Security

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

Tracking narratives

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

Media policy

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

International response

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol. 

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack. 

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge. 

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.” 

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner. 

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries. 

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny. 

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August. 

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.” 

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Spanish presidency is the first of the new trio comprised also of Belgium and Hungary. Whereas the previous trio was defined by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this new trio will potentially need to reshuffle its priorities for the EU and transatlantic relationship, following not only the parliamentary elections in June 2024 and the formation of the next European Commission, but also the US elections shortly after. Each new presidency trio sets long-term goals for its collective eighteen-month term and the priorities of each individual presidency generally reflect the broad ambitions of the trio (although Hungary may be blocked from chairing the Council given ongoing concerns about the government’s lack of alignment with EU values).

Spain takes up the mantle from Sweden, whose presidency prioritized security, European unity, competitiveness, the green transition, democratic values, and the rule of law. Sweden made a dent in these goals, and Spain is inheriting over three hundred pieces of unfinished legislation, of which it has identified more than 120 as priorities. Spain’s thematic priorities for its own presidency show continuation on some themes (the green transition and European unity) as well as more novel focuses (reindustrialization and social justice).

In a speech on June 15, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez outlined a number of priorities for Spain’s EU presidency. It is worth taking a closer look at four of these priorities to assess the chances of moving each issue forward, as well as one additional wildcard he did not mention.

1. European reindustrialization

Sánchez’s agenda includes a new emphasis on economic security and beefing up European industrial strategy, including in the health and agriculture sectors. Spain will pay special attention to ensuring thriving strategic industries in Europe with greater innovation capacity, combined with an openness to deepen external partnerships.   

In that vein, the commitment to openness will likely include a push to deepen ties between the EU and Latin America, potentially as soon as the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States summit on July 17-18. Spain might also prioritize getting the long-negotiated EU-Mercosur free trade agreement with Latin America over the finish line, although divergences over environmental rules might take longer to overcome than Spain would like.

Regarding its intention to ensure economic security within the bloc, Spain will likely take advantage of its presidency to advance the conversation on economic governance. Especially on the future of fiscal rules, EU member states need to reach consensus on the re-imagination of the Stability and Growth pact (the agreement that sets limits of 60 percent of gross domestic product for debt and 3 percent for annual deficits), which has been suspended since the COVID-19 pandemic. The success of the Spanish presidency may well be judged on this contentious issue. In an increasingly fragmented global economy, Europe is facing growing challenges to maintain its competitiveness. These include the effects of the Russian war in Ukraine and the US Inflation Reduction Act, which has drawn criticism as protectionist. Here Spain must facilitate conversations within the EU that build on recent Commission proposals for EU competitiveness beyond 2030.  

Although Europe hasn’t produced big tech champions on artificial intelligence (AI), it is leading the world in proactive regulation—a phenomenon called the “Brussels Effect,” in which the EU’s size and active approach toward regulation encourages foreign-based companies to comply with EU standards. In that regard, one of the most likely accomplishments of the Spanish presidency will be finalizing the AI Act, which Sánchez identified as a key priority—unsurprisingly, given Spain’s own leadership in the AI market. Although there is widespread support to get the AI Act passed, there is still a major sticking point between the Parliament and the Commission on banning facial recognition software.

2. The green transition

Driving the green transition has been a long-time focus of the current Spanish government. Heading into the Spanish presidency, pushing environmental legislation around the EU’s “Fit for 55” ambitions is one of Spain’s top priorities.

In particular, following the European Parliament’s vote in May on legislation to reduce methane emissions, the Spanish presidency will preside over the conversations between the Council and the Parliament on the final text of this legislation. Another green transition priority will be building on the progress that took place under Sweden’s presidency on proposals to define the regulatory framework for a future natural gas and hydrogen market. Trilogues—talks among the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission—have begun on the issue, but one of the main hurdles remains identifying, or “unbundling,” gas providers from the owners of the infrastructure.

We’re also likely to see movement on legislation to decouple the EU’s wholesale electricity prices from natural gas, a long-held Spanish priority that Spain helped push into the Commission proposal for reforming the EU electricity market. Despite Spain historically leading the charge on this initiative (motivated most recently by ongoing protests over sky-high energy prices), it may be hindered by its new position as it must oversee the debate on this legislative proposal neutrally. The proposal remains controversial and detractors such as Germany and Denmark continue to argue that the current system is preferable, as it promotes transparency and investment in greener energy sources.

3. Social and economic justice

Progressive social policy has been a priority at the national level in Spain for years, and we can expect this portfolio to receive special attention during its presidency, unless the elections turn to the advantage of the right and far-right. Spain has been a dedicated advocate for policies promoting social equality and workers’ rights, which we will likely see carry over to the EU level. For instance, Madrid’s presidency comes at the final stages of the negotiations on the Commission’s proposed legislation to issue a European disability card, allowing for easier freedom of movement for disabled persons across the EU.

Spain may also push to finalize legislation protecting the rights for platform workers so that ride-share drivers, delivery drivers, and other gig workers are afforded similar rights as traditional company employees. It is a contentious issue. European countries use different practices and approaches, with some more determined to protect gig workers while others seek to preserve the economic advantages offered by the platforms.

While not specifically on the agenda, the multi-pronged demographic challenge Europe has to face in the near future requires much more attention. It is already playing out in issues around competitiveness, social welfare programs, immigration policy, and Europe’s position in the world. Spain could use its presidency to give the necessary impetus to the discussion. In addition, Spain will likely oversee the discussions on the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.

4. Strengthening European unity

The Spanish presidency will likely divide this priority into an individual and an EU-wide component. At the individual level, this will mean ensuring citizens feel a part of Europe. One way to do this might be for Spain to restart the conversation on European identity by hosting a summit or another kind of convening, following the Conference on the Future of Europe, which concluded in 2022.

From an EU perspective, Spain has been vocal in its support for enlargement for candidate countries, including Ukraine. In October, the European Commission will release its report on enlargement, which the European Council will have to draw conclusions from. Western Balkans countries intent on joining the EU have a strong supporter in Spain. (A notable exception is Kosovo, whose independence Spain refuses to recognize, in part because Madrid sees parallels with its own separatist movements.) In April, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs José Manuel Albares toured the Western Balkans, marking the first visit in twelve years by a Spanish foreign minister to the region and signaling Spain’s support for its countries’ EU hopes.

In addition to enlargement, Spain is vocal in its support for institutional reforms at the EU level. In particular, Madrid has been a leader on the debate around extending the EU’s qualified majority voting (QMV) mechanism to include foreign and security policy issues, which would allow the EU to be more dynamic and responsive in these areas. Spain is unlikely to make a significant breakthrough on QMV during its presidency, but it may be able to advance the discussion during its term. Despite growing consensus among EU member states, smaller countries are more reluctant to adopt QMV because their views could be more easily overcome: Only fifteen out of the twenty-seven member states need to agree in a QMV system, but they must represent at least 65 percent of the EU’s total population.

5. Elections could revise the agenda

“Europe must become an area of certainties,” Sánchez said as he was introducing the Spanish agenda for its EU presidency. And yet, the approaching snap general election has introduced a great deal of uncertainty about who will be in power in Spain going forward. Spaniards are now in election mode, with voting taking place on July 23. The elections were supposed to take place in December, but Sánchez called for snap elections after his party had a poor result in local elections at the end of May.

If Sánchez’s party wins the election, it will, of course, have a minimal impact on the current agenda for Spain’s EU presidency. Likewise, if there is no clear majority from the election, the current government will remain as a caretaker during negotiations around a new coalition, albeit with limited ability to prioritize the European agenda. However, in the event of a major shakeup in the election, the formation of a new government will be decisive for the future of Spanish domestic policy, and, just as decisively, the EU agenda could change, too.

Lisa Homel is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Marie Jourdain is a visiting fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Five things to expect from Spain’s EU presidency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Yevgeniya Gaber wrote an article for the German journal IPS on what to expect from Turkey’s new government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What were the main takeaways from the second round of the Greek parliamentary elections? What were the key political cleavages driving Greek voters? What are the implications of these elections on the future of democracy in Greece? And how will the new government seek to work with Europe and the United States as Greece continues to tackle challenges from climate change to migration?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Luka Ignac sits down with Katerina Sokou, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, to discuss the Greek election results and implications for relations with the United States and Europe. 

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What’s the outcome of the Greek parliamentary elections? | A Debrief with Katerina Sokou appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”  

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine. 

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort. 

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime. 

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 25, 2023

Short-lived Wagner mutiny will undermine Russia’s Ukraine invasion

By Peter Dickinson

The short-lived Wagner mutiny was over in less than two days but it will have a long-lasting consequences for Russia, for a weakened Vladimir Putin, and for the already faltering invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert Apr 4, 2023

Russia’s Wagner Group is a feature not a bug of the Putin regime

By Allen Maggard

Russian private paramilitaries like the Wagner Group are a symptom of the institutionalized corruption at the heart of Putin’s regime and not just another instrument in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox, writes Allen Maggard.

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UkraineAlert Jun 27, 2023

Ukrainians have good reason to cheer Russia’s Wagner rebellion

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Ukrainians have good reason to cheer the short-lived Wagner mutiny, which has removed Russia’s most effective military units from the battlefield while exposing the weakness of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Sandra Torres, a well-known but polarizing figure in her third bid for the presidency, and Bernardo Arevalo, a congressman, first-time presidential hopeful, and former diplomat with a strong anti-graft message, have advanced to the second round, which will be held on August 20. The low voter turnout of 60 percent and high percentage of null votes—four times as high as in the last elections, making up nearly a quarter of all votes—reflect a prevailing sense of apathy among Guatemalan voters and an erosion of confidence in an electoral process that, to date, has been marred by seemingly arbitrary court decisions on candidates’ eligibility to run. For this cycle, political parties brought a record number of legal actions against each other, with at least three presidential candidates and other candidates for congress barred from running.

Nonetheless, Guatemala’s runoff election to replace term-limited Alejandro Giammattei will have far-reaching implications, both for the region and beyond. For one, Guatemala’s next president will be less ideologically conservative than the last three administrations in Central America’s most populous country. The emergence of more left-leaning governments is in line with trends from other recent elections in the region (Honduras, Chile, Colombia, and Brazil, for example).

The next president’s decision to align with China or maintain relations with Taiwan will reverberate beyond Guatemala’s borders. The outcome could determine whether the Biden administration has a reliable partner for its strategy in Central America—which is designed to help quell the surge of migrants on the US-Mexico border and to combat graft and corruption. And the economic challenges facing the country, including poverty, inequality, and fiscal deficits will require comprehensive policy measures and hard reforms from whoever takes office in 2024. That’s a tall order when considering the two candidates for the August runoff.

Geopolitical implications

Guatemala is host to one of the last two Taiwanese embassies in Central America (the other is in Belize), and one of only seven in Latin America and the Caribbean. The outcome of the runoff election has the potential to tip the region’s balance toward China once and for all, thus shaping the future trajectory of not just Guatemala but also the broader interests of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. China has been calling on Guatemala to make the “right choice” and has overtly increased its footprint in the region in the last few months—first through Honduras’ decision to break off ties with Taiwan in March and then with reports of late-stage talks for the establishment of a Chinese military training facility in Cuba. Despite this, leading candidate Torres has vowed to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Arevalo’s position is less clear. He has stated that Guatemala’s sovereignty and interests are most important and that there is no reason to “jump trains.” After all, China is Guatemala’s second-biggest commercial partner, behind the United States.

Closer to home, the runoff election results may determine the extent to which the next Guatemalan government is willing to collaborate with the United States to address matters such as irregular migration, corruption, and transnational crime. As a political insider whose party has been embroiled in several corruption investigations, Torres is seen as unlikely to take strong measures against suspected corruption within the party system. On the other hand, Arevalo is known as the anti-corruption congressman. His party—Movimiento Semilla—is all but a symbol of the 2015 “Guatemalan Spring,” which resulted in the resignation and arrest of then-president Otto Perez Molina. Arevalo announced on Monday that if he were to win the election, he would convene former judges and prosecutors to create a national anti-corruption advisory group. With increasingly unreliable allies across the region, the Biden-Harris administration’s ability to carry out its strategy toward Central America hinges upon the election of a trustworthy and dependable leader in Guatemala.

Economic implications

Guatemala is the largest economy in Central America, but with some of the highest rates of poverty and inequality in the region, as well as the lowest rate of tax collection in Latin America. While Torres would likely continue with a more conservative economic agenda focused on macroeconomic stability, market-oriented reforms, attraction of foreign investment, and fiscal discipline, less is known about Arevalo’s plan. The next president will also have to deal with a growing fiscal deficit and continued social demands. The president will need to work with a split Congress to pass budgets—the country failed to do so in 2020 and 2021, when protestors set the Capitol on fire—to support the population’s needs and continue to improve the country’s basic infrastructure. To address the low rates of tax revenue in relation to the size of the economy, the next administration will also have to undertake important reforms on the fiscal front.  

Should Torres win in August, she would likely pursue a robust social domestic agenda—she’s already promised bags of basic food items for the most vulnerable and cuts in taxes on basic foods. Meanwhile, Arevalo has floated the idea of a public hospital for cancer treatment and a state-owned enterprise that would create a network of pharmacies with medicines at “fair prices.” But his economic plan, which will need some refinement over the next six weeks, depends on the creation of “jobs, jobs, jobs”—the lack of which is a main driver of migration in Guatemala. Arevalo has laid out plans to bring Guatemala’s citizens into the formal economy while vowing to eradicate poverty and boost quality education. With increasingly few resources to finance the robust social programs these center-left candidates are proposing, breaking ties with Taiwan in favor of China could just make economic sense. This would be especially attractive if a landmark infrastructure project accompanied the announcement. For example, Costa Rica received a national stadium in 2011. More recently, El Salvador received a stadium and a library in 2019, and, following President Xiomara Castro’s announcement of breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan this year, Honduras received a pledge for Chinese investment in a major hydroelectric dam project.

Guatemala’s voters will likely be most concerned with their pocketbooks when they head to the ballot box in August. Urban centers want a leader who will work to root out corruption—which could give Arevalo an edge. But their choice will reverberate far beyond the country’s borders and could reshape the geopolitical map in the hemisphere.  

María Fernanda Bozmoski is the deputy director of programs at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Eva Lardizábal is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Check out the transcript of the interview below, and Wajahat S. Khan’s analysis of the big takeaways from his conversation with the ex-Pakistani leader here.

Read the recap of this conversation

New Atlanticist

Jun 20, 2023

Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death

By Wajahat Khan

The former Pakistani prime minister spoke with the Atlantic Council about unsuccessful plans to meet with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and much more.

Corruption Economy & Business

Watch the full interview

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Good morning, good afternoon, and a very good evening to you, wherever you may be. My name is Wajahat Saeed Khan, I’m the senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington. However, I am here in New York City with the chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Pakistan’s former prime minister, the one and only Imran Khan. Good evening, Khan Sahib. How are you doing?

IMRAN KHAN: As good as in the circumstances, living in interesting times.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Well, speaking of the times, is your famous exercise regime still in play considering your bullet injuries and considering your schedule these days with your 150-something court cases?

IMRAN KHAN: I still haven’t fully recovered from my bullet wound because it damaged my nerve in my right foot, so therefore, exercise is very limited. And then I have, well, almost 160 cases now, so my time is really spent from one courtroom to the other. Plus, I mean a lot of them are terrorism cases. I mean, I’m supposed to have committed terrorism, so about forty odd cases are related to terrorism.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Well, let’s start with that, let’s start with the big picture and go to the… Let’s time travel back to April 2022 when all of this started and begin with the so-called American connection with your ouster. A lot of people are interested, at least in this neck of the woods, about whether it was shortsighted of you to blame the US, target the Americans after your ouster, considering how you and your party are now hoping for their support. The State Department has just recently called you a private citizen and said that it’s not going to comment on your status. I see you smiling, interestingly, but do you think it was shortsighted to really tick off the Americans considering where you stand now regarding their support?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, let’s just break it up. First of all, the facts. What happened? I get a cipher—a cipher is this coded message—from my ambassador in Washington. He sends me this coded message, and now you tell me how should have I responded, I mean anyone, if they had got a message like that: prime minister of a country gets a message, an official meeting taking place between the undersecretary of state, US, and the Pakistan ambassador in Washington, and the message reads, here’s the prime minister reading the message that unless the Prime Minister, Imran Khan, is removed in a vote of no confidence, there’ll be consequences for Pakistan. There were other things in the cipher, but I mean imagine a prime minister of a country—elected prime minister of a country—reads this message that an American official is telling my ambassador that Pakistan should get rid of me, otherwise there’ll be consequences.

So, I took this to the cabinet because I thought this was deeply insulting for a country of 250 million people. I thought it was humiliating for anyone to write… Any official from any country writing a letter like that or sending a message like that to the prime minister—elected prime minister. Then I put it in front of the National Security Council, the National Security Council, which is headed by all the service chiefs, including the army chief. The National Security Council then gives a demarche to the US, protest that this is meddling in the internal affairs of Pakistan. But what happened was that after the cipher, the next day, the vote of [no] confidence is tabled in the National Assembly and within weeks my govern goes. So, I basically narrated the fact this is not anti-Americanism. This is a fact.

After my government goes, the government of Shehbaz Sharif, who was part of this conspiracy, they then hold a National Security Council meeting. They call the ambassador from the US, Asad Majeed, and they asked him, “Were the contents in the cipher true? Does he stand by them?” And he stood by them. He said, “This is exactly what happened.” So, I was basically narrating a fact. Now, when you… As subsequently things unfolded, it turns out that our ex-army chief, who was then the army chief, General Bajwa, he was actually campaigning through his lobbyist Husain Haqqani,¹ who was paid thirty thousand dollars by my government, he was lobbying with the US to say that Imran Khan was anti-American. He tweeted, “General Bajwa was pro-American, I was anti-American.” So therefore, what transpired later on was that actually my own army chief was campaigning against me, that I was anti-American and I think he was feeding them because that’s how this cipher must have come because I had perfectly good relationship with the Trump administration.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: So premised on that, I understand it’s a long arc, it’s a long narrative, but they say that your positions have been inconsistent. There was first, of course, the letter, then there wasn’t a letter, then there was the cipher, which was then admonished by the ambassador himself: Asad Majeed Khan. Then there was the Donald Lu² connection, the threat by Donald Lu, so to say. Then there was, of course, you premising all of this after the vote of confidence saying, “This is because I didn’t… I said, ‘absolutely not’ to their drone bases.” Then, of course, in all of this is compounded by you politicking, telling millions of Pakistanis almost on a nightly basis that there’s a clear American conspiracy for regime change, then comes the Haqqani connection where you said that, “He’s taken money and he’s convinced all of Washington against me.”

Then you finally put it down in the court of Bajwa, General Bajwa, the former army chief. The question is then I understand there was a lot happening, it was over months, but today the positioning is quite simple. You said it’s less the Americans, it’s more Bajwa. That was not where you were a year ago, fourteen months ago. And that has hurt your credibility, at least in this neck of the woods, in Washington. So, would you have done it differently?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, look, Wajahat, look, I used the word “unfolded,” as things unfolded. At the time, this is first week of March, I received this cipher, and so I didn’t immediately talk about the cipher because there was an OIC [Organization of Islamic Countries] conference in Pakistan and I didn’t want this thing to break before the OIC conference, which was about 22nd or 23rd of March. And so therefore after that, on the 28th of March, I first disclosed this. And at that time, I was convinced that… I mean, who would not be convinced reading that cipher? Who would not be convinced that the Americans are demanding that they get rid of the prime minister? I mean, what inference should I get from that? Clearly, it was clear. So, therefore, I did blame them that they were responsible. I never used the word “bases,” I never used what reasons.

All I give the facts that here is the cipher, this is what happened. The moment the cipher came, the vote of no confidence is tabled. And then those members of our back benches in our party, who we had knowledge that they were visiting the American embassy for the past two months before, and they were the first ones to jump ship. So, what am I supposed to gather from that? So therefore, that’s exactly what I said. Now, subsequently, how did we find out? Because I think FARA [Foreign Agents Registration Act], which is in the United States, you have to register, all lobbies have to register there. And FARA, then this thing came out that Husain Haqqani was on my government’s payroll, but then not hired by us, hired by Bajwa. And then there was a Haqqani tweet, which came in the end of March, which said that General Bajwa is pro-American and Imran Khan is anti-American.

So, then you put two and two together exactly what had happened because General Bajwa wanted the extension. So, that extension he wanted—he later on told the United States too. So, these things subsequently came out. Therefore, whatever I said was at the time exactly what I believed, and in the end, what was the conclusion? My conclusion was that General Bajwa had lobbied: he was lobbying for himself. He had deliberately campaigned against me to make me the bad guy because the conspiracy was then his, and as it unfolded.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: I’m with you about the unfolding bit and especially that it went over months and that you adjusted your positions accordingly, Khan Sahib. But again, in retrospect, was it shortsighted to have so much vitriol, so much venom, so much rhetoric on a daily basis, convincing millions of Pakistanis, angering them about the so-called American connection and thus alienating Washington, alienating the Biden administration, which today calls you a “private citizen” and won’t back you up, even though clearly you need that backing.

IMRAN KHAN: Listen, Wajahat, I don’t want any backing from anyone. Look, if the people of Pakistan decide that they want to elect me as the prime minister, fine. If they don’t, I don’t care. I mean, I’ve seen everything. I’ve been to the top. I mean, I have more love and respect in this country than anyone else, why would all the twelve parties together, including the military establishment, with one aim: somehow the whole policy is how to get rid of one man? The whole country’s democracy is being dismantled just to get rid of one man. So, I have more love and respect in this country. I don’t care whether I become the prime minister or not. But the truth is that this is exactly what happened. How humiliating is it for a country? How come the US thinks of me as anti-American? Why don’t they want to ask the question that how could their official make such an arrogant statement that a country should… an ambassador should give a message to get rid of the elected prime minister?

And you didn’t think that there should be any response because the US would be annoyed with me? I mean, I should shut up and allow this thing to happen? Well, if they are angry at me, so be it. I mean, all I want the US… I don’t want any backing for myself—they professed values, the Western values are democracy, human rights, rule of law. Whenever they have to whip up China in Hong Kong or in Uyghurs or the Russians, they use these things. All I want them to do is to say all these things are being violated in Pakistan; human rights, custodial torture going on, democracy being dismantled. They should talk about that. I don’t care if they say nothing about me, I’m quite happy being a private citizen.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: All right, well, when you were not a private citizen, when you were Pakistan’s prime minister, you were praised. Let’s go back to even further, forget last year. Let’s go back to your career. Let’s pivot to India. So, 2019, February, as you remember, there was a military escalation with India, Pakistan Air Force jets shot down Indian aircraft. You were praised globally in those tense, twenty-four, forty-eight hours for the stance you took against war. You deescalated what could have been a potential nuclear face-off between these two rivals. Again, I’m going to say it on the record because it needs to be said, you were quite responsible in your statements and praised globally, even in India. However, eventually the criticism is that you missed an opportunity to establish long-term peace with India.

General Bajwa—I know you’re not a fan—but General Bajwa came with a peace plan, which was constructed very delicately over years. There was a ceasefire, there were trade talks, there was a potential visit in the offing, and you rejected the trade talks, even though as commerce minister, which you wore that hat, you first approved the trade ties, but then as prime minister, you rejected them. It was quite awkward to see the same man, Imran Khan, the commerce minister saying, yes, peace with India, normalization with India, saying no as prime minister, no peace with India, no normalization with India. Well, what caused that irregularity? Was there ISI interference? Did you get a second reckoning? Why did you change your mind?

IMRAN KHAN: Look, I do not believe in settling issues through military action. I have always been anti-military settling of issues through war or through using arms. And this is not now. It’s been my view for three decades. Now, what happened was that when that happened, when the Pulwama [attack] happened and we returned the pilot [who was shot down], I mean, it was clear that it is unthinkable for two nuclear-armed countries to even think of escalation. I am worried about what’s happening in Ukraine right now and I worry that this could go out of hand. So as someone who is against nuclear arms and the idea of the world committing suicide through nuclear war…So what happened was that in [August] 2019, India took away the statehood of Kashmir unilaterally.

Now, we all know that there’s a United Nations Security Council, not one, two resolutions on Kashmir that Kashmir was a disputed territory between Pakistan and India, and through a plebiscite, it was to be decided. The people of Kashmir were supposed to decide. Now, that was the status. Suddenly, on 5th August 2019, India unilaterally got rid of that treaty and the UN resolutions and took away the statehood. What were we supposed to do? A hundred thousand Kashmiris have been martyred in their quest for independence, and so what was Pakistan supposed to do? Accept the fait accompli? Or actually stand with the people of Kashmir who had given such sacrifices? So that’s what we decided. And by the way, I tried my best before then to improve our relationship with India. In fact, my first statement was, “You come one step towards us, we’ll come two towards you.”

I mean, I tried everything, but I came across this brick wall, and I realized it’s something to do with the RSS-BJP mentality where they’ve cashed in on hostility with Pakistan. That’s all. But, frankly, it was never a question of being misled by anyone. And, Bajwa, I don’t know what he’s talking about because the idea which he was floating, it was that first India would give some concession, then we would invite them to Pakistan. The concession was that they would gradually take steps that would undo what they had done on 5th August. But that never happened. So, we had never moved forward. I don’t know what he is talking about because Bajwa keeps shifting his positions.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: So, what about the bit which your office did? Forget Bajwa. You accepted during all of this, during this potential breakthrough, when there was a ceasefire in place, when there was a visit by Prime Minister Modi in the offing where you would’ve hosted him, if I may… this is a Nobel Prize being presented to you and here you are as commerce minister, where you accept trade talks and then a few days later you reject your own trade talks. I’m trying to get to the bottom of, was it forces within the military? Was it the ISI? Did you get intelligence briefings from someone? What caused you to change your mind when you were almost there along with your chief in trying to repair ties, even convincing India to back off from Article 370?

IMRAN KHAN: Look, I don’t remember the trade talks. All I know is that there was supposed to be a quid pro quo. India was supposed to give some concession, give some sort of a roadmap to Kashmir, and I was going to then host Prime Minister Modi in Pakistan. But it never materialized. So, it never went further than that. That’s how it was.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Speaking of that era as well, it was around the same time, now recent reports have emerged, that General Bajwa went public at that time, he said it privately, he said it to a bunch of journalists, that Pakistan has lost military parity with India. Pakistan’s tanks are rusted, Pakistan doesn’t have the fuel to provide its forces to fight a war, and that’s why peace with India is inevitable because Pakistan can’t keep up. You’ve seen this in recent news items. Did that intelligence, did that briefing from your chief of army staff ever come to your office? Did he ever consult you or confront you with this data?

IMRAN KHAN: Look, even if that was the case, for an army chief to make these statement is so ridiculous. What army chief makes these foolish statements even if it is the case? So, number one, yes, General Bajwa would make these statements, but I mean for an army chief, he is basically saying, “We are just too weak.” You never make such a statement. But more to the point, who wants war with India? I mean, why would we want war with India? Why would anyone want to see a confrontation between the two countries? The thing is, like two civilized countries, we should solve our issues through dialogue, and if we can’t solve them through dialogue, we just keep talking. But war is never an option. So, firstly, war is not an option. Secondly, for an army chief to keep saying that, I can’t imagine an army chief saying such a stupid thing as that.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But you were not privy to it? He did not inform you of this lack of security preparedness vis-à-vis India?

IMRAN KHAN: No, no. He used to talk about it frequently. All I’m saying is, why would he talk to journalists about this? This is supposed to be a secret. Would you disclose, if you have a problem with another country, and our problem is Kashmir, would you make a statement like that if you are the army chief? No, you wouldn’t say that. You would say, “We are ready to defend our country.” Even if you can’t, but you would say that. So, all I’m saying is for an army chief to make a statement, what more can I say?

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: So, moving on from India, let’s pivot back to our friends and allies. Now, of course, you had very warm ties with regional leadership, with [Former Prime Minister of Malaysia] Mahathir, of course, with [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan. You’ve made a lot of friends especially in the OIC community. But two or three things. Firstly, they say that the moment Imran Khan lost the Americans was the day after the Taliban took over when he went to a hotel in Islamabad and said, “Oh, the Afghans have broken the shackles of slavery.” I know that was rhetorical, you’ve commented on this before, but two days later… your words were in the Wall Street Journal and that’s how you were perceived. But moving beyond that, they also say here, there are assessments that you lost the confidence of the Chinese. You lost the confidence of the Saudis.

