment releasing new ambitious targets for 2030, such as increasing offshore wind capacity.

The G7 has engaged in greater cooperation with NATO as well. Since February 2022, the G7 has coordinated closely with NATO in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This included the convening of the 2022 G7 Summit just prior to NATO’s Madrid Summit, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in attendance at the latter. Later, during the G20 Bali Summit, the G7 and NATO issued a joint statement for the first time in their histories to express their concern about the missile strike in Polish territory.

Altogether, there is a strong opportunity for meaningful NATO-EU cooperation by using the G7 as a convening platform for climate change-related discussions. The demand to accelerate decarbonization campaigns has never been stronger in all three organizations, and they should seize this opportunity together.

Francis Shin is a research assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Russia’s new reality: Less Peter the Great, more Putin the Pariah

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 30 May 2023 20:40:09 +0000

Will Vladimir Putin dare to visit the BRICS summit in South Africa this August? In previous years, his attendance would have been taken for granted, but war crimes charges brought by the International Criminal Court in March 2023 are fueling speculation that he could face arrest if he decides to risk the trip. As a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC, South Africa is technically obliged to arrest Putin.

Reports this week suggest the South African government may be seeking to bypass its obligations to the ICC by granting all summit participants diplomatic immunity, but officials also stressed that immunity “does not override any warrant that may have been issued by any international tribunal against any attendee of the conference.” Even if Putin receives assurances that he will not be detained in Cape Town itself, traveling to the summit would involve considerable uncertainty due to the potential for emergency landings in numerous other jurisdictions where apprehension would be possible.

Many commentators still regard the entire notion of arresting Vladimir Putin as somewhat far-fetched. Nevertheless, the fact that his travel plans are now being shaped by the likelihood of detention speaks volumes about the Russian dictator’s dramatic fall from grace. Ten years ago, Putin was a member of the elite G8 group of world leaders and a permanent fixture at the top table of international affairs. Today, he is a wanted war crimes suspect who cannot leave his own country without first checking that he will not end up in jail.

On the rare occasions when Putin has traveled abroad since launching the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, his interactions with other heads of state have tended to underline his reduced status. For years, Putin was notorious for making world leaders such as Angela Merkel, Donald Trump, and Pope Francis wait while he arrived hours after the appointed time. With his position seriously undermined by the disastrous war in Ukraine, Putin is now the one doing the waiting. During a September 2022 conference in Uzbekistan, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, India, and Kyrgyzstan all left Putin standing as they arrived fashionably late for bilateral meetings.

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Putin’s geopolitical isolation looks even uglier when compared to the remarkable recent international ascent of his nemesis, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In recent weeks, Zelenskyy has been lionized during high-profile visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London; he has grabbed the headlines at the Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia and was the center of attention at the G7 summit in Japan. While everyone apparently wants to be seen alongside the Ukrainian leader, very few appear eager to stand with Putin.

This is not just a problem for Putin alone. Indeed, the toxicity engulfing his personal reputation has also led to Russia’s international ostracism. When the owner of popular dating apps Tinder and Hinge announced its departure from the Russian market in May 2023, company officials made clear that they could not afford the reputational damage of association with Vladimir Putin. “It’s not a good look for a trusted brand to be continuing operations in a nation where the head of state has been indicted by the International Criminal Court,” commented Match Group executive director Jeff Perkins.

Dating apps are only the tip of the iceberg, of course. A long list of global brands including McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Nike, and Starbucks have exited or begun the process of leaving Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. European countries have pivoted away from Russian energy imports, leading to an historic loss of market share for the Kremlin. Russia is also finding it increasingly difficult to source the spare parts it needs to keep its war machine rolling due to chronic shortages caused by the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the West over the attack on Ukraine.

None of this was anticipated by Putin when he first gave the order to invade Ukraine early last year. Based on his prior experience of Western weakness following the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin fully expected the democratic world to respond to his latest act of international aggression with vocal protests and symbolic sanctions before getting back to business as usual. This was an extremely costly miscalculation that has left Russia more isolated than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution one hundred years ago.

Eurasia Center events

Daniel Fried: The G7 brought good news for Ukraine and strong new sanctions on Russia

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

As something of an amateur historian, Putin must be painfully aware that he has brought his own country to one of its lowest points in centuries. He has long been preoccupied with his place in Russian history and has authored a number of lengthy historical essays that have been carefully crafted to justify his own deeply revisionist worldview. This obsession with the past has defined Putin’s entire reign and lies at the heart of his fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has consistently expressed his bitterness over the perceived historical injustice of the Soviet collapse. This has fed a vicious contempt for Ukrainian statehood, which he has come to view as the primary obstacle to his sacred mission of reuniting “historical Russia.” Putin is notorious for claiming Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has called Ukraine “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.” In February 2022, he resolved to settle the matter once and for all.

From the very beginning of Russia’s invasion, the baleful influence of Putin’s historical baggage has been abundantly clear. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged this on day one of the war, when he reportedly quipped that Putin only has three advisors: “Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great.” Speaking months later in summer 2022, Putin confirmed the accuracy of Lavrov’s observation by publicly comparing his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Czar Peter.

With the war now in its sixteenth month, it is fair to say things have not gone according to plan for the would-be conqueror. Putin originally envisioned a blitzkrieg campaign that would rapidly extinguish Ukrainian independence and mark the dawn of a new Russian Empire. Instead, his soldiers have suffered a string of humiliating defeats that have shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower, and stand accused of sickening war crimes that have horrified the watching world.

For now, Putin remains defiant and insists his war aims will eventually be achieved, but it is difficult to see how Russia can hope to repair the damage done to its international standing. Instead, the decision to invade Ukraine looks set to be remembered as one of the greatest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. It has left Russia shunned and greatly diminished on the world stage, while earning Putin himself a place in infamy alongside history’s greatest criminals. He dreamed of emulating Peter the Great, but he has become Putin the Pariah.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Seldom since the birth of the G7 ahead of the oil crisis of 1973 has the group been this unified and effective. The meeting also underscored the staying power of the G7, based on a commitment to pluralism and representative government, that as of 2020 accounted for half of the world’s net wealth ($200 trillion).

That said, it represents only 10 percent of the world’s population, comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus the European Union (EU) as a “non-enumerated member.” (The EU has full membership rights, though it cannot chair meetings and is not counted as the eighth member.)

On the downside, US partners around the world regard the US domestic political dysfunctions that the debt-ceiling negotiations have highlighted as new evidence that Washington cannot be relied upon to provide the financial or political stability they all crave. How, they ask, can a country whose own domestic fabric is so frayed be relied upon to prevent the unraveling of the global system of institutions, values, and rules that these same democracies forged after World War II?

Nothing would pose a greater danger to the world economy than a US sovereign default. Most global investors and US allies are wagering that Washington’s warring parties will solve the debt ceiling impasse before the June 1 deadline, but that will not alter their longer-term worries about US leadership. Recent US bank failures, the unsettling political violence of January 6, 2021, and the growing prospect of a Donald Trump electoral rerun in 2024 has US partners hoping for the best but worried about the worst.

You can forgive Americans for not being all that concerned that Biden, in order to head off the debt-ceiling disaster, called off his stop in Papua New Guinea—an island nation of 14.8 million citizens around 6,600 miles southwest of the continental United States, which few Americans have heard of and even fewer will ever visit.

Yet Biden’s canceled stop underscores a larger issue of the United States losing traction globally by leaving a vacuum for Chinese and Russian economic and political influence—in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. Previous American presidents have canceled foreign visits to address domestic crises—US presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama among them—but self-inflicted wounds are more damaging at this time of expanding Chinese sway and ambition.

It would have been the first-ever visit of a sitting US president to Papua New Guinea, a visit that prompted Port Moresby to declare a national holiday to mark Biden’s visit. Washington’s political dysfunction undermined months of assiduous diplomacy and planning and has set back US efforts to counter Chinese military, diplomatic, and economic investments in these strategically placed island nations.

Over the short term, there is no issue of greater significance to the future of the rules-based global system than providing Ukraine the military wherewithal to prevail against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Over the longer term, however, the US ability to shape the global future alongside its partners and allies will be decided primarily by non-military competition globally and America’s ability to address its weaknesses at home.

Beyond the need to address political polarization, another urgent challenge the United States faces is maintaining its global technological leadership. Though Washington has done much to support that effort with the promise of its recent CHIPS and Science Act, it still has done far too little to attract the world’s best and brightest talent.

“The United States is still the world’s most attractive country for immigrants,” writes former Google chief executive officer Eric Schmidt in Foreign Affairs, noting that more than half of US companies valued at more than one billion dollars were founded or co-founded by immigrants. “But if Washington wants to stay ahead … it must act to remove the needless complexities to make its immigrant system more transparent and create new pathways for the brightest minds to come to the United States.”

This week’s Economist also argues that Biden’s global “doctrine,” outlined recently by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Brookings Institution, is “too timid and pessimistic.”

Sullivan spoke expansively about the need for a new consensus, driven by Biden’s pursuit of a modern industrial and innovation strategy, at home and with partners around the world. He laid out the reasons why charges that this approach was “America alone, or American and the West to the exclusion of others, is just flat wrong.”

The Economist pushes back: “Mr. Biden has backed Ukraine and revived NATO and alliances in Asia. Yet America’s unpredictable economic nationalism and unwillingness to offer access to its markets undermines its influence. Europe fears a subsidy race and worries escalating tensions with China will cause it severe damage.”

What the Economist calls for is a mixture of greater consistency and self-confidence that characterized US policies in the 1940s and early 1950s when America built the world order that Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Putin have now quite explicitly said they want to replace with something more conducive to their interests.

“Such a revived global order would be the best defence against an autocratic one led by China,” the Economist argues. “Unfortunately the Biden doctrine fails to rebut the narrative of American decline and so has not resolved the tension between the country’s toxic politics and its role as the linchpin of a liberal order. Unless America looks out at the world with self-confidence, it will struggle to lead it.”

Because if the United States struggles to lead, Putin’s war in Ukraine will be just the beginning of a lost era.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 A conversation with Henry Kissinger
ECONOMIST

Read every word of this wide-ranging Economist interview with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who at nearly a hundred years old remains one of the preeminent strategic thinkers of our times or any time. (He is also the Atlantic Council’s longest serving board member.) In this two-day conversation, he is as much oracle as strategist.

“We are on the path to great power confrontation,” Kissinger says. “And what makes it more worrisome to me is that both sides have convinced themselves that the other represents a strategic danger. And it is a strategic danger in a world in which the decisions of each can determine the likelihood of conflict.”

“How does the threat compare to previous episodes,” asks the Economist.

“Let me answer, in terms of the evolution of my thinking,” responds Kissinger. “The nature of sovereignty begins with the definition of interests of states. And it is also inherent that sovereign interests will not always coincide, and that nations will need to explain their interests to each other. So if either of those elements come into being where those interests are close enough to permit a negotiation of differences, it becomes a mediating influence. Where sovereign nations use force to prevent outcomes, military conflict may occur.”

Throughout his discussion of weighty topics, Kissinger nonetheless maintains his classic self-deprecating humor. “I won’t be around to see it either way,” he tells the Economist on the outcome of the US-China relationship, speaking “with a characteristic twinkle.” Read more →

#2 To compete with China on tech, America needs to fix its immigration system
Eric Schmidt | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this compelling essay, former Google chief executive officer Eric Schmidt argues for the importance of reforming the US immigration system if the United States wants to effectively compete with China.

“In fact,” writes Schmidt, “the US government already has a successful history of using such a strategy in the decades around World War II. In the 1930s and 1940s, the United States succeeded in attracting a whole generation of talent, including such luminaries as Albert Einstein and Enrico Fermi. The two left Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, respectively, before coming to the United States, where their research, along with that of other émigré scientists, was instrumental to the Manhattan Project. Today, Washington needs to do more to attract leading scientists from nonaligned or even hostile countries, even if doing so requires more extensive security screening.”

Schmidt argues, for example, that the United States has not done enough to attract Russian or Chinese scientists and innovators.

“Since 2000, Chinese STEM Ph.D.’s have created startups valued at over $100 billion. If Washington wants innovators to start their businesses in the United States, rather than in China, it must be more welcoming to Chinese talent. Although much has been made in Washington of the security risks posed by a few foreign researchers who have been accused of intellectual property theft, far greater harm will be done to the country over the long term by keeping out entrepreneurial Chinese scientists.” Read more →

#3 The vanishing acts of Vladimir Putin
Joshua Yaffa | NEW YORKER

For an authoritarian leader who has plunged his country into a major, catastrophic war, Putin has been curiously absent from public view. The New Yorker’s Joshua Yaffa examines this curious angle on the Russian leader’s behavior.

“One of the seeming paradoxes of the Putin system,” Yaffa writes, “is the degree to which its figurehead is at once a unitary micromanager and an absent, aloof, and often indecisive leader. During the past decade, I have heard stories of Putin signing off on the appointments of mid-level executives to Gazprom, the state energy company; yet I also watched how he effectively withdrew during the pandemic, leaving covid-response measures to ministers and governors. The war in Ukraine, now in its fifteenth month, is perhaps the most dramatic example of Putin’s tendency to both hoard authority and shirk the responsibility that comes with it. The decision to invade was Putin’s own, the result of his pent-up grievances toward the West, conspiratorial fantasies about Ukraine, and misplaced confidence in his own Army. Few in the Russian élite, to say nothing of the public at large, wanted a war or even knew one was coming. But, as the war has unfolded, Putin has offered few signals or explanations for how the conflict is going—and to what end.” Read more →

#4 Mysterious killing of Chinese miners puts new pressure on Beijing
Nicole Hong and Elian Peltier | NEW YORK TIMES

This brilliantly reported New York Times piece highlights the security challenges China faces as it attempts to expand its economic footprint, and hints at a troubled relationship with Russia’s Wagner Group, which is suspected of being responsible for the murder of a group of Chinese miners in the Central African Republic.

“The attacks” Nicole Hong and Elian Peltier report, “have exposed the widening disconnect between China’s economic ambitions and its security apparatus abroad, which relies on a patchwork of local military, mercenaries and private firms to guard Chinese workers …”

And while the Wagner Group has denied responsibility for the Chinese deaths, “researchers and Western diplomats say the killings of the miners did not fit the profile of how rebel groups have targeted Chinese nationals in the past. The groups have typically kidnapped Chinese workers to extract ransom from their employers, with such execution-style assassinations being highly unusual.” Read more →

#5 In Vienna, the US-China relationship shows signs of hope
David Ignatius | WASHINGTON POST

The recent meeting in Vienna between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi marks the most promising moment of the Biden administration for the world’s most significant and most perilous bilateral relationship. This David Ignatius column in the Washington Post captures the new promise.

Writes Ignatius, “Talking about resets in foreign policy is always risky, and that’s especially true with Washington and Beijing. These two superpowers might be ‘destined for war,’ as Harvard professor Graham Allison warned in a book with that title. What they’ve lacked, in their increasingly combative relationship, has been common ground. But some shared space seems to have emerged during the long, detailed discussions between Sullivan and Wang.”

One meeting cannot change history, not even one as long and involved as this one, but it can help counter a dangerous trajectory. Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist May 20, 2023

Experts react: A ‘game changer’ G7 summit in Japan

By Atlantic Council experts

As leaders of the Group of Seven countries gather in Hiroshima, Atlantic Council experts share their insights on what is coming out of the summit about Russia, China, the global economy, and more.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

New Atlanticist May 20, 2023

Don’t call it a Quint, but South Korea does have a future with the Quad

By Thomas Cynkin

There is space for South Korea to participate in aspects of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and other minilateral structures aimed at maintaining international order and security in the Pacific.

Australia India

New Atlanticist May 16, 2023

Not so fast: The case for a new SWIFT

By Josh Lipsky, Ananya Kumar

Imagine a network that combines both messaging and settlement to become a one-stop shop for international payments. It’s time for the US and its allies and partners to make that idea a reality.

Digital Currencies Economy & Business

The post G7 triumphs and the debt ceiling quagmire provide a glimpse into competing futures for US global leadership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: A ‘game changer’ G7 summit in Japan

Atlantic Council experts — Sat, 20 May 2023 16:06:10 +0000

Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) countries are gathering in Hiroshima, Japan, for a three-day summit in which they will try to come together on some of the world’s biggest challenges. Throughout the summit, Atlantic Council experts are taking stock of the gathering of leaders from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan—plus the European Union. On Saturday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy joined the G7 leaders in Japan, an appearance French President Emmanuel Macron called a “game changer” for Ukraine’s international support. Already the summit in Hiroshima is shaping up to be a game changer in a number of areas as leaders address issues ranging from artificial intelligence to Russia and China.

Read on to find out how these powerful democracies are tackling some of the world’s thorniest problems.

This post will be updated as news develops and more reactions come in.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Josh Lipsky: Unthinkable two years ago, G7 countries are addressing China together

John E. Herbst: Hiroshima makes clear the authoritarian high-water mark has passed

Daniel Tannebaum: Continued alignment on Russia sanctions is impressive, but it’s time to finish the job

Kyoko Imai: The Quad crumbles without a corner

Dexter Tiff Roberts: What will the G7 do when China next attempts economic coercion?

Thomas Cynkin: A breakthrough in fighting China’s economic coercion, but the details must be fleshed out

Steven Tiell: The regulators are coming for your AI

Robert Cekuta: G7 leaders should have gone further on energy security

Bee Yun Jo: US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation is back on track

Jessica Taylor: Can US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation endure beyond a photo op?

Parker Novak: Biden skipping Papua New Guinea was a missed opportunity

The G7 brought good news for Ukraine and strong new sanctions on Russia

The G7 summit generated a lot of support for Ukraine, again demonstrating that persistent predictions of eroding support are off. The G7 Leaders’ statement on Ukraine was strong and, critically, did not push Kyiv toward negotiations on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s terms (a common recommendation from a certain school of thought that seems resigned to Russian victory even as the battlefield seems to favor Ukraine). The rapid coming together of a European coalition to provide Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, an initiative that the United States in a policy reversal has now joined, was a major step in intensifying military assistance for Ukraine—a big G7 deliverable, as the saying goes.

There were also new sanctions announced, outlined thematically in the G7 statement and in detail by the United States. These were also a big deal, even as the new sanctions did not include some ambitious proposals. For example, there was no lowering of the oil-price cap, no across-the-board ban on trade with Russia with exceptions (a so-called “white list,” as opposed to the current “black list” approach), and no decision to use the immobilized Russian sovereign assets for Ukraine.

But the announced US sanctions package was broad, well-prepared, and impactful. To cite only a few of the new measures, the Biden administration targeted sanctions evaders from around the world, a labor-intensive process that may hinder Russia’s efforts to escape the vise of restrictions on high-tech exports to Russia. It went after future Russian energy production and export capacity, a clever move that seems intended to lock in pressure on Russia’s critical energy sector for the longer term. The new US sanctions also targeted Russian gold sales (and the European Union seems prepared to target Russian diamond exports), good examples of going after Russian foreign-exchange earnings.

This was solid work. Sanctions theory usually asserts that sanctions are intended to change behavior. The Russian sanctions regime, however, seems intended to weaken the Russian economy generally, and rightly so. The current sanctions recall (and are more sophisticated than) the Cold War–era sanctions that contributed to the decline and fall of the Soviet Union. Putin, who seeks by war to recreate the Soviet and Russian empires, may yet learn that democracies, for all their messiness, are not as weak and feckless as he supposes.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was the coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration, assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia during the Bush administration, and senior director at the National Security Council for the Clinton and Bush administrations. He also served as ambassador to Poland during the Clinton administration.

Unthinkable two years ago, G7 countries are addressing China together

China is not mentioned a single time in the G7’s new special statement on economic security—but make no mistake, it is all about China. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida made the issue of combating China’s economic coercion a priority for Japan’s G7, and with this unified statement the leaders achieved what will likely be the lasting legacy of the summit. The big question coming into Hiroshima was: Could the leaders maintain unity against Russia and harness that collective power in addressing China? The statement is the first concrete sign that the answer is yes. Two years ago, during the United Kingdom’s G7 summit in Cornwall, it would have been hard to believe that European leaders would sign on to a statement that was so specifically directed at Beijing. But after China targeted Lithuania for its support of Taiwan, the calculus on the continent began to shift. Now, all G7 leaders have committed to a new rapid response coordination platform if another country is targeted. They are also speeding up their push for new supply chains and trying to leverage the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment as an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative.

The statement doesn’t specify what other specific steps the group will take to combat what they describe as the “disturbing rise in the incidents of economic coercion.” And you can be sure that other participants at the G7, including India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, will stay away from associating with this statement. Many countries will ask privately, what about the West’s use of sanctions and other tools of economic statecraft? The answer from the G7 is that those tools have a legal basis and are a justified response to violations of international law. The bottom line is that the G7 has shown it will increasingly focus on China and will try to maintain a coordinated policy approach. That’s a major development.

—Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund.

Hiroshima makes clear the authoritarian high-water mark has passed

G7 summits are usually nerd nirvanas, producing long statements on numerous issues that specialists mine to figure out in which direction the world’s leading democracies are moving, usually incrementally. Hiroshima was different. It was rich in substance and symbolism indicating that the world’s great democracies recognize the dangers, geopolitical and economic, posed by the two authoritarian revisionist powers, China and Russia.

In the summit statement and discussion, the G7 leaders seemed to be moving toward the understanding that China is a predatory power that needs to be kept in check. The statement also laid out a host of measures to further support Ukraine and isolate Russia for its war-crime laden aggression; and by hosting Zelenskyy, it gave the world a clear symbol of the world’s great democracies’ determination to enable Ukraine’s successful defense. To underscore this, the Biden administration used Hiroshima to finally allow the transfer of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. What’s more, Hiroshima offered a reminder of just how potent the democratic ideal is in also hosting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a long-time Putin pal and stalwart of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). It would have been nice to be a fly on the wall in the Kremlin as Putin watched the coverage of Modi’s bilateral meeting with Zelenskyy.

Was it really just fifteen months ago that Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Putin issued their lengthy joint statement in Beijing and the world appeared to tremble at the specter of the marching authoritarian great powers? And today, Xi meets with the five Central Asian leaders while the G7 countries sit with India and Ukraine, and International Criminal Court–indicted Putin wonders if he can attend the BRICS Summit in South Africa in August without being arrested. Were these the extraordinary “changes” that Xi told Putin their two nations were driving when they met in Moscow in March?

—John E. Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and served for thirty-one years as a foreign service officer in the US Department of State, retiring at the rank of career minister. He was US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

Continued alignment on Russia sanctions is impressive, but it’s time to finish the job

The G7 members continued to show their alignment on new waves of Russian sanctions after meetings in Hiroshima over the last few days. The rhetoric continues to be one threatening those who would evade or circumvent sanctions, or those supporting them, with severe penalties. We’ve certainly seen designations of those who have circumvented sanctions to date, but without material enforcement, is the coalition missing the plot? Having served at the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the US Department of Treasury, I know firsthand the time it takes to bring an enforcement case to conclusion. If the goal is further isolation of Russia, then seeing nearly five billion dollars per month of exports from G7 nations (according to the Atlantic Council’s Niels Graham) is evidence of the scale of Russia’s role in the global economy. I do not mean to say that those who have been trading monthly with Russia have been violating sanctions, but perhaps countries and companies do not feel as much that they need to make a choice.

Hopefully, in time, there will be further rounds of sanctions focusing more broadly on export bans, unless otherwise expressly exempted. This would certainly make life more operationally easier for financial institutions which finance the aforementioned trade. For example, as sanctions were built up on Iran, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), trade with Iran was certainly viewed largely as off-limits, and further enforcement actions against global banks reinforced the consequences for those who would purposefully violate these sanctions. When the JCPOA was enacted and secondary sanctions lifted, as a condition of the deal, there were initial views that Western businesses, where permissible, would flood the market. There were numerous reports of civil aviation, automotive, and consumer products companies who announced plans to reenter the market. Few, if any, global financial institutions would facilitate this trade, even if it was legal. At one point, then US Secretary of State John Kerry and then UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson convened the world’s largest banks to remind them that certain trade was now permissible. But the banks did not bite. The fear of potentially being on the wrong side of the remaining Iran sanctions, and the large-scale penalties that went along with those violations, was a painful reminder that it may not be worth it.

Now, Iran is certainly not Russia. The former is, according to the International Monetary Fund, the twenty-second largest economy in the world, while the latter recently ranked as the eleventh largest. However, for these Russia sanctions to be truly effective, more companies need to fear the downside risk to their organizations if things go wrong and they end up violating sanctions. To be clear, I do not wish for enforcement to occur outside of the truly egregious examples of violations. Enforcement has served as an effective deterrent historically to help reinforce a sanctions agenda. In the Iran example, these were some of the largest banks in the world that paid billions of dollars in settlement costs, and billions more in remediating their historical issues. There is another reason why enforcement is critical in a new sanctions regime, especially one as challenging to implement as with Russia. It is at times hard for companies to know whether they’re doing it right. Some of the best guidance out of OFAC used by firms was borne from enforcement actions, where organizations could apply the lessons learned to themselves and ask if they had done something similar. At the most basic level, if continued rounds of new sanctions are launched without material examples of violators, assuming they exist, can we really say they’re effective?

—Daniel Tannebaum is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative in the GeoEconomics Center and a partner in Oliver Wyman’s Risk and Public Policy Practice, where he leads the firm’s Global Anti-Financial Crime Practice.

The Quad crumbles without a corner

Biden’s decision to abruptly end his Asia trip and pull out of the Quad Leaders’ Summit reflects poorly on US credibility and reinforces doubts about its resolve. The leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States were expected to meet in Sydney on May 24 to enhance cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, climate change, and maritime domain awareness. However, Biden cut his trip short to deal with domestic debt ceiling negotiations, which are undermining US foreign policy at a pivotal moment for the Indo-Pacific region.

The Quad Summit was intended to signal unity in the face of Chinese attempts to challenge the existing regional order. Instead, China will be further emboldened to assert territorial claims, expand naval capabilities, and militarize islands in the South China Sea. This is a diplomatic gift to Xi, and Chinese state media outlets will jump at the opportunity to tear Washington down. In its messaging to the region, Beijing will claim that a country failing to keep its own government afloat is unfit to lead.

China is right about one thing: Building trust requires consistency, reliability, and simply showing up. Withdrawing from diplomatic trips to Asia due to political emergencies has become an unfortunate pattern for the United States, as presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama all did so.

Furthermore, US foreign policies are at risk of a 180-degree shift every four years, as shown by the political re-emergence of Donald Trump—who ditched the 2017 East Asia Summit in the Philippines because it started late.

Nonetheless, the United States has been deemed the unofficial leader of the Quad. Although the four leaders met on the sidelines of the G7 meeting in Hiroshima, the meeting only lasted fifty minutes and was a clear indication that the Quad framework had been pushed to the wayside.

Perhaps another country ought to take control. With India overtaking China as the most populous country in the world, Modi is asserting himself. India’s prime minister is proceeding full steam ahead with his visit to Australia, which includes a public event, a bilateral with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and meetings with leaders in the business community. But India’s democratic backsliding under Modi means that other Quad members must exercise caution in their engagement.

While the four countries sought to resuscitate the Quad Leaders’ Summit by bandwagoning onto the G7, it is evident that this was a missed opportunity to not only strengthen Quad partnerships but more importantly signal commitment to Indo-Pacific countries.

—Kyoko Imai is an assistant director with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

What will the G7 do when China next attempts economic coercion?

While some are criticizing the “G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security” for lacking detail on how countries intend to respond to economic coercion (coercion from China, of course, even if Beijing is never mentioned by name), just the fact that the disparate G7 members, all of which have significant trade and investment relations with China, were able to put out such a strong statement is a big accomplishment. “We will work together to ensure that attempts to weaponize economic dependencies… will fail and face consequences” is just one of numerous tough lines in the document.

If there was any doubt whether China is taking the statement seriously, just check out its irate response. Late Saturday, Beijing lashed out at the United States, calling it the “real coercer” that “politicizes and weaponizes economic and trade relations” with its use of sanctions. It went on to warn the G7 to stop “bludgeoning other countries” and “stoking bloc confrontation.” We will have to wait to see what concrete steps are taken by the G7 the next time one of its members or partner countries faces business pressure from China (the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion that the G7 mentions indeed lacks specificity). But the statement released at the close of the Hiroshima summit is nonetheless a big first step toward confronting this growing challenge head on.

—Dexter Tiff Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and Global China Hub.

A breakthrough in fighting China’s economic coercion, but the details must be fleshed out

Perhaps the signal achievement of the Hiroshima G7 Summit was agreement on a “Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion” to counter Chinese economic coercion, highlighted through a stand-alone document.

Despite the obvious utility of such a mechanism, this outcome was long in coming. Japan and the United States have urged coordination among the leading industrialized democracies to counter Chinese economic coercion. However, European G7 countries have been reluctant, fearful of antagonizing Beijing. They exceeded expectations by joining consensus not only on a general statement of principles opposing economic coercion, but on a coordinating mechanism to take concrete actions.

Now that the G7 has moved past admiring the problem and reached consensus on the need for a coordination platform, the devil will be in the details of implementation. A good starting point may well be mapping out supply-chain vulnerabilities by industry and sector, alerting countries and corporations that might be affected, and helping them devise and implement “de-risking” strategies that would render them more resilient to supply-chain disruptions by China.

This could be an important means of G7 outreach to Global South countries, sensitizing them to the perils and pitfalls of economic dependence on China and demonstrating the benefits of upholding international order and the rule of law in cooperation with developed industrial countries and multilateral institutions.

Another important element will be devising joint approaches on mitigation via ready-made tools to counter economic coercion by providing support and relief for countries targeted by China. Flexible response options include, inter alia, stockpiling critical materials or commodities that China could restrict, providing export credit insurance to encourage alternative exporters to meet demand when China restricts exports, and enacting temporary tariff reductions to compensate when China restricts imports. Similarly, the G7 could consider retaliatory measures, although that may be a bridge too far at this juncture.

Whichever tools are adopted, the G7 decision to work together through a common coordination platform may be seen in retrospect as a watershed moment for countering Chinese economic coercion.

—Thomas Cynkin is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and a former career US diplomat, serving in Japan and elsewhere.

The regulators are coming for your AI

The G7 has lobbed the latest of three notable salvos in signaling that governments around the globe are focused on regulating Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI). The G7 ministers have established the Hiroshima AI Process, an inclusive effort for governments to collaborate on AI governance, IP rights (including copyright), transparency, mis/disinformation, and responsible use. Earlier in the week, testimony in the United States highlighted the grave concerns governments have and why these discussions are necessary.

“Loss of jobs, invasion of personal privacy at a scale never seen before, manipulation of personal behavior, manipulation of personal opinions, and potentially the degradation of free elections in America.” These are the downsides, harms, and risks of Generative AI as Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO) recapped after the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on May 16, saying “this is quite a list.”

Just last week, the European Union (EU) AI Act moved forward, paving the way for a plenary vote in mid-June on its path to becoming law.

Make no mistake, regulation is coming.

Read more here:

GeoTech Cues

May 22, 2023

The regulators are coming for your AI

By Steven Tiell

The Group of Seven (G7) has lobbed the latest of three notable salvos in signaling that governments around the globe are focused on regulating Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI). The G7 ministers have established the Hiroshima AI Process, an inclusive effort for governments to collaborate on AI governance, IP rights (including copyright), transparency, mis/disinformation, and responsible […]

Technology & Innovation

—Steven Tiell is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. He is a strategy executive with wide technology expertise and particular depth in data ethics and responsible innovation for artificial intelligence.

G7 leaders should have gone further on energy security

When it comes to energy security, the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Communique falls short. While paying extensive, needed attention to slashing greenhouse gas emissions and rightfully condemning the negative impacts on global energy security stemming from Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, the communique could do better in addressing the changing geopolitics of energy and meeting the world’s need for assured, predictable, and affordable energy.

The communique is strong on the imperative to decarbonize and limit the rise in global temperatures. Fighting climate change requires radical changes in how the world gets and uses energy. However, energy security, affordability, and access are also important.

While last year Europe built oil and gas stocks as the EU, the United States, and others sanctioned Russia, it was the warmer-than-normal winter that was key to the continent avoiding serious energy shortfalls and economic pain. Significant new natural gas supplies to replace Russia’s will not be on stream for another year or more; tight, expensive energy supplies will remain a reality. Next winter may not be as obliging. Continued international action is essential.

Another serious factor tightening the market is rising energy demand. Emerging economies, especially China and India—not the mature, industrialized West—now drive the demand side of the ledger. Their decisions about whether they use coal and other fossil fuels to generate electricity or to decarbonize have global impacts. The G7 needs to keep engaging them.

A third energy security issue demanding attention concerns the billions of people without access to energy today. One of the Sustainable Development Goals is to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all,” but those without it rose by twenty million in 2022 to nearly 775 million. As many as three billion people lack a safe way to cook, leading to millions dying each year from household air pollution. Moreover, another two billion people are expected to join the world’s population between now and 2050. All of them will need access to reliable energy.

While focusing on pushing the energy transition ahead, the 19,000-word G7 communique is too often silent on other pressing realities. Working, as the communique says, “to holistically address energy security, climate crisis, and geopolitical risk including expansion of global use of renewable energy in order to… keep a limit of 1.5°C within reach” is a worthy objective. But it may prove inadequate in meeting other pressing energy security challenges.

It is essential the United States, its G7 partners, and other governments widen the aperture. The realities of a growing world population looking for greater access to energy should be taken into account. Solutions need to be developed, including new technologies. Governments will need to recognize that some countries will remain more dependent on fossil fuels than others. Countries that already face high borrowing costs and other difficulties in obtaining needed financing, for example, will face difficulties financing lower carbon energy solutions.

G7 leaders need to keep a focus on a changing, dynamic global energy security picture, and push on a wider range of policies and actions.

—Robert Cekuta is a former principal deputy assistant secretary for energy at the State Department and was the US ambassador to the Republic of Azerbaijan.

US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation is back on track

Six months after their previous meeting in November, the leaders of South Korea, the United States, and Japan resumed their talks on the last day of the G7 summit—where highly anticipated topics included enhancing real-time information sharing on North Korea’s ballistic missiles, as well as the possibility of Japan joining the South Korea-US Nuclear Consultative Group announced during South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s visit to Washington last month. Although the meeting was short, given tight schedules at the summit, the brief sideline meeting is the culmination of real progress in getting trilateral relations back on track.

Most importantly, the three leaders did get to discuss “new coordination” over North Korea’s “illicit nuclear and missile threats,” according to the White House statement. This manifests how working-level discussions are ongoing and making real progress. As Biden invited Yoon and Kishida for a formal trilateral meeting in Washington, more fine-tuned outcomes will be available in the near future. Second, their appearance in the setting of Hiroshima was symbolic in and of itself. The leaders of South Korea and Japan put forth “courageous” efforts (as Biden put it) to mend ties during their bilateral meeting just before the trilateral sideline meeting, which showcased their unity and just how much their ties have improved in the past few months.

Moreover, as Yoon clarifies and realigns South Korea’s approach to global issues—agreeing to push back against China’s “coercive behavior” and provide more non-lethal aid to Ukraine—the trilateral meeting signals a resumed heyday of trilateral security cooperation.

— Bee Yun Jo is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. She is also an evaluation committee member of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an advisory committee member of the the ministry’s Department of Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

Can US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation endure beyond a photo op?

The decision by Kishida, Yoon, and Biden to meet despite the compressed timeline of Biden’s abbreviated Asia-Pacific trip displayed the leaders’ strong desire to communicate that increasing trilateral cooperation is a priority. However, significant hurdles remain to advancing this cooperation.

Amid North Korea’s efforts to improve its nuclear and missile capabilities, the three countries have notably increased cooperation on combined military readiness and intelligence sharing. However, there is a limit to their working together, as shown by South Korea’s rejection of Japan joining the South Korea-US Nuclear Consultation Group and Seoul’s hesitation to expand the grouping’s military cooperation beyond North Korea.

As anticipated, the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security highlights continued cooperation toward strengthening the semiconductor supply chain. The United States is trying to form a semiconductor alliance (known as the Chip 4) with semiconductor heavyweights South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. But despite the group’s increased alignment on export controls, this alliance has not yet come together. With US-South Korean-Japanese trilateral military cooperation solely focused on North Korea, it is unclear whether the grouping would be able to coordinate a response in the event of a critical threat to the supply chain outside of the Korean peninsula. For instance, the idea floating around some national-security circles that the United States should blow up TSMC’s foundries on Taiwan in the event of a cross-strait conflict displays a clear lack of discussion of contingency options. Earthquakes and climate change–driven weather events also threaten the supply chain, but it is unclear how the prospective Chip 4 would cooperate to come up with flexible response options as their respective semiconductor industries continue to compete.

The picture also remains unclear for US-South Korea-Japan cooperation on strategic stability. The South Korean public so far appears unmoved in its disapproval for Yoon’s overtures to Japan, and it does not appear that Kishida will expend political capital to match Yoon’s effort. Meanwhile, amid international concerns the United States is becoming even more protectionist, the US public remains predominantly concerned with the economy, making it difficult for either Republicans or Democrats to shift from an increasingly “America First” approach. But perhaps the biggest hurdle for this group is how to balance the need to cooperate among each other on Chinese threats against the need to maintain an off-ramp from tensions to cooperate with China as well.

—Jessica Taylor is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, a logistics officer in the US Air Force Reserve, and a Ph.D. candidate in Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs Security Studies Program. She served in South Korea from 2019 to 2021 as an international relations strategist for the headquarters command staffs of United Nations Command, ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea.

Biden skipping Papua New Guinea was a missed opportunity

First, let’s acknowledge the things that the United States has gotten right as it’s stepped up its engagement in the Pacific Islands over the past year. It is following through on promises to expand its diplomatic footprint, opening new embassies in the Solomon Islands and Tonga and reestablishing the US Agency for International Development’s regional mission in Fiji. Senior officials have lavished attention on the region with high-level visits, and last September’s United States-Pacific Islands Country Summit was the first ever hosted in Washington. Crucially, compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau are also being finalized.

US President Joe Biden’s now-scrapped visit to Papua New Guinea (PNG) was meant to be a culmination of these efforts and send a powerful signal to Pacific Islanders about the US commitment to the region. Instead, it underlines skepticism about the United States’ ability to follow through on the promises it has made and its staying power. The concurrent cancellation of Biden’s visit to Australia for the Quad summit only reinforces this; as a headline in the Sydney Morning Herald put it, “Biden’s 11th hour Quad snub a disappointment, a mess, and a gift to Beijing.”

Will this do long-term damage to US efforts in the Pacific? Perhaps not. But, in the immediate term, the optics are dreadful. After the visit to PNG was canceled, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Biden plans to host a major summit with leaders of the Pacific Islands “within this calendar year.” It is important to follow through on that promise. In addition, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a visit to Port Moresby on May 22.

This episode showcases a key challenge bedeviling the United States on the world stage—that of internal political dysfunction hindering its conduct of a consistent foreign policy and projecting an unappealing image across the world. If the United States is going to succeed in the Pacific—and elsewhere, for that matter—it not only needs to deliver on its assurances, but also get its domestic house in order.

—Parker Novak is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

The post Experts react: A ‘game changer’ G7 summit in Japan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s European integration is the key to a sustainable peace

Stephen Nix, Zachary Popovich — Thu, 18 May 2023 21:14:09 +0000

On her first foreign trip since winning reelection in March, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas paid a highly symbolic visit to Ukraine. While in the country, the Estonian leader declared: “For peace in Europe, we need Ukraine in the EU and NATO.”

The people of Ukraine would certainly seem to agree. After over a year of defending their country against Russia’s war of aggression, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to a European future. According to recent polling data published by the International Republican Institute, 85% of Ukrainians want their country to join the EU and 82% wish to join NATO.

These trends represent a unique opportunity to integrate Kyiv within Europe’s institutional frameworks and pave the way for a sustainable peace. Ukraine’s trajectory as a free and modern European state would shore up the transatlantic community’s defense against Russian encroachment, and would also help to limit the scope for interference by Moscow’s autocratic ally in Beijing. An independent, European Ukraine not only denies Russia its delusional revanchist empire; it offers a path for Kyiv to secure freedom and prosperity centered around democratic values.

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In their quest for autocratic consolidation, Russia and China both seek to leverage economic and political vulnerabilities to expand their control over neighboring states. By building upon the support already directed to Ukraine and incorporating Kyiv within formal Western institutions, organizations like the EU and NATO would signal to other countries reliant on dominant regional powers like Russia and China that there is a better path forward.

Ukraine’s official membership status across European intrastate institutions would also provide protections from Chinese economic ambitions and expand opportunities for transatlantic states to strengthen economic and security relationships. In this sense, Ukraine’s further European integration is an imperative to safeguard Kyiv’s democratic progress along with US and European strategic interests.

Ukraine has already made considerable progress initiating the kind of institutional and political reforms necessary to formally join European institutions. After receiving official EU candidate country status in June 2022, Ukraine’s government moved quickly to adopt EU recommendations across various legislative and judicial sectors.

In 2022, the Ukrainian parliament confirmed Andriy Kostin as the new Prosecutor General, appointed Oleksandr Klymenko as the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), and passed important reforms bolstering judicial oversight. SAPO and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) conducted almost 300 corruption investigations in the latter portion of 2022, underscoring Ukraine’s commitment to establishing transparent and accountable public institutions aligned with European ethical standards.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Europe’s collective support for Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 has built upon a growing technical relationship with Ukraine that significantly predates the current war. As recently as 2021, Ukrainian forces took part in joint military exercises with NATO colleagues. Since 2014, the Ukrainian military has implemented a wide range of NATO standards that many observers believe have helped pave the way for the remarkable successes achieved against Russia’s invading army over the past fifteen months.

Since February 2022, EU institutions have given Kyiv over $29 billion in financial aid, alongside the more than $26 billion provided by the United States. The US has been at the forefront of efforts to arm Ukraine and help the country to defend itself against Russian aggression. Countries like Germany, the UK, France, and Poland have provided growing quantities of sophisticated military assistance including fighter jets, modern battle tanks, and long-range cruise missiles.

After establishing the parliamentary Temporary Commission of Inquiry (TCI) on issues of monitoring the receipt and use of international material and technical aid during martial law, Ukraine continues to demonstrate it is equipped with both the security competencies and administrative procedures necessary to operate as a modern NATO ally.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London brought encouraging signs of a growing consensus regarding the necessity of Ukraine’s further integration. The time is now ripe for European leaders to formally include Ukraine within organizational frameworks.

Earlier strategic projects with Russia such as the Nordstream pipelines should be replaced with new long-term investments across Ukraine’s energy, tech, and agricultural sectors. Meanwhile, Ukraine must build upon the country’s recent successful institutional reforms and establish a robust reconstruction plan. Together, Ukrainians and their European partners have the potential to create not just a free Ukraine, but a better future for all of Europe.

Stephen Nix is Senior Director for Eurasia at the International Republican Institute. Zachary Popovich is a senior program associate at the International Republican Institute.

Washington’s investment in Mullah Baradar as its savior was consistent with the United States’ decades-old practice in Afghanistan. Earlier saviors included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani, and Zalmay Khalilzad.

The United States’ strategy to convert the Taliban into its new partner is also visible in the diplomatic and economic arenas. By rejecting armed resistance against the Taliban, the United States has been advocating for an “intra-Afghan dialogue” to create an inclusive, representative, and constitutional governance system in Afghanistan. This delusion is supported by the usual peace-industrial complex and Norway and Qatar’s petrodollar diplomacy. For the Taliban, accepting any form of representative, democratic, and developmental governance is tantamount to committing political and ideological suicide, particularly when they are endowed by the sense of victory over the democratic alliance. Since the Taliban occupation, the United States remains the largest donor to Afghanistan. The monthly shipment of US dollars via United Nations (UN) agencies has been the key factor in stabilizing the Taliban-run economy and monetary management. Additionally, individual Taliban commanders are enriching themselves by abundant donor monies. The donor-induced corruption of militia and political actors has been another feature of Western interventions in Afghanistan since the 1980s.

However, as with its previous policies, reality has already exposed the limit of US’ machinations in Afghanistan. Mullah Baradar has been sidelined by the invisible Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Hibatullah, who is converting his base in Kandahar as the actual capital of the Islamic Emirate of Taliban. Even the Taliban’s spokesperson has moved his office from Kabul to Kandahar. The scope of relations between the US officials and the Taliban’s supreme leader is not publicly known.

What is globally understood, however, are the dire consequences of the Taliban’s reign. Afghanistan under the Taliban represents a leading humanitarian crisis, where two-thirds of households struggle to meet basic food and non-foods needs, according to a World Bank survey. Afghanistan is now the only country where the ruling junta have established a functioning gender apartheid system. The Taliban’s reign of terror and oppression is making Afghanistan the North Korea of the region. Former allies of the United States remain key targets for assassination and detention by the Taliban.

Global ramifications of Washington’s abandonment of Afghanistan are also visible. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the neutral stance of key countries such as India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Brazil have been partly shaped by receding trust in the United States’ capacity as a reliable ally and a serious power. Washington’s self-made defeat in Afghanistan has given the militant Islamist bloc a new global victory. Palestinian protesters waved the Taliban flag recently in Jerusalem, showing that Islamists have found an inspiring power in the group. Another major terrorist attack on US and European soils emanating from Afghanistan is no longer a question of if, but when and how.

There are two alternatives to Washington’s decades-old tried and spectacularly failed approaches to Afghanistan: fulfil Biden’s wish to leave in its entirety, or complete what it initially began in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The former entails disbanding all ongoing US intelligence, political, diplomatic, and human and women’s-rights programs and rhetoric. The United States should let Afghans and regional countries fill the vacuum created by its departure.

Neither total disengagement nor the present Taliban-centric strategy is feasible or sustainable without risk of considerable blowback. The tragic events of 9/11 aligned Afghans’ yearning for a dignified life and a constitutional polity with the world’s fear of militant Islamists. The United States’ numerous blunders, Afghanistan’s polarized elites, and the region’s anti-US agendas destroyed both Afghans’ inspiration and also the prospect of victory against the global threat of Islamist militancy.

The two objectives are intertwined, and the Taliban’s entrenched power is an obstacle to both ends; as such, it needs to be dismantled by a global coalition of stakeholders that are threatened by Afghanistan’s descent into Talibanistan. The upcoming UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan in Doha should be seized as an opportunity to charter a meaningful, inclusive, and Afghanistan-centric political path. Such a process should recognize key anti-Taliban constituencies, including Afghan women, democratic voices, progressive Pashtuns, and non-Pashtun communities.

Regional and Western security concerns can only be addressed by a peaceful, inclusive, and constitutional polity in Afghanistan, not by the naïve idea of fighting one terrorist group—Islamic State—with another one—the Taliban. Neither the early US-led nor present Taliban-centric approaches would address Afghanistan’s multiple crises.

Dr. Davood Moradian is director-general of the Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS).

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

The stark choice facing the United States in Afghanistan: Leave entirely or finish the job” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource Dec 22, 2022

Afghanistan and regional realignments since August 2021

By South Asia Center

When looking towards future solutions, there is no easy fix for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Central Asia

The stark choice facing the United States in Afghanistan: Leave entirely or finish the job” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource Oct 20, 2022

The lionesses of Kabul & Tehran in Khorasan

By Davood Moradian

Afghan and Iranian women continue to be denied their basic human rights, and this shared struggle is built on an overlapping Iranian-Afghan history and civilizational space known as the Iranian plateau.

Afghanistan Human Rights

The stark choice facing the United States in Afghanistan: Leave entirely or finish the job” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource Sep 8, 2022

Dismantlement of the Taliban regime is the only way forward for Afghanistan

By Davood Moradian

Ask ten individuals about the Taliban, and you will receive ten different answers—or as one might phrase it, the “Taliban in the eye of the beholder.”

Afghanistan Politics & Diplomacy

#AtlanticDebrief – What’s the state of EU-US engagement with the Global South? | A Debrief with Dhruva Jaishankar

nlawler — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 15:13:13 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

As India’s G20 presidency gets underway, what’s the state of EU-US engagement with the Global South? In this new era of great power competition, what is the degree of convergence between India and countries in the Global South with the United States and Europe on China? What is India’s position on Russia following the war in Ukraine? And how does India’s on-going ties with Russia come up against its cooperation with Europe and the United States?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Dhruva Jaishankar, Executive Director, Observer Research Foundation America; Nonresident Fellow, Lowy Institute, to discuss both areas of cooperation and obstacles to deeper transatlantic engagement with the Global South.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What’s the state of EU-US engagement with the Global South? | A Debrief with Dhruva Jaishankar appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Xi calls Zelenskyy but doubts remain over China’s peacemaker credentials

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 01:51:50 +0000

China’s Xi Jinping and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy spoke for over an hour by phone on April 26 in what was the first conversation between the two leaders since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began more than fourteen months ago. The long-awaited call was welcomed in Kyiv and by much of the international community as an indication of Chinese readiness to support diplomatic efforts to end the invasion. At the same time, questions remain over China’s ability to strike a balance between a potential peacemaker role and the country’s strategic ties with Russia.

In a Twitter post, President Zelenskyy described his telephone conversation with Xi as “long and meaningful.” In an expanded statement that appeared to address Xi’s calls for a “political settlement to the crisis,” Zelenskyy stressed Ukraine’s rejection of any land-for-peace compromises with the Kremlin. “No one wants peace more than the Ukrainian people,” wrote Zelenskyy. “Peace must be just and sustainable, based on the principles of international law and respect for the UN Charter. There can be no peace at the expense of territorial compromises.”

According to Chinese state media, Xi sought to assure Zelenskyy that China would refrain from taking sides in the ongoing war, while also offering thinly veiled criticism of US-led Western support for Ukraine. “China is neither the creator nor a party to the Ukraine crisis,” he was quoted as saying. “As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a responsible great power, we will not stand idly by, we will not add fuel to the fire, and above all, we will not seek to profit from the crisis.”

While the call did not produce any major breakthroughs, the two leaders agreed on the appointment of a new Ukrainian Ambassador to China. Xi also committed to dispatching former Chinese Ambassador to Russia Li Hui as a special envoy to Ukraine and other unspecified countries with a brief “to conduct in-depth communication with all parties,” as Beijing seeks to lead peace efforts.

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The timing of Wednesday’s call sparked considerable debate. Zelenskyy has sought to engage directly with Xi for a number of months, publicly expressing his readiness for dialogue in late March following the Chinese leader’s high-profile visit to Moscow. However, in early April, Xi refused to confirm when he planned to call his Ukrainian counterpart, stating instead that the conversation would take place “when the conditions and the time are right.”

It is unclear why Beijing decided that conditions are now suitable for renewed dialogue with Kyiv. The most recent diplomatic development certainly did little to convince doubters that China is a credible peacemaker. Speaking in Paris last Friday, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye questioned Ukraine’s sovereignty and indicated that all former Soviet countries lack “effective status under international law.” His comments sparked a strong diplomatic backlash, with Ukraine branding the Chinese ambassador’s position “absurd” and senior officials in other post-Soviet capitals demanding urgent clarification.

In a bid to defuse tensions, China’s foreign ministry officially distanced itself from Ambassador Lu Shaye’s remarks early this week and confirmed that it respected the independence of all post-Soviet states. Wednesday’s call to Zelenskyy may have been viewed in Beijing as an opportunity to repair the damage caused by the scandal and shift international attention back toward China’s push for progress toward a negotiated peace.

Eurasia Center events

Russia escalates attacks in Avdiivka as new private-military-company unit launches in Crimea

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in early 2022, China has sought to portray itself as neutral. At the same time, Beijing has refused to condemn Russia for the war, preferring instead to express cautious understanding for Moscow’s actions while voicing criticism for the alleged role of the West in provoking the conflict. A 12-point plan published in February 2023 was China’s first major intervention, but the vague document failed to gain serious traction.

China’s attempts to position itself as a neutral mediator have inevitably been undermined by the country’s close relations with the Kremlin. Moscow and Beijing have strengthened ties considerably over the past decade, notably in the wake of the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Following Xi’s official visit to Moscow in March 2023, China said the bilateral relationship had now “acquired critical importance for the global landscape and the future of humanity.”

At the same time, other Chinese officials have attempted to downplay the significance of Beijing’s links to the Putin regime. Speaking to the New York Times in early April, Chinese Ambassador to the European Union Fu Cong denied China is on Russia’s side in the war and dismissed earlier official statements about a “friendship without limits” between the two countries as “nothing but rhetoric.” The diplomat also stated that China would not provide arms for Russia to use in Ukraine now or in the future.

While China’s decision to call Kyiv is a welcome gesture, there is little to suggest Beijing is currently in a position to broker a sustainable peace. Both Russia and Ukraine continue to reject talk of a compromise settlement, with Moscow demanding recognition for its claims to around 20% of Ukrainian territory and Ukraine insisting on the complete deoccupation of the country.

Despite these obstacles, Wednesday’s conversation between Zelenskyy and Xi is nevertheless noteworthy. The call was a diplomatic victory for Ukraine and an indication of China’s desire to be seen as a global force for peace rather than a Russian ally. This positioning could take on greater significance in the coming months if battlefield developments create opportunities for serious talks to take place.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Nicole Goldin, Mrugank Bhusari — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 12:00:00 +0000

The World Bank is about to enter a moment of significant transition. Former Mastercard Chief Executive Officer Ajay Banga is the sole candidate to be the organization’s next president, with the nomination window now closed, and he could take the helm as soon as early May. He arrives at a time of growing enthusiasm within the United States and other Group of Twenty (G20) nations for reform of international financial institutions and also a moment of significant economic upheaval.

The compounding crises of COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, persistent inflation, and climate change have battered the global economy. Meanwhile, debt, digital, and demographic disruptions are reorganizing the needs for and nature of development investments. To deliver on its mission to “end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity in a sustainable way,” the World Bank should seize this moment and redefine its role in the global economy. It can start by focusing on these five policy priorities to help address the challenges to inclusive growth in the global economy today.

1. Address the uptick in extreme poverty due to COVID, conflict, and climate

COVID-19 ended the decline in global poverty dating back to 1998. More than seventy million people were pushed into extreme poverty in 2020. By its own admission, the World Bank will no longer be able to achieve its goal of reducing extreme poverty (currently around 9 percent of the world’s population) to 3 percent by 2030. Slow vaccine rollout in poorer economies has prolonged COVID’s impact. Since the start of the pandemic, inequality within and between countries has grown; young people and women disproportionately have carried the costs of these crises.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 sent global prices of food, fuel, and fertilizer skyrocketing. The World Food Programme estimated that 345 million people will face acute food insecurity in 2023, double the amount of 2020. Meanwhile the climate crisis and weather-related events continue to undercut infrastructure, impact agriculture production, and intensify humanitarian disasters that displace millions globally. The World Bank should devote as much as possible of its lending and advisory might to social protection and tackling the immediate shortfalls in food, energy, and raw materials that are driving higher inflation and exacerbating poverty. At the same time, it should work to support longer-term recovery and resilience, including through data, infrastructure, governance, and economic reform.

2. Deal with debt distress

Throughout the 2010s, countries increased external borrowing in a long period of low interest rates and high liquidity and then accumulated even more debt in response to the pandemic. Now as financial conditions tighten, questions over the sustainability of this debt are rising. Fifty-four countries are already in debt crises. The private sector has fared no better; looming corporate debt distress poses systemic risks. A growing problem of non-performing loans and the recent banking sector crisis will likely lead to a credit crunch, disproportionately hampering lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises that dominate emerging market and developing economies.

While the International Monetary Fund is on the front line of financial crises, it is up to the World Bank to keep developing countries focused on projects and reforms that support long-term economic growth prospects. When key projects are at risk of being canceled or deferred, the World Bank should engage with all stakeholders, from creditors and ratings agencies to domestic policymakers, to isolate these from cuts. The World Bank has the resources to do this, for example, through its Development Policy Financing tools. But it should redouble efforts and consider raising more money on markets to lend into debt-distressed countries and companies (especially small businesses) and to restructure existing debts.

3. Embrace the digital revolution

Commerce, public administration, and education are all evolving with rapid digitization. As technology becomes part of most jobs or business processes and creates entirely new ones, the World Bank should prioritize projects providing new and accessible ways to upskill youth and reskill older workers who are not digital natives, as well as technologies that make physical activities easier to perform. The World Bank has already taken encouraging steps in this direction, such as Skilling Up Mashreq and other programs. The World Bank should also provide support for innovation and entrepreneurship across government, education, health care, finance, green energy, and agriculture to increase digital and technology integration at the sector level. It should further develop infrastructures, policy frameworks, and regulatory reform that improves the availability, access, and affordability of new technologies. That should include incentivizing public-private partnerships and directly engaging with the private sector.

4. Change incentive structures for private capital

Interest rates have been hiked in response to high inflation, raising borrowing costs for governments and the private sector. At the same time, higher interest rates in developed markets mean higher rates of return, which, combined with increased risk in lower- and middle-income countries, could lure emerging-market investors to the United States and Europe. In order to maintain the flow of investment into projects in emerging economies, it is crucial for investment contracts to be well thought through, with protections against inflation. The World Bank’s lending for a project, even when small, will continue to play a key role in reassuring investors and “crowding in” funding and financing—including climate finance for adaptation and mitigation.

5. Reestablish that inclusive growth begins with inclusive governance

The Group of Seven (G7) and European Union member states together control more than 50 percent of all votes at the World Bank, even as they represent under 13 percent of the global population. As part of its overall reforms, the World Bank should seriously consider voting reforms to address criticism from its members of unequal voice and representation. The organization should increase coordination with regional development banks, which are more sensitive to the dynamics of their operating regions and have demonstrated their capacities in helping respond to the pandemic and to climate change. It should deepen engagement with sovereign wealth funds, multinational corporations, and pension funds, which play a far greater role in the global economy than they did in 1944, when the Bretton Woods Institutions were created. At the same time, operationally, the World Bank should re-double its consultation with and support to young people, women, and small- and medium-sized enterprises—each has seen substantial pre-COVID gains erased. This support can include helping them tap into recovery initiatives and opportunities in the expanding green, social, and industrial sectors.

The challenges facing the World Bank are daunting. But the appointment of a new president and an appetite for reform in the United States and elsewhere mean that the World Bank has a unique opportunity to anticipate changes to its mandate and prepare for a stronger future.

Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center and global head of inclusive economic growth at Abt Associates, a consulting and research firm.

Mrugank Bhusari is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center.

The post Five ways the World Bank can redefine its role in the global economy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: A new private military company emerges in Crimea

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 31 Mar 2023 20:29:11 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Tracking narratives

Russia and its political allies in Moldova continue to inflame information space around Transnistria

Putin and Lukashenka announce plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus after news of UK uranium-depleted ammo transfer

Secretary of Kremlin Security Council accuses NATO of being “party to the conflict” in Ukraine

Documenting dissent

New audio allegedly documents Russian elites criticizing Putin for war in Ukraine

Russia escalates attacks in Avdiivka as new private-military-company unit launches in Crimea

Russian forces continue their attempts to break through Ukrainian army defenses in several directions. Russian units attacked Ukrainian positions in Pervomaisk, and conducted strikes on Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv. On March 30, at least ten Iranian-made Shahed drones targeted Ukrainian territory as Russian aviation dropped guided bombs on Lvove village in Kherson Oblast.

The Russian army continues to pressure Ukrainian forces in the direction of Avdiivka, where fighting has recently escalated. Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade, active in Avdiivka, has been successful in countering Russian attacks. However, Russian Telegram channels claimed that incendiary shells struck Ukrainian positions around the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant.

On March 29, Russia claimed that Ukraine had struck a railway depot in the Russian-occupied city of Melitopol, located deep behind the front line, knocking out power. Ukraine’s exiled mayor of the city also confirmed the explosions. Footage published online shows explosions lighting up the night sky. Melitopol is located on the edge of the range of Ukraine’s HIMARS multiple rocket launchers but is within reach of newer weapons, including air-launched joint direct attack munitions and ground-launched small-diameter bombs (GLSDB). The strike could disturb Moscow’s logistics at a time when Kyiv has suggested it could soon launch a counterattack.

On March 28, Russia reported for the first time that it had shot down a GLSDB. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that air defenses had shot down a new Ukrainian Hrim-2 ballistic missile in the area of Novoandriivka, Donetsk Oblast.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin-installed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, has created his own Wagner-like military unit. To lead the group, dubbed “Convoy” (Конвой), Aksyonov has recruited Konstantin Pikalov, a former Wagner commander who served in Africa. The mercenary unit is said to be composed of three hundred fighters and has reportedly already deployed to occupied parts of Kherson Oblast. On March 16, Aksyonov spoke about the “professional military unit” on Crimean television. “The guys who have gone through everything that is possible,” he said, discussing military honors they had received. “The leaders have several Orders of Courage; the chief of staff is a Hero of Russia.”

A video published on the Convoy Telegram channel showed Aksyonov inspecting the positions of the new unit. The channel was created last November and heavily features Russian Orthodox imagery and icons. It also refers to Ukrainians as “satanists.”

Vladimir Osechkin, the founder of the Russian human-rights organization Gulagu, said the new private military contractors are designed to replace Wagner units on the frontlines. He said the new unit could be expected to operate alongside the Russian army in Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and areas just north of Crimea.

Convoy’s training grounds are located in the village of Perevalne, southeast of Simferopol, according to the independent Russian news outlet Important Stories. This village has existing military infrastructure from the Cold War era, including the 165th Training Center, used for the training of foreign military personnel. A January 2023 Convoy ad recruiting snipers on Telegram offered room and board at the training center, as well as clothing, equipment, and a scholarship worth 100,000 rubles ($1,286).

Convoy sniper recruitment poster circulated on Telegram, January 17, 2023. (Source: @lobaev_vlad/archive)

The ad included a contact email address with the domain conwoy.org; according to a WHOIS search, the domain was registered on June 15, 2022, by “’Military Security Company Convoy’ Limited Liability Company” in Leningrad Oblast.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia and its political allies in Moldova continue to inflame information space around Transnistria

In an interview with the Russian state-owned news outlet TASS, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alleged Ukrainian interference in the unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria, saying Ukrainian leadership “[demonstrates] in every way its readiness to interfere in this process, including with the use of force.” Lavrov accused Ukraine of playing an “extremely negative, subversive role” in the “5+2” negotiation format, a diplomatic platform designed to settle the Transnistria conflict. The minister said that by clearly siding with Chisinau, “Kyiv authorities support its belligerent, destructive policy towards Transnistria.” Lavrov also emphasized Russia’s responsibility for the security of Transnistria, which according to him, is “in full accordance” with the mandate of Russian troops.

Earlier, Marina Tauber, vice president of the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition party Sor, claimed that Moldovan authorities were preparing a military provocation near the border of Transnistria, scheduled for April 17, after the Easter holidays. “[Moldovan President] Maia Sandu and [Moldovan Prime Minister] Dorin Recean are preparing a military provocation on the border with Transnistria,” Tauber claimed, citing “international intelligence services.” Tauber further asserted that Moldova had sent ten thousand uniforms to Romania for the Romanian security forces, with the goal of involving them in a military conflict. She also claimed that authorities had ordered three thousand coffins.

Moldovan government spokesperson Daniel Voda dismissed Tauber’s claims, saying, “Tauber’s statements are false and are part of a constant discourse promoting fear and division in society.”

The Russian Defense Ministry had previously alleged that Kyiv was preparing an armed provocation against Transnistria, which Kyiv and Moldova have denied.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Putin and Lukashenka announce plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus after news of UK uranium-depleted ammo transfer

The Kremlin may be exploiting a March 20 announcement by the United Kingdom concerning the transfer of depleted uranium armor-piercing rounds to Ukraine, using it as an excuse to allegedly deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.

Despite the fact that depleted uranium rounds do not actually contact radioactive elements, state-owned Russian news outlets claimed the ammunition could indeed contain radioactive uranium, which fueled a Kremlin-led narrative advocating for deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus as retaliation. Putin said the transfer of weapons by the West containing “nuclear components” called for “an adequate answer.” State-owned news outlet TASS reported that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the transfer of these rounds a further escalation of the conflict, and claimed without evidence that the use of them would contaminate Ukraine’s food supply.

In a March 23 video on the Russian military TV station Zvezda News, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said that if Russian forces are targeted by Ukrainian depleted rounds, “the response will be terrifying, it will be a lesson for the whole planet.” On his personal Telegram channel, Lukashenka noted that discussions about the transfer of nuclear weapons took place in November 2021.

In a March 25 interview on Rossiya 1, Putin announced plans to relocate tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory. He said that Belarus was already equipped with ten bomber aircrafts as well as Iskander systems compatible with nuclear-class weapons. The Russian president insisted the weapons would be deployed to Belarusian “territory.” Using this wording indicates that Putin is trying to avoid being accused of nuclear proliferation to a neighboring country.

According to a report by the Belarusian website Motolko Help citing Putin’s interview, Russia will reportedly build storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus by June 1. Citing a video posted on the Belarusian YouTube channel ONT, Motolko also assessed that the 465th Missile Brigade in Osipovichi district—the only missile brigade in Belarus—was likely already equipped with Iskander missile systems. This claim has not been independently verified.

Motolko also reported that Lukashenka recently announced that additional SU-25 fighter jets would undergo “reequipment” to adapt their technical capabilities to carry nuclear payloads. However, the Belarusian president also made similar claims in June and August 2022.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Secretary of Kremlin Security Council accuses NATO of being “party to the conflict” in Ukraine

On March 27, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Kremlin Security Council, said that NATO is a party to the war in Ukraine. The government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta quoted Patrushev saying, “in fact, NATO countries are a party to the conflict. They made Ukraine one big military camp. They send weapons and ammunition to the Ukrainian troops, provide them with intelligence.”

On March 21, at a meeting in Ulyanovsk, Russia, Patrushev said that foreign intelligence agencies are trying to “stir up protest and separatist sentiments in Russia,” with the support of “pseudo-political structures” located abroad and foreign nongovernmental organizations. The remarks were made amid ongoing military setbacks by the Russian military in eastern Ukraine and internal problems within the officer corps fueled by a power struggle in the Kremlin that has been on display since the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Patrushev, a close ally of Putin, previously served as the head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He has served in the powerful role of secretary of the Kremlin Security Council since 2008. The anti-NATO remarks are the latest in an ongoing campaign of narratives that the Kremlin has utilized to justify its war on Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New audio allegedly documents Russian elites criticizing Putin for war in Ukraine

On March 7, audio emerged online purporting to capture a phone call between Russian music producer Iosif Prigozhin and Farhad Akhmedov, the Azerbaijan-born billionaire and former Russian senator, in which they criticized Putin for the war in Ukraine. The audio did not gain traction until March 24, when Ukraine’s Channel 5 published the conversation.

During the alleged call, Prigozhin seems to refer to Kremlin leaders as “criminals.” He then appears to claim that former Russian Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and National Guard Director Viktor Zolotov are “united” and “blame everything” on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. “Putin is pinning everyone against each other to save himself,” Prigozhin allegedly added. Akhmedov, in turn, appears to say that Putin would not be able to save himself and would be held accountable for his actions.

The independent Russian media outlet Important Stories reported that the audio was genuine, citing an anonymous source in Russian intelligence services. According to the source, “the leadership of the FSB recently held a meeting and instructed subordinates to take action.”

When the audio first gained attention, Prigozhin shared a video on his Telegram channel insisting the audio was fake. “This recording is a symbiosis of spoken phrases and those that were generated, they were never spoken,” he insisted.

Wagner Group founder Yevgenzy Prigozhin, who bears no relation to the music producer, called Iosef Prigozhin “impudent, aggressive, and quick-tempered.” He speculated that whoever recorded the call may have thought that they had been recording the Wagner Group leader instead of the music producer.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: A new private military company emerges in Crimea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 24 Mar 2023 15:57:24 +0000

Security

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Tracking narratives

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

International response

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

After months of heavy fighting in which Russian forces failed to fully capture Bakhmut, the Ukrainian army is likely preparing its counteroffensive. Ukrainian ground forces commander Oleksandr Syrskyi said on his Telegram channel that Russian forces “are losing considerable strength and are running out of steam” and “very soon we will take advantage of this opportunity.” The DFRLab has observed indications of a Ukrainian counterattack and is closely monitoring the developments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to exert pressure on Ukraine. Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian troops will likely focus on targets of military importance in their next missile strikes. Particular attention is being paid to areas with troop concentration, oil depots, airfields, supply routes for military equipment from allied countries, and other logistical facilities. In addition, the possibility of repeated attacks against energy infrastructure or other objects of significant economic importance for Ukraine cannot be ruled out.

