International Norms - Atlantic Council

The lessons that Washington and Beijing appear to be learning from Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and from Ukraine’s resistance and counteroffensive, could set the stage for a crisis over Taiwan in the next few years. This grim prospect is driven by the United States and China arraying themselves for a strategic rivalry since 2017 through the continuing trade war, economic decoupling, and increasing rhetorical and military positioning for confrontation over Taiwan. In light of the Chinese military’s threatening gestures, belligerent rhetoric, and other recent actions that read like they could be preparation for war, there is a danger that the successive warnings by senior US military commanders that Chinese CCP General Secretary and President Xi Jinping has already decided to use military force in the near term could become the proverbial tail wagging the dog — and could impose a logic that makes a US-China war more likely, rather than enhancing deterrence.¹ Therefore, the key question for the United States and its allies is how an increasingly truculent and belligerent Chinese leadership can be incentivized to walk back from the brink. This paper examines what lessons China, the United States, and European allies have drawn from the Ukraine conflict and how such lessons have shaped these actors’ strategic assumptions. It concludes with a discussion of policy recommendations for the transatlantic community confronting the possibility of a US-China conflict over Taiwan.

China’s assumptions and lessons learned

Even as Beijing modulates its public statements in support of Moscow, China’s strategic assumptions from before the Ukraine invasion likely have not changed, and may depend on the longer-term outcome in Ukraine. That includes the prospect of an outcome that Vladimir Putin can claim as a Russian “victory,” in which Russia continues to hold territory and forecloses Ukraine’s NATO or European Union (EU) integration.

China is likely to apply the following strategic assumptions as it digests lessons learned from the Ukraine war.

According to Beijing, the United States is an adversarial, declining hegemony that will be antagonistic to China’s rise for the foreseeable future, and which will seek to foment instability within China and hostility on its periphery. In Beijing’s view, US antagonism to China is now structural and bipartisan. China’s previous self-imposed restraint, as it chose to prioritize stable US relations and drive economic reform and growth, is therefore moribund. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the relatively peaceful global and regional environment that prevailed in the late bipolar Cold War and the post-Cold War period is severely challenged, as Xi told President Joe Biden in their March 18 call.“² Economic growth and rising prosperity are still important, but diminishing, sources of regime legitimacy. Defense of the CCP system, fueled by nationalism, expanded party control, while more active cooperation with Russia and other US adversaries, such as Iran, is becoming more prominent. Xi made this explicit in his speech to China’s National People’s Congress on March 6: “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”³

Economic growth and rising prosperity are still important, but diminishing, sources of regime legitimacy.

Giant screen displays a live broadcast of Chinese President Xi Jinping delivering a speech during the closing ceremony of the National People’s Congress (NPC), in Beijing. (Tingshu Wang via Reuters)

Another key view in Beijing is that Russia is China’s strategic partner. This status was further elevated on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russian President Putin and Xi met in Beijing and signed a joint statement on February 4, 2022.“⁴ Throughout the war in Ukraine, China’s leaders have reiterated their stance, most recently during visits to Moscow by Xi and by China’s top foreign affairs official Wang Yi in early 2023.⁵ The two countries are unlikely to ever have a formal mutual-defense treaty, but intensified cooperation in many spheres—including military coordination, intelligence sharing, energy, and trade—will continue and even accelerate.⁶ Even before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia was the junior partner in the bilateral relationship, but Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power and coordinating at the United Nations. Most importantly, Beijing has a strategic need to keep Russia from internal turmoil or international setbacks that could result in the rise of a regime that is hostile to China. One of the greatest gifts to Beijing of the Sino-Russian rapprochement that started during the 1990s, and truly took off from the mid-2000s, was a passive 4,200-kilometer border that enabled China to focus military modernization on naval, rather than land, warfare for potential conflict with the United States and Japan over Taiwan, or with India or Vietnam over border and maritime sovereignty disputes, respectively. The fact that Russia had dared to commit an estimated 97 percent of its entire forces to the fight in Ukraine by mid-February 2023 and, thus, baring its far-eastern borders, is a testament to this.⁷

Third, in the view of China’s leadership, the EU can act as a Western counterweight to perceived US hostility to China, and Beijing has at times tweaked its approach when deemed necessary to try to stabilize its ties to Europe. The EU lacked unanimity about following Washington’s lead, or did so only slowly and with less intensity, on hostile trade action and efforts to isolate China internationally prior to Russia’s invasion. In late April, inflammatory comments from China’s ambassador to France Lu Shaye, who essentially denied the sovereignty of former Baltic states, sparked an outcry across Europe and beyond.⁸ Shortly thereafter, Xi held his long-awaited call with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy,⁹ and separately, the Chinese Government voted in favor of a UN resolution containing language that explicitly acknowledges “the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine,” a sharp departure from Beijing’s previous neutral UN voting patterns on Ukraine.¹⁰ While these moves are largely symbolic and mark a slight tactical rather than a strategic shift, they underscore Beijing’s willingness to make adjustments to try to maintain favorable relations with Europe, given the value Chinese leaders place on the region as a counterbalance to the United States.

However, China’s refusal to condemn the war against Ukraine and its enabling stance toward Russia have galvanized worries, particularly in Eastern European countries, over the trustworthiness of the Chinese government.¹¹ On January 30, Czechia’s president-elect made it a point to accept a phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-Wen, in a stark departure from previous practice.¹² US intelligence made public in February 2023 that China was considering lethal arms supplies to Russia, causing grave concern in European capitals.¹³ Should Beijing actually deliver arms or ammunition to Russia despite its assurances to the contrary, China’s relations with much of Europe could be stretched past the breaking point and, indeed, there are signs of worsening strain, such as the aforementioned call between the Czech president-elect and President Tsai and his intention to plan a personal meeting with her, an unprecedented step from any Western leader; the withdrawal of the Baltic states from the Chinese 17+1 format; and, following similar decisions by many other European countries, Germany’s decision after long hesitation to finally ban and remove key components delivered by Chinese telecoms firms Huawei and ZTE from its fifth-generation (5G) network.¹⁴ At the same time, German leaders have continued to reach out diplomatically to China in the hopes of avoiding a complete Cold War-style economic decoupling scenario. On the other hand, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s March 30, 2023, speech on EU relations with China put the future of the shelved Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) firmly in doubt.¹⁵

How the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ultimately digest strategic lessons from Russia’s war on Ukraine, therefore, will depend on that conflict’s course, the longer-term effects of Western sanctions on Russia and the global economy, and myriad other aspects, including elections in the United States and Taiwan in 2024.

Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power.

Vladimir Putin and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping made statements for the media following the Russian-Chinese talks on March 21, 2023. (Mikhail Tereshenko, TASS via Russian Presidential Press and Information Office)

Beijing likely is also watching closely to see how deeply entrenched in—or distracted by—the Ukraine conflict the United States becomes, where it contributes the lion’s share of direct military aid, including key munitions and weapons platforms that are in short supply; Ukraine is currently expending US annual production of nine thousand HIMARS missiles every two months.¹⁶ As Russia continues to achieve reduced war aims in the east and south, the war seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It presents new opportunities for fissures in the Alliance, and reduced US strategic standing headed into US presidential elections in 2024 that are likely to be even more disruptive than previous election campaigns after former US President Donald Trump’s March 30 grand-jury indictment on business-fraud charges.¹⁷ Partly because of Washington’s massive arms support for Ukraine, its deliveries of key weapons and munitions already sold to Taiwan have been significantly delayed.¹⁸

But one momentous strategic implication of Russia’s invasion is probably already clear to Xi and the CCP. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the prospect of major-power military conflict, and even nuclear-weapons use, is again a characteristic of the global order. Russia’s gamble in Ukraine that it could quickly defeat a non-NATO European neighbor and secure its near abroad has so far failed, but US-led Western unity and imposition of sanctions against Moscow have the earmarks of a protracted conflict that could drive new instability. If Beijing concludes that this is a characteristic of geopolitics and great-power competition in the twenty-first century, it could increase Chinese preparations for military conflict in Asia with either the United States or its proxies.

The deepening enmity of US-China strategic rivalry since 2017 has already eroded core CCP assumptions that competition would remain bounded by nuclear deterrence, deep economic integration, shared stewardship of financial stability, and cooperation on global challenges such as pandemics and climate. The Western reaction to the Russian war against Ukraine is likely to reinforce these judgments, and may be amplifying Beijing’s assessment that the United States is on a trajectory to pursue overthrow of the CCP as a strategic goal.

Even China’s February 24 “Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” seemingly centers most around its affirmation of “sovereignty” as the key thing to be respected—crucially, without ever mentioning Ukraine’s sovereignty in particular, nor calling Russia’s invasion of Ukrainian sovereign territory an invasion, let alone illegal, despite this being a peace template for the Ukraine war.¹⁹ This implies the text has more to do with reaffirming China’s position on Taiwan and offering support to Russia than being an actual attempt to mediate. In calling to freeze the conflict, it would cement Russian territorial gains; ending the “unilateral” sanctions would again benefit Russia; and “promoting post-conflict reconstruction” would presumably benefit Chinese infrastructure companies. Beijing’s proposal on its face seems decidedly tilted toward Moscow or self-serving goals.

US assumptions and lessons learned

While dealing with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the US government has not reduced its attention on the strategic challenge posed by China. At the time of the invasion, the Biden administration was aggressively focused on continuing and expanding Trump-era strategic competition with China. Even as Washington openly warned of intelligence regarding Moscow’s intentions, it continued adversarial policies and alliance building directed at China. It has since announced multiple rounds of technology restrictions on Chinese companies, and signed the CHIPS and Science Act to revitalize US semiconductor leadership.²⁰ Moreover, the president has personally eroded US strategic ambiguity on US military commitments to Taiwan—despite National Security Council (NSC) staff “clarifications” after each repeated instance that US policy has not, in fact, changed.

While dealing with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the US government has not reduced its attention on the strategic challenge posed by China.

President Joe Biden talks to workers as CEO of TSMC C. C. Wei and Chairman of TSMC Mark Liu look on during a visit to TSMC AZ’s first Fab (Semiconductor Fabrication Plant) in P1A (Phase 1A), in Phoenix, Arizona. (REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst)

In its National Defense Strategy (NDS) released last year, the Biden administration focused on homeland defense challenges posed by Russia and China, rather than simply on military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific or Europe.²¹ This sends a strong message that the world is actively contested now, and that the Department of Defense and all of the US government are not just preparing for potential kinetic conflict, but engaged already in active operations to disadvantage China—tantamount to a new Cold War. Moreover, the NDS’ emphasis on “integrated deterrence” with allies and partners will underscore the threat to China of the United States designating Taiwan as a “key non-NATO ally,” potentially breaking existing US policy barriers to a virtual defense guarantee.

The United States is likely to apply the following lessons learned from the Ukraine war as it prepares for potential future conflict with China.

The United States sees public intelligence disclosures of Russian plans to invade Ukraine since November 2021 as a major success, despite failing to deter Russia or realize major pre-war Alliance (or Ukrainian government) preparation for the attack.²² The credibility that Washington gained when Russia invaded in February helped drive the immediate post-invasion international reaction (the reverse of the 2003 Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) fiasco) and resulted in even more comprehensive sanctions than were threatened pre-invasion to deter Russia. Senior US military and administration warnings of Beijing’s “2027 plans” echo US intelligence warnings about Ukraine, albeit without the same specificity and high confidence.²³

Similarly for the United States, a Russian military “paper tiger” perception can be applied to the PLA in a Taiwan scenario that draws on the usual tropes.

“China hasn’t fought a major war since 1979” and, therefore, its military operational abilities may be more limited than expected.
“Amphibious invasion across 100NM Taiwan Strait is far more challenging than Russian land invasion of Eastern Ukraine,” due to the enormous inherent complexity of a Normandy-style amphibious landing and the PLA’s insufficient lift capacity for the task.
“Economic sanctions work, imposing a heavy burden for Moscow, thereby increasing regime insecurity, which can deter Beijing from taking action on Taiwan.”²⁴

The key lesson Washington probably finds applicable to a Taiwan 2027 scenario is the importance of providing both conventional and non-conventional support, including intelligence sharing and equipment, in the runup to, and during, any conflict. In the case of Ukraine, Kyiv’s ability to blunt Moscow’s invasion was enabled by the strengthening of Ukraine’s resilience and resistance post-2014. While the United States and its NATO allies have not directly intervened in Ukraine, they maintain military equipment, intelligence, and economic/communications lifelines that have helped deny Russia its original war aims. Specifically, deliveries of new weapons (Javelin, Stingers, artillery/HIMARS, antiship missiles), near-real-time battlefield intelligence and targeting, and initial success in the public-relations/propaganda/information domain seemed to have blunted Russian hybrid warfare and aligned developed world/Global North opinion behind Ukraine and NATO. However, it is far from clear how well Taiwan could be resupplied in the event of a blockade, if at all. As an island nation, Taiwan has no cross-border sanctuaries for stockpiling and delivery of key military and civilian supplies. And while Russia has been restrained from striking NATO members on Ukraine’s western and southwestern borders, US bilateral allies in the Pacific have no NATO-like structure for collective defense.

A lesson the United States so far seems resistant to learning from Ukraine is that nuclear deterrence by the aggressor (Russia in the case of Ukraine, China in Taiwan) enables conventional war and blunts outside major-power intervention.²⁵ The United States and its NATO allies are strongly united in resisting pressure from pundits to enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine, break the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, or other ideas that could risk direct NATO-Russian war. China could very well conclude that inducing self-deterrence in Western capitals has worked well in Ukraine, and is a promising approach for Taiwan.²⁶ On the other hand, nuclear deterrence works both ways. One could speculate how things would stand today had Ukraine been given a security guarantee akin to NATO’s Article Five in time, and whether this would not have effectively deterred a Russian attack.²⁷ When President Biden conversely ruled out military intervention on behalf of Ukraine during the lead-up to the attack, deterrence was arguably weakened rather than strengthened. Rather than appreciating the transparency and reliability displayed by the United States, and accepting the olive branch it represents, an authoritarian aggressor might see preemptive self-constraint as a weakness to be exploited.

The more the United States talks up the prospect of a 2027 Taiwan war scenario, the more it will turn to buttressing Taiwan’s “resilience”—regardless of whether Taiwan wants this, given the island’s failure to buttress its own defense during twenty-five years of rapid PLA modernization and growing tensions on the strait.²⁸

The more the United States talks up the prospect of a 2027 Taiwan war scenario, the more it will turn to buttressing Taiwan’s “resilience”—regardless of whether Taiwan wants this

US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) announces that he will unveil a new package of legislation to address competition with China. (REUTERS via Craig Hudson)

So far, the drumbeat in US media, from Congress, and among some members of the current administration is to be prepared for direct US military intervention to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military attack. The United States, and its allies and partners, should assume that China would be at least as determined as Russia to wield its rapidly expanding nuclear-capable forces (and space/counterspace and cyber capabilities) to deter direct US intervention. China has stated numerous times that it would be prepared to declare a state of war today if it saw Taipei, Washington, or Tokyo violate the understandings that have preserved the peace since at least 1979. The main potential triggers for this are: Chinese perceptions that Taiwan is moving irrevocably away from the possibility of unification and toward the founding of a new state under the moniker “Taiwan” at some future point; a renewed Taiwanese effort to acquire nuclear weapons; or a return to a quasi-formal US military-security relationship with Taiwan, including through stationing US forces on the island or integrating Taiwan into the US alliance sphere through actions such as inviting it to participate in regional or bilateral military exercises or in Alliance intelligence-sharing arrangements. At the same time, China itself through its threatening actions has been doing the most to upend the understandings that constituted the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait, forcing Taiwan, other regional actors such as Japan, and the United States to reposition themselves.

Europe’s lessons learned

Europe as a whole—comprising not just the EU, but also the United Kingdom, Norway, and other key non-EU states—has rather divergent regional security cultures. Former Eastern Bloc countries, for instance, have been far more alert to the risks posed by a belligerent Russia than have Western European countries that have never been under Russian occupation. European lessons learned from the Ukraine war, therefore, differ markedly in each region. For countries with a traditional Russia-friendly outlook—in particular, Germany, France, and Austria—the Ukraine war came as a shock and was met with initial disbelief and disorientation, giving way to a painful process of finding a new security paradigm.²⁹ Other countries—such as the Nordics, Baltics, and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries—were not as surprised, and indeed felt vindicated after decades of open disregard for their warnings.³⁰ With the exception of Finland, most European countries discovered that their previous strategies of reaping a “peace dividend” by shrinking the armed forces and neglecting societal preparedness for crises and war had backfired.³¹ Collectively, Europe has learned (or is learning) five primary lessons.³²

First, a real effort to bolster collective defense through tangible capabilities was urgently required, after countries paid only lip service to NATO commitments (such as the pledge to commit 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense spending). This includes the need to ramp up production of defense goods in support of Ukraine during what could be a long struggle.³³

Second, Europe learned the dangers of energy dependence on Russia. Prior to the war, Germany had dismissed concerns voiced by its eastern neighbors, the United States, and especially Ukraine that Nord Stream 2 would make Germany dependent and vulnerable to coercion, while also massively weakening Ukraine’s geopolitical situation. These warnings were proven right and have led to a painful reorientation process in Germany (dubbed the “Zeitenwende”) that is still in full swing more than a year after the war started, and is far from concluded.³⁴ Intense debates still surround the questions of rebuilding German military capability, lethal arms supplies for Ukraine, and the future orientation of Germany’s Russia policy. As Germany is a key member state of both the EU and NATO, due to its size and geographic location, its unresolved security-political identity crisis negatively impairs both these organizations, leading to impatience—particularly among the Eastern European states—and a diminished German stance.³⁵

China’s dubious role in the Ukraine war definitely has the potential to make China “lose Europe,” even if China refrains from delivering arms and ammunition to Russia.

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang attend a joint press conference at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, China. (Suo Takekuma/Pool via REUTERS)

Third, Europe has recognized China’s apparent role in the Ukraine war as a covert supporter and enabler of the Russian aggressor, and the consequences this realization has for the security of critical infrastructures in Europe that were built with Chinese technology.³⁶ Rather than supporting Ukraine and using its influence on Russia to stop the war, China has bolstered Russia diplomatically and economically, stopping just short of violating Western sanctions that would endanger China’s economy, while failing to condemn the invasion and effectively calling in its February 2023 “Position” for a freezing of the conflict that would reward Russia’s aggression with territorial gains.³⁷ Particularly among the post-socialist EU and NATO member states in the Baltics and in CEE, this has led to intense distrust of China and disillusionment regarding the official EU formula of China as a “partner, competitor and rival” of the EU.³⁸ The final outcome of this reevaluation will largely depend on China’s further actions of support for Russia—or its refraining from such support, as it may be. Against the backdrop of negative experiences with Chinese “wolf warrior diplomats” during the pandemic, and following coercive diplomacy, China’s dubious role in the Ukraine war definitely has the potential to make China “lose Europe,” even if China refrains from delivering arms and ammunition to Russia.³⁹ Previous Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s hostile stance during the February 2023 Munich Security Conference, and a rather aggressive first speech by China’s new Foreign Minister Qin Gang, do not seem to offer much hope in this regard.⁴⁰

Moreover, Europeans have come to realize that war over Taiwan could break out, despite the risk of nuclear escalation and despite the huge economic constraints in place, and regardless of the political risk such a war would pose to China’s leaders.⁴¹ Given Putin’s complete disregard for such constraints when following through with his attack plan, Europeans have had to accept that their assumptions about the economic rationale as a deterring factor in security-political decision-making of autocratic countries can no longer be relied upon, and that military forms of deterrence are ultimately more meaningful.⁴² The notion that China’s even greater degree of economic dependence on the outside world than Russia’s would serve as sufficient deterrent against military adventurism, therefore, might not hold. Consequently, there has been a palpable uptick in European analyses and discussions surrounding the risk of escalation in the Taiwan Strait, possible military and economic consequences, and Europe’s role in such a scenario, while exchanges with Western and South Pacific NATO partner states have markedly increased. French President Macron’s initiative during his early April 2023 China visit of implying that Taiwan is not Europe’s problem was quickly rebutted across European capitals, and Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock made it a point during her subsequent China visit to name war over Taiwan a “horror scenario” that would send “shock waves” around the world and deeply affect Europe.⁴³

Finally, European countries in general, and NATO members in particular, have a newfound appreciation of the United States as the ultimate security provider for European NATO member states. Particularly in Germany and France, the realization that a European “strategic autonomy” remains a pipe dream for the foreseeable future due to lack of capabilities, and the fact that Ukraine’s defense effort would likely not be viable without massive US support, has been an unwelcome, yet necessary, reality check.⁴⁴ Finland and Sweden’s applications for NATO accession are a testament to the indispensability of the nuclear umbrella provided by US forces to frontline NATO states. Russia’s decision to withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the nuclear blackmail it employed to keep Western countries from intervening on behalf of Ukraine, and China’s massive expansion of its nuclear arsenal all run counter to European hopes of creating effective arms-control regimes and working toward nuclear threat reduction.⁴⁵ Six years after the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Europeans are needing to accept that there is currently no substitute for nuclear deterrence in the face of the Russian—and, potentially, the Chinese—threat, and that the global trend points toward more nuclear-armed states in the medium term rather than successful arms reduction.⁴⁶ This also implies a newfound sense of European vulnerability to exposure, should the United States become tied down in a conflict with China. All in all, Europe is still reeling from the shock of the war and the challenge it poses to long-held assumptions of economic interdependence and institutionalism as the effective and civilized way to resolve conflicts. Regardless of the war’s ultimate outcome, it is already clear that its humanitarian, economic, political, and security consequences massively complicates the way European states will calibrate their exchanges with China going forward.

Implications of conflicting lessons for deterrence

The collision of these conflicting “lessons” could result in a deterrence trap. If the US increasingly acts on its conviction that China plans to attack on its own initiative in the next few years, the United States is likely to put enormous pressure on Taiwan to prepare to become the next Ukraine, and its self-imposed restraints on security assistance will further erode. US fear of a Chinese attack would increasingly drive a deepening cycle that is bound to cross at least some of China’s red lines.

Deterrence traps, of course, usually have more than one moving part; for its part, China’s actions drive this dangerous dynamic more strongly than those of the United States. China keeps moving the red lines, conducting increasingly provocative military operations around Taiwan, creating provocative situations (such as its “blockade drill” after Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, which included the unprecedented shooting of ballistic missiles over the island), and intensifying efforts to choke off Taiwan’s international breathing space.⁴⁷ Honduras’ switch to China leaves Taipei with only thirteen formal diplomatic partners as of April 2023, demonstrating that Beijing’s “checkbook diplomacy” threatens to flip others soon and making Taipei more reliant on the United States, Japan, and the EU to prevent greater isolation. And, crucially, if war over Taiwan ever breaks out, it will have been because China chose to use lethal force against Taiwan for the first time since 1958, not the other way around.

Upping the military ante to some degree seems necessary as long as China is changing its military posture and behaving aggressively.

An F/A-18E Super Hornet flies over the flight deck of the Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan in the South China Sea. (US Navy)

The key question, therefore, is what steps Washington, Taipei, and others can take to preserve a stable status quo without fueling tensions. Upping the military ante to some degree seems necessary as long as China is changing its military posture and behaving aggressively. The United States is far from alone in seeing a military threat from China, as that perception is shared within much of the region (including Japan, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines etc.), and even Europeans are becoming increasingly worried, despite remaining relatively inattentive to the military details of China’s behavior.

The Ukraine war, therefore, offers all sides a chance to learn how such a situation can be avoided: signaling weakness and indecisiveness on the part of the West before February 24, in any case, was not helpful in avoiding the Ukraine war. In the case of China, there is no reason to assume that signaling weakness and indecisiveness will yield any better outcome. In other words, there is a chance to drive home to China the great risks of going to war, and to signal allied resolve in aiming to avoid a second scenario of the same type as that in Ukraine. However, the Ukraine example has limits when applied to Taiwan, where China’s decision to use force—either to convince Washington or Taipei to reverse actions that cross Beijing’s long-established “red lines” (formal independence, a US military alliance) or to compel unification—likely would not be as opportunistic, or as lacking in constructive strategic aims, as Moscow’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Policy recommendations

The collision of these conflicting “lessons” identified by the United States, China, and Europe could result in a deterrence trap, and China’s actions drive this dangerous dynamic more strongly than those of the United States. However, Washington, Taipei, Brussels, and others can still play important roles in preserving stability without fueling tensions.

Allies must analyze, and urgently address, the reasons why deterrence failed in Ukraine. A key lesson to draw from the Ukraine war should be the realization that deterrence failed for a number of reasons, including naiveté and wishful thinking; a willingness among allies to make themselves overly dependent on Russian energy supplies; a lack of resolve in showing a unified front before aggression; and disregard for basic military preparedness among most of the allies.
Non-kinetic scenarios might be China’s favored option for subduing Taiwan, and could be difficult to effectively address as allies. In light of the military difficulties Russia is experiencing in Ukraine, which came as a surprise to the Chinese leadership, it can be assumed that China might prefer non-military or less decisive options of coercing Taiwan if at all possible, short of a PRC perception that Taiwan has taken actions tantamount to a declaration of independence or an explicit US defense commitment. Allies should wargame and prepare for such non-kinetic scenarios, including blockades, hybrid attacks, and subversion, because a less than clear-cut case of aggression might prove far more difficult to react to as united allies than a clearly attributable violation of the United Nations (UN) Charter as in the case of the Ukraine war.
Information warfare over Taiwan presents a key challenge for allies. Just like Russia, China is highly effective at using information and psychological warfare to its advantage. Likeminded countries in the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific communities should identify and address, in a timely fashion, any false narratives China is spreading to sow discord among them or to shape perceptions in the Global South that are detrimental to the goal of upholding the UN Charter and the principles of the rules-based international order.
“Anti-colonial” and “anti-hegemonial” self-justifying narratives by aggressor states targeting audiences in the Global South should be countered more effectively. China and Russia are jointly positioning themselves as “anti-hegemonial” champions of a multipolar world order and, in some cases, are successful despite the fact that Russia is fighting to regain a former colony, or that the PRC threatens war as it seeks “reunification” over Taiwan, which it has never controlled. Transatlantic allies should, therefore, make sure to correct this self-representation by publicly addressing China’s violations of its own 2013 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Ukraine, signed by Xi Jinping himself, in which China reinforced the security guarantee extended to Ukraine in recognition of its voluntary relinquishment of its nuclear arms via the Budapest Memorandum (Article 2); pledged to assist Ukraine in the protection of its territorial integrity (Article 5), promised not to take any action prejudicial to the sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of Ukraine (Article 6), and is bound to hold “urgent consultations” with Ukraine to develop measures to counter a threat in case of a crisis (Article 7).⁴⁸ Despite China’s obligations under this treaty, Xi didn’t reach out to Zelenskyy until more than a year after the Russian invasion began.⁴⁹ Ukraine, for its part, has always upheld its treaty obligations to China.⁵⁰
Allies should not put too much hope in a “wedge” strategy. Though some political leaders still harbor hopes of driving a wedge between China and Russia, and incentivizing China to work against Russia, there is currently no reason to believe such an approach might yield viable results. Rather, based on recent Chinese leaders’ consistent actions and rhetoric, allies should assume that Beijing continues to share Russia’s strategic vision of challenging, and fundamentally revising, the international rules-based order (as laid out in their joint statement of February 4, 2022). China can, at best, be hindered from throwing its full weight behind Russia in this war, but not weaned from Russia as long as Xi Jinping is in power, due to the countries’ mutual synergies and shared geopolitical interests.⁵¹
Sharing intelligence can bolster credibility and unity among allies and beyond. The US strategy of sharing intelligence prior to the Ukraine war, and the accuracy of that intelligence, was highly effective in foiling a Russian surprise attack and bolstering US credibility among allies. This approach should also be continued with regard to China’s military actions in the Western Pacific. Care should be taken, however, not to repeat the mistake of sharing unreliable assessments, as in the infamous Iraq “weapons of mass destruction” analysis, which damaged US credibility in Europe at the time.

Although NATO is chiefly concerned with the European theater, its member states represent a sizeable share of global GDP, and the economic deterrence they can provide toward China is not to be discounted.

French President Emmanuel Macron talks to other European leaders during the second day of the European Union leaders summit in Brussels, Belgium October 18, 2019. (Aris Oikonomou/Pool via REUTERS)

Frustrations notwithstanding, European allies make valuable contributions to security. From the US perspective, notwithstanding its predilection toward working with the United Kingdom and its existing frustrations with large EU and NATO partners Germany and France, Europe as a whole should not be discounted as a valuable security partner—including as a partner for routine engagement to better understand and track China’s capabilities and intent toward Taiwan in the military, economic, information, and political domains. In particular, the Nordic, Baltic, and many CEE states, and NATO as an organization, have proven capable of quickly drawing meaningful security-related conclusions from the Ukraine war. NATO accession by Finland, soon followed by Sweden’s, can be expected to improve NATO’s effectiveness as a whole, since at least Finland is going to be a net security provider—for instance, in a scenario of the Baltic states coming under threat. Although NATO is chiefly concerned with the European theater, its member states represent a sizeable share of global GDP, and the economic deterrence they can provide toward China is not to be discounted.

Conclusion

The lessons that Washington and Beijing appear to be learning from Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Ukraine’s resistance and counteroffensive, in terms of military effectiveness and deterrence, could set the stage for a crisis over Taiwan in the next few years if those lessons are not accompanied by simultaneous efforts to defuse tensions where that is possible. European allies, just like US allies in Asia, can—and should—play a key role in this. For that, it is necessary to think of Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific not as two distinct theaters, but as interlinked theaters where events in one will inevitably have repercussions in the other. In other words, despite the cost, supporting Ukraine is not a detraction from deterring China if it leads to an outcome in which Russian aggression is thwarted, as that also enhances deterrence regarding Taiwan. At the same time, when the United States is focusing more strongly on the Western Pacific, Europeans need to cease seeing this as “abandoning Europe,” and instead step up their own game to bolster the rules-based international order both at home and abroad, with the means at their disposal.

Understanding more closely why deterrence failed in Ukraine, and exploring how these lessons could be applied to enhancing deterrence, bolstering diplomatic initiatives, and, thereby, hopefully defusing tensions over Taiwan should be high on the agenda of the entire Alliance. After all, all members share the same interest, as does China: finding out how to avoid sleepwalking into a global war.

Acknowledgements

This publication was produced under the auspices of a project conducted in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused on the impact of China on the transatlantic relationship.

About the authors

Fellow

John K. Culver

Global China Hub

China East Asia

John K. Culver is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior intelligence officer with thirty-five years of experience as a leading analyst of East Asian affairs, including security, economic, and foreign-policy dimensions.

Previously as national intelligence officer for East Asia from 2015 to 2018, Culver drove the Intelligence Community’s support to top policymakers on East Asian issues and managed extensive relationships inside and outside government. He produced a large body of sophisticated, leading-edge analysis and mentored widely on analytic tradecraft. He also routinely represented the Intelligence Community to senior US policy, military, academic, private-sector and foreign-government audiences.

Culver is a recipient of the 2013 William L. Langer Award for extraordinary achievement in the CIA’s analytic mission. He was a member of the Senior Intelligence Service and CIA’s Senior Analytic Service. He was also awarded the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal.

Fellow

Sarah Kirchberger

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

China Defense Industry

Dr. Sarah Kirchberger is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She serves as head of Asia-Pacific Strategy and Security at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and vice president of the German Maritime Institute (DMI). Her current work focuses on maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region, emerging technologies in the maritime sphere, Russian–Chinese military-industrial relations, China’s arms industries, and China’s naval and space development.

Before joining ISPK she was assistant professor of contemporary China at the University of Hamburg, and previously worked as a naval analyst with shipbuilder TKMS Blohm + Voss. She is the author of Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications (2015). Her earlier work includes a monograph on informal institutions in the Chinese and Taiwanese political systems as well as studies of reform discourses within the Communist Party of China and of Mainland Chinese perceptions of Taiwan’s post-war transformation. She completed undergraduate and graduate studies in Sinology, Political Science and Archaeology in Hamburg, Taipei, and Trier and holds an MA and a PhD in Sinology from the University of Hamburg.

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Explore the Initiative

Global China Hub

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 15 other programs and centers.

Explore more

Report Feb 2, 2023

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By Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton

Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

China Europe & Eurasia

Report Jan 20, 2023

China and the new globalization

By Franklin D. Kramer

The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined.

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China Economy & Business

1 John A. Tirpak, “IISS: China’s Aggressive Exercises Near Taiwan Are a ‘New Normal,’’ Air & Space Forces Magazine, February 7, 2022, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/iiss-china-aggressive-exercises-near-taiwan-new-normal/; Keoni Everington, “China Reportedly Approves Resolution to Make ‘Taiwan Separatists’ Kill List,” Taiwan News, March 7, 2023, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4828473; “China’s New Reservist Law: Preparing for War,” TableChina, February 9, 2023, https://table.media/china/en/opinion/chinas-new-military-service-law-preparing-for-war; Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass, “To Deter Beijing, What the United States Says Matters,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/deter-beijing-what-united-states-says-matters.

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3 “When Xi Jinping Visited the Members of the CPPCC Meeting, He Emphasized That the Private Economy Should Be Correctly Guided to Develop in a Healthy and High-Quality Way. Wang Huning, Cai Qiding, Ding Xuexiang and Xue Xiang Participated in the Visit and Discussion,” Xinhua, March 6, 2023, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-03/06/c_1129417096.htm.

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6 Michael Kofman, “The Emperors League: Understanding Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, August 6, 2020, http://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-emperors-league-understanding-sino-russian-defense-cooperation/.

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9 Simone McCarthy, “With Zelensky call, Xi Jinping steps up bid to broker peace – but does he have a plan?” CNN, April 27, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/27/china/china-ukraine-xi-jinping-zelensky-call-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html .

10 Jorge Liboreiro, “China and India vote for UN resolution with a reference to Russia’s ‘aggression’ against Ukraine,” EuroNews, May 2, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/05/02/china-and-india-vote-for-un-resolution-with-a-reference-to-russias-aggression-against-ukra .

11 Ivana Karásková, “How China Lost Central and Eastern Europe,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, April 22, 2022, https://www.merics.org/en/short-analysis/how-china-lost-central-and-eastern-europe.

12 Stuart Lau, “New Czech President Risks China’s Rage with Call to Taiwanese Leader,” Politico, January 30, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/petr-pavel-czech-president-elect-taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-china-military/.

13 Sophia Barkoff, “CIA Confirms Possibility of Chinese Lethal Aid to Russia,” CBS News, February 25, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-director-bill-burns-china-russia-lethal-aid/.

14 Milda Seputyte and Ott Tammik, “Latvia, Estonia Join Lithuania in Abandoning Eastern Europe-China Cooperation,” Bloomberg, August 11, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-11/baltic-states-abandon-eastern-european-cooperation-with-china?leadSource=uverify%20wall; Sarah Marsh and Andreas Rinke, “Germany Could Ban China’s Huawei, ZTE from Parts of 5G Networks—Source,” Reuters, March 7, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/germany-set-ban-chinas-huawei-zte-parts-5g-networks-source-2023-03-07.

15 Speech by the President on EU-China Relations,” European Commission, March 30, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063; Stuart Lau, “EU’s von Der Leyen Calls for Tougher Policy on China Ahead of Beijing Visit,” Politico, March 30, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/eus-ursula-von-der-leyen-xi-jinping-calls-for-tougher-policy-on-china-ahead-of-beijing-visit.

16 Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, “How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 22, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts; Kinsey Lindstrom, “Army Celebrates Production of 50,000th GMLRS Rocket and Its Continued Evolution,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, January 12, 2021, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/386831/army-celebrates-production-50000th-gmlrs-rocket-and-its-continued-evolution.

17 Kara Scannell, et al., “Donald Trump Indicted by Manhattan Grand Jury on More than 30 Counts Related to Business Fraud,” CNN, March 30, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/30/politics/donald-trump-indictment/index.html.

18 Ellen Nakashima, “Taiwan Frustrated by Weapons Delays, Key Lawmaker Finds in Stealth Visit,” Washington Post, February 22, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/22/taiwan-weapons-china-gallagher.

19 “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, February 24, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html.

20 “CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China,” White House, August 9, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china.

21 “2022 National Defense Strategy,” US Department of Defense, October 27, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

22 Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, “The U.S. Intelligence Playbook to Expose Russia’s Ukraine War Plans,” New York Times, February 23, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/23/us/politics/intelligence-russia-us-ukraine-china.html.

23 Hope Yen, “CIA Chief: China Has Some Doubt on Ability to Invade Taiwan,” Associated Press, February 26, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-taiwan-politics-united-states-government-eaf869eb617c6c356b2708607ed15759.

24 Nahal Toosi and Lara Seligman, “The U.S. Overestimated Russia’s Military Might. Is It Underestimating China’s?” Politico, June 15, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/15/china-military-00039786.

25 Keir Giles, “Russia’s Nuclear Blackmail Is a Spectacular Success for Putin,” CNN, March 29, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/29/opinions/russia-putin-nuclear-blackmail-belarus-giles/index.html.

26 Harlan Ullman, “Self-Deterrence Does Not Work,” Hill, March 14, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/597985-self-deterrence-does-not-work.

27 Wilhelmine Preussen, “NATO Membership for Ukraine Would Have Prevented War, Says Finland’s PM,” Politico, January 17, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-membership-ukraine-would-have-prevented-russia-war-finland-sanna-marin-prime-minister-says.

28 Gunter Schubert, “Is Taiwanese Society Ready to Face a Belligerent China?” CommonWealth Magazine, June 9, 2021, https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3007.

29 Isabel Muttreja and Bernhard Blumenau, “How Russia’s Invasion Changed German Foreign Policy,” Chatham House, November 18, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/11/how-russias-invasion-changed-german-foreign-policy; Sylvie Kauffmann, “There Are Too Many Russian Skeletons in France’s Closets,” Le Monde, February 8, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/02/08/there-are-too-many-russian-skeletons-in-france-s-closets_6014938_23.html; “Russia-Friendly Austria Breaks with Its Neutrality: ‘Enough Is Enough,’” Vindobona, March 2, 2022, https://www.vindobona.org/article/russia-friendly-austria-breaks-with-its-neutrality-enough-is-enough.

30 Kristin Haugevik Øyvind Svendsen, “More Alignment in Nordic States’ Security and Defence Policies,” Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, December 8, 2021, https://www.nupi.no/en/news/more-alignment-in-nordic-states-security-and-defence-policies; Sinéad Baker, “After Years of Being Ignored, the Countries That Know Putin’s Russia the Best Have Been Proved Totally Right,” Business Insider, October 8, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/countries-that-warned-about-russia-have-been-vindicated-2022-9; David Hutt, “Central and Eastern Europe Want More Security Clout. Will Increased Spending Be Enough?” Euronews, February 14, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/02/14/central-and-eastern-europe-want-more-security-clout-will-increased-spending-be-enough.

31 Teri Schultz, “In Defense, Finland Prepares for Everything,” Deutsche Welle, October 4, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/finland-wins-admirers-with-all-inclusive-approach-to-defense/a-40806163.

32 Max Bergmann, Ilke Toygür, and Otto Svendsen, “A Continent Forged in Crisis: Assessing Europe One Year into the War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 26, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/continent-forged-crisis-assessing-europe-one-year-war.

33 “EU Agrees 2-Billion-Euro Ammunition Plan for Ukraine,” France24, March 20, 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230320-eu-hammers-out-2-bn-euro-ammunition-plan-for-ukraine.

34 “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag, 27 February 2022 in Berlin,” Bundesregierung, February 27, 2022, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378.

35 Lucas Robinson, “Germany’s Identity Crisis: European Security After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” EGF, April 7, 2022, https://egfound.org/2022/04/germanys-identity-crisis-european-security-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine; Piotr Buras, “East Side Story: Poland’s New Role in the European Union,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 16, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/article/east-side-story-polands-new-role-in-the-european-union.

36 Stuart Lau, “You Ain’t No Middleman: EU and NATO Slam China’s Bid to Be a Ukraine Peacemaker,” Politico, February 24, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-russia-china-negotiations-diplomacy-nato-europe-diplomacy-peacemaker.

37 “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis.”

38 Josep Borrell, “The EU Needs a Strategic Approach for the Indo-Pacific,” Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America, March 12, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-needs-strategic-approach-indo-pacific_en?s=253.

39 Chun Han Wong and Chao Deng, “China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats Are Ready to Fight,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-are-ready-to-fight-11589896722; Matthew Reynolds and Matthew P. Goodman, “China’s Economic Coercion: Lessons from Lithuania,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 6, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-economic-coercion-lessons-lithuania.

40 “China in the World,” Munich Security Conference, last visited April 12, 2023, https://securityconference.org/en/msc-2023/agenda/event/china-in-the-world.

41 “Taiwan Strait Crisis: Implications for Europe,” Central European Institute of Asian Studies, October 2, 2022, https://ceias.eu/taiwan-strait-crisis-implications-for-europe.

42 Anniki Mikelsaar, “Taiwan and Europe—Far Away, Not Worlds Apart,” International Centre for Defence and Security, August 16, 2022, https://icds.ee/en/taiwan-and-europe-far-away-not-worlds-apart.

43 Nicolas Camut, “Macron’s China remarks are a ‘disaster’ for Europe, EU conservative leader says,” Politico, April 17, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/macrons-china-remarks-disaster-for-europe-eu-conservative-leader-says-us-manfred-weber-italian-daily-corriere-della-sera/; Philip Oltermann, “German foreign minister warns of ‘horror scenario’ in Taiwan strait,” The Guardian, April 14, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/14/germany-annalena-baerbock-warns-horror-scenario-taiwan-strait-china.

44 Fraser Cameron, “EU Strategic Autonomy—A Perennial Pipe Dream?” European Policy Centre, January 27, 2022, https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/EU-strategic-autonomy-A-perennial-pipe-dream~4565a0.

45 Mary Ilyushina, Robyn Dixon, and Niha Masih, “Putin Says Russia Will Suspend Participation in New START Nuclear Treaty,” Washington Post, February 21, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/21/putin-speech-ukraine-state-of-nation; “2022 China Military Power Report,” US Department of Defense, 2002, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

46 Max Bergmann and Sophia Besch, “Why European Defense Still Depends on America,” Foreign Affairs, March 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-european-defense-still-depends-america.

47 Greg Torode and Yew Lun Tian, “Risks Mount from China Drills near Taiwan during Pelosi Visit—Analysts,” Reuters, August 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/risks-mount-china-drills-near-taiwan-during-pelosi-visit-analysts-2022-08-03.

48 “INDOPACOM Report: ‘PRC-Russia Cooperation—Spotlighting PRC’s Continued Support to Russia Despite Legal Commitments to Ukraine,’” Andrew S. Erickson (blog), February 25, 2023, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2023/02/indopacom-report-prc-russia-cooperation-spotlighting-prcs-continued-support-to-russia-despite-legal-commitments-to-ukraine; “中华人民共和国和乌克兰友好合作条约[PRC-Ukraine Treaty of Friendship & Cooperation]”, People’s Republic of China Treaty Database, Dec. 5, 2013, http://treaty.mfa.gov.cn/tykfiles/20180718/1531877012440.pdf.

49 Simone McCarthy, “With Zelensky call, Xi Jinping steps up bid to broker peace – but does he have a plan?” CNN, April 27, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/27/china/china-ukraine-xi-jinping-zelensky-call-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html .

50 “2013 PRC-Ukraine Treaty of Friendship & Cooperation/Joint Communiqué: Russian, Ukrainian & Chinese Documents, Context, Timeline,” Andrew S. Erickson (blog), August 21, 2022,https://www.andrewerickson.com/2022/08/2013-prc-ukraine-treaty-of-friendship-cooperation-joint-communique-russian-ukrainian-chinese-documents-context-timeline.

51 Kofman, “The Emperors League.”

The post US-China lessons from Ukraine: Fueling more dangerous Taiwan tensions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Kyiv: Ukraine deserves NATO membership and even more robust weapons

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 04 Jun 2023 11:45:00 +0000

The air raid siren sounded at 3:00 a.m. on Thursday morning, several hours after the Atlantic Council’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his well-fortified offices, sounding the arrival of ten Russian Iskander ballistic missiles in Kyiv airspace.

Each of them—more than twenty feet long and weighing in at more than four tons—served as a further reminder that the time was over for providing half measures in supporting Ukraine. After fifteen months of withstanding and pushing back against Moscow’s aggression—acting in the interests of free people everywhere—Ukraine deserves support: faster and larger deliveries of ammunition, more plentiful supplies of Patriot and other air defenses, longer-range missiles to hit targets within Russia (that are killing Ukrainians) and, as rapidly as possible, F-16s and other fourth-generation fighter jets to reduce Moscow’s deadly air superiority.

Most of all, Ukraine deserves NATO membership. Given the generational consequences of Ukrainians’ struggles, NATO should provide much clearer and more robust security guarantees to Ukraine at the Alliance’s Vilnius summit in July. Most urgently, NATO should provide a concrete path to membership, including the timing and avenues for a fast-track accession decision by the Alliance’s seventy-fifth-anniversary summit in Washington next April. To put that off until after Russia’s war ends or until Russia withdraws from Ukrainian territory only encourages Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression.

Mercifully on that Thursday morning, US-provided Patriot air defense systems took out all of the incoming Iskanders, but the fragments still killed three Ukrainians (including a woman and her nine-year-old child) and injured eleven others, adding to the victims from Russia’s murderous war. Dozens more would have been killed this week, the deadliest week in Kyiv in months, had the United States and other allied systems not been put in place in April, after long months of discussions.

After Ukrainian reports that Patriot missiles shot down a Russian hypersonic weapon for the first time on May 4 and six more in a single night two weeks later, Zelenskyy reflected with one of his top advisers on how many hundreds more Ukrainian lives might have been saved had the deliveries come faster. He also pondered how many more Ukrainians might die on the front lines in the coming summer offensive because the F-16s won’t be providing air cover for months to come, telling the Wall Street Journal that the lack of protection means “a large number of soldiers will die.”

However, in our meeting with Zelenskyy this week, where we presented him with the Atlantic Council Global Citizen Award, he adopted his more familiar public posture of looking forward and doing what he can to maintain domestic and international unity.

“I’m not looking at the past, but rather to the future,” he said. “We have to achieve comparable airpower to Russia in the sky.” He spoke about the historic cost not just to Ukraine, but also to Europe, the United States, and the world, should his country come up short. “We can’t be losers,” he said.

And that brought him to NATO’s upcoming Vilnius summit.

His advisers have briefed him on the options allies are said to be discussing regarding Ukraine, ranging from a security relationship akin to that between the United States and Israel, of robust weapons deliveries and intelligence exchanges, to the renaming and repurposing of a body at which NATO meets regularly with Ukraine in order to give it more heft.

Zelenskyy noted that Ukraine lacks the deterrent power of Israel’s nuclear capabilities, which it gave up along with Kazakhstan and Belarus after signing the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in 1994, when Russia provided assurances that it wouldn’t use military force or economic coercion against Ukraine or the others.

Given the urgency of their war with Russia, most Ukrainians would see a more robust consultative body within NATO as window dressing if it didn’t come with membership certainties. More NATO members are coming to realize that as well, with French President Emmanuel Macron telling the GLOBSEC conference in Slovakia this week that Ukraine deserved to be included “in an architecture of security.”

As Zelenskyy said to our delegation, “if Ukraine will not be given some hope at Vilnius, it will be demoralizing for our soldiers. It will be seen as a big message to our soldiers and people.”

If NATO doesn’t come forward with “more ambitious ideas” at its summit, Zelenskyy indicated to us, it might not be appropriate for him to accept the Alliance’s invitation to attend. “I don’t want to betray our people,” he said, sensing Ukrainians would feel underappreciated for the irreplaceable role they are playing on Europe’s front lines against Russian aggression.

“We need the world not to be afraid of Russia,” he said. His unstated message was clear: The world’s fears about Russia’s potential escalation of its war in Ukraine, up to and including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, have prevented more robust support at earlier stages—but that was the opposite of what would better deter Putin.

A short week’s stay in Ukraine underscores two inescapable realities as the country braces for its long-anticipated summer counteroffensive, which is expected to begin in the coming days.

The first reality is that without the remarkable level of US and partner support thus far, it would have been impossible for Ukrainians to have held the line against Russian adversaries, who are more numerous, are well-armed, and maintain still far superior airpower.

The second reality, however, is that the cautiousness and relative slowness in those deliveries of support have prevented the Ukrainians from making more rapid gains, made it harder to prevent civilian casualties, and made it harder for Ukraine to retake enough territory to force Russia to the negotiating table, prolonging the war.

As certainly as West Berlin’s survival was a pre-condition for Cold War victory, and as certainly as Poland’s Solidarity movement and democratic change laid the ground for Soviet collapse, so it is now Ukraine’s fate as a free and democratic nation—integrated into the European Union and NATO—that will be at the center of the context for Europe’s future.

Our Kyiv interlocutors (Ukrainian military strategists) see three potential scenarios for their coming summer counteroffensive.

The first, and most desired but least likely outcome, would be a complete Russian military collapse and retreat. The second, and more likely outcome, would be for Ukraine to achieve sufficient battlefield and territorial gains in the nearly twenty percent of Ukraine that remains in Russian hands to force a Putin reassessment and better negotiating terms. The third, and the most feared outcome, would be a Ukrainian failure in the summer offensive that would demoralize Ukrainians and dishearten their international backers.

The stakes for Ukraine in the coming months are enormous. Yet the stakes for the United States and Ukraine’s other friends may be even greater over time. In recognizing that, it will be easier to make the tough decisions regarding weapons and NATO membership that are so urgently required.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 Fake Signals and American Insurance: How a Dark Fleet Moves Russian Oil
Christiaan Triebert, Blacki Migliozzi, Alexander Cardia, Muyi Xiao, and David Botti | NEW YORK TIMES

In this powerful report, New York Times reporters track several cargo ships moving oil between Russia and China in violation of US sanctions and explain the technology and methodology these cargo ships use.

“The vessels,” they report, “are part of a so-called dark fleet, a loose term used to describe a hodgepodge array of ships that obscure their locations or identities to avoid oversight from governments and business partners.”

Moreover, as the Times points out, such tactics are not isolated to Russia. “[The dark fleet’s ships] have typically been involved in moving oil from Venezuela or Iran—two countries that have also been hit by international sanctions,” the authors write. “The latest surge of dark fleet ships began after Russia invaded Ukraine and the West tried to limit Moscow’s oil revenue with sanctions.” Read more →

#2 Bakhmut and the spirit of Verdun
ECONOMIST

The Economist compares the Russian assault on Bakhmut with the German assault on Verdun over one hundred years ago during World War I, and considers how Ukraine’s heroic defense has ground down the Russians and upheld the Ukrainian spirit of heroic defiance.

“Above all,” the Economist writes, “each place has acquired a symbolic importance that outweighs its original strategic value. At Verdun, the French were caught ill-prepared. Under Philippe Pétain’s command, they built resistance around the rotation of forces, limiting soldiers’ time at the front and supplying the effort by road from Bar-le-Duc. ‘They shall not pass’ became the Verdun battle cry, a defiant call to hold the town, just as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called Bakhmut ‘our fortress.’”

“‘What Bakhmut shares with Verdun is the notion of prestige,’ says Nicolas Czubak, a historian at the Verdun Memorial. The war was not won or lost at Verdun; but the French turned it into an emblem of strength that made retreat unthinkable.” Read more →

#3 How the US is deepening military alliances in China’s backyard
Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille | FINANCIAL TIMES

To understand the Biden administration’s increased efforts to counter China using alliances, read this Financial Times report on the steps the United States has taken to build up a Pacific security architecture and what remains to be done.

The FT notes that “the US is not only focused on its biggest allies. It has also been forced to step up cooperation with smaller Pacific Island nations after Beijing shocked Washington last year by signing a security pact with the Solomon Islands. In response, the US last week signed a security pact with Papua New Guinea and extended so-called Compact of Free Association agreements with Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia—deals that will give the US military exclusive access to facilities for two decades.”

“Arguably the biggest challenge for the US, however,” the FT reports, “is to get its allies to the point where they are conducting joint operational exercises based on actual joint war plans. This particularly applies to Japan and Australia, the nations most likely to fight alongside the US in a war in the region.” Read more →

#4 The Illusion of China’s AI Prowess
Helen Toner, Jenny Xiao, and Jeffery Ding | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As this smart Foreign Affairs analysis explains, one of the great ironies of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s much touted authoritarian model is that the censorship it necessitates also hobbles China’s development of artificial intelligence (AI), by drastically limiting what Chinese scientists can include in the large language models, or LLMs, that underlie AI chatbot technology.

“Over the past three years,” Toner, Xiao, and Ding write, “Chinese labs have rapidly followed in the footsteps of US and British companies, building AI systems similar to OpenAI’s GPT-3 (the forerunner to ChatGPT), Google’s PaLM, and DeepMind’s Chinchilla. But in many cases, the hype surrounding Chinese models has masked a lack of real substance. Chinese AI researchers we have spoken with believe that Chinese LLMs are at least two or three years behind their state-of-the-art counterparts in the United States—perhaps even more. Worse, AI advances in China rely a great deal on reproducing and tweaking research published abroad, a dependence that could make it hard for Chinese companies to assume a leading role in the field. If the pace of innovation slackened elsewhere, China’s efforts to build LLMs—like a slower cyclist coasting in the leaders’ slipstream—would likely decelerate.” Read more →

#5 To Protect Europe, Let Ukraine Join NATO—Right Now
Andriy Zagorodnyuk | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this must-read essay, former Ukrainian defense minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk (an Atlantic Council distinguished fellow) makes a strong case for immediate Ukrainian membership of NATO.

“It is time, then, to let Ukraine join—not sooner or later, but now,” Zagorodnyuk writes. “By entering the Alliance, the country will secure its future as part of the West, and it can be sure the United States and Europe will continue to help it fight against Moscow. Europe, too, will reap security benefits by allowing Ukraine to join the Alliance. It is now apparent that the continent is not ready to defend itself and that its politicians have largely overestimated its security. Indeed, Europe will never be secure from Russia until it can militarily stop Moscow’s attacks. And no state is more qualified to do so than Ukraine.”

“Ukraine should join NATO right away,” Zagorodnyuk adds. “But unfortunately, it will almost certainly have to wait. It takes a unanimous vote to add a country to the Alliance, and there are still far too many governments that remain opposed to the country’s ascension. But in Vilnius, NATO should at least move beyond vague promises about Ukraine’s future and get down to the specifics of helping Kyiv join the organization. It is time for Western states to stand firm against bullies and stop giving Russia (or any other outside state) a voice in the security architecture of an organization that considers it an adversary. Instead, now is the time for NATO to start strengthening itself, and bringing in Ukraine is essential to accomplishing this task. No state, after all, knows more about how to fight back against the Kremlin. In fact, no country has more current experience fighting large-scale wars anywhere. Ukraine’s only peer is Russia itself.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jun 2, 2023

Five questions (and expert answers) about the recent clashes in Kosovo

By Atlantic Council experts

Protests this week in Kosovo when local officials took office resulted in injuries to NATO peacekeeping troops—and in fears of a further escalation of violence. Atlantic Council experts answer the critical questions.

Conflict Crisis Management

Fast Thinking May 28, 2023

What the world should expect from Erdogan now

By Atlantic Council

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan triumphed in his re-election bid on Sunday. Our experts break down what to expect next on the war in Ukraine, NATO enlargement, Syria, and more.

Conflict Elections

New Atlanticist Jun 1, 2023

China stands to gain from a weakened Russia. The West should prepare now.

By Andrew A. Michta

A protracted war of attrition in Ukraine serves Beijing’s interests in that it will lead to the long-term weakening of Russia, thereby fundamentally shifting the Sino-Russian power balance in China’s favor.

China Politics & Diplomacy

The post Dispatch from Kyiv: Ukraine deserves NATO membership and even more robust weapons appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Belgorod incursion brings deluge of online mockery of Russia’s defenses

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 25 May 2023 19:09:42 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Tracking narratives

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

International response

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Drone imagery from a burning border control outpost in the Russian region of Belgorod sparked a frenzy on social media this week. According to Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps and other Russian nationals crossed from Ukraine into Belgorod Oblast and attacked a border outpost in Grayvoron. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, claimed responsibility for the attack; the Free Russia Legion also claimed responsibility.

An assessment by Russian news outlet RBC regarding the broader situation in Belgorod indicated an armed incursion, with shelling and artillery fire reported. On the evening of May 22, Russian government declared a state of counterterrorist emergency in Belgorod Oblast. Although the governor of the oblast did not officially issue an order to evacuate the civilian population immediately, footage and photographs posted on social media indicated that at least some residents evacuated to other areas in the region. Meduza also reported several drone strikes on the city of Belgorod itself.

Conflicting reports emerged on May 23 after Russian officials lifted the counterterrorist alert. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have “liquidated” around seventy “saboteurs,” reporting from the news outlet Mash indicated the deployment of additional Russian law enforcement in nearby Bryansk Oblast. In an effort to support their assertions of having eliminated the insurgency, Russian news outlets also released photos of military-class vehicles allegedly used by the insurgents stuck in the mud; some open-source analysts, however, questioned the authenticity of the photos. Russian media chased these reports with claims of destroyed Ukrainian tanks, while the Russian Volunteer Corps posted footage to Telegram seemingly showing intact military equipment.

Shortly after the news broke out, footage of a drone attack on the local Russian border outpost, APP Grayvoron, appeared on the outpost’s Google Maps profile, though it was later deleted. At the time of writing, it had been replaced with footage showing a convoy of vehicles, one flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps.

The Google Maps profile for a Russian border outpost in Belgorod featured a video of a mechanized convoy flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps. (Source: Google Maps/archive)

Simultaneously, trolling reviews appeared on the border outpost’s Google Maps profile, calling the border guards “friendly” and the facilities “understaffed.” These too have been deleted, though not before they were documented by the Saint Javelin Twitter account and other Twitter users.

Trolls post mocking reviews of Russia’s Belgorod border post. (Source: @SaintJavelin/archive)

Other trolls took to Twitter, where members of the NAFO meme movement, a pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian community on the platform, renamed their account to “Government of The Bilhorod’s Peoples Republic” as a joking reference to the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics. “Bilhorod” is the Ukrainian name for Belgorod.

NAFO meme account @nitro19820 changes its Twitter name and bio to joke that it now represented a new “People’s Republic” in Belgorod. (Source: @nitro19820/archive)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Following the apparent border incursion into Belgorod Oblast and subsequent attacks on the region, pro-war military bloggers condemned Moscow’s handling of the war in Ukraine, including its border defenses.

Telegram channel Vоенкор Котенок Z (“Milblogger Kitten Z”) criticized the Kremlin for being late in declaring a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod and not knowing how to fight “for real.” “There is a war, and in Russia … they are afraid to call the war a war,” stated the Telegram post.

The channel ДШРГ Русич (“DShRG Rusich”) questioned “commanders of all levels” on how the incursion happened. It also blamed Russia’s intelligence services for failing to reveal “plans of an enemy.” The channel added that as long as there is no photographic evidence of corpses or burned equipment, “the enemy has no losses, and the [Russian] propagandists crapped themselves a little, saying that everything is fine.”

The Kotsnews Telegram channel addressed pro-Kremlin pundits who dismissed military blogger concerns as “hysteria” by insisting that the threat to Russian territory is real and that there are uncomfortable questions around Russia’s defensive capabilities that nobody wants to ask. “What is happening with our technical equipment at the border, surveillance systems, tracking, motion detection?” the channel asked. “What about the mining of potentially dangerous areas? What about anti-tank weapons? Why did the enemy armored group calmly penetrate deep into our territory?”

As Russia’s war against Ukraine has dragged on, the frequency and intensity of pro-war military bloggers’ criticism have increased and become bolder. The DFRLab has previously covered how Russian military bloggers criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Ministry of Defense.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

On May 20, a series of so-called “World Wide Freedom Rallies” took place in many cities around the world. The Telegram account for Simeon Boikov, a pro-Kremlin activist and blogger in Australia, claimed to have organized the Sydney edition of the rally, part of a decentralized movement that originated in 2021 to express dissatisfaction with COVID security measures. Boikov promoted a poster for the event on April 6, a day before the event announcement on the movement’s official Telegram channel.

The rally ostensibly focused on demanding the release of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who is currently being held in London facing potential extradition to the United States. After the event, however, Boikov highlighted a speech by Assange’s father, John Shipton, in a video showing scenes from the rally and emphasized that Shipton was wearing a “double headed eagle and St George’s ribbons,” both of which are Russian symbols. Additional videos and images from the rally showed many people carrying Russian flags and wearing pro-Kremlin symbols.

Kremlin-controlled media outlets emphasized in their headlines not just the pro-Russia nature of the event, but also claims of anti-NATO sentiment, which appear to have been exaggerated. Reviewing footage from the event, the DFRLab identified only one instance of someone sporting anti-NATO messaging. Nonetheless, Russian media embraced the event as specifically anti-NATO, including state outlets Gazeta.ru, TASS, RIA Novosti, and Komsomolyskaya Pravda, and pro-Kremlin media such as News Front, Inforeactor, Ekonomika Segodnya. Additionally, The Eastern Herald, an Indian media outlet, and Belarus state-controlled television both framed the event as anti-NATO in their English-language publications.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

On May 22, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had amended its list of sanctioned entities and individuals by adding seventy-one entities that the US government had determined to be acting “contrary to [US] national security or foreign policy interests.” Alongside Russian companies, one Kyrgyz company, Tro.Ya LLC, and one Armenian company, Medisar LLC, were included in the amended list. According to the Department of Commerce, both companies engaged in conduct that “prevented the successful accomplishment of an end-use check.” In other words, the Department of Commerce suspected that the final destination for the products was Russia but the companies themselves had obfuscated this information.

Medisar LLC, which was registered in Armenia in 2001, is an importer of chemicals and laboratory equipment. The company is one of the thousand largest taxpayers in Armenia, paying about one million dollars in taxes in 2022. It also has a longstanding trade history with Russian companies. On its website, Medisar indicates that one of its trading partners, dating back to 2011, is Russian company Minimed.