Early on in your tenure, Razak Dawood, your senior advisor, said, “We’re not happy with the lack of transparency with CPEC, nor is the Skipper.” He said that. Then he rolled that back. Then, of course, you miffed the Saudis for a quick minute when they refused to back up Pakistan with the OIC, admonishing Kashmir Article 370. You threatened the Saudis that, “I’m going to have my own OIC. I’m going to have my own meeting on Kashmir. Take a walk.” And the Saudis rolled back a bunch of loans, which they were going to [grant]. The larger question is: Imran Khan was on a rampage. He managed to upset the Americans. Of course, he’d shot down an Indian plane while he was at it. Those are the tasks of the job, hazards of the job, but also the Saudis and the Chinese? “Is there anyone,” they say, “that he didn’t miff?” How do you take that?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, first, the Americans. I mean, this thing was completely taken out of context. I was speaking in Urdu and then they translated it, and because the US was hurting at the time, that whole drama, which I actually don’t blame President Biden, because how was he expected to know that three hundred thousand Afghan troops would give up without a fight? And so, it collapsed so quickly, and when President Ghani left Kabul, the whole thing collapsed so there was chaos. So, I could see that the US, they were in shock and awe of what happened. They were taken by complete surprise, and they didn’t know how to react. So, I could see they were hurting, and this one comment would be misconstrued because I was talking about mental colonialism.

But the thing is, I mean, I was always right about Afghanistan. I kept saying for years that, look, firstly, your idea of victory no one quite understands. Is it either liberate Afghan women or bring democracy? I mean, such a vague idea of victory. But then there was never going to be a military solution. Anyone who knows Afghan history… So, I think that maybe they took that as anti-American, because if you are from a weaker country and you criticize the US foreign policy, you’re immediately dubbed as anti-American. I was just simply because anyone who knows the history of Afghanistan and we knew the whole Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, we knew where it was going to be headed. Anyway, I think the US was feeling very vulnerable and hurt and I think that’s why. But that’s not the reason why the US administration disliked me. I think there were other reasons.

They blamed me for going to Russia, for instance. Now, the Russian trip was organized by the foreign office. They’d been asking for months for my trip to Russia. They wanted to mend the relationship and the army chief wanted me to go there, the service chiefs, because they wanted to buy hardware from Russia. So how would I know that I arrived in Russia and the next morning they invaded Ukraine? I mean, how was I supposed to know? That was held against me.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: I mean, it was a pretty tenuous time.

IMRAN KHAN: Let me just be clear. This idea that Saudis were upset, the Chinese were upset, it is so ridiculous. Who says so? Because my government, the vote of [no] confidence came on the 7th or 8th of March. On the 20th or 21st of March, this was the second time Pakistan hosted a foreign minister’s OIC meeting—second time in four months. Before that, it was fourteen or fifteen years ago Pakistan had hosted a meeting. A meeting of the OIC cannot take place without the Saudis’ agreement. So why would they agree to, just before I’m leaving power in two months, three months, two OIC meetings? And, secondly, the Chinese foreign minister came as a special guest. Why would he come if the Chinese were not happy?

So, this whole myth that I had upset, who was behind this? Guess who was promoting these myths? Because compare the foreign policy in my time to what is happening right now, Pakistan today is totally isolated. I mean, it doesn’t even feature anywhere. In our time, Pakistan was being taken seriously. And I’m telling you, this relationship between Iran and Saudi, on behest of MBS, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, I went to Iran to speak to them. Remember, there were tensions at the time—some missile attack had taken place—so the Saudi prince sent me to Iran and he wanted me to bring down the tensions. And so I played my part. And even on Yemen, I mean, Yemen, we tried to end this war and play our role in it and this is because the Saudis and the Iranians asked us. So, this idea that we were isolated and I had upset friends is just total nonsense.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Right. Well, thanks for that. But the reports about your reservations about CPEC [China Pakistan Economic Corridor] precede all of this. They go way back. The reports about you threatening a secondary meeting, an alternative meeting, when the Saudis didn’t back you up on Kashmir after Article 370 via the OIC. You’re right about the fact that you have hosted… multiple meetings of the OIC. You’re right about the fact that you have hosted meetings, multiple meetings of the OIC. You did mend those fences, yes, I will give you that, eventually towards the end of your tenure.

But in the early part of your tenure, they said he was just being a cowboy. He was shooting from all cylinders and just going all out. And that may have been why some of these people are quite silent today about what’s going on with you, your party, and your country.

IMRAN KHAN: Countries never interfere. I know, I was in power for three and a half years. I know that countries never interfere in other countries’ businesses. Never. This hardly ever happens. Only thing they should talk about are human rights. But normally, I mean, it’s just not done. I mean, unless it is your country, which you don’t have good relationship with. So, the US would talk about Hong Kong or Uyghurs.

But I mean India, when they clearly violated international law in Kashmir and put them in a open prison, they basically put a curfew in Kashmir. I mean, did any of the big power, Western power, criticize India for it? No. No one said anything. Some UN human rights organizations spoke against it, but none of the Western countries said anything against India.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Let’s move on. Let’s take it in-house. We need to start wrapping up as well. But let’s be introspective about the famous “same page” with the military …. There are dozens of examples of the “same-pagedness” as it was called famously, from giving the military so much space in the affairs of the country, to even, I would say the highlight is really General Bajwa’s extension, number one. And then number two, allowing Nawaz Sharif to leave the country.

I’m assuming you’ve said this before, but I would like to hear you again. When did the “same page” change? When did the same page stop? When you were playing ball consistently, what was it that just the “same page” just ran out of space and you ran out of ink. What happened?

IMRAN KHAN: Look, first of all, let’s understand one thing. The military has been in power directly or indirectly for seventy-five years. So let there be no illusion about this. So, either they’re directly in power or indirectly.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Sure.

IMRAN KHAN: And they’re entrenched. So, they’re entrenched. Now, when I became the prime minister, it is wrong to say that the army supported me or they rigged the elections, because they actually rigged the election for Nawaz Sharif in 2013, when we asked for just four constituencies out of 133 to open them up, they refused. And when they were opened up, the election was rigged.

In our case, we offered from day one, I said, open the elections. So, the army didn’t oppose me, but they didn’t rig the elections for us. But I knew from day one that I had to work with them. And so for a while, the working relationship with army means army chief, really. There’s no democracy in the army. It’s just one man. So it worked well in the beginning. The problem started when I gave him the extension. And I admit it was the biggest blunder I made. I admit. And I was actually ambushed in this. I mean, it is a long story. But anyway…

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: I’d really like to hear it Khan… because this story is the story of our country at this point. Isn’t it? Well, Imran Khan comes in on a mandate where he can do pretty much everything he wants. And yet he gives a man of, well, limited reputation an extension, then allows his rival, Nawaz Sharif, his lifelong rival, to leave even though you came in on the platform of justice.

IMRAN KHAN: So let me clarify. We had just come in, I was due and the army as an institution is the only institution that works in Pakistan because it’s intact. All other institutions when I took power were in a terrible condition. I mean, they had been tampered with, politicized, they weren’t working properly. So, if you wanted things done, you got it done through the Army. I mean, I’m talking about, say for instance, COVID-19. We wanted logistics support. We wanted the whole country to—data from all the hospitals. I’m just giving an example. And the best way we could do was the army. It would immediately get us all the data.

So, in that sense, so it worked. It worked. We did well in the beginning. The only problem is after the extension what happened, there was a different General Bajwa. And so the problem, what I faced with them is that my whole platform was bringing the powerful under the law. So, rule of law is what I started off with twenty-seven years back. And when I tried to bring the powerful under the law, I discovered that unless General Bajwa wanted it, I couldn’t do it. So because NAB, the [national] accountability bureau was controlled by him. So, we had no control over what was going on. All these guys who are now in the government, they would blame me for their corruption cases. But we inherited all the corruption cases.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But Khan-

IMRAN KHAN: But what was happening-

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Didn’t you let the fox into the house?

IMRAN KHAN: Let me first complete. So, because he controlled the accountability Bureau, I could not bring the powerful under the law because I was helpless, and he didn’t want to, because he was already dealing with them. So “one page” was good, it went on. And then I worked with him. I realized that if he didn’t want accountability, I was stuck. But our main thing, priority at the time was the economy.

Because we had two years of COVID everywhere the world, the impact of COVID-19 and the commodity super cycle. So, the whole concentration was there. And so as far as the economy went, we did the best economic performance in the last seventeen years. Our last two years we grew at almost 6 percent. But General Bajwa at some point decided to change horses. I didn’t betray him. He decided to change horses. And he is the one who pulled the rug [from] under my feet.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But I’m personally shocked that for a man who used to threaten to walk away from his own team, if he wasn’t allowed to pick it, if he wasn’t allowed to literally pick his own men in his own cricket squad—they’ve written about this; you have written about this—someone who is so adamant about control, about his vision, about his strategy when it’s interfered with is now saying that he was new, he was inexperienced. And I understand the same page about COVID, I’ll give you that, for example, right.

But I don’t understand the “same page” about pretty much every contract going to the FWO or tons of generals going on as ambassadors or even a colonel running PTV. I mean you had the wherewithal, you had the manpower, you had the mandate, and yet you just kept on ceding them space and eventually ended up in a situation where you led the fox into the hen house. So, is there regret? Is there regret about your decision making?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, the only thing, when I look back, and I’ve said this before, if I had to go back again, I would not… Bearing in mind that I wanted to bring in reforms, main reform is rule of law. Bringing the powerful under the law, which has never happened in Pakistan’s history before. The powerful are above law and the masses have no access to justice. So that was my main theme. I discovered that unless you have a powerful mandate by the public, the public must give you a strong mandate. You must have a strong government. Only then can you implement your reform program. Unfortunately, I had a weak coalition government. So, the moment I used to go after the powerful, the problem used to be to keep my majority intact. And we could only keep our majority intact by telling the army, the ISI, look, you must make sure that they come, my members appear for voting.

This is what happened. With hindsight, I should have immediately called for elections and if I had not got a good enough mandate, I should have stayed out. Because it is not possible. If you want a reform program and to take on the big mafias, you cannot do it if you have a coalition with government, with a thin majority, you can’t do it. So that is the mistake I made. And that’s why I became more and more dependent on the army chief because he could get a budget passed because they have the clout. It’s exactly what’s happening right now. If the military withdraws support, this coalition would fall apart in days.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: So, speaking of current affairs, coalitions, electoral politics, Khan Sahib, leadership is the undergirding of all of this. And currently I see the PTI’s flag right behind you. And the PTI is a shadow today of what it was just a few weeks ago. People have left in droves. Just this morning you were kind enough to send me a story by the New York Times about how people are leaving in droves. They’re being forced to leave in droves. Some of your old school, old guard has stuck around. Most of your “electables,” of your new guard who you praised so highly, you gave them high office and appointments, they’ve left. And yet, this brings me to the question of leadership where again, a man who was famous for his captaincy in the cricket field, who used to claim that, “Listen, trust me, I can put together the right unit. This is what they pay me for. This is what I do”—today, has been left by much of his unit. Which then makes me compare the plight of the PTI today to the plight of, for example, the PML-N in the late 1990s where they were under pressure too after a military coup. But nobody left Nawaz Sharif in the droves, in the mass exodus that we are seeing with the PTI. Does that say something about your captaincy and your leadership? Or does that say something about the weak structure of the PTI?

IMRAN KHAN: Let me, let me first tell you exactly what happened because I was in the opposition in 2002. The entire PML-N became PML-Q. So, there were only ten members left. What are you talking about there? Nawaz Sharif was left by his entire party, which formed government under PML-Q. So, I mean, I’m just correcting you.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: They went through a couple of years of jail, some of them, not like a couple of weeks.

IMRAN KHAN: No, no, it’s not true. There were five or ten people who went to jail this time. I mean, what people have gone through now, they’ve been thrown in jails and they’ve been shut in these cells with a lot of people and dead cells. I mean, their businesses have been destroyed. They’ve been warned. I mean their families have been threatened. This has never happened in this country before. The way they have been making people leave my party, it’s unprecedented. But Wajahat, today PTI is stronger than ever in its history. PTI today is the strongest party in Pakistan’s history. Why? Because PTI has the biggest vote bank. It doesn’t matter if people leave you. If “electables” leave you, it doesn’t matter. I’ll just give you an example of Punjab. We gave almost four hundred tickets in the Punjab election. Punjab is 60 percent Pakistan’s population. So I gave four hundred tickets. Only forty people have left. And do you know what about the rest? They’re all hiding. None of them are staying in their houses. Their houses are broken in, the relatives are picked up, their businesses are shut. And yet out of four hundred, only forty people have left. Why aren’t they leaving? Because they all realize that the moment they leave the party, it’s the end of their politics. Because the people in this country have never stood with any party as they stand with PTI today. Which is why you have the whole government machinery, the whole intelligence agencies, all institutions [have] one-point agenda somehow to dismantle PTI. And they’re failing because the vote bank is growing rather than the vote bank shrinking. The vote bank of PTI is growing, which is why people are not leaving us.

The vote bank of PTI is growing, which is why people are not leaving us. You would imagine, it’s never happened here before. My sisters’ houses, the police has gone in there. They picked up the servants when the son was there. One sister has a huge corruption case thrown on her. She was not even in government. So, my house, my wife, they have cases against my wife. They’ve gone after everyone. So, they’re doing this to all ticket holders. Despite all that, people are not leaving the party. Only a few people you see have left.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But Khan-Saab, they’re saying you tried to trigger a coup. They’re saying you’ve been in touch with the former army officers. They were saying you tried to divide the ranks of the world’s fifth-largest military. Which begs the question, have you been in touch with, for example, General Faiz? I know you were in touch with General Bajwa even after your ouster, and you said so accordingly. Which surprises me, by the way. The same man who kicks you out, you end up trying to negotiate with him. But are you in touch with General Faiz? Have you been in touch with military brass? Because that’s what they say. They say, “This man is trouble and he thinks the rules don’t apply to him. And his party tweets, that he’s a red line. Why can’t he turn up to court like everybody else has since Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar, Pakistani or Indian Muslim leaders have suffered court cases and have gone to jail. What’s so special about Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi?” That’s what they say.

IMRAN KHAN: Special…? I have 160 court cases, 160 cases against me, and I do nothing but most of my time is going from one court to the other to get bail. Tomorrow again, nineteen cases tomorrow, I’m trying to get bail. nineteen cases. It’s never happened in our history before. No political leader has ever had… At the age of seventy, he does not have one criminal case. And suddenly in the last few months, he has 170 cases, 160 cases. People have known me for fifty years. They’ve just slapped a murder case on me. People know me. So, I repeat. The only time I couldn’t go to attend the courts was when I was shot and I was housebound and they knew about it. They knew my reports. I had my leg broken, so therefore I couldn’t attend. But since I’ve been recovered, I attend every case.

Now, I have never, the only people I knew in the army, one was General Faiz, the other one was General Bajwa. Faiz because he was the ISI chief. I had to deal with him. General Bajwa because he was the army chief. I dealt with Bajwa after I was ousted only for the sake of Pakistan because I wanted to ask him, “Where are we heading? Because at the moment we are going nowhere.” The country is going into a black hole. They have no policy. The only policy is to get rid of Imran Khan. That’s no policy. I mean, what is the future of Pakistan? The only reason I met General Bajwa was look the only way ahead of free and fair elections, which will bring political stability and that then will bring economic stability. Right now, we have the worst economic indicators in our history.

The country’s going down, we are heading towards default. We already have 38 percent inflation. We are heading towards hyperinflation. So, my talks with only for the country and trying to make him understand that unless you have elections, you will not have political stability. General Faiz, I might have spoken to him three times since I left government and since he was not the army chief…I mean the ISI chief. This is all nonsense. They’re just trying to get rid of me because for some reason the current army chief has decided that whatever happens, I cannot come into power.

So, they’re throwing all these things on me. I mean, I go to be… army court. These military courts. The reason why these military courts have been set up is to try me because in civil courts there’s no way any of these bogus cases can throw me in jail. So that’s why all this is going on. These conspiracy theories, I don’t know anyone in the army. I don’t know any of the generals. I had no business for them. It was not my job to know—except the ones I was dealing with. I don’t know the other generals.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Khan-Saab, about the current army chief. You singled him out after you were released from prison. You-last

IMRAN KHAN: Last question please, Wajahat. I have to go. It’s eleven o’clock.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Sure, Khan-Saab. Thank you. So, then I’ll compound this question with another question. I’ll give you one and a half questions. One, you singled out the army chief. You said, “It’s not about the army, it’s about one man.” What’s the problem here with him? Was it because you sacked him when you were prime minister, when he was ISI Chief. Does it go back to that episode? That’s question number one. What’s the beef here between you and General Asim Munir? I’d like to know, because you’ve said that there’s beef, so that’s question one. And then question two, Khan-Saab before I let you go. What would you do differently? What would you do differently if you were in a time machine today, and you were allowed to go back to August 2018. What would Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi do differently?

IMRAN KHAN: Firstly, it’s not about me or General Asim. It’s about Pakistan. I mean, I have no personal thing against him. He clearly has something, I don’t know, which is why I offered to meet and hold dialogue and not now, since he came to power, since he became the army chief, I have been since then saying that, look, it’s about Pakistan, it’s not about us. So, I need to understand why this whole country is… “There’s only one mission, get rid of Imran. He should not come into power.”

So, what alternative have they got? I mean, maybe he can convince me that I’m so bad for the country, but there is some other plan which will be good for the country. At the moment, there is no other plan. There’s only one plan. So that’s why I wanted to meet him. And remember, it’s not about us. It’s not whether I like him or he likes me. It’s about the country. And the country is going down rapidly. People are losing hope in the country. Almost a million professionals, quality people, have left the country in the last few months. There’s a flight of capital. So that’s my point.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But I must interject. Why did you fire him when he was ISI chief, Khan Sahib? What happened?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, there were issues. I had issues with him and so therefore I couldn’t work with him. But that’s in the past. I have no issue with him. So, I think right now it’s not about personal likes and dislikes. It’s about the country. Now, secondly, if I had to go back again to 2018, I would’ve called for elections. I would’ve dissolved the parliament and gone for general elections again and only taken power—

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: When you were asked for an extension, at that point, when would you have asked for elections again, I’m just trying to figure out—

IMRAN KHAN: No, straightforward, straightaway. I mean, had I known how difficult it was to implement your program… We inherited the biggest current account deficit in our history. So, the country was bankrupt. So, we inherited two big deficits, the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit. So, the economy was in shambles, and we were the first time in government. And here I had this ambitious program of rule of law to bringing the mafias under control. There was no way I could have done it with a coalition government with a thin majority. It was just not possible. So, with hindsight, I should have immediately called for elections and only taken government if I had a substantial majority.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: And moving on this week, you are faced with a lot of court charges. You’re going to Islamabad, you’re going to Baluchistan, a sensitive area, an insecure area. Do you still fear that you might be targeted, your life might be targeted, Imran Khan?

IMRAN KHAN: Yes, I do. Well, the government, I mean the interior minister has said my life is a danger. I mean, he said from foreign agencies, but, actually, it’s the government itself who were… I mean there were two assassination attempts on me. One was on the 3rd of November last year. One was on 18th of March in Islamabad. So, will there be another one? I think there’s a strong possibility because they would imagine that even if I am put in jail, which I just know that in the next two weeks they’ll find somewhere to put me in jail. So, they would worry that even if I’m in jail, my party would still win. So, I think they’d be thinking of the final solution. So mentally, I’m prepared—

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: I’m sorry-—

IMRAN KHAN: —that anything could happen.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Imran, did you just say that you’re mentally prepared to be killed? Is that what you just said to me?

IMRAN KHAN: No, I’m mentally prepared that anything could happen. I mean, someone who’s faced two assassination attempts is going to be prepared that there’s a possibility because the same reasons, the reasons are still there when they tried to kill me twice before. The reason is that the party’s popular will win the next election. So, as long as that reason is there, they could try again. So, in that sense, mentally, I mean I have overcome the fear of dying. I feel that I should be prepared for everything. But jail, I know in the next two weeks they’ll put me in jail because there’s so many cases. All they have to do is cancel one bail and I’ll be inside.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi—

IMRAN KHAN: Okay, Wajahat

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Good luck. Thank you, sir.

IMRAN KHAN: Thank you.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Stay safe.

IMRAN KHAN: Thank you. Okay.

Read more on Imran Khan

New Atlanticist Jun 20, 2023

Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death

By Wajahat Khan

The former Pakistani prime minister spoke with the Atlantic Council about unsuccessful plans to meet with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and much more.

Corruption Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource May 22, 2023

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career

By Roohan Ahmed

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s populist former prime minister, is facing the biggest test of his political career as he challenges the very same security establishment that accelerated his journey to power in the 2018 elections.

Corruption Elections

SouthAsiaSource May 10, 2023

Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan

By South Asia Center and other experts

On March 9, 2023, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan was arrested over corruption charges. We asked experts to react to this decision.

Corruption Elections

The post Read Imran Khan’s full Atlantic Council interview on failed peace with India, Pakistan’s plight, and his own fate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s former prime minister, has been on the warpath in the streets of Pakistan against the military-led establishment ever since he was voted out by parliament last year. Once seen as the military’s darling and reportedly assisted by the military and its intelligence agencies in the elections that brought him to power in 2018, he has now turned on the army and its chief. In an interview with the Atlantic Council this week, he also claimed that the former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa told him “frequently” that the army was not equipped or prepared for a war with India.

In the interview, conducted June 18, Khan confirmed that there was indeed an opening for peace with India—despite New Delhi’s rescinding of disputed Jammu and Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status in 2019—and the Pakistani army chief favored it. (Bajwa had previously revealed this plan to reporters.) Normalizing trade between the two nuclear-armed countries was reportedly one of the steps that was to be taken before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could visit Pakistan.

Watch the full interview

However, despite successfully deescalating a military standoff in 2019, Khan couldn’t explain why he faltered on trade normalization with New Delhi after India changed its relationship with the disputed territory of Kashmir by removing its special status in the Indian union. Khan responded to India’s Kashmir move by closing the border for trade with India.

“I don’t remember the trade talks,” Khan said. “All I know is that there was supposed to be a quid pro quo. India was supposed to give some concession, give some sort of a roadmap to Kashmir, and I was going to then host Prime Minister Modi in Pakistan. But it never materialized.”

Bajwa’s plan, which included a ceasefire with Indian forces on the Line of Control in Kashmir, was a lost opportunity for establishing long-term peace with Pakistan’s archrival. “I tried everything, but I came across this brick wall,” Khan said. “And I realized it’s something to do with the RSS-BJP [the Modi-aligned ideological movement and political party] mentality where they’ve cashed in on hostility with Pakistan. That’s all.”

Transcript

Jun 20, 2023

Read Imran Khan’s full Atlantic Council interview on failed peace with India, Pakistan’s plight, and his own fate

By Atlantic Council

In an Atlantic Council conversation, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan shared details about a potential peace plan with India and discussed the future economic and political prospects for Pakistan.

Economy & Business Elections

Currently, Khan says he is facing nearly 160 legal cases, ranging from terrorism to corruption to conspiracy against the state—a roster that keeps him busy court-hopping to secure bail or relief. The seventy-year-old former cricket champion-turned-populist firebrand spends his weekdays commuting from city to city in protective gear to attend court hearings. Every evening, he addresses his followers on YouTube from his residence in Lahore, which just last month was surrounded by security forces.

Khan said he fears that he may be incarcerated over the next two weeks but admitted that he’s “prepared for everything,” including the prospect of being assassinated. (Khan was wounded in an assassination attempt last November and claims to have survived another plot in March.)

Reviewing his performance as premier, Khan admitted to political blunders during his tenure, including granting an extension of service to Bajwa, who Khan claims was responsible for engineering his ouster. He did not elaborate on the exact reasons for their break-up.

Khan confessed that he was dependent on the military’s clout to push his reforms through parliament because he had a weak coalition government with a razor-thin majority. But this admission—needing the military to remain in power—runs counter to his claim that he didn’t need or get the military’s support to achieve power in the 2018 general elections.

“If you want a reform program and to take on the big mafias, you cannot do it if you have a coalition with government, with a thin majority, you can’t do it,” Khan said. “So that is the mistake I made. And that’s why I became more and more dependent on the army chief, because he could get a budget passed because they have the clout. It’s exactly what’s happening right now. If the military withdraws support, this coalition would fall apart in days.”

Crucially, Khan also said he sacked the current army chief, General Asim Munir, from his previous position as the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) because he “couldn’t work with him.” He did not explain why. Yet he went on to declare his willingness to talk to the all-powerful chief of army staff now—but not to his civilian counterparts—an unsustainable position in a multi-party parliamentary democracy that he wants to lead again. Claims by former members of Khan’s own party suggest that Khan sacked Munir because he had alleged that Khan’s wife was involved in corruption; Khan has denied these allegations.

While Khan defended his economic and foreign policy record and claimed that his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, or Movement for Justice) is the most popular party in the country’s history, he also claimed that ceding further space to Pakistan’s all-powerful military while he was in power was the right thing to do—until it wasn’t.

But as Pakistan faces the prospect of economic default, and his quest for an immediate election seems to be waning, Khan stands isolated. Over one hundred of his party leaders, including many senior deputies, have left the PTI, through what he claims is coercion by the military. Thousands of party workers face trials over the riots of May 9, when many Pakistanis took to the streets to attack government and military installations while protesting what Khan says was his provocative detention, designed to trigger mass outrage.

“The country is going into a black hole,” he said. “The only policy is to get rid of Imran Khan. That’s no policy. I mean, what is the future of Pakistan?”

Meanwhile, the military-backed regime continues its legal and information crackdown against sections of the press and public who dare to support Khan on mainstream and social media. Also, as the military claims that Khan and the PTI leadership tried to sow dissent in the rank and file of the all-powerful army—treason by definition and law—Khan has denied that he has any active links to senior military leadership.

None of Pakistan’s foreign friends and allies have issued any statements in favor of Khan. The US State Department said last week that it would refrain from comment as Khan is a “private citizen”—a categorization that he shrugged off without expressing regrets about his bashing of the United States following his ouster. Khan continued to blame a senior US official for, as Khan claims, making his removal as prime minister a condition for US assistance and goodwill—a claim that he watered down earlier this year while blaming Bajwa for poisoning the US view of Khan through Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Washington. (Haqqani has rejected Khan’s allegations as baseless and his attorney has issued a cease-and-desist notice to Khan, threatening legal action if Khan keeps on alleging Haqqani’s involvement in the former premier’s ouster. The US State Department has said that “there is not and there has never been a truth to” Khan’s claims that the United States was involved in removing him from power, adding that “we will not let propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation get in the way of any bilateral relationship, including our valued bilateral [partnership] with Pakistan.”)*

Further evidence of Khan’s shifting position is his party’s active support for lobbying efforts inside the United States, including letters from members of the US Congress admonishing the Pakistani military’s crackdown. Furthermore, not a single influential member of the fifty-seven-state Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a grouping that Khan claims to have galvanized, has come out in support of him.

Khan has responded by saying that as long as he has the people of Pakistan behind him, he doesn’t need foreign help. How he will do this now is unclear considering that many of his party’s senior leaders have deserted him after having been arrested and released by the authorities. Khan claims they were coerced and has named new, younger members to replace them. He believes strongly that he is still the most popular political leader in Pakistan and this will help him yet again in the elections that currently are expected to be held in October or November.

Khan said that popularity is the reason why his enemies have tried to kill him. “As long as that reason is there, they could try again,” he said. “So, in that sense, mentally, I mean I have overcome the fear of dying. I feel that I should be prepared for everything.”

Wajahat S. Khan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and an Emmy-nominated journalist and author. He is the former bureau chief in Kabul and Islamabad for NBC News.

This article was updated to include the US State Department’s denials of Khan’s allegations about US involvement in his ouster.

The post Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Jittery reactions of the Indian media

Since the new visa policy was announced, a flurry of opinion commentary and editorials published in the Indian press reveal a widespread discomfort with the United States visa decision, and an acknowledgement that it has put India in a “tricky position.” These commentaries describe the US move as  “muscle-flexing,” and allege that it is “a hypocritical interference in the election and internal affairs of a sovereign nation.” A large part of the Indian press appears to agree with Bangladesh’s Prime Minister that the United States action is intended to depose the Hasina regime, an allegation Prime Minister Hasina has made twice since April 10. Some Indian commentators even suggest that it is “not the right time” to support democracy in Bangladesh. The common thread in the Indian commentary is that Delhi must ensure that Hasina stays in power. One analyst writes, “India must do everything possible, within four corners of international law and with absolute respect for Bangladesh’s sovereignty, to help Sheikh Hasina-led Bangladesh Awami League win the parliamentary elections scheduled in that country in January 2024.” The argument that has been advanced for unqualified support to Hasina is the Indian national interest; in the words of one commentator, “India has no option without supporting Hasina regime,” while another has explained further, “for India, an Awami League government is key to push forward its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy.”