A Russian slowdown in Bakhmut could mean that Moscow is diverting its troops and resources to other regions. Russian troops have made gains further north, partially regaining control over the axis to the town of Kreminna. Intense battles have also been underway in the south. Further, Russian forces have become more active in the regions of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Russian troops are conducting offensives in the direction of Avdiivka with the aim of establishing control over Avdiivka and Marinka.

In the occupied Crimean town of Dzhankoi, an explosion reportedly destroyed cruise missiles utilized by Russia’s Black Sea navy to target Ukraine, according to a March 21 statement from Ukrainian military intelligence. The strike appeared to have originated from a drone. A video of the explosion published on March 20 shows the blast was immediately preceded by a loudly buzzing engine which bears audio similarities to the sound made by Iranian-made drones. The DFRLab cannot confirm whether an Iranian drone caused the blast.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Video footage of a missile strike against a nine-story residential building in the center of Zaporizhzhia emerged on Telegram on March 29. The DFRLab identified the location of the missile strike and the apartment complex it struck using geolocation and geospatial analysis. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described in a tweet, the strike occurred near a residential area near a mall.

Geolocated images of the residential apartment building in Zaporizhzhia struck by a Russian missile. (Source: Valentin Châtelet)

A photograph shared online indicates that an S-300 missile system fired the missile from the Russian-occupied southern bank of the Dnipro River. This location was corroborated by other open-source investigators, including the GeoConfirmed project, which reported that the missile likely came from the southeast direction. Reports claimed the attack caused the death of seven people.

Later that same day, counternarratives emerged on the pro-Kremlin English-language Telegram channel Slavyangrad and spread to a French-language channel. The narrative claimed that the strike resulted from a Ukrainian S-300 system failure while attempting to intercept a Russian missile. Russian news outlets and pro-Kremlin amplification channels have repeatedly used similar narratives to obfuscate Russian culpability in incidents involving civilians.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Following the International Criminal Court issuing an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin leader paid a defiant visit to the occupied Ukrainian city of Mariupol. The Kremlin shared a thirty-minute video of the visit, which reportedly took place on March 18. During the visit, Putin reportedly examined restoration work under way in the city. Approximately twenty minutes into the footage, Putin has a short conversation with individuals described as residents of Mariupol.

Footage of the visit published by state-owned news outlet RIA included frames cut out of the Kremlin video. The RIA footage includes an extended version of Putin’s interactions with alleged residents. During the filmed conversation, an unidentified female voice can be heard in the background shouting at Putin, approximately eighteen seconds into the clip. Meduza reported that the woman yelled, “This all is not true! It’s all for a show!” While the women’s comments do sound similar to Meduza’s interpretation, the voice is muffled and difficult to interpret with certainty. Immediately after the woman shouts, the officials accompanying Putin react and begin to look around the streets. The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds earlier, switching to another woman speaking with Putin.

A woman can be heard yelling in the background eighteen seconds into this video clip, causing Putin’s entourage to look around for her. (Source: RIA Novosti)

The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds before the woman starts yelling. (Source: Kremlin.ru)

According to Meduza, a Russian journalist described the district visited by Putin as “virtually the only one rebuilt” in the city destroyed by Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

On March 20, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, the head of Russia’s interior ministry, said that in 2022, “Particular attention was paid to preventing the discreditation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” The ministry reported that last year police documented five thousand offenses and forty-one crimes related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army. In addition, they documented almost ninety cases of “deliberate false publications” about the Russian military.

“In cooperation with Roskomnadzor, the dissemination of about 160,000 false and other prohibited information was stopped,” Kolokoltsev added.

The DFRLab has previously reported on Russian attempts to tighten control of the internet in order to prevent the spread of content the Kremlin considers undesirable.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

According to independent Russian pollster Levada, 77 percent of Russians supported the war in February 2023, the highest level of public support since March 2022. Only 17 percent of Russians currently disapprove the war, Levada reported.

The number of people supporting the continuation of hostilities has steadily increased since October 2022 “as the shock of the announcement of partial mobilization passed,” Levada concluded.

Seventy-one percent of Russians perceive the return of Luhansk and Donetsk to Ukraine as unacceptable conditions for a peace treaty, while 67 percent see the return of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as unacceptable. In addition, 76 percent of respondents perceive Ukraine’s accession to NATO as unacceptable.

Since November 2022, the share of respondents who believe that the “special military operation” is advancing successfully increased from 54 to 65 percent.

The Levada research center, labeled a foreign agent by Russia, published its assessment on March 13. Russia has cracked down on public dissent since the start of the war; it remains unclear whether this crackdown impacted Levada’s poll results.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

On March 24, the Armenian Constitutional Court gave its blessing to the parliament’s ratification of the Rome Statute, noting that the country’s obligations to the International Criminal Court do not contradict the national constitution. The decision is final and went into effect immediately.

Armenia’s plans to ratify the Rome Statute had been complicated by the International Criminal Court’s recent decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. On December 29, 2022, Armenian parliament approved the draft law, “On Ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” which then made its way to the constitutional court. Armenia signed the statute in 1999 but did not ratify it at the time.

Armenia’s recent push to ratify the ICC charter appears motivated by the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia initiated the ratification to take Azerbaijan to the ICC over alleged war crimes committed by Azerbaijani troops during the September 2022 invasion, but some observers thought the constitutional court would rule against it due to the Putin arrest warrant.

Human rights defender Artur Sakunts told Caucasus news outlet Jam News that Armenia would end up in a “miserable position” if it did not continue on course to ratify the statute. “We will remain in the status of an ally of a fascist regime – where Belarus is now,” Sakunts added. “And such regimes have no allies, they only have subordinates, colonies, zones of influence.”

Armenia’s Speaker of Parliament, Alen Simonyan, told reporters on March 20 that Armenia had begun the ratification process months before the ICC decision. When asked about the possibility of arresting Putin on a visit to Armenia, Simonyan said, “First, let’s ratify the Rome Statute for now, and then we’ll decide what to do next. I wonder what they will do in other countries in case of his arrival. I just physically can’t imagine it [the arrest].”

—Ani Mejlumyan, Research Assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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Maybe Putin should be worried: Most leaders facing international justice don’t get away free

Thomas S. Warrick — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 15:10:31 +0000

After the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 17, many observers quickly said there was “little prospect” he would face justice. But while past performance is often no guarantee of future results, modern international justice efforts actually are far more successful than what many believe. If modern history is a guide, the ICC arrest warrant has dramatically changed Putin’s fate.

The “modern” era of accountability for heads of state and heads of military forces for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes can be dated from United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) establishing the UN Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia. This was a major step by the Security Council to hold senior officials to account, and led to the establishment of the first modern multilateral war crimes tribunal under the Council’s Chapter VII authority a year later.

Prior to the March 17 arrest warrant for Putin, some eighteen heads of state or heads of major military forces have been wanted by international justice—defined here, broadly, as serious multilateral efforts at accountability under customary international law or treaty law for genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes. This list includes officials wanted by international tribunals set up under the Chapter VII authority of the UN Security Council for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, by multilateral treaties such as the Rome Treaty that set up the International Criminal Court, by multilateral ad hoc courts set up for Sierra Leone and elsewhere, and by domestic courts set up with significant international support and assistance as in Cambodia and Iraq. Many of these courts also sought the arrest of subordinate officials, with mixed results, but heads of state and major political or military leaders wanted by international courts have faced justice far more often than not.

The preferred result of international justice advocates is a fair trial and a verdict under the rule of law. An accused who appears before an international court counts as a “win” even if the result is an acquittal. But practical realities sometimes intervene, dealing out “rough justice” where an accused reportedly commits suicide to avoid being handed over to a court, as happened with Pol Pot in 1998, or is killed out of vengeance by those who lost relatives and friends at the hands of a ruthless dictator, as happened with Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Working in the field of international justice in the early 1990s, my colleagues and I became accustomed to being told by diplomats and journalists that it was impossible that the former Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, or Ratko Mladić; or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein would ever face justice. In the end, they all did—and many others, as well. The atrocities get the headlines, while the work of activists, diplomats, investigators, prosecutors, and judges is slow, sometimes tedious, and always comes years later than it should. But the record of international justice in the modern era is one of history’s most striking if least-recognized successes.

To be sure, Putin is today the president of a nuclear-armed state that currently holds a veto in the UN Security Council. Thus, Putin has leverage that the eighteen other top officials on this list did not. Nevertheless, the political wheels in Russia may turn as they did for many of the officials on the list below.

The potentially surprising outcome facing Putin should be informed by these statistics:

Of the eighteen men—all are men—wanted prior to Putin:

Fifteen have faced justice of some kind before a judicial tribunal.
Two of the fifteen were acquitted for lack of evidence under less-than-ideal circumstances, but nevertheless appeared before judges of the ICC and saw the charges against them dismissed.
Two others of the eighteen faced rough justice and were killed or committed suicide before they could be turned over to an international tribunal.
Three of the eighteen turned themselves in voluntarily, of which two had the charges dismissed; the trial of the third is still underway.
Only one of the eighteen major figures on this list is still at large.

In percentage terms:

83 percent of all heads of state and senior military leaders wanted by international justice have faced justice.
94 percent have either received the judgment of an international tribunal, been killed, or committed suicide prior to being turned over for international trial.
17 percent turned themselves over voluntarily, and two of those three accused had the charges dropped and are now free; the trial of the third is underway.
17 percent were acquitted or had the charges dismissed.
Of the seven who have died, 0 percent died in their beds at home as free men.

Thomas Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. In 1993-1995, he was senior counsel to the chair of the UN Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia. From 1997-2001, he was the first deputy in the US State Department Office of War Crimes Issues.

The author thanks David J. Scheffer of the Council on Foreign Relations and Celeste Kmiotek of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project for their assistance in filling out the entries in this table.

The post Maybe Putin should be worried: Most leaders facing international justice don’t get away free appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s Black Sea blockade is part of Putin’s war on international law

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Wed, 22 Mar 2023 23:46:50 +0000

On March 18, the UN announced an extension to the Grain Deal, an agreement brokered in summer 2022 which allows for limited amounts of Ukrainian grain to be exported to global markets via the country’s blockaded Black Sea ports. This is good news. However, within days, it became clear that Russia wanted further concessions and was only prepared to prolong the deal for a limited period of 60 days. Once again, we were reminded of how Moscow seeks to weaponize global food security in order to hold the international community hostage.

The blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports began on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. It aims to break Ukraine economically by undermining the country’s position as one of the world’s leading agricultural exporters. The impact of the blockade goes beyond Ukraine and is global in scale. By preventing the free passage of merchant shipping in the Black Sea, Russia deprives world markets of vital Ukrainian agricultural produce while also challenging the core principles of international maritime law.

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From the very beginning, Russia’s attack on Ukraine has always gone beyond the boundaries of conventional military operations and attempted to strike at Ukraine’s very ability to exist as a functioning state. Russian troops have systematically destroyed vast swathes of farmland and made Ukraine the most mined country in the world. For the past six months, Russia has conducted a campaign of airstrikes targeting Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in a bid to deprive Ukrainians of access to heating, electricity, and water supplies. The maritime blockade is another element in this war against Ukrainian statehood.

The suffering inflicted by Russia’s brutal invasion is not restricted to Ukrainians. According to the country’s Ministry of Infrastructure, more than 400 million people in Asia and Africa face the prospect of mounting food insecurity as a result of Russian efforts to restrict Ukrainian agricultural exports. While the current Grain Deal goes some way to countering this threat, it offers only a partial and short-term solution. Much more is needed in order to improve global food security and reaffirm the right to free passage for merchant shipping in international waters.

It is clearly in the interests of the international community to work toward ending Russia’s Black Sea blockade. First and foremost, this would lead to dramatically improved food security for many of the world’s most vulnerable communities. The resumption of maritime trade in the Black Sea would also provide the Ukrainian economy with approximately $20 billion in additional annual revenues. This would significantly reduce the economic burden on Ukraine’s partners and international financial institutions, which are now being asked to prop up the struggling Ukrainian economy indefinitely. Renewed merchant shipping would also be good for other economies, allowing Ukraine to resume imports worth tens of billions of dollars in 2021.

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Ukrainians understand that there is no international appetite for any direct military intervention to break Russia’s Black Sea blockade. Nevertheless, there are numerous other tools available to the international community that could be used to pressure Moscow. The most obvious measures would include additional sanctions and restrictions targeting Russian shipping.

This approach has yet to be fully explored. At present, Russian ships are not subject to the same checks and inspections that Ukrainian vessels must undergo in line with the terms of the Grain Deal. Instead, they are free to continue their international trade unhindered. Over the past year, Russia has reportedly increased its maritime exports by more than a quarter. At the same time, there have been numerous accusations made against Russian vessels for allegedly shipping military cargoes, including in contravention of the 1936 Montreux Convention governing maritime passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits in Turkey.

By blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, Russia is violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the UN Charter. In response, Ukraine is calling on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to force Russia to unblock the country’s sea ports. The IMO must use its powers as a UN agency to hold Russia accountable for violating the UNCLOS, and must be ready to impose suitable sanctions measures if Moscow refuses to comply.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created a wide range of fundamental challenges to the rules-based international order that first emerged from the ashes of World War II. This is very much part of Putin’s plan. He wishes to return the world to an era when a handful of major powers were able to dictate to their weaker neighbors.

One of the many front lines in this geopolitical confrontation is the maritime front. Putin seeks to bankrupt Ukraine and overcome international opposition to his war by weaponizing agricultural exports. He does so in clear violation of international maritime law. If he succeeds, other autocrats will take note and adopt similarly aggressive tactics, with potentially catastrophic consequences for global trade. Ending Russia’s Black Sea blockade will not be easy and will require considerable political courage, but failure to do so will lead to rising costs in the years to come.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

We believe that the United States can strengthen its HADR work globally, and particularly with LAC countries, through partnership and relationship building as well as education and exercises. By deepening its strengths and address- ing room for improvement, the United States can remain the partner of choice for LAC countries and conserve its positional advantage over China and other strategic competitors.

How can LAC and partner nations (such as the United States), nongovernmental organizations, and regional and other global organizations strengthen their abilities to respond to natural disasters? What can the United States do to improve its disaster preparedness and response in LAC? And what can Washington learn from Beijing’s approach to disaster assistance in LAC?

In crafting this report to address these questions, we drew from a roundtable discussion, verbal and written consultations with subject matter experts, and written material. A full description of the methodology is provided in the appendix.

The findings of the report include eight recommendations grouped under two mutually complementary areas: (1) partnership and relationship building, and (2) education and exercises. Not only are these recommendations timely and relevant for HADR practitioners, but taking these steps would strengthen Western hemispheric security by investing in the region’s infrastructure and human capital. As the United States and its LAC partners consider future room for cooperation and collaboration, HADR work will form an indispensable centerpiece of their strategies.

Report Feb 23, 2022

US-China vaccine diplomacy: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean

By María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, Bosco Marti, Riyad Insanally and Claudia Trevisan

The implications of diverging COVID-19 responses, notably at the onset of the pandemic’s rise in the region, will reverberate beyond the health sector. What might the differing US and China pandemic approaches portend for future influence in the region?

Caribbean China

Issue briefs and reports May 12, 2021

China-LAC Trade: Four Scenarios in 2035

By Tatiana Prazeres, David Bohl, and Pepe Zhang

Executive Summary Trade between China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) experienced dramatic growth since the early 2000s. Going forward, China is poised to solidify its position as a leading regional trading partner. By 2035, trade values will likely reach unprecedented levels. This, accompanied by greater Chinese investment and financial flows, will further increase […]

China Economy & Business

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

The post Humanitarian aid: Defining new areas of US-LAC collaboration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

Anders Åslund — Sun, 19 Mar 2023 16:46:03 +0000

On March 17, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague indicted Russian President Vladimir Putin and issued an arrest warrant. This indictment is likely to have far-reaching consequences for Putin personally and for Russia.

The warrant states that Putin “is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. There are reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes.”

The ICC is a comparatively new international organization. It was created in July 1998 and formally established in 2002. At present, 123 countries have ratified its statute. They include all the countries of South America, all EU countries, most of Oceania, and roughly half of Africa. All these countries are now theoretically committed to arresting Putin. No sovereign immunity will shield him.

ICC indictments are rare. To date, the court has only indicted 52 people, but it aims to prosecute top culprits. Earlier indictments have targeted former presidents Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. In this context, the indictment of Putin appears entirely natural.

Following their ICC indictments, al-Bashir and Gaddafi became international pariahs. Putin and his regime are not likely to fare any better. After this indictment, no serious politician or public figure will want to meet with or even talk to Putin. He cannot travel abroad without considering the possibility of arrest and extradition to The Hague.

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In light of his new status as an indicted war crimes suspect, Putin will likely find that he is no longer invited to international forums such as G20 or the United Nations General Assembly. Since all power in Russia is concentrated to Putin, this means Russia has effectively lost its voice on the international stage.

Another consequence of the indictment is that no democratic political leader who values their own reputation will want to have any further contact with Putin. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emanuel Macron will need to rethink their earlier policies of holding regular phone conversations with Putin. Likewise, there is no longer any realistic chance of a negotiated peace settlement between Putin’s Russia and Ukraine brokered by the international community. Meanwhile, Kremlin-friendly European politicians such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban will have to abandon their personal links with Putin.

There are limits to the impact of the ICC indictment, of course. Many influential countries in addition to Russia itself do not recognize the court, with the list including the United States, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, even those countries that have yet to sign and ratify the ICC statute will be well aware that continuing to maintain close ties with Putin could now hurt their international standing.

Chinese President Xi Jingping has just confirmed that he will visit Putin in Russia on March 20-22. While few expect him to alter his plans in light of the ICC arrest warrant, his visit is unlikely to be good for China’s reputation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had quite intense contacts with Putin in recent years. As the leader of a NATO member state, will he maintain this level of engagement after Putin’s indictment? I doubt it.

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The implications of the ICC arrest warrant are not limited to the international arena. It is also likely to impact Putin’s standing within Russia, undermining his absolute power and leaving him more isolated than ever.

Russian investigative journalists have recently revealed that the increasingly reclusive Putin now travels in armored trains between his three main residences in Valdai, Novo-Ogaryovo, and Sochi, with special railway stations constructed at each location for his personal security. He rarely dares to meet anyone in person, only physically convening Russia’s Security Council three times over the past year. Now a wanted man, Putin’s paranoia looks set to worsen.

With Putin unable to play his usual active role in international negotiations, his value as Russia’s national leader will be greatly diminished. This will have a significant negative impact on Russia’s international standing that will continue for as long as Putin remains in office. Putin’s domestic political position will be seriously undermined, with members of the Russian elite drawing the inevitable conclusion that he is now a liability.

The indictment against Putin sends a powerful message to other senior figures within the Russian establishment, leaving them in no doubt that they are also vulnerable to possible prosecution. If the Russian President can be charged, they may also be indicted for their participation in Putin’s alleged crimes against humanity. Loyalty to Putin was once seen as the only way to get ahead in modern Russia; it now looks increasingly like a dangerous dead end.

The Russian leader is unlikely to appear in The Hague any time soon. Nevertheless, the ICC decision to indict him for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while significantly weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad.

Anders Åslund is a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum. He is co-author with Andrius Kubilius of the new book “Reconstruction, Reform, and EU Accession for Ukraine.”

Unfortunately, the ICC’s poor conviction record and its tendency to focus almost entirely on African countries has led to disaffection and undermined its legitimacy. This is why it is so significant that although Putin is only the third sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC for war crimes, he is the first leader of a major power.

This is also why it matters that in the Ukraine case, the ICC received the largest ever state party referral to open an investigation. This unprecedented show of international resolve has the potential to revive the court’s authority. If states continue to provide it with the necessary logistical and material support, perhaps the ICC can begin to live up to its lofty aspirations to end impunity for atrocity crimes.

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It is also important that the ICC chose to make the warrants public instead of keeping them sealed. It did so because “the conduct addressed in the present situation is allegedly ongoing, and public awareness of the warrants may contribute to the prevention of the further commission of crimes.”

In other words, if not even Putin himself can escape the court’s notice, Russian soldiers all the way down the chain of command should also not expect to get away with war crimes. While there is unfortunately little evidence to suggest that international justice mechanisms like the ICC have been effective in deterring future atrocities, this does not mean that the ICC’s decision to name and shame Putin won’t have other important deterrent effects.

Perhaps most significantly, the warrant permanently isolates Putin and spells doom for lingering efforts to resume “business as usual” with today’s Russia. While some critics allege that the ICC warrant will provoke the accused and escalate conflict, the fact is that Putin has already become radicalized beyond redemption and was unlikely to show restraint in Ukraine anyway. Because the ICC’s warrant has no statute of limitations, either Putin will stand trial or the threat of it will haunt him until the end of his days.

Unless Putin is held accountable or loses power, there can never again be normalized relations with Russia. This signals to the many countries, particularly in the Global South but also in Europe, who have continued to hedge their bets over the war, that there is little point in doing so unless they want to risk their own reputations on the world stage. It also eliminates any diplomatic leverage Putin may have had in a peace process, because the ICC has made it clear that without accountability all the way to the very top, there can be no peace at all.

What remains unclear is how the ICC’s move will impact the thinking of the Russian elite, whose loyalty is critical for Putin’s survival. Many are hopeful, such as Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak, who described the warrants as “the beginning of the end for the Russian Federation in its current form on the world stage.”

The ICC’s high degree of scrutiny and willingness to go straight for Russia’s biggest fish may certainly make some of Putin’s supporters think twice, which could undermine the current regime and ultimately incentivize a future Russian government to hand the dictator over to The Hague. This is not beyond the realm of possibility. Indeed, it has already happened before with Slobodan Milosevic of the former Yugoslavia and Charles Taylor of Liberia. While it was once unimaginable that these war criminals would ever be handed over, they were both eventually extradited by their successors.

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Although it is impossible to predict, most observers agree that regime change is unlikely to happen anytime soon in Russia. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin is safe for now. Indeed, there is good reason to expect him to cling even harder to power, precisely to avoid the possibility that any successor would hand him over to the ICC. It is also worth remembering that Putin has successfully nurtured a revisionist, imperial mindset in the country and has made the Russian media heavily complicit in his crimes. This makes the possibility of a peaceful change of power something of a pipe dream.

Herein lies the main problem for those who long to see Putin in the dock. Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC. In theory, if Putin sets foot in any one of the 123 countries which have ratified the Rome Statute, he would have to be arrested and sent straight to The Hague. Unfortunately, as the case of former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir shows, states cannot always be counted on to live up to this obligation.

With this in mind, what can the ICC and the wider international community do to ensure the warrant for Putin’s arrest becomes a genuine step towards meaningful justice? The ICC has an important role to play outside of the courtroom, but it needs the logistical and material support to live up to it. While the Court documents atrocities and gives them a permanent place in the public record, it should also give victims a sense of ownership over the process by facilitating their participation in the trials themselves and through its own outreach to affected communities.

Given the unlikelihood of Ukrainians seeing Putin stand trial, it will be critical for the court and its supporters to nevertheless manage expectations and communicate what is happening and why the process still matters. The court must also work in partnership with Ukrainian civil society, without whom such extensive evidence on child deportations could never have been collected and acted upon in real time.

In this sense, it is crucial to remember that the ICC is meant to complement, not replace, Ukraine’s own judicial system in how it handles war crimes on its own territory. Ukraine’s courts are already overwhelmed by the size of the caseload, which only continues to grow. The international community must do everything it can to support Ukraine’s capacity to investigate and prosecute war crimes in a fair and impartial manner.

The international community should also create a broader framework in which to pursue justice and accountability. One immediate step is to establish clear mechanisms to help locate, trace, and reunite all separated Ukrainian children with their families and legal guardians. This means supporting Ukrainian civil society activists who not only facilitate family reunification but stand ready to provide the vast array of services Ukrainians will need for years to come in order to recover from the horrors of the war. Even when peace and the rule of law are restored in Ukraine, much will depend on how well the country can pursue a holistic, comprehensive form of justice.

To come full circle back to the question of whether the ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is indeed “historic,” a cynical read would be that this moment ultimately highlights the most important gap in international law when it comes to Russia’s crimes in Ukraine. It remains impossible for the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression if the states in question are not parties to the Rome Statute. Until there is a viable international mechanism to prosecute aggression and the collective political will to do so, the root causes of this war can never be fully addressed, rule of law will never be fully restored, and impunity will continue.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Twenty years on from the US invasion of the country, Iraq has fallen off the policymaking agenda in Washington, DC—cast aside in part as a result of the bitter experience of the war, the enormous human toll it exacted, and the passage of time. But looking forward twenty years and beyond, Iraqis need a great deal from their own leaders and those of their erstwhile liberators. A national reconciliation commission, a new constitution, and an economy less dependent on oil revenue are just some of the areas the experts at the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative highlight in this collection of reflections marking two decades since the US invasion.

What else will it take to transform Iraq into a prosperous, productive regional player? What can the United States do now, with twenty years’ worth of hindsight? And just how far-reaching were the effects of the war? Twenty-one experts from across the Atlantic Council take on these questions in a series of short essays and video interviews below.

Oula Kadhum on what March 20, 2003 was like for a young Iraqi

How the Iraq war changed…

Scroll and click through the carousel below to jump to a response:

The cause of democracy in the region

When the United States invaded Iraq two decades ago, one of the public justifications for the war was that it would help spread democracy throughout the Middle East. The invasion, of course, had the opposite effect: it unleashed a bloody sectarian conflict in Iraq, badly undermining the reputation of democracy in the region and America’s credibility in promoting it.

Yet the frictions between rulers and ruled that helped precipitate the US invasion of Iraq persist. The citizens of the region, increasingly educated and connected to the rest of the world, have twenty-first-century political aspirations, but continue to be ruled by unaccountable nineteenth-century-style autocrats. Absent a change, these frictions will continue to shape political developments in the region, often in cataclysmic fashion, over the next two decades.

The George W. Bush administration’s failures in Iraq severely set back the cause of democracy in the region. In the perceptions of Arab publics, democratization became synonymous with the exercise of American military power. Meanwhile, Iraq’s chaos strengthened the hand of the region’s autocrats: as inept or heavy-handed as their own rule might be, it paled in comparison to the breakdown of order and human slaughter in Iraq.

Citizens’ frustrations with their political leaders finally erupted in the Arab Spring of 2010 and 2011, but their protests failed to end autocracy in the region. Gulf monarchs were able to throw money at the problem, first to shore up their own rule and then other autocracies in the region. The Egyptian experiment with democracy proved short-lived; Tunisia’s endured far longer but also appears over. More broadly, the region has seen democratic backsliding in Lebanon and Israel as well.

The yawning gap between what citizens want and what they get from their governments remains. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators show that, on aggregate, states in the region are no more politically stable, effectively governed, accountable, or participatory than two decades ago. Unless political leaders address that gap, further Arab Spring-like protests—or even social revolution—are probable.

Having apparently gotten out of the business of invasion and occupation following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States could play a new and constructive role here. It could both cajole and assist the region’s political leaders to improve governance for their citizens.

The United States exacerbated political tensions in the region two decades ago; now it has an opportunity to help ameliorate them.

—Stephen R. Grand is the author of Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us About the Prospects for Arab Democracy. He is a nonresident senior fellow with the Council’s Middle East programs.

State sovereignty

Since the seventeenth century, more or less, world order has been based on the concept of state sovereignty: states are deemed to hold the monopoly of force within mutually recognized territories, and they are generally prohibited from intervening in one another’s domestic affairs. The invasion of Iraq challenged this standard in three important ways.

First, the fact of the war represented a direct attack on the sovereignty of the Iraqi state, which undermined the ban on aggressive war. While the Bush administration cast the invasion as a case of preemptive self-defense, it was widely seen as a preventive war of choice against a state that did not pose a clear and present danger. Moreover, the main exceptions to sovereignty that have developed over time, such as ongoing mass atrocities or United Nations authority, were not applicable in Iraq. Thus, the United States dealt a major blow to the rules-based international system of which it was one of the chief architects. This may have made more imaginable later crimes of aggression by other states.

Second, the means of the war, and especially the occupation, powered the reemergence of the private military industry. Driven by the need to sustain two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US armed forces became dependent on military contractors, which sometimes involved authorizing paid civilians to kill. The US effort to (re)privatize warfare brought back into fashion the use of private military force, generating a multibillion-dollar industry that is here to stay. Over time the spread of private military companies could unspool the state’s exclusive claim to violence and hammer the foundations of the current international system.

Third, the consequences of the war led to the spectacular empowerment of armed nonstate actors in the region and beyond, who launched a full-frontal assault on the sovereignty of many states. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, of course, emerged amid the brutal contestation of power in post-invasion Iraq and pursued its “caliphate” as an alternative (Sunni) political institution to rival the nation-state. While the threat has been contained, for now, in the Middle East, it is only beginning to gather force on the African continent. In addition, because Iran effectively won the war in Iraq, it was able to sponsor a deep bench of Shia nonstate groups which have eroded state sovereignty in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq itself.

The US invasion of Iraq left us a world with less respect for state sovereignty, more guns for hire, and a dizzying array of well-armed and determined nonstate groups.

—Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and host of the Guns for Hire podcast.

Abbas Kadhim on the opportunities missed

US-Turkish ties

By launching a war on Turkey’s border, against Turkish advice, in a manner that prejudiced Turkish interests, the United States in 2003 upended a strategic understanding that had dominated bilateral relations for five decades.

During and immediately after the Cold War, Turkey and the United States shared a strategic vision centered on containing the Soviet Union and its proxies. In exchange for strategic cooperation, Washington provided aid, modulated criticisms of Turkish politics, and deferred to Ankara’s sensitivities regarding its geopolitical neighborhood. With notable exceptions (e.g., Turkish opposition to the Vietnam War and US opposition to Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus operation), consensus was the norm and aspiration of both sides. After close collaboration in the Balkans, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan from 1991 to 2001, though, Ankara became increasingly alarmed about the prospect of a new war in Iraq.

Bilateral relations deteriorated sharply after the Turkish parliament voted against allowing the United States to launch combat operations from Turkish soil. The war was longer, bloodier, and costlier than its planners had anticipated. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (known as the PKK and designated by the United States as a terrorist organization in 1997) ended a cease-fire in place since the 1999 capture of its founder, Abdullah Öcalan, and gained broad new freedom of movement and action in northern Iraq. US military aid to Turkey ended, while defense industrial cooperation and military-to-military contacts dropped. In July 2003 US soldiers detained and hooded a Turkish special forces team in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, on suspicions that they were colluding with insurgents. This event, coupled with Turkish anger over the bitter conduct and conclusion of the prewar negotiations, helped fuel a sustained rise in negative views about the United States among the Turkish public.

Sanctions and the war in Iraq damaged Turkish economic interests, though these would rebound from 2005 onward. The relationship of the US military to the PKK—first as tacit tolerance of PKK attacks into Turkey from northern Iraq despite the US presence, and later with employment of the PKK affiliate in Syria as a proxy force against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—rendered the frictions of 2003 permanent. That US forces train, equip, and operate with a PKK-linked militia along Turkey’s border today is fruit of the Iraq war, because US-PKK contacts were brokered in northern Iraq, and US indifference to Turkish security redlines traces back to 2003.

The story of US-Turkish estrangement can be told from other perspectives: that Ankara sought strategic independence for reasons broader than Iraq, that President Erdoğan’s anti-Westernism drove divergence, that the countries have fewer shared interests now. There may be truth in these arguments, though they are based largely on speculation and imputed motives. Yet they, too, cannot be viewed except through the lens of the 2003 Iraq War, which came as Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party was assuming power and greatly influenced his subsequent decision-making.

Many effects of the Iraq War have faded, but the strategic alienation of Turkey and the United States has not.

—Rich Outzen, a retired colonel, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private-sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

China’s rise

As George W. Bush took office in 2001, managing the US-China relationship was regarded as a top foreign policy concern. The administration’s focus shifted with 9/11 and a wartime footing—which in turn altered Beijing’s foreign policy and engagement in the Middle East.

A high point in US-China tension came in April with the Hainan Island Incident. The collision of a US signals intelligence aircraft and a Chinese interceptor jet resulted in one dead Chinese pilot and the detention of twenty-four US crew members, whose release followed US Ambassador Joseph Prueher’s delivery of the “letter of the two sorries.”

But after the September 11 attacks, the United States launched the global war on terrorism, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq became the all-encompassing focal points. While that relieved pressure on China, the US decision to invade Iraq raised serious concerns in Beijing and elsewhere about the direction of global order under US leadership.

American willingness to attack a sovereign government with the stated goal of changing its regime set a worrisome precedent for authoritarian governments. Worries transformed into something else following the global financial crisis in 2008. Chinese leaders became even more wary of US leadership, with former Vice Premier Wang Qishan telling then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson after the financial crisis, “Look at your system, Hank. We aren’t sure we should be learning from you anymore.”

The war in Iraq was especially troubling for Chinese leaders. Few believed that the United States would engage in such a disastrous war over something as idealistic as democracy promotion in the Middle East. The dominant assumption was that the war was about maintaining control of global oil—and using that dominance to prevent China from rising to a peer competitor status. The so-called “Malacca Dilemma” became a feature of analysis in China’s strategic landscape: the idea that any power that could control the Strait of Malacca could control oil shipping to China, and therefore its economy. Since then, China has developed the world’s largest navy and invested in ports across the Indian Ocean region through its Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Its defense spending has increased fivefold this century, from $50 billion in 2001 to $270 billion in 2021, making it the second-largest defense spender in the Indo-Pacific region after Japan, and higher than the next thirteen Indo-Pacific countries combined.

Since the Iraq war, the Middle East has become a much greater focus in Chinese foreign policy. In addition to building up its own military, China began discussing security and strategic affairs with Middle East energy suppliers, conducting joint exercises, selling more varied weapons systems, and pursuing a regional presence that increasingly diverges or competes with US preferences.

Would China’s growing presence in the Middle East have followed the same trajectory had the United States not invaded Iraq? Possibly, although one could argue that the same sense of urgency would not have animated decision makers in the People’s Republic of China.

—Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and host of the China-MENA podcast. He is also an assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. Follow him on Twitter: @jonathandfulton.

The country’s readiness to meet climate challenges

Over the course of the last two decades, Iraq has become one of the five most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change. It has been affected by rising temperatures, insufficient and diminishing rainfall, intensified droughts that reduce access to water, sand and dust storms, and flooding. Iraq’s environmental ministry warns that the country may face dust storms for more than 270 days per year in the next twenty years.

While not the sole cause of environmental mismanagement in Iraq, the muhasasa system of power sharing has exacerbated and contributed to a culture of corruption and political patronage that has undermined efforts to protect the environment and to sustainably manage Iraq’s natural resources. Muhasasa is an official system that allocates Iraqi government positions and resources based on ethnic and sectarian identity. It may have been a good temporary compromise to promote stability in the early 2000s, but today it is widely viewed as a harmful legacy of the post-invasion occupation period.

In the context of protecting the environment, the muhasasa system has led to a situation where some government officials are appointed to their respective positions without the necessary skills or qualifications to manage resources efficiently or effectively. Forced ethnosectarian balancing has encouraged natural resource misuse for political or personal gain to the immediate detriment of average Iraqis. While muhasasa was intended to promote political stability and prevent marginalization of minority groups, in practice it has contributed to a culture of corruption and nepotism, and undermined efforts to promote good governance and sustainable development.

To address its acute climate challenges, Iraq needs to move away from the sectarian-based power sharing and toward a more inclusive, merit-based system of governance. It must strengthen its environmental regulations, commit itself to sustainable development, and better manage its natural resources for the country and as part of the global effort to mitigate climate change. The international community has a role to play here through supporting technical assistance, capacity building, and providing financial resources to help address these concerns along the way.

—Masoud Mostajabi is an associate director of the Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council.

Iran’s regional footprint

From the outset of the invasion of Iraq, the United States’ decision was built on several dubious premises that the administration masterfully overhyped to build support for its aspirations of removing Saddam Hussein by force. The last two decades have tragically shown the consequences of this decision—with high costs of blood and treasure and a serious blow to American credibility. But from a strategic standpoint, one particular miscalculation continues to create blowbacks to US regional security interests: top US policymakers willfully ignored the need for an adequate nation-rebuilding strategy, leaving a power vacuum that an expansionist Iran could fill.

With the removal of the Baathist regime, Iran finally saw the defeat of a rival it could not best after eight years of one of the region’s bloodiest wars. This cleared the path to influence Iraqi Shia leaders who had long relied on the Islamic theocracy next door for support. Even as some Shia learning centers in Najaf and Karbala challenged (once again) Qom, new opportunities of influence that never existed before opened up for Iran.

By infiltrating Iraq’s political institutions through appointed officials submissive to its regime’s wishes, Iran succeeded in two goals: deterring future threats of Iraqi hostilities and preventing the United States from using Iraqi territories as a platform to invade Iran. Through its Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Qods Force, Iran trained and supplied several militia groups that later officially penetrated Iraq’s security architecture through forces called Popular Mobilization Units, which have repeatedly carried out anti-American attacks. Nevertheless, those groups would eventually prove valuable to the United States in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—yet even then Iran succeeded in appearing as the protector of Iraq’s sovereignty by immediately equipping the Popular Mobilization Units, unlike the delayed US response that arrived months later.

Regionally, Iran’s military leverage and political allies inside Iraq provided it with a strategic ground link to its network in Syria and Lebanon, where the Qods Force ultimately shifted the political power dynamics to Iran’s advantage, especially as they crucially strengthened engagement in recruiting volunteers to support Bashar al-Assad’s fighters in Syria. Through the land bridge that connects Iran to the Bekaa Valley, Iran has helped spread its weapons-trafficking and money-laundering capabilities while reinforcing an abusive dictatorship in Syria and a crippled state in Lebanon.

Twenty years ago, the United States went to liberate Iraq from its oppressive dictatorship. What it left behind is a void in governance and an alternative system that fell far short of what the United States wanted for Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime continues to base its identity on anti-Americanism while it gets closer to its political and ideological ambitions. With US sanctions having so far failed to halt Iran’s network of militia training and smuggling—and the attempt to revive the nuclear deal stalled, despite being the main focus of US Iran policy—the question remains: How long will the United States tolerate Iran’s regional ascendancy before it intensifies its efforts toward restraining it?

—Nour Dabboussi is a program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

How governments counter terrorist financing

Without the experience of the war in Iraq, US and transatlantic economic statecraft would be less agile and less able to prevent terrorist financing. However, more work and continued international commitment is needed to ensure Iraq and its neighbors are able to strengthen and enforce their anti-money-laundering regimes to protect their economies from corruption and deny terrorists and other illicit actors from abusing the global financial system to raise, use, and move funds for their operations.

The tools of economic statecraft, including but not limited to sanctions, export controls, and controlling access to currency, became critical to US national security in the wake of 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Sanctions and other forms of economic pressure had been applied against the government of Iraq and illicit actors prior to 2003. However, economic pressure and the use of financial intelligence to combat terrorist financing became increasingly sophisticated as the war progressed. Since 2001, the State Department and Treasury have designated more than 500 individuals and entities for financially supporting terrorism in Iraq. Following the money and figuring out how terrorist networks raised, used, and moved funds was a critical aspect in understanding how they operated in Iraq and across the region. Information on terrorist financial networks and facilitators helped identify vulnerabilities for disruption, limiting their ability to fund and carry out terrorist attacks, procure weapons, pay salaries for fighters, and recruit.

Sanctioning the terrorist groups and financial facilitators operating in Iraq and across the region disrupted the groups’ financial flows and operational capabilities while protecting the US and global financial systems from abuse. Targets included al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, among others. For example, the US Treasury recently sanctioned an Iraqi bank moving millions of dollars from the Revolutionary Guard Corps to Hezbollah, preventing terrorists from abusing the international financial system.

Notably, the fight against terrorist financing set in motion the expansion of the Department of the Treasury’s sanctions programs and helped the US government refine its sanctions framework and enforcement authorities and their broad application.

Equally important, the US government’s efforts and experience in countering the financing of terrorism increased engagement and coordination with foreign partners to protect the global financial system from abuse by illicit actors. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental body responsible for setting international anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards, strengthened and revised its standards, recommendations, and red flags to account for what the international community learned from the experience of combatting terrorist financing in Iraq. The United States and partner nations provided, and continue to provide, training and resources to build Iraq’s and its neighbors’ capabilities to meet FATF standards and address terrorist financing and money laundering issues domestically.

—Kim Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

—Maia Nikoladze is an assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The United States

Perhaps no event since the end of the Cold War shaped American politics more than the invasion of Iraq. It is fair to say that without the Iraq war neither Donald Trump nor Barack Obama would likely have been president.

Weirdly, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is still almost a forbidden topic in GOP foreign policy circles. After the Bush years, a kind of collective-guilt omerta about the Iraq war took hold among Republicans. It was as if US-Iraqi history had started in 2005, or 2006, with Democrats and a few Republicans baying for a needed defeat. It never came. The 2007 surge, as David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy came to be known, was the gutsiest political call by an American leader in my lifetime.

It happened also to be right when very little else about the war was: There were, of course, no weapons of mass destruction found. Iran did expand its power, massively. Iraq did not offer an example of democracy to the region: rather, it horrified the region. It became linked to al-Qaeda only after the invasion. The White House refused to take the insurgency seriously until it was very serious. Iraq pulled attention away from Afghanistan. And of course there were 4,431 Americans killed.

By 2016, the narrative favored by Republicans had become that the execution of the war was flawed. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, was the villain in this story: But for Bremer’s incomprehensible decision to disband the Iraqi army and institute de-Baathification in early 2003, so the story went, the Iraq war could have succeeded. But in retrospect these decisions were defendable. Bremer was erring on the side of satiating the Shia majority, not the Sunni minority, and trying to reassure them that a decade after they were abandoned in 1991 the United States would deliver them political power. And the one real success of the Iraq war, beginning to end, is that the United States never faced a generalized Shia insurgency.

The other villain was Barack Obama, who played in the sequel. (Obama largely owed his electoral victory to the Iraq war, brilliantly using Hillary Clinton’s vote for the invasion to invalidate her experience and judgment and thus the main argument for her candidacy.) In this version of events, Obama’s precipitous decision to withdraw troops from Iraq in 2011 contributed to the country’s near-collapse three years later under the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This was basically accurate. The withdrawal of US forces eliminated a key political counterweight from Iraq, and the main incentive for then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to hedge his sectarianism and friendliness with Iran. This accelerated political support for Sunni rejectionist movements like ISIS.

Both the Bremer narrative and the Obama narrative allowed George Bush’s Republican party to avoid revisiting the core questions of American power: intervention, exceptionalism, and its limits—precisely the same questions that had featured prominently in the 2006 and 2008 elections.

This was the broken market that Donald Trump exploited: that Republican voters’ views on Iraq after 2008 looked much like Democratic voters’, but the Republican establishment’s views did not. And it was no accident, in the 2016 presidential primaries, that the two candidates most willing to criticize the interventionism of the 2000s, Trump and Ted Cruz, were the ones who did best.

This debate remains critical. More than any other decision, Bush’s war created the contemporary Middle East. Above all that includes the unprecedented regional dominance of Iran, the power of the Arab Shia, and the constraints on American power in buttressing its traditional allies. That imbalance, combined with a decade-long sense that America is leaving the region and wants no more conflict, has led Sunni Arab states to look for their security in other places.

Especially in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which if anything has sharpened foreign policy divisions, the Republican party and the United States need a dialectic, not a purge; a discussion, not a proscription; and a reasonable synthesis of the lessons of Iraq. People want to vote for restraint and realism, as much as or more than they want to vote and pay for interventionism and idealism. Was the Iraq War a mistake? Let us start this debate there, and produce something better.

—Andrew L. Peek is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He was previously the senior director for European and Russian affairs at the National Security Council and the deputy assistant secretary for Iran and Iraq at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

Andrew Peek on the historical context of the 2003 invasion

US foreign policy

The US decision to invade Iraq twenty years ago was, to use the words of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, a wily French statesman and diplomat of the Napoleonic era, “worse than a crime; it’s a mistake.”

While Saddam Hussein was a monster, and had ignored numerous United Nation-mandated commitments, the US-led effort in 2003 to topple him as president of Iraq was strategically unnecessary. It became the center of a failed mission in nation-building—one that has proved disastrous for US interests in the greater Middle East and beyond.

Iraq was at the center, but it was only one of four failed American interventions in the region. The others were Afghanistan, Libya, and, to a lesser extent, Syria. The operation to take down the Taliban was fast and efficient, but consolidation of a post-Taliban Afghanistan never occurred. Part of the reason for that was the United States’ war of choice in Iraq, which began less than eighteen months after Afghanistan. That sucked up most of the resources and attention for the rest of that decade. But the other reason for US failure in Afghanistan was that we were beguiled by the same siren song that misled us in Iraq: that we could overcome centuries of history and culture and create a stable society at least somewhat closer to US values. Failure on such a scale is not good for the prestige and influence of a superpower.

But that is not the end of it. There is also the domestic side. The misadventures in the greater Middle East were a failure not just of the US government but of the US foreign policy elite. It was a bipartisan affair. Neoconservative thinking dominated the Republican Party throughout the aughts, while liberal interventionism prevailed in the Democratic Party. They were all in for the utopian policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

While the failures in the greater Middle East were widely understood even before the unnecessarily embarrassing 2021 departure from Afghanistan, there has never been a public reckoning. There was nothing like the Church Committee, which in the mid-1970s shined a very harsh light on US failures in Southeast Asia. Few prominent thinkers or officials have publicly acknowledged their failed policy choices. And the same figures who led us into those debacles are still widely quoted on all major foreign policy matters.

This has had the consequence in the United States of providing ground for the growth of neoisolationist thinking. In running for the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump was not wrong in pointing out the failures of elites in both parties in conducting foreign policy in the greater Middle East. Since then, populists on the right have used this insight to undermine the credibility of foreign policy experts. And like generals fighting the last war, they have applied their “insight” from the Middle East to the latest challenges to US interests, such as Moscow’s war on Ukraine.

In this reading, US support for Ukraine is comparable to US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and will result in failure. There is no analysis—simply dismissal—of the dangers that Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine poses to US security and economic prosperity. No recognition that, as Putin has stated numerous times, he wants to restore Kremlin political control over all the states that used to make up the Soviet Union—which includes NATO and European Union (EU) member states. In other words, he seeks to undermine NATO and the EU.

Furthermore, there’s no understanding that despite the presence of American troops, the United States’ local allies in Iraq and Afghanistan could not win—but without one NATO soldier on the battlefield, Ukraine is fighting Russia to a standstill. Indeed, Ukraine has destroyed between 30 percent and 50 percent of Moscow’s conventional military capability. These analogies with the Iraq war ignore the reality that if Putin takes control of Ukraine, the United States will likely spend far more in financial resources and perhaps American lives in defending its NATO allies.

These failures of understanding are not simply or mainly a consequence of US errors in the Middle East. Utopian thinking in the United States and especially Europe was a natural consequence of the absence of great-power war since 1945. Especially since the fall of the Soviet Union, people on both sides of the Atlantic got comfortable with the notion that Russia was no longer an adversary. And isolationism also has a long pedigree in US society. So it would be vastly oversimplifying to blame the confusion of today’s neoisolationists exclusively on US failures in the Middle East. But the strong US response to the challenge of a hostile Soviet Union was possible because a bipartisan approach on containment was endorsed by leaders of both parties. After the United States’ misadventures in Iraq, such endorsements carry less weight today. In US foreign policy as elsewhere, we still do not know what the ultimate impact of the decision to invade Iraq will be.

—John Herbst’s 31-year career in the US Foreign Service included time as US ambassador to Uzbekistan, other service in and with post-Soviet states, and his appointment as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

What Iraq needs now

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William F. Wechsler on the future of Iraq

A reconciliation commission to rebuild national unity

One of the most devastating shortcomings of the 2003 Iraq invasion was the dismantlement of state institutions and the weakening of the Baghdad central government. That structural vacuum of power and services forced Iraqis back into tribal, religious, and ethnic allegiances, contributing to the nation-state’s fragmentation and exacerbating divisive sectarian discourses and intercommunity tensions. A quota-based constitutional system only served to institutionalize and legitimize the ethnosectarian distribution of power.

Conflicting groups grew further apart over the past two decades and became more motivated by accumulating political positions, hefty oil incomes, and territorial and symbolic gains rather than collectively seeking to rebuild their balkanized nation. Iraqi youth, on the other hand—who campaigned in the name of “We Want a Homeland” [نريد_وطن#] during the 2019 Tishreen (October) protests—seem to have understood what political elites might be missing: the necessity for national reconciliation and memorialization.

The bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra in 2006 unleashed the chaos trapped inside Pandora’s box and resulted in violent Sunni-Shia confrontations, which pushed the country to the brink of civil war. Today, political elites, aware of the fragility and precariousness of the political consensus, pretend the time of friction is over. My firsthand work in Iraqi prisons and camps, and the research projects I led in the country’s conflict zones off the beaten path, such as west of the Euphrates, in Zubair, and in rural areas in the Makhoul Basin, prove the absolute contrary.

A flagrant example of the sectarian ticking bomb that persists in Iraq is the mismanagement of the Sunni populations in the aftermath of the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Many pretended that ISIS fighters came from some fictional foreign entity and refused to face the fact that most of them, including their leader, were Iraqi-born and raised, which I observed as an eyewitness working with the International Committee of the Red Cross during the ISIS war in Nineveh and Salahuddin. Many people who were accomplices of the atrocities even engaged in rewriting the narrative altogether after 2017 in the name of national unity.

A number of Sunni populations in Iraq were mystified by their sudden loss of power with the toppling of Saddam Hussein and were in disbelief that the Shia they stigmatized as shrouguis—literally, “easterners,” a derogatory reference used by Sunni elites to refer to Shia Iraqis from the southeast—became the new lords of the land. Instead of engaging in meaningful mediation and reconciliation to work through these social changes, the majority parties preferred to bury their heads in the sand. This tendency led them to allow militia groups to displace and isolate the Sunni inhabitants of a key city like Samarra, to submerge under water the citizens of northern Kirkuk and Salaheddin, or to conceal the evidence incriminating Tikrit Sunnis during the Speicher massacre, in which ISIS fighters killed more than a thousand Iraqi military cadets, most of them Shia.

These are not isolated examples in a chaotic political and constitutional system in which many communities feel persistently misunderstood, including Kurds, Assyrians, Mandaeans, Baha’is, Afro-Iraqis, Turkmen—and even the Shia themselves. The only possible and plausible pathway for the country to be one again in the next twenty years is to engage in an excruciating but indispensable reconciliation process, through which responsibilities are determined, dignity is restored, and justice is served.

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

A new constitution

Iraq needs a new constitution. A good constitution spells out the framework and structure of government. It provides essential checks and balances to prevent dictators from coming to power. It helps protect the people’s rights. It has measures to prevent gridlock or the collapse of a functioning government.

Judged by these standards, the 2005 Iraqi constitutionis only a partial success.

However, complaints have built up since 2005: over the muhasasa system under which the established political parties divide up ministerial appointments; over the failure of Iraq’s government or other institutions to deliver basic services like electricity and water; over perceptions of excessive Iranian meddling in Iraq’s politics; and over the inability of the government to provide meaningful employment for millions of young Iraqis—or to foster a private sector capable of doing so. These grievances came to a head in the 2019 Tishreen protests in which more than 600 Iraqis died.

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 in part to bring democracy to Iraq, so it is ironic that Iraq’s 2005 constitution was the product of mostly Iraqi political forces unleashed by the failure of the United States to ensure a democratic transition. It was expected that the Kurdish political parties, which had worked closely with the United States for years, would insist upon a federal republic to ensure their autonomy from a central government whose long-term character and leanings in 2005 were far from settled. Beyond this, however, the small number of Americans actually involved in advising the key Iraqi players in the constitutional process—in the room where it happened—actually had relatively little experience in constitutional mechanics or modern comparative constitutional practice. The American sins of commission during the first two years after Iraq’s liberation were replaced by sins of omission during the crucial months of negotiation of the 2005 constitution.

Genuine constitutional reform in Iraq is not likely to be accomplished directly through the parliament, given the interests of Iraq’s political parties and the parliament’s need to focus on legislative responsibilities. Instead, Iraqi civil society—including scholars, lawyers, religious and business leaders, and retired government officials and jurists—should initiate serious discussions about constitutional reform. Many of these voices were not heard when the 2005 constitution was adopted. Their effort can be far more open and transparent than the process was in 2005.

Foreign governments should have a minimal role, limited to supporting and encouraging Iraqi-led efforts, without trying to broker a particular outcome. International foundations, institutes, universities, and think tanks can offer outside expertise, particularly in comparative constitutional law and other kinds of technical assistance. But the overall effort needs to be Iraqi-led, with input from a broad spectrum of Iraqi voices.

While civil society discussions in Iraq could begin with considering amendments to the 2005 constitution, US experience may be relevant. The US Constitutional Convention convened in May 1787 to consider amendments to the Articles of Confederation decided to completely redesign the government, resulting in a Constitution that, with amendments, has been in force in the United States for more than 230 years. Sometimes it’s better to start over.

Iraq’s path to constitutional reform is not clear today, but there is a path nevertheless. Incremental reform is possible, but reform on a larger scale may achieve a more lasting result. The more promising outcome could be for a slate of candidates to run for office with the elements of the new constitution as their platform. A reform slate is not likely to gain an absolute majority, but if its base of support is broad enough, it may be able to gain support in a new parliament needed to send a revised constitution to the Iraqi people for their approval. A new constitution, done right, could propel Iraq towards a better future.

—Thomas S. Warrick led the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project from 2002 to 2003, served in both Baghdad and Washington, and was director (acting) for Iraq political affairs from July 2006 to July 2007. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Thomas S. Warrick on the need for Iraqi-led constitutional reform

An economy diversified away from oil

The post-2003 political order, based on the muhasasa system of sectarian apportionment, came with the promise of a complete break with the past. The 2005 constitution, drafted by the new order, promised: “The State shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with modern economic principles to insure the full investment of its resources, diversification of its sources, and the encouragement and development of the private sector.”

As with other bold promises made, the economic promise was broken as soon as the constitution came into effect, as the political order pursued a decentralized and multiheaded evolution of the prior economic model, and persistently expanded the patrimonial role of the state as a redistributor of the country’s oil wealth in exchange for social acquiescence to its rule.

Over the last twenty years the economy developed significant structural imbalances, and was increasingly bedeviled by fundamental contradictions. Essentially, it was dependent on government spending directly through its provisioning of goods and services as well as public services, and indirectly on the spending of public-sector employees. However, this spending was almost entirely dependent on volatile oil revenues that the government had no control over; yet the spending was premised on ever-increasing oil prices.

The political order had the opportunity to correct course and honor the original promise during three major economic and financial crises, each more severe than the last and all a consequence of an oil-price crash: in 2007 to 2009, due to the global financial crisis; in 2014 to 2017, due to the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; and in 2020, due to the emergence of COVID-19. Yet, paradoxically, the political order doubled down on the policies that led to these crises as soon as oil prices recovered.

On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the political order—buoyed by the bounty of high, yet unsustainable, oil prices—is planning a budget that is expected to be the largest ever since 2003, to seek legitimacy from an increasingly alienated public. These plans will only deepen the economy’s structural imbalance and its fundamental contradictions, and as such could likely lead to even greater public alienation if an oil-price crash triggers yet another economic and financial crisis. Even if oil prices were to stay high, however, the country’s demographic pressures will in time create the conditions for a deeper rolling crisis.

—Ahmed Tabaqchali is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. An experienced capital markets professional, he is chief strategist of the AFC Iraq Fund.

Andrew Peek on the current state of Iraq and the US-Iraq relationship

An inclusive vision, representative of all its people

One of the enduring legacies of the 2003 invasion has been its deleterious effect on the many diverse ethnic and religious minority communities that make up the social fabric of Iraq. Yet it is that diversity and rich heritage that could now unlock a brighter future for the nation, if the political system can recognize and represent it.

Marginalized by an institutionally inscribed political system and few representative seats in parliament, Iraq’s minority communities have found themselves peripheralized by the state—and in the imaginations of the country’s future. Many have emigrated and now reside in diaspora, changing the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Iraq.

Calculating the cultural toll of war goes beyond the destruction of shrines and artifacts, and the looting of museums and buildings: One of the biggest social and cultural losses for Iraq has been the exclusion of minority communities from the nation-building processes. This is a tragic state of affairs for Iraq, whose uniqueness, strength, and richness stems from its ancient histories and cultures, its religious, artistic, and musical traditions, and the languages that have contributed to its heritage and development. That heritage deserves to be protected and celebrated.

Until the day the muhasasa system is dismantled, and a new Iraq built on meritocracy can thrive, minority communities must be safeguarded and included in Iraq’s future. Yet, this can only be achieved through the protection of minorities’ rights in Iraq’s political life, and genuine and concerted effort to increase parliamentary seats and legal representation of minorities. Investment in areas destroyed by terrorism and conflict, more reparations for communities whose livelihoods and homes have been ruined, and more boots on the ground to protect communities and religious shrines should be a priority.

Twenty years of destruction, corruption, violence, and the subsequent emigration of many communities cannot be erased. Yet the twentieth anniversary of Iraq’s occupation ought to serve as a point of reflection for the kind of Iraq that Iraqis want now. There is certainly much hope in a new generation of Iraqis calling for new national visions, an end to muhasasa, more civil rights, and expanding economic opportunities.

Yet all of Iraq’s communities must be part of this conversation. A more inclusive Iraq that applauds its diversity and takes pride in difference could be the driving force needed to unify the nation.

—Oula Kadhum, a former nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, is a postdoctoral research fellow at Lunds University in Sweden and a fellow of international migration at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom.

Oula Kadhum on the reforms needed to reposition Iraq in the next twenty years

A new US Iraq policy focused on youth and education

As the global community reflects on the twentieth anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq and looks to the future, it is time for foreign policy toward Iraq to move beyond its traditional, security-heavy approach.

While security threats persist, including a potential resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and should be a priority, US aid to Iraq has historically been ineffective and financially irresponsible. Humanitarian assistance, meanwhile, tends to focus on short-term issues like the response to COVID-19 and assisting displaced individuals. And while such aid can be beneficial, continuing with the traditional avenues of support is not a sustainable solution to rebuild Iraq. The United States and the international community must begin to focus on long-term solutions that address human security, development, infrastructure, education, and the economy. At the center of all these issues are two key variables that must be the focal point of policy: education and the youth population.

A 2019 UNICEF report estimates that a staggering 60 percent of Iraq’s population is under the age of twenty-five. Learning levels and access to education in Iraq remain among the lowest in the region. The great challenges these two facts pose can also be seen as a unique opportunity: to place its large youth population at the epicenter of Iraq’s future through policy that increases the number of educators and trains them, ensures sanitary and competent learning conditions, and increases access to education.

The benefits of a long-term investment in Iraq’s education system and youth population go beyond simply educating its citizens: It would be the first step in unlocking the human potential of Iraq. More education means more qualified professionals; more doctors would increase the quality and access to healthcare, an increase in engineers will ensure that the country’s infrastructure continues to develop, and additional business leaders and entrepreneurs will assist in growing the economy.

To truly rebuild Iraq, the United States and the international community can no longer view the country as only a security issue. Rather, this moment must be seen as an opportunity to empower bright Iraqi youths, who hope to lead in rebuilding their own country—providing them with a fair shot of again being a cradle of civilization.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Fuad Hussein reflects on the twentieth anniversary of the invasion

What the United States can do now

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Recommit to the cause of Iraqi freedom

It’s hard to believe that it has been twenty years since the US invasion of Iraq. As I sat waiting to launch my first mission on March 20, the war’s historical significance was not my primary thought. How I found myself flying on the first night of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq was. That thought was accompanied by the tightness in the pit of my stomach that I always got before launching into the unknown.

We didn’t debate the case for the war among ourselves. It has been discussed thoroughly since, and I don’t claim to have any new insight to offer on that topic. We were focused on not letting down our fellow Marines and accomplishing our mission: to remove Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and replace it with a democracy that would give the people of Iraq the freedom that people everywhere deserve as their birthright.

Did we succeed? We certainly succeeded in rapidly destroying the Baathist regime and its military, the third largest in the world. The answer to the second question is less clear. On my second and third tours in Iraq, I saw the chaos from the al-Qaeda-fueled insurgency in 2005 and 2006 and the dramatic turnaround following the al-Anbar “Sunni Awakening” in 2006-2007. From afar, I watched the horrors that the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham inflicted on its people after US troops withdrew without a status-of-forces agreement.

Today, Iraq is rated “not free,” scoring twenty-nine out of one hundred in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2022 report. Although not up to Western liberal democracy standards, this is an improvement over 2002, when it received the lowest score possible and was listed as one of the eleven most repressive countries in the world. Moreover, Iraq’s 2022 score is vastly better than most of its neighbors: Iran scored fourteen, Syria scored one, and Afghanistan scored ten.

Despite Afghanistan being widely seen as “the good war” of the two post-9/11 conflicts, where the casus belli was clear, today it is Iraq, and not Afghanistan, that gives me hope that twenty years from now, on the fortieth anniversary, we will see our efforts to promote democracy in Iraq come entirely to fruition. We owe it to the 36,425 Americans killed and wounded there, the thousands of veterans who took their own lives, and the many more still struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder to stay engaged in Iraq and the region to try and make sure that they do.

—Col. John B. Barranco was the 2021-22 Senior US Marine Corps Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense or Department of the Navy.

Balance confidence and humility

I officially swore into the military at Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, on April 4, 2003, during the early stages of the US “shock and awe” campaign in Iraq. Having decided to join the Air Force following 9/11, the lengthy administrative process I’d endured to get to this point had been agonizing. I recall going through the in-processing line at Officer Training School on April 9, when an instructor whispered to us: “Coalition forces have taken Baghdad, stay motivated.” The thought that immediately went through my mind was: “I’m going to miss the wars.”

I had made the choice to pursue special operations and still had two years of training ahead of me. At the time, the war in Afghanistan seemed like it was nearing completion, and the swift overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq had me convinced that, by the time I was ready to deploy, there would be no fighting left. Little did I know that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with their expansions across the Middle East and Africa, would end up consuming a large majority of my twenty years of service, take the lives of many of my special operations teammates, and impact the health and well-being of a generation of US service members and their families.

It’s impossible to know how the war in Iraq shaped other US endeavors in the region. Did it take our focus from Afghanistan and put us on a path of increased escalation and investment there? Did it set conditions for the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham to take root many years later, setting off another expansive counterterrorism campaign?

More broadly, did it allow adversaries the time and space to study US capabilities and ultimately inform their strategies for malign influence? I often think of this today when I’m asked about what’s going to happen with the Russian war in Ukraine, or how prepared the United States is to defend Taiwan.

The United States needs the confidence to confront global challenges to peace and prosperity, but also the humility to know we get things wrong, and mistakes involving direct military intervention can be catastrophic. Given the escalatory risks associated with the security challenges in the world today, our pursuit of a balance of confidence and humility has never been more important.

—Lt. Col. Justin M. Conelli is the 2022-23 Senior US Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

William F. Wechsler on the current political discourse around Iraq

Recognize the successes as well as the failures

“Was the invasion of Iraq worth it?”

I’ve spent a great deal of my military and postmilitary career answering questions about Iraq, but this one—from a brigadier general in the audience—caught me off guard. It was 2018, seven years after the formal withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, and I found myself in front of a roomful of Army officers giving a talk on the future of US-Iraq security cooperation. By that time, such talks had become a little frustrating. The fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (aka the Islamic State group) demonstrated that Iraqi forces could rise to the immediate challenge; however, the conditions that led to their unceremonious collapse in 2014 had not much changed. As a result, there remained many questions about the best way to continue the security partnership to prevent future catastrophe.

The question I got that day, however, had little to do with how to partner with Iraqi forces. A co-presenter from Kurdistan jumped in immediately to answer the brigadier general’s question: the US invasion had removed Iraqi Kurdistan’s most significant threat—Saddam Hussein—and had provided opportunities for economic and political development it would not have had otherwise. Sensing a trap, I nonetheless walked right into it. While Iraqi Kurdistan was certainly in a better position, I pointed out that was not consistently so for the rest of Iraq. The US invasion had unleashed a sectarian free-for-all that allowed Sunni extremists, Shia militias, and their Iranian sponsors to fill the vacuum of oppression Saddam’s departure had left. Moreover, this vacuum had empowered Iran to challenge the United States and its partners regionally. So my answer was no, toppling Saddam likely did not outweigh the costs.

In previous years, the questions had been more policy-focused. For example, when I arrived at the Pentagon’s Iraq Intelligence Working Group in August 2002, the first question asked was how Iraq’s diverse ethnic and confessional demographics would affect military operations and enable—or impede—victory. By early 2003, the questions were about the larger effort to construct a new political order. Before long, we were asking how the confluence of Islamist terrorism, sectarian rivalries, and external intervention drove resistance to efforts to reconstruct Iraq.

In 2012, I became the US defense attaché in Baghdad, just after the last US service members withdrew. At first, the question I heard in this capacity was how to continue the reconstruction project with a limited military and civilian presence whose movement was often severely restricted in a sovereign, sometimes uncooperative, Iraq with frequent interference from Iran. Before I left, al-Qaeda had metastasized into the Islamic State group and the question became how to cooperate to prevent the group’s further expansion and liberate the territory it had seized. Meanwhile, Iran’s influence with the Iraqi government continued to grow.

In retrospect, the conditions I described in 2018 were accurate (and still largely hold today), but I wish I had given a more considered response. What I wish I had said was that a better question than “was it worth it” is: what have we learned about past failures to assess future opportunities? A prosperous Iraq that contributes to regional stability was not possible under Saddam. Now Iraq is an effective partner against Islamist extremists, and the Iraqi people, if not always their government, are in a position to push back on Iran in their own way, exposing Tehran for the despotic government it is. Moreover, Iraq’s hosting of discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran was a catalyst to their recent normalization of relations.

The point is not to rationalize failure. Rather, the question now is: what have we learned from those failures to effectively capitalize on the success we have had, and how can we take advantage of the opportunities the current situation presents?

—C. Anthony Pfaff, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative and a research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Tony Pfaff on the future of US-Iraq relations

Remember the price of hubris

For me, the memories of those first days and weeks in Iraq remain quite clear. I remember calling my family from a satellite phone on the tarmac of Baghdad International Airport to let them know I was alive, late night meetings with Iraqi agents in safe houses, wrapping up Iraqi high-value targets, the fear amid firefights and the carnage on streets strewn with dead and mutilated bodies, and a confused Iraqi population that at the time did not know what to make of US forces who claimed to be liberating them from the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Upon arrival in Baghdad in early April, there were few signs of the resistance that would haunt the United States for decades to come. Yes, there were still combat operations underway, but that was against Iraqi military and paramilitary units. So, as we tracked down Iraqi regime targets one by one—members of the famed “deck of fifty-five cards” that US Central Command had dreamed up and distributed like we were trading baseball cards—we saw this as part of a new beginning.

Yet soon after, the wheels began to fall off. Orders came from Washington policy officials with absolutely zero substantive Middle East experience both to disband the Iraqi military and purge the future government of Baath party officials, which immediately put tens of thousands of hardened military officers, conscripts, and officials out of work and on the street. The CIA presence on the ground protested, but to no avail. I had never seen Charlie, my station chief, so angry, including face-to-face confrontations with senior figures in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Charlie—the most accomplished Arabist in the CIA’s history—sadly predicted the insurgency that was about to come. If only Washington had listened.