Screenshot from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) Aleph database, made available through Friends of OCCRP access, about Medisar’s trade. The third and fourth companies on the list are both OOO Minimed, a Russian company with a long-term trading relationship with Medisar. (Source: DFRLab via OCCRP)

On May 20, Armenian investigative website Hetq reported that data obtained from the country’s customs service showed that in 2022, Medisar exported equipment from Armenia to Russia, including electronic integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices.

A company executive who did not want to be identified acknowledged to RFE/RL that Medisar imported chemicals and laboratory equipment from the United States and the European Union and re-exported them to Russia.

Medisar is the second-largest company registered in Armenia to be sanctioned by the United States. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the other firm, TAKO, in April. The company is in the wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts. TAKO, spelled TACO in Armenia’s legal entities register, was registered in May 2022 in Armenia and is fully owned by a Russian citizen, according to public registry records.

On April 18, the New York Times reported that in 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more chips and processors from the United States and 212 percent more from the European Union than in 2021, and that Armenia exported 97 percent of those same products to Russia.

During a May 22 press conference, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that despite Armenia’s “strategic” relationship with Russia and membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, the country “cannot afford to come under Western sanctions.” Pashinyan underscored that if Armenia faced sanctions, “it wouldn’t be good for any of our allies, while we would ruin our relations with our Western partners.”

A joint “compliance note” issued on March 2 by the US Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, titled “Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls,” mentioned Armenia, along with China, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, as “transshipment points commonly used to illegally redirect restricted items to Russia or Belarus.”

According to the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, Russian-Armenian trade soared in 2022, including exports to Russia, which nearly tripled to $2.4 billion.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Belgorod incursion brings deluge of online mockery of Russia’s defenses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How to hold the Assad regime accountable, even as countries normalize relations with Syria

Elise Baker — Thu, 25 May 2023 17:21:57 +0000

Not long ago, countries in the Arab League condemned Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s “mass slaughter” and demanded accountability for his regime’s chemical weapon attacks. Today, those words ring hollow as Assad was warmly welcomed back into the Arab League this month.

This latest step in normalizing ties with Assad was met with protests in northern Syria and feelings of disgust and anger among Syrians who fled the country and the Assad regime’s crimes. Many are left with questions about whether Assad and his regime will ever face justice.

There are many reasons to think that countries’ moves to normalize relations with Assad could make it more difficult to hold him and his regime accountable for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. But there still remains a slate of accountability tools for Syria. In fact, certain avenues for seeking accountability may be expanding with normalization.

Universal jurisdiction trials

One of the few accountability tools currently employed for Syria is the framework of universal jurisdiction, which enables domestic courts to try atrocity crimes committed outside of their borders based on the premise that the crime is so grave that it threatens the international community as a whole. Many countries only allow cases to proceed if a suspect is present within their borders, and thus there have been a limited number of cases on Syria. Many of these cases have focused on terrorism charges and only a few have been against Assad regime–linked perpetrators.

With normalization, Assad and his regime’s senior leadership may increasingly travel outside of Syria and the region. Any country wanting to support Syrians’ demands for accountability should ensure they have the laws and resources available to arrest, investigate, and prosecute any suspected war criminal who ends up on their soil.

Most perpetrators will likely avoid traveling to countries in Western Europe that oppose normalization and are known for bringing universal jurisdiction cases, such as Germany and France. However, universal jurisdiction laws extend outside of Western Europe, to Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and even some countries in the Middle East. While most of these countries have rarely or even never used their universal jurisdiction laws, concerted advocacy by civil society in Syria and the relevant country, combined with support or resources from countries with more practice on universal jurisdiction cases, could help change the tide.

Where perpetrators are found in countries that fail to try them under universal jurisdiction frameworks, countries could also follow the example set by Belgium in seeking to prosecute former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. This could include issuing arrest warrants under their universal jurisdiction laws, following up with extradition requests wherever perpetrators are found, and bringing cases at the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals to ultimately ensure trials.

Trials of senior leadership in national courts

While universal jurisdiction trials typically require the presence of a perpetrator, some civil law countries allow for certain trials to proceed in absentia, provided there are sufficient safeguards to protect a defendant’s fair trial rights. For example, France can hold in absentia trials when the victim is a national of that country. French authorities are using these laws to try three architects of the Assad regime’s detention and torture apparatus—Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdel Salam Mahmoud—for their alleged role in arbitrarily detaining, torturing, and killing a father and son who were French-Syrian dual nationals. This trial will not result in the imprisonment of the accused if they are found guilty, at least for now. It will, however, serve as a powerful moment for Syrian victims and lawyers to present evidence against those responsible for designing and ordering atrocity crimes in Syria.

To help close the justice gap for Syria, countries with authority to hold in absentia trials should explore opportunities that may be available and fill strategic gaps in the Syria accountability space. For example, this might include cases against high-level perpetrators who may be less likely to travel to countries with universal jurisdiction trials but whose cases may have significant symbolic importance for victims.

While universal jurisdiction trials are proceeding slowly for Syria, many countries have been eager to bring universal jurisdiction cases related to Ukraine. In the past year, Germany, Canada, and other countries have opened structural investigations to begin building universal jurisdiction cases against Russian perpetrators. These countries should proactively investigate links between the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria to ensure that any future trials related to Ukraine also incorporate relevant links to Syria. For example, a Russian commander responsible for atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have committed those same crimes in Syria. Officials liable for the use of Iranian drones to facilitate atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have done the same in Syria. Or Syrian soldiers reportedly recruited to Ukraine may have committed atrocity crimes in Syria.

Whenever an apprehended perpetrator is suspected of committing crimes in both Ukraine and Syria, both sets of crimes should feature in a universal jurisdiction trial.

Ensuring reparations for Syrian victims

One element of justice, in addition to trials determining legal responsibility for crimes, is reparations for victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, countries have eagerly explored legal avenues to seize Russian assets and use the proceeds to ensure reparations and reconstruction in Ukraine. As recently as May 17, the Council of Europe established a register of damages for Ukraine as a first step toward ensuring compensation for Ukrainian victims. Lest countries want to support selective justice, they should explore the application of these legal tools to ensure that Syrian victims also receive reparations for the harm they have suffered.

Normalization will ensure that individuals connected to the Assad regime have increasing access to global financial markets. These perpetrators could attempt to purchase properties overseas or place their money in foreign banks. This, in turn, would increase legal pathways to seize assets and repurpose them as reparations for Syrian victims.

Countries could also fund reparations for Syrian victims using existing pools of funding obtained as a result of violations in Syria—for example, the $778 million judgment against the French industrial company Lafarge for violations in Syria, or proceeds from sanctions violations, or the assets of Bashar al-Assad’s uncle Rifaat al-Assad, which France seized after finding him guilty of corruption.

Cases at the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is not investigating crimes committed in Syria because Syria is not a member state of the ICC and because Russia and China vetoed a United Nations Security Council referral to the ICC. However, Syria does not fall entirely outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Using the precedent established for Myanmar in 2019, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan could open an investigation into crimes committed in Syria that resulted in forced deportation to Jordan, an ICC member state.

The ICC is a particularly important accountability avenue to activate for Syria. An ICC investigation would, for example, make available additional resources to investigate and build cases. It would also send a message to Assad because the ICC can issue arrest warrants for and try sitting heads of state. National courts do not have this authority under international law. Thus, while Assad is still in power, the ICC is virtually the only avenue to secure his arrest and subsequent trial. And the modern era of accountability has seen relatively high success for ensuring that heads of state or major military forces who are subject to arrest warrants or indictments face accountability.

Khan has received multiple requests to open an investigation into Syria but has thus far failed to do so. A referral of Syria by an ICC member state would significantly increase the likelihood of an investigation. Dozens of countries were motivated last year to refer Ukraine to the ICC and should consider doing the same for Syria.

Cases at the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also can ensure accountability for Syria by hearing a case against the state (in contrast, the ICC tries cases against individual perpetrators). The Netherlands and Canada are preparing to bring the first ICJ case against Syria for violations of the Convention Against Torture.

Countries could bring other cases against Syria at the ICJ, for example, for violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since Syria acceded to the convention in September 2013—a month after carrying out a sarin gas attack near Damascus that reportedly killed 1,300 people—the Assad regime has been accused of hundreds of chemical weapons attacks. Any member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention that wishes to support accountability could bring a case against Syria at the ICJ.

The trend towards normalizing relations with Assad was not inevitable. Normalization is happening now because states have failed to use existing accountability tools to bring Assad and his regime to justice. But the tools are still available, and some opportunities to use them may be increasing. Justice for the horrors experienced by millions of Syrians is long overdue, and more concerted efforts by countries to pursue justice may help counter the trend in normalization.

Elise Baker is a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. Previously, she worked at the United Nations International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria and led Physicians for Human Rights’ Syria Mapping Project, which documented attacks on Syria’s health care system.

The post How to hold the Assad regime accountable, even as countries normalize relations with Syria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

G7 triumphs and the debt ceiling quagmire provide a glimpse into competing futures for US global leadership

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 21 May 2023 18:45:00 +0000

The collision of this weekend’s Group of Seven (G7) meetings and the ongoing drama of US debt ceiling negotiations—prompting US President Joe Biden to cut his Asia trip short—underscores both the enduring promise of the United States’ global leadership and the growing perils of its decline.

On the positive side, Biden’s common cause with fellow leaders of the world’s democracies has produced new progress in supporting Ukraine’s military ahead of a crucial spring offensive (including the United States training of F-16 pilots and eventual provision of advanced fighter jets), additional steps sanctioning Russia for its criminal war, and its first statement by the G7 ever aimed at Chinese economic coercion.

In a powerful message of support to the world, the G7 in Japan hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy alongside invited guests from the Global South—including seating him beside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—who has been the most prominent leader of a major democracy who has failed to side with Ukraine’s struggle.

Seldom since the birth of the G7 ahead of the oil crisis of 1973 has the group been this unified and effective. The meeting also underscored the staying power of the G7, based on a commitment to pluralism and representative government, that as of 2020 accounted for half of the world’s net wealth ($200 trillion).

That said, it represents only 10 percent of the world’s population, comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus the European Union (EU) as a “non-enumerated member.” (The EU has full membership rights, though it cannot chair meetings and is not counted as the eighth member.)

On the downside, US partners around the world regard the US domestic political dysfunctions that the debt-ceiling negotiations have highlighted as new evidence that Washington cannot be relied upon to provide the financial or political stability they all crave. How, they ask, can a country whose own domestic fabric is so frayed be relied upon to prevent the unraveling of the global system of institutions, values, and rules that these same democracies forged after World War II?

Nothing would pose a greater danger to the world economy than a US sovereign default. Most global investors and US allies are wagering that Washington’s warring parties will solve the debt ceiling impasse before the June 1 deadline, but that will not alter their longer-term worries about US leadership. Recent US bank failures, the unsettling political violence of January 6, 2021, and the growing prospect of a Donald Trump electoral rerun in 2024 has US partners hoping for the best but worried about the worst.

You can forgive Americans for not being all that concerned that Biden, in order to head off the debt-ceiling disaster, called off his stop in Papua New Guinea—an island nation of 14.8 million citizens around 6,600 miles southwest of the continental United States, which few Americans have heard of and even fewer will ever visit.

Yet Biden’s canceled stop underscores a larger issue of the United States losing traction globally by leaving a vacuum for Chinese and Russian economic and political influence—in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. Previous American presidents have canceled foreign visits to address domestic crises—US presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama among them—but self-inflicted wounds are more damaging at this time of expanding Chinese sway and ambition.

It would have been the first-ever visit of a sitting US president to Papua New Guinea, a visit that prompted Port Moresby to declare a national holiday to mark Biden’s visit. Washington’s political dysfunction undermined months of assiduous diplomacy and planning and has set back US efforts to counter Chinese military, diplomatic, and economic investments in these strategically placed island nations.

Over the short term, there is no issue of greater significance to the future of the rules-based global system than providing Ukraine the military wherewithal to prevail against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Over the longer term, however, the US ability to shape the global future alongside its partners and allies will be decided primarily by non-military competition globally and America’s ability to address its weaknesses at home.

Beyond the need to address political polarization, another urgent challenge the United States faces is maintaining its global technological leadership. Though Washington has done much to support that effort with the promise of its recent CHIPS and Science Act, it still has done far too little to attract the world’s best and brightest talent.

“The United States is still the world’s most attractive country for immigrants,” writes former Google chief executive officer Eric Schmidt in Foreign Affairs, noting that more than half of US companies valued at more than one billion dollars were founded or co-founded by immigrants. “But if Washington wants to stay ahead … it must act to remove the needless complexities to make its immigrant system more transparent and create new pathways for the brightest minds to come to the United States.”

This week’s Economist also argues that Biden’s global “doctrine,” outlined recently by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Brookings Institution, is “too timid and pessimistic.”

Sullivan spoke expansively about the need for a new consensus, driven by Biden’s pursuit of a modern industrial and innovation strategy, at home and with partners around the world. He laid out the reasons why charges that this approach was “America alone, or American and the West to the exclusion of others, is just flat wrong.”

The Economist pushes back: “Mr. Biden has backed Ukraine and revived NATO and alliances in Asia. Yet America’s unpredictable economic nationalism and unwillingness to offer access to its markets undermines its influence. Europe fears a subsidy race and worries escalating tensions with China will cause it severe damage.”

What the Economist calls for is a mixture of greater consistency and self-confidence that characterized US policies in the 1940s and early 1950s when America built the world order that Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Putin have now quite explicitly said they want to replace with something more conducive to their interests.

“Such a revived global order would be the best defence against an autocratic one led by China,” the Economist argues. “Unfortunately the Biden doctrine fails to rebut the narrative of American decline and so has not resolved the tension between the country’s toxic politics and its role as the linchpin of a liberal order. Unless America looks out at the world with self-confidence, it will struggle to lead it.”

Because if the United States struggles to lead, Putin’s war in Ukraine will be just the beginning of a lost era.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 A conversation with Henry Kissinger
ECONOMIST

Read every word of this wide-ranging Economist interview with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who at nearly a hundred years old remains one of the preeminent strategic thinkers of our times or any time. (He is also the Atlantic Council’s longest serving board member.) In this two-day conversation, he is as much oracle as strategist.

“We are on the path to great power confrontation,” Kissinger says. “And what makes it more worrisome to me is that both sides have convinced themselves that the other represents a strategic danger. And it is a strategic danger in a world in which the decisions of each can determine the likelihood of conflict.”

“How does the threat compare to previous episodes,” asks the Economist.

“Let me answer, in terms of the evolution of my thinking,” responds Kissinger. “The nature of sovereignty begins with the definition of interests of states. And it is also inherent that sovereign interests will not always coincide, and that nations will need to explain their interests to each other. So if either of those elements come into being where those interests are close enough to permit a negotiation of differences, it becomes a mediating influence. Where sovereign nations use force to prevent outcomes, military conflict may occur.”

Throughout his discussion of weighty topics, Kissinger nonetheless maintains his classic self-deprecating humor. “I won’t be around to see it either way,” he tells the Economist on the outcome of the US-China relationship, speaking “with a characteristic twinkle.” Read more →

#2 To compete with China on tech, America needs to fix its immigration system
Eric Schmidt | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this compelling essay, former Google chief executive officer Eric Schmidt argues for the importance of reforming the US immigration system if the United States wants to effectively compete with China.

“In fact,” writes Schmidt, “the US government already has a successful history of using such a strategy in the decades around World War II. In the 1930s and 1940s, the United States succeeded in attracting a whole generation of talent, including such luminaries as Albert Einstein and Enrico Fermi. The two left Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, respectively, before coming to the United States, where their research, along with that of other émigré scientists, was instrumental to the Manhattan Project. Today, Washington needs to do more to attract leading scientists from nonaligned or even hostile countries, even if doing so requires more extensive security screening.”

Schmidt argues, for example, that the United States has not done enough to attract Russian or Chinese scientists and innovators.

“Since 2000, Chinese STEM Ph.D.’s have created startups valued at over $100 billion. If Washington wants innovators to start their businesses in the United States, rather than in China, it must be more welcoming to Chinese talent. Although much has been made in Washington of the security risks posed by a few foreign researchers who have been accused of intellectual property theft, far greater harm will be done to the country over the long term by keeping out entrepreneurial Chinese scientists.” Read more →

#3 The vanishing acts of Vladimir Putin
Joshua Yaffa | NEW YORKER

For an authoritarian leader who has plunged his country into a major, catastrophic war, Putin has been curiously absent from public view. The New Yorker’s Joshua Yaffa examines this curious angle on the Russian leader’s behavior.

“One of the seeming paradoxes of the Putin system,” Yaffa writes, “is the degree to which its figurehead is at once a unitary micromanager and an absent, aloof, and often indecisive leader. During the past decade, I have heard stories of Putin signing off on the appointments of mid-level executives to Gazprom, the state energy company; yet I also watched how he effectively withdrew during the pandemic, leaving covid-response measures to ministers and governors. The war in Ukraine, now in its fifteenth month, is perhaps the most dramatic example of Putin’s tendency to both hoard authority and shirk the responsibility that comes with it. The decision to invade was Putin’s own, the result of his pent-up grievances toward the West, conspiratorial fantasies about Ukraine, and misplaced confidence in his own Army. Few in the Russian élite, to say nothing of the public at large, wanted a war or even knew one was coming. But, as the war has unfolded, Putin has offered few signals or explanations for how the conflict is going—and to what end.” Read more →

#4 Mysterious killing of Chinese miners puts new pressure on Beijing
Nicole Hong and Elian Peltier | NEW YORK TIMES

This brilliantly reported New York Times piece highlights the security challenges China faces as it attempts to expand its economic footprint, and hints at a troubled relationship with Russia’s Wagner Group, which is suspected of being responsible for the murder of a group of Chinese miners in the Central African Republic.

“The attacks” Nicole Hong and Elian Peltier report, “have exposed the widening disconnect between China’s economic ambitions and its security apparatus abroad, which relies on a patchwork of local military, mercenaries and private firms to guard Chinese workers …”

And while the Wagner Group has denied responsibility for the Chinese deaths, “researchers and Western diplomats say the killings of the miners did not fit the profile of how rebel groups have targeted Chinese nationals in the past. The groups have typically kidnapped Chinese workers to extract ransom from their employers, with such execution-style assassinations being highly unusual.” Read more →

#5 In Vienna, the US-China relationship shows signs of hope
David Ignatius | WASHINGTON POST

The recent meeting in Vienna between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi marks the most promising moment of the Biden administration for the world’s most significant and most perilous bilateral relationship. This David Ignatius column in the Washington Post captures the new promise.

Writes Ignatius, “Talking about resets in foreign policy is always risky, and that’s especially true with Washington and Beijing. These two superpowers might be ‘destined for war,’ as Harvard professor Graham Allison warned in a book with that title. What they’ve lacked, in their increasingly combative relationship, has been common ground. But some shared space seems to have emerged during the long, detailed discussions between Sullivan and Wang.”

One meeting cannot change history, not even one as long and involved as this one, but it can help counter a dangerous trajectory. Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

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#AtlanticDebrief – What’s the state of EU-US engagement with the Global South? | A Debrief with Dhruva Jaishankar

nlawler — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 15:13:13 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

As India’s G20 presidency gets underway, what’s the state of EU-US engagement with the Global South? In this new era of great power competition, what is the degree of convergence between India and countries in the Global South with the United States and Europe on China? What is India’s position on Russia following the war in Ukraine? And how does India’s on-going ties with Russia come up against its cooperation with Europe and the United States?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Dhruva Jaishankar, Executive Director, Observer Research Foundation America; Nonresident Fellow, Lowy Institute, to discuss both areas of cooperation and obstacles to deeper transatlantic engagement with the Global South.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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Shalomov and Pelayo in the Jerusalem Post

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 14:53:26 +0000

The post Shalomov and Pelayo in the Jerusalem Post appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Charai in Al Jazeera

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 14:48:59 +0000

The first-ever criminal indictment of a former U.S president holds important lessons for the world and American allies.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies, a board of trustees member of International Crisis Group, and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and Global Board of Advisors at The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem.

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Charai in The National Interest

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Apr 2023 19:59:57 +0000

The United States has left a vacuum in Africa and now its rivals have rushed in. It is not too late for America to offer the African continent what it really wants: peace, prosperity, recognition, and democracy.

The first-ever criminal indictment of a former U.S president holds important lessons for the world and American allies.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

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Holding the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for atrocity crimes

Celeste Kmiotek, Alana Mitias, Nushin Sarkarati — Wed, 19 Apr 2023 13:01:49 +0000

With little to no prospect for accountability within Iran’s domestic courts, victims and survivors of serious violations of international law are turning toward an increasing number of foreign jurisdictions—most commonly in Europe and North America, but also in Latin America, Africa, and other regions—to pursue justice for human rights violations carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, certain domestic justice systems allow prosecutions in national courts for crimes committed abroad, regardless of the victim’s or perpetrator’s nationality.

Universal jurisdiction stems from the concept that certain crimes are of such gravity that they harm the international community as a whole, so national courts outside the country where the violations took place may prosecute them to protect the international order. Although the crimes subject to universal jurisdiction provisions differ by state, they generally include crimes against humanity, torture, war crimes, and genocide. Limitations on universal jurisdiction also vary between states, however, as do the processes for filing complaints and procedures for investigations, trials, and appeals.

As was shown by the trial and conviction of Hamid Noury in Sweden for his involvement in the massacre of Iranian political prisoners in 1988, national prosecutions of international crimes can be a fruitful avenue to justice for victims of the Islamic Republic. To this end, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project has compiled a guide to aid practitioners and independent investigators in navigating the legal systems of European states with the highest likelihood of prosecuting Iranian human rights violators. Focusing on five states—France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—this manual outlines the crimes and violations subject to universal jurisdiction, best practices for investigating and documenting crimes, and processes for requesting investigations and participating in prosecutions as a victim, witness, or NGO. For information that is beyond the scope of this manual, the annex includes printed resources to consult and organizations to contact for additional assistance.

For media inquiries, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

Report Dec 10, 2020

Closing the accountability gap on human rights violators in the Islamic Republic of Iran through global litigation strategies

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Gissou Nia presents recommendations for new laws, amendments to existing laws, and the creation of enforcement mechanisms to aid in the effort to combat impunity for the IRI’s human rights violations and atrocity crimes.

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Gender persecution is happening in Iran. Targeted sanctions would be a step toward accountability.

By Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo

Designating the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, a principal institution behind the systematic oppression of women in Iran, would put its members on notice.

Corruption Human Rights

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Russia’s Wagner Group is a feature not a bug of the Putin regime

Allen Maggard — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 19:57:07 +0000

Of the various parties embroiled in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, few have attracted as much international attention as the paramilitary Wagner Group. Indeed, a veritable cottage industry has emerged dedicated to monitoring the Wagner network’s alleged involvement as unofficial agents of Russian foreign policy everywhere from Estonia to Sub-Saharan Africa.

The general consensus is that private military companies (PMCs) like Wagner Group must be countered because they advance Kremlin interests and help the Putin regime to project Russian power internationally. But a closer look suggests the Wagner Group and other Russian mercenary organizations may ultimately be liabilities and not assets for Putin.

For Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, 2023 already looks to be a tumultuous year. He has accused senior Russian military leaders of “treason” for allegedly holding up logistical and material support to Wagner mercenaries battling for control of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, and recently complained of being cut off altogether from the Kremlin.

Some commentators believe Prigozhin’s frequent jabs at members of the Russian elite could presage a contest for political power that may reach the heights of the Kremlin towers. Indeed, Prigozhin now says that he plans to remold Wagner into “an army with an ideology,” suggesting that he seeks to officially re-brand himself as an out-and-out political operator.

For all the speculation regarding the potential threat Prigozhin poses to the stability of the Putin regime, few have explored the Wagner leader’s relationship to the power structures that Putin himself depends upon for the perpetuation of his rule. In reality, the Wagner Group is as much a product of this system as it is a tool of Kremlin foreign and military policy. Western policymakers seeking to understand the role of Russian private paramilitaries should treat them as a symptom of the institutionalized corruption at the heart of Putin’s regime and not as just another instrument in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox.

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Prigozhin has managed to carve a niche for himself by leveraging opaque corporate networks to facilitate Russian hard and soft power projection in Ukraine, Syria, and various conflict zones across Africa. This appears to be profitable work; his companies have reportedly raked in hundreds of millions of dollars from mineral extraction alone. White House officials have even claimed in recent months that Prigozhin directed Wagner fighters to capture the Ukrainian town of Soledar in order to secure access to nearby salt and gypsum mines. The notion that Prigozhin personally benefits from enabling the Kremlin’s foreign policy adventures appears to be a feature rather than a bug of Putin’s particular approach to governance.

Political scientists generally characterize Putin’s rule as a corrupt patron-client system in which elites are compensated for their allegiance with access to resources. Vladimir Gel’man of the University of Helsinki contends that Putin accepts bad governance by trusted elites to cultivate a loyal, informal power base separate from those formal institutions which might challenge his authority. Russia analyst Mark Galeotti likens this arrangement to a public-private “adhocracy” in which informal networks of enterprising business and political elites, rather than formal institutions, end up taking the initiative in divining and executing official policy.

The Wagner phenomenon reflects a political ecosystem that rewards the stewards of government policy with official as well as illicit perks in exchange for loyalty. Wagner benefits Putin by providing deniable cover for a wide range of military operations outside of Russia. In exchange, Prigozhin is allowed to pursue commercial ventures in the countries where his forces are active.

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Prigozhin’s trajectory is an indication that the Russian state’s claim to a monopoly on violence may be the next frontier to be challenged by Kremlin elites. The Wagner Group’s example appears to have encouraged everyone from Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov to Russian natural gas giant Gazprom to organize PMCs of their own, a trend that some analysts argue could portend a “descent into warlordism.” Recent reports of a company owned by longtime Putin associate Gennadiy Timchenko hiring another PMC outfit not affiliated with Wagner to secure oil and gas infrastructure in Syria further suggest that Prigozhin is not the only person vying to supply PMC services to regime insiders.

International efforts to counter the Wagner network will require many of the same mechanisms used to combat corruption more generally. This will require governments to reflect on how their own institutions play into the interests of figures like Prigozhin, who has pursued journalists through the British courts despite being the subject of UK sanctions. Critics claim transnational imbalances in financial transparency that allow offshore jurisdictions to provide a veil of corporate secrecy to American and European nationals also help to obscure the Wagner network’s operations.

Efforts by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to target Wagner-linked shell companies registered in tax havens are a step in the right direction. But Western governments should also aim to hold accountable those individuals responsible for managing the network of corporate entities behind Wagner’s more mundane business operations.

One may reasonably question why Ukraine and its allies should go after Russian PMCs at all if their continued presence has the potential to undo Putin. Why not let them multiply and further weaken the foundations of the Putin regime? While potentially tempting, such an approach would involve considerable risks. If and when Putin leaves office, this is likely to create a power vacuum in which Russia’s nascent PMC class would flourish. Such an outcome could return Russia to a state of lawlessness reminiscent of the “wild nineties,” a period characterized by a proliferation of organized crime groups whose mercenary enforcers were often veterans of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

Putin often invokes the chaos of the 1990s to justify his authoritarian rule. Tolerating the presence of PMCs like the Wagner Group in the hope that they could unseat Putin risks reducing Russia to new depths of disorder and thereby facilitating the rise of aspiring autocrats in the years to come. Combating Russia’s private paramilitaries is essential not just in order to contain Putin, but to preempt the empowerment of future Russian leaders molded in his likeness.

Allen Maggard is a Russia analyst and specialist in the intersection of Russian political economy and the defense industry at C4ADS.

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What to expect from the world’s democratic tech alliance as the Summit for Democracy unfolds

Katherine Walla — Wed, 29 Mar 2023 17:37:06 +0000

Watch the full event

Live from the Freedom Online Coalition: How the FOC works for people around the world

The DFRLab hosts the US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman along with civil society and industry experts for a discussion on the Freedom Online Coalition and how the world’s democratic tech alliance advances human rights online.

Africa East Asia Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

Ahead of the Biden administration’s second Summit for Democracy, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman gave a sneak peek at what to expect from the US government on its commitments to protecting online rights and freedoms.

The event, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab on Monday, came on the same day that US President Joe Biden signed an executive order restricting the US government’s use of commercial spyware that may be abused by foreign governments or enable human-rights abuses overseas.

But there’s more in store for this week, Sherman said, as the United States settles into its role as chair of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC)—a democratic tech alliance of thirty-six countries working together to support human rights online. As chair, the United States needs “to reinforce rules of the road for cyberspace that mirror and match the ideals of the rules-based international order,” said Sherman. She broke that down into four top priorities for the FOC:

Protecting fundamental freedoms online, especially for often-targeted human-rights defenders
Building resilience against digital authoritarians who use technology to achieve their aims
Building a consensus on policies designed to limit abuses of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI)
Expanding digital inclusion

“The FOC’s absolutely vital work can feel like a continuous game of catch-up,” said Sherman. But, she added, “we have to set standards that meet this moment… we have to address what we see in front of us and equip ourselves with the building blocks to tackle what we cannot predict.”

Below are more highlights from the event, during which a panel of stakeholders also outlined the FOC’s role in ensuring that the internet and emerging technologies—including AI—adhere to democratic principles.

Deepening fundamental freedoms

Sherman explained that the FOC will aim to combat government-initiated internet shutdowns and ensure that people can “keep using technology to advance the reach of freedom.”
Boye Adegoke, senior manager of grants and program strategy at the Paradigm Initiative, recounted how technology was supposed to help improve transparency in Nigeria’s recent elections. But instead, the election results came in inconsistently and after long periods of time. Meanwhile, the government triggered internet shutdowns around the election period. “Bad actors… manipulate technology to make sure that the opinions and the wishes of the people do not matter at the end of the day,” he said.
“It’s very important to continue to communicate the work that the FOC is doing… so that more and more people become aware” of internet shutdowns and can therefore prepare for the lapses in internet service and in freely flowing, accurate information, Adegoke said.
On a practical level, once industry partners expose where disruptions are taking place, the FOC offers a mechanism by which democratic “governments can work together to sort of pressure other governments to say these [actions] aren’t acceptable,” Starzak argued.
The FOC also provides a place for dialogue on human rights in the online space, said Alissa Starzak, vice president and global head of public policy at Cloudfare. Adegoke, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, stressed that “human rights [are] rarely at the center of the issues,” so the FOC offers an opportunity to mainstream that conversation into policymakers’ discussions on technology.

Building resilience against digital authoritarianism

“Where all of [us FOC countries] may strive to ensure technology delivers for our citizens, autocratic regimes are finding another means of expression,” Sherman explained, adding that those autocratic regimes are using technologies to “divide and disenfranchise; to censor and suppress; to limit freedoms, foment fear, and violate human dignity.” New technologies are essentially “an avenue of control” for authoritarians, she explained.
At the FOC, “we will focus on building resilience against the rise of digital authoritarianism,” Sherman said, which has “disproportionate and chilling impacts on journalists, activists, women, and LGBTI+ individuals” who are often directly targeted for challenging the government or expressing themselves.
One of the practices digital authoritarians often abuse is surveillance. Sherman said that as part of the Summit for Democracy, the FOC and other partners will lay out guiding principles for the responsible use of surveillance tech.
Adegoke recounted how officials in Nigeria justified their use of surveillance tech by saying that the United States also used the technology. “It’s very important to have some sort of guiding principle” from the United States, he said.
After Biden signed the spyware executive order, Juan Carlos Lara, executive director at Derechos Digitales, said he expects other countries “to follow suit and hopefully to expand the idea of bans on spyware or bans on surveillance technology” that inherently pose risks to human rights.

Addressing artificial intelligence

“The advent of AI is arriving with a level of speed and sophistication we haven’t witnessed before,” warned Sherman. “Who creates it, who controls it, [and] who manipulates it will help define the next phase of the intersection between technology and democracy.”
Some governments, Sherman pointed out, have used AI to automate their censorship and suppression practices. “FOC members must build a consensus around policies to limit these abuses,” she argued.
Speaking from an industry perspective, Starzak acknowledged that sometimes private companies and governments “are in two different lanes” when it comes to figuring out how they should use AI. But setting norms for both good and bad AI use, she explained, could help get industry and the public sector in the same lane, moving toward a world in which AI is used in compliance with democratic principles.
Lara, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, explained that the FOC has a task force to specifically determine those norms on government use of AI and to identify the ways in which AI contributes to the promise—or peril—of technology in societies worldwide.

Improving digital inclusion

“The internet should be open and secure for everyone,” said Sherman. That includes “closing the gender gap online” by “expanding digital literacy” and “promoting access to safe online spaces” that make robust civic participation possible for all. Sherman noted that the FOC will specifically focus on digital inclusion for women and girls, LGBTI+ people, and people with disabilities.
Starzak added that in the global effort to cultivate an internet that “builds prosperity,” access to the free flow of information for all is “good for the economy and good for the people.” Attaining that version of the internet will require a “set of controls” to protect people and their freedoms online, she added.
Ultimately, there are major benefits to be had from expanded connectivity. According to Sherman, it “can drive economic growth, raise standards of living, create jobs, and fuel innovative solutions” for global challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, and good governance.

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave: A playbook for countering the authoritarian threat

Hardy Merriman, Patrick Quirk, Ash Jain — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 12:00:00 +0000

Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave is a joint project between the Atlantic Council and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC), aimed at catalyzing support for nonviolent pro-democracy movements fighting against authoritarian rule.

The project recognizes that civil resistance movements—using tactics such as strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, and a range of other nonviolent tactics—are one of the most powerful forces for democracy worldwide and therefore central to reversing the last seventeen years of democratic recession.

The project produced a three-part report, titled Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave: A Playbook for Countering the Authoritarian Threat, that:

Proposes new approaches and tools to support civil resistance movements
Advances a new international norm — the “Right to Assist” pro-democracy movements
Develops strategic and tactical options to constrain authoritarian regimes and drive up the cost of their repression

Introduction

The security of the United States, democratic allies, and humanity’s future depends significantly on the state of democracy worldwide.

Yet over the past seventeen years, authoritarianism has risen globally, while democracy shows alarming decline. Dictatorial regimes in China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela and many other countries have become more repressive. Meanwhile, democracies in all parts of the world have backslid, with some regressing completely into authoritarianism.

This playbook focuses on a key factor that can help reverse both of these trends. Popular civil resistance movements—using tactics such as strikes, boycotts, protests, and many other tactics of noncooperation—are historically one of the most powerful drivers of democracy worldwide. They can play a central role in transforming authoritarian regimes and countering democratic backsliding. We offer recommendations for how the United States and democratic allies can adeptly support and enable these movements.

The stakes in this contest over global governance could not be higher. A more authoritarian world is a world dangerous for democracies. As autocrats support each other, abuse their own populations, and undermine democratic states, they also perpetrate and create conditions for violent conflict, atrocities, humanitarian crises, the growth of violent non-state actors, subversion of multilateral institutions, and transnational corruption. These produce massive human suffering, and further exacerbate internal weaknesses of democratic governments, thereby creating a positive feedback loop that contributes greatly to the present-day autocratic wave.

Turning the tide now requires urgency, clear vision, strategy, collective action, discipline, and innovative tactics. Democracies must unify, strengthen their alliances, and go on offense because the future depends on it.

Yet this threat can be countered. Three previous global democratic waves have emerged from democratic troughs. Developing a strategy to catalyze a fourth wave begins with a clear-eyed look at the challenges we currently face. Externally, democracies confront an increasingly existential conflict waged against them, with authoritarian governments using democratic openness to enable them to spread corruption, undermine government institutions, influence economic decision-making, and manipulate the information environment. Simultaneously, many democracies are experiencing legitimacy crises due to long-standing failure to deliver adequately for their constituents. This core weakness has made them more vulnerable to populism, polarization, disruptive information technologies, external authoritarian attacks, and internal demagogues who now use a well-trod path to weaken democratic governance from the inside out. Past denial about the potency of these threats enabled them to grow. Turning the tide now requires urgency, clear vision, strategy, collective action, discipline, and innovative tactics. Democracies must unify, strengthen their alliances, and go on offense because the future depends on it.

Any strategy to counter authoritarianism will entail action on multiple fronts. By articulating in this playbook how to better support and create an enabling environment for pro-democracy civil resistance movements, we focus on one of the greatest foreign policy opportunities available today—engaging the power potential of populations worldwide who want to protect and advance human rights and democratic rule. Our allies are found not only in fellow governments and registered civil society organizations, but also among billions of people who live daily under either weakening democracies or the abuse of dictatorship.

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Hardy Merriman

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Civil Society Human Rights

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Patrick Quirk

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

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Ash Jain

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

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Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

Anders Åslund — Sun, 19 Mar 2023 16:46:03 +0000

On March 17, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague indicted Russian President Vladimir Putin and issued an arrest warrant. This indictment is likely to have far-reaching consequences for Putin personally and for Russia.

The warrant states that Putin “is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. There are reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes.”

The ICC is a comparatively new international organization. It was created in July 1998 and formally established in 2002. At present, 123 countries have ratified its statute. They include all the countries of South America, all EU countries, most of Oceania, and roughly half of Africa. All these countries are now theoretically committed to arresting Putin. No sovereign immunity will shield him.

ICC indictments are rare. To date, the court has only indicted 52 people, but it aims to prosecute top culprits. Earlier indictments have targeted former presidents Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. In this context, the indictment of Putin appears entirely natural.

Following their ICC indictments, al-Bashir and Gaddafi became international pariahs. Putin and his regime are not likely to fare any better. After this indictment, no serious politician or public figure will want to meet with or even talk to Putin. He cannot travel abroad without considering the possibility of arrest and extradition to The Hague.

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In light of his new status as an indicted war crimes suspect, Putin will likely find that he is no longer invited to international forums such as G20 or the United Nations General Assembly. Since all power in Russia is concentrated to Putin, this means Russia has effectively lost its voice on the international stage.

Another consequence of the indictment is that no democratic political leader who values their own reputation will want to have any further contact with Putin. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emanuel Macron will need to rethink their earlier policies of holding regular phone conversations with Putin. Likewise, there is no longer any realistic chance of a negotiated peace settlement between Putin’s Russia and Ukraine brokered by the international community. Meanwhile, Kremlin-friendly European politicians such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban will have to abandon their personal links with Putin.

There are limits to the impact of the ICC indictment, of course. Many influential countries in addition to Russia itself do not recognize the court, with the list including the United States, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, even those countries that have yet to sign and ratify the ICC statute will be well aware that continuing to maintain close ties with Putin could now hurt their international standing.

Chinese President Xi Jingping has just confirmed that he will visit Putin in Russia on March 20-22. While few expect him to alter his plans in light of the ICC arrest warrant, his visit is unlikely to be good for China’s reputation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had quite intense contacts with Putin in recent years. As the leader of a NATO member state, will he maintain this level of engagement after Putin’s indictment? I doubt it.

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The implications of the ICC arrest warrant are not limited to the international arena. It is also likely to impact Putin’s standing within Russia, undermining his absolute power and leaving him more isolated than ever.

Russian investigative journalists have recently revealed that the increasingly reclusive Putin now travels in armored trains between his three main residences in Valdai, Novo-Ogaryovo, and Sochi, with special railway stations constructed at each location for his personal security. He rarely dares to meet anyone in person, only physically convening Russia’s Security Council three times over the past year. Now a wanted man, Putin’s paranoia looks set to worsen.

With Putin unable to play his usual active role in international negotiations, his value as Russia’s national leader will be greatly diminished. This will have a significant negative impact on Russia’s international standing that will continue for as long as Putin remains in office. Putin’s domestic political position will be seriously undermined, with members of the Russian elite drawing the inevitable conclusion that he is now a liability.

The indictment against Putin sends a powerful message to other senior figures within the Russian establishment, leaving them in no doubt that they are also vulnerable to possible prosecution. If the Russian President can be charged, they may also be indicted for their participation in Putin’s alleged crimes against humanity. Loyalty to Putin was once seen as the only way to get ahead in modern Russia; it now looks increasingly like a dangerous dead end.

The Russian leader is unlikely to appear in The Hague any time soon. Nevertheless, the ICC decision to indict him for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while significantly weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad.

Anders Åslund is a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum. He is co-author with Andrius Kubilius of the new book “Reconstruction, Reform, and EU Accession for Ukraine.”

Unfortunately, the ICC’s poor conviction record and its tendency to focus almost entirely on African countries has led to disaffection and undermined its legitimacy. This is why it is so significant that although Putin is only the third sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC for war crimes, he is the first leader of a major power.

This is also why it matters that in the Ukraine case, the ICC received the largest ever state party referral to open an investigation. This unprecedented show of international resolve has the potential to revive the court’s authority. If states continue to provide it with the necessary logistical and material support, perhaps the ICC can begin to live up to its lofty aspirations to end impunity for atrocity crimes.

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It is also important that the ICC chose to make the warrants public instead of keeping them sealed. It did so because “the conduct addressed in the present situation is allegedly ongoing, and public awareness of the warrants may contribute to the prevention of the further commission of crimes.”

In other words, if not even Putin himself can escape the court’s notice, Russian soldiers all the way down the chain of command should also not expect to get away with war crimes. While there is unfortunately little evidence to suggest that international justice mechanisms like the ICC have been effective in deterring future atrocities, this does not mean that the ICC’s decision to name and shame Putin won’t have other important deterrent effects.

Perhaps most significantly, the warrant permanently isolates Putin and spells doom for lingering efforts to resume “business as usual” with today’s Russia. While some critics allege that the ICC warrant will provoke the accused and escalate conflict, the fact is that Putin has already become radicalized beyond redemption and was unlikely to show restraint in Ukraine anyway. Because the ICC’s warrant has no statute of limitations, either Putin will stand trial or the threat of it will haunt him until the end of his days.

Unless Putin is held accountable or loses power, there can never again be normalized relations with Russia. This signals to the many countries, particularly in the Global South but also in Europe, who have continued to hedge their bets over the war, that there is little point in doing so unless they want to risk their own reputations on the world stage. It also eliminates any diplomatic leverage Putin may have had in a peace process, because the ICC has made it clear that without accountability all the way to the very top, there can be no peace at all.

What remains unclear is how the ICC’s move will impact the thinking of the Russian elite, whose loyalty is critical for Putin’s survival. Many are hopeful, such as Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak, who described the warrants as “the beginning of the end for the Russian Federation in its current form on the world stage.”

The ICC’s high degree of scrutiny and willingness to go straight for Russia’s biggest fish may certainly make some of Putin’s supporters think twice, which could undermine the current regime and ultimately incentivize a future Russian government to hand the dictator over to The Hague. This is not beyond the realm of possibility. Indeed, it has already happened before with Slobodan Milosevic of the former Yugoslavia and Charles Taylor of Liberia. While it was once unimaginable that these war criminals would ever be handed over, they were both eventually extradited by their successors.

Eurasia Center events

Elise Baker: Next, prosecute Russia’s attacks on hospitals

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Although it is impossible to predict, most observers agree that regime change is unlikely to happen anytime soon in Russia. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin is safe for now. Indeed, there is good reason to expect him to cling even harder to power, precisely to avoid the possibility that any successor would hand him over to the ICC. It is also worth remembering that Putin has successfully nurtured a revisionist, imperial mindset in the country and has made the Russian media heavily complicit in his crimes. This makes the possibility of a peaceful change of power something of a pipe dream.

Herein lies the main problem for those who long to see Putin in the dock. Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC. In theory, if Putin sets foot in any one of the 123 countries which have ratified the Rome Statute, he would have to be arrested and sent straight to The Hague. Unfortunately, as the case of former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir shows, states cannot always be counted on to live up to this obligation.

With this in mind, what can the ICC and the wider international community do to ensure the warrant for Putin’s arrest becomes a genuine step towards meaningful justice? The ICC has an important role to play outside of the courtroom, but it needs the logistical and material support to live up to it. While the Court documents atrocities and gives them a permanent place in the public record, it should also give victims a sense of ownership over the process by facilitating their participation in the trials themselves and through its own outreach to affected communities.

Given the unlikelihood of Ukrainians seeing Putin stand trial, it will be critical for the court and its supporters to nevertheless manage expectations and communicate what is happening and why the process still matters. The court must also work in partnership with Ukrainian civil society, without whom such extensive evidence on child deportations could never have been collected and acted upon in real time.

In this sense, it is crucial to remember that the ICC is meant to complement, not replace, Ukraine’s own judicial system in how it handles war crimes on its own territory. Ukraine’s courts are already overwhelmed by the size of the caseload, which only continues to grow. The international community must do everything it can to support Ukraine’s capacity to investigate and prosecute war crimes in a fair and impartial manner.

The international community should also create a broader framework in which to pursue justice and accountability. One immediate step is to establish clear mechanisms to help locate, trace, and reunite all separated Ukrainian children with their families and legal guardians. This means supporting Ukrainian civil society activists who not only facilitate family reunification but stand ready to provide the vast array of services Ukrainians will need for years to come in order to recover from the horrors of the war. Even when peace and the rule of law are restored in Ukraine, much will depend on how well the country can pursue a holistic, comprehensive form of justice.

To come full circle back to the question of whether the ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is indeed “historic,” a cynical read would be that this moment ultimately highlights the most important gap in international law when it comes to Russia’s crimes in Ukraine. It remains impossible for the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression if the states in question are not parties to the Rome Statute. Until there is a viable international mechanism to prosecute aggression and the collective political will to do so, the root causes of this war can never be fully addressed, rule of law will never be fully restored, and impunity will continue.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

John Herbst: This case will have geopolitical implications from the Global South to Washington

Nushin Sarkarati: The US Department of Defense must send evidence to the ICC

Celeste Kmiotek: Time for the United States to reconsider its stance on the ICC

Gissou Nia: Behind the warrants is evidence, a global campaign, and perhaps a strategy

Haydee Dijkstal: These warrants are a step toward justice and accountability, not just symbolism

Shelby Magid: A step forward in dismantling Lvova-Belova’s network

Rayhan Asat: This case is a message to human-rights violators around the world—including China

Kristina Hook: Any Russians committing crimes in Ukraine should consider themselves formally on notice

A moment of moral clarity

No one should expect Putin to be behind bars anytime soon, but that’s not the point of today’s ICC arrest warrant. No indictments have been issued yet, and the warrant is one of several provisional measures that the ICC is taking to develop its case for the prosecution of Russian officials for war crimes in Ukraine. The case against Putin is still in its preliminary stages, and today’s war-crimes charges are likely the first steps towards further charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.

However, the law is unambiguous, and the facts are increasingly undeniable. For example, Article II, paragraph (e) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to which both Russia and Ukraine are parties, says that genocide includes “[f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group” when done “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Russia has openly transferred Ukrainian children to Russian custody. Putin’s own statements going back to 2014, and the statements of other Russian officials and voices under Putin’s control, are available as evidence of the intent to erase Ukrainian identity.

Ukraine has invited the ICC to investigate crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. But Russia is not a party to the ICC treaty, so no one expects Putin to be turned over for trial right away. Still, former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic thought that he wouldn’t be turned over for trial when he was indicted by a different international tribunal, yet he died behind bars in The Hague.

Today’s arrest warrant will limit Putin’s diplomatic options, and it will make it harder for anyone to dismiss Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as a “territorial dispute.” The real point of today’s ICC arrest warrant is to bring the world to a moment of moral clarity that what Putin is ordering in Ukraine violates the law and moral values of civilized nations around the world.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council. From 1997-2001, he was the deputy in the US State Department Office of War Crimes Issues.

Next, prosecute Russia’s attacks on hospitals

The ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is a notable step in meting out justice for the atrocities he has led in Ukraine. However, this arrest warrant covers only a sliver of Russian crimes in Ukraine. The ICC and national justice actors in Ukraine and around the world must build cases reflecting the full range of any and all war crimes and crimes against humanity Russia can be charged with committing in Ukraine.

Chief among the crimes that should be prioritized are targeted attacks on medical facilities and personnel. In the first ten months of the war, Russian forces launched 707 attacks on Ukraine’s health care system, bombing and shelling hospitals and ambulances, killing and injuring medical workers, and threatening and imprisoning other health workers. Targeted attacks on medical facilities and personnel are war crimes. When carried out in a widespread or systematic manner, they amount to crimes against humanity.

Ukraine is not the first place Russia has perpetrated these crimes. After carrying out similar attacks in Chechnya in 2000 and in Georgia in 2008, Russian forces attacked ten medical facilities in Syria in the first month of its military intervention there, joining the Syrian government’s systematic assault on the country’s health care system that has killed 945 medical personnel and destroyed hundreds of medical facilities.

The continuation of attacks on medical facilities and personnel erodes international law and poses a global threat. Syrian and now Ukrainian health workers are suffering the deadly consequences of global inaction in the face of these crimes. International justice actors must prosecute attacks on health care as war crimes and crimes against humanity to reinforce these lifesaving laws and help prevent the spread of these attacks to yet another conflict.

—Elise Baker is a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and previously documented attacks on Syria’s health care system with Physicians for Human Rights.

This case will have geopolitical implications from the Global South to Washington

The ICC indictment of Putin and Lvova-Belova for the alleged war crime of abducting children from Ukraine is a stunning development with wide implications. First, it is a huge black eye for the Kremlin as Putin gets ready to receive Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Moscow next week. This makes it harder for China to push its “peace plan” that could work to keep Moscow’s control over occupied Ukrainian territory. What would such control mean for Ukraine’s children? After all, Russia has not hidden this war crime.

This development will also have some impact in the Global South, where the Kremlin has had some success arguing that years of NATO enlargement are somehow responsible for Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine. What does kidnapping Ukrainian children have to do with protecting Moscow’s borders from the West? This point could be particularly useful in those parts of Europe that talk about a “Zeitenwende,” yet cannot muster the will to send Ukraine the means to stop Moscow’s aggression and war crimes there. It likewise raises uncomfortable questions for US politicians and “realists” who think that this war is simply a territorial dispute. Why is Moscow removing the younger inhabitants of the disputed territory to Russia? Is this Putin’s perverse version of family values?

Most importantly, it will have impact in Russia. For months, the Russian media has been talking about Western investigations of Russian war crimes. It will work like rust on the Putin regime as weaker-kneed Russian officials wonder what this means for them. It’s another bad day for the Russian war machine.

—John Herbst is the senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The US Department of Defense must send evidence to the ICC

The ICC’s issuance of arrest warrants today for Putin and Lvova-Belova puts greater urgency on the impasse between the Pentagon and the US State Department over the United States’ support of the ICC’s investigation on Ukraine. On March 8, the New York Times reported that the Pentagon is blocking the Biden administration from sharing evidence with the ICC about Russian atrocities in Ukraine. The information is reportedly related to Russian officials’ deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, as well as the abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied territory—the very crime that Putin is accused of by the ICC.

While, generally, the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) limits the United States’ ability to cooperate with the ICC, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 included amendments to ASPA that allowed for the United States to assist with “investigations and prosecutions of foreign nationals related to the Situation in Ukraine.”

If the reports are accurate, the Department of Defense’s refusal to provide evidence to the ICC that is directly related to the crimes under investigation undermines the United States’ continued support of Ukraine and the United States’ commitment to holding perpetrators of Russia’s crimes in Ukraine accountable. Today’s arrest warrants show the importance of supporting the ICC’s investigation into the situation in Ukraine, as the ICC is presently the only court willing and able to indict a sitting head of state—something US courts would not be able to do on their own.

—Nushin Sarkarati is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Program.

Time for the United States to reconsider its stance on the ICC

While there are plenty of significant accountability efforts moving forward for Ukraine, the legal and symbolic importance of today’s warrants cannot be overlooked. Putin is the head of state of a permanent United Nations Security Council member (otherwise known as a P5 country) and is scheduled to host another P5 president, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, next week. While the proposed Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression would likely also be able to issue a warrant for Putin’s arrest, no current standing court holds that power. Targeted sanctions already prevent Putin from traveling to many countries, but he now cannot travel to any of the 123 States Parties to the Rome Statute without risking arrest. This includes two other P5 members: the United Kingdom and France.

Today’s warrants highlight the power the ICC holds: the ability to stand up to leaders who perpetrate atrocities. Even before Putin stands trial, it has a practical effect, demonstrating the importance of accountability efforts within this conflict.

The United States has echoed the need for such accountability by strengthening its war crimes law so that it can domestically prosecute perpetrators who are not entitled to immunity, establishing Task Force KleptoCapture to target regime assets, and signing a memorandum of understanding with the Ukrainian prosecutor general to pursue accountability. But the United States is still not a party to the only court able to take action on Putin and other senior officials. Today’s news presents an opportunity for the United States to reconsider its stance and put meaningful action behind its rhetoric.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Behind the warrants is evidence, a global campaign, and perhaps a strategy

With the issuance of arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova for alleged war crimes in Ukraine, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor has shown it is going straight to the top. Putin and Lvova-Belova stand accused of the war crimes of unlawful deportation and the transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia. Russia is alleged to have committed a wide range of crimes in Ukraine, including the bombing of civilian infrastructure; the systematic and widespread use of torture, including shocking detainees with electricity and hanging them from the ceiling; indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians, including massacres in which hundreds of civilians were killed at once; and brutal sexual assaults as a weapon of war. Thus, it is notable that the ICC prosecutor has chosen to focus on crimes against children as an opening salvo for what will likely be the first of many arrest warrants to follow.

This is in part likely a function of the evidence—the Russian state has been very overt in acknowledging its child transfers and Lvova-Belova herself has even admitted to “adopting” a Ukrainian child—and in part a result of the growing global priority placed on protecting children’s rights in conflict. However, it may also reflect savvy strategy on the prosecutor’s part. Many members of the court from Latin America, Africa, and Asia feel disconnected from the West’s denunciation of Putin and call for the preservation of the international rules-based order when that order has been violated on so many occasions in their own regions, often aided by the direct actions or complicity of the West. By focusing its first arrest warrants on war crimes against children, the ICC made sure the bare and brutal truth of Putin’s war cannot be denied, even among those who bristle at Western hypocrisy. The allegations may also reflect an intention to later add charges of genocide, under Article 6(e) of the Rome Statute, since it will be a long road from the issuance of these arrest warrants to any confirmation of charges hearing in The Hague.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

A step forward in dismantling Lvova-Belova’s network

The announcement today from the ICC that arrest warrants have been issued for Putin and Lvova-Belova is significant legally and politically. Legally, the ICC is moving forward the pursuit of justice for one of the most heinous war crimes the Russian regime is committing. Politically and diplomatically, this can hopefully serve to increase pressure on Putin to cease the unlawful transfer and deportation of children, encourage others to cooperate with international organizations to share information about children who are now in Russia and Russian-occupied territories, and ultimately return Ukrainian children to Ukraine.

While this is only one of the many heinous crimes Putin and the Russian officials and forces are committing, it is a critical issue that needs more attention, which this ICC arrest warrant can help bring. Putin and Lvova-Belova are central to the systemic forced deportation of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. Lvova-Belova, in serving as the commissioner for children’s rights, is a vital part of the Russian criminal enterprise of forcibly transferring and deporting Ukrainian children to a network of dozens of camps that serve a range of purposes including “re-education.” In addition to being allegedly guilty of running this policy and network, she also personally “adopted” a boy evacuated from Mariupol.

Ukrainian children in a variety of categories—including orphans, children with severe mental and physical disabilities who were in state-run homes, children of prisoners of war, and others—have been forcibly relocated by Russian forces since the beginning of the full-scale invasion last February. The true figures are unknown and are likely much higher, but as of now at least sixteen thousand children are reported as forcibly transferred, and only 308 have been returned. This is a clear violation of human rights and international law, and the ICC has taken a huge step forward in addressing this.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

These warrants are a step toward justice and accountability, not just symbolism

Today’s announcement by the ICC of the issuance of arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova signifies an important step toward justice and accountability for Ukrainian victims and a historic step by the court.

Importantly, the charges represent a focus by the Office of the Prosecutor on those who are consistently most vulnerable to harm during conflict—children—who were specifically targeted within this conflict. While the charges are narrowly focused on the war crime of unlawfully deporting and transferring children from Ukraine into Russia, the court has clarified that these charges represent a first step, and investigations by the prosecutor continue as to the many other alleged crimes. Notably, the deportation and/or transfer of children constitutes one of the underlying acts required to demonstrate the crime of genocide under the Rome Statute, and attention should be paid as to whether these initial charges might support a future allegation by the Office of the Prosecutor as to Russia’s intent to destroy, in whole or in part, Ukraine as a group.

While some commentators have questioned whether the arrest warrants should be viewed as primarily symbolic given that Russia is not a member state to the court, the significance of the arrest warrants go beyond mere symbolism to represent steps towards justice and accountability. The arrest warrants and charges are based on the investigations of the prosecutor and evidence collected, and the findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber that the evidence submitted in support of the arrest warrant application provided reasonable grounds to believe that Putin and Lvova-Belova bore individual criminal responsibility. The court said that its announcement of the arrest warrants also aims to deter further crimes through public awareness, even as the arrest warrant documents remain confidential.

In addition, the historic step of issuing an arrest warrant, for the first time, against a national leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and calling on all ICC member states to arrest and transfer the accused to the court, is notable and could be viewed as a representation of the prosecutor’s commitment to accountability.

—Haydee Dijkstal is a nonresident senior fellow at the Strategic Litigation Project and a UK barrister representing victims before the ICC, including victims in the Ukraine Situation.

This case is a message to human-rights violators around the world—including China

It’s too premature to say whether Putin will be tried, but the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant against him sends a strong message to human-rights violators and war criminals everywhere. This groundbreaking decision shows that no matter how powerful the architects of atrocity are within their own national borders, the ICC will work to bring them to justice. As we react to this decision, I urge observers to remember victims of heinous crimes no matter where they are, including those who have suffered crimes against humanity and genocide.

While Putin faces potential prosecution for his crime of forcibly deporting Ukrainian children, Chinese officials have been implicated in the same offense in Xinjiang. Parliaments and governments across the world have officially determined that the Chinese government’s actions and policies constitute genocide. In August, the United Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also concluded that China may have committed crimes against humanity. As we celebrate the ICC’s decision, we must remember the landmark case two Uyghur groups have brought before it, asking for the court to investigate China’s crimes. Today, more than a half-million Uyghur children have been forcibly separated from their parents in state orphanage camps. Chinese officials should take note of the court’s decision that no government, however powerful they may be, can commit atrocities with impunity. When they do, senior officials will bear personal responsibility.

—Rayhan Asat is a nonresident senior fellow at the Strategic Litigation Project and an international human-rights lawyer.

Any Russians committing crimes in Ukraine should consider themselves formally on notice

The ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is a seismic moment for international law and judicial accountability. The Russian president now joins an exceedingly short list of world leaders formally charged with war crimes. In legal terms, reasonable grounds exist to believe that Putin himself bears individual criminal responsibility for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukraine’s children.

To international human-rights watchers, the ICC’s historic announcement also indicates an increased scope of prosecution. The ICC does not (currently) have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in Ukraine, a charge focused on prosecuting a nation’s most senior leaders, which explains why different options for a special tribunal are being explored. Today’s warrant confirms that the ICC could not only pursue lower-level offenders but also Putin himself for additional charges.

The arrest warrant for Lvova-Belova, Russia’s so-named commissioner for children’s rights, is no less significant. By naming her along with Putin, the ICC is signaling that other officials and functionaries also bear criminal responsibility for the Russian Federation’s crimes against Ukrainian civilians. The ICC’s decision to publicly announce these arrest warrants is likely intended to have a deterring effect against Russian perpetrators committing atrocity crimes in Ukraine. Russian warfighters, cabinet members, security services involved in deporting Ukrainian children, and bureaucrats involved in their illegal adoption into Russian homes should consider themselves formally on notice.

The West and broader international community should now support international law by sanctioning a wider range of actors involved in Russian atrocity crimes, making it clear to these actors and their families that international opportunities for vacation, work, and education are closed for any involved in war crimes against Ukrainians.

Finally, today’s ICC arrest warrants highlight Russia’s premeditated and extreme cruelty through the mass trafficking of children, most of whom still languish away from their homes and loved ones in Russia. These particular war crimes are also direct violations of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, which prohibits “forcibly transferring children of the [victim] group to another group.” No nation or institution has ever fundamentally contested this legal definition or its mandate. Thus, the full gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine will continue to move through the legal system.

—Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University’s School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding, and Development and a former US Fulbright scholar to Ukraine.

The post Experts react: The International Criminal Court just issued an arrest warrant for Putin. Will he wind up behind bars? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How the war in Iraq changed the world—and what change could come next

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 12:00:00 +0000

How the war in Iraq changed the world—and what change could come next

Twenty years on from the US invasion of the country, Iraq has fallen off the policymaking agenda in Washington, DC—cast aside in part as a result of the bitter experience of the war, the enormous human toll it exacted, and the passage of time. But looking forward twenty years and beyond, Iraqis need a great deal from their own leaders and those of their erstwhile liberators. A national reconciliation commission, a new constitution, and an economy less dependent on oil revenue are just some of the areas the experts at the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative highlight in this collection of reflections marking two decades since the US invasion.

What else will it take to transform Iraq into a prosperous, productive regional player? What can the United States do now, with twenty years’ worth of hindsight? And just how far-reaching were the effects of the war? Twenty-one experts from across the Atlantic Council take on these questions in a series of short essays and video interviews below.

Oula Kadhum on what March 20, 2003 was like for a young Iraqi

How the Iraq war changed…

Scroll and click through the carousel below to jump to a response:

The cause of democracy in the region

When the United States invaded Iraq two decades ago, one of the public justifications for the war was that it would help spread democracy throughout the Middle East. The invasion, of course, had the opposite effect: it unleashed a bloody sectarian conflict in Iraq, badly undermining the reputation of democracy in the region and America’s credibility in promoting it.

Yet the frictions between rulers and ruled that helped precipitate the US invasion of Iraq persist. The citizens of the region, increasingly educated and connected to the rest of the world, have twenty-first-century political aspirations, but continue to be ruled by unaccountable nineteenth-century-style autocrats. Absent a change, these frictions will continue to shape political developments in the region, often in cataclysmic fashion, over the next two decades.