The ignored history

To understand the current moment in India-Bangladesh relations, we must analyze the progression of the relationship between Bangladesh and India over the past fourteen years. The relationship, since the Awami League came into power in 2009, has been officially described as “the golden era,” but Bangladeshi analysts have expressed concerns that the relationship has perhaps become lopsided in favoring India. Under the Hasina regime, India has received Bangladesh’s support in rooting out insurgency in India’s Northeastern region, securing transit through Bangladesh, gaining permanent access to two main ports in the Bay of Bengal, signing an energy deal which ensures that Bangladesh buys electricity with the highest cost, inking an agreement which allows India to install a surveillance system in the Bay of Bengal, agreeing to a water-sharing deal which provides India control over the river Kushiyara and engaging in close defense cooperation to name but a few significant bilateral achievements. On the contrary, Bangladesh’s repeated request to sign a deal about Teesta River water sharing has been ignored; the India-Bangladesh border has become the most violent border as Indian Border Security Force (BSF) continue to kill Bangladeshis in large numbers; trade gaps between the two countries have increased over the years in favor of India; and Bangladesh has not received support from India dealing with the Rohingya refugee crisis. In 2018, responding to a question on whether she wants reciprocation from India, Hasina stated that India will remember forever what Bangladesh gave it. This unequal relationship has persisted because of India’s unqualified support to the Hasina government. In the wake of the 2014 election, the Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh visited Dhaka and allegedly pressured the Jatiya Party, led by General H.M. Ershad, to join the election which was boycotted by all opposition parties. In 2018, although it was evident to the Indian establishment that the Awami League has already “assiduously subverted democratic norms and institutions” and that in a fair election “the Awami League will be reduced to an embarrassing minority in the next Parliament,” India’s support to the Awami League was unflinching. Such actions contribute to a perception in Bangladesh that India’s support is vital for the survival of the Hasina government. Such suspicion was further cemented when Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen said in 2022 that he had asked India to ensure the Hasina government’s survival at any cost.

The follies of Indian media coverage

Three follies are easily discerned in the arguments of Indian commentators:

1. While they are criticizing the United States for what they are describing as intrusion into Bangladesh’s domestic politics, they conveniently ignore how India has maintained its influence over the past decade and ironically call upon the Indian government to side with the incumbent Hasina regime disregarding their own stated concerns about sovereignty. While the United States has repeatedly reaffirmed that it is not favoring any party over the other but simply underscoring the need for a fair electoral process, the Indian media are asking it to interject on behalf of a specific political party.
2. They are implicitly suggesting that a fair election will deliver a victory to the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). This concern is difficult to square with their claims that Bangladesh has achieved remarkable economic and social successes in the past fourteen years and that Hasina has the support of most of the population.
3. The argument that a victory of BNP will reignite militancy disregards the global context of the rise of transnational and regional terrorist groups around the world and the changed circumstances. It is not a stretch to suggest that such an argument is nothing short of using Islamist bogeymen to justify undemocratic behavior. 

How India assumed the commanding position

The enormous influence of India over Bangladesh’s domestic politics is a result of a geopolitical game in the region since 2001, and reflects the conspicuous absence of the United States. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States remained focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Iraq invasion diverted its attention from South Asia. A growing relationship between the United States and India gave the latter the opportunity to extend its sphere of influence. This was furthered by China’s assertive policy, which began after Xi Jinping became the leader, and South Asia became one of the battlegrounds. The United States had seen India as the antidote to China. As for the Bangladesh policy, despite Washington’s reliance on India, it disagreed with New Delhi on the course of Bangladesh’s democratic trajectory. In 2013-14, New Delhi and Washington went through several rounds of conversations about the need for an inclusive election in Dhaka. Then United States ambassador to Bangladesh, Dan Mozena, made several visits to New Delhi, but India took a firmer stand and rebuffed United States efforts. The United States backstepped, allowed India to do its bidding, and the Hasina government continued; however, the United States had not lost sight of the continued regression of human rights and democracy in Bangladesh as reflected in the annual human rights reports of the State Department.

The United States returns to Bangladesh

With the Presidency of Joe Biden, democracy and human rights once again are a professedly cornerstone of United States foreign policy. This has spurred a change in Bangladesh policy. The imposition of sanctions on Bangladesh’s elite police force, the Rapid Actions Battalion (RAB), and its seven officials in December 2021, and serious warnings through 2022 and early 2023, clearly revealed that Bangladesh is being closely watched by the United States administration. The growing influence of China on Bangladesh since 2016 and United States focus on the Indo-Pacific region enhance the geo-political significance of Bangladesh. As such, the United States seemed to adopt a carrot-and-stick policy towards Bangladesh. The United States donated the largest number of COVID-19 vaccines to Bangladesh, but such largesse was also accompanied by concerns regarding the erosion of democracy. These efforts, which didn’t go through New Delhi, showed that the “US is no longer watching Bangladesh through the Indian lens.” 

Does the Indian government’s silence bear any message?

Despite the intense discussions in the media, there hasn’t been any official word from New Delhi regarding the new United States policy or the growing tension between the United States and Bangladesh. New Delhi has remained studiously silent. Unlike in 2014, India is leaving the US-Bangladesh issue out of its public posture. After the imposition of sanctions on RAB, India’s reaction was muted, although Bangladesh sought India’s help to reverse the decision. Many wondered whether New Delhi was consulted on the issue, and there is no indication that New Delhi ever raised the issue with Washington.

Three interpretations of India’s current lack of engagement are worth considering:

1. Despite United States actions demanding a reversal of democratic erosion, New Delhi is comfortable with the status quo. In the past year and a half, as US officials were sending strong messages to Bangladesh regarding the human rights situation and democracy, public messages from India were a show of support to Hasina. Visits of Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Khatra in February this year and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in April and May, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s invitation to Hasina as an observer to the Group of Twenty to be held in New Delhi in September are cases in point. These give the impression that “New Delhi … wants Hasina to win by any means.” It bears watching if India will use its leverage with the United States to convince the Biden administration to soften its Bangladesh policy in the coming months.
2. India is not opposed to the United States pressure on Bangladesh, which it recognizes will make Hasina vulnerable and more dependent on India to act an interlocutor between Bangladesh and the United States and as a countervailing force to China. The more vulnerable the regime in Dhaka is, the more leverage New Delhi will hold.
3. Considering the high-stake geopolitical contestation between United States and China in the Asia-Pacific region and the increasing importance of Bangladesh in this tug-of-war, India is grudgingly accepting that it is becoming a secondary external actor in Bangladeshi politics as the United States no longer considers India a strong player.

What should the United States and India do?

India-US relations are complex. Both nations emphasize the strategic interdependence reflected in their close cooperation through several multilateral frameworks such as QUAD and Indo-Pacific strategy and bilateral engagement in defense and trade. However, India’s own democratic erosion has drawn attention in the United States in recent years. Additionally, some are raising questions about the reliability of India’s foreign policy and whether India is a safe bet for the United States against China. 

Whether the Bangladesh issue will be included on the Biden-Modi summit agenda next week in Washington is an open question. Considering other pressing issues around the world, and several other issues of divergence between the United States and India, Bangladesh may seem less significant but larger geopolitical considerations pertaining to the Indo-Pacific region undoubtedly dictate that Bangladesh receive attention. It’s incumbent on the United States to let India know that they will follow through in its promise to defend Bangladesh’s democracy, and that its broader South Asia policy will not be shaped by its relationship with New Delhi. How India navigates the tension between its global aspirations and regional preferences will be revealing indeed. 

Ali Riaz is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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Cognizant of the fact that the visa policy is in some ways a follow up to earlier measures such as sanctions on the country’s elite force and its officials, many are wondering whether harsher measures will follow.

What does the new policy say?

The purpose of the new visa policy is to support a fair election in Bangladesh as well as those trying to restore the democratic system. The election is scheduled to be held in January 2024. Under this new policy, the United States will be able to deny visas to those who obstruct the election process in Bangladesh. 

The actions to be considered “obstructions” to the electoral process and those who will come under it are clearly laid out. Vote rigging, voter intimidation, the use of violence to prevent people from exercising their right to freedoms of association and peaceful assembly, and the use of measures designed to prevent political parties, voters, civil society, or the media from disseminating their views, are listed as acts of obstruction. Those who will come under the purview of the new policy include current and former Bangladeshi officials, members of pro-government and opposition political parties, and members of law enforcement, the judiciary, and security services. 

State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller and US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu clarified that this policy is not only applicable to the government and its supporters, but to the opposition as well. Additionally, according to Lu, the restrictions would be applicable to those who give orders.

Implications

The announcement of the policy, though not overtly targeted towards the government, is a clear rejection of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s claim that an environment conducive to a free and fair election is prevailing in the country. This preemptive action is not a punitive measure, but the expansive scope of the policy sends a warning to everyone connected to the electoral process. 

The broad scope of the policy shows that Washington is trying to be even-handed with the regime and the opposition, but it is also a reflection of the growing exasperation in Washington about governance in Bangladesh.

Warnings made, warnings ignored

US concerns regarding the deteriorating human rights situation in Bangladesh and overall democratic regression are not new. The United States had taken punitive actions against the elite police force Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and seven current and former officials in December 2021. It also refrained from inviting Bangladesh to two Democracy Summits, held in December 2021 and in March 2023. These measures were followed by repeated calls and warnings that political development is on the radar of the US establishment. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen in April 2023 that the world is watching Bangladesh’s upcoming election. In February 2023, US State Department Counsellor Derek Chollet said that erosion of democracy in any country, including Bangladesh, limits Washington’s ability to cooperate with that country. In March 2022, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, while visiting Dhaka, underscored the issue of democracy as a key point in the relationship between these two countries. The United States also insisted that RAB reform remain a precondition for rescinding the sanctions. 

Unfortunately, these calls and warnings fell on deaf ears. The Bangladeshi government continues to ignore US pressure, instead showing defiance. These calls were riddled with anti-American populist rhetoric such as by Prime Minister Hasina’s son Sajeeb Wazed Joy, describing the US State department as a ”bunch of hypocrites” and Hasina alleging that the United States is trying to topple her.

What prompted these developments?

Both domestic and foreign policy appear to have prompted US actions. Three domestic factors can be identified as influencing Washington’s decision. 

• The growing authoritarian tendency of the Hasina regime. Obstruction to peaceful opposition rallies and persecution of opposition leaders have intensified in recent months ahead of the election. The government and its supporters have continued with wanton use of draconian laws such as the 2018 Digital Security Act, taking an inflexible position despite criticisms at home and abroad. Additionally, it has made moves to introduce more restrictive laws such as the Data Protection Act (DPA). Introduction of the DPA will adversely impact US investment and businesses in Bangladesh and provide the government enormous regulatory authority. 
• A likely repeat of the unfree and unfair 2018 election, which was described by international media as “transparently fraudulent.” The government has continued to show indifference to the concerns of the opposition and members of civil society about the role of the election commission in ensuring an inclusive election. 
• The role of civil administration in local elections, boycotted by the major opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party. This was largely contested by ruling party leaders, but members of the civil administration appear to have shown support for candidates officially nominated by the ruling party. 

Geopolitics at play

With the growing international importance of South Asia thanks to heightened competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region, US insistence on having a democratic system in Bangladesh is not devoid of geopolitical considerations. Although the US-Bangladesh relationship has expanded and become multifaceted in recent decades, there are concerns in Washington about China’s assertive posture in Bangladesh.

Besides buying two submarines from China in 2016, Bangladesh joined Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the same year. The BRI is not only a framework for infrastructure development and cooperation in different countries but is also a tool to expand China’s sphere of influence. Bangladesh-China cooperation is thus not limited to economic realms. Then-Chinese Ambassador to Dhaka Li Jiming’s warning in 2021 that Bangladesh’s relations with Beijing would be severely harmed if the country joins the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue showed the expectation of China. 

In the past six months, three top Chinese foreign affairs officials have visited Bangladesh. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang made a surprise stopover in Dhaka in the middle of the night just before Assistant Secretary Donald Lu’s visit to Bangladesh in January. Chinese Special Envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun arrived in Dhaka in April just a day before Foreign Minister Momen was to visit Washington. 

Further, amid the current tension in US-Bangladesh relations, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong visited Dhaka for three days beginning May 26, 2023. Bangladesh is considering joining China’s Global Development Initiative. On the contrary, Dhaka’s response to the Indo-Pacific Strategy initiated by the United States did not seem encouraging and Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific Outlook falls short of Western expectations. 

As democracy and human rights are the purported centerpiece of US President Joseph R. Biden and his administration’s foreign policy, it is not surprising that the United States wants to make an example of Bangladesh. 

Will it work?

Bangladesh is not the first country subjected to US visa restrictions as a tool to punish those who have subverted the democratic process. Previously, visa restrictions have been imposed on individuals from Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, Nicaragua, and Belarus for undermining democracy and electoral processes under different laws. In most instances, these measures were adopted after the elections. However, to date, successes have been limited which raises questions as to whether it will have a different impact on Bangladesh. 

Adopting such a measure at least seven months ahead of the election in Bangladesh is a positive sign, because Washington can take proactive actions to prevent rather than ex post facto measure. In addition, it is unclear how the US embassy in Dhaka will sort and decide on which cases to follow up and investigate. A former US diplomat with extensive experience at the US embassy has described this as a “daunting task for [a] handful of staff.” 

Despite these challenges, the announcement is having an impact on those connected to the government who either aspire to visit the United States in the future or already have immediate family members residing there. This pressure will no doubt be felt among Bangladesh’s political and economic elites.

Looking ahead

The US visa restrictions alone will not guarantee a free and fair election or restore democracy in Bangladesh. However, the new policy sends a loud and clear message to Dhaka as much as to US allies about how Washington views the possible trajectory of Bangladeshi politics. In short, it signals a readiness to act. The desired goal of a free and inclusive election and a return to the democratic path will require a more concerted international effort on the one hand, and political engagement of the citizens of Bangladesh demanding a neutral administration on the other.

Ali Riaz is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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At the same time, Turkey is beset by change, including a reeling economy at home and open conflict in its neighborhood. To its north, Russia wages war on Ukraine. To its south, Syria is on edge. Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights on what to expect on these issues and more.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Defne Arslan: It’s time for Turkey to shift its economic policy

Borzou Daragahi: Erdoğan signals he will tighten his grip

Rich Outzen: Expect more strategic semi-independence and balancing among great powers

Yevgeniya Gaber: How Erdoğan could use his leverage on Russia’s war in Ukraine

Ariel Cohen: Expect Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the US to weaken

Ali Bakir: Stability alone will not solve Turkey’s pressing issues

It’s time for Turkey to shift its economic policy

Turkey is getting ready for another five-year term under Erdoğan with an AK Party-led alliance holding a majority in the parliament. Given the presidential system and with a parliament majority behind him, the reelection of Erdoğan will give Turkey a five-year stable term without elections, except for municipal elections to be held in ten months. Erdoğan’s reelection means Turkey will be entering another era of centralized decision-making, however this five-year term can also be regarded as securing political stability for Turkey. If Turkey’s economic team can go back to credible and more conventional economic policies that can fix the current problems through setting strong economic benchmarks and implementing crucial structural reforms, then I believe Turkey can be a destination for foreign capital in time, given the current state of other emerging markets. 

The Turkish economy currently has serious problems, including a high inflation rate and low currency reserves caused in part by a controlled exchange rate regime. Current unconventional policy is not helping Turkey achieve a high growth rate or a boost in its exports. In short, the economy needs to be addressed quickly. It is important for Erdoğan and the new government to reassure confidence in the Turkish economy both for domestic and foreign investors. With a strong economic team and more conventional and independent policies, this is possible. In his victory remarks, Erdoğan discussed the Turkish economy at length, which shows that he is determined to deliver a stronger road map for the economy. Regarding regional energy policies, I do not expect any shift there. Current policies will continue. We will be hearing from the new cabinet this weekend, if not by Friday, but early news signals that the economy is a major priority for Erdoğan.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and Turkey programs, and former chief Turkey economist and senior energy policy adviser in the US embassy in Ankara.

Erdoğan signals he will tighten his grip

Early signs suggest that the reelection of Erdoğan will lead to further erosion of human rights and political freedoms in Turkey.

In the run-up to the second round of voting, it was an open question as to whether Erdoğan, who had promised to serve only one more five-year term, would burnish his legacy by easing some of the harsh measures he has imposed against his liberal and leftist political opponents and minority communities.

But in a pair of victory speeches on Sunday in Istanbul and Ankara, Erdoğan was hardly magnanimous in victory. He dispensed quickly with the obligatory post-election call to put aside differences. “There will be no losers in such a victory. The winner is Turkey,” he said, dutifully thanking all Turks who voted.

But his tone quickly darkened. He slammed his opponent Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as incompetent and smirked as the crowd booed him. He described jailed Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas and other political opponents as “terrorists.”

He accused the Anglophone, French, and German media outlets covering Turkey of trying to overthrow him. He drew howls of delight from the crowd when he warned that opposition parties were pursuing a pro-LGBTQI+ agenda. “For us, family is sacred,” he said.

He also warned that he would prevent political opponents from damaging Turkey’s “success with other people and other intermediaries,” suggesting he would crack down on journalists, human-rights campaigners, and political dissidents who attempted to pressure Ankara by appealing to international governments and institutions.

Erdoğan’s vow to stay in office for just one more term appeared to fall by the wayside. “My commitment is until I die, until the grave,” he said. 

Erdoğan still has time, opportunity, and breathing space to moderate his ways, draw in opponents, and focus the nation’s efforts on improving the country’s battered economy, which is now the most pressing concern for most Turks. But Erdoğan’s post-election posturing suggests he may have already settled on a path of demonizing vulnerable minorities and targeting political opponents to retain social control ahead of potentially rough economic times.

—Borzou Daragahi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and an Istanbul-based journalist.

Expect more strategic semi-independence and balancing among great powers

When an incumbent president wins reelection—as Erdoğan has in Turkey by a roughly 52-48 margin—one expects more continuity than change in foreign policy. For Erdoğan, this means hewing to three pillars that have evolved as the basis for Turkish foreign policy under his lead: strategic semi-independence (anchored by NATO with expansive caveats), balancing and hedging among great powers, and a carrot-and-stick mixture of hard power and adaptive diplomacy in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood.

NATO remains the cornerstone of Turkish security, and Ankara has spoken in favor of admitting Ukraine and Georgia. After extracting concessions on defense cooperation and prosecution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror group, the Turkish parliament approved Finland’s accession in March. As Sweden’s new counter-terror legislation takes full effect next month, the prospects for Swedish accession are looking up. Under Erdoğan’s upcoming presidential term, Turkey will remain a strong contributor to the Alliance’s training, readiness, and mutual defense missions. Should the war in Ukraine end during his presidential term, Erdoğan can be expected to continue offering strong defense partnership to Ukraine, as he has for the past decade.

Yet NATO membership offers little help to Erdoğan in an arc of conflict—and tension with Russia—that spans Turkey’s eastern and southern borders. The counter-PKK campaigns in Iraq and Syria, standoffs in the Caucasus and Libya, and the unresolved Syrian civil war all require that Erdoğan alternately deter and negotiate with Moscow, Tehran, Damascus, and other regional powers without much help from the West. One might add the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, where Turkey butts heads with Greece and Cyprus, necessitating an independent approach. In this “zone beyond NATO” for Turkish security, Erdoğan is likely to leave the door open for deals while rattling the saber occasionally for effect. 

Syria stands out as a matter of personal legacy for Erdoğan; he will want to remove the PKK-linked People’s Defense Units (YPG) from the Turkish border, while facilitating the safe return of significant numbers of Syrian refugees to their homeland. What mixture of diplomatic finesse and military threats compels Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to provide assurances on refugee protection and border security remains to be seen. If Ankara believes it can weaken the YPG and bring Assad to the table through drone and artillery strikes alone, it may forgo a large ground operation, but a major new operation against the YPG this year or next cannot be ruled out. Syrian refugees and Turkish nationalists both favored Erdoğan in the recent election, and the Turkish president feels an obligation to both—which he will seek to fulfill by ending YPG control of border areas and keeping Assad from annihilating the Syrian opposition or returning refugees.

Erdoğan emerges from his reelection campaign with a reasonably strong public mandate, an experienced foreign policy team, endorsement of his conservative-nationalist approach, and some margin for risk-taking. It will be interesting to see how he uses those things.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former military and civilian adviser in the US State Department.

How Erdoğan could use his leverage on Russia’s war in Ukraine

Erdoğan’s winning the presidential elections means much more continuity rather than change in Ankara’s foreign policy and business as usual with both Russia and Ukraine. Turkey’s ambivalent stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine—trading and developing economic cooperation with the former while providing support for the self-defense of the latter—will likely remain unchanged. Turkey’s balancing policy between the two warring parties has paid off, not least in domestic politics. At the same time, Erdoğan’s shuttle diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow has brought concrete results—enabling prisoner swaps in the early days of war, brokering the grain deal, and facilitating meetings of the delegations. With Erdoğan strengthening his position with a new “vote of confidence” from the Turkish people, and Russian President Vladimir Putin losing his grip on power both internally and externally, Erdoğan might play hard this time—pushing both sides for a ceasefire, maintaining the work of the grain corridors, and negotiating to get the rest of the Turkish ships out of Ukrainian ports. 

One might assume that with a new, much more nationalistic parliament, the issue of Crimean Tatars and other Turkic communities discriminated against and persecuted by the Russian occupational authorities in Ukraine would play a bigger role in the future. However, this is very unlikely since both Turkey’s economic woes and geopolitical setting in the region demand its close cooperation with Russia. Tackling the problem of Syrian refugees, refueling exhausted central bank reserves, and accumulated problems in relations with the United States and European Union will keep Russia high among Turkey’s top partners, no matter what. “[Turkey’s] relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States,” was Erdoğan’s message in the final days of the campaign. It’s no surprise that Putin was quick to congratulate Erdoğan on the victory—even before the official results were announced.

At the same time, ongoing projects with Ukraine—most notably in defense industry and military cooperation—will also likely remain in place, meaning that no time will be wasted on a transition period in Ankara had the leadership changed. 

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a former foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister of Ukraine.

Expect Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the US to weaken

Erdoğan’s unprecedented two decades in office and third presidential term of five years will have far-ranging consequences for Europe and Asia. As Turkey continues its ascent as a major power, it will drift away from the West and weaken its relationship with Europe and the United States. Ankara is building ties with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Erdogan is weighing joining. He also has aspirations to become a member of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

At the same time, its support of Ukraine and power projection into the Caucasus via Azerbaijan will lead to clashes with Russia and Iran, as will Turkey’s continuing involvement in the Middle East, where Iran is demonstrating insatiable quasi-imperial ambitions. The Turkey-Azerbaijan axis and Ankara’s support of the Organization of Turkic States, a tool of Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia, will likely bring both Moscow’s and Tehran’s ire.

Arab allies of Turkey, including Qatar, and old-new “friends” such as Saudi Arabia may also become weary of Ankara’s vast ambitions rooted in the Ottoman legacy. Frustrated with barriers to US arms supplies, Turkey, a leader in drone technology with its widely lauded Bayraktar, is likely to embark on an even more robust military-industrial build-up to boost its muscle. This could include investing more in its native fifth generation TAI Kaan (TF-X / F-X) fighter jet, its Altay Main Battle Tank, and its Hisar and Siper missile systems.

Finally, the challenges of economic reform and curbing inflation will be front and center. Erdoğan will likely (and hopefully) review his religiously inspired anti-usury, inflation-denying monetary policy. He may also support economic growth by building up Turkey’s role as an energy hub, with Azeri, Eastern Mediterranean, Iranian, Russian, Turkmen, and Gulf gas pipelines going through the country and into Europe. Erdoğan may also push for constructing a massive Mediterranean-Black Sea canal to bypass the congested and hard-to-navigate Bosporus, representing a significant economic development engine for the next decade and beyond.

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Stability alone will not solve Turkey’s pressing issues

With Erdoğan’s win, both the presidency and parliament are now aligned under a single political front. This will likely facilitate Erdoğan’s task of maintaining stability and ensuring the continuity of his policies. However, this is not a panacea; no magical solutions will materialize to the most pressing issues.

Internally, this scenario could spell disaster for the opposition. The opposition coalition may now crumble, signaling the end of Kılıçdaroğlu’s political career, with Meral Akşener, head of the Good Party (Iyi), another possible political casualty. Sweeping changes are anticipated within the opposition camp if they are willing to show responsibility.

The most pressing issue on Erdoğan’s agenda is the economic situation. The president has already made clear that he has no intention of revising his unconventional economic theory. Should pressure mount, he would likely resort to a mix of strategies, including soliciting more money from regional partners and allies such as Azerbaijan, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, Erdoğan may expedite the exploration of oil and gas in the Black Sea and possibly in the Eastern Mediterranean and boost defense exports to secure hard currency. As he continues the normalization process with regional countries, including Egypt, to stabilize the situation and increase Turkey’s trade with the region, Syria is poised to emerge as the most significant obstacle.

From Erdoğan’s viewpoint, if normalization with Assad becomes inevitable due to the emerging regional and international dynamics, it should come at a price. Erdoğan will likely seek financial support from Qatar, other Gulf countries, and the international community to fund housing projects in liberated areas to accommodate returning refugees. He insists that Assad should demonstrate commitment on at least three fronts: countering the YPG and Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), ensuring the safety of those who choose to return voluntarily at the current moment, and making notable progress on the political front in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. Should Assad fail to show such commitment, Erdoğan will be in a suitable position vis-à-vis Russia to launch a new military operation in northern Syria versus the offshoots of the PKK, backed by the nationalist voices in the parliament.

Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey will prioritize its own interests and bolster its autonomous and independent foreign policy, as well as its forward defense policy. He has already reached out to Biden’s administration to try to resolve some persistent issues, including the F-16 fighter jet deal, and may discuss other hot topics such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Syria. Ankara is expected to affirm its position on the YPG and even show more assertiveness with its deployed unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Erdoğan will likely reassert Ankara’s position toward Sweden, emphasizing the need to counter terrorism to ensure Sweden’s access to NATO. Moreover, Erdoğan will likely reach out to Putin to ensure the continuation of Ankara’s constructive efforts in halting the ongoing war against Ukraine.

—Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East programs and an assistant professor at Qatar University’s Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences.

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They’re staying the course. A majority of Turkish voters backed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Sunday’s runoff election, earning him another five-year term as president and extending his twenty-year hold on power. Yet the vote for continuity comes amid major changes in and around Turkey, which is still recovering from a devastating earthquake, dealing with financial turmoil, and contending with security challenges in its neighborhood. Our experts elected to share their insights on what to expect from another Erdoğan term.

• Defne Arslan (@defnesadiklar): Senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and Turkey programs, former chief Turkey economist and senior energy policy adviser in the US embassy in Ankara
• Yevgeniya Gaber (@GaberYevgeniya): Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former foreign-policy adviser to the Ukrainian prime minister
• Rich Outzen (@RichOutzen): Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former military and civilian adviser in the US State Department

Pivotal position

• Erdoğan winning about 52 percent of the vote against challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, combined with the parties supporting him having secured a majority in parliament, means Turkey will be entering another period of “centralized decision making” but also one of “political stability,” Defne tells us.
• “Turkey’s ambivalent stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, trading and developing economic cooperation with the former while providing support for the self-defense of the latter, will likely remain unchanged,” explains Yevgeniya. But secure in his power, “Erdoğan might play hard this time,” she adds, by asking Russia for more in negotiations over grain exports from Ukraine and even pushing both sides for a ceasefire.
• Turkey’s foreign policy will likely continue with its strategic semi-independence and its balancing and hedging among great powers, explains Rich. Yet within NATO, “the prospects for Swedish accession are looking up,” he adds, especially with Sweden’s new counter-terror legislation taking full effect next month.

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An economic rethink?

• At home, Erdoğan’s first priority will be the Turkish economy, which is currently battling slow growth, low reserves, and high inflation due in part to the government’s low interest rate policy. “If Turkey’s economy team can go back to credible and more conventional economic policies that can fix the current problems,” Defne says, the country could become a destination for foreign capital once again.
• In his victory remarks, Erdoğan referenced this year’s one hundredth anniversary of the Turkish Republic and discussed the Turkish economy at length, which Defne interprets as a signal “that he is determined to deliver a stronger road map for the economy.”
• It will take “setting strong economic benchmarks and implementing crucial structural reforms,” Defne adds, to reestablish “confidence in the Turkish economy both for domestic and foreign investors.”
• Expect Russia to remain high among Turkey’s economic partners, as Ankara seeks to refuel its exhausted central bank reserves, explains Yevgeniya. She underscores that Erdoğan’s message at the close of his campaign was: “[Turkey’s] relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.” It’s no surprise, she adds, that Russian President Vladimir Putin was quick to congratulate Erdoğan on the victory—even before the official results were announced.
• But for Ukraine, Yevgeniya notes that Erdoğan is likely to continue “Turkey’s military support and ongoing projects in the defense sphere.”