I rarely think of Iraq in terms of big-picture strategy. As a CIA operations officer, I was a surgical instrument of the US government, and I gladly answered the bell when called upon to do so. I am proud to have served with other CIA officers and special operations personnel who performed valiantly. I suppose I can defend the invasion on human rights grounds. It seems we forget that Saddam was one of the great war criminals in history, and Iraq has been freed from his depravity. Yet two numbers are haunting: 4,431, and 31,994. Those are the number of Americans killed and wounded in action, per official Department of Defense statistics.

War is a nasty business, and many times a terrible price is paid for hubris. The casualty figures noted above paint a stark picture of the historic intelligence failure that the analytic assessment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was. The CIA in particular suffered a credibility hit that has taken decades to recover from.

—Marc Polymeropoulos, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, served for twenty-six years at the CIA before retiring in 2019.

Thomas S. Warrick on the lessons to learn from the Iraq War

The post How the war in Iraq changed the world—and what change could come next appeared first on Atlantic Council.

State of the Order: Assessing February 2023

ssherry — Mon, 13 Mar 2023 20:45:39 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Biden Goes to Ukraine. Days ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Joe Biden made an unannounced visit to Kyiv to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. While expressing gratitude for US and allied support, Zelensky appealed for heavier weapons, including fighter jets and long-range missiles that could help drive Russian forces back. On the battlefield, Ukrainian forces held their ground as Russia launched a new offensive in the Donbas.

Shaping the order. Biden’s high-risk visit signaled America’s resolve to stand with Ukraine and maintain military support for as long as necessary, as the war extends into its second year. The administration has framed the conflict as a battle between democracy versus autocracy and a struggle to uphold a rules-based order. If Putin succeeds in Ukraine, Russia and other revisionist autocracies may be emboldened to commit aggression or engage in coercion against other nations.
Hitting home. Despite the prolonged conflict, recent polling indicates that a substantial majority of Americans continue to favor US support for Ukraine’s war effort.
What to do. While coordinating closely with allies, the Biden administration should give Ukraine the weapons it needs to win the war, including seriously considering Zelensky’s request for fighter jets and longer-range weapons.

China-Russia War Aid. Amid intelligence reports indicating that China is considering the provision of lethal weapons to support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that there would be “serious consequences” if Beijing moves forward on this front. US officials revealed that China is already providing non-lethal military assistance to Russia. The US began consulting with G7 allies to impose sanctions if Beijing were to transfer munitions. China sought to downplay such reports, instead highlighting its newly announced twelve-point peace plan for Ukraine that called for an immediate ceasefire—a proposal dismissed by US and EU officials as a “gimmick.”

Shaping the order. With Russian forces rapidly depleting ammunition stocks and facing shortages of essential equipment, Chinese military support could provide a critical lifeline for the Kremlin and potentially alter the trajectory of the war. Such a move would also have far-reaching strategic implications, serving to solidify the China-Russia partnership and deepening an “axis of autocracy” aimed at pushing back on the US-led global order.
Hitting home. Economic sanctions against China could have serious implications for US businesses and the global economy.
What to do. Washington should continue efforts to deter China from providing lethal aid to Russia, while being prepared to impose coordinated sanctions with allies if Beijing decides to move forward.

US Pops Chinese Balloon. US fighter planes shot down a Chinese spy balloon that had crossed into US sovereign airspace and traveled across the mainland for several days. Despite Beijing’s claims that the balloon was conducting civilian weather research before accidentally veering of course, US intelligence officials assessed that the aircraft was part of a vast surveillance program run by China’s People’s Liberation Army. The incident led to recriminations, as Secretary of State Blinken scuttled a planned trip to Beijing, though he later met China’s top diplomat Wang Li on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.

Shaping the order. While it remains unclear whether China intended to have the balloon fly over US airspace, the incident exacerbated tensions between the US and China. Despite efforts by President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s to set “guardrails” on their relations since their meeting in Bali last fall, Washington and Beijing appear to be increasingly at odds, as China has become more assertive in threatening Taiwan, strengthening ties with Russia, and challenging the legitimacy of US global leadership.
Hitting home. The specter of a Chinese spy balloon traveling through US airspace starkly highlighted the potential threats to homeland security posed by China.
What to do. The US should remain vigilant in defending against potential threats to the homeland from China and other foreign malign actors, while at the same time seeking to establish more consistent lines of communication with Beijing to minimize future risks of escalation.

Quote of the Month

“The democracies of the world have grown stronger, not weaker. The autocrats of the world have grown weaker, not stronger … Democracies of the world will stand guard over freedom today, tomorrow, and forever … There is no higher aspiration than freedom.”

– President Joe Biden, speaking in Warsaw, February 21, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

Tunisian police arrested two more prominent opposition leaders in an escalating campaign targeting rivals of President Kais Saied, as Tunisia—once a bright spot for democracy in the Arab world—slid further into autocracy.
At the urging of Mexican President López Obrador, the Mexican Congress passed a measure to overhaul the country’s independent election agency, triggering large-scale protests as opponents expressed concerns that the move could weaken the country’s democracy by hampering the ability to conduct reliable elections.
A controversial proposal by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to limit the independence of the country’s Supreme Court sparked large protests in Israel and raised concerns among opposition groups, as well as among pro-Israel lawmakers in Washington.
Nearly twenty years after the US invasion, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani touted the country’s success in establishing a peaceful democracy, saying that most Iraqis appreciate that the US and its allies came to “save” Iraq from the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime and that, despite the heavy toll on the Iraqi population, “it’s much better to have a freedom and democracy rather than a dictatorship.”
On balance, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↓)

Marking the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia will suspend cooperation under the 2010 New START Treaty, the last major arms control agreement with the United States that limits each country to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads.
China is seriously considering the provision of lethal weapons to support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, a move that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned would have “serious consequences.”
A Chinese spy balloon that had crossed into US sovereign airspace was shot down by US fighter planes, exacerbating tensions between the US and China.
China sought to expand security cooperation with partners across the world, as Xi Jinping hosted Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, and Beijing unveiled a Global Security Initiative that calls for expanded training with security forces from other countries.
Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that Iran has produced enriched uranium particles to the level of 83.7%, reducing the breakout time for producing one bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium to about twelve days if it were to move forward.
The US and the Philippines announced an agreement to provide US forces access to four new military bases in the country, as part of a US effort to expand its strategic footprint across the Indo-Pacific.
On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

After three years of negotiations, Britain and the EU reached a breakthrough agreement on new trade rules in Northern Island, a move that resolves a simmering dispute following Britain’s exit from the EU.
On a visit to India, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz discussed with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi the contours of a potential new trade deal between India and the EU.
Overall, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

The US Energy Department concluded, based on uncited new evidence, that the COVID-19 virus most likely emanated from a leak from a virology laboratory in Wuhan, a conclusion also reached by the FBI in 2021—though other US intelligence agencies remain divided on the assessment.
Overall, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

Vice President Kamala Harris joined the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, the EU, and other nations at the Munich Security Conference to reaffirm their commitment to stand up to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Separately, G7 foreign ministers called for other countries to cease assistance to the Russian military and avoid undermining sanctions measures against Russia.
Finland will seek to move forward with NATO membership independently from Sweden, whose membership bid remains stalled as Turkey and Hungary continue to delay potential ratification.
The new basing agreement between the US and the Philippines bolstered their bilateral alliance—one that had soured during the previous presidency of Rodrigo Duterte—as defense ministers from the two nations also discussed a potential military triad with Japan.
Overall, the alliance pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Samantha Power, in a Foreign Affairs piece titled “How Democracy Can Win,” asserts that autocrats are on the backfoot, and the United States and other democracies have an opportunity to regain momentum in their efforts to counter authoritarianism.
Timothy McLaughlin, in The Atlantic, contends that the US must reorient its Indo-Pacific strategy from building military agreements to crafting strong economic policies with allies in the region.
Paul Poast argues that, through their recent actions, democracies in the BRICS—Brazil, India, and South Africa—are lending support to Moscow and effectively aiding and abetting Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, argues that, in the wake of President Biden’s visit to Kyiv, the US needs to double down on its support to ensure Russia is strategically defeated and the West remains united.
Dan Fried and Brian O’Toole, in the New Atlanticist, outline the effect of sanctions against Russia but note that a victory in Ukraine will require more than economic tools.
Patrick Quirk and Katya Rimkunas, in The National Interest, discuss how the US should approach the upcoming Summit for Democracy, particularly in regards to support for democratic institutions and political parties.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Sydney Sherry – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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The US has gotten the day to day right in Africa policy. Time to think bigger.

Aubrey Hruby — Mon, 13 Mar 2023 18:25:38 +0000

Summits, conferences, fora. Whatever one calls the gatherings, summitry has defined Africa policy globally for decades. Japan was a pacesetter, inviting African governments to the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993 and hosting a steady drumbeat of Africa summits ever since. The most recent took place in August and featured more than twenty African leaders. The European Union and China quickly caught up, convening their first Africa summits in 2000: the European Union-African Union (EU-AU) Summit and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), respectively. Over the past year alone, there was a sixth EU-AU Summit, an eighth TICAD, and a second US-Africa Leaders Summit. A second Russia-Africa Summit and a fourth Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit are set for later this year, and the ninth FOCAC arrives in 2024.

Summits are about announcements. In the days and months prior to these splashy events, there is always a mad dash to gather success stories and draft up new—at times purely aspirational—funding commitments. The recent US-Africa Leaders Summit in December is a case in point, featuring a large number of announcements, some new and some repackaged. It also included some sizable financial commitments to African markets, albeit with a little creative accounting that makes it difficult for even the most assiduous US-Africa policy watchers to make sense of what’s new and what is repackaged. (See one attempt in the chart below.)

Two solid successes and continued momentum

The three-day US-Africa Leaders Summit in December brought together high-level delegations from forty-nine African countries and the AU, along with business and civil society leaders. The summit was part of an overall new Africa strategy authored by Judd Devermont, the special assistant to the president and senior director for African affairs at the National Security Council. The strategy has returned US-Africa policy to the basics, including consistent high-level diplomatic engagement between US and African leaders—and US President Joe Biden pledged at the summit to continue to make that engagement a priority.

The Biden administration is thus far making good on this promise. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield have already made official visits to the continent in 2023. Vice President Kamala Harris will travel to Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia from March 26 to April 1, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo will visit the continent this summer. Devermont has long argued for this type of consistent, high-level engagement, and it is refreshing to see it operationalized. Regular, high-level engagement has long been a staple of how the United States approaches other regions of the world and it is important that African nations continue to be integrated into the broader, day-to-day practice of US diplomacy. He reiterated this view during his recent visit at the Atlantic Council. “If we are going to solve problems in the world, if we are going to come up with creative solutions, it is going to be with our African partners,” he said. “The summit was just a kick off.”

Biden’s focus on the diaspora was another important aspect of the US-Africa Leaders Summit, with diaspora interests and concerns highlighted across sectors and in multiple fora. The African diaspora in the United States distinguishes and enriches US-Africa ties from those of global competitors and should remain a centerpiece of US policy toward the continent. The summit also served as the launching pad for the President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States, a new initiative that follows in the footsteps of the Obama administration–established President’s Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa. The new initiative should help ensure the diaspora has a seat at the table in shaping US policy toward the continent.

The summit also gave additional momentum to US efforts to support digitization in African markets. While hugely important and widely supported across the US-Africa policy community, Biden’s new flagship Africa initiative—Digital Transformation with Africa—simply builds on old programs such as the US International Development Finance Corporation’s Connect Africa and the US Trade and Development Agency’s Access Africa (among others with overlapping mandates). In its new form, the initiative intends to invest $350 million in the digital sector, but it will require congressional support.

Big ideas for US-Africa policy

The Biden administration’s summit could have been a launch pad for big, bold ideas, but here it fell short. Instead of repackaging existing programs, the Biden administration, working with Congress, should champion new initiatives that match US competitiveness with African opportunity while deepening US-Africa relations. Here are three ideas:

Create a US Commercial Corps as a corollary to the US Peace Corps that would send recent graduates or retired volunteers to emerging markets to work alongside Prosper Africa embassy deal teams on commercially related engagements. The potential benefits of such a program are numerous, including advancing people-to-people diplomacy, supporting US government personnel across the continent with business acumen and commercial expertise, and creating a cadre of US business professionals with working experience in emerging markets who will enhance long-term US competitiveness on the international stage. Six decades of the Peace Corps has yielded CEOs, members of Congress, and community leaders with lasting ties and relationships across the Atlantic. A Commercial Corps could do the same for US-Africa commercial relations.
Prioritize partnerships in the creative industries by establishing an advisory council modeled on the Presidential Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa and the newly minted President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement. This new council would link company executives from the music, film, and fashion industries in the United States and across Africa with financiers and key US government stakeholders to drive investment into Africa’s creative industries. Building on the work of the Africa Center’s Task Force and efforts being made by Afreximbank, the council could focus on creating the linkages needed–particularly around financing growth in the sector.
Support sustained capacity-building in climate finance. The Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership program runs an accelerator for climate finance leaders, for example. Additionally, the International Finance Corporation and Milken Institute are now in their seventh year of a unique training program that brings mid-career professionals from finance ministries, central banks, and stock exchanges to the United States to deepen their experience with capital markets. Since 2016, 160 professionals have participated in the program from nearly fifty countries, the majority in Africa, and strong working relationships have been created that deepen regional integration. The Biden administration could partner with them to expand the effort to focus on climate finance or bring others to the table such as Bloomberg Green, the Rocky Mountain Institute, and leading US and European universities to design a best-in-class program. African countries are home to some of the world’s most important natural assets, including the Congo Basin, and they need to ensure that their finance executives—both in the public and private sectors—have access to the best thinking and skills when it comes to ensuring sustainable growth.

The Biden administration’s return to summit diplomacy is a welcome development, and the commitment to consistent, high-level engagement with African leaders is being demonstrated month by month. Still, given the potential of the world’s youngest continent and the growing role African nations will play in global affairs in the coming decades, the United States needs to be bolder and more creative with initiatives that create lasting structural change in US-Africa relations.

A summary of key summit takeaways–some old, some new, some questions remain

The chart below is a first effort by the author to track and categorize the summit commitments in order to stimulate further discussion.

Aubrey Hruby is a co-founder of Tofino Capital, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

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Calls mount for Russia to face tribunal for aggression against Ukraine

Irina Paliashvili — Tue, 28 Feb 2023 22:02:47 +0000

The idea of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine was first proposed by Professor Philippe Sands immediately following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in early 2022. As the war now enters its second year, this initiative continues to gain momentum.

Since the invasion began, the concept of a special tribunal has been developed by various groups of international and Ukrainian legal experts. There have been several significant breakthrough developments in the past few months that have elevated this proposal from an academic proposition to the decision-making level and placed it firmly on the international agenda.

The crime of aggression is the underlying crime that triggers all other crimes. It is a leadership crime, for which those perpetrators who organized, decided on, and ordered aggression are tried. If plans for a special tribunal proceed, the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine would be tried for the first time since the Nazi leadership was tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg following World War II.

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It has already been established that the International Criminal Court (ICC) at present and for the foreseeable future does not have jurisdiction over Russia’s use of aggression against Ukraine, so a special tribunal is needed. ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan appears to be an isolated voice disputing this consensus. He argues for reforms to address the gap at the ICC, but has not been able to advance any practical and timely solution, keeping in mind the principle that justice delayed is justice denied.

So far, three options for a special tribunal have crystallized. The first is the institution-based option, which envisages a tribunal established on the basis of a treaty between Ukraine and the UN, following the adoption of the relevant UN General Assembly resolution. If this scenario does not work out, a tribunal could be set up on the basis of another international organization such as the Council of Europe, EU, or G7, preferably still with the backing of the UN General Assembly.

Another option is the treaty-based approach. This would involve setting up a tribunal on the basis of a multilateral international treaty, which would potentially be open to any state. There is also a hybrid option, which could see a specialized court based on Ukrainian law and jurisdiction, with some type of international element. At this stage, the institution-based option involving the UN is widely seen as optimal.

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Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

When the idea of a tribunal was first introduced, it was supported by international law experts, civil society, and opinion leaders, but not by individual governments. This began to change after the Ukrainian government elaborated on its initial concept and started working with expert groups to develop the possible format of a future tribunal. Towards the end of 2022 and during the first months of 2023, the debate advanced to the inter-governmental level.

The first breakthrough came in November 2022, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared that the EU was proposing “to set up a specialized court, backed by the United Nations, to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression.” At the same time, the French Foreign Ministry announced that it had started “working with our European and Ukrainian partners on the proposal to establish a special tribunal on Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine.” Dutch officials also confirmed that the Netherlands would be willing to house a new UN-backed tribunal to try Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In the first weeks of 2023, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock noted the “disastrous” limitations on the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and called for a “special solution” to address what she termed as a gap in international law. Minister Baerbock also backed the immediate establishment of an investigating authority in The Hague to address Russian aggression.

Speaking in January, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said he could not accept that the international community would let the Russian invasion of Ukraine go unpunished, and confirmed Dutch officials are working with their Ukrainian colleagues and others to set up an aggression tribunal, preferably in The Hague. Meanwhile, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated, “if a special tribunal is created, we are not against it.”

The European Parliament adopted a resolution in January 2023 backing the establishment of a special tribunal. Also in January, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted for a resolution which confirmed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine meets the definition of international aggression and reiterated its call “to set up a special international criminal tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, which should be endorsed and supported by as many states and international organizations as possible, and in particular by the United Nations General Assembly.”

Recent months have witnessed further practical steps toward the establishment of a special tribunal. In early 2023, a core group of more than 20 countries was created to develop plans for a tribunal, with the first in-person meeting taking place on January 26 in Prague. On February 2, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that an international center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression in Ukraine would be set up in The Hague.

It is evident from recent developments that initial calls for a special tribunal are now evolving toward practical implementation, with the various legal options taking more concrete form and being evaluated in terms of preference. This process will continue in the coming months as inter-governmental engagement on the issue deepens.

Dr. Irina Paliashvili is Chair of the Legal Committee at the US-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC) and International Rule of Law Officer at the IBA Rule of Law Forum.

Following World War II, the United States and its European allies sought to forge a new world order rooted in liberal values of democracy, economic openness, and the rule of law. Over the subsequent decades, they established a series of institutions aimed at fostering cooperation across economic, security, and political fronts. Together, this family of institutions formed the foundation of a US-led international order that has helped bring peace, security, and prosperity for much of the world over the past seventy years.

The United States set a benchmark for the liberal order starting in 1948 with the European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan. To allocate aid and coordinate a joint recovery following World War II, Western European countries formed the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This evolved into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961, expanding its membership not only to the United States, but in a few years to the major Pacific allies, and, decades later, to market democracies around the world.¹

While the Marshall Plan, OEEC, and eventually OECD offered a blueprint for the postwar liberal order, they remained focused on economic challenges. The Marshall Plan’s early ambitions to foster European integration and deter communist expansion in Europe demanded a more intentional, security-focused framework, along with military might. In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty formed a legal basis for a new North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, in order to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” and ensure collective defense and peace.² Since its inception, NATO has expanded to include thirty countries (with two more on the horizon), and has served as a cornerstone of transatlantic security and of the liberal order.

In decades that followed, the United States, Canada, and advanced economies in Europe sought further venues for political cooperation. Beginning in the 1970s, the Group of Seven (G7) served as a political forum for leading democracies to promote shared liberal values and work together to tackle common transnational challenges ranging from economics and trade to global health and climate change. The G7 brought in Japan, formally integrating transatlantic and transpacific allies in an influential common platform for political and economic engagement.

Separately, beginning in the 1950s, the United States formed bilateral security alliances with Japan and South Korea, and a multilateral alliance with Australia and New Zealand.³ The United States also formed an intelligence-sharing agreement among key English-speaking allies in the Atlantic and Pacific; the Five Eyes include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. More recently, the Indo-Pacific Quad has become a forum to draw together the US, Japan, Australia, and India in a multilateral platform for cooperation in specific areas of mutual interest. AUKUS – a trilateral security pact between Australia, Britain, and the United States formed in 2022 with a focus on nuclear-powered submarines – represents the latest US attempt to bridge security coordination across the Atlantic and Pacific.

The need to strengthen Atlantic-Pacific ties

For the first time in more than three decades, the United States and its democratic allies face systemic challenges from revisionist powers that aim to disrupt or displace the existing international order. Russia is engaged in a war of aggression against Ukraine, seeking to redraw the map of Europe by force on a scale not seen since World War II. Under Putin’s leadership, the Kremlin has taken actions to control its neighbors, engage in energy coercion, meddle in foreign elections, and support crackdowns against pro-democracy movements both at home and abroad. As its capabilities expand, China represents a more durable and broad-based challenge to the rules-based order. While escalating its threats against Taiwan, Beijing has claimed control over much of the South China Sea and continues to expand its military footprint across the Pacific and beyond. China’s state-driven economy, built around forced technology transfers and other unfair trade practices, poses an alternative model to market-based international economic relations, as Beijing uses its increasing economic influence to engage in wolf warrior tactics to coerce other nations to accede to its political demands. With their shared interests in challenging the US-led order, Moscow and Beijing recently forged a “no limits” strategic partnership and appear determined to establish a broader axis of autocracy that includes other anti-Western regimes across the world, starting with Iran.⁴

The challenges posed by China and Russia are setting the terms for a new era of strategic competition among major global powers.⁵ To succeed, the United States will need to work closely with likeminded allies and partners. To deal with the Soviet challenge during the Cold War, the United States prioritized coordination with transatlantic allies. Today, America’s most capable allies are located not just in Europe and North America, but also in the Asia-Pacific. With the intensifying challenges posed by China, and a global economy that is more interconnected than ever before, the US needs to find new ways to deepen and strengthen cooperation among its allies across the globe.

Avenues for reinvigorating Atlantic-Pacific engagement

The world’s leading democratic states can have a determinative influence in shaping global outcomes when they pool their collective resources and influence. Collectively, the United States and other leading democracies represent nearly sixty percent of the global gross domestic product and commit more than six times the resources to defense expenditures annually than do Russia and China combined. Together, they can marshal the resources necessary to maintain a favorable balance of power.

Washington should undertake a determined effort to work with allies across the Atlantic and Pacific to align common objectives and cultivate a shared sense of purpose. There are several potential avenues for strengthening the trilateral – North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific – cooperation. They fall into three broad categories.

First, the existing institutions— NATO, OECD, G7— should be strengthened in their own tasks and structures. NATO, for example, has demonstrated remarkable cohesion in standing up to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. But as the latest NATO Strategic Concept suggests, China could represent a potentially longer-term challenge to transatlantic security, and the alliance will need to bolster its capabilities and enhance coordination to deal with this challenge.⁶

Second, these existing entities should be better interconnected. The invitation to the leaders of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand to join the NATO leaders’ summit in Madrid this past June should become a regular feature — perhaps a “NATO Plus Four — serving as a means to strengthen NATO engagement with allies in the Asia-Pacific. Similarly, Australia and South Korea could be included as ongoing participants in the G7 leaders’ summit, perhaps as permanent observers, not unlike the status that Spain and the Netherlands have in the G20, or as a “G7 plus Two.”. Other primarily transatlantic entities and meetings, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council (TTC), could invite observers from Japan and South Korea to promote a more cohesive approach to dealing with economic issues. More broadly, this existing family of allied institutions could be more directly linked. The heads of NATO and the OECD, for example, could also be included in G7 summit meetings (last year’s G7 invitation to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg may serve as a precedent).

Third, a new series of Atlantic-Pacific entities should be established to promote cooperation across key domains of strategic competition. A “Democracies 10,” or D-10, could formally bind G7 partners with Australia and South Korea, serving as a core group of likeminded and influential democracies to coordinate and strategize on the most significant global challenges.⁷ A Democratic Technology Alliance could bring together leading democracies to ensure that the free world prevails in the race for advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, genetic engineering, 5G, and robotics.⁸ A new Democratic Trade and Economic Partnership, could provide an integrated framework for leading democracies to foster ally shoring, secure supply chains, and counter autocratic coercion.⁹ More specialized agencies to promote Atlantic-Pacific integration should also be considered, such as an OECD-area health agency or a revamped Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).¹⁰

Conclusion

In his State of the Union address earlier this month, President Joe Biden took note of “the bridges we’re forming between partners in the Pacific and those in the Atlantic.”¹¹ Building on this momentum, the administration should charge senior officials at the State Department and the National Security Council with developing new options to advance trilateral cooperation. Policy planning officials from leading allies across Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific could lead this effort by beginning consultations on concrete ways forward.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the increasing challenges posed by China have created an urgency to act. The war in Ukraine has spawned a new spirit of determination among the US and its European allies. Given the momentous challenges of this new era, the time is ripe for Atlantic and Pacific democracies to work more closely together and uphold the rules-based order.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

1 “About the OECD,” OECD Watch, accessed February 6, 2023, https://www.oecdwatch.org/oecd-ncps/about-the-oecd/.

2 NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” last updated April 10, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

3 The ANZUS Treaty initially included Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The United States suspended its treaty obligations toward New Zealand in 1986. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus.

4 Guy Faulconbridge, “Factbox: How Does the Xi and Putin ‘No Limits’ Partnership Work?” Reuters, September 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/how-does-xi-putin-no-limits-partnership-work-2022-09-15/.

5 Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig, “From the G7 to a D10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges,” Atlantic Council, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/from-the-g7-to-a-d-10-strengthening-democratic-cooperation-for-todays-challenges/.

6 “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.

7 Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig, “Toward a Democratic Technology Alliance: An Innovation Edge that Favors Freedom,” Atlantic Council, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/toward-a-democratic-technology-alliance-an-innovation-edge-that-favors-freedom/.

8 Ibid.

9 Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig, “A Democratic Trade Partnership: Ally Shoring to Counter Coercion and Secure Supply Chains,” Atlantic Council, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/strategic-decoupling-building-a-democratic-trade-and-economic-partnership-d-tep/.

10 Ira Straus, “The War in Ukraine Is an Opportunity to Upgrade the Transatlantic Architecture. Here’s How.” New Atlanticist, August 31, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-war-in-ukraine-is-an-opportunity-to-upgrade-the-transatlantic-architecture-heres-how/.

11 “Remarks of President Joe Biden – State of the Union Address as Prepared for Delivery,” White House, February 7, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/02/07/remarks-of-president-joe-biden-state-of-the-union-address-as-prepared-for-delivery/.

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One year, eight world-changing numbers. Quantifying Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 16:11:51 +0000

One year ago, Russian troops streamed over the borders of Ukraine in the dead of night in an attempt to swiftly seize the country and topple its government. Instead they met with remarkable Ukrainian resistance and the rallying of Ukraine’s international allies to its defense, thwarting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans. It is hard to calculate the suffering, destruction, and global upheaval caused by the conflict, which has evolved into a brutal war of attrition with no end in sight. But there are some eye-opening numbers that help tell this story. To mark one year since Putin’s full-scale invasion, experts from across the Atlantic Council have identified the figures they believe best illustrate all the ways this war has shaken the world.

108,000

Approximate amount of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia, in square kilometers

Many analysts see Russia’s failure to topple Kyiv as a sign of Russian weakness. They argue that Washington and Brussels need not worry about Russia’s threat to NATO because Russia’s military is weaker than we thought. These data tell a different story: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows that Moscow—which controls roughly 108,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian land, according to Institute for the Study of War data analyzed by the New York Times—is capable of seizing and occupying territory on its border the size of two Baltic states. Estonia’s total territory is about 45,000 square kilometers, while Latvia checks in at 64,000 and Lithuania at 65,000. The Russian military is potentially strong enough to cause World War III and break NATO. These are the data that keeps US European Command planners and vulnerable Eastern flank NATO allies up at night.

—Matthew Kroenig is the senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

8 million+

Refugees from Ukraine recorded in Europe since the start of the war

Russian atrocities in Ukraine over the past year have caused untold disaster and spurred the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe in nearly eighty years. The Kremlin has launched unrelenting assaults on civilian infrastructure, culminating in the deaths of civilians and permanently damaging energy facilities. Meanwhile, over fifty thousand allegations of war crimes have emerged from recently liberated Ukrainian cities, including harrowing reports of mass graves, torture in detainment camps, and the utilization of sexual assault as a weapon of war.

As a result, Europe has opened its doors to more than eight million refugees fleeing from Ukraine for their safety. While the prevailing belief is that large, Western European countries have led Europe’s efforts to counter Russia’s aggression, Central and Eastern European countries bear the brunt of refugee waves coming from Ukraine—due to both their proximity and already established Ukrainian diaspora communities. Nearly one-third, or 2.5 million, of total refugees from Ukraine in Europe have settled in countries included in the United Nations’ Refugee Response Plan (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia), while Poland has settled the greatest number of refugees at over 1.5 million and has seen over eight million refugees cross its border seeking safety since the start of the war (though six million have also returned to Ukraine).

Looking at the refugees taken in as a proportion of national population, Estonia, Montenegro, and the Czech Republic top the list, while some larger countries such as France and the United Kingdom fall toward the bottom. As Ukraine’s closest neighbors, Central and Eastern European countries have served on the front line of Europe’s greatest refugee crisis in generations and are likely to continue doing so as the war enters its second year.

—Kristen Taylor was a Young Global Professional at the Europe Center in the fall of 2022 and is a master’s student at American University. Akshat Dhankher and Emma Nix are program assistants at the Europe Center and lead the Ukraine Aid Tracker project.

Nearly 90%

Reduction in Russia’s piped natural gas export volumes

Russia’s piped natural gas export volumes have shrunk from four hundred to five hundred million cubic meters (mcm) per day to around sixty mcm per day, one year after Putin unleashed his bloody war of choice on Ukraine and an energy assault on Europe, Moscow’s biggest energy consumer at the time. Neither is going as planned.

While oil and gas are vital for Russia’s state budget, Moscow leans heavier on oil exports for revenue and gas exports for geopolitical leverage, which Putin unleashed by abruptly stopping supplies to multiple nations in Europe in order to discourage support for Ukraine. But by cutting supplies, Moscow also cut itself out of the European market as nations adjusted to the massive curtailment—albeit at a hefty price. Much of the market share will be challenging or impossible to recover, regardless of the war’s outcome, as European buyers commit to long-term contracts with alternative suppliers and invest in new liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure to bring gas to areas previously monopolized by Russian exports.

However, a full decoupling from reliance on Russian gas is far from complete. New projects must come online to fill the supply gap in the long term, and the allure of discounted Russian exports could tempt some regions in Europe to take in gas from the Kremlin after the war. Additionally, Russian LNG exports to Europe increased in 2022—an important trend for European nations to observe as they work to unburden themselves from dependance on an unreliable producer.

Nevertheless, Putin accelerated Europe’s preexisting diversification efforts with his energy blackmail and, ironically, without Western sanctions on Russian methane. Moscow will never again supply 40 percent of Europe’s natural gas.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Global Energy Center.

60.2%

Amount of Russia’s forecasted 2023 budget deficit reached by January

Moscow’s budget deficit in the month of January alone is more than half of its planned deficit for the entirety of 2023. Looking at the below graph, you’ll see a clear surge in Russia’s budget deficit in December. While December spending in Russia is usually high, January remained far into negative territory at a loss of 1.8 trillion rubles. Why the mismatch with Moscow’s predictions?

It’s because the 2023 budget is calculated based on oil revenues coming in at sixty dollars per barrel—the same value that the Group of Seven (G7) nations set as its price cap on December 5—but prices have since dropped well below that mark. With income shrinking, and heavy costs of the war to bear, Russia’s budget deficit is likely to widen past its own 2023 estimate of 2.9 trillion rubles.

—Sophia Busch is a program assistant at the GeoEconomics Center.

52.5%

Proportion of Russia’s tank arsenal destroyed

Prior to last February’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia was estimated to possess around 3,330 operational tanks. After one year of fighting, open-source intelligence has visually confirmed that Russia has lost over 1,700 tanks, or just over 50 percent of its pre-war total operational stocks. One estimate suggests that the total lost could be over 70 percent, given that not all losses are accessible to open-source intelligence. Russia is estimated to have around 17,000 additional tanks in storage, ranging from early Cold War-era T-55s, T-62s, and T-64s to more recent T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s, however the condition of these stored tanks is unclear.

—Jeffrey Cimmino is an associate director in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Countries with domestic accountability responses to Russia’s invasion

The response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—and the 68,321 crimes of aggression and war crimes registered by Ukraine—has included rapid international action to ensure accountability. Ukraine tops the list with domestic investigations and trials, advocacy to establish a Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression, and work to establish a claims commission. However, other countries have followed suit with domestic processes including criminal investigations, targeted sanctions designations, and asset seizures, as well as coordinated efforts through a joint investigative team and the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force.

This is an atypical amount of legal action. This is partly due to practical reasons: Ukraine has an incentive to cooperate with other jurisdictions, and countries close to Ukraine are likely to have refugees who can provide evidence and perpetrators arriving on their territory. However, there are also known double standards in global access to justice—there is less clamor for international action when the perpetrators are from politically well-connected Western countries or part of intractable conflicts—which are considered likely to be a contributing factor to a reported lack of support for certain measures from the Global South. These accountability efforts will shape international legal precedent as they progress, but authorities should also ensure that they become the norm and serve to expand the options available to all atrocity victims.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

Number of countries in a new nonaligned movement

On March 2, 2022, in an emergency special session following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations General Assembly advanced resolution ES-11/1 demanding full withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. A total of 141 countries voted in favor of the resolution, including many of the world’s democracies. Thirty-five countries, from China and India to Iran and South Africa, abstained. Five countries— Belarus, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, and Syria—voted against it.

Seven months later, the General Assembly voted again to condemn Russia’s invasion and not recognize Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory. The votes remained largely unchanged, with only two additional countries voting in favor (a total of 143) of a weakened resolution, thirty-five abstentions, and the same five no’s. (Several countries missed the vote in both cases.)

Both votes show that the international community overwhelmingly stands together to rebuke Russia’s invasion. But such little movement in vote numbers and member groupings—after nearly a year of an increasingly brutal and illegal war, human-rights abuses and apparent war crimes, and massive disruptions to the global economy—suggests that the world is roughly divided into three blocs. The first is a collection of countries, encompassing many members of the free world, that stand together to defend international law and order when it is most under threat. The second is a new nonaligned movement of countries that, for varied political or strategic reasons, choose to hedge or stay out of the fray completely. The third is an “axis of autocracies” that act to disrupt or displace the rules-based order.

These groups are of course not exact or exhaustive. Many states who voted in favor of both resolutions are not free or democratic or may not be supportive of more punitive steps to punish Russia, such as sanctions. Still, how countries have voted on these resolutions displays a real fact of today’s global order: Countries are increasingly coalescing into democratic and autocratic blocs when responding to international issues, with some remaining non-aligned.

—Danielle Miller and Imran Bayoumi are assistant directors with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative.

50 billion euros

Monetary value of assistance sent to Ukraine by the EU and its member states since the start of the war

Despite the Kremlin’s bet that its war of aggression would isolate Ukraine from Europe, the European Union (EU) and its member states have responded with unity of purpose by sending immediate and continued aid to Ukraine.

An estimated 12 billion euros of this assistance was dispatched in the form of military aid, which accounts for both the 3.6 billion euros the EU has contributed via the European Peace Facility and bilateral donations from twenty-four EU member states. European partners not only sent a major wave of this military assistance immediately after Russia’s initial incursion but have also sustained donations throughout the year since—progressively sending heavier and longer-range weaponry—suggesting growing trust in Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and an increasing realization that Ukraine is the front line for the defense of Europe overall.

Meanwhile, an estimated 1.7 billion euros has taken the form of humanitarian aid, which has provided food, clothing, shelter, health care, and other basic needs to nearly fourteen million people in Ukraine. The European Commission has coordinated this unprecedented operation under the auspices of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, standing up logistical hubs in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia to direct aid into the country. Lastly, as the challenge of Ukraine’s physical and institutional reconstruction looms ahead, the EU has provided 7.2 billion euros in macro-financial assistance—with an additional 18 billion euros of loans approved by the European Council in December 2022—and is sending other financial support through the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

—Akshat Dhankher and Emma Nix are program assistants at the Europe Center and lead the Ukraine Aid Tracker project.

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The big questions (and answers) about Ajay Banga’s nomination to lead the World Bank

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 00:39:26 +0000

By most accounts, US President Joe Biden’s nomination earlier today of Ajay Banga to lead the World Bank was a surprise. Banga was “not on the short list and not someone even being mentioned as an outside candidate,” explains Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former International Monetary Fund (IMF) adviser.

In part, the shock came because Banga hails from the private sector. He is the vice chairman of the private equity firm General Atlantic and a former chief executive officer of Mastercard. Names floated as potential nominees in recent weeks favored current and former government officials.

Banga’s nomination comes after the current World Bank president, David Malpass, announced that he will step down in June, ahead of the end of this five-year term. It also comes as the nearly eighty-year-old organization faces an array of global crises, from the COVID-19 pandemic and food insecurity to climate change. In fiscal year 2022 alone, the World Bank provided more than $104 billion in loans, equity investments, grants, and guarantees to partner countries and private businesses.

Below, experts from our GeoEconomics Center answer the burning questions around this announcement.

Do you expect any pushback on Banga’s nomination?

Other countries can put forward their nominees, and then the World Bank’s executive board will consider the nominees. The board has signaled they will decide by the end of May. However, per an informal agreement at the creation of the Bretton Woods Institutions in 1944, the United States has always chosen the World Bank president and has always selected an American. The Europeans are informally granted the privilege of selecting the head of the IMF (currently Kristalina Georgieva, a Bulgarian economist who was actually a former acting president of the World Bank herself). It is possible that other countries from emerging markets may try to oppose this arrangement this time around, but it seems unlikely that they could prevent Banga from ultimately being selected.

—Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the GeoEconomics Center.

There has been explicit signaling from the World Bank’s executive board, as well as a push from the nongovernmental-organization community, including ONE, that it’s time for a woman to (finally) helm the World Bank. There has also been an increasing sense that emerging markets and developing economies should have a stronger role in governance. With this nomination of Banga, we could very well see an alternative candidate emerge.

—Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center and the global head of inclusive economic growth at Abt Associates.

What does Banga’s nomination reveal about how the Biden administration views the World Bank?

The US nomination of Banga as the next president of the World Bank seems to convey the priorities the Biden administration expects from the institution going forward. Besides sharing the administration’s concerns about mobilizing resources to combat the effects of climate change, Banga brings to the table his track record as a successful chief executive officer of Mastercard, skill in mobilizing public and private capital, and experience doing business in developing countries. These skills and knowledge are important in leading the World Bank in the period ahead.

—Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center and a former IMF official.

Selecting a former leader of a major international company (which is not the typical mold for a president) suggests that the United States is focused as much on internal reform of the bank as it is on changing World Bank lending policy on climate and China. Reforming the inner workings of the World Bank has been a perennial mission for the institution’s presidents, and it’s unclear if Banga will have more success than others.

We have done work on this issue at the Atlantic Council through our Bretton Woods 2.0 project, and what we show is that the World Bank’s ability to lend effectively to countries around the world ties directly to how it is structured internally.

—Josh Lipsky

What is the most pressing issue the next World Bank president will face?

The next World Bank president will have to contend with compounding crises: COVID-19, climate change, and conflict. The fallout from them includes learning loss, the reversal of gains against poverty, inflation and food insecurity, widening inequality between and within countries, and debt.

—Nicole Goldin

While the White House announcement of Banga’s nomination highlighted climate change among “the most urgent challenges of our time” facing the World Bank, there are several other issues that will require his immediate attention, notably the debt crisis that has enveloped dozens of countries since the COVID-19 pandemic hit. An estimated 60 percent of low-income countries are in, or at high risk of, debt distress, and a solution to their plight has been elusive because of an impasse in getting private-sector lenders and China (the World Bank’s third-largest shareholder) to agree to debt-restructuring deals.

The US government and Malpass have repeatedly criticized China over the issue, and the White House likely will expect Banga to keep up the pressure. But as China cuts its lending to developing countries, the World Bank will face calls to increase its commitment of funds not just to climate change programs, but in traditional areas such as infrastructure and poverty reduction.

—Jeremy Mark is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center. He previously worked for the IMF and the Asian Wall Street Journal.

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China and private lenders are blocking a solution to the global debt crisis. The G20 must step in.

Vasuki Shastry and Jeremy Mark — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 22:40:08 +0000

It came as a shock last week when India’s Group of Twenty (G20) Sherpa Amitabh Kant—ditching the technical and dense language of economic diplomacy—took on China over the matter of resolving debt in developing countries. “China needs to come out openly and say what their debt is and how to settle it,” Kant declared in response to recent calls from China for the multilateral lenders to write off debt to poor countries. “It can’t be that the International Monetary Fund takes a haircut, and it goes to settle Chinese debt,” he continued. “How is that possible? Everybody has to take a haircut.”

The international community must apply pressure so that China and private-sector lenders join in facilitating a collective haircut that includes all lenders.

As this year’s G20 chair, India clearly wants to position itself as the voice of the Global South, and resolving developing-country debt distress will serve as validation of its approach. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that 60 percent of low-income countries are in, or at high risk of, debt distress—double the 2015 level. However, the international community has struggled to offer a cohesive solution to resolve the most urgent cases, as the damage from COVID-19 continues to deepen, global growth remains slow, and high inflation continues.

The debt issue will be front and center when G20 finance ministers meet in India this week, with the Indian chair clearly prepared to turn up the heat on recalcitrant creditors. But representatives of the bondholders and some bankers who are major lenders to developing countries were expected to be absent from the discussions as the governments seek to resolve their differences. The meeting, however, can be a hopeful, fresh start.

India’s tongue-lashing of China, coupled with pressure on Beijing from the United States, World Bank, and IMF, brings unprecedented pressure to bear on a single sovereign lender. It is the inevitable result of Beijing’s decision to move at a snail’s pace to resolve the debt crisis that is resulting from its extensive lending—more than eight hundred billion dollars to developing countries between 2000 and 2017. But Chinese flexibility alone will not be enough to resolve the crisis. Comprehensive debt solutions will only become possible when the arm-twisting turns to private-sector creditors (such as powerful asset managers BlackRock and Aberdeen Asset Management and Swiss commodities giant Glencore) whose lending represents a large proportion of several countries’ debt.

Baby steps

To be sure, there have been small steps in that direction. Creditor committees have been established for some of the worst-off debtors—Zambia, Chad, and Ethiopia—with varied results. Committees for Ghana and Sri Lanka are likely to follow suit. But those talks have dragged, offering little hope to nations on the brink of default. The scale and depth of debt issues faced in particular by many African countries require a magnanimous, multilateral approach from all classes of creditors

By some estimates, China’s collection of official and quasi-official lenders accounts for around 13 percent of Africa’s stock of private- and public-sector external debt, much of it made at commercial rates. The private sector, by contrast, accounts for about 40 percent. Multilateral lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, which lend at zero or extremely low interest rates, account for an additional 32 percent. That has led Beijing to call for those institutions to take a haircut as well—a position that lacks support from the rest of the international community, including some borrowers. That’s because multilateral institutions need to retain their preferential status as creditors since they are often the only agencies willing to provide financial assistance during a crisis—when other lenders are unwilling to help. This impasse underlines that there can be no meaningful resolution to developing-country debt distress without the active participation of all lenders.

Of all the failures in global cooperation in recent years, the debt crisis stands out as a sad example of government lenders and private creditors working at cross purposes. At the outset of the pandemic, the G20 appeared to have found a response to the rising cases of debt distress by agreeing to a Common Framework for Debt Treatment (which governs the negotiations in Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia). Multilateral agencies stepped in to provide emergency loans and some debt relief, and G20 lenders agreed to suspend interest payments until the end of 2021. These actions provided some breathing room for countries at the front line of debt distress and gave creditors the opportunity to organize and resolve the most urgent cases.

But debt resolution in the post-pandemic era has turned into a four-legged stool comprised of national governments, the Paris Club coalition of long-time government lenders and multilateral agencies, China, and private creditors—and if two legs break, the whole stool collapses. That appears to be the case in a world with shifting power dynamics as the Paris Club, led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, has found itself out-flanked by more powerful creditors such as China and the private sector. To be sure, the latter two have sharply varying objectives when it comes to debt resolution, and there is no suggestion that they are colluding. While the private sector hopes to extract favorable terms by way of debt repayments or an outright haircut, China’s position is more ambivalent: Geopolitics plays a role, and Beijing prefers having leverage over countries in debt distress. The end result is an international community that cannot deliver.

A study in contrasts

This is starkly evident in the cases of Zambia and Sri Lanka. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen met with Chinese Vice Premier Liu He (who is expected to retire soon) in Zurich before she visited Lusaka, Zambia’s capital city, last month to, as she said, “press for all official bilateral and private-sector creditors to meaningfully participate in debt relief for Zambia, especially China.” IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva followed with her own trip to Lusaka, urging a “swift resolution.” Yet there are few overt signs of Chinese flexibility on the six billion dollars it is owed by Zambia. Meanwhile, private holders of Zambian Eurobonds, who account for about 20 percent of Zambia’s external obligations, have largely sat on their hands while the governments try to work out their differences—a stance that hasn’t helped the restructuring process across Africa.

In the case of Sri Lanka, while some major official creditors (India and the Paris Club) have provided financing assurances that are critical to unlocking an IMF loan, China has merely agreed to a two-year moratorium on debt payments, with no indication of any future forbearance. Private-sector creditors—who represent about 40 percent of the country’s outstanding debt—have pursued a more constructive approach, with one group writing to the IMF earlier this month committing to “design and implement restructuring terms.”

Why is the private sector apparently being more cooperative with Sri Lanka than Zambia? In private conversations, bankers say that Sri Lanka has better credit credentials and should be judged as a middle-income country on its capacity and ability to repay in the future. The implied conclusion here is that low-income African countries in debt distress have neither the capacity nor the means to recover from the pandemic-induced shock. If these perceptions are widely held, it is a scathing indictment of the global financial architecture, which incentivized poor countries to reduce aid dependence and encouraged them to access international capital markets to finance their development needs.

What’s next in this never-ending saga of debt and distress? The G20 will try to work out some solutions this week. Two things need to happen to signal to the international community that this year’s G20 will not be business as usual.

First, the G20 has to decide if a new sovereign debt roundtable convened last week by the World Bank and the IMF, which includes China, is a more effective way of addressing debt restructuring cases compared with the Common Framework, which appears to be mired in bureaucratic reporting requirements that have little bite. The private sector’s enthusiasm to participate in the Sri Lanka debt negotiations offers a helpful model for addressing existing and future cases of debt distress, with a focus on a few large individual institutions driving the agenda rather than cumbersome industry associations.

Second, the G20 will have to delicately make a choice regarding China’s role. If the private sector and Paris Club creditors speak with one voice, Beijing may feel isolated enough to come to terms with aligning with the international community.

A new approach is needed, but the G20’s track record of stalemate on difficult issues over the past decade hardly offers confidence. In the absence of a breakthrough, it will be up to the individual governments, led by India, to maintain public pressure. That would likely prove less effective, but Beijing has already shown it will respond to pressure on some debt-related issues—for example, when it agreed to the Common Framework.

The international community needs to build momentum in 2023 for a comprehensive debt resolution. After initially facing the risk of a lost decade of development due to the pandemic, many low-income countries in Africa now face the prospect of several lost decades. To prevent this, the private sector and China need to be shamed into joining forces with the rest of the G20 and do what India has wisely suggested—get a haircut.

Vasuki Shastry, formerly with the IMF, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Standard Chartered Bank, is the author of Has Asia Lost It? Dynamic Past, Turbulent Future. Follow him on Twitter: @vshastry.

Jeremy Mark is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center. He previously worked for the IMF and the Asian Wall Street Journal. Follow him on Twitter: @JedMark888.

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Shahid in foreign policy and security conference

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 18:37:00 +0000

original source

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State of the Order: Assessing January 2023

ssherry — Fri, 17 Feb 2023 15:05:00 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Allies Unite on Tanks. After weeks of wrangling, Germany and the United States agreed on a way forward to provide large numbers of modern tank systems to Ukraine. Berlin will deliver fourteen Leopard 2s, clearing the way for other European allies to send scores more, while Washington pledged dozens of M1 Abrams. Separately, Britain will send several Challenger 2 tanks. The moves come as Russia secured its first major battlefield advance in months, taking control of the town of Soledar as it prepared for a larger winter assault. Russian officials warned that the tank deliveries could lead to “a new level of confrontation.”

Shaping the order. The delivery of the heavily-armed tanks — among the most powerful offensive weapons systems provided to Ukraine so far — will considerably boost Kyiv’s fighting capabilities and could allow Ukrainian troops to break through Russian defenses and take back captured territory. The move also reaffirmed alliance solidarity, sending a strong signal to the Kremlin that the US and its NATO allies are determined to stay united in support of Ukraine.
Hitting home. Russian aggression, if allowed to succeed, would undermine European security and lead to a world that is more dangerous for Americans.
What to do. The US and Europe should follow this bold move by responding favorably to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s request for fighter jets and longer-range weapons, the provision of which could make a significant difference in Ukraine’s ability to push back Russian forces.

South Africa Warms to Russia. While Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was on a visit to Pretoria, South Africa’s foreign minister Naledi Pandor lauded the growing “political, economic, social, defense and security cooperation” between the two nations and announced that South Africa will join Russia and China in joint military exercises next month. The meeting was a prelude to South Africa’s hosting of the BRICS summit in August. In response, the White House expressed concerns about any “country … exercising with Russia as Russia wages a brutal war against Ukraine.”

Shaping the order. Despite US and European efforts to isolate Russia in the wake of its assault on Ukraine, the Kremlin has been able to maintain a close working relationship with South Africa and to some degree India and Brazil — major democracies that are lending support to Moscow in one way or another. As China also makes inroads in Africa and Latin America, competition in the Global South has become a defining feature of the international order.
Hitting home. Americans would be safer in a world where nations that share common values are working together to weaken and isolate aggressive dictators.
What to do. The Biden administration will need to find new approaches to incentivize democracies in the Global South to join in efforts to uphold the rules-based order.

Rioters Storm Brazil’s Capital. Thousands of supporters of Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro stormed the National Congress, presidential palace, and Supreme Court in the nation’s capital. While the Congress was not in session and newly inaugurated president Lula da Silva was out of town, the attack defaced government buildings and left a trail of destruction across Brasília as protestors claimed that the recent presidential election was marred by widespread fraud. President Biden and other world leaders condemned the assault and affirmed their support for Brazil’s democracy.

Shaping the order. The attack on the capital of South America’s largest democracy echoed that of the January 6 assault on the US Capitol and dramatically illustrates the erosion of democratic norms that many nations around the world have experienced in recent years. But with the violence quickly stemmed and large numbers of those involved taken into custody, the aftermath also highlights the resilience of Brazil’s democratic institutions.
Hitting home. Americans need to stay vigilant to defend democratic institutions from forces — internal or external — that may seek to undermine them.
What to do. Washington should continue to support President Lula’s efforts to restore order in Brazil and use the upcoming Summit for Democracy to rally democracies worldwide to uphold shared norms and principles.

Quote of the month

“[T]he most important thing [is] … that countries that believe in democracy, in the rule of law… stand together. And when we see that authoritarian regimes are coming closer, working closer together in the political, in the diplomatic domain, but also in the military domain, it is even more important that we stand together as countries believing in the rules-based international order.”

– NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in South Korea, January 30, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

Rioters stormed the Brazilian National Congress, presidential palace, and Supreme Court in the nation’s capital, claiming that the recent presidential election won by Lula da Silva was marred by widespread fraud. But order was quickly restored.
India banned a BBC documentary criticizing Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s alleged role in Hindu-Muslim riots more than 20 years ago and arrested students at university screenings — actions criticized as assaults on freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
With Venezuela’s autocratic leader Nicolás Maduro maintaining his grip on power, the US and the EU withdrew recognition of Juan Guadió as interim president of Venezuela, following a decision by the opposition-controlled National Assembly to remove him.
On balance, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↑)

In a significant boost for Ukrainian security forces, the US agreed to send 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, paving the way for Germany and other European allies to send several dozen German-made Leopard 2s.
In a break with previous policy, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol said he would consider asking the US to position nuclear weapons on the peninsula or have South Korea develop its own, if the threat from North Korea continues to escalate.
Citing different “democracy and justice systems,” Fiji terminated a police training agreement with China while allowing agreements with Australia and New Zealand to stand.
Israel conducted a drone attack against a military complex in Isfahan, a major center for Iran’s ballistic missile research and production.
A Palestinian terrorist killed seven people during Friday night prayer services outside a synagogue in East Jerusalem as tensions mounted between Israel and Palestine.
With the US and allied decisions on tanks, the security pillar was strengthened.

Trade ()

President Biden joined Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for the North American Leaders’ Summit in Mexico City, discussing supply chains and securing the “technologies of the future in North America.”
The European Union is prioritizing 70 infrastructure projects around the world, with plans to invest over $320 billion as part of its Global Gateway initiative that seeks to offer developing countries an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
While positive, these developments were relatively limited in scope, and the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

China reopened its borders to international travel after three years, as Chinese officials claimed COVID-19 cases had peaked across the country — though health experts suggested it was still too early to confirm.
The US, Canada, and Mexico issued a joint declaration pledging to meet their national commitments under the Paris Agreement, while working to keep the 1.5°C temperature goal within reach.
Overall, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

Turkish officials indicated that Ankara is unlikely to ratify Sweden and Finland’s bids for NATO membership for now and will reconsider the matter after regional elections in May or June, due to concerns over the presence of Kurdish organizations in Sweden.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, on a visit to Japan and South Korea, highlighted the challenges posed by China and reaffirmed the importance of NATO’s Asia-Pacific partnerships.
Britain and Japan signed a security agreement granting reciprocal access to each nation’s military forces, described by a British official as the “most significant defence agreement between the two countries in more than a century.”
In a sign of improving relations, South Korea and Japan plan later this year to restart joint military exercises that were suspended in 2018.
With India’s national security advisor visiting Washington, the US and India held an inaugural meeting of a new joint initiative on critical and emerging technologies intended to boost defense and technology cooperation between the two nations.
On balance, and given the significance of Turkey’s decision, the alliance pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Michael McFaul, in Foreign Affairs, argues that now is the time for allies to go big with military assistance to Ukraine to produce a breakthrough on ending the war.
Boris Johnson, in The Washington Post, makes the case for NATO membership for Ukraine.
Mary Lovely, in Foreign Affairs, contends that for friend-shoring to work in the Indo-Pacific, the US needs to offer preferential market access to those who agree to new trade provisions on China.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Dan Fried, in the New Atlanticist, weighs in on Germany’s decision to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine.
Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford, in Foreign Policy, debate Turkey’s role in NATO and whether the state helps or harms the alliance.
Nicole Bibbins Sedaca, in Perspectives, outlines how both sides of the American political spectrum need to unite against the true enemies of democracy.

__________________________________________________

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Sydney Sherry – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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ECHR ruling confirms Russian invasion of Ukraine began in 2014

Zakhar Tropin — Tue, 14 Feb 2023 16:16:46 +0000

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled on January 25 that cases brought by Ukraine and the Netherlands against Russia were admissible. This intermediate decision is a significant legal milestone in the quest for justice over Russian aggression against Ukraine, as it recognizes that parts of eastern Ukraine seized by so-called separatists in spring 2014 were in fact controlled by Russia. “The Court found that areas in eastern Ukraine in separatist hands were from May 11, 2014, and up to at least January 26, 2022, under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation,” the court stated.

This ruling confirms what had long been the world’s worst-kept secret. Ever since the appearance of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in spring 2014, it was apparent that these nominally independent entities were in fact closely tied to Russia. Nevertheless, Moscow continued to officially deny any direct involvement in eastern Ukraine until the launch of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

Russia’s blanket denials complicated the numerous international court proceedings initiated over alleged crimes committed in Ukraine following the outbreak of hostilities in 2014. The recent ECHR decision will have potentially wide-ranging implications in this context. It now paves the way for a series of international cases that had been put on hold pending a ruling over jurisdiction.

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The case in question at the ECHR relates to claims from both Ukraine and the Netherlands. The Ukrainian claims were brought against Russia in 2014, while later claims by the Netherlands are in connection with the shooting down of civilian airliner MH17 over eastern Ukraine, which resulted in the deaths of 298 people including 196 Dutch nationals.

One of the ECHR’s main conclusions was that Russia exercised effective control over the regions of eastern Ukraine nominally held by separatist forces. The court cited extensive evidence to support this conclusion including the presence of Russian military personnel in eastern Ukraine from April 2014 and the large-scale deployment of Russian troops from August 2014 at the very latest. Evidence was also provided to highlight the extensive provision of Russian weapons along with comprehensive political and economic support.

In political terms, the ECHR ruling is undoubtedly a victory for Ukraine. It confirms that the invasion of February 24, 2022, was actually a continuation of the war which began eight years earlier in 2014. It also debunks Russian attempts to depict the so-called separatist republics as legitimate representatives of the local population in eastern Ukraine. This exposes the absurdity of later Russian efforts to portray the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a response to appeals from their own puppet regimes.

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Looking ahead, the ECHR will now consider numerous human rights violations that have allegedly been committed by Russia in eastern Ukraine since 2014. The list of crimes is extensive and includes summary executions, torture, sexual violence, and the abduction of children. These offenses will be very familiar to the many Ukrainian human rights activists who are currently attempting to document alleged Russian war crimes in recently liberated parts of Ukraine such as Bucha, Kherson, and Izyum.

The ECHR decision is also an important step toward unlocking thousands of individual claims against Russia submitted to the ECHR as a result of Russian aggression in Ukraine. To date, there are more than 8000 such claims relating to gross violations of human rights in eastern Ukraine and Crimea following the Russian seizure of these Ukrainian regions.

Even though Russia is not currently a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, it is still responsible for all violations of this Convention committed until September 16, 2022, the date when Moscow terminated its participation. Nobody expects the current Russian authorities to comply with ECHR decisions or recognize the authority of the court. However, any future Russian government seeking to return to the international community will be obliged to do so. In the meantime, international human rights rulings against Russia are expected to deepen the Putin regime’s isolation and toxicity.

The recent European Court of Human Rights decision marks a new stage in the struggle to hold Russia accountable for its attack on Ukraine. However, it is important to stress that there remains a very long road ahead before justice is truly served. In parallel to the many ongoing cases against Russia relating to events dating back to 2014, discussions continue over the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, which could potentially see Russia’s political and military leadership put on trial for the current full-scale invasion. Additional war crimes probes are also underway.

These efforts are vital for the future of the international security system. Russia’s nine-year campaign of aggression against Ukraine represents an unprecedented challenge to the rules-based international order that cannot go unpunished. Thankfully, while the wheels of international justice turn slowly, they appear to be moving in the right direction.

Zakhar Tropin is a nonresident fellow at the Center for Defence Strategies in Kyiv.

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The liberation of Kherson and the surrounding region in late 2022 revealed the scale of the effort that will be necessary to restore agricultural production in regions of Ukraine subjected to Russian occupation. These regions are now believed to be among the most heavily mined areas in the world. De-mining will add significant costs and delays before farming activities can resume. Experts say that one day of war means one month of de-mining. We are already investing in de-mining equipment and personnel. At present, we calculate that with 20-25 people working ten hours a day, it will take three years to clear our fields in the worst affected areas.

To a greater or lesser degree, these problems are affecting the entire agricultural industry in Ukraine. The UN estimates that this strategically crucial sector of the Ukrainian economy has already suffered damages and losses of over $30 billion. Prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, Ukraine had been steadily expanding its global reach as a food exporter and was widely seen as an emerging agricultural superpower. There is now a very real danger that Putin will succeed in bankrupting the Ukrainian breadbasket.

Like so many other Ukrainian companies, we have been adapting our business model to wartime conditions. We have successfully re-routed exports via land and rail and have built a new grain terminal on the Danube close to the Romanian border. However, we need to invest more in order to increase our exports and reduce the much higher transportation costs that farmers are now having to pay.

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One of the key problems facing the entire private sector in wartime Ukraine is the lack of access to financing because of prohibitively high borrowing rates domestically and internationally. Not surprisingly, war creates a significant risk premium. As a result, international capital markets are effectively closed for Ukrainian companies. Alternative forms of financing are urgently needed.

The United Nations and Turkey have succeeded in establishing a grain corridor to allow limited exports of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. Now is the time to establish a “financing corridor.” Just as the grain corridor has been a lifeline for Ukraine’s agricultural sector, the Ukrainian economy needs a mechanism to help private businesses secure immediate survival and safeguard their futures by investing to become more resilient and competitive.

A financing corridor would help ensure private businesses are not forced to close and can instead go on to underpin Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery. The requirements are simple. First, lenders should offer Ukrainian businesses a standstill on their existing liabilities. A standstill will provide much-needed flexibility to address some of the immediate challenges to their operations. Second, international institutions should provide fresh financing for urgent working capital needs or strategic investments. Third, G7 countries and international financial institutions should offer partial guarantees to enable Ukraine’s major exporters to issue new debt at acceptable cost levels.

In the agricultural sector, enhanced financial support is essential as businesses look to repair or replace damaged equipment and facilities. The World Bank estimates the sector will require $18.7 billion in new investment over the coming decade. The next agricultural planting season is just around the corner. Without increased access to capital, farmers will not be able to obtain the equipment and fertiliser they need to sow their crops as planned.

If this happens, the consequences will be felt not only in Ukraine but far beyond the country’s borders as well. Reduced yields in Ukraine will impact global food security. The UN World Food Program estimates that the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine could increase the number of people at risk of acute hunger by 47 million, with the greatest impact on Sub-Saharan Africa.

Agriculture is a slow-motion business. If producers cannot invest today, the negative effects will be felt for years to come. The survival of the country’s major agricultural exporters is essential for Ukraine’s long-term economic reconstruction and recovery. It is also important for global stability. Good business strategy requires looking to the risks and opportunities that lie ahead. Western governments need to think beyond the immediate challenges of the war today and also consider what will be needed to secure Ukraine’s future.

Andriy Vadaturskyy is the owner and CEO of Ukrainian agribusiness Nibulon.

In Syria, the earthquake ‘did what the Assad regime and Russians wanted to do to us all along’

Arwa Damon — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 14:40:05 +0000

As I write this, I have images juxtaposed in my mind on top of the photos and videos that are coming out now. They are the images of past tragedies: children’s dust-covered and blood-streaked faces; mothers crying silently; and rescue teams desperately digging through rubble—often with their bare hands.

Like an evil creature from the most horrific of nightmares, the deadly 7.8-magnitude earthquake on February 6 destroyed hundreds of miles of homes and lives in southern Turkey and decimated a population that was already in many ways decimated in Syria.

I know the areas impacted by the earthquake well. The southeastern Turkish city of Gaziantep is where my charity, International Network for Aid Relief & Assistance (INARA), has its Turkey office based, and is where all our staff and beneficiaries live. In my years as a CNN senior international correspondent, that border zone is where I spent weeks on end covering everything from refugees flooding across, to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)’s takeovers of areas in Syria, to the relentless bombing of the miserable Syrian rebel-held swath of Idlib.

Turkey, well equipped to deal with the aftermath of natural disasters, has mobilized its emergency teams and military. On the ground, international rescue teams continue to arrive from the United States, Ukraine, Lebanon, Japan, and more, as many countries pledge their support for the victims in Turkey and Syria. However, whether the level of international response will be enough or not is yet to be seen. The earthquake has already killed more than 19,000 people. The scale of the crisis is incredibly vast. Turks and Syrians in Turkey have posted countless messages on social media about the lack of rescue efforts in certain areas, and people I know have messaged that their friends are still trapped under the rubble.

While aid increasingly flows into Turkey from around the world by air, land, and sea, areas on the other side of the border in Syria’s rebel-controlled areas are seeing none of that. Syrians impacted by the earthquake in northwest Syria have already endured a twelve-year war, hunger, cold, and a pandemic. They have long felt and, in fact, been abandoned by the international community. Since the earthquake rocked the region, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been pleading to international agencies and the world’s governments to provide much-needed support to implement effective search and rescue operations in the vital first seventy-two hours of the crisis.

In a continuation of what has become a daily reality throughout the last twelve years, NGOs have to beg and plead for funding for Syria, but never come close to hitting their targets. On the ground, the Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets—experts in saving lives in the aftermath of bombings—has been leading the search and rescue efforts. However, this level of destruction all at once eclipses their capacity.

The White Helmets and other volunteer groups are suffering from a lack of everything that they could possibly need, including a shortage of diesel to run their heavy machinery, a lack of shelters for those now out in the cold and snow, and a lack of winterization kits. While local organizations rush to deliver humanitarian assistance—a drop in the bucket of what is needed—there has yet to be a single official rescue team dispatched by governments across one particular border into Syria. In fact, there has not been anything going across that border at all.

Despite having several functioning border crossings between Turkey and northwest Syria, there is only one lone border crossing that has been authorized by the United Nations (UN) Security Council to deliver UN aid to rebel-held Idlib and the 4.1 million people who live there, many of whom are originally from elsewhere, having fled bombings by the Bashar al-Assad regime, Russia, and Iran multiple times. The border crossing’s existence has always been heavily politicized, with the threat of a Russian veto looming every six to twelve months as the Assad government in Damascus continues to insist that all aid to Syria should come through the capital. Right now, that border crossing is not functional. The UN has said that, while the crossing itself is intact, the roads leading to it are either closed or damaged—all of which leaves this rebel-held region at the mercy of its meager resources and a government that wants to wipe its population off the map.

The Assad government-controlled areas, like Aleppo and Lattakia, have also been impacted in devastating fashion. Hundreds have lost their lives there, since there is a severe lack of infrastructure or ability to launch rescue operations despite being under Assad regime control. However, aid has arrived in Damascus from countries like Iraq, Iran, and Russia.

In theory, Damascus could be an entryway to reach all Syrians in need, but that’s hardly about to happen, given that access to humanitarian aid has become one of the biggest geopolitical cards. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock called on Russia and all international actors to put pressure on the Assad regime to allow aid to reach everyone in the country. This is tragically laughable, since the international voices that did not work to stop the Assad government from bombing its people are hardly going to be effective in getting the regime to feed and keep its people warm.

To quote a Syrian friend in the hours after the earthquake struck: “It did what the Assad regime and Russians wanted to do to us all along.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and a former senior international correspondent at CNN.

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Pan-Africanism and soccer: How Africa can secure its next diplomatic win

Deneyse A. Kirkpatrick — Wed, 08 Feb 2023 19:22:18 +0000

Morocco’s magical run at the 2022 World Cup, where it became the first African nation to reach the semifinal, was celebrated across the continent. What brought Morocco to that moment was not just talent, but also the Pan-African movement that opened doors for African nations’ inclusion in global institutions like the Fédération Internationale De Football Association (FIFA).

Africa’s advancement today is still tied to Pan-Africanism. And with the upcoming 2024 Paris Olympics and 2026 World Cup in North America, African nations have an opportunity to collectively lobby for permanent representation in institutions including the Group of Twenty (G20) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). They’ll be able to combine the modern media spotlight of these global events with a model established nearly six decades ago.

The 1966 strikers

The 1966 World Cup offers a clear example of Africa using smart power and bloc voting to push for greater representation, and it speaks to the potential of Pan-Africanism to shape the continent’s integration in the global community today.

Nelson Mandela once said: “Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does.” For Africans in the 1960s, soccer was a unifying vehicle that helped them advance a regional agenda in the new world order that followed a wave of African nations declaring independence.

FIFA, which was established in Paris in 1904 by soccer officials from seven European countries, did not envision Africa as integral to the sport—as shown by its decision to allocate fifteen of the sixteen team slots in the 1966 World Cup to countries in Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. That left almost thirty countries across Africa and Asia competing for one slot, sparking great discontent, with some arguing an injustice was being placed on already disadvantaged countries. In response to FIFA’s decision, Africa boycotted the tournament.

When Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah tapped Ohene Djan, Ghana’s Football Association president, to lead the fifteen-nation African boycott, three things happened: It brought African soccer to the fore, laid the foundation for Sub-Saharan Africa and newly independent nations to flex global influence, and forced FIFA to open more qualifying spots for non-European countries. Ultimately, the boycott displayed the growing importance of the African regional bloc in the geopolitical sphere.