The George W. Bush administration’s failures in Iraq severely set back the cause of democracy in the region. In the perceptions of Arab publics, democratization became synonymous with the exercise of American military power. Meanwhile, Iraq’s chaos strengthened the hand of the region’s autocrats: as inept or heavy-handed as their own rule might be, it paled in comparison to the breakdown of order and human slaughter in Iraq.

Citizens’ frustrations with their political leaders finally erupted in the Arab Spring of 2010 and 2011, but their protests failed to end autocracy in the region. Gulf monarchs were able to throw money at the problem, first to shore up their own rule and then other autocracies in the region. The Egyptian experiment with democracy proved short-lived; Tunisia’s endured far longer but also appears over. More broadly, the region has seen democratic backsliding in Lebanon and Israel as well.

The yawning gap between what citizens want and what they get from their governments remains. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators show that, on aggregate, states in the region are no more politically stable, effectively governed, accountable, or participatory than two decades ago. Unless political leaders address that gap, further Arab Spring-like protests—or even social revolution—are probable.

Having apparently gotten out of the business of invasion and occupation following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States could play a new and constructive role here. It could both cajole and assist the region’s political leaders to improve governance for their citizens.

The United States exacerbated political tensions in the region two decades ago; now it has an opportunity to help ameliorate them.

—Stephen R. Grand is the author of Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us About the Prospects for Arab Democracy. He is a nonresident senior fellow with the Council’s Middle East programs.

State sovereignty

Since the seventeenth century, more or less, world order has been based on the concept of state sovereignty: states are deemed to hold the monopoly of force within mutually recognized territories, and they are generally prohibited from intervening in one another’s domestic affairs. The invasion of Iraq challenged this standard in three important ways.

First, the fact of the war represented a direct attack on the sovereignty of the Iraqi state, which undermined the ban on aggressive war. While the Bush administration cast the invasion as a case of preemptive self-defense, it was widely seen as a preventive war of choice against a state that did not pose a clear and present danger. Moreover, the main exceptions to sovereignty that have developed over time, such as ongoing mass atrocities or United Nations authority, were not applicable in Iraq. Thus, the United States dealt a major blow to the rules-based international system of which it was one of the chief architects. This may have made more imaginable later crimes of aggression by other states.

Second, the means of the war, and especially the occupation, powered the reemergence of the private military industry. Driven by the need to sustain two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US armed forces became dependent on military contractors, which sometimes involved authorizing paid civilians to kill. The US effort to (re)privatize warfare brought back into fashion the use of private military force, generating a multibillion-dollar industry that is here to stay. Over time the spread of private military companies could unspool the state’s exclusive claim to violence and hammer the foundations of the current international system.

Third, the consequences of the war led to the spectacular empowerment of armed nonstate actors in the region and beyond, who launched a full-frontal assault on the sovereignty of many states. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, of course, emerged amid the brutal contestation of power in post-invasion Iraq and pursued its “caliphate” as an alternative (Sunni) political institution to rival the nation-state. While the threat has been contained, for now, in the Middle East, it is only beginning to gather force on the African continent. In addition, because Iran effectively won the war in Iraq, it was able to sponsor a deep bench of Shia nonstate groups which have eroded state sovereignty in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq itself.

The US invasion of Iraq left us a world with less respect for state sovereignty, more guns for hire, and a dizzying array of well-armed and determined nonstate groups.

—Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and host of the Guns for Hire podcast.

Abbas Kadhim on the opportunities missed

US-Turkish ties

By launching a war on Turkey’s border, against Turkish advice, in a manner that prejudiced Turkish interests, the United States in 2003 upended a strategic understanding that had dominated bilateral relations for five decades.

During and immediately after the Cold War, Turkey and the United States shared a strategic vision centered on containing the Soviet Union and its proxies. In exchange for strategic cooperation, Washington provided aid, modulated criticisms of Turkish politics, and deferred to Ankara’s sensitivities regarding its geopolitical neighborhood. With notable exceptions (e.g., Turkish opposition to the Vietnam War and US opposition to Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus operation), consensus was the norm and aspiration of both sides. After close collaboration in the Balkans, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan from 1991 to 2001, though, Ankara became increasingly alarmed about the prospect of a new war in Iraq.

Bilateral relations deteriorated sharply after the Turkish parliament voted against allowing the United States to launch combat operations from Turkish soil. The war was longer, bloodier, and costlier than its planners had anticipated. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (known as the PKK and designated by the United States as a terrorist organization in 1997) ended a cease-fire in place since the 1999 capture of its founder, Abdullah Öcalan, and gained broad new freedom of movement and action in northern Iraq. US military aid to Turkey ended, while defense industrial cooperation and military-to-military contacts dropped. In July 2003 US soldiers detained and hooded a Turkish special forces team in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, on suspicions that they were colluding with insurgents. This event, coupled with Turkish anger over the bitter conduct and conclusion of the prewar negotiations, helped fuel a sustained rise in negative views about the United States among the Turkish public.

Sanctions and the war in Iraq damaged Turkish economic interests, though these would rebound from 2005 onward. The relationship of the US military to the PKK—first as tacit tolerance of PKK attacks into Turkey from northern Iraq despite the US presence, and later with employment of the PKK affiliate in Syria as a proxy force against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—rendered the frictions of 2003 permanent. That US forces train, equip, and operate with a PKK-linked militia along Turkey’s border today is fruit of the Iraq war, because US-PKK contacts were brokered in northern Iraq, and US indifference to Turkish security redlines traces back to 2003.

The story of US-Turkish estrangement can be told from other perspectives: that Ankara sought strategic independence for reasons broader than Iraq, that President Erdoğan’s anti-Westernism drove divergence, that the countries have fewer shared interests now. There may be truth in these arguments, though they are based largely on speculation and imputed motives. Yet they, too, cannot be viewed except through the lens of the 2003 Iraq War, which came as Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party was assuming power and greatly influenced his subsequent decision-making.

Many effects of the Iraq War have faded, but the strategic alienation of Turkey and the United States has not.

—Rich Outzen, a retired colonel, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private-sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

China’s rise

As George W. Bush took office in 2001, managing the US-China relationship was regarded as a top foreign policy concern. The administration’s focus shifted with 9/11 and a wartime footing—which in turn altered Beijing’s foreign policy and engagement in the Middle East.

A high point in US-China tension came in April with the Hainan Island Incident. The collision of a US signals intelligence aircraft and a Chinese interceptor jet resulted in one dead Chinese pilot and the detention of twenty-four US crew members, whose release followed US Ambassador Joseph Prueher’s delivery of the “letter of the two sorries.”

But after the September 11 attacks, the United States launched the global war on terrorism, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq became the all-encompassing focal points. While that relieved pressure on China, the US decision to invade Iraq raised serious concerns in Beijing and elsewhere about the direction of global order under US leadership.

American willingness to attack a sovereign government with the stated goal of changing its regime set a worrisome precedent for authoritarian governments. Worries transformed into something else following the global financial crisis in 2008. Chinese leaders became even more wary of US leadership, with former Vice Premier Wang Qishan telling then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson after the financial crisis, “Look at your system, Hank. We aren’t sure we should be learning from you anymore.”

The war in Iraq was especially troubling for Chinese leaders. Few believed that the United States would engage in such a disastrous war over something as idealistic as democracy promotion in the Middle East. The dominant assumption was that the war was about maintaining control of global oil—and using that dominance to prevent China from rising to a peer competitor status. The so-called “Malacca Dilemma” became a feature of analysis in China’s strategic landscape: the idea that any power that could control the Strait of Malacca could control oil shipping to China, and therefore its economy. Since then, China has developed the world’s largest navy and invested in ports across the Indian Ocean region through its Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Its defense spending has increased fivefold this century, from $50 billion in 2001 to $270 billion in 2021, making it the second-largest defense spender in the Indo-Pacific region after Japan, and higher than the next thirteen Indo-Pacific countries combined.

Since the Iraq war, the Middle East has become a much greater focus in Chinese foreign policy. In addition to building up its own military, China began discussing security and strategic affairs with Middle East energy suppliers, conducting joint exercises, selling more varied weapons systems, and pursuing a regional presence that increasingly diverges or competes with US preferences.

Would China’s growing presence in the Middle East have followed the same trajectory had the United States not invaded Iraq? Possibly, although one could argue that the same sense of urgency would not have animated decision makers in the People’s Republic of China.

—Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and host of the China-MENA podcast. He is also an assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. Follow him on Twitter: @jonathandfulton.

The country’s readiness to meet climate challenges

Over the course of the last two decades, Iraq has become one of the five most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change. It has been affected by rising temperatures, insufficient and diminishing rainfall, intensified droughts that reduce access to water, sand and dust storms, and flooding. Iraq’s environmental ministry warns that the country may face dust storms for more than 270 days per year in the next twenty years.

While not the sole cause of environmental mismanagement in Iraq, the muhasasa system of power sharing has exacerbated and contributed to a culture of corruption and political patronage that has undermined efforts to protect the environment and to sustainably manage Iraq’s natural resources. Muhasasa is an official system that allocates Iraqi government positions and resources based on ethnic and sectarian identity. It may have been a good temporary compromise to promote stability in the early 2000s, but today it is widely viewed as a harmful legacy of the post-invasion occupation period.

In the context of protecting the environment, the muhasasa system has led to a situation where some government officials are appointed to their respective positions without the necessary skills or qualifications to manage resources efficiently or effectively. Forced ethnosectarian balancing has encouraged natural resource misuse for political or personal gain to the immediate detriment of average Iraqis. While muhasasa was intended to promote political stability and prevent marginalization of minority groups, in practice it has contributed to a culture of corruption and nepotism, and undermined efforts to promote good governance and sustainable development.

To address its acute climate challenges, Iraq needs to move away from the sectarian-based power sharing and toward a more inclusive, merit-based system of governance. It must strengthen its environmental regulations, commit itself to sustainable development, and better manage its natural resources for the country and as part of the global effort to mitigate climate change. The international community has a role to play here through supporting technical assistance, capacity building, and providing financial resources to help address these concerns along the way.

—Masoud Mostajabi is an associate director of the Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council.

Iran’s regional footprint

From the outset of the invasion of Iraq, the United States’ decision was built on several dubious premises that the administration masterfully overhyped to build support for its aspirations of removing Saddam Hussein by force. The last two decades have tragically shown the consequences of this decision—with high costs of blood and treasure and a serious blow to American credibility. But from a strategic standpoint, one particular miscalculation continues to create blowbacks to US regional security interests: top US policymakers willfully ignored the need for an adequate nation-rebuilding strategy, leaving a power vacuum that an expansionist Iran could fill.

With the removal of the Baathist regime, Iran finally saw the defeat of a rival it could not best after eight years of one of the region’s bloodiest wars. This cleared the path to influence Iraqi Shia leaders who had long relied on the Islamic theocracy next door for support. Even as some Shia learning centers in Najaf and Karbala challenged (once again) Qom, new opportunities of influence that never existed before opened up for Iran.

By infiltrating Iraq’s political institutions through appointed officials submissive to its regime’s wishes, Iran succeeded in two goals: deterring future threats of Iraqi hostilities and preventing the United States from using Iraqi territories as a platform to invade Iran. Through its Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Qods Force, Iran trained and supplied several militia groups that later officially penetrated Iraq’s security architecture through forces called Popular Mobilization Units, which have repeatedly carried out anti-American attacks. Nevertheless, those groups would eventually prove valuable to the United States in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—yet even then Iran succeeded in appearing as the protector of Iraq’s sovereignty by immediately equipping the Popular Mobilization Units, unlike the delayed US response that arrived months later.

Regionally, Iran’s military leverage and political allies inside Iraq provided it with a strategic ground link to its network in Syria and Lebanon, where the Qods Force ultimately shifted the political power dynamics to Iran’s advantage, especially as they crucially strengthened engagement in recruiting volunteers to support Bashar al-Assad’s fighters in Syria. Through the land bridge that connects Iran to the Bekaa Valley, Iran has helped spread its weapons-trafficking and money-laundering capabilities while reinforcing an abusive dictatorship in Syria and a crippled state in Lebanon.

Twenty years ago, the United States went to liberate Iraq from its oppressive dictatorship. What it left behind is a void in governance and an alternative system that fell far short of what the United States wanted for Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime continues to base its identity on anti-Americanism while it gets closer to its political and ideological ambitions. With US sanctions having so far failed to halt Iran’s network of militia training and smuggling—and the attempt to revive the nuclear deal stalled, despite being the main focus of US Iran policy—the question remains: How long will the United States tolerate Iran’s regional ascendancy before it intensifies its efforts toward restraining it?

—Nour Dabboussi is a program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

How governments counter terrorist financing

Without the experience of the war in Iraq, US and transatlantic economic statecraft would be less agile and less able to prevent terrorist financing. However, more work and continued international commitment is needed to ensure Iraq and its neighbors are able to strengthen and enforce their anti-money-laundering regimes to protect their economies from corruption and deny terrorists and other illicit actors from abusing the global financial system to raise, use, and move funds for their operations.

The tools of economic statecraft, including but not limited to sanctions, export controls, and controlling access to currency, became critical to US national security in the wake of 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Sanctions and other forms of economic pressure had been applied against the government of Iraq and illicit actors prior to 2003. However, economic pressure and the use of financial intelligence to combat terrorist financing became increasingly sophisticated as the war progressed. Since 2001, the State Department and Treasury have designated more than 500 individuals and entities for financially supporting terrorism in Iraq. Following the money and figuring out how terrorist networks raised, used, and moved funds was a critical aspect in understanding how they operated in Iraq and across the region. Information on terrorist financial networks and facilitators helped identify vulnerabilities for disruption, limiting their ability to fund and carry out terrorist attacks, procure weapons, pay salaries for fighters, and recruit.

Sanctioning the terrorist groups and financial facilitators operating in Iraq and across the region disrupted the groups’ financial flows and operational capabilities while protecting the US and global financial systems from abuse. Targets included al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, among others. For example, the US Treasury recently sanctioned an Iraqi bank moving millions of dollars from the Revolutionary Guard Corps to Hezbollah, preventing terrorists from abusing the international financial system.

Notably, the fight against terrorist financing set in motion the expansion of the Department of the Treasury’s sanctions programs and helped the US government refine its sanctions framework and enforcement authorities and their broad application.

Equally important, the US government’s efforts and experience in countering the financing of terrorism increased engagement and coordination with foreign partners to protect the global financial system from abuse by illicit actors. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental body responsible for setting international anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards, strengthened and revised its standards, recommendations, and red flags to account for what the international community learned from the experience of combatting terrorist financing in Iraq. The United States and partner nations provided, and continue to provide, training and resources to build Iraq’s and its neighbors’ capabilities to meet FATF standards and address terrorist financing and money laundering issues domestically.

—Kim Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

—Maia Nikoladze is an assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The United States

Perhaps no event since the end of the Cold War shaped American politics more than the invasion of Iraq. It is fair to say that without the Iraq war neither Donald Trump nor Barack Obama would likely have been president.

Weirdly, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is still almost a forbidden topic in GOP foreign policy circles. After the Bush years, a kind of collective-guilt omerta about the Iraq war took hold among Republicans. It was as if US-Iraqi history had started in 2005, or 2006, with Democrats and a few Republicans baying for a needed defeat. It never came. The 2007 surge, as David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy came to be known, was the gutsiest political call by an American leader in my lifetime.

It happened also to be right when very little else about the war was: There were, of course, no weapons of mass destruction found. Iran did expand its power, massively. Iraq did not offer an example of democracy to the region: rather, it horrified the region. It became linked to al-Qaeda only after the invasion. The White House refused to take the insurgency seriously until it was very serious. Iraq pulled attention away from Afghanistan. And of course there were 4,431 Americans killed.

By 2016, the narrative favored by Republicans had become that the execution of the war was flawed. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, was the villain in this story: But for Bremer’s incomprehensible decision to disband the Iraqi army and institute de-Baathification in early 2003, so the story went, the Iraq war could have succeeded. But in retrospect these decisions were defendable. Bremer was erring on the side of satiating the Shia majority, not the Sunni minority, and trying to reassure them that a decade after they were abandoned in 1991 the United States would deliver them political power. And the one real success of the Iraq war, beginning to end, is that the United States never faced a generalized Shia insurgency.

The other villain was Barack Obama, who played in the sequel. (Obama largely owed his electoral victory to the Iraq war, brilliantly using Hillary Clinton’s vote for the invasion to invalidate her experience and judgment and thus the main argument for her candidacy.) In this version of events, Obama’s precipitous decision to withdraw troops from Iraq in 2011 contributed to the country’s near-collapse three years later under the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This was basically accurate. The withdrawal of US forces eliminated a key political counterweight from Iraq, and the main incentive for then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to hedge his sectarianism and friendliness with Iran. This accelerated political support for Sunni rejectionist movements like ISIS.

Both the Bremer narrative and the Obama narrative allowed George Bush’s Republican party to avoid revisiting the core questions of American power: intervention, exceptionalism, and its limits—precisely the same questions that had featured prominently in the 2006 and 2008 elections.

This was the broken market that Donald Trump exploited: that Republican voters’ views on Iraq after 2008 looked much like Democratic voters’, but the Republican establishment’s views did not. And it was no accident, in the 2016 presidential primaries, that the two candidates most willing to criticize the interventionism of the 2000s, Trump and Ted Cruz, were the ones who did best.

This debate remains critical. More than any other decision, Bush’s war created the contemporary Middle East. Above all that includes the unprecedented regional dominance of Iran, the power of the Arab Shia, and the constraints on American power in buttressing its traditional allies. That imbalance, combined with a decade-long sense that America is leaving the region and wants no more conflict, has led Sunni Arab states to look for their security in other places.

Especially in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which if anything has sharpened foreign policy divisions, the Republican party and the United States need a dialectic, not a purge; a discussion, not a proscription; and a reasonable synthesis of the lessons of Iraq. People want to vote for restraint and realism, as much as or more than they want to vote and pay for interventionism and idealism. Was the Iraq War a mistake? Let us start this debate there, and produce something better.

—Andrew L. Peek is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He was previously the senior director for European and Russian affairs at the National Security Council and the deputy assistant secretary for Iran and Iraq at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

Andrew Peek on the historical context of the 2003 invasion

US foreign policy

The US decision to invade Iraq twenty years ago was, to use the words of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, a wily French statesman and diplomat of the Napoleonic era, “worse than a crime; it’s a mistake.”

While Saddam Hussein was a monster, and had ignored numerous United Nation-mandated commitments, the US-led effort in 2003 to topple him as president of Iraq was strategically unnecessary. It became the center of a failed mission in nation-building—one that has proved disastrous for US interests in the greater Middle East and beyond.

Iraq was at the center, but it was only one of four failed American interventions in the region. The others were Afghanistan, Libya, and, to a lesser extent, Syria. The operation to take down the Taliban was fast and efficient, but consolidation of a post-Taliban Afghanistan never occurred. Part of the reason for that was the United States’ war of choice in Iraq, which began less than eighteen months after Afghanistan. That sucked up most of the resources and attention for the rest of that decade. But the other reason for US failure in Afghanistan was that we were beguiled by the same siren song that misled us in Iraq: that we could overcome centuries of history and culture and create a stable society at least somewhat closer to US values. Failure on such a scale is not good for the prestige and influence of a superpower.

But that is not the end of it. There is also the domestic side. The misadventures in the greater Middle East were a failure not just of the US government but of the US foreign policy elite. It was a bipartisan affair. Neoconservative thinking dominated the Republican Party throughout the aughts, while liberal interventionism prevailed in the Democratic Party. They were all in for the utopian policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

While the failures in the greater Middle East were widely understood even before the unnecessarily embarrassing 2021 departure from Afghanistan, there has never been a public reckoning. There was nothing like the Church Committee, which in the mid-1970s shined a very harsh light on US failures in Southeast Asia. Few prominent thinkers or officials have publicly acknowledged their failed policy choices. And the same figures who led us into those debacles are still widely quoted on all major foreign policy matters.

This has had the consequence in the United States of providing ground for the growth of neoisolationist thinking. In running for the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump was not wrong in pointing out the failures of elites in both parties in conducting foreign policy in the greater Middle East. Since then, populists on the right have used this insight to undermine the credibility of foreign policy experts. And like generals fighting the last war, they have applied their “insight” from the Middle East to the latest challenges to US interests, such as Moscow’s war on Ukraine.

In this reading, US support for Ukraine is comparable to US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and will result in failure. There is no analysis—simply dismissal—of the dangers that Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine poses to US security and economic prosperity. No recognition that, as Putin has stated numerous times, he wants to restore Kremlin political control over all the states that used to make up the Soviet Union—which includes NATO and European Union (EU) member states. In other words, he seeks to undermine NATO and the EU.

Furthermore, there’s no understanding that despite the presence of American troops, the United States’ local allies in Iraq and Afghanistan could not win—but without one NATO soldier on the battlefield, Ukraine is fighting Russia to a standstill. Indeed, Ukraine has destroyed between 30 percent and 50 percent of Moscow’s conventional military capability. These analogies with the Iraq war ignore the reality that if Putin takes control of Ukraine, the United States will likely spend far more in financial resources and perhaps American lives in defending its NATO allies.

These failures of understanding are not simply or mainly a consequence of US errors in the Middle East. Utopian thinking in the United States and especially Europe was a natural consequence of the absence of great-power war since 1945. Especially since the fall of the Soviet Union, people on both sides of the Atlantic got comfortable with the notion that Russia was no longer an adversary. And isolationism also has a long pedigree in US society. So it would be vastly oversimplifying to blame the confusion of today’s neoisolationists exclusively on US failures in the Middle East. But the strong US response to the challenge of a hostile Soviet Union was possible because a bipartisan approach on containment was endorsed by leaders of both parties. After the United States’ misadventures in Iraq, such endorsements carry less weight today. In US foreign policy as elsewhere, we still do not know what the ultimate impact of the decision to invade Iraq will be.

—John Herbst’s 31-year career in the US Foreign Service included time as US ambassador to Uzbekistan, other service in and with post-Soviet states, and his appointment as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

What Iraq needs now

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William F. Wechsler on the future of Iraq

A reconciliation commission to rebuild national unity

One of the most devastating shortcomings of the 2003 Iraq invasion was the dismantlement of state institutions and the weakening of the Baghdad central government. That structural vacuum of power and services forced Iraqis back into tribal, religious, and ethnic allegiances, contributing to the nation-state’s fragmentation and exacerbating divisive sectarian discourses and intercommunity tensions. A quota-based constitutional system only served to institutionalize and legitimize the ethnosectarian distribution of power.

Conflicting groups grew further apart over the past two decades and became more motivated by accumulating political positions, hefty oil incomes, and territorial and symbolic gains rather than collectively seeking to rebuild their balkanized nation. Iraqi youth, on the other hand—who campaigned in the name of “We Want a Homeland” [نريد_وطن#] during the 2019 Tishreen (October) protests—seem to have understood what political elites might be missing: the necessity for national reconciliation and memorialization.

The bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra in 2006 unleashed the chaos trapped inside Pandora’s box and resulted in violent Sunni-Shia confrontations, which pushed the country to the brink of civil war. Today, political elites, aware of the fragility and precariousness of the political consensus, pretend the time of friction is over. My firsthand work in Iraqi prisons and camps, and the research projects I led in the country’s conflict zones off the beaten path, such as west of the Euphrates, in Zubair, and in rural areas in the Makhoul Basin, prove the absolute contrary.

A flagrant example of the sectarian ticking bomb that persists in Iraq is the mismanagement of the Sunni populations in the aftermath of the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Many pretended that ISIS fighters came from some fictional foreign entity and refused to face the fact that most of them, including their leader, were Iraqi-born and raised, which I observed as an eyewitness working with the International Committee of the Red Cross during the ISIS war in Nineveh and Salahuddin. Many people who were accomplices of the atrocities even engaged in rewriting the narrative altogether after 2017 in the name of national unity.

A number of Sunni populations in Iraq were mystified by their sudden loss of power with the toppling of Saddam Hussein and were in disbelief that the Shia they stigmatized as shrouguis—literally, “easterners,” a derogatory reference used by Sunni elites to refer to Shia Iraqis from the southeast—became the new lords of the land. Instead of engaging in meaningful mediation and reconciliation to work through these social changes, the majority parties preferred to bury their heads in the sand. This tendency led them to allow militia groups to displace and isolate the Sunni inhabitants of a key city like Samarra, to submerge under water the citizens of northern Kirkuk and Salaheddin, or to conceal the evidence incriminating Tikrit Sunnis during the Speicher massacre, in which ISIS fighters killed more than a thousand Iraqi military cadets, most of them Shia.

These are not isolated examples in a chaotic political and constitutional system in which many communities feel persistently misunderstood, including Kurds, Assyrians, Mandaeans, Baha’is, Afro-Iraqis, Turkmen—and even the Shia themselves. The only possible and plausible pathway for the country to be one again in the next twenty years is to engage in an excruciating but indispensable reconciliation process, through which responsibilities are determined, dignity is restored, and justice is served.

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

A new constitution

Iraq needs a new constitution. A good constitution spells out the framework and structure of government. It provides essential checks and balances to prevent dictators from coming to power. It helps protect the people’s rights. It has measures to prevent gridlock or the collapse of a functioning government.

Judged by these standards, the 2005 Iraqi constitutionis only a partial success.

However, complaints have built up since 2005: over the muhasasa system under which the established political parties divide up ministerial appointments; over the failure of Iraq’s government or other institutions to deliver basic services like electricity and water; over perceptions of excessive Iranian meddling in Iraq’s politics; and over the inability of the government to provide meaningful employment for millions of young Iraqis—or to foster a private sector capable of doing so. These grievances came to a head in the 2019 Tishreen protests in which more than 600 Iraqis died.

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 in part to bring democracy to Iraq, so it is ironic that Iraq’s 2005 constitution was the product of mostly Iraqi political forces unleashed by the failure of the United States to ensure a democratic transition. It was expected that the Kurdish political parties, which had worked closely with the United States for years, would insist upon a federal republic to ensure their autonomy from a central government whose long-term character and leanings in 2005 were far from settled. Beyond this, however, the small number of Americans actually involved in advising the key Iraqi players in the constitutional process—in the room where it happened—actually had relatively little experience in constitutional mechanics or modern comparative constitutional practice. The American sins of commission during the first two years after Iraq’s liberation were replaced by sins of omission during the crucial months of negotiation of the 2005 constitution.

Genuine constitutional reform in Iraq is not likely to be accomplished directly through the parliament, given the interests of Iraq’s political parties and the parliament’s need to focus on legislative responsibilities. Instead, Iraqi civil society—including scholars, lawyers, religious and business leaders, and retired government officials and jurists—should initiate serious discussions about constitutional reform. Many of these voices were not heard when the 2005 constitution was adopted. Their effort can be far more open and transparent than the process was in 2005.

Foreign governments should have a minimal role, limited to supporting and encouraging Iraqi-led efforts, without trying to broker a particular outcome. International foundations, institutes, universities, and think tanks can offer outside expertise, particularly in comparative constitutional law and other kinds of technical assistance. But the overall effort needs to be Iraqi-led, with input from a broad spectrum of Iraqi voices.

While civil society discussions in Iraq could begin with considering amendments to the 2005 constitution, US experience may be relevant. The US Constitutional Convention convened in May 1787 to consider amendments to the Articles of Confederation decided to completely redesign the government, resulting in a Constitution that, with amendments, has been in force in the United States for more than 230 years. Sometimes it’s better to start over.

Iraq’s path to constitutional reform is not clear today, but there is a path nevertheless. Incremental reform is possible, but reform on a larger scale may achieve a more lasting result. The more promising outcome could be for a slate of candidates to run for office with the elements of the new constitution as their platform. A reform slate is not likely to gain an absolute majority, but if its base of support is broad enough, it may be able to gain support in a new parliament needed to send a revised constitution to the Iraqi people for their approval. A new constitution, done right, could propel Iraq towards a better future.

—Thomas S. Warrick led the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project from 2002 to 2003, served in both Baghdad and Washington, and was director (acting) for Iraq political affairs from July 2006 to July 2007. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Thomas S. Warrick on the need for Iraqi-led constitutional reform

An economy diversified away from oil

The post-2003 political order, based on the muhasasa system of sectarian apportionment, came with the promise of a complete break with the past. The 2005 constitution, drafted by the new order, promised: “The State shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with modern economic principles to insure the full investment of its resources, diversification of its sources, and the encouragement and development of the private sector.”

As with other bold promises made, the economic promise was broken as soon as the constitution came into effect, as the political order pursued a decentralized and multiheaded evolution of the prior economic model, and persistently expanded the patrimonial role of the state as a redistributor of the country’s oil wealth in exchange for social acquiescence to its rule.

Over the last twenty years the economy developed significant structural imbalances, and was increasingly bedeviled by fundamental contradictions. Essentially, it was dependent on government spending directly through its provisioning of goods and services as well as public services, and indirectly on the spending of public-sector employees. However, this spending was almost entirely dependent on volatile oil revenues that the government had no control over; yet the spending was premised on ever-increasing oil prices.

The political order had the opportunity to correct course and honor the original promise during three major economic and financial crises, each more severe than the last and all a consequence of an oil-price crash: in 2007 to 2009, due to the global financial crisis; in 2014 to 2017, due to the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; and in 2020, due to the emergence of COVID-19. Yet, paradoxically, the political order doubled down on the policies that led to these crises as soon as oil prices recovered.

On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the political order—buoyed by the bounty of high, yet unsustainable, oil prices—is planning a budget that is expected to be the largest ever since 2003, to seek legitimacy from an increasingly alienated public. These plans will only deepen the economy’s structural imbalance and its fundamental contradictions, and as such could likely lead to even greater public alienation if an oil-price crash triggers yet another economic and financial crisis. Even if oil prices were to stay high, however, the country’s demographic pressures will in time create the conditions for a deeper rolling crisis.

—Ahmed Tabaqchali is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. An experienced capital markets professional, he is chief strategist of the AFC Iraq Fund.

Andrew Peek on the current state of Iraq and the US-Iraq relationship

An inclusive vision, representative of all its people

One of the enduring legacies of the 2003 invasion has been its deleterious effect on the many diverse ethnic and religious minority communities that make up the social fabric of Iraq. Yet it is that diversity and rich heritage that could now unlock a brighter future for the nation, if the political system can recognize and represent it.

Marginalized by an institutionally inscribed political system and few representative seats in parliament, Iraq’s minority communities have found themselves peripheralized by the state—and in the imaginations of the country’s future. Many have emigrated and now reside in diaspora, changing the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Iraq.

Calculating the cultural toll of war goes beyond the destruction of shrines and artifacts, and the looting of museums and buildings: One of the biggest social and cultural losses for Iraq has been the exclusion of minority communities from the nation-building processes. This is a tragic state of affairs for Iraq, whose uniqueness, strength, and richness stems from its ancient histories and cultures, its religious, artistic, and musical traditions, and the languages that have contributed to its heritage and development. That heritage deserves to be protected and celebrated.

Until the day the muhasasa system is dismantled, and a new Iraq built on meritocracy can thrive, minority communities must be safeguarded and included in Iraq’s future. Yet, this can only be achieved through the protection of minorities’ rights in Iraq’s political life, and genuine and concerted effort to increase parliamentary seats and legal representation of minorities. Investment in areas destroyed by terrorism and conflict, more reparations for communities whose livelihoods and homes have been ruined, and more boots on the ground to protect communities and religious shrines should be a priority.

Twenty years of destruction, corruption, violence, and the subsequent emigration of many communities cannot be erased. Yet the twentieth anniversary of Iraq’s occupation ought to serve as a point of reflection for the kind of Iraq that Iraqis want now. There is certainly much hope in a new generation of Iraqis calling for new national visions, an end to muhasasa, more civil rights, and expanding economic opportunities.

Yet all of Iraq’s communities must be part of this conversation. A more inclusive Iraq that applauds its diversity and takes pride in difference could be the driving force needed to unify the nation.

—Oula Kadhum, a former nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, is a postdoctoral research fellow at Lunds University in Sweden and a fellow of international migration at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom.

Oula Kadhum on the reforms needed to reposition Iraq in the next twenty years

A new US Iraq policy focused on youth and education

As the global community reflects on the twentieth anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq and looks to the future, it is time for foreign policy toward Iraq to move beyond its traditional, security-heavy approach.

While security threats persist, including a potential resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and should be a priority, US aid to Iraq has historically been ineffective and financially irresponsible. Humanitarian assistance, meanwhile, tends to focus on short-term issues like the response to COVID-19 and assisting displaced individuals. And while such aid can be beneficial, continuing with the traditional avenues of support is not a sustainable solution to rebuild Iraq. The United States and the international community must begin to focus on long-term solutions that address human security, development, infrastructure, education, and the economy. At the center of all these issues are two key variables that must be the focal point of policy: education and the youth population.

A 2019 UNICEF report estimates that a staggering 60 percent of Iraq’s population is under the age of twenty-five. Learning levels and access to education in Iraq remain among the lowest in the region. The great challenges these two facts pose can also be seen as a unique opportunity: to place its large youth population at the epicenter of Iraq’s future through policy that increases the number of educators and trains them, ensures sanitary and competent learning conditions, and increases access to education.

The benefits of a long-term investment in Iraq’s education system and youth population go beyond simply educating its citizens: It would be the first step in unlocking the human potential of Iraq. More education means more qualified professionals; more doctors would increase the quality and access to healthcare, an increase in engineers will ensure that the country’s infrastructure continues to develop, and additional business leaders and entrepreneurs will assist in growing the economy.

To truly rebuild Iraq, the United States and the international community can no longer view the country as only a security issue. Rather, this moment must be seen as an opportunity to empower bright Iraqi youths, who hope to lead in rebuilding their own country—providing them with a fair shot of again being a cradle of civilization.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Fuad Hussein reflects on the twentieth anniversary of the invasion

What the United States can do now

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Recommit to the cause of Iraqi freedom

It’s hard to believe that it has been twenty years since the US invasion of Iraq. As I sat waiting to launch my first mission on March 20, the war’s historical significance was not my primary thought. How I found myself flying on the first night of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq was. That thought was accompanied by the tightness in the pit of my stomach that I always got before launching into the unknown.

We didn’t debate the case for the war among ourselves. It has been discussed thoroughly since, and I don’t claim to have any new insight to offer on that topic. We were focused on not letting down our fellow Marines and accomplishing our mission: to remove Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and replace it with a democracy that would give the people of Iraq the freedom that people everywhere deserve as their birthright.

Did we succeed? We certainly succeeded in rapidly destroying the Baathist regime and its military, the third largest in the world. The answer to the second question is less clear. On my second and third tours in Iraq, I saw the chaos from the al-Qaeda-fueled insurgency in 2005 and 2006 and the dramatic turnaround following the al-Anbar “Sunni Awakening” in 2006-2007. From afar, I watched the horrors that the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham inflicted on its people after US troops withdrew without a status-of-forces agreement.

Today, Iraq is rated “not free,” scoring twenty-nine out of one hundred in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2022 report. Although not up to Western liberal democracy standards, this is an improvement over 2002, when it received the lowest score possible and was listed as one of the eleven most repressive countries in the world. Moreover, Iraq’s 2022 score is vastly better than most of its neighbors: Iran scored fourteen, Syria scored one, and Afghanistan scored ten.

Despite Afghanistan being widely seen as “the good war” of the two post-9/11 conflicts, where the casus belli was clear, today it is Iraq, and not Afghanistan, that gives me hope that twenty years from now, on the fortieth anniversary, we will see our efforts to promote democracy in Iraq come entirely to fruition. We owe it to the 36,425 Americans killed and wounded there, the thousands of veterans who took their own lives, and the many more still struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder to stay engaged in Iraq and the region to try and make sure that they do.

—Col. John B. Barranco was the 2021-22 Senior US Marine Corps Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense or Department of the Navy.

Balance confidence and humility

I officially swore into the military at Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, on April 4, 2003, during the early stages of the US “shock and awe” campaign in Iraq. Having decided to join the Air Force following 9/11, the lengthy administrative process I’d endured to get to this point had been agonizing. I recall going through the in-processing line at Officer Training School on April 9, when an instructor whispered to us: “Coalition forces have taken Baghdad, stay motivated.” The thought that immediately went through my mind was: “I’m going to miss the wars.”

I had made the choice to pursue special operations and still had two years of training ahead of me. At the time, the war in Afghanistan seemed like it was nearing completion, and the swift overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq had me convinced that, by the time I was ready to deploy, there would be no fighting left. Little did I know that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with their expansions across the Middle East and Africa, would end up consuming a large majority of my twenty years of service, take the lives of many of my special operations teammates, and impact the health and well-being of a generation of US service members and their families.

It’s impossible to know how the war in Iraq shaped other US endeavors in the region. Did it take our focus from Afghanistan and put us on a path of increased escalation and investment there? Did it set conditions for the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham to take root many years later, setting off another expansive counterterrorism campaign?

More broadly, did it allow adversaries the time and space to study US capabilities and ultimately inform their strategies for malign influence? I often think of this today when I’m asked about what’s going to happen with the Russian war in Ukraine, or how prepared the United States is to defend Taiwan.

The United States needs the confidence to confront global challenges to peace and prosperity, but also the humility to know we get things wrong, and mistakes involving direct military intervention can be catastrophic. Given the escalatory risks associated with the security challenges in the world today, our pursuit of a balance of confidence and humility has never been more important.

—Lt. Col. Justin M. Conelli is the 2022-23 Senior US Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

William F. Wechsler on the current political discourse around Iraq

Recognize the successes as well as the failures

“Was the invasion of Iraq worth it?”

I’ve spent a great deal of my military and postmilitary career answering questions about Iraq, but this one—from a brigadier general in the audience—caught me off guard. It was 2018, seven years after the formal withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, and I found myself in front of a roomful of Army officers giving a talk on the future of US-Iraq security cooperation. By that time, such talks had become a little frustrating. The fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (aka the Islamic State group) demonstrated that Iraqi forces could rise to the immediate challenge; however, the conditions that led to their unceremonious collapse in 2014 had not much changed. As a result, there remained many questions about the best way to continue the security partnership to prevent future catastrophe.

The question I got that day, however, had little to do with how to partner with Iraqi forces. A co-presenter from Kurdistan jumped in immediately to answer the brigadier general’s question: the US invasion had removed Iraqi Kurdistan’s most significant threat—Saddam Hussein—and had provided opportunities for economic and political development it would not have had otherwise. Sensing a trap, I nonetheless walked right into it. While Iraqi Kurdistan was certainly in a better position, I pointed out that was not consistently so for the rest of Iraq. The US invasion had unleashed a sectarian free-for-all that allowed Sunni extremists, Shia militias, and their Iranian sponsors to fill the vacuum of oppression Saddam’s departure had left. Moreover, this vacuum had empowered Iran to challenge the United States and its partners regionally. So my answer was no, toppling Saddam likely did not outweigh the costs.

In previous years, the questions had been more policy-focused. For example, when I arrived at the Pentagon’s Iraq Intelligence Working Group in August 2002, the first question asked was how Iraq’s diverse ethnic and confessional demographics would affect military operations and enable—or impede—victory. By early 2003, the questions were about the larger effort to construct a new political order. Before long, we were asking how the confluence of Islamist terrorism, sectarian rivalries, and external intervention drove resistance to efforts to reconstruct Iraq.

In 2012, I became the US defense attaché in Baghdad, just after the last US service members withdrew. At first, the question I heard in this capacity was how to continue the reconstruction project with a limited military and civilian presence whose movement was often severely restricted in a sovereign, sometimes uncooperative, Iraq with frequent interference from Iran. Before I left, al-Qaeda had metastasized into the Islamic State group and the question became how to cooperate to prevent the group’s further expansion and liberate the territory it had seized. Meanwhile, Iran’s influence with the Iraqi government continued to grow.

In retrospect, the conditions I described in 2018 were accurate (and still largely hold today), but I wish I had given a more considered response. What I wish I had said was that a better question than “was it worth it” is: what have we learned about past failures to assess future opportunities? A prosperous Iraq that contributes to regional stability was not possible under Saddam. Now Iraq is an effective partner against Islamist extremists, and the Iraqi people, if not always their government, are in a position to push back on Iran in their own way, exposing Tehran for the despotic government it is. Moreover, Iraq’s hosting of discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran was a catalyst to their recent normalization of relations.

The point is not to rationalize failure. Rather, the question now is: what have we learned from those failures to effectively capitalize on the success we have had, and how can we take advantage of the opportunities the current situation presents?

—C. Anthony Pfaff, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative and a research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Tony Pfaff on the future of US-Iraq relations

Remember the price of hubris

For me, the memories of those first days and weeks in Iraq remain quite clear. I remember calling my family from a satellite phone on the tarmac of Baghdad International Airport to let them know I was alive, late night meetings with Iraqi agents in safe houses, wrapping up Iraqi high-value targets, the fear amid firefights and the carnage on streets strewn with dead and mutilated bodies, and a confused Iraqi population that at the time did not know what to make of US forces who claimed to be liberating them from the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Upon arrival in Baghdad in early April, there were few signs of the resistance that would haunt the United States for decades to come. Yes, there were still combat operations underway, but that was against Iraqi military and paramilitary units. So, as we tracked down Iraqi regime targets one by one—members of the famed “deck of fifty-five cards” that US Central Command had dreamed up and distributed like we were trading baseball cards—we saw this as part of a new beginning.

Yet soon after, the wheels began to fall off. Orders came from Washington policy officials with absolutely zero substantive Middle East experience both to disband the Iraqi military and purge the future government of Baath party officials, which immediately put tens of thousands of hardened military officers, conscripts, and officials out of work and on the street. The CIA presence on the ground protested, but to no avail. I had never seen Charlie, my station chief, so angry, including face-to-face confrontations with senior figures in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Charlie—the most accomplished Arabist in the CIA’s history—sadly predicted the insurgency that was about to come. If only Washington had listened.

I rarely think of Iraq in terms of big-picture strategy. As a CIA operations officer, I was a surgical instrument of the US government, and I gladly answered the bell when called upon to do so. I am proud to have served with other CIA officers and special operations personnel who performed valiantly. I suppose I can defend the invasion on human rights grounds. It seems we forget that Saddam was one of the great war criminals in history, and Iraq has been freed from his depravity. Yet two numbers are haunting: 4,431, and 31,994. Those are the number of Americans killed and wounded in action, per official Department of Defense statistics.

War is a nasty business, and many times a terrible price is paid for hubris. The casualty figures noted above paint a stark picture of the historic intelligence failure that the analytic assessment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was. The CIA in particular suffered a credibility hit that has taken decades to recover from.

—Marc Polymeropoulos, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, served for twenty-six years at the CIA before retiring in 2019.

Thomas S. Warrick on the lessons to learn from the Iraq War

The post How the war in Iraq changed the world—and what change could come next appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What Zelenskyy should know before he talks with Xi

Gabriel Alvarado — Thu, 16 Mar 2023 18:38:42 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy may finally get a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping as soon as next week. The expected discussion follows Beijing’s release of a position paper for Ukraine on February 24—the one-year mark of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Zelenskyy, however, should be wary about what Xi truly seeks, namely the mitigation of criticism about Beijing’s role in the conflict and a platform to sell his Global Security Initiative (GSI), for which Beijing released a concept paper just days before releasing its position paper. As such, it is critical that Zelenskyy provide his honest public assessment of Beijing’s peace plan and role in the conflict—otherwise, he risks giving Beijing the perfect cover to refute questions about its alleged neutrality while doing little to ensure an outcome to the crisis that actually works for Ukraine.

For Xi, a meeting with Zelenskyy would be more about securing soundbites that reflect positively on Beijing’s position paper and on the GSI—specifically its potential for addressing the problems in the world that, according to China, the United States and its NATO allies have wrought. The plan mirrors important elements of the GSI by calling for respecting the sovereignty of all countries and by taking countries’ security concerns seriously—not only a nod to Moscow but also a clear dig at Washington, intended to warn the United States to avoid adopting a “Cold War mentality” and abusing unilateral sanctions. China’s portrayal of the United States and the West more broadly as the main reasons for the world’s “peace deficit” has indeed been a prominent theme in the GSI since it was unveiled last year.

Zelenskyy must also contend with the fact that Beijing’s position paper does not mean that China is going to distance itself from Russia. The expected meeting with Xi will likely happen virtually and only after Xi visits Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Chinese State Councilor and Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang Yi was also in Moscow just days before the paper was released; more recently, Belarusian leader (and Putin ally) Alyaksandr Lukashenka visited China and met with Xi.

Additionally, the timing of Beijing’s paper almost certainly was meant to deflect criticism of China as Russia’s full-scale invasion reached the one-year mark, particularly in light of US intelligence indicating that Beijing is considering supplying lethal aid to Moscow. China’s foreign ministry called those claims disinformation, stating that Washington is the one “fanning the flame and fueling the fight with more weaponry” in a classic example of whataboutism. The Chinese state-owned Global Times bashed the United States in an editorial, writing that Washington cannot on one hand criticize China’s close ties with Russia while on the other ask Beijing to use friendly relations with Moscow to rein in Putin. It further indicated that Xi is not planning to distance himself from Putin with the release of the position paper. It also shows that Beijing believes that it can continue to profess neutrality while in reality supporting Moscow without any substantial repercussions.

Despite claiming to be open to working with all countries, Beijing is under no illusions that Washington will back its peace plan. But it does hope that the plan will appeal to the rest of the world, including countries across the Global South and possibly even some US allies and partners. The Global Times editorial highlights the impact of the war in Ukraine on developing countries and their abilities to achieve their development goals, arguing that those economic struggles are the reason developing countries are “unwilling to be forced to choose sides in the conflict.” This is almost certainly a reference to US pressure on developing countries to punish Russia, in contrast to what Beijing claims is a more reasonable approach that considers these countries’ interests in its paper and GSI plan. An article in Chinese Communist Party-owned China Daily published three days after the position paper was released boasted that GSI gets support from eighty countries and regional organizations. The article also quoted analysts from Japan, South Korea, and India expressing positive reactions to GSI.

Regardless of Beijing’s intent, by using the publicity of its position paper to promote GSI, China has increased its visibility in—and thus its burden for—resolving the crisis. Linking the GSI to its paper may seem risky, considering that if China’s efforts to achieve peace fail, so too might its effort to promote the GSI. But in the current atmosphere of diverging narratives on who is right or wrong, it is possible that Xi has already decided to spin the GSI as a program that yields success regardless of how things turn out in Ukraine or any other crises his GSI tackles, including by blaming others (i.e. Washington) for any obstacles and failures.

One thing that could seriously hamper such a plan, however, is if Xi is unable to get the sound bites he wants from a meeting with Zelenskyy. If Ukraine were to shoot down China’s position paper, it would harm Beijing’s veneer of neutrality and raise doubts about the GSI’s ability to deliver. It is in this context that words matter, and although it is commendable that Zelenskyy is giving Beijing the benefit of the doubt, he should recognize that he would be better served by pushing for specifics.

He also should provide a full public account of the next steps that were discussed with Xi, along with his assessment of whether those steps have any merit, rather than releasing a jargony statement that might, to any extent, suggest outright Ukrainian support for Beijing’s position paper and the GSI. Such a statement would only make it easier for Xi to sell the GSI—which portrays some countries trying to help Ukraine as the enemy—and make it harder to reproach Beijing for its support to Moscow against Kyiv.

Trying to curry favor with Beijing in this way will not guarantee its help in securing an end to the conflict that works for the Ukrainian people. Rather, Zelenskyy should be aware that it is arguably his direct and honest assessment of Beijing’s paper and role in the conflict that Xi is worried about the most, which therefore may provide Zelenskyy with some leverage to push for and hold Beijing to specific next steps. In this sense, the actual meeting with Xi is less important than what Zelenskyy has to say about the exchange afterward.

Gabriel “Gabo” Alvarado is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub with previous experience at the US Department of State in the bureaus of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Western Hemisphere Affairs. He works at Nisos, a managed intelligence services company.

The post What Zelenskyy should know before he talks with Xi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Premature peace with Putin would be disastrous for international security

Peter Dickinson — Sat, 04 Mar 2023 00:55:59 +0000

For the past twelve months, Ukraine’s remarkable resistance to Russian aggression has captured the imagination of the watching world. The international community has been been amazed by the resilience of the Ukrainian people and inspired by their determination to defy the Russian colossus. At the same time, as the invasion enters its second year, calls are now mounting for some kind of compromise with the Kremlin that would end the fighting and effectively freeze the conflict.

Most advocates of a compromise peace argue that a complete Ukrainian victory is simply not realistic and insist that even a bad peace is better than more war. While often vague on details, they typically hint at some kind of land-for-peace deal that would involve Ukraine giving up part of its sovereign territory and condemning millions of Ukrainian civilians to permanent Russian occupation in exchange for an end to hostilities.

Such wishful thinking conveniently underestimates the extent of Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions while ignoring the grave implications for international security of anything less that a decisive Russian defeat in Ukraine. If Moscow is rewarded for the invasion of Ukraine with territorial gains, the world will become a far more dangerous place. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the perils of appeasing Putin is by imagining where we would be today if Ukraine had indeed fallen one year ago.

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Since the invasion began on February 24, 2022, a combination of captured documents, prisoner accounts, Russian propaganda messaging, and the conduct of the Russian military in occupied Ukrainian regions have made it possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive vision of Putin’s plans for a conquered Ukraine. The chilling picture that emerges is of a genocidal campaign to not only extinguish Ukrainian statehood but wipe out all traces of Ukrainian national identity.

If Putin’s initial invasion plan had succeeded and his troops had captured Kyiv in three days as anticipated, he would have deposed the government and installed a puppet regime drawn from Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin political forces. Much of the country would have quickly come under direct Russian military control and would have been subjected to months of mass arrests, summary executions, and forced deportations designed to break all resistance. Working with local collaborators across the country, the Russian occupation authorities would have targeted anyone viewed as a potential threat to the Kremlin.

This pattern of atrocities has been repeated systematically over the past year in every region of Ukraine occupied by Putin’s troops. International investigators have concluded that the crimes taking place in occupied regions are evidence of a “calculated plan” to destroy the Ukrainian nation. “Putin’s plan is to occupy Ukraine, subjugate the Ukrainian population to Russian rule, and destroy Ukrainian identity. This plan is becoming clearer as the evidence of war crimes proliferates and as our investigations progress,” commented British barrister Wayne Jordash, who leads the Mobile Justice Team of international lawyers investigating possible Russian crimes in Ukraine.

With less than 20 percent of Ukrainian territory currently occupied by Russia, the humanitarian consequences of the war have already been disastrous. Tens of thousands of civilians are feared dead and over a million have been subjected to forced deportation to the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, millions more have had to flee their homes and move elsewhere in Ukraine or cross the border into neighboring EU countries.

If Putin had managed to seize the whole of Ukraine, the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe would have been far greater. Tens of millions of Ukrainian refugees would have flooded into the European Union, while ongoing acts of resistance inside Ukraine would have led to a bloodbath of increasingly savage reprisals designed to terrorize the population into submission. Global audiences would have witnessed the previously unthinkable spectacle of a modern genocide unfolding methodically in the heart of Europe and livestreamed on social media.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The negative implications of a Russian victory in Ukraine would not have been limited to the captive Ukrainian population, of course. On the contrary, the repercussions would have been felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine, shaping the geopolitical climate for years to come and destabilizing the entire world.

The most immediate consequence would have been additional Russian wars of aggression. Success in Ukraine would have encouraged Putin to continue, with Moldova and Kazakhstan among the most obvious next targets. Sooner or later, the emboldened Russian dictator would test NATO’s commitment to collective security. Would the likes of France and Germany really risk World War III in order to defend Estonia? If Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, that is a question all NATO members will probably have to answer in the not-too-distant future. At this stage, it seems reasonable to assume that Putin is far from convinced.

Nor would Russia be the only threat on the horizon. The fall of Ukraine would undermine the core principles of the global security order and inspire other authoritarian regimes around the world to engage in their own foreign policy adventures. In the wake of a successful Russian invasion of Ukraine, a Chinese assault on Taiwan would become far more likely, while autocrats everywhere would draw the logical conclusions for their own neighborhoods.

A Ukrainian defeat could also have sparked an unprecedented international scramble for nuclear weapons. Even before Putin’s full-scale invasion, the preceding eight years of Russian aggression against Ukraine had already highlighted the folly of the Ukrainian government’s 1994 decision to unilaterally hand over the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK. If Russia had achieved its goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood, many countries would have begun looking nervously at their neighbors, with some deciding that the only truly reliable security guarantee was a nuclear arsenal of their own.

The aftershocks of a successful Russian blitzkrieg in Ukraine would have proved hugely damaging for the future of democracy itself. Putin’s triumph would have discredited the democratic world and reinvigorated authoritarian regimes around the globe. From Central Asia to the Balkans, the often fragile democratic progress of recent decades would have given way to a fresh wave of authoritarianism drawing its legitimacy from the new geopolitical realities created by Russian victory in Ukraine. Populism would have reached new heights throughout the West, with the likes of Hungary’s Viktor Orban emerging as key beneficiaries.

This nightmare vision of a world marked by chronic international instability, wars of aggression, nuclear proliferation, and rising authoritarianism is still a very real possibility. Russia continues to commit genocide in those parts of Ukraine under its control, and remains as determined as ever to replace the rules-based international order with a system where great powers can dictate to their weaker neighbors. The only way to avoid this dystopian future is by ensuring that Putin’s attempt to destroy Ukraine ends in failure.

The many people currently proposing peace plans may well have good intentions, but they are delusional if they believe Putin will be satisfied with relatively modest territorial gains in eastern and southern Ukraine. In reality, any concessions will merely whet his imperial appetite while convincing him of the West’s fundamental weakness. The Russian dictator is already openly comparing his invasion to Czar Peter the Great’s eighteenth century wars of imperial conquest. If Putin is rewarded for his aggression in Ukraine, he will inevitably go further.

Rather than insisting on a premature peace, it would make far more sense to actually listen to Ukraine. Nobody wants peace more than the millions of Ukrainians who have seen their lives shattered and their country devastated by Russia’s criminal invasion. It is therefore particularly revealing that there is virtually zero support in today’s Ukraine for a negotiated settlement. Ukrainians are under no illusions over the difficulties of achieving victory. Nevertheless, they also understand the nature of the current Russian regime and recognize that unless Putin is decisively defeated, he will continue to wage war against their country and the wider democratic world.

Luckily, Ukrainians are ready to do the fighting themselves. Last year, their valor prevented the world from plunging into a new dark age of authoritarian aggression. All they ask now is for the international community to remain steadfast in their support and give Ukraine the tools to finish the job.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

The Ukrainian criminal code includes provisions on acts of aggression, violations of the rules of warfare, and genocide. As of February 17, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine had registered 70,180 war crimes and crimes of aggression and 16,882 crimes against national security, with eighty-six reported indictments and twenty-five convictions. While the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office has faced staff shakeups stemming from allegations of treason, it is working with organizations such as the International Bar Association and the Council of Europe to strengthen its capacity.

However, with the office’s success and dedication, the international community has voiced some concerns about proceedings. These concerns primarily regard trials held in absentia—a somewhat controversial option that requires particular attention to fair trial rights for the accused under the European Convention on Human Rights—and the lack of an investigation into Ukrainian troops despite evidence that suggests possible violations (albeit on a significantly lower level). While Russia has launched domestic trials against Ukrainian soldiers, these trials “brazenly [undermine] fair trial rights” that are guaranteed for prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, according to Amnesty International.

States not currently directly involved in the conflict have also opened investigations into international crimes under universal jurisdiction provisions. In Germany, the federal prosecutor launched a structural investigation, a tool allowing the office to gather evidence broadly without focusing on a particular suspect. Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, and Romania have further joined with Ukraine to form a joint investigation team. The US Department of Justice issued indictments related to Russia’s invasion, while Congress amended US war crime provisions to facilitate cases against Russian perpetrators.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide when a crime is committed by a national of or on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC or if the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) refers a matter to the ICC. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is a State Party, and Russia would almost certainly use its veto to block a UNSC referral. However, Ukraine submitted declarations in 2014 and 2015 accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on its territory from November 21, 2013 onwards. On March 2, 2022 the ICC prosecutor, Karim Ahmad Khan, announced that he had opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine based on what ultimately totaled forty-three states’ referrals. By April 25, Khan’s office had joined as a participant in the joint investigation team, and by June 17, Khan had visited Ukraine three times and announced plans to open a field office there. The ICC is a “court of last resort,” and Ukraine’s prosecutor general has indicated that his plan is to try “the overwhelming majority” of cases domestically, leaving the ICC to fill in the blanks. These blanks are likely to be cases against senior leaders who would be protected by personal immunities in domestic trials, as such immunities are generally considered inapplicable at international courts.

The ICC also has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression—the use of armed force by one state against another in violation of the United Nations Charter. However, it can only exercise that jurisdiction if both the aggressor state and the victim state have signed onto the Kampala Amendments, which added the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute, or if the UNSC referred the matter. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has signed these amendments, and it can again be assumed that Russia would veto a referral. Furthermore, because the criminalized acts under most definitions of aggression typically involve senior-level leaders, an international court is again needed to overcome personal immunities. As such, Ukraine has proposed the creation of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This option continues to face considerable scrutiny—on principle, as it highlights double standards for Western countries (many of which have evaded responsibility for their own acts of aggression and bear responsibility for the difficulties in prosecuting the crime at the ICC), and pragmatically, given concerns about support and the feasibility of the proposed structure because of personal immunity concerns. Still, the special tribunal proposal seems to be gaining support.

Civil cases, sanctions, and more

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) allows states to bring complaints against other states for violations of various treaties. In February 2022, Ukraine filed an application against Russia under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, alleging both that Russia was erroneously accusing Ukraine of genocide and also that Russia was itself planning acts of genocide. A record number of third parties—over forty-one states and the European Union (EU)—filed declarations of intervention on the construction of the provisions. Even the United States filed a declaration of intervention, likely the first time it has ever done so before the ICJ. With the conflict in Ukraine as a backdrop, senior officials stressed at a recent UNSC debate that increased state consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction as well as compliance with its decisions could strengthen the rule of law.

While there are not yet cases related to Russia’s 2022 invasion before the European Court of Human Rights, there are several cases against Russia relating to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. At the court, cases regarding violations of the European Convention on Human Rights by states that have ratified it can be brought by individuals, companies, nongovernmental organizations, or other States Party. In a decision released on January 25, the court held both that states still must respect human-rights obligations under the Convention during armed conflicts and that Russia controlled the separatist regions in Eastern Ukraine from the outset of the 2014 invasion. This opens the way for cases related to human-rights violations, such as acts of torture and ill-treatment, committed last year between February and September 16, the day that Russia ceased to be a party to the Convention.

One of the most immediate and prolific quasi-judicial tools has been the use of targeted human-rights sanctions. Broadly speaking, these sanctions freeze assets of and deny visas to the designated person or entity. These gained popularity once it became clear that Kremlin-connected oligarchs were storing assets in the West. While the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU, Canada, and Australia are among the main jurisdictions with permanent sanctions regimes, many additional states designated Russians in the past year.

Because these sanctions only froze assets, additional efforts then went toward finding avenues to seize and repurpose these assets to support Ukraine. The United States and the EU set up Task Force KleptoCapture and the “Freeze and Seize” Taskforce, respectively, and Canada amended its targeted sanctions legislation to allow the seizing of assets in certain circumstances. In November 2022, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution recommending that member states work with Ukraine to create a “register of damage,” recording evidence and claims related to damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia’s wrongful acts. Then, a compensation mechanism would help pay out these claims with confiscated Russian assets.

Novel legal issues

The changing nature of conflict is particularly evident in this war, as the sides have engaged in significant cyber operations. Of particular concern are cyberattacks, in conjunction with kinetic attacks, against critical infrastructure and civilian targets. Targeting civilians and civilian objects in conflict is prohibited under international humanitarian law. Additionally, attacks against military objects are prohibited when they can be expected to result in excessive harm to civilians and/or civilian objects as compared to the anticipated military advantage. Furthermore, parties to the conflict are expected to take all feasible precautions when choosing their means and methods of warfare so as to avoid or minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects. Due to their novelty, however, cyberattacks are not included in the Geneva Conventions or even the Rome Statute. The recent request from Ukrainian officials to the ICC to investigate whether certain Russian cyberattacks constitute war crimes marks the first time a sovereign government has asked this of the court. A prior request was submitted by human-rights lawyers and investigators in March 2022 for the ICC to consider war crimes prosecutions for cyberattacks against Ukraine dating back to Russia’s 2014 invasion.

The participation of civilians in cyber operations, or cyber “hacktivism,” in support of both Russia and Ukraine raises important questions about rules and protections under international humanitarian law. On February 24 last year, for example, the hacker collective Anonymous announced it would engage in a cyberwar with Russia in retaliation for Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine. Two days later, Mykhailo Fedorov, minister of digital transformation of Ukraine, announced in a tweet the creation of a volunteer “IT army.” The tweet included a link to a Telegram channel with instructions for attacking Russian websites. As of March 2022, the Telegram channel had up to four hundred thousand members. With respect to Russia, reports suggest that pro-Russian hacktivists have been coordinating their actions with the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. While civilians are protected from attack under international humanitarian law, this protection is lost “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” The determination of whether someone is a combatant or a civilian is crucial in assessing whether an attack directed against that person is a war crime or legally permissible.

What Ukraine’s example means for atrocities worldwide

There are several reasons why so many avenues are open to Ukraine and why it has pushed forward international law so quickly. Ukraine had already accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction and criminalized the relevant acts. Furthermore, the nature of the conflict—in which one state is clearly the aggressor—has given Ukraine an incentive to cooperate with all available authorities and to use its own. However, another factor appears to be in play: While not in the least a reflection on Ukraine, much of the Western news coverage, especially early on, expressed heightened horror at seeing atrocities in Europe, a striking contrast from the media’s approach to atrocities in other regions of the world—and one that was distinctly racist.