Contesting the ‘zone beyond NATO’

• “Syria stands out as a matter of personal legacy for Erdoğan,” says Rich. The Turkish president wants to remove the Kurdistan Workers’ Party–linked People’s Defense Units (YGP) from the Turkish border and facilitate the return of a significant number of refugees to Syria, he explains.
• Rich warns that “a major new [military] operation against the YPG this year or next cannot be ruled out.” However, if Turkey can sufficiently weaken the YPG and bring Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to negotiations through drone and artillery strikes alone, then it may forgo a large ground operation.
• Turkish security concerns extend beyond Syria, Rich points out, to Libya, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean and Aegean seas—all of which require deft negotiation with regional powers. “In this ‘zone beyond NATO’ for Turkish security,” he says, “Erdoğan is likely to leave the door open for deals while rattling the saber occasionally for effect.”

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On May 19, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest column, they discuss Turkey’s recent elections, tensions between the Russian military and the private Wagner Group, the Ukrainians’ delayed Spring offensive, and the surprising outcomes of Thailand’s recent elections. In particular, the co-authors delve deep into the topic of the Turkish elections, exploring how the results will impact NATO, as well as Sweden’s ascension into the Alliance.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate the implications of Turkey’s elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At 40 percent of the vote (and a whopping 20 percentage points above second-place Syriza, the leftist party of former Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras) the New Democracy Party’s showing was higher than when Mitsotakis was first elected to power in 2019. In fact, it is the best of any incumbent Greek government in half a century. The impressive win is widely considered a vote of confidence in the Greek prime minister, who went to the polls asking for a second term to complete his pro-business agenda. 

But as much as it says about how Greek voters evaluate his first term, the result also speaks volumes about the state of the opposition, especially Syriza, which failed to persuade voters that it had a compelling governing proposition and refused to shed its populist rhetoric.

Given a new voting law of proportional representation, New Democracy was still a few seats shy of forming a majority government. Thus, Mitsotakis has called for a runoff election as soon as June 25, which will be held under a different voting law that may well propel New Democracy to a majority, given the bonus of as many as fifty seats that it grants to the first-place party. As for the prospect of Mitsotakis forming a coalition government, a lack of appetite or scope for such cooperation all but rules it out.

Contrary to the years of the financial crisis, these elections in Greece did not attract wide international attention. The fact that no government was formed did not rattle the markets, nor did it create cause for geopolitical concern. On the contrary, the Greek stock market rallied on the news on Monday.

This is partly because the strategic direction of Greece is not in question in these elections, as all the mainstream parties support Greece’s defense cooperation with the United States and are committed to the eurozone. This is also true on foreign policy, where they agree on the strategic priorities of a country that is moored to the West and playing a stabilizing role in the wider region. As US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller congratulated the people of Greece on the elections in anticipation of the runoff, he noted that “the US-Greece bilateral relationship has strong support across political parties in both the United States and Greece. It has been strengthened over years of cooperation between multiple administrations and governments in both countries.”

That said, New Democracy is focused on further deepening the US-Greece strategic partnership, including on defense, and continuing to support Ukraine by providing it with military aid and implementing sanctions against Russia. Greece under the leadership of Mitsotakis has also gained influence within the European Union (EU) on issues such as the energy transition and energy security, which could continue as Greece has a goal of tripling its regasification capacity (converting liquefied natural gas back to gas) this year. Greece is also expected to continue to exert tight control over its borders. And despite a rocky relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (who also seems poised for reelection on May 28) Mitsotakis is open to a rapprochement, if anything to avoid a replay of recent tensions.

Yet the biggest focus of a second New Democracy term would be on the economy. The May 21 election was the first in Greece after the end of the post-bailout monitoring. Under Mitsotakis’s reign, Greece registered one of the fastest economic growth rates in the eurozone in 2022, at 5.9 percent, and he promises to push with the reforms that will further increase foreign direct investment and improve Greek competitiveness, while also making good use of the 30.5 billion euros that Greece is due to receive from the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility.

But as the Financial Times notes, “Greece’s economic revival is still a work in progress.” Despite significant improvement, the legacies of the debt crisis are still evident in its gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment numbers, with New Democracy promising to continue increasing salaries and pensions to deal with a cost-of-living crisis. And Greece has committed to primary surpluses of 2 percent of GDP per year, which may prove difficult to achieve if public expenditures exceed the government’s projections amid higher inflation.

Indeed, the Greek prime minister offered an economic reason for calling the elections a couple of months early: to regain the investment-grade credit rating that the country lost during its debt crisis, considered a prerequisite to sustainably increase growth and manage its debt. As S&P Global Ratings changed its outlook for Greece from neutral to positive last month, it signaled that an upgrade to investment grade may be a matter of months away. But the credit rating agency also noted that this is subject to preserving political stability. And as the governor of the Bank of Greece warned, there is no fiscal room in Greece for all of the political parties’ electoral promises.  

But even as the prospect of another debt crisis does not seem near, the New Democracy government withstood more immediate challenges on the road to its electoral triumph. These include the 2020 Evros border crisis—in which thousands of migrants and asylum seekers tried to breach the Greece-Turkey border with the encouragement of the Turkish government—as well as the devastating effects of the pandemic, heightened tensions with Turkey, and the cost of the energy crisis for Greek households and the economy.

So, despite the tragic loss of life in a train accident in March that exposed the inefficiencies that are still plaguing Greece’s public sector, or a wire-tapping scandal that embroiled the prime minister’s office last year, it was the quest for stability and the promise of a more efficient and bolder government that gave New Democracy its impressive lead. Now, Mitsotakis is betting this will be confirmed in the runoff.

Katerina Sokou is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, Theodore Couloumbis research fellow on Greek-American relations at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, and the Washington DC correspondent for Greek daily newspaper Kathimerini, where she is also a columnist.

The post Have Greek politics finally settled down? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Earlier this month, Khan was arrested by Pakistan’s paramilitary Rangers during a hearing for a corruption case at the Islamabad High Court. This came after the country’s anti-corruption watchdog issued warrants for his arrest related to the case. Moments later, Khan’s supporters took to the streets in protest, setting ablaze public and private property. Amidst their anger, the violent protesters did something that no political party has done in decades: they set ablaze the official residence of a three-star general in the eastern city of Lahore, with some going so far as to enter military headquarters in Rawalpindi to vent their frustration.

Imran Khan and his political party (the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, or PTI) have denied that their supporters were behind the violent protests, instead alleging that it was a conspiracy to squash the party and its followers. The former prime minister—now out on bail by the country’s Supreme Court—claims that General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, is leading a crackdown against Khan and his party.

However, the attacks on military installations brought a perhaps unintended but serious consequence—they gave Khan’s opponents a golden opportunity to dismantle the PTI. The military suggested that those who staged violent protests be tried under the Pakistan Army Act and the Official Secrets Act, a suggestion that has been approved by current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s civilian government.

Thousands of Khan’s party workers have been arrested across Pakistan and over a dozen leaders and former lawmakers have left the party. Those who still remain loyal to the former prime minister are either in jail or on the run. The political turmoil that Pakistan has been going through since last year could further dent the country’s turbulent democracy, and Khan’s opponents are not the only ones behind it.

Imran Khan, unlike other politicians, does not believe in talks with his rivals to settle political disputes. Instead, he stages rallies and calls opponents “thieves” and “looters” in front of thousands of supporters. His arrogance and refusal to engage in political dialogue with rivals has brought Pakistan’s political scene to a point of no return.

As a result, the situation is unlikely to improve anytime soon.

Khan’s main rivals—the parties of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Asif Ali Zardari—have been long active in the country’s politics. They, too, have experienced the wrath of the military establishment currently faced by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf. Their governments were either thrown out of power or weakened because of the establishment’s meddling. In the end, though, their parties still exist and remain key civilian players in Pakistan’s politics. Likewise, attempting to dismantle Khan’s political party will not simply make his support base and influence disappear.

Democracy is about not the politicians, but the voters who send these men and women into the corridors of power. There is no denying that Imran Khan and the PTI have a support base in almost every city of the country. If his party is dismantled, his supporters may lose interest in politics and serve to strengthen undemocratic forces in Pakistan, a trend which has long plagued its political landscape.

Imran Khan, with all his faults, is a popular leader and should face the law as would any other politician. That said, attempts to break his party should not only be opposed by all the political parties, but especially by those who are in the current government. If Khan and his military backers’ undemocratic sidelining of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Shehbaz Sharif’s party before the 2018 elections was indeed wrong, then the same rule must apply to the equally undemocratic crackdown against the PTI.

Democracy remains the only system that can save Pakistan from plunging into darkness. To strengthen it, all political parties need to come together and agree to the earliest date possible to hold countrywide elections in hopes of alleviating the political crisis. This fight is about power. Power comes from the people, and elections remain the only way to have their voice heard in government.

Roohan Ahmed is an independent journalist based in Islamabad covering politics and extremist groups in the region.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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The post <strong>In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. At an Atlantic Council event in Washington less than six months ago, Lasso declared that Ecuador “has fully returned to democracy.” What is the impact of this decree on Ecuador’s democratic institutions?

Ecuador’s constitution is unique in that it allows the president to dissolve congress in three instances. In this case, Lasso’s reasoning is that his actions are warranted under the third instance: “political crisis and internal commotion.” From his perspective, this is true since congress began impeachment proceedings to remove him from office on May 16. From the opposition’s viewpoint, represented by Rafael Correa, a former Ecuadorian president who currently lives abroad, it is Lasso who is creating internal commotion. Importantly, the decree ensures that new elections must be held for president and congress. Already, Ecuador’s armed forces and national police have been clear that personnel will respect the constitution, which does allow for dissolving congress under Article 148.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

It is very important to clarify that this movement by Lasso to activate the “muerte cruzada” is defined by Article 148 of Ecuador’s constitution. It will basically dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections in six months’ time. This election includes the president and vice president positions. He will not acquire total governing powers. The only laws that he can expedite during these six months are executive decrees on economically urgent laws that have to be sanctioned by the constitutional court.

—Felipe Espinosa is the executive president of Cámara de Comercio Ecuatoriano Americana (AMCHAM).

The decision made by Lasso once again highlights the significant challenge of protecting democracy in Latin America. While the decision is in accordance with Ecuador’s constitution and a response to internal political complexity, the effective functioning of democracy relies on a balanced distribution of power. Governing through decrees diminishes one of the crucial checks on power—the National Assembly.

—Fernando Larraín is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

2. Is there anything Washington can or should do to respond?

Ecuador has become one of the United States’ closest partners in the hemisphere over the last few years. In December 2022, just days before Lasso met with US President Joe Biden at the White House, Congress approved the bipartisan United States-Ecuador Partnership Act—historic legislation given its singular focus on advancing the bilateral relationship in areas such as economic and commercial ties, the environment, and security. Congress has since then taken additional action. In March, Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and James Risch (R-ID) have again led legislation focused on the bilateral partnership with the introduction of the Innovation and Development in Ecuador Act of 2023, which would include Ecuador in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.

The last six months have again reinforced the focus on Ecuador among many in Washington. What is needed now is continued support and vocal messages across the US political spectrum reinforcing the importance of the democratic process and for stability in Ecuador at a time in which the streets may erupt at any point.

—Jason Marczak

The United States should have a continuous policy toward the region to enhance democratic values and institutions. Only economic prosperity in the region will guarantee that the people there view the rule of law and other long-term institutions as the solution instead of populist offerings. Poverty and inequality are never good advisors, more so when you talk about values with people struggling to make a day-to-day living. This mandate requires a long-term commitment of the United States to its allies in Latin America, through economic and social programs and support for trade.

—Felipe Espinosa

3. How do you see Lasso’s “rule by decree” tenure playing out?

Lasso’s decision to govern by decree is poised to embark on a challenging journey, with its overall impact yet to be determined. Upon invoking Article 148 today, he also introduced his first decree law, effectively reducing taxes and offering much-needed relief to Ecuadorian families. Additionally, Lasso is likely to push forward with labor reform and investment reform, both of which have long been stalled in congress. These reforms have the potential to bring positive impacts to Ecuadorian families by addressing crucial aspects such as hourly employee compensation, part-time work, and fair wages. While these reforms are likely to take place, the road ahead will be tumultuous. 

As expected, many members of congress do not align with Lasso’s decision to govern by decree, and it is likely that supporters of the impeachment will voice their discontent on the streets of Ecuador, potentially leading to protests similar to those witnessed in June and July of last year. The possibility of such protests, capable of paralyzing the Ecuadorian economy, adds complexity to Lasso’s governance under the “rule by decree” strategy. Navigating this challenging environment may overshadow the potential benefits these reforms can bring. 

—Isabel Chiriboga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

4. Why does this matter for the United States? What are the implications for broader hemispheric stability?

Ecuador’s stability matters far beyond the country’s borders given its role as an important US partner. Ecuador made a clear decision a few years ago to strengthen its relationship with the United States. The hemisphere is thus looking at how that decision affects the country’s trajectory at a time of growing competition with China.

—Jason Marczak

Over the years, Ecuador has emerged as a strong US partner in the hemisphere, maintaining a close alignment with the United States amid shifting government ideologies across the region. However, the ongoing political crisis in Ecuador, fueled by pressing concerns such as inequality, insecurity, and the government’s struggle to address the basic needs of its citizens, raises concerns about the relevance of the United States in the region. Once seen as an example of economic stability, Ecuador will now face uncertainty as it approaches presidential elections in six months. In general, the United States finds itself with diminishing influence in Latin America. This situation creates an opportunity for broader Chinese influence to gain traction in the region. As Ecuador’s political landscape evolves, it becomes crucial for the United States to reassess its approach and take meaningful steps to maintain and strengthen its ties with Latin American countries.

—Isabel Chiriboga 

It is worth noting that Ecuador’s neighboring countries are grappling with greater internal political challenges, suggesting that the impact of this decision may not extend beyond Ecuador’s borders. Nevertheless, we can expect months of uncertainty, which will inevitably influence investment decisions and the financial market in Ecuador as governance dynamics are affected. In the upcoming months, Ecuador will undergo a political process where the focus may shift from addressing citizen concerns to matters of political power.

—Fernando Larraín

The post Ecuador’s president just invoked ‘mutual death’ to avoid impeachment. Here’s why it matters. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite many observers’ initial beliefs that the new constitution would align with the governing coalition’s left-leaning political ideologies, the final tally of the May 6 vote showed a strong swing to the right, with nearly two-thirds of the available seats going to center-right and far-right candidates. 

The far-right Republican Party, led by former presidential candidate José Antonio Kast, secured twenty-three of the available seats, granting the party veto power over constitutional articles. Alongside the eleven seats won by traditional right and center-right parties, the collective influence of right-leaning council members exceeds the crucial threshold of thirty-one votes (or 60 percent) required for approving constitutional clauses. While an alliance between the Republican Party and other right-leaning factions remains uncertain, there is a strong likelihood of these groups working together.

So, will the council agree on a new constitution? Hopefully yes. But it will also need to deliver one that is then approved by the majority of voters. In short, it is in the Republican Party’s best interest that the draft constitution does not solely embody conservative values. Absolute veto power and the ability to approve clauses by allying with traditional and center-right members of the constitutional council means that the elected members could create the constitution they want. But if the document they produce ends up being rejected in December, the party loses its opportunity to lead the process, a prospect that is unlikely to happen again. 

Moreover, voters are watching this closely as a test case for how Republicans might govern. The optics of the party successfully delivering a democratically accepted legal charter would grant the Republicans a distinct advantage over left-leaning parties and could be regarded as the cornerstone for their campaigns in the upcoming 2024 mayoral and 2026 presidential elections. These factors make it imperative that the Republican Party remains open to compromise.

The results of the election also present a dilemma for left-leaning Chilean President Gabriel Boric and his administration, particularly as their approval rating continues to decrease. How do they continue to govern considering the country’s legal charter will almost certainly be more right-leaning than they anticipated? Will they continue working to build alliances with the right or reinforce their existing posture? 

In a region that is struggling with the challenges of polarization, democratic backsliding, corruption, and violence, Chile’s positive trajectory in the constitutional reform process demonstrates the importance of fostering consensus. The first attempt at reform by a left-leaning constitutional convention, deemed the world’s most progressive constitution, was rejected by voters. A shift toward unity would serve as a powerful testament to the strength of Chile’s institutions and Boric’s commitment to democracy, transparency, and representation. Failing to do so could stagnate the constitutional reform process and impede Chile’s advancement as a democratic and economic frontrunner in the region. Such a scenario would not only diminish investor confidence, but also foster distrust in the regulatory environment that has thus far enabled businesses to operate confidently in the country. 

On the other hand, more than three years after the Estallido Social took to the streets, Chileans have become increasingly detached from the constitutional reform process. After the first attempt at reform was rejected in 2022, the Chilean Senate and Chamber of Deputies appointed a panel of experts to compose a revised proposal. This will next be reviewed and approved by the constitutional council, thus limiting the involvement of the general population in the document’s drafting process.

Similarly, the issues that Chileans identified as the country’s most pressing problems in 2019—such as pension and health care systems—have fallen off the radar in favor of crime, inflation, immigration, and drug trafficking. With these day-to-day issues taking the spotlight away from systemic concerns, people in Chile have shifted their attention away from the constitutional process.

The constitutional council will meet for the first time on June 7 and will begin discussing the fourteen-chapter draft proposal written by the expert commission. On December 17 the final document will once again be presented for a national plebiscite, enabling Chileans to cast their votes and determine the approval or rejection of the new constitution.

The right-wing members of the new constitutional council have an opportunity that should not be missed. Delivering a non-polarizing constitution that is approved in December is in everyone’s best interest but will not be achieved unless the majority members compromise on conservative values to create a constitution that works to the benefit of every member of society.

Ignacia Ulloa Peters is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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1. What do the results tell us about the Turkish electorate? What factors are driving their votes?

The outcome was a choice for many Turks between pain tolerance (Erdoğan’s poor economic performance and heavy hand domestically) versus risk tolerance (an ideologically diverse coalition with untested personalities, scant unifying principles other than opposing Erdoğan, and a lot of policy unknowns). A comparison with the 2018 results shows progress for the opposition in a sense—the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) vote share and parliamentary seats dropped, the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) share rose, Erdoğan’s vote share dropped over 3 percent—but the opposition also underperformed expectations. Polls prior to the election generally showed Kılıçdaroğlu ahead by several percentage points, and if we tally the 2018 total of opposition candidates (CHP; Good Party, or Iyi; and Peoples’ Democratic Party, or HDP), their 46.33 percent exceeded the 44.45 percent garnered by Kılıçdaroğlu as a unified candidate with ex officio HDP support. 

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant.

With a turnout of almost 90 percent, the Turkish people proved their commitment to the democratic process. There were, in fact, two elections on May 14: One for the Turkish parliament, Turkey’s legislative organ under a presidential system, and a second one to select the next Turkish president. The results showed an electorate still highly divided, but also showed an increase in nationalist votes. Compared to previous elections, the AKP votes decreased from 43 percent to 35.4 percent. Its alliance partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), surprisingly protected its vote share, in contrast to pre-election polls. The end result appears to be the People’s Alliance (AKP plus MHP) as the majority group in the parliament, securing 321 seats. This number will be sufficient for a legislative majority, but short of the 360 seats needed to make a constitutional amendment. On the other hand, the main opposition Nation Alliance, led by the CHP and Iyi, secured only 213 seats.

Despite the general expectations, it was surprising to see that the recent economic policies of the government—which led to high inflation, low reserves, and a foreign exchange crunch—were not determinant for those who voted for the AKP. This suggests that the recent economic incentives Erdoğan announced, and nationalist motives combined with Erdoğan’s leadership style, played a bigger role in their votes. The increasing nationalist votes were also reflected in the surprisingly strong showing by third-place presidential candidate Sinan Oğan, who secured 5.3 percent of the vote when pre-election polls projected him only at only 1-2 percent.

As a final note, with the exception of the hard-hit Hatay province in southern Turkey, the recent earthquake in Turkey did not make the expected impact on the electorate’s decision, according to the current results. Again, half of Turkey thinks that securing stability rather than a change will be better for the country.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. 

Across Turkey, Erdoğan’s vote total in 2023 decreased between 1-5 percent in most provinces compared to the last presidential election in 2018, in which he took 52.6 percent of the vote, enough to avoid a runoff. That modest decline does not match the high hopes of the opposition, buoyed by many but not all polls heading into the election. Despite years of economic struggle and runaway inflation, Erdoğan was able to hold on to the loyalty of most of his base and end up just shy of 50 percent. The results remind us again that the Turkish electorate leans heavily right, with right-wing parties winning over 60 percent of the parliamentary vote. It also hints that the electorate is not convinced in the opposition’s vision for the country or its ability to solve the challenges facing the country. In its campaign, the AKP heavily played on the achievements realized in the past twenty-one years under its rule, from its signature infrastructure projects to health care reforms and defense industry development, which may have resonated with voters more than intangible promises and change promoted by the opposition.

—Grady Wilson is an associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

2.  What do you make of the composition of the new parliament, and what impact will it have on the ultimate winner of the presidential race?

Adding up the current numbers as broadcasted by news outlets (no official numbers are out yet), AKP will have 266 seats and CHP will have 169 seats, of which 37 seats actually belong to four other coalition partners. These include political parties led by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ali Babacan, and Temel Karamollaoğlu. In addition, the Green Left Party (YSP) will have 62 seats, the MHP 50 seats, the Iyi 44 seats, and two others parties with a total of 9 seats. These numbers put the People’s Alliance (AKP plus MHP) at 312 seats and Nation’s Alliance (a CHP-led group of six parties) at 213 seats. These numbers give the majority to the AKP-led alliance.

Two options appear possible for the runoff:

• The Turkish electorate could consolidate around nationalist votes. They may prefer continuity of the current status quo: a president supported by a majority in the parliament.
• Turks can decide it is risky to consolidate too much power around the AKP and consolidate, instead, for Kılıçdaroğlu.

—Defne Arslan

The Turkish electorate remains a center-right electorate. Kılıçdaroğlu did not attract enough of the winnable center-right votes to win and, in my view, that was the key to the outcome. Over 20 percent of the parliament will consist of explicitly nationalist parties (MHP, Iyi, BBP), and Oğan’s surprising 5 percent in the presidential race shows the persistence of anti-Erdoğan nationalist voters who also rejected the primary opposition candidate. It is possible that the more explicit support to Kılıçdaroğlu from the heavily Kurdish HDP, and Erdoğan’s instrumentalization of it by accusing his opponent of being adjacent to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist group, worked by driving some potential nationalist votes from the opposition to Oğan or the MHP. 

Despite Western predictions that the Kurds of Turkey would be kingmakers in a tightly divided electorate, it did not pan out that way. The HDP/YSP (sympathetic to the PKK) drew only 8.8 percent, down roughly 3 percent from 2018, and dropped from 67 to 62 parliamentary seats. Even in the Kurdish-majority areas of the southeast, the race was competitive, with Erdoğan’s alliance ahead of the HDP/YSP in half the provinces and the opposition CHP pulling five parliamentary seats while HDP/YSP held roughly half the provinces.

—Rich Outzen

One of the most surprising results from the election is the resilience of the second largest party in the People’s Alliance, the MHP. Once again (as they did in 2018), the MHP surpassed all pre-election predictions, taking about 10 percent of the vote and guaranteeing the People’s Alliance will continue its control of parliament. Meanwhile, the CHP and Iyi underperformed. The results will not help the opposition’s morale going into the runoff.

—Grady Wilson

3. What is your take on allegations of Russian influence in the election?

Despite the fact that foreign policy was almost absent from the agenda of the current Turkish elections, the Russian factor became a major issue in domestic politics just days before the voting with the opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu saying he had evidence of Russian interference in the upcoming elections. Erdoğan denied the accusations and added that cooperation with the Russian Federation was no less important for Turkey than with the United States. Though no evidence of Russian meddling has been shared so far, Moscow’s influence on the Turkish domestic politics may go far beyond deep fakes and cyber-attacks in the aftermath of the voting when the newly elected Turkish president will have to deliver on electoral promises, pay for Russian gas, get to the negotiation table with the Assad regime, and stabilize the economic situation. Whatever the name of the president, Russia is likely to remain a major factor in Turkey’s foreign and domestic politics.   

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a Ukrainian foreign-policy expert, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

4.  What is your expectation for the second round given that the first round showed Erdoğan with a significant lead?

There was a negative market reaction to results this morning, Turkish credit default swaps, which are an indicator of the country’s economic risk, rose by 70 basis points to 576. The Turkish lira depreciated despite the controlled foreign exchange markets. The Turkish stock exchange fell, too, led by banking sector stocks—after a significant jump last week in expectation that the opposition, which promised to deliver more conventional economic policies supported by structural reforms, would win. The market reaction might have been more severe if there were more foreign investors in Turkish markets, but there are very few now. The outcome shows that if current economic policies continue, then Turkey will continue to suffer from reserve losses and a high inflation rate, which is no longer sustainable. For this reason, we might now expect to see a shift in Erdoğan’s rhetoric toward new economic policies, while also increasing his tone to attract nationalist votes.

—Defne Arslan

In the absence of any major unforeseen developments, it is very difficult to see Kılıçdaroğlu making up the difference in the second round. He would essentially need 90 percent of the vote that went to Oğan, who took 5.3 percent of the vote.

—Grady Wilson

What did come as a surprise to many is an unexpectedly high level of support for the third-place candidate, Oğan, who has built his electoral campaign on nationalistic and anti-migrant rhetoric. Having gained more than 5 percent of the votes, he has turned from a marginal outsider to a joker with a trump card for the runoff as both front-runners fell short of the support required to win the election in the first round. As both Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu will try to mobilize constituencies for the May 28 voting, it is the voters of Oğan—Turkish nationalists with largely anti-Western sentiments but supportive of the parliamentary system in Turkey—who may play the decisive role. The unexpectedly high level of support for the nationalistic MHP aligning with the ruling AKP party adds to the feeling that observers may have underestimated the level of anti-immigrant sentiments in a Turkish society that is hosting more than 4.5 million Syrian refugees amidst a deep economic crisis. 

—Yevgeniya Gaber

Turkey has had an impressive, though for the West disappointing, exercise in democracy. The verdict—pending completion of the second round—seems to have been “better the devil we know.” Erdoğan’s attempts to sow doubt about Kılıçdaroğlu’s proximity to PKK-adjacent Kurds, his lack of international expertise (the CHP leader does not speak English or have foreign-policy experience), and his deference to Atlanticism seems to have worked. Erdoğan’s distribution of pre-election money and promises seems to have worked, as well. 

Kılıçdaroğlu was an unimpressive campaigner, though a thoroughly decent man. His coalition proved too scant on policy details, proved vulnerable to charges of being weak on security and not ready for prime time. Worst-case scenarios of obvious cheating or civil unrest seem not to have materialized. The Turks have affirmed their essentially risk-averse and conservative outlook embodied in the statement “böyle geldi, böyle gider” (as it came, so also will it go).

—Rich Outzen

The post Four questions (and expert answers) about the Turkish presidential election runoff appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To offer insights about the implications of Khan’s arrest for Pakistan, the Atlantic Council’s Pakistan Initiative asked experts to react to recent developments below.

Shuja Nawaz: Pakistan’s self-created vortex

Kalsoom Lakhani: Pakistan has already been impacted by increasing political and economic instability, which will continue to exacerbate the funding challenges for startups

Ali Hasanain: Pakistan needs to finalize an IMF deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June

Amber Rahim Shamsi: A Pakistani journalist’s guide to survival

To learn more about the arrest, tune in below with Pakistan Initiative Director Uzair Younus.

Pakistan’s self-created vortex

Just when one imagined Pakistan could not sink further into an economic and political morass, its leaders, civil and military, appear to have come up with yet another unnecessary crisis. The use of the military to arrest former Prime Minister Imran Khan in the sacrosanct confines of the Islamabad High Court reflects the inability of Pakistani political leaders to provide a coherent strategy to fight its economic and political woes. It also represents the inability of its military leaders to resist political engineering.