Tackling barriers with Black political power

One of the important factors that contributed to Africa’s effectiveness in boycotting FIFA was Pan-Africanism, the movement to unite and mobilize everyone of African descent (including Black people in the United States, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean) in the pursuit of shared goals such as eliminating racism and colonialism. In the spirit of collaboration around a shared experience, Nkrumah, who is considered a founding father of Pan-Africanism, exercised grassroots soccer diplomacy and reinforced the idea among African thought leaders that solidarity would be the key to improving representation and inclusion.

Such thinking, heavily influenced by the African-American experience, defined the way in which Africa inserted itself into the Cold-War geopolitics of the time and asserted its claim to representation in global institutions. Specifically, Nkrumah’s engagement with African Americans during his formative years in the United States was critical. In his pursuit for African sovereignty—and while a student at historically Black Lincoln University in Pennsylvania—Nkrumah sought not only to understand the common struggle among Black people but also to identify global solutions for addressing structural racism. Later on, his interactions with African American civil-society leaders including W.E.B. Du Bois, Martin Luther King Jr., and Malcom X transformed diaspora relations.

The US civil rights movement inspired an identity shift among Black people from colonized to citizen, informing Nkrumah’s perspective. Using his platform as the leader of the first independent African nation south of the Sahara, he helped shape the thinking on African citizenship and its connection to a larger struggle rooted in a shared Black experience. Such a framework integrated common cultural experiences, values, and interpretations shared among people of African descent. Nkrumah’s concept for African citizenship also encouraged Africans of newly independent countries to see themselves as global actors, ultimately influencing Africa’s conduct of international affairs—including the continent’s participation in the World Cup.

Nkrumah saw the need to push for change in soccer, a sport heavily tied to politics. His solution to address FIFA’s barriers drew from the African American experience as well: Boycotts throughout the civil rights movement became synonymous with the fight against exclusionary institutions. In taking a page from the African American liberation struggle playbook, members of the boycott during the World Cup saw themselves as confronting similar barriers that inhibited integration.

All players on the pitch

Since FIFA’s inception, countries have used World Cup diplomacy to advance nation branding (or convey a particular image of their national identities), political protest, and grassroots diplomacy. For example, at the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, the host country promoted a specific image of itself as a strong and newly emerging international market player in an attempt to expand its soft power: Recall the theme “all in one rhythm,” which promoted collaboration. In another example of how countries have used World Cup diplomacy, players, countries, and international institutions against apartheid boycotted South Africa, and in response FIFA suspended South Africa in 1961.

Following the 1966 boycott, Nkrumah leveraged his platform to engage and persuade FIFA to make the World Cup more inclusive. He showcased smart power in a way that did more than change soccer; it influenced how Africans saw themselves in the global community. In particular, Ghana’s leadership around the boycott helped change perceptions about Africa and its international profile.

The collective front of boycotting countries highlighted Africans’ abilities to think for themselves and navigate Western institutions. And, with the boycott, Africans demonstrated that they, too, could play the game of global politics, using Western platforms and tactics such as regional bloc voting, collective bargaining, and political mobilization to compel change from FIFA. In doing so, African leadership challenged the idea that Africans lacked intellectual savviness to advance their causes. The act of taking on established institutions such as FIFA brought to light the importance of representation, which enabled African nations, through nation branding, to enhance their soft power.

Pan-Africanism, as it was in the 1960s, remains an increasingly critical tool for African nations searching for ways to assert themselves in the era of great-power competition and looking to change the course of development across the continent.

In the next three years, African nations will have two venues—the 2024 Paris Olympics and 2026 World Cup spread across the United States, Canada, and Mexico—at which they can unite with the diaspora, mobilize their diplomatic corps, and propel their regional organizations to lobby for permanent representation in the G20 and UNSC. A renewed approach to African bloc engagement—in which African nations and the diaspora exert influence to direct their advancement on their terms and engage in public diplomacy with other leaders in attendance at international convenings—would acknowledge Africa’s pivotal role in forging global peace and prosperity.

A renewed approach to African bloc engagement would also unlock new avenues for addressing the toughest challenges facing the international community. Intellectual, financial, and entrepreneurial collaboration between Africans and the diaspora through knowledge sharing and partnerships could address global challenges such as climate change, social injustice, and economic exclusion. The combination of Africa’s wealth of natural resources and its burgeoning youth population gives the continent strength that, with the support of the African diaspora, could potentially reshape power dynamics in favor of Africa’s development. The 1966 World Cup boycott showed that when an international intervention gets a dose of Pan-Africanism, change on a global scale is possible.

Deneyse A. Kirkpatrick is the senior advisor at the US Department of State’s Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and an award-winning public diplomacy expert. Her previous diplomatic postings include Angola, Niger, Iraq, Brazil, and Egypt. Follow her on Linkedin. The views in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the State Department or the US government.

Transcript Dec 19, 2022

Macky Sall: Africa needs ‘justice and equity in international relations’ to ‘build its own destiny’

By Atlantic Council

Senagal’s president, who is also the head of the African Union, spoke at an Atlantic Council dinner ahead of the US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Jun 20, 2022

Time to get ‘glocal’: Here’s how the US can better connect the African and African diaspora communities

By Tyrell Junius

In this new vision, the United States should implement policies at the local level that fold into an international agenda.

Africa Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Mar 15, 2022

Africa’s sports industry is revving up. It will fuel a generation of young leaders.

By Katherine Walla

Here are highlights from the Africa Center’s Sports Business Forum which covered everything from optimizing youth talent across Africa to fostering inclusion in sports.

Africa Economy & Business

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Russian presence at Paris Olympics risks normalizing Ukraine invasion

Mark Temnycky — Thu, 02 Feb 2023 17:54:53 +0000

On January 25, news broke that the International Olympic Committee would allow Russian athletes to compete at the 2024 Summer Olympic Games in Paris under a neutral flag. The decision has sparked controversy and revived a longstanding debate over the separation of sport from politics.

Many critics slammed the IOC decision as a step toward normalizing relations with Russia despite Moscow’s ongoing genocidal invasion of Ukraine. “Ukrainian decathlete Volodymyr Androshchuk will not be representing his country at the Paris Olympics because he was just killed by the Russian armed forces. In other news, the IOC announces that Russian athletes are welcome in Paris,” tweeted Yale historian Timothy Snyder on February 1.

Some went even further. A joint statement from a coalition of Ukrainian athletes and the Global Athlete movement drew attention to Russia’s record of exploiting the Olympics for propaganda purposes. “Russia used the Sochi Olympics to bolster its international standing before annexing Crimea,” the statement highlighted. “Russia has proven time and time again that athletes are an integral part of its foreign policy. If Russian athletes are allowed to return to international competition, the Russian state will again use athletes to bolster the war effort and distract from the atrocities in Ukraine.”

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Anger over the IOC decision reflects global outrage at the brutality of the invasion launched by Russia in February 2022. As the war in Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, the list of Russian atrocities continues to grow. Thousands of Ukrainian civilians have been killed and more than ten million people have been displaced by the fighting. Dozens of towns and cities have been reduced to rubble by Vladimir Putin’s advancing army, while regions of Ukraine occupied by Russia have reportedly been subjected to an array of war crimes including mass executions, torture, sexual violence, and forced deportations.

With Russia showing no signs of abandoning its efforts to extinguish Ukrainian independence and force Ukrainians back into the Kremlin orbit, there appears to be little scope for a negotiated settlement that would lead to a sustainable peace. Instead, it is becoming increasingly clear that the only way to end the war is on the battlefield. Unless Russia is decisively defeated, the war will continue.

As the Russian invasion enters its second year, it is imperative to maintain support for Ukraine. If the international community starts taking steps to normalize relations with Russia, this could set a dangerous precedent. The Kremlin has long predicted that Western leaders will eventually lose interest in Ukraine and seek to resume cooperation with Russia. Allowing Russian athletes to return to the Olympic Games would send a strong signal that such expectations are entirely realistic. Other authoritarian rulers would also note the West’s apparently short attention span and draw the obvious conclusions for their own aggressive foreign policies.

Opponents of the IOC stance argue that allowing an unrepentant Russia to return to the Olympics is particularly foolish given the long history of failed attempts to appease the Kremlin. Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the United States initiated a notorious “reset” of relations with Russia. Meanwhile, European leaders continued to advocate policies of appeasement and pursued deepening economic ties with Moscow right up until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Ukrainian officials and their colleagues in the Baltic states, Poland, and other former Warsaw Pact countries advised against these policies for many years but were consistently ignored or accused of exaggerating the Russian threat. With the largest European conflict since World War II now raging in Ukraine, such accusations are no longer valid. If the Olympic authorities choose to ignore the war and insist on the return of Russian athletes, it will strike a powerful blow against international unity in support of Ukraine.

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How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy ” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Numerous individual athletes and national sporting associations have already voiced their concerns over the possible return of Russian athletes to Olympic competition. Many also continue to stand with Ukraine. It is important to note that the IOC has demonstrated its support, establishing a solidarity fund to help the Ukrainian Olympic community that had raised $7.5 million by summer 2022.

“Many members of the Olympic community are continuing to make huge efforts to support the Ukrainian Olympic community,” an IOC spokesperson commented recently. “These efforts take the form not just of financial aid but also logistical support and ensuring Ukrainian athletes can continue to take part in competitions by providing travel support, training facilities, accommodation, equipment, and uniforms.”

Support for Ukraine has come from many of the world’s top sporting brands. In the United Kingdom, the English Premier League dedicated one week’s matches during the 2021/2022 season to the people of Ukraine. Numerous individual English football clubs including Leicester City, Leeds United, and West Ham United organized charity events and donations for Ukraine. Across Europe, football clubs have played charity games against Ukrainian teams Dynamo Kyiv and Shakhtar Donetsk in order to raise money for Ukrainian causes.

In the world of tennis, top players including Rafael Nadal participated in a charity competition ahead of the US Open. “I’m incredibly proud of the way we were able to use the global platform of the US Open to increase the worldwide tennis community’s support for the Ukrainian people,” USTA Chairman of the Board and President Mike McNulty said on the US Open website.

The support for Ukraine demonstrated by members of the international sporting community is meaningful. However, if Russian athletes are given the green light to participate at the 2024 Paris Olympics, this will send a clear message that the international community is no longer fully committed to opposing the invasion of Ukraine. That would be catastrophic for the Ukrainian people and would also have dire consequences for the future of European security.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and an accredited freelance journalist covering Eastern Europe.

On October 25, 2021, however, a military coup upended that progress. Now, as the international community and domestic Sudanese actors, including the military and civilian groups, work toward a restoration of democracy, a number of challenges confront them. How they address them could either make or break the dreams of the young Sudanese behind the 2019 revolution.

A fresh start

The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have helped restart dialogue and have initiated a road map for transition. On December 5, 2022, the army, FFC, other political forces, civil society organizations, and some youth resistance committees signed a framework agreement to establish a civilian government to manage a democratic transition for two years, ending with free and fair elections.

Planning for general elections after a short transitional period must incorporate creative arrangements that account for the multiple political, security, and economic crises that Sudan faces.

The prospects for elections in Sudan must be discussed within the framework of the transition process as a whole. A crucial decision to be made by the political actors is the timing and sequencing of the election in relation to other transitional tasks, including peace-making and implementation or revision of the JPA, transitional justice, dismantling the power structures of the previous regime, economic reform, and constitution-building.

The election dilemma

The relationship between elections and constitution-building is particularly important. If elections are to be held, the question is to what? There must be some body—with a defined constitutional structure, powers, roles, and terms of office—that is being elected, and which once elected can fulfil its mandate.

Holding credible elections means more than the elections themselves being free and fair. It also means that the parameters defining the body to be elected must be broadly accepted and legitimate. Without that, losers of the election will challenge the legitimacy of the elected institutions, while the winners will push their victory to extremes and potentially have no limits in power. It’s an invitation to instability.

There is no scope for elected institutions under the 2019 Constitutional Charter. In August 2022, the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) proposed a new draft constitution as a framework for restoring the democratic path and regulating the procedures of the transitional period. This draft did not provide provisions for holding elections. All its institutions are appointed, not elected. This is because, until now, it has always been assumed that the transition will culminate with elections, rather than elections being part of a broader transitional process. The requirement for elections to be held at the end of the transitional period is specified in Article 13 of the JPA.

This is unusual. Often elections happen at some point in the middle of a transition process. In many cases, transitional institutions—such as a constituent assembly—are elected under a transitional constitution, and a final or permanent constitution is then developed by that elected body.

Elections or Constitution: What comes first?

The requirement that elections will happen only at the end of the transition places a huge burden on unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution before elections can take place.

Holding elections after the transitional period, and not in the middle of it, also means the transitional period has to be relatively short. Elections, which are vital to public legitimacy and to the establishment of normal institutionalized politics, cannot be postponed indefinitely. At some point the people of Sudan must decide on who and how they will be governed.

Yet there is reason to be concerned that there might not be enough time to develop a permanent constitution, based on a sufficient consensus, before the planned end of the transitional period.

There are only three (non-attractive) possible solutions:

Amend transitional constitutional documents, to allow for elections to transitional institutions, before the end of the transition process, with a permanent constitution to be developed after the election—although that is against Article 13 of the JPA.
Rush permanent constitution-building, to get a constitution in place before the scheduled end of the transition, with necessary compromises on the quality of document and on the extent to which the process can be fully inclusive.
Delay elections indefinitely until after the completion of permanent constitution-making, which may result in the ebbing away of the legitimacy of transitional institutions and raise the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention.

Whatever the case, the signatories to the Framework Agreement have begun to hold stakeholder conferences to discuss four fundamental issues necessary for signing the final political agreement: security sector reform, transitional justice issues, the regional case of eastern Sudan, and the issue of amending the JPA.

It is important to make use of these ongoing consultations to discuss extending the transitional period to accommodate institutional and legislative reforms and the necessary logistical preparations for elections. The international community, including UNITAMS, can help transfer technical expertise, international experiences, lessons learned, and resources to assist a democratic transition and plan elections, and to support sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

Aside from the constitution, Articles 12 and 13 of the JPA establish other preconditions for the holding of credible elections. They include:

arrangements for international monitoring
implementation of the agreed-upon plan for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees
the conduct of the population census, “in an effective and transparent manner before the end of the transitional period, with international support and oversight”
the enactment of a Political Parties Law
the formation of the Electoral Commission

Similar preconditions are also specified in the draft constitution presented by the SBA. Additionally, it is necessary to conduct a campaign to make voters aware of the new constitution and of the electoral system.

This is a lot to do, and Sudan is starting from a low baseline. If the transition period is to be just two years, Sudan will require considerable technical support, and investment of resources, to meet the requirements of the JPA and the SBA’s draft transitional constitution.

Role of the international community

Since the formation of the transitional government in August 2019, a broad international campaign has been launched to support the democratic transition in Sudan. My organization, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), has joined this effort by providing technical support to the transitional government, especially in supporting the formation of the Electoral Commission and the Constitution Making Commission, and in enacting laws related to these commissions. This support from international institutions must continue and be consistent with the political changes that occur.

There is a mandate for such support. Security Council Resolution 2425 of 2020, establishing UNITAMS, gave the UN mission in Sudan a mandate to provide assistance related to the transition and peace. Given the scale of the task and tight deadline, such financial and programmatic support must be provided urgently. Much of the preparatory work, both on elections and on the constitution, can be started now, for example the formation of working groups and technical committees.

There is also precedent for this support. The Electoral Assistance Mission in Iraq was formed within the larger Iraq mission, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2576 (2021), to provide advice, support, and technical assistance to Iraq in planning, preparing, and conducting elections and referendums. Similarly, the European Union delegation assisted Jordan (2016) and Lebanon (2022). The African Union deployed, in May 2019, a team of observers and a team of technical experts ahead of the elections in Malawi.

The threats that may result from holding elections amid challenging security conditions—including the weaknesses and divisions within the state’s security institutions—cannot be overlooked. In addition to financial and logistical assistance, an international assistance mission should provide a qualified, trained, and experienced security force.

No time to waste

It is necessary to start soon and move fast to help build political consensus around the design of the process and the sequencing of the transition.

Failure to reach a political agreement on the electoral processes, on the constitutional structures that give rise to elections, and on legal rules regulating elections, may cause political tension, which could disrupt the elections and undermine the democratic transition.

The opportunities currently available to the Sudanese people to discuss issues of democratization, including the issue of organizing free and credible elections, with the help of the international community, might not last forever.

The international community needs to provide substantial support for the coming elections in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. This is vital for security, peace, and political stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Failure to do so would create security, political, and social risks that are difficult to count—or predict.

Sami A. Saeed is the head of the Sudan program at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. He previously served at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan from 2006–2020.

AfricaSource Apr 11, 2022

The days of elite deals in Sudan should be over

By Cameron Hudson

It is not too late for Washington to correct the course on Sudan and help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact.

Africa Politics & Diplomacy

How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy ” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

AfricaSource Sep 27, 2022

Here’s what a Marshall Plan for the DRC could look like

By Jean-Paul Mvogo

The development progress the DRC witnessed in the 1970s is now lost. A massive economic assistance program equivalent to the Marshall Plan may be necessary to recover what’s been lost.

Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo

How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy ” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

AfricaSource Oct 7, 2022

How Niger’s safety net helps its most vulnerable citizens thrive amid crises

By Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou and Mamta Murthi

The World Bank’s Wadata Talaka safety-net partnership program with Niger aims to empower women in the country and protect its human-capital gains in the face of overlapping shocks.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

The post How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How a health attache can elevate global health diplomacy

South Asia Center — Thu, 26 Jan 2023 15:59:58 +0000

COVID-19 highlighted the flaws and inequalities in global public health systems as well as transboundary cooperation. As the world emerges from the pandemic, it is a critical time for health policymakers, diplomats, foreign governments, inter-country organizations, and practitioners to innovate and fill the gaps in the system.

In his recently published issue brief Health attaches are the missing link in global diplomacy, South Asia Center non-resident senior fellow Dr. Edmond Fernandes argues that health attaches are the missing piece in diplomacy to strengthen global health infrastructure. He asserts that the system would benefit from having trained medical experts as health attaches to be the first line of communication between countries on the subject of global public health.

To launch the issue brief, the South Asia Center convened a panel of experts including academics and practitioners along with the author to assess the issue while reflecting on the wider need to prioritize global health diplomacy.

This program was recorded on January 17, 2023.

Featuring

Dr. Edmond Fernandes
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

Amb. Mustapha Jawara
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to India with Accreditation to Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bangladesh
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Gambia

Dr. Rebecca Katz
Professor and Director of the Center for Global Health Science and Security
Georgetown University

Dr. Syed Muntasir Mamun
Chief Innovation Officer & Director General, International Trade, Investment & Technology, ICT
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh

Moderated by

Dr. Amita Vyas
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Issue Brief Dec 5, 2022

Health attaches are the missing link in global diplomacy

By Dr. Edmond Fernandes

Given the globalized nature of the modern world, with frequent travel and people living outside their home countries for extended periods for a variety of reasons, standardizing a healthcare liaison from one’s home government would be a crucial step in internationalizing public health diplomacy.

Coronavirus Human Rights

New Atlanticist Sep 8, 2022

How South Asian countries can protect their migrant workers abroad

By Elaine Zhang

India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have a role to play in creating safer and more prosperous conditions for their citizens working abroad.

Human Rights Inclusive Growth

SouthAsiaSource Jun 27, 2022

COVID-19 and tourism in the Himalayan & Indian Ocean countries of South Asia

By South Asia Center

While in 2019 tourism was among the fastest growing sectors in South Asia, the pandemic resulted in billions of dollars in losses across the region. To understand these developments, the South Asia Center brought together a panel of experts to discuss COVID-19 and the future of tourism in the Himalayan and Indian Ocean Countries of South Asia.

Climate Change & Climate Action Coronavirus

Southasiasource blog

The post How a health attache can elevate global health diplomacy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is a make-or-break year for US-Caribbean relations

Wazim Mowla — Tue, 24 Jan 2023 15:46:43 +0000

Bahamian Prime Minister and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Chair Philip Davis’s trip to Washington last week shows that, because the United States recently “reengaged” with the Caribbean, 2023 could be transformative for US-Caribbean cooperation. But for that to happen, the United States must change its Caribbean strategy by focusing on making good on its promises, letting the Caribbean lead, and updating security partnerships.

The United States has historically been the Caribbean’s preferred ally, mainly due to proximity. The movement of goods, people, and services to, from, and within the Caribbean often involves the United States. But despite the historical strength of the relationship, there remains a simmering frustration among Caribbean leaders about the United States’ empty and unfulfilled promises and an absence of consistent attention from US officials, which have kept the US-Caribbean relationship from truly deepening. The Caribbean has always seen the potential benefits of its relationship with the United States, but the same cannot be said the other way around.

Last year did see the United States making critical investments in its partnership with the Caribbean. In June, on the sidelines of the Summit of the Americas, US Vice President Kamala Harris announced the US-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030 (PACC 2030)—a new framework created to support climate and energy resilience in the Caribbean. The next day, US President Joe Biden met with Caribbean leaders, and the convening was praised by many across the region. And in a show of the region’s appetite to work with the United States, five Caribbean leaders met with Harris in September to discuss improving future cooperation; at the meeting, the United States announced new commitments to support the region’s energy, food, and financial security.

Last year the United States was in listening mode, and US statements and policies reflected as much. But 2023 promises to be the year in which the United States can finally satisfy some of the Caribbean’s needs and calm its frustrations. Today, there is confidence in the Caribbean that the United States understands the region’s challenges and priorities. Caribbean governments are looking for action, and it will be important that the United States delivers in what is expected to be a pivotal year for the relationship.

With the challenges the region faces, the Caribbean no longer has time to wait on the United States for action—and the United States can’t keep putting it off. Davis, speaking at the Atlantic Council on Tuesday, explained that if the United States fails to pay attention, “someone else will pay the attention.” For example, while China’s influence in the Caribbean has diminished, large projects and new concessional loans are beginning to pop up again, such as a $192 million concessional loan to Guyana to finance a road project and a new agreement with Suriname to expand city surveillance. At the same time, many Caribbean governments have broken from the zero-sum US-China competition narrative that pervades Washington and are building bridges with others including India, the African Union, and the United Arab Emirates.

Furthermore, any further delays mean that potential policy shifts may have a vanishingly short shelf life, as the 2024 presidential election approaches. US policy toward the Caribbean has seen more change than continuity, as each administration brings its own different approach.

What should the United States focus on in 2023?

The United States must understand that showing up is only half the battle. Calls from Caribbean leaders demanding that the United States pay more attention to the region after decades of neglect have translated into more US officials showing up at Caribbean-wide meetings and has resulted in more government and private-sector visits. This should continue but it should not be considered sufficient for the US-Caribbean relationship, which requires policy implementation. Continuing to show up with little to show for it will only create more frustration among Caribbean leaders in the medium to long term.

In 2023, the United States should focus on three key areas:

The United States should fulfill its PACC 2030 promises. PACC 2030 requires a full interagency effort, so the United States should ensure the Treasury, State Department, and vice president’s office are aligned on how to move forward with this massive undertaking. US officials should work with Congress on legislation that enshrines PACC 2030 for the long term. Lawmakers should also allocate funding to each of PACC 2030’s four pillars—development finance, clean-energy projects, local capacity-building, and deepening collaboration.

Second, the United States should let the Caribbean lead in areas for which it has in-house expertise and support the Caribbean’s positions in multilateral organizations. Most Caribbean countries are dependent on imports for energy and food, making the supply squeezes caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine particularly devastating for the region. While US help is needed, regional leaders are pushing forward on their own solutions. CARICOM’s plan to reduce the region’s food-import bill by 25 percent by 2025 is one such example. Here, the United States does not need a food-security policy for the region but instead should provide technical expertise and financing for Caribbean-led solutions.

US advocacy for Caribbean and small-state priorities in multilateral meetings that include other wealthy and powerful actors, such as the Group of Twenty (G20) and international financial institutions, can move the needle on solutions to these countries’ economic challenges. International support is needed in tackling the Caribbean’s struggles with debt relief, financial de-risking (the loss of correspondent banking relations with overseas banks), and poor access to concessional financing. For the United States, there are inherent benefits because slow Caribbean economic growth drives migration; plus, stronger economies can help preserve the strength of the region’s democracies.

Finally, the United States should address the region’s growing security concerns. Rightfully, climate, energy, and financial resilience have all featured prominently in the Biden administration’s Caribbean policies, but this has also meant that security challenges have lost prominence. Crime, violence, and gang activity have skyrocketed across the region over the past year. Trinidad and Tobago’s homicide rate in 2022 reached its highest level in more than a decade, and a rise in gang activity pushed Jamaica to institute a state of emergency. And per capita, Saint Lucia now ranks in the top 5 of highest homicide rates in the hemisphere.

This increase has been fueled in part by small-arms trafficking, with illicit small arms being imported into the Caribbean from the United States. Caribbean islands have limited security forces with numerous unmanned ports of entry, making the region a hotbed for small arms trafficking. Increased US-Caribbean security cooperation is needed. But first, US policies and projects—such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)—should be updated to reflect the region’s current security concerns. The CBSI barely touches on illicit small arms, for example; the United States should work this year with Congress and the Department of Defense to refocus its current security efforts.

After the progress of 2022, Caribbean leaders expect action instead of just more promises. The region knows that to survive climate change, rising food inflation, and its vulnerability to global economic shocks, it’ll need to leverage a US partnership that is backed by technical and financial resources. It adds up to a make-or-break year for US-Caribbean relations. As the United States begins to show attention to the Caribbean and regional leaders continue to welcome more US support, the timing has never been better to see real action. Without it, Caribbean nations could seek out more willing partners.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director of the Caribbean Initiative at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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State of the Order: Looking Back on 2022

daniellemiller — Tue, 24 Jan 2023 15:40:48 +0000

This special edition of State of the Order breaks down the most important events that shaped the democratic world order last year.

Reshaping the order

The year’s three topline developments

Russia’s Invasion Stalls. Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine constituted the most significant geopolitical event in 2022. Russian troops crossed into Ukraine overtly aiming to overthrow the country’s democratic government, but despite being outnumbered, Ukrainian forces thwarted Russian president Vladimir Putin’s plans for a decisive military victory. While Ukraine was able to take back some of the territory seized by Russia, Russian troops remained in control of much of eastern and southern Ukraine. The US and its NATO allies responded to Moscow’s invasion by providing increasingly sophisticated weapons and economic support for Kyiv, while imposing sanctions and restrictions on Russian oil sales that have significantly damaged Russia’s economy.

Shaping the order. Russia’s brazen assault on Ukraine constitutes an egregious violation of fundamental norms of the rules-based order – the prohibition of aggression against sovereign states and the seizure of territory. Despite mounting casualties, Putin showed no signs of backing down, and appears determined to reconstitute a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. But rather than creating fissures within the West, as the Kremlin had hoped, Russia’s actions brought the US and its allies closer together, as they joined in common cause to help defend a democracy under attack.
Hitting home. Putin’s aggression reminds Americans of the dangers posed by aggressive dictators, and that it is beneficial for the US to work with its NATO allies to defend democracy and shared security interests.
What to do. The administration should coordinate closely with allies to provide more advanced military equipment to Ukraine and help ensure that Kyiv has what it needs to continue to roll back Russian gains and ultimately force Russia to withdraw all troops from the country.

A World Divided. A key development in 2022 was the intensifying polarization between leading democracies and revisionist autocracies. China and Russia issued a joint manifesto forging a “no limits” strategic partnership, asserting their desire to push back against key tenets of the democratic world order, while Iran and North Korea provided direct military support to Russia for its war in Ukraine. At the same time, the G7, NATO and democracies in the Asia-Pacific came together to condemn Russia and help defend Ukraine. The US and its allies also began to find greater convergence on China, with the G7 criticizing Beijing’s “threatening actions” around Taiwan and NATO adopting a new Strategic Concept that, for the first time, cites China as a strategic priority.

Shaping the order. The show of solidarity between the leaders of Russia and China, while being tested in Ukraine, could mark a key inflection point in shaping the global order. The world appears to be dividing into blocs, with the advanced democracies of the free world standing on one side, while Russia and China build an expanding “axis of autocracy” aimed at pushing back on the US-led rules-based order. Meanwhile, much of the global South remained largely on the sidelines.
Hitting home. The strategic competition with revisionist autocracies will have direct implications for American businesses, which will need to look at ways to reduce vulnerabilities to Chinese and Russian suppliers as pressure toward selective economic decoupling continues to build.
What to do. The United States should coordinate with allies and partners to prepare for a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia, while seeking new ways to incentive democracies in the global South to advance common goals.

Autocracies Under Pressure. Anti-regime protestors took to the streets across Iran, China, and Russia, and other authoritarian states in 2022. The triggers for the protests varied – anger at the morality police in Iran; frustration over zero-COVID policies in China; anti-war sentiments in Russia – but all sought greater openness and political change. The autocratic regimes responded by arresting and intimidating demonstrators, restricting social media, and placing protestors on trial.

Shaping the order. The protests appear to be part of a pattern of growing citizen unrest in autocracies around the world, signaling the desire for freedom and governance that reflects the will of the people. But authoritarian regimes have become increasingly adept in clamping down on demonstrations and blunting their impacts, including by deploying and sharing more sophisticated surveillance technologies.
Hitting home. American values are better protected in a world where democratic norms and human rights are respected.
What to do. In coordination with allies, the Biden administration should supplement measures to constrain authoritarian governments with assistance to nonviolent pro-democracy movements across the world. The upcoming Summit for Democracy, in March 2023, will provide an opportunity to advance efforts in this space.

Quote of the year

“[W]e [have] emerged anew in the great battle for freedom. A battle between democracy and autocracy. Between liberty and repression. Between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force… We need to steel ourselves of a long fight ahead… And finally, and most urgently, we maintain absolute unity – we must – among the world’s democracies.”

– President Joe Biden, speaking in Warsaw, March 26, 2022

State of the Order in 2022: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy ( )

Ukraine – a fledgling democracy on Russia’s periphery – survived an existential threat, as Russian forces invaded the country and continued to fight for control.
Large-scale protests broke out across Iran after the killing of a young woman while in police custody because she refused to wear a hijab. Iranian security forces reacted violently to suppress the anti-regime demonstrations, while authorities ordered the executions of many of those involved.
In the most significant protest movement in mainland China since the Tiananmen Square massacre, thousands of citizens across the country demonstrated against Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policies. Government authorities quickly detained protestors and suppressed further demonstrations.
In Brazil, South America’s largest democracy, president Jair Bolsonaro reluctantly agreed to transfer power to former president Lula da Silva after being narrowly defeated in a runoff election.
Once seen as a pariah, Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman was resurrected on the global stage, welcoming President Biden to Saudi Arabia with an infamous fist-bump – despite Biden’s pledge to hold the regime accountable for the execution of dissident Jamal Khashoggi.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ( ↓ )

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marked the most significant assault on European security in decades, resulting in devastating loss of life and physical destruction of towns and cities across the country. The US and its NATO allies responded by providing Ukraine with advanced military equipment to help defend against Russian forces.
Putin and Chinese president Xi Jinping issued an extraordinary joint manifesto pushing back against key tenets of the democratic world order, and affirming their intent to deepen cooperation on an encompassing range of economic, political, and security issues.
In an aggressive show of support, Iran and North Korea provided arms shipments to assist the Kremlin’s war effort in Ukraine, as part of a growing partnership among the autocratic regimes.
Xi Jinping secured a third term as general secretary of the party, as China continued its threats and intimidation against Taiwan. Separately, Beijing signed a groundbreaking security agreement with the Solomon Islands that could allow China to establish a permanent military presence in the South Pacific.
Multilateral negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear agreement faltered, as Tehran rapidly expanded its weapons grade uranium enrichment production and narrowed the breakout time it needs to produce a nuclear device to within weeks.
On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ( )

With thirteen other nations on board, the US unveiled plans for an significant new regional trade pact – the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework – aimed in part to counter China’s growing economic influence in the region.
The G7, along with the EU and several Asia-Pacific allies, imposed broad economic sanctions on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, including an EU ban on some Russian oil imports and an oil price cap, as well as export restrictions on technology. But Moscow welcomed China and India’s decisions to vastly increase oil purchases from Russia at premium discounts.
The US Congress passed groundbreaking legislation – the CHIPS Act – to help strengthen US competitiveness vis a vis China. The EU adopted a similar measure, allocating $46 billion to subsidize semiconductor production.
The EU, South Korea, and other US allies expressed concerns about rising US protectionism and discriminatory treatment, pointing to recent “buy American” provisions in spending bills and legislation providing subsidies for US companies.
On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ( )

While the level of carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere reached a record high, 2022 brought significant progress to address climate change. Congress passed a historic climate bill putting the US on track to significantly lower greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. The US and its allies also agreed to establish a fund to compensate developing countries for negative effects of climate change and accelerate global decarbonization.
As the world continued to move beyond the COVID pandemic, Chinese authorities began to shift away from the country’s “zero Covid policy,” relaxing rules on quarantines and surveillance as hospitals struggled to cope with the rapidly growing numbers of infections.
On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ( ↑ )

NATO members, as well as Japan, Australia, and other US allies, stood united in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while providing significant military assistance to Kyiv and imposing a slate of hard-hitting sanctions against Moscow. More broadly, Germany, France, the UK, Japan, and other allies joined the US in increasing overall defense spending.
NATO invited Sweden and Finland to join the Alliance, reinforcing its critical role as an alliance defending its members against aggression. But Turkey continued to block formal ratification as it sought additional concessions relating to the treatment of Kurdish groups and other issues.
The US and Europe found increasing convergence on China, as G7 allies joined the United States in criticizing Beijing’s threats against Taiwan and NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept citing China as a strategic priority. The leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea joined the NATO Summit in Madrid, strengthening cooperation between the transatlantic Alliance and its Indo-Pacific partners.
But divisions among other democracies persisted, as the leaders of India, Brazil and South Africa joined Vladimir Putin at a virtual BRICS summit meeting and remained equivocal on Western efforts to isolate Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.
Overall, the alliance pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weighed in on the year’s top developments

Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig co-authored two new Atlantic Council reports as part of a project on Shaping a New Democratic World Order. The first, A Democratic Trade Partnership: Ally Shoring to Counter Coercion and Secure Supply Chains, proposes an integrated framework for leading democracies and other partners to reduce strategic dependency on revisionist autocracies and coordinate and counter economic coercion by China and Russia. The second, Toward a Democratic Technology Alliance: An Innovation Edge That Favors Freedom, outlines the need for a Democratic Technology Alliance that would help the free world prevail in the race for advanced technologies by jointly investing in innovation, countering unfair practices, and developing rules and norms consistent with democratic values.
The Atlantic Council, in cooperation with the US State Department, hosted the ninth meeting of the D-10 Strategy Forum, bringing together policy planning and strategy officials from ten leading democracies to bolster cooperation amid a range of pressing global challenges, including those posed by Russia and China.
Dan Fried provided insightful commentaries on the democratic world order, including a long-term strategy that the United States and its G7 allies can take to sustain economic pressure against Russia, and why, over the long-run, progress toward democracy and the rule-of-law is possible, but not inevitable.
Matthew Kroenig offered several assessments on US policy, asserting that the United States needs to develop a defense strategy capable of deterring threats from Russia and China simultaneously, and setting forth how the United States can deter Russia from employing nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
Ash Jain outlined the strategic implications of Biden’s Warsaw speech and suggested ways that democracies can strengthen cooperation in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Melinda Haring proposed clear steps the United States must take to help resolve the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and warned that Russia has not abandoned its goal of crushing Ukrainian statehood.

__________________________________________________

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Otto Hastrup Svendsen – Georgetown Student Researcher

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Looking Back on 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: How to reduce carbon emissions without blocking progress

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 14 Jan 2023 18:01:29 +0000

This article was updated on January 16 to reflect the fact that the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Masdar, where Sultan Al Jaber serves as CEO and chairman, respectively, are sponsors of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum.

If the world gets lucky, this could be the year fossil fuel producers and climate activists bury their hatchets and join hands to reduce emissions and ensure our planet’s future.

If that sounds hopelessly utopian, take that up with the leaders of this resource-rich, renewables-generating Middle Eastern monarchy. The United Arab Emirates is determined to inject specificity, urgency, and pragmatism into a process that often has lacked all three: the twenty-eighth convening of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as COP28, from November 30 to December 12.

To kick off 2023, the oil and gas and climate communities gathered this weekend for the Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum, launching the annual Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week. After decades of mutual mistrust, there is a growing recognition that they can’t live without each other.

Thank Russian President Vladimir Putin’s criminal war in Ukraine, and his ongoing weaponization of energy, for injecting a new dose of hard-headed reality into climate conversations. It’s seldom been so clear that energy security and cleaner energy are indivisible. The guiding principle is “the energy sustainability trilemma,” defined as the need to balance energy reliability, affordability, and sustainability.

What’s contributing to this new pragmatism is a recognition by much of the climate community that the energy transition to renewables can’t be achieved without fossil fuels, so they must be made cleaner. They have come to accept that natural gas, in particular liquified natural gas (LNG), with half the emissions footprint of coal, provides a powerful bridging fuel.

Once derided by green activists, nuclear power is also winning over new fans—particularly when it comes to the small, modular plants where there are fewer concerns over safety and weapons proliferation.

For their part, almost all major oil and gas producers, who once viewed climate activists with disdain, now embrace the reality of climate science and are investing billions of dollars in renewables and efforts to make their fossil fuels cleaner.

“Every serious hydrocarbon producer knows the future, in a world of declining use of fossil fuels, is to be low cost, low risk, and low carbon,” said David Goldwyn, the former State Department special envoy for energy. “The only way to ensure we do this is to have industry at the table.”

Nowhere is this shift among climate activists more evident than in Germany, where Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, the Green Party leader, is serving as the pragmatist-in-chief.

Habeck, who serves as federal minister for economic affairs and climate action, has been the driving force behind extending the life of the country’s three nuclear plants through April and in launching Germany’s first LNG import terminal in December, with as many as five more to follow.

“I am ultimately responsible for the security of the German energy system,” Habeck told Financial Times reporter Guy Chazan in a sweeping profile of the German politician. “So, the buck stops with me. … I became minister to make tough decisions, not to be Germany’s most popular politician.”

Some climate activists were aghast this Thursday when the UAE named Sultan Al Jaber, the CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), as president of this year’s COP28.

“This appointment goes beyond putting the fox in charge of the henhouse,” said Teresa Anderson of ActionAid, a development charity. “Like last year’s summit, we’re increasingly seeing fossil fuel interests taking control of the process and shaping it to meet their own needs.”

What that overlooks is that Al Jaber’s rich background in both renewables and fossil fuels makes him an ideal choice at a time when efforts to address climate change have been far too slow, lacking the inclusivity to produce more transformative results.

Full disclosure: Al Jaber’s companies ADNOC and the clean-energy innovator Masdar (where he was founding CEO in 2005 and is now chairman) are sponsors of the annual Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi, a fact that has given me a close-up look at his years-long commitment to reducing emissions and promoting renewables.

Al Jaber also represents a country that despite its resource riches has become a major nuclear power producer, was the first Middle East country to join the Paris Climate Agreement, and was the first Middle East country to set out a roadmap to net-zero emissions by 2050.

Over the past fifteen years, the UAE has invested forty billion dollars in renewable energy and clean tech globally. In November it signed a partnership with the United States to invest an additional one hundred billion dollars in clean energy. Some 70 percent of the UAE economy is generated outside the oil and gas sector, making it an exception among major producing countries in its diversification.

Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, president of the United Arab Emirates, has explained his country’s approach this way: “There will be a time, fifty years from now, when we load the last barrel of oil aboard the ship. The question is… are we going to feel sad? If our investment today is right, I think—dear brothers and sisters—we will celebrate that moment.”

Al Jaber, speaking to the Global Energy Forum, captured his ambition to drive faster and more transformative results at COP28.

“We are way off track,” said Al Jaber.

“The world is playing catch-up when it comes to the key Paris goal of holding global temperatures down to 1.5 degrees,” he said. “And the hard reality is that in order to achieve this goal, global emissions must fall 43 percent by 2030. To add to that challenge, we must decrease emissions at a time of continued economic uncertainty, heightened geopolitical tensions, and increasing pressure on energy.”

He called for “transformational progress… through game-changing partnerships, solutions, and outcomes.” He said the world must triple renewable energy generation from eight terawatt hours to twenty-three and more than double low-carbon hydrogen production to 180 million tons for industrial sectors, which have the hardest carbon footprint to abate.

“We will work with the energy industry on accelerating the decarbonization, reducing methane, and expanding hydrogen,” said Al Jaber. “Let’s keep our focus on holding back emissions, not progress.”

If that sounds utopian, let’s have more of it.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 A new world energy order is taking shape
Rana Foroohar | FINANCIAL TIMES

In this smart piece, the FT’s Rana Foroohar warns of a China-led energy order and how that could shift the global balance of power.

“What does that mean in practice?” Foroohar asks. “For starters, a lot more oil trade will be done in renminbi. [Chinese leader] Xi [Jinping] announced that, over the next three to five years, China would not only dramatically increase imports from [Gulf] countries, but work towards all-dimensional energy co-operation.”

“This could potentially involve joint exploration and production in places such as the South China Sea, as well as investments in refineries, chemicals, and plastics. Beijing’s hope is that all of it will be paid for in renminbi, on the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, as early as 2025.”

This is something any serious thinker on energy should bear in mind. Read more →

#2 Ships going dark: Russia’s grain smuggling in the Black Sea
ECONOMIST

In this thought-provoking narrative, the Economist highlights the growing economic potential of the North Sea, particularly as a producer of wind power.

While the Economist acknowledges significant hurdles, from the vagaries of weather to the threat of cheaper competition in Southern Europe, it also writes that if “these problems can be overcome, the new North Sea economy’s impact on the continent will be momentous.

“As Europe’s economic epicentre moves north, so will its political one, predicts Frank Peter of Agora Energiewende, a German think-tank. Coastal Bremen, one of Germany’s poorest states, could gain clout at the expense of rich but landlocked Bavaria. At the European level, France and Germany, whose industrial might underpinned the European Coal and Steel Community, the EU’s forebear, may lose some influence to a new bloc led by Denmark, the Netherlands and, outside the EU, Britain and Norway.” Read more →

#3 Time is not on Ukraine’s side
Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates | WASHINGTON POST

Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, two of the most perceptive international strategists out there, deliver a compelling argument for how President Joe Biden’s administration should do more for Ukraine now.

The only way to avoid Russian domination of Ukraine, they write, “is for the United States and its allies to urgently provide Ukraine with a dramatic increase in military supplies and capability — sufficient to deter a renewed Russian offensive and to enable Ukraine to push back Russian forces in the east and south. Congress has provided enough money to pay for such reinforcement; what is needed now are decisions by the United States and its allies to provide the Ukrainians the additional military equipment they need — above all, mobile armor.”

“Because there are serious logistical challenges associated with sending American Abrams heavy tanks, Germany and other allies should fill this need,” they write. “NATO members also should provide the Ukrainians with longer-range missiles, advanced drones, significant ammunition stocks (including artillery shells), more reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and other equipment. These capabilities are needed in weeks, not months.”

One hopes Biden is reading. Read more →

#4 Robert Habeck was Germany’s most popular politician. Then he took office
Guy Chazan | FINANCIAL TIMEs

Don’t miss Guy Chazan’s brilliant, sweeping profile of German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, who oversees his country’s energy and economic policies, and his struggle as a Green politician to diversify resources away from Russia.

“As the energy crisis continued, traits that distinguished Habeck from other politicians came to the fore,” Chazan writes, reporting on Habeck’s willingness to make tough decisions. “On the day of the invasion last February, amid rounds of emergency meetings, he found time to visit Andrij Melnyk, Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin. ‘That was the most important meeting I had since the war began,’ Melnyk told Der Spiegel, ‘because he offered real human sympathy.’ Habeck also spoke openly about the uncertainties the government faced.”

Read this for a profile of the type of leader who, understanding the importance of compromise and pragmatism, will be vital in making the energy transition a success. Read more →

#5 American Democracy is Still In Danger
Erin Baggot Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Larry Diamond | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This week’s must-read is a clarion call on the importance of US democracy and the dangers it faces, from Erin Baggot Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Larry Diamond.

“The health of American democracy,” they write, “is both a domestic and a national security concern. China and Russia—the United States’ principal authoritarian adversaries—have been using (and exacerbating) America’s democratic divisions and travails to gain advantage in the competition for global leadership. To regain the advantage, the United States must both repair its own democracy and reinvigorate its voice for democracy in the global arena. Democracy must go on the offensive.”

To do this, they argue, “Washington must rejoin the battle for global soft power, in a manner that reflects American values. It must transmit the truth, and in ways that engage and persuade global audiences. The goal must be not only to counter disinformation persuasively with the truth but to promote democratic values, ideas, and movements. In order to counter disinformation and report the truth that autocracies suppress, multiple credible streams of information are needed. Furthermore, they must be independent; while the US government may provide material support, these outlets must operate free of editorial control. That way, they will be seen to be independent because they are.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

Global Energy Forum Jan 14, 2023

COP28 president-designate: With the world ‘way off track’ on Paris goals, ‘transformational progress’ is needed

By Daniel Malloy

In his first remarks since being named the incoming president of COP28, Sultan Al Jaber spoke on Saturday morning at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Fast Thinking Jan 9, 2023

How Brazil can respond to its democracy stress test

By Atlantic Council

Now that authorities have cleared the protests and launched an investigation into security failures, our experts break down what’s to come.

Brazil Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Jan 13, 2023

Russian War Report: Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

In December 2022, Wagner Group organized a hackathon that was won by a man wanted by the FBI for his connection to computer malware.

Conflict Cybersecurity

The post Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: How to reduce carbon emissions without blocking progress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

State of the Order: Assessing December 2022

daniellemiller — Fri, 13 Jan 2023 14:55:42 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

China Deepens Arab Ties. In what was billed as the “largest and highest-level diplomatic event” between China and the Arab world since the founding of the People’s Republic, Chinese President Xi Jinping received a grand welcome in Riyadh, where he arrived for a series of summit meetings with Arab and Gulf leaders. Xi joined Saudi crown prince Muhammad bin Salman in signing a “comprehensive strategic partnership” agreement, and new technology agreements, including one involving Huawei. Beijing also pledged to increase oil purchases, while calling for future payments to be settled using the Chinese yuan rather than the US dollar.

Shaping the order. Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia, which follows Biden’s trip there last summer, illustrates the intensifying strategic competition for influence between the two powers in the Middle East. Beijing is seeking to deepen its ties to the Arab world and position itself as a stable and reliable partner in a region of autocracies. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are looking to diversify their alliances amid growing strains with the United States, partly in light of Riyadh’s recent decision to join Russia in reducing oil production and continuing fallout from the brutal killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Hitting home. Americans benefit from the dollar’s status as a global reserve currency. Despite Xi’s call to use the yuan for energy payments, the dollar will likely remain the currency of choice for oil purchases in the region.
What to do. As Beijing expands its ties in the region, Washington should seek to maintain its own influence by bolstering security partnerships with the Gulf states to deal with shared threats, including Iran. At the same time, the US should also make clear that it views the protection of human rights as a key component of a stable, rules-based order.

Zelensky Goes to Washington. Leaving Ukraine for the first time since Russia’s invasion last February, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to Washington, meeting with President Biden at the White House and delivering a rousing address to a joint session of Congress. Zelensky’s visit, amid concerns that change in congressional control might lead to reduced aid, was followed by a US announcement that it would provide the highly sophisticated Patriot missile system, as part of a nearly $2 billion security assistance package for Ukraine. Increased support for the country’s air defenses comes as Russia continued its barrages of missile and drone attacks.

Shaping the order. Zelensky’s decision to make Washington the destination of his first trip outside of Ukraine illustrates just how important Kiev views American support for the war effort. The US has led a successful coalition of allies firmly united behind Ukraine, while providing increasingly sophisticated military equipment that has put Russian forces largely on the defensive.
Hitting home. The enthusiastic reception for Zelensky at the US Capitol and repeated standing ovations during his speech illustrates the continued bipartisan support for Ukraine, even as Republicans get set to take control of the House of Representatives.
What to do. The Biden administration should work with allies in Congress on both sides of the aisle to provide more advanced military equipment to Ukraine and help ensure that Kiev has what it needs to ultimately force Russia to withdraw its troops.

Biden Hosts Africa Summit. Forty-five African heads of state joined President Biden in Washington for the US-Africa Leaders Summit, with discussions focused on climate change, public health, and food security. The White House pledged $55 billion in investments in African and announced new initiatives to grow two-way trade and investment, as well as bolster African health systems and technological innovation. The summit excluded the leaders of four nations who took power in military coups, and Biden separately hosted a session with a select group of democratic leaders to highlight US support for free and fair elections across the continent.

Shaping the order. With China investing heavily in development initiatives and building relations across the continent, Africa has emerged as an important battleground for strategic competition. The summit follows other regional summits where Biden has met with leaders from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, as the US seeks to make inroads in the Global South
Hitting home. Given the potential new trade and investment opportunities, and with so many Americans tracing their roots to the continent, strengthening US-African ties is likely to have broad political support at home.
What to do. Washington should build on the summit by expanding investments in health and infrastructure across Africa and the developing world. The US should also seek to strengthen relations with key African democracies, particularly Nigeria and South Africa.

Quote of the month

“[S]haring democratic values and systems will help us define joint priorities and achieve common goals… [I]t makes a huge difference whether capitalism is organized in a liberal, democratic way or along authoritarian lines.”

– German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, December 5, 2022

State of the Order this month: Strengthened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy ()

In response to the Iranian regime’s systemic repression of women and girls, the US led a successful effort to remove Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of Women. Anti-regime protests continued across the country, despite the government’s violent crackdown and imposition of the death penalty for certain individuals.
The FBI warned that Beijing is seeking to silence criticism of the Chinese government by Chinese citizens based in the United States, by using agents to threaten, harass, stalk, blackmail, and surveil them. Canada raised similar concerns, issuing a “cease and desist” warning to China over monitoring stations it has illegally established in the country to surveil Chinese citizens.
Sudan’s ruling generals and the country’s main pro-democracy group signed an agreement to establish a civilian-led transitional government following the military takeover in 2021, which, if implemented, could set a path toward new elections.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

The Biden administration announced plans to provide the Patriot missile defense system to Ukraine to bolster its air defense capabilities, a part of a $1.85 billion package of new military assistance. Russia continued its aerial barrage of Ukraine, launching cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones on Kiev and other cities, while the Ukrainian military successfully intercepted many of the attacks.
Following a meeting with former Russian prime minister Dmitri Medvedev, a close Putin ally, in Beijing, Xi Jinping reaffirmed China’s support for Russia, saying that relations between the two countries had “stood the test of international changes” and that their partnership was a “long-term strategic choice made by both sides.”
North Korea provided arms shipments to the Wagner Group, a private Russian military company, to support the Kremlin’s war effort in Ukraine, as part of growing partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang.
Xi Jinping, on a visit to Riyadh, touted closer security and energy ties with Gulf nations, amid reports that Saudi Arabia purchased US $4 billion worth of weapons from China, including drones and anti-ship missiles.
Overall, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

The G7, along with the EU and Australia, agreed to set a joint cap on the price of Russian oil at $60 per barrel, with the goal of further restricting Putin’s primary source of revenue for the war in Ukraine. But Moscow welcomed the decision by India, a major purchaser of Russian oil, not to abide by the cap.
The Biden administration signed a memorandum of understanding in support of the proposed African Continental Free Trade Area, which, if fully implemented, would create a continent-wide common market, constituting the fifth-largest economy in the world.
At the third meeting of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, both parties agreed to establish an early warning system for semiconductor supply chain disruptions and endorsed common standards for electric vehicle charging stations.
In light of these developments, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons (↑)

The US announced a major scientific breakthrough in the decades-long effort to harness nuclear fusion, an energy source that has the potential to create abundant clean electricity – though practical applications could still be years away.
A landmark conservation deal was reached at a UN biodiversity summit in Montreal, with measures aimed at halting species extinctions, conserving thirty percent of the world’s land and sea by 2030, and mobilizing $200 billion per year for conservation.
The US and the EU agreed to a joint roadmap to find ways to ensure that artificial intelligence meets common standards and values of democratic countries.
Chinese authorities began to shift away from the country’s “zero Covid policy,” relaxing rules on quarantines and surveillance in response to widespread protests, as hospital struggled to cope with the rapidly growing numbers of infections across the country.
On balance, the global commons pillar was strengthened.

Alliances (↑)

In a display of allied unity, the G7 came together, with Australia and the EU, to approve a joint price cap on Russian oil.
In the first state dinner hosted by the Biden administration, French president Emmanuel Macron joined Biden in reaffirming the longstanding friendship between France and the United States based on a “shared commitment to democratic principles, values, and institutions.”
Overall, the alliance pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Robert Kagan, in Foreign Affairs, contends that in a world where autocratic hegemons are challenging the free world, Americans must understand that only US power can maintain stability, as it has over the past century.
Aaron Friedberg, in The Economist, argues that the West should abandon efforts to integrate a revisionist China into the global order, and focus instead on protecting a perimeter bloc of liberal nations and strengthening ties among them.
Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, in Foreign Affairs, lay out three scenarios for Russia’s defeat in the Ukraine war, including potential benefits for the US and Europe and how to deal with the risks of instability that could follow.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Fred Kempe, in CNBC, outlines steps the democratic world must take to transform authoritarian setbacks in 2022 into a more sustainable advance of the free world.
Atlantic Council senior directors, in the Scowcroft Center’s Global Foresight 2023, offer their assessments of Top 23 Risks and Opportunities for 2023.
Dan Fried, in the New Atlanticist, outlines how Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington proves that the US is still the leader of the Free World.
Matthew Kroenig, in CBS News, shares his foreign policy predictions for 2023, including how long the war in Ukraine might last and Chinese ambitions in Taiwan.
Anca Agachi, in Politico Magazine, discusses the biggest security threats to the United States and why they may be non-traditional.

__________________________________________________

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Danielle Miller – Assistant Director
Otto Hastrup Svendsen – Georgetown Student Researcher

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing December 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rebuilding Ukraine the right way

Stephen Blank — Sun, 08 Jan 2023 21:08:33 +0000

It is not too early to begin discussing Ukraine’s reconstruction. Indeed, various proposals, including estimates regarding the scale of the overall rebuilding project, are currently circulating. Moreover, it is already clear that getting this process right will prove critical for the future of both Ukrainian and European security. As well as funding reconstruction, the international community must also ensure the process actually strengthens Ukraine by revitalizing both its democratic and economic vibrancy.

The existential nature of the current war and the anticipated long-term scope of the post-war rebuilding challenge mean that the Ukrainian state is likely to enjoy wide-ranging regulatory powers for an extended period. Indeed, Kyiv has already reportedly invoked wartime laws to nationalize a number of strategically important companies including engine maker Motor Sich, energy companies Ukrnafta and Ukrtatnafta, vehicle maker AvtoKrAZ, and transformer producer Zaporizhtransformator. This is fueling speculation that we may soon witness further steps toward the wholesale nationalization of at the least the commanding heights of the Ukrainian economy.

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Admittedly, Ukraine’s recent nationalizations may be justified due to the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s ongoing invasion. At the same time, it is also true that anti-oligarch policies adopted by the Ukrainian authorities before the war were inconsistent, despite President Zelenskyy’s claims that de-oligarchization is a major national priority.

There is no doubt that wartime nationalizations undermine the political power of the oligarchs while augmenting that of the state. One could thus argue that such takeovers serve a democratic as well as a military purpose. But if Ukraine is to strengthen its democracy and become fit for EU membership, it might be better to ultimately eschew ownership of energy providers and key companies in the defense, telecommunications, and media sectors.

In this context, it is important that wartime nationalizations take place as a last resort when all other legal means prove to be ineffective. Any nationalization that does take place must be transparent. Failure to meet such conditions could cost Ukraine dearly, not least when it comes to the distribution of recovery funding, which is likely to be released only on condition that Kyiv meets tough rule of law commitments.

There are also practical issues to consider. It is vital that any nationalizations do not exceed the state’s capacity to manage targeted companies effectively in both war and peacetime. It is true that many if not most European energy companies are state owned or managed. However, if the Ukrainian state is not able to govern effectively and manage these firms fully and impartially because the economy is in ruins due to the wanton destruction inflicted by Russia, then Ukraine runs the risk of falling back into oligarchic domination.

Since secure property rights are an essential pillar of both democracy and a genuine market economy, Ukraine must prioritize safeguarding these foundational rights. Furthermore, it may take a long time to restore state capacity to the point where it can effectively manage these kinds of large firms.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Looking ahead, it might be wiser to encourage private and mixed public-private forms of ownership within the boundaries of a strong regulatory state and legislature. This approach could help consolidate democratic governance and the rule of law in post-war Ukraine. Coupled with Ukraine’s gradual compliance with EU membership requirements, such an approach would likely attract significantly more foreign investment and help generate faster economic growth.

At present, the temptation to nationalize key sectors of the economy is understandably great. But the authorities in Kyiv should also remember that once the war ends and the huge task of reconstruction gains pace, meeting the EU’s membership conditions will become equally urgent. In this light, the nationalization of key sectors of Ukraine’s economy could lead the country backwards to a lesser but still damagingly excessive role of the state in the economy. It could also provide opportunities for oligarchic penetration of the state and a revival of crony capitalism.

With the country’s continued existence still very much under threat, Ukraine’s leaders are currently focused on securing national survival and winning the war. Nevertheless, it is also vital to lay the foundations for a post-war recovery period that is likely to involve international investments amounting to trillions of dollars. This requires a deliberate approach to questions of nationalization and the right balance between public and private ownership in critical sectors.

It is crucial that decisions shaping Ukraine’s post-war revival are not based on purely partisan political grounds. Instead, they must take into account the necessity of consolidating democratic governance and creating the right conditions for a flourishing market economy based on the rule of law and secure property rights. This will invigorate Ukraine’s economy and strengthen the country’s security while also boosting the post-war process of European integration.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Yet so far, Sunak has leaned on continuity and caution with little in the way of evolution.

Sunak has opted for caution and continuity with his predecessors across four areas—Ukraine, Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and China. For Britain’s allies, stability will be welcome following almost a year of political theater and chaos. But the maintenance of existing policy will have its limits, especially as officials in Washington ask for more from a prime minister who has less to give.

On Ukraine, Sunak has continued London’s support to Kyiv but has raised alarms about his attitudes toward the aid. Sunak has largely mirrored the popular approach championed by Johnson, who ingratiated himself with the people of Ukraine by lending fervent support to the country. Sunak has promised to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes,” most recently promising to supply Kyiv with more artillery ammunition. This pledge follows Sunak’s early visit to Ukraine, which resembled the trip made by Johnson and the one planned by Truss before her resignation. At the same time, a leak from Whitehall that Sunak called for an audit of UK support for Ukraine only builds on his reputation as a leader guided by caution and with a proclivity for a simplistic cost-benefit approach to foreign policy.

Beyond Ukraine, Sunak has opted for cool but productive relations with the rest of Europe. His push for a cordial relationship is a break from Johnson’s bitter dealings with Brussels but still takes a cautious approach, allowing for cooperation where mutual interests align without a full embrace of the continent. Sunak’s biggest success with Europe is rapprochement with French President Emmanuel Macron and the UK-France deal on stopping illegal migrants from making the dangerous journey across the English Channel. He has endorsed the United Kingdom’s involvement in the European Political Community and voiced support for Britain’s participation in the PESCO project on European military mobility, but both initiatives reflect continuity. They came about before his time as prime minister.

Like in Europe, Sunak has so far continued existing projects in the Indo-Pacific rather than starting new evolutionary initiatives. For proof of his government’s focus on the region, Sunak has leaned on two relics of the Johnson era: the AUKUS pact between the United Kingdom, United States, and Australia, and the 2021 Integrated Review, which identified the tilt toward the Indo-Pacific as a strategic objective for “Global Britain.” Sunak has pledged to lay out his vision in more detail with an update to the Integrated Review in 2023, but any revision of the strategy document will likely be a touching up around the periphery, not an overhaul of priorities.

Finally, Sunak’s biggest push for policy continuity is on China. The prime minister promised an end of the United Kingdom’s “golden era” with China and dismissed “naïve” former policies. Yet action on China still mirrors that of previous governments. Sunak has pointed to a ban on Chinese-owned Huawei from Britain’s 5G infrastructure as an example of tough policy, but it was a policy started in 2020 and has more recently faced delays in implementation. In his November speech, he cited the government’s decision to block the sale of Britain’s largest semiconductor plant to a Chinese-owned firm, but that decision really marked the end of a sixteen-month saga spanning both the Johnson and Truss governments.

Sunak has also already tempered expectations on China. Stressing that Britain “cannot simply ignore China’s significance in world affairs,” his comments fit with a quiet policy of complacency seen under previous governments, which positions Britain to be less active against China than some in Washington or Sunak’s own Conservative Party may hope.

Approaching the end of a chaotic year, Sunak’s actions reveal the limits of a prime minister whose reputation as a cautious operator carries over into his foreign policy. This caution translates into the embrace of the status quo that Sunak promised to adapt.

Continuation is not necessarily a disqualifier of sound foreign policy. Britain has earned praise for its support to Ukraine and early turn to the Indo-Pacific, and smart foreign-policy decisions will help cement Sunak as a serious leader on the world stage. However, as Russia’s war in Ukraine is poised to continue and the West’s focus continues to move toward the Indo-Pacific and China, Sunak’s cautious approach will have its limits. Officials in Washington will want an active partner who will step up on support to Ukraine and embrace confrontation with China, for example on support for Taiwan and for decoupling of trade dependences.

As a European nuclear power with significant military might and established relations in the Indo-Pacific, Britain is an important player on the world stage. Sunak will inevitably have his foreign-policy decisions measured against Truss and Johnson, especially as a young and inexperienced statesman. He must deliver on his own promises to evolve Britain’s foreign policy by doing away with caution and embrace more than just continuity on the world stage.

James Batchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Rishi Sunak needs to do away with caution to deliver on his promise of evolutionary foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Taiwan’s engagement with the world: Evaluating past hurdles, present complications, and future prospects

Jessica Drun — Tue, 20 Dec 2022 17:00:00 +0000

Introduction

Since Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) took office in May 2016, relations across the Taiwan Strait have grown increasingly tense—and even more so following the visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in August 2022. Following Beijing’s move to unilaterally suspend official and semiofficial cross-Strait contacts, the Chinese leadership has demonstrated the broad spectrum of the toolkit it wields against the island.

Beijing’s toolkit includes disinformation campaigns and larger influence operation efforts to spread discord across the Taiwan public and paint Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as ill-equipped to govern. Other tactics include routine incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and targeted import bans to hit critical agricultural sectors. Internationally, Beijing has sharply retracted the goodwill it extended to the previous administration, led by the more China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT), by poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocking not only Taiwan’s access to international and regional fora, but also pressing these organizations to adopt Beijing’s framing of “Taiwan as a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).”

Preserving and expanding Taiwan’s international space, broadly defined as its participation in and engagement with the larger global community, has been a consistent goal across recent Taiwan government administrations—be it KMT or DPP—since the early 1990’s.¹ There are numerous ways Taiwan tries to remain active in the international arena, including by maintaining official and unofficial relations with other countries, participating in international political and economic organs, or engaging with external actors through its civil society and the nonprofit sectors. Taiwan’s objectives include obtaining support for its sovereignty claims; contributing to and gaining information from global debates with relevance back home; accessing preferential trade agreements or blocs; and shaping Taiwan’s global image, including trying to portray itself as a responsible stakeholder.

While successive administrations in Taiwan have pursued different policies regarding the island’s international space, these approaches were shaped in response to the geopolitical realities of the time. The current Tsai administration has arguably had to adapt to a disproportionately large number of world events, compared to previous administrations, including two major unprecedented ones in relative quick succession: the outbreak of COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

This issue brief will first provide a succinct overview of the history of diplomatic competition between the Republic of China (ROC) and the PRC, which will be followed by a discussion of the policies advanced by the previous KMT administration under former President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). The piece will then explore the evolution of the Tsai administration’s approach to securing Taiwan’s international space, including adjustments made in response to the global pandemic and increasing authoritarian aggression, and it will conclude with predictions on how Taiwan’s international engagement will persist beyond its elections in 2024.