Other atrocities also face distinct practical hurdles. For example, repeated attempts to open a case on Syria at the ICC have so far remained fruitless, and Iran’s judiciary is currently being utilized as an instrument of repression against its own people. However, justice efforts for Ukraine have opened new avenues—fixing legislative gaps, establishing new task forces, and developing needed case law on modern issues—and have shown what political will and public support can accomplish when galvanized. As the one-year mark of Russia’s full-scale invasion arrives, this progress toward justice should be commended, but it should also be recognized as the standard that victims of all atrocities deserve.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post How legal actions against Russian aggression in Ukraine can serve as a model for other conflicts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian presence at Paris Olympics risks normalizing Ukraine invasion

Mark Temnycky — Thu, 02 Feb 2023 17:54:53 +0000

On January 25, news broke that the International Olympic Committee would allow Russian athletes to compete at the 2024 Summer Olympic Games in Paris under a neutral flag. The decision has sparked controversy and revived a longstanding debate over the separation of sport from politics.

Many critics slammed the IOC decision as a step toward normalizing relations with Russia despite Moscow’s ongoing genocidal invasion of Ukraine. “Ukrainian decathlete Volodymyr Androshchuk will not be representing his country at the Paris Olympics because he was just killed by the Russian armed forces. In other news, the IOC announces that Russian athletes are welcome in Paris,” tweeted Yale historian Timothy Snyder on February 1.

Some went even further. A joint statement from a coalition of Ukrainian athletes and the Global Athlete movement drew attention to Russia’s record of exploiting the Olympics for propaganda purposes. “Russia used the Sochi Olympics to bolster its international standing before annexing Crimea,” the statement highlighted. “Russia has proven time and time again that athletes are an integral part of its foreign policy. If Russian athletes are allowed to return to international competition, the Russian state will again use athletes to bolster the war effort and distract from the atrocities in Ukraine.”

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Anger over the IOC decision reflects global outrage at the brutality of the invasion launched by Russia in February 2022. As the war in Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, the list of Russian atrocities continues to grow. Thousands of Ukrainian civilians have been killed and more than ten million people have been displaced by the fighting. Dozens of towns and cities have been reduced to rubble by Vladimir Putin’s advancing army, while regions of Ukraine occupied by Russia have reportedly been subjected to an array of war crimes including mass executions, torture, sexual violence, and forced deportations.

With Russia showing no signs of abandoning its efforts to extinguish Ukrainian independence and force Ukrainians back into the Kremlin orbit, there appears to be little scope for a negotiated settlement that would lead to a sustainable peace. Instead, it is becoming increasingly clear that the only way to end the war is on the battlefield. Unless Russia is decisively defeated, the war will continue.

As the Russian invasion enters its second year, it is imperative to maintain support for Ukraine. If the international community starts taking steps to normalize relations with Russia, this could set a dangerous precedent. The Kremlin has long predicted that Western leaders will eventually lose interest in Ukraine and seek to resume cooperation with Russia. Allowing Russian athletes to return to the Olympic Games would send a strong signal that such expectations are entirely realistic. Other authoritarian rulers would also note the West’s apparently short attention span and draw the obvious conclusions for their own aggressive foreign policies.

Opponents of the IOC stance argue that allowing an unrepentant Russia to return to the Olympics is particularly foolish given the long history of failed attempts to appease the Kremlin. Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the United States initiated a notorious “reset” of relations with Russia. Meanwhile, European leaders continued to advocate policies of appeasement and pursued deepening economic ties with Moscow right up until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Ukrainian officials and their colleagues in the Baltic states, Poland, and other former Warsaw Pact countries advised against these policies for many years but were consistently ignored or accused of exaggerating the Russian threat. With the largest European conflict since World War II now raging in Ukraine, such accusations are no longer valid. If the Olympic authorities choose to ignore the war and insist on the return of Russian athletes, it will strike a powerful blow against international unity in support of Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Numerous individual athletes and national sporting associations have already voiced their concerns over the possible return of Russian athletes to Olympic competition. Many also continue to stand with Ukraine. It is important to note that the IOC has demonstrated its support, establishing a solidarity fund to help the Ukrainian Olympic community that had raised $7.5 million by summer 2022.

“Many members of the Olympic community are continuing to make huge efforts to support the Ukrainian Olympic community,” an IOC spokesperson commented recently. “These efforts take the form not just of financial aid but also logistical support and ensuring Ukrainian athletes can continue to take part in competitions by providing travel support, training facilities, accommodation, equipment, and uniforms.”

Support for Ukraine has come from many of the world’s top sporting brands. In the United Kingdom, the English Premier League dedicated one week’s matches during the 2021/2022 season to the people of Ukraine. Numerous individual English football clubs including Leicester City, Leeds United, and West Ham United organized charity events and donations for Ukraine. Across Europe, football clubs have played charity games against Ukrainian teams Dynamo Kyiv and Shakhtar Donetsk in order to raise money for Ukrainian causes.

In the world of tennis, top players including Rafael Nadal participated in a charity competition ahead of the US Open. “I’m incredibly proud of the way we were able to use the global platform of the US Open to increase the worldwide tennis community’s support for the Ukrainian people,” USTA Chairman of the Board and President Mike McNulty said on the US Open website.

The support for Ukraine demonstrated by members of the international sporting community is meaningful. However, if Russian athletes are given the green light to participate at the 2024 Paris Olympics, this will send a clear message that the international community is no longer fully committed to opposing the invasion of Ukraine. That would be catastrophic for the Ukrainian people and would also have dire consequences for the future of European security.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and an accredited freelance journalist covering Eastern Europe.

Then try out the following compound words: Kampfpanzer (main battle tank) and Panzerschlacht (armored operations). For further effect, don’t leave out Blitzkrieg (lightning war), Germany’s use of surprise, speed, and armored superiority to overwhelm enemy forces and overrun Europe during World War II.

To understand the significance of Germany’s decision this week to provide fourteen Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, it’s worth understanding how much more history-laced and emotion-laden the word Panzer is for German speakers than is the word tank for the English-speaking world.

It captures at the same time all the pride Germans feel in their capacity for advanced engineering alongside the horrors in how that capacity was deployed to advance a murderous dictator’s revanchist and expansionist ambitions, at the cost of millions of lives. The memory of it all elicited a national consensus: “never again.”

This week’s media reports on the Leopard decision instead focused on perceived dithering by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, not wanting to be out in front of his US allies, until US President Joe Biden agreed to deliver Ukraine thirty-one M1 Abrams tanks. (The German decision will also unlock the delivery of a total of around eighty Leopard 2 tanks from various European arsenals.)

However, as important as the tanks will be to Ukrainians’ hopes for retaking their territory this year, and fending off an anticipated Russian offensive, what’s more significant are the two stories that lurk behind their delivery.

The first story is about an unfolding German Zeitenwende, or historic turning point, as Scholz has called it, that would redefine the German and European role in a dramatically changing world of renewed authoritarian challenges.

The second is a growing recognition among Ukraine’s allies and friends that Kyiv requires an immediate surge of military and other support, as I argued last week in this space. While Russian President Vladimir Putin’s capacity to escalate the war, particularly his nuclear arsenal, remains a great concern, US and European officials alike increasingly realize that if they don’t provide Ukraine the wherewithal to stop Putin, then at some point they might need to put their own soldiers in harm’s way to do so.

How these two stories play out will do much to determine whether Putin’s criminal war against Ukraine, launched on February 24 last year, will result in a stronger Europe and a safer and freer world, or produce just the opposite.

Scholz first began to lay out this change in German thinking in his Zeitenwende speech to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, just three days after Putin’s invasion. He has been building upon that since, particularly in an insufficiently noticed must-read essay in Foreign Affairs.

Until recently, the prevailing argument was that history imposed upon Germany a unique degree of political modesty and military restraint. What the Russian invasion unlocked was the embrace of a healthier, more activist approach to redefine the “never again” mantra as one that requires Germany to stand against any authoritarian aggressor who wishes to dictate European or global affairs through military force.

“My country’s history gives it a special responsibility to fight the forces of fascism, authoritarianism, and imperialism,” Scholz wrote. “At the same time, our experience of being split in half during an ideological and geopolitical contest gives us a particular appreciation of the risks of a new cold war.”

Among other measures in Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech, he announced that his government would spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense and use a one-hundred-billion-euro fund to better equip German armed forces, even changing the country’s constitution to do so. In his Foreign Affairs piece, Scholz called it “the starkest change in German security policy since the establishment of the Bundeswehr [German armed forces] in 1955.”

What Scholz also did in the Foreign Affairs piece is put Germany’s response to the Ukraine war in a larger context as a global “ Zeitenwende: an epochal tectonic shift,” building upon Biden’s oft deployed phrase of “an inflection point.”

Wrote Scholz, “When Putin gave the order to attack, he shattered a European and international peace architecture that had taken decades to build. Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has defied even the most basic principles of international law… Acting as an imperial power, Russia now seeks to redraw borders by force and to divide the world, once again, into blocs and spheres of influence.”

If Scholz and Biden are correct regarding a historic turning point, and all evidence indicates that they are, then Ukraine’s friends and allies must do even more now to ensure its survival as a free and independent country—and ultimately its embrace, as former US Secretary of State (and Atlantic Council board member) Henry Kissinger argued this month, into NATO and other European institutions.

For the moment, nothing is more important to achieving that goal than providing Ukraine the modern weapons it needs—and fast—to save its people’s lives, head-off a planned Russian offensive, and retake lost Ukrainian territory.

Like dictators before him, Putin is obsessed. Until Ukraine demonstrates to Putin that he can’t achieve his objectives by force, he will not give up in his efforts to conquer and absorb Ukraine. And if he can’t conquer the country, he’s shown he is willing to destroy it.

Ukraine and its friends are in a race against the clock as Putin claims to have mobilized three hundred thousand additional soldiers for the Russian army, including twenty thousand volunteers. Russia’s Wagner Group has put thousands of convicts into the fight, and Russia is pressuring Belarus to provide more assistance as well.

The time is now to give Ukraine the list of military equipment it urgently needs: Western armor and combat aircraft, up to and including the F-16; longer-range artillery and missiles, with a green light to hit the targets inside Russia from which Russia is killing Ukrainians; and large stocks of capable drones and air-defense systems that can stop everything from ballistic and cruise missiles to manned aircraft and drones.

With that, Ukraine can stop Putin. That is the most effective way to ensure that this Zeitenwende turns in the right direction.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 Transatlantic ‘growing pains’: how Olaf Scholz made Joe Biden shift on tanks for Ukraine
James Poiliti, Courtney Weaver, Laura Pitel, and Guy Chazan | FINANCIAL TIMES

For an understanding of the behind-the-scenes negotiations and diplomatic exchanges that led to the United States and Germany agreeing to send tanks to Ukraine, read this fascinating FT report on how the deal came about.

“The breakthrough,” the FT reports, “involved tense negotiations, policy U-turns and leaps of faith in both Berlin and Washington that tested the strength of US-German relations as a fundamental pillar of the western alliance. They also underlined how, for all its talk of taking on a leadership role in the world, Europe is still deeply dependent on America as a guarantor of its security.”

On the German side, the FT notes, “Officials in Berlin said the frustration expressed by some allies was unfair. Germany is, after all, one of the largest suppliers of military assistance to Ukraine after the US. There is also a particular sensitivity in Germany about tanks, which they say the country’s allies have failed to understand. ‘If tanks with German crosses appear on the battlefield, Putin can say — look, it’s what I’ve said all along, NATO is intervening in this war,’ said one official. ‘It’s an RT [Russia Today] narrative that has a lot of resonance in Latin America and Africa and we need to be aware of that.’” Read more →

#2 Can Germany Be a Great Military Power Again?
James Angelos | NEW YORK TIMES

In this brilliantly reported narrative, James Angelos offers a deep dive into the problems and hopes of the German Bundeswehr in a Europe where Putin has torn up the post-Cold War order.

“’My generation, I always say,” Anne Katrin Meister, a German reservist, told Angelos, “is a bit like a generation without war… Of course, there were conflicts, like in Kosovo, but we were still relatively young, and we grew up in such a safe, ideal world. But this is now changing… you can only be a pacifist if you have this safe, ideal world. And we don’t have such a world.”

Writes Angelos, “It was the Russian threat that led to the resurrection of the German military during the Cold War; it’s once again the Russian threat that may lead to its revitalization. Meister and her fellow trainees see joining the reserves as their democratic duty, and the officer running the training program in Nienburg told me that interest in the reserves rose sharply in the days following Russia’s invasion. But many Germans don’t share that enthusiasm, and the war has not led to a boom in recruitment for the Bundeswehr as a whole. Still, there are signs that a historic shift — a growing acceptance of the need to wield military power — is taking root in Germany.” Read more →

#3 Putin’s Miscalculation
Fred Kaplan | NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

Fred Kaplan’s review of Mark Galeotti’s new book on the modern Russian military is worth reading as an examination of why the Russian military has performed so poorly in Ukraine.

“Has the Ukrainian army turned out to be much better than imagined, or has the Russian army turned out to be a lot worse, or both?” Kaplan writes. “In Putin’s Wars, Mark Galeotti, a British scholar and journalist highly regarded by experts on Russian military matters, attributes the unexpected battlefield outcome to Russian weaknesses as well as Ukrainian strengths (greatly abetted by NATO weapons and American intelligence resources), but he lays out a persuasive, detailed case that Russia’s deficiencies are more severe and more deeply rooted than many Western officials and pundits had detected.

“Galeotti notes that Moscow overloads its army with weapons but allots too little money and attention to the mundane stuff of logistics—spare parts, food, water, and the trucks to transport them—thus leaving supply lines vulnerable and making offensive operations unsustainable. Junior officers receive rote training, so they’re unprepared to take the initiative—a deliberate policy to keep them from rebelling against senior officers, though as a consequence, campaigns can plunge into chaos if they don’t go as planned. Combine all this with widespread hazing of enlisted men, ramshackle barracks, poor nutrition, and low pay, and it should have been foreseeable that while today’s Russian soldiers might be roused to defend the motherland, they’re lackluster at invading other countries.” Read more →

#4 China and the new globalization
Franklin D. Kramer | ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Don’t miss this in-depth, thought-provoking new report by Frank Kramer, an Atlantic Council distinguished fellow, board member, and former senior Pentagon official.

He starts with the premise that the “fundamental challenge” going forward in globalization is to establish an effective strategy to manage relations with China, a massive trading partner that is at the same time a significant security threat. His recommendations recognize the need for “selective decoupling” alongside the development of strategic supply chains outside China “to resolve problems of dependencies.”

I particularly like his idea regarding the expansion of the Group of Seven (G7) nations to a G10, including Australia, Norway, South Korea, and the European Union—including a multinational staff focused on China. Kramer’s bottom line in this smart report: “The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built.” Read more →

#5 China’s New Anti-Uyghur Campaign
James Millward | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Amid the horrors of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it can be easy to forget that China continues to conduct a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide against its Uyghur minority. As James Millward points out in this Foreign Affairs piece, the West must pay closer attention and keep pressure on China to end this.

“For now,” Millward writes, “it may seem as if Xi [Jinping] is getting away with his brutal actions in Xinjiang. But the saga in the province is not yet over. U.S. and European sanctions could impinge more on China’s economy as time goes on, provided that governments vigorously enforce them. These economic costs would come on top of the severe reputational costs that Beijing has incurred for its behavior, including worsened relations with Europe, as well as with the United States. It is unclear if these penalties will ultimately matter to Xi, who now wields nearly unconstrained political power and is willing to subject his country to economic and social pain in pursuit of his aims. But Xi is capable of correcting course when his policies become disastrously costly. If the world keeps up the economic and rhetorical pressure, it can convince China to end its efforts to repress and assimilate the non-Han peoples of Xinjiang.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jan 27, 2023

What Turkey really wants from Sweden

By Rich Outzen

Turkey likely will still approve Sweden’s bid for NATO membership, but not until summer and only after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gets more cooperation against the PKK.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

Report Jan 24, 2023

Authoritarian kleptocrats are thriving on the West’s failures. Can they be stopped?

By Francis Shin, Ben Judah

A new, more dangerous form of kleptocracy has arisen since the end of the Cold War, and the transatlantic community—hobbled by outdated, cliched images of what kleptocracy looks like, and by siloed, reactive regulatory and enforcement systems—isn’t equipped to handle it. A Transatlantic Anti-Corruption Council could coordinate anti-corruption reforms.

Corruption Economic Sanctions

New Atlanticist Jan 27, 2023

What will it take to deter Iran from targeting opponents inside the US?

By Atlantic Council experts

The US Department of Justice unsealed charges Friday in an alleged assassination plot directed by Iran against a US journalist. Our experts unpack the ongoing threat.

Human Rights Iran

The post Found in translation: the deeper meaning of the German ‘Panzer’ for Ukraine and Europe appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Davos Dispatch: Why now is the time for a ‘Ukraine surge’: military, intelligence, economic and other support to defeat Putin

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 21 Jan 2023 13:00:00 +0000

Human-rights lawyer Oleksandra Matviichuk, whose Center for Civil Liberties won the Nobel Peace Prize last year, had an unsettling message for global elites here in Davos: Only more modern weaponry can deliver peace and human rights to Ukraine.

And Ukraine’s allies must send them fast!

Speaking to the Davos crowd virtually in a conversation with Harvard Professor Graham Allison, who was once his student, former US Secretary of State (and Atlantic Council board member) Henry Kissinger reversed his years-long opposition to Ukraine joining NATO, embracing membership as an “appropriate outcome” of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, which has left no room for Ukraine’s neutrality.

“My feeling is we are at a crucial moment in the conflict when the momentum could shift in favor of Russia if we don’t act decisively and quickly,” former US Senator Rob Portman told me after a public session at the Palantir Pavilion. “A surge is needed.”

Portman detailed what that should include: more effective weapons and training, longer-range missiles, more Patriot missile systems and air defense—including coordination with Poland and Slovakia to use their Patriots along Ukraine’s borders to provide an umbrella for Western Ukraine—Abrams tanks, and F-16s. Another part of the surge, he says, should include sanctions and export controls in coordination with the European Union.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) annual Davos meeting, which ended on Friday, was the extent and nature of its focus on Ukraine. Even more notable was the growing number of voices recognizing the danger of Putin’s war to the global system of rules and institutions, and thus embracing greater support for Ukraine.

To be sure, there wasn’t any consensus about that. Senior officials representing governments of what has become known as the “Global South” complained about all the emphasis on military means, reminding Americans in particular of their miscues in Iraq and Afghanistan. Others said they regard addressing climate change and economic inequality as higher global priorities.

It’s not surprising that this year’s Davos theme was “cooperation in a fragmented world.” The world remains divided around a vast number of issues, and while roughly forty countries have joined sanctions against Putin and Russia over the Ukraine war, around 140 have not. That said, the recognition has grown even among fence-sitters that evidence of Putin’s war crimes is accumulating and that his imposition of the rule-of-the-jungle in Ukraine, if not addressed, endangers the rule-of-law worldwide.

That brings me back to Portman’s concept of a Ukraine surge, replacing the habit of incremental increases in support that have preceded it. That approach makes sense for a number of reasons.

It recognizes that more effective and longer-range weaponry is all that will allow Ukraine to protect its population and eliminate the “sanctuary” provided to the Russian bases from which it is being targeted. The surge approach also recognizes that the current policy of incremental change could face the growing dangers of Western funding fatigue.

Most of all, it acknowledges that a longer war of attrition favors Moscow. Though Putin’s military lacks the quality of Ukraine’s defense technology, intelligence, and morale, it may be able to offset that over time with the quantity of soldiers and weapons it can throw at the war. Moscow’s current mobilization will soon bring tens of thousands of new soldiers to the front lines.

The most compelling argument against a surge has been that it would provoke a response from Putin, up to and including the use of tactical nuclear weapons. US President Joe Biden, whose military and political support for Ukraine has been significant and consistent, has nevertheless spoken of his desire to avoid World War III when explaining why he hasn’t done even more.

However, as Eric Schlosser argues in the Atlantic this week, “the greatest nuclear threat we face is a Russian victory in Ukraine.”

Schlosser complains that concerns about Russia’s nuclear weapons have deterred the United States and its allies from providing Ukraine with the wherewithal that could change the course of the war. “If nuclear threats or the actual use of nuclear weapons leads to the defeat of Ukraine,” he writes, “Russia may use them to coerce other states. Tactics once considered immoral and unthinkable might become commonplace.”

It was a remarkable fact that Henry Kissinger, at age ninety-nine, was the geopolitical voice most quoted on Davos’s snowy streets this week.

He warned against the “destruction of Russia as a state,” which he feared would “open up the vast area of its eleven time zones to internal conflict and to outside intervention at the time when there are fifteen thousand and more nuclear weapons on its territory.”

At the same time, he praised the United States, its allies, and Ukraine for demonstrating “that a conventional attack from Russia on Europe will find united resistance and that Russia probably does not have the capacity to overcome it by conventional means.”

Second, he said NATO’s plan to expand to Finland and Sweden had achieved a significant strategic objective. Beyond that, Kissinger argued that the United States should, “if necessary, intensify its military support” for Ukraine until a settlement can be reached.

Kissinger revisited his long-standing hope of providing Russia “an opportunity to rejoin an international system,” but he introduced a new wrinkle in his thinking. His suggestion was that Russia’s unhappy war experience may cause it to “reevaluate its historic position” of military overreliance, distance from Europe, and fears of domination by Europe.

I’m tempted to read this between Kissinger’s lines: Putin’s defeat would also be the best outcome for Russians who want to escape counterproductive, historical patterns and join the community of civilized nations.

“I am happy that Kissinger changed his mind” about Ukraine’s NATO membership, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his own WEF session.

As for Kissinger’s desire to ensure Russia’s international place, Zelenskyy countered, “I think Russia has earned a place among terrorists… They have to open their eyes if they want to see the future of their Russian civilization. They have to recognize their own mistakes… They will have to respect our territorial integrity.”

To achieve that outcome, let the surge begin.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 The Greatest Nuclear Threat We Face Is a Russian Victory
Eric Schlosser | ATLANTIC

In this powerful piece, Eric Schlosser makes clear the stakes in Ukraine. If Putin is victorious, it will teach him, and the world, the dangerous lesson that nuclear blackmail works.

The arguments Russian propaganda makes, Schlosser writes, “are based on lies. They are being spread to justify Russia’s unprecedented use of nuclear blackmail to seize territory from a neighboring state.”

Schlosser continues, “concerns about a possible nuclear exchange have thus far deterred the United States and NATO from providing Ukraine with the tanks, aircraft, and long-range missiles that might change the course of the war. If nuclear threats or the actual use of nuclear weapons leads to the defeat of Ukraine, Russia may use them to coerce other states. Tactics once considered immoral and unthinkable might become commonplace. Nuclear weapons would no longer be regarded solely as a deterrent of last resort; the nine countries that possess them would gain even greater influence; countries that lack them would seek to obtain them; and the global risk of devastating wars would increase exponentially.” Read more →

#2 The Sanctions on Russia Are Working
Vladimir Milov | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

For those who argue that sanctions on Russia have failed, former Russian Deputy Energy Minister Vladimir Milov shows how Putin relies on massaged data and projections to conceal the truth.

“Russian figures showing manageable levels of inflation are also misleading,” Milov writes. “Even the Russian central bank currently reports that observed inflation—that is, how the public views the increase in prices, as reported in surveys—to be 16 percent, or over four percentage points higher than the official statistic, which is a little less than 12 percent.”

“According to a poll released by the private Russian research company Romir in October 2022,” Milov continues, “68 percent of Russians had noticed a reduction in the supply of goods offered in stores over the past three months. According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 35 percent of Russians were forced to cut their spending on food in 2022. The Public Opinion Foundation, a Russian polling organization, reported in December 2022 that only 23 percent of Russians considered their personal financial situation to be ‘good.’” Read more →

#3 Oil price cap and falling cost of crude worry Kremlin
Anastasia Stognei | FINANCIAL TIMES

For further evidence of the toll Western sanctions are taking on Russia, read this excellent FT report.

“With oil prices falling and the costs of the war widening Russia’s deficit last year to 2.3 percent of gross domestic product,” Anastasia Stognei reports, “Putin and his officials see financial risks ahead. ‘You need to look at this discount so that it does not create any budget problems. Discuss it and deliver your proposals,’ he told officials last week after Alexander Novak, deputy prime minister, admitted the crude discounts were ‘the main risk.’”

All the more reason to keep the pressure on. Read more →

#4 The America trap: Why our enemies often underestimate us
Rober Kagan | WASHINTON POST

In this brilliant essay adapted from his new book, Robert Kagan explains how the United States’ reluctance to involve itself in foreign conflicts lulled Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial Japan into a false sense of security.

“Hitler fell into a trap unwittingly laid by American policymakers, Congress and the public,” he writes. “In the critical years of his rise to power, the consolidation of his rule, Hitler feared and expected the democracies would come after him during what he called that ‘perilous interval.’”

“When they did not, and he was allowed to pass undisturbed through his time of greatest vulnerability, he grew overconfident. As early as 1935, Hitler and his lieutenants were already ‘absolutely drunk with power,’ convinced that ‘the whole world’ was afraid of them and would not move against them ‘no matter what’ they did. He was emboldened to reoccupy the Rhineland in 1936 and then to move on to fulfill his ambitions in central Europe. When Roosevelt took office, it was already too late to knock Hitler off his course merely with strong words or even sanctions. By the time Roosevelt actually began trying to convince Americans that they would have to become involved in the general international crisis, both Hitler and the Japanese were so far down the road that they could not be deterred by anything short of a genuine threat of war, and perhaps not even by that.”

Read this piece. Check out the book: The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of the World Order, 1900-1941. Read more →

#5 A Conversation with Henry Kissinger: Historical Perspectives on War
Henry Kissinger and Graham Allison | WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

Henry Kissinger, who at age ninety-nine is still the world’s premier strategic thinker, spoke to his former student Graham Allison in a Davos conversation, which is worth listening to in its entirety.

“Before this war,” Kissinger said, “I was opposed to membership of Ukraine in NATO because I feared that it would start exactly the process that we have seen now. Now that this process has reached its level, the idea of a neutral Ukraine under these conditions is no longer meaningful. And at the end of the process that I described, it ought to be guaranteed by NATO in whatever forms NATO can develop. But I believe Ukrainian membership in NATO would be an appropriate outcome.”

Amen. Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Jan 20, 2023

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2023

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsize impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Brazil China

New Atlanticist Jan 18, 2023

As Brazil investigates Bolsonaro’s role in anti-democratic riots, should the US kick him out?

By Gissou Nia, Thomas S. Warrick

While the Biden administration needs to demonstrate moral leadership, acting too hastily could fuel the flames of Brazil’s polarized politics and damage democracy in the long term.

Brazil Elections

New Atlanticist Jan 20, 2023

Like it or not, Europe can only tackle its big challenges with Franco-German consensus

By Marie Jourdain, Jörn Fleck

The January 22 France-Germany summit, amid bumpy relations between the two powers, comes at a pivotal time for Europe and the transatlantic alliance.

Defense Policy Energy & Environment

The post Davos Dispatch: Why now is the time for a ‘Ukraine surge’: military, intelligence, economic and other support to defeat Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Svetlova in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich: Israel’s Power Couple

Atlantic Council — Wed, 04 Jan 2023 15:02:26 +0000

The post Svetlova in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich: Israel’s Power Couple appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Svetlova quoted by NPR on Ben-Gvir’s visit to Jerusalem

Atlantic Council — Wed, 04 Jan 2023 14:58:38 +0000

The post Svetlova quoted by NPR on Ben-Gvir’s visit to Jerusalem appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Shapiro quoted in New York Times on Israeli-U.S. Relations

Atlantic Council — Fri, 30 Dec 2022 05:34:18 +0000

The post Shapiro quoted in New York Times on Israeli-U.S. Relations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What might be ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023? Take our ten-question poll and see how your answers stack up

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center — Tue, 20 Dec 2022 17:43:26 +0000

2023 might very well define the trajectory for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) over the next decade.

While many countries are still on the rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic, new crises—and their effects—are emerging, and are expected to continue into the next year. From global inflation to a costly energy crisis, and from food insecurity to new political shifts, how can the region meet changing dynamics head-on? And how might risks turn into opportunities as we enter a highly consequential 2023?

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we look at some of the key questions that may shape the year ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean, then take our signature annual poll to see how your opinions shape up against our predictions.

How might new regional collaboration take shape across Latin America and the Caribbean with a wave of new leaders? What decision points might shape government policy? Will Bitcoin continue to see the light of day in El Salvador? Are the harmful economic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the rearview mirror for the region, or is the worse yet to come? Will China’s new foreign policy ambition translate to closer relations with LAC?

Take our ten-question poll in less than five minutes!

Report Sep 27, 2022

The economic impact of a more efficient US-Mexico border: How reducing wait times at land ports of entry would promote commerce, resilience, and job creation

By Alejandro Brugués Rodríguez, John Byrd, Noé Arón Fuentes Flores, David Gaytan, John Gibson, Camila Hernández, Mayra Maldonado, Jason Marczak, Jorge Eduardo Mendoza Cota, Roberto Ransom, and Ignacia Ulloa

Improvements in border management and the adoption of new technologies at the US-Mexico border have the potential to enhance border security and generate economic benefits for the United States and Mexico through expedited flows of goods and people.

Economy & Business Latin America

Issue Brief Sep 20, 2022

PACC2030: Quick wins for a US-Caribbean partnership on climate and energy resilience

By Wazim Mowla, Riyad Insanally

PACC2030’s success is crucial for CARICOM countries and the United States, and it needs to deliver in the short term to generate confidence that the United States is committed to a sustainable partnership.

Caribbean Economy & Business

Experts react Nov 27, 2022

Experts react: As the US eases oil sanctions, is Venezuela coming in from the cold?

By Atlantic Council experts

With Chevron expanding operations and talks ongoing between the government and the opposition, what’s next for Venezuela? Our experts drill down on the details.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

The post What might be ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023? Take our ten-question poll and see how your answers stack up appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Individual Russians must be held accountable for war crimes in Ukraine

Stanislav Aseyev — Thu, 15 Dec 2022 19:45:15 +0000

The broken windows theory of criminal justice holds that if comparatively minor instances of social disorder such as broken windows are not addressed, they will pave the way for more serious crimes. The same principle can also be applied to international relations and geopolitics.

In 2014, Russia began “breaking windows” in Crimea. When the world failed respond adequately, Russian aggression expanded into eastern Ukraine and escalated into armed hostilities that left more than 14,000 dead while forcing millions to flee their homes. Again, the international community did not react with sufficient decisiveness. This led directly to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine which began in February 2022.

For the past eight-and-a-half years, Russia has been permitted to slowly but steadily challenge and undermine the global security order established in the decades following World War II. For many in the West, this process has been unspectacular and has involved minor inconveniences such as rising food prices and mounting energy bills. Some even complain of “Ukraine fatigue,” seemingly oblivious to the fact that atrocities are being committed in Europe on a scale not seen since the days of Stalin and Hitler.

This leads us back to the broken window theory. In order to arrest this slide toward a dark future of international lawlessness, it is vital to hold Russians accountable for the crimes they are committing in Ukraine. And yet at present, the issue of war crimes is being addressed in vague terms without any real mechanisms in place to bring specific defendants to court.

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While there is general recognition within the international community that Russia is guilty of grave war crimes in Ukraine, we currently lack the tools to prosecute thousands of potential suspects. This could create a dangerous precedent for future conflicts and must change.

I have first-hand experience of Russian crimes in Ukraine. I previously spent two-and-a-half years as a prisoner in the notorious Izolyatsia prison in Russian-occupied Donetsk. I was subjected to torture during my incarceration and was eventually freed in a prisoner exchange. Following my release, I helped locate the commandant of the prison and contributed to his arrest.

I was able to do this thanks to the Justice Initiative Fund (JIF), an initiative I founded that seeks to identify and track down Russian war criminals. The JIF lists those who are officially suspected of war crimes and offers a reward for anyone who can provide information that will lead to their arrest.

This task is just beginning. Huge obstacles must yet be overcome before justice can be served. Today’s Russian war criminals are not like the Nazis after World War II, who were scattered around the world. On the contrary, they overwhelmingly live in Russia itself, and have no intention of leaving. Most are part of a vast Russian underclass with low incomes and even lower expectations that Putin has been careful to cultivate during his two decades in power.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The first step toward justice is to identify war criminals. There is currently no single international organization that is willing or able to identify and search for large numbers of war crimes suspects around the world. The JIF seeks to expand its scope internationally in order to help meet this challenge. There is a logic to these ambitions. Many of the war crimes suspects in locations such as Africa and Syria are also sought in relation to atrocities committed in Ukraine.

The war crimes committed by the Russian military wherever it is deployed can be traced to the sense of impunity felt by the perpetrators. In order to bring this impunity to an end, it is vital to identify individual war criminals. This will require the combined efforts of the international community. Ukraine should be at the heart of such efforts.

Along with identification, the other key goal is bringing war crimes suspects to trial. The experience of recent decades indicates that only a handful of suspects ever actually make it to the courtroom, while thousands of actual perpetrators never face justice. I have personally participated in three war crimes trials relating to atrocities committed at the Izolyatsia prison, and only one of the three featured an actual defendant.

I would like to see the democratic world take the lead in developing new legal procedures for the transfer of war crimes suspects to the jurisdiction of the relevant international and national courts. Everyone is well aware that Russia will never hand over war crimes suspects within the framework of existing extradiction procedures. New mechanisms are required that will place war criminals on an equal footing with terrorism suspects, with all the legal consequences of this status.

Without these initiatives, there is a risk that all the current work being done to collect evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine will be futile. Unless we have the resources to identify the perpetrators and the tools to bring them to justice, exposing the atrocities committed in Ukraine will fail to prevent these crimes from being repeated.

Stanislav Aseyev is a Ukrainian author, journalist, and founder of the Justice initiative fund.

Criminal trials are generally limited to domestic courts, the ICC, or any relevant international tribunals. While several countries have universal-jurisdiction provisions for aggression, practitioners have raised legal and pragmatic concerns over whether the provisions can effectively be used in practice, for example noting the potential political ramifications and difficulties of accessing evidence containing classified information. Furthermore, aggression is considered a leadership crime, meaning that, for example according to the ICC’s Rome Statute, only those in a position to “exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State” are held liable. These leaders are usually in positions and roles that would benefit from immunities and so are shielded from prosecution.

These immunities are broadly considered not applicable at certain international criminal courts—which, for aggression, leaves only the ICC. However, the ICC can only try the crime of aggression with a referral from the United Nations (UN) Security Council (on which Russia holds veto power) or when both the aggressor and the victim state have ratified the Kampala Amendments, which added the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute—and neither Russia nor Ukraine has done so. Without any other viable options, the proposed tribunal creates a tailored solution.

Ironing out the legal details

As with any court, there is no guarantee that any given case of aggression at the proposed tribunal will succeed. For example, it remains possible that suspects will never travel outside Russia, and so the court will not be able to arrest them. In such instances, the court either will have to hold trials in absentia—a highly controversial option—or will not be able to conduct trials at all.

In the longer term, the tribunal’s limited mandate means that it would not extend to any similar issues. Out of 123 States Parties to the Rome Statute, only forty-four have ratified the Kampala amendments. Resorting to special tribunals each time aggression occurs raises concerns about issues like selectivity—wherein only certain states are likely to receive support for such an option—and the diversion of funds away from the ICC. A permanent court of aggression has also been suggested, but this again raises concerns that efforts and funds going into its establishment could instead be used for the ICC. For example, these could go toward advocacy to request that member states amend the Rome Statute to allow additional paths to try the crime of aggression, and the funds could go toward carrying out those prosecutions if successful.

According to details shared with me by the Ukrainian government, the proposed tribunal would be created through either a multilateral treaty between states (as with the ICC) or through an agreement between Ukraine and an international organization (as with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established with the UN). A tribunal based on a multilateral treaty may still be endorsed by an international organization, such as the UN General Assembly. For a tribunal built on an agreement between Ukraine and an international organization, the organization could be the UN, but could also be the European Union (EU) or the Council of Europe. Afterward, according to the Ukrainian government, the tribunal’s jurisdiction and functions would be defined in a statute, which would then be included in an annex to the treaty or agreement.

Last week, the EU made its own similar proposal: a multilateral treaty-based special independent international tribunal and a specialized, hybrid court integrated into a national system.

Leading from behind

The United States has not yet given an official position on the creation of an international tribunal. It has vigorously supported Ukraine since the invasion, including backing the ICC investigation despite historic tensions with the court. However, leading the 2003 invasion of Iraq—coupled with a subsequent lack of accountability for its aggression—lost the United States considerable goodwill in the international justice space. Taking a leadership role with a tribunal centered on aggression risks claims of hypocrisy and could cost the court support and legitimacy. Instead, the United States may choose to support from behind with funding, as it did with the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.

At post-World War II trials in Nuremberg, Germany, crimes against peace were deemed the “mother of all crimes,” a phrase Ukrainian officials have frequently employed. Yet there have been no international criminal trials on aggression since Nuremberg. In advocating for this tribunal, Zelenskyy has highlighted the gravity of the crime of aggression, while also underscoring just how narrow the path for accountability remains. The proposed tribunal offers a path forward, but it demands further scrutiny as to how it will bring cases forward once established and how a long-term and sustainable path can be created for prosecuting other past and future instances of aggression.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post How Ukraine’s proposed special tribunal for Russian aggression would work appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Taiwan: The key to containing China in the Indo-Pacific

John B. Barranco — Mon, 05 Dec 2022 16:41:25 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

REPORT RELEASE

2021-22 Senior US Marine Corps Fellow

China is the pacing challenge for the United States, posing the most consequential global threat to US and allied security. As China flexes its military and economic muscles, Beijing’s increasingly coercive behavior tests the defense of its neighbors—and none more so than Taiwan. Much of the United States’ ability to prevent Chinese power projection in the Indo-Pacific hinges upon its relationship with Taiwan. This paper proposes a US strategy for strengthening the relationship between Taiwan and the United States in order to deter Chinese military aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan as a flashpoint for Sino-US tensions

Taiwan offers a key strategic link, both within the Indo-Pacific and on the global stage. The island is strategically situated in the middle of the first island chain off the East Asian coast, making it geo-strategically important to Chinese military ambitions. Taiwan is also the primary supplier of semiconductors (which are used to make microchips underwriting advanced military systems) to the United States and its allies, winning Taipei a spot as a major player in the global economy.

While Taiwan is not a formal US ally due to the “One China” policy—recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China—Taiwan still falls under the US security umbrella. However, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s desire to reunify Taiwan is clear, and efforts to test Taiwanese and US resolve on this issue are increasingly bold. Security analysts often point to a potential Taiwan conflict scenario, positing that a failure to deter Chinese aggression could escalate into a war with global consequences.

China as the pacing threat

When China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, the threat posed by Beijing was still unrecognized by leadership in Washington, DC. Since then, China’s voice on the global stage has only gotten louder: The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) naval fleet exceeds the size of the US Navy, and China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy allows it to rapidly develop artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other emerging technologies for military purposes. Moreover, Beijing’s annual economic growth rate has been three-to-four times that of the United States over the past two decades, and Chinese gross domestic product is projected to surpass that of the United States by 2030.

However, the China challenge is not just military or economic in nature—it is also ideological, posing a serious threat to the US-led rules-based global order. The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognized this for the first time, offering a strategic shift and reaching bipartisan consensus by identifying China as a major revisionist rival acting counter US interests.

Major elements of the strategy

In this report, John Barranco identifies the interests of key players in the Indo-Pacific region, which then flow into his strategic plan. Particularly, he identifies the following as key goals of the United States and China:

The United States aims to preserve and revitalize the US-led, rules-based global system, as well as to prevent the rise of regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe.

China seeks to overthrow the traditional balance of power, supplanting the United States as the world’s preeminent power, and ensure regime stability through both domestic policy successes and establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.

China sees Taiwan as central to achieving all its interests. Therefore, the United States ought to consider this lens when crafting strategies to deter China and understand how the defense of Taiwan fits into its own plans.

The way forward for US-Taiwanese relations

The goals of this strategy are to contain China in the Indo-Pacific, deter China from attacking Taiwan, and, if necessary, deny it from taking Taiwan upon attack. To achieve these objectives, the United States must bring Taiwan into the fold, tying it more closely with potential allies and partners diplomatically, economically, and defensively. US strategy can do so in myriad ways, to include:

Strengthening regional security and trade relations with Taiwan;
Accelerating and realigning US force posture in the Indo-Pacific; and
Increasing bilateral US-Taiwanese military cooperation through joint military exercises.

An effective strategy for containing China in the Indo-Pacific must include consideration of Taiwan’s role in the region. Read the full strategy for more details on the path ahead.

About the author

Former fellow

John B. Barranco

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Americas Iraq

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Taiwan: The key to containing China in the Indo-Pacific appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russian Telegram channel spreads digitally modified photo of Poland’s prime minister

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 02 Dec 2022 19:42:18 +0000

Heavy fighting in the Bakhmut trenches as Russia continues to attack critical Ukrainian infrastructure

The Russian army has been implementing defensive facilities in the Kherson region since October, preparing for either a Ukrainian army advance or an organized retreat. Russian forces remain entrenched in various parts of Kherson and southern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces reportedly damaged a rail bridge north of Melitopol that served as a critical supply route for Russian troops.

After the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson, Russian forces are likely to increase attacks on critical infrastructure, such as factories and warehouses. On November 19, the Russian armed forces attacked the Motor Sich plant in Zaporizhzhia with Iranian drones. Video emerged on Telegram of explosions at the site of the attack. The plant manufactures aircraft engines and industrial marine gas turbines.

Russian forces are also expected to escalate the front line in the Donetsk region after the retreat at Kherson. The situation remains dire in Bakhmut, a strategically important city that has seen months of fighting as Russia attempts to capture the territory, which would provide the Russian army with an opportunity to launch an offensive. According to the Guardian, hundreds of soldiers from both sides are killed or wounded on the Bakhmut front on a daily basis. The fighting on the front includes artillery fire, with Ukrainian forces managing to inflict losses on Russian units with precision-guided shells. Bakhmut is heavily fortified and has sustained significant damage. Ukrainian forces also conduct patrols inside the city, fearing possible infiltration behind the defensive line.

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was shelled on November 19 and November 20, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which warned that such attacks risk causing a nuclear disaster. Russia and Ukraine blamed each other for the attack on the facility, which is in Russian-controlled territory. While some media reports claim Russian forces are preparing to abandon the Zaporizhzhia power plant, the Kremlin denies it plans to leave the facility. The Russian wartime administration recently promoted the chief engineer of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to director.

On November 23, Russia launched a large-scale missile attack targeting different regions of Ukraine, including Kyiv, where a missile hit a high-rise building. Strikes took place on critical infrastructure facilities across Ukraine, causing electrical outages that stretched from Kyiv to the western city of Lviv. Meanwhile, Moldova also experienced electrical outages as a result of the shelling in Ukraine, including in the occupied region of Transnistria. On December 1, electricity in Kherson was cut due to Russian shelling. Ukrainian authorities, fearing new attacks, began evacuating civilians from recently liberated areas of Kherson and Mykolaiv. Attacks targeting energy infrastructure will likely continue during the winter months and the new year.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian Telegram channel spreads digitally modified photo of Poland’s prime minister

On November 26, a Russian Telegram channel disseminated a manipulated photo showing Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki at a Stepan Bandera monument during his visit to Ukraine. The image was digitally modified, with the original photo of the prime minister taken at a memorial to Holodomor victims. The Russian Telegram channel Ненасытный Гардемарин (“Insatiable Gardes-Marine”) shared a false quote they alleged to have come from Morawiecki: “The memory of this great fighter against Russians will remain in our hearts forever. Bandera has always been a great friend of the Polish people.”

Stepan Bandera is a polarizing figure in Poland and Ukraine for his role in the massacre of Polish civilians in 1943-1944. The Polish fact-checking platform Konkret 24 confirmed the alleged photo at the Bandera monument was digitally modified. The prime minister’s office published authentic images taken during Morawiecki’s visit to a monument for Holodomor victims in Kyiv, where he laid a symbolic wreath. The forgery extracted the prime minister and his companion’s bodies from the original photo, flipped the image, and then added it to a photo of the Stepan Bandera statue. A Yandex reverse image search revealed that the photo of the Stepan Bandera statue previously appeared on multiple websites, including Wikipedia.

Top: Prime Minister Morawiecki in front of the monument to Holodomor victims in Kyiv. Bottom left: the digitally modified image; Bottom right: a copy of the original Bandera monument photo on Wikipedia. (Sources: @PremierRP/archive, top; Telegram/archive, bottom left; Wikipedia/archive, bottom right)

Two days before Morawiecki’s visit to Kyiv, pro-Kremlin Russian Telegram channels also spread images of forged questionnaires allegedly prepared by the Polish embassy in Ukraine. The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Украина.ру (Ukraine.ru) asserted that the embassy organized the questionnaires to ask Ukrainian citizens whether they wanted to be under a Polish “protectorate.” The Telegram post also included a photo of a forged letter addressed to the Polish the consuls general in the Ukrainian cities of Lutsk and Lviv, asking them to conduct public opinion polls in Lviv and Volyn. According to the letter, the Consuls should submit the results of the polls to the embassy no later than November 21.

The Telegram post also contained a video of a printer making copies of the questionnaires. The documents contained the logos of two Polish organizations, the White Eagle Association of Poles (Orzeł Biały) and the Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation (PAUCI). The forged documents are written in Ukrainian. Konkret24 translated the documents and found three questions visible in the video regarding the respondent’s nationality, whether they count on Poland increasing support for Ukraine, and a partially obscured question appearing to ask their thoughts on a Polish protectorate over the Volyn region.

A spokesperson for the Polish foreign ministry denied the questionnaires were authentic. “Entries regarding the preparations for the referendum on joining the western regions of Ukraine to Poland are disinformation,” he stated.

The alleged forgery appears to be another attempt to trigger disputes between Poland and Ukraine. The DFRLab has previously reported on similar false claims that Poland intends to occupy the Western part of Ukraine.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

New reports of Russian forces killing Ukrainian civilians

Russian armed forces reportedly killed a family on November 18 in the village of Komysh-Zoria, Zaporizhzhia, according to Ukrainian news agency Ukrainska Pravda, citing anonymous law enforcement officials and Ukrainian security services. The online Ukrainian publication Obozrevatel also reported on the killing, claiming that pro-Russian militants from the Donetsk People’s Republic and soldiers from Ossetia drove into the occupied settlement to Pochtovaya Street, where the family had lived.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Ukraine division published an article on November 30 about atrocities reportedly committed by a high-ranking Russian officer. Sergey Safonov, commander of the 27th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, allegedly stabbed an elderly Ukrainian woman to death while retreating from the Kharkiv region.

Meanwhile on November 22, a Russian missile strike damaged a maternity ward at the central district municipal hospital in Vilnyansk, Zaporizhzhia. Civilian casualties were reported.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

European Parliament declares Russia a state sponsor of terrorism

On November 23 , members of the European Parliament voted to adopt a resolution designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. The final vote was 494 in favor and fifty-eight against, with forty-four abstentions. The resolution was in response to Russian atrocities in the war against Ukraine, including strikes against hospitals, schools, shelters, and other civilian targets. The resolution also called for the Russian state-backed Wagner Group and Chechen forces led by Ramzan Kadyrov to be added to the European Union’s list of persons, groups, and entities involved in terrorist acts.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

US, Bulgaria, Lithuania expand support efforts

The US Department of Defense submitted a purchase order for the production of UKR/TPQ-50 lightweight anti-mine radars for use in Ukraine. These radars can track the trajectory of mortar fire at up to ten kilometers, calculating the location of the mortar. The order is scheduled to be completed in June 2023.

According to Bulgarian Minister of Defense Dimitar Stoyanov, Bulgaria will send at least nine Boeing C-17 Globemasters to Ukraine. Bulgaria has sought logistical assistance from the US and the United Kingdom to help deliver the shipment of military transport aircraft.

Lithuania, meanwhile, will provide Ukraine forces with 25,000 pieces of winter clothing. The country’s defense ministry will spend $2 million purchasing warm clothing for Ukraine, according to Ukrainian sources.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Russian Telegram channel spreads digitally modified photo of Poland’s prime minister appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: What this wave of protests means for the future of the Chinese Communist Party

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 28 Nov 2022 21:05:31 +0000

They’re spreading like wildfire. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) restrictive policies to limit COVID-19 have sparked a wave of protests from Xinjiang province to Beijing to Shanghai. And the protesters are looking for much more than an end to severe lockdowns; some are also pushing for Xi Jinping to step down and for the party to stop censoring dissent. How is the CCP likely to scramble to save face—and will its efforts even work? Our experts give their takes on what the future holds.

Jump to an expert reaction

John Culver: When the real crisis for the CCP starts

Michael Schuman: Xi’s unpalatable choices: Ease up or crack down

David Shullman: Expect even more repressive policies across the board

Kenton Thibaut: Beware comparisons to 1989. This is mostly about COVID.

Anonymous: Chinese voices amplify protests online as officials crack down

Matthew Kroenig: China’s internal-security struggles point to weakening international power

Hung Tran: With China’s economy disrupted, leaders will need to relax macroeconomic policies

Jeremy Mark: What investors are seeing in the zero-COVID hit to China’s economy

When the real crisis for the CCP starts

China’s Communist Party (CCP) is boxed in by its zero-COVID policy (ZCP). It’s much more than a branding that served CCP political goals until Omicron variants hit them. The CCP doesn’t have the health infrastructure to do what the US government or some Western European governments did—fail at many public-health measures but ride it out and push vaccinations while accepting large numbers of deaths. If they “let it rip,” a collapsed healthcare system (with sick or dead doctors and nurses) and 1.6 million dead (primarily those over age sixty who remain largely unvaccinated) could be an optimistic result.

Part of the current wave of new lockdowns is a failed ZCP easing a few weeks ago after the Twentieth Party Congress. The CCP’s only practical way out is to import or license and manufacture Western mRNA vaccines and compel or encourage vaccination, especially of the elderly. But even if they decided to do that today, that solution won’t produce results for months—or even another year. And the CCP would have to admit that their policies and reliance on domestic vaccines had failed, which they are loath to do.

Politically, they have a vast stick, far more sophisticated, layered, and pervasive than during the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. In some ways, this is the situation for which Xi and his predecessor built the hardened party-state. But like even the biggest bank, they can’t survive a run in the form of major, persistent protests everywhere all the time. The crowds I’ve seen up to now are small—hundreds, up to a thousand—but given the consequences the protesters face, they are clearly the brave tip of the iceberg.

A practical course would include selective crackdowns now and easing over time. The Spring Festival starts on January 22 next year, so that will be a key test—if they prevent travel on a large scale, their security nightmare will deepen, but travel could create superspreader events nationwide. That would unfold just before the National People’s Congress in March, which is held to install the new premier and State Council to complete the leadership arrangements unveiled at the Party Congress last month.

So the CCP needs to stop the most visible of the protests, especially in Beijing and Shanghai, but start to offer people hope: Rely more on masks, isolating the sick, and even China’s less-effective vaccines; announce plans to import/license the latest Western therapies, ease lockdowns by shifting the criteria, and ride it out.

The key things to look for are leadership divisions. This comes at a very interesting time—after Xi won his third term, but before the new premier and State Council are announced in March. I subscribe to Lucian Pye’s 1980s writings for RAND on the nature of CCP factionalism. The ingredients for factions are always there, embedded in the nature of the CCP and Chinese system. But they are latent until crisis, and then mere guanxi connections crystalize into something much more significant—power networks arrayed toward particular leaders based on calculations of power and survival (political and literal, perhaps).

The crisis so far is not sufficient for factions to form among elites, especially so soon after Xi’s complete victory in October. But there’s a perfect storm potential where the regime relies on the stick; doesn’t provide hope or a plan to get out of ZCP hell; and protests spread, build, and are sustained. For watchers in the United States, discerning when factional formation is happening will be much harder today than in 1989, when then CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s split was public, on global TV, and on the front page of People’s Daily for weeks. Instead, discerning it will take a tea-leaf reading of who shows up where during the Lunar New Year, the comments made by departing figures like Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, or any public emergence of former party chiefs Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who implicitly criticized Xi via his ZCP policies. If there’s going to be a major 1989-scale political crisis, it will have to start at the top, not from the grassroots. If grassroot events show Xi’s opponents that there’s a need and opportunity, that’s when the real crisis for Xi and the CCP would start.

I haven’t seen the People’s Armed Police (PAP) in the video clips of protests—there is a lot of dubious footage floating around, but all I’ve seen are local cops and health workers pushing back protesters. When we see the PAP in Beijing, Shanghai, or other major cities, that will demarcate an intensifying crisis. It’s a huge anti-riot force, but anti-riot should not be the regime’s preferred solution—they can’t be everywhere, as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) understood in 1989.

Speaking of the PLA, the anticorruption campaign Xi launched ten years ago has put him in an excellent position to be able to rely on the PLA for domestic turmoil in a manner Hu could not. I see the military as a wholly subordinate force, more integrated into domestic stability operations than ten years ago, and completely broken as an independent political actor—there’s no prospect of an Egypt/Hosni Mubarak scenario in China today. If you see the PLA rolling into cities, that means the regime is ready to kill people to stay in power, but their initial goal would be to avoid that by cowing them. No competent regime pushes their military, no matter how loyal, into repeated confrontations with the people—it’s a card they can only play a few times before the guns could start to swing the other way.

—John Culver is a nonresident senior fellow at the Global China Hub and former US national intelligence officer for East Asia.

Xi’s unpalatable choices: Ease up or crack down

The protests against Xi’s zero-COVID policy represent the greatest challenge to his power since he first claimed China’s helm a decade ago. At the heart of the problem is the very authoritarian system the regime touts as being a superior form of governance. The zero-COVID policy, though meant to protect public health, was enforced with arbitrary severity by local officials with little accountability. Xi is left with unpalatable choices: ease the policy and risk both damage to his political standing and an uncontrolled COVID-19 outbreak or crack down and possibly incite greater resistance. For now, the leadership is signaling it will keep zero-COVID in place but modify it to eliminate some of its excesses, but it’s not at all clear whether that will satisfy a frustrated public.

The measures announced so far to ease—or “optimize,” as the regime calls it—the zero-COVID policy are generally tweaks to the existing system, such as reductions in certain quarantine periods. I think the government is going to have to introduce more fundamental changes to really make a difference. As long as the pandemic strategy relies on arbitrary detentions and business closures, people’s lives and livelihoods will continue to face disruptions, and public discontent could continue to rise. Furthermore, as long as the leadership demands that infections must be kept at or near zero, local officials will still feel pressured to take whatever steps they can to suppress the virus on their watch. And that means continued abuses.

—Michael Schuman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Global China Hub and a contributing writer to the Atlantic magazine.

Expect even more repressive policies across the board

While public protests are not uncommon in China, it is the size and geographic spread of unrest across multiple cities emerging from a shared frustration with a central government policy—in this case, strict ZCP measures—and instances of broader anger at the government and at Xi Jinping himself that are highly unusual and no doubt concerning for Xi and other leaders. The party-state is typically highly effective in using its tools of censorship and social control to prevent protests in localities over labor, environmental, and other issues from becoming shared grievances against the central government.

This does not mean we are witnessing the beginning of the end of the Communist Party. But the question now becomes whether the playbook of a relatively restrained police crackdown, stepped-up propaganda and censorship efforts, and selective arrests employed thus far will be effective in quelling protests. And, if protests do not fizzle on their own (including as a result of poor weather expected in Beijing and Shanghai), what will Chinese leaders directing the party-state’s massive “stability maintenance” architecture do to ensure things do not spiral out of control? If unrest grows, with tens of thousands protesting across major cities, it is not implausible that Xi may step up use of China’s internal security apparatus—including the PAP—to restore order and to head off the sort of internal factional leadership challenge John Culver references above, in ways almost certain to involve significant casualties. Beyond the potentially awful human toll, this result would likely set the groundwork for even more repressive policies across the board as the party-state’s rule becomes more brittle and reliant on the threat of brute force and information control to maintain power.

There is also a “competing models” element to this in the damage to China’s global narrative about the superiority of its model. Clearly these protests are not compatible with Xi’s claims that China’s successful management of COVID-19, in comparison to the United States and other developed democracies, has demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s authoritarian system in comparison to democracy and more broadly puts the lie to the argument frequently (and increasingly) repeated by Chinese officials that the Chinese people overwhelmingly approve of party rule and its approach to governance.

—David O. Shullman is the senior director of the Global China Hub and a former US intelligence official focused on East Asia.

Beware comparisons to 1989. This is mostly about COVID.

There are four critical points to consider when tracking these protests from afar.

First, China’s campaigns on global social media platforms are distinct from activities on domestic social media—and even are undertaken by different entities. The global social media campaigns on these issues are aimed at information suppression and preventing news from spreading, either to the domestic population or to the diaspora and broader audiences through Chinese citizens getting information out from China. Domestic social media campaigns are focused on censoring discussions and critiques of zero-COVID and suppressing news of protests, while amplifying neutral news of the fire in Xinjiang province to prevent rumors from spreading. Calls for regime change during some protests were real, but I’d be reluctant to say that it was a primary theme. At the same time, it’s difficult to say how widespread any online calls for regime change are on Chinese social media, as anything like that is automatically censored. For example, anything you post about Xi, Tiananmen Square, etc., is automatically blocked.

Second, these protests should not be viewed as “sudden” or spontaneous. The protests mostly center on public frustrations over the draconian measures of zero-COVID, which have been building over the past several months. China’s censorship machine has been working overtime in the past half year to take down essays, comments, news, etc. on domestic social media platforms documenting events of public ire, desperation, and hopelessness over the lockdown measures. Preventable deaths are especially sensitive, which is why the news of the Urumqi fire served as a catalyst for this round of protests. For example, an incident in September, when a bus carrying residents to a quarantine facility overturned and killed twenty-seven people, was heavily censored and repressed after it sparked intense public backlash online.

Third, the protests seem to be involving a broader coalition (students, workers, rural people) than is normal in most protests. The vast majority of protests focus on local issues and local government, leading the central government to mostly remain insulated from serious challenges to its legitimacy. But because zero-COVID is a central policy, criticism is more likely being targeted at the top. This can reach dangerous territory for the CCP. All the major crackdowns of the past—Tiananmen, the Falun Gong movement, etc.—involved causes that mobilized large numbers of people and challenged the legitimacy of the central government (rather than being just local in scope). Zero-COVID is potentially such a driver.

Fourth, we still need to remain cautious about drawing direct parallels to 1989, as some are doing. China implemented intense reforms after the Tiananmen Square massacre and has nearly perfected its repression mechanisms. Also, zero-COVID is still an acute issue, and most of the angry crowd energy would be dispelled quickly if the regime makes even modest shifts to the policy, which it can do if the heat rises too much. The CCP may also be allowing protests to a certain extent as a kind of pressure-release valve, before an internal red line may be triggered to implement crackdowns. Additionally, today’s CCP does not have obvious factions like there were in 1989. Xi has loyalists installed at the central and provincial levels of government, and it is perhaps less likely that these elites would support the protesters in the way that moderates did in 1989. At the same time, Chinese elite politics in the Xi era are notoriously opaque, and we should be circumspect in drawing too many broad conclusions.

—Kenton Thibaut is the resident China fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Chinese voices amplify protests online as officials crack down

The recent zero-COVID protests in Beijing, Shanghai, and Xinjiang carry the momentum of previous demonstrations, such as the Beijing Sitong Bridge protest and the current Zhengzhou Foxconn clashes. The sudden outpouring of protests already surpasses the scale of those resisting Xi’s third term in the Twentieth Party Congress last month. Chinese voices are actively amplifying the protests on Western social media platforms, and overseas students are also putting up posters and organizing demonstrations.

On Monday, officials reportedly cracked down on residents in the protest area by having security forces check phones for foreign apps and VPN usage. Some organizers may have used WeChat and everyone has a COVID-19 app that tracks location information. Thus, some protestors will likely be taken away for disobeying gathering restrictions.

Although the protests are still ongoing, they are unlikely to lead to foundational reforms of the Chinese government or any significant easing of pandemic restrictions in their current form. Shijiazhuang eased testing requirements this month, leading to speculation about the end of the nation-wide zero-COVID policy, only to reinstate them days later. The vaccination rates of the elderly are low enough to forestall a quick reopening. Furthermore, further rent-seeking by COVID-19 testing and enforcement stakeholders may also prevent opening up. Nevertheless, the protests are a striking display of the emotional, physical, and economic toll experienced by Chinese people under these stringent lockdowns.

—Anonymous

The author was granted anonymity to speak freely and safely about sensitive matters.

China’s internal-security struggles point to weakening international power

It is unlikely that these protests will result in the near-term fall of the CCP, but it reminds the world that regime instability is a persistent weakness of dictatorships—like Xi’s China—in great power competition. In my study of democracy versus autocracy over 2,500 years of great power rivalry, I found that autocracies often struggle to compete internationally because they are preoccupied with challenges to internal security. Indeed, today China spends more on internal security than on its military, whereas US spending is 2:1 in the opposite direction. These competitions throughout history often resulted in the collapse of the autocratic competitor; these protests remind the world that the US-China competition might very well conclude with a CCP regime collapse.

—Matthew Kroenig is the acting director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former US Department of Defense and intelligence community official.

With China’s economy disrupted, leaders will need to relax macroeconomic policies

Protests against the strict implementation of the zero-COVID policy have spread among big cities and major university campuses across China and have been met with police measures. This, and the fact that COVID-19 infection rates have reached record daily levels of more than forty thousand cases, means that economic activity will likely be disrupted and in more locations, further depressing growth for the remainder of the year. China’s authorities will have to ease at least some of the draconian measures of the zero-COVID policy to calm public sentiment and, more importantly, will have to relax macroeconomic policies to support the economy. There is room for China’s monetary policy to be eased further, beyond this year’s reserves requirement ratio cuts to 7.8 percent and specific packages designed to help the real estate sector.

—Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center.