If the ultimate aim is to rid Pakistani politics of Imran Khan, then the storm that appears to have been unleashed may produce unintended and unmanageable consequences. The military’s calculations appear to hinge on expectations of a declining trend of Khan’s popularity and an inflated view of its own ability to ride out street unrest. What it may not have calculated is the cumulative effect of unrest on the national economy, currently gasping for air and heading toward hyperinflation and default, as well on its own rank and file. Will schisms emerge within the military? Or, will the unrest and mayhem serve as an excuse to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the provincial and national elections ordained by the Constitution? Pakistan can ill afford a coup on the Egyptian model. If that were to occur, the country would struggle to survive an extended period of chaos as an economic and political pariah.

A fascinating picture of absences from Pakistan emerged this week. The prime minister had repaired to London for a coronation and extended his stay while Pakistan was burning. He returned to Pakistan and addressed the nation on May 10, 2023. The army chief was in the Gulf, if one could believe the information on FlightAware for his personal aircraft. The caretaker chief minister of the powerful Punjab province was also abroad when the drama unfolded.

Who was in charge? Who took the decision to allow a relatively small rampaging mob to break into and torch the Corps Commander House and the Governor’s House in Lahore? Where did their guards go? And where were the military guards that abandoned the gate leading to the army headquarters in Rawalpindi to the mob? Who allowed the mob to “liberate” the headquarters of the Frontier Corps at the Bala Hissar fort in Peshawar? Some pundits opined that this was a master plan of subterfuge that has yet to unfold. Social media had a field day adding to the confusion with colorful conspiracy theories till the pulling of the plug on the internet slowed their dissemination. But the images shared by hundreds of participants in the rioting created the impression that the military was being challenged with impunity by mobs of youth and angry women. Abandoned military check posts in some military cantonment areas remained a puzzle. Only a day later did the provincial authorities in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa seek military assistance in aid of civil power.

In one fell swoop, Pakistan has managed to hurt its stability more than any enemy action could have achieved. Will its leaders speak out now and take responsibility for the shambolic mess that unfolded on May 9, 2023? The silent majority of Pakistan that is suffering the effects of poor governance and secretive decision making deserves some quick and clear answers. So do Pakistan’s friends abroad, who want it to return to a path of stability and development.

Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow and the founding director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, Washington DC. His latest book is The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood. Website: www.shujanawaz.com. On Twitter: @ShujaNawaz.

Pakistan has already been impacted by increasing political and economic instability, which will continue to exacerbate the funding challenges for startups

In the wake of the recent developments in Pakistan, the suspension of mobile broadband usage “indefinitely” by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority as well as the restriction and blocking of social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube has an immediate and adverse effect on the country’s technology sector and startup ecosystem. Not only are Pakistani startups reliant on these platforms for new user acquisition and growth of their companies, but many Pakistanis are mobile first in how they engage with the digital economy, meaning their ability to leverage technology to access startups solutions for financial services, mobility, food, commerce, and other areas has been hindered and halted. Moreover, given that international perceptions of Pakistan have already been impacted by the country’s increasing political and economic instability, this will continue to drive a negative narrative of the country in the minds of investors globally, which will only exacerbate funding challenges for startups in Pakistan.

Kalsoom Lakhani is a non-resident senior fellow at the South Asia Center and co-founder and general partner of i2i Ventures. On Twitter: @kalsoom82.

Pakistan needs to finalize an IMF deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June

Over the past eighteen months, every major power player in Pakistan has demonstrated a willingness to disregard the rule of law and national interest to strengthen its claim to power. This ugly fight has looked uglier as it has played out in lockstep with an economic meltdown that has led to 40 percent inflation this year. The country is seeing an endemic of personal tragedies played out over and over, triggered by normal citizens descending rapidly and seemingly hopelessly into poverty—from fathers killing children they cannot feed before taking their own lives, to stampedes in food lines.

Pakistan needs to finalize an International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June. For months, it has suffered not only from gross internal mismanagement, but a lack of coordination between its most important creditors—the IMF, the Chinese government, and its allies in the Middle East.

On May 6, 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang put it bluntly while he was in Islamabad: “We sincerely hope the political forces in Pakistan will build consensus, uphold stability, and more effectively address domestic and external challenges so it can focus on growing the economy.”

Two days later, the wildly popular former Prime Minister Imran Khan has been jailed, bringing his followers into direct and physical conflict with Pakistan’s powerful military, which is seen as being behind Khan’s fall from office.

One can only wonder what Pakistan’s creditors in Beijing, Washington, Riyadh, and elsewhere must be thinking about this latest chapter in a sordid tale of economic mismanagement and intemperance in managing the country’s affairs.

Put bluntly, default appears near certain unless unprecedented corrections are embarked on over the next few days.

Ali Hasanain is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. On Twitter: @AliHasanain

A Pakistani journalist’s guide to survival

Spare a thought for the journalist. Not the Whatsapp-as-a-source, vlog-from-the-basement kind of journalist, but the reporters, camerapersons, producers assignment editors, and desk editors who just want a normal country. It’s been a year since politics in Pakistan have been high on amphetamines with a generous sprinkling of LSD. They are exhausted, they are underpaid, and their stories are shaped by everything other than news value.

Just last Sunday, Sindh-based reporters were deployed to cover the local bodies elections. The stakes are high, particularly since these could offer control over Pakistan’s largest and richest city—Karachi—and as a bellwether for general elections. The local body polls have already been subject to intense legal contestation for several months. One reporter told me how his story on irregularities during polling in one station was dropped by his channel because it did not suit that channel’s agenda. Sometimes, reporters are asked to find evidence to fit a pre-determined verdict.

But what is a journalist to do when the biggest story after Khan’s arrest isn’t his first photograph in detention (yes, that’s a scoop, but a transient one), but the protests and riots that have erupted across Pakistan targeting military-owned property? I keep hearing the word “unprecedented” on international channels and social media, but only condemnation rather than nuanced context on local media. More glaringly, the visuals of protestors breaking into General Headquarters or marauding the guest house of the Lahore corps commander (that came to symbolize the post-Khan arrest reaction from his supporters) cannot be broadcasted.

I met a media manager the day after, his phone buzzing with calls from one of his bureau chiefs. “I asked him to divert the calls pressuring him to stop coverage to me,” he said, without naming who, although we both knew who he was referring to. It’s a code that doesn’t need deciphering any more. “We find ways to slip coverage into a show or a bulletin, and then run with it.”

Journalists have gotten really good at finding ways to cover the unnamed and unnameable in the last five years. For example, when one anchor couldn’t play clips of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accusing the former army and intelligence chiefs of political manipulation, he read a carefully curated transcript on his show. Others have found solace, and subsequently legal and physical threats, through social media.

But the pockets of resistance are still small, given that political allegiance is safer and more lucrative than independent reporting. By and large, mainstream television—and to a lesser extent newspapers—have learned their lessons the hard way. On the day the press wing of the armed forces released a statement condemning Imran Khan’s accusation against a serving military officer, I was on a television show with other analysts. Two of the analysts knew their over-the-top sparring in favor of their preferred political parties would be great for ratings, so they kept at it for the bulk of the show. As soon as they were asked to comment on the military’s press statement, there was a pause, and suddenly it was hard to tell the two apart. 

Amber Rahim Shamsi is the director of the Centre for Excellence in Journalism at IBA Karachi. On Twitter: @AmberRShamsi

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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The post Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Poland has seen transformational success and rapid economic growth led by a series of governments—liberal, rightist, social democratic, and odd coalitions—since overthrowing communist rule in 1989. Poland is thus poised to emerge as an agenda setter in Europe and critical ally of the United States in the face of a hostile and dangerous Russia. Poland’s domestic politics—divisive and likely to get more ugly ahead of this fall’s elections, in which the Law and Justice Party faces a challenge to its eight-year run in power—could complicate its position. Partisanship is hot in Poland, with the opposition (the liberal Civic Platform, Peasants’ Party, Poland 2050, and other parties) calling these elections a decisive moment for Polish democracy. But, with some notable exceptions, Rau’s statement of Polish foreign policy is likely to stand, whatever the results of the election.

Rau put Russia’s war against Ukraine at the center of Poland’s strategy and generalized the challenge, contrasting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression with a rules-based international order that rejects great-power domination in favor of shared values. Rau cast the former as “imperialism,” seemingly with the Global South in mind, given Rau’s outreach to that part of the world. Poland’s relations abroad, Rau made explicit, will reflect its partners’ attitude toward (and actions to counter) Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Poland, Rau emphasized, is committed to “a true free world coalition” that can defend itself and to that end will devote a minimum of 3 percent of its gross domestic product to defense, including 4 percent this year.

Unsurprisingly, Rau gave pride of place to Polish-US relations, stressing the United States’ role as natural leader of the free world and a European power, emphasizing bilateral security and military relations but also lauding US investment, including in nuclear energy. He was enthusiastic about Polish-UK relations and emphasized the positive in Polish-French relations. Rau was enthusiastic about NATO’s role and mission to defend allied territory from attack and, again unsurprisingly, urged NATO to “denounce” the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act that included unilateral NATO limitations on new stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of NATO members.

Finding its place in Europe

Some elements of Rau’s “Exposé” covered trickier issues or striking elements. For example, Rau accurately noted “overwhelming” Polish commitment—within society and across the divided Polish political spectrum—for its continued European Union (EU) membership. That means no push for a PolExit or explicit expression of Euroskepticism, notwithstanding some support for that outlook within some parts of the Polish right, which is the Law and Justice Party’s base. However, he did not emphasize what the EU has done for Europe and Poland, i.e., bring peace after centuries of European wars and serve as the instrument for bringing Poland into core Europe rather than remaining on its periphery. Without referring directly to the heated dispute between Poland and the EU over charges that the government has politicized Poland’s judiciary (he simply notes “temporary twists and turns” in Polish-EU relations), Rau made clear Poland’s view that the EU is an association of sovereign nations and that Poland supports the principle of EU unanimity in decision making and not the existing practice of “qualified majority” voting on some issues.

Rau’s assessment of the EU, while positive, lacked a full appreciation of what Poland gains from its EU membership materially and strategically. A liberal-led Polish government, if one emerges from this fall’s elections, would almost certainly seek to settle the Polish-EU dispute over the judiciary (thus restoring thirty-five billion euros in withheld EU pandemic recovery funds) and would probably be more definitive about the massive benefits Poland gains from EU membership.

In a justified “we told you so” section, Rau reviewed Russia’s threatening language and actions, starting with Putin’s diatribe at the 2007 Munich Security Conference and Poland’s warnings about it at the time. He urged the international community to keep Russia “beyond the community of civilized nations” until its aggression against Ukraine ends. At the same time, and in contrast to the views of many Poles and others in Eastern Europe with direct experience of Russia’s brutality, Rau noted Russia’s democratic potential: “It can be the Russia of Andrei Sakharov and Anna Politkovskaya,” recalling the liberal-minded nuclear scientist turned democracy activist and the murdered Russian journalist. Such a Russia, Rau qualified, is possible only after Russia withdraws from Ukraine and gives up its imperial pretentions. It is striking, nevertheless, that a Polish foreign minister in a formal statement does not rule out a better relationship with a future, better Russia. This characterization skillfully sets up Poland to be a leader as Europe builds its longer-term future with Russia.

In a powerful section, Rau advocated Ukraine’s EU and NATO accession “as soon as possible… because it is in Poland’s most vital, existential interest.” He explained that the long, complicated Polish-Ukrainian history could lead to “considerable frictions,” but history shows that their quarrels benefit only Moscow. Rau advocated “permanent cooperation” between Poland and Ukraine—implicitly recalling the best republican and multi-national traditions of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that included most of present-day Ukraine. Rau’s approach rests on decades of Polish rethinking about Ukraine, including a largely successful effort to turn aside nationalist narratives; importantly, this view is shared across the Polish government and within most of the political opposition, excepting only the hard right.

Given its rightist government, many in Western Europe and the United States have casually associated Poland with Hungary, led by the nationalist Prime Minister Victor Orbán. This association was often exaggerated by outsiders, and it fell apart after Putin opened full-scale war against Ukraine. In contrast to Poland, Orbán’s Hungary has pursued a more ethnic-nationalist agenda with Ukraine, flirting with territorial irredentism as officials bemoan the loss of prior Hungarian territory after 1918 and display maps of Greater Hungary. Orbán often seems to make common cause with Moscow even while accepting most EU sanctions against Russia. Rau’s remarks included a sharp break with Hungary, noting their “fundamentally different” perceptions of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, a divergence that “concerns the vital interests of Poland and Europe as a whole.” For Poland, strategic divergence over Ukraine trumps some ideological compatibility. Rau also emphasized Poland’s “strategic relations” with Romania (with which Hungary has had difficulties) given their shared views about security on Europe’s eastern flank. Romania has long sought closer relations with Poland given their similar views of Putin’s Russia; this may now be at hand.

The German conundrum

Polish-German relations are encumbered by history, significant differences over Russia, Poles’ concern that Germany might not stand up for them should Russia turn on Poland, and Polish election-year politics. In discussing Germany, Rau walked a difficult line, addressing the differences while affirming that Poland needs Germany and gains from their alliance. Rau acknowledged the positives but went straight away to the substantively strongest Polish complaint: For decades, Germany was mistaken about the nature of Russia’s threat to Europe and “would ignore our warnings.” That is true, and it wasn’t just Polish warnings that German governments would dismiss. While serving in the US government, one of the authors often cautioned his German interlocutors about Putin’s aggressive ambitions, with mixed results.

Rau welcomed the German government’s acknowledgment that its Russia policy had been mistaken and praised German Chancellor Olaf Scholz for his “Zeitenwende” speech of February 2022 proclaiming a strategic shift in Germany’s view of Russia. But instead of focusing on (and pocketing) that strategic shift or offering to work with Germany to develop a common approach on Russia, Rau went on to note three areas where Poland sought changes in German policy.

Firstly, Rau urged Germany to support NATO renouncing the NATO-Russia Founding Act on the grounds that it includes restrictions on the stationing of NATO forces. Indeed, given Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Founding Act no longer reflects the reality of NATO-Russia relations and NATO would be on solid ground (and well-advised) to suspend or renounce it, pending a satisfactory settlement of the war in Ukraine and change in Russia’s general belligerence. This is a reasonable and relatively easy request for Warsaw to make of Berlin.

Secondly, and more problematically, Rau said that a “debt owed by Germany” for its attack on and occupation of Poland during World War II is a “dramatic burden on our mutual relations.” He noted, with strong basis, that Germany’s post-World War II sense of responsibility and guilt had focused on Russia but not on Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, or other nations that arguably had suffered more. Given that Germany has rejected the Polish government’s request for compensation, Rau concluded, a Polish-German problem will persist.

Rau has a historical case, but the potential for impasse is high; the issue could fuel nationalist sentiment in both countries. Exploiting anti-German sentiment in this year’s political campaign risks locking in a Polish-German dispute in ways that could damage all parties. However, one leading Polish foreign policy strategist close to the government, Slawomir Debski, head of the Polish Institute for International Affairs, has hinted at a way forward. Writing in Politico last fall, Debski defended the Polish position but then suggested that the “details” of a resolution could involve something other than simply monetary reparations, such as an education fund or endowment to help retrieve Polish art and other looted items of cultural heritage. In concept, such funds could apply to countries beyond Poland that suffered at the hands of Nazi Germany such as Ukraine. Given the heat of the Polish election campaign, the time is not ripe to explore creative approaches. But that time may come, and something like what Debski suggests may help.

Thirdly, using strong language, Rau expressed skepticism about Germany taking a leading role in the continent: “Europe does not need Germany’s leadership.” At the same time, Rau made clear that he meant especially Germany’s efforts to expand qualified majority voting in the EU that could weaken Poland’s position. This contrasts with the position of previous, liberal Polish governments that sometimes urged Germany to assume more leadership, especially in opposing Russia’s aggressive designs.

Taking the lead

Rau’s “Exposé” presents a compelling strategic vision for his country, including commitment to a rules-based international order and a free world to defend it; enduring alliance with the United States; resistance to Russia’s aggression; support for Ukraine in its war of survival and its full integration with the EU; and, with qualifications, affirmation of Poland’s European future. Building on a generation of successful development at home and integration with Europe and NATO after overthrowing communist rule in 1989, Poland has its best chance in centuries to assume an influential, even leadership role.

That European and transatlantic leadership potential can be compromised, however, if differences with the EU remain persistent and especially if tensions with Germany are locked in to create lasting chilliness. Germany seems to be in a rare moment of strategic flexibility, traumatized by the collapse of its prior assumptions about Russia and, finally, moving in the direction Poland has long advocated—European security not with Russia but against Russia, to use a powerful and apt phrase German officials are now using. Poland should take advantage of the potential to work with (and perhaps push) Germany to build a common Russia policy for Europe. The Germans may be ready and, for their part, should be eager to work with the Poles to this end. In the meantime, and probably through Poland’s elections this October, the reality of Polish-German economic and military cooperation may help stabilize their relations until a way through or around current difficulties can be found, as it needs to be.

During communist rule, Poland’s democratic dissidents of all political complexions stressed that Poland belonged in an undivided Europe and the Western alliance. After coming to power after 1989, they helped make this vision real by pushing, successfully, for NATO and the EU to open their doors to Poland and Europe’s other newly free nations. As Russia wages war against Ukraine, Poland still stands, rightly, for expanding the frontiers of freedom in Europe. Hopefully, it can build on past success to achieve that worthy goal.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as US ambassador to Poland and assistant secretary of state for Europe.

Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, which is part of the Europe Center.

The post Poland makes its case for European leadership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the 2024 presidential election season starts, will Europe and transatlantic relations become campaign issues? How have partisan positions on the United States’ role in Europe and transatlantic relations evolved? And how have US domestic policies had unintended foreign policy consequences, such as with the Inflation Reduction Act?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Ian Russell, Partner at Beacon Media, to discuss the upcoming US presidential election and how positions on Europe and NATO have changed in the Republican party since Trump’s presidency.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief –  Will transatlantic relations be on the ballot? | A Debrief with Ian Russell appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To ensure that Sudan’s transition to democracy succeeds, its leaders must put limits on the power of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). For a successful political transformation, the SAF, led by Burhan, and the paramilitary RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan. Absent meaningful reform to rein in the existing power of the security services, institutional tension between the services could spark a wider conflict that would destabilize the country and threaten the transition to democracy.

Reform of the security services will not be easy, and it is the subject of ongoing debate as the factions try to strike a deal on a transitional government. But there are steps Sudan’s leaders and those who support Sudan’s transition to democracy can take now.

The struggle for reform

Sudan’s military has played a major role in the political landscape of the country since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came into power in a military coup and, following thirty years of autocratic rule, was removed in 2019 by another military coup. Following his ouster, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for fundamental reforms of the security sector, but Sudan continues to struggle with attempts at reform.

During the transition to democracy since 2019, the SAF and RSF have both cooperated and competed with one another for power in the country. For example, in an October 2021 coup ousting Sudan’s civilian leadership led by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, the SAF and RSF joined forces with an array of Sudan’s armed movements and marginalized groups. At the same time, the RSF and SAF compete with each other behind the scenes to retain as much economic and political power, influence, and control as possible.

Managing the tension between the SAF and RSF will be a paramount concern for Sudan’s leadership as it seeks to avoid future conflict between the security forces that could trigger greater violence. This is a key element to establishing peace, security, and sustainable development in the country while allowing for the development and modernization of Sudan’s security institutions.

Meaningful security sector reform must address the role of the SAF and the professionalization and integration of the RSF into the SAF. It must also place the security services firmly under civilian control and oversight. In the security sector, reforms to Sudan’s legal framework must include formally establishing the role of the security forces and a single national army trusted by local communities across Sudan, especially in the conflict areas of the country.

Another critical step is untangling the military institutions from the economy. This will be very difficult and will require careful planning, as the SAF and RSF currently dominate nearly all facets of political, economic, and media power in Sudan—and work to protect this influence. Civilian authorities should seize the moment and take steps to address the challenges of security sector reform in Sudan during the transition to civilian leadership. The Bashir regime created a vast array of expensive, corrupt, and ineffective security forces accused by critics of operating outside of the law, committing human-rights abuses, and creating an economy that directly benefits the security institutions—preventing more robust economic reform and development. To set the country on a better path, Sudan’s civilian leaders must enact reforms that begin to disentangle the military from the construction, telecommunication, aviation, and banking sectors.

Steps Sudan’s military and civilian leaders should take

In concert with the new civilian leadership, the military must commit to reform that helps modernize and develop the SAF. This includes ensuring that the SAF is tasked with protecting civilians and is accountable to the country’s civilian leadership. The SAF needs to be respected and not feared by those it is assigned to protect.

Civilian and military leaders must adopt legislation that addresses the specific gaps in Sudan’s transitional documents. Using the legal framework, civilian authorities should work with the military leadership to scale down the size of the SAF, find meaningful economic opportunities for former fighters, identify core priorities for its mission, and deploy a military that is able to meet the needs of the country. Sudan’s authorities should also identify funding to create and support a broad disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy that avoids a sole focus on the reintegration of militia fighters and includes appropriate financial oversight.

Outside of these efforts, civilian authorities must look for ways to reform Sudan’s economy that help to disentangle the vast array of companies linked to the security services, create opportunity to improve the business environment, and send the signal to investors, banks, and credit rating agencies that Sudan is open for business. Civilian authorities must take steps to increase transparency and accountability in the illicit gold trade to disrupt illicit financial flows to Sudan’s militias, including the RSF.

As Sudan’s economy faces uncertainty due to elevated food, fuel, and transportation prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank must balance the need for economic reforms in the country with the imperative to not destabilize a new civilian-led government. This government will need to walk a difficult line to implement reforms that address economic mismanagement by the SAF, the rising cost of living, and stubbornly high prices for basic goods that have further complicated efforts to secure international funding and support for the economy.

Steps the United States should take

The United States can help Sudan’s transition to democracy and help facilitate security sector reform. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, elevating Sudan on the foreign policy agenda and sending a signal to Sudan’s new leadership that the United States is ready to support Sudan as it enacts difficult reforms. This law is an effective messaging tool, encourages a coordinated US government response to support the civilian leadership, and can direct public reporting on sensitive issues, support a sanctions regime, and show the private sector that Sudan is not open for business as usual. Policymakers can use this legislation to support Sudan’s economic reforms, stability, and oversight of the security and intelligence services in the short term while seeking to hold human-rights abusers, spoilers to the transition, and those seeking to exploit Sudan’s natural resources accountable for their actions.

Working with other countries, the United States can also play a leading role to encourage international financial institutions to carefully leverage the approval of World Bank projects, consider withholding IMF disbursements, and institute public reporting to ensure that economic and security sector reforms remain on track. The diplomatic community must continue to apply coordinated pressure on Sudan’s authorities to ensure that they follow through on their verbal commitments and work with key external actors—including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—to encourage them to be meaningful contributors to Sudan’s democratic progress.

Sudan’s transition to democratic leadership provides another critical opportunity for security sector reform in the country. As the transitional government moves forward, Sudan’s civilian leadership can show investors, banks, and its people that greater connectedness to the global economy, a modern security apparatus, and a commitment to fighting corruption is in its long-term interest. Doing so would solidify a path toward a peaceful and democratic Sudan.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

The post <strong>As Sudan’s transition to democracy accelerates, reforming the security forces must be a top priority</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the international media there was a lot of surprise that Prime Minister Sanna Marin’s reign is coming to an end, given her high profile and popularity abroad. As is often the case, this election turned on domestic matters, even as its outcome will have far wider implications. Specifically, it was worries about the Finnish economy that seemed to give the decisive boost to the opposition. Marin’s center-left Social Democratic Party fell to third place, behind Orpo’s National Coalition and the populist Finns Party.

Then on Tuesday, Finland became the thirty-first member of NATO—officially ending the policy of military non-alignment. Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and key ministers traveled to Brussels for a flag-raising ceremony and to deposit the instruments of ratification. With the change of government, is there a reason to expect turbulence in Finland’s NATO path right after joining the Alliance?

Only by degrees, if at all. Security and defense policy have traditionally been areas of consensus in Finland. The decision to apply for NATO membership was backed by a strong majority of Finnish public opinion, and all the major parties in the new parliament are supportive of the accession. In fact, several outgoing members of parliament seem to have been voted out partially because of their anti-NATO sentiments. Finland is also set to continue its support to Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. Most members of parliament understand well that Ukraine is fighting for all of Europe, and it is Kyiv’s resistance against Moscow that gave Helsinki the time and space needed for a course correction in its defense policy, now culminating in the accession to NATO. 

The fact that Finnish governments are always multi-party coalitions tends to be a moderating factor. The government program is a result of compromises. Continuity, especially in security policy, is always highly valued. While it is too early to surmise the exact composition of the new government, the continuity will be there. The president, with constitutional powers in the realm of foreign policy, will also represent continuity. Niinistö’s second and final term ends next year.

But some changes can be expected in the nuances of foreign and security policy. For example, the Finns Party tends to condone nationalist narratives and emphasizes the sovereignty of the country. This sometimes sits uneasily with the changes in the security environment calling for greater international cooperation across many policy areas, not least in security policy. While the Finns Party might still support greater cooperation in NATO since it is an intergovernmental organization and not a supranational one, issues like solidarity and multinational joint capabilities might put them in an uncomfortable situation. Of course, it is far from clear if the Finns Party will be in the next coalition government.

Meanwhile the National Coalition Party, which is likely to form the new government, is close to the Social Democrats when it comes to foreign and security policy but usually a bit more open to deepening cooperation with the United States.

It will also be interesting to watch the rhetoric of the incoming government. Marin gave a voice to the new generation of leaders who are accustomed to speaking their minds on issues of foreign and defense policy without mending their words. Most likely, there is no way of putting the genie back into the bottle and the discourse has changed for good. The other party leaders have in most cases embraced the new approach.

Other changes, brought on by NATO membership itself, will be much farther reaching over the long term. The technical interoperability between Finland and its new allies is at an excellent level, but that was always going to be the easy part. The challenge is in changing the culture surrounding Finnish policymaking to embrace mutual solidarity and open debate, and in fostering an understanding of Alliance dynamics and processes. Finland needs to know how to best leverage its policies, geopolitical position, and resources to drive its objectives in NATO. The new government will play a key role in this.

While the composition of the new government is still unknown, the other important question relates to the time needed to form the government. It might take weeks or months. In the meantime, the outgoing government will continue in a caretaker capacity. This will limit the possibilities for making major policy decisions, but it allows for running the daily business of government. The new government will hopefully be in place by summer. Absent an international crisis or a significant escalation of Russian activities against Finland, this transition period should pass smoothly. Even in a moment of massive change, Helsinki is doing its usual best to hold steady.

Rasmus Hindrén is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Head of International Relations at the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

The post Will Finland’s political turn mean a course change on NATO too? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Strengthening democratic institutions is critical to reversing the trend of democratic decline across the region. While these democracies struggle, international partners can help. That’s because the assistance these partners are already sending has an impact on each country’s democratic health. All aid either hinders or helps democratic development, and donors should be intentional about aligning all forms of assistance to make sure that the assistance supports countries’ democratic development. Thus, the United States and other democracies that send aid to Latin America and the Caribbean have a vital role to play in the region’s future. They must make a renewed push for assistance to the region.

Recently updated indexes and projects that summarize countless social, institutional, and political metrics across countries—including the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, the Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2023, and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2022—convey a clear message. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s Kevin Casas-Zamora sums it up best in the organization’s 2022 Global State of Democracy Report: “Democracy is under both literal and figurative assault around the world.”

As this week’s Summit for Democracy—which the United States is co-hosting with Costa Rica, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Zambia— gets underway, these reports highlight in increasingly urgent terms the regression of democratic governance around the world, including in most of Latin America.

For example, Colombia held three broadly free and fair electoral processes last year, and the rule of law is relatively strong. Many in Bogotá and other big cities have access to judicial, health, law-enforcement, and other state institutions. However, elsewhere in the country, the situation is different: Rural municipalities do not have the resources to provide the same level of education or health care as capital cities, and basic infrastructure is lacking. Public safety is even weaker. With its unequal application of democratic norms and protections, Colombia has been labeled a “flawed democracy” by the Economist Intelligence Unit. It’s not alone: Two-thirds of countries in the region (including Brazil and Mexico) qualify as flawed democracies or “hybrid regimes.” Only three are full democracies and the remaining four of the countries scored are fully authoritarian.