History

Competition for diplomatic recognition between the ROC and the PRC was borne with the inception of the latter and played out against the larger backdrop of the Cold War. Both were competing to be the “true China” and both maintained a “one China” baseline, refusing to forge diplomatic relations with a country that recognized the other, presenting countries with an “either/or” choice.² This came to a head when the PRC had garnered sufficient support and backing to bring to a vote the issue of whether or not the PRC should hold the “China” seat at the United Nations (UN) to a vote—which ultimately passed with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971.³

Following the passage of UN Resolution 2758, the number of countries recognizing the PRC surged, continuing further along this trajectory after the United States and the PRC normalized relations in 1979.⁴ Around the same time, Taipei began to place greater emphasis on the commercial and cultural elements of diplomacy. Coupled with Taipei’s nascent democratization efforts at the time, this laid the foundation for an approach to international outreach that extended beyond the hard political elements of diplomacy and that tied the ROC’s legitimacy to the Taiwan people and, by extension, positive perceptions of democracy worldwide (though this is not to underemphasize or devalue the contributions of the Dangwai (黨外) movement to Taiwan’s democratization).⁵

In the early 1980s, the ROC lost its membership to major global financial organizations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, when its seat was transferred to the PRC. During this time, President Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) adopted a policy of “practical diplomacy”—maintaining a firm “one China” baseline for joining intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) while preserving space for flexibility in joining nongovernmental organizations under a “no avoidance and no surrender” mindset, and saw successes such as with the International Olympic Committee.⁶ Concurrently, though, Beijing persisted in blocking Taiwan’s access to nongovernmental organizations and in trying to lure away Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies.⁷

Chiang’s successor, Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), set forth a policy of “pragmatic diplomacy” (務實外交) that sought to counteract Taipei’s increasing international isolation by being less rigid about what his administration would be willing to accept, most critically on “one China” hard line. Early on in his administration, Lee touted his openness for dual-recognition (of two political entities under a common “one China”) at IGOs and drove a largely unsuccessful effort to join and participate in these organizations. Under this approach, Taipei accepted countries having official ties with both the ROC and PRC, though Beijing remained steadfast in it being one or the other.⁸ Under the Lee administration, Taipei doubled down on informal diplomatic efforts, including by opening representative offices in dozens of countries, following the model it used with the United States and Japan from the decade prior, and utilizing unofficial travel for reciprocal exchanges between government officials; this latter approach was spurred in part by Taiwan’s burgeoning transition to a full democracy and surging economic growth.⁹ ¹⁰

Taiwan took advantage of its economic strength to help grow its international space. It fostered deeper trade and investment relationships with major economies around the world, which lessened its reliance on the PRC market. It also used initial economic outreach to cultivate unofficial political ties with new partners, such as post-Soviet states, and offered foreign aid in what was known as “dollar diplomacy” for smaller, poorer countries, which often spurred these countries to switch diplomatic recognition from the PRC to the ROC.¹¹ This latter practice, often criticized as “checkbook diplomacy,” persisted into the next administration.¹²

In 2000, Taiwan had its first transition of power to the DPP, with Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) elected as the first non-KMT president. In his first term, Chen undertook several conciliatory measures toward the PRC to try to chart a positive course for cross-Strait relations, including his “Four Nos” policy centered around not moving towards independence, and opening the three “mini-links” of direct cross-Strait trade, transport, and postal.¹³ Taiwan successfully joined the World Trade Organization and secured membership in eight IGOs and observer status in seven.¹⁴ Beijing’s recalcitrance due to its “one China” precondition prompted Chen to later shift gears and initiate what would be dubbed by his critics as “scorched earth diplomacy (烽火外交),” intended to overwhelm the PRC with diplomatic feints—making motions to poach a diplomatic ally without following through—and to deplete Beijing’s resources so that Taiwan would face less resistance in achieving its actual priorities.¹⁵ Chen also sought to apply for UN membership for the first time as “Taiwan”—rather than the ROC—but fumbled in his effort. This all led to wariness from the United States and other countries, all while accusations of checkbook diplomacy endured.¹⁶ Taiwan lost nine of its official diplomatic allies, and global perceptions of Taiwan soured. Chen also earned the unfortunate moniker of “troublemaker,” though this was due in no small part to PRC propaganda efforts.¹⁷

Recent approaches and developments

Under the Ma administration from 2008 to 2016, Taipei pursued a policy of “flexible diplomacy” (活路外交) that sought to deepen trust with Beijing, project cross-Strait rapprochement into the international arena, and suspend ROC-PRC competition for diplomatic recognition. At the same time, the administration fostered positive relationships with Taiwan’s unofficial allies and sought meaningful participation in those international fora in which sovereignty was not a prerequisite.¹⁸

Ma envisioned this policy as a course correction from his predecessors, concluding that the past “scorched earth diplomacy” and “checkbook diplomacy” had proved to be “detrimental to Taiwan’s national interest”; he also noted that “mutual trust with our non-diplomatic allies has fallen, the number of our diplomatic allies has decreased, our participation in international activities has encountered unprecedented pressure, and Taiwan’s international image has worsened.”¹⁹

A major component of this “flexible diplomacy” policy was the “diplomatic truce (外交休兵)” in which Taiwan would no longer vie with the PRC for diplomatic recognition. While China never formally agreed to the truce, it tacitly accepted it by respecting the policy in practice—with rumors that Beijing rejected overtures from many of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin and South America to switch recognition.²⁰

The diplomatic truce era was revealing in that it showcased PRC priorities, with the management of cross-Strait relations—a core interest for the Chinese Communist Party leadership—taking precedence over increasing the number of countries that recognize the PRC. This included corresponding gains for PRC bureaucracies in expanding the country’s global footprint (as there were whispers that certain elements of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs were discontented about the diplomatic truce, due to it limiting the number of ambassadorships and posts available for PRC diplomats).²¹

The example of Gambia in 2013 demonstrated most starkly Beijing’s resoluteness in tacitly accepting the diplomatic truce. When Gambia unilaterally cut ties with the ROC without prior consultation with Taipei or Beijing, it expected the latter to welcome its offer to formalize an official relationship. However, Beijing did not respond, and between November 2013 and January 2016, Gambia did not have formal diplomatic ties with either the ROC or the PRC, finding itself in the same position as Bhutan.²² ²³

The flexible diplomacy policy also brought Taiwan tangible gains beyond maintaining a steady number of diplomatic allies from 2008 to 2016. Taiwan secured more access to international organizations, including specialized UN agencies. For example, it attended the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer from 2009 to 2016 and the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Assembly in 2013 as an invited guest of its president.²⁴ The Ma administration claimed that the policy fostered a political climate that allowed for a number of visa exemptions for Taiwan tourists in Western countries and paved the way for it to sign pseudo-free trade agreements for the first time with countries with which it did not have official ties, such as New Zealand and Singapore.²⁵ Beijing likely permitted this because it had existing FTAs with those countries and in the agreements, Taiwan used its WTO designation as “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu”; taken together, these measures provided enough ambiguity to not contradict the PRC’s “one China,” achieved then through the “1992 Consensus.”²⁶

Ma likewise touted the successes of flexible diplomacy in recalibrating Taipei’s unofficial relationship with the United States by demonstrating how Taiwan could be a “responsible stakeholder.”²⁷ Ma’s focus on UN specialized agencies aligned with longstanding US support for Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in organizations where “statehood is not a requirement.”²⁸ While US-Taiwan relations were placed on a backburner as his administration prioritized cross-Strait rapprochement, the Ma era included the initiation of the Global Cooperation & Training Framework, which served as “a platform to utilize Taiwan’s strengths and expertise to address global issues of mutual concern.”²⁹ The period also saw more routinized stopovers for President Ma and his Vice President Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) as they transited the United States en route to meetings with diplomatic allies in the Western Hemisphere (and with zero opposition from Beijing, contrasting sharply with complaints it lodged during the Chen era).³⁰

After Taiwan’s general elections in 2016, in which the DPP took control of both the presidency and the legislature for the first time, it became all too apparent that the concerns of critics of the diplomatic truce—and flexible diplomacy, more broadly—were valid and realized. Those that opposed or were skeptical of the diplomatic truce held that the policy was imbalanced, as it let Beijing wield all the cards, and the PRC’s forbearance from poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies could easily be withdrawn and used as a tool to apply political pressure on Taipei, sparking a domino effect among the ROC’s remaining official allies.³¹ Others also argued that the truce provided room for the PRC to advocate for the universality of its “one China” principle³² on the world stage.³³

In the four months between Tsai’s election and her inauguration, Beijing began to posture by signaling that it would constrict Taiwan’s international space if Tsai refused to accept the 1992 Consensus. Such actions were first seen in March of 2016, when the PRC abruptly established diplomatic relations with Gambia—which presented Beijing with a unique opportunity. The PRC did not compel Banjul to switch recognition from the ROC—with state-affiliated media denying claims that this move meant an end to the tacit truce—but the PRC made clear that it could very much defy the diplomatic truce if desired.³⁴ Beijing likewise delayed Taiwan’s annual WHA invitation, which, for the first time, included language on the importance of adhering to “one China”—another thinly veiled threat that the preservation of Taiwan’s international space hinged on acquiescence to the 1992 Consensus.³⁵

The “one China” baseline for the 1992 Consensus is a nonstarter for the DPP, and Beijing viewed Tsai’s nod to the “historical fact” of the achievements and understandings reached since that year in her inauguration address as insufficient.³⁶ Since then, the PRC has steadily poached Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, with only a minor lull during the pandemic, likely stemming from associated travel restrictions. Eight of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies have switched their recognition from the ROC to the PRC, with thirteen country allies and the Holy See now remaining. However, there have been rumors recently that Paraguay insisted on a $1 billion investment from Taipei to resist “enormous pressure” from the PRC to switch recognition (though these comments were quickly addressed).“³⁷ In some instances, these announcements on changes in diplomatic recognition were deliberately timed to signal discontent with the Tsai administration or advancements in US-Taiwan relations. For example, Beijing established relations with Sao Tome and Principe following Trump’s phone call with Tsai after he was elected³⁸ and with Panama as Taiwan representatives were participating in the Biden administration’s “Summit for Democracy.”³⁹ Notably, many of the former ROC allies that Beijing has successfully poached since 2016 are geographically situated in strategically-important locations.⁴⁰

Taiwan has also seen its access to international organizations and fora restricted and has not received an invitation to attend the WHA since 2016, despite a global pandemic and Western efforts to push for its inclusion.⁴¹ Fears that Beijing would double down on its narrative that “one China” is an international norm were also substantiated, with PRC representatives and proxies justifying Taiwan’s exclusion from these meetings with false claims that UN Resolution 2758—which shifted the holder of the “China” seat at the UN from the ROC to the PRC in 1971—embodied “one China” and thus came to a UN-level determination on the status of Taiwan.⁴²

Fundamentally, the eight years under former President Ma and the early Tsai years brought to the fore just how critical “one China” and its associated 1992 Consensus are as a baseline for leadership in Beijing to set the tone first and foremost for cross-Strait relations and also for PRC-ROC interactions globally. This includes how swiftly PRC approaches can turn from one of forbearance—with demonstrated restraint in peeling off the ROC’s diplomatic allies and permitting participation in international organizations—to one of coercion, used as a leveraging tool to pressure Taipei to adopt policies in line with Beijing’s goals and objectives.

Policies under President Tsai

Since President Tsai came to power in May 2016, her administration has pursued a foreign policy strategy that shares contours with that of her predecessors, but with required adjustments due to changes in its strategic environment. These include evolving dynamics in the Taiwan Strait, in Sino-US relations, and Taiwan’s corresponding role in the wider triangular relationship and globally.

Since 2016, cross-Strait relations have had greater rigidity, which extends into the broader international realm. Taipei faces a Catch-22 situation: as it seeks to further expand its international space—in part to hedge against PRC pressure—it reinforces perceptions in Beijing that Taiwan is asserting autonomy and working counter to “one China,” which further exacerbates tensions in the Taiwan Strait and with continued spillover internationally. Thus, as outlined above, many of Taiwan’s efforts to preserve its international space have been unsuccessful—especially those relating to the UN and to retaining official diplomatic allies. This is in spite of the fact that President Tsai has maintained more or less the same positions on these fronts as former President Ma, namely, focusing on joining specialized UN agencies as an observer or nonmember and vowing to refrain from zero-sum checkbook diplomacy.⁴³

Another shift has been a hardening of US views toward the PRC. This began with the Trump administration, but has persisted into the Biden administration and showcases bipartisan consensus on the PRC as a major strategic competitor. US-Taiwan relations have deepened over the past six years, building on renewed confidence achieved under the Ma years. These deeper ties are characterized by a number of high-level visits, including by a cabinet secretary; a slew of Congressional legislation on Taiwan, such as calls for helping it regain observer status at UN-affiliated organizations and maintain its official diplomatic relationships; and regular official statements reiterating US support for Taiwan.⁴⁴

Furthermore, since Joe Biden’s inauguration in January 2021, his administration has weaved Taiwan into many of its larger policy efforts. The Biden administration has emphasized the importance of cross-Strait stability in several multilateral fora and in joint statements with key partners and allies, including those in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It has likewise linked Taiwan’s security with broader US interests in the Indo-Pacific region and fostered deeper economic dialogue between Taipei and Washington.⁴⁵ The Biden administration has stressed the importance of values-based diplomacy, with Biden himself asserting, “we must start with diplomacy rooted in America’s most cherished democratic values,” and calling democracy “the grounding wire of our global policy—our global power” and “America’s abiding advantage.”⁴⁶ At the Summit of Democracy—which Taiwan participated in—he highlighted his view that defending democracies would be “the defining challenge of our time.”⁴⁷

Against this backdrop, Tsai’s foreign policy contains converging and complementary elements with Biden’s. Tsai emphasizes Taiwan’s contributions to the international community, noting that despite restrictions, Taiwan has positioned itself as a responsible stakeholder that enables regional peace and security.⁴⁸ More critically, she underscores the importance of Taiwan’s democracy, writing in Foreign Affairs that Taiwan “lies at the intersection of contending systems” and amidst “a contest of ideologies,” presenting Taiwan as a bastion of defense against authoritarianism and democratic-backsliding.⁴⁹ It’s essential to note that this approach has been imperfect. The Tsai administration has been unable to square its calls for an “Alliance of Democratic Values” with the contradiction that the bulk of its official diplomatic partners are among the world’s least free states (though this has been a pervasive issue across presidencies).⁵⁰

Robust public diplomacy efforts, including on social media platforms, have been a key facet of Tsai’s strategy for expanding Taiwan’s international space. Building off the pan-green coalition’s greater familiarity with social media, which first saw demonstrated successes in Taiwan’s 2014 local elections, Tsai—alongside other government officials and DPP leaders—has built solid followings on Facebook and Instagram, tailored toward domestic audiences, and on Twitter, for engagement outside of Taiwan.⁵¹ Tsai has called social media a means for Taiwan to “enter the global conversation” that “helps Taiwan connect with the world.”⁵²

These public diplomacy efforts have ramped up in the past two years, due in part to an overall increase in online presence globally as most of the world quarantined during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Tsai administration used this window of opportunity to informally expand its international space and advocate for its inclusion in formal ones. The momentum has continued, with Taiwan using public diplomacy and social media to stress its invaluable role in the fight against authoritarianism; engage with like-minded countries, specifically in Eastern Europe; and voice its unwavering support for Ukraine, as the world’s focus has turned to the Russian invasion, and some have inadvertently drawn parallels with a potential Taiwan invasion scenario.

COVID-19

The outbreak of the coronavirus at the end of 2019 shone a light on the frailty of Taiwan’s position internationally, while also providing the island with a chance to showcase its ability to serve as a responsible stakeholder and contribute to global pandemic relief efforts—both because of and despite its relative isolation on the world stage.

Taiwan quickly implemented measures to contain COVID-19 due in part to its mistrust of the global international health system resulting from the SARS outbreak of the early 2000s. Taiwan could not obtain SARS information or samples from the WHO because it was not a recognized member and was instead referred to Beijing.⁵³ Notably, Taiwan’s Center for Disease Control in late 2019 used WHO-designated communication mechanisms— put into place to institutionalize Taiwan as subordinate to the PRC—to raise questions on the transmissibility of the coronavirus only to have the request more or less dismissed. Taiwan then opted to begin prevention initiatives without waiting for formal WHO guidance.⁵⁴

Accordingly, Taiwan was one of the few places in 2020 that allowed its citizens relative normalcy and was commended for its COVID-19 response. As a result, Taipei sought to share its best practices through soft power campaigns such as “#TaiwanCanHelp” that was spearheaded by the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, an organization self-described as an “international cross-party group of legislators working towards reform on how democratic countries approach China.” Taiwan also engaged in “mask diplomacy,” sending masks and personal protective equipment to its official diplomatic allies and to the countries hardest hit by the coronavirus, such as Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.⁵⁵ Taiwan’s scientists and medical practitioners also were able to take part in research collaborations with countries such as the United States and the Czech Republic.⁵⁶

Despite these contributions and the prominent “#LetTaiwanHelp” campaign, Taiwan was still unable to participate in WHA meetings.⁵⁷ Limitations on Taiwan’s public health outreach, particularly in vaccine distribution (with high demand, finite supply, and the government’s difficulty balancing between providing vaccines to allies versus its unofficial relationships), arguably also made its official diplomatic allies more susceptible to PRC enticements—with Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accusing Beijing of using the offer of vaccines to compel Paraguay to switch its recognition.⁵⁸

Nonetheless, the pandemic period reinforced several points in the eyes of international observers:

The PRC prioritizes its self-interests even during a global pandemic despite its rhetoric calling for international cooperation.
Taiwan can make valuable contributions to support global health, and its exclusion comes to the detriment of the international community.
Taiwan can expand its global footprint through nontraditional channels by leveraging its messaging on social media through hashtag campaigns and bringing greater awareness to the value it can add and the challenges it faces vis-à-vis the PRC.

War in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to renewed attention on Taiwan, with the international community drawing parallels between Russia and Ukraine and the PRC and Taiwan. Many saw the shared plights of democracies striving to preserve their way of life in the face of a looming authoritarian aggressor. This has prompted several like-minded countries—including post-Soviet states that have faced similar threats–to offer greater support for Taiwan. Beginning with Beijing’s overreaction to Prague’s signing of a sister-city agreement (which promotes cultural and business ties) with Taipei in 2019, hesitation in Central and Eastern Europe has grown over the PRC’s influence in the region, including mounting disaffection for China’s 17 + 1 regional framework (now down to 14 due to withdrawals by Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) and disillusionment about promised Chinese investment through its Belt and Road Initiative. Partly as a result, Taiwan’s unofficial relations with Eastern European and Baltic states have since deepened.⁵⁹

The most prominent example is the case of Lithuania, which in July 2021, announced that Taiwan would open a representative office in its capital, Vilnius, and that a reciprocal office would be opened in Taipei.⁶⁰ Notably, the office would be called the “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania,” diverging from the nomenclature used in similar offices with Taiwan’s other unofficial relationships, which include some formulation around “Taipei” (i.e., Taiwan’s de facto embassy in the United States is called the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office”).⁶¹ This was met with fervent backlash from the PRC–as “Taipei” preserves a certain amount of neutrality and avoids allusions to sovereignty that using “Taiwan” or “ROC” could denote (Taiwan’s official embassies hold the name of the latter).

In the months leading up to the office’s formal opening and during its aftermath, Beijing levied numerous punitive measures against Vilnius, such as recalling its ambassador and downgrading diplomatic relations, as well as a swath of coercive economic actions that included removing Lithuania from its customs system and imposing informal secondary sanctions and targeted import bans.⁶² Vilnius did not succumb to pressure, and Taiwan launched its office in November 2021 and opened a reciprocal office for Lithuania in Taipei a year later.⁶³ PRC moves against Taiwan–taken in conjunction with existing wariness over Beijing’s human rights record, growing authoritarianism, and tacit support for Russia’s invasion–have further soured China’s image in Eastern Europe.

Heightened reservations towards the PRC have seemingly gone hand-in-hand with enhanced contacts with Taipei, which is viewed as an ideological peer, underscoring how an emphasis on democracy and on common values and goals has increased global awareness of cross-Strait issues and brought in new stakeholders.⁶⁴ Examples of Taiwan’s deepening support in Eastern Europe abound, including Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia leaving the PRC-led 17 + 1 forum; the first-ever joint visit to Taiwan by parliamentarians from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; the signing of cooperation agreements between the Czech Republic and Taiwan; an unprecedented meeting with EU parliamentarians and Taiwan’s foreign minister in Brussels; and ongoing support for an EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement.⁶⁵

Notably, these countries have been willing to bear the brunt of any PRC retaliation resulting from enhanced ties with Taiwan. This is partly because they benefit from membership in multilateral organizations such as the European Union and NATO, which have both voiced concerns and released statements critical of PRC actions against their member states; such membership allows for corresponding burden-sharing and solidarity against coercive measures from Beijing. For example, in December 2022, the EU brought the PRC’s earlier export embargo on Lithuania to the WTO, calling the moves “discriminatory and coercive.”⁶⁶ The EU has likewise come out with statements reaffirming “one China” but stressing that EU policy permits it to “[persist with and intensify] our cooperation with Taiwan.”⁶⁷

This momentum is likely to continue, yielding tangible benefits for both Taiwan and its European partners through the many Memoranda of Understanding and investment agreements signed covering areas such as bilateral trade, collaboration among start-ups, and the sharing of technical expertise, including on semiconductors.⁶⁸ Trade data suggests a similar conclusion, with Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs highlighting that its exports to Central and Eastern Europe reached a “record high” of $1.38 billion during the first four months of 2022.⁶⁹

Looking forward

The PRC has made clear that its forbearance on condoning Taiwan’s international space is explicitly tied to the Taiwan leadership’s recognition of the 1992 Consensus” and “one China.” Taipei is unlikely to adopt such policies given that demographic identity trends suggest support for the DPP’s more Taiwan-centric policies will only increase in the future.⁷⁰ In addition, PRC leader Xi Jinping has seemingly tied the 1992 Consensus to “One Country, Two Systems,” which has left the formulation unpalatable for Taiwan’s people and its viability as a core element of the KMT’s cross-Strait policy unclear.⁷¹

As such, the PRC will continue employing all available means to squeeze Taiwan’s international space. Beijing has demonstrated that no event, meeting, or area has been too insignificant to assert its framing of the Taiwan issue, as demonstrated by PRC pressure on even high schools and bicycle associations trying to gain UN access or accreditation.⁷² The PRC may continue poaching Taiwan’s official diplomatic allies—though some analysts speculate that debate exists as to whether too aggressive of an approach could inspire movements towards independence; some staunchly pro-independence groups view “diplomatic zero” as a way for Taiwan to shed what they view as the inconvenient legacy of the ROC.⁷³ Further, the PRC will continue trying to weaken Taiwan’s unofficial contacts with other countries even as Taiwan seeks to expand them, using its full coercive toolkit to include trade restrictions and political pressure.

Yet, as the ROC’s diplomatic history has shown, its leadership and people are adaptive—reshaping their policies and priorities to better align with global trends and developments. Many of the successes of the Tsai administration, such as its effective messaging strategies, especially in tying Taiwan’s fate with global democracy promotion efforts, will likely endure in subsequent Taiwan administrations.

Recommendations

There are a number of avenues that Taiwan, the United States, and US allies and partners can pursue to preserve and increase Taiwan’s international space. These efforts can leverage some of the lessons learned from the international community following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and build on some of the successes Taiwan has had in burnishing its image and expanding its outreach through nontraditional channels during COVID.

Expand and transition working-level relationships into more formalized frameworks and mechanisms

Despite China’s relative success in denying Taiwan’s official participation in international organizations, Taiwan has been able to use bilateral and multilateral working-level relationships to circumvent these restrictions. Taiwan has gained significant traction over the past five years in deepening its ties with countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, that share similar values and face similar threats; these efforts form the basis for expanded ties. Moreover, the outpouring of support and attention Taiwan received in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and around Speaker Pelosi’s visit and the subsequent Chinese military exercise suggest ample opportunities exist for crafting an allied approach to formalize and upgrade engagement with Taiwan. Such efforts would provide a measure of security against Chinese coercive efforts through increased international ties and could involve the following:

Increase engagement with developing countries, particularly those in the Global South. These countries not only serve as a critical voting bloc within the UN, but they are also particularly vulnerable to PRC influence and pressure—with stark implications for transparency, good governance, and foreign policy independence. Taiwan officials could conduct such outreach bilaterally or in collaboration with the United States and its partners on a range of topics such as technology, civil society development, and agricultural best practices, as well as through continued efforts under the Global Cooperation and Training Framework.
Utilize and advance formalized mechanisms for promoting Taiwan’s resilience. Pursuing targeted approaches to Taiwan’s existing diplomatic allies, similar to what has been described in the US Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act of 2019 (TAIPEI Act) that became law in 2020, could increase Taiwan’s resilience to PRC coercion. Such efforts could include expanding and deepening coordination with key US partners in areas of mutual interest. It could also involve more robust and regionally-focused approaches, such as enhanced collaboration with Australia and New Zealand to counteract PRC pressure on Taiwan’s remaining allies in the South Pacific. US allies and partners should likewise prioritize supporting Taiwan’s growing unofficial relationships in Eastern Europe.
Embed Taiwan’s economic ties in bilateral trade agreements. As the Lithuania example showcased, a growing number of countries around the world are willing or able to bear the brunt of economic pressure from the PRC resulting from their engagement with Taiwan. In some cases, this reflects countries that are less economically integrated with and reliant on the PRC and those that can contend with Beijing’s moves to weaponize deeper trade ties. Accordingly, these countries could make ideal partners for Taiwan to pursue free trade agreements with, offering an alternative to Ma’s approach in which Taiwan could only sign agreements with countries that had existing ones with the PRC. This would enable Taiwan to diversify its economy and lessen its reliance on the PRC market, creating more resilience against economic pressure from Beijing.
Safeguard Taiwan’s access to multilateral fora. To date, China’s efforts to restrict Taiwan’s access to international fora have been concentrated on political and security-focused entities, rather than economic ones. Taiwan’s participation in economic organizations such as APEC has thus far been largely untouched.⁷⁴ As the PRC continues to constrict Taiwan’s international space, Taiwan, the United States, and like-minded countries should look at ways to jointly proactively counter Chinese efforts to impede Taiwan’s access to economic organizations, including by using institutional bylaws or pressure to restrict Taiwan’s access.

Increase coordination to shape the narrative on Taiwan globally

Efforts to counter Beijing’s narrative that Taiwan is a part of the PRC could also yield major dividends, given that this narrative has been used to justify Taiwan’s exclusion from many international fora and venues during the past two decades. Since its entry into the international community in the early 1970s, the PRC has worked to normalize this stance through the internationalization of “one China” and its efforts to embed this position within organizations. The United States has pushed back and should continue to do so, coordinating its messaging with other countries that hold “one China” policies that do not take a position on Taiwan’s status. In the lead-up to and aftermath of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, PRC propaganda organs pushed forth a relentless and false narrative that the visit violated commitments made under the United States’ “one China” policy.⁷⁵ Beijing likewise used this argument to assign blame on the United States and its allies for changing the status quo and to try to justify increased incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, including past the median line of the Taiwan Strait, and in conducting military exercises closer to the island.⁷⁶ This underscores the need for US allies and partners to develop a networked approach—with simultaneous and joint efforts to clarify their policies and to refute PRC claims—to counter China’s overt and covert attempts at narrative control.

Forecast and plan for the future

One consistent element in Taiwan’s foreign policy across administrations has been its leadership’s ability to adjust to the changing times and adapt recommendations so that Taiwan can optimize opportunities. Taiwan’s domestic political trends point to the increasing popularity of pan-green parties’ cross-Strait approaches and the increasing unpopularity of the KMT’s 1992 Consensus—both of which the PRC will likely respond to by continuing to clamp down on Taiwan’s international space.⁷⁷ In anticipation of further Chinese attempts to restrict its access, Taiwan should continue looking for channels to expand its international space in which the PRC has less or no influence. One particularly effective approach has been participating in multilateral discussions in which the PRC is not a member, such as the Halifax Security Forum, the Summit for Democracy, and the Open Parliament Forum. The United States and its allies could also encourage greater alignment on any offensive or defensive approaches to maximize Taiwan’s international space and help Taiwan build its capacity and mitigate vulnerabilities.

Finally, Taiwan should take advantage of enhanced multilateral ties to foster and hone deeper bilateral ones with more like-minded countries. This would permit Taiwan not only to further internationalize cross-Strait issues but also to cushion against the potential impact on its interests of fickle partisan politics in friendly democracies that change the direction and level of engagement of foreign policy. Expanding bilateral ties with newer supporters will help avoid overreliance on traditional backers and ensure the longevity and effectiveness of actions designed to preserve and expand Taiwan’s international space.

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The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 15 other programs and centers.

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2021-2022 Senior Marine Corps Fellow John Barranco considers the role of the US-Taiwanese relationship in deterring Chinese aggression and ways in which the United States can strengthen this relationship.

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On July 19, the Office of the President for the Republic of China (Taiwan) released a synopsis of President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with Atlantic Council delegates Mark Esper, former US Secretary of Defense, Stefano Stefanini, former Permanent Representative of Italy to NATO, and Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President and Director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft […]

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

1 Bonnie Glaser, “Taiwan’s Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2013, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/131121_Glaser_TaiwansQuest_WEB.pdf.

2 Timothy Ka-ying Wong, “Changing Taiwan’s Foreign Policy: From One China to Two States,” Asian Perspective 24, no. 1 (2000): 9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704247.

3 Drun and Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758.”.

4 John F. Copper, “Taiwan’s Diplomatic Isolation: How Serious a Problem?” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 6, no.1 (1992): 207-208, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23253989.

5 Copper, “Taiwan’s Diplomatic Isolation,” 207; and Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). The Dangwai, or “outside the party,” movement was composed of opposition politicians and dissident intellectuals at a time when opposition parties in Taiwan were banned. Activists from the Dangwai movement advocated for self-rule and played a pivotal role in Taiwan’s democratization movement. Many of the movement’s members were founders of the DPP. For more on this, see S. Rigger’s From Opposition to Power.

6 Wong, “Changing Taiwan’s Foreign Policy”: 10

7 Wong, “Changing Taiwan’s Foreign Policy”: 9

8 T. Y. Wang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-Hui’s Rule, 1988-2000,” American Asian Review 20, no.1 (2002): 78-79.

9 Wang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Relations,”: 81-87.

10 Drun and Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758”; Wang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Relations under”: 75-76.

11 Wang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Relations”: 84-91.

12 Timothy S. Rich and Vasabjit Banerjee, “Time to End Checkbook Diplomacy, Taiwan,” News Lens, June 15, 2017, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/70867.

13 James Mitchell, “Taiwan stands up,” Taipei Times, May 21, 2000, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/05/21/36952; and Shelley Rigger, “Notes for the Conference on Taiwan and US Policy: Toward Stability or Crisis? The Role of Domestic Politics: Taiwan,” Presented in part two of a two-part series sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in conjunction with Stanford University, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the National Committee on US-China Relations, hosted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 9, 2002, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/rigger_paper_100902.pdf.

14 Glaser, “Taiwan’s Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community.”

15 Tingting Yang, “Southeast Asia’s Relations with Taiwan, 2000-2016: An Assessment of Vietnam and Singapore,” Calhoun: Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School, September 2019, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Southeast_Asia%E2%80%99s_relations_with_Taiwan%2C_2000-2016-_an_assessment_of_Vietnam_and_Singapore_%28IA_southeastasiasre1094556192%29.pdf; and Kwei-Bo Huang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and International Space”, Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan, ed. Gunter Schubert (Abingdon-on-Thames, United Kingdom, and New York: Routledge, 2016), 465-81.

16 “President Chen Shui-bian’s Letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon Delivered on July 19,” Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), July 20, 2007, https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/2720; Minxin Pei, “Crash Landing for Transit Diplomacy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 9, 2006, https://carnegieendowment.org/2006/05/09/crash-landing-for-transit-diplomacy-pub-18337; Yang, “Southeast Asia’s Relations with Taiwan, 2000-2016”; and Huang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and International Space.”

17 Huang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and International Space”; and “Beijing: Chen Shui-bian Is a ‘Troublemaker, Saboteur,’” China Daily, February 8, 2006, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-02/08/content_518231.htm.

18 “President Ma’s Remarks at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Concept and Strategy of the ‘Flexible Diplomacy’,” Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), August 4, 2008, https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/2653.

19 “President Ma’s Remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”.

20 Shih-chung Liu, “Strategies for a Cross-Strait Truce,” Brookings Institution, November 20, 2008, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/strategies-for-a-cross-strait-truce/; and Jessica Drun, “China-Taiwan Diplomatic Truce Holds Despite Gambia,” Diplomat, March 29, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-taiwan-diplomatic-truce-holds-despite-gambia/.

21 Drun, “China-Taiwan Diplomatic Truce Holds Despite Gambia”; “Forced to Give Up the Opportunity to Perform Meritorious Service [because of] the Diplomatic Truce, the PRC Ministry of Affairs Is unhappy (被迫放棄建功機會外交休兵中國外交部不爽),” Liberty Times (自由時報), September 9, 2011, https://news.ltn.com.tw/amp/news/focus/paper/522894?fbclid=IwAR3-4kdmkXIIemO4Lk3Yzuj5iFb10_vJ4qV8JQg-6KcJWD3jzYIxMlMUh9M.

22 Bhutan’s approach to foreign policy is complex; at risk of oversimplification, it can be categorized as somewhat isolationist, because it is selective in its official and unofficial engagement with other countries, out of a need to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Due to this wariness, it does not have diplomatic ties with any of the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council. Bhutan maintains a special friendship with India, but this also serves as a means for the two to counterbalance the PRC. Longstanding issues between Bhutan and the PRC are questions around Tibet and border disputes. For more, see: “Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Bhutan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Kingdom of Bhutan, February 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.bt/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Foreign-Policy-Document.pdf;Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “The Changing Contours of Bhutan’s Foreign Policy and the Implications for China and India,” Observer Research Foundation, June 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ORF_OccasionalPaper_356_Bhutan.pdf; and Andi Dahmer and Timothy S. Rich, “Taiwan’s Diplomatic Relations in Central America: A Historical Legacy or Enduring Partnership?” 2018, Draft Paper presented at the American Association for Chinese Studies Annual Conference (AACS), University of Maryland Law, Baltimore, MD, October 5-7, 2018, https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2018conference/Dahmer%20Rich%20%20AACS%20paper%209-20-18.pdf.

23 Drun, “China-Taiwan Diplomatic Truce Holds Despite Gambia.”

24 Nike Ching, “G-7 Countries Back Taiwan’s Observer Status in World Health Assembly,” Voice of America, May 5, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_g-7-countries-back-taiwans-observer-status-world-health-assembly/6205478.html; Bonnie Glaser, “Taiwan Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community.”

25 “Flexible diplomacy yields visa-free European travel,” Taiwan Today, October 15, 2010, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=1468&unitname=Politics-Top-News&postname=Flexible-diplomacy-yields-visa-free-European-travel.

26 Glaser, “Taiwan’s Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community.” The “1992 Consensus” formulation served as the foundation for cross-Strait dialogue during the Ma administration and was premised on a common One China baseline. However, the concept is contentious in Taiwan, from its purported origins in a 1992 meeting between PRC and ROC representatives in Hong Kong (which notably, was prior to Taiwan’s full democratization and thus did not include the assent of its people) to whether there is any semblance of an actual consensus between the two sides. For more, see: Jessica Drun, “Taiwan’s Opposition Struggles to Shake Pro-China Image,” Foreign Policy, March 11, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/11/taiwanopposition-kuomintang-kmt-pro-china-1992-consensus/.

27 “President Ma explains his new diplomatic approach,” Taiwan Today, August 15, 2008, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=10,23,45,10&post=14925; Alan D. Romberg, “Cross-Strait Relations: First the Easy Steps, Then the Difficult Ones,” China Leadership Monitor (No. 26), Fall 2008, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CLM26AR_1.pd;

28 Ibid.

29 “Taiwanese Perspectives on United States-Taiwan Relations and the People’s Republic of China during the Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen Administrations,” before the Hose Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation, 116th Congress, page 1-2 (2020) (Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of Political Science at Davidson College); “Mission,” Global Cooperation and Training Framework, 2020, https://www.gctf.tw/en/IdeaPurpose.htm.

30 Ralph Jennings, “Taiwan VP US Trip Tests Diplomatic Truce,” Voice of America, August 15, 2012, https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-vp-us-trip-tests-taiwan-china-diplomatic-truce/1486409.html; Kristian McGuire, “Tsai Ing-wen’s US Transit Stops in Historical Context,” The Diplomat, July 5, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/tsai-ing-wens-u-s-transit-stops-in-historical-context/.

31 Shih-chung Liu, “Strategies for a Cross-Strait Truce”;

32 The One China Principle is the PRC’s insistence that “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.” Notably, it is different from countries’ unique One China policies, which vary across the spectrum. The US position is that Taiwan’s status is undetermined. For more on how the PRC has attempted to internationalize its One China Principle, see: Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations,” German Marshall Fund, March 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Drun%26Glaser-distortion-un-resolution-2758-limit-taiwans-access_1.pdf. For more on the US One China policy, see: Richard Bush, “A One-China Policy Primer,” Brookings Institution, March 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer-web-final.pdf.

33 Shih-chung Liu, “Strategies for a Cross-Strait Truce.”

34 “Cross-Straits ‘diplomatic truce’ still holds,” Global Times, March 18, 2016, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/974522.shtml.

35 Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations.”

36 “Inaugural address of ROC 14th-term President Tsai Ing-wen,” Office of the President of the Republic of China, May 20, 2016, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893; Javier C. Hernández, “China Suspends Diplomatic Contact with Taiwan,” June 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/world/asia/china-suspends-diplomatic-contact-with-taiwan.html.

37 Diplomatic Allies,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), November 4, 2022, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=1294&sms=1007; Michael Stott and Kathrin Hille, “Paraguay calls for Taiwan to invest $1bn to remain allies,” Financial Times, September 28, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/9d752c51-2c3d-4f93-85c1-49b4d663f075; Daniela Desantis and Ben Blanchard, ““Paraguay Says ‘Excellent’ Taiwan Ties Not Conditional on New Investment, Reuters, September 29, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/paraguay-says-excellent-taiwan-ties-not-conditional-new-investment-2022-09-29/.

38 On December 2, 2016, president-elect Donald Trump had a phone call with Tsai, the first time the U.S. and Taiwan’s presidents have directly communicated since the termination of ties in 1979. This was met with significant blowback from Beijing. For more, see: Anne Gearan, Philip Rucker, and Simon Denyer, “Trump’s Taiwan phone call was long planned, say people who were involved,” The Washington Post, December 4, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-taiwan-phone-call-was-weeks-in-the-planning-say-people-who-were-involved/2016/12/04/f8be4b0c-ba4e-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html.

39 Jonathan Chin, “Academics say Sao Tome linked to Trump,” Taipei Times, December 22, 2016, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/12/22/2003661706; Sarah Wu, “China targeted Taipei’s allies while US hosted democracy summit -Taiwan foreign minister,” Reuters, December 14, 2021.

40 Panama, which switched in 2017, straddles the narrowest point between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Taken together with the other Central and Latin American countries that now recognize the PRC, these moves can be viewed as part of Beijing’s broader efforts to deepen its ties and influence in the region—seen in investment agreements and the integration of Chinese technology into critical infrastructure, some as part of Belt and Road Initiative projects and loan agreements; a growing PRC role in regional organization such as the Inter-American Development Bank; more robust security ties, to include arms sales and training schemes; and, more recently, the vaccine diplomacy initiatives that appear to be strings-attached. These developments have raised U.S. concerns that Washington is losing its longstanding “positional advantage” in the region, as described by the former commander of U.S. Southern Command, and that Beijing is bolstering authoritarianism close to home. Similarly, increased PRC presence in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati and the greater South Pacific more broadly, has implications for sealines of communication critical to global trade and U.S. naval presence, as well as for ANZUS. For more, see: Diana Roy, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 12, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri; Kenneth Rapoza, “China’s Financial Footprint Deepens In Latin America,” Forbes, November 4, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2022/11/04/chinas-financial-footprint-deepens-in-latin-america/?sh=2d74fa21235a; Charles Edel, “Small dots, large strategic areas: US interests in the South Pacific,” The Lowy Institute’s The Interpreter, April 3, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/small-dots-large-strategic-areas-us-interests-south-pacific.

41 “MOFA thanks the international community for unprecedented support of Taiwan’s participation in the WHA,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), June 1, 2021, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1329&s=95949.

42 Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations.”

43 Jacques deLisle, “Taiwan’s quest for international space in the Tsai era: adapting old strategies to new circumstances,” in Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen: Changes and Challenges, ed. June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques deLisle (New York: Routledge, 2021): 242-246; “Era of ‘checkbook diplomacy’ is over, Tsai Ing-wen says,” Taipei Times, July 1, 2016, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/07/01/2003650102.

44 Jacques deLisle, “Taiwan’s quest for international space in the Tsai era: adapting old strategies to new circumstances”: 253-256.

45 “Japan-US Joint Leaders’ Statement: Strengthening the Free and Open International Order,” The White House, May 23, 2002, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/japan-u-s-joint-leaders-statement-strengthening-the-free-and-open-international-order/; “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, May 21, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/; “US-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” US Department of State, August 5, 2002, https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-japan-trilateral-strategic-dialogue/; Statement By Dr. Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 117th Congress, page 1-3 (2021) (Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense); United States and Taiwan Commence Formal Negotiations on US – Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, Office of the United States Trade Representative, August 17, 2022, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/august/united-states-and-taiwan-commence-formal-negotiations-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade;

46 “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” The White House, February 4, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.

47 “Summit for Democracy Summary of Proceedings,” The White House, December 23, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/23/summit-for-democracy-summary-of-proceedings/.

48 “Inaugural address of ROC 15th-term President Tsai Ing-wen,” Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2020, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004;

49 Tsa Ing-wen, “Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/taiwan/2021-10-05/taiwan-and-fight-democracy?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20221113.

50 Nick Aspinwall, “Taiwan: The Tsai Doctrine,” The Diplomat, January 7, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/taiwan-the-tsai-doctrine/

51 Jessica Drun, “Taiwan’s Social Media Landscape: Ripe for Election Interference?” Center for Advanced China Research, November 13, 2018, https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2018/11/13/taiwans-social-media-landscape-ripe-for-election-interference; Chris Horton, “Muffled by China, Taiwan President Embraces Twitter as Megaphone,” July 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/asia/taiwan-tsai-twitter.html; “Taiwan president pushes online diplomacy through tweets,” Taiwan News, April 19, 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3918821.

52 “Taiwan president pushes online diplomacy through tweets”

53 Cindy Wang and Samson Ellis, “How Taiwan’s COVID response became the world’s envy,” Fortune, October 31, 2020, https://fortune.com/2020/10/31/taiwan-best-covid-response/; David Cyranoski, “Taiwan left isolated in fight against SARS,” Nature 422, 652 (2003), https://doi.org/10.1038/422652a

54 Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations.”

55 Chun-yi Lee and Yu-ching Kuo, “Taiwan Can Help!” Taiwan Insight, June 26, 2020, https://taiwaninsight.org/2020/06/26/taiwan-can-help/; Nicole Jao, “‘Mask Diplomacy’ a Boost for Taiwan,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/13/taiwan-coronavirus-pandemic-mask-soft-power-diplomacy/;

56 Stacy Chen, “Taiwan to donate 10 million masks to countries hit hardest by coronavirus,” ABC News, April 1, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/Health/taiwan-donate-10-million-masks-countries-hit-hardest/story?id=69918187.

57 Jenny Li, “#LetTaiwanHelp: What Taiwan’s Hashtag Diplomacy is About,” The News Lens, April 29, 2021, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/150349; “MOFA thanks the international community for unprecedented support of Taiwan’s participation in the WHA,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), June 1, 2021, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1329&s=95949; “About,” Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, 2022, https://ipac.global/about/.

58 “Taiwan accuses China of ‘vaccine diplomacy’ in Paraguay,” BBC News, April 7, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56661303; Chris Horton and Ken Parks, “Paraguay Says Chinese Vaccine Offers Tied to Dumpling Taiwan,” March 24, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-24/paraguay-says-offers-of-chinese-vaccine-tied-to-dumping-taiwan#xj4y7vzkg.

59 Gregory Coutaz, “Taiwan’s Diplomatic Offensive in Eastern Europe,” Diplomat, February 3, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwans-diplomatic-offensive-in-eastern-europe/; “Why are eastern European countries cosying up to Taiwan?” The Economist, December 2, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/12/02/why-are-eastern-european-countries-cosying-up-to-taiwan.

60 Lin Chia-nan, “ ‘Taiwanese’ office to open in Lithuania,” Taipei Times, July 21, 2021, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2021/07/21/2003761201.

61 “Taiwan to use its own name at new Lithuania office,” France24, July 20, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210720-taiwan-to-use-its-own-name-at-new-lithuania-office.

62 “China condemns opening of Taiwan office in Lithuania as ‘egregious act’,” The Guardian, November 18, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/19/china-condemns-opening-of-taiwan-office-in-lithuania-as-egregious-act; “China halts Lithuania beef, dairy and beer imports amid Taiwan row,” BBC News, February 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60343316; Matthew Reynolds and Matthew Goodman, “China’s Economic Coercion: Lessons from Lithuania,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 6, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-economic-coercion-lessons-lithuania.

63 Milda Seputye, “Lithuania Opens Trade Office in Taiwan as Ties With China Sour,” Bloomberg, November 7, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-07/lithuania-opens-trade-office-in-taiwan-as-ties-with-china-sour.

64 James Lamond and Edward Lucas, “Getting Ahead of the Curve: Chinese Influence in Central and Eastern Europe,” Center for European Policy Analysis, September 21, 2022, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/getting-ahead-of-the-curve-chinese-influence-in-central-and-eastern-europe/; Thorsten Benner, “Europe is Doubling Down on Taiwan,” Foreign Policy, November 8, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/08/europe-is-doubling-down-on-taiwan/; Hiroyuki Akita, “How China continues to lose friends in Central and Eastern Europe,” Nikkei Asia, November 3, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/How-China-continues-to-lose-friends-in-Central-and-Eastern-Europe.

65 “Latvia, Estonia leave China-backed East Europe forum,” Associated Press, August 12, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-taiwan-china-beijing-24a51164e0b0a849c33b83dcc92fb1e1; Stuar Lau, “Lithuania pulls out of China’s ’17+1′ bloc in Eastern Europe,” Politico, May 21, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-pulls-out-china-17-1-bloc-eastern-central-europe-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis/; Natsumi Kawasaki, “Lithuania’s ties with Taiwan will pay high-tech dividends: PM,” Nikkei Asia, October 28, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Lithuania-s-ties-with-Taiwan-will-pay-high-tech-dividends-PM; “Baltic lawmakers meet Taiwan’s Tsai, stepping up cooperation,” Associated Press, November 29, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europe-china-estonia-taiwan-latvia-de0c6b41ad5a50e9d4089ad9bb2c144d; “Taiwan, Czech Republic ink six cooperation agreements,” Focus Taiwan, September 23, 2022, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202209230007; Erin Hale, “European MPs Meet with Taiwan Envoy Despite China Risks,” Voice of America, October 31, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/european-mps-meet-with-taiwan-envoy-despite-china-risks/6292615.html; Jorge Liboreiro, “European lawmakers issue joint appeal calling for EU-Taiwan investment deal,” Europe News, September 21, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/21/european-lawmakers-issue-joint-appeal-calling-for-eu-taiwan-investment-deal.

66 “EU requests two WTO panels against China: trade restrictions on Lithuania and high-tech patents,” European Commission, December 7, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7528.

67 Mario Esteban and Michael Malinconi, “EU-Taiwan relations continue to expand in the framework of the One China Policy,” Elcano Royal Institute, October 10, 2022, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/commentaries/eu-taiwan-relations-continue-to-expand-in-the-framework-of-the-one-china-policy/

68 Chou Yung-chieh and Sean Lin, “Taiwan, Slovakia sign MOUs to boost exchanges on trade, semiconductors,” Focus Taiwan, December 2, 2022, https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202212020025; Judy Lin, “Taiwan invests EUR10 million in Lithuania and provides semiconductor scholarships to Central and Eastern Europe students,” DigiTimes Asia, November 8, 2022, https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20221108VL201/eastern-europe-lithuania-semiconductor.html;

69 “Taiwan’s Exports to Central and Eastern Europe Reach a Record High from January to April 2022,” Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Republic of China, May 31, 2022, https://www.moea.gov.tw/MNS/english/news/News.aspx?kind=6&menu_id=176&news_id=100226

70 While the DPP saw a crippling defeat in the 2022 local elections, identity trends in Taiwan–as they pertain to views of the island’s relationship with China and thus, party preference–do not feature prominently as local issues inherently are the focal point. How an individual chooses to identify–as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both–does however play in significantly in national level elections and will shape party politics and policies into the future. For more, see: Jessica Drun, “A Green Wave?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/green-wave.

71 Jessica Drun, “The KMT Continues to Grapple with its ‘1992 Consensus’,” Global Taiwan Brief, October 7, 2002, https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/10/the-kmt-continues-to-grapple-with-its-1992-consensus/.

72 Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations.”

73 Jacques deLisle, “Taiwan’s quest for international space in the Tsai era: adapting old strategies to new circumstances”: 251; Thomas J. Shattuck, “The Race to Zero?: China’s Poaching of Taiwan’s Diplomatic Allies,” Orbis vol.64, 2 (2020): 334-352, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7102519/#fn0135.

74 Jacques deLisle, “Taiwan’s quest for international space in the Tsai era: adapting old strategies to new circumstances”: 247

75 “Six reasons why Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is a mistake,” China Daily, August 6, 2022, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202208/06/WS62eda850a310fd2b29e709ab.html; “Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 9, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202208/t20220809_10738069.html; “Pelosi’s provocative Taiwan visit lashed out by mainstream US media, intl politicians,” Global Times, August 7, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1272408.shtml.

76 “Six reasons why Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is a mistake,” China Daily; “Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China;“Pelosi’s provocative Taiwan visit lashed out by mainstream US media, intl politicians,” Global Times.

77 Jessica Drun, “A Green Wave?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/green-wave.

The post Taiwan’s engagement with the world: Evaluating past hurdles, present complications, and future prospects appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Macky Sall: Africa needs ‘justice and equity in international relations’ to ‘build its own destiny’

Atlantic Council — Tue, 20 Dec 2022 01:56:28 +0000

Below are the remarks of Senegal President and Chairperson of the African Union Macky Sall as prepared for delivery at an Atlantic Council dinner in Washington on December 12, 2022, ahead of the US-Africa Leaders Summit.

Dear colleagues, ministers, members of Congress, ambassadors, representatives of the private sector, the academia, and civil society; dear guests.

I would like to thank the [chairman] of the Atlantic Council, Mr. John Rogers, and its CEO, Mr. Frederick Kempe, for their kind invitation, as well as my compatriot, Ambassador Rama Yade, who has been following up on this for several weeks. I greet and thank all the colleagues, personalities, and other guests gathered here.

I appreciate the efforts that the Atlantic Council has been making for several decades in the analysis and reflection on global issues and challenges facing the world. In my opinion, the place of Africa in contemporary international relations is one of these issues.

More than sixty years after our independence, Africa is still hemmed in on the world stage, and prejudices against the continent remain tenacious. We must therefore continue to advocate, explain, deconstruct unfounded narratives, demand justice and equity, and re-establish historical truths.

Sixty years ago, the vast majority of African countries gained their independence after five hundred years of slavery and colonization. This handicap is unparalleled in the history of humankind. But Africa is still here, alive and resilient.

My view is that despite this historical wrong and the challenges of the day, Africa is moving generally in the right direction. It is true that the cumulative effects of the COVID pandemic and the war in Ukraine have seriously slowed down the dynamics of African growth, which has been regularly higher than the world average in recent years, but the momentum of Africa’s emergence seems irreversible to me.

It is up to us to support this ambition for progress in the fully assumed responsibility of an Africa that does not have any complexes, that makes its own story, carries its own vision of the world, makes its choices in its best interests, and builds its own destiny.

In a way, I can echo here what the founding fathers of the United States Declaration of Independence affirmed 246 years ago, by saying the time has come for Africa to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle her.

And Africa has the potential to assume that station, with its thirty million square kilometers, 1.4 billion inhabitants, large water reserves, 60 percent of the world’s undeveloped arable land, 40 percent of the world’s gold reserves, 85-95 percent of the world’s chromium and platinum group metal reserves, 85 percent of the world’s phosphate reserves, more than 50 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves, one third of the world’s bauxite reserves, 12 percent of the world’s oil reserves, and a world-class new gas calling.

What we need today is to work on improving the conditions for exploiting these resources.

This requires qualified human capital in sufficient numbers, by further developing technical and vocational training at all levels so that our countries can have human resources capable of supporting the structural transformation of their economies. Without quality human capital, the demographic dividend will be more of a handicap that hinders our development efforts than a force that supports our economies.

The pursuit of Africa’s integration seems to me to be just as fundamental, not only at the political level, but also at the economic and commercial levels. This has been the purpose of the gradual establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area, to which the African Union devoted an Extraordinary Summit on November 25.

But beyond the texts, it is also through infrastructure that we will be able to enable the free movement of people and goods, which is essential for integration. With the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), we want to invest more in the construction of roads, highways, ports, airports, and railroads in order to catch up in this area.

I must say that for a long time, several countries and partner institutions showed little interest in this strategic sector. Today, everyone realizes that the development of such profitable infrastructures is an important niche of opportunities for investors and host countries, especially through PPPs.

All our partners, old and new, are welcome on these projects. While keeping their traditional friendships, our countries are also opening up to new horizons. Openness is the very meaning of history.

Beyond our national and continental responsibilities, Africa’s place in the international system also depends on fairer and more equitable global governance. This is what the advocacy that I have been leading since the beginning of my mandate at the head of the African Union on several fronts is all about.

First, for the consistent financing of African economies, we believe it is necessary for the OECD to reform the conditions of access to export credit, by relaxing the rules on credit rates and the duration of grace periods and repayment periods. This would make it possible to mobilize more resources for the financing of development projects, including through private investment and public-private partnerships.

Second, we need to do more to combat abusive tax holidays, tax evasion, and tax optimization, which deprive our countries of significant financial resources, even though taxes should be paid where the activity generates wealth. It is fortunate that, at the initiative of the United States, the OECD adopted in October 2021 a landmark agreement on a 15 percent global minimum tax. This is a significant step in the fight against irregular tax practices that contribute to tax base erosion.

In addition, we need to do more on improving the assessment methods of rating agencies. It has been noted that African countries continue to be penalized by an exaggerated perception of risk that increases insurance premiums and the cost of investment.

The 2022 Financing for Sustainable Development Report published last April by some sixty international institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank, also noted the limitations of these assessments and recommended that the assessment criteria better reflect the real situation of each country.

Finally, we want a fair and equitable energy transition that enables our countries to use their own resources to address their industrialization needs at competitive costs and ensure universal access to electricity, of which more than six hundred million Africans are still deprived. As noted at COP27, when it comes to climate change adaptation, it is our countries that tend to finance their green projects, including infrastructure, through debt, as agreed financial commitments to support developing countries’ adaptation efforts have been slow to materialize.

In addition to these economic, financial, and environmental considerations, we are advocating for a more equitable representation of Africa in global governance bodies such as the United Nations Security Council and the G20, so that its interests are better taken into account.

Finally, what Africa is calling for in terms of a different vision of the world is not a revolution, but a simple evolution for more justice and equity in international relations. It is a legitimate demand to which we want to associate all our friends and partners. I hope that the Atlantic Council will help to amplify this advocacy.

These are the few remarks I would like to make here, while waiting to deliver Africa’s message to our summit. Thank you for your attention.

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Individual Russians must be held accountable for war crimes in Ukraine

Stanislav Aseyev — Thu, 15 Dec 2022 19:45:15 +0000

The broken windows theory of criminal justice holds that if comparatively minor instances of social disorder such as broken windows are not addressed, they will pave the way for more serious crimes. The same principle can also be applied to international relations and geopolitics.

In 2014, Russia began “breaking windows” in Crimea. When the world failed respond adequately, Russian aggression expanded into eastern Ukraine and escalated into armed hostilities that left more than 14,000 dead while forcing millions to flee their homes. Again, the international community did not react with sufficient decisiveness. This led directly to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine which began in February 2022.

For the past eight-and-a-half years, Russia has been permitted to slowly but steadily challenge and undermine the global security order established in the decades following World War II. For many in the West, this process has been unspectacular and has involved minor inconveniences such as rising food prices and mounting energy bills. Some even complain of “Ukraine fatigue,” seemingly oblivious to the fact that atrocities are being committed in Europe on a scale not seen since the days of Stalin and Hitler.

This leads us back to the broken window theory. In order to arrest this slide toward a dark future of international lawlessness, it is vital to hold Russians accountable for the crimes they are committing in Ukraine. And yet at present, the issue of war crimes is being addressed in vague terms without any real mechanisms in place to bring specific defendants to court.

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While there is general recognition within the international community that Russia is guilty of grave war crimes in Ukraine, we currently lack the tools to prosecute thousands of potential suspects. This could create a dangerous precedent for future conflicts and must change.

I have first-hand experience of Russian crimes in Ukraine. I previously spent two-and-a-half years as a prisoner in the notorious Izolyatsia prison in Russian-occupied Donetsk. I was subjected to torture during my incarceration and was eventually freed in a prisoner exchange. Following my release, I helped locate the commandant of the prison and contributed to his arrest.

I was able to do this thanks to the Justice Initiative Fund (JIF), an initiative I founded that seeks to identify and track down Russian war criminals. The JIF lists those who are officially suspected of war crimes and offers a reward for anyone who can provide information that will lead to their arrest.

This task is just beginning. Huge obstacles must yet be overcome before justice can be served. Today’s Russian war criminals are not like the Nazis after World War II, who were scattered around the world. On the contrary, they overwhelmingly live in Russia itself, and have no intention of leaving. Most are part of a vast Russian underclass with low incomes and even lower expectations that Putin has been careful to cultivate during his two decades in power.

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The first step toward justice is to identify war criminals. There is currently no single international organization that is willing or able to identify and search for large numbers of war crimes suspects around the world. The JIF seeks to expand its scope internationally in order to help meet this challenge. There is a logic to these ambitions. Many of the war crimes suspects in locations such as Africa and Syria are also sought in relation to atrocities committed in Ukraine.

The war crimes committed by the Russian military wherever it is deployed can be traced to the sense of impunity felt by the perpetrators. In order to bring this impunity to an end, it is vital to identify individual war criminals. This will require the combined efforts of the international community. Ukraine should be at the heart of such efforts.

Along with identification, the other key goal is bringing war crimes suspects to trial. The experience of recent decades indicates that only a handful of suspects ever actually make it to the courtroom, while thousands of actual perpetrators never face justice. I have personally participated in three war crimes trials relating to atrocities committed at the Izolyatsia prison, and only one of the three featured an actual defendant.

I would like to see the democratic world take the lead in developing new legal procedures for the transfer of war crimes suspects to the jurisdiction of the relevant international and national courts. Everyone is well aware that Russia will never hand over war crimes suspects within the framework of existing extradiction procedures. New mechanisms are required that will place war criminals on an equal footing with terrorism suspects, with all the legal consequences of this status.

Without these initiatives, there is a risk that all the current work being done to collect evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine will be futile. Unless we have the resources to identify the perpetrators and the tools to bring them to justice, exposing the atrocities committed in Ukraine will fail to prevent these crimes from being repeated.

Stanislav Aseyev is a Ukrainian author, journalist, and founder of the Justice initiative fund.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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State of the Order: Assessing November 2022

daniellemiller — Wed, 14 Dec 2022 01:19:56 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Biden-Xi Summit. Meeting in-person for the first time as national leaders, President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping sought to diminish tensions in what has become an increasingly adversarial relationship between China and the United States. On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Indonesia, the two leaders agreed to reopen talks on climate change and discussed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with Xi reportedly agreeing with Biden that “nuclear weapons must not be used.” But Xi also warned the US not to “cross the redline” regarding Taiwan.

Shaping the order. While the historic summit may help the two nations establish guardrails in their relationship, it is unlikely to impact the broader trajectory, as the US and China seem headed toward a potentially decades-long strategic competition over the future of the global order. Such a competition appeared to be playing out in real time, as Xi met separately at the G20 with French president Emmanuel Macron and earlier in Beijing with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, suggesting that European leaders should act independently and distance themselves from US polices toward China.
Hitting home. The intensifying strategic competition between the West and China will have direct implications for American businesses, which will need to look at ways to reduce vulnerabilities to China in critical sectors.
What to do. Washington should continue to pursue cooperation with Beijing in potential areas of common interest. But with China seeking to undermine democratic solidarity, the US should prioritize efforts to forge a common strategic approach for dealing with Beijing among its core allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

Protests Across China. In a remarkable show of bravery, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in cities across China, many shouting anti-regime slogans, to protest Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policies of forced quarantines and strict lockdowns. Chinese authorities responded to the protests – the most widespread in mainland China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre – by arresting and intimidating demonstrators and restricting social media. Chinese officials later seemed to indicate a willingness to soften Covid restrictions. US officials reacted cautiously, defending the right to peaceful protest but avoiding direct criticism of Beijing.

Shaping the order. The anti-government protests erupting across China suggest that Beijing’s response to Covid may not be a model of autocratic efficiency, as it was once touted. More broadly, the protests follow those recently taking place in Iran and Russia (albeit briefly) and appear to be part of a pattern of growing citizen unrest in autocracies around the world. But authoritarian regimes have become increasingly adept in clamping down on demonstrations and blunting their impacts, including by deploying and sharing more sophisticated surveillance technologies.
Hitting home. American values are better protected in a world where democratic norms and human rights are respected.
What to do. In coordination with allies, the Biden administration should supplement measures to constrain authoritarian governments with assistance to non-violent civil resistance movements across the world. Its upcoming Summit for Democracy, in March 2023, will provide an opportunity to focus on efforts in this space.

Russia Scales Back. In a significant setback for the Kremlin’s war aims in Ukraine, Russian forces pulled out of Kherson, the capital of one of the four regional provinces that Russian president Vladimir Putin formally purported to annex in September. As Russian forces consolidate, the Ukrainian military appeared to be preparing for a new counteroffensive potentially aimed at seizing back territory to the south and east. Russia continued to strike power and water facilities across the country, causing widespread outages as a cold winter approaches, as G7 leaders condemned the “barbaric missile attacks” on civilian infrastructure.

Shaping the order. While the conflict is likely to go on for months, the tide of the war continues to turn in favor of Ukraine, as Russian forces have been put on the defensive. Russia also appears to be increasingly isolated on the global stage, with Putin choosing to stay away from the G20 leaders’ summit in Bali – one that concluded with a joint statement announcing that “most leaders” strongly condemned the war in Ukraine and declaring the threat to use nuclear weapons as “inadmissible.”
Hitting home. America is less secure in a world where global powers can invade their neighbors and commit war crimes with impunity.
What to do. Washington should work with allies to ensure that Ukraine continues to receive advanced weapons and equipment to repair power and water systems, while seeking to incentivize governments in the global South to join in efforts to sanction and isolate Russia.

Quote of the month

“[I]f we let Putin win, all of us will pay a much higher price, for many years to come… There can be no lasting peace if the aggressor wins. There can be no lasting peace if oppression and autocracy prevail over freedom and democracy.”

– NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, November 29, 2022

State of the Order this month: Strengthened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↑)

In the most significant protest movement in mainland China since the Tiananmen Square massacre, thousands of citizens across the country demonstrated against Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policies, many shouting anti-regime slogans, as government authorities arrested and intimidated demonstrators and restricted social media.
The UN Human Rights Council approved an investigation into human rights abuses in Iran, where over 300 people have been killed and 14,000 arrested since anti-regime protests began three months ago.
In the US midterm elections, nearly every candidate for an office that oversees and certifies elections in battleground states that had denied the results of the 2020 election was defeated — a win for the integrity of America’s democratic system.
Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, who had been diplomatically isolated after conducting fraudulent elections in 2018, was welcomed back to the international community, attending a UN climate conference in Egypt and shaking hands with French President Emmanuel Macron and US climate envoy John Kerry.
On balance, the democracy pillar was strengthened.

Security (↑)

In a significant battleground victory for Ukraine, Russian forces pulled out of Kherson, a key southern city and capital of one of the four regional provinces that Russian president Vladimir Putin formally purported to annex in September.
Russia came under increasing diplomatic pressure over its aggression in Ukraine, as Putin backed out of the G20 summit and faced subtle pushback from allies in a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-dominated alliance of post-Soviet nations.
North Korea test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile potentially capable of reaching the US mainland, a move strongly condemned by the US and its allies, including Japan and South Korea.
At a meeting in Tehran signaling a growing polarization between democracies and autocracies, officials from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Belarus, and other nations issued a joint rebuke of the “so-called rules-based order” and criticized efforts to “divide our world into blocs.
In light of Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine, the security pillar was strengthened.

Trade ()

France and other European nations criticized subsidies for US companies included in the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act, suggesting that such measures were protectionist and inconsistent with principles of an open economic order.
Russia asked India for assistance in keeping vital industries running, as the two nations exchanged lists of products that could be the basis for expanded trade between the two nations, despite Western sanctions on Russia.
On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↑)

With emissions likely to reach historic levels this year, the US and its allies agreed at a global climate summit in Egypt to establish a fund for wealthy industrial nations to compensate developing countries for negative effects of climate change and accelerate global decarbonization.
China braced for significant increases in nationwide Covid-related illnesses as the government’s zero-Covid strategy came under pressure in the wake of a looming economic slowdown and an under-vaccinated population.
With the actions taken at the climate summit, the global commons pillar was strengthened.

Alliances ()

G7 leaders, meeting on the margins of the G20 summit in Bali, jointly condemned Russia’s “barbaric” missile attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, and vowed to hold Russia accountable.
While in Asia, President Biden met with his counterparts from Japan and South Korea and resolved to forge closer trilateral links, amid continuing discord between Tokyo and Seoul, and also announced a new economic security dialogue among the three nations.
In a sign of potential divergence among allies, Emmanuel Macron accused former Australian prime minister Scott Morrison of provoking “nuclear confrontation” with China, and, in a meeting with Indo-Pacific leaders, called for “dynamic balance” with regard to China as opposed to strict alignment with the US.
Overall, the alliance pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

John Ikenberry, in Foreign Affairs, contends that as the world faces a struggle between liberal and illiberal world orders, America is well-positioned to succeed given the appeal of its ideas and capacities to build partnerships and alliances.
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, in Foreign Affairs, argues that despite its mounting setbacks in Ukraine, Russia will remain a formidable threat to the United States and its allies.
Fareed Zakaria, in the Washington Post, contends that while much has been written about democracy’s fragility, the world’s most powerful autocracies are showing signs of deep and structural weaknesses.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

In an Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino joined Stephen Hadley, William Taylor, John Herbst, and Melinda Haring in proposing a long-haul strategy to help Ukraine win the war against Russia and secure the peace.
Dan Fried, in Just Security, contends that initiating negotiations to end the Ukraine war on Putin’s terms is oddly timed, and potentially dangerous.
Peter Engelke, in the New Atlanticist, outlines key recommendations for G20 member states on how to combat global food insecurity, in the context of the Atlantic Council’s Global Food Security Forum in Bali, on the sidelines of the G20 summit.
Atlantic Council experts react to recent waves of protests in China against the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) restrictive Covid-19 policies.

__________________________________________________

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Jeffrey Cimmino – Associate Director
Danielle Miller – Program Assistant
Otto Hastrup Svendsen – Georgetown Student Researcher

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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Zelenskyy urges special tribunal for Russian aggression against Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 09 Dec 2022 19:23:44 +0000

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine now in its tenth month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is urging the international community to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression in order to prosecute Russia’s political and military leadership. The move reflects concerns that existing international criminal courts will be unable to hold the Kremlin fully accountable for Russian crimes committed in Ukraine.

Zelenskyy reiterated his call for a special tribunal on December 7 during an event hosted in Washington DC by the United States Institute of Peace, the Atlantic Council, and the Ukrainian Embassy. In keynote remarks delivered on Zelenskyy’s behalf by presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak, the Ukrainian leader stressed that without justice, peace would be impossible. In the context of Russia’s ongoing Ukraine invasion, Zelenskyy defined justice as prosecuting not only those guilty of committing individual war crimes but also “those who gave the order to start this criminal war.”

While war crimes prosecutions typically address how wars are fought, Zelenskyy’s push for a special tribunal seeks to target the people in senior positions who are responsible for unleashing the war. The initiative envisions a special tribunal established specifically to put Russian officials on trial for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. “The crime of aggression is the alpha and omega of the war,” noted the Ukrainian President in his address. “To start a criminal and unprovoked war is to open the door to thousands of crimes committed during hostilities and in occupied territory.”

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Zelenskyy’s initiative appears to be gaining international momentum. In recent days, France became the first major Western nation to publicly back the creation of a special tribunal. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also stated on November 30 that the European Union will try to set up a specialized court, backed by the United Nations, to “investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression” in Ukraine.

While the US has yet to adopt an official position on the issue, individual US politicians and commentators have spoken in favor of establishing a special tribunal. Speaking at this week’s Washington DC event, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova noted growing support for the idea of a special tribunal both in the US and in Europe. The Ukrainian diplomat underlined the importance of the initiative for the future of international security. “We need this tribunal for Ukraine, but we also need it for the entire world,” commented Markarova. “If we can hold Putin accountable, we can prevent more wars.”

Fellow panelist Andriy Smyrnov, who serves as Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, highlighted the legal barriers that currently prevent the International Criminal Court (ICC) from prosecuting Russia for crimes of aggression. At present, the ICC is only able to address the crime of aggression via referral from the UN Security Council, where Russia has a veto, or if both the aggressor and victim states have ratified the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute, which neither Russia nor Ukraine has done. “We have come to the conclusion that the only effective mechanism for holding the Russian Federation accountable for the crime of aggression is the creation of a special international tribunal,” Smyrnov commented.

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The exact structure of a possible future special tribunal has yet to be determined. However, most observers agree that in order to gain the confidence of the international community, it would need to involve the United Nations. Former US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer told fellow panelists this week that a UN role was “entirely feasible.” Scheffer has a wealth of personal experience to draw on, having participated in the creation of international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. He also headed the United States negotiating team during talks on the creation of the International Criminal Court.

Scheffer noted that a framework agreement to establish a special tribunal could be reached relatively quickly once the necessary support had been secured from the United Nations General Assembly. “You have to have political will at the UN, and right now you do have that political will,” he commented, pointing to the numerous UN General Assembly votes since the invasion began in February that have overwhelmingly condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The creation of a UN-backed special tribunal may well be technically feasible, but many skeptics continue to argue that Russia’s status as a major world power makes it practically impossible to put senior Russian officials on trial. Ambassador John Herbst, who serves as Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, acknowledged that most previous international war crimes trials have targeted comparatively smaller nations. He also noted that the only trials involving major powers took place following the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan at the end of World War II. While nobody envisages similar circumstances in relation to Putin’s Russia, Herbst said there were a number of reasons why the current push for a special tribunal is nevertheless worthwhile.