What investors are seeing in the zero-COVID hit to China’s economy

The economic shockwaves from the protests so far appear confined to production of Apple’s iPhone 14 at a Foxconn Technology Group factory in Zhengzhou, where workers rioted over COVID-19 lockdowns and other indignities. But the unrest does not bode well for an economy struggling to recover from the worst downturn in more than forty years. Zero-COVID policies have decimated demand for retail goods, entertainment, and travel; weakened business investment; worsened a troubling property crisis; and caused many foreign investors to reconsider their commitment to China. Youth unemployment in the cities is creeping up toward 20 percent, adding to the anger in the streets.

Some investors—especially foreign institutions that always appear ready to give the Chinese government the benefit of the doubt—have taken heart from Beijing’s stated commitment to loosen COVID-19 restrictions. But they are also witnessing confusion on the ground among the officials charged with implementing that policy. The economic malaise can only deepen in the face of continuing anger in the streets and mixed messages from China’s rulers.

—Jeremy Mark is a nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center and former International Monetary Fund official and Asian Wall Street Journal correspondent.

The post Experts react: What this wave of protests means for the future of the Chinese Communist Party appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Offside: Watch the World Cup alongside the Atlantic Council

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 21 Nov 2022 21:59:32 +0000

The most watched sporting event in the world is underway, and the global viewers for this year’s World Cup will be watching much more than the action on the pitch in Qatar. Fans are also closely scrutinizing what unfolds on the sidelines of the controversial tournament, as concerns about Qatar’s human-rights record and FIFA’s corruption scandals have come to the fore in recent months and years.

Geopolitics are also playing out on the pitch, as players from the thirty-two teams competing in the tournament look to make a stand against human-rights abuses and discrimination. Our experts will be tracking it all—and handing out cards where they see fit.

The latest from Qatar

The long-term impact of Morocco’s magical World Cup run

Morocco’s triumphs signal a new world order in more than soccer

No politics… except Palestine

Where is the UAE?

In Rabat, unprecedented unity behind the Atlas Lions

Gulf neighbors get cozy

DECEMBER 15, 2022 | 10:01 AM WASHINGTON | 6:01 PM QATAR

The long-term impact of Morocco’s magical World Cup run

The world abruptly woke up from the roller-coaster ride of a dream that was Morocco’s miraculous World Cup run on Wednesday when the Atlas Lions lost 2-0 to defending champion France in the semifinals. But Morocco nonetheless succeeded by inspiring millions of children from Africa and the Middle East, uniting much of the world during an uncertain time with its historic performance.

Not only was Morocco the first African and Arab nation to ever reach the semifinals of the World Cup, but it accomplished that feat with a roster in which fourteen out of twenty-six players were born abroad, mostly in Europe. While this phenomenon can be attributed to the failure of some European nations to assimilate migrants from North Africa, it has implications for the future of international soccer teams in African and Arab nations. Children in the region and in the diaspora have seen the successes of Morocco and could now be inspired to play for the nation of their cultural roots over the country where their family may have emigrated. Western nations are known for having powerhouse teams made up from immigrants, most notoriously France’s 2018 World Cup-winning team, in which twelve of twenty-three players had African roots, spanning nine different nations. Therefore, this shift in which nation a player chooses to represent could cause a seismic shake-up in the international soccer hierarchy, with more African and Middle Eastern teams potentially rising in rank from a generation of youth that have been inspired by the 2022 Atlas Lions.

Off the field, it could be argued that Morocco’s World Cup run was more successful in bringing together the Arab and African community than traditional diplomatic routes—showcasing the overwhelmingly positive impact that soccer and other sporting events can have. With Africa and the Middle East having large youth populations, governments in the region and international organizations should seize this positive momentum by building infrastructure and programs to support inclusive sporting opportunities for young people.

From kids running around with a soccer ball at their feet in the historic streets of Marrakech, to neighboring nations such as Tunisia celebrating the victories of Morocco’s team like their own country had won, to internally displaced people’s camps in northern Syria tuning into the matches, the Middle East and Africa stood and cheered in unison behind the Atlas Lions and the beautiful game. Although their inspiring World Cup run is over, this special group of Moroccans has forever etched their names into history and changed the future of soccer and the region for the better.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

DECEMBER 10, 2022 | 2:18 PM WASHINGTON | 10:18 PM QATAR

Morocco’s triumphs signal a new world order in more than soccer

Soccer has proven to be much more than a simple sport. It is a powerful diplomatic tool, an avenue for national branding, and a potent apparatus for symbolic power in the Bourdieusian sense. When an underdog with a 0.01 percent chance to win the 2022 World Cup at the start of the tournament advances to the semifinals and eliminates football legends such as Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, it is undeniably added symbolic capital to the regional and international credit of the Atlas Lions.

With a stunning, intense victory over Portugal on Saturday, Morocco became the first Arab country and the first African country to make the World Cup semifinals. The kingdom’s wins were perceived as symbolic redemption for defeats and deceptions of MENA and African countries in modern times, as well as an act of metaphorical revenge against Western colonizers and imperialist legacies. African and Middle Eastern populations have been fervent supporters of this tournament’s dark horse, as they can identify with its tenacity and resilience vis-à-vis teams four times its market value (based on the transfer value of each team’s players).

Although the Moroccan team relies heavily on diaspora players, with fourteen out of twenty-six team members born abroad—mostly in European nations such as France, the Netherlands, or Spain—these double nationals chose to play under the colors of their country of origin. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a failure of European integration and assimilation of migrants from North African nations. These phenomenal footballers couldn’t identify with their host countries and continued to pay allegiance to the Arab Islamic kingdom where their families emigrated from.

Players who prostrate to pray after each win and wave the Palestinian flag, alcohol-free matches, and high-level competition in an Arab land are all peculiar and novel sights for global spectators. These symbolic elements could be signs of a changing world order where euro-centric value systems are no longer dominant, and a more diverse football culture is being established. Similarly, European teams such as Italy and Germany that were disqualified early could also be a symbolic reflection of their own countries’ post-pandemic woes. Could France be next?

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

DECEMBER 7, 2022 | 1:54 PM WASHINGTON | 9:54 PM QATAR

No politics… except Palestine

FIFA and Qatar have diligently worked to silence issues deemed too political, from rainbow flags and attire in support of LGBTQ rights to t-shirts commemorating the death of Mahsa Amini and demanding rights for Iranian women. Stadium security and police have forced fans to hand over their items or have taken fans away from the stadium areas. Those instances have circulated widely on social media and fan group chats. Too frequently, security has made an issue where one really did not exist, resulting in more attention, not less, on the fan advocate.

In contrast, support for Palestinians is prominent across the World Cup, with Palestinian flags and chants everywhere: matches, the souq, public transportation, and even social media platforms. In Morocco’s win over Spain, players and fans donned the flag for photos, and fans sang pro-Palestine songs. Fans from elsewhere in the world who are not well versed on the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict are learning; some fans are even now becoming converts to the Palestinian cause. Examples of fans donning the Palestinian flag are more and more common each day in malls, television interviews, and the many fan areas in and around Doha.

One lasting outcome of the World Cup could well be that fans who were disinterested in the issues surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict are now at least interested and remain aware of happenings in the broader Levant. The world may also see more Palestinian flags at international matches moving forward as World Cup fans continue to commemorate their attendance in Qatar by raising the flag that they were gifted–and commentators would be forced to acknowledge the change in fan behavior.

—Jennifer Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is attending the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar.

DECEMBER 6, 2022 | 2:11 PM WASHINGTON | 10:11 PM QATAR

Where is the UAE?

Noticeably absent from the Gulf’s neighborhood block party is an Emirati presence. This unique tournament has Arab culture and societies on display—whether they qualified for the World Cup or not. Unlike the Qatari, Saudi, and Palestinian flags found everywhere, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) flag is noticeably missing from the fan zones and stadiums. Plus, UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan only came to Doha on an official visit on December 5, well after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) initial visit to Qatar to take in the spectacle. And unlike MBS and his informal family visits with the Qatari royal family, the UAE leader’s visit was short and formal. Despite lingering trust issues between Qatar and the UAE in the post-blockade period, the lack of Emirati presence is somewhat surprising during the first-ever Middle East-hosted World Cup. Arguably, Abu Dhabi appears to be taking its relationship with Saudi for granted as MBS, on behalf of Riyadh, soaks up the love from Qatari leaders.

DECEMBER 6, 2022 | 1:55 PM WASHINGTON | 9:55 PM QATAR

In Rabat, unprecedented unity behind the Atlas Lions

You want drama? Heart-pounding, nerve-wracking drama? Join a sports bar full of Moroccan fans desperately cheering on their beloved underdog Atlas Lions in a scoreless draw against mighty Spain. And you want a heart attack? Have it go to penalty kicks. You want an explosion of joy? Morocco, three-nil.

A busy street in Rabat during Morocco’s World Cup match. And the hotel sports bar. pic.twitter.com/vX49AfVDZb
— Dan Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro) December 6, 2022

Here in Rabat, the work week might as well be over. Delirious Moroccans are pouring into the streets, honking, dancing, singing their hearts out.

The Moroccan squad played with the pluck, modesty, and unity that characterizes this nation. Morocco is a leader in Africa and the Arab world, but does not flaunt its weight. It is used to not being in the room with great powers. It looks after its own interests, is a good partner to those it chooses as its friends (the United States, and now Israel, among them), and rarely makes much of a fuss.

But it is also a society that feels deeply proud of its ancient history, cultural diversity, and the broad consensus in support of the royal leadership. A quiet, humble self-confidence expresses itself in cultural pride and legendary hospitality.

Tonight, Moroccans are more unified than ever. As the exhausted players tossed Bono, the hero goalkeeper, into the air, the happy din in the streets was already rising.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is the director of the N7 Initiative.

DECEMBER 5, 2022 | 9:22 AM WASHINGTON | 5:22 PM QATAR

Gulf neighbors get cozy

Saudis make up the third-largest group of ticket purchasers behind Qataris and Americans. After a shocking win against Argentina, the Saudis came out of their proverbial shell. They wore their flag proudly around their shoulders, bought up green scarves with their national symbol, and could be spotted at Saudi matches and even non-Saudi matches in their team’s jerseys. Saudis and Qataris could be seen partying at the Saudi House, a pavilion set up on the Corniche, or the main thoroughfare along the Doha waterfront. In short, it’s now “cool” to be Saudi at the World Cup.

With this newfound status, the Saudis have embraced the atmosphere and have actively engaged with fans from around the world. By fixing thobes and ghutrahs (robes and headscarves) of foreign fans embracing the local culture, joking in social media posts asking “Where’s Messi?!,” and simply striking up conversations with other fans, no matter where they are from, the Saudis are a key fixture in this World Cup. In many ways, they have made the tournament their own, playing host alongside the Qataris, to ensure fans from other parts of the world have fun and begin to see that Gulf Arabs are not as often portrayed in Western media according to stereotypical representations.

Along with the strong representation of Saudi fans, senior leaders from both Qatar and Saudi Arabia took part in the tournament’s opening ceremony and attended matches. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s seat next to FIFA President Gianni Infantino on the ceremony stage was no coincidence: It was a clear overture from the Qatari emir that it was time for the two countries to put the blockade, which was in effect from 2017 to 2021, behind them and start anew. Similarly, attendance at matches, and sharing of the royal box, by senior members of both Qatari and Saudi ruling families is a sign that the countries are looking forward.

At a more grassroots level, under a program established for the tournament, Qatari families are hosting fans, which has enabled them to reconnect with families, friends, and colleagues. Many Qataris are hosting multigenerational Saudi families, solidifying deep connections based on their time together and shared experiences attending matches. To ease congestion on roads and infrastructure during the World Cup, Qatar closed its schools, meaning that Qatari children are home and likely spending significant time with their guests—meaning the connections they build are likely to result in future communication and travel between the two countries.

DECEMBER 2, 2022 | 1:02 PM WASHINGTON | 9:02 PM QATAR

Saudi Arabia lost at the 2022 World Cup. But its sports sector is winning.

The Saudi Arabia versus Argentina match during the 2022 World Cup resulted in one of the biggest upsets in Argentina’s history, with the two-time champions experiencing its first defeat in thirty-six matches. The day of the November 22 match, Saudi ministries, government agencies, schools, and universities were directed to end working hours early so that people could watch the game. After Saudi Arabia’s victory, King Salman declared the next day a national holiday.

The Saudi victory brought euphoria not just to Saudis but also the entire region, with social media users from other Arab countries sharing videos of their reactions to the Saudi national team victory. As journalist Sarah Dadouch put it: “The Arab world in particular witnessed a rare moment of shared ecstasy.”

The outcome of the game was not a coincidence. As Saudi Sports Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Turki Al Faisal stated, the team had been preparing for that moment for three years. The ministry’s significant efforts to promote and support soccer reflects its overall direction and goals.

The sports sector is one of the vital pillars of Saudi Vision 2030 and the Ministry of Sport’s dedication is tangible in Saudi Arabia, where one can witness the enhanced facilities and increased citizen participation in sports. This change did not occur overnight, and it is partly the result of the widespread public support for sports and entertainment and a desire to compete at the international level.

—Lujain Alotaibi is a project coordinator at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. Follow her on Twitter: @LM_Otaibi.

MENASource

Dec 2, 2022

Saudi Arabia lost at the 2022 World Cup. But its sports sector is winning.

By Lujain Alotaibi

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

NOVEMBER 25, 2022 | 9:08 PM WASHINGTON | 5:08 AM QATAR

The ties that bind the US and England

The relationship between the United States and England is uniquely close; it’s appropriate, perhaps, that the two teams drew when they played in Qatar. The connections are very strong: Nine of the twenty-six-man US squad play in UK leagues, the same number that play in the United States (the remainder play in Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey). Some even play in the same club teams.

It goes deeper. US defenders Antonee Robinson and Cameron Carter-Vickers were born and raised in England. Midfielder Yunus Musah lived in England in his teenage years, went through Arsenal’s players’ academy, and even played for the English youth national team—before making the decision to play for the United States. “It was very difficult because, as I’ve said, I had such a great time in England. They did a lot for me in that country,” he said recently. The United States “obviously took one of ours, which we weren’t very happy about,” said England coach Gareth Southgate laconically earlier this week.

Friday’s draw means England has yet to beat the United States in the World Cup. They have played only three times at that level, and the United States won the first encounter in 1950, shocking the world’s oldest footballing nation; the second and now the third were draws.

—Andrew Marshall is the senior vice president of engagement at the Atlantic Council.

NOVEMBER 23, 2022 | 1:24 PM WASHINGTON | 9:24 PM QATAR

A World Cup for all Arabs, but…

By Sarah Zaaimi

Qatar and its leadership are aggressively branding the 2022 World Cup as an event for all Arab countries: The first event of the sport hosted by an Arab and Muslim-majority country, they claim. The rest of the Arab states, however, may feel differently about such a statement, given the contentious nature of pan-Arabist discourse in an undeniably racially, religiously, and linguistically hybrid region and Qatar’s interventionist records in many regional conflicts.

The ongoing World Cup actively included contributions and elements from across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Moroccan artist RedOne produced the official music and designed the launching event; the official cup balls were created in Egypt; and Arabs from various countries are providing security for the event, sculpting the iconic globe trophy, or participating in the dozens of artistic performances on the agenda. Doha is also a hub for Arab expatriates who constitute a core component of Qatar’s workforce, operating primarily in the government, media, business, and hospitality industries. Despite their tremendous contributions, these migrants possess no pathway toward Qatari citizenship, according to the laws in place.

Beyond the buoyant façade reflected at the launching event, where Arab leaders from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan came together to celebrate the kick-off of the World Cup, many structural differences persist between the MENA brothers. It is essentialist and reductionist to label all countries with Arabic-speaking majorities or Arab cultural elements as “Arab.” The region is much more complex and has undergone serious revisionist identity quests since the pan-Arab ideology of the fifties and sixties. For example, countries like Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, with significant Amazigh communities, find it insulting to be reduced to one component of their complex and multi-layered heritage. Other communities in the region must feel the same, like Kurds, Assyrians, Nubians, etc.

On the political front, Qatar, in its pursuit to widen its geostrategic reach and overcome its “small state syndrome” ended up upsetting many fellow MENA countries. The healing process from the schism with other Gulf Cooperation Countries hasn’t been completed yet, especially with the UAE. Qatar’s financial and ideological meddling in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is still fresh in the memories of the citizens of these countries. At the same time, Al-Jazeera and Qatari media continue to upset multiple MENA regimes and undermine the territorial integrity of certain sovereign states. A World Cup for all Arabs, yes, but…

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 12:03 PM WASHINGTON | 8:03 PM QATAR

Money talks. And Saudi Arabia’s World Cup squad was screaming today.

By Hezha Barzani

Saudi Arabia just defeated one of the World Cup favorites—Lionel Messi led Argentina, with the Saudis breaking the third-highest ranked FIFA team’s thirty-six game unbeaten streak. This game is already being regarded as one of the most shocking upsets in World Cup history, but it is also just one piece of an enormous economic and cultural focus placed recently on the sport by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Last year a Saudi Arabia-led consortium, led by the Saudi sovereign wealth fund (the Public Investment Fund), purchased Newcastle United for over £300 million (over $405 million). This purchase was significant from an economic standpoint, as Saudi Arabia joined Gulf neighbors Qatar (ownership ties with Paris-Saint Germain) and the United Arab Emirates (ownership ties with Manchester City) in the lucrative European soccer investment arena. This purchase also aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, which includes revamping the nation’s tourism sector and branding the Kingdom as a “football loving nation.” In addition to the massive purchase of Newcastle United, it is clear that economically, Saudi Arabia has long-term commitments to the sport, with its sovereign wealth fund recently announcing more than two billion dollars in soccer sponsorship deals.

A large portion of these deals involves the development of Saudi Arabia’s domestic soccer clubs. From a cultural perspective, Saudi Arabia getting involved in European soccer will have a profound impact on the Saudi youth population and overall development of their soccer talent. With the Cup being played in neighboring Qatar, Saudi soccer academies are expecting an enrollment spike, while the government is simultaneously promoting more physical activity, showcasing how the Kingdom is laying plans for long-term international success.

With Saudi Arabia bidding to co-host the 2030 World Cup, it is making a strong play to become the capital of the soccer world in the Middle East. This decisive win against Argentina further cements its claim, but only time will tell if this victory was luck or the first sign of an emerging soccer powerhouse—thanks to the government’s economic and cultural investment.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 10:18 AM WASHINGTON | 6:18 PM QATAR

How China stands to win from Western attacks on Qatar

By Ahmed Aboudouh

Western media has launched a campaign to criticize World Cup host Qatar for its abhorrent record on LGBTQ+ rights and migrant labor, mainly of Asian origin. While justified, the campaign has been widely castigated as selective, hypocritical, and indicative of a double standard. China has found a chance to exploit this apparent Western grudge against the first Arab and Muslim country to host the World Cup. In addition to a Chinese construction company building Lusail Stadium, which will host the World Cup final, other firms supplied the tournament with everything “made in China”—from LED big screens, a solar power plant, and clean energy shuttle vehicles, to flags and throw pillows.

China knows how this feels. It has been chastened in the past while hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics with diplomatic boycotts and a similar media crusade for its “genocide” against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. There is no doubt that the reasoning behind such campaigns is entirely just. But going soft on hosts with even worse human rights records, as was the case with Russia in 2018, while scolding Qatar is mindboggling.

These kinds of media campaigns can be self-harming at best for two reasons. First, they signal that Western countries, especially Europeans, will seek to maintain hegemony over soccer by wielding prejudice. Second, they encourage China (and other rivals) to score geopolitical points by doubling down on smaller countries’ grievances toward those over-the-top media offensives and positioning China as a viable alternative and trusted leader of the Global South. Years of backbreaking diplomatic work to confront China’s soft power expansion in the Middle East is now at risk.

— Ahmed Aboudouh is a nonresident fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and a senior journalist covering world affairs at the Independent newspaper in London.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 8:39 AM WASHINGTON | 4:39 PM QATAR

Watch for the Iran team’s small acts of defiance to continue

By Masoud Mostajabi

In the history of the World Cup, Iran has qualified a total of six times—five under the Islamic Republic. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranians across the globe have agreed on little. But when it has come to supporting Team Melli (“the nation’s team”), all have cheered—until now. At the 2018 Cup, Iran’s win over Morocco provoked celebration among the likes of exiles and diaspora communities, then Islamic Republic President Hassan Rouhani, and former heir apparent to the throne Reza Pahlavi—an outpouring stemming from a shared membership in a national family.

However, for the first time in memory, this year many Iranians have soured on the team, thanks in large part to Team Melli’s meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi before traveling to Qatar—which came amid the deadly crackdowns by Raisi’s security services against protesters. The team’s silent protest by refusing to sing the national anthem on Monday was widely seen as too little too late. Iranians expect more from a team they consider a representative of the people. In a country losing its youth, a loss or win in a tournament is meaningless. Unlike most fans enjoying the games, Iranians are in mourning.

However, these players are themselves part of this generation of youth, having grown up watching heroes such as Ali Daei and Ali Karimi, vocal supporters of today’s protests. Many of the players have commented in support of the protestors, changed their social media profile photo to black, or covered up the national emblem. It’s early in the tournament, so the world can watch for these small acts of defiance to continue—with Friday’s match against Wales the next major opportunity.

—Masoud Mostajabi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter @MMostajabi1.

NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 10:22 AM WASHINGTON | 6:55 PM QATAR

Why Iran’s subtle stance is being seen as “meaningless”

By Holly Dagres

Since antigovernment protests began in Iran on September 16 after Mahsa Jina Amini was murdered by so-called “morality police,” many Iranian athletes competing in international competitions have taken clear stances that show solidarity with the protesters. But one group of athletes that has disappointed Iranians is Team Melli, the Iranian men’s national soccer team. Except for heaving worn black jackets over their kits during a World Cup friendly with Senegal on September 27, Team Melli has not taken a notable stance.

However, what has caught the attention of many Iranians is that Team Melli met with hardline President Ebrahim Raisi last week and took celebratory photos of their World Cup entry. Photographs of both incidents have gone viral, and not for a good reason, as these events took place while protesters were being fatally beaten with batons or shot by security forces. As a result, many Iranians see Team Melli not as their team, but rather as the team of the Islamic Republic. This was best captured by a banner hanging over a bridge in Tehran that read “don’t let your foot slip on the blood,” referring to the blood of both protesters slain since September 16 and those being killed by security forces while the match between England and Iran took place. Right before the game began, Team Melli finally took a subtle stance by remaining silent during the Islamic Republic’s anthem. While their silence and stony faces may seem significant to an outsider, it’s a belated gesture that many Iranians interpret as meaningless given how little Team Melli has done to show solidarity with their international platform.

—Holly Dagres is editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs. She also curates The Iranist newsletter. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

NOVEMBER 20, 2022 | 4:15 PM WASHINGTON | NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 12:15 AM QATAR

Focus on Qatar’s human-rights record is justified—but why have other hosts been left unscathed?

By Joze Pelayo

Despite the loud beats of FIFA anthem “Tukoh Taka,” World Cup watchers can still clearly hear the outrage against Qatar.

The significance of the first World Cup in the Arab world has been overshadowed by legitimate criticism about the country’s track record on minority rights and treatment of migrant workers. Serious abuses need to be addressed.

But Western coverage so far has been based on double standards and selective outrage; were the calls for a boycott of Russia’s World Cup in 2018 and the Beijing Olympics in 2022 this loud? The Biden administration had announced a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing event due to China’s ongoing genocide against Uyghurs. Russia used its 2018 World Cup, and also its 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, to sportswash and distract the world from Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Crimea—a prelude to today’s invasion—and the Russian leader’s increasingly imperialistic ambitions. Where was the outrage from European critics then?

Qatar is the first Arab and Muslim-majority country to host the World Cup—so one wonders whether that is the variable that makes Qatar the target of critical countries. Or, will countries critical of Qatar this year similarly scrutinize the 2026 host countries—Canada, the United States, and Mexico—regarding migrants’ rights?

Qatar’s mistreatment of predominantly South Asian workers is deplorable, and criticism is justified. But the selective outrage shown mainly from some countries in Europe is also borderline arrogant and racist.

On a brighter note, the United States’ Nicki Minaj, Colombia’s Maluma, and Lebanon’s Myriam Fares are bringing the Arab-Latin relationship and a shared passion for soccer to a new level with “Tukoh Taka,” which features English, Spanish, and Arabic lyrics. The song briefly reached number one in iTunes in the United States, making it the highest-charting FIFA World Cup song ever—and Fares the first Arab artist to reach such a spot in the United States.

—Joze Pelayo is an assistant director at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative/Middle East Programs.

The post Offside: Watch the World Cup alongside the Atlantic Council appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainian victory can deal a decisive blow to Russian imperialism

Danylo Lubkivsky — Thu, 17 Nov 2022 00:23:42 +0000

Almost nine months since his tanks first rolled across the border, it is now clear that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is an old-fashioned colonial war complete with illegal annexations and the denial of Ukraine’s right to exist. This savage act of aggression reflects modern Russia’s refusal to abandon its imperial identity and Moscow’s readiness to employ military force as a foreign policy tool. Until this resurgent brand of Russian imperialism is decisively defeated, it will remain one of the greatest threats to global security.

Russia’s defeat may be closer at hand than many people currently appreciate. The invasion of Ukraine is rapidly unraveling, with Putin’s demoralized army consistently finding itself outfought and out-thought on the battlefield. Russia has already been forced to retreat from more than half of the territory occupied since the invasion began in February, with most observers expecting Ukraine’s highly motivated and battle-hardened military to liberate more of the country in the coming winter months.

The failure of Putin’s invasion is due in large part to his imperial arrogance and habit of underestimating the Ukrainian people. Throughout his political career, the Russian dictator has refused to recognize Ukraine as a separate and independent nation. Instead, he has insisted on dismissing Ukrainians as inferior Russians while dangerously downplaying the strength of Ukrainian national feeling.

Crucially, Putin has never acknowledged Ukrainian agency and has sought to blame each successive Russian failure in Ukraine on the meddling interference of foreign actors. In 2004, Putin’s clumsy attempts to rig Ukraine’s presidential election and install a pro-Russian candidate led directly to the Orange Revolution. Rather than admit his error, Putin accused the West of orchestrating Ukraine’s big pro-democracy breakthrough. Ten years later when millions of Ukrainians once again took to the streets in defense of their European choice, Putin repeated his earlier mistake and blamed the entire uprising on Western agents.

Putin’s ultimate blunder was his February 2022 decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He seems to have bought into his own propaganda and genuinely believed the invading Russian army would be welcomed as liberators. Instead, Putin has found himself at war with a nation of forty million Ukrainians who now view Russia as their sworn enemy. The escalating conflict has also had a disastrous impact on Russia’s international standing, with Putin himself now widely viewed as a pariah and even formerly friendly nations such as China and India looking to distance themselves from the Kremlin.

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While the war is far from over, even the most committed of Russian imperialists now recognize that the invasion can no longer hope to achieve its original goals of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and forcing Ukrainians to accept an imposed Russian identity. Confronted by the grim spectacle of retreat after retreat, they are gradually coming to terms with the previously unthinkable notion that Russia may have already lost the war.

This realization is sparking panic in Moscow. Regime officials and nationalist hardliners understand that losing the war in Ukraine would be an existential defeat that could bring about the collapse of Russian imperialism. So far, they have responded with bloodcurdling threats and nuclear blackmail, while raising the rhetorical stakes by ranting about holy wars against Satanists. The escalating campaign of Russian airstrikes against civilian Ukrainian targets is further evidence of Moscow’s fury and frustration over battlefield failures.

Western leaders must ignore Russia’s threats and remain steadfast in their support for Ukraine. The Kremlin is currently desperate to secure a ceasefire in order to rearm and rebuild its shattered military. In the interests of international security, it is vital that these efforts fail. The West currently has a rare window of opportunity to deal a decisive blow to Russian imperialism. If this moment is not seized, the price of countering the Kremlin will continue to rise.

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The defeat of Russian imperialism would bring a range of benefits that would be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine. The most immediate effect would be an economic upswing as the negative impact of the war on the global economy is lifted.

Russia’s defeat would also pave the way for a transformation of the international security apparatus, including new approaches to preventing the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Reforming the United Nations Security Council and rethinking the veto powers of permanent members would be high on the agenda. New security approaches for Eurasia would also be critical, with NATO and the EU both playing key roles.

The collapse of Russian imperialism would reinvigorate global democracy and serve as a powerful blow to the forces of autocracy. It would deter other authoritarian regimes from imposing themselves on smaller neighbors and encourage countries to embrace democratic values by demonstrating that they can expect to receive support from the democratic world.

Defeat in Ukraine would almost certainly lead to rising demands for independence among the many non-Russian nations within today’s Russian Federation. This would present a range of security challenges for the international community similar to the issues faced following the collapse of the USSR. As setbacks in Ukraine expose Moscow’s military weakness, the disintegration of Russia into a number of smaller nation states is no longer beyond the realms of possibility; the international community should begin preparing now for such an outcome.

Other countries in the post-Soviet region would also have the opportunity to abandon pro-Kremlin positions in the wake of a Russian imperial collapse. Belarus, which is currently under unofficial Russian occupation, would be of particular importance in this process. The liberation of Belarus would create the possibility of establishing a firm and geographically coherent border along Europe’s eastern flank.

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is widely acknowledged as the biggest threat to the global security system since the end of the Cold War. The Russian dictator is seeking to rewrite the rule book and drag the international community back to a time of naked imperial aggression. If he succeeds, the whole world will enter a menacing new era of conflict and confrontation marked by escalating militarism and closed borders.

Luckily, there is an alternative. Ukraine has already destroyed the central imperial myth of Russian military invincibility and has demonstrated that it is more than capable of beating Putin’s forces on the battlefield. If the West maintains its support and provides Kyiv with the tools to finish the job, there is every reason to believe Ukraine can decisively defeat Russia.

This would be an historic victory for Ukraine itself, but it would also represent a hugely significant win for the wider international community. Defeat in Ukraine would leave Russia’s imperial ideology in tatters while paving the way for a lasting peace in Europe. It would help secure a rules-based geopolitical environment where smaller countries are free to determine their own fate and need not fear their larger neighbors. These goals are within reach. All that is required is unwavering support for Ukraine.

Danylo Lubkivsky is the director of the Kyiv Security Forum and former Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine.

Steven Pifer — Fri, 11 Nov 2022 00:34:34 +0000

Ukraine is the victim of an unprovoked and unjustified war launched by Vladimir Putin’s Russia more than eight years ago. The latest stage in this war is the ongoing full-scale invasion that began on February 24, 2022. US President Joe Biden has said the United States will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes.”

Some question this commitment in view of other US priorities and argue that Russia, given history and geography, has a greater interest in Ukraine than does the United States. That latter point may be true, but it ignores the Ukrainians, who hold understandably strong views on the future of their country and have shown that they are prepared to fight tenaciously to defend their freedom. With Russia’s full-scale invasion now in its ninth month, it is vital to recognize that continued US support for Ukraine in this war is both the morally correct position and serves key national interests of the United States.

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In 1994, Kyiv agreed to give up the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, comprising some 1900 Soviet-era strategic nuclear warheads designed, built, and deployed to strike cities and other targets in the United States. Eliminating those weapons mattered a great deal to Washington. The Ukrainian government agreed to their elimination in large part because Russia, along with the United States and United Kingdom, committed in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, and further committed not to use force or threaten to use force against Ukraine.

During the negotiations that preceded the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, Ukrainian officials asked what Washington would do if Russia were to violate its commitments. US officials said the United States would take an interest and support Ukraine.

Beginning with its seizure of Crimea in 2014 and continuing with this year’s invasion, Moscow has grossly violated the commitments it made in 1994. The morally correct response from the United States is to support Ukraine, as it has done with political measures and economic sanctions to punish Russia along with providing economic assistance, arms, and ammunition to Ukraine. Supporting Ukraine until its military drives Russian forces out of Ukrainian territory or, at a minimum, reaches a point where a negotiated settlement becomes possible on terms that Kyiv can accept, is not only morally the right thing to do. It is also very much in the US national interest.

First, the United States has had a vital national interest in a stable and secure Europe going back more than 70 years. This reflects the core security, political, and economic interests that provided the rationale for the formation of NATO in 1949. A Russian victory in the current war with Ukraine would have a major negative impact on stability and security in Europe. The countries of Europe, most of whom also support Ukraine, look to Washington for leadership. An insecure Europe would command more US resources, military power, and senior-level attention than would otherwise be the case.

Second, other countries are watching how Washington responds to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. China poses the largest strategic challenge facing the United States in the coming decades. If Putin succeeds in Ukraine, that could encourage President Xi Jinping to adopt a more hostile stance. Moreover, should Russia prevail, the resulting situation in Europe would mean that Washington has fewer resources, less military power, and less attention to devote to dealing with the China challenge.

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Third, the United States has a strong interest in preserving international norms and a rules-based international order. A key norm in Europe, dating back to the UN Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, is that large states should not use force to take territory from smaller states. That is precisely what Putin is attempting now. If international norms break down, other autocratic states will likewise be emboldened. A “dog-eat-dog” world without such norms will be a much more difficult place in which to pursue a range of US political, security, and economic interests.

Moreover, respect for basic human rights is an important part of international norms. Russia has waged a brutal military campaign, committing wide-scale war crimes and atrocities such as the destruction of Mariupol. Russian occupation of Ukrainian towns and cities has meant torture chambers, mass arrests, summary executions, filtration camps, and deportations, including of children separated from their parents and sent to Russia for adoption by Russian families. The United States has an interest in opposing such grave human rights abuses and in supporting Kyiv’s efforts to hold those responsible to account.

Fourth, it is not clear that Putin’s ambitions end with Ukraine. In a June conversation with young Russian entrepreneurs, the Russian leader asserted that he was not taking Ukrainian territory but “returning” historic Russian lands to Moscow’s control. The Russian Empire once included the Baltic states, Finland, and part of Poland. If Putin were to prevail in Ukraine, would he be tempted to seek the “return” of other “historic Russian lands?”

In the case of Ukraine, the United States is contributing money and weapons. If Putin’s ambitions were to extend to one or more of the Baltic states, which are members of NATO, the United States would have to contribute money, weapons, and the lives of American soldiers. The United States has a strong interest in stopping Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine.

Steven Pifer is an affiliate of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a retired Foreign Service officer.

Tokayev’s moves to establish a measured democratization in the wake of January’s unrest have staved off further large-scale protests. Leaders in Astana likely feel stuck: A return to greater authoritarianism would only cause the pre-January fissures in society to fester, while a rapid liberalization, they believe, would threaten an immediate reprisal of the chaos of January.

Since Kazakhstan became an independent state in 1991, it has been a target in the sights of Russian foreign policy. Kremlin aggression has been a consistent threat to Kazakhstan’s national sovereignty and even territorial integrity. But after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Astana distanced itself from Moscow, refusing to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory and harboring Russian citizens seeking to dodge the draft.

It is no coincidence that Tokayev is pursuing domestic liberalization at the same time. After the Kremlin invaded Ukraine, Western democracies have revealed themselves to be a competent counter to Moscow’s influence.

Ukraine secured Western support in no small part due to its burgeoning democratic institutions. Thus, authoritarian institutions have become a liability for Kazakhstan, jeopardizing Astana’s ability to leverage the West in opposing Moscow’s attempts to re-establish a sphere of influence in the region. As such, the liberalizing reforms of Tokayev are a step not only toward democracy but also toward the West and away from Russia.

Tokayev’s reforms carry symbolic weight because they promise to open a severely closed political system, but their practical effects are limited. The snap presidential election, for example, is supposed to be interpreted as the birth of a competitive political environment in Kazakhstan. In practice, however, the elections leave the opposition without time to organize and consolidate support, all but assuring Tokayev’s re-election and doing more to consolidate Tokayev’s authority than bring in any real competition.

If Tokayev’s reforms go no further, they risk falling short of their full potential as a geopolitical tool by alienating Western capitals, whose support is increasingly conditioned on serious democratic progress.

For leaders like Tokayev, close partnership with China presents an enticing counterbalance to both Russia and the West. The political model that China champions does not grant political freedom to the people, but it does preserve the elite in power and might unlock exponential economic growth.

China is also making efforts to court Kazakhstan, as Chinese leader Xi Jinping offered greater cooperation and support for Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity during his recent trip to the country.

In the process of exiting one imperial orbit, however, Astana does not seem eager to enter another. While Tokayev’s strategic ambiguity does not close the door to a closer alliance with Beijing—or a return to Moscow’s fold—it does open the window to Western alignment. But as long as Kazakhstan’s democratization stands incomplete, however, the West removing its support is an option; that would force Astana to choose between two autocratic spheres of influence.

Western engagement over the coming months and years is going to be crucial. After the snap presidential elections, Tokayev will find his domestic position stronger than ever. He’ll have the chance to halt or even reverse the changes he’s made to liberalize the country. But the West’s credibility and engagement provide a crucial incentive for Tokayev to continue his reforms and secure both democracy and sovereignty for Kazakhstan.

High-level visits to the country and economic partnerships could demonstrate Western interest in further engagement. Western countries can facilitate investment in the country and offer technical assistance for Kazakhstan’s leading private industries.

Western engagement should be Kazakhstan-specific and avoid viewing the country only through the lens of the wider Central Asian region. During that process, Western leaders should make clear what kind of democratic progress they would need to see in order to increase their engagement. Western diplomats should make clear that engagement is predicated on Kazakhstan’s reforms, and further partnership should be predicated on continued liberalization.

If Western attention is not forthcoming, the forces in Astana advocating for greater autocracy will only gain strength. They will argue that their fears have been realized, as elite power will be threatened by democratic forces without any geopolitical benefits to show for the effort.

It is up to Western leaders, then, to understand the situation that Kazakhstan’s leaders find themselves in and operate accordingly. They should support what nascent efforts exist and provide incentives to ensure continued liberalization. Western engagement and understanding with Kazakhstan will help to demonstrate the value of Tokayev’s moves, set clear expectations for what reforms are to accomplish, and spur the development of a Kazakh democracy.

The story of democracy in Kazakhstan has yet to be written, and at this critical moment, the West has a unique opportunity to determine whether Kazakhstan sees either the birth of a fledgling democracy or retrenchment to autocracy.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The post How the West can help build Kazakh democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cohen in The Hill: How to expel Russia from the UN

Atlantic Council — Thu, 03 Nov 2022 14:49:00 +0000

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#AtlanticDebrief – How will Germany’s new strategy on China develop? | A Debrief from Noah Barkin

nlawler — Fri, 14 Oct 2022 16:07:22 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

What is the current state of Germany’s China policy ahead of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s trip to Beijing next month? What can we expect from the German Foreign Ministry’s new China strategy, and how might China’s leverage on Germany’s economic policy impact its development? How far is the Chancellery willing to take a stance on China in light of Germany’s strategic dependencies?

For this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Europe Center Nonresident Senior Fellow Rachel Rizzo sits down with Noah Barkin, Visiting Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Managing Editor of the Rhodium Group, to discuss the future of Germany’s China policy in light of these strategic challenges.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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Before moving forward, King Charles III must address the Commonwealth’s past with Africa

Alexander Tripp and Caitlin Mittrick — Wed, 12 Oct 2022 14:05:01 +0000

Africa’s relationship with the British monarchy is fraught with complications, not least being that the cornerstone of their modern affiliation, the Commonwealth, is rooted in a dark legacy of colonialism and empire.

Yet even against that historical backdrop, the late Queen Elizabeth II was respected by her peers across the continent, and upon the announcement of her death, tributes from African heads of state poured in.

How did a monarch that, for many, embodied empire and colonialism garner such tribute among people whose ancestors chafed against British rule? The Queen committed herself to fostering relationships with various African heads of state, an effort that sometimes required her to step outside the United Kingdom’s dominant political context of the time. And after seventy years on the throne, she was omnipresent as a symbol of continuity, comradery, and commonality across the Commonwealth.

The Queen, both as head of state or head of the Commonwealth to twenty-one African nations, took her duties seriously. She respected local customs, was comfortable operating in a post-colonial environment, and often went against the advice of the British political establishment when approaching issues on the continent.

Such an approach paid off.

Not only was the Queen respected by many African political figures, but she enabled the United Kingdom to make inroads where politicians were unable to do so. But can the Commonwealth’s relationship with Africa continue to thrive with its greatest asset gone?

The Queen’s triumphs

The Queen’s relationship with Africa began at the very start of her reign: After all, she ascended the throne while in the foothills of Mt. Kenya in 1952. Her connection to the continent over the course of her reign would be long standing, but also one defined by a forced evolution as the United Kingdom left its ambitions for empire behind.

From her first visits to Africa as monarch, she would work to cement her credibility as a leader not only for the United Kingdom, but also for the Commonwealth. While reigning over a tumultuous shift in global geopolitics, she was able to juggle her responsibilities and effectively serve as a moral and figurative leader.

This is perhaps most evident in her 1961 visit to Ghana. The former colony had recently declared its independence and was debating leaving the Commonwealth; its founding father and president, avowed socialist Kwame Nkrumah, increased his hold on power and cozied up to the Soviets at the same time the Berlin Wall was being erected and the Cold War was getting into full swing.

British politicians were very much against the trip. Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill called the prime minister at the time, Harold Macmillan, in an attempt to lobby the government to cancel the Queen’s travel. The Queen was steadfast, however, and despite the pressure visited for twelve days.

The visit was an immense success.

Most famously, at a ball organized to celebrate the trip, the Queen shone in a way only she could. In the year that apartheid partitioned South Africa and the Freedom Riders took on segregation in the United States, the Queen danced with Nkrumah in front of the world media. The Queen was able to reassure Ghana’s political leadership on a personal level, one of her key skills as a monarch.

Nkrumah maintained his political differences with the West, but he chose to keep Ghana in the Commonwealth, allowing the West crucial access to counter Soviet influence in the region. But on a more concrete level, the Queen demonstrated that while the nations of the Commonwealth may have their political differences, they could remain united under her leadership; more than just an association of former British colonies, the Commonwealth could also be a community of independent nations working together for their mutual advancement.

Another example of the Queen’s strong moral determination and her sense of duty was her willingness to go against the British political establishment in the 1980s. It was an open secret that the Queen quarreled with then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over sanctioning the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Queen would go on to establish a close personal friendship with Nelson Mandela, the dissident who became the country’s first post-apartheid president. Not only were they known to call each other by their first names, but they also communicated regularly and famously danced together during his state visit to London.

Her willingness to advocate for the needs of Commonwealth nations, sometimes contradicting the home government’s positions, earned the Queen the respect she held among several important African leaders—relationships that were only enhanced by her seemingly singular ability to connect with leaders on a personal level.

In short, the Queen’s personality and her approach to cultivating people-to-people relationships with African leaders allowed the Commonwealth to remain relevant and even thrive at a time when it probably shouldn’t have.

However, despite the Queen’s ability to connect with Africa and (at least by the standards of the time) rebut the sometimes racist tendencies of Western attitudes toward the continent and its leaders, some Africans saw her, and continue to see her, as an emblem of a painful history of empire and colonialism. This viewpoint is one of the key challenges facing the future of the Commonwealth.

A legacy of colonialism

With the United Kingdom’s history of colonialism in Africa, it comes as little surprise that the Queen’s death brings complex emotions to the fore for many former colonial subjects. There is a history of brutal colonial oppression that many say has been overlooked.

For example, Nigerian Carnegie Mellon professor Uju Anya recently made headlines for her criticism of the Queen on Twitter, saying that Queen Elizabeth II “supervised a government that sponsored the genocide that massacred and displaced half my family” in reference to the UK government’s role in the Biafran War in the late 1960s.

This dichotomy is one with which the Commonwealth will continue to struggle. Queen Elizabeth II’s emphasis on strong interpersonal ties with African leaders helped smooth over relationships, but it didn’t address the past injustices endured by many African groups. Given that past injustices are no longer swept under the rug, the monarchy will need to address criticism of its historical actions and its representations if it hopes to maintain the Commonwealth’s relevance.

At a time when imperial legacy is a burden, not a boon, and the dark shadow of colonialism is no longer quietly brushed aside, it remains to be seen whether the Commonwealth will be able to flourish without its greatest asset and distraction from that historical truth: Queen Elizabeth II.

What’s next for King Charles III

The Commonwealth has historically served as a vital link for the United Kingdom, and by extension the West, to engage with Africa.

But to maintain that link, the Commonwealth needs to address its imperial legacy and work to solidify itself in a changed world.

King Charles III stands a good chance of managing that endeavor and for the past few years has stood in for his mother at many Commonwealth meetings. Those meetings have seen significant change. To the dislike of many of its detractors, the Commonwealth has not been relegated to the history books just yet—it is actually expanding.

Just earlier this year, Togo and Gabon were admitted to the club at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Rwanda—a country that itself joined in 2009. The inclusion of two Francophone nations signifies how the Commonwealth is evolving and how crucial that evolution is for the organization’s future. They joined not because of historic connections to the British empire, but because of the cultural and commercial prowess of the Commonwealth. Charles III should harness these cultural and commercial ties to maintain the strong ties that currently exist across the continent and to foster new ones.

The Commonwealth is evolving into an organization based more exclusively on mutual interests and benefits. King Charles III, as head of the Commonwealth, will need to shepherd the organization through this transformation using similar methods as his mother: personal connections and an acceptance of each member’s political autonomy. He will also need to address the Commonwealth’s origins rooted in colonialism, but there are questions about whether he will even be able to do so.

The African continent is crucial to the Commonwealth’s continued success. Out of fifty-six Commonwealth members, twenty-one are African. Plus, the continent is central to many of the United Kingdom’s economic interests abroad, as Africa is now home to the world’s youngest population and the largest free-trade zone by number of countries. And in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and of increased Chinese interest across the continent, Africa’s role in geopolitics is growing—which will be of interest to the post-Brexit United Kingdom. Without ties to the European Union, the Commonwealth is increasingly important as a key mechanism for both the United Kingdom to remain a key player on the international stage and for the West’s attempts to engage with Africa.

The West and Africa’s historical ties, while not always something to be proud of, served as a foundation so that Queen Elizabeth II could build people-to-people ties and reset bilateral relations with African countries in a way that reflected the modern world. That desperately needs to continue. But in addition, King Charles III will need to address the very real grievances those historical ties represent.

Queen Elizabeth II’s reign saw her navigate a tumultuous shift in global geopolitics all while keeping a steady course. Hopefully, King Charles III is up to the challenge to do so as well. If he is, the Commonwealth will continue to flourish. If he isn’t, the West will have lost an invaluable tool to engage with a continent and group of nations that are now more important than ever.

Alexander Tripp is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Caitlin Mittrick is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a graduate student at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs.

The post Before moving forward, King Charles III must address the Commonwealth’s past with Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin denounces imperialism while annexing large swathes of Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 30 Sep 2022 17:35:05 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered one of his most unhinged performances on September 30 in a speech announcing the annexation of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. Addressing hundreds of Russian officials during a ceremony in the Kremlin, Putin had relatively little to say about the war in Ukraine. Instead, his address was dominated by some of the fiercest anti-Western rhetoric of his 22-year reign.

Putin branded Western leaders as “racist” and claimed they were guilty of “spreading Russophobia all around the globe.” However, his main focus was the allegedly imperialistic policies of the West. The Russian leader supported his argument by reciting a long list of crimes committed in the name of Western imperialism including everything from the colonization of Africa to the mid-nineteenth century Opium Wars in China. “For centuries, the West has claimed to be bringing freedom and democracy to the world,” he declared. “In fact, the exact opposite is true.”

Putin is apparently oblivious to the absurdity of condemning imperialism while at the same time committing the most brazen act of imperial aggression in modern European history. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise. After all, for years he has been transforming Russia into a fascist state while presenting himself an anti-fascist. Why not also pose as an anti-imperialist while engaging in naked imperial aggression?

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Many veteran Kremlin observers commented that this was comfortably the most vitriolic public attack on the West ever delivered by the Russian leader. “I’ve watched a lot of Putin speeches over the last 10-15 years and this is the most anti-US one by a really long way,” tweeted Financial Times Moscow bureau chief Max Seddon.

Putin’s decision to focus his annexation address on the alleged injustices of modern Western imperialism was in part motivated by a desire to distract domestic attention away from Russia’s embarrassing battlefield defeats in Ukraine and place the war in a broader geopolitical context. But it also aimed to position Russia at the forefront of a new global coalition of anti-Western forces. At one point in his speech, the Russian leader spoke specifically of ending US hegemony through an “anti-colonial movement” to be led by Moscow.

This emphasis on anti-imperialism reflects Russia’s broader geopolitical realignment as the Kremlin comes to terms with the fallout from the disastrous invasion of Ukraine. Moscow now appears to recognize that there is little chance of repairing relations with Europe or the US. Instead, Russia will seek to mobilize global anti-Western sentiment and play the role of counter-weight to Western dominance in the international area.

It is far from clear whether this gambit will be successful. At present, few countries from the developing world seem ready to align themselves with Russia. Judging by voting habits at the United Nations, only a handful of global pariahs such as Syria and North Korea are currently prepared to side with the Kremlin. Meanwhile, both China and India have signaled in recent weeks that they are far from happy with the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Nor are Putin’s anti-imperial credentials particularly convincing. While he has tried to blame the war in Ukraine on everything from NATO expansion to imaginary Ukrainian Nazis, it is now painfully obvious that the invasion is actually an old-fashioned war of imperial aggression. Putin himself admitted as much in summer 2022 when he compared the invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great. His decision to annex approximately 15% of Ukraine now removes any lingering doubts.

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Today’s speech should cure Western policymakers of any illusions regarding the possibility of a pragmatic relationship with Russia as long as Vladimir Putin remains in the Kremlin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has already drawn the necessary conclusions and declared that there will be no more negotiations with Putin. Given the gravity of the situation, similar clarity from other Western leaders is now urgently needed. Putin has effectively declared war not only on the West but on the entire rules-based system of international relations. He is attempting to redraw the map of Europe by force and is holding the world hostage with the thinly-veiled threat of nuclear apocalypse.

It is crucial that the democratic world stands up to Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Failure to do so will have potentially catastrophic consequences for international security. Putin would be emboldened to repeat his nuclear ultimatums against new victims throughout the former Soviet Empire, while countries across the globe would soon scramble to protect themselves from this new reality by acquiring nuclear arsenals of their own. Decades of nuclear nonproliferation efforts would collapse and give way to a perilous new era of international instability.

Putin is not escalating from a position of strength. His fake referendums, absurd annexations, nuclear threats, and anti-Western rants all point to the fact that he is losing the war in Ukraine. This desperation makes him more dangerous than ever. The West must respond by demonstrating unwavering unity and resolve. This means tougher sanctions against Russia and accelerated military support for Ukraine. Today’s events make clear that Putin can no longer be reasoned with. He can only be defeated.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Documenting dissent

Tracking narratives

Russia-based Facebook operation targeting Europe with anti-Ukraine messaging revealed

Kremlin spins quotes from the Western leaders to blame the US in Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline explosions

Refugees and migration

Thousands of Russian citizens flee to neighboring Georgia, raising security concerns among Georgian civil society

Putin illegally annexes Ukrainian territory

On September 30, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially annexed four Ukrainian oblasts, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, effectively incorporating all of southeastern Ukraine into Russia. “There are four new regions of Russia,” he told the assembled audience at the Kremlin, and insisted that annexing the regions was “the will of millions of people.” After a brief history lesson in which he lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “catastrophe,” he called for Ukraine to accept a ceasefire. Putin was open to negotiating a settlement, he continued, but added that he would defend the newly annexed territories “by all means available.” In reference to the possible use of nuclear weapons, he said the US “created a precedent” for their use when it bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

Prior to the annexation ceremony, Reuters and the Guardian reported Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov discussing how Russia would “’de jure’ incorporate parts of Ukraine which are not under the control of Russian forces into Russia itself.” Russia would therefore consider Ukrainian attacks on annexed areas that Russia does not even control as an attack on Russia itself.

Response to today’s developments have been swift. UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace declared on Twitter, “The UK will never recognise Russia’s illegal annexations in Ukraine.”

The UK will never recognise Russia’s illegal annexations in Ukraine. Russia doesn’t even control some of these oblasts. The truth is Russia is losing in Ukraine and their incompetent Generals are sending thousands to their deaths to please President Putin’s imperialist fantasy.
— Rt. Hon Ben Wallace MP (@BWallaceMP) September 30, 2022

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas lambasted the move as a “land grab” and put the annexation into stark geographic terms:

Let’s look at the magnitude of Russia’s illegal annexation. Russia will announce that around 20% of Ukraine’s territory is annexed to Russia. It is the size of 108 800 km2 – this is comparable to Austria and Belgium combined. Or Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands combined. Or 30% of Germany. Or the size of the Republic of Korea. If you add Crimea to it, the territory is comparable to three Belgiums and the Netherlands combined. And around 40% of Germany.

And let’s call things with the right names. Russia tries to rewrite the map of Europe. It’s a land grab. It’s theft. Putin hopes to add legitimacy to his invasion with this step. The international community will never recognize it.
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas

US President Joe Biden also condemned Putin’s annexation move. “Make no mistake: these actions have no legitimacy,” he said in a statement. “The United States will always honor Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders.”

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Ukraine attempts to encircle Lyman; civilian convoy hit in Zaporizhzhia

Russian and Ukrainian analysts on Telegram are predicting that Lyman could fall into Ukrainian control, as Ukraine continues its efforts to encircle the Russian-controlled city. A Ukrainian armed forces spokesman told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the encirclement of Lyman is “nearing its completion.” There are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces are attempting a pullback from the city.

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1575792380468658176

In recent days, Russian army shelling was most active in the front areas of the front near Bakhmut and Pokrovsk. In the Bakhmut area, Toretsk and Svitlodarsk came under fire. There is a Ukrainian breakthrough reported in Stavky, the liberation of Yampil which reportedly fell under Ukrainian control on this morning, and a blockade of Drobysheve, which is important for the Russian defense of the city.

Outside of Zaporizhzhia, a missile struck a civilian convoy of residents attempting to relocate. Initial reports from the scene suggest a death toll of more than two dozen people, but at the time of writing had not been confirmed.

The news from the front comes against the background of the Kremlin’s announcement to annex four more areas of Ukraine after self-styled referendums condemned by Ukraine and the West as a sham. It is worth noting that Russia does not fully control any of the four regions it has decided to annex. Although most of Luhansk remains under Russian control, Moscow only controls 60 percent of Donetsk. The capital of the southern region of Zaporizhzhia is under the control of Ukraine’s government while the frontlines in Kherson remain unstable.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Russian men resist mobilization across the country

Against the backdrop of Ukrainian pressure on the front lines in the Donbas, signs of resistance in the Russian Federation against the announced mobilization continue to emerge. Authorities detained an individual after an arson incident took place at the military enlistment office in Uryupinsk. At least fifty-four arson incidents have been document documented in recent weeks, according to Russian independent media outlet Mediazona.

On September 26, a Russian man lit himself on fire at a bus station in Ryazan while yelling he didn’t want to take part in the Ukraine war. In another incident that same day, a commander was killed at a military enlistment office in eastern Russia. A video emerged of a Russian man opening fire and killing the commander in the city of Ust-Ilimsk, who was also the head of the local draft committee.

Meanwhile, the number of Russians attempting to leave the Russian Federation has increased since Putin declared a partial mobilization. The Finnish Border Guard, for instance, reported an increase of 37 percent on September 24 compared with the previous weekend at the immigration checkpoints Salla and Raja-Jooseppi in Lapland. Further south, where Finland has several cross-border roads to Karelia and the St. Petersburg region, traffic was reportedly higher. A total of 38,444 Russian citizens entered Finland at land border checkpoints last week, the Border Guards stated. Considering the mass exodus from Russia, Novaya Gazeta reported that 261,000 men had left the country since mobilization, according to the FSB; most had fled to Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. Especially dire is the situation on the Georgian border, where the Russian army even established mobile barricades to stop those of military age from departing the country. Several outlets reported that Russian authorities could close the border for military-aged men as soon as this week. These reports also suggested that Putin will make the final decision on a departure ban and the possible introduction of martial law prior to addressing both chambers of parliament today.

Some Russian officials are going even further to convince more recruits. Kirill Kabanov, a member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, proposed to depriving residents from Central Asia of Russian citizenship if they refuse military service. This proposal would also affect people who had received citizenship within the last ten years, as well as their immediate family, thus raising the possibility that they would be stripped of their citizenship.

Russian Muslims announced protests against the mobilization on September 30 after Friday prayers. They also planned to express solidarity with Dagestan, whose population was among the first to protest earlier this month. In recent days, over 100 people have been arrested during protests in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, and tensions between residents and security forces continue to rise. Arrests were also reported in the Republic of Tuva following local protests.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia-based Facebook operation targeting Europe with anti-Ukraine messaging revealed

In August 2022, the DFRLab discovered a network consisting of six inauthentic Facebook pages purchasing ads to promote posts about Germany’s impending energy crisis and called for the lifting of sanctions on Russian gas imports. An independent review of these assets by Meta, along with others separately identified by German media, led to the discovery of a much larger network consisting of 1,633 accounts, 703 pages, twenty-nine Instagram profiles, and one Facebook group. These assets promoted Kremlin interests beyond Germany, also targeting France, the UK, Italy, Ukraine, and Latvia.

It was “the largest [network] of its kind we’ve disrupted since the war in Ukraine began,” Meta said in its report.

The network exhibited an overarching pattern of targeting Europe with anti-Ukraine narratives and expressions of support for Russian interests. It manifested multiple indicators of previous Russian influence operations, including the amplification of pro-Kremlin and anti-Ukraine or anti-Western narratives; the paid promotion of content; calls for action on petition sites and other forms of audience engagement; amplification across multiple languages reflecting inaccurate and non-native grammar; impersonating real people or institutions or creating fake ones; and generating names with detectable patterns.

The timing and narratives of the posts coincided with policy decisions made by the targeted countries pages regarding the war in Ukraine. For example, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz went to Canada for talks about liquified natural gas supplies on August 21, 2022. On August 22 and 23, five pages in the network posted a cartoon portraying Europe as a character named “Dr. EuroReich,” who is seen cutting Russian gas to a patient representing Germany’s economy. Similarly, in June 2022, France completed its first delivery of Caesar self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine. At the end of that month, four pages posted an image of the howitzer and suggested that France was getting itself involved in war crimes allegedly committed by Ukraine.

Meta concluded that the network originated in Russia and spread out across multiple platforms beyond Facebook and Instagram. It spent the equivalent of about $105,000 in advertising on Facebook and Instagram, primarily in US dollars and euros.

Some of the Facebook pages within the network posted links to websites of Russian origin, as well as links spoofing the domains of legitimate media organizations, including Bild and Welt in Germany, 20minutes in France, ANSA in Italy, RBC in Ukraine, and the Guardian in the UK. EU DisinfoLab, together with the Swedish non-profit foundation Qurium Media Foundation, were able to identify fifty-six spoofed domains that were part of the network.

Read the full report

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin spins quotes from the Western leaders to blame the US in Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline explosions

Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), demanded on her Telegram channel that US President Joe Biden “answer whether the United States realized its threat on September 25 and 26, 2022, when an emergency occurred on the three lines of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, which is tentatively qualified as a pipeline rupture, suggesting that they were blown up.” Zakharova referred to a press conference on February 7, 2022, when Olaf Scholtz visited the White House. During the that meeting, President Biden said, “If Russia invades, that means tanks or troops crossing the — the border of Ukraine again, then there will be — there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2.” After a journalist asked to clarify on how exactly the US will stop Nord Stream 2, which is under German control, Biden said, “We will — I promise you — we will be able to do it.”

Zakharova took out the video fragment of the press briefing and posted it on her Telegram. The post garnered more than 850,000 views, 85 shares to other Telegram channels and chats, 3,6000 forwards and 492 comments, according the TGStat.ru, a Telegram analysis tool.

Screenshot of Maria Zakharova’s Telegram post’s engagement data retrieved from TGStat.ru (Source: @nikaaleksejeva/DFRLab via TGStat)

Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a German right-wing political party, used Facebook advertisements to promote the video fragment with Biden suggesting that the US might be behind the attack.

Screenshot of Facebook ad paid by AfD and translated to English from German by Google translate. (Source: Meta Ad Library)

Zakharova also used a tweet by Radek Sikorski, the former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, now Member of the European Parliament, in which he posted the bubbling surface of the Baltic Sea and wrote, “Thank you, USA.” Sikorski’s Tweet was amplified by the Russia’s MFA on Twitter to further suggest US involvement in the gas pipelines’ disruptions.

Screenshot of Russian MFA’s quote tweet of Radek Sikorski’s tweet. (Source: @mfa_russia/archive)

Sikorski later deleted this tweet but left another tweet celebrating the gas leak. Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw, attempted to explain that what Sikorski might have meant was thanking the US for warning that such gas pipeline explosions might happen. Previously, on September 28, 2022, Spiegel, the German mainstream media outlet, wrote that the CIA warned Germany about possible attacks on the gas pipelines.

Russian gas deliveries to Western Europe through Nord Stream 1 pipeline were among the Kremlin’s leverage over sanctions put on Russia after Russia invaded Ukraine. On September 5, 2022, Russian state-owned Gazprom company shut down Nord Stream 1 due to “necessary repairs.” Nord Stream 2 was never in use, as Germany decided to freeze the project amid Russia’s recognition on two breakaway regions in Eastern Ukraine. Putting both pipelines out of order does not change much for Western European countries in terms of gas supply, while the Kremlin has lost direct access to a large part of the European gas market.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Thousands of Russian citizens flee to neighboring Georgia, raising security concerns among Georgian civil society

Putin’s partial mobilization order on September 21 has led to a second wave of mass exodus from Russia. Tens of thousands of Russian citizens have left the country. According to statistics published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, up to 79,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia between September 17–26, out of which 53,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia since September 21, after the mobilization announcement in Russia. This is the second large wave of Russian influx in Georgia. The first wave followed shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24 and peaked in summer. Between March and August, up to 800,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia. The visa-free regime was introduced by the previous Georgian administration. The Georgian Dream-led government has expanded the visa-free stay in the country from ninety days to one year.