Across Latin America, weak institutions perpetuate corruption, inequality, poverty, and insecurity, and they standardize illicit economies. This provides a breeding ground for populist leaders on both the left and right to turn the situation to their advantage by exacerbating political polarization and popular distrust of the government. Weak rule of law is a constant trait of fragile democracies or hybrid regimes. Populist El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, for example, suspended civil liberties and arrested thousands of suspected gangsters with no due process. In the presence of weak institutions, criminals and corrupt officials can buy their way out of accountability. Gangs can shake down business owners with impunity. A lack of leadership and inclusion, including political parties’ own undemocratic behavior, is also a constant regionwide.

The factors contributing to the region’s democratic decline are well-known. What is less acknowledged is how these democratic deficits undermine the quality of life for millions of citizens and how they hinder government responses to new challenges and crises. From COVID-19 to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, shocks have already tested the region’s governments, and they were found wanting. Three threats in particular have the potential to further destabilize Latin America’s democratic progress:

• Climate change and natural disasters have already started to upend economic and social conditions. Much of southern South America has suffered from record heat waves this year, fueling record forest fires in parts of Chile. A heavy rainy season has exacerbated a major Dengue fever outbreak in eastern Bolivia and caused devastating floods in Brazil. Meanwhile, the Paraná River—a major transportation artery and irrigation source—has fallen to such a low level that shipping has struggled; and Uruguay declared a national emergency in October last year due to crop failures caused by drought. Poor environmental governance both contributes to these phenomena and hinders mitigation and adaptation efforts. Governments’ inabilities to respond effectively contribute to poverty, dislocation, and migration across the region. To strengthen their democracies, governments must be able to channel citizen demands more nimbly and mobilize resources to mitigate these environmental or climate shocks .
• Latin America and the Caribbean struggle with food insecurity and price shocks. Energy prices and inflation add to severe cost-of-living pressures for many across the region. A new report from the Pan American Health Organization shows that over 22 percent of the Latin American and Caribbean population cannot afford a healthy diet, with rates reaching over 50 percent in the Caribbean. Many governments provide subsidies for certain foodstuffs, fuel, and other critical imports, but high inflation and soaring debt payments will challenge governments’ abilities to keep this up. This can rapidly lead to popular unrest: For example, in 2019, a simple public transportation fare hike triggered massive protests in Chile. A similar increase in gas prices in Panama resulted in over a week of protests over fuel, food, and medicine, and Suriname saw protests this month after the government announced it would cut electricity and fuel subsidies.
• Most regional governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean are also under extreme financial stress, which limits their abilities to respond to new crises. The resource boom—fueled by Chinese growth and consumption—that propelled massive social spending and slashed poverty around the region ended years ago. As budgets were tightening, COVID-19 struck the region harder than most others and forced governments to expand deficit spending as economies closed for months at a time. Several states ended the pandemic with bulging debts and lower credit ratings, meaning that they now have less flexibility when it comes to confronting the next shock. And while Latin America’s economy grew nearly 4 percent in 2022, that growth is projected to slow in 2023 as the US Federal Reserve continues to hike interest rates and the value of the dollar continues to rise, with damaging spillover effects for regional economies.

The most effective way to prepare for and mitigate against these external shocks is by strengthening democratic institutions—ensuring greater transparency, democratic participation, and government responsiveness. The United States and other democracies that help the region in dealing with these external shocks have a vital role to play in helping Latin America reverse the trend of democratic decline and prepare for coming challenges that could exacerbate democratic decay. This role extends to the diplomatic, development, and private sectors, which should support partners with best practices and resources that incentivize transparency, civic participation, free trade, and countering the influence of malign foreign actors such as China, Iran, and Russia. As US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power recently wrote, “everywhere they provide assistance, democratic countries must be guided by and seek to promote democratic principles—including human rights, norms that counter corruption, and environmental and social safeguards.”

Voters have delivered major course corrections in Brazil, Colombia, and elsewhere in the past year, with newly installed leaders vowing to tackle inequality. But beyond these democratic processes, there’s more that governments will need to do to fully shore up vulnerable institutions. Investing in initiatives that strengthen civil society, political party systems, and open government will help give citizens a stake in the system, improve the function of institutions, and reduce the space for incursion by would-be autocrats.

Power has rightly called for a development strategy that “addresses the economic grievances that populists have so effectively exploited, that defangs so-called digital authoritarianism, and that reorients traditional democracy assistance to grapple with modern challenges.” As the United States and its partners convene for the Summit for Democracy, creating a vision for strengthening democracy in all US assistance to Latin America should figure among the Biden administration’s highest priorities.  

Antonio Garrastazu is the senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the International Republican Institute.

Casey Cagley is a resident program director at the International Republican Institute.

The post How can Latin America halt its democratic backsliding? And how can the US help? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Mon, March 27, 2023 • 1:30 pm ET

Live from the Freedom Online Coalition: How the FOC works for people around the world

The DFRLab hosts the US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman along with civil society and industry experts for a discussion on the Freedom Online Coalition and how the world’s democratic tech alliance advances human rights online.

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Ahead of the Biden administration’s second Summit for Democracy, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman gave a sneak peek at what to expect from the US government on its commitments to protecting online rights and freedoms.

The event, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab on Monday, came on the same day that US President Joe Biden signed an executive order restricting the US government’s use of commercial spyware that may be abused by foreign governments or enable human-rights abuses overseas.

But there’s more in store for this week, Sherman said, as the United States settles into its role as chair of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC)—a democratic tech alliance of thirty-six countries working together to support human rights online. As chair, the United States needs “to reinforce rules of the road for cyberspace that mirror and match the ideals of the rules-based international order,” said Sherman. She broke that down into four top priorities for the FOC:

1. Protecting fundamental freedoms online, especially for often-targeted human-rights defenders
2. Building resilience against digital authoritarians who use technology to achieve their aims
3. Building a consensus on policies designed to limit abuses of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI)
4. Expanding digital inclusion  

“The FOC’s absolutely vital work can feel like a continuous game of catch-up,” said Sherman. But, she added, “we have to set standards that meet this moment… we have to address what we see in front of us and equip ourselves with the building blocks to tackle what we cannot predict.”

Below are more highlights from the event, during which a panel of stakeholders also outlined the FOC’s role in ensuring that the internet and emerging technologies—including AI—adhere to democratic principles.

Deepening fundamental freedoms

• Sherman explained that the FOC will aim to combat government-initiated internet shutdowns and ensure that people can “keep using technology to advance the reach of freedom.”
• Boye Adegoke, senior manager of grants and program strategy at the Paradigm Initiative, recounted how technology was supposed to help improve transparency in Nigeria’s recent elections. But instead, the election results came in inconsistently and after long periods of time. Meanwhile, the government triggered internet shutdowns around the election period. “Bad actors… manipulate technology to make sure that the opinions and the wishes of the people do not matter at the end of the day,” he said.
• “It’s very important to continue to communicate the work that the FOC is doing… so that more and more people become aware” of internet shutdowns and can therefore prepare for the lapses in internet service and in freely flowing, accurate information, Adegoke said.
• On a practical level, once industry partners expose where disruptions are taking place, the FOC offers a mechanism by which democratic “governments can work together to sort of pressure other governments to say these [actions] aren’t acceptable,” Starzak argued.
• The FOC also provides a place for dialogue on human rights in the online space, said Alissa Starzak, vice president and global head of public policy at Cloudfare. Adegoke, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, stressed that “human rights [are] rarely at the center of the issues,” so the FOC offers an opportunity to mainstream that conversation into policymakers’ discussions on technology.

Building resilience against digital authoritarianism

• “Where all of [us FOC countries] may strive to ensure technology delivers for our citizens, autocratic regimes are finding another means of expression,” Sherman explained, adding that those autocratic regimes are using technologies to “divide and disenfranchise; to censor and suppress; to limit freedoms, foment fear, and violate human dignity.” New technologies are essentially “an avenue of control” for authoritarians, she explained.
• At the FOC, “we will focus on building resilience against the rise of digital authoritarianism,” Sherman said, which has “disproportionate and chilling impacts on journalists, activists, women, and LGBTI+ individuals” who are often directly targeted for challenging the government or expressing themselves.
• One of the practices digital authoritarians often abuse is surveillance. Sherman said that as part of the Summit for Democracy, the FOC and other partners will lay out guiding principles for the responsible use of surveillance tech.
• Adegoke recounted how officials in Nigeria justified their use of surveillance tech by saying that the United States also used the technology. “It’s very important to have some sort of guiding principle” from the United States, he said.
• After Biden signed the spyware executive order, Juan Carlos Lara, executive director at Derechos Digitales, said he expects other countries “to follow suit and hopefully to expand the idea of bans on spyware or bans on surveillance technology” that inherently pose risks to human rights.

Addressing artificial intelligence

• “The advent of AI is arriving with a level of speed and sophistication we haven’t witnessed before,” warned Sherman. “Who creates it, who controls it, [and] who manipulates it will help define the next phase of the intersection between technology and democracy.”
• Some governments, Sherman pointed out, have used AI to automate their censorship and suppression practices. “FOC members must build a consensus around policies to limit these abuses,” she argued.
• Speaking from an industry perspective, Starzak acknowledged that sometimes private companies and governments “are in two different lanes” when it comes to figuring out how they should use AI. But setting norms for both good and bad AI use, she explained, could help get industry and the public sector in the same lane, moving toward a world in which AI is used in compliance with democratic principles.
• Lara, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, explained that the FOC has a task force to specifically determine those norms on government use of AI and to identify the ways in which AI contributes to the promise—or peril—of technology in societies worldwide.

Improving digital inclusion

• “The internet should be open and secure for everyone,” said Sherman. That includes “closing the gender gap online” by “expanding digital literacy” and “promoting access to safe online spaces” that make robust civic participation possible for all. Sherman noted that the FOC will specifically focus on digital inclusion for women and girls, LGBTI+ people, and people with disabilities.
• Starzak added that in the global effort to cultivate an internet that “builds prosperity,” access to the free flow of information for all is “good for the economy and good for the people.” Attaining that version of the internet will require a “set of controls” to protect people and their freedoms online, she added.
• Ultimately, there are major benefits to be had from expanded connectivity. According to Sherman, it “can drive economic growth, raise standards of living, create jobs, and fuel innovative solutions” for global challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, and good governance.

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post What to expect from the world’s democratic tech alliance as the Summit for Democracy unfolds appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Atlantic Council’s Pakistan Initiative asked experts to react to this decision below.

Shuja Nawaz: The convoluted decision of the Election Commission betrays the hidden hand of the military yet again in giving the current set up a chance to prove itself by serving out its full term.

Arifa Noor: Already under attack from uncertainty, a balance of payments crisis with its ban on imports, and an elusive IMF deal, this new blow will bleed Pakistan further.

Mosharraf Zaidi: The delay in the Punjab election will only deepen the severity of the crisis and further pit both political actors and the country’s key institutions against each other.

Amber Rahim Shamsi: If the constitution is the adult version of a coloring book, then all the adults have been coloring outside the lines.

Dr. Ali Hasanain: Timely elections and an adherence to constitutional principles are not just morally imperative, but have become crucial to the country’s medium-term viability.

The convoluted decision of the Election Commission betrays the hidden hand of the military yet again in giving the current set up a chance to prove itself by serving out its full term.

Pakistan remains true to form. Power continues to reside in the traditional bastion. As the country hurtles towards the abyss of a financial default amidst an economic crisis, the fractured coalition ruling the country has become ever more reliant on the military in its quest to nullify the street power of the ousted populist prime minister Imran Khan. On its part, the military faces a Hobson’s choice. Should it continue to support the anachronistic, dynastic, and religious parties that have failed numerous times in keeping the promise of democracy and equitable economic development for the people of Pakistan? Or should it find a way to rein in the Trumpian unpredictability of Imran Khan and allow him the chance to return as prime minister under a “free and fair election?”

The wordy and convoluted decision of the Election Commission of Pakistan of this week betrays the hidden hand of the military yet again in giving the current set up a chance to prove itself by serving out its full term. Hence both the national and provincial elections may be expected in October 2023. Unless, of course, the economy implodes sooner and the impoverished masses—mainly youth—come out onto the street to challenge the military’s cohesion and power.

The Military Operations Directorate of the General Headquarters was the principal instrument for this decision. By withholding security forces to ensure a safe election atmosphere, the military has voted, for the time being, in favor of the coalition. Its excuse was the perennial deteriorating law and order situation. Readers will recall that this was the same excuse Imran Khan used to give the previous army chief his second term.

But the speed at which the economy is collapsing and the inability of the government to garner sustained and sustainable external investments and bail-out financing will hurt the poor masses on the one hand and the military’s readiness on the other. It may also heighten the growing socio-political differences between the more urban petit bourgeoisie military recruits (officers and Jawans) and the well-heeled senior officer corps. Imran Khan may light the fuse of this unrest. 

Meanwhile, the government has yet to come up with a national consensus on meeting the growing threat of terrorism and militancy that was exemplified by the horrific Peshawar mosque bombing of January 31 this year. This is the second time in the last twelve years that a prime minister named Sharif has proclaimed a National Action Plan only to show it to be a “National Inaction Plan,” leaving it to the military to launch its own autonomous intelligence based operations.

The ostensible master of all that he surveys, new army chief General Syed Asim Munir reflects and represents his petit bourgeoisie roots and upbringing on the one hand and the interests of his army on the other. He will be under pressure from his senior commanders and the rank and file to “sort things out” while resisting the contagion of association with amoral and self-serving politicians. 

When will his patience run out?

Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow and the founding director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, Washington DC. His latest book is The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood. On Twitter: @ShujaNawaz

Already under attack from uncertainty, a balance of payments crisis with its ban on imports, and an elusive IMF deal, this new blow will bleed Pakistan further.

The provincial election for Punjab has been postponed by the ECP, hours after the interior minister spoke in parliament where he also made a case for a delay in the polls. The ramifications of this are multifold. The constitutional implications extend beyond the immediate point of a violation of the principle that elections have to be held within ninety days. What and how will these two provinces run once the caretaker government’s constitutional limit runs out will come up as well. And last but not least, it appears the provincial government’s power to dissolve the assembly is redundant, because elections are clearly dependent on federal departments such as finance and defense agreeing to it rather than the chief minister’s powers to dissolve an assembly and call for a fresh election.

Chances are this issue will end up in court, which is already under attack from the main ruling party and its allies. But whatever the decision, this is the biggest crisis since the restoration of democracy in 2008. And there is no doubt, as in the past, that the establishment has played a role in it, which is said to have been in favor of a delay.

But more than that, this will have a direct impact on the economy. Already under attack from uncertainty, a balance of payments crisis with its ban on imports, and an elusive International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal, this new blow will bleed Pakistan further. This is not going to bring any change to the government’s capacity to take difficult decisions because it still—on the surface, at least—confronts an election in six months time. Ishaq Dar, the finance minister, continues to be in charge and there is no evidence he is planning to change the way he operates.

And the pain the ordinary people are facing and the growing social unrest (which is feeding into the growing support for opposition leader Imran Khan) will end up becoming a decisive factor in the days to come. 

Arifa Noor is a journalist and anchor at Dawn News. On Twitter: @arifanoor72

The delay in the Punjab election will only deepen the severity of the crisis and further pit both political actors and the country’s key institutions against each other.

There are no legitimate grounds for a postponement of the provincial election in Punjab. The deadly game of chicken that began with Imran Khan’s refusal to follow the army chief’s dictate and change Pakistan’s intelligence chief in late 2021 has metastasized into a full scale constitutional, political, security, and economic crisis. The delay in the Punjab election will only deepen the severity of the crisis and further pit both political actors and the country’s key institutions against each other. 

The political confrontation could be managed through a process of political dialogue—but for years, Imran Khan has flatly refused to engage with his political opponents. Khan’s hesitation is not without merit. His entire political appeal is constructed on delegitimizing Pakistan’s traditional political families—the Bhutto-Zardaris and the Sharifs. Sitting and negotiating with them would be akin to, in Khan’s own words, endorsing “their corruption.” In recent days, Khan’s reportedly more amenable approach has yet to manufacture a breakthrough. The postponement of the Punjab election will almost certainly further erode the hopes for dialogue. 

The institutional confrontation is decidedly more complex and will require more than just dialogue. The military has no grounds to be involved in questions of election dates or who is or is not qualified to lead the country. Yet it is the same military that aggressively cultivated Imran Khan’s rise as a new force in Pakistani politics. Like Frankenstein’s monster—and not for the first time—the military’s political engineering has gone awry. Khan is no longer the obedient political partner he once was. A lot of the chaos and disarray in Pakistan today is a product of the military’s continued political interference.

The only legitimate arbiter of what is or is not legal is the Pakistani judiciary—but it is wrought with differences between senior judges. A slew of low quality judgements made to please the military—including the 2017 disqualification of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif—have also reduced the Supreme Court’s stature and ensured that all decisions are viewed through a political lens. 

Who, then, can help cut through the toxic partisanship and deep differences that have wrecked the economy and paralyzed the country’s progress? Every possible answer, other than a timely election, is the wrong one. 

The postponement of the Punjab election is yet another demonstration of the Pakistani elite continually providing the wrong answers. Expect more of the same in the days and weeks to come. 

Mosharraf Zaidi is a founding partner at Tabadlab and a senior advisor at Albright Stonebridge Group. On Twitter: @mosharrafzaidi

If the constitution is the adult version of a coloring book, then all the adults have been coloring outside the lines.

Historically, elections have been postponed for only two reasons in Pakistan—a military coup or a grave emergency. The military coups followed collisions between civilian governments and the military. In recent history, general elections due to be held on January 8, 2008 were postponed for over forty days following the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto—a transition period from nine years of military dictatorship marked by incidents of terrorism, civil society protests, and a violent outpouring of grief over her murder. 

Since his ouster in April 2022, Imran Khan’s political strategy has aimed to force early elections—due to be held in October 2023. After two failed long marches, Khan dissolved two provincial assemblies where his party was in power. Both are crucial: Punjab, which is the electoral key to the prime minister’s seat, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which is not only Khan’s stronghold but also vulnerable to rising terrorist attacks. 

By postponing the provincial assembly elections to October following a decision by the coalition government, the ECP is not only violating the constitutionally mandated ninety days, but it is also defying Supreme Court orders. The court had given the Commission only the “barest minimum” margin outside of ninety days to hold polls. If elections could be held over a month following an intense period of conflict and violence in 2008, six months is neither bare nor minimum. 

Both the police and the military have declined to provide security personnel to the ECP to maintain law and order for the elections, and both represent the state. Thus, the message from the state—Khan and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif have indicated a willingness to talk—is that the former will not get what he wants at the cost of the law and the constitution.

Indeed, if the constitution is the adult version of a coloring book, then all the adults have been coloring outside the lines. Traditionally, it was just the courts and the military, but the ambit has widened to the ECP and the caretaker governments that are meant to oversee the elections.

More crucially, the ECP’s postponement pits the current coalition government and the military establishment against Khan’s agitational juggernaut on the streets and politicized factions within the judiciary. Unlike other times in Pakistan’s history when polls were deferred due to emergencies, an emergency is being manufactured. 

Everyone is coloring, not just outside the lines, but the book itself. 

Amber Rahim Shamsi is the director of the Centre for Excellence in Journalism at IBA Karachi. On Twitter: @AmberRShamsi

Timely elections and an adherence to constitutional principles are not just morally imperative, but have become crucial to the country’s medium-term viability.

The postponement of the Punjab provincial elections is both extremely disruptive and entirely predictable. For the last eighteen months, Pakistan has suffered shock after self-inflicted shock.

Consider just some of the most prominent events: the controversial appointment of a new head of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); a massive and unsustainable fuel subsidy; a flurry of court verdicts on constitutional matters; a government falling; a finance minister undercut by his own party; parallel provincial assemblies in Punjab; the split of the Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid-i-Azam party, and brief rejection of its votes in chief minister elections before court intervention; massive floods; the arrest and alleged torture of Imran Khan’s chief of staff on sedition charges; the leaking of telephonic conversations between senior provincial and federal ministers, including multiple conversations of the prime minister; the assassination of a top journalist in mysterious circumstances; the unprecedented appearance of the head of the ISI on television, claiming that the “establishment” had decided “last year” to stay within its constitutional role; an assassination attempt on Imran Khan, the country’s most popular politician, that claimed a young father’s life in front of his little children; a senator being blackmailed with intimate videos secretly shot of him and his family; the revelation that the outgoing army chief had amassed wealth many times that of his Indian or US counterparts; another fuel subsidy; and the handing over of 183 square kilometers of land to the military for “corporate farming.”

God alone knows what else is to come. The only constant this time is that every rule, every action, every event, and every principle is open to contestation. We are as far from the rule of law as it is perhaps possible to get.

The ruling class has yet to provide a single instance of putting the nation before narrow self interest. The idea that all individuals and organizations need to be confined by and to enjoy the benefits of clear, public, and stable laws enforced by independent courts remains alien in the country. Ironically, it is the state’s so-called institutions that most prominently flout the law and the constitution, even as they strictly enforce dress and mess codes internally.

In this time, the Pakistani rupee has halved in value, depreciating every two months as much as it did per year in the recent past. Pakistan remains stuck in negotiations with the IMF and other lenders to stave off imminent default. Inflation is touching 50 percent, news of starving parents killing themselves and their children in the hopelessness of extreme poverty have become endemic, and relatively privileged young Pakistanis are leaving for greener (and saner) pastures in record numbers.

The project of stabilizing the Pakistani economy and starting to lift people out of poverty will be a long and difficult one, and thus requires a stable and confident government that can start undertaking long-delayed reforms. 

Timely elections and an adherence to constitutional principles are not just morally imperative, but have become crucial to the country’s medium-term viability.

Dr. Ali Hasanain is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. On Twitter: @AliHasanain

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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The post Experts react: Elections postponed in Pakistan’s Punjab province appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In politics and positions of power, the lack of equitable representation of women is striking. Women represent 49.7 percent of the world population, yet only twenty-seven countries have a female leader as of February 2023.2 Brazil, which elected its first and only woman president in 2011, has seen slow progress in ensuring greater female participation in politics. Political violence against women, among other factors, is a deterring factor for women’s political participation.

Political violence is not a new phenomenon, nor it is exclusive to women. However, evolving analysis has identified differences between political violence generally and political violence against women. The latter is directed at women with the intent of restricting their political participation and active voice, while also generalizing women’s participation as “wrong.” In the Brazilian context, political violence against women is a “physical, psychological, economic, symbolic, or sexual aggression against women, with the purpose of preventing or restricting access to and exercise of public functions and/or inducing them to make decisions contrary to their will.” As such, political violence against women plays an important role in deterring women’s active participation in politics—and even more daunting for black, indigenous, or LGBTQI+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer) women.

Brazil has a unique opportunity to adjust its legislation and reframe the incentives in the political sphere tackle this issue now, ahead of municipal elections in 2024. Doing so will ensure greater and more equitable political participation, enrich the political debate, strengthen the legislative agenda, and further solidify the country’s democratic ethos, even if other challenges to democracy remain. This report presents solutions Brazil could take to reach this more representative and resilient version of democracy.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The post An imperative for women’s political leadership: Lessons from Brazil appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With a population of just over six hundred thousand, Montenegro plays a crucial role in maintaining stability in the Western Balkans and is a key factor in ensuring NATO’s full control of the Adriatic coast. The country’s accession to NATO in 2017 reinforced the security and stability of the region and signaled to other Western Balkan countries that NATO’s door remains open to them. But beyond that, NATO membership also signaled that Montenegro is ready and able to implement the necessary reforms that would lead to European Union (EU) membership.

While the country enjoyed a long-held status as a regional frontrunner for EU accession, events of the past two years have cast doubt on this prospect. Last summer, the government signed a controversial property agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which does not fully recognize Montenegro’s independence from Serbia or an autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church, triggering an extended period of ethnic tensions and political instability. This resulted in Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic losing a no-confidence vote and a blockade of the constitutional court.

Relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church have long divided Montenegro into two camps, one that seeks close connections between the state and the church and one that advocates for further distance based on the contention that the church embodies an ongoing Serbian influence. As a result, the prospect of Montenegro’s EU membership now seems weak, with the European Commission expressing concern over political volatility, government instability, and lagging reform implementation in its yearly assessment of Montenegro’s progress toward accession benchmarks.

Russian meddling in the upcoming election is of great concern, as well. The Kremlin is no stranger to weaponizing cultural and religious connections in Montenegro. In 2019, fourteen people, including two alleged Russian intelligence agents, were convicted of attempting to overthrow the government in Podgorica and prevent the country from joining NATO.

The US State Department has warned of expected Russian attempts to stir ethnic tensions ahead of the election. Domestic sympathy in Montenegro for Russian aims could provide an opportunity for Russian interference, as some candidates are openly pro-Russian and seek to distance Montenegro from NATO and the European Union. As such, Montenegro risks becoming another victim of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fight against the West.

While the Montenegrin president’s role is chiefly ceremonial, the office does have the power to accept or reject candidates for the prime minister’s job. The current president, Milo Djukanovic, for example has used that power to block a candidate in the past year, demanding instead that a new prime minister be chosen through new parliamentary elections, a move previously encouraged by US officials to break the political deadlock and refocus on delivering key reforms. It took until the prime minister-designate’s three-month constitutional deadline to form a government expired, but Djukanovic dissolved parliament on Thursday and called for extraordinary elections to take place as early as May or June.

Key candidates running for president of Montenegro:

• Milo Djukanovic is the incumbent who has served as Montenegrin prime minister six times and as the country’s president twice. He is the longest-running European leader. Djukanovic and his party are pro-EU but he is associated with a range of corruption scandals.
• Andrija Mandić, a main challenger to Djukanovic, is a leader of Democratic Front, a pro-Russian party and pro-Serbian party with close ties to Belgrade.
• Aleksa Bečić comes from the Democratic Montenegro party. He labels himself a civic politician, but his politics and those of his party are largely seen as pro-Serbian.
• Jakov Milatović, a political newcomer from the Europe Now party, is trying to prove his pro-EU credentials. He previously served as the minister of economy under a government with strong ties to the Serbian Orthodox Church.
• The other three candidates do not appear to stand a realistic chance of getting to a second round.

This high-stakes election will help determine whether Montenegro and the region will fall further under Russian influence or if the prospect of EU membership provides a strong enough incentive for voters to remain committed to a European perspective. The international community should closely watch Montenegro to see whether Russian influence is on the rise in the Western Balkans or whether a heartening political trend will continue. 

Luka Ignac is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Kevin Morris is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

The post Montenegro’s presidential election is a litmus test of Russian influence in the Western Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 11, Imran Bayoumi authored an article for The Diplomat discussing reports that China meddled in Canada’s 2021 federal parliamentary elections. Bayoumi highlights China’s goals of preventing the election of candidates deemed unfriendly to China and limiting parliament’s ability to pass legislation, as well as emphasizes concerns surrounding the lack of an immediate Canadian response.

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

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The post Bayoumi in The Diplomat discussing China’s meddling in Canada’s elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. National security must include national cohesion

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, Estonia became a major donor to the war effort while also facing the highest inflation rate of all European Union (EU) countries at 25 percent, with very limited government support for Estonian households and companies. Then Kallas’ first coalition collapsed in June 2022.

The government’s 2023 budget represented a pivot and a recognition that national security is also about national cohesion: Along with increased defense spending came new support to the Estonian population and companies to deal with high energy prices, plus increased pensions and family allowances. Estonia also more deeply integrated its ethnic Russian community (which is between 25 percent and 30 percent of the population) by beginning the transition to having schools teach only in the Estonian language, removing Soviet-era war monuments from public places, offering Estonians alternative Russian-language information sources to those based in Russia, and investing to develop the Narva region close to the Russian border.

2. Foreign policy competency mattered more than the economy

The far-right EKRE called for prudence regarding Russia, denouncing the economic consequences for Estonia of the country’s massive aid to Ukraine while rejecting the welcoming of Ukrainian refugees (Estonia has taken in the second-most Ukrainian refugees per capita of any country). But this strategy did not resonate with voters, not even ethnic Russian voters, who usually vote for the Center Party (which was expected to lose votes) but were wooed by the EKRE. Kallas, on the contrary, demonstrated her leadership in foreign policy to reassure voters. To some extent, the vote breakdown suggests that Estonian voters see economic struggle as the accepted price to pay in the name of preserving shared values and national security.

3. For struggling fringe parties, the future may depend on where they sit

The Center Party (EKE) performed quite poorly, because of the radical changes following the Russian invasion and past corruption scandals. The relative decline of the conservative Isamaa (Fatherland) party is probably more a result of internal difficulties (some key party officials having left to create another more liberal party), while the Social Democratic Party had a limited ability to attract new voters. That is not the case for Eesti 200, which will enter Parliament for the first time, having run on a socially liberal platform pushing for more state intervention in the economy. These groups now must adapt for survival: They might opt to be in the opposition or to join Kallas’s coalition.