One of the most compelling arguments in favor of establishing a special tribunal is the role such an institution could play in exposing the invasion and ensuring Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. Herbst highlighted that in recent weeks, some of the Kremlin’s top propagandists have already begun publicly complaining that senior Russian officials are talking about the possibility of prosecution in The Hague. “This is helping to undermine the morale of the bad guys conducting this war and bringing it to the attention of the entire Russian people,” he commented. Herbst also noted that a special tribunal could create a legal framework to distribute hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as reparations for war damage.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Most observers expected this inexperienced side to be completely outclassed in what is Europe’s premier football competition. Instead, Shakhtar put together a highly credible Champions League group stage campaign that saw the club defeat Germany’s Leipzig in style before drawing against both Real Madrid and Celtic to secure a place in February’s Europa League playoffs. This six-point haul was a considerable improvement on the previous season’s effort, which had seen Shakhtar collect just two points and exit European competition before Christmas.

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The scale of Shakhtar’s achievement was most immediately evident in the club’s first group stage tie. Despite being considered rank outsiders, the Ukrainians scored a shock 4-1 victory away in Leipzig. Ten of Shakhtar’s starting eleven players in Germany were Ukrainian, while six were under the age of 23. Some had been signed recently from less fashionable Ukrainian clubs such as Desna Chernihiv and FC Mariupol and were enjoying their first taste of Champions League football.

Other highlights of the campaign included an impressive 1-1 draw with the mighty Real Madrid. Shakhtar actually came within seconds of what would have been an historic victory over Madrid, only for the Spanish giants to grab an injury time equalizer in the ninety-fifth minute.

The undoubted star of this season’s Shakhtar show has been turbo-charged winger Mykhailo Mudryk. The tattooed and coiffured 21-year-old Ukrainian player looks every inch the celebrity footballer and was already turning heads before this year’s campaign. Following a series of stunning Champions League performances, he is now regarded as one of the most sought-after players in world football.

Mudryk weighed in with a total of three Champions League goals and two assists. He was also recognized by UEFA as the fastest player in the Champions league group stages with a top speed of 36.6 kilometers per hour. This emerging superstar is now being widely tipped for a big money transfer to English Premier League club Arsenal and could soon break the record for the most expensive Ukrainian player.

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Shakhtar’s success is all the more remarkable as the club has been forced to play its Champions league ties in exile. With the Russian invasion making it impossible to stage Champions League games anywhere inside Ukraine, Shakhtar has played home matches in Polish capital Warsaw.

This nomadic existence is not entirely new for the club. Shakhtar has been unable to stage matches in hometown Donetsk since the city was first occupied by Russia in spring 2014, and has spent the past eight seasons alternating between temporary bases in Lviv, Kharkiv, and Kyiv.

The scale of the war unleashed by Putin meant that this season’s Champions League campaign involved additional logistical issues for the club as players and staff traveled from their base in western Ukraine’s Lviv region. With no civilian flights currently possible in Ukrainian airspace, players were forced to endure ten-hour coach journeys across the border into Poland prior to and following European games.

Shakhtar players also suffer from the same wartime trauma and anxiety as millions of their compatriots. Most members of the overwhelmingly Ukrainian first team squad have friends and family living across the country who are experiencing the daily horrors of the Russian invasion including missile attacks and drastically limited access to light, heating, water, and other basic amenities.

Despite these uniquely difficult circumstances, morale within the club has remained remarkably high. There is a strong sense of camaraderie among the players and an awareness that their success on the football pitch can provide a welcome distraction from the war while also inspiring fellow Ukrainians to defy their doubters.

Overcoming overwhelming odds has become something of a Ukrainian national pastime in 2022. When Putin’s invasion began on February 24, the entire country was widely expected to fall within a matter of days. Instead, Ukraine’s courageous and brilliant resistance has humbling the once vaunted Russian military and won the admiration of the watching world.

Shakhtar’s heroics are of a far humbler nature, of course. Nevertheless, the club’s determination to overcome wartime adversity has captured the imagination of football fans across Europe and provided Ukrainians with one more symbol of their country’s refusal to accept defeat.

David Kirichenko is an editor at Euromaidan Press, an online English language media outlet in Ukraine. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

The international community should take an “inclusive engagement” approach, rather than one that relies mostly on meeting with morally compromised Taliban leaders, to try to persuade them to rule according to international human rights norms. On balancing the scale of engagement that is currently tilted in favor of the Taliban, there are more options than either ignoring the opposition or getting in bed with the next insurgency, 1980’s style. An approach espoused by an Afghan visiting scholar at the University of Notre Dame (and recently articulated by the president of the European Parliament) is to work with the “people of Afghanistan, not its rulers.”

Inclusive engagement could involve talking to multiple, smaller Afghan groups that cross traditional ethnic or regional lines, with a focus not on who will eventually take power but on how to preserve basic human rights and freedoms today. Now is not the time to “pick the winner” or rely on former political parties. Emerging leaders can be found among the new diaspora, longtime exiles, former Afghan diplomats who still have convening power and the respect of their international colleagues, peace groups inside the country, private sector, and the non-Taliban religious and tribal hierarchy.

Over the past year, in a series of meetings in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Commission, the international community has articulated its positions on human rights and concerns about terrorism. We must stick to those redlines as firmly as the Taliban stick to theirs. A new overall international approach is urgently needed and should start, at long last, with a handover from failed US primacy. The United States should make it clear to the Taliban that there no longer exists a separate bilateral channel or agenda above a technical level and formally abrogate the deeply flawed 2020 Doha Agreement between the United States and the Taliban. Since it now has the most at risk geographically—given the increasing flow of drugs and migrants from South Asia in Europe—the European Union (EU) should take on the role of senior partner in the so-called “Western” effort. It is time to give the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, the political clout to implement explicit transparency and fairness conditionalities on humanitarian aid distribution, and to get results from its human rights interventions such as calling for the release of detained women protesters.

There should be deliberate speed to determine which Afghan voices speak for everyone else, while Afghans determine a mechanism for recognizing new leaders. There are international civil society organizations such as Freedom House who are engaged with groups in Afghanistan to monitor the civic space, while other efforts are underway by the EU. Given the human rights and democracy issues at stake, the US Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights should be the US lead, along with other senior international officials, to meet publicly with all these groups—a higher rank than those who meet with the Taliban, serving as a significant reminder to the Taliban that other Afghans have international legitimacy.

Some would argue that we must accept the Taliban as the government, a quasi-legitimate force that bested the corrupt former government. This is arguably the easiest way to deliver both humanitarian assistance and development aid, and there is even the quixotic idea that they can deliver counter-terrorism help against mutual enemies. But while their hold on power is clear for now, the Taliban are not the only interlocutors who will matter over time, given Afghanistan’s difficult history and human terrain, their governing incompetence, and the existence of sporadic armed resistance groups and emerging or still-respected non-Taliban Afghan leaders. Working only with the Taliban would be just one more historical example of short-circuiting Afghan representation, and an elite bargain with them would end like other such agreements: in civil unrest, the growth of warlordism, and more Afghan migration. And, funding to help Afghans cannot exist without buy-in from Western donors, who are going to tire of funding a regime that proudly defies human rights and counter-terrorism norms at the same time its drug profits are skyrocketing.

This international “inclusive engagement” strategy needs to be both clear and well-broadcast, with logical carrot and stick applications. Ending pernicious human rights abuses and allowing others a voice in government is the only route to political recognition; sanctions relief must reflect improvement in the conditions which brought on the sanctions in the first place—supporting terrorism; and aid requires full commitment to international controls on international funds and a guarantee that the Taliban will use its own revenues to bring food and employment to starving Afghans. Once this strategy is in motion and well understood, we must remain patient. Afghanistan’s situation presents a wicked dilemma which the United States helped create, and there is no shortcut to a solution.

A myriad of US national security policies, from promoting democracy, preventing atrocities, balancing China and Russia in Central Asia, countering terrorism and narcotics, and more, require us to remain engaged in and with the totality of Afghanistan.

Annie Pforzheimer, a Senior Non-resident Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Afghanistan from 2017-2019.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

SouthAsiaSource Nov 17, 2022

Reflections on the 2022 Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan and regional security

By Nilofar Sakhi

The countries involved in the 2022 Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan have yet to address, let alone resolve, fundamental issues related to regional security and a political settlement for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

SouthAsiaSource Oct 20, 2022

The lionesses of Kabul & Tehran in Khorasan

By Davood Moradian

Afghanistan Human Rights

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Afghanistan under the Taliban: Regional recalibrations, challenges, and ways forward

By Hameed Hakimi

Despite the spectacular and unprecedented events following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the global spotlight steadily shifted away from the country.

Afghanistan Economy & Business

An introduction to the Freedom Online Coalition

Rose Jackson, Leah Fiddler, Jacqueline Malaret — Tue, 06 Dec 2022 20:00:00 +0000

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Understanding the first ten years of the world’s democratic tech alliance

Democratic and authoritarian nations are in a global competition for the digital world, amid a bid to renew or remake the world order. On one side is the long-standing global norm that the Internet is a global good, governed by a multistakeholder community and designed to be free, open, secure, and interoperable. On the other side is a model antithetical to the universal rights and democratic norms around which the United States and its allies organize. That authoritarian model advances a version of the Internet in which states leverage technology to shatter citizen expectations of privacy, free expression, and assembly.

Core to the authoritarian strategy are efforts to drive a wedge between the historically effective alliance of democratic nations working collectively to ensure everyone, everywhere can benefit from a digital ecosystem in which basic rights are embedded. The growing variance in approach between democratic countries in governing their own use of technology only serves to broaden that wedge. As the authoritarian model spreads, it is politically and practically shifting the online experience of billions of people, including those within democracies. The stability and sustainability of a free, open, secure, and interoperable Internet relies on democracies’ ability to rebuke these efforts and defend the Internet as a key infrastructure to advance human rights. In addition to countering authoritarian repression abroad, this includes grounding their own use of technology in democratic principles and working to prevent emerging innovations from being misused to undermine human rights at home and around the world. A failure to do so will only accelerate the authoritarian capture of the Internet, and cause a global loss in access to speech, expression, and prosperity.

It is no surprise, then, that policymakers increasingly call for “democratic tech alliances” on everything from supply chains to emerging technology to global Internet freedom. This has renewed attention to the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), which comprises thirty-five member countries committed to advancing Internet freedom and human rights online. The FOC’s mission is more relevant now than ever in its eleven-year history, providing opportunities for its member states to

coordinate public and private diplomatic action in response to threats to democracy and human rights online;
collaborate in multistakeholder and multilateral forums to bolster human-rights-aligned norms and standards for the digital ecosystem; and
maintain a trusted space for collaboration with civil-society and industry actors that serves as a center of gravity for joint strategic action.

At the same time, the FOC as an institution is at an inflection point. As democracies seek mechanisms to drive collaboration and action in an increasingly adversarial global space, FOC member countries have an opportunity to strengthen, clarify, and focus energy through the coalition. Doing so will require members to address long-standing debates related to its scope of work, incentives, and impact in international forums.

This primer on the FOC is intended to serve as an introduction to the entity, summarizing its structure and development over time. In the final section, this introduction provides an overview of the key tensions that member countries will need to address to make the coalition more effective, credible, and durable.

The document is based on a literature review of publicly available information on the FOC website, including the coalition’s descriptions of its activities, meeting minutes, declarations, and other materials related to convenings and workstreams. Additionally, DFRLab staff interviewed civil-society leaders from around the world who have worked in partnership with the coalition, and consulted with others present during the FOC’s founding and various iterations of its development. Staff also consulted former US government and other member-nation officials, and contacted the FOC Support Unit for information about its structure, budget, and workstreams.

What is the Freedom Online Coalition?

The Freedom Online Coalition is a multilateral group of thirty-five countries that coordinates diplomatic discussion and possible response on salient issues involving Internet freedom and digital rights. The central aim of the FOC is to ensure “that the human rights that people have offline enjoy the same protection online.”¹ The coalition aims to protect Internet freedom and ensure that digital rights are a priority in policymaking around the world. At its founding in 2011, the FOC focused predominantly on organizing diplomatic responses to threats to freedom of expression and association online, including threats related to content filtering, network disruptions, surveillance technology, and censorship. As the impacts of technology and the Internet become increasingly central in international and political discourse, the FOC has also considered the rights implications of cybersecurity, digital authoritarianism, and digital equality and access. The FOC has also sought to engage more formally with the private sector and civil society through thematic working groups, the FOC Advisory Network, and periodic external-stakeholder engagements.

Origins of the Coalition

Throughout the early twenty-first century, Internet connectivity increased around the world, as did its impact on political expression and attitudes. While citizens had started to leverage technology to organize protest movements as early as Iran’s 2009 Green Movement, the 2011 Arab Spring captivated the attention of much of the world and thrust social media platforms to center stage. As a result, governments and companies alike scrambled to make sense of the increasingly central role the Internet was playing in geopolitics. As activists deployed digital tools to organize protests and broadcast the subsequent brutal crackdowns, authoritarian governments sought to censor content, surveil citizens, or shutter open platforms altogether to reassert government control. Amid this dangerous match between citizens and authoritarian states, democratic governments explored how best to support those seeking to extend universal rights to and through the Internet.

In the United States, the nascent idea of “Internet Freedom” percolated as a foreign policy priority, with then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton leading a dedicated Internet freedom agenda. This new US government focus was based principally on values Clinton set out in a January 2010 address, notably promising to increase funding and diplomatic engagement on the issue set, and to seek opportunities to partner with other governments to do the same.² In the following years, the US government created the Open Technology Fund to develop anti-surveillance and anti-censorship tools for activists in authoritarian states, and secured bipartisan resources from the US Congress for the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to support those on the front lines of Internet freedom globally.³ It was in this context that the United States joined thirteen other countries in the Netherlands on December 8, 2011, to formally launch the FOC at the inaugural Freedom Online Conference, with the seemingly simple commitment to “engage together to protect human rights online.”⁴

Current Coalition structure and operations

The FOC is not a legal entity, and member contributions are made on a voluntary basis. The official structure and procedure for the coalition have been developed over time and are still somewhat ad hoc.⁵ The FOC is led each year by a different country chair, which is selected after members state their interest and the full coalition votes on the slate. The chair is supported by the “Friends of the Chair,” a rotating group of FOC member states intended to ensure continuity and consistency through the yearly transitions.⁶ Each year, the chair of the FOC assumes responsibility for coordinating the coalition, setting its agenda, providing diplomatic support, and hosting the Freedom Online Conference. Annually since 2017, the FOC has published its goals in a program of action that outlines substantive and organizational priorities for the upcoming year.“⁷ The coalition makes key decisions at annual conferences, on the sidelines of international convenings, and through continued communications throughout the year.

An organizational chart of the FOC’s current structure.

In addition to its core diplomatic-coordination role, the FOC also conducts outreach and programming with civil society and industry. The FOC advisory network (FOC-AN), created in 2017 and launched in 2018, is a group of nongovernmental stakeholders that provides FOC member governments with advice and serves as the main mechanism for the FOC to receive the insights of civil society and the broader multistakeholder community.⁸ The FOC also currently operates three task forces and a working group, each of which includes government, industry, and civil-society representatives: the Task Force on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights; the Task Force on Digital Equality; the Task Force on Internet Shutdowns; and the Silicon Valley Working Group, which is particularly focused on engaging industry in the FOC’s work.

The current criteria to become an FOC member state are laid out in the Stockholm Terms of Reference, which were adopted in 2017. They require countries to demonstrate a strong commitment to human rights and Internet freedom—both domestically and through their foreign policy—as well as to be members in good standing of other democracy-focused multistakeholder and intergovernmental organizations and forums.“⁹ To be removed from the coalition, a country can voluntarily withdraw, or its membership can be terminated following a recommendation from the chair or “Friend of the Chair” and a review of the government’s actions. After such a recommendation, a case is prepared and sent to the full FOC, and, if there are no objections, the member is terminated from the coalition. This procedure has never been used.

The chair and “Friends of the Chair” effectively function as the rotating FOC secretariat, which is staffed by a Support Unit housed at Global Partners Digital (GPD), based in London.¹⁰ This support function was not created until 2014, and the funding, personnel, structure, ownership, and terms of reference are a patchwork that developed over the intervening years. GPD was selected by the FOC, in part, because it was already engaged in the digital-rights space and had existing funding through the US Department of State. The Support Unit is run by the executive director of GPD and three dedicated staff members. Its primary responsibilities are serving as the main point of contact for FOC members, organizing member convenings and conference calls, communicating with the FOC Advisory Network, supporting task-force communications, maintaining the FOC internal listserv, providing substantive guidance when appropriate, and administering the FOC website and social media accounts.

Funding for the Support Unit fluctuates on an annual basis, dependent on voluntary contributions from member states via flexible grant agreements.¹¹ The Support Unit’s funding has steadily increased over the past five years, with a budget of just over $625,000 in 2022. The Support Unit reports against the requirements of each individual grant signed with the respective FOC members, and its day-to-day activities are mandated by an internal program of action developed in partnership with the chair and “Friends of the Chair” cohort. The Support Unit then reports against this broader program of action with updates on the funding for its own operations, as well as for discrete projects and efforts of the FOC more broadly. Noting concerns around the unpredictability of this funding arrangement, the 2017 Stockholm Terms of Reference established a mandate for a voluntary member-state “Funding Coordination Group,” though it never became operational.

Coalition workstreams and outputs

Freedom Online Conference

The FOC’s most visible output is the Freedom Online Conference, which doubles as a stakeholder gathering and annual meeting of member states to discuss the state of digital rights and coordinate diplomatic strategies in response. Since the inaugural conference in The Hague in 2011, the FOC has held eight additional conferences: one every year except for 2017, 2019, and 2022.¹² FOC Conferences are hosted by each year’s chair, and have been held in Nairobi, Kenya (2012); Tunis, Tunisia (2013); Tallinn, Estonia (2014); Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (2015); San José, Costa Rica (2016); Berlin, Germany (2018); Accra, Ghana (early 2020 as part of Ghana’s 2019 chairship); and Helsinki, Finland (2021). Instead of a conference this year, FOC chair Canada opted to convene strategic retreats in Paris and Rome for member countries and the FOC-AN.

Each conference convenes FOC member countries, civil society, and industry for panels, workshops, and plenary sessions. The annual conference also serves as a platform to discuss organizational changes for the coalition itself, and is often used to initiate strategic reviews and to negotiate or publish new terms of reference, other official documents, or processes. A summary of these gatherings and the resulting statements can be found in Annex I.

In addition to the Freedom Online Conference, the FOC has, on occasion, convened on the sidelines of various international forums, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), and the Stockholm Internet Forum.

Joint statements
The FOC publishes joint statements responding to challenges to Internet freedom. The FOC’s earliest statements stressed the importance of freedom of expression and compelled governments to protect it online. As the coalition evolved, it published joint statements on a wider range of topics related to digital rights, comprising Internet shutdowns and content filtering, disinformation, state surveillance, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence. A list of these statements can be found in Annex II. The coalition as an entity has only once published a country-specific statement: in 2013, it condemned Internet legislation introduced in Vietnam that restricted access and limited online speech.“¹³ This statement led to significant debate within the coalition about the appropriateness of country-specific statements, due to sensitivities around complicating direct diplomatic relationships. Since then, the lack of direct government references in FOC statements has been a topic of debate, particularly as governments from Nigeria to Russia have moved to ban platforms or restrict Internet access in their countries.

In 2022, the Canadian government, as chair, led an effort to amend the Stockholm Terms of Reference to create a process for a form of “country-specific” statements—joint statements in which member states have the option of endorsing a statement critical of a named government, which is then distributed by the FOC. Additionally, the chair of the FOC can issue a “chair statement,” in which the chair drafts and issues a statement, and other member states have the option to endorse it. While the “country-specific” process has never been used, in March 2022, Canada issued a chair statement, condemning the Russian government for sponsoring and spreading disinformation to justify its invasion of Ukraine, with nineteen FOC member countries choosing to sign on.¹⁴

Diplomatic coordination
Core to the FOC mission is diplomatic coordination on issues related to human rights online and Internet freedom. The result of this diplomatic coordination may not always be publicly evident. As the Internet freedom field grows, and digital issues are infused into an increasing number of policy areas, one of the more important functions of the FOC Support Unit is maintaining the list of contacts responsible within each government system for Internet freedom and digital issues, particularly as points of contact within diplomatic missions frequently rotate. These contacts and regular engagement across governments are a sure, but uneven, benefit. The coalition has faced regular calls to increase the relevance and effectiveness of its diplomatic engagement, but doing so will depend on the ability to call the right person at the right time on the right issue.

Engagement with the multistakeholder internet community
At its inception, multistakeholder engagement with the FOC was relatively open and unrestricted. Civil society participated at the annual conference and was encouraged to make recommendations for, and provide input on, joint statements. In recent years, the FOC formalized mechanisms to include civil society and industry in its work through the FOC-AN (discussed above) and Silicon Valley Working Group. The FOC-AN standardized civil-society engagement, and has also helped to narrow which individuals and organizations are able to regularly access the coalition.

Additionally, the coalition has long collaborated with the multistakeholder community through a mixture of working groups and task forces. Since its creation, the FOC has run a total of eight such efforts, focused on everything from cybersecurity to digital inclusion, with four currently running. The efficacy of these working groups has been mixed, with early efforts garnering a fair amount of participation. Over time, however, insufficient resourcing—and a lack of clear aims and outputs—led some early participants to disengage with the coalition. A common complaint has been a lack of clarity on what the expected outputs and impact of these working groups could or should be, and a disconnection from contentious and important policy issues actively under debate.

By way of example, in the wake of the Edward Snowden disclosures beginning in June 2013, civil society and FOC members leveraged the now sunset “Internet Free and Secure” working group to drive serious discussions about state surveillance, civil liberties, and human rights—including domestic and international stakeholders who do not often sit at the same tables. While the discussion was highly relevant, the lack of follow-on action or member-country attention to the group’s recommendations left some civil-society collaborators disillusioned with the coalition more broadly.¹⁵

Support to frontline defenders and the Internet freedom ecosystem
While there is yet to be a reliable and dedicated funding stream for the FOC itself, the coalition launched the Digital Defenders Partnership (DDP) fund in 2012, administered by the nonprofit Hivos.¹⁶ The stated purpose of the pooled fund is to support frontline digital defenders. The ministries of foreign affairs of Australia, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, along with the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the US State Department, have contributed funding. Its current budget is 3.5 million euros through 2023. An exhaustive list of projects administered via the fund is not publicly available, though Hivos’s website cites implementation in Brazil, Yemen, and Russia.¹⁷

Coalition changes over time

Since its formation in 2011, the FOC has been in an iterative cycle, adding new functions and support, debating impact, and assessing opportunities to strengthen the entity. After its creation in 2011, the founding members reconvened in 2012 in Nairobi, in an effort to reinforce global support for, and relevance of, the coalition. The resulting Nairobi Terms of Reference established the annual rotation of the chairmanship on a voluntary basis, outlined the responsibility of the chair to host the annual conference, and delineated criteria for new members wishing to join.“¹⁸ It also initiated a conversation about with what substantive issues the coalition might engage, created the Digital Defenders Partnership and rallied funding for it, and identified forums and opportunities for the FOC to drive its action beyond the yearly gathering.

In 2013, the group convened in Tunis, in a nod to one of the earlier Arab Spring countries in the midst of a democratic transition. There, it established three working groups: An Internet Free and Secure; Digital Development and Openness; and Privacy and Transparency Online.¹⁹ The purpose of the working groups was to facilitate ad hoc convenings outside of the Freedom Online Conference, focused on specific topics under the umbrella of Internet freedom. The working groups also brought new stakeholders into the fold, giving civil society and industry the ostensible opportunity to strategically advise FOC governments and shape both domestic and international outcomes. The mandates of the original three working groups officially ended in 2017.

In 2014, current events drove the agenda at the coalition’s fourth formal gathering in Tallinn, Estonia, stalling what had been steady momentum in building clarity and action around the group. The Snowden disclosures hit newsstands in June 2013, with thousands of classified documents leaking to the press over the following year, bringing to light the extent of the US government’s digital-surveillance practices.“²⁰ For an entity focused on governments restricting Internet access and human-rights abuses, accusations of one of its founding members advancing extraconstitutional surveillance through the Internet was an unavoidable earthquake and credibility challenge. That year’s “Recommendations for Freedom Online,” referred to as the Tallinn Agenda, doubled down on the coalition’s founding principles.²¹ In addition to restating the coalition’s commitment to protect digital rights, it acknowledged the growing global concern around surveillance, and called on governments to establish strong domestic oversight of the deployment of such technologies.

Despite these foundational debates, FOC countries managed to advance organizational development at the Tallinn event, creating a secretariat and tapping GPD (as discussed above) to host the Support Unit, enabled through an increase of funding through an existing grant from the US government.

In 2015, Mongolia hosted the Freedom Online Conference in Ulaanbaatar (in a nod to growing concerns about China’s regional and global digital authoritarianism), where the coalition renewed the mandates of the original three working groups. In the wake of the 2014 disclosures, enthusiasm within the coalition waned, causing a change of focus to the need to reinvigorate and reform the wayward effort. Beyond featuring Mongolia’s leadership in a highly geopolitically contested region, the 2015 Ulaanbaatar conference’s primary contribution was the creation of an internal working group tasked with a strategic review of the organization. The strategic review was led by the United States and supported by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and other member countries. The group contracted an outside expert to lead a concurrent external survey, the full results of which are included in the table at the end of this document.

The FOC published the results of that “external strategic review” at the 2016 conference in San José, Costa Rica, finding that, while there was still broad support for the coalition, member states saw a need to clarify the mandate of the FOC and identify clear overarching goals and outputs.“²² Building on the results of the review, member states released the San José Statement, which reaffirmed the coalition’s core principles, and outlined a work plan to strengthen the FOC by increasing coherence among and expanding membership, improving the coalition’s and cross-regional coordination, and building external relationships.“²³

The strategic review and subsequent conversations around it in San José laid the groundwork for one of the most significant sets of structural changes and formalization since the founding of the coalition, the revision of the Nairobi Terms of Reference. The coalition formalized these updates in what is called the Stockholm Terms of Reference.²⁴ It is notable that this significant update occurred during one of the two years when the FOC had no chair. As there was no Freedom Online Conference that year, the updated terms of reference were adopted on the sidelines of the Stockholm Internet Forum in 2017. These new terms updated and expanded the structure of the coalition and clarified its workstreams. Notably, it expanded the procedure for a new member to join, established an “observer status,” and introduced a procedure for a government to either leave or have its membership revoked. Further, the Stockholm Terms of Reference established an organizational structure for the FOC that included outlining the responsibilities and election of the annual chair, establishing the “Friends of the Chair” structure, and clarifying working methods, including the process for issuing FOC statements.

The Stockholm Terms of Reference also restated the importance of the ad hoc working groups and created the FOC-AN, a new track for multistakeholder engagement, as discussed earlier. Finally, the new terms reframed the work of the FOC secretariat, formalizing the Support Unit as a neutral third party responsible for facilitating collaboration and coordinating convenings for FOC members.²⁵ This more inward-looking work occurred in the months following the 2016 US presidential election, amid rising global concern with a proliferation of disinformation online and brazen foreign interference in core democratic processes. Amid the shift in US administrations, the FOC released a joint statement condemning state-sponsored disinformation in 2017.

In 2018, Germany took over the FOC chair and formally launched the FOC-AN, later hosting the Freedom Online Conference in Berlin. In 2019, during Ghana’s term as chair, the FOC created a limited one-year task force on “Cybersecurity and Human Rights.”²⁶ Ghana hosted its conference early the following year in Accra with the theme of “Achieving a Common Vision for Internet Freedom,” which did not advance any organizational changes.²⁷ FOC members released a joint statement on digital equality at the Accra conference, after which the FOC established a task force focused on bridging the digital divide and on topics of diversity, equity, and inclusion more broadly. Despite lacking a chair from March 2020 until January 2021, the FOC in that same time period established a Task Force on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights and issued three joint statements on topics ranging from COVID-19’s impact on Internet freedom to disinformation and artificial intelligence. This was the highest rate of statement releases in the coalition’s history.

Finland took over as chair in 2021 as the FOC celebrated its tenth anniversary. That year’s Helsinki Declaration restated the group’s commitment to the protection of digital rights a decade on.²⁸ The FOC also created a task force on Internet Shutdowns, as well as the Silicon Valley Working Group, which was intended to promote the work of the coalition and provide continuous engagement between parts of the tech industry and FOC governments.²⁹

As chair in 2022, adapting to COVID-19 concerns and accommodating the US-hosted virtual Summit for Democracy, Canada opted not to host a conference. Instead, it organized a strategic retreat for FOC members and the FOC-AN in Paris, and convened regional workshops on Internet freedom and digital rights across North America, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Asia-Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. The goal of these workshops is to update the Tallinn Agenda, with a new “Ottawa Agenda.”

Key issues and debates

As democracies and autocracies grapple over the future of the Internet, the Freedom Online Coalition is regularly raised as a conceptually important body with disappointing impact. The rationale for a venue for likeminded countries to coordinate shared approaches seems clear, and is often suggested anew by those seeking to address concerning trends in the digital world. Yet, the FOC is often overlooked or dismissed in those very conversations, leaving the coalition floating as yet another well-intended, poorly resourced international body, neither engaged seriously enough to be made central to an increasingly urgent issue nor fully disavowed to make way for something new.

This crisis of legitimacy is driven by a thematic set of perennial debates and questions that span the operational and substantive. For those newly engaging with the FOC, understanding these fault lines and strategic debates will be an important starting point. Below is an overarching summary of some of the key issues at play.

Mission and scope

The FOC was created originally to enable likeminded democracies to coordinate diplomatic action around state-based Internet repression. In its narrowest conception, this could be limited to coordinating individual country statements. In its most expansive conception, it could include growing the slate of countries proactively advancing a free, open, secure, and interoperable Internet. Divergent views on where on this spectrum the FOC should sit is one recurring debate that drives different strategies for the growth and focus of the coalition.

Another related debate centers on the tensions inherent in democratic nations organizing to call out the undemocratic actions of other countries, while sometimes replicating those same actions within their own borders. This dynamic was most evident in the wake of the Snowden disclosures, but it certainly extends to more recent questions around tech governance and regulation, and the significant variance between member-country domestic approaches. For some, this lack of willingness to “look within” undermines the worthiness and credibility of the coalition as a whole.

Funding and leadership

The FOC has never had a dedicated source of funding, and this lack of clear resourcing has implications for what it means to chair the group, what is achievable through it, and the ability to plan for more than a year at a time. This also impacts mechanisms for a support structure to carry out the work of the coalition through transitions.

The coalition is also impacted by an unequal and uncertain funding stream from each of its member states. Over the course of former US President Donald Trump’s administration, the FOC and other Internet freedom initiatives were disrupted by bipartisan reductions in US government funding. Some argue that this precariousness could be solved by an expansion of funding commitments from other members, while others feel that a broad reevaluation of funding strategy at large is vastly overdue.

Relatedly, with leadership of the FOC changing annually, there are limits to what “programs of action” can be carried through, with some arguing for longer terms and others believing the yearly rotating model better matches global examples.

Support and staffing

The FOC did not have a support mechanism until 2014, when the US government increased an existing grant to a United Kingdom-based organization to provide secretariat functions for the chair and FOC members. The expectations for that arrangement were more clearly articulated in 2017, but the setup remains somewhat ad hoc. Further, some have suggested that there is a conflict of interest in housing the Support Unit at an organization involved in the digital-rights space, saying that an organization that acts simultaneously as a key facilitator of the FOC and a civil-society advocate can wield asymmetric influence.

How a Support Unit is funded, housed, directed, and functions has major ramifications for the capacity and aims of the FOC itself. Many of the ideas for institutional learning, more intentional coordination and campaigns, greater support for working groups, task forces, and initiatives, and broader FOC strengthening depend on a stable and resourced Support Unit. The FOC is not the first organization to struggle with identifying funding for support mechanisms, but there is broad agreement that finding a sustainable model is essential.

Membership

From its inception, the FOC has been sensitive to the risk of appearing to be a club of Western countries lecturing the rest of the world. Member countries have sought to find regional balance in peers, but it is unquestionable that the group remains largely Western, with very few members from the “global majority.” While few argue that the FOC should not work to grow the community of countries aligned and coordinating on Internet freedom issues, how, when, and in what way to do so are still subjects of significant debate.

Simultaneously, there are others focused on ensuring FOC members are accountable to the principles of the coalition. Some are concerned that a sole focus on expanding national representation could result in a watering down of approach and substance and could detract from efforts to push existing countries to contend with difficult inconsistencies in their domestic and international approaches. For others, an expansion of membership is secondary to driving powerful countries to more successfully and seriously leverage their power to advance the cause of Internet freedom, whether diplomatically, or through foreign assistance or other means.

While none of these aims is necessarily contradictory with any other, optimizing for one or the other will lead to different approaches in funding, support, agenda, and mission—as well as affect the overall impact of the coalition itself.

Incentives

For those wishing to expand FOC membership, a common discussion focuses on what would incentivize countries to join. Are there streams of funding, support, or information sharing that could be made available only to members? Are there things the FOC can advance for member countries? For example, sharing good practices on digital public infrastructure or other digital-inclusion tools like advancing digital literacy? Simultaneously, are there any downsides for countries not joining the FOC? Those familiar with the FOC’s operations flag this as an important and underexamined element of the coalition’s potential approach.

Impact

Perhaps the single most important debate focuses on what success should look like for the FOC. With so many different visions for the coalition, and a real challenge to Internet freedom globally, it is no surprise few people are satisfied with the group’s achievements. The question of impact is closely tied to the debate around the FOC’s core mission and scope. For some, the FOC would be more impactful if it more successfully helped countries coordinate diplomatic responses behind the scenes. For others, success would include more forceful and collaborative public rebukes of antidemocratic actions.

Impact could also be demonstrated by the FOC’s ability to marshal resources and attention at high-impact moments such as the consideration of antidemocratic tech regulations, or situations like that in Russia in 2021, when the government coerced Apple and Google to remove a political-organizing app from their app stores.³⁰ There is also the question of how the FOC advances its work, whether through loose coordination of member and nonmember states at international forums (such as the International Telecommunication Union or the UN General Assembly) or solely through its own coalition.

Finally, for some, the end goal of the coalition should be more countries and people buying into a proactive vision of Internet freedom based on international human-rights law and norms. In some ways, clarity on what the FOC is not focused on may be just as important as clarity on its mission and goals. There is a real risk that the FOC collapses under the weight of undifferentiated expectations. Clarifying and building agreement around FOC priorities, mandate, and scope is, therefore, essential.

This primer is based on a literature review of publicly available information on the FOC website, including the coalition’s descriptions of its activities, meeting minutes, declarations, and other documents related to convenings and workstreams. Additionally, DFRLab staff interviewed civil-society leaders from around the world who have worked in partnership with the coalition (at its inception, or through the FOC-AN or working groups), and consulted with others present during the founding and various iterations of the FOC’s development. Staff also consulted former US government and other member-nation officials and contacted the FOC Support Unit (Global Partners Digital) for information about its structure, budget, and workstreams.

The DFRLab is grateful to the individuals who contributed their expertise as we prepared this resource. Particular thanks are owed to Jochai Ben-Avie, Jessica Dheere, Eileen Donahoe, Verónica Ferrari, Katharine Kendrick, Mallory Knodel, Sarah Labowitz, Emma Llanso, Katherine Maher, Susan Morgan, Christopher Painter, Jason Pielemeier, Chris Riley, and Michael Samway.

Annex I: Timeline: Evolution of FOC Structure

Annex II: Timeline: FOC Joint Statements

Annex III: Glossary: FOC Terms

Coalition Chair: The chair of the coalition is responsible for coordinating the day-to-day meetings and strategy of the coalition, as well as providing diplomatic and political support for coalition convenings. Chairs may elect to host the Freedom Online Conference. The chairmanship rotates on an annual basis.

Digital Defenders Partnership (DDP): The Digital Defenders Partnership is a fund initiated by the FOC and managed by Hivos, which is intended to support digital-rights activists and human-rights defenders.

Freedom Online Conference: The Freedom Online Conference is a multistakeholder convening hosted semiannually by the coalition chair. The purpose of the conference is to advance the chair’s goals, laid out in the program of action, and facilitate discussions on Internet freedom issues relevant to the local context of the conference.

Friends of the Chair: The “Friends of the Chair” are a group of FOC members that provide support to the coalition chair. The purpose of this grouping is to ensure continuity between annual rotations of the chairmanship.

FOC Advisory Network (FOC-AN): The FOC Advisory Network is the formal mechanism for the FOC to engage with the broader multistakeholder Internet community and global civil society.

Joint Statement: Joint statements allow all member governments of the FOC to react together, and to prioritize issues related to Internet freedom. These statements include all members of the coalition.

Country-Specific Statement: Country-specific statements are exceptional joint statements intended to call out the actions of a specific government that is threatening online freedoms. In this instance, the statements are opt in, and member countries may affirmatively choose to endorse them.
Chair Statement: The chair of the FOC may issue a statement that is related to Internet freedom or that calls out the actions of a specific government. Member states may choose to opt in and endorse the statement of the chair.

Program of Action: The program of action is an agenda authored by the coalition chair and “Friends of the Chair” that sets the priorities for the coalition on an annual basis.

Support Unit: The Support Unit assists the coalition by providing administrative and logistical work to advance the goals laid out in the program of action.

Ad hoc working groups and task forces: Ad hoc working groups and task forces are established by the “Friends of the Chair” and are focused on a narrow substantive mandate. They typically comprise multistakeholder experts and are used to drive action and advise the coalition on issues related to their mandate.

Transcript Dec 7, 2022

Can the Freedom Online Coalition live up to its potential?

By Atlantic Council

The Freedom Online Coalition has operated with varied success. As the US prepares to take over as chair of the body, civil society leaders who helped launch and shape the Coalition discuss how it can best be leveraged to advance a proactively democratic digital world.

Technology & Innovation

Transcript Dec 13, 2022

Canadian Deputy Foreign Minister David Morrison and US Deputy National Security Advisor Anne Neuberger on the importance of the Freedom Online Coalition

By Atlantic Council

Canada’s David Morrison discusses the end of Canada’s chairmanship of the alliance for democratic tech, while the United States’ Anne Neuberger outlines the top priorities ahead.

Technology & Innovation

360/StratCom Dec 8, 2022

The call for coordinated action for a free, open, and interoperable internet

By Erika Hsu

The DFRLab, as part of its annual 360/StratCom event, convened a discussion about the FOC, including the need to coordinate action to protect a free, open, secure, and interoperable internet.

Cybersecurity Disinformation

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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1 “Freedom Online: Joint Action for Free Expression on the Internet,” Freedom Online Coalition, December 8–9, 2011.

2 Hilary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” (remarks at the Newseum, Washington, DC, January 21, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm

3 “About: Open Technology Fund,” Open Technology Fund, last visited November 9, 2022, https://www.opentech.fund/about/

4 “Freedom Online: Joint Action for Free Expression on the Internet.” The founding members of the FOC include Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Estonia, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Latvia, the Republic of Maldives, Mexico, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

5 “Structure, Freedom Online Coalition,” Freedom Online Coalition, last visited November 9, 2022, http://freedomonlinecoalition.com/structure

6 Ibid. Current “Friends of the Chair” include Canada (2022 chair of the FOC), Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States

7 Aims and Priorities, Freedom Online Coalition,” Freedom Online Coalition, last visited November 9, 2022, http://freedomonlinecoalition.com/aims-and-priorities.

8 “Advisory Network, Freedom Online Coalition,” Freedom Online Coalition, last visited November 9, 2022, http://freedomonlinecoalition.com/advisory-network.

9 Stockholm Terms of Reference of the Freedom Online Coalition,” Freedom Online Coalition, May 16, 2017, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/document/the-stockholm-terms-of-reference/.

10 “Global Partners Digital,” Global Partners Digital, last visited November 9, 2022, https://www.gp-digital.org. The “Friends of the Chair” convene on a monthly basis, and the minutes of these calls are published at: “Friends of the Chair Monthly Call #1,” Freedom Online Coalition, last visited November 9, 2022, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Minutes-from-the-Friends-of-the-Chair-Call-1-January-1.pdf.

11 Member states that contributed to the Support Unit’s 2022–2023 budget include Australia, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States.

12 The FOC did not have a chair in 2017 or 2020. The 2019 chair (Ghana) hosted its conference in February 2020.

13 FOC Joint Statement on The Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s Decree 72,” Freedom Online Coalition, August 2013, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/FOC-Joint-Statement-on-The-Socialist-Republic-of-Vietnams-Decree-72.pdf.

14 “Statement on Behalf of the Chair of The Freedom Online Coalition: A Call to Action on State-Sponsored Disinformation in Ukraine,” Freedom Online Coalition, March 2, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/03/statement-on-behalf-of-the-chair-of-the-freedom-online-coalition-a-call-to-action-on-state-sponsored-disinformation-in-ukraine.html.

15 “Recommendations for Human Rights Based Approaches to Cybersecurity,” Internet Free & Secure Initiative, last visited November 9, 2022, https://freeandsecure.online/recommendations/.

16 “Digital Defenders Partnership,” Hivos, last visited November 9, 2022, https://hivos.org/program/digital-defenders-partnership/#:~:text=Digital%20Defenders%20Partnership%20(DDP)%20was,harm%20and%20mentorship%20and%20partnership.

17 Ibid.

18 Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) Terms of Reference,” Freedom Online Coalition, September 6, 2012, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Nairobi-Terms-of-Reference.pdf.

19 “Ad Hoc Working Groups & Other Entities,” Freedom Online Coalition, last visited November 9, 2022, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/ad-hoc-working-groups-task-forces.

20 Snowden Revelations,” Lawfare, last visited November 9, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations.

21 “Recommendations for Freedom Online,” Freedom Online Coalition, April 28, 2014, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/FOC-recommendations-consensus.pdf.

22 Looking Back to Move Ahead: Freedom Online Coalition Strategic Review Outcome. Final Report and Recommendations of the FOC Strategic Review Working Group May 2015–October 16,” Freedom Online Coalition, October 17–18, 2016, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/FOC-SRWG-Outcome-bundle_FINAL-1.pdf.

23 The San Jose Statement of the Freedom Online Coalition Regarding the Outcome of the 2016 Strategic Review,” Freedom Online Coalition, October 17–18, 2016.

24 “Stockholm Terms of Reference of the Freedom Online Coalition.”

25 The support unit remains housed at Global Digital Partners (GDP), with its most recent contract renewed in 2020.

26 “Ad Hoc Working Groups & Other Entities.”

27 Ibid.

28 “FOC 10th Anniversary Helsinki Declaration—Towards a Rules-based, Democratic and Digitally Inclusive World,” Freedom Online Coalition, December 2–3, 2021, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FOC-10th-Anniversary-Helsinki-Declaration-Towards-a-Rules-based-Democratic-and-Digitally-Inclusive-World.pdf.

29 Ibid.

30 Greg Miller and Joseph Menn, “Putin’s Prewar Moves Against U.S. Tech Giants Laid Groundwork for Crackdown on Free Expression,” Washington Post, March 12, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/12/russia-putin-google-apple-navalny.

The post An introduction to the Freedom Online Coalition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Health attaches are the missing link in global diplomacy

Dr. Edmond Fernandes — Mon, 05 Dec 2022 20:21:19 +0000

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The health attaché will serve as the prime representative and advocate for healthcare, development, human rights, and trade for the people represented by the embassy or mission in the host country. Given the globalized nature of the modern world, with frequent travel and people living outside their home countries for extended periods for a variety of reasons, standardizing a healthcare liaison from one’s home government would be a crucial step in internationalizing public health diplomacy.

The attaché will also further multilateralism by supporting embassies and/or high commissions via a health security and development angle. This work will intersect within a domestic and international setting by providing intellectual support on global health outcomes to local and national officials and work to build bilateral ties on issues of shared medical, public health, pharmaceutical, technological, and academic interests across the health and development sectors. As an individual, the health attaché should carry a strong track record on public health and healthcare issues, and be a local citizen of the receiving country. The health attaché’s professional philosophy will speak a language of social progress where health is portrayed as a means of investment as opposed to expenditure, where human life is valuable beyond dry statistical means, and where sensible engagement serves to inform classic diplomacy that puts people ahead of political goals.

The office of a health attaché must have dual goals: to strengthen bilateral relations among and within countries; and to improve public health systems with health intelligence inputs that have the potential to influence outcomes, while also providing local assistance to country nationals who may need help.

Today’s health attaché must be a person with sound knowledge of understanding diseases and global health outcomes as well as have keen interest in the processes of understanding national priorities with sound solutions for policies that have impact at scale.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have a role to play in creating safer and more prosperous conditions for their citizens working abroad.

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2021 was a pivotal year for South Asia, as the US defeat in Afghanistan reinforced Washington’s historically security-centric focus in the region.

Southasiasource Blog

The post Health attaches are the missing link in global diplomacy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Autocratic setbacks offer Biden his ‘inflection point’ for democracies

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 04 Dec 2022 16:34:31 +0000

This year has been a tough one for the world’s worst authoritarians: Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Each of them ends 2022 reeling from self-inflicted wounds, the consequences of the sorts of bad decisions that hubris-blinded autocrats find far easier to make than to unwind.

Given that, the United States and its global partners should double down in 2023 to shape the contest unfolding between democrats and despots that will define the post-Cold War order. US President Joe Biden has consistently focused on this competition as a historic “inflection point.” His third year in office provides him his best opportunity yet to score lasting gains in that contest.

At the beginning of this year, autocracy seemed to be on the march. Putin and Xi in early February 2022, just ahead of the Beijing Olympics, entered a “no limits” strategic partnership. That was followed by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

But since then, in all three cases—Russia, China, and Iran—autocratic leaders’ errors of commission have deepened their countries’ underlying weaknesses while breeding new difficulties that defy easy solutions.

That’s most dramatically the case with Putin, whose reckless, unprovoked, and illegal war in Ukraine has resulted in 6,490 civilian deaths, per the United Nations’s most recent estimate, and has prompted more than a million Russians to flee his country. International observers point to proof of crimes against humanity.

Beyond that, Putin has set back the Russian economy—some experts believe by as much as a decade—and sanctions are only beginning to bite. He’ll never regain his international reputation, and his military has revealed itself—despite many years of investments—as poorly trained, badly disciplined, and lacking morale.

Xi’s mistakes are less bloody in nature thus far. The excesses of his zero-COVID policy set off large-scale, spontaneous protests that amounted to the most serious challenge of his decade in leadership. Just last month, the Twentieth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party anointed Xi with a third term as China’s leader, but the protests that followed shortly thereafter shattered that aura of invincibility and apparent public support.

“Xi is in a crisis of his own making, with no quick or painless route out,” wrote the Economist this week. “New COVID cases are near record levels. The disease has spread to more than 85 percent of China’s cities. Clamp down even harder to bring it back under control, and the economic costs will rise yet higher, further fueling public anger. Allow it to spread and hundreds of thousands of people will die… China’s leaders appear to be searching for a middle ground, but it is not clear there is any.”

Beyond COVID-19, what is in danger is the unwritten social contract between the Chinese Communist Party of just 96 million members and the total Chinese population of 1.4 billion. Namely, the Chinese people accept restricted freedoms and fealty to the party so long as the party provides economic rewards and social security. A series of policy mistakes has slowed Chinese growth to just 3 percent in 2022, yet Xi continues to prioritize party control over economic freedoms.

Though the global stakes of Iran’s protests are less obvious, the Mideast and world would be far better off with a more moderate and pluralistic Iran that focuses on its public needs, retreats from its regional adventurism, and steps back from the nuclear brink. Here, too, the regime’s problems have been self-created, the protests being a result of excessive regime brutality and endemic corruption.

So, what should be done in 2023 to transform these authoritarian setbacks into a more sustainable advance of the “free world” (helping to reverse a sixteen-year global decline of democracy, as measured by Freedom House’s 2022 report)?

First and most immediately, the United States and its partners should deepen and expand their military and financial support for Ukraine. The Biden administration’s top officials understand this is the defining battle of our post-Cold War era. Without US military and financial support, and without US rallying of allies, all of Kyiv’s remarkable courage and resilience might not be enough.

That said, Biden’s caution and his often-stated fears of setting off World War III have limited the sorts and amounts of armaments Ukraine receives—and the speed at which they reach the battlefield. Faster delivery of more and better air defense could have saved Ukrainian lives.

It’s remains difficult to understand continued limits put on Ukraine’s ability to strike the targets from which they are being hit as Putin murderously pummels more civilian targets and infrastructure.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has rightly accused Putin of weaponizing winter in the hope of freezing Ukraine’s citizens into submission. Perhaps the greater danger is that of Western fatigue in supporting Ukraine and growing external pressure on Kyiv to negotiate, when only further battlefield gains will prompt Putin to withdraw his troops and provide concessions that would allow a secure, sovereign, and democratic Ukraine to emerge.

Even as Russia requires action now, managing the Chinese challenge requires a more patient course, one that will be made easier should Putin be strategically defeated in Ukraine. Biden was right to meet with Xi in Bali, on the margins of the Group of Twenty meeting, to build a floor which can keep the world’s most crucial bilateral relationship from sinking.

Where the United States should step up its efforts in 2023 is in coalescing allies in Europe and Asia around a sustainable, consensus-driven approach to China that recognizes Beijing’s underlying weaknesses and deters its efforts to absorb Taiwan and remake the global order.

There are three potential outcomes at this “inflection point”: a reinvigoration and reinvention of our existing international liberal order, the emergence of a Chinese-led illiberal order, or the breakdown of world order altogether on the model of Putin’s “rule of the jungle.”

As 2022 ends, the failures and costs of those alternative models are clearer than ever.

Therefore, what’s crucial in the year ahead is for democracies to unify in common cause to shape the global future alongside moderate, modern non-democracies that seek a more secure, prosperous, and just world.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 China’s failing COVID strategy leaves Xi with no good options
ECONOMIST

To understand Xi’s dilemma, read this smart Economist essay breaking down the consequences China will face if it abandons Xi’s “zero-COVID” policy—and the consequences it will face if it doesn’t.

One jarring image of Xi’s determination to go all-in on “zero-COVID” is an empty vaccine factory. “The stifling of debate,” the Economist writes, “has had baleful consequences. China has not approved the use of foreign vaccines, including the most effective ones, the mRNA jabs made by Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna.”

What experience shows is “the protection accorded by Chinese shots appears to wane significantly after six months. Worse, the authorities have focused on testing and building quarantine sites this year, while failing to administer third (or even fourth) doses to all, even though these would require no new infrastructure or political messaging.” Read More →

#2 Enough about democracy’s weaknesses. Let’s talk about its strengths.
Fareed Zakaria | WASHINGTON POST

CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, one of the premier strategic thinkers out there, has written a compelling defense of democracy’s virtues in the face of authoritarianism’s setbacks.

“It is astonishing to remember that when America’s Founding Fathers were constructing their experiment in government,” Zakaria writes, “they were virtually alone in a world of monarchies. These politicians were drawing on the writings of Enlightenment intellectuals such as Montesquieu and John Locke, studying historical examples from ancient Greece and Rome, and embracing key elements of English governance and common law. But they were mostly making it up in their heads. They had failures; their first effort, the Articles of Confederation, collapsed. In the end, however, they concocted something stunning: a system that protected individual rights, allowed for regular changes in leadership, prevented religious hegemony, and created a structure flexible enough to adapt to massive changes.” Read More →

Kevin Rudd | INTERPRETER

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, one of the keenest observers of China anywhere, has delivered a brilliant obituary on former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin that provides insight into China’s reformist past and puts in perspective its unfortunate return to Marxism-Leninism under Xi.

His narrative recalls his own experience of Jiang, then mayor of Shanghai, singing O Sole Mio at the Sydney Opera House in 1987. It then tracks how this larger-than-life individual navigated the shoals of Communist Party politics to usher in China’s era of rapid economic growth and private sector expansion.

“Jiang’s death this week at 96,” writes Rudd in the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter, “marks the final, flickering embers of that now-distant reformist age—and the unambiguous beginning of the brave, new world of Xi Jinping.” Read More →

#4 The Russian Billionaire Selling Putin’s War to the Public
Betsy McKay, Thomas Grove, and Rob Barry | WALL STREET JOURNAL

This WSJ investigation is a powerfully reported exposé of Yuri Kovalchuk, also known as “Putin’s banker,” an oligarch and media baron, who has used his banking and media empires to promote Putin’s murderous war in Ukraine.

“A physicist by training,” three WSJ reporters write, “Kovalchuk is motivated more by patriotic ideology than by the trappings of wealth, say people who know him. He doesn’t hold a formal position in the Russian government. Yet he has deep influence over Kremlin policy and personnel, and helps supply dachas and yachts for Putin’s use, and lucrative jobs and stockholdings to the president’s family and friends, according to people familiar with the deals, financial documents and anticorruption groups.”

“Kovalchuk,” the WSJ adds, “controls the US-sanctioned Russian Bank Rossiya. The bank, in turn, built a network of offshore companies that have benefited Putin and his associates, and invests in projects important to the state, according to interviews with former US officials and Kremlin analysts as well as public documents and information revealed in the Panama Papers, a trove of leaked documents detailing offshore financial holdings.” Read More →

#5 Rise in Iranian assassination, kidnapping plots alarms Western officials
Shane Harris, Souad Mekhennet, and Yeganeh Torbati | WASHINGTON POST

This week’s must-read is chilling. In a remarkable narrative, the Washington Post pieces together a large-scale Iranian campaign of kidnapping, intimidation, and assassination against critics and opponents, which has escalated in recent years.

One heartbreaking case is that of the Iranian journalist Ruhollah Zam, who was lured to Iraq where he was arrested and turned over to Iranian authorities. “The IRGC,” the Post writes, referring to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, “publicly boasted of its own deception, portraying Zam’s capture as a triumph for the Iranian security services, which had outfoxed their Western adversaries. Zam was tried and sentenced to death for ‘corruption on Earth.’ He was hanged on Dec. 12, 2020, at the age of 42.”

“Another chilling example is of a failed Iranian plot to kidnap Masih Alinejad, an American citizen. “The plan to kidnap Alinejad from her home in Brooklyn is illustrative of a global effort to intimidate exiled Iranians by showing they aren’t safe anywhere outside Iran,” the Washington Post authors write. “Last year, the Justice Department indicted four alleged Iranian intelligence officials and agents in the plot, saying they targeted Alinejad because she was ‘mobilizing public opinion in Iran and around the world to bring about changes to the regime’s laws and practices.

“The operatives allegedly hired private investigators to photograph and take video recordings of Alinejad and her family and researched how they might use speedboats to secret her out of New York and eventually on to Venezuela, ‘a country whose de facto government has friendly relations with Iran,’ the Justice Department said in a statement.” Read More →

Atlantic Council top reads

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Nov 30, 2022

Preparing for victory: A long-haul strategy to help Ukraine win the war against Russia—and secure the peace

By Stephen J. Hadley, William Taylor, John E. Herbst, Matthew Kroenig, Melinda Haring, and Jeffrey Cimmino

Ukraine’s counteroffensives, backed by expanded and accelerated US and allied support, continue to push Russian forces out of Ukrainian territory, although at a reduced rate. These hard-won successes, however, bring with them possible challenges that also must be addressed.

Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist Dec 2, 2022

What to expect from the new Russian oil price cap

By Reed Blakemore, Charles Lichfield, Brian O’Toole

As the EU comes to an agreement on a $60 price cap, here’s how it will work—and what impacts the world will see on the global and Russian economy.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

TURKEYSource Dec 1, 2022

The risks and rewards of Erdogan’s next military operation

By Rich Outzen

The November 13 bombing in Istanbul, blamed on the PKK, is spurring a planned Turkish offensive against PKK affiliates in Northern Syria, fulfilling a long term goal to better secure the country’s southern border.

Conflict Iraq

The post Autocratic setbacks offer Biden his ‘inflection point’ for democracies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Warrick in Newsweek on diplomatic options to deter Russian nuclear use

Atlantic Council — Fri, 02 Dec 2022 15:51:38 +0000

original source

On October 28, Thomas Warrick wrote an opinion-editorial for Newsweek. Warrick argued for that the US and its allies should be prepared to use the “diplomatic nuclear option” of reconstituting a United Nations without a Russian veto on the security council if Russia were to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

That leaves the West a diplomatic “nuclear option”: re-constituting the United Nations without a Russian veto. This would strike directly at one of Russia’s major sources of power and leverage in world affairs.

Thomas Warrick

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Vladimir Putin’s Ukrainian Genocide: Nobody can claim they did not know

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 01 Dec 2022 21:55:07 +0000

The liberation of Kherson in early November sparked a wave of euphoria as Ukrainians celebrated a landmark victory over Vladimir Putin’s invading army. Weeks later, this celebratory mood has now given way to all-too-familiar feelings of grief and fury as the Ukrainian authorities uncover evidence of war crimes committed during the city’s eight-month Russian occupation.

This grim process has already been repeated in hundreds of liberated villages, towns, and cities throughout northern and eastern Ukraine. On each occasion, retreating Russian troops have left behind a vast crime scene of mass graves, torture chambers, sexual violence, and deeply traumatized communities. Specific accounts of civilian suffering are strikingly similar from region to region, indicating that these crimes are the result of deliberate Kremlin policy rather than the rogue actions of individual Russian army units.

Wherever Russia establishes control, anyone regarded as posing a potential threat to the occupation authorities is at risk of abduction. This includes elected local officials, military veterans, civil society activists, journalists, and anyone suspected of overtly pro-Ukrainian sympathies. Many victims are subjected to torture and execution. Others simply disappear. Those who avoid abduction face the threat of forced deportation to the Russian Federation. Millions of Ukrainian civilians, including thousands of children, are believed to have been deported in this manner over the past nine months.

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The atrocities committed by Russian troops in occupied regions of Ukraine are only one part of a wider genocidal agenda that defines the invasion unleashed by Vladimir Putin on February 24. In areas of Ukraine occupied by the Kremlin, all symbols of Ukrainian statehood have been methodically removed and a new Russian imperial identity imposed on the civilian population. Teachers have been brought in from Russia to indoctrinate Ukrainian schoolchildren, while access to the Ukrainian media has been blocked and the Ukrainian language suppressed.

Putin’s intention to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and eradicate Ukrainian national identity was evident long before Russian tanks crossed the border in early 2022. His menacing statements have since been matched by the criminal actions of his army. Apologists had earlier been able to dismiss the Russian dictator’s genocidal rhetoric as mere political hyperbole, but that is no longer possible.

For years prior to the current invasion, Putin publicly denied Ukraine’s right to exist and insisted Ukrainians were actually Russians (“one people”) who had been artificially and unjustly separated from the motherland. In summer 2021, he took the highly unusual and revealing step of publishing a 5000-word treatise arguing the illegitimacy of Ukrainian statehood.

On the eve of the invasion, Putin lambasted today’s independent Ukrainian state as an intolerable “anti-Russia” and declared that Ukraine was an “inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.” More recently, he has directly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great and boasted that he is “returning historically Russian lands.” In late September, he illegally annexed four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces while proclaiming that they had joined the Russian Federation “forever.”

Other senior Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have been even more explicit in terms of the genocidal language they have employed to champion the invasion. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently described Ukrainians as “cockroaches” while dismissing the Ukrainian nation as “mythical.” Meanwhile, on Russia’s carefully curated state TV political talk shows, calls for genocide against Ukrainians have become completely normalized. Pundits dehumanize and demonize Ukrainians while routinely questioning the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation and casually discussing the necessity of destroying the Ukrainian state.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The staggering quantity of genocidal statements coming out of Russia since the invasion of Ukraine began nine months ago makes it relatively easy to demonstrate the intent that is so crucial when identifying acts of genocide. The United Nations defines genocide as meaning any one of five acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.” The mass killings, systematic human rights abuses, forced deportations, and deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure carried out by the Russian military mean that Moscow is arguably guilty of committing all five genocidal acts in Ukraine.

Despite widespread awareness of the war crimes taking place in Ukraine, many in the international community remain reluctant to speak explicitly about the genocidal objectives of Russia’s invasion. Instead, debate continues over the dangers of humiliating Putin and the need for a negotiated settlement. Numerous senior officials and prominent commentators insist on addressing the invasion as if it were a particularly unruly border dispute rather than an exercise in national extermination. In reality, any talk of compromising with the Kremlin is both absurd and obscene. Advocates of appeasement must recognize that there can be no middle ground between Russian genocide and Ukrainian national survival.

In the aftermath of World War II, post-war audiences looked back on the horrors of the Nazi regime and asked how crimes of such magnitude were allowed to happen. Many of those who lived through the war protested that they had been completely unaware of the atrocities taking place around them. Similar excuses will not work in the current situation. On the contrary, the overwhelming evidence of Russian war crimes and the openly genocidal intent on display in Moscow mean that when future generations look back at Putin’s Ukrainian Genocide, nobody can claim they did not know.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Graham interviewed for the CNA938 World Report on the G20 and US-China relations

avishwanath — Fri, 18 Nov 2022 21:17:42 +0000

Read the full piece here.

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Lipsky quoted in USA Today on how President Biden will navigate relationships with world leaders at the G20 summit

avishwanath — Tue, 15 Nov 2022 14:35:26 +0000

The post Lipsky quoted in USA Today on how President Biden will navigate relationships with world leaders at the G20 summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Research on G20 sanctions cited in Politico’s Global Insider newsletter

avishwanath — Mon, 14 Nov 2022 20:59:00 +0000

The post Research on G20 sanctions cited in Politico’s Global Insider newsletter appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Memo to the G20: The fierce urgency of food security

Peter Engelke — Mon, 14 Nov 2022 16:52:57 +0000

In 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. stood atop the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC, and gave a speech for the ages. “We are confronted with the fierce urgency of now,” he so eloquently said, calling for immediate action against racial injustice in the United States.

Decades later, at the Atlantic Council’s Global Food Security Forum, held on the sidelines of this week’s Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in Bali, Indonesia, speaker after speaker echoed King’s theme—if not explicitly then at least in spirit. During an unprecedented global food crisis, they said, the plight of the world’s hungry must not be ignored. As was true in King’s time, the fierce urgency of our own time also is a moral one: to take decisive action to correct a great injustice and source of global instability.

At the Forum, which the Atlantic Council co-hosted with the Gaurav & Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation as well as Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment, leading officials and experts from around the world examined the complexity, fragility, and unsustainability of today’s global food system. They assessed the numerous and often complex roots of global food insecurity and the many equally complex consequences. These roots range from near-term shocks to the global food system—for example, the awful destructiveness of the war in Ukraine or unforeseen spikes in energy prices—to longer-term and more structural challenges such as the significant and possibly catastrophic impacts of climate change on food production. The consequences then ripple through global food supply chains, reflected in the increasing prices of grain, fertilizers, and foodstuffs. Price spikes in turn harm all who depend on price stability, most especially the world’s poor.

The Forum’s participants repeatedly returned to one consistent theme: that the victims of food insecurity are ordinary people whose suffering cannot be overlooked. Today, hunger and famine threaten an estimated 828 million people every single day. Nearly fifty million are children under age five suffering from acute malnutrition. Those numbers, unfortunately, are trending in the wrong direction, the result of a confluence of factors including the war in Ukraine, distortions in oil and gas markets, the lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on global supply chains, and the increasing impacts of climate change—drought, extreme heat, and flooding. The United Nations World Food Programme estimates that it will feed some 150 million hungry people in 2022—a new record, beating the old one established in 2021.

Therein lies a source of enormous trouble. Even if we were to put aside the moral case for relieving hunger, which we never should do, we still would need to recognize just how serious a threat widespread hunger is to global stability and prosperity. Food is the most immediate need that people have. Not having enough food destroys the individual, the family, and the community. Hunger attacks the stomach, strikes fear in the mind, and hardens the heart. If enough people see their families and children go without, hunger becomes the wellspring of insecurity: social unrest, political instability, forced out-migration, even violence and warfare. In such circumstances, no one is immune. Human history is replete with revolutions begun by the hungry and desperate.

Such a grim future need not be our fate. Although they were clear-eyed about the difficulties of the current situation, Forum participants expressed great hope that humankind can solve the multifaceted problems that give rise to hunger. Real, feasible solutions exist today, or are coming soon, if we have the foresight to see their potential and the courage to invest in them. Humans always possess agency, which means no obstacle is immovable. As difficult as it may be, we can resolve conflicts, fix global supply chains, diversify food production, eliminate food waste, put a stop to our assault on the natural world that gives us our bounty, and ultimately end hunger.

The Global Food Security Forum featured a rich discussion of the steps that the international community can take in the days and months ahead. For G20 member states, meeting this week in Bali, the fierce urgency of their task will be to have the foresight and courage to embrace innovative and transformative solutions to the challenge of global hunger.

Several of the policy recommendations that came out of the Forum are distilled below. All credit goes to the Forum’s speakers and participants:

End the war in Ukraine on Ukraine’s terms. By far the Forum’s most common recommendation was to stop the war in Ukraine and end it on Ukrainian terms. Russia’s invasion has been a significant driver of soaring prices for food and agricultural inputs (fertilizer and fuel) during 2022. Russia can stop the war in Ukraine if it chooses to do so.
Strengthen global norms and laws against the weaponization of food. Although there are provisions in international humanitarian law (IHL) that can be interpreted as opposing the use of food as a weapon of war, the status of IHL measures against weaponizing food are murky. Strengthening IHL in this context is imperative if the international community is to draw brighter lines against deliberately causing hunger and starvation during warfare.
Elevate food security on the multilateral agenda. The Forum’s participants also were unanimous in calling for enhanced food security coordination at the highest levels of global governance. Food security dialogues should be created for this purpose as part of multilateral forums such as the G20 and Group of Seven (G7) summits. Forum participants embraced the idea of creating a standing yearly G20 dialogue as an informal advisory mechanism to annual G20 Summits.
Fortify and expand financial instruments for emergency humanitarian relief. The international financing of emergency food reserves should be a greater priority, as doing so addresses the immediate needs of hungry people during food crises. G20 member states, other states, and international organizations ought to build more robust mechanisms for emergency food financing, including the creation of instruments such as barter-based trade exchanges that can help alleviate food shortages during crises.
Bolster norms against grain export controls. During food security crises, including the 2022 crisis, grain-exporting states create export controls to protect domestic industries and consumers. Such controls, which are often self-defeating, reduce global trade in food commodities that already have become scarce. G20 countries should strengthen norms against such actions during food crises.
Increase fertilizer production over the short run, and remake fertilizer types in the long run. Rising energy prices severely impact fertilizer production, which in turn reduces fertilizer use, particularly by poor farmers. G20 member states should take a variety of actions to combat fertilizer price spikes, including expanding fertilizer production plants around the world, reducing fertilizer trade barriers, making sure that fertilizers are applied as efficiently as possible by farmers, and ensuring that fertilizer subsidies are as effective as possible and oriented toward the greatest need. Over the longer run, fertilizers need to be made more sustainable, including through their decarbonization and integration into the circular economy. Governments should increase investment in projects, for example, that turn food waste—a massive problem on its own—into fertilizer.
Make the world’s food system more resilient and sustainable through diversification and investment in nature-based solutions. The global food system is efficient but fragile, depending on too few breadbaskets delivering too few types of grains and with too much impact on the natural world. Diversification of food systems everywhere should be prioritized, including by geography (more breadbaskets) and by commodity (expansion of the number of crops that are grown and traded at scale). Greater investment in nature-based solutions is imperative, including in agroforestry, sustainable fishing and aquaculture, urban agriculture, soil conservation and soil sequestration, waste reduction and recycling, and more.
Enhance and grow investments in innovation, ranging from research and development (R&D) to on-farm applications. Innovation is key to solving many of the world’s food security problems. Governments should expand investments in basic science (the underpinning of all technological advancement), support innovation ecosystems that can quickly identify and scale on-farm and off-farm food security solutions, and otherwise embrace innovative experimentation through public policies. As younger generations embrace technology, turning farming and other food-producing sectors into tech-centric endeavors can encourage younger people to build careers in these sectors.
Boost agricultural extension services everywhere. Agricultural extension services provide smallholding farmers with greater knowledge, skills, and tools to advance their farming needs. Governments should expand such services to ensure that accurate and practical information and skills are transmitted as swiftly and thoroughly as possible. Such programs not only improve food production but also strengthen rural communities.

Peter Engelke is a deputy director and senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a nonresident senior fellow with the Council’s Global Energy Center.