Footage emerged on social media platforms depicting thousands of Russian citizens trying to cross the border with Georgia at the Upper Lars border crossing. Maxar Technologies published satellite imagery from September 27 depicting a sixteen kilometer traffic jam near the Lars border checkpoint. The Insider also published drone footage of long lines near the border crossing.

Our latest #satelliteimagery, from today, Sept 27, along the #Russia – #Georgia border and the extensive (~16 km in length) traffic jam approaching the Upper #Lars border checkpoint (lat/lon: 42.768, 44.631) as well as the Lars border crossing (lat/lon: 42.740, 44.627). pic.twitter.com/chG2ZzJYT6
— Maxar Technologies (@Maxar) September 27, 2022

What is going on in front of the Upper Lars border crossing: drone footage
Many kilometer traffic jams, drivers wait in front of the border for 40-50 hours. Scuffles keep sparking from time to time in the queue pic.twitter.com/1EReyhhyHs
— The Insider (@InsiderEng) September 26, 2022

The latest influx of Russian citizens has raised concerns among civil society actors and democracy activists in Georgia. On September 28, activists held a protest rally near the Georgia-Russia border demanding closure of the checkpoint. Citizens also started to mobilize on Facebook. A Facebook group called “ჩავკეტოთ ლარსის გზა“ (“Let’s block the Lars road”) was created on September 27 and garnered 9,300 members in two days. The group has already organized two events on Facebook to demand the closure of the Lars checkpoint.

The Georgian Dream-led government has not been responsive to the situation. Earlier in August, Georgian Dream party chairperson Irakli Kobakhidze accused opposition parties, media, and civil society actors of holding “xenophobic” and “chauvinistic” attitudes towards Russian citizens. On September 27, the Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri stressed that about 60 percent of Russian entrants had already left the country. “Russians have always entered Georgia…why should this become a problem today?” – he added.

On Telegram, the increase in mentions of “Ларс” (Lars) following Putin’s September 21 “partial” mobilization announcement peaked on September 27, with 4,502 mentions and up to 88 million views.

Screengrab from a TGStat query showing the increase of mentions (gray) and reach (blue) of “Ларс” (Larsi) following Putin’s announcement of “partial mobilization.” (Source: DFRLab via TGStat)

Various Russian Telegram channels and groups with “Lars” in their titles have been growing audience and garnering engagement. The groups include “ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ” (Upper Lars chat), ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ | ГРУЗИЯ (Upper Lars chat | Georgia), ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС (Upper Lars ), among others. The subscribers of the channels and groups have been sharing information about where to get products, water, and petroleum; advertising the private services of transportation from Russia to Georgia; posting images and videos of people crossing Georgian border; and giving various tips to each other.

For instance, ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ | ГРУЗИЯ (Upper Lars chat | Georgia) had around 11,000 members at the end of August; by late September the number reached 36,000.

Screengrab from TGStat showing the participants number growth (top) and number of messages (bottom) in the Telegram group Upper Lars chat . (Source: EtoBuziashvili/DFRLab via TGStat)

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Putin illegally annexes Ukrainian territory appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin threatens to increase attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure

Victor Kevluk — Tue, 27 Sep 2022 22:27:41 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin made global headlines on September 21 by threatening to use nuclear weapons if Ukrainians refuse to end their resistance to his invasion and continue to liberate Russian-occupied regions of their country. There has subsequently been much debate over whether Putin’s nuclear ultimatum is genuine or merely an attempt to intimidate the Western world into abandoning its support for Ukraine.

Many observers believe that a less publicized threat made one week earlier offers a clearer indication of Moscow’s likely next steps. Speaking on September 16 during a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Uzbekistan, Putin noted a recent series of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and warned of more to come. “Just recently the Russian armed forces hit some sensitive targets. Let’s consider these to have been warning strikes. If the situation develops further in the current direction, our response will be more serious.”

The strikes Putin was referencing to included missile attacks on Ukrainian power stations in Kharkiv, Zmiiv, Pavlograd, and Kremenchug on September 11-12, which left parts of the Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia regions temporarily without water and electricity. Two days later on September 14, Russia struck a dam at the Karachuniv Reservoir close to Kryvyi Rih, causing fears over possible flooding and disruption to local water supplies.

Attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure are not new and have been taking place regularly since the Russian invasion began on February 24. Nevertheless, the coordinated nature of the recent airstrikes indicates a change in tactics. This can also be seen on Russia’s Kremlin-controlled federal TV channels, which have recently began to actively promote the idea of destroying Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.

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Calls for a new campaign against civilian infrastructure targets across Ukraine have emerged following the Russian army’s humiliating retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in early September. The rapid pace of Ukraine’s advance and the comprehensive nature of Russia’s collapse sent shockwaves through Moscow. For the first time, many Russians began to understand that they may be witnessing the early stages of an historic defeat. This appears to have further radicalized opinion in the Kremlin, leading to open demands for war crimes targeting the Ukrainian civilian population.

Russia’s actions are in clear violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that established international legal standards for humanitarian treatment in war. However, with UN investigators already confirming that Russia has committed war crimes in Ukraine, an isolated and cornered Putin seems ready to entertain increasingly drastic measures in order to prevent his faltering invasion from unraveling further.

A Russian campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure would have thousands of potential targets to choose from including everything from power stations and energy supply networks to water, internet, rail, and transport hubs. Any attacks that succeeded in disrupting the supply of food or medicines could have a devastating impact on whole regions, especially if timed to coincide with the coldest periods of the coming winter season.

The targeting of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure poses obvious and significant challenges to the country’s population. While some elements of infrastructure are protected, many possible targets are highly vulnerable to attack. This could lead to significant loss of life and may also trigger a new wave of refugees as Ukrainians seek food and shelter in neighboring EU countries.

Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is thought to be particularly at risk from Russian attack. Russia is well aware of Ukraine’s excessive dependence on energy imports as well as the country’s issues with inefficient energy use. Attacks targeting energy supply could plunge entire cities into darkness and spark panic among the civilian population, with negative consequences for a whole series of different sectors.

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With the winter heating season fast approaching, the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s international partners must waste no time as they prepare for Russian attacks on every element of the country’s civilian infrastructure. Likewise, ordinary Ukrainians should take measures in anticipation of possible coming disruption to basic services in the months ahead.

In military terms, this means enhancing and expanding Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The best way to thwart Russian attacks is by preventing missiles from reaching their targets. Ukrainian leaders have been consistently requesting more air defense systems since before the Russian invasion began. Putin’s stated plans to target civilian infrastructure should now add a sense of urgency to these calls.

Cyber security must also be strengthened. Russia has previously demonstrated that it can disable vital infrastructure via cyber attacks. Such tactics are likely to be used in conjunction with airstrikes.

Ukraine must seek to increase energy efficiency and find alternative sources of energy supply in anticipation of possible disruption. Strategic reserves should be built up and preparations put in place to repair any damage. Encouragingly, drills are already taking place at key energy infrastructure objects.

Local authorities should consider establishing well-stocked community hubs offering warmth, electricity, and access to basic supplies such as food, water, and medicines in the event of massive infrastructure failure. Individual Ukrainians can take similar precautionary measures for their own households, and may also wish to stock up on specific items including torches, candles, canned food, and warm winter clothing.

Attempts to destroy Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure represent the latest escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow is now prepared to openly attack both military and non-military targets in order to achieve its goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and erasing Ukrainian national identity. All the indications are that Ukraine will face an historically challenging winter of hardships as Russia seeks to break the country’s will to resist. It is vital that the necessary preparations are put in place without delay.

Victor Kevluk is an analyst at the Center for Defence Strategies in Kyiv.

But that will soon change. At the latest EU foreign ministers’ informal meeting in Prague on August 31, member states agreed on the full suspension of the preferential visa agreement. The long-overdue decision will considerably reduce the number of EU visas issued to Russians. Moreover, visa requests by Russians will now be examined far more strictly than before, David Konecký, political director at the Czech foreign ministry, recently told me. The European Commission on September 6 officially proposed the suspension of the EU-Russia agreement, and on September 9 the European Council gave its stamp of approval.

Some countries would like to see the EU go even further by not only ending privileged treatment, but banning tourist visas for Russians altogether. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (all of which share a land border with Russia) jointly agreed to stop issuing Schengen visas to Russians for tourism, business, sports, and cultural purposes—and on Monday, all four began blocking Russian tourists from entering. This is a big deal, since it means the only land crossing between the EU and Russia that remains open for Russians is Finland (because Helsinki couldn’t find justification under the national legislation for banning Russian tourists). Even so, the country has considerably reduced tourist-visa issuance, accepting applications from Russians only once per week.

On the other side, most of the western part of the EU, including France and Germany, remains reluctant to take such strong steps. Still, according to Konecký, there was a strong consensus at the Prague meeting: Moscow is desperate to see Europe divided—but that’s not happening. Even without a visa ban, there’s a growing understanding among EU countries that relatively unrestricted tourism is no longer a legitimate right for Russians in Europe.

The case for a ban

The Prague meeting was a good example of the EU’s dealmaking capabilities, and the Czech Republic can consider the outcome a significant achievement of its ongoing EU presidency. Countries pushing for a full visa ban should be happy with the moderate approach to which the EU agreed; there are moral, political, and security reasons for the current decision, as well as for further restrictions on Russian travels to Europe. If Moscow continues with its aggression against Ukraine, a full ban may well eventually become a reality.

Morally, European leaders shouldn’t let Russians enjoy the perks of European life when their country is waging a war against an EU candidate and, indeed, against European values in general. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and several other leaders have expressed fear that a tourist-visa ban would mean applying a principle of collective punishment; but the EU’s current sanctions against Russia, both in response to the Kremlin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and to this year’s invasion, already adversely affect ordinary Russians.

It’s also worth recalling what German philosopher Karl Jaspers wrote in the aftermath of World War II in a powerful book called The Question of German Guilt (Die Schuldfrage). He distinguished between those who actively participated in the execution of war crimes and those who passively tolerated them: Even the latter were politically guilty, he concluded. Likewise, all adult Russians are not directly responsible for the massacre of civilians in Ukrainian towns such as Bucha—but they bear political responsibility and should pay an appropriate price.

Politically for Europe, unprovoked Russian aggression against its sovereign neighbor is a violation of international law and represents a major threat to the international order. Russians must be made to feel discomfort with the behavior of their government. Visa restrictions help the EU signal to Russians that Moscow crossed a red line. Some of them will understand, but others certainly won’t, and Russian President Vladmir Putin will certainly use this for his anti-EU propaganda. Europe may even lose some support in Russia among those who could feel abandoned, but it shouldn’t blink; it must show strength and commitment to its values.

From a security perspective, it is worth remembering that several Russian subversive operations—such as in Salisbury, England, or Vrbětice, Czech Republic—have involved Kremlin operatives traveling on tourist visas. With Europe’s ongoing efforts to help Ukraine, the continent is even more exposed. Overwhelmed borders in frontline states such as Finland and Estonia make it difficult for local authorities to properly check all Russian tourists. The same applies to visa issuance: After a series of expulsions, EU embassies in Russia are terribly understaffed, and the remaining personnel are unable to properly check all applicants.

Still, when considering a ban on Russian tourism, it’s important to ensure that those who might need to travel to Europe for safety, humanitarian, family, or other reasons can do so. Visa restrictions should go hand-in-hand with programs for those who need to leave the country. Countries calling for the EU tourist ban are often setting an example with such initiatives already in place.

The trouble with existing visas

Ample questions remain: For instance, what should the EU do with the one million Schengen visas already issued to Russians? The problem won’t go away by itself any time soon, as the validity of these visas is generally three years, with some lasting as many as five years. Although most direct flights to Europe from Russia have already been suspended (and nearly all Schengen-area land crossings closed), Finland appears set to keep its border with Russia open.

To understand the scope of the issue, consider this: According to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), almost one million Russians had legally entered the EU through land borders between the beginning of the war and August 22 (with entries to Finland and Estonia making up more than 60 percent). It’s noteworthy, as one EU official pointed out to me on condition of anonymity, that these travelers mostly used visas issued by other European nations rather than by bordering countries.

Ministers in Prague recognized the problem and allowed countries to apply their own national solutions, provided that they are in line with the general rules of the EU’s visa code. This represents a de facto recognition of earlier decisions of the few member states that have limited Russian tourists’ entry on a national-security basis (and also facilitated the recent decision of the Baltic countries and Poland).

A healthy debate

These issues will continue to be debated in the coming weeks and months, but the framing of the conversation marks a departure for the EU: The Prague consensus indicates an instance in which the views of Central and Eastern Europe largely shaped an outcome—despite hesitation among France, Germany, Italy, and Southern Europe. It is yet another indicator of the rebalancing of power within the EU.

Central and Eastern Europe are becoming more influential players, with the Russian war against Ukraine serving as a catalyst of this shift. These countries were ahead of Western Europe in sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine in the early days of the war, and the prime ministers of Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic were the first leaders to travel to embattled Kyiv in mid-March. This trend extends well beyond the region: With Lithuania, Lithuania, and Estonia withdrawing from the “17+1” platform of cooperation with China in recent years and the speaker of the Czech Senate visiting Taiwan in 2020, these countries are also setting a new course toward Beijing.

This is healthy for the EU as a whole, and this process should continue. A more realistic approach toward Russia and China, together with the broader rebalancing of power within the EU, could also help to further strengthen transatlantic cooperation.

To be sure, this process is complicated. Hungary’s democratic backsliding, with its systematic undermining of European consensus, cannot be simply dismissed as an exception; other countries are not immune to the frustrations that are haunting the region. For example, Slovakia for some time seemed like a political and economic success story, culminating with the election of liberal Zuzana Čaputová as president. Yet with the recent departure of one of the coalition parties from the government, the return of populist former prime minister Robert Fico—who has partnered up with xenophobic nationalists—is a worrying possibility. A recent public opinion poll even showed that a majority of Slovaks wanted Russia to win its war in Ukraine.

Central and Eastern Europe’s rise to political prominence won’t be easy, and the results are not guaranteed. But the consensus on visa policy toward Russia is yet another sign that the process has begun.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Europe Center and a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations.

The post The EU’s Russia visa ban debate reveals the bloc’s new power center appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Putin escalates his war against Ukraine, the world faces a moment of maximum danger—and maximum opportunity

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 18 Sep 2022 18:10:49 +0000

^{This piece was updated on September 21, 2022.}

The world is entering the moment of maximum danger—and at the same time of maximum opportunity—in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, now in its seventh month.

It is the moment of maximum danger because Putin is so dramatically failing in the pursuit of his delusional obsession, which prompted him to launch a major invasion of Ukraine on February 24, that he could rebuild some modern notion of the Russian empire with Kyiv as its centerpiece and as his legacy.

As Ukrainian courage and resilience transform his hubris into humiliation, the danger is rising that he could turn to weapons of mass destruction, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, to coerce Ukraine and confound its allies at a time when Putin’s influence is eroding and he is running out of options. This peril was plainly evident on Wednesday when, in announcing a partial mobilization of Russian forces to buttress his flagging war in Ukraine, Putin once again threatened to use nuclear weapons. “Russia will use all the instruments at its disposal to counter a threat against its territorial integrity—this is not a bluff,” the Russian president declared.

This presents a moment of maximum opportunity for world leaders at the gathering this week of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the first since Putin launched his war. It’s a chance for US President Joe Biden, alongside his European and Asian allies, to openly discuss the dangers Putin’s war poses to any country that cares about national sovereignty, to condemn Putin’s indisputable war atrocities, and to sway those remaining fence-sitters around the world who have neither condemned Putin nor backed sanctions against him.

It’s disheartening that the UN, instead of focusing on how best to stop Russia’s despot now and before winter wages, has been wrestling with the technicality of whether Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy should be allowed to speak via video link to this most significant gathering of world leaders. The good news is that UN General Assembly members voted 101 to 7, with 19 abstentions that included China, to provide the Ukrainians their stage.

Russia, a member of the UN Security Council, had been doing everything in its power to block the speech. That’s no surprise, for when Zelenskyy spoke virtually to the Security Council in April, he told the group that it should act for peace immediately or “dissolve” itself.

“We are dealing with a state that turns the right of veto in the UN Security Council into a right to kill,” he warned. Zelenskyy could not have been more prophetic, saying that if the UN failed to stop Putin, then for countries going forward, it wouldn’t be international law that would define the future but rather the law of the jungle.

There has been some speculation that the chance that Putin will use tactical nukes against Ukraine—or order some other escalatory action involving chemical or biological agents—has grown in rough proportion to the Russian despot’s increasing military setbacks on the ground.

Scenes from Ukraine last week of Russian soldiers—who cast aside their rifles, fled the battlefield on bicycles, and ditched their uniforms to disguise themselves as locals—were all part of a mosaic of failure.

The spectacular implosion of Putin’s military in the south and east of Ukraine, where Ukrainian troops have retaken at least 2,320 square miles of territory, has given new life to talk that Putin may have no way out of a losing war except through a self-defeating Hail Mary: nuclear weapons.

For a leader whose claim to leadership has all along focused on his personal masculinity and political invulnerability, this growing perception of his military’s ineptness and his own weakness endangers his continued rule.

That, in turn, seems to be prompting a rethink among both the handful of his allies and a larger group of countries—India chief among them—as Putin learned at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit last week in Samarkand. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed his concern about the war by telling Putin publicly that “today’s era is not an era of war, and I have spoken to you on the phone about this.”

Putin’s meeting last week in Samarkand with Chinese President Xi Jinping also gave Putin no relief. Indeed, Putin perhaps began to see the limits of what the two men had called their “no limits” relationship in a statement just before the Beijing Olympics and before Putin launched his war. “We understand your questions and concern” about the war, Putin told Xi last week.

Personal survival remains the highest priority for autocrats. For Putin, that must be top of mind now. What’s less clear is what would ensure it. One possibility is resorting to weapons of mass destruction and particularly tactical nuclear weapons.

While the risk to Putin would be huge, the world must be ready for this contingency. The best way to do that would be to pre-empt him, deter him, and be proactive rather than reactive because the world knows his plot.

“I fear [Putin’s Russia] will strike back now in really unpredictable ways, and ways that may even involve weapons of mass destruction,” Rose Gottemoeller, a former deputy secretary general of NATO, told the BBC last week.

What concerns her is something that has been growing in importance in Kremlin strategy: tactical nuclear weapons that weigh a few kilotons or less—some with only one-fiftieth of the yield of the Hiroshima bomb. Such weapons aren’t designed to reach Washington or Berlin but rather to coerce or, as Gottemoeller puts it, “to get the Ukrainians, in their terror, to capitulate.”

In an Atlantic Council “Memo to the President” last week, Matthew Kroenig tries to answer the question of “how to deter Russian nuclear use in Ukraine–and respond if deterrence fails.”

“Such nuclear use,” writes Kroenig, “could advance the Kremlin’s military aims, undermine US interests globally, and set off a humanitarian catastrophe unseen since 1945. To deter such a potential disaster, the United States should issue public, deliberately vague threats of serious consequences for any Russian use of nuclear weapons and be prepared to follow through with conventional military strikes on Russian forces if deterrence fails.”

It is also essential that the United States convey this message privately at senior levels and accompany it with the movement of relevant conventional forces into the area in a way that underscores the United States’ seriousness.

As world leaders gather at UNGA, one hopes they use the chance they have to fully listen to Zelenskyy.

Ukraine’s ability to survive as an independent, sovereign, and democratic state has wide-reaching implications for the international community that the UN represents.

There are terrible dangers in the weeks ahead. However, Putin’s battlefield failures and the increasing erosion of his international standing provide an opportunity to do the right thing: accelerate and step up all efforts to ensure Putin’s defeat and Ukraine’s defense.

If not now, when?

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 The World Putin Wants
Fiona Hill and Angela Stent | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this week’s must-read, Angela Stent and Fiona Hill, two of the smartest Russia-watchers anywhere, offer up a compelling analysis of Putin’s warped worldview, his strategy, and the sacrifices he’s willing to make in Ukraine.

“The real pinch from Western export controls will be felt in 2023,” they write, “when Russia will lack the semiconductors and spare parts for its manufacturing sector, and its industrial plants will be forced to close. The country’s oil industry will especially struggle as it loses out on technology and software from the international oil industry.” Yet Putin, they warn, is confident that he can outlast the West and is willing to put up with immense damage to the Russian economy if need be.

And why have countries in the world not joined US support for Ukraine?

“Since 2014,” write Stent and Hill, “Putin has assiduously courted ‘the rest’—the developing world—even as Russia’s ties with the West have frayed. In 2015, for example, Russia sent its military to the Middle East to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his country’s civil war. Since then, Russia has cultivated ties with leaders on all sides of that region’s disputes, becoming one of the only major powers able to talk to all parties. Russia has strong ties with Iran, but also with Iran’s enemies: particularly Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states. In Africa, Russian paramilitary groups provide support to a number of leaders. And in Latin America, Russian influence has increased as more left-wing governments have come to power. There and elsewhere, Russia is still seen as a champion of the oppressed against the stereotype of US imperialism. Many people in the global South view Russia as the heir to the Soviet Union, which supported their post-colonial national liberation movements, not a modern variant of imperial Russia.” Read more →

#2 Fortress China: Xi Jinping’s plan for economic independence
James Kynge, Sun Yu, and Leo Lewis | FINANCIAL TIMES

To understand Xi’s economic goals, read this FT report, which examines China’s determination to achieve greater self-sufficiency from the rest of the world.

The underlying objective, the FT reports, “is to build a ‘fortress China’—re-engineering the world’s second-largest economy so it can run on internal energies and, if the need arises, withstand a military conflict. While many in the US want to ‘decouple’ their economy from China, Beijing wants to become less dependent on the West—and especially on its technology. The strategy has several constituent parts and—if successful—will take several years to realize… In technology, the aim is to spur domestic innovation and localize strategic aspects of the supply chain. In energy, the objective is to boost the deployment of renewables and reduce reliance on seaborne oil and gas. In food, the path to greater self-reliance includes revitalizing the local seed industry. In finance, the imperative is to counter the potential weaponization of the US dollar.” Read more →

#3 The Wrong Way to View the Xi-Putin Meeting
Evan A. Feigenbaum | CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

“China is a self-interested power,” Feigenbaum writes. “It has every reason to be selfish about its own interests, not to run interference as a proxy for Moscow’s interests. China is the stronger power than Russia. And its interests are more global—and more multifaceted. Beijing’s goal is surely to preserve its entente with Russia at the strategic level, to counterbalance American power and growing economic pressure on China from the West. But it wants to do this without having to back Moscow at the tactical level, since it also benefits from preserving global market access, avoiding Western sanctions, and building relations with countries, like those in Central Asia, that are terrified of Russia.”

“This is a balance that Xi would struggle to strike if he appears to back Putin or the Russian war in Ukraine wholesale,” Feigenbaum adds.

For Xi, who has grand ambitions for a Chinese-led world, tipping too far one way or the other is not worth the risk. Read more →

#4 What Russia’s Failure in Ukraine Means for Putin and the World
Yaroslav Trofimov | WALL STREET JOURNAL

The Wall Street Journal’s Yaroslav Trofimov has produced some of the best reporting on the war in Ukraine. It’s no surprise he would deliver the most compelling reflection, which is on the cover of the Journal’s Weekend Review section, on Putin’s current troubles and their meaning.

“Moscow’s recent military defeats, inflicted by a country that it never considered a serious adversary, have challenged Russia’s basic assumptions about itself and its role in the world,” Trofimov writes.

More importantly, Russia’s failures are also shifting international thinking. “The losses are prompting Russia’s partners, allies, and arms customers to reassess their relationships, with many voicing private shock about Moscow’s bungling even as they hold back from public criticism,” writes Trofimov.

And in this characteristically excellent piece, also from Trofimov, he examines how Russia has shifted tactics to increase its assaults on civilian infrastructure.

“Changing its strategy after stinging military defeats,” Trofimov writes, “Russia this week began a campaign of cruise-missile strikes on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Wednesday’s initial attack on a dam in Kryviy Rih followed a strike on Monday that disabled the main power station in the country’s second-largest city of Kharkiv, knocking out electricity in much of eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities have contained the damage, restoring services in a matter of hours. Still, a sustained Russian effort to destroy Ukrainian power stations, dams, bridges, and pipelines could over time severely degrade the country’s ability to function, especially as winter sets in.” Read mo r e →

#5 The Queen Met 13 Sitting US Presidents, Who Basked in Her Global Prestige
Peter Baker | NEW YORK TIMES

In honor of the passing of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, read Peter Baker’s New York Times reflection on her relationship with the thirteen different US presidents she met and the important role she played in the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.

“The queen’s myriad encounters with presidents over the last seven decades… provided a regular tableau of the enduring British-American relationship,” Baker writes, “a symbol of the powerful bond between the onetime colonial power and the breakaway nation on the other side of the ocean. While Americans cast off the rule of the monarchy, many still revered it, and there was always something grand when a president met the queen.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Sep 16, 2022

The lesson Queen Elizabeth II leaves for King Charles III

By Andrew R. Marshall

The United Kingdom is a country where change has been the rule. And what’s most notable about the monarchy is, in fact, its ability to adapt to that change.

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

Issue Brief Sep 15, 2022

Democratic institutional strength before and beyond elections: The case of Brazil

By Valentina Sader

Brazil—Latin America’s largest economy and the fourth-largest democracy in the world—will elect its next president, governors, congress, and state-level assemblies in October 2022. This is one of the most momentous elections in recent years, a result of the inflection point that Brazil faces.

Americas Brazil

Markup Sep 15, 2022

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address.

By Atlantic Council experts

Ursula von der Leyen’s speech focused on energy and strategic decoupling of supply chains amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, but didn’t delve into common defense.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

The post As Putin escalates his war against Ukraine, the world faces a moment of maximum danger—and maximum opportunity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ambassador Marcy Grossman, Former Canadian Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, joins the Atlantic Council as nonresident senior fellow

Atlantic Council — Mon, 12 Sep 2022 13:27:39 +0000

Former Canadian Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates will contribute to the Council’s work on the Israeli-Arab normalization process and regional conflict resolution initiatives.

Washington, DC—September 12, 2022—The Atlantic Council announced today that Ambassador Marcy Grossman will serve as a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and N7 Initiative in the Middle East Programs.

A former Canadian Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, Grossman will play a key role in building on the Atlantic Council’s growing body of work on Israeli-Arab normalization and regional conflict resolution initiatives through a dedicated gender lens.

“Ambassador Grossman brings creativity, skill, and an unparalleled network that will significantly strengthen the Atlantic Council’s work on normalization in the N7 program, including by ensuring the full inclusion of women in all the opportunities that accompany this trend,” said Ambassador Daniel Shapiro, Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow. “We are fortunate to have this innovative, dynamic, and deeply experienced diplomat join our team.”

Grossman spent over twenty years abroad as a Canadian diplomat and has been on the leading edge of the Abraham Accords and the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world, including as an advocate for the role of women in diplomacy and peacebuilding. Prior to being appointed ambassador, she was Canada’s consul general to Dubai and the Northern Emirates.

Over the span of her career, Grossman has developed an expertise in geopolitical, security, and economic issues impacting North America and the Middle East. She spent fifteen years representing Canada in four distinct regions of the United States, including as consul general in Miami and Denver, and as the senior trade commissioner in Dallas and Los Angeles.

During her tenure in the United States, she was responsible for a wide range of Canada’s business, political, academic, consular, immigration, and public-safety interests. She also closed several large-scale foreign investment deals in cities across Canada.

She is an international business development expert and was notably responsible for the creation of Canada’s foreign direct investment agency, Invest in Canada. Grossman joined Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2001 as a senior trade officer, developing a full spectrum of investment marketing campaigns for Canada, including the publication of the bestselling book Innovation Nation.

“We are thrilled to welcome Ambassador Grossman to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. We are excited that the broader public will now have the opportunity to hear and read the Ambassador’s expert insights and analysis, stemming from her extensive diplomatic career,” said Jonathan Panikoff, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.”And we are thrilled that she will continue her distinguished leadership across a variety of spheres at the Atlantic Council—including her renowned efforts to encourage more women to take part in international security and diplomacy.”

Before joining Canada’s foreign service, Grossman held management positions in numerous federal government departments, including Industry Canada, Canada’s School of Public Service, and the Treasury Board. She launched her career in the criminal justice system, and between 1990 and 1998, served in various capacities within Correctional Services Canada. She is a graduate of Carleton University in Ottawa, Ontario, with a master’s degree in criminal psychology.

For inquiries or to request an interview, please contact press@AtlanticCouncil.org

#BritainDebrief – What did Gorbachev believe? | A Debrief from Dr. Vladislav Zubok

Ben Judah — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 22:34:52 +0000

What did Gorbachev believe?

Following Gorbachev’s passing, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Vladislav Zubok, Professor of International History at LSE and author of Collapse, on how Gorbachev saw Lenin, Europe and Ukraine. Did Gorbachev look to Lenin for inspiration? Was the Soviet collapse inevitable because Gorbachev was simply too naïve about economic management? What did Gorbachev feel about Ukraine and Putin’s foreign policy towards Kyiv?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Explore the #BritainDebrief series

The post #BritainDebrief – What did Gorbachev believe? | A Debrief from Dr. Vladislav Zubok appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#BritainDebrief – What are the origins of Europe’s energy crisis? | A Debrief from Dr. Helen Thompson

Ben Judah — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 22:22:57 +0000

What are the origins of Europe’s energy crisis?

As concerns continue to grow over Europe’s capacity to endure a winter with less Russian natural gas, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Dr. Helen Thompson, Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge University, on Europe’s energy, climate and geopolitical reckoning. What are the historical origins of Europe’s predicament? Is the current crisis only caused by war in Ukraine? Why have Western Europe politicians become more “energy illiterate” when describing policy objectives? Is this a geopolitical and climate-related reckoning for Europe, in addition to it being an energy security-related reckoning?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What are the origins of Europe’s energy crisis? | A Debrief from Dr. Helen Thompson appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#AtlanticDebrief – What’s in store for the transatlantic relationship in 2024? | A Debrief from Liana Fix

jbatchik — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 16:04:28 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

How have tensions over the last few years shaped Europe’s view of the US-European relationship? In the midst of historic unity between Europe and the United States, uncertainty still remains a key worry across Europe about the future of transatlantic relations.

In the first episode of the re-launched #AtlanticDebrief series, acting director Jörn Fleck speaks to Liana Fix, programme director for international affairs at Körber-Stiftung, and Europe Center senior fellow Damir Marusic about Körber-Stiftung’s Policy Game and report Europe home alone.

How do European policymakers view any potential transatlantic divide? Can Europe do anything now to increase their ability to act? This Körber Policy Game brought together a group of participants from France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom to game out policy options for Europe in case of a shift in US domestic and foreign policy and a breakdown of the transatlantic relationship.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

SUBSCRIBE TO #Atlanticdebrief

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Rachel Rizzo

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The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What’s in store for the transatlantic relationship in 2024? | A Debrief from Liana Fix appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine demands special international tribunal

Olena Khomenko — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 11:00:35 +0000

What did we do to stop Russian war crimes in Ukraine? This question inevitably comes to mind for anyone who visits the sites of recent Russian atrocities in places like Bucha and Irpin outside Kyiv.

The desire for justice is a fundamental expression of the human spirit, but the international community currently lacks the tools to hold Russia accountable. This is dangerous. If the world does not put an end to the sense of impunity fueling Russia’s genocidal invasion, we will inevitably witness further Russian crimes against humanity in Ukraine and beyond.

Over the past six months, international support has proved vital for the Ukrainian resistance. Weapons supplies have helped the Ukrainian military to stall the invasion and force Russia to retreat from large parts of the country, while financial aid has kept the Ukrainian economy afloat. It is now equally vital for the international community to make sure that Russians do not escape punishment for their war crimes in Ukraine and other flagrant violations of international law.

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American psychologist Philip Zimbardo has identified in his research that deindividualization and impunity are to a great extent responsible for mass crimes committed by soldiers in wars. This is why the inevitability of punishment has to be our guiding principle if we want to discourage new Russian atrocities in Ukraine and defend the basic human rights that form the foundation of the international security system.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a crime in itself that brutally violates the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity of nations. Nor did this criminality begin with the full-scale invasion of February 24, 2022. Russian aggression against Ukraine actually dates back to the February 2014 invasion of Crimea and has been gradually escalating ever since. Failure to respond decisively to Russia’s landmark breach of the international order eight years ago directly paved the way for what is now the largest European conflict since WWII.

Russia is already under investigation for war crimes in Ukraine. However, existing legal mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court in The Hague offer an agonizingly slow road to justice and are limited in their ability to hold the Russian Federation and individual Russian leaders fully accountable for their actions.

This is why it is so important to establish a special tribunal to prosecute Russia for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Aggression is recognized as the “mother of all crimes” in international law as it sets the stage for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. A special tribunal focusing on the crime of aggression would make it possible to hold significant numbers of Russians individually accountable.

Charging Russian leaders with the crime of aggression would allow a special tribunal to prosecute suspects regardless of rank and effectively bypass the issue of immunity for the highest state and military officials. If we want to see Russia’s political leadership prosecuted for atrocities in Ukraine, we need to find them guilty of the crime of aggression.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The idea of establishing a special tribunal to prosecute Russia for aggression against Ukraine was first voiced by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in March 2022. Kuleba reiterated his call for a special tribunal on September 7 following Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s latest incriminating comments on the war. “Putin has just publicly confessed to the crime of aggression against Ukraine: “We did it consciously”. I once again call on all states: back the creation of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine. The crime is in plain sight. Justice must be served,” he tweeted.

A number of international organizations have already adopted resolutions supporting the idea of a special tribunal. The list currently includes the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The Lithuanian parliament has passed a resolution backing a special tribunal. Other national parliaments are expected to follow suit in the coming months. Securing the support of more countries is a top priority.

A special tribunal would potentially be able to address the crime of aggression in a far more timely manner than the existing mechanisms for prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. There is already ample evidence to demonstrate that Russia’s political leaders are guilty of the crime of aggression based on the definition for the act of aggression adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.

The jurisdiction of a future special tribunal should cover all events since the February 2014 invasion and seizure of Crimea, as this marked the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The tribunal would have a mandate to investigate and prosecute both the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation.

A special tribunal would seek to complement rather than hamper or replace the work of the ICC in Ukraine. The ICC is primarily focused on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, but experience has demonstrated that it will be difficult and time-consuming in practice to pass guilty verdicts against senior Russians and establish their personal responsibility for specific atrocities committed in Ukraine such as the mass killings in Bucha.

The ICC also faces other potential obstacles in terms of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in relation to the situation in Ukraine. The existing rules do not allow the ICC to address Putin’s war of aggression as a crime because Russia has not ratified the Rome Statute and the relevant amendments. Meanwhile, any attempts to refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council would inevitably be vetoed by Russia.

It is only natural that some of Ukraine’s partners might be cautious about the idea of a special tribunal. This is particularly true of those Western leaders who remain under the illusion that constructive dialogue with Russia is still possible. Skeptics need to accept that Russia’s decision to launch a genocidal invasion on February 24 placed the country in direct opposition to the existing international order and the entire civilized world. It is not possible to be half-pregnant. The sooner the international community recognizes this grave reality, the better equipped we will all be to deal with it. The best way to do so is via the creation of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

Olena Khomenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the Servant of the People party.

Now, six months into the war, Russia—amid military losses in Ukraine—may be pushing its partner to talk Ukraine into a ceasefire. At least that seemed to be the motivation behind Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Lviv last month, where he met his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. Since Russia holds the key to Turkey’s own domestic and economic stability less than a year before Turkish presidential elections, there were few doubts that Vladimir Putin’s increasingly isolated regime would seize this opportunity.

Turkey’s leadership has been keen to capitalize on its previous diplomatic success with the grain deal by presenting that agreement as only the first step toward a permanent peace. Some Turkish officials even suggested that the Joint Coordination Center established in Istanbul could function as a confidence-building measure between Ukrainians and Russians. While this may be music to the ears of Turkish voters—73 percent of whom want their government to remain neutral—calls for peace with Putin’s regime evoke the same feelings in Ukrainians as calls for peace with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization would among Turks. Zelenskyy himself perhaps said it best in Lviv: “They can’t actually want peace if they’re bombing our cities and killing our people.”

This is why Turkey’s efforts to push for peace talks will be nothing but counterproductive, at least until basic preconditions are secured. For any meaningful negotiations, Russia needs to be defeated on the battlefield (and in this regard Turkish Bayraktar drones have done more for peace in Ukraine than Ankara’s shuttle diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow). Until peace is made possible, there is still plenty of space for Ankara to play a constructive role in the conflict to serve both Ukraine’s and its own interests. Here’s how:

Step up military assistance to Ukraine. Turkey’s arms supplies remain significant for Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. Turkish drones have played an important role in deterring Russian assault, and the recently delivered “Kirpi” mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAP) are crucial in maintaining control of terrain. Experts agree that supplying new batches of MRAPs, “Akinci” combat drones, and Turkish multi-launch rocket systems with heavy firepower capabilities (such as the TRG-230 Kaplan and TRG-300 Kasirga) will be of crucial assistance to the Ukrainian military. Additionally, much more could be done to train Ukrainian personnel. After all, Turkish contributions to Kyiv’s military are direct investments into Ankara’s own national and regional security, since Ukraine plays a critical role in deterring not only Russian aggression in the Black Sea but also its power projection to the Mediterranean.
Secure strict adherence to the Montreux Convention. Turkey has always paid special attention to full compliance with the 1936 convention, which guarantees free movement throughout the Turkish Straits for civilian vessels, and closed the area to Russian warships in the early days of the war to prevent further escalation. But there have been occasional reports of Russia’s violation of the Montreux provisions by using commercial vessels to supply logistics to its military operations in Syria and Ukraine. Most recently, the Turkish ambassador to Ukraine was summoned by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to answer for the alleged transportation of S-300 missile systems from Syria to Russia via the Bosphorus Strait by a Russian Defense Ministry-chartered ship. Such cases not only undermine Turkey’s image as a country respecting international law but also create dangerous loopholes that can lead to the erosion of the Montreux regime in the future. Ankara must take all necessary measures to thoroughly inspect cargo on the Russian ships passing through the Straits and put an end to any violations.
Crack down on sanctions evasion. While Turkey hasn’t joined the Western sanctions regime against Russia, it should not allow itself to turn into a hub for Russian efforts to circumvent the measures, especially in sensitive and dual-purpose goods. The US Treasury has already warned Turkey’s largest business group, TUSIAD, and officials that the country will face secondary sanctions if its concerns are grounded in reality. Having $178.6 billion in trade with the European Union, Ankara’s largest trade partner, and only $35 billion with Russia, it is not a moral obligation but simple economic expedience that demands prioritizing economic ties with the West.
Help expand Ukrainian exports. While the Black Sea Grain Initiative has helped ease the food crisis, it has not fully restored freedom of navigation—which remains a cornerstone of international law (and of Turkey’s own interests in the region). The next tactical aim should be to gradually expand the scope of the grain deal to include other Ukrainian seaports, such as Mykolayiv and Kherson, and to other Ukrainian exports, such as critical raw materials and metals. At the same time, increasing Ukrainian military capacity to put an end to Russian blockades of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov shall remain a key strategic objective for Ukraine and its allies.
Cooperate with Ukraine on nuclear safety and security. Russian nuclear blackmailing at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant demands an adequate response. Turkey can play a constructive role in boosting diplomatic efforts to stop Russia’s shelling of the plant and facilitate greater continued access for international monitors. The hands-on experience in safety and security measures will be useful for Turkish specialists once the Russian state nuclear power company Rosatom completes construction of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, Akkuyu.
Mediate on humanitarian issues. Turkey should take the lead in facilitating exchanges of Ukrainian prisoners of war and the bodies of deceased soldiers. Here, it already has experience: Ankara successfully facilitated the release to Ukraine of Crimean Tatar political prisoners Akhtem Chiygoz and Ilmi Umerov in 2017. Its diplomatic efforts may be highly sought after as the Kremlin prepares its illegitimate tribunals of captured Ukrainian troops from Mariupol.
Take part in postwar reconstruction. Following up on its participation in the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland, and the conclusion in Lviv of a memorandum of understanding on rebuilding Ukraine’s damaged or destroyed infrastructure, Turkey should seek a greater role in this process. The Ukrainian Presidential Office said it expects the Turkish government and businesses to develop “special recovery projects” and provide technical and consulting services as part of the deal. While its current financial situation may not allow Turkey to become a major donor to Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction on its own, it could pool its resources with those of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, which would benefit all sides. By helping Ukraine restore its critical infrastructure, Turkey can boost its own economy in a more transparent way by relying on construction contracts rather than shady Russian money transfers.
Help ensure regional energy security. More broadly, Turkey should step up its efforts to diversify gas supplies to domestic and European markets. For its part, Europe should strengthen its cooperation with Turkey to increase Azerbaijani gas supplies via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline and double down on diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. It should also support Turkey’s bid to reduce reliance on fossil fuels from Russia by facilitating international loans for liquefied natural gas imports and the exploration of Turkey’s own Black Sea gas reserves. The Western policy of using sanctions as “a stick” against Ankara has hardly been an efficient way to decrease Turkish dependence on Russian “carrots.”

If there is any silver lining in the war, it is in Turkey’s opportunity to take a stronger stance on Russia and showcase its strategic autonomy—not by questioning the Western resolve to defeat the aggressor, but by taking a lead in the process. Erdogan’s decisive remarks at the Second Crimea Platform Summit denouncing the Russian annexation of Crimea as “illegal and illegitimate” and advocating for the “return of Crimea to Ukraine” show Turkey’s unwavering support to the full de-occupation of Ukraine. But it must follow up with sound policy.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

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Chinese discourse power: Ambitions and reality in the digital domain

Kenton Thibaut — Wed, 24 Aug 2022 04:00:00 +0000

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Executive Summary

As China’s military and economic power has grown, so has its ambition to shape global norms to suit its priorities. China believes that the United States currently dominates the international system, and sees growing Western opposition to China as evidence that the current order is now a threat to the continued security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As such, China’s leadership has come to see its ability to reshape the international order—or, at least, to decenter US power within it—as essential to the party’s future.

China’s leaders have clearly articulated that they believe that Western countries, and especially the United States, have been able to exert global dominance because they possess what China terms “discourse power” (话语权): a type of narrative agenda-setting ability focused on reshaping global governance, values, and norms to legitimize and facilitate the expression of state power.

For the CCP, gaining discourse power translates into an ability to increase China’s geopolitical power by creating consensus around an alternative, China-led international order—one that privileges state sovereignty over civil liberties, and that subordinates human rights to state security. China has identified both the digital realm and the geographic regions of the Global South as arenas of opportunity in advancing its goals and gaining a discourse-power advantage over the United States.

China’s leadership has been transparent in outlining its goals for both gaining discourse power and implementing a strategy for doing so. Chinese government scholars believe that discourse power comprises two, mutually reinforcing components: the “power to speak,” or to articulate a coherent vision for the world order, and the “power to be heard,” or to have audiences have exposure to, and then to buy into, this message. This involves embedding cultural values within a system so that it comes to structure the relations between states—in both subjective terms (such as norms) and objective terms (such as rules and standards). To operationalize its strategies for gaining discourse power, China has embarked on a major restructuring of the party-state to ensure that the CCP Central Committee—the seat of CCP leadership, of which Xi Jinping is the head—retains direct oversight over the bodies responsible for carrying out China’s discourse-power goals.

Chinese official and academic writings also show that the CCP has come to see the digital arena as crucial in its discourse-power strategy, seeing the opportunities brought about by the Fourth Industrial Revolution as offering a chance to disrupt the hegemony of the West. As one Chinese government official wrote in July 2020, “technological changes in different periods throughout history not only bring about economic changes, but also affect changes in the global power structure […] The digital economy is prompting a reshuffle, and China has the opportunity to gain a first-mover advantage.” Beijing has made clear its intentions to command the digital world, announcing its aims to dominate advanced-technology manufacturing by 2025, to lead in international standards setting by 2035, and to become a “cyber superpower” by 2050.

As such, China has embarked on a concerted strategy to gain discourse power via the digital domain. It has done so through several mechanisms: by shaping local information ecosystems via social and digital media platforms, by promoting CCP-approved norms for digital governance and Chinese-developed international technical standards, and by offering the physical digital and Internet infrastructure on which these information ecosystems rely at an affordable cost, and with no conditions for how it is used.

China also sees the Global South as potentially more receptive to its norms and governance principles, and as an attractive market for Chinese digital-infrastructure offerings. China’s external propaganda narratives couch Beijing’s activities in the digital sphere as ultimately aimed at granting countries more power over the development and direction of their digital economies.

China has promoted the norm of “cyber sovereignty” (网络主权)—in China’s definition, the right of each country to exert total control over the Internet within its borders—in various international organizations, technical standards-setting bodies, and its commercial relations with countries interested in Chinese products and services. In its external propaganda messaging, China often targets audiences with narratives that erode the legitimacy of the liberal democratic framework and that resonate with local experience; for example, in the Global South, Chinese messaging on digital cooperation emphasizes a shared distrust of Western governments or a shared experience as “developing” (to use China’s term) countries.

In actuality, however, China’s strategy is less about a true attempt to make the digital world more inclusive, and more about supporting the Chinese government’s leadership goals. While boosting its economic growth and protecting its ability to exert political control domestically are two major goals of China’s promotion of cyber sovereignty, Beijing sees laying the necessary groundwork for gaining a discourse-power advantage over the West as another key objective. As Adam Segal puts it, “cyber sovereignty represents a pushback against the attempted universalization of [Western] norms [regarding privacy, free speech, access to information, and the role of regulation] that has become the default of the current operating system, as well as a reassertion of the priority of governments over non-state actors.”

China sees engaging in targeted messaging, and gaining support for its normative framework across various audiences, as better positioning it to gain the discourse power it sees as essential for reshaping the international environment in a way that better facilitates the expression of Chinese power. Additionally, China’s leaders fundamentally do not believe that the Chinese perspective can be “heard” unless they can make the soil fertile globally for their message to seed.

As such, China’s strategy around discourse power should not be understood as an attempt to turn the world into an authoritarian stage. China is clear in emphasizing its agnosticism with regard to the domestic political characteristics of the governments with which it engages. To this end, it is less important to China whether countries support “cyber sovereignty” because it offers them more freedom in determining their digital futures, or whether governments see support for this approach as an opportunity to clamp down on Internet freedoms. In either case, China gains discourse power by increasing buy-in for its vision of the global digital order, bringing it closer to achieving its aims of gaining a comparative advantage over the West.

Lastly, while China has advanced presence and strategy in standard-setting bodies, normative spaces, the digital information ecosystem, and the provision of physical infrastructure, the Western world’s approach has been more piecemeal and reactive. Notably, China is advancing much of this strategy through the very mechanisms the United States and its allies created to govern and shape a “free, open, secure, and interoperable” digital world. Chinese leaders have taken a bet on the West’s overconfidence in its systems and have built a relatively successful strategy of quietly shaping, repurposing, and encircling them to advance China’s discourse power. Any effort to counter this reshaping, therefore, relies on the democratic world reinvigorating its engagement in these spaces, more clearly defining mutually reinforcing industrial, commercial, and geopolitical strategies, and doubling down on creating a more geographically inclusive, multistakeholder, collaborative system.

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Why US global leadership keeps surviving partisanship

Daniel Fried — Fri, 05 Aug 2022 12:34:07 +0000

The US Senate’s overwhelming ratification on Wednesday of Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO was a vote of confidence in those countries, in the Alliance itself, and in the US role as leader of the free world—just as two authoritarian powers, Russia and China, are challenging the international system the United States has led since 1945.

Bringing the two Nordic nations into NATO will not only strengthen transatlantic security amid threats from Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, but also signal the continuing political viability—regardless of the bipartisan doldrums on the home front—of American leadership in the free world.

Time and again, that leadership has faced serious trials.

The first US bid for this global role—President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech of 1918, which offered a grand strategy rooted in universalist values to supplant European imperial thinking—failed in spectacular fashion when the Senate rejected the League of Nations. Right- and left-wing variants of isolationism kept the United States passive as Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin rose to power. When the United States was finally thrust into World War II, its late start effectively forced the country to seek an alliance with Stalin to defeat Hitler.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to reboot Wilson’s universalist vision, but it was his successor, Harry Truman, who put together the political underpinnings for modern US global leadership: a coalition of liberal internationalists and conservative anti-communists who swept away the discredited isolationists on both sides of the aisle. That coalition produced the Marshall Plan, supported what later became the European Union, created a web of international economic institutions to mitigate the cycles of capitalist speculation and collapse, and built a security architecture aimed at containing would-be continental dictators.

The first years of that new international order were not exactly smooth. Early disasters—the Soviet atomic bomb, Stalin’s consolidation of control over Eastern Europe, communist victory in China, and the Korean War—led to a backlash from the right that came to be known as McCarthyism. Losing the Vietnam War led to a backlash from the left. Then, the economic stresses of the 1970s—“stagflation” and an Arab oil embargo—left many Americans, regardless of their political leaning, demoralized about the United States’ ability to influence the world for the better.

From the right, President Ronald Reagan advanced Truman’s Cold War strategy—and more successfully, since the Soviet Union’s internal weaknesses had by then hollowed out its power. From the center-right and -left, respectively, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton advanced Roosevelt’s strategy from the 1941 Atlantic Charter to push for NATO enlargement—something even the highly partisan Clinton impeachment of 1998 did not derail. And later, President George W. Bush enjoyed Democratic support for continuing the NATO-enlargement strategy despite intense acrimony over the Iraq War.

President Donald Trump revived the tradition and some of the rhetoric of rightist isolationism (such as “America First”), including its old hostility to an alliance with Europe and to a universalist strategy more generally. Missouri Republican Sen. Josh Hawley, the sole vote against NATO accession for Finland and Sweden, made that point explicit Wednesday when he said on the Senate floor that the United States did not face major security threats from Europe and, moreover, that while some “think American foreign policy is about creating a liberal world order… they’re wrong.”

But that was just one Senator’s vote. Once again, US international leadership has persisted and prevailed. It has done so because it has mostly worked for the American people, who have witnessed decades of growing prosperity and general peace—and because when it didn’t, it still looked better than the alternatives: Soviet Communism in its time, or re-booted nationalism and spheres of influence enforced through expansionist aggression and war. Facing these challenges, working with allies looks far better than working alone.

The current bitterness of US domestic politics, including the rise of authoritarian politics, leaves little to be proud of. But on Wednesday, the bipartisan tradition of support for internationalism, alliances, and sober US leadership—all embodied by NATO—scored a win.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was the coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration, assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia during the Bush administration, and senior director at the National Security Council for the Clinton and Bush administrations. He also served as ambassador to Poland during the Clinton administration. Follow him on Twitter: @AmbDanFried.

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Schuman in the Atlantic: The Gamble of Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan

James Hildebrand — Wed, 03 Aug 2022 16:49:00 +0000

Original Source

On August 3, 2022, Global China Hub senior fellow Michael Schuman published an article in The Atlantic, “The Gamble of Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan.”

“Taipei is celebrating; Beijing is seething. This may prove a consequential moment in a looming confrontation between China and the U.S. over not just the island’s future but the world’s.”

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It’s time to block Taliban leaders’ trips abroad

Wed, 03 Aug 2022 14:17:26 +0000

Since coming to power last year, the Taliban has increasingly reverted to form on almost every level. The killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a Kabul safe house on July 31 only underscores the group’s continued close ties with the Taliban, particularly the Haqqani network. Taliban leaders are also steadily reimposing the world’s most extreme restrictions by far on women and girls, returning to their old practices of “disappearing” women by closing off their education, restricting their travel, dictating their dress, and limiting their movement.

The juxtaposition of the Taliban’s evident and continuing support for international terrorism and the violation of the most fundamental rights of women and others justifies a next step in demonstrating global rejection of what they stand for: The United Nations (UN) travel-ban waiver, which has allowed Taliban leaders to leave Afghanistan, should be rescinded when it comes up for review by the UN Security Council in mid-August.

While declarations of outrage over human-rights violations and lack of cooperation on terrorism may feel good, all of us during our service in Afghanistan have learned that statements unsupported by actions are generally ignored. Hence, it is imperative that the United States and its partners link actions to words.

Taliban leaders are encased in their own beliefs, focused inward. They have made it clear that they have no intention of changing their basic orientations on issues of core interest to the United States and most others in the international community. While there do seem to be different views within Taliban ranks on the issue of girls’ education, the hardliners are able to bolster their arguments on reactionary ideology by arguing that the international community can be ignored because it doesn’t act with impact.

In fact, since the West did not react in a meaningful way to the closure of girls’ schools, continues to provide humanitarian aid (as it should), and is negotiating to reopen an Afghan central bank, many Taliban leaders may feel that the West is moving toward greater acceptance on the Taliban’s terms despite its refusal to respect women’s rights or broaden representation in its government, and its continuing support for terrorist groups.

Clearly, taking strong, meaningful action against these abuses is not easy. Having pulled out of Afghanistan, the United States has given up most of the tools of pressure, leaving it with limited influence. On moral grounds, the United States does not wish to see a greater humanitarian disaster, so it needs to continue relief measures. The United States cannot starve the Afghan people to pressure the Taliban.

Equally, there is a strong argument to be made for maintaining engagement with the Taliban—for example, to continue helping citizens who worked with the United States to leave the country. If possible, the United States needs to find ways to address the disastrous economic situation that the World Bank and others highlight, without legitimizing or strengthening the Taliban. The United States needs to send clear and direct warnings against any tolerance and support for terrorist groups. In sum, the United States needs to communicate with the Taliban because that is the basic element of diplomacy, not only now but in the future if the Taliban begins to show more flexibility on the many issues of concern to the United States and the international community.

Yet notwithstanding the need to support and protect the Afghan people through continued engagement, the United States still must find actions that make its words meaningful.

One of the few available actions is to end the waiver of the UN travel ban. The Security Council originally waived the ban in 2019 to allow senior Taliban representatives to travel for peace negotiations. But the Taliban now takes advantage of it to allow its leaders to take business-class jaunts to multiple foreign capitals and conferences in efforts to bolster their perceived legitimacy.

When the Security Council renewed the waiver two months ago, it excluded two Taliban education officials who are now subject to the ban once again. While these exclusions were supposed to be a symbolic reaction to the closing of high schools to girls, the symbolism was pathetic: The two officials were among the most junior of Taliban officials and were known to be among those most sympathetic to opening girls’ schools. This minor wrist slap failed to convey any sense of seriousness from the United States or the international community.

The extension of the travel ban waiver comes up for renewal in the Security Council on August 20. The United States should lead in objecting to the extension, thereby reinstating the ban. Admittedly, closing off travel by itself is unlikely to cause the Taliban to make major changes; but it would begin to shift the sense that the United States and its partners on the Security Council are not serious enough. It would convey that the international community is losing patience.

Reinforcement with other actions would be useful, if such can be found, especially as the Taliban’s haven for al-Qaeda has now been exposed. For the moment, reimposing the travel ban is one of the very few actions available.

Some will argue that reapplying the ban will cut off engagement, but this need not be so. First, it only applies to a dozen or so senior Taliban officials. Other officials could still engage internationally. Online engagement is also still available, as is the option to continue talks for international bodies in Kabul, such as the UN mission for Afghanistan. Also, the travel ban has a provision for requesting specific waivers. Further, a new ban could be designed with an exception for travel to Doha, Qatar, where most of the engagement takes place. And if it is in Washington’s interest, US diplomats traveling to Afghanistan could still pursue engagement with the Taliban.

Another argument against reimposing the ban is that some regional states will not respect it. The Russians, for one, may well ignore it. So what? The Taliban leadership will still be dealing with the embarrassment of not being able to show up in European and major Asian capitals, while states that violate the ban can also be embarrassed by criticism. Allowing the possibility of incomplete success to cripple US decision-making would be a mistake. If the United States can only act when certain of success, it will act very little.

There are many issues worth considering when figuring out how to approach the Taliban: terrorism, women and girls, Special Immigrant Visas, and the economy. Yet while there are many steps to consider, if the United States doesn’t take this one, there may not be a next step with impact.

We cannot escape the hard truth that the United States’ poorly devised agreement with the Taliban and ill-judged decision to unilaterally leave Afghanistan created this situation. Now, the United States must show that its multilateral leadership still matters and that it will be committed to the long, hard slog to create a better reality in Afghanistan.

The bottom line remains: If the United States cannot find any actions to support its words, then its words are hollow. The women of Afghanistan will remain unsupported, and the terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan will remain—no matter what Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other senior US and partner nation officials say.

Reimposing the travel ban is one of the few actions the United States can take to show that it’s serious. It should use this opportunity.

Ambassador James Cunningham was US ambassador and deputy representative to the United Nations (1999-2004), US ambassador to Israel (2008-11), and US deputy ambassador and ambassador to Afghanistan (2011-2014). He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Ambassador Ryan Crocker was the US ambassador to Afghanistan 2011-12. He was also ambassador to Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait, and Lebanon.

Ambassador Hugo Llorens was US assistant chief of mission in Afghanistan (2012-2013) and special charge d’affairs (2016-2017), as well as ambassador to Honduras.

Ambassador P. Michael McKinley was US deputy ambassador and ambassador to Afghanistan (2013-2016), as well as ambassador to Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. He is a nonresident senior adviser at CSIS.

Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann was US ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-2007) as well as ambassador to Algeria and Bahrain. He is president of the American Academy of Diplomacy.

Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne was US deputy ambassador to Afghanistan and coordinating director for development (2009-2011), as well as ambassador to Mexico and Argentina. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a diplomat in residence at American University’s School of International Service, and co-chair of the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute board.

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Former US Defense Secretary Esper’s five-point plan for Taiwan to deter China

Katherine Walla — Thu, 28 Jul 2022 18:00:42 +0000

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A conversation about Taiwan with the 27th US Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – Former US Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper shared his insights following the four-day Atlantic Council transatlantic delegation trip to Taiwan.

Indo-Pacific Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society Security & Defense

As China intensifies its aggressive messaging around Taiwan, the island must “make the first move” in shoring up its defenses and protecting its national security, said former US Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper at an exclusive Atlantic Council Front Page event on Tuesday.

He suggested five ways Taiwan can become “the porcupine” that can deter China: increase the defense budget, adopt an asymmetric-warfare strategy; lengthen (up to one year) its conscription and toughen up training; revitalize reserve mobilization and build resilient infrastructure and telecommunications; and stockpile energy supplies, food, and weapons. Doing so would also give the West “more confidence [and] more inspiration” in standing behind Taiwan.

Speaking with Lingling Wei, chief China correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, Esper recalled describing this plan to Taiwanese leaders as part of an Atlantic Council delegation in Taipei last week, organized in partnership with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office.

“It’s important to go over there… to get a feel for what is happening in Taiwan diplomatically, security-wise, and economically,” Esper said. After China delivered a warning to the United States this week about House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s possible visit to Taiwan, Esper cautioned US officials to avoid succumbing to Beijing’s threats. “If we allow Beijing to start dictating who can or cannot travel [to Taiwan], then where does that end?” he asked.

Here are more highlights from the event:

China policy: “One” is done

Citing Biden’s repeated pledges that the United States would militarily defend Taiwan, Esper said the president is “spot on the mark.” With China attempting to change the status quo by increasing incursions and claiming the Taiwan Strait, Esper argued that “less strategic ambiguity is a good thing.” At the very least, he said, US officials are trying to prevent war: “The way to do that is to signal both our resolve and our willingness to act in defense” of Taiwan.

Arguing that the One China policy is insufficient, Esper has called for a national dialogue between the White House and Congress to design a new China policy. He said it needs to be credible, durable, and principled “because it has to be able to bear the weight of some tough decisions” in the coming years.

One of the “easy” things the United States can do right now, Esper noted, is to pursue a free-trade agreement with Taiwan—to be completed by the end of next year—and encourage other Western economies to do the same and overcome their fear “of the reaction out of Beijing.”

Esper also argued that excluding Taiwan from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework was a mistake, but a free-trade agreement with the island could be a way to acknowledge Taiwan’s important economic role. He asked: “Why shouldn’t we extend the privileges of free trade… to 23 million people in Taiwan who provide strategic resources for us” like semiconductors?

United front

Former Italian Ambassador to NATO Stefano Stefanini also joined the visit to Taipei, and Esper said his “European view on the situation was particularly important,” since European attitudes toward China have changed “quite dramatically” following China’s support for Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Esper said he was proud to see allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea step up “diplomatically and economically” against Russia, and explained that because alliances are reciprocal, “European allies should be expected to stand firm if there’s a conflict in Asia.”

In standing up for Ukraine, Esper said democratic countries are sending “all the right signals that we’re going to stand behind a fellow democracy” like Taiwan. He hopes that as the world watches Western support and a powerful Ukrainian “fighting spirit” continuing to blunt Russia’s invasion, Xi will stand down. “We want Xi Jinping to wake up every day and say, ‘You know, it’s not worth it, costs are too high, [so] I’m not going to make a move on Taiwan,’” Esper explained.

Defense and diplomacy

Esper predicted that Xi might snag a third term as China’s president at the Twentieth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) later this year, or possibly instead become chairman of the CCP. In the case of a leadership reshuffle, however, he warned that the Chinese leader may feel “more free” to pursue Taiwan or lead a “more aggressive foreign policy.”

During his visit to Taipei, Esper sought to communicate to officials that Taiwan needs to have a greater sense of urgency to ensure democracy can survive there. Despite Taiwan’s military capability, which includes arms bought from the United States and other forms of assistance, Esper doesn’t think “it’s sufficient to really deter [for the] long haul.”

As for whether a nonmilitary option exists for China and Taiwan, Esper cautioned that the way China broke promises with Hong Kong over the past twenty-five years leads to skepticism about whether Taiwan can “trust Beijing to live up to their word.” And back then, “the West didn’t do enough to stand up to China,” Esper said. In the case of Taiwan, “we need to stand up for our values and what we believe in.”