4. E-voting is the wave of the future

A stunning 51 percent of the votes in this year’s election were cast online—making Estonia the first country in the world where electronic votes outscore the traditional ballot box. The e-vote was favored by Reform Party supporters, while the EKRE performed better with in-person balloting. The high turnout of 63.7 percent (including Estonians living abroad, who usually are less likely to vote) should be noted especially by other European countries where more voters might participate if they could vote electronically. E-voting requires ample resources committed to securing the vote, verifying identification, and more, but Estonia is proving that this method is now favored by most of its population—a trend that must be taken into account when talking about the future of democracies.

5. Expect continuity in foreign affairs

Forming the coalition may take time, and Kallas, with thirty-seven seats, needs to partner with other parties to reach the required fifty-one. She could turn to the newcomer Eesti 200 (fourteen seats) and the Social Democrats (nine sets). An alternative could be to reconstruct the current coalition with the Social Democrats and Isamaa, but that is less likely. Nevertheless, don’t expect major changes for Estonian foreign policy—which is built on strong support to Ukraine, the EU, and NATO—and budgetary orthodoxy. If anything, the prime minister’s international stance is here to stay.

Marie Jourdain is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former staffer for the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

The post Five takeaways from the Estonian elections, where security trumped inflation by a landslide appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These developments come amid ongoing instability in the country, with the former prime minister continuing to criticize retired army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who Khan argues played a role in ousting him from power in April 2022. Khan has stated a desire to engage with Pakistan’s current military chief General Asim Munir “for the betterment of the country.” 

This is not the first time that television channels have been barred from airing speeches made by Khan or other political leaders: a similar order banning his speeches was issued in November 2022; former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s speeches were banned in October 2020; and former president Asif Ali Zardari’s interview was taken off air in July 2019.

Growing polarization and instability in the country have increased the likelihood that as elections draw near, curbs on speech, largely limited thus far to television channels, may extend to internet platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

For example, on September 6, 2022, YouTube encountered disruptions across Pakistan ahead of Khan’s speech at a rally. This was not the first such disruption—NetBlocks confirmed that a similar disruption also occurred on August 21, 2022, when Imran Khan was making another public speech. In addition, Wikipedia was blocked (and subsequently unblocked) by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) a few weeks ago for its failure to “remove or block allegedly sacrilegious content.” 

Other notable examples in the recent past include TikTok, which has been banned and unbanned on numerous occasions, and YouTube, which was blocked in the country back in 2012 and was only unblocked by the PTA more than three years later.

These developments make clear that the PTA indeed has the capability to disrupt internet services across Pakistan on a whim, something that journalist Abid Hussain pointed out as far back as April 2021 on Twitter. To further control access to the internet, the PTA has also been seeking to limit the use of virtual private networks in the country.

As the conflict between the current government, the military establishment, and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf party sharpens ahead of elections—Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province, is expected to go to elections on April 30—further curbs on expression and disruptions to the internet, especially platforms like YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Facebook, cannot be ruled out.

In recent months, US companies and US government stakeholders have often chosen not to react to these developments, preferring to adopt a wait-and-watch approach. In addition, they have followed a strategy to engage privately and discreetly, hoping to positively influence government stakeholders through private conversations.

As the crisis in Pakistan deepens, it is time for diplomatic and business stakeholders with an interest in strengthening its democracy and maintaining a largely open internet in the country to shift their approach. 

Given the evolving situation, these stakeholders should consider the following steps to proactively deter further curbs on expression on the internet in Pakistan:

1. Enhance level of engagement with domestic civil society: Recent weeks have seen a flurry of concerning developments in Pakistan, with the recent PEMRA order being the key development. US companies and diplomats must deepen conversations with civil society stakeholders, especially the digital rights community that has been voicing these concerns for years.

2. Proactively communicate concerns to Pakistani government officials: Ongoing diplomatic conversations between Islamabad and Washington have focused on the potential for deepening investment in the country’s technology sector. The PTA’s recent and past actions, however, undermine confidence in Pakistan’s internet economy and it is important that the negative economic impact of arbitrary bans and disruptions to the internet is clearly communicated to Pakistani stakeholders.

3. Build new alliances with the technology and content creator ecosystem: In private conversations, members of Pakistan’s burgeoning technology and content creation ecosystem continue to express growing concern over curbs on freedom of expression. These stakeholders are domestic allies for companies like Meta, Google, and Twitter. However, limited interactions and collaboration with these stakeholders mean that more often than not, a united front is not presented to deter Pakistani government stakeholders from taking adverse actions that curb expression, undermine democracy, and hurt confidence in the country’s digital economy.

The coming months will be a challenging period for Pakistan’s flawed and floundering democracy. This challenge will be compounded by the state’s own capabilities and predilections to curb expression both in the traditional  media and the internet. 

With the PTI and Imran Khan possessing a strong advantage in their ability to digitally percolate party messaging through Pakistani society, the government and its institutions may be incentivized to take drastic measures to disrupt internet services and platforms that allow Khan to bypass television channels who may not air his speeches. As elections draw near, the likelihood of such actions is increasing. For this reason, it is important for US stakeholders—including private sector companies—to proactively monitor the evolving situation and develop strategies to deter such actions. 

Doing so may perhaps safeguard Pakistan’s internet economy, its democracy, and the global reputation of internet platforms that are vital to public discourse within and outside Pakistan.

Uzair Younus is director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He also is the Vice President at The Asia Group.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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The post Amid Pakistan’s political and economic turmoil, risks to curbs on digital freedoms grow appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It was a close call. Ruling party candidate Bola Tinubu was declared the narrow winner of Nigeria’s presidential election on Wednesday after balloting delays and scattered violence, with his two closest challengers saying they will dispute the results in court. Assuming Tinubu takes office as planned in May, he will lead a nation that is at once making big strides on the world stage and reeling from crises at home. Why was the election so rocky, and what should the new president’s priorities be? Our experts share their insights.

• Constance Berry Newman: Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center, former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and official international observer of Nigeria’s 2023 elections 
• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Senior director of the Africa Center
• Aubrey Hruby (@aubreyhruby): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and co-founder of Tofino Capital

Notes from the ground

• Constance, who monitored the elections as part of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission, says the government did many things right in administering the election, including technological improvements and getting all political parties to commit to using only peaceful, legal means to challenge the results.
• But she says the government made several key mistakes, including long delays in opening polling sites. “This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities,” Constance reports.
• Another failure, she adds, was “a seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.”
• Constance attributes the surprisingly low voter turnout (27 percent) to “a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures.”
• But she comes away most impressed with the enthusiastic young people in a country where around 70 percent of the population is younger than age thirty. “Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country.”

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Tinubu’s agenda

• While Peter Obi, an outsider candidate from the Labour Party, garnered a ton of international press and led in some polls, Rama tells us that Tinubu’s win is “not a surprise.”
• That’s because Tinubu, 70, hails from the ruling All Progressives Congress party, “is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos,” Rama adds.
• But the fact that Tinubu lost Lagos—where he served as governor from 1999 to 2007—“demonstrates the power of the message” from Nigeria’s disaffected youth to their country’s political leaders, Aubrey says. Tinubu spoke directly to their concerns in his victory speech, referring to young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.”
• It won’t be easy for him to deliver: Aubrey points to Nigeria’s 42.5 percent youth unemployment, rampant inflation, soaring debt burden, and plummeting oil production. Tech and entrepreneurship are “a bright spot” in the economy, but amid a brain drain that’s seeing fifty doctors leave per week to work overseas, she adds, “Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide.” 

On the world stage

• Tinubu will be immediately thrust into a leadership role on the continent. “The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands,” Rama tells us.
• And as Africa seeks a larger role in the G20 and Bretton Woods Institutions, “Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue,” Rama adds. “The expectations have never been so high.”

The post What’s in store for Nigeria after a messy election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Constance Berry Newman: The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

Aubrey Hruby: To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

Rama Yade: Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

On the ground, where I served in recent days as an election observer, it is about the Nigerian people—the voters, non-voters, youth, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other government officials, political parties, media, and civil society. Around ninety-three million Nigerians were registered to vote, but only 26 percent of those registered turned out to vote. Those who voted were engaged, standing in lines sometimes for hours, staying for the final counts, saluting each announced winner in their polling site. 

One puzzle not yet solved is: Why did so many more people decide not to vote than in previous elections? It’s probably all the same reasons Nigerians did not vote in the past—a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures. However, the youth are amazing. We saw them at the polling sites, though exact turnout numbers are yet to be verified, and the National Youth Service Corps ran the election at the polling site level. My conversations with many of the youth led to an observation that Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country. There are mixed reviews regarding the role of the media, because there are barriers to media having the freedom to do its job, and parts of the media allow for and even provide misinformation and hate speech. 

With regard to the civil-society participants, many are sophisticated in data collection and analysis, questioning government officials with facts, using media and social media in effective ways. However, neither they nor the government nor the political parties has been effective in getting the citizens to vote in any meaningful numbers. Also, the political parties have a long way to go in terms of improving inclusion for youth, women, persons with disabilities, and internally displaced persons in the political process.

With regard to the government’s role in the administration of the election, one can draw both positive and negative conclusions. On the positive side: 

1. The Electoral Act of 2022 took steps to improve electoral integrity. However, conclusions are yet to be determined about the implementation of those steps across the board. 
2. Preparations for the election started earlier than for previous elections, which should have resulted in improved Election Day activities at the polls and final reporting of the results. 
3. Generally speaking, the technology worked, but it would have worked better had INEC pilot tested the technology on a national level prior to the February election. INEC piloted the key new systems in three off-cycle elections but never conducted a nationwide test.  
4. The government secured signatures from the eighteen political parties to the 2023 Peace Accord. Therefore, each presidential candidate and the candidate’s party committed to accepting the outcome of the elections or seek legitimate means of remedy in the event of divergent viewpoints.

For the various governmental entities charged with playing a role in the election, currency and fuel shortages were a negative. Also, while some may argue that it is unfair to assign blame, the fact is that the government did not stop election violence such as the assassination of the Labour Party senatorial candidate for Enugu East.

Specially for INEC, there were three main negatives: 

1. A lack of transparency, so voters and the general public did not understand why election data was published late, for example. 
2. Very late openings of polling sites because of late transportation of materials, missing materials, and late arrival of staff. This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities. 
3. A seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.

—Constance Berry Newman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs. She is a member of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission to Nigeria’s 2023 presidential and legislative elections.

To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

After one of the closest elections in recent Nigerian history, Tinubu has called for an “era of renewed hope,” asking for peace, patience, and solidarity. He acknowledged the role that the youth have played in the elections and the need to address young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.” The fact that the “godfather of Lagos” lost his home city to Peter Obi demonstrates the power of the message Nigerian youth sent in this election.  

In order to address the concerns of the youth, the septuagenarian Tinubu will need to turn his immediate attention to the economy. Food inflation, at a seventeen-year high, is up 28 percent year on year from 2021 to 2022, official youth unemployment hit 42.5 percent (according to the national bureau of statistics) and oil production has fallen to a forty-year low. Power is still expensive—Nigeria is home to sixty million diesel generators and fuel products are still imported—and the World Bank estimates that over 40 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line. Borrowing on international markets to invest in infrastructure is not really an option for the new Tinubu administration, as Nigerian debt has nearly doubled since 2015 and is now over one hundred billion dollars.  

In the campaign, Tinubu committed to removing the fuel subsidies that cost Nigeria more than ten billion dollars in 2022, but this is not the first time a president tried to take on this beast. Then President Goodluck Jonathan’s efforts to remove the fuel subsidies ended after nationwide protests in 2012. This time around also promises to be politically difficult given the financial hardships faced by Nigerians.

Tinubu will also be asking a lot of Nigerians who are dependent on day-to-day imports should he push for the free float of the naira. The central bank currently restricts access to foreign exchange and rations dollars to prop up the naira, which is now valued at half of what it was when outgoing President Muhammad Buhari was first elected in 2015, resulting in a large spread between the official and street exchange rates. By the time Tinubu officially takes office at the end of May, hopefully the current government will have rationalized the demonetization plan that has caused cash shortages and long lines at ATMs.  

Despite all of these economic challenges, the Nigerian spirit has remained resilient. The informal economy (which, based on my experience doing business in the country for twenty years, is two-to-three times the size of the official economy) continues to absorb newcomers to the labor market, and there is a bright spot within Nigerian tech and entrepreneurship. The country is home to Africa’s largest venture capital and tech hub, and Nigerian companies such as Sabi, SeamlessHr, Moniepoint, and Moove are expanding to other economies in the region. 

But Tinubu will have an uphill battle in renewing young people’s faith in Nigeria. Young Nigerians are leaving the country in record numbers—those going to the United Kingdom to work has quadrupled since 2019—and the Nigerian Medical Association says that at least fifty doctors are leaving every week to work abroad. Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide. 

—Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, a co-founder of Tofino Capital, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

What we can say today is that even if the election was highly disputed, with Bola Tinubu, logic prevailed. Tinubu’s victory is not a surprise. He was running on behalf of the ruling All Progressives Congress. He is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos. If the result is confirmed, the largest African democracy will have passed one of its most important tests since military rule ended in 1999. And it is not over: Beyond the presidential election, Nigerians are also electing their 469 representatives in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Democracy is a tough path.

This election is special, too, because Nigeria is transitioning to a new environment marked by an economic turning point and a changing continental and international context. The expectations have never been so high. Tinubu will lead a country that is expected to become the world’s third most populous by 2050. At the African level, Nigeria is a major actor whose economy represents 70 percent of the West African gross domestic product. The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands. Even as it faces major shifts, it will tremendously impact the rest of the continent. At the global level, the African continent will negotiate its role in international bodies from the Bretton Woods system to the Group of Twenty (G20) nations, and Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post Experts react: As the ruling party’s Tinubu wins a contested election, what’s next for Nigeria? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The troubled history of Russian-Ukrainian relations stretches back centuries. It a story of unequal interaction shaped by the politics of Russian imperialism. During the post-Soviet era, the bilateral relationship has been particularly turbulent as Russia has sought to retain its dominant position while preventing Ukraine from asserting its independence. Throughout this period, the Kremlin’s heavy-handed and tone-deaf policies have consistently proved counter-productive, serving only to widen the divide separating today’s Russia and Ukraine.

The first major watershed moment in this unfolding geopolitical divorce came in 2004 with Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, which saw mass protests over a rigged presidential vote leading to the subsequent election of pro-European candidate Viktor Yushchenko in a rerun ballot. Prior to the vote, Putin personally visited Ukraine to support pro-Kremlin candidate Viktor Yanukovych. This hubris backfired spectacularly and was widely regarded as a key motivating factor behind the huge street protests that erupted weeks later.

The Kremlin-controlled Russian media responded to the Orange Revolution with a coordinated anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign that set the tone for many years to come. Yushchenko and his American wife, First Lady Kateryna, were vilified, while Ukraine itself was dismissed as an artificial country and Ukrainians dehumanized as “fascists.” Within months of Ukraine’s popular uprising, Moscow launched the Russia Today TV channel (now RT) to take the information war to international audiences.

A furious and humiliated Putin regarded the Orange Revolution as an act of aggression against Russia and accused Western governments of orchestrating the protests. This was to prove a major turning point in his reign. Prior to the Orange Revolution, Putin had frequently spoken of integrating Russia into the club of leading democracies. After 2004, he turned sharply away from the West and began to court a more traditional form of Russian nationalism. This included the championing of the Russian Orthodox Church and the rehabilitation of early twentieth century White Russian emigre imperialist ideologies.

While Putin’s Russia lurched back toward the authoritarian past, Ukraine continued to consolidate its fledgling democracy. The Orange Revolution had succeeded in ending government censorship over the Ukrainian media, meaning that there was no centrally orchestrated anti-Russian campaign in Ukraine to match the Kremlin’s own poisonous anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Instead, many of Ukraine’s most popular TV channels continued to broadcast Russian-made content and adopt Russia-friendly editorial positions. This reflected the prevailing mood within Ukrainian society, with attitudes toward Russia remaining broadly positive.

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The second major watershed in the post-Soviet relationship between Russia and Ukraine was the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. When Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, fled the country following the mass killing of protesters, Putin chose to intervene directly by occupying Crimea and sparking a war in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Russian media escalated the information war against Ukraine, branding the revolution a “putsch” while portraying Ukrainians “Nazis” and puppets of the West with no real agency of their own.

The onset of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 had a profound impact on Ukrainian public opinion. As Russian troops flooded into Kremlin-created “separatist republics” in the east of the country, polls showed a surge in negative Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia’s political leaders. Similar trends were evident among Russian audiences, with Ukraine rising to second place behind America in polls identifying hostile nations.

During the eight years after the 2014 crisis, Ukraine and Russia moved further apart as the undeclared war between the two countries in eastern Ukraine rumbled on. In a bid to reduce the Kremlin’s ability to wage information warfare, Ukraine banned Russian social media, newspapers, TV channels, and Moscow-made television content. Meanwhile, affirmative action policies led to a rise in Ukrainian-language TV, cinema, and pop music, while many Russian cultural figures found they were no longer welcome in Ukraine.

Attitudes toward the shared part also diverged. While the Putin regime rehabilitated the Soviet era and glorified the Red Army role in World War II, decommunization legislation adopted by the Ukrainian authorities in 2015 outlawed Soviet symbols and led to a wave of name changes across the country as cities, towns, villages, and individual streets ditched Soviet-era names. Once seen by some as virtually indivisible, the two countries were now on strikingly different trajectories.

The spring 2019 election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s new president sparked fresh hope for a revival in Russian influence, but this was short-lived. As a native Russian-speaker who had spent much of his showbiz career in Moscow prior to entering politics, Zelenskyy was seen by many Russians as a potentially pliable partner. However, he proved just as principled as his predecessor, refusing to implement a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the Minsk peace plan to end the simmering war in eastern Ukraine and shutting down a series of TV channels linked to Russia’s unofficial representative in Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk. Zelenskyy also sought to revive international interest in the Russian occupation of Crimea, launching the Crimean Platform initiative in summer 2021.

With Russia’s soft power influence inside Ukraine in apparently terminal decline, the confrontation entered a dangerous new phase which saw the Kremlin adopting an increasingly radical stance. Russian officials and propagandists began questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, which was branded as an unnatural “anti-Russia” that sought to divide the “Russian people” and could no longer be tolerated.

In July 2021, Putin himself took the highly unusual step of publishing a long, rambling personal essay entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” that questioned Ukraine’s right to exist and was widely interpreted as a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Seven months later, many of the core ideas from this essay would feature in a series of unhinged speeches that marked the launch of the current full-scale invasion. Earlier talk of brotherhood had given way to openly genocidal rhetoric.

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The brutality of Russia’s invasion has disproportionately affected the predominantly Russian-speaking populations of eastern and southern Ukraine, leading to an historic shift in attitudes toward Russia in what were previously the most pro-Russian regions of the country. Dozens of towns and cities in these regions have been reduced to rubble, with thousands of civilians killed and millions subjected to forced deportation. As a result, anti-Russian sentiments that were traditionally more prevalent in central and western Ukraine are now also widely embraced in the south and east. A recent poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group found that 98% of Ukrainians believe the Russian military is guilty of war crimes, while 87% also hold Russian citizens accountable.

Ukrainians now overwhelmingly express negative attitudes toward the Russian population and have been horrified to witness the popularity of the war among ordinary Russians. They point to the consistently high levels of support identified by Russia’s most respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, and also note the almost complete absence of anti-war protests. Millions of Ukrainians with friends and family in Russia have learned from bitter personal experience that many Russians wholeheartedly back the war and refuse to acknowledge the atrocities taking place in Ukraine.

Amid the horrors of today’s full-scale war, the breakdown in relations between Russia and Ukraine has now reached the point of no return. Evidence of this historic shift can be seen throughout Ukrainian society. Large numbers of Ukrainians are switching their everyday language from Russian to Ukrainian. Derussification efforts have gained new grassroots momentum, with individual communities seeking to remove the last vestiges of the imperial past in both its Czarist and Soviet forms. Ukrainians are also deserting the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church in growing numbers and flocking to the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The current war has accelerated an ongoing deterioration in bilateral ties that has long reflected Russia’s misguided efforts to keep independent Ukraine in the Kremlin orbit. For decades, Russian leaders have been oblivious to the transformations taking place in post-Soviet Ukrainian society and have ignored Ukraine’s strengthening national identity. Their efforts to prevent Ukraine’s departure from the Russian sphere of influence have proved self-defeating and have resulted in deepening hostility along with a realization among Ukrainians that their country will never be truly free until it cuts all ties with Russia.

Many Russians remain in denial over the depth of the divide now separating them from their Ukrainian neighbors, preferring instead to blame everything on phantom fascists and meddling Westerners. This is wishful thinking. In reality, the two countries have never been further apart and the seeds of hatred sown by Putin’s invasion will continue to define the bilateral relationship long after Russia is defeated.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of “Fascism and Genocide: Russa’s War Against Ukrainians” published by Columbia University Press.

Further reading

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Poland was the unsung hero of the recent landmark decision by Berlin and Washington to provide Ukraine with tanks as Polish leadership continues to shape the European response to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

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Vladimir Putin’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine has exposed modern Russia’s unapologetically imperial identity but could yet lead to the collapse of the Kremlin’s broader imperial ambitions, writes Botakoz Kassymbekova.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Putin’s invasion shatters the myth of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Four years and five elections since the dissolution of the last Knesset to survive two years, returning Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holds a sixty-four seat coalition, which he maintains will serve out a full term. His supporters are heralding the establishment of a durable and homogenous leadership to pilot the country’s ship of state. The fine print suggests otherwise.

A new Issue Brief by Atlantic Council Nonresident Senior Fellow Shalom Lipner examines the conventional wisdom predicting the new ruling cohort will operate as a unified, conservative bloc, arguing instead that such a prognosis denies sufficient attention to the nuanced differences between the various players in the governing bloc. Rather, Lipner’s new Issue Brief contends that the coalition’s divergent priorities reveal an underestimated fragility that will threaten the government’s prospects. Pundits should expect a contest between Netanyahu’s coalition partners over the direction and soul of the government.

For media inquiries, please contact aslater@atlanticcouncil.org.

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The international community then committed to supporting Sudan’s transition toward democratization, reconstruction, and sweeping reforms across politics, economics, and the security structure to meet the aspirations of the country’s people after the revolution.

Yet the transitional process began to unravel almost immediately after the overthrow of the government of Omar al-Bashir on April 11, 2019, amid turmoil and instability. The Transitional Military Council—the military junta that took power after Bashir’s ouster—and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)—a coalition of civilian and rebel groups—agreed on the Constitutional Charter and on the formation of a Sovereignty Council to lead the country during the transition to democracy through fresh elections. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) between the transitional government and rebel groups in October 2020 appeared to be cementing those gains toward peace and democracy.

On October 25, 2021, however, a military coup upended that progress. Now, as the international community and domestic Sudanese actors, including the military and civilian groups, work toward a restoration of democracy, a number of challenges confront them. How they address them could either make or break the dreams of the young Sudanese behind the 2019 revolution.

A fresh start

The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have helped restart dialogue and have initiated a road map for transition. On December 5, 2022, the army, FFC, other political forces, civil society organizations, and some youth resistance committees signed a framework agreement to establish a civilian government to manage a democratic transition for two years, ending with free and fair elections.

Planning for general elections after a short transitional period must incorporate creative arrangements that account for the multiple political, security, and economic crises that Sudan faces.

The prospects for elections in Sudan must be discussed within the framework of the transition process as a whole. A crucial decision to be made by the political actors is the timing and sequencing of the election in relation to other transitional tasks, including peace-making and implementation or revision of the JPA, transitional justice, dismantling the power structures of the previous regime, economic reform, and constitution-building.

The election dilemma

The relationship between elections and constitution-building is particularly important. If elections are to be held, the question is to what? There must be some body—with a defined constitutional structure, powers, roles, and terms of office—that is being elected, and which once elected can fulfil its mandate.

Holding credible elections means more than the elections themselves being free and fair. It also means that the parameters defining the body to be elected must be broadly accepted and legitimate. Without that, losers of the election will challenge the legitimacy of the elected institutions, while the winners will push their victory to extremes and potentially have no limits in power. It’s an invitation to instability.

There is no scope for elected institutions under the 2019 Constitutional Charter. In August 2022, the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) proposed a new draft constitution as a framework for restoring the democratic path and regulating the procedures of the transitional period. This draft did not provide provisions for holding elections. All its institutions are appointed, not elected. This is because, until now, it has always been assumed that the transition will culminate with elections, rather than elections being part of a broader transitional process. The requirement for elections to be held at the end of the transitional period is specified in Article 13 of the JPA.

This is unusual. Often elections happen at some point in the middle of a transition process. In many cases, transitional institutions—such as a constituent assembly—are elected under a transitional constitution, and a final or permanent constitution is then developed by that elected body.

Elections or Constitution: What comes first?

The requirement that elections will happen only at the end of the transition places a huge burden on unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution before elections can take place.

Holding elections after the transitional period, and not in the middle of it, also means the transitional period has to be relatively short. Elections, which are vital to public legitimacy and to the establishment of normal institutionalized politics, cannot be postponed indefinitely. At some point the people of Sudan must decide on who and how they will be governed.

Yet there is reason to be concerned that there might not be enough time to develop a permanent constitution, based on a sufficient consensus, before the planned end of the transitional period.

There are only three (non-attractive) possible solutions:

1. Amend transitional constitutional documents, to allow for elections to transitional institutions, before the end of the transition process, with a permanent constitution to be developed after the election—although that is against Article 13 of the JPA.
2. Rush permanent constitution-building, to get a constitution in place before the scheduled end of the transition, with necessary compromises on the quality of document and on the extent to which the process can be fully inclusive.
3. Delay elections indefinitely until after the completion of permanent constitution-making, which may result in the ebbing away of the legitimacy of transitional institutions and raise the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention.

Whatever the case, the signatories to the Framework Agreement have begun to hold stakeholder conferences to discuss four fundamental issues necessary for signing the final political agreement: security sector reform, transitional justice issues, the regional case of eastern Sudan, and the issue of amending the JPA.

It is important to make use of these ongoing consultations to discuss extending the transitional period to accommodate institutional and legislative reforms and the necessary logistical preparations for elections. The international community, including UNITAMS, can help transfer technical expertise, international experiences, lessons learned, and resources to assist a democratic transition and plan elections, and to support sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

Aside from the constitution, Articles 12 and 13 of the JPA establish other preconditions for the holding of credible elections. They include:

• arrangements for international monitoring
• implementation of the agreed-upon plan for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees
• the conduct of the population census, “in an effective and transparent manner before the end of the transitional period, with international support and oversight”
• the enactment of a Political Parties Law
• the formation of the Electoral Commission

Similar preconditions are also specified in the draft constitution presented by the SBA. Additionally, it is necessary to conduct a campaign to make voters aware of the new constitution and of the electoral system.

This is a lot to do, and Sudan is starting from a low baseline. If the transition period is to be just two years, Sudan will require considerable technical support, and investment of resources, to meet the requirements of the JPA and the SBA’s draft transitional constitution.

Role of the international community

Since the formation of the transitional government in August 2019, a broad international campaign has been launched to support the democratic transition in Sudan. My organization, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), has joined this effort by providing technical support to the transitional government, especially in supporting the formation of the Electoral Commission and the Constitution Making Commission, and in enacting laws related to these commissions. This support from international institutions must continue and be consistent with the political changes that occur.

There is a mandate for such support. Security Council Resolution 2425 of 2020, establishing UNITAMS, gave the UN mission in Sudan a mandate to provide assistance related to the transition and peace. Given the scale of the task and tight deadline, such financial and programmatic support must be provided urgently. Much of the preparatory work, both on elections and on the constitution, can be started now, for example the formation of working groups and technical committees.

There is also precedent for this support. The Electoral Assistance Mission in Iraq was formed within the larger Iraq mission, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2576 (2021), to provide advice, support, and technical assistance to Iraq in planning, preparing, and conducting elections and referendums. Similarly, the European Union delegation assisted Jordan (2016) and Lebanon (2022). The African Union deployed, in May 2019, a team of observers and a team of technical experts ahead of the elections in Malawi.

The threats that may result from holding elections amid challenging security conditions—including the weaknesses and divisions within the state’s security institutions—cannot be overlooked. In addition to financial and logistical assistance, an international assistance mission should provide a qualified, trained, and experienced security force.

No time to waste

It is necessary to start soon and move fast to help build political consensus around the design of the process and the sequencing of the transition.

Failure to reach a political agreement on the electoral processes, on the constitutional structures that give rise to elections, and on legal rules regulating elections, may cause political tension, which could disrupt the elections and undermine the democratic transition.