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Lipsky quoted in the AP on the G20’s functionality

avishwanath — Sun, 13 Nov 2022 19:45:00 +0000

The post Lipsky quoted in the AP on the G20’s functionality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lipsky quoted in Bloomberg on President Biden navigating a divided G20

avishwanath — Sat, 12 Nov 2022 21:02:00 +0000

The post Lipsky quoted in Bloomberg on President Biden navigating a divided G20 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lipsky quoted in DW on the G20’s upcoming challenges

avishwanath — Fri, 11 Nov 2022 19:50:00 +0000

The post Lipsky quoted in DW on the G20’s upcoming challenges appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The G7’s $600 billion response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative is here. This is how to make sure it succeeds.

Kaush Arha — Tue, 08 Nov 2022 11:00:00 +0000

This summer, Group of Seven (G7) leaders followed on their 2021 promise to develop the new six hundred billion dollar Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)—described as “a values-driven, high-impact, and transparent infrastructure partnership to meet the enormous infrastructure needs of low- and middle-income countries.” The PGII, plus the two hundred billion dollars pledged by US President Joe Biden over the next five years to support it, represents the most integrated and demonstrable alternative by the United States and its allies and partners to China’s Belt and Road Initiative to date.

But where do we go from here?

The White House has announced a series of early PGII wins to emphasize that the initiative is already more than a press release, including a wide and eclectic group of projects addressing infrastructure, energy, health care, digital infrastructure, food security, climate change, urban development, and more. They range from solar power in Angola to vaccine manufacturing in Senegal to a modular nuclear reactor in Romania to submarine cables extending from Singapore to France. But skeptics will question whether this is simply the latest in a long list of infrastructure-related efforts announced—but not followed through with—in recent years.

With billions of dollars already nominally tied to previous announcements about Build Back Better World, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, Global Gateway, the Blue Dot Network, and more, it’s only fair to ask what makes PGII different or more impactful. It presents an opportunity to address the procedural and structural obstacles that have hampered multilateral cooperation in the past.

The first key aspect of the partnership is its emphasis on mobilizing the private sector—so the true test of its success will not be the amount of public funds put into it, but how successful they are in attracting private investment. The second key aspect is that it is explicitly a “partnership:” PGII is not meant just to be a set of complementary but separate national efforts; it aspires at its core to be an integrated effort.

So how can participating countries execute a coordinated and synchronized series of actions that are greater than the sum of their individual parts? Here are five key recommendations:

Appoint a lead agency to represent each country. For the partnership to bear fruit, it requires sustained and challenging coordination across each G7 country’s suite of agencies that are engaged in infrastructure investments. In the United States alone, for example this suite includes the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC); the US Agency for International Development (USAID); and the departments of State, Commerce, and Transportation, among others. Appointing a clear lead agency to coordinate national efforts would better ensure institutional expertise and commitment over time, as well as improve coordination across the G7.

Establish clear partnership goals and offer guidance to achieve them. Is the goal to pool funds and invest jointly in projects, or to share information and coordinate discreet investments in a given project, sector, or across sectors? Or is it to develop a common communication platform to convey aggregated G7 infrastructure investments in a given nation or sector? Or a combination of the above? Whatever the ambitions for the partnership, they need to be clearly stated and the partnership goals commensurately assessed and communicated. The optimal level of coordination may require G7 nations able to fund each other’s projects even if their national companies are not involved. For example, the DFC favors but does not require a US nexus in infrastructure investment (e.g., the Ethiopian telecom project with Vodafone and Sumitomo). If all G7 nations could arrive at a similar approach, it will allow for optimal partnership impact. They could also develop additional partnership modalities to invest in both debt and equity, and in local currencies.

The execution of PGII calls for nuanced balance across three major drivers of demand. Meeting PGII’s purported goals of addressing global infrastructure demand calls for clear articulation and quantification of relevant demand signals. Three major, but not exclusive, demand drivers include: host nation demand for high-quality infrastructure to fuel economic growth; private sector demand, particularly from institutional investors, for quality infrastructure investments with stable returns; and geopolitical considerations for infrastructure investments for influence in highly contested strategic regions such as the South Pacific islands. PGII may be well served by developing a triangulated demand framework to deploy scarce resources to optimal impact.

Position PGII at the center of the constellation of bilateral and multilateral international development efforts. Emerging nations are inundated by a steady stream of infrastructure facilitating initiatives championed by G7 nations individually and collectively, either directly or through multilateral development banks in which they are the largest shareholders. It may be of strategic value to explicitly position PGII at the center of the full suite of multifaceted G7 resources affecting global infrastructure demand—to enshrine PGII as a catalyst for global impact on high-quality infrastructure. The PGII must be wholly incorporated and championed by G7 development agencies and G7-supported multinational development banks and financial institutions in their loans and investments, ensuring that the cumulative impact of the PGII reaches beyond its initial six hundred billion dollar allocation. This would also create an opportunity to engage the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, build on lessons from the Blue Dot Network and similar past high-quality infrastructure certification efforts, and integrate the PGII into a global network that extends beyond the G7.

Implement a robust global communication strategy. For the PGII to be credible in its global impact and recognition, it needs a sustained professional communication and marketing strategy that conveys the sum total (and more) of the aforementioned recommendations. It will have limited recognition and shelf life if it remains a G7 talking point. The cumulative impact of G7 nations’ full suite of infrastructure investments and supporting initiatives if properly collated and communicated would rival and exceed BRI outlays. This was true before the announcement of PGII, and the inability to tell that story has been a lamentable shortcoming. The G7 cannot afford to persist with this shortcoming. It is a strategic imperative to execute a well-resourced PGII communication strategy that offers an accurate cumulative impact on global infrastructure of the collective efforts of G7 nations individually, collectively, and along with their supported multinational development banks and like-minded allies.

Kaush Arha is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

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The international community must prepare for a post-Putin Russia

Francis M. O’Donnell — Mon, 07 Nov 2022 21:09:44 +0000

Nine months is enough time to bring a human being to birth, but it is apparently not long enough for Russian President Vladimir Putin to realize the folly of his war against Ukraine. Instead, it is becoming increasingly clear that no meaningful settlement will be possible as long as Putin remains in power. The international community must therefore seek pathways to a lasting peace with a future post-Putin Russia.

For many decades, the USSR and subsequently the Russian Federation played a major role in advancing humanity’s progress. In sharp contrast to his predecessors, Vladimir Putin is now leading Russia away from that legacy and is transforming the country into a pariah state. Russian acts of hostility are global in scale and include everything from waging war in Georgia to the subversion of domestic politics throughout the West. Since the unprovoked attack on Ukraine began in 2014, the Putin regime has embarked on a further diplomatic frenzy that has increasingly alienated Russia’s erstwhile closest friends and foreign partners.

Yet just four years ago, Russia was party to a UN Security Council resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflict which recognized for the first time the intrinsic link between hunger and conflict. Russia now behaves in stark defiance of these principles. On four separate occasions this year, the UN General Assembly has resoundingly rebuked Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and unwarranted and egregious violations of UN norms. Russia has been suspended from the UN Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe, and has lost its seat on the Governing Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

In a March 2022 resolution, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva agreed to establish a commission to investigate violations committed during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A subsequent resolution examined the deteriorating human rights situation in Ukraine stemming from the invasion. This led to a report by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine addressing events during late February and March 2022 in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions of northern Ukraine.

Evidence continues to mount indicating tens of thousands of war crimes committed by Russian forces acting under command responsibility, as distinct from occasional rogue elements. This evidence includes official statements, actions, and systemic politically-driven campaigns with clear genocidal intent, including widespread ethnic cleansing, deportations, and repeated large-scale missile and artillery targeting of civilian populations and vital civilian infrastructure.

For a comparatively minor territorial gain, Putin has sacrificed Russia’s reputation and socio-economic well-being. Even worse, the ricochet effects have also surged around the world creating food and energy insecurity, escalating inflation, and widespread impoverishment. There would never have been a good time for such willful misadventure, but coming in the wake of the Covid pandemic, the timing could hardly be worse.

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The increasing mendacity of the Putin regime is now so severe that members of the elite cannot even trust each other, with key figures close to the Kremlin engaging in public attacks on the leadership of the Russian military. As battlefield failure and international isolation continue to erode Putin’s authority, his entire model of government is now under threat. Russia’s prospects today are the dimmest they have been since World War II, with a range of possible dangers now emerging including deepening internal divisions and the potential collapse of the country.

While it is important to rule out any interference in the internal governance of the Russian Federation, the West can and should call for full compliance with Russia’s international obligations to defend the human rights and legitimate aspirations of Russian citizens. At this stage, the inclusion of Russian local governments and municipalities in the global effort to tackle climate change and pandemic recovery could be an opener to the de-concentration or leveling of power. When President Trump pulled the US out of the Paris Accord on Climate Change, several US states and municipalities strengthened their commitment to it.

We may already be witnessing the early warning signs of a degradation in the Russian state as sanctions and military defeats take their toll and warlords like Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov openly question Putin’s leadership of the war. Members of the Russian elite need to take stock of this decline and move beyond today’s misguided imperialism with a view to harnessing the energies of Russian society and thoroughly reforming the country’s institutions.

Eurasia Center events

Check out all our work on COP27 here.

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The real Russia is deeper and richer than today’s stolen billions in assets and the forfeited lives from Putin’s genocidal wars against the country’s neighbors. The real Russia, including its repressed civil society and talented Russian communities around the globe, can strive to optimize broad-based outcomes that uplift the people of Russia and enhance their lives whilst restoring international partnerships and global respect. This will only be possible through the openness, transparency, and accountability of elected leaders divorced from the power of money, media, and mania. Multiple networks of Russians abroad need to coalesce around a reform agenda that looks to a post-Putin Russia and ushers in a new era of benign leadership that puts the well-being of the Russian people before the narrow predatory interests of the country’s current kleptocratic leadership.

The international community should therefore focus their attention and resources not only on enabling Ukraine to win the war but also to encourage a process of reconciliation and convergence that unites all the various and often conflicting elements of the Russian opposition both internally and in the diaspora. This would not be unprecedented. It was the unifying of the Serbian opposition that led to the overthrow of Milosevic regime.

A recognition of the dilemmas and internal stresses that Russia is facing, as distinct from but in addition to the harm caused to Ukraine and the world at large, warrants attention at the forthcoming G20 summit. The stifling of civil society and dissent has deprived the people of Russia of their rightful freedom of expression. Despite various Russian opinion polls indicating majority support for the invasion of Ukraine, this cannot be credibly authenticated. By its behavior and utterances alone, the Kremlin has disqualified itself from international relations. It is time for world leaders to acknowledge that a change of tack in Moscow is essential.

In order to advance toward the goal of peace, the international community must act to help empower alternative Russian voices. The global networks, institutions, and methods that can enable capacity for mediation and negotiation in conflicts around the world, are a vital resource to foster engagement with Russian civil society, which is largely silenced internally but not abroad, and can also be approached virtually at the local level. Getting Russian civil society to converge on peaceful alternatives and a different narrative than the Kremlin’s is the key to de-concentrating political power in Russia and incubating real participatory reform. It may also be the best way to achieve a sustainable peace.

Ambassador Francis M. O’Donnell (Ret.) is the former UN Representative in Ukraine (2004-2009)

Have countries heeded this year’s wake-up calls with bold commitments at COP27? Our experts—many of whom were in Sharm el Sheikh—dispatched their insights and recommendations for world leaders throughout the course of this critical conference. This post was continuously updated as their reactions streamed in.

The latest analysis from Sharm el Sheikh

COP27 readout: The good and the bad as COP27 concludes
The big success and bigger failure of COP27
Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

NOVEMBER 23, 2022 | 3:30 PM WASHINGTON | 10:30 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

COP27 readout: The good and the bad as COP27 concludes

Requiring an additional thirty-six hours of negotiation, official delegates finally reached a settlement and final communique early Sunday morning. The deal is underpinned by the landmark agreement to create a fund for climate compensation, bringing a nearly three-decade journey for “loss and damage” closer to the finish line. Even if details are sparse regarding contributions to the fund and the criteria for disbursement to vulnerable or impacted nations, bringing forth a commitment from two hundred participating countries is representative of the amount of influence the Global South has wielded throughout the past two weeks.

The disappointing absence of increased emissions reduction targets in the communique is an indicator of how the needs of the developing world have underpinned this COP. Ambitions for economic development amidst a global energy crisis have given enough influence to global oil and gas producing states that room for a significant push to reduce the role of oil and gas in the energy mix has been significantly limited.

EnergySource

Nov 23, 2022

COP27 readout: The good and the bad as COP27 concludes

By Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center experts take stock of two weeks of COP developments in Sharm el Sheikh.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 8:57 AM WASHINGTON | 3:57 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

The big success and bigger failure of COP27

The Global South won, but did the climate? Negotiators at the UN climate-change conference known as COP27 extended their stay in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt to hammer out a final agreement that will create a loss and damage fund to compensate developing countries harmed by climate change. But the deal barely addresses other urgent topics such as reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, even as the consequences of climate change become clearer by the day. Have negotiators done enough to help save the planet and the people on it? What other surprises cropped up at COP? Our experts, who were on the ground in Sharm el Sheikh, are here to weigh in.

Read their takeaways

Fast Thinking

Nov 21, 2022

The big success and bigger failure of COP27

By Atlantic Council

What other surprises cropped up at the conference? Our experts, who were on the ground in Sharm el Sheikh, are here to weigh in.

Brazil China

Stepping up ahead of negotiations

Solutions for achieving net-zero emissions and improving energy access for all
How climate change affects peace and security across the world
Insurance for a climate-safe future
Dispatch from the Resilience Hub: Why countries can’t give up on the 1.5 degree Celsius cap on warming
Will countries step up on loss and damage?
Saudi Arabia’s take on aligning energy security needs and decarbonization goals
How Freetown is addressing extreme heat
Addressing Africa’s rapidly rising energy demand
Why now is the best time to address energy security and climate change in tandem
Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

NOVEMBER 18, 2022 | 6:18 AM WASHINGTON | 1:18 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Solutions for achieving net-zero emissions and improving energy access for all

Our Global Energy Center pulled to the side top thinkers, leaders, and innovators on climate solutions at COP27 to talk about their ideas for achieving net-zero ambitions while ensuring energy access for all.

Watch the full playlist

NOVEMBER 17, 2022 | 9:28 AM WASHINGTON | 4:28 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

How climate change affects peace and security across the world

By Lama El Hatow

As climate change impacts intensify—fueling migration and competition over scarce resources—so does the risk that conflict that may emerge. That risk has only been exacerbated by recent economic shocks, energy-supply disruptions, and increasing food insecurity.

While climate-linked migration and displacement (or “human mobility”) are discussed extensively at COP27, they are not officially on the agenda. The US Center, as well as several other pavilions at COP27 like the Climate Mobility Pavilion, have hosted series of events discussing the connections between climate change, conflict, peace, and security. At these events, speakers explained how, with assessments by officials from the US Departments of State and Defense, the United States is looking at hotspot zones around the world that are at risk from severe climate impacts—including how fragile and conflict-affected countries are negatively affected by these impacts. The United States is conducting these assessments in an attempt to provide an early warning about which regions are most at risk from climate change.

One of the most concerning ways that climate change will impact these regions is by contributing to increasing food insecurity. According to a report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme, up to 205 million people across forty-five countries are expected to face acute food insecurity, while up to 45 million people across thirty-seven countries are projected to face severe malnourishment that may result in starvation or death. The report also explains that more than 70 percent of people facing acute food security over the last year were living in conflict-affected countries; and in several countries and regions, climate change and extreme weather events are driving increases in food insecurity. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has only added to the crisis by elevating prices for food and energy, the latter key to distributing food worldwide.

The report also identified nineteen hotspots—seventeen countries and two regional clusters—that are most at risk of worsening food insecurity over the next few months due to climate change effects, increasing conflict, economic shocks, and more. The 970,000 people who are projected to face the most severe conditions are located in five countries—Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen.

With the number of climate refugees increasing, countries are beginning to assess how to manage this new movement of people, which will likely have spillover effects across regions. Although climate change is impacting the world all over, some countries have more capacity and resilience to manage the crisis than others; hence, migration flows in the Global South are steering toward countries with better resilience. Many at COP27 have argued that developed countries have a moral and ethical responsibility towards the migrants from the Global South, since they are coming from countries that didn’t contribute as much to the world’s emissions problem. Historically, however, there has been a pervasive anti-immigration sentiment that fuels restrictive policies and a general reluctance to provide legal protection to people fleeing their home countries due to conflict or climate change. Additionally, there has not yet been an established finance arrangement or action protocol on climate-linked mobility at the global level. Extensive work with significant cooperation still needs to be done to address this worsening crisis.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

NOVEMBER 17, 2022 | 1:55 AM WASHINGTON | 8:55 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Insurance for a climate-safe future

With COP27’s focus on climate change adaptation, in addition to mitigation, the insurance sector now has an “absolutely integral role to play” in helping people manage disasters after—and even before— they happen, said Francis Bouchard, Marsh McLennan’s managing director of climate.

In conversation with Jorge Gastelumendi, director of global policy at the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, Bouchard explained that insurance still has a very “traditional” role in terms of signaling to people the risks they may be acquiring in a new venture and paying claims after events unfold.

But there’s a new way that the insurance sector is helping send those risk signals earlier: Anticipatory finance, in which some companies offer a way to pay before a disaster strikes. “So if you statistically know that at some point [an] event is going to turn into something that would’ve been insured, you can actually put money in peoples’ hands before the event,” Bouchard explained. “They can spend that money to protect their families, their businesses, their cattle, their farms, whatever it is; but they can take steps before.”

Bouchard warned, however, that the idea hasn’t been scaled yet, as companies undergo a “mindset shift” from paying a claim after an event to making a claim never happen. Yet, he added, with momentum sparked by the global focus on risk reduction, which has resulted in new initiatives like the Group of Seven’s Global Shield, “the time is now for the insurance industry to lead.”

Watch more

NOVEMBER 16, 2022 | 7:18 PM WASHINGTON | NOVEMBER 17, 2022 | 2:18 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Dispatch from the Resilience Hub: Why countries can’t give up on the 1.5 degree Celsius cap on warming

If countries that signed the Paris Agreement agree that we’ll exceed 1.5°C & change the temp, it means accepting more floods, fires & extreme heat+more people vulnerable to climate impacts. We must accelerate solutions that protect people &communities from climate disasters pic.twitter.com/4jIWd2JZgH
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 17, 2022

NOVEMBER 16, 2022 | 12:04 PM WASHINGTON | 7:04 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Will countries step up on loss and damage?

By Lama El Hatow

While loss and damage is near the top of the agenda at COP27, it has been a sticky point for many countries as they debate how to finance the loss and damage payments.

Climate mitigation looks to avert climate change through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the development of zero-emission solutions; climate adaptation aims to minimize the chance that climate change impacts a given community. But loss and damage addresses the harms and costs induced by climate change, which is already happening.

In Pakistan, for example, the recent disastrous floods, which put one-third of the country under water, damaged over a million homes, and killed over a thousand people. The damage has been estimated to cost more than thirty billion dollars and it displaced more thirty million people from their homes, raising an immediate need for loss and damage compensation. Overall, while some countries like Belgium and Scotland have been willing to pledge funding for loss and damage, other leading economies, including the United States, showed resistance.

At the same time, climate finance has traditionally been in the form of loans to developing countries. So essentially, developing countries are borrowing money from developed countries for a problem they mostly haven’t caused—and are being asked to pay it back with interest. Additionally, when climate disasters cause significant damage, they bring significant costs for the impacted country and, for developing countries, wipe out their financial resources, so the net outcome of the loan is almost nil. This essentially is why Pakistan has called for debt restructuring and debt relief after the flooding, to change this unfair setup.

At the institutional level, the Vulnerable Twenty Group (V20), a “cooperation initiative” of finance ministers from the countries most vulnerable to climate change, was formed in 2015 to present a unified voice on climate action. V20 members are also members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, a non-treaty organization of fifty-five member countries which are estimated to have collectively lost $525 billion from 2000 to 2019 due to climate change. These two forums are actively pushing to promote a loss and damage payments mechanism.

While reaching a consensus on loss and damage has been challenging, some developed countries proposed alternative funding mechanisms for vulnerable countries. For example, the Group of Seven-led Global Shield announced at COP27 provides immediate financial support to V20 countries when climate-change-related disasters strike. With Germany’s contribution of $175 million, and with additional contributions from France, Austria, Denmark and Ireland, the total financial coverage of the Global Shield is about $207 million. But the V20 countries also warned earlier this year that they could stop paying their debt service (estimated at about $685 billion) if lenders are not willing to restructure these debts and deduct the climate induced costs. In the words of Ghanaian Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta, by leaving nations at the mercy of climate catastrophe, “you could be triggering a global economic meltdown.”

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

NOVEMBER 16, 2022 | 11:00 AM WASHINGTON | 6:00 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Saudi Arabia’s take on aligning energy security needs and decarbonization goals

Global Energy Center Senior Director sat down with Khalid M. Abuleif, chief negotiator for the climate agreements for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to talk about Saudi Arabia’s latest plans to meet its commitments in the Paris Climate Accords and the world’s needs for energy security.

The Paris Agreement has the potential to “be very costly for Saudi Arabia,” Abuleif explained. “The countries that will be most impacted… [are] going to be oil producers, developing countries; the reasoning is because their economies are not fully diversified and they rely heavily on limited sectors.”

But now is still the time for global climate action, Abuleif said. So as Saudi Arabia moves forward, it is working on making the country more resilient “to any kind of measures that could be taken,” Abuleif explained.

Watch the full interview to hear about Saudi Arabia’s latest initiatives geared toward improving energy security, boosting the country’s economy, and meeting its climate obligations.

Watch more

NOVEMBER 16, 2022 | 9:05 AM WASHINGTON | 4:05 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

How Freetown is addressing extreme heat

Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr, mayor of Freetown, Sierra Leone, caught up with Kathy Baughman McLeod at the Resilience Hub and explained how her city is using an affordable and “simple solution” to protect women from extreme heat at markets across the city.

Watch the full conversation

We’re coming #TogetherForImplementation with our partner @yakisawyerr! https://t.co/pPQr4to3pO

She stopped by the @COPResHub to chat with @KBMcLeodFLA about how Freetown is building a cooler future with adaptation solutions. Watch our latest #COPChat now! pic.twitter.com/vOdCaHuo7u
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 16, 2022

NOVEMBER 16, 2022 | 2:03 AM WASHINGTON | 9:03 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Addressing Africa’s rapidly rising energy demand

The African Development Bank Group’s Kevin Kariuki joined Global Energy Center Deputy Director Reed Blakemore at COP27 to talk about sustainable development and energy access across Africa.

“Africa has endemic energy poverty which must be addressed,” Kariuki said, “and at the same time, we must address the issues of the climate crisis.”

To do that, Kariuki explained that he hopes leaders at COP27 realize that “what is actually required today is synergizing growth in energy demand with climate action.” He said that would help “[meet] the needs of Africa.”

“But we must also be realistic,” Kariuki added, “that renewable energy on its own will probably not be able to provide the security of supply and affordable power that is required to be able to underpin Africa’s social economic development.”

Watch more

NOVEMBER 16, 2022 | 1:10 AM WASHINGTON | 8:10 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Why now is the best time to address energy security and climate change in tandem

Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz joined the National Grid’s Rhian Kelly at COP27 to talk about addressing energy security in tandem with the energy transition.

“I think in many ways they’re more aligned than they’ve ever been because if we want to get ourselves off Russian gas, the cheapest form of self-reliant energies are renewables,” Kelly explained. She added that because global politics have changed, she thinks it’s “the best time to be thinking about energy security and climate change together.”

Watch more

A strategy for the Global South

How cities in the Global South are adapting to climate change
The first global ambassador for heat action lays out his top priorities
Dispatch from the Resilience Hub: How women are impacted by climate change
How to inhabit an uninhabitable region
Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

NOVEMBER 15, 2022 | 5:07 PM WASHINGTON | NOVEMBER 16, 2022 | 12:07 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

How cities in the Global South are adapting to climate change

At the Thailand Pavilion, Mauricio Rodas talked about urban resilience and climate adaptation in cities across the Global South. “Extreme heat is the climate hazard that [effects] more people than any other, and it is particularly severe in cities,” he explained. He pointed out the innovations that are addressing extreme heat, such as the Cool Capital Stack investment portfolio recently launched by the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center and its partners.

See the highlights

Today at @COP27P discussing in different sessions the need to implement Nature based Solutions in cities, and highlighting the importance of the recently launched Cool Capital Stack as an innovative financial mechanism to address extreme heat related risks. @ArshtRock pic.twitter.com/sTtcx5lgtA
— Mauricio Rodas (@MauricioRodasEC) November 15, 2022

NOVEMBER 15, 2022 | 10:05 AM WASHINGTON | 5:05 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

The first global ambassador for heat action lays out his top priorities

Newly appointed Global Ambassador for Heat Action Felipe Calderón outlined his agenda for tackling extreme heat in conversation with Mauricio Rodas, the senior advisor for heat and city diplomacy at the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center.

“The first thing we need to do is gather information… [and] second, to transmit that information to the right people,” Calderón said.

He said that he believes “the main problem is the lack of awareness about the importance of the problem, about the magnitude of the problem.” But, he added, getting information out to leaders, the media, and other stakeholders can help boost the urgency among leaders to address heat.

Afterall, Calderón explained, “the most cost effective way to avoid human deaths… [is] preventing or taking action on heat waves.”

He also stressed the importance of nature-based solutions like planting trees in cities. That, he said, is an effective one because it “combines an adaptation solution with a mitigation solution.”

Watch more

NOVEMBER 15, 2022 | 7:49 AM WASHINGTON | 2:49 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Dispatch from the Resilience Hub: How women are impacted by climate change

Arsht-Rock’s Director @KBMcLeodFLA shares that “80 percent of the people displaced by climate change are women, and women are 14 times more likely to die from climate disasters.” Action here at #COP27 is to understand how to better protect them from climate change. pic.twitter.com/RPUx2fN6vW
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 15, 2022

NOVEMBER 15, 2022 | 7:17 AM WASHINGTON | 2:17 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

How to inhabit an uninhabitable region

By Lama El Hatow

The latest analysis from the United Nations (UN) indicates that we are still nowhere near limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius—the target set by the Paris Accords—and are actually headed towards 2.8 degrees. That means we may see regions around the globe become completely uninhabitable. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, about six hundred million people across the Middle East and North Africa will face heat waves that go beyond the human survivability threshold by 2100. The Middle East North Africa (MENA) region is already a hot arid climate, and it will get hotter and drier with the impacts of climate change—with summertime temperatures that make it dangerous to be outdoors.

In this respect, we are heading toward an uninhabitable world and need to consider how best to adapt to it, particularly during the summer months. The immediate impact will be for people to spend more time indoors with the safety of air conditioning, which increases the demand for energy even further—bringing greater urgency to the search for clean renewable energy to power a smooth green transition. Additionally, within this year’s COP there have been many discussions about the possibilities of heat resilience within cities, including urban reforestation that can create cooler micro climates, shaded areas above bicycle lanes, and holistic urban planning with an eye toward resilience.

Consider the way many cities in Canada and the far north have adjusted to their harsh winters by creating underground infrastructure to minimize outdoor exposure, including public transportation, tunnel systems, and connections to buildings. Similarly, countries in MENA such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are already working to enhance their infrastructure to limit outdoor exposure by connecting their metro lines through tunnels to buildings, along with tailoring cultural attractions to the climate from the world’s largest indoor ski slope in Dubai to indoor stadiums and indoor golf courses. The MENA region is already building its cities to adapt to an uninhabitable world. The biggest risk, however, does not lie in wealthier countries that have the capacity to do this, but in the most vulnerable communities that will suffer tremendously in an environment made uninhabitable by climate change.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

The future of climate adaptation

Water Day comes to COP27
Delivering on UPS’s emissions-reductions commitments
Here’s what to know heading into week two of negotiations
Dispatch from virtual reality: How games are informing decision makers on climate adaptation
What to make of USAID’s new adaptation and resilience plan
The United States is finally stepping up—but it there are also other climate leaders to watch
Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

NOVEMBER 14, 2022 | 2:37 PM WASHINGTON | 9:37 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Water Day comes to COP27

By Lama El Hatow

Monday was Water Day at COP27; it was a reminder that putting water in the center of the climate debate is imperative, necessary for crucial action, and long overdue.

Water access is still a challenge for many local communities. While the world leaders are striving to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 6 (clean water and sanitation for all), they are in many ways moving backwards.

For example, in many parts of the world, the privatization of water has shifted communities away from bodies of fresh water hat sustain their livelihoods. Water is a public good, and commodifying water takes away very basic human rights. Private companies have bought the rights to use bodies of water for profits, while poor and marginalized communities struggle to pay the higher prices on water. In many cases, private companies are not only limiting access to this public good but also polluting it further with industrial processes.

Several groups at COP27 have discussed how vital it is to preserve water as a public good. With the impacts of climate change, the world is seeing water scarcity in some regions (such as the Middle East and North Africa), and floods and extreme rainfall in others. The COP27 president and the World Meteorological Organization launched the Action for Water Adaptation and Resilience initiative to focus on the climate and water nexus and on water adaptation.

Climate adaptation and covering loss and damage will require more climate financing, and much of that money needs to go toward water—specifically, toward efforts supporting water security for vulnerable communities. During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the New Orleans area lacked sufficient access to clean water for days. Similarly, the floods in Pakistan left millions without access to clean water as some of the infrastructure needed to provide it was severely destroyed. Drought-stricken countries are banding together to share their technologies and expertise to manage water scarcity. For example, a group of countries led by Spain and Senegal launched the International Drought Resilience Alliance at COP27 to “shift drought management from emergency response to resilience against climate change impacts.” Spain is committing five million euros to start it off.

As countries continue to partner with one another on water action, it will be crucial to ensure that there is appropriate focus on action for adaptation and resilience.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

NOVEMBER 14, 2022 | 10:38 AM WASHINGTON | 5:38 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Delivering on UPS’s emissions-reductions commitments

Laura Lane, executive vice president and chief corporate affairs and sustainability officer of the United Parcel Service (UPS), sat down with Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz at COP27 to talk about UPS’s emissions-reductions goals.

Lane hopes that COP27 ultimately helps foster a “greater sense of collaboration between government, the private sector, and the NGO community. If they all come together, they “can solve a lot of the challenges that lie ahead for companies like [UPS],” that, Lane explained, are part of “one of the… hardest to abate industry sectors.”

She pointed out that while UPS has a goal to be carbon neutral by 2050, global tensions and supply chain shortages are making it difficult to hit key checkpoints. For example, the global shortage of microchips is making it more difficult to electrify their ground fleet.

“And so we are trying to find other ways to be able to get the emissions out of our… operations,” Lane explained. She said that UPS is searching for alternative fuels for its ground fleet and is working with other companies to incentivize the production of sustainable aviation fuel to power its operations in the air.

Watch more

NOVEMBER 13, 2022 | 1:16 PM WASHINGTON | 8:16 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Here’s what to know heading into week two of negotiations

By the Global Energy Center

As COP27 reaches its midway point, technical discussions are set to gain speed in week two. The twin realities of an energy security crisis and the sweeping impacts of climate change on the developing world remain at the forefront of discussions throughout Sharm el Sheikh. The multi-stakeholder drive to surmount both challenges is drawing stronger linkages between climate action and energy security, opening new avenues for collaboration between governments, civil society, and industry.

After week one, a few things are clear:

US climate leadership is achieving legitimacy through action. Midterm elections at the start of COP27 served only to further energize a US delegation already operating with confidence following passage of the Inflation Reduction Act. President Biden, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, the Director of the National Economic Council Brian Deese, and many others arrived in Egypt emphasizing an optimistic outlook for the energy transition in the United States, while underscoring the need to unlock “trillions” in private financing to replicate US momentum in the developing world. The steadfast presence of US congressional delegations from both sides of the aisle further reinforced the United States’ commitment to addressing the climate crisis.

Next, the narrative at COP27 is no longer Western-led. The introduction of “loss and damage” to the COP agenda illustrates how the global south has successfully used the conversation in Europe and the West around energy security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to underscore the need for access to sustainable energy resources that enable economic growth.

And finally, the hard conversations which have often been missed or dodged at prior COPs are now front-and-center.

Overall, the twin realities of a global energy security crisis and a developing world at the forefront of a majority of the worst impacts of climate change have created an opportunity to better integrate the policy spheres of climate action and energy security.

EnergySource

Nov 13, 2022

COP27 readout: Week 1 comes to a close

By Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center react to the first week of COP27 proceedings.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

NOVEMBER 12, 2022 | 3:34 AM WASHINGTON | 10:34 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Dispatch from virtual reality: How games are informing decision makers on climate adaptation

Our Director of Extreme Heat Initiatives @KurtShickman & @ACMideast’s Lama El Hatow caught up at Arsht-Rock’s virtual reality booth https://t.co/4YjD37Q4iq

Great to see @AtlanticCouncil representation on the ground at #COP27! #ArshtRockAtCOP pic.twitter.com/iPcxCaSFs8
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 12, 2022

NOVEMBER 12, 2022 | 2:57 AM WASHINGTON | 9:57 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

What to make of USAID’s new adaptation and resilience plan

At #COP27 @SamanthaJPower, citing the devastating $30+ billion flooding of Pakistan of @USAID announces new push to urgently drive private investment in adaptation & resilience. Big opportunity and vision here – @ArshtRock is ready – let’s go! pic.twitter.com/ITz3hKu5Qb
— Kathy Baughman McLeod (@KBMcLeodFLA) November 12, 2022

NOVEMBER 12, 2022 | 2:33 AM WASHINGTON | 9:33 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Experts praise the United States for finally stepping up—but there are also other climate leaders to watch

Global Energy Center Deputy Director Reed Blakemore sat down with the World Resources Institute’s Dan Lashof to talk about the countries taking the lead on climate action.

Lashof explained that while this is the twenty-seventh COP, “it’s COP1 for the United States being able to show up with a transformative climate law in place domestically.” He thinks “that gives President Biden much more credibility,” but he added that the world will be watching whether Congress will be able to sustain the momentum on climate action.

Lashof explained that, while people still pay a lot of attention to how politics in the United States impact the country’s climate leadership, the world is “no longer unipolar.”

“People are also looking to the EU and to China,” he said. So I think those three major players are pushing the wall forward, sometimes together, sometimes not so much. But as long as they’re moving and accelerating action, then we’re seeing progress.”

Watch more

Public-private partnerships

COP’s focuses on implementation, emerging economies, and public-private partnerships raise hopes
At the “corporate COP,” a new focus on private-sector solutions
Partnerships to benefit the planet—and the private sector
Gaming and social tech can reorient the world toward a climate-resilient future
Quick take: The attendance at COPs has transformed. Here’s what that means for the energy transition.
Improving clean-energy access for everyone
The energy crisis shows the need to accelerate the energy transition
Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

NOVEMBER 11, 2022 | 7:12 PM WASHINGTON | NOVEMBER 12, 2022 | 2:12 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

COP’s focuses on implementation, emerging economies, and public-private partnerships raise hopes

By Roger Martella

In this pivotal moment for global action on climate change, I’m in the full optimist camp regarding COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh—not only for Egypt, but for the precedent Egypt is setting for the future.

Two main reasons drive this enthusiasm. First, COP27 is focused on implementation—putting climate promises into action. Second, the event is committed to highlighting the needs and challenges of emerging economies. This will place a global spotlight on the unique opportunities for countries where most of the 750 million people without reliable access to electricity live.

Another reason to be optimistic about COP27 is the rapidly growing role of public-private partnerships between policymakers and corporate stakeholders. The growing role of companies to be part of the solution and partner with governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other companies in industrialized and emerging markets is leading to unprecedented collaborations, some already having an impact.

The pursuit of public-private partnerships is perhaps the top undercurrent at COP27, as many collaborators and odd bedfellows alike come together for bold pronouncements of projects and initiatives together. These examples demonstrate how emerging economies, through public-private partnerships and tangible proof points, are addressing the energy transition by blending different approaches, technologies, and perspectives. Additionally, they illustrate how emerging economies are positioning strategically to build climate resilient infrastructure that grows access to energy at the same time. The lessons learned from each will help inform the many ongoing discussions and negotiations in Sharm el Sheikh.

Roger Martella is the chief sustainability officer of GE. GE is a presenting partner of GEC at COP27: Ambitions for All.

EnergySource

Nov 11, 2022

Partner perspectives: In emerging markets, partnerships and proof points are key to driving the energy transition

By Roger Martella

COP27 is an opportunity for emerging economies to lead the energy transition. Public-private partnerships can help drive progress towards their goals.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

NOVEMBER 11, 2022 | 12:37 PM WASHINGTON | 7:37 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

At the “corporate COP,” a new focus on private-sector solutions

By Lama El Hatow

The private sector has an immense presence at COP27 in all the various zones within Sharm El Sheikh, earning this conference the label of the “corporate COP.” The business role comes in several forms.

First, there is a growing recognition that the private sector will have to close the gap in the unfulfilled one hundred billion dollar per year climate finance promise made by developed countries. We already know that one hundred billion is insufficient, with reports now claiming that two trillion dollars per year is what’s needed for the Global South. UN Climate Change High-Level Champion for Egypt Mahmoud Mohieldin and US climate envoy John Kerry have argued that various modes of blended finance (using development funds to leverage private capital), as well as regulations on the private sector, are the only way to meet the one hundred billion dollar pledge and move toward the two trillion dollar goal. Kerry even announced that the US Energy Transition Accelerator would be carried out in partnership with Bezos’ Earth Fund and the Rockefeller Fund, solidifying the role of the private sector in implementation.

Second, fossil-fuel and high-polluting companies are frightened and lobbying quite strongly. During decarbonization day today, their viewpoints were expressed in various sessions discussing how they are shifting their practices to renewable energy and phasing out fossil fuels. However, they are concerned, as Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Mottley and other island state leaders opened COP27 by stating that fossil fuel companies should pay a global carbon tax on profits to fund loss and damage for the Global South. The massive third quarter profits recently reported by Saudi Aramco ($42.4 billion), Exxon ($20 billion), and Chevron ($11.2 billion) alone show why this could be an attractive option for policymakers seeking loss and damage funds.

Third, businesses along with banks are under new pressure from investors to meet environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals, and they are trying to catch up and understand what needs to be done. The Net Zero Banking Alliance, which is one of the four pillars of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero that emerged at the last COP, has been convening to see how to enable as well as enforce banks to transition to net zero. CEOs of top commercial and investment banks including Blackrock, Citibank, and Standard Chartered are skipping the summit as they focus more on issues such as the fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine, energy crises, rising inflation, and the threat of recession. It is no secret that many large-scale corporations produce more greenhouse gas emissions than many countries. The argument is that these companies should be liable for compensation, not only to their consumers and board of directors, but also to the Global South and the world’s most vulnerable people.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

NOVEMBER 11, 2022 | 11:23 AM WASHINGTON | 6:23 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Partnerships to benefit the planet—and the private sector

Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz hosted Dorothy McAuliffe, the US State Department’s special representative for global partnerships, to talk about how governments can work with the private sector to develop climate solutions.

“Governments can’t tackle this challenge alone,” McAuliffe explained. “We have to be in this all together.”

While there are major benefits for the planet to be reaped from this partnership, McAuliffe explained that there are benefits for the private sector too: “There are jobs and opportunities that come along with this clean energy transformation… and finding these solutions.”

Watch more

NOVEMBER 11, 2022 | 10:43 AM WASHINGTON | 5:43 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

By increasing awareness of climate adaptation measures, gaming and social technologies are creating impact on the ground in many countries.

On Friday, the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center hosted an event at the COP27 Resilience Hub that brought together gaming and technology experts to talk about innovative solutions to build resilient communities.

For example, games like Garden Story help users acquire the knowledge and skills they need to take climate action in their communities. Similarly, Meta aims to help users understand the types of climate-adaptation tools that are available to prevent future damage and loss.

See top moments from the event

“Gamers are ahead on the curve on climate & we’re seeing this permeate the industry a little faster than others,” says @ChanceGlasco. Arsht-Rock’s VR pilot & games like @gardenstorygame integrate climate solutions, equipping players w/knowledge & skills for climate action. pic.twitter.com/aF6XSVyNv3
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 11, 2022

NOVEMBER 11, 2022 | 11:12 AM WASHINGTON | 6:12 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Quick take: The attendance at COPs has transformed. Here’s what that means for the energy transition.

#COP27 quick take: As uniform acceptance of the #EnergyTransition takes hold, an increasing number of energy and finance executives – many for the first time – are gravitating to the conference. A post-denial posture is empowering a groundswell of new solution-oriented actors.
— Landon Derentz (@Landon_Derentz) November 11, 2022

NOVEMBER 11, 2022 | 7:30 AM WASHINGTON | 2:30 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Improving clean-energy access for everyone

As the energy transition gets underway, experts are searching for ways to bring clean energies to everyone—and particularly low-income and developing countries.

Doing so will require focuses like improving financing, making the energy supply chain more efficient, and turning toward cooling solutions, said panelists at an Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center event at the Resilience Hub.

“We need to make sure that access to energy is resilient,” said Lavinia Bauerochse, global head of ESG at Deutsche Bank. “Climate change-induced weather extremes like floods and heat must be factored in. Without a resilient infrastructure, our efforts will be short lived.”

See top moments from the event

“One billion people have no access to cooling… & are considered highly vulnerable to heat events,” says @jmcurtin of @RockefellerFdn.

But traditional cooling contributes to emissions. We must bring cooling to vulnerable communities w/o further exacerbating climate-driven heat. pic.twitter.com/rAw06gdiAo
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 11, 2022

NOVEMBER 11, 2022 | 6:46 AM WASHINGTON | 1:46 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

The energy crisis shows the need to accelerate the energy transition

Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz sat down with HIF Global’s Meg Gentle to talk about decarbonization ambitions at COP27.

“There are so many incredible ideas here in Egypt this year, and we can show that eFuels, this synthetic fuel, this is happening now,” Gentle explained. HIF Global produces eFuels in countries like Chile and Australia.

EFuels, which are fuels created by renewable energies and carbon capturing from the air, have potential now, added Gentle. “These are fuels that can be used immediately; this is a solution for today.”

Watch more

The innovative solutions at play

Gaming and virtual reality set out to change how decision makers tackle climate change
Investments in climate technologies must begin with software
Nancy Pelosi and Kathy Castor at COP27: The US won’t abandon its climate leadership, regardless of who controls Congress
Energy security and the energy transition are “mutually reinforcing,” says US official
Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

NOVEMBER 10, 2022 | 2:08 PM WASHINGTON | 9:08 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Gaming and virtual reality set out to change how decisionmakers tackle climate change

By Lama El Hatow

As climate change becomes the world’s reality, groups are using technology to bring it to virtual reality as well.

With the evolution of technologies over the years and the emergence of the gaming industry, there has been an increase in the number of innovative ways through which people can see how climate change impacts the world and, by association, how to deal with it. The COP27 Resilience Hub, run in part by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, has created a VR experience that allows each user to click on various places around the globe to see what would happen in a +2 degree Celsius or +4 degree Celsius world. Based on the Paris Agreement and the science, we need to remain underneath 1.5 degree Celsius of warming to avoid catastrophic climate impacts. In this VR experience, one can see that the city of Miami, for instance, would be completely submerged underwater from flooding. Experiencing this submersion is quite difficult to process.

Additionally in this experience, the user has the option to select from various adaptation measures that can help the city of Miami avoid these catastrophic changes. For instance, after selecting “reforestation,” a nature-based solution, the user can see how Miami is able to withstand floodwaters. Alternatively, users can choose measures that may not be as effective, such as breakwaters in the case of Miami; from that, users can understand that decisions on adaptation must be designed for the particular contexts of each city. This technology allows policymakers to decide what kind of Miami they’d like to plan for in the future based on climate impacts.

Similarly, the video game “Eco” allows users to explore the “tragedy of the commons”—a situation in which users competing over environmental resources act in their own interest and ultimately deplete the resources entirely. Other games show how people’s physical conditions change in response to increased temperatures and heatwaves in certain settings—for example in poorly serviced areas versus in areas with resilient infrastructure. This game can be useful to help users understand how workers who are exposed to the outdoors for long periods of time are impacted by a world that is continuously heating.

The gaming industry and VR have opened up ways to envision the world in the future and how best to live in it. Ultimately, this technology and innovation is important in that it can help decisionmakers decide which adaptation measures to employ.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

NOVEMBER 10, 2022 | 12:15 PM WASHINGTON | 7:15 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Investments in climate technologies must begin with software

By Scott Reese

The annual United Nations Conference of Parties is underway in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, with delegates from around the world gathering to address one of the most urgent of global imperatives: climate change and the energy transition. Central to the conversation is tackling carbon emissions, the leading contributor to planet-wide warming.

During last year’s conference, leaders reinforced the sense of urgency to take action. Since then, important moves have been made to drive progress. Notably, the United States, currently the world’s second-largest carbon emitter, took its biggest step yet in combating climate change with a $369 billion investment via the Inflation Reduction Act that will reduce US carbon emissions to an estimated 40 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. This is in addition to steps to fund a modernized grid and breakthrough technologies in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. These two landmark climate change laws not only aim to reduce climate emissions, but they also advance US investments in both energy security and grid resiliency as well as critical breakthrough technologies.

Yet a problem so daunting can leave us all wondering, how does the world move faster?

While it’s critical to invest in long-term, high-impact levers like renewable energy, hydrogen, and carbon capture and sequestration technologies, software is an investment that can pay dividends today and accelerate our ability to embrace electrification and decarbonization tactics.

EnergySource

Nov 10, 2022

Partner perspectives: The next unlock: Why software is key to the energy transition

By Scott Reese

The energy transition requires scale, but it also requires speed. Through the marriage of human ingenuity with data and computing power, software integration can enable the acceleration of electrification and decarbonization, moving the world closer to loftier climate ambitions.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

NOVEMBER 10, 2022 | 9:00 AM WASHINGTON | 4:00 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Nancy Pelosi and Kathy Castor at COP27: The US won’t abandon its climate leadership, regardless of who controls Congress

By Katherine Walla

The United States is officially back “in the game,” leading the fight against climate change, said US Representative Kathy Castor, chair of the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis. “And we’re not leaving the playing field ever again.”

Castor and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi spoke on Thursday about how the United States is addressing the climate crisis at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center at the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP27) in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt.

While the United States—which withdrew from the Paris Climate Accords in 2019 but rejoined the agreement in 2021—has seen its climate leadership questioned, Castor said the country now has the tools to meet its emissions reduction goals. Those tools, she explained, include the bipartisan infrastructure law and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the latter of which she deemed the “most important climate bill” in US history.

At COP27, Pelosi hopes that US and global leaders will “find common ground” to address climate change, especially because of how pervasive the effects will be on health, economies, and even security globally. “The competition for habitat and resources can cause conflict,” Pelosi noted. “We have to avoid that.”

COP

Nov 10, 2022

Nancy Pelosi and Kathy Castor at COP27: The US won’t abandon its climate leadership, regardless of who controls Congress

By Katherine Walla

The US House speaker and the chair of the climate committee appeared at an Atlantic Council Front Page event in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

NOVEMBER 10, 2022 | 6:52 AM WASHINGTON | 1:52 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Energy security and the energy transition are “mutually reinforcing,” says US official

On Thursday, Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz sat down with US Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt to talk about global energy security.

“Energy is at the white hot center of international affairs in a way that it has not been in a long time,” Pyatt said. But despite countries scrambling for cheaper and more destructive energy sources like coal amid global gas shortages, Pyatt argued that energy security and the energy transition “are not in conflict with each other; in fact, they’re mutually reinforcing.”

“We need to continue to work… to build an energy system internationally which helps our allies and partners to advance their economies [and] to deliver results for their citizens,” he said. “But we also need to keep working on the energy transition.”

Watch more

Protecting the planet—and people

For COP outcomes that benefit the groups most vulnerable to climate change, representation must improve
Reasons to be optimistic about the “implementation COP”
The health sector’s role in climate change and ambitions
The newest advocate of heat resilience: The world’s first global ambassador for heat action
Cash for cooling
How cities are taking the lead on heat action
Read our experts’ analysis from earlier in the conference

NOVEMBER 9, 2022 | 12:30 PM WASHINGTON | 7:30 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

For COP outcomes that benefit the groups most vulnerable to climate change, representation must improve

By Lama El Hatow

Looking around to see who is present at COP27, there’s a lot of diversity and an array of ethnicities, cultures, and backgrounds across groups that aim to represent their communities and share their stories about how climate change impacts them. But not everyone has the privilege to be able to attend this COP and convene in an effort to inform policymakers of the realities on the ground. In fact, the most vulnerable and impacted communities around the world are often the ones that face the most hurdles in attending these conferences. Hence, these communities’ stories oftentimes never make it to the ears of the decision makers in the negotiating rooms deciding the world’s fate.

It thus becomes the international community’s responsibility to inform those decision makers for the sake of those not present at COP27. Within Egypt, minority groups such as the Nubian communities in Aswan and the Bedouins of Sinai will not be present at this COP. In November 2021, a severe storm hit the city of Aswan, destroying homes, flooding small islands, and decimating the already limited agriculture—and the community there is still healing from this disaster today. They report that such a storm has not hit Aswan in the last forty years. As these communities rely on the Nile River for their daily livelihood, the impacts of climate change, including lower water levels in rivers, are acute and detrimental for them. There are other examples of detrimental impact worldwide, most recently with floods in Pakistan destroying over a million homes and killing over a thousand people.

As leaders discuss the financial mechanisms for loss and damage payments in the negotiating rooms, it is important to know how and where these losses and damages are taking place across the globe. The Global Stocktake launched at COP26 requires countries to report on local- and community-level participation in nationally determined contributions, thus making the participation more feasible but still far from what is needed. That is why representation matters; and having local communities, tribes, indigenous peoples, and minority groups present at such a convening as COP is not only necessary but vital so that any outcomes of negotiations are holistic and take into consideration the needs of those most vulnerable to climate change. To ensure the inclusion of these groups, they must be allowed access to funding as well as partnerships with local and international civil-society organizations.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

NOVEMBER 9, 2022 | 10:41 AM WASHINGTON | 5:41 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Reasons to be optimistic about the “implementation COP”

COP27 has, to date, been scarce on tangible results, with the majority of action occurring outside of the negotiating room as a diverse coalition of industry and nongovernmental organizations descends on Sharm el Sheikh.

But there are clear signs emerging that should offer optimism as technical groups dominate the balance of the next two weeks:

Finance remains center stage. Financing both energy transitions and climate adaptation has, at least thus far, remained front-of-mind for policy leaders over the past two days. Commitments from a handful of European countries seeking to accelerate international climate adaptation finance are one such bright spot, despite the relative lack of optimism for progress leading up to the COP this year. Yet this box is still largely unchecked.
Private sector participation. COP’s transition from a largely technocratic convening to an increasingly multifaceted climate convention filled with corporations and civil society continues. Observers should be encouraged that the dialogue is moving past simple greenwashing, in favor of efforts to establish a widespread coalition of parties engaged in the climate conversation.
Implementation is in limbo. Though COP is meant to focus on acting on the pledges laid out in COP26 and the Bonn intersessional, homing in on details that expose the current tension between energy security and climate ambitions is proving to be more difficult than gaining commitments from governments for these pledges in the first place.

Significant work remains to be done in the coming days.

EnergySource

Nov 9, 2022

COP27 readout: Days 1 and 2

By Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center experts are on the ground at COP27. Here’s what they observed over the first two days.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

NOVEMBER 9, 2022 | 10:30 AM WASHINGTON | 6:30 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

The health sector’s role in climate change and ambitions

Global Energy Center Deputy Director Reed Blakemore sat down with John Balbus, acting director of the Office of Climate Change and Heath Equity at the US Department of Health and Human Services to talk about health equity and decarbonizing the health sector.

“Health is often mentioned as a reason to be acting on climate change, but the health community isn’t present,” Balbus explained. But over the last year, he added, “the health sector has mobilized in a way that it has not over the last twenty-six COPs.”

“So what we’re hoping is that by mobilizing the health sector,” Balbus said, the sector can provide health information to national leaders that convinces them to increase the urgency to tackle climate change.

According to Balbus, the health sector is responsible for about 5 percent of global carbon emissions, but no countries focus on the decarbonization of the health sector. He said they should include the health sector in both reducing emissions and adapting to climate change.

Watch more

NOVEMBER 9, 2022 | 7:16 AM WASHINGTON | 3:16 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

The newest advocate of heat resilience: The world’s first global ambassador for heat action

On Wednesday, the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center unveiled a new leader in climate adaptation. At COP27, Felipe Calderón, former president of Mexico, took the reins as the first-ever global ambassador for heat action with a mandate to raise the issue of extreme heat among the world’s leaders to protect people, jobs, and the economy.

Watch the unveiling

Agradezco enormemente a @ArshtRock Resilience Center la invitación para ser Embajador Global para la Acción frente a las “Olas de Calor”. En el marco de la #COP27 en Egipto. Las “olas de Calor” mata muchos más personas en el mundo que el resto de los eventos climáticos extremos. https://t.co/Vxxps9fJy1
— Felipe Calderón (@FelipeCalderon) November 9, 2022

NOVEMBER 9, 2022 | 10:05 AM WASHINGTON | 5:05 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Cash for cooling

As the temperature goes up, it’ll be vital to protect people, communities, and local economies from extreme heat and its effects.

The Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center and partners including the Rockefeller Foundation, JP Morgan Chase & Co, ClimateWorks, Marsh McLennan, and IFC, gathered together at COP27 to launch the Cool Capital Stack, the first investment portfolio dedicated to supporting cooling solutions for the world’s most vulnerable.

Watch top moments from the launch

Cities are taking the lead in implementation, like Freetown’s market shading project. https://t.co/eplPzcyxkT

But it’s hard to scale. “There just is not enough [money] flowing to the Global South,” says @yakisawyerr. “The difference between the rhetoric & the reality is huge.” pic.twitter.com/I2CnmMZMzi
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 9, 2022

NOVEMBER 9, 2022 | 1:15 AM WASHINGTON | 8:15 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

How cities are taking the lead on heat action

On Wednesday, Luis Donaldo Colosio Riojas, mayor of Monterrey, Mexico, recounted watching his city’s temperature rise ten degrees over the last thirty years. “We are ill-prepared for this silent killer and people are facing the consequences,” he said.

The mayor gave his thoughts at an Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center event focused on what cities are doing to take the lead on heat action. Earlier this year, the city of Monterrey appointed a chief heat officer committed to reducing the threat of extreme urban heat for vulnerable people.

Global Chief Heat Officer Eleni Myrivili explained that the way cities are built makes them “death traps” of heat for people. It is important to listen to cities, she added, as they know “where the problem is and what they really need to do to respond to it.”

Watch top moments from the event

“The way cities are built are death traps for people, that’s why it’s important to listen to cities.” We know that people don’t have to die from #ExtremeHeat.

Global Chief Heat Officer @leniomyrivili explains why cities need a seat at the policy table to protect people. #CoP27 pic.twitter.com/QB1NtbeA87
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 9, 2022

Takeaways as negotiations get underway

NOVEMBER 8, 2022 | 6:47 PM WASHINGTON | NOVEMBER 9, 2022 | 1:47 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Dispatch from the World Leaders Summit: The most fundamental plan for adaptation in a decade

LIVE FROM #COP27 Director of Global Policy @Gasteluj gives you an inside look at the newly launched Sharm El Sheikh Adaptation Agenda, with 30 adaptation outcomes to accelerate climate resilience. Watch now #cop27egypt pic.twitter.com/ddo4DP4OkZ
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 8, 2022

NOVEMBER 8, 2022 | 2:45 PM WASHINGTON | 9:45 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Some MENA countries are under-represented at COP27. Here’s what that means for the negotiations.

By Lama El Hatow

The delegates at COP27 face the challenging and daunting dilemma of tackling the world’s climate crisis in the midst of a series of global political and economic crises.

The world is still feeling the brunt of the COVID-19 pandemic with supply chain stalls from China and insufficient resources elsewhere. Add to that Russia’s war in Ukraine has pulled a plug on global gas flows—raising Europe’s worries about staying warm this winter—and has also generated concern about wheat-supply shortages and food insecurity globally.

The compounded effect of all of these issues has led to broadening global inflation. So not only are the least developed countries becoming more vulnerable to the worsening global economic outlook, but even some of the wealthier countries have difficulties staying afloat. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), several countries face their own economic and political turmoil with Syria still at war, Sudan reeling from political instability after a coup last year, and Lebanon facing the worst economic crisis in its history with power outages and bank closures that put the Lebanese people in unforeseen circumstances.

Without ignoring political and economic turbulences like these, how will the delegations at COP27 deal with global crises while also asking the world to commit to more ambitious pledges and enforce the execution of them? The limited representation of many delegations from MENA countries at COP, including some of the most water-scarce countries in the region, raises concerns about the outcomes of the negotiations. Since the conflict-affected MENA countries are very consumed with their local economic and political challenges, the capabilities of these countries to address the climate crisis at COP27 are certainly going to be limited.

While some countries are being represented by delegations made up of several dozens of negotiators and experts, conflict-afflicted countries from the MENA region only have a few delegates to cover an agenda with so many key topics. They’ll likely, therefore, have less negotiating power to tackle and influence the outcomes of the more controversial topics on the agenda, including climate financing and loss and damage.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

NOVEMBER 8, 2022 | 11:17 AM WASHINGTON | 6:17 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Public capital is key to funding solutions to the “energy trilemma”

By Susan Flanagan

It is abundantly clear that achieving net-zero carbon emissions by mid-century is necessary to avoid the worst climate outcomes. However, the path to decarbonizing the energy sector is not “one-size-fits-all” between developed and developing markets. Given the historical tensions between developed economies, which modernized with fossil fuels, and developing economies, now being asked to forgo this route, it is evident that sustainable, long-term global cooperation will require addressing the ”energy trilemma”—the need for the people to have access to sustainable, reliable, and affordable energy.

Sustainability is more urgent for countries hardest hit by climate change and often exposed to greater environmental risks. Reliability remains an elusive goal in many countries still working to bring basic electricity to their citizens in a secure and dependable way. Many of these developing economies also face roadblocks to electricity affordability due to weak government finances and credit, and the corresponding higher cost of capital for infrastructure development.

To drive global decarbonization and increase electrification in developing countries, policymakers and financial institutions must partner with project sponsors to tailor capital solutions that best fit each region and country.

Susan Flanagan is the president and chief executive officer of GE Energy Financial Services. GE is a supporter of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

EnergySource

Nov 8, 2022

Partner perspectives: With COP27 underway, there’s no time to waste—public capital is a key conduit to a just energy transition

By Susan Flanagan

The sheer scale of needed investments to enact the energy transition will require an unprecedented mobilization of capital. Given its unique capabilities, public capital must play a significant part in this effort.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

NOVEMBER 8, 2022 | 3:35 AM WASHINGTON | 10:35 AM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Ensuring both a just energy transition and access to affordable energy

Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz sat down with General Electric’s Roger Martella to talk about ensuring a just energy transition and decarbonization while ensuring access to reliable, affordable, and sustainable power for everyone.

“We want to help countries, particularly in emerging economies achieve these goals by focusing on bespoke solutions for each country. There’s no one-size-fits-all approach here,” Martella said. He explained that while solutions may be different in each country, they’ll all need to have the “same tools in the toolbox”: a combination of renewable energy, gas, and grid.

General Electric is a presenting partner for the Global Energy Center’s Ambitions for All project, which you can read about here.

Analysis as leaders assembled

NOVEMBER 7, 2022 | 1:43 PM WASHINGTON | 8:43 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

What’s happening beyond official negotiations?

Alongside other @AtlanticCouncil colleagues, Arsht-Rock’s Director of Global Policy @Gasteluj set the scene for COP27 and the work that goes on beyond the official negotiations https://t.co/BKdk4GBGs3 @PoliticoRyan pic.twitter.com/y1CMuml9N2
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 7, 2022

NOVEMBER 7, 2022 | 12:36 PM WASHINGTON | 7:36 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

The private sector holds a lot of the cards at COP27

By Lama El Hatow

As COP27 gets underway, various platforms of engagement are taking place.

In the blue zone, countries’ official delegations are coming together to meet and negotiate on the agenda items put forth and agreed upon with the support of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Glasgow, the COP26 host. These agenda items include increasing ambition on pledges for greenhouse gas emission reductions by all countries to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, making progress on climate adaptation and ways to propel it forward, boosting climate finance and pushing developed countries to meet their financing commitments of $100 billion per year, and discussing a mechanism for loss and damage payments. The delegations agreed on Saturday to include the loss and damage fund as part of the agenda; it’s considered a huge win for the Global South that is most vulnerable to and at risk from climate change impacts.

Meanwhile, the green zone is designated for civil-society pavilions, where various ministries from Egypt elsewhere can showcase their work; it is also a culture and arts hub for participants to network and have side events outside the negotiation rooms.

Additionally, there is a third zone this year: The Climate Action Innovation Zone, which has been set up as a private-sector hub for companies and corporations from around the world to showcase their work through exhibitions, side events, and networking sessions. Many of the region’s largest players including Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power and Neom, the United Arab Emirates’ IRENA, and Egypt’s TAQA Arabia are all present on the sidelines of COP27 to discuss technology and innovation that sets the stage for a smoother green transition. Adjacent to the climate innovation zone is the Saudi Green Initiative, which also has its own designated area to showcase its work.

While the world focuses on the blue zone with government pledges and commitments, it appears the private sector holds a lot of the cards in this convening. As UN Climate Change High-Level Champion for COP27, Mahmoud Mohieldin reiterated that nonstate actors need to lead the way with regard to climate finance. It appears the role of the private sector and the deals happening on the outskirts of the COP may help set the stage for advancement in climate technology, innovation, and even financing.

—Lama El Hatow is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative.

NOVEMBER 7, 2022 | 11:23 AM WASHINGTON | 6:23 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Dispatch from the Singapore Pavilion: How to build cities resilient to heat

Kurt Shickman, director of Extreme Heat Initiatives at our Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, shared his readout from an event with the Mayor of Monterrey, Mexico, Luis Donaldo Colosio and Athens Chief Heat Officer Eleni Myrivili about the best solutions for managing extreme heat in cities.

Watch more

Live from #COP27 ! @ArshtRock‘s Global #ChiefHeatOfficer @LenioMyrivili & City Champion for Heat Action Mayor @colosioriojas joined @RCitiesNetwork to share climate resilience lessons from cities. Our Director for Extreme Heat @KurtShickman shares his key takeaways. Watch now pic.twitter.com/XPw0lsEtvT
— Arsht-Rock Resilience Center (@ArshtRock) November 7, 2022

Gearing up for COP27

NOVEMBER 5, 2022 | 3:13 PM WASHINGTON | 10:13 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

How a lack of energy security will impact the speed and impact of the energy transition

As today’s energy crisis intensifies, Global Energy Center Senior Director Landon Derentz points out that a lack of energy security will slow the energy transition and spell trouble for ensuring affordable energy is accessible for all. “The world is short energy,” he writes, “now and over the next decade.” That calls for investment across the board—in zero-carbon energy sources and also oil and gas, he argues.

Read the thread

Policymakers must accept the path to climate progress starts with inclusivity. Unlike in prior decades, the bulwark of industry now accepts that the energy transition is real. They are engineers, put them to work. 8/x
— Landon Derentz (@Landon_Derentz) November 5, 2022

NOVEMBER 4, 2022 | 3:30 PM WASHINGTON | 10:30 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

The new partnership financing a just energy transition in emerging economies

By Christopher Cassidy, Rainer Quitzow, and Maia Sparkman

As the global community convenes for COP27, Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) are poised to play an expanded role in financing the energy transitions of emerging economies. Conceived as multi-donor agreements to accelerate the phase-out of coal-fired power plants, JETPs first gained attention at COP26 with the announcement of the Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa, an $8.5-billion venture between the governments of South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union. Since then, several other countries have expressed interest in their own JETPs, presenting an opportunity to drastically reduce global coal emissions. Nonetheless, while JETPs may represent an avenue for increased climate engagement with high-emitting emerging economies, they also face several key challenges moving forward.

Despite those challenges, JETPs bear the potential to represent a turning point in the climate finance agenda. By combining funding from several major Group of Seven (G7) donor countries, they not only offer substantial financial support to partner countries, but they also send an important political signal. To be sure, the sums under discussion only represent a fraction of the capital needed to reach the needed scale of investment to place these countries on a pathway that is compatible with the 1.5 degree Celsius target. Nevertheless, the hope is that they can lend additional momentum to ongoing reform efforts.

EnergySource

Nov 4, 2022

Just Energy Transition Partnerships: Will COP27 deliver for emerging economies?

By Christopher Cassidy, Rainer Quitzow, and Maia Sparkman

The JETP model is poised to deliver results in South Africa. Now, at COP27 and beyond, the true test will be translating the model to other country contexts.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

NOVEMBER 4, 2022 | 9:30 AM WASHINGTON | 4:30 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

The West must rethink its development strategy to help electrify the African continent

By William Tobin and Maia Sparkman

Electricity access in Africa is in a dire state, and progress is being reversed. Outside of North Africa, around half of the population is electrified, and the electrification rate has decreased by 4 percent since 2019.

This problem is self-perpetuating. When energy infrastructure is weak, there is less signal to invest as individual projects are less viable and are deemed riskier, particularly by the private sector, which has historically provided around 10 percent of infrastructure funding across the continent. Infrastructure, in this sense, should be expanded beyond the state of electricity grids or gas pipelines to include public services such as trained utility workers, water resources, public safety and security forces, and much more.

It is becoming clearer that the paradigm of “aid,” which has underpinned Western countries’ development strategies in the African continent, is increasingly insufficient. Providing aid alone to African nations will not provide the tools and enablers of self-sustaining, endogenous growth. For that, the continent needs investment, not just aid.

EnergySource

Nov 4, 2022

To meet energy security and climate goals, Africa needs investment in infrastructure

By William Tobin, Maia Sparkman

To this point, Western engagement in Africa has primarily taken the form of aid. For the continent to achieve widespread electrification and form the foundation for robust economic growth, that engagement will need to morph into investment and partnership.

Africa Energy & Environment

NOVEMBER 3, 2022 | 9:00 AM WASHINGTON | 4:00 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

What leaders at COP27 should take away from the World Energy Outlook

By Emily Burlinghaus

The International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook (WEO), released last week, is historic in its first-ever presentation of a scenario where fossil fuels peak or plateau based on prevailing policy settings. But despite the cause to celebrate, the global transition to net-zero carbon emissions remains precarious. Developing countries are most vulnerable to the effects of both climate change and capital and resource restrictions. Meanwhile, global conflict and supply chain disruptions threaten national efforts to ensure food security, meet energy demand, and deploy resilience and adaptation measures. The WEO serves as a roadmap for where and how countries can allocate money at COP27 to maximize impact and ensure that no country is left behind.

EnergySource

Nov 3, 2022

The IEA World Energy Outlook 2022 highlights climate finance needs ahead of COP27

By Emily Burlinghaus

The new IEA World Energy Outlook 2022 should be used as a roadmap at COP27 for the allocation of climate-oriented resources. Doing so would better enable developing nations to ride the wave of interest in clean technologies amid the global energy crisis and share in the benefits of the transition.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

NOVEMBER 1, 2022 | 10:04 AM WASHINGTON | 5:04 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

How Europe can reclaim international climate leadership at COP27

By Michał Kurtyka and Paddy Ryan

COP27 will be uncomfortable for Europe. The continent’s energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended the lofty objectives set at COP26. In Glasgow, the European Investment Bank and over a dozen European states pledged to cease financing fossil fuel projects abroad. Now, Europe is scouring the globe for new gas supply, pricing out poorer nations while maintaining opposition towards their development of reserves for domestic use. Europeans stand accused of climate hypocrisy, charges likely to be echoed at a COP notable for taking place in Africa.

Europe needs gas, and will for some time. The continent must reconcile short-term efforts to source new imports with long-term climate ambitions. Through more constructive gas diplomacy with the developing world and by accelerating domestic decarbonization, Europe can begin to repair its damaged climate credibility in Sharm el Sheikh. Doing so, Europe can reclaim international climate leadership by advancing low-carbon, energy-secure growth with partners in Africa and the developing world.