Katherine Walla is an assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Schuman in the Atlantic: How China Wants to Replace the U.S. Order

swong — Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:45:37 +0000

Original Source

On July 13, 2022, Global China Hub senior fellow Michael Schuman published an article in the Atlantic, “How China Wants to Replace the U.S. Order”.

“What began as a trade war over Beijing’s discriminatory business practices and a tech war to dominate the industries of the future is now an ideas war—a battle to establish the norms that govern global affairs. The U.S. and China are locked in a struggle to define how countries interact, the legitimacy of different forms of governments, the rules of commerce, and the meaning of human rights,” Schuman writes.

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The rise of complex ‘intermediate zones’: the Ukraine War and China’s opportunity and dilemma in the Middle East

She Gangzheng — Tue, 12 Jul 2022 07:00:00 +0000

The past few months have witnessed a new Middle East full of complexity and contradiction. On the one hand, some of the tensions that have gripped the region over the past decade now show signs of abating, with various adversaries engaging in dialogue and rapprochement. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made a historic visit to the United Arab Emirates in March, and Saudi Arabia is resetting its relations with Turkey while holding rounds of talks with Iran on the restoration of ties. On the other hand, in addition to the COVID-19 pandemic that is still raging across the region, the lives of people in Middle Eastern countries are continuing to be afflicted by various internal and external crises. The average economic growth rate in the Middle East in 2021 was 4.1 percent, which was lower than the global average. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern leaders are closely watching the United States’ strategic rivalry with China and Russia, worrying the region would remain vulnerable to the spillover effects of extra-regional great-power politics.

Starting with the Trump administration, Washington has unequivocally viewed Beijing as its most serious challenger and sought to mobilize resources from around the world to counter China. Despite the differences in wording and approach, US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., has largely retained his predecessor’s framework of great-power competition. However, the retrenchment of the United States in the Greater Middle East, in particular the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, gave the world a clear signal that there is only a small chance that the United States will fully intervene in crises outside the Indo-Pacific. As a result, Moscow perceived that this could be the right time to hit Kyiv hard, enlarging its buffer zone with the West, and pushing back NATO’s eastward expansion to a certain extent.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced Washington to refocus most of its recent attention on Eastern Europe. Top US officials claim that the West has forged an unprecedentedly strong alliance against Russian President Vladimir Putin, and that Moscow now faces a global campaign of sanctions and condemnation. In reality, however, the core of such a united front is still limited to NATO members and a small number of traditional US allies in the West and South Pacific. Many other countries, including most Middle Eastern ones, obviously have little enthusiasm for participating in the firm and vigilant containment of Russia at their own cost. The refusal of Gulf leaders to take calls from the White House amid the Ukraine conflict is just another example of the fading unipolar moment in the world in general and in the Middle East in particular.

The major reason for the decrease in US authority over Middle Eastern countries is not the decline of absolute power but the lack of political commitment and predictability. A country’s reputation for competence and credibility, as argued by Stephen Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard University, could be its “critical force multiplier,” and the global influence of a hegemonic power inevitably erodes when others doubt its wisdom and ability to act persistently and effectively. While the Democrats in Washington detest former US President Donald J. Trump’s erratic narrative pendulum, which swung between bellicosity and disengagement regarding the Middle East, for now Biden is also caught between reviving the Iran nuclear deal and reassuring regional allies. Therefore, attempts by the United States to induce Middle Eastern countries to contribute comprehensively and directly to the plan of “decoupling” from China are likely to come to naught. Against the background of regional countries betting on multiple sides among major powers, China, Russia, and some European countries all have significantly expanded their strategic space in the Middle East.

Beijing’s involvement in the Middle East is mainly concentrated in infrastructure and trade, but in recent years it has also gradually extended to the domains of security and social governance. In 2021, China continued to be the largest trading partner of Middle Eastern countries, with the trade volume close to $400 billion. Nineteen countries in the region have had their development plans, including Vision 2030 of a couple of Arab states and Turkey’s Middle Corridor, strategically synergized with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

In the energy sector, the share of Middle Eastern oil and gas in the Asian market, including in China, has largely expanded in the last decade, while US and European companies have withdrawn a large part of their investment from the Middle Eastern energy industry for years before the Ukraine war. In addition, in the fields of clean energy, such as solar and wind, which is a growing concern for oil dependent Middle Eastern states, China is also in a leading position as it has the largest renewable energy equipment production capacity in the world. In the realm of arms trading, Chinese-made military drones all but dominate the Middle Eastern market, with the United States unwilling to supply such advanced armaments to its Arab allies.

It should be pointed out, however, that China remains hesitant to march on the Middle East in an all-round way due to a number of difficulties and dilemmas. The Middle East is still arguably the most volatile region in the world, and will continue to be beset by sectarian violence, ethno-religious conflict, and political uncertainty for the foreseeable future. Chinese officials, such as Foreign Minister Wang Yi, openly and repeatedly describe the region as “the lowland of global security,” and China has good reason to doubt that its investment and cooperative projects in the region could survive and thrive as the world economic recovery faces even more severe challenges. In addition, policy makers in Beijing also face a seemingly insoluble dilemma when formulating their Middle East policy. A rapid increase of China’s footprint in the Middle East could divert some of the pressure from the United States in East Asia, but such a move would require substantial investment in political, economic, and military resources and would likely lead to unwelcome regional entanglements.

In the early days of the Cold War, Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong proposed the concept of “intermediate zone” to depict the vast area between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which China would have great potential on its way back to the world’s center stage. In the current digital age that follows a period of US unipolarity, intermediate zones have not just returned but become much more complex as the number of issues affecting transnational relations drastically increase. In the United States’ asymmetric competition with China, Russia, and Iran, many countries in different regions of the world may cooperate with Washington on specific targets or issues, but more often they would largely remain neutral or adopt a strategy of hedging.

It is necessary and ideal, for example, for the Arabs and the Israelis to seek US support to cope with the threat from Iran, but amid the confrontation between Washington on one end and Beijing or Moscow on the other, they would maintain strategic dialogue with both sides to avoid damaging actual interests. In this sense, the rise of complex intermediate zones is hard to reverse and, in fact, makes the strategic balance between the United States and its global rivals more stable. This is why Beijing understands that it is unwise to make replacing the United States the fundamental goal of its Middle East policy, but claims to support Middle Eastern countries resolve regional security issues “through unity and cooperation” and the people of the Middle East “independently explore their own development paths.”

The war in Ukraine has provided an opportunity to observe the rise of complex intermediate zones, and subsequent developments on the battlefield will continue to influence the course of global affairs. As Russia failed to quickly topple the Ukrainian government, Washington adjusted its policy, shifting from preventing the conflict to prolonging it. This seems like a “smart” move to continuously weaken the Russian army without losing a single US soldier, but it is not beneficial for Washington’s role as world leader. The longer the war drags on, the worse the results will be for many developing countries, as food crises, economic difficulties, and political turmoil might arise.

Nevertheless, the interests of the Global South are not a priority in Washington right now. The United States is focused on how to bleed Russia, and preferably smear or pressure China as well in the process. On the issue of pursuing stability and development in the Middle East, countries including China, the United States, and also many European ones share common interests and could have cooperated accordingly to solve practical problems in the lives of local people, such as contributing to connectivity through infrastructure construction, providing the energy transition with funds and technology, and protecting the natural environment. But under the current circumstances, every extra-regional major power is individually exploring new ways of dealing with the Middle East. While Washington debates how to strike a balance between Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific, China is striving to navigate and gain more influence in many other parts of the world, including the Middle East, in particular by learning how to provide regional public goods without getting into unnecessary trouble.

She Gangzheng is an associate professor of international relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

In-Depth Research & Reports

Jul 12, 2022

Evolving MENA power balances: What is next for US engagement in the region?

By Karim Mezran, Valeria Talbot, Jonathan Panikoff, Sanam Vakil, Maha Yahya, Mark N. Katz, Gangzheng She, and Julien Barnes-Dacey

US President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s upcoming visit to the Middle East provides an opportunity to assess what role the United States will play in the Middle East and North Africa in the future. With the war in Ukraine further diverting US attention from the region, the big question is whether the region is entering a ‘post-US’ era.

Energy & Environment Middle East

The post The rise of complex ‘intermediate zones’: the Ukraine War and China’s opportunity and dilemma in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ashford in The National Interest: Ukraine and the return of the multipolar world

Atlantic Council — Mon, 04 Jul 2022 15:40:00 +0000

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 4, The National Interest published an article by Emma Ashford about how the war in Ukraine demonstrates the persistence of spheres of influence and signals an ongoing shift to a multipolar world.

“A sphere of influence is not a normative concept, nor something a state cedes to another out of courtesy or pity. It is instead a simple fact: the place where one great power is unwilling or unable to commit the necessary resources to force another state to submit. In that regard, Ukraine is itself not a repudiation of the idea of spheres of influence, but rather a clear example of how they work in practice,” Ashford wrote.

“Ukraine is both a clear indicator of the limits of America’s global sphere of influence in the post-Cold War period, and a demonstration of the extent to which Russia is able to defend what it sees as its own regional sphere. The war in Ukraine thus does not mark a continuation of the unipolar moment, but instead, a dividing line between the period when the United States saw the whole world as its sphere of influence, and a new, more multipolar world in which U.S. power is constrained and limited.”

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Emma Ashford

Conflict Economic Sanctions

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Special dispatch from Madrid: At NATO’s historic summit, good scores points on evil, but it’s not enough to stop Putin’s Ukraine war

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 02 Jul 2022 18:45:00 +0000

This is a story of evil versus good.

It’s the story of a despot’s ruthless attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine, versus the historic, but nonetheless insufficient, rallying of democratic states to save the country.

At midday on Monday, in the central Ukrainian industrial city of Kremenchuk, sitting serenely astride the Dnipro River, about a thousand men, women, and children wandered the Amstor shopping mall, trying to enjoy some normalcy amidst a brutal war.

Some 185 miles away and a few thousand feet overhead, Russian bombers flying over Russia’s Kursk region, likely Tupolev Tu-22M3s, released at least two Kh-22 medium-range, two-thousand-pound nuclear-capable cruise missiles, developed in the 1960s to destroy aircraft carriers. An air raid siren wailed, and Ukrainians, well-practiced in the fifth month of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, scrambled for safety.

Around the same time at Schloss Elmau in Germany’s Bavarian Alps, the Group of Seven (G7) leaders, representing the world’s largest democracies, huddled around conference tables in an effort to add to their far-reaching sanctions on Putin and Russia. They debated options to choke the finances that fuel Putin’s war, including putting a price cap on oil sales to Russia that could reduce the one billion dollars the world pays Russia every day for energy.

As they struggled to make progress, one of the missiles screamed down on the shopping mall. A CCTV video captured a bucolic day, with wispy clouds adorning the otherwise blue sky, and then the massive fireball of the blast and the curling up of a gigantic black smoke plume. Shattered glass and debris flew past the camera.

A day later, as Ukrainian officials tallied the death toll—at least twenty dead and fifty-nine wounded in a war where Putin’s military has already killed tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians—world leaders gathered for the NATO summit that had brought me to Madrid. They were abuzz about the timing of Putin’s shopping mall strike, knowing that it was aimed as much at them as Ukraine.

“Talk as much as you want,” Putin seemed to be saying to them. “Sign whatever documents you like. I’ll outlast you and your spoiled societies with my war of attrition, restoring imperial Russia and sealing my place in history even as your decadent West continues its decay.”

Putin could be confident that despite historic agreements in Madrid this week, and even though arms deliveries from the United States and its partners are increasing in numbers and quality, no one was yet willing to provide the heavier, longer-range, precision weaponry that could have prevented the shopping mall strike and so many others, and might allow an urgently needed counteroffensive.

Even so, NATO reached a level of unity unseen in more than thirty years.

At the end of a marathon, hours-long negotiating session involving NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, and Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, the sides reached an agreement that cleared the way for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and end, in Sweden’s case, two centuries of neutrality.

The following day NATO leaders would sign off on a new Strategic Concept, highlighting Russia as their most present danger but including China for the first time as a matter of common concern. The leaders of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand attended a NATO summit for the first time as partners and guests.hat the Alliance understood it faced a global and interrelated challenge.

NATO’s China language signaled that the Alliance understood it faced a global and interrelated challenge. Considering that thirty countries needed to sign off on the text, many of them still with China as their number one trading partner, it’s a powerful read.

“The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values,” it said. Later it continued, “The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic minerals and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains.”

There was a lot of celebratory talk among allies about their increased unity and deepened purpose, including US President Joe Biden’s declaration that NATO was sending an “unmistakable message” to Putin.

The closer you live to Russia as an EU citizen, the more you argue, as I did in this space on June 5, that Putin doesn’t need the diplomatic off-ramp that Macron is offering but rather the dead-end that can only be brought by tougher sanctions and a more effective Ukrainian counter-offensive backed by longer-range weapons.

Among other agreements, NATO acted to shore up its eastern and southern flanks, and the US Army will send a corps headquarters to Poland and more troops to the Baltics and Romania. NATO pledged to increase its high-readiness forces from forty thousand to three hundred thousand, even as Sweden and Finland brought it significant new military weight.

Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares heralded the summit as potentially as significant as Yalta (heaven help us) or the fall of the Berlin Wall.

At a NATO Public Forum that the Atlantic Council co-hosted on the margins of the summit, I asked French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna how she would rank the historic moment. “History will tell,” she said.

No one should miss Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s message to G7 leaders this week that they must provide him the means for a counteroffensive to push back Russian troops before winter sets in and Ukraine’s allies lose interest in the face of growing economic headwinds.

“Russia is waging two wars right now,” writes Greg Ip in the Wall Street Journal. “A hot war with Ukraine whose costs are measured in death and destruction, and a cold war with the West whose costs are measured in economic hardship and inflation.”

Putin might fold over time in the face of a more determined West and better-armed Ukraine, writes Ip, but he’s wagering that he can “inflict a high enough short-term cost on Western consumers that political support for Ukraine will crumble.”

I leave Madrid encouraged by an increased consensus among European and Asian democracies that a Ukrainian defeat would be disastrous for Europe and the world order as other despots calculate their own opportunities.

Yet I also come away discouraged that for all this week’s progress, the military support and sanctions still aren’t equal to the historic stakes.

In this contest between a determined despot and rallying democracies, the forces for good had an excellent week. If they don’t build upon it, and fast, it won’t be enough.

This article originally appeared on CNB C.com. Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points will return in September after a summer pause. Special editions might appear, as warranted by events.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 How Far Do Putin’s Imperial Ambitions Go?
NATO

This is big. For anyone with even a passing interest in transatlantic security and foreign policy, this year’s NATO Strategic Concept is a must-read. Understanding the interrelated challenge to the international order, all thirty allies signed on to this document, which identifies not only Russia, but also China, as potential threats.

“Authoritarian actors,” the document writes, “challenge our interests, values and democratic way of life. They are investing in sophisticated conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities, with little transparency or regard for international norms and commitments. Strategic competitors test our resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness and digitalisation of our nations. They interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance.” Read more →

#2 Ships going dark: Russia’s grain smuggling in the Black Sea
Chris Cook, Polina Ivanova, and Laura Pitel | FINANCIAL TIMES

Among the many war crimes Putin is alleged to have committed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the large-scale theft of Ukrainian grain. This brilliantly reported Financial Times investigation sheds light on how that grain is smuggled.

While the Financial Times cautions that “There is no evidence that the grain being shipped out of Crimea on the Fedor or other ships analysed by the FT has been stolen from parts of Ukraine now occupied by Russia,” the newspaper reports that “…there is a pattern of activity that indicates a rise in smuggling from Crimea. Although there is little historical data about volumes of exports through the port, Ukrainian activists who monitor the port say they have seen a rise in grain traffic at Sevastopol in May and into June compared with previous years.” Read more →

#3 We Are Now In a Global Cold War
Michael Hirsch | FOREIGN POLICY

One of the clearest signs of the new geopolitical fault lines was the inclusion of the United States’ Asian and Pacific allies—including Japan, South Korea, and Australia—at this year’s NATO summit. As Michael Hirsh writes, this is a sign of an incipient new cold war which encompasses China and Russia as adversaries.

“But plainly,” Hirsh writes, “the major Western powers now believe that—from Mariupol, Ukraine, on the Black Sea to Taipei, Taiwan, on the Taiwan Strait and possibly all the way to Honiara, Solomon Islands, in the South Pacific—a new sort of iron curtain is descending around the world. In front of that line on the European continent lie the newly invigorated Western European and NATO countries as well as the former Soviet bloc states that have since joined NATO or want to, including the Baltic countries and now Ukraine. Read more →

#4 Gas Prices Test American Appetite For New Cold War with Russia
Greg Ip | WALL STREET JOURNAL

This smart column from the Wall Street Journal’s Greg Ip nails how Russia is using an energy weapon in its cold war with the West, and how Biden must course correct on energy.

“Russian President Vladimir Putin knows that in this cold war, time is not on his side,” Ip writes. “Even with China in his corner, the U.S. and its allies have an overwhelming advantage in wealth, knowledge, technology and finance. Mr. Putin’s only path to victory is to inflict a high enough short-term cost on Western consumers that political support for Ukraine will crumble.”

Therefore, Ip concludes, “the challenge for Mr. Biden and other Western leaders is to navigate the next six months while Mr. Putin exploits the leverage he now has.” Read more →

#5 Last Best Hope
Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this week’s must-read, Ivo Daalder and James M. Lindsay make a powerful argument that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided the United States and its allies a rare second chance to rebuild the international order and correct their previous mistakes.

“Even as the West works to manage these differences,” they write, “it should turn its newfound unity into a broader effort to save the rules-based order. The first step should be to create a new group, the G-12, that would bring together the United States and its leading allies in Asia, Europe, and North America. Every member of this group has a vital interest in preserving the order, and none of them can do it on their own. But formalized cooperation alone will not be enough. The United States and its allies will need to take the second step of learning from the mistakes they had made over the last three decades.”

“The silver lining in the horror of the aggression against Ukraine,” they add, “is that it gives the United States and its Western allies a chance to do what they failed to accomplish after the end of the Cold War: reinvigorate international institutions and deepen cooperation on transnational threats. But this moment will not last forever. The West needs to resist the temptation to regard the aggression against Ukraine as an aberration rather than a trend. To that end, the United States should join with the 11 other prospective members of the G-12 to revitalize the rules-based order. Western democracies cannot afford to squander this second chance to get things right.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Sep 16, 2022

The lesson Queen Elizabeth II leaves for King Charles III

By Andrew R. Marshall

The United Kingdom is a country where change has been the rule. And what’s most notable about the monarchy is, in fact, its ability to adapt to that change.

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

Issue Brief Sep 15, 2022

Democratic institutional strength before and beyond elections: The case of Brazil

By Valentina Sader

Americas Brazil

Markup Sep 15, 2022

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address.

By Atlantic Council experts

Ursula von der Leyen’s speech focused on energy and strategic decoupling of supply chains amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, but didn’t delve into common defense.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

The post Special dispatch from Madrid: At NATO’s historic summit, good scores points on evil, but it’s not enough to stop Putin’s Ukraine war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Varshney in The Indian Express: Backsliding in America

Atlantic Council — Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:11:00 +0000

The post Varshney in The Indian Express: Backsliding in America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Manning in Global Asia: Ukraine and US Asia-Pacific policy

Atlantic Council — Mon, 27 Jun 2022 13:38:00 +0000

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

In the June 2022 issue of Global Asia, Robert Manning authored an article about how the war in Ukraine affects US Asia-Pacific policy.

“Few have yet to fathom just how deep in uncharted waters we are — and why it is a hinge of history, like the Sept. 11 attacks, reshaping world affairs,” Manning predicted. “Its short-term impact is already being felt, if more politically in the West than in Asia, while economically, it is being felt universally — in the form of inflation, energy and food price hikes and shortages and new trends set in motion that are likely to have long-term after-effects, from deglobalization and nuclear policies to new global alignments. How will the fallout impact US policy toward the Asia-Pacific?”

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Emma Ashford

Conflict Economic Sanctions

The post Manning in Global Asia: Ukraine and US Asia-Pacific policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Europe’s ‘rewiring’ is crucial in the face of grinding inflation and Putin’s war

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 26 Jun 2022 21:07:40 +0000

Europe has been rewiring itself in impressive ways in the four months since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine.

The coming weeks will show whether that work of building a more resolute European Union for a future of new geopolitical challenges will continue—or, instead, if the rewiring will short-circuit before the job is done in the face of rising economic headwinds and Putin’s grinding war of attrition.

Thus far, the European Union (EU) has remained unified with the United States and others behind an unprecedented set of sanctions on Russia. Further, it has begun to strengthen its hard power through increased defense spending, and it has moved swiftly to reduce its shameful energy dependence on Moscow. Most recently the Group of Seven (G7) appears poised to announce an import ban on Russian gold.

In ways Putin never envisioned when he hatched his war, the EU has committed itself to ensuring Ukraine’s future as a democratic, independent, and European country through billions of euros of economic support, unprecedented arms deliveries, and now an offer of membership candidacy to Ukraine and Moldova.

As NATO prepares to open its summit in Madrid this week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov voiced Moscow’s growing concern about EU unity of purpose alongside the alliance. He said the EU and NATO were building a coalition to engage in a war with Moscow that he compared to “Hitler during World War II.” As laughable as Lavrov sounds to reasonable ears—this era’s tyrannical dictator sits in Moscow and not Berlin—it underscores Putin’s worries about Western common cause and his warped view of history.

Yet as impressive as the EU rewiring project has been thus far, it’s likely to short-circuit in the months ahead unless the political conviction grows even stronger around this historic moment. That will demand faster implementation of new defense and energy policies—and greater support for Ukraine.

As Putin gains ground in Ukraine, with new strikes on Kyiv today almost certainly timed to coincide with the G7 meeting in Germany, it will take all the political will European leaders can muster. They will face greater public pressures to end the war with benchmark gas prices climbing an additional 15 percent in the last week amidst the double shocks of Russian cuts and a fire at Freeport LNG in Texas, with inflation reaching 8.1 percent in the euro area in May, and with economic recession dangers rising rapidly, given the threat of Russian gas cutoffs this winter.

On another front, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde summoned her colleagues to an emergency session last week in Frankfurt that was designed to generate solidarity around steps to preempt any danger of a new Eurozone debt crisis reaching Italy from the dual shocks of rising inflation and slowing growth.

Putin is counting on the usual fatigue and political divisions that set in among Western democracies when they must weigh growing domestic concerns against international dangers. He’s seen enough to encourage him, including newly re-elected Emmanuel Macron’s failure to win a majority in the National Assembly, the first time in thirty years that’s been denied the French president.

And for all the impressive arms shipments and economic support the Biden administration has delivered Ukraine, the weaponry firing range of some fifty miles remains insufficient to stop the Russian carpet-bombing, for fear of expanding the war.

Beyond that, Putin knows US midterm elections are likely to weaken Biden further amid domestic disputes over the Supreme Court’s overturning of the Roe v. Wade abortion protections and the country’s continuing disputes over gun laws. Even as Putin’s war grows uglier, Americans are seeing less of it on their TV screens.

Meanwhile, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is also looking weaker than in his first days in office, as he hosts the G7 leaders in the Bavarian Alps this weekend.

Scholtz faced such a storm of criticism that he’s been dragging his feet on heavy weapons deliveries to Ukraine that his Defense Ministry was compelled to publish a full list of completed and planned deliveries, including seven self-propelled Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers that at long last have arrived in Ukraine.

It’s worth remembering that Europe’s greatest moments of forward progress typically come at times of crisis, as has been the case again following Putin’s war in Ukraine. It’s at such times that member states better manage their divisions and work more effectively around the EU’s mind-bending bureaucracy.

The problem is that the current European divide that looks hardest to fix is a fundamental disagreement over how important a Ukrainian victory is and what it would take to bring it about.

Russia’s closest neighbors know that a bad peace in which Ukraine gives up new territory will only provide a respite before Putin resumes his imperial efforts to take all of Ukraine and ultimately other former Soviet areas.

In Western Europe, the desire is greater for a peace that would end the war now, even if the outcome leaves Putin in power and, as Macron has said, avoids humiliating him.

“Despite the celebratory rhetoric in Brussels about the European Union’s surprisingly robust response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine…” writes Eoin Drea this week in Foreign Policy, “the war has not united the bloc in any unprecedented or transformative way. In fact, it’s having exactly the opposite effect: Beneath the soaring vista of Ukraine as a catalyst for a more muscular and geopolitically effective EU like deep divisions, shifting allegiances, and a much more complex reality.”

Counterbalancing that gloom, Macron, Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis visited Kyiv on June 16 to hammer home their support for Ukrainian security and European ambitions.

Shortly after they returned, the European Parliament voted with 529 votes to 45 against and 14 abstentions to adopt a resolution calling on the heads of state or government to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, which they have now done.

That symbolism must now be complemented by even greater substance. The rewiring of the EU has only just begun to strengthen its defenses, diversify its energy sources, tighten its transatlantic links, and ensure Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign, free European state.

To stay the course, European leaders and citizens must understand what they are doing isn’t just for Ukraine but even more for themselves. The lessons from two devastating World Wars and a Cold War are that staying unified is a prerequisite for victory and that appeasing despots is always self-defeating.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 How Far Do Putin’s Imperial Ambitions Go?
Yaroslav Trofimov | WALL STREET JOURNAL

In this chilling analysis, Yaroslav Trofimov lays out in frightening detail just how far Putin’s imperial ambitions might take him.

Trofimov opens with a bizarre and telling scene, in which Putin, long before his Ukraine invasion, makes a spectacle out of contradicting a nine-year-old on the question of where Russia’s borders end.

“’At the Bering Strait with the United States,’ the nine-year-old boy ventured hesitantly. Putin, who chairs the board of the Russian Geographic Society, contradicted the boy to triumphant applause ‘The borders of Russia,’ he pronounced, ‘never end.'”

“Earlier this month,” writes Trofimov, “Putin said that he views Ukraine as just the first step, with many other territories potential targets.” Just this month in St. Petersburg, while honoring the 350th anniversary of Peter the Great, he said that when Peter conquered Sweden “he was merely returning what is ours, and strengthening it.” Read more →

#2 What If Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?
Eric Schlosser | THE ATLANTIC

As Putin’s war in Ukraine bogs down into a battle of attrition, the danger that Vladimir Putin will deploy battlefield nuclear weapons persists. In this richly reported piece, Eric Schlosser interviews nuclear weapons exports to explore what could happen—and how the United States could respond.

“The risk of nuclear war,” Schlosser warns, “is greater today than at any other time since the Cuban missile crisis. And the decisions that would have to be made after a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine are unprecedented. In 1945, when the United States destroyed two Japanese cities with atomic bombs, it was the world’s sole nuclear power. Nine countries now possess nuclear weapons, others may soon obtain them, and the potential for things going terribly wrong has vastly increased.” Read more →

#3 What Makes a Power Great
Michael J. Mazarr | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this smart, in-depth analysis, Michael Mazarr draws from a RAND corporation study on what makes great powers—and how they can fall.

Over the course of fifteen months, Mazarr led a RAND Corporation study for the US Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment, supported by analysis from outside historians. The study isolated a number of national characteristics that throughout history have underpinned national competitive success—”including a strong national ambition, a culture of learning and adaptation, and significant diversity and pluralism.”

“These domestic strengths are the building blocks of international power. But,” Mazarr warns, “to enable a country to succeed, they must reinforce and support one another. And they must not fall out of balance. Too much national ambition, for instance, can lead to overreach, imperiling the country that overcommits itself. But countries with too little ambition, diversity, or willingness to learn and adapt risk starting a negative cycle that can spiral into national decline.”

Read this study to learn why it is that the United States, if it is to prevail in the years ahead in contests with China and Russia, “will have to do more than just outspend its rivals on defense or advanced military technologies. It will have to nurture the qualities that make great powers dynamic, innovative, and adaptive. Read more →

#4 After a Pivotal Period in Ukraine, US Officials Predict the War’s Path
Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, Julian E. Barnes| NEW YORK TIMES

Based on analyses by a number of US defense officials, including Atlantic Council military fellows, this New York Times article provides a useful examination of how the US defense establishment expects the war in Ukraine to unfold.

Now that four to six weeks have passed since Russia shifted its main focus to eastern Ukraine, Cooper, Schmitt, and Barnes write, “officials say the picture is increasingly clear: Russia is likely to end up with more territory, they said, but neither side will gain full control of the region as a depleted Russian military faces an opponent armed with increasingly sophisticated weapons.”

In this situation, they add, “other analysts predict a back and forth that could stretch for months or even years. ‘This is likely to keep going, with each side trading territory on the margins,’ [director of Russian studies at CNA Michael] Kofman said. ‘It’s going to be a dynamic situation. There are unlikely to be significant collapses or major surrenders.’”Read more →

#5 A Ukrainian Refugee’s Fight To Save The Family She Left Behind
Ed Caesar | NEW YORKER

This week’s must-read is Ed Caesar’s riveting, heartbreaking New Yorker piece about a Ukrainian family separated by the war and navigating life as refugees from Putin’s war.

Follow Inna Blahonravina and her daughters Sasha and Oliviia as they depart Ukraine in midst of Russian air-raids on Kiev, leaving Inna’s husband Maksym behind. It is a chronicle of resilience and separation, fear, and hope, and it shows a portion of the vast human cost of Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine.

“Once,” Caesar writes, “Oliviia looked over Inna’s shoulder as she read on her phone about an attack on Kyiv. The report was accompanied by an image of a building on fire, with rescuers at the scene. Oliviia asked who the people in the photograph were—whether they were Russian or Ukrainian, and if one of them was Vladimir Putin. Then she said, ‘Mommy, I’m so glad we’re not killed.’ Every day, the kids had video calls with their father. Maksym tried to keep the conversations lighthearted, but even banal topics could be laced with sadness.

“‘Do you miss the cats?’” he’d ask.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Sep 16, 2022

The lesson Queen Elizabeth II leaves for King Charles III

By Andrew R. Marshall

The United Kingdom is a country where change has been the rule. And what’s most notable about the monarchy is, in fact, its ability to adapt to that change.

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

Issue Brief Sep 15, 2022

Democratic institutional strength before and beyond elections: The case of Brazil

By Valentina Sader

Americas Brazil

Markup Sep 15, 2022

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address.

By Atlantic Council experts

Ursula von der Leyen’s speech focused on energy and strategic decoupling of supply chains amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, but didn’t delve into common defense.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

The post Europe’s ‘rewiring’ is crucial in the face of grinding inflation and Putin’s war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ashford on the Chicago Council’s Deep Dish podcast: How different foreign policy approaches assess the war in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Fri, 24 Jun 2022 18:18:00 +0000

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 24, Emma Ashford appeared on the Chicago Council’s Deep Dish podcast as a guest. Alongside James Goldgeier, visiting scholar at Stanford University, Ashford discussed the war in Ukraine and divergent views on it in Washington.

“If you look at the responses of most people who are realists or restrainers to this war, they’ve been in many ways quite similar to liberal internationalist perspectives,” Ashford observed. “There’s been a fair amount of common response to the notion that Russia shouldn’t be changing borders by force in Europe, that we do have some humanitarian concerns, that US interests are at stake here.”

“That said, I do think there are some big differences now that we are three months into the war. Those differences are starting to become clearer in places where restrainers or realists tend to differ, on the questions of war termination. Are we trying to support Ukraine to maintain a sovereign Ukrainian state or to help Ukraine expel Russia from every inch of its territory?”

More about our expert

Former staff

Emma Ashford

Conflict Economic Sanctions

The post Ashford on the Chicago Council’s Deep Dish podcast: How different foreign policy approaches assess the war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

President Xi’s damage control focuses on Europe and the Chinese economy

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 19 Jun 2022 21:20:46 +0000

For Chinese President Xi Jinping, dispatching his special envoy to Europe for a three-week charm tour was just one of many acts of high-stakes damage control ahead of the Twentieth Chinese Communist Party Congress this autumn.

Xi’s economy is dangerously slowing, financing for his Belt and Road Initiative has tanked, his zero-Covid policy is flailing, and his continued support of Russian President Vladimir Putin hangs like a cloud over his claim of being the world’s premier national-sovereignty champion as Russia’s war on Ukraine grinds on.

Few China watchers believe Xi’s hold on power faces any serious challenge, but that’s hard to rule out entirely given how many recent mistakes he’s made. So, Xi’s taking no chances ahead of one of his party’s most important gatherings, a meeting designed to assure his continued rule and his place in history.

European business leaders understood that as the context for their recent meetings with Wu Hongbo, the special representative of the Chinese government for European affairs and former UN undersecretary general. His message was a similar one at every stop: Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Germany, and Italy.

“The Chinese want to change the tone of the story, to control the damage,” said one European business leader who asked to remain anonymous due to his Chinese business interests. “They understand they have gone too far.”

The businessman described Wu, with his fluent and fluid English, as one of the smoothest, most open, and intellectually nimble Chinese officials he’s met. At every stop, Wu conceded China had “made mistakes,” from its handling of Covid-19, to its “wolf warrior” diplomacy, to its economic mismanagement.

His trip came as concerns in China have grown about “losing Europe” in the wake of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

The public mood has shifted sufficiently to have Finland and Sweden knocking on NATO’s door, and the European Union this week embracing the prospect of Ukraine’s membership candidacy. Wu’s visit was also something of a mop-up operation following a failed visit by Chinese official Huo Yuzhen to eight central and east European countries. In Poland, he was refused a meeting with government officials.

Germans and their political leaders—Europe’s most significant target for Chinese diplomats and business—are raising new questions about everything from investment guarantees for German business in China to specific projects like VW’s factory in Xinjiang province, home of human rights abuses against the primarily Muslim Uyghur population.

Though Wu addressed Putin’s war in Ukraine only indirectly, his message was designed to reassure Europeans that they are preferred partners, as opposed to the United States. His bottom line: China will always be China, a country of growing significance and economic opportunities for Europe.

Yet lost ground in Europe is just one of many gathering problems Xi faces ahead of his party congress, which will determine the country’s economic, foreign policy and domestic agenda for years to come.

At the same time, China and Xi continue to have a strong reputation and influence in much of the rest of the world. Even with Belt and Road financing slowing, China remains ascendant in the Global South, where the United States has been less focused or, in places, isn’t present at all.

Also, the party congress is likely to provide Xi a third term and even more internal party power, a move that follows a 2018 decision to scrap term limits. China watchers will be waiting to see whether Xi can continue to put his allies in key party positions, but thus far there aren’t any signs he won’t be able to do so.

However the Congress turns out, there is still growing talk among China experts about whether we are entering a period of “Peak Xi” or even “Peak China.” There’s growing evidence that he and the country he represents (and his approach has been to make the two inseparable) have reached the height of their influence and reputation, at least in Europe and as a steadily growing economic juggernaut.

Nothing will determine the outcome more than how Xi manages China’s economy, which is the foundation for the country’s far-reaching global influence as well as the Communist party’s domestic legitimacy.

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, one of the keenest China watchers anywhere, sees China’s economic prospects weakening due to a chain of factors. They include at least ten Chinese property developer defaults and Xi’s crackdown on China’s technology sector, which has cost it $2 trillion in market capitalization of its ten biggest tech companies over the past year.

Moreover, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has sent energy and commodity prices soaring and has snarled supply chains, “terrible news for the world’s largest manufacturer, exporter and energy-consuming economy,” Rudd wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal. Add to this Xi’s insistence on China’s Zero Covid strategy, which led to mass lockdowns.

Rudd concludes that this combination of factors is enough to make Xi miss his 5.5 percent growth target and perhaps even grow more slowly this year than the United States. “For Mr. Xi, failing to reach the target would be politically disastrous,” writes Rudd.

Xi’s damage control on the economic front has included fiscal and monetary stimulus and infrastructure spending to grow domestic demand. A recent meeting of the Politburo also suggested some coming relief from the regulatory crackdown on China’s tech sector.

Yet none of that will be enough to reverse Xi’s cardinal sin, and that was his dramatic pivot to stronger state and party controls.

Writing in Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic Council’s Daniel H. Rosen, who is a founding partner of Rhodium Group, argues, “China cannot have both today’s statism and yesterday’s strong growth rates. It will have to choose.”

Adds Craig Singleton this week in Foreign Policy, “China’s fizzling economic miracle may soon undercut the (Communist party’s) ability to wage a sustained struggle for geostrategic dominance.”

There’s not much time left for damage control before Xi opens his party Congress in the Great Hall of the People. He’s likely to get the outcome he wants sealed long before the Congress, but that won’t solve the larger problem. It has been his leadership and decision-making that have generated China’s challenges, and he’ll have to correct course if he is to restore economic growth at home, revive his international momentum and avoid “Peak Xi.”

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 What Returning to China Taught Me About China
Michael Schuman | THE ATLANTIC

Long-time readers of Inflection Points know I’m a big fan of the Michael Schuman’s reporting on China.

This time Schuman, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, serves up a personal account of the arbitrary and bizarre world Xi’s zero-COVID policy has created in China, full of long, solitary confinements and mountains of paperwork. Schuman writes that he was separated from his wife after the Chinese government denied his visa and he left Beijing for Hong Kong in 2020. What followed was a 662-day odyssey before he saw his wife again.

“This zero-COVID policy is not an aberration,” Schuman writes. “It is representative of China’s political and social system. Authoritarian rule, by its very nature, must be arbitrary. Anything else would require the state to be held accountable for its failings and actions, and that would be intolerable here. The knock on the door must be able to come at any moment—and too often does—for something written, said, read, or done that the state doesn’t like. The consequence, by design, is a society that lives in a constant atmosphere of trepidation and helplessness.” Read more →

#2 The U.S. overestimated Russia’s military might. Is it underestimating China’s?
Nahal Toosi and Lara Seligman | POLITICO

Nahal Toosi and Lara Seligman powerfully highlight the difficulty of gleaning accurate intelligence about China’s military ability and aims–and why that matters.

“Growing U.S. worries,” they write, “that China will sooner rather than later attack Taiwan as part of a broader effort to eclipse American power in the Pacific make the topic of Beijing’s military prowess more salient than ever, said lawmakers and eight current and former officials interviewed for this story. The concerns about a lack of U.S. understanding of China’s military are compounded by the fact that the People’s Liberation Army has not fought in a war in more than 40 years.”

The authors add, “Beyond military capability, American officials have limited insight into the inner workings of China’s communist leadership, how security-related decisions are made, and what moves could trigger what responses.”

Read this for an excellent analysis of what the United States doesn’t (but should) know. Read more →

#3 Has China Lost Europe?
Ian Johnson | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

One notable casualty of Xi’s friendship with Putin has been China’s initiatives in central and eastern Europe. As my former Wall Street Journal colleague Ian Johnson writes, China has long courted central and eastern European countries, only to watch those gains vanish in the face of China’s undelivered promises and China’s de facto support of Putin’s war in Ukraine.

“China’s failures in central and eastern Europe,” Johnson writes, “highlight the country’s increasingly ideological approach to foreign affairs under Xi Jinping. Most of these failures were self-inflicted. China has long been suspicious of Western alliances, such as NATO, but its decision to openly endorse the Russian position went a step further, essentially telling countries in the 16+1 to abandon one of their key foreign-policy priorities. People in the Chinese foreign policy establishment must have recognized how badly this would play in the region, but they were apparently unable to sway the Chinese leadership. Instead, Xi’s desire to strike a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, with whom he has strong personal relations, won out. This behavior is part of an overall of China’s foreign-policy experts in favor of ideologues closer to Xi.” Read more →

#4 China’s Lessons From Russia’s War
Kevin Rudd | PROJECT SYNDICATE

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, one of the smartest China watchers writing tFormer Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd offers this must-read analysis of Xi’s calculation’s regarding a potential invasion of Taiwan.

Far from being deterred by Russia’s failures, Rudd argues, “the Chinese will watch what happens in Ukraine with an eye toward avoiding Putin’s mistakes, and with a deep confidence that China can and will do better. Of course, the danger for Xi is that such confidence could ultimately prove as delusional as Putin’s belief that he would conquer Ukraine in a matter of days.”

Therefore, Rudd concludes, it is imperative that the United States, Taiwan, and their allies build up “effective levels of deterrence, so that when Xi’s preferred timetable reaches its moment of decision, the PLA will have no choice but to advise him that the military risks are still too great to launch an invasion.”

If Ukraine offers lessons, it’s that it is better to prevent war through unmistakable deterrence than risk conflict through wishful thinking. Read more →

#5 Ukraine could be an inflection point for the West
Andrew A. Michta | POLITICO EUROPE

Andrew Michta, one of the top experts on NATO and transatlantic security, offers this important warning about the need to continue giving Ukraine as much aid as possible, and the dangers of a negotiated peace.

“Let’s first consider the consequences of Ukraine’s defeat,” Michta writes. “At this stage, any ceasefire would allow Putin to hold on to conquered territory, and the remaining Ukrainian rump state — bereft of its industrial basin in the east and with Russia’s continued Black Sea blockade — would be unable to sustain itself economically. More importantly, in a few years, Putin would regroup, rebuild his military and be able to launch another round of conquest to seize all of Ukraine — especially if the ceasefire deal included lifting sanctions on Western imports critical to his weapons production.”

If, on the other hand, Russia is driven out and Ukraine is restored, “With its vast array of natural resources and as one of the richest agricultural lands on earth, a rebuilt Ukraine — restored not as a post-Soviet state but as a thriving democratic polity and closely integrated into Europe’s economy — would fundamentally change the power dynamics both in Europe and globally.”

Michta sums things up: “Let’s have the courage to help Ukraine win.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

Trackers and Data Visualizations Jun 16, 2022

Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance’s future

By Atlantic Council experts

We asked our experts: With so much happening in the global arena, what topics will be featured in NATO’s Strategic Concept – and how should the Alliance think about addressing them?

Climate Change & Climate Action Cybersecurity

New Atlanticist Jun 18, 2022

Why I expected more from the UN human-rights chief

By Rayhan Asat

Michelle Bachelet was supposed to fight for imprisoned Uyghurs like my brother. But she failed.

China Human Rights

Econographics Jun 17, 2022

Where do the “fence-sitters” sit on trade with Russia?

By Josh Lipsky, Sophia Busch

At least in terms of trade, seemingly neutral countries aren’t enabling Russia as much as their public positions might suggest.

China Economic Sanctions

The post President Xi’s damage control focuses on Europe and the Chinese economy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Engagement Reframed #8: How to avoid anarchy in space

Robert A. Manning — Thu, 16 Jun 2022 19:41:01 +0000

What is the opportunity?

The international community has entered a new era in space. The year 2021 marked an inflection point exemplified by: US and Chinese land rovers (and a US helicopter) on Mars; a Russian anti-satellite (ASAT) test creating some 15,000 pieces of space debris; space tourism and private-sector activities such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX launches and SpaceX’s Starlink mini-satellites nearly colliding with a Chinese space station; and not least, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) launch of the spectacular Webb telescope into orbit around the sun in cislunar space—the vast area between the Earth and just beyond the Moon’s orbit. The explosive growth of activities in space will accelerate in this decade, making for an increasingly crowded and contested domain.

Currently 4,852 satellites from some eighty nations are in Low Earth Orbit (LEO); roughly half of these are US commercial and government/military satellites. They are essential for everything from nuclear command and control, climate observation to GPS, and the internet, streaming video, and ATMs. Moreover, an already crowded LEO is getting more so. The burgeoning private sector is driving the new space economy enabled by innovation, new technologies like relaunchable orbital space vehicles, and miniaturized satellites, such as the aforementioned mini-satellites. Google and Elon Musk’s SpaceX alone plan to launch some 50,000 Starlink satellites in this decade.

These incidents reflect a troubling anarchy in the cosmos, from a burgeoning Wild West–scramble for space resources to a full-blown militarization of space. The problem is clashing ambitions and a deficit of rules governing behavior in space—a domain like sea, air, and cyber that constitute global commons. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the one foundational accord signed by all major space-faring nations, totaling 111. They agreed to the principles in the OST, which states:

“Exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means and shall be the province of all mankind.”

Unfortunately, the treaty is sadly outdated by technology, politics, and competing major powers’ space ambitions. The United States and China plan to create Moon bases (which will compete for real estate at the Moon’s water-rich north and south poles). Several nations have passed laws appropriating the right of private-sector firms to exploit minerals on asteroids and planets. The treaty offers little guidance on collisions, the growing problem of space debris, or the intrusion or obstruction of a nation’s space assets and lacks any dispute-settlement mechanism. Some additional legal agreements are in effect under the United Nations’ (UN’s) Office for Outer Space: liability for damage caused by space objects; safety and rescue of spacecraft and astronauts; and registration of space activities. In theory, a Moon Treaty exists, but it has not been ratified by the United States, Russia, or China. The International Telecommunications Union regulates radiocommunications and orbital resources (satellites), but some doubt it will have the capacity to manage the exponential growth of space traffic.

NASA has embarked on a gallant effort to update rules for operations in space, the Artemis Accords, signed by 19 US allies and partners, but some major space powers—China, Russia, India, and Germany—have declined to join. The Biden administration has endorsed the Artemis Accords, initiated by the Trump administration, as the preferred vehicle to define rules and norms in Outer Space.

The accords are, in effect, principles that assert dominion over activities that, “. . . may take place on the Moon, Mars, comets and asteroids . . . as well as in the orbit of the Moon or Mars,” and in cislunar space. Most of Artemis’s principles are intended as public goods and would make sense as negotiated global norms. Nevertheless, though NASA has tried to ensure that the Artemis Accords are “in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty,” they assert the right to, in effect, claim real estate in the “global commons,” contrary to the Outer Space Treaty. In that sense, the accords may be viewed as an assertion of US primacy—whether intended or not—potentially hastening the trend toward fragmentation of global governance.

NASA had little choice but to exclude China from the accords—the 2011 Wolf Amendment bans NASA’s cooperation or coordination with any Chinese government–affiliated entities. This law has proved largely counterproductive, neither improving human rights nor constraining China’s space efforts. Instead, alarmed by NASA’s robust collaboration with SpaceX and other commercial partners, China has significantly accelerated investment in its own, largely parallel lunar exploration plans. Russia, though a longstanding partner in the International Space Station (ISS), has refused to sign the agreement, opting instead to partner with China on a Moon base and other space ventures. The divorce between Russia and its space-station partners has drastically accelerated due to sanctions on Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine.

Why now?

A growing number of emerging space powers, the increasing role of space in major powers’ military calculus, the burgeoning private-sector space economy, and the myriad risks—from space junk to space wars—all point to the urgent need to reach new understandings and create new modes of cooperation.

Prospective conflicts arise in Artemis’s language on the extraction of space resources. The accords state that the extraction of resources from the Moon and other celestial bodies “should be executed in a manner that complies with the Outer Space Treaty” before adding that “signatories affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.” Owning resources seems to be a dubious proposition given the OST language that says celestial bodies are not subject to “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.” The OST adds that the Moon or asteroids cannot be claimed “by means of use . . . or by any other means.” The accords do include provisions for consultation with non-Artemis parties, but no global-dispute settlement mechanism exists.

The private-sector space economy is exploding. Tens of thousands of asteroids are rich with rare-earth and other minerals, a potential $1 trillion market. Dozens of startups in the United States, EU, and Japan are gearing up for space-mining and removing space debris. China, too, is planning space-mining ventures.

A host of nations, including the United States, have already begun staking legal claims in the cosmos. For example, Luxembourg, seeking to become a European hub for space-mining, has enacted a law granting private firms the right to extract space resources, created a space-mining center, and invested in space-mining startups. The United Arab Emirates has adopted a similar law, as has the United States, with President Barack Obama’s signing of a commercial space law in 2015 granting US businesses the right to extract resources throughout the cosmos. President Donald Trump took this move a step further with a 2020 Executive Order authorizing the commercial development of space resources and explicitly rejecting the notion that space is a “global commons.”

Absent new global rules, the space resource issue is a prime area ripe for conflict between space-faring nations.

These laws assert the right to assign property rights on celestial bodies to space-mining companies—but on what legal basis can nations unilaterally grant property rights to such companies, or, for that matter, build manned stations on the Moon or Mars, given that celestial bodies are not subject to sovereignty claims? Nobody owns the Moon. What would preclude China, India, or the EU from granting the right to mine minerals to their state firms if they got there first, or from claiming prime real estate on the Moon’s water-rich north or south poles for their manned bases? Absent new global rules, the space resource issue is a prime area ripe for conflict between space-faring nations.

Similarly, there are a dearth of rules on how to deal with space debris, or codes of conduct for military satellites vulnerable to disabling or destruction by cyberattacks, stalking by other satellites, and ASAT counterspace weapons. ASAT tests have produced thousands of pieces of space debris that pose an immediate threat.

Russia’s ASAT test in November 2021, which destroyed one of Russia’s own defunct military satellites, creating a cloud of some 1,500 pieces of space debris, illuminates the problem. Even small pieces of debris, traveling at some 17,000 miles per hour, can cause crippling damage to satellites, potentially disrupting the space infrastructure, the nervous system of modern life. Moscow’s test forced astronauts—and its own cosmonauts—on board the ISS to take emergency safety measures for fear of collision.

Russia’s test followed a similarly dangerous Chinese ASAT test in 2007, as well as a US ASAT test (though designed to minimize long-term orbital debris) in 2008. More recently, China protested small shoebox-sized satellites launched by SpaceX’s Starlink project to facilitate global broadband WiFi when one of the satellites almost collided with China’s space station, so close that Beijing protested to the UN last December after having to take evasive action. An explosion of private-sector space business—from satellite launches and space shuttles to the quest for mining asteroids and planets—has blurred the line between civilian and military activities, racing ahead of any duly considered global regulation. President Joe Biden’s recent unilateral ASAT test ban offers a chance to lead by example in fostering new norms.

How to make it happen

Of all the unresolved questions about space activities, the most urgent need—and most promising area for new cooperation—is alleviating the threat from space debris. Nations can cooperate, pooling risks and burdens when they perceive that their interests intersect. The threat of space debris to all nations’ vital economic and national security assets in space would, like climate change, seem to be such an instance. Space junk does not recognize whose space assets it damages or destroys.

In December 2021, the White House issued a document billed as the “US Space Priorities Framework.” One of its principles is that “the US will lead in strengthening global governance of space activities.” There is no better opportunity than on space debris.

The US Department of Defense’s Space Surveillance Network is the premier mechanism for monitoring space junk. Moreover, in addition to its unrivaled Space Surveillance capacity to monitor debris, the United States has already signed space-sharing agreements with over 100 nations to provide data and notifications to avoid collisions. It has aided China in this regard. These are important global public goods that can provide diplomatic leverage for shaping space rules and standards on space debris.

In addition, private-sector firms and startups in Japan, the United States, and Europe are devising ways to remove space debris in what appears to be a coming sector of the space economy. The US Space Force’s technology arm is already exploring the possibility of funding private firms to remove space debris. Methods of space-junk removal include satellite magnets, nets, harpoons, and even spider-like webs, all being developed by private contractors that are bearing the risks of research and development.

All these steps create possibilities for new cooperation on space junk, great-power competition notwithstanding. The most expeditious course would be an ad hoc multilateral initiative, not a UN institution. There are only a handful of high-performance space-faring states—the United States, Russia, China, the EU countries, Japan, and India.

As discussed above, the United States is well positioned as first among equals to launch an ad hoc public-private coalition of space powers—call it the Space Six—partnering with the private sector to pool resources and (nonnational-security-sensitive) capabilities to better monitor, clean up space debris, and seek mutually acceptable codes of conduct and rules for such activities. If there is agreement among the United States, China, Russia, and the EU, the UN Security Council (UNSC) could pass a UNSC resolution, as was the case in similar ad hoc efforts (e.g., the two-plus-four talks on German reunification and the six-party talks on North Korea). It should be an open architecture, based on the principle of form follows function, and open to emerging space powers such as South Korea, Brazil, Israel, and others.

Over the coming decade, multifarious activities and presence in cislunar space and on the Moon will unfold. If left untended, the probability of conflicts over competing Moon presences, space-mining, and military activities is significant, if not inevitable. Given the magnitude of the space-debris problem—existential for all activities in space—a space debris-focused coalition could catalyze a favorable political climate and might eventually evolve into a forum to address other space-governance issues. Building on the US unilateral ban on ASAT testing, for example, could produce a consensus for a moratorium on ASAT tests among the Space Six and beyond.

Conceptually, the long-term vision should be to negotiate an agreement analogous to the UN Law of the Sea Treaty that defines property rights on the Moon and other celestial bodies, though such would likely be an arduous, protracted undertaking—the Law of the Sea negotiations began in 1973 and ended in 1982, and the treaty still has not been ratified by the United States, Canada, Israel, Turkey, and other states.

Negotiations between the alliance associated with the Artemis Accords on the one hand and China, Russia, and nonaligned space powers like India or Brazil on the other will be a tough road to hoe. Yet the prospect of a lunar version of Wild West–range wars over valuable real estate should give the international community pause. Unregulated resource exploitation on the Moon will probably lead to the competitive deployments of military forces on the Moon’s surface and in the vastness of cislunar space.

To avoid a full-blown military competition, it will be necessary, however difficult, to develop a number of confidence-building, if not arms control measures. One possibility is to internationalize the demanding requirements for situational awareness in cislunar space. This might include the creation of one or more command centers or intelligence cooperation clearinghouses on the Earth and Moon that have access to a multinational fleet of surveillance spacecraft.

Developing an information-sharing clearinghouse to maximize transparency of human activities in and around the Moon would be a good first step. Another area of potential conflict is military activities in space. The United States, China, and Russia would be wise to begin talks to define military activities in space, starting with interactions of their respective military satellites. A code of conduct for such activities, including notifications of movements of satellites along the lines of the Cold War US-USSR Incidents at Sea agreement could be a model.

The ISS has become an emblem of successful science collaboration on space issues, an area of agreement between the respective space agencies of the United States, Russia, EU, Japan, and Canada. Washington recently announced that it will extend the operations of the ISS until 2030; despite the looming divorce from Russia, other partners appear supportive.

China has accelerated its robust space-exploration activities, including a planned Moon base. Diminished Russian space capabilities will most likely be another consequence of the Ukraine war, making Moscow a less appealing space partner to Beijing. There are many aspects of space exploration, to which China is deeply committed, that do not necessarily clash with US interests. After the near-collision of its space station with a Starlink satellite, there were hints of Chinese interest in cooperation to avoid such risks. The Biden administration should invite China to accede to the ISS, and its affiliate, the Tiangong Space Station, to explore possible areas of space cooperation. For that to happen, the United States would need to abolish or amend the 2011 Wolf Amendment banning collaboration between NASA and the Chinese space agency. Given the challenges of space and space governance, some degree of cooperation with China on civil space activities will almost certainly be necessary and need not compromise national security. The United States has an opportunity to catalyze global efforts to manage space technologies and activities before risky confrontations ensue.

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A new transatlantic relationship for the Middle East and North Africa

Alexandra Kaiss — Thu, 16 Jun 2022 15:14:07 +0000

On June 7, the Atlantic Council’s (AC) North Africa Initiative hosted an event, “New Transatlantic Relations for the Middle East and North Africa,” in collaboration with US Embassy Rome and Centro Studi Americani. Moderated by Karim Mezran, director of the AC’s North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the event explored increased Russian and Chinese presence in North Africa, as well as opportunities to leverage the US-Italian partnership to address challenges from great power activity in the region.

The event included opening remarks by William Wechsler, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs; Thomas Smitham, chargé’ d’affaires of the US Embassy in Rome; and Ferdinando Salleo, former ambassador of Italy to the United States. It featured a broad panel of experts, with Valeria Talbot, co-head of the Middle East and North Africa Centre at the Institute for International Political Studies; Khemaies Jhinaoui, former minister of foreign affairs of Tunisia and founder of the Tunisian Council for International Relations; Jonathan Fulton, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; and Dina Fakoussa-Bherens, associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations.

Opening the discussion, Weschler emphasized the necessity of transatlantic cooperation in creating sustained policy change in North Africa, presenting a strong counterargument to the perception that the US has vacated the region. Salleo contextualized North Africa at-large, emphasizing the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the economies of both Europe and North Africa. Smitham contended that these challenges can be addressed by greater US-Italian partnership in the region, which has grown stronger in the past year under the Italian presidency of the G20 and bilateral meetings between President Biden and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi.

Remarks from Keynote Speaker Yael Lempert
In her keynote speech, Yael Lempert, acting deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, addressed widespread misconceptions of US withdrawal from North Africa and the Middle East (MENA), affirming that the Biden administration has focused on affirmative engagement in the region. Through this initiative, the US is empowering North African nations to decide with whom and when they cooperate on issues. Lempert made clear that regional stability is in the best interest of nations across the globe, and that the US will continue to have a newly defined presence in North Africa that highlights the region’s human potential. She underscored this commitment through the US’s donation of 35 million COVID-19 vaccines, alongside ongoing collaboration on key issues such as climate change.

According to Lempert, the US has also been at the forefront of enacting a sustainable political vision in the MENA. The US continues to deliver transformative regional changes through the Abraham Accords, as shown by increased economic and diplomatic engagement between Israel and its once adversarial regional neighbors. In nearby Syria, the US has maintained its voice for peace by advocating for a ceasefire agreement, cross-border mechanisms, and accountability for the Assad regime. These efforts have proven to be effective in Libya, where the US and allies have upheld a 19-month ceasefire agreement that has facilitated political negotiations.

However, Lempert warned that the positive effects of such transatlantic efforts are under threat. Russia and China have both benefitted from the status-quo created by an increased US presence that enabled greater security. China has increased investment and trade, delivering opaque investments that leave countries in debt, and compromising sovereignty. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has precipitated a global food security crisis that will exacerbate existing food insecurity challenges in the MENA region. While Lempert made clear that the US remains optimistic about the region’s future, she is clear-eyed about the work that needs to be done to unlock its human potential.

North Africa’s Transatlantic Relations Panel Discussion
Citing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic, Jhinaoui opened the panel by stating that the MENA region is experiencing a profound geopolitical evolution. The war in Ukraine is dividing North Africa, as evidence by a recent UN vote condemning Russia’s military offensive. North African nations have been hesitant to openly criticize Russian actions, fearing the repercussions of lambasting a powerful ally. Moreover, the Ukrainian crisis threatens to divert European engagement from North Africa.

Fulton provided a China-centric lens on the region. Addressing the myth of US departure, he argued that even Chinese policymakers do not share this view. Chinese party leaders recognize the US’s power and long-standing relationships in the region, which China has yet to build itself. Fulton described China’s primary interests in the Middle East and North Africa as related to economic and political engagement with its Belt and Road Initiative. This policy has drastically changed, however, with the weaponization of trade due to the US-China trade war. The Chinese government therefore views the MENA region as an opportunity to challenge US foreign policy. Ultimately, while the US’s focus on development continues to resonate, there are increasing attempts from Beijing to discredit the US.

Dina Faoukoussa-Behrens addressed how North African countries, especially Egypt, view the US and its partners vis-à-vis China and Russia. Both regional leaders and the public were disillusioned by the US response to the Arab Spring, prompting many North African nations to turn to China and Russia. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi embodies the transition to allyship with Russia, which drawing on Sisi’s extensive military background, has led to the establishment of bilateral military partnerships between the two countries. Russia’s seemingly poor performance in its invasion of Ukraine, however, has dissuaded many in North Africa from relying on one nation. In fact, a multipolar order is in the best interest of North Africa, as it provides them a bargaining tool in future negotiations.

Focusing on how Italy can engage with European and US leaders to tackle issues in MENA, Talbot explained that there is little cohesion in Italy’s foreign policy, a void which has damaged its credibility in the region. Italy’s policy in the MENA has focused on mitigating illegal migration and terrorism, avoiding fragmentation and power vacuums, ensuring economic prosperity, and securing energy supplies. However, the war in Ukraine could create an opportunity for Italy to collaborate with regional partners like Turkey to address shared interests in Libya and elsewhere.

Main Policy Recommendations
According to the panelists, countering Russian and Chinese influence in the region must be achieved through transatlantic cooperation. With North Africa beginning to experience duress as a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Fakoussa-Behrens articulated that now is the time for transatlantic allies to provide aid to the region, serving as a valuable substitute to Russia. Similarly, Fulton stressed that the US must maintain a level-handed economic approach to North African nations to appear as the preferable partner to China and Russia. Furthermore, Talbot stated that it is necessary for Italy and its allies to develop a more coherent policy in the North African region, working to advance their goals in cooperation with North African nations.

While Jhinaoui agreed with the necessity of transatlantic cooperation, he contended that transatlantic allies must tailor their policy in the region to meet the specific needs of each country, while also working to limit the socio-economic fallout of war in Ukraine. Similarly, it is necessary that the US and its allies pursue a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine alongside ending the conflict in Syria, as these issues impact engagement in North Africa. By addressing these ideas, a new partnership can be created in a way that is mutually beneficial for the transatlantic alliance and the MENA.

Alexandra Kaiss is a Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post A new transatlantic relationship for the Middle East and North Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Attacks on hospitals from Syria to Ukraine: Improving prevention and accountability mechanisms

Elise Baker, Gissou Nia — Tue, 14 Jun 2022 14:00:00 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it soon began implementing one of its frequent—and criminal—tactics that it had already been using in its military intervention in Syria: bombing healthcare and medical facilities. Syrian government forces first began targeting health workers in Syria in 2011 at the start of the Syria crisis, and Russia joined them in targeting the healthcare system upon its official entrance to the conflict in 2015. Over the course of the conflict, over 90 percent of 601 recorded attacks on medical facilities were attributable to either Syrian or Russian forces. In Ukraine, Russia has reportedly perpetrated more than 200 attacks on healthcare facilities and ambulances since the start of the invasion.

The well-documented pattern of targeted attacks on healthcare in Syria and Ukraine undermines long-established and hard-won provisions under international humanitarian law intended to protect civilians during conflict. Despite the scale of the problem, which extends beyond Syria and Ukraine, there has been no prominent criminal prosecution of any alleged perpetrators of attacks on healthcare in any conflict, no establishment of a UN mandate dedicated to this issue, and no task force created by national governments specifically aimed at prevention of and accountability for these crimes. The international community’s failure to compel meaningful action to stop the criminal practice of targeting healthcare in conflict after conflict has resulted in continued deaths of health workers and civilian populations.