EnergySource

Nov 1, 2022

How Europe can salvage its climate credibility at COP27

By Michał Kurtyka and Paddy Ryan

Europe’s recent energy policies have begotten accusations of climate hypocrisy, as the continent blocks access to financing for gas projects in developing countries yet scours those countries for gas supplies for its own use. At COP27, Europe can—and should—responsibly reconcile those contradictions.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

NOVEMBER 1, 2022 | 4:00 PM WASHINGTON | 11:00 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Will the West’s competition with China get in the way of a clean-energy future?

By Joseph Webster and William Tobin

China uneasily straddles both sides of the energy transition. On the one hand, China is indisputably a world leader in numerous clean energy technologies, including electric vehicles, renewable generation, and supply chains. On the other hand, it is also the world’s largest carbon emitter and coal producer, and is constructing over half of the world’s new coal-powered electricity plants. With Western-China tensions rising and Beijing increasingly focused on energy security, there is a shrinking scope for climate cooperation. Perversely, however, US-China political competition could deliver climate benefits, as both sides will face pressure to provide clean energy leadership at COP27 and beyond.

At COP27, Western leaders will need to grapple with the emerging reality that two competing climate camps may be forming, one led by the West and another by China.

Not only will this dynamic unfold as a competition between economies in China and the West, but as a paradigm of global engagement and investment on climate mitigation and adaptation, particularly with respect to engagement with the developing world. For instance, in Africa, China’s trade volumes exceeded the United States’ by a factor of four. Moreover, China has not shied away from financing fossil fuel projects that rank high on the priority list of less developed countries with limited energy access. This has been welcomed by many African nations, as 43 percent of all people on the continent do not have access to modern energy services.

As the developing and developed world seek to resolve key issues on the agenda at COP27 such as loss and damages, closing the climate finance gap, and financing for natural gas projects in Africa, Western leaders will need to keep in mind that competition with China is likely to become a more prominent feature of climate negotiations.

EnergySource

Nov 1, 2022

China’s energy security realities and COP27 ambitions

By Joseph Webster, William Tobin

China will enter COP27 firmly playing both sides of the energy transition. The country is a global leader in clean technologies, but it is also pouring money into new coal plants and production. Beijing may have to choose between its climate aspirations and its coal realities to compete successfully with the West.

China Energy & Environment

OCTOBER 13, 2022 | 8:28 AM WASHINGTON | 3:28 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

Cairo’s next steps forward on climate adaptation and human rights at COP27

By Shahira Amin

Skeptics are questioning Egypt’s leadership of COP27, citing human rights concerns and unideal environmental policies. Others are doubtful about the choice of Sharm el Sheikh as the host city. They argue that the holiday resort may not be the most suitable venue for a global conference of this magnitude and scale, given the logistical, organizational, and managerial challenges of hosting such a gathering.

Nevertheless, the opportunity to host COP27 has incentivized Cairo to take steps forward in regard to climate adaptation and human rights, even if a lot more needs to be done to show that authorities are serious about political and environmental reforms. Meanwhile, continued financial and moral support from the United States and other development partners—and further scrutiny of human rights violations committed—would ensure there’s no backtracking on the country’s progress in the past year.

Cairo needs to keep the momentum going and show that it is actually committed to continuing the progress made so far. To do this, it needs to speed up its green transition, taking steady and concrete steps to lower its emissions and shift towards renewables. Moreover, Cairo needs to free all political detainees, many of whom are imprisoned for nothing more than exercising their right to free speech and free expression. By doing so, it can expect to reap the rewards of its serious efforts: greater support from the international community and prosperity and stability for Egypt and all Egyptians.

MENASource

Oct 13, 2022

Egypt has made some progress on human rights and the environment in preparation for COP27. But there’s still more to be done.

By Shahira Amin

Skeptics are questioning Egypt’s leadership of the climate talks, citing human rights concerns and unideal environmental policies.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

SEPTEMBER 22, 2022 | 8:28 AM WASHINGTON | 3:28 PM SHARM EL SHEIKH

What Egypt’s COP presidency means for how this conference may play out

By Lama El Hatow

Egypt has a huge role to play during its presidency of COP27, as all eyes will be geared towards how the country can lead by example. To put things in perspective, with 1.3 percent of the world’s population, Egypt accounts for only 0.6 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and ranks twenty-eighth on the global list of polluters. This number appears to be relatively small from a global perspective. Regionally, however, Egypt contributes 31 percent of the overall GHG emissions from North Africa and 13 percent of the overall GHG emissions from the entire African continent. Thus, Egypt has a great responsibility to establish a pathway towards a green energy transition.

This year, Egypt’s presidency for COP27 is very important as a middle-income, African, and Middle Eastern country hosting this event. Egypt may, therefore, be able to influence the agenda items and bring more focus to Africa’s increasing needs for adaptation and mitigation financing.

There are four main items at the top of the agenda: climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage, and increased ambition. Egypt has a significant role to play in all of them.

MENASource

Sep 22, 2022

Egypt is hosting COP27. What are the expectations?

By Lama El Hatow

As the host country for the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference, Egypt has a huge role to play during its presidency of the event, as all eyes will be geared towards how the country can lead by example.

Energy & Environment Middle East

The post Live updates from COP27 as leaders battle climate change amid global crises appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Germany steps up in the Western Balkans. Will the EU follow its lead?

Damir Marusic, Maja Piscevic, Jörn Fleck — Thu, 03 Nov 2022 21:41:49 +0000

On Thursday, the prime ministers of the six Western Balkan countries convened in Berlin to sign three important agreements—on mutual recognition of ID cards, university diplomas, and professional qualifications—as part of a revitalized “Berlin Process.” The signing is a meaningful step in rebuilding momentum for regional economic cooperation and integration, and it is a signal that European Union (EU) countries are once again focusing on the Balkans in the shadow of Russia’s ruinous invasion of Ukraine. That attention is paying dividends. And it couldn’t come at a more important time.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has promised to put the EU enlargement process back on track, vowing to make the Western Balkans’ future a foreign-policy priority for his government. “The stability and prosperity of your region cannot be detached from the stability and prosperity of Europe as a whole,” Scholz said at the summit.

Enlargement hit a roadblock in 2019, when France blocked opening negotiations for Albania and North Macedonia, with President Emmanuel Macron demanding reform of the enlargement process before considering new members. This occurred just after North Macedonia had settled its long-running name dispute with Greece, expecting to have these compromises unlock its EU path. As soon as new EU procedures were drawn up and adopted and Macron dropped his objections, Bulgaria blocked the opening of North Macedonia’s candidacy for arcane reasons related to language and history—only to relent this past May when France finally brokered a compromise. Thursday’s summit was a serious attempt to build on this breakthrough.

The EU enlargement agenda needs all the help it can get. Though there has been a lot written about how the EU is stepping up to the moment by granting Ukraine and Moldova candidate status in the shadow of Russia’s aggression, the reality is much less sunny. Many countries in the EU have long been committed to slow-rolling the process. And in private conversations with political and civil-society leaders across Europe this year, we have heard concerns voiced about how little has really changed. Indeed, there is a sense that with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU is making promises it has no ability to keep.

The Western Balkans countries’ unmet promise of EU membership was first extended at Thessaloniki in 2003. While it’s true that necessary democratic reforms, including on media freedoms and the rule of law, have stalled across the region, it’s also true that EU member states have shown a real political hesitancy on enlargement—and people on the ground in the Balkans can feel it. “They pretend that they want to let us in, and we pretend to reform,” is a frequent refrain from dispirited activists across the region. Many enlargement advocates across the EU fret that a similar mistake was made earlier this year in raising unrealistic hopes in Kyiv and Chișinău.

Berlin’s lead role

In this context, renewed German engagement in the Western Balkans is to be applauded and welcomed. Given that actual accession is still many years away even in the most optimistic scenarios, Scholz has focused his energies on reviving efforts at establishing a Common Regional Market (CRM) to implement the “four freedoms”—the freedom of movement for goods, capital, services, and people—across the region’s economies, firmly based on EU standards. Doing so will go a long way toward preparing the region for full membership, the thinking goes. It will also provide tangible benefits to the region’s citizens by creating a more attractive destination for Western capital, especially as global supply chains struggle to adapt to political imperatives for near- and friend-shoring. The agreements signed this week represent a meaningful step in re-establishing the initiative, which had foundered over disputes between Serbia and Kosovo at a Berlin Process summit in Sofia in 2020.

The Berlin Process was launched by then German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014 at a time when hopes for enlargement had first started to fade. It has been criticized for talking big but delivering little. Early efforts at establishing the CRM yielded an agreement guaranteeing free cellular roaming across the region—and little else. Transformative infrastructure investments, an important plank of the initiative, failed to meaningfully materialize and suffered from delays in matching funds to projects.

But the Berlin Process’s annual summit schedule did generate a previously scarce commodity: a shared political consciousness and familiarity among the region’s leaders. When tensions and disputes halted progress on CRM in Sofia (with Kosovo refusing to sign agreements that allow Serbia to persist in not recognizing its statehood) three of the region’s six countries—Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania—forged ahead on realizing the four freedoms among themselves.

In launching the Open Balkan initiative last year, the three have made progress in signing several agreements. Implementation of measures that would allow citizens the freedom to work in any of the three participating countries is currently held up in North Macedonia’s parliament. But expedited customs “green lanes” for the transportation of goods among the three have been opened, and tourism and cultural exchange has increased. The thaw between Serbia and Albania has been most pronounced, but relations between Serbia and North Macedonia have also markedly warmed.

A cottage industry sprung up among think tanks and civil society, with people arguing over whether Open Balkan represented a dangerous alternative to European-mediated efforts such as the Berlin Process, or whether it was a healthy sign that the region was maturing and taking initiative on its own. In their efforts to reboot the Berlin Process, the Germans have admirably steered clear of this ultimately academic debate. They have renewed their efforts at using the institutional weight of the EU to make progress with all six countries. If a subset of the countries gets ahead of the pack on their own initiative, all the better—as long as their integration efforts are fully in line with European standards.

Politics at the fore

In our conversations in Berlin this autumn, we were told that the big lesson learned from previous rounds has been the importance of political engagement, especially on the European side. No longer can progress on European integration be treated as a dry technocratic problem, a question of sequencing reforms in just the right way. Political commitment from the region’s leaders will be met, and tested, by reciprocal political goodwill at the highest levels on the European side. Getting things done will depend on both sides doing their part. The personal engagement by Scholz, both in the run-up and at the summit, is a testament to this new approach.

And that level of engagement will be necessary for tackling issues on the horizon. The coming winter’s privations will likely strain the impoverished region’s economies. EU leaders, aware of how poorly the Balkans were integrated into the continent’s COVID-19 response (and the residual bitterness that experience has engendered), are keen not to repeat the mistake. Immediate food and energy needs were discussed in Berlin this week, as were ambitious plans for financing the region’s transition to a more sustainable, greener energy mix.

The agreements signed this week are a long-overdue and important step in the right direction. Follow-through will be very important. The next Berlin Process summit will be held in Tirana, and the 2024 edition in Vienna. And progress will not just be measured in how well the region is integrating, but also on resolving outstanding disputes, especially between Serbia and Kosovo. “It is high time to overcome regional conflicts that have continued for far too long—conflicts that divide you and hold your countries back on your European path,” Scholz said on Thursday. Serbia’s reluctance to fully align itself with the EU’s common foreign policy on Russia is another bone of contention. Expect political pressure to pile on Belgrade even as Europe opens its coffers to help the region through a difficult time.

The most hopeful sign is that Europe seems to have embraced political engagement. The Berlin Process will succeed if it is used as a problem-solving and action-forcing tool in the region. The changes must be seen to be happening, not just felt after the fact. Visible summitry is an important component of success, but it alone is not a magic formula. Much work remains to be done.

Damir Marusic is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center who works on the Council’s Balkans Forward Initiative.

Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center and representative of the Council in the Western Balkans.

Jörn Fleck is the acting director of the Europe Center.

The post Germany steps up in the Western Balkans. Will the EU follow its lead? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cohen in The Hill: How to expel Russia from the UN

Atlantic Council — Thu, 03 Nov 2022 14:49:00 +0000

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Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 01 Nov 2022 19:09:17 +0000

For centuries, Russia has seen itself as one of the world’s great powers. This superpower status was somewhat sullied by the humiliations of the 1991 Soviet collapse, but post-Soviet Russia has worked hard under Vladimir Putin to reclaim its position among the leading nations on the global stage. During the first two decades of his reign, Putin won plaudits for rebuilding Russia’s military and economic might, and was credited with returning the country to the top table of international affairs. However, his disastrous invasion of Ukraine has now done much to reverse this progress by exposing the deep dysfunction and hollow boasts that lie behind the facade of Russia’s superpower pretensions.

Russia’s weakness has not come as a total surprise. Ever since the fall of the USSR, Western commentators have noted the debilitating impact of corruption at every level of the modern Russian state. In recent decades, some have branded the Putin regime a “mafia state,” where the boundaries between the authorities and organized crime are blurred.

Corruption has flourished under Putin amid a climate of stagnation inherited from the late Soviet era. Unlike Ukraine, post-Soviet Russia has never undergone de-communization or acknowledged the need to reject the Soviet legacy. Instead, Putin has rehabilitated the Soviet era and placed the Red Army’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany at the heart of his vision for a modern Russian national identity. Efforts to honor the memory of Stalin’s victims have been silenced and attempts to acknowledge the crimes of the USSR drowned out by a victory cult that has elevated the Soviet World War II experience to the level of religious cult and re-established Josef Stalin as a national hero. In 2020, Putin condemned Russians to a further sixteen years of stagnation when he staged a referendum on constitutional reforms that made it possible to extend his reign until 2036.

From politics to the economy, the consequences of widespread corruption and stagnation can be seen throughout Russian society. Crucially, this negative impact is also highly visible in the invasion of Ukraine. Whereas Ukrainian troops have repeatedly demonstrated the kind of initiative and leadership that one would expect from a society shaped by two post-Soviet pro-democracy revolutions, the Russian military remains hamstrung by a deeply hierarchical system and rigid chain of command.

On the eve of this year’s invasion, the Russian military was widely touted as the world’s number two army, but such claims have been brutally debunked by subsequent events in Ukraine. Putin’s army has been exposed in almost every department, from poor leadership and outdated tactics to equally out-of-date equipment. Chronic corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense has hampered military logistics, with soldiers in many instances receiving kit dating from the 1970s or earlier. It has also become painfully obvious that many of the vehicles and weapons listed as part of the vast Russian arsenal exist on paper only. With the war now in its ninth month, chronic supply problems mean that Russia is now increasingly reliant on Iran for drones that it is unable to produce itself.

These shortcomings have highlighted the cosmetic nature of the much-vaunted military reforms carried out by Russia over the past two decades. In reality, the Russian army under Putin remains largely a Soviet relic with a distinctively Soviet political culture that allows Russian commanders to treat soldiers with contempt. This lack of consideration for troops has been particularly evident in the treatment of recently mobilized Russians, many of whom have been sent to the front in Ukraine with minimal training and inadequate equipment.

The human price of Russia’s military failures in Ukraine has been exceptionally high. An estimated 70,000 Russian soldiers have been killed during the first eight months of the invasion, according to the latest Ukrainian Ministry of Defense data. While this figure is disputed, even the most conservative independent analysis indicates tens of thousands of Russian casualties. This makes the invasion of Ukraine far deadlier than the nine-year Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, which resulted in the loss of 15,000 Soviet troops and has been widely cited as a contributing factor in the collapse of the USSR.

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The invasion of Ukraine has also revealed other areas where today’s Russia falls well short of superpower status. Unlike China and other rising powers, Russia has never diversified or modernized its economy. Instead, the country’s ruling elites have prioritized the accumulation of staggering personal fortunes. As a result, today’s Russia remains heavily dependent on commodities exports and has no technological equivalent of China’s Huawei or South Korea’s Samsung. With sanctions imposed in response to the invasion of Ukraine restricting access to a range of cutting-edge tech, Russia has struggled to produce sophisticated weapons and has in some instances reportedly resorted to cannibalizing elements of household appliances.

Russia’s excessive economic reliance on the export of energy and arms now looks to have been even more of a strategic blunder as international demand plummets due to the invasion of Ukraine. The EU has weaned itself off Russian gas earlier than expected and will enter 2023 with a high degree of independence from the Kremlin’s energy blackmail. With European customers turning away from Russian energy, Moscow will struggle to find sufficient alternative buyers for gas in the coming year as Russia has not invested in LNG.

Meanwhile, Russia’s defense industry also faces bleak prospects. The often abysmal performance of the Russian military in Ukraine has been a PR disaster for Russian arms exporters, who must now explain why their products are so technologically inferior. Numerous traditional clients have already cancelled weapons contracts. More are expected to follow suit.

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Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, Russia has become something of an international pariah. The entire Western world has condemned Moscow’s actions while even traditional allies such as China and India have offered muted criticism. Only a handful of fellow pariahs such as Syria, North Korea, and Nicaragua have been prepared to stand with Russia and back Moscow at the United Nations. In the former Soviet region, only Belarus has voted with Russia at the UN.

This international isolation has highlighted the fundamental weakness of Russia’s geopolitical position and the absence of any meaningful message behind Moscow’s anti-Western posturing. Putin’s attempts to position Russia as a champion of traditional values have failed to resonate. In reality, abortion, divorce, suicide, and alcoholism rates are all significantly higher in Russia than in most European countries. Russians have a far shorter life expectancy and are poorer on average than their European neighbors. This poverty is reflected in the mass plundering of household goods from Ukrainian homes, with Russian soldiers stealing everything from washing machines to used underwear.

The war has also revealed the limitations of Russian soft power, with Western audiences in particular overwhelmingly rejecting Russian attempts to justify the invasion. Even in regions with strong historic links to Russia such as the the South Caucasus and Central Asia, audiences have treated Kremlin narratives with deep distrust.

Despite massive investment in media operations, the invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the limitations of Kremlin disinformation. In the West, Moscow has largely been preaching to the converted and has failed to move beyond a minority audience driven primarily by anti-Americanism and conspiratorial thinking. The picture is similar in the political sphere. As the recent election of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has shown, Russian support for right-wing populists and nationalists has not led to any major breakthroughs in European politics.

The war in Ukraine has ruthlessly revealed Putin’s Russia as a Potemkin Great Power. Like the Potemkin villages erected along the banks of Ukraine’s Dnipro River in the late eighteenth century to impress visiting Russian Empress Katherine the Great, Russia’s much-hyped revival under Putin is in fact a masterly facade designed to disguise a far less impressive reality. This illusion has now been shattered by the harsh realities of Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II.

Russia is heading toward an historic defeat in Ukraine that will have profound ramifications for the way Russians view their state and themselves. Defeat in Ukraine will undermine the imperial identity that defines Putin’s Russia. It will force the Russian public to belatedly confront decades of nationalistic myth-making by their own rapacious elites. It is still far too early to predict what kind of Russia will emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Ukraine invasion, but it already looks unlikely that anyone will continue to view the country as one of the world’s superpowers.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming book “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

The global infrastructure financing gap: Where sovereign wealth funds and pension funds can play a role

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Naomi Aladekoba — Mon, 31 Oct 2022 20:22:39 +0000

The global infrastructure financing gap is estimated to be around $15 trillion by 2040. To provide basic infrastructure for all people over the course of the next two decades, every year the world would need to spend just under $1 trillion more than the previous year in the infrastructure sector.

Most of this spending must happen in low-income economies. Nearly eight hundred million people in the world do not have access to electricity and basic drinking water services. Around 1.8 billion people in the world are not using basic sanitation services. The vast majority of these people reside in low-income economies, including the Sub-Saharan African and South Asian regions. Moreover, around 3.2 billion people around the world do not use the internet and only sixteen out of one hundred people have broadband subscriptions. As shown in figure 1, in low-income countries, only 21 percent of people have access to the internet, and only one in two hundred have broadband. Figure 1 can be explored for more detailed statistics on various forms of basic infrastructure gaps, such as in access to electricity, drinking water, sanitation, internet, and broadband.

From 2015 to 2020 assets under management (AUM) for sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and private pension funds grew from $11 trillion to $15 trillion. As of the end of 2020, total global pension assets (public and private) exceeded $56 trillion, almost double the amount in 2010. Having more than $65 trillion in assets (see figure 2 and figure 3), institutional investors (such as SWFs and pension funds) are uniquely positioned to bridge low-income economies’ infrastructure financing gap in the coming decades. This is mainly because the investment horizons of institutional investors are often long-term with low but secure return expectations, which are characteristic of large-scale infrastructure projects. As shown in figure 2, Asia and the Middle East are home to some of the largest SWFs in the world, accounting for 40 percent and 34 percent of world’s total SWF assets, respectively. Available data suggests that cross-border investments of SWFs from these regions mainly target the financial and real estate sectors of advanced economies, accounting for around 40 percent of all their cross-border transactions.

As seen in figure 3, advanced economies are home to the world’s largest pension funds and retirement saving accounts. The United States accounts for around two-thirds of AUM in this industry. While highly liquid and low-risk assets such as bonds and equities have traditionally been the two main asset classes invested by pension funds and retirement saving accounts, they are slowly starting to invest in less liquid asset classes with longer return time-horizons, such as infrastructure and real estate. This could be a game-changer in filling the global infrastructure financing gap. However, despite their growing importance in the global economy and financial markets, institutional investors such as SWFs and pension funds account for less than 1 percent of private participation in infrastructure in developing economies, largely due to risks of long-terms investments in these countries.

It has long been clear that traditional mechanisms of public financing of infrastructure projects are not sufficient to meet the growing demand for infrastructure. This calls for new and innovative mechanisms to bring in investments from institutional investors and the private sector. To make this possible, infrastructure needs to be defined as an asset class that can readily be invested in by private and public entities alike. The establishment of Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF) by the World Bank is an effort in this regard. Such efforts have also been complemented by increasing activity in public-private partnerships. For example, in 2012, the World Pension Council and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development first convened a meeting focusing on promoting pension funds’ exposure to long-term assets such as infrastructure investment.

The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) are uniquely positioned to encourage investment in developing countries’ infrastructure through providing various guarantee and insurance mechanisms, thereby reducing risk for private investors. In other words, BWI’s involvement in developing economies’ infrastructure projects can crowd-in institutional and private investors by reducing risks and increasing trust and transparency in such projects. While the establishment of the GIF by the World Bank is an important step forward, the following two reports identify other areas where the World Bank and International Monetary Fund could engage with private capital, non-state, and quasi-state actors (such as SWFs and pension funds) to bridge the infrastructure financing gap over the next few decades: Modernizing the Bretton Woods Institutions for the twenty-first century and Changing Bretton Woods Institutions: How non-state and quasi-state actors can help drive the global development agenda.

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou is a macroeconomist with the GeoEconomics Center and leads the Atlantic Council’s Bretton Woods 2.0 Project. He is also an assistant professor of economics at American University in Washington DC. @AMohseniC

Naomi Aladekoba is a consultant with the GeoEconomics Center focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese foreign policy, and international development. @NAladekoba

Econographics Apr 21, 2022

The North-South divide is growing. Can a new Bretton Woods help?

By Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou

The growing divide is under the scanner as US Treasury Secretary Yellen and Colombian Finance Minister Restrepo both voiced a need to modernize the institutions.

Americas China

Econographics Apr 11, 2022

Democratic challenges at Bretton Woods Institutions

By Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou

Voting quotas at Bretton Woods Institutions continue reflecting the 1944 power structure, despite significant changes to the global economy.

Africa Americas

Econographics Apr 11, 2022

“Inequality starts at the top”: Voting reforms in Bretton Woods Institutions

By Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou

Full democratization of BWIs is not realistic. A more pragmatic approach would work towards a “double majority” system.

Africa Americas

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post The global infrastructure financing gap: Where sovereign wealth funds and pension funds can play a role appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How to respond if Putin goes nuclear? Here are the economic and political options.

Brian O’Toole, Daniel Fried — Thu, 20 Oct 2022 20:59:38 +0000

Losing on the battlefield, Russian President Vladimir Putin has resorted to implied threats of nuclear weapons use in his war of choice in Ukraine. The United States, Group of Seven (G7) nations, NATO, and the European Union (EU) have responded to his brinksmanship by reaffirming support for Ukraine and its territorial integrity.

Additionally, the United States and others have sent public (and, reportedly, private) messages on the severe consequences Russia will face if it indeed uses any type of nuclear weapon against Ukraine. Although unlikely, the chances of Russian use of nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine are not negligible. After all, Putin surprised many (though not the US government) when he launched his February 24 offensive against Ukraine.

Laying out for the Russians the consequences of any nuclear use is a good idea. Those conversations must necessarily focus on military options as the most effective deterrent, but should not end with them. Even though Putin has eschewed traditional rational actor behavior in the political and economic sphere with his unprovoked and gruesome invasion of Ukraine, the West should still threaten severe political and economic steps in response to any Russian nuclear use. All these measures should be prepared for rapid application by the G7 and coordinated to at least some extent with other key countries, including China. Russia’s use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine would demand a fast, near-immediate response by a broad coalition of concerned states beyond just the current Western-aligned nations.

Impose a full economic, financial, and trade embargo. Turning Russia into Iran or North Korea, economically, should be the moral and logical starting point for any Russian use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. The G7 and EU countries have imposed extraordinary sanctions thus far over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but in large part, they have also been measured in their steps to avoid negative spillover to the global economy. Any nuclear weapon use by Putin in Ukraine must eviscerate any thoughts of a measured escalatory ladder. Morally, it would place Russia’s behavior far beyond the atrocities committed by similarly embargoed nations such as Iran, Syria—and even North Korea. Logically, it would also be incongruous for the West to hope that Russia under Putin can be a reliable participant in an international economic order that relies on mutually agreed-upon rules.

There may need to be some allowances for an extended wind-down of certain trade sectors (energy and perhaps some specified metals) and longer exemptions for continued food-related and medical trade, including Russian exports of grain and fertilizer. There would need to be carve-outs for humanitarian contingencies and measures to support the Russian people, such as authorizing communications apps and devices that allow beleaguered Russian dissidents and human-rights activists to communicate with the outside world. However, the baseline assumption for the day after Russian use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine should be that of a complete embargo: All Russian companies would be considered under full blocking sanctions with exceptions available. The overseas property of Russian oligarchs or Russian state companies should be made subject to nationalization.

Enforcement would include broad use of secondary sanctions against any foreign persons or nations, China included, that violate such sanctions. This would include the rapid imposition of sanctions on any bank, insurance company, logistics provider, or other financial or non-financial entity trading with Russia or facilitating prohibited trade. Given Russia’s use of practices to hide investments and their ownership, the United States, EU, United Kingdom, and G7 countries should consider regulatory (preferably) or legislative action forcing transparency and disclosure of any Russian investment or other significant ownership whether in a company, real estate, art, or financial instruments. The Russian state is familiar with money laundering and would almost certainly become more akin to a criminal enterprise, like North Korea, than a normal government, if it is placed under broad economic sanctions.

Sanctions on this level will have a significant, negative impact on the global economy. However, it is unlikely that they would be much more economically destabilizing than the use of a nuclear weapon on European soil. Western nations must make clear to Putin and his inner circle that they are ready to bear the economic consequences.

Seize Russian state assets. Within days of Putin’s February 24 attack on Ukraine, G7 countries locked down over three hundred billion dollars of Russian foreign-exchange reserves held in their countries. That effective freeze does not, however, allow the use of those funds for any purpose. We have noted elsewhere that there is widespread desire to make use of those funds for Ukraine’s reconstruction, given both Russia’s responsibility for the war and the problem of asking the taxpayers of G7 countries to pay to rebuild Ukraine while sitting on large amounts of Russian state funds.

There are enormous legal complications in doing so, however. Russian nuclear use would make taking those assets for use in Ukraine, including post-nuclear attack reconstruction, an immediate objective. Arguments over precedent should and probably would give way to a categoric imperative of acting against nuclear weapons use.

Remove Russia from international organizations. Although Russia was kicked out of the G8—thus making it the G7—back in 2014, it remains party to a number of international organizations. Should Russia use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, its participation in other international organizations should be reviewed. The first place to begin curtailing Moscow’s participation should be in economically focused organizations, including the Group of Twenty (G20) and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and perhaps even the World Trade Organization. Expelling or curtailing membership in any of these bodies would be unprecedented and, interestingly, not explicitly in violation of their existing bylaws. Therefore, expelling Russia would entail a complex political and bureaucratic undertaking, and require substantial support of the governing members of each institution; the IMF would require at least 85 percent of voting members to agree to expel Russia, for instance. Political support for such a drastic action may be more forthcoming following a Russian nuclear strike.

There may be good arguments for keeping Russia engaged in international political organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, as venues for potentially valuable diplomacy with the Kremlin even after nuclear weapons use. However, Russia’s membership even in those groups should be reviewed and reconsidered in light of such a dramatic escalation.

Now is the time to consider and prepare such severe responses, and to coordinate them ahead of time within existing G7 and transatlantic forums. There should be no illusions about the lengths to which Putin will go in Ukraine.

The West’s planned responses need not be made public but could usefully be communicated both to the Russian government and to other strategically important nations that stayed relatively neutral in the current conflict, such as China, India, Turkey, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia.

But this planning shouldn’t preclude the United States and its allies from responding to the horrors Putin is inflicting right now with conventional weapons. They should prepare for the worst while continuing to intensify current efforts across the board—military, economic, and political—to constrain Russia and help Ukraine defend itself and prevail.

Brian O’Toole is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He is a former senior adviser to the director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the US Department of the Treasury. Follow him on Twitter @brianoftoole.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was the coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration, assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia during the Bush administration, and senior director at the National Security Council for the Clinton and Bush administrations. He also served as ambassador to Poland during the Clinton administration. Follow him on Twitter @AmbDanFried.

The post How to respond if Putin goes nuclear? Here are the economic and political options. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

AC Selects: Addressing Jordan and Egypt’s economic challenges and China’s unprecedented third term presidency

rcasberg — Mon, 17 Oct 2022 19:05:36 +0000

Last week, Jordan’s Minister of Finance, Mohamad Al-Ississ and Egypt’s Minister of Planning and Economic Development, Hala H. Elsaid sat down with the EmpowerME initiative to discuss challenges and potential areas of growth for their economic and financial sectors. The GeoEconomics Center and Global China hub hosted two panels of experts to examine the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and how Xi Jinping’s third term will impact China and the rest of the world.

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A conversation with the Finance Minister of Jordan H.E. Mohamad Al-Ississ

empowerME and GeoEconomics Center host a virtual conversation with Finance Minister H.E. Mohamad Al Issis on Jordan’s economy and discuss the potential areas of growth within its finance sector.

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Online Event Wed, October 12, 2022 • 10:30 am ET

A conversation with the Planning and Economic Development Minister of Egypt H.E. Hala H. Elsaid

H.E. Hala H. Elsaid discusses the opportunities and challenges faced by the Egyptian economy in 2023 and beyond.

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Online Event Fri, October 14, 2022 • 11:00 am ET

What Xi Jinping’s third term means for the world

What does Xi Jinping’s third term mean for China’s continued development as a global power and its relationships with the United States and the rest of the world?

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Online Event Tue, October 11, 2022 • 9:30 am ET

Troubling trends: China Pathfinder 2022 launch

The launch of the GeoEcon Center’s flagship China Pathfinder 2022 update featuring Yao Yang, Sofia Horta e Costa, Nargiza Salidjanova, and Daniel Rosen.

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At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post AC Selects: Addressing Jordan and Egypt’s economic challenges and China’s unprecedented third term presidency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Modernizing the Bretton Woods Institutions for the twenty-first century

Ajay Chhibber — Mon, 17 Oct 2022 13:00:00 +0000

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This paper outlines reforms for Bretton Woods Institutions – such as the World Bank Group (WGB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The world needs a Bretton Woods 2.0 for the twenty-first century. The challenges that led to World War II — inequality, protectionism, and rising nationalism — have resurfaced and created the dire need for reform of these institutions.

New, even bigger challenges — such as climate change, pandemics, global inflation, and supply chain disruptions — now threaten the global economy and trade. The current institutions are too small and ill-equipped to adequately address the threats of widening wars and surging food and fuel prices. This paper argues that a new international financial and economic architecture is needed. Bretton Woods Institutions must be modernized and revamped to help address these problems for the remainder of the twenty-first century.

The new system requires three core “Rs” – a revised global remit, an enhanced resource base to help individual countries confront collective global problems, and the mandate to monitor agreed-upon global rules. The IMF must refocus itself on addressing global financial instability and macroeconomic policy. The World Bank must become a financial institution focused on planetary sustainability and shared prosperity. A strengthened WTO must become the forum for freer and fairer trade in goods, services, and cross-border transactions.

These institutions must work with regional and other United Nations (UN) specialized bodies. They should coordinate with bilateral aid agencies, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and private philanthropic organizations. The IMF, WTO, and WBG need to leverage their power and resources to draw in private capital at much higher levels. This would provide the Bretton Woods institutions with the needed resources and expertise to address rising global challenges and development needs. These reforms would create a stronger international economic and financial architecture suitable for the twenty-first century.

Report Oct 17, 2022

The evolution of the IMF: A case for IMF 1.5 before Bretton Woods 2.0

By Hung Tran

Bretton Woods Institutions will face enormous challenges going forward. While ambitious reforms are needed, its unlikely they will be seriously considered due to high geopolitical tension and mistrust among major countries. Nevertheless, the need for reform is pressing. Therefore, it is important to look at more feasible reform, narrower in scope and technocratic in nature, to improve the these institutions.

China Economy & Business

Report Oct 17, 2022

Changing Bretton Woods Institutions: How non-state and quasi-state actors can help drive the global development agenda

By Nisha Narayanan

Economy & Business Fiscal and Structural Reform

Report Oct 17, 2022

How China would like to reshape international economic institutions

By Victor Shih

Despite its size, China has an inadequate voice in traditional Bretton Woods Institutions. This paper examines aspects of the dissatisfaction China has with existing global governance institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It also discusses the proposed changes to these institutions according to discussions with Chinese experts.

China Economy & Business

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

The post Modernizing the Bretton Woods Institutions for the twenty-first century appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Changing Bretton Woods Institutions: How non-state and quasi-state actors can help drive the global development agenda

Nisha Narayanan — Mon, 17 Oct 2022 13:00:00 +0000

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The Bretton Woods institutions continue to serve as the champions of international development and financial stability, but several factors create a challenge for their continued effectiveness and relevance. The growing finance gap from rising poverty, income and gender inequality and poor infrastructure are threatening global sustainable development. Emerging and developing countries, still recovering from pandemic, are also dealing with challenges related to climate change, food and energy security issues and access to technological innovation. Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, on their own, will not be able to effectively tackle these issues in the long-run. An increasingly connected world had led to the emergence of new and increasingly relevant, actors in the global development field.

The emergence of these actors, both non-state and quasi-state actors, which include Multi-National Corporations, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Pension Funds, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) has demonstrated how critical their inclusion in development-finance is for the BWIs. MNCs are continuing to expand their footprints globally, shifting supply chains and additional economic benefits to both emerging and developing markets, while SWFs and Pension Funds are accessing their growing pool of assets to boost disadvantaged markets and promote sustainability. Despite the recognition of their valuable contribution, the IMF and the World Bank, have been limited in the scope of the inclusion of these actors. The opportunity to create more effective and impactful Bretton Woods institutions will depend on both the willingness and capacity of the institutions to effectively integrate these non-state and quasi-state actors into a constructive operational framework.

This new report examines the increasingly influential role of non-state and quasi-public actors in global development and sustainable finance, specifically through the rising level of sustainable investments in emerging and development markets. Implementing near-term solutions that include these actors in future capital mobilization and development financing will be critical to ensuring the gap between the North and South does not continue to expand. Moreover, integrating the data and expertise these actors into streamlined thematic initiatives and consultations and country-level analysis between the Bretton Woods institutions can strengthen efforts in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals in an increasingly high risk environment.

Report Oct 17, 2022

The evolution of the IMF: A case for IMF 1.5 before Bretton Woods 2.0

By Hung Tran

China Economy & Business

Report Oct 17, 2022

Changing Bretton Woods Institutions: How non-state and quasi-state actors can help drive the global development agenda

By Nisha Narayanan

Economy & Business Fiscal and Structural Reform

Report Oct 17, 2022

How China would like to reshape international economic institutions

By Victor Shih

China Economy & Business

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

The post Changing Bretton Woods Institutions: How non-state and quasi-state actors can help drive the global development agenda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How China would like to reshape international economic institutions

Victor Shih — Mon, 17 Oct 2022 13:00:00 +0000

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Despite being the second largest economy in the world and the largest trading partner for a majority of the world’s economies, China has an inadequate voice in traditional international economic institutions, leaving many of its experts and policymakers dissatisfied. For example, on a per capita basis, 170 out of 189 member countries in the World Bank Group’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), have more voting power than China. This paper examines different aspects of the dissatisfaction that Chinese scholars and officials’ have with existing global governance institutions (GGIs), with a special focus on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It also discusses the underlying aspirations that drive proposed changes to various GGIs according to discussions with Chinese experts.

In the IMF, China is pursuing greater representation in the decision-making process while in the WTO China seeks to revise rules so that the United States can no longer dominate the organization’s case flows. China is also prepared to navigate an increasingly fragmented and complex set of GGIs, including new ones it has established –New Development Bank or BRICS Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the BRI Bank, across different regions and issue areas.

For Bretton Woods Institutions to remain relevant and effective in the twenty-first century and address ongoing global challenges in a timely manner, China’s active engagement in these institutions is crucial. However, the lack or slow pace of substantial reforms in these institutions increases the risk of China becoming disillusioned and disengaging with them. Therefore, the United States alongside its G7 allies and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries should take meaningful steps to make existing GGIs more inclusive of all developing and emerging economies, with an emphasis on China, and also actively engage with regional multilateral development banks and financial institutions around the world.

Report Oct 17, 2022

The evolution of the IMF: A case for IMF 1.5 before Bretton Woods 2.0

By Hung Tran

China Economy & Business

Report Oct 17, 2022

Changing Bretton Woods Institutions: How non-state and quasi-state actors can help drive the global development agenda

By Nisha Narayanan

Economy & Business Fiscal and Structural Reform

Report Oct 17, 2022

How China would like to reshape international economic institutions

By Victor Shih

China Economy & Business

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

The post How China would like to reshape international economic institutions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The evolution of the IMF: A case for IMF 1.5 before Bretton Woods 2.0

Hung Tran — Mon, 17 Oct 2022 13:00:00 +0000

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Since their creation in 1944, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) have made significant contributions to the growth and stability of the world economy. However, they are now faced with enormous challenges going forward in the remainder of the twenty-first century. A century likely marked by increasing frequency of climate-related acute events, global inflation, rising public debt beyond sustainable levels, and growing geoeconomic rivalry among the world’s largest economies.

Many ideas have been put forward to reform these institutions to make them fit for the new era.

Unfortunately, ambitious and comprehensive reform proposals are not likely to be seriously considered due to high geopolitical tension and mistrust among major countries. An example of these ambitious ideas includes changing the quota and voting shares among members to better reflect the increasing weight of emerging and developing economies, most importantly China. Other ideas consider raising the capital of the IMF and the World Bank Group (WBG) and promoting the SDRs as the main international reserve currency. Clearly, these proposals will not attract much attention in today’s strained geopolitical environment.

Nevertheless, the need for reform is pressing. Therefore, it is important to look at more practical and feasible reform, narrower in scope and technocratic in nature, to improve the working of those institutions in the current difficult environment. This paper argues for IMF 1.5 in the short and medium run as a path to IMF 2.0 in the long run. These practical reforms include equitably allocating lending resources among member countries, more specifically, a relative shift from Latin America to Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, the IMF should scale back structural reform as conditionality and offer coordination to different providers of emergency liquidity to make them more effective. Moreover, the IMF should avoid mission creep by focusing on and leveraging its institutional expertise in economic analysis and assessment of risks. The success or failure of these smaller-scale feasible reforms today will determine the path forward to more substantive reforms of Bretton Woods Institutions in the long run.

Report Oct 17, 2022

How China would like to reshape international economic institutions

By Victor Shih

China Economy & Business

Report Oct 17, 2022

Modernizing the Bretton Woods Institutions for the twenty-first century

By Ajay Chhibber

The challenges that led to World War II have resurfaced and created the dire need for reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions. A new system to address these challenges requires the three core “Rs”—a revised global remit, an enhanced resource base, and a mandate to monitor agreed-upon global rules.

Economy & Business Financial Regulation

Report Oct 17, 2022

Changing Bretton Woods Institutions: How non-state and quasi-state actors can help drive the global development agenda

By Nisha Narayanan

Economy & Business Fiscal and Structural Reform

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

The post The evolution of the IMF: A case for IMF 1.5 before Bretton Woods 2.0 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Before moving forward, King Charles III must address the Commonwealth’s past with Africa

Alexander Tripp and Caitlin Mittrick — Wed, 12 Oct 2022 14:05:01 +0000

Africa’s relationship with the British monarchy is fraught with complications, not least being that the cornerstone of their modern affiliation, the Commonwealth, is rooted in a dark legacy of colonialism and empire.

Yet even against that historical backdrop, the late Queen Elizabeth II was respected by her peers across the continent, and upon the announcement of her death, tributes from African heads of state poured in.

How did a monarch that, for many, embodied empire and colonialism garner such tribute among people whose ancestors chafed against British rule? The Queen committed herself to fostering relationships with various African heads of state, an effort that sometimes required her to step outside the United Kingdom’s dominant political context of the time. And after seventy years on the throne, she was omnipresent as a symbol of continuity, comradery, and commonality across the Commonwealth.

The Queen, both as head of state or head of the Commonwealth to twenty-one African nations, took her duties seriously. She respected local customs, was comfortable operating in a post-colonial environment, and often went against the advice of the British political establishment when approaching issues on the continent.

Such an approach paid off.

Not only was the Queen respected by many African political figures, but she enabled the United Kingdom to make inroads where politicians were unable to do so. But can the Commonwealth’s relationship with Africa continue to thrive with its greatest asset gone?

The Queen’s triumphs

The Queen’s relationship with Africa began at the very start of her reign: After all, she ascended the throne while in the foothills of Mt. Kenya in 1952. Her connection to the continent over the course of her reign would be long standing, but also one defined by a forced evolution as the United Kingdom left its ambitions for empire behind.

From her first visits to Africa as monarch, she would work to cement her credibility as a leader not only for the United Kingdom, but also for the Commonwealth. While reigning over a tumultuous shift in global geopolitics, she was able to juggle her responsibilities and effectively serve as a moral and figurative leader.

This is perhaps most evident in her 1961 visit to Ghana. The former colony had recently declared its independence and was debating leaving the Commonwealth; its founding father and president, avowed socialist Kwame Nkrumah, increased his hold on power and cozied up to the Soviets at the same time the Berlin Wall was being erected and the Cold War was getting into full swing.

British politicians were very much against the trip. Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill called the prime minister at the time, Harold Macmillan, in an attempt to lobby the government to cancel the Queen’s travel. The Queen was steadfast, however, and despite the pressure visited for twelve days.

The visit was an immense success.

Most famously, at a ball organized to celebrate the trip, the Queen shone in a way only she could. In the year that apartheid partitioned South Africa and the Freedom Riders took on segregation in the United States, the Queen danced with Nkrumah in front of the world media. The Queen was able to reassure Ghana’s political leadership on a personal level, one of her key skills as a monarch.

Nkrumah maintained his political differences with the West, but he chose to keep Ghana in the Commonwealth, allowing the West crucial access to counter Soviet influence in the region. But on a more concrete level, the Queen demonstrated that while the nations of the Commonwealth may have their political differences, they could remain united under her leadership; more than just an association of former British colonies, the Commonwealth could also be a community of independent nations working together for their mutual advancement.

Another example of the Queen’s strong moral determination and her sense of duty was her willingness to go against the British political establishment in the 1980s. It was an open secret that the Queen quarreled with then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over sanctioning the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Queen would go on to establish a close personal friendship with Nelson Mandela, the dissident who became the country’s first post-apartheid president. Not only were they known to call each other by their first names, but they also communicated regularly and famously danced together during his state visit to London.

Her willingness to advocate for the needs of Commonwealth nations, sometimes contradicting the home government’s positions, earned the Queen the respect she held among several important African leaders—relationships that were only enhanced by her seemingly singular ability to connect with leaders on a personal level.

In short, the Queen’s personality and her approach to cultivating people-to-people relationships with African leaders allowed the Commonwealth to remain relevant and even thrive at a time when it probably shouldn’t have.

However, despite the Queen’s ability to connect with Africa and (at least by the standards of the time) rebut the sometimes racist tendencies of Western attitudes toward the continent and its leaders, some Africans saw her, and continue to see her, as an emblem of a painful history of empire and colonialism. This viewpoint is one of the key challenges facing the future of the Commonwealth.

A legacy of colonialism

With the United Kingdom’s history of colonialism in Africa, it comes as little surprise that the Queen’s death brings complex emotions to the fore for many former colonial subjects. There is a history of brutal colonial oppression that many say has been overlooked.

For example, Nigerian Carnegie Mellon professor Uju Anya recently made headlines for her criticism of the Queen on Twitter, saying that Queen Elizabeth II “supervised a government that sponsored the genocide that massacred and displaced half my family” in reference to the UK government’s role in the Biafran War in the late 1960s.

This dichotomy is one with which the Commonwealth will continue to struggle. Queen Elizabeth II’s emphasis on strong interpersonal ties with African leaders helped smooth over relationships, but it didn’t address the past injustices endured by many African groups. Given that past injustices are no longer swept under the rug, the monarchy will need to address criticism of its historical actions and its representations if it hopes to maintain the Commonwealth’s relevance.

At a time when imperial legacy is a burden, not a boon, and the dark shadow of colonialism is no longer quietly brushed aside, it remains to be seen whether the Commonwealth will be able to flourish without its greatest asset and distraction from that historical truth: Queen Elizabeth II.

What’s next for King Charles III

The Commonwealth has historically served as a vital link for the United Kingdom, and by extension the West, to engage with Africa.

But to maintain that link, the Commonwealth needs to address its imperial legacy and work to solidify itself in a changed world.

King Charles III stands a good chance of managing that endeavor and for the past few years has stood in for his mother at many Commonwealth meetings. Those meetings have seen significant change. To the dislike of many of its detractors, the Commonwealth has not been relegated to the history books just yet—it is actually expanding.

Just earlier this year, Togo and Gabon were admitted to the club at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Rwanda—a country that itself joined in 2009. The inclusion of two Francophone nations signifies how the Commonwealth is evolving and how crucial that evolution is for the organization’s future. They joined not because of historic connections to the British empire, but because of the cultural and commercial prowess of the Commonwealth. Charles III should harness these cultural and commercial ties to maintain the strong ties that currently exist across the continent and to foster new ones.

The Commonwealth is evolving into an organization based more exclusively on mutual interests and benefits. King Charles III, as head of the Commonwealth, will need to shepherd the organization through this transformation using similar methods as his mother: personal connections and an acceptance of each member’s political autonomy. He will also need to address the Commonwealth’s origins rooted in colonialism, but there are questions about whether he will even be able to do so.

The African continent is crucial to the Commonwealth’s continued success. Out of fifty-six Commonwealth members, twenty-one are African. Plus, the continent is central to many of the United Kingdom’s economic interests abroad, as Africa is now home to the world’s youngest population and the largest free-trade zone by number of countries. And in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and of increased Chinese interest across the continent, Africa’s role in geopolitics is growing—which will be of interest to the post-Brexit United Kingdom. Without ties to the European Union, the Commonwealth is increasingly important as a key mechanism for both the United Kingdom to remain a key player on the international stage and for the West’s attempts to engage with Africa.

The West and Africa’s historical ties, while not always something to be proud of, served as a foundation so that Queen Elizabeth II could build people-to-people ties and reset bilateral relations with African countries in a way that reflected the modern world. That desperately needs to continue. But in addition, King Charles III will need to address the very real grievances those historical ties represent.

Queen Elizabeth II’s reign saw her navigate a tumultuous shift in global geopolitics all while keeping a steady course. Hopefully, King Charles III is up to the challenge to do so as well. If he is, the Commonwealth will continue to flourish. If he isn’t, the West will have lost an invaluable tool to engage with a continent and group of nations that are now more important than ever.

Alexander Tripp is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Caitlin Mittrick is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a graduate student at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs.

The post Before moving forward, King Charles III must address the Commonwealth’s past with Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The ITU election pitted the United States and Russia against each other for the future of the internet

Konstantinos Komaitis and Justin Sherman — Thu, 29 Sep 2022 19:17:56 +0000

Earlier this morning, the 193 member states of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations’ (UN) tech agency and oldest institution, elected as Secretary-General the American candidate Doreen Bogdan-Martin, the first-ever woman to head the ITU. Bogdan-Martin is the current head of the ITU’s development bureau, ITU-D. Her now-former opponent, Russian candidate Rashid Ismailov, is president of Russian telecom VimpelCom, former deputy minister of Russia’s Ministry of Communications, and a former executive at Chinese telecom company Huawei. The current Secretary-General is Houlin Zhao, a Chinese citizen who has held the position since 2014.¹

Many challenges to an open and global internet lie ahead, and the US win should provide a sigh of relief to the internet community. Nonetheless, the way the election for the ITU’s leadership unfolded underscores how internet governance processes, international internet policymaking, and internet standards creation are becoming increasingly political issues. In an unprecedented move, for instance, both US President Joe Biden and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken posted messages in support of the US candidate.

For the United States, it was evident that this election was a foreign policy issue—and rightly so. Over the years, the Russian and Chinese governments have grown closer in pushing for a state-controlled vision of internet governance, and both have long wished to see the UN play a central role in the management of the internet. Their vision is gaining traction, especially among African countries, which have historically felt excluded from internet governance conversations and see the ITU as one of the few places they can wield political power. In addition, Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine might have strained Russia’s relationship with the West, but for many other parts of the world, it remains business as usual.

At the center of the election, therefore, was indeed the future role of the ITU in governing the internet. The organization currently has little involvement, but some governments maintain an interest in the ITU becoming more central to the process. Presently, internet governance is largely the purview of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a nonprofit, multi-stakeholder internet standards-setting body, and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit that, along with five regional internet registries, manages domain names and internet protocol (IP) addresses globally. This governance system, though imperfect, works because it is agile, inclusive of industry and civil society, and not directly subject to intergovernmental negotiations and maneuvering. It has worked based on a relatively common objective among these institutions: an open, global, and interoperable internet.

However, not every country buys into this system. A number of countries, including Russia, China, and some in both Africa and the Asia-Pacific, look at the ITU as a more appropriate institution to manage the internet. Its broad development agenda has allowed the organization to become increasingly active on issues as wide-ranging as cybersecurity, connectivity, cybercrime, IP number allocation, and network management. At the same time, for decades, the Chinese government and the Russian government have both pushed for the ITU to have a greater role in governing the internet, from suggesting that the ITU literally take over ICANN to pushing for internet standards-setting to move to the ITU almost entirely. The United States, Japan, Australia, Germany, South Korea, and other open-internet supporters have managed to push back, but the tides may be shifting. More governments are adopting a “cyber sovereignty” approach that seeks to increase their perceived decision-making power or increase government surveillance online (or both).

The stakes in the election, therefore, were high. A Russian-led, China-friendly ITU would, most likely, have sought more control over the internet; and from Moscow and Beijing’s past efforts, standards development is one of the likeliest routes. The Chinese government already knows this and has been working towards such a goal with its “New IP,” a proposal that seeks to centralize core functions of networking. The proposal has persisted in the ITU’s study groups for the past two years, and it has recently moved to another study group dealing with issues of the environment. Beijing has even renamed the standard “IPv6+” to repackage the same, top-down protocol proposal as merely a technological advancement. In a similar vein, China, at another study group, submitted a proposal for the standardization of the “metaverse.” In such a volatile environment, Ismailov’s victory would increase the likelihood of passage of government-controlling-internet proposals at the ITU.

Heavy government involvement in standards setting with Russia at the ITU’s helm would be catastrophic for the internet. Presently, internet standards follow an open, participatory process and are voluntarily adopted on a global level; they serve as the building blocks for products and services targeted to meet the needs of consumers and the market. Now, try to imagine 193 different states negotiating standards about, say, privacy or security; the pace and the formality of an organization like the ITU cannot support the technical specificity and informality that is required by internet standards setting. Not to mention, the same issues that have plagued UN cyber norms discussions will become more prominent in the ITU: the Russian and Chinese government pushing for an expansive definition of terms like “information security” or “cybercrime” that allow them to promote censorship and surveillance under the guise of international security.

In order, therefore, to preserve an internet that is relatively open and globally connected while navigating the processes and politics at play, the ITU needed a leader who understands the value of collaboration and bottom-up coordination when it comes to the internet. The United States can deliver on this; Russia cannot.

For Russia, the UN has always been a core part of its internet governance strategy. Although its pushes over the last thirty-or-so years for more UN involvement were unsuccessful, in 2019, Russia achieved an unexpected win when it managed to get the votes for a cybercrime treaty at the UN General Assembly. The Kremlin’s tech envoy celebrated this as a significant win and a sign of Russia’s influence in the UN. For Moscow, this moves a step closer to a multipolar world in which the Russian government takes a more central role. The US victory means Russia doesn’t yet have the votes to continue on this trajectory.

Even with Bogdan-Martin prevailing, it will be a rough road ahead to maintain an ITU that respects existing internet processes and institutions, while also trying to drive genuine progress in areas like internet development and capacity-building (which Bogdan-Martin presently leads at the ITU). Beijing and Moscow will not sit on the sidelines, as the past decades have shown. Not having a voting bloc to pass resolutions has not stopped the Chinese and Russian governments from “flooding the zone” with proposals before. But without a doubt, navigating a rough road with a US leader at the helm, experienced in internet development and a believer in an open internet, is better than cutting the brakes entirely.

Authors

Konstantinos Komaitis (@kkomaitis) is an internet policy expert and author.

Justin Sherman (@jshermcyber) is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

learn more

1 Although several candidates, representing different countries, could theoretically run at once, the US and Russian governments were the only ones to throw a candidate’s hat in the ring.

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#BritainDebrief – What was the Queen’s diplomacy? | A Debrief from Professor Philip Murray

Ben Judah — Wed, 28 Sep 2022 23:45:07 +0000

What was the Queen’s diplomacy?

As the state funeral of Queen Elizabeth II draws to a close, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Professor Philip Murray, Director of History and Policy at the Institute for Historical Research, to discuss the legacy she leaves behind.

What role did the Queen play in the end of the British Empire? How did the Queen’s involvement shape the Commonwealth of Nations? What can we expect from King Charles III and his relationship with the Commonwealth?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What was the Queen’s diplomacy? | A Debrief from Professor Philip Murray appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Here’s what a Marshall Plan for the DRC could look like

Jean-Paul Mvogo — Tue, 27 Sep 2022 20:03:11 +0000

In June, the remains of Patrice Lumumba—the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) first prime minister—were repatriated from Belgium to his native land, sixty-one years after his assassination. If Lumumba were returning alive to the country today, he would be shocked: His prophecy for a prosperous DRC, which he penned in his final letter to his wife, has not been fulfilled, despite the abundance of natural, economic, human, and cultural resources in the country.

Instead, over decades, an abysmal series of obstacles have repeatedly hindered the country’s development. A poorly managed decolonization process by Belgium, multiple rebellions, and the failure to promote good governance—combined with living in a state of war since 1996, particularly in the east—have resulted in profound setbacks in health, education, the economy, society, and governance.

Those obstacles led to deep and pervasive effects on Congolese society, and they make a good case for massive assistance. There is a model already in place for the United States and other friends of the DRC around the world to follow: the 1948–1951 European Recovery Program, otherwise known as the Marshall Plan. Advanced by then US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the plan gave countries that were devastated by World War II mostly donations to restore industry, support agriculture, and increase international trade. The United States appropriated $13.3 billion over four years. In the end, the plan helped Western and Southern European countries boost industrial production by 55 percent and average gross national product by 33 percent, laying the foundations for a prosperous Europe. Since then, the expression “Marshall Plan” has been used to refer to massive assistance or economic stimulus programs worldwide, the latest case being the European Recovery Plan.

Comparable assistance focused on improving governance could help the DRC develop while laying a similar foundation for a prosperous African Great Lakes region—and even African continent. Yet, achieving this goal will require focusing the plan more on building strong institutions and less on building infrastructure, the beloved child of many development partners. Then US President Barack Obama emphasized a need for updated partnership programs with Africa in a July 2009 speech in Accra, Ghana, declaring: “The true sign of success is not whether we are a source of perpetual aid that helps people scrape by… It’s whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.”

Decades of development lost

A bit like in the 1960s and 1970s, military conflicts and violence are entrenched in the DRC. The death toll of near-weekly attacks by the allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an insurgent group with ties to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), practically tripled between 2020 and 2022. Furthermore, the militant March 23 Movement, after a deceptive slumber, has occupied the strategic town of Bunagana since June.

After former President Mobutu Sese Seko’s three-decade single-party rule and former President Joseph Kabila’s tumultuous terms from 2001 to 2019, Congolese people hoped that their political class would mobilize in favor of development. This has not yet fully happened; and far from rallying the much-needed unity required to end the conflict in the east, political parties seem preoccupied with the 2023 presidential election.

Despite recent social and economic progress—notably a solid annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate that has averaged above 5 percent over the last ten years—many long-term per capita indicators have worsened since the 1970s, according to the World Bank: Electricity consumption per capita (159 kilowatt hours in 1972 and 109 kilowatt hours in 2015) and the number of hospital beds per thousand people (3.2 in 1975 against 0.8 in 2006) have dropped. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita remains less than half of values in the 1970s ($1,372 in 1974 versus $518 in 2021, in constant 2015 US dollars).

There are several other indicators that raise concerns about the country’s economic and social progress: As of the beginning of this year, twenty-one diseases under surveillance in the DRC had the potential to become epidemics—and in the year before, six had done so, including measles, cholera, and COVID-19. According to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 4.2 million people, including 2.4 million children under five years old, suffer from acute severe malnutrition. Roughly six million people are internally displaced, and 74,000 cases of sexual and gender-based violence were reported over the period, with the majority occurring in the eastern conflict-torn part of the country.

These economic and social indicators are a sign of an unhealthy ecosystem that cannot support development. Contributing factors include political instability, wars, a lack of economic diversification, an overreliance on natural resources, and the consequences of a conflict economy—in which investment is dampened by the uncertainty caused by wartime disruptions to local and national activities, and Congolese don’t benefit from the revenues created by their natural resources. These factors make it difficult to uproot corruption, mismanagement, and state capture, even more than half a century after the DRC’s independence, despite recent efforts, such as reforms within the central bank and the publication of mining contracts.

Thus, the country’s lack of development, caused by its political, social, and economic conditions, is likely to be long-lasting.

The “big push” to prosperity

In his farewell letter, Lumumba was optimistic about the destiny of his country because he believed that the DRC could overcome its afflictions, just as other countries that have experienced war and political instability have done.

Germany experienced such a period of economic and social adversity after World War II: In 1947, industrial output was only one-third and food production was one-half of the country’s 1938 levels. Nearly one-fifth of the country’s housing had been destroyed over the course of the war. Inflation had resulted in a wave of poverty, while the country’s price controls fueled the expansion of the black market.

But today, Germany has become a formidable economic force. The reasons for the German economic miracle, or “Wirtschaftswunder,” are subject to debate among economists, but some credit the Marshall Plan.

The initial Marshall Plan and its variants worldwide are in line with economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan’s “big push” theory that massive reforms and investments are more helpful than gradual actions in overcoming obstacles that preclude development in underdeveloped economies. In other words, a “big push” is required to undo the inertia of a stagnant economy. Such a “big push” would help the DRC get out of its rut, given the country’s numerous and multifaceted economic, social, and security challenges. But the push must address the real issues that Congolese face.

Institutions over infrastructure

Investment plans for African countries often focus on spending in areas like infrastructure and equipment—and ultimately, some costly and not terribly useful “white elephants.” A Marshall Plan for the DRC should avoid falling into those two pitfalls by taking a completely different approach: focusing on institutions rather than infrastructure.

After all, infrastructure projects in the DRC easily mobilize resources from a variety of public and private stakeholders. The Emirati company DP World, for example, is investing hundreds of millions of dollars over decades in the construction and management of the DRC’s first deep-sea port in Banana due to the economic potential there. Beyond that case, the country’s infrastructure potential and needs are so immense that all that the government would have to do is to design bankable projects and abide to the conditions set by international private or public partners.

Conversely, commitment to lasting and in-depth institutional reform is far below what the DRC and other poor nations need because a reformed institution is less immediately visible than a bridge or a school. In addition, reforming or even creating an institution is more time-consuming, more complex, and dependent on combining success factors such as overcoming vested interests and tailoring institutions to sociological realities. It involves mapping and optimizing processes, investing in training, and paying civil servants better—but also limiting abuses vis-à-vis users of public services, who are often not considered as customers but rather as sheep that can be sheared mercilessly.

Overcoming the DRC’s development obstacles will require a substantial investment in the country’s institutions. Strong institutions are the key to turning the DRC’s immense potential into tangible results, enabling the country to fish for itself instead of being offered fish by other countries.

A DRC with strong institutions would see civil servants better paid, unbiased decisions from the courts, vulnerable groups protected by the police, natural resources and projects managed without corruption, better-equipped schools, and a social safety net that protects the most vulnerable.

Preparing for the push

Initial work in designing the Marshall Plan should start with an in-depth inclusive discussion among Congolese and between Congo and its partners about the governance mechanisms of such an initiative.

This initial discussion is essential because of the colossal sums at stake and also the controversies that have plagued Congolese infrastructure projects: In order to avoid problems associated with the DRC’s poor public finance management and to increase the likelihood that the plan succeeds, this discussion should be structured around strengthening its absorptive capacity—the amount of foreign aid that the DRC can use productively. The DRC has faced difficulties in quickly implementing quality investment projects and ensuring that every dollar invested reaches its intended beneficiary. Shaping a new normal will require improvements in three areas.

Preparations for the Marshall Plan should include the recruitment and training of motivated and skilled people who can effectively design and manage reform projects in the long term.
The DRC must establish a stronger and more efficient control mechanism to ensure good fiduciary management of the plan’s projects in order to avoid misappropriation, collusion, and corruption. Such practices have long bedeviled public contract tenders and public funds management.
It will be necessary to meticulously prepare the various projects and investment plans in order to avoid mistakes of the past, including some famous white elephants, and to guarantee adequate social impact. To do this, leaders taking part in the plan should adopt an experimental approach in which they run small-scale test projects to better understand and correct their shortcomings before deploying them throughout the country.

Institution building is a serious matter. It requires time and stability. Besides, institutional quality is sensitive to policy changes that follow shifts in political leadership. Hence the need, as a foundation to the Marshall Plan, to build a clear, accountable, and trans-partisan consensus around institutional reform. If a platform for reform has buy-in from political parties and stakeholders across Congolese society, it would be immune to the negative side effects of changes in government. With new elections slated for 2023, now is an opportune political moment to start that dialogue. Presidential candidates, in particular, should explain how their pledges will contribute to the much-needed institutional transformation. The country’s burgeoning civil society could seize the opportunity to mobilize Congolese across party lines and identify priority sectors for institution building in preparation for the plan.

Such a process would empower the Congolese people, who have often been marginalized in designing development policies even though they’re meant to be the beneficiaries. It would foster crucial local commitment to institutional transformation. Plus, the preparation effort could help establish an equal relationship between the DRC and its financial partners in their mission to propel the country into the twenty-first century.

Doing the Marshall Plan math

How much should an institutional Marshall Plan for the DRC cost? Let’s start with a linear method to evaluate the original.

From 1948 to 1952, sixteen countries received a total of $13.3 billion, representing roughly $159 billion in 2022. Distributing that among the total 1948 population (approximately 270 million) of the countries that received this aid yields a per capita endowment of $588 in today’s dollars to match the original Marshall Plan.

That would add up to approximately $55 billion for the DRC and its estimated 95.2 million people. The amount is practically the size of the DRC’s GDP and more than ten times what it receives in annual Official Development Assistance. It may seem enormous—but that is not the case considering the scale of the DRC’s weak social indicators and immense needs. The sum is about one-third more than the $40 billion the US Congress committed this year to aid Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and represents roughly three to four years of expenditures for Washington, DC, or Chicago.

The spillovers from the Marshall Plan would also be transformative; those resources would help provide the “big push” that the country needs to fight against the rise of the ADF in eastern DRC, meet its development challenge, rebuild, and, above all, consolidate its governance and move from a cyclical, natural-resource-led growth to a more balanced and sustainable momentum supported by strong institutions.

A Marshall Plan-style investment could quickly transform the DRC, which is projected to become the world’s eighth most populous country by 2050, into one of the globe’s most dynamic markets. The DRC, with its connections to world cobalt battery supply chains, could also become a home for green industries, with jobs available for youth in all sectors of a radically transformed economy.

Ultimately, an institution-centered Marshall Plan would dramatically transform the DRC over the next decades, helping new generations of Congolese achieve Lumumba’s vision of a bright future for the country, the region, and for Africa.

Jean-Paul Mvogo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Africa Center.

The post Here’s what a Marshall Plan for the DRC could look like appeared first on Atlantic Council.

From the UN to The Late Show, Ukraine’s diplomats are winning

Pete Shmigel — Mon, 26 Sep 2022 15:35:53 +0000

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba delivered one of the more memorable quotes of the war during his recent visit to New York. Commenting on Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s hasty departure from a United Nations Security Council session on Ukraine, Kuleba quipped, “I also noted today that Russian diplomats flee almost as aptly as Russian soldiers.”

Just hours after Kuleba’s instantly viral one-liner hit social media, he was starring on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert. Ukraine’s top diplomat received a rousing reception on the flagship US talk show, including a standing ovation from the studio audience in honor of the Ukrainian people and the country’s armed forces. Speaking with dignity, candor, and a dash of humor, Kuleba concisely expressed Ukraine’s view of the Russian invasion in a nine-minute interview that was hailed as a masterclass in public diplomacy.

The Ukrainian Foreign Minister’s strong showing in New York was a good example of the innovative approaches that are enabling Ukraine to gain the upper hand over Russia on the diplomatic front. In many ways, this confrontation is a generational clash between two very different diplomatic schools. While Russia is still represented by a Soviet-era generation of diplomats epitomized by 72-year-old Cold War veteran Sergei Lavrov, Ukrainian diplomats who came of age in the post-Soviet era are embracing new methods and achieving considerable success.

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Ukraine’s wartime diplomacy has already delivered numerous significant results. These include securing the largest military support for any ally since World War II, along with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and other measures to increase Moscow’s international isolation. With the war now in its eighth month, the broad alliance of international partnerships created and nurtured by Ukrainian diplomats shows no signs of weakening.

What has Ukrainian diplomacy been doing differently in support of the country’s strategic interests? Based on personal interaction with and observation of Ukrainian diplomats at work, several aspects of Ukraine’s new diplomacy are noteworthy.

One key feature is empowerment. I first met Dmytro Kuleba when he was an advisor to the Ukrainian President a few years before his 2020 appointment as the country’s Foreign Minister. At the time, he gave the impression of a thoroughly modern person. It was also clear that Kuleba feels entirely at home as a manager of issues, relationships, and teams. In concert with Ukraine’s Defense Ministry, he appears to be providing explicit direction to Ukraine’s diplomats in the form of specific, country-based military support goals. This approach is combined with an expectation of proactivity on the part of individual ambassadors.

Thirty years after Ukraine’s independence, Kuleba is presiding over the final dismantling of the inherited Soviet diplomatic corps, which was notoriously clunky, bureaucratic, and sometimes truly under-skilled. Amid the pressure and pace of a full-blown war, a new organizational culture is emerging at the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that includes self-belief, positivity, and an emphasis on initiative.

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