In a new issue brief by the Atlantic Council Strategic Litigation Project‘s Elise Baker and Gissou Nia, the two propose recommendations to UN bodies, the World Health Organization, national governments and other institutions and decision makers for concrete actions to prevent future attacks and advance accountability for past ones.

For media inquiries, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

Report Dec 10, 2020

Closing the accountability gap on human rights violators in the Islamic Republic of Iran through global litigation strategies

By Gissou Nia

Human Rights International Norms

New Atlanticist Mar 16, 2022

Punish Putin for past and present crimes

By Gissou Nia, Jomana Qaddour

Justice will remain incomplete if the dots aren’t connected among Putin’s crimes in Chechnya, Syria, and Ukraine.

Conflict Human Rights

MENASource Mar 24, 2022

Action must be taken to award reparations to victims of Russian war crimes

By Jomana Qaddour, Celeste Kmiotek

The international community is overdue for an overhaul of the legal tools accessible to victims of state-sponsored crimes in the twenty-first century. Perhaps justice mechanisms for Ukraine and Syria can stymie such impunity once and for all.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

The post Attacks on hospitals from Syria to Ukraine: Improving prevention and accountability mechanisms appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Toward a Democratic Technology Alliance: An innovation edge that favors freedom

Ash Jain, Matthew Kroenig — Mon, 13 Jun 2022 17:16:05 +0000

READ FULL REPORT

This is the fourth report in a five-part series of Atlantic Council publications, as part of a project on revitalizing the rules-based international system and positioning the United States and its allies to succeed in an era of strategic competition.

The first publication, Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System, sets forth an overarching global strategy for the United States and its allies to uphold the rules-based system by strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies, while seeking to cooperate with other glob

The second report, From the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges, proposes the creation of a new D-10 core group of influential democracies across North America, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific, aimed at deepening strategic collaboration on the most pressing challenges facing the rules-based order.

The third report, An Alliance of Democracies: From Concept to Reality in an Era of Strategic Competition, suggests that an Alliance of Democracies could foster cooperation among a larger group of nations committed to shared values and goals, potentially as a standing body stemming from the Biden administration’s series of democracy summits.

This report calls for a Democratic Technology Alliance that would ensure that the free world prevails in the race for advanced technologies by jointly investing in innovation, countering unfair practices, and developing rules and norms consistent with democratic values.

The fifth and final report, A Democratic Trade and Economic Partnership: Ally Shoring to Counter Coercion and Secure Supply Chains, proposes an integrated framework for leading democracies and other partners to reduce strategic dependency on revisionist autocracies, coordinate on economic challenges, and foster free, fair, and secure trade.

Report Jun 1, 2022

A Democratic Trade Partnership: Ally shoring to counter coercion and secure supply chains

By Ash Jain, Matthew Kroenig

A Democratic Trade and Economic Partnership could provide an integrated framework for leading democracies and other partners to selectively decouple from revisionist autocracies and foster free, fair, and secure trade.

China Economy & Business

Report Dec 7, 2021

An Alliance of Democracies: From concept to reality in an era of strategic competition

By Ash Jain, Matthew Kroenig, and Jonas Parello-Plesner

With the rules-based democratic order under threat, the United States and its allies need new entities that facilitate cooperation not just across the transatlantic, but among larger groups of democracies worldwide.

Australia Economy & Business

I. Executive summary

Following World War II, the United States and its democratic allies established and defended a rules-based international system. This system was expanded and deepened after the end of the Cold War. Despite its shortcomings, it has proven unmatched in its ability to deliver peace, prosperity, and freedom to the United States and much of the world. The global order, however, is at an inflection point. It is being confronted by revisionist autocratic powers — China and Russia — and, at the same time, contending with a range of other challenges, from emerging and disruptive technologies to climate change to a lack of confidence in open-market democracy.

The rules-based system has been successful in ways that its founders could not have imagined. But, as the authors of this report have set forth in a series of related publications, this system must be revitalized and adapted for a new era. Inclusive institutions, including the United Nations (UN), have been limited in their effectiveness, in part because of obstruction by autocracies that systematically violate key tenants of the rules-based system. New institutions are needed that bring together powerful and likeminded democracies – those that are willing to play by certain rules and use their collective influence to positively shape the future of the system.

Such an approach is particularly necessary to address the challenges of emerging technologies. The world is experiencing a Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). An array of new technologies are being simultaneously developed and advanced, such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, synthetic biology, additive manufacturing, fintech, and robotics. As with previous advances, these new technologies off er great promise but also threaten serious downside risks. Fire can fuel stoves and keep people warm, but it can also be used to torch villages. Similarly, AI algorithms can be employed to run efficient smart cities of the future, but can also guide lethal and destructive autonomous weapons systems. The central question is how can the United States and its allies harness these advanced technologies for good while successfully managing their potential dangers?

Among the greatest challenges in the area of technology are those posed by China. As it acts to challenge the rules based international system, Beijing is pursuing a systematic effort to win the race for advanced technologies, and it appears to be leading in several key areas. China has invested heavily in research and development in advanced technologies, from AI to quantum computing to hypersonic missiles, while also gaining advantages through unfair practices, including the widespread theft of intellectual property (IP).

China’s increasing capabilities in the technology realm pose significant risks for the United States and its democratic allies and partners. These risks are evident across three main areas: defense and national security, economics, and values. Beijing is using its increasingly advanced technological capabilities to develop more sophisticated weapons systems. China’s leadership in advanced technologies could help fuel its economic growth and render much of the world dependent on it for critical technologies. Beijing is also employing new technologies in ways that are inconsistent with democratic norms, such as facial recognition technology to assert greater surveillance of its citizens, and is exporting these technologies to other autocracies.

To be sure, not every aspect of China’s role in developing advanced technology is cause for concern. Efforts by Chinese scholars to develop AI for medical diagnostics, for example, could constructively advance scientific knowledge and provide health benefits for people around the world. The challenges posed by China and other autocracies, including Russia, stem from their disregard of international norms and systematic attempts to undermine key elements of the rules-based order.

The nation or group of nations that are first to develop and harness the technologies of the 4IR will enjoy a sustained economic, military, and geopolitical advantage. The first three industrial revolutions originated in the West and helped propel democracies to a position of global leadership that has lasted for several centuries. If leading democracies are able to maintain their technological edge, they will be well-positioned to sustain their geopolitical, economic, and military advantages and uphold the rules-based international system. If, on the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) succeeds in deploying advanced technologies ahead of the democratic world, it will be in a much stronger position to advance a China-centric system that is more consistent with its autocratic values. Indeed, the strategic competition between democracy and autocracy may ultimately be decided in the technological domain.

For the United States to prevail in this competition, it must successfully harness the technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. But to compete effectively, the United States cannot act alone. It must work closely with democratic allies and partners to leverage shared capabilities and resources, and implement joint strategies and policies that are strategically aligned. Several efforts have been initiated to help strengthen democratic cooperation on the technologies of the 4IR, including through the G7, the Quad, and the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. However, while valuable, these efforts have been limited in geographic and technological scope. What is missing is an integrated framework for technology cooperation that brings together leading democracies to advance a holistic, coherent, and effective set of strategies across a range of domains.

The nation or group of nations that are first to develop and harness the technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution will enjoy a sustained economic, military, and geopolitical advantage.

The United States and leading democracies across North America, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific should establish a new Democratic Technology Alliance (DTA). Bringing together the world’s most technologically advanced democracies, such an alliance would foster cooperation across a wide range of the most critical and emerging technologies, including AI, quantum, 5G, biotech, semiconductors, nanotechnology, hypersonics, and others.

The DTA should focus on three major lines of effort. First, it should strengthen innovation ecosystems in the free world through joint research and development, increased data sharing, and forging a common approach to technology regulation. Second, it should limit China’s unfair technology advantages by developing common approaches to investment screening, IP theft, export controls, outbound investment, and cybersecurity. Third, the DTA should follow a two-track path for establishing global technology norms: seeking agreement on rules and norms among leading democracies, while also seeking to engage autocratic powers from a unified position of strength to negotiate a more inclusive set of global norms.

Through a new technology alliance, the United States and its allies can work together to ensure that democracies maintain their technological edge and foster new technologies in a manner consistent with democratic values, while acting to uphold the rules-based international system.

Lead authors

Former staff

Ash Jain

Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Toward a Democratic Technology Alliance: An innovation edge that favors freedom appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin admits Ukraine invasion is an imperial war to “return” Russian land

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 10 Jun 2022 12:45:20 +0000

Throughout the past few months, Vladimir Putin has offered up all manner of outlandish excuses for his invasion of Ukraine. At various different times he has blamed the war on everything from NATO expansion to imaginary Nazis, while also making completely unsubstantiated claims about Western plots to invade Russia and Ukrainian schemes to acquire nuclear weapons.

The reality, it now transpires, is considerably less elaborate and infinitely more chilling. Putin has launched the largest European conflict since WWII for the simple reason that he wants to conquer Ukraine. Inspired by the czars of old, Putin aims to crush his neighbor and incorporate it into a new Russian Empire.

Putin elaborated on his imperial vision during a June 9 event in Moscow to mark the 350th birthday of Russian Czar Peter the Great. He spoke admiringly of Czar Peter’s achievements during the Great Northern War and drew direct parallels to his own contemporary expansionist policies. The lands taken from Sweden during the Great Northern War were historically Russian and Peter was merely returning them to their rightful owners, Putin stated. “Apparently, it is now also our responsibility to return (Russian) land,” he said in a clear reference to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Putin’s latest comments underline his imperial objectives in Ukraine and expand on years of similar statements lamenting the fall of the Russian Empire. For more than a decade, he has questioned the historical legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood and publicly insisted that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”). Putin has also repeatedly accused Ukraine of occupying ancestral Russian lands and has blamed the early Bolsheviks for bungling the border between the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet republics.

His unapologetically imperialistic attitude toward Russian-Ukrainian relations was laid bare in July 2021 in the form of a 7,000-word essay authored by Putin himself which set out to explain the alleged “historical unity” binding the two nations together. “I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. For we are one people,” Putin the amateur historian concluded. This bizarre treatise was widely interpreted as a declaration of war against the entire notion of an independent Ukraine and has since been made required reading for all Russian military personnel.

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The Russian dictator’s obsession with Ukraine reflects his burning resentment over the collapse of the USSR and his lingering bitterness at post-Soviet Russia’s dramatic loss of international status.

This nostalgia is not rooted in a fondness for the ideology of Marxist-Leninism. Instead, Putin regards the disintegration of the Soviet Empire as the demise of “historical Russia” and has spoken of how the 1991 break-up left “tens of millions of our compatriots” living beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. As the former Soviet republic with the deepest ties to Russia and the largest ethnic Russian population, independent Ukraine has come to embody this sense of historical injustice.

Putin’s efforts to “return” Ukrainian land to Russia did not begin with the invasion of February 24. The current campaign of imperial conquest actually started eight years earlier with the Russian takeover of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, which Putin seized in a lightning military operation that took advantage of political paralysis in Kyiv in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.

Following his success in Crimea, Putin then attempted to partition mainland Ukraine by instigating pro-Kremlin uprisings throughout the south and east of the country. This initiative fell flat after Kremlin agents ran into stronger than expected local opposition from Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriots, leaving Putin’s proxies in possession of a relatively small foothold in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Control over Crimea and the Donbas allowed Putin to keep Ukraine destabilized, but his true objective has always been the reestablishment of complete Russian control over the whole country. After eight years of geopolitical pressure and hybrid warfare failed to achieve the desired outcome, and sensing that Ukraine was now in danger of moving irreparably out of the Russian orbit, Putin made the fateful decision in early 2022 to launch a full-scale invasion.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

By abandoning all pretense and comparing himself to Peter the Great, Putin has now confirmed that he is waging an old-fashioned imperial war of conquest with the goal of annexing Ukrainian territory. Recent statements from Kremlin officials have also made these imperial intentions explicit. During a visit to southern Ukraine’s Russian-occupied Kherson region in early May, Russian Senator Andrei Turchak declared that the current Russian presence in the region would be permanent. “Russia is here forever,” he stated. “There should be no doubt about this. There will be no return to the past.”

This openly imperialistic agenda represents an unprecedented challenge to international law and poses a grave threat to the entire post-WWII global security system. It also exposes the absurdity of appeals to appease Moscow or accept some kind of negotiated settlement that would avoid “humiliating” Russia. There can be no compromise with the Kremlin as long as Putin continues to deny Ukraine’s right to exist and declares his intention to annex entire regions of the country.

If Putin is not decisively defeated in Ukraine, he will surely go further in his mission to “return” lost Russian lands. The list of former Russian imperial possessions that could potentially become targets is extensive and includes Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the nations of Central Asia. Nor can future Russian attacks on the former Warsaw Pact countries of Central Europe be entirely ruled out. If this sounds far-fetched, it is important to remember that almost nobody in Ukraine believed a Russian invasion was even remotely possible until it actually happened.

Today’s brutal colonial war in Ukraine is a reminder that unlike the other great European empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Russia never underwent a period of de-imperialization. Despite collapsing spectacularly in both 1917 and 1991, Russia’s imperial identity is still very much intact and has become a central pillar of the Putin regime. Until Russia enters the modern era and becomes a post-imperial power, peace in Europe will remain elusive. The best way to speed up this process is to ensure Ukraine wins the war.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

UkraineAlert May 24, 2022

Putin’s Mariupol Massacre is one of the 21st century’s worst war crimes

By Paul Niland

The Russian destruction of Mariupol ranks among the gravest crimes against humanity of the twenty-first century and sends a clear message to the international community that can be no compromise peace with Putin.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert May 27, 2022

South Ukraine holds the key to Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire

By Taras Kuzio

The biggest European battles since WWII are currently raging in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region but the ultimate outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War is likely to be decided hundreds of miles to the south.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert May 22, 2022

Centuries of Russian oppression have forged Ukraine’s remarkable resilience

By Pete Shmigel

Centuries of traumatic experience with the horrors of Russian imperialism have shaped today’s Ukraine in ways that may actually contribute to Putin’s defeat and help Ukrainians to build a better future for their country.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

It’s time to show Putin a dead end in Ukraine, not an off-ramp

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 05 Jun 2022 21:08:09 +0000

Ukraine must win. Vladimir Putin must lose. It’s really that simple.

So, Let’s first stipulate that you agree with that end goal, as has everyone from US President Joe Biden and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, to German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

To embrace anything less would be immoral, set a historical precedent with catastrophic costs, and unravel what remains of our fraying international order of rules and institutions.

Biden laid out the argument clearly in his New York Times op-ed this week. His words should be read closely by all members of his administration and NATO allies who are still acting too tentatively in providing Ukraine the weaponry, and the freedom of action in using it, to ensure Ukraine’s victory.

“Standing by Ukraine in its hour of need is not just the right thing to do,” wrote Biden. “It is in our vital national interests to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe and to make clear that might does not make right. If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate countries… And it could mark the end of the rules-based international order and open the door to aggression elsewhere, with catastrophic consequences the world over.”

Why write all this now, as Putin’s war in Ukraine passes its hundredth day? Put most simply, it’s because Putin is showing grinding gains after shifting tactics in response to Ukraine’s unexpected victories and resilience, and Russian troops’ heavy losses and abysmal performance in the war’s early stages.

Putin’s brutal new approach is to pulverize Ukrainian population centers in eastern and southern Ukraine with stand-off weapons—thus emptying them of their people through death or flight, with less risk to his own troops, replicating the brutal tactics he deployed in Syria. Once these cities and towns are drained of their humanity, his troops can then “liberate” the rubble, seize the territory, and position Russia for the most advantageous peace deal possible, or a further offensive.

At the same time, Putin has been striking at Ukraine economically by blockading its grain exports and either destroying or stealing its available supplies. Though Putin continues to choke on tough sanctions against him, he is willing to risk starvation elsewhere while wagering that he can outlast Western support for Kyiv through upcoming election cycles and other democratic distractions such as the recent US school shootings and Supreme Court battles.

“We need to discard Cold War mentality and seek peaceful coexistence and win-win outcomes,” he said, just a matter of days before he signed a joint statement with Putin agreeing to a relationship “without limits.” That, in turn, was a little more than a month before Putin launched his war.

There is a way, however, to counter Putin’s new tactics. It will require the newly united West and its Asian partners to grow even more determined, creative, and proactive through a combined military, economic and public relations offensive that would again put Putin on his back foot.

The aim should not be to ensure a stalemate, which has allowed Putin to take 20 percent of Ukrainian territory, nor pressure Ukraine into a self-defeating peace agreement, but rather give Ukraine the means to retake territory through a counteroffensive—perhaps most importantly to retake Kherson, which would ensure access to Odesa and to the Black Sea now and in any eventual peace agreement.

Most important is for Ukraine’s potentially fatigued supporters, and even for those countries still sitting on the fence, not to lose sight of the barbarity of Putin’s atrocities and thus the moral responsibility to oppose them.

“It’s extremely important that we don’t forget the brutality,” Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary general, told the Atlantic’s Tom McTague in the most emotional of terms. “Of course, it is emotional. This is about people being killed; it’s about atrocities; it’s about children, women being raped, children being killed.”

With that in mind, it’s flat wrong for the United States or any arms supplier to limit Ukrainian fire to hitting only Russian targets on Ukrainian soil. In his otherwise excellent op-ed, Biden wrote, “We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflect pain on Russia.”

Think about that for a moment. If someone is killing your family members by shooting across a fence from your neighbor’s yard, what good is a weapon that can only shoot as far as your side of the fence? If you don’t take out the shooter, the killing continues. It’s this kind of weakness that makes Putin so confident he can win through attrition.

At the same time, the collective West, working closely with Turkey, needs to open Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, particularly at Odessa, to address a Putin-generated global food crisis and enable Ukraine to ship the twenty-eight million tons of grain it has in storage.

For justification, one can call upon the Montreux Convention of 1936 that regulates traffic through the Black Sea and guarantees “complete freedom” of passage for civilian vessels.

Said David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme, “Failure to open those ports in Odesa region will be a declaration of war on global food security.”

Historians point to the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939-1940 to demonstrate that a smaller but more determined country with less military strength can outlast Moscow and retain its sovereignty.

What’s true is that Moscow then, despite overwhelming strength in tanks and aircraft, suffered severe losses and made few gains initially following its November 1939 invasion, three months after the outbreak of World War II.

Finland held off Soviet forces for more than two months, inflecting substantial losses before the Soviet Union adopted different tactics and overcame Finnish defenses in February. Finland reached a peace deal in March 1940 that ceded 9 percent of its territory to the Soviet Union. Though Moscow’s reputation suffered, and it was removed from the League of Nations, it came away with more territory than it had initially demanded.

On the negative side, Putin is every bit as determined now as Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was then, and shares Stalin’s utter indifference to casualties and human suffering.

On the positive side, Ukraine is receiving dramatically more outside support than Finland did at the time.

Yet without even more Western resolve, Putin can still win, and Ukraine can still lose.

Ukraine and the West need to show Putin a dead end and not an off-ramp.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 ‘It’s Extremely Important That We Don’t Forget The Brutality’
Tom McTague | THE ATLANTIC

This week’s must-read is Tom McTague’s powerful interview with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, one that underscores that NATO’s efforts to help Ukraine are as much about character as military strength.

“Although he wouldn’t say it quite so openly,” writes McTague, “he clearly believes that Ukraine is fighting not only for itself but for the civilized world, for the basic values of life and liberty, land and sovereignty. It is crucial, therefore, that the West continues to be outraged by Russia’s behavior, to not lose sight of Moscow’s barbarity as the war drags on.”

Said Stoltenberg, “This is about people being killed; it’s about atrocities; it’s about children, women being raped, children being killed.” Read more →

#2 President Biden: What America Will and Will Not Do in Ukraine
Joseph R. Biden Jr. | NEW YORK TIMES

To get a better understanding of the US strategy on Ukraine, and the Biden administration’s rationale, read this op-ed by President Biden laying out US aims.

“America’s goal is straightforward,” Biden writes. “We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression.”

Biden adds, “Standing by Ukraine in its hour of need is not just the right thing to do. It is in our vital national interests to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe and to make it clear that might does not make right. If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate other countries. It will put the survival of other peaceful democracies at risk. And it could mark the end of the rules-based international order and open the door to aggression elsewhere, with catastrophic consequences the world over.” Read more →

#3 China’s spies are not always as good as advertised
THE ECONOMIST

Despite the fearsome reputation of Xi Jinping’s intelligence services, as The Economist points out, China’s spies are much better at harassing dissidents and technology theft than stealing government secrets and uncovering information.

Take the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example. “Whatever Vladimir Putin told Xi Jinping when the two presidents met in Beijing on February 4th,” The Economist writes, “China did not seem prepared for Russia’s invasion three weeks later. One giveaway was its failure to make plans to evacuate its citizens in Ukraine. China’s embassy first advised them to stay at home or fix a Chinese flag ‘on an obvious place on your car’… Two days later the embassy retracted its advice, warning citizens: ‘Don’t show your identity or display identifying symbols.'”

Writes the Economist: “Mr Xi appears to be making enormously consequential decisions based on dodgy intelligence. It is unclear whether the root cause is the information itself, the analysis applied or how it is communicated to China’s leaders. In any case, the outcome could be deadly miscalculation.” Read more →

#4 The Long Arm of Authoritarianism
Nana Gorokhovskaia and Isabel Linzer | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Drawing on a Freedom House report, Yana Gorokhovskaia and Isabel Linzer provide chilling evidence of the way authoritarian regimes are increasingly cooperating to suppress dissent and punish dissidents.

“We find that safe spaces for dissent are rapidly shrinking around the world,” they write. “Based on a data set of 735 documented incidents of explicit transnational repression that occurred between 2014 and 2021, we show that authoritarian governments are increasingly working together to help locate, threaten, detain, and expel their critics. Moreover, thanks to the restrictive asylum policies of many democracies that could otherwise serve as havens for dissidents, there are fewer safe places available for those seeking shelter from persecution. If democracies want to shore up liberal values and human rights worldwide, they could start by welcoming those who are risking their lives to stand up to authoritarian regimes.”

Read this for a clarion call on the importance of protecting dissidents—a vital part of promoting democracy around the world, and pushing back against authoritarianism.
Read more →

#5 36 Experts Agree: Stay the Couse in Ukraine
John Herbst, Steven Pifer, and David Kramer | THE HILL

This open letter signed by over thirty experts and former officials, including several at the Atlantic Council, is a powerful call to stay the course in Ukraine and not to pressure President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into a self-defeating peace deal.

“The United States and Europe,” they warn, “must avoid the urge to encourage Kyiv to negotiate a cease fire that falls short of Ukraine’s goals and could consign millions of Ukrainians to Russian control; after all, Putin denies the legitimacy of a unique Ukrainian identity, and Russian forces have already committed countless war crimes against them. Moreover, the Ukrainian side has tried to engage in good-faith negotiations, but got nowhere because Putin has shown no interest in serious negotiations. Western pressure on Kyiv to begin negotiations or accept a cease fire that the Ukrainians do not want would likely harden the Kremlin’s attitude and prolong the fighting.”

Read this in its entirety, including the powerful group of signatories at the end. Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Sep 16, 2022

The lesson Queen Elizabeth II leaves for King Charles III

By Andrew R. Marshall

The United Kingdom is a country where change has been the rule. And what’s most notable about the monarchy is, in fact, its ability to adapt to that change.

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

Issue Brief Sep 15, 2022

Democratic institutional strength before and beyond elections: The case of Brazil

By Valentina Sader

Americas Brazil

Markup Sep 15, 2022

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address.

By Atlantic Council experts

Ursula von der Leyen’s speech focused on energy and strategic decoupling of supply chains amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, but didn’t delve into common defense.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

The post It’s time to show Putin a dead end in Ukraine, not an off-ramp appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Davos Dispatch: Why I’m going ‘long’ on optimism despite global anxiety

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 29 May 2022 16:13:40 +0000

A hedge fund investor told me she attends the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland each year “so that I’ll know what to short.” In a world awash with geopolitical and economic pessimism—the dominant mood at this year’s Davos—her argument is that it might be time to go “long” on optimism.

One can quibble with her premise that Davos is a place more for conventional wisdom than investable solutions. As the world’s leading convener of global and business elites for most of the past half century, the WEF often has been ahead in identifying trends, including the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and in generating positive change, such as chief executive officers’ increased focus on social responsibility.

That said, there’s no doubt that this year’s prevailing theme was a collective gloom without ready solutions. One of Europe’s most murderous conflicts since World War II grinds on without resolution; the global economy continues to slide toward recession with slowing growth and growing inflation; and COVID-19, with all its variants, persists into its third year, with a particular pounding of China and related supply chains.

Yet there was another narrative on display in Davos as well.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has jolted the collective West from its slumber. Europe has responded with more collective purpose, and its taxpayers are funding weapons for a Ukraine fighting for shared freedoms. Even Davos’s newest elites, the cryptocurrency crowd, are exploring ways to deploy aid more effectively and swiftly to Ukraine even as they lick their wounds from billions in losses from the Terra crypto collapse.

That Davos for the first time took Russians off its invite list underscored that there are some crimes the global community must oppose.

“In Davos, our solidarity is foremost with the people suffering from the atrocities of this war,” said Klaus Schwab, the WEF’s founder and executive chairman. The WEF called for a “Marshall Plan” for the reconstruction of Ukraine, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Davos crowd via video that it should use seized Russian assets to help accomplish that task.

Not present was Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has used the Davos stage to preen as champion for a better world, most recently on January 17 this year when he spoke to a virtual WEF session.

One wonders whether Xi ever tried to convince Putin of what he told his January Davos audience: “History has proved time and again that confrontation does not solve problems; it only invites catastrophic consequences.”

The week’s most repeated story was that of how Ukrainian business leader and philanthropist Victor Pinchuk (an Atlantic Council International Advisory Board member) transformed the perennial “Russia House” into “Russian War Crimes House.”

Prominently located on the ski resort’s main drag, Russian business and government leaders took meetings and downed vodka shots at the “Russia House” in previous years. This year, its walls wore photographs and a big screen showing Putin’s atrocities.

“Russia for years came here to Davos to present itself in the way it believed it should show itself to the world,” exhibition curator Bjorn Geldhof told CNBC’s Silvia Amaro. “We are representing war crimes that Russia is committing in Ukraine, but war crimes that were also committed in Chechnya, that were committed in Syria—so what we are showing is the reality from Russia that most people don’t speak about.”

For all these reasons and more, I am going “short” on pessimism and “long” on optimism as I return to Washington, DC this weekend. I’m acting less due to any conviction about a positive outcome than I am because of the costs to us all if we don’t leverage this moment for a common cause.

I’m wagering that the hope and heroism Ukrainians have demonstrated will overwhelm the complacency that has weakened global democracies for much of the past three decades. I’m betting that the resolve to help the Ukrainians win will expand and outlast signs of fatigue as Russia makes gains in eastern Ukraine.

As Delaware Senator Christopher Coons told the Washington Post’s Ishaan Tharoor in Davos: “I think it’s fairly obvious that the Russian plan is to grind it out…and to count on the West to come apart in some way and frankly to lose interest and be distracted by high energy costs and our own elections.”

I’m also wishing, against previous experience, that following this week’s school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, resulting in twenty-one deaths, the United States can address its domestic ills even as it rallies the world to help Ukraine defeat Putin. One draws hope from the new $40 billion aid package for Ukraine that Washington’s toxic partisanship isn’t irreparable.

One can only see hope in Sweden and Finland’s applications to join NATO, ending a two-hundred-year history of Swedish neutrality, not to threaten Putin but rather to better unify the transatlantic community against a generational threat. I’m betting that NATO can overcome Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s objections.

US President Joe Biden’s trip this week to Asia was also encouraging, in that it introduced a new economic plan to advance relations with his partners and abandoned the outdated concept of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan, not to make war but to prevent it.

It was US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s speech at George Washington University on Thursday that captured the link between Putin’s war and China’s challenge.

“Beijing’s defense of President Putin’s war to erase Ukraine’s sovereignty and secure a sphere of influence in Europe should raise alarm bells for all of us who call the Indo-Pacific region home,” he said, later adding “we cannot rely on Beijing to change its trajectory. So we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system.”

That’s an outcome worth investing in.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 My Lunch With President Biden
Thomas L. Friedman | NEW YORK TIMES

Don’t miss Friedman’s column—one of his best and most powerful—written after a lunch with Biden at the White House. The fact that it was off the record doesn’t mean you won’t learn, as Friedman put it, “what I ate and how I felt after.”

“What I felt afterward was this,” he wrote. “For all you knuckleheads on Fox who say that Biden can’t put two sentences together, here’s a news flash: He just put NATO together, Europe together, and the whole Western alliance together—stretching from Canada up to Finland and all the way to Japan—to help Ukraine protect its fledgling democracy from Vladimir Putin’s fascist assault.”

And yet, Friedman fears that despite being able to rally US allies, Biden has failed to unite Americans. “I am talking about our ability to transfer power peacefully and legitimately, an ability we have demonstrated since our founding,” he explains. “The peaceful, legitimate transfer of power is the keystone of American democracy. Break it, and none of our institutions will work for long, and we will be thrust into political and financial chaos.” Read more →

#2 How to Make Biden’s Free World Strategy Work
Hal Brands | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Brands offers this smart look in Foreign Affairs at how Biden can modify his strategy to bring more countries into the fold and shore up US relationships.

Brands would like Biden to amend his divisive language of “autocracy versus democracy” that separates the world in ways that are imprecise and inaccurate. The fact is that there are democracies that haven’t joined the pressures on Putin, and there are autocracies that the United States needs and don’t embody the “combination of tyranny, power, and hostility” of Russia.

“The United States isn’t opposed to all autocracies, and not all democracies are on its side,” writes Brands. That means, Brands argues, that Biden must better articulate the coalition he aims to rally to better achieve success. Read more →

#3 China Is Doing Biden’s Work for Him
Michael Shuman | ATLANTIC

Schuman, an Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow, provides this helpful analysis of how China’s arrogance and diplomatic miscalculations continue to provide Biden with opportunities.

“Despite their constant pledges of ‘peaceful development,’” writes Schuman, “China’s leaders have scared many of the country’s neighbors. New Delhi, historically no fan of Washington, has felt threatened by Chinese hostility over disputed borders. Beijing’s intensifying intimidation of Taiwan—with Chinese jets buzzing dangerously close to the island—has alarmed the region. Politicians in Canberra and Seoul have certainly not forgotten the economic coercion Beijing employed against them to compel changes in their policy. China’s bullying in the South China Sea has irked those with competing maritime claims.”

The bottom line: Biden’s trip to Asia, marked by his comments on the defense of Taiwan and announcements of a proposed new regional trade pact, not only demonstrated the persistence of US global power but also underscored “Beijing’s failure to translate economic might into political dominance, even in its own backyard.” Read more →

#4 Three possible futures for a frozen conflict in Ukraine
Mathew Burrows and Robert A. Manning | ATLANTIC COUNCIL

For months, the Atlantic Council’s foresight experts have been projecting how the war could break out and, once it did, how it could unfold next.

In this latest installment, Burrows and Manning revisit their April forecasts considering the conflict’s trajectory since then. Their three possible scenarios are worth reading: Ukraine is slowly strangled, Russia makes no gains, and Ukraine wins back nearly everything.

“What happens next on the battlefield will determine whether the current largely frozen conflict will eventually advantage Russia or Ukraine,” they write. “Various military outcomes are still plausible. With so many variables in play, it is difficult to attach probabilities to potential scenarios.” Read more →

#5 We should not be afraid to set new precedents—speech by the President of Ukraine at the World Economic Forum in Davos
Volodymyr Zelenskyy

There will be a time when historians will review Zelenskyy’s rich collection of speeches and statements to understand how this unique leader rose to the challenge of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

His address to the World Economic Forum has been one of his strongest, where he seized upon the theme of the Davos gathering: “History at a turning point: government policies and business strategies.”

“This is really the moment when it is decided whether brute force will rule the world,” Zelenskyy told his audience, following their standing ovation. “If it reigns, our thoughts won’t matter to it. And we may no longer convene in Davos. Because what for?”

It was a tough message, telling those gathered that the war would not have happened if they had responded more resolutely after Russia started its war in Ukraine in 2014. That was a bad precedent that had to be corrected through unity of purpose.

“So, now we can do it differently,” he concluded. “Finally in the right way.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Sep 16, 2022

The lesson Queen Elizabeth II leaves for King Charles III

By Andrew R. Marshall

The United Kingdom is a country where change has been the rule. And what’s most notable about the monarchy is, in fact, its ability to adapt to that change.

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

Issue Brief Sep 15, 2022

Democratic institutional strength before and beyond elections: The case of Brazil

By Valentina Sader

Americas Brazil

Markup Sep 15, 2022

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address.

By Atlantic Council experts

Ursula von der Leyen’s speech focused on energy and strategic decoupling of supply chains amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, but didn’t delve into common defense.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

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Shapiro quoted in Haaretz on the how the Red Sea islands could normalize Israel-Saudi relations

Atlantic Council — Wed, 25 May 2022 18:56:00 +0000

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Darnal in Inkstick: The Global South and the war in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Wed, 25 May 2022 12:48:00 +0000

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On May 25, Aude Darnal was quoted in the monthly edition of “Adults in a Room,” a series from Inkstick Media in collaboration with the New American Engagement Initiative. This month’s installment focused on the Global South’s perspectives on the war in Ukraine.

“The new multipolar world, in which non-Western states will legitimately have greater power, commands a restructuring of the global order and its institutions. This calls, therefore, not for greater pressure from the West but rather for the creation of mutually beneficial partnerships and the United States and its Western allies to respect international norms and pursue policies that will make them attractive partners for the rest of the world.”

Former staff

Aude Darnal

Africa Conflict

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Katz quoted in Arab News on overlapping interests between Russia and authoritarian leaders in the Middle East

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 May 2022 18:03:00 +0000

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Iran Initiative event on the Taliban was mentioned in Politico’s National Security Daily newsletter

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 May 2022 17:58:00 +0000

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Khoury joins CGTN to discuss the political impacts of Lebanon’s election results and Hezbollah losses

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 May 2022 17:50:00 +0000

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Five ways Ukraine’s partners can defeat Putin and shape the future

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 15 May 2022 16:24:29 +0000

Here are five crucial challenges Ukraine and its global partners and allies must tackle as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s criminal war approaches its most decisive phase.

Some are short-term, while others have generational consequences. But all five are necessary to transform Putin’s murderous authoritarian threat into a historic opportunity for the civilized world to shape a better future.

Can Ukraine’s friends—particularly those in Europe and North America—not only maintain, but also strengthen, their unity and solidarity in the face of Putin’s growing brutality? With global energy prices and inflation rising, can they avoid the inevitable fatigue among democracies and remain focused on what seems a far-away threat?
Will Ukraine’s arms suppliers continue to provide Kyiv greater military capabilities despite Moscow’s threats of escalation (including its possible use of nuclear weapons)? And with this enhanced weaponry, can Ukrainian troops not only hold but retake territory occupied by Russian troops?
Can NATO overcome Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s opposition—and potentially that of others—to the imminent Finnish and Swedish application for membership? Can it provide Finland and Sweden protective status until they are full members, and accelerate the accession process? Can the US Senate ratify Finnish and Swedish NATO membership before its summer break, creating the crucial momentum?
Can Ukraine and its friends do more to establish the factually correct narrative that Putin is solely responsible for this premeditated and unprovoked war? Can they reach the Russian people more effectively so that they better understand that their president launched a war in their name that was not in their interests?
Finally, can the United States and its allies and partners strategically defeat Putin and sufficiently weaken Russian military capability so that Moscow is unable to continue the war or repeat something similar elsewhere? Can NATO and its global partners strengthen themselves enough so that they more effectively deter this sort of threat in the future?

That’s a long list—and it’s only the beginning.

The bottom line is that unanticipated Ukrainian resilience, resourcefulness, patriotism, and bravery have provided the free world an opportunity not only to save Ukraine, but also to reverse years of democratic drift and authoritarian resurgence.

If the democratic world is to avoid the rule of the jungle replacing the rule of law, now is the time to act.

It will be as important in the years ahead that the transatlantic community embrace Russia and Russians as part of US President George H.W. Bush’s dream of a Europe “whole and free.” Policymakers should already be designing how to make that happen. In the meantime, however, Ukraine’s friends must quell Putin’s revanchist, historically perverted obsession with restoring some false notion of “ancient Rus” through whatever means necessary.

The past week underscored positive momentum toward this end.

Finland and Sweden moved toward NATO membership; the United Kingdom tightened sanctions that cracked Putin’s wall of secrecy around his family and rumored girlfriend; Russian troops appeared to be retreating from Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city; and Ukrainian troops began launching a counteroffensive toward the eastern city of Izyum, targeting Russian supply lines to the Donbas region.

On Sunday, Finnish President Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Sanna Marin jointly announced that their country would apply for Alliance membership. “This is a historic day,” Niinisto said. “A new era begins.”

Reportedly, Sweden could arrive at the same decision as early as Monday.

For those misguided voices who still argue that NATO membership destabilizes rather than secures a more peaceful Europe, talk to officials in these two countries—who have watched the three Baltic members of NATO remain secure while Russia overran Ukraine, a non-NATO member.

Erdogan represents the greatest opposition thus far to Sweden and Finnish membership, based on what Turkey says is Sweden’s long-standing sheltering of Kurdish terrorists. Yet his language suggests this is more of a negotiating ploy than an immovable object: “At the moment, we are following the developments regarding Sweden and Finland, but we don’t hold positive views,” he said.

Not only has Putin’s war failed to take Ukraine, but it has also prompted global shifts that go far beyond Finland and Sweden.

Upon receiving a Distinguished Leadership Award from the Atlantic Council on May 11, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused “a paradigm shift in geopolitics.”

Added Draghi: “It has strengthened the ties between the European Union and the United States, isolated Moscow, raised deep questions for China. These changes are still ongoing, but one thing is certain: They are bound to stay with us for a long, long time.”

“We must continue to support the bravery of the Ukrainians as they fight for their freedom and for the security of us all,” he said. There should be peace, he argued, but added that “[i]t will be up to Ukrainians to decide the terms of this peace, and no one else.”

The threats of historic nature have been clear since Putin began assembling his troops last year for the February 24 attack. Now, Draghi argued, the opportunities are clearer.

“The war in Ukraine has the potential to bring the European Union even closer together,” he said. “We must remember the urgency of the moment, the magnitude of the challenge. This is Europe’s hour and we must seize it. The choices the European faces are brutally simple. We can be masters of our own destiny or slaves to the decisions of others.”

What makes Draghi optimistic is that Europe isn’t tackling this alone, but is strengthened by the “timeless bond” of transatlantic relations.

The test now is whether the current unity and momentum of Ukraine’s friends can withstand Putin’s escalating brutality and their own fatigue.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 World War II Is All That Putin Has Left
Anne Applebaum | THE ATLANTIC

Between the heroism of Ukraine’s defenders and his own wild miscalculations of Russia’s military ability, Putin’s attempt to create a propaganda narrative to justify his invasion of Ukraine has largely collapsed. That has left Putin only World War II mythmaking to fall back on—and Applebaum illustrates how even that is based on lies.

“In practice, Putinism is a powerful but ultimately empty ideology,” she writes. “Its propaganda divides people from one another, creates suspicion, and promotes apathy. State media put forth multiple nonsensical explanations for reality, including multiple nonsensical reasons for the invasion of Ukraine. In different tellings, Ukraine, a democratic state led by a Jewish president, is ‘Nazi,’ is Russian, is a Western puppet, is nonexistent. Alongside these stories, Russians are spoon-fed cynicism, mockery, and nihilism.”

Applebaum continues: “If he wants to expand the current conflict—if he wants to persuade millions of people to sacrifice their lives and their fortunes to fight across Europe once again—he will need to provide a far more powerful motivation, a far deeper reason to fight, something other than this war’s alleged resemblance to a past tragedy.” Read more →

#2 America Must Embrace the Goal of Ukrainian Victory
Alexander Vindman | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In Foreign Affairs, Alexander Vindman explains why the United States must push for a peace settlement that not only holds off Russia—but defeats it.

“As it stands,” he writes, “the United States has missed one opportunity after the other to help precipitate a decisive Ukrainian victory and stop Russia from making gains in the Donbas. Instead of foreclosing the possibility of a Russian success, Washington’s strategy of metering incremental military aid to Ukraine—based on a flawed assessment of the risk of escalation and the potential consequences of a Russian defeat—has provided Moscow with the time and space to continue its war, even as it now shifts to defending the territory it has seized since February 24.” Read more →

#3 How Ukrainians Saved Their Capital
Luke Mogelson | THE NEW YORKER

The Atlantic Council honored the Ukrainian people as a whole this week with a Distinguished Leadership Award for their heroism in the fight against Russia’s invasion. As President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his remarks, “[W]e must say and remember that behind the courage and wisdom of our people, there are thousands of real stories, names, and heroic feats.”

To understand the individual stories of their heroism more deeply, read Luke Mogelson’s New Yorker narrative.

One such story is that of a violinist who volunteered for the Ukrainian military in 2014 after a policeman broke her hand during a political protest. Another tracks the life of an eighty-four-year-old woman with, Mogelson wrote, “shrapnel wounds to her groin and abdomen. She did not cry out. When a medic commented on her grit, the woman said that she had also survived the Second World War.” Read more →

#4 Xi Jinping Scrambles as China’s Economy Stumbles
Kevin Rudd | THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

To more deeply understand how President Xi Jinping’s leadership has damaged the Chinese economy, read this smart analysis by former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, one of the leading China experts writing today.

As Xi hurtles toward what he hopes will be his inevitable reelection as China’s leader later this year, Rudd writes: “Recent economic assessments have predicted a sharply slowing Chinese growth trajectory, to around 3% by 2030 and 2% by 2050. If this proves to be the case and Mr. Xi doesn’t radically change course, the global strategic and economic significance will be profound. China would cease being the world’s growth engine. It may not surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by decade’s end after all—and if it does, it won’t be by much.”

Yet although China’s economic woes are of Xi’s own making, don’t expect him to admit that: As Rudd notes, the only way to a better economic future is for the leader to change course. “But given his Marxist-Leninist ideological predilections, that will be hard,” Rudd concludes. Read more →

#5 Remarks by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi at the 2022 Distinguished Leadership Awards
ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The Atlantic Council on Wednesday held its Distinguished Leadership Awards dinner, an annual salute to individuals whose leadership contributes to a better world. Atop the list of recipients this year were Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and, for the first time, an entire nation: the people of Ukraine.

The acceptance speeches by Draghi and Zelenskyy are worth reading for the insight they provide into our historic moment and the bravery and resilience of the Ukrainian people.

“This is Europe’s hour and we must seize it,” Draghi said. “The choices the European faces are brutally simple. We can be masters of our own destiny or slaves to the decisions of others.”

Zelenskyy, meanwhile, said: “Do not be afraid and come to Ukraine. Hear thousands of similar stories about us, Ukrainians. Look into their brave eyes, shake their strong hands, and you will see that they are doing all this not for glory, that they need not only awards, but also concrete help and support. Weapons, equipment, financial support, sanctions on Russia, and the most important: the feeling that in this difficult struggle, they are not alone, that they are supported by you, by the whole world—free states and free nations of our planet.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Sep 16, 2022

The lesson Queen Elizabeth II leaves for King Charles III

By Andrew R. Marshall

The United Kingdom is a country where change has been the rule. And what’s most notable about the monarchy is, in fact, its ability to adapt to that change.

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

Issue Brief Sep 15, 2022

Democratic institutional strength before and beyond elections: The case of Brazil

By Valentina Sader

Americas Brazil

Markup Sep 15, 2022

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address.

By Atlantic Council experts

Ursula von der Leyen’s speech focused on energy and strategic decoupling of supply chains amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, but didn’t delve into common defense.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

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Nia quoted in the Middle East Eye on legal accountability mechanisms for Shireen Abu Akleh

Atlantic Council — Fri, 13 May 2022 13:20:00 +0000

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Blanford quoted in France24 on the implications of expat Lebanese votes for parliamentary elections

Atlantic Council — Mon, 09 May 2022 21:07:00 +0000

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Blanford in CS Monitor: The Syria-Israeli peace deal that almost was: A diplomat looks back

Atlantic Council — Fri, 06 May 2022 20:58:00 +0000

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Putin and Xi are accelerating their push against democracy. Here’s how the US can fight back.

Patrick Quirk, David O. Shullman — Fri, 06 May 2022 16:39:06 +0000

Although a welcome development, the recent US and European escalation of arms shipments to Ukraine is insufficient to curb Russian President Vladimir Putin’s designs on expanding illiberalism.

That’s because the Kremlin isn’t alone: Both Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping view the expansion of democracy as a threat to their grip on power and key to the advancement of US and allied influence around the world. Disrupting democracy and strengthening authoritarianism globally are therefore central elements of their strategic competition with the United States.

Before Putin’s brazen invasion of Ukraine, both he and Xi had long recognized that interference in open societies to advantage illiberal friends is preferable to and far less costly than military invasion. There is no shortage of examples: In Ethiopia and Kenya, for instance, Beijing has invested in training the ruling parties on the same strategies and tactics the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses to stay in power. It has also poured money into countries such as Cambodia and Serbia without demanding progress on human rights or democratic development, reinforcing authoritarian trends there. For its part, Russia actively uses a range of online information operations to advantage illiberal populist allies abroad—from bolstering euroskeptic actors in the Netherlands to promoting a Kremlin-friendly narrative in government-controlled media in Hungary.

Chinese and Russian efforts to undermine democratic institutions and bolster illiberal leaders also frequently complement one another. Russian disinformation campaigns and efforts to exacerbate societal divides are often more effective in countries that are increasingly dependent on Chinese investment and convinced by its promotion of an authoritarian development model. While these efforts are typically undertaken independently, there is mounting evidence of coordination, particularly on propaganda and disinformation.

The Kremlin’s evident failings in Ukraine will likely spark fear among Putin, Xi, and their elite support networks that this could snowball into more democratic successes in their neighborhoods. As this perceived threat escalates, so too will the dedication among the leaders of Russia and China to advance illiberalism and undercut democratic movements. Beyond its immediate periphery, Beijing’s protection of its expanding global interests will increasingly result in efforts to prevent inconvenient political transitions. Its recent deal with the Solomon Islands allowing it to send security forces “to assist in maintaining social order” is only a harbinger of things to come. Meanwhile, Russia’s war has injected new life into the NATO alliance and broader transatlantic relationship.

Funding freedom

The United States needs to strike while the iron is hot to establish deeper collaboration with allies to shore up democracy. There are two steps that can keep the West ahead of Putin and Xi as they shift their promotion of authoritarianism into overdrive.

First, the United States must secure the resources necessary to protect democracy from Beijing and Moscow—in Eastern Europe and beyond. While President Joe Biden’s proposed fiscal year 2023 budget rightfully includes increases for the Pentagon (bringing its budget to $773 billion) to enable US armed forces to address simultaneous threats from China and Russia, the challenge from Moscow and Beijing is not a unidimensional military one. From Ukraine to Taiwan, Central African Republic to El Salvador, Putin and Xi use a multiplicity of political, economic, and diplomatic tactics to exert influence and undermine fledgling and established democracies.

Democracy has not faced as significant a challenge from expansionist authoritarianism in decades—yet the US budget to protect and promote democracy by non-military means is a mere $3.2 billion, or less than one-quarter of the cost of a single aircraft carrier.

Congress must address this discrepancy between today’s threat profile and the resources at the disposal of the United States. Swiftly passing legislation such as the bipartisan Democracy in the 21^st Century Act, introduced late last year by Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Chris Coons (D-DE), would be a good place to start: The bill provides forty million dollars to a “Fund to Defend Democracy Globally.” These modest funds could go a long way toward girding vulnerable democracies against adversaries’ attempts to undermine institutions, discredit elections, spread disinformation, and co-opt elites.

Second, the United States also must capitalize on Europe’s newfound recognition of the protracted contest it faces with both Russia and China, having watched Beijing’s craven response to the tragedy in Ukraine. They must collectively amplify a powerful allied narrative about the need to protect democracy and punish adversaries who seek to undermine it. This is essential at a time when Beijing is trying to redefine the very meaning of democracy, claiming the concept as its own while gleefully cataloging the failures of US democracy and promoting its own repressive system of governance.

The United States has done well to rally European and key Asian allies against Russia, bringing them together to levy sanctions, transfer arms, and present a joint diplomatic front. This same grouping can do more to support and fund democratic activists and critical journalists working to expose opaque deals between their own governments and the CCP and the Kremlin. Electoral processes, the lifeblood of any democracy, must also be shored up against Russian and Chinese interference and corruption.

Democratic allies also need stronger partnerships with platforms and regulators to share best practices on combating disinformation. China’s brazen campaign amplifying Russian lies about the horrors unfolding in Ukraine underscores their joint challenge to the global information ecosystem.

Joining forces against autocracy

To achieve maximum strategic impact ahead of an expected uptick in authoritarian pressure on democracies, developed democracies must play to their strengths. The United States and its allies should together determine how national aid agencies, diplomats, development finance institutions, and democracy promotion and civil society organizations can combine forces and split responsibilities to bolster critical institutions and democratic actors in countries targeted by China and Russia.

To its credit, the Biden administration has updated the shopworn sanctions playbook by going big—targeting Russia’s foreign currency reserves, for instance—rather than using the meager measures deployed after Putin’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas in 2014. The United States should build on this by exploring forceful penalties other than sanctions that are sufficiently consequential to alter the behavior of adversaries.

At the moment, Russia and China are employing the equivalent of hypersonic weapons to undermine democratic processes, while the United States and its allies are fighting with something akin to Cold War-era rifles. To defeat Putin and confront the long-term challenge both he and Xi pose together, the democracies of the world need to arm Ukraine but also redouble their arsenal in support of democracy.

Patrick W. Quirk is senior director for strategy and research at the International Republican Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served on the US Secretary of State’s policy planning staff.

David O. Shullman is senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council.

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The Hill covered the Israel Initiative’s event with Ambassador to Israel, Thomas R. Nides

Atlantic Council — Thu, 05 May 2022 14:20:00 +0000

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Hamodia mentioned the Israel Initiative’s event with Ambassador to Israel, Thomas R. Nides

Atlantic Council — Tue, 03 May 2022 14:05:00 +0000

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Times of Israel mentioned Israel Initiative event with Ambassador Thomas R. Nides

Atlantic Council — Tue, 03 May 2022 13:26:00 +0000

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Khoury quoted in Politics Today on Emirati-Israeli relations amidst aggression in Jerusalem and Arab public opinion on normalization

Atlantic Council — Sun, 01 May 2022 13:17:00 +0000

Listen to the episode here.

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Friedlander interviewed by Bloomberg on President Biden’s proposal to seize and sell the assets of Russian oligarchs to help Ukraine

naladekoba — Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:05:00 +0000

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Ferziger in Circuit News: Emirates rabbi sees interfaith shrine opening by year’s end

Atlantic Council — Thu, 28 Apr 2022 12:01:00 +0000

Listen to the episode here.

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Friedlander quoted in NPR on sanctions imposed on Russia as the ultimate test for the future use of the tool

naladekoba — Thu, 28 Apr 2022 11:13:00 +0000

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Mezran and Melcangi in the Italian Journal of International Affairs: “Truly a Proxy War? Militias, Institutions, and External Actors in Libya between Limited Statehood and Rentier State”

Atlantic Council — Wed, 27 Apr 2022 13:14:00 +0000

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Daoud in Times of Israel: Can Lebanon be neutral on the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Atlantic Council — Wed, 27 Apr 2022 11:55:00 +0000

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Aboudouh in Community99: Russia’s war on Ukraine causes Saudi Arabia and the UAE to reconsider how they handle U.S pressure on China

Atlantic Council — Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:11:00 +0000

Read the full article here.

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Biden should deploy ‘great arsenal of democracy’ to defend Ukraine

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 24 Apr 2022 18:55:30 +0000

On December 29, 1940, nearly a year before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II, millions of Americans turned on their radios to hear President Franklin D. Roosevelt explain why they should support Europe’s forces of freedom against Adolf Hitler’s fascist advance.

Americans at the time were deeply uncertain about whether they should be involved at all in the distant European war, though they were aghast at the reports of its horrors. Roosevelt used one of his famous fireside chats to convince them that the United States should rapidly and decisively deploy its vast industrial capacity on freedom’s behalf.

“We must be the great arsenal of democracy,” he said in the firm, familiar voice that Americans had let into their living rooms for most of that decade. “We have furnished the British great material support and we will furnish far more in the future. There will be no ‘bottlenecks’ in our determination to aid Great Britain. No dictator, no combination of dictators, will weaken that determination by threats of how they will construe that determination.”

Eight decades later, President Joe Biden must decide just how far he is willing to go in deploying an updated “great arsenal of democracy” to empower Ukraine to defeat today’s European tyrant, Russian President Vladimir Putin. What Biden’s administration and its partners have done thus far, through sanctions and military support, has been remarkable—but it remains insufficient as Putin escalates his offensive on Ukraine’s east and south.

As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited Kyiv Sunday, it is no longer enough for Biden to pledge that the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory, as required by all twenty-nine other Alliance members under Article 5 of its founding treaty. Although that commitment is commendable and crucial for member states bordering Russia and Ukraine, it has been construed by Putin as open game on Ukraine itself (which is not in the Alliance).

It’s now time for Biden to commit Americans and, to the extent possible, the democratic world more broadly to defending Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and freedom. That means not only extending political support and rhetorical common cause, but also sufficient intelligence and military assistance to halt Putin’s ongoing advance. Anything less would be contrary to Biden’s own stated convictions.

As Biden himself said during his State of the Union address this year, “Throughout our history we’ve learned this lesson when dictators do not pay a price for their aggression they cause more chaos. They keep moving. And the costs and the threats to America and the world keep rising.”

He continued: “That’s why the NATO Alliance was created to secure peace and stability in Europe after World War II…Putin’s latest attack on Ukraine was premeditated and unprovoked. He rejected repeated efforts at diplomacy. He thought the West and NATO wouldn’t respond. And he thought he could divide us at home. Putin was wrong. We were ready.”

But are we really ready for the next stage, which is growing uglier and more dangerous with each day of Putin’s advance? Only Ukraine’s survival as a free country can begin the reversal of a three-decade downward trajectory of democratic freedoms in Europe and the world—which, in turn, endangers all the forward progress of Europe since World War II.

The newest report by the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, which produces the largest global dataset on democracy in the world, found that “the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2021 is down to 1989 levels,” meaning that the last thirty years of democratic advances following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union have now been fully reversed.

The number of countries that V-Dem considers liberal democracies was down to just thirty-four in 2021, the smallest number since 1995. “Together, autocracies now harbor 70% of the world population,” the report warns. That accounts for some 5.4 billion people, it adds.

Democracy scholars are tracking disturbing evidence that autocrats are growing bolder. Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an independent country led by an elected government, followed five military coups in 2021—the largest single-year increase of the previous two decades, the report finds. V-Dem sees the dangers increasing within established democracies as well.

“Polarization and government misinformation are also increasing,” it writes. “These trends are interconnected. Polarized publics are more likely to demonize political opponents and distrust information from diverse sources, and mobilization shifts as a result.”

In his new book, “The Revenge of Power: How Autocrats are Reinventing Politics for the 21^st Century,” Moisés Naím writes about the “three Ps” that are driving this trend: populism, polarization, and post-truth. He sees this ilk of autocratic power as “malign” and “incompatible with the democratic values at the center of any free society.”

A great deal separates the international situation Roosevelt confronted in 1940 from the one facing Biden in 2022. What connects these two inflection points is the danger of aggressive authoritarianism and the insufficient common cause to confront it.

When Roosevelt spoke in December 1940, his appeal came three months after the signing of the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan, which created a defense alliance of autocracies that was intended to deter the United States from entering the war.

On February 4 of this year, the bipartite “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China” doesn’t seem to go nearly as far—in that it doesn’t commit either side to a defense alliance. But its language is hardly less ambitious, and is similarly aimed at the United States.

And this time, the two authoritarian great powers are armed with nuclear weapons.

“Friendship between the two States has no limits,” reads the 5,300-word text (which came just twenty days before Putin launched his war), “[and] there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation.”

As was the case then with Roosevelt, Biden must also weigh the dangers of the moment against the future perils born of an insufficient response.

“If we are to be completely honest with ourselves,” Roosevelt told Americans, “we must admit that there is risk in any course we may take. But I deeply believe that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I advocate involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.”

His message for Biden is clear: Do more now to stop Putin, or pay the consequences later.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 America’s Interest in Ukrainian Victory
Andrew A. Michta | CITY JOURNAL

In this smart reflection, Andrew Michta emphasizes what’s at stake for the United States in Ukraine. In light of the partnership between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, he writes, it is a mistake to separate Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from China.

With that in mind, Michta writes, “Russian defeat would free the United States to focus on the Indo-Pacific, in the process solidifying NATO and finally bringing about a genuine rearmament of Europe.”

But to help Ukraine defeat Russia, merely trying to force a stalemate is insufficient. Instead, Michta believes, the West faces a stark choice: “[G]o for a stalemate and all but ensure that Putin, once he has reconstituted his forces, will invade yet again (this time with a greater risk of escalation into NATO territory); or supply Ukraine with what it needs today to defeat Putin’s army and, in doing so, transform the regional security equation.” Read more →

#2 Ukraine Can Win: The Case Against Compromise
Alina Polyakova and John Herbst | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this week’s second must-read, the Atlantic Council’s John Herbst and Alina Polyakova provide an in-depth explanation of what the United States and Europe must do to help Ukraine not just hold off, but actively defeat, Russia.

“Winning in Ukraine won’t be cheap, materially or politically. The United States will need to spend more than the $14 billion that Congress committed to Ukraine last month to achieve all these aims. It will need to pressure its allies in Europe. And it will have to manage more nuclear saber rattling from Moscow by sending clear messages about what Washington will do if Putin resorts to using nuclear weapons in Ukraine, rather than constraining itself by promising not to take certain steps.”

Yet if Ukraine is able to defeat the Russians, it will prove one of the smartest investments the United States has ever made. Read more →

#3 The French Election is a Glimpse at the Volatile Future of Western Politics
Catherine Fieschi | POLITICO

Against the backdrop of today’s presidential election in France, and with the specter of populism alive and well in Western democracies, this thoughtful analysis from Catherine Fieschi argues that populism is less of a new political state than likely a transition to something else.

The French election, Fieschi writes, “ultimately offers a glimpse at the future of Western politics: Whether populist politicians take power or not, they are certain to continue to upend our politics for years to come.

She continues: “The once emotional charge of casting a vote, of contributing to political decisions, of making history by crafting compromises that benefit entire communities — all this needs to be reinvented and replenished. We need more voting, more often, more campaigns, more opportunities to discuss what normally comes around only every few years, lest we let populism deliver all the wrong excitement of the occasional, binary and oppressive referendum.” Read more →

#4 Interests, not values, underpin Asia’s ambivalence about Russia
THE ECONOMIST

To understand the emerging non-aligned movement in the new global superpower contest, read this Economist article about how Asian nations are responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Despite largely being democracies, the Economist writes, “few Asians share the European and American perception of the war as a grand battle between democracies and autocracies. For many of them, including most of America’s allies in Asia, responses to Russia’s invasion have been dictated first by cold calculations of interests, with values coming a distant second.” Read more →

#5 Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond
Richard D. Hooker | ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Amid calls for further military aid to Ukraine, one consistent concern is that of escalation. In this smart analysis, the Atlantic Council’s Richard Hooker examines the potential points of escalation—and explains how the West can manage them while still supporting Ukraine.

Crucially, Hooker writes, “[t]he best the West can do is prepare for the worst, keep its nerve, and employ all its resources when its vital interests and most cherished values are attacked. Things are very close to that stage now. At stake is an international order founded on something other than brute force, imperial ambition, and autocratic self-help. A Russian victory in Ukraine, even at great cost, places a vengeful Putin on Europe’s doorstep, his ambitions partially achieved but still unrealized. The next blow will fall on NATO’s eastern flank. Now is the time to ensure that never happens.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Sep 16, 2022

The lesson Queen Elizabeth II leaves for King Charles III

By Andrew R. Marshall

The United Kingdom is a country where change has been the rule. And what’s most notable about the monarchy is, in fact, its ability to adapt to that change.

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

Issue Brief Sep 15, 2022

Democratic institutional strength before and beyond elections: The case of Brazil

By Valentina Sader

Americas Brazil

Markup Sep 15, 2022

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address.

By Atlantic Council experts

Ursula von der Leyen’s speech focused on energy and strategic decoupling of supply chains amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, but didn’t delve into common defense.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

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Lipsky quoted in Associated Press on how Russia benefits from the US calling for its removal from the G20

naladekoba — Sat, 23 Apr 2022 13:51:00 +0000

The post Lipsky quoted in Associated Press on how Russia benefits from the US calling for its removal from the G20 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lipsky quoted in Bloomberg on the importance of the G20 in coordinating global action

sbusch — Fri, 22 Apr 2022 19:11:33 +0000

Read the full article here.

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Friedlander interviewed by the RUSI Suspicious Transaction Report podcast

sbusch — Fri, 22 Apr 2022 19:11:09 +0000

Listen to the episode here.

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Episode 1: “Living in the Arctic”

rcasberg — Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:09:43 +0000

Anu Fredriksson, Executive Director for Arctic Frontiers, gives a local perspective on living in the Arctic. “There is a danger of our stories being sidetracked,” Ms. Fredriksson said. As climate change and global powers reshape the Arctic, “people of the Arctic will need to have a say in the development of our region. And what we are experiencing at times, is that we struggle to get our own stories across.”

Anu is originally from Oulu in Northern Finland and has worked with Arctic issues for over a decade. She has previously served as Director at the Arctic Economic Council and as an Arctic Policy Advisory at the Finnish Embassy in Norway.

more episodes

europe center

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Qaddour joins the Henry Jackson Society to discuss international law and Russian aggression in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Fri, 22 Apr 2022 11:39:00 +0000