The opportunities currently available to the Sudanese people to discuss issues of democratization, including the issue of organizing free and credible elections, with the help of the international community, might not last forever.

The international community needs to provide substantial support for the coming elections in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. This is vital for security, peace, and political stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Failure to do so would create security, political, and social risks that are difficult to count—or predict.

Sami A. Saeed is the head of the Sudan program at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. He previously served at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan from 2006–2020.

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The Biden administration is under increasing pressure from progressive leaders in Latin America and the US Congress to compel Bolsonaro to leave the United States. While the Biden administration needs to demonstrate moral leadership in upholding democracy and the rule of law, acting too hastily could fuel the flames of Brazil’s increasingly polarized politics and do more damage to democracy in the long term. In order to navigate this politically sensitive situation, the US government must follow established legal processes and ensure Bolsonaro does not undermine Brazilian democracy from US soil.

Ideally, Bolsonaro—who may have entered the United States on a diplomatic visa, which would have expired when his successor was sworn in on January 1—would simply return to Brazil voluntarily. He has said he plans to accelerate his planned departure at the end of January, which would resolve the problem.

Should Bolsonaro not leave voluntarily, it may take years to compel his departure, as the history of high-profile extradition requests to the US government shows. However, today there is hope that Bolsonaro will be persuaded to leave the United States of his own accord because of the possibility that he could face years of shameful publicity trying to stave off the extradition the Brazilian government, when it decides the time is right, is almost sure to seek.

While Bolsonaro would have ample opportunity to challenge the evidence against him in US courts before any action is taken to extradite or remove him, the Brazilian government would have an equal opportunity to make the case for Bolsonaro’s responsibility for the riots before the world’s media. The US government also would have the opportunity under US law to provisionally arrest Bolsonaro for at least several months, an indignity he may prefer to avoid.

Since 1964, the United States and Brazil have agreed by extradition treaty that each country must “deliver up” those charged with or convicted of certain enumerated crimes—which include destroying government property, as happened in Brasília—when committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting country and when criminalized in both countries.

While there are some exceptions for when the offense is of a “political character,” the treaty notes that “[c]riminal acts which constitute clear manifestations of anarchism or envisage the overthrow of the bases of all political organizations will not be classed as political crimes or offenses.” It is unlikely that a court would rule that the exception for acts of a “political character” would apply in Bolsonaro’s case, if he is found culpable, because the incitement resulted in violence.

To avoid getting mired in political sensitivities, the Biden administration would be wise to pursue three immediate priorities.

1. Follow the law—even if it moves slowly

First, the White House should demonstrate what the rule of law looks like. If Bolsonaro chooses to stay in the United States, the Biden administration should urge the Brazilian government to initiate a formal extradition request. While it could be appealing to swiftly end Bolsonaro’s presence in the United States by exercising the authority that the president and the secretary of state have to declare him persona non grata (if he actually entered on a diplomatic visa) or to revoke his visa and have the Department of Homeland Security remove him, Bolsonaro would still have the right to contest that in court. In the end, little time would be saved if Bolsonaro wants to delay his return.

The question over Bolsonaro brings to mind one faced by the Obama administration in 2016, when Turkey’s government requested the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish religious leader living in Pennsylvania, following a failed coup against Turkey’s government by some of Gülen’s supporters. However, despite repeated urging (including from then-Vice President Joe Biden) and expert-level consultations in which the Department of Justice explained US extradition requirements to Turkish counterparts, the Turkish government never presented evidence sufficient to convince a US magistrate to turn Gülen over to Turkey for trial.

Insistence on following established legal processes in the Gülen matter allowed the US government to navigate a politically sensitive situation without eroding the rule of law, even under serious pressure from the Turkish government.

While a formal extradition process for Bolsonaro would take several years to unfold, starting with the issuing of a warrant and a hearing to establish whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain the charge, this would keep Bolsonaro out of Brazil and, perhaps, allow for restrictions on his access to media and electronics that could be used to incite supporters to further violence.

From there, the process involves several layers of preliminary review by the US Department of State and a probable cause determination by the US Department of Justice before the case is forwarded to the US attorney for the district where the individual is located. An extradition order is not appealable, but Bolsonaro could petition for a writ of habeas corpus to ensure that he gets a hearing. The US secretary of state then makes the final decision whether to extradite.

The Biden administration should be clear that the length of the process is not any indication of US government reluctance to turn Bolsonaro over or interest in delaying the process. Bolsonaro’s status as a former head of state does not privilege or penalize.

2. Provide US law enforcement and intelligence support to Brazil

Second, the Biden administration should also support efforts to hold those responsible for the January 8 attack accountable for their assault on democracy by promising total cooperation from US law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share what they know, including any information regarding Bolsonaro’s role in instigating, directing, or supporting it.

A public announcement of US law enforcement’s full cooperation would have a chilling effect on Bolsonaro’s capacity to machinate disruptions to Brazil’s democracy from his current location in Orlando, Florida, given the ability, and obligation, of US law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent acts of violence or crime emanating from a foreign national on US soil.

3. Allow civil cases to run their course

Third, Bolsonaro no longer holds any official position, so in the United States, he is subject to US laws for civil damages—and the Biden administration should not shield him from culpability. His assets can be tied down or even frozen while US courts decide whether he is liable for the January 8 riots and subsequent events. He could also be required to give depositions and provide evidence about his own actions even outside of any criminal or extradition proceedings.

Life in the United States could quickly look less and less attractive for Bolsonaro. The threat of being cut off from his supporters while under the watchful eye of US law enforcement agencies may be the deciding factor in whether Bolsonaro decides to stay in the United States or go home. Either way, he will face justice.

Gissou Nia is a human rights lawyer and director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. Follow her on Twitter: @GissouNia.

Tom Warrick is a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997 to 2007 and as a deputy assistant secretary in the Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019. Follow him on Twitter: @TomWarrickAC.

The post As Brazil investigates Bolsonaro’s role in anti-democratic riots, should the US kick him out? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s a shock to the system. One week after new Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn into office, thousands of supporters backing former President Jair Bolsonaro—who falsely claimed that October’s election had been stolen from him—descended upon the country’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace, leaving shattered windows and overturned furniture in their wake. Now that authorities have cleared the protests and launched an investigation into security failures, our experts break down what’s to come.

• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
• Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab
• Valentina Sader (@valentinasader): Associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Failures abound

• Brazil’s January 8 triggered comparisons to the United States’ January 6 attack. “But that is an oversimplification,” Jason says. “In Brazil, rioters were focused on absolute destruction of Brazil’s legislative, judicial, and executive buildings without the ability to disrupt the democratic order.”
• Iria points out that Bolsonaro’s supporters had been planning publicly for days, and the call to action “was not made on fringe or secret sites but in public groups and channels” on TikTok, YouTube, Telegram, and WhatsApp. Security forces “had the chance to take preventive measures,” she says, calling it “inexplicable” that Brazilian authorities never “established strong security controls.”
• Calls rose on Sunday for stronger regulation of social media, Iria tells us, even though Brazil has one of the more “vigorous” regulatory regimes in the region. One way Brazilian policymakers can tackle the problem, she says, is to improve intelligence agencies’ capabilities to monitor open-source data that provides “early warnings” about extremist threats—but in a way that doesn’t “limit freedom of expression and association of citizens.”
• While Lula wasn’t even in Brasília at the time, Jason says that the riots are still a “wake-up call” for the Lula government because they highlight the risks that lie ahead for “the continued peaceful functioning of Brazil’s institutions.”

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Lula’s moment

• “Democracy prevailed, but it’s cracked,” Valentina tells us. While Brazil’s democratic institutions have proven resilient, “they still must be strengthened.”
• According to Valentina, the fact “that some police forces, officials, and financial backers appear to have enabled this anti-democratic vandalism underscores the danger to Brazil’s democratic system.”
• But politicians from across the political spectrum have responded to the riot with an “eagerness to defend democracy,” a rare moment of “common ground,” Valentina says. “Lula must seize the opportunity to pacify the country and gain political power in Congress” to show the strength of democracy, punish wrongdoers, and enact key planks of his policy agenda. 

Friends in need

• US President Joe Biden quickly condemned the attack on Sunday. Jason tells us that next, his administration should “take action to reassure the new Lula government that US support will not be in statements alone.”
• That could take the form of a Lula visit to Washington early this year. “That visit should be prioritized and scheduled as soon as possible,” Jason says, “to show Lula and allies around the hemisphere that the United States is here to help when partners are in need.”
• Valentina says the United States can view January 8 as “yet another failed attempt by the extreme right to undermine democracy.” But “amid global trends of declining democratic freedoms and political instability across Latin America and the Caribbean, which country is the next target?”

The post How Brazil can respond to its democracy stress test appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Jason Marczak: January 6 comparisons are an oversimplification, but the US has a role to play now

Valentina Sader: It’s Lula’s time to show strength as democracy is challenged

Iria Puyosa: Brazilian intelligence agencies failed. Here’s what they can do now.

January 6 comparisons are an oversimplification, but the US has a role to play now

Brazil is a divided nation. But hopefully, unlike in the United States, those divisions do not play out in holding accountable those responsible for Sunday’s attacks. Leaders across the Brazilian political spectrum have condemned the violence; what is needed are swift actions to hold responsible those directly and indirectly complicit in the ransacking of Brazilian institutions. That started on Sunday with the arrest of hundreds of looters and the order by Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes calling for the ninety-day removal of Federal District Governor Ibaneis Rocha following the absolute failure of Federal District security.

Comparisons will continue to be made to January 6. But that is an oversimplification of what happened in Brazil. The January 8 rioters took their cues from the United States, but, in Brazil, rioters were focused on absolute destruction of Brazil’s legislative, judicial, and executive buildings without the ability to disrupt the democratic order. Lula had taken office one week earlier and was not even in the capital city at the time. Still, for the Lula government, the Brasília violence is a wake-up call regarding the forces that will continue to undermine the continued peaceful functioning of Brazil’s institutions.

What should the United States do? Unlike the reaction to the recent self-coup in Peru, from left to right, governments across the Americas and Europe voiced a loud and resounding condemnation of the Brasília attacks. Multiple US officials, including President Joe Biden, forcefully spoke out. This is the moment for the United States to take action to reassure the new Lula government that US support will not be in statements alone. A potential Lula visit to Washington is in the cards for early in the year. That visit should be prioritized and scheduled as soon as possible to show Lula and allies around the hemisphere that the United States is here to help when partners are in need.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

It’s Lula’s time to show strength as democracy is challenged

January 8, 2023 will go down as an ugly day in Brazilian history. The past few months have been clouded by the fear that a January 6-like event would take place in Brazil, and that fear sadly came to fruition on Sunday. One week separates Lula’s inauguration, a celebratory moment for the democratic process and the peaceful transition of power, and this weekend’s violence.

Inspired by the United States’ January 6 riots, the attacks in Brasília targeted all three branches of government. The fact that some police forces, officials, and financial backers appear to have enabled this anti-democratic vandalism underscores the danger to Brazil’s democratic system. The repercussions of this day will be long-lasting.

The United States and the West should see what happened in Brazil as yet another failed attempt by the extreme right to undermine democracy. But amid global trends of declining democratic freedoms and political instability across Latin America and the Caribbean, which country is the next target?

In Brazil, democracy prevailed, but it’s cracked. The country proved that its democratic institutions are resilient, but they still must be strengthened. Lula has an even greater opportunity to do that now. The horror of the day and the eagerness to defend democracy pushed politicians from across the political spectrum to find common ground. That’s a rarity in Brazilian politics, and Lula must seize the opportunity to pacify the country and gain political power in Congress, backed by a pro-democracy front, to show the strength of his government and of Brazilian democracy, to punish those involved, and to move the needle forward on key policy priorities.

—Valentina Sader is the associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Brazilian intelligence agencies failed. Here’s what they can do now.

Brazil’s security and intelligence agencies failed to take effective measures to prevent the assault on the National Congress, the Federal Supreme Court, and the Presidential Palace. They are not the first security forces taken off guard by a popular uprising or an attempted coup d’état. But they had a chance to take preventive measures, given the amount of open-source data available.

Contrary to what typically occurs in attempted coup d’états, the assault on the Brazilian government was publicly announced. The call was not made on fringe or secret sites but in public groups and channels with thousands of followers. Videos, flyers, and texts indicating places and times of departure for Brasília, age requirements to participate, necessary supplies for the trip, and the objective of the mobilization circulated on TikTok, YouTube, public Telegram groups, and public WhatsApp groups for several days.

It is inexplicable that the Brazilian authorities have not investigated these calls and established strong security controls to prevent pro-Bolsonaro extremists from taking over the Square of the Three Powers.

On Sunday, calls began to rise for greater regulation of social media and messaging platforms, even as Brazil has been among the more vigorous countries in Latin America in restricting the circulation of misleading or polarizing content on messaging platforms. Policymakers should consider how intelligence agencies can activate resources for open-source monitoring that do not limit freedom of expression and association of citizens but provide early warnings about actual threats from extremist activities.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The post Experts react: Brazil has suffered its own attack against democracy. Here’s what the government and its allies can do next. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The protests led to clashes with police and the killing of a police officer on December 16, 2022. The situation in Jordan raises many questions on why Amman is still unable to reform its economy despite receiving tremendous amounts of foreign aid—around $3.5 billion annually. It also raises many questions on why the Jordanian government seeks easy solutions, like gasoline price increases, instead of implementing structural reforms to solve Jordan’s fiscal and economic issues.

In the Jordanian context, international and local analysts blame this situation on limited resources, limited fiscal capacity, and regional turmoil. However, these are only symptoms of Jordanian economic structural weaknesses.

Top aid recipient but slow on reform

Jordan is highly aid dependent and among the top US and international foreign aid recipients globally. Despite that, foreign aid was one of Jordan’s main stabilizing factors in the past few years. Yet, many questions are being raised among Jordanians and international observers regarding slow reform implementation in the country and the persistently weak economy. In fact, Jordan is one of the top foreign aid recipients globally. For example, Jordan was the second highest aid-receiving country from the United States in 2021. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data, Jordan received around $32.4 billion during 2011-2020 in foreign aid, as shown in the graph below.

Notwithstanding the tremendous amounts of foreign aid received by Jordan, the country is currently suffering from a 22.6 percent overall unemployment rate, a public debt constituting around 110 percent of the country’s GDP, and around 27 percent of the population living in poverty. Moreover, polling data shows a significant level of dissatisfaction among Jordanians, where 70 percent believe that their country is “governed in the interest of a few.” However, as this article argues, that is not the only issue, with there being five main obstacles to economic reform implementation in Jordan.

Lack of government autonomy

Civilian government autonomy vis-à-vis other forces within a political system is a defining factor of a government’s ability to implement reform. In the Jordanian context, the government faces several forces that undermine its ability to control state institutions and take ownership of reform implementation. For example, the monarch of Jordan enjoys extensive constitutional powers leaving limited room for his civilian government’s control and lead of state institutions.

During 2016 and 2022, the Jordanian constitution was amended to expand the monarch’s powers to the judiciary, foreign policy, defense, and security, alongside his powers of hiring and firing the ministerial cabinet, hiring the house of senate, and dissolving the parliament. The constitution now grants the king the powers of appointing and dismissing the chief justice, head of the sharia judicial council, grand mufti, chief of the royal court, minister of the court, and court advisors.

This expansion of the king’s powers has been associated with an increased turnover of ministerial cabinets. From 1999 until the present, Jordan has had thirteen prime ministers, nineteen different governments, and forty-two cabinet reshuffles. This led to short-aged governments with an average life span of 1.2 years. The high turnover made Jordanian ministerial cabinets hesitant to take unpopular measures that might contradict the royal court vision—lest they be dissolved by the king.

Similarly, due to the weak economy, Jordanian governments have limited space to implement crucial reforms that spawn controversy and public dissent. The accumulated public grievances, weak economic situation, and the huge penetration of social media made it easier for Jordanians to gather and express their anger against government policies. Consequently, this has led to governments delaying reforms or diverting policies.

Jordanians do not trust their political system

A recent 2022 national survey published by the International Republican Institute in Jordan shows that almost 40 percent of Jordanians believe the country is mostly headed in the wrong direction, a 24 percent increase from 2020. Similarly, public trust levels in the government—particularly the ministerial cabinet—have declined significantly after the 2011 Arab Spring. The Arab Barometer data shows that the proportion of Jordanians who trust the government declined from 71.5 percent in 2011 to 43.3 percent in 2020. The same applies to parliament, where trust levels declined from 48 percent in 2011 to 13.7 percent in 2018. This decline in social trust in state institutions reduced the credibility of current reform programs and created more space for populist forces to build influence that hinders reform.

Poor elite recruitment mechanisms

With the persistence of “institutional favoritism,” Jordan lacks clear, transparent, and effective elite recruitment mechanisms. Public offices are obtained via favoritism, nepotism, and clientelism. In other words, “elite recruitment continues to be based on personal friendship, if not family relationship,” according to academics Oliver Schlumberger and André Bank.

When it comes to elected officials, Jordanian parliaments face many legitimacy questions due to unfair representation of the public. For instance, voter turnout in the latest elections of 2020 reached only 29.9 percent, with many questions raised on election fairness due to COVID-19 measures back then. Moreover, voting behavior in Jordan is predominantly tribal.

In the 2016 and 2020 parliamentary elections, the majority of voting came from tribal districts, while the urban cities of Amman and Zarqa witnessed the lowest voter turnout in both elections (in the 2020 elections, eligible voters in Amman and Zarqa constituted 53.54 percent of the national electorate). On the other side, the highest turnout rates in both elections came from the three Bedouin districts of Jordan, in addition to other cities with tribal majorities, as shown in the graphs below.

Private sector marginalization

Despite Jordan’s active involvement in liberalization programs with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund since 1989, the Jordanian private sector still struggles with governmental control over the economy. In fact, investor confidence levels have been declining over the past few years. The Investor Confidence Survey published by the Jordan Strategy Forum shows that the percentage of investors who see the business environment being “not encouraging” for investment increased from 56 percent in 2017 to 68.4 percent in 2022.

Moreover, the Jordanian private sector is highly state-dependent, making it less able to grow autonomously. For example, financial facilities—such as loans and government bonds—provided by the Jordanian banking sector to the Government of Jordan constituted around 22.7 percent of the sector assets during the period 2010-2020, making the sector highly dependent on the state and less able to provide financing for the private sector. Similarly, the Jordanian government is currently doing business through the military. According to the Jordanian ministry of trade and industry data, seventeen new companies were registered during 2006-2022 with the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) as a partner. Eleven of these companies were registered between 2019 and 2022. These businesses owned by the Jordanian military work in military equipment development, agriculture, mining, construction, real estate, and telecommunications. Therefore, the government of Jordan is crowding the private sector instead of creating a growth-enabling environment for private enterprises.

Declining human capital

The high unemployment rate in Jordan (22.6 percent) is caused by many structural distortions in the labor market. One of these main problems is declining human capital. Jordan’s score of 55/100 in the World Bank’s 2022 human capital index is “lower than the average for the Middle East [and] North Africa region.” This implies that “a child born in Jordan just before the pandemic will be 55 percent as productive when she grows up as she could be if she enjoyed complete education and full health.” Additionally, Jordanian school students scored below the global average on the 2018 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test. In other words, Jordan cannot fill the private and public sectors with talented and innovative workers.

Based on the aforementioned issues, Jordan’s economic struggles cannot be reduced to the regional situation and weak fiscal capacity. Many other structural issues need to be tackled by serious economic and administrative reforms that require leadership and political will. The current reform plans neglect the fundamentals and propose superficial economic reforms.

Politically, the current plans try to build an ineffective democratic façade. Without tackling the root causes of the country’s issues, such as corruption, weak education, favoritism, political tribalism, and lack of leadership, the country will only delay the crisis and it will snowball into something larger in the future. Therefore, Jordan is expected to witness more protests and public dissent if structural reforms are not implemented.

Laith Alajlouni is a Jordanian political economist. He worked as a policy consultant for different organizations including the World Bank. Follow him on Twitter: @LaithAlajlouni.

The post <strong>Jordanians are protesting again. It’s time for economic and administrative reforms.</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A nationalistic populist, Fico has repeatedly stressed that he would stop military aid for Ukraine if he enters office, echoing the opinion of an important part of his electoral base. If Fico returns to power, he will steer Slovakia closer to Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, with adverse implications for European Union (EU) and NATO cohesion.

Slovak politics can go either way from here. There’s still a chance that the liberal, pro-Western camp will handle the crisis to its advantage. But it is important to pay attention to what’s going on in Bratislava and eventually to motivate Fico’s opponents to get together to prevent a Slovak shift toward Hungary and Russia. Too much is at stake here for Europeans and the transatlantic community to remain passive.

What happened: blame Matovič

The no-confidence vote was called by the liberal conservatives of the Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS) of Richard Sulík. SaS was part of the governing coalition until September when the party left over long-term disputes with Minister of Finance Igor Matovič.

Matovič is a leader of the governing OLANO party and served as prime minister until he was forced to swap positions with party colleague Eduard Heger in March 2021 after coalition partners learned about a secret deal Matovič had struck with Russia to purchase Sputnik COVID-19 vaccines. However, the unpredictable Matovič has continued—as Slovaks call it—to throw political nukes.

When SaS members’ patience ran out, they signaled they would call a no-confidence vote if Matovič did not resign. He first agreed and went to the presidential palace to hand over his resignation letter. Then something awkward happened: He changed his mind when in the presidential palace and pulled his resignation. This was the final straw for SaS. Yet the fall of Heger’s government is no surprise. The ruling coalition was plagued by discord and had been paralyzed for some time.

What will happen: four options

Heger’s cabinet resigned before President Zuzana Čaputová on December 16. What will happen next is an open question. Here are four possibilities:  

1. Čaputová could form a caretaker government that can stay in place until regular elections that are scheduled for the spring of 2024. However, there’s no tradition in Bratislava for this solution. The opposition has already objected, and Čaputová herself has said this is not her preferred choice. Nevertheless, she can still use it as a last resort option or as a threat to get the National Council (Slovak parliament) to explore other options.
2. Heger’s cabinet-in-demission could govern for a longer period with limited powers. But Slovakia needs strong leadership amid multiple crises (security, energy, health, inflation), and nobody seems to favor this alternative. It would also undermine parliament by effectively overruling the outcome of the vote of no confidence.
3. Čaputová could call for early elections. Yet not every parliamentarian is eager to see early elections. Some lawmakers are afraid of losing their jobs while political parties could lose vital access to financial resources. (Groups that make it into the National Council are reimbursed on an annual basis.) A bill to call for fresh elections would need the support of 60 percent of lawmakers, which simply isn’t there now.
4. At the same time, many lawmakers are exploring the option of a reformed center-right coalition without Matovič, as a “sine qua non” condition. Even Sulík—whose SaS party left the coalition—appears now to be on board. They would need a majority in parliament, not an easy task after the no-confidence vote. However, the first important signal that they can succeed in reforming the coalition is the December 22 agreement on Slovakia’s budget for next year. Heger’s government-in-demission reached a deal in cooperation with SaS. The gravity of the situation, where a provisory budget would limit the government’s ability to help people cope with skyrocketing energy prices, motivated them to compromise. Matovič’s removal on December 23 was part of the deal.  

If elections were to be held today, the Voice–Social Democracy party led by Peter Pellegrini would likely win. The party split off from SMER–Social Democracy, run by Fico, who is currently polling in second place.

Pellegrini—whose party is sometimes dubbed Fico’s B team by critics—is not eager to work with his former boss. However, if it will be the only way for him to get back into power, Pellegrini could agree. Together with Fico, they’ll need another partner. They could turn to ultranationalist, neo-Nazi groups such as People’s Party Our Slovakia or the breakaway Republika party.

Realistically, a center-right coalition opposed to Fico could come to power if it gets enough votes in an election so that Pellegrini can form the government with them rather than joining Fico.

What to watch: Dark matter

Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once called Slovakia “the black hole of Europe” when in the mid-1990s then Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar—a forerunner of nationalistic populism in the region—did his best to disrupt the country’s move to join NATO and the EU.

Since then, Slovakia has often been praised as the region’s champion of liberal democracy. The 2019 election of Čaputová—a former environmental activist and liberal democrat—as president solidified that reputation. The coalition government that just fell could have added to that growing stature after Fico’s reign, which was marked by the erosion of rule of law and democracy.

Fico was forced to step down after the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak, whose work exposed how deeply Slovak police, the justice system, and some politicians were colluding with criminals, including the Italian mafia. The investigation into those allegations is still ongoing, and critics argue that one of Fico’s motivations for his government’s comeback is to terminate it.

At the moment, when the country is preparing for the thirtieth anniversary of its independence on January 1, the mood among Slovak voters is one of deep frustration and apathy, which creates political space for populists and extremists.

Aside from euroskepticism, a government including Fico could add another challenge to NATO and EU efforts to maintain unity in support of Ukraine. In fact, since Fico was forced into the opposition, he has taken even more pro-Russian positions than Orbán.

In July, Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation (part of the National Security and Defense Council) listed Fico among the politicians spreading Russian propaganda. From his standpoint, what we see in Ukraine is a war between Russia and the United States, where both are to blame. He has repeatedly stated that he wouldn’t send a single bullet to Ukraine.

Unlike Italy’s new Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who transformed her country’s far-right politics by turning against Russian aggression, Slovak politicians are actually fighting for a slice of the country’s pro-Russian electorate. After former Russian intelligence agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned in the British city of Salisbury in 2018, the unwillingness to alienate pro-Russian voters meant that Bratislava was the only EU capital other than Vienna that didn’t expel a single Russian diplomat.

Today, Slovakia hosts a multinational NATO battlegroup put together to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. A significant portion of Fico’s voter base is against the foreign military presence in the country. If he returns to power, Czech, German, Dutch, Polish, and US military contingents currently present in Slovakia could come under scrutiny.

Segments of the Slovak population continue to perceive their country as a victim that suffered under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later within Czechoslovakia. During the 1990s under Mečiar’s rule, anti-American sentiments started to rise. These further intensified after the NATO bombing of Serbia and later with the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pan-Slavism and targeted disinformation campaigns have played a role in strengthening pro-Russian narratives as well.

What should be done: engage Slovaks

Currently, there’s no other country within the EU closer to forming such a hard-line nationalist government than Slovakia, especially if two minor neo-Nazi parties (People’s Party Our Slovakia and Republika) are in. It is important to mobilize efforts to stop such a scenario from unfolding.

Slovakia’s partners, including the United States, should do their best to convince those opposed to Fico to join forces. That is not an easy task given the deep divisions within Slovak politics, but there’s still time to do it.

Friends and allies of Slovakia should also talk to Pellegrini, offering him a mix of carrots and sticks to discourage him from cooperating with Fico and the far-right groups.

Last but not least, it is important for US and EU politicians and diplomats to maintain contact with Fico. As populist, pro-Russian, and mercurial as he has become, he also used to be a great political gambler, an opportunist, a pragmatist similar to Orbán or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan who is capable of U-turns if they worked for him. Fico might have lost that aspect of his political personality, but if it can be revived with efforts to show that working with the West is a better bet than siding with Russia, it is worth a try.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Europe Center and a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations.

The post <strong>Slovakia risks becoming another Hungary-style EU spoiler. How should the West respond?</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Tue, December 20, 2022 • 11:00 am ET

A conversation with Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso

A conversation around the priorities of the Lasso administration, the growing US-Ecuador partnership, and the main challenges affecting Ecuador and the region.

Americas Economy & Business Latin America Rule of Law

This week, Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso chose Washington—specifically, an event co-hosted by the Atlantic Council at the Inter-American Dialogue—to announce his plans to run for re-election in 2025. The announcement was part of his pitch, following meetings with US President Joe Biden and others, for newfound stability in a country that is finding its democratic footing. And he hinted that Washington could be a useful campaign ally.

“The Constitution of Ecuador allows re-election only once. For me that will be in 2025,” Lasso said on Tuesday. “Washington can certainly give a boost in confidence, and I can tell you that I am not going to shy away from that possibility.”

Here are some more highlights from Lasso’s conversation with Rebecca Bill Chavez, president and CEO of the Inter-American Dialogue:

Democracy on the agenda

• During his Washington trip, Lasso met with Biden, the US Agency for International Development, the Organization of American States, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, coming away with nearly forty million dollars in commitments from the US government to support female entrepreneurs, fight child malnutrition, and protect the environment.
• Lasso said that he seeks to “continue working on economic matters with virtuous policies required by Ecuador, with more democracy and greater investment in social programs.”
• Following his triumph over President Lenin Moreno in April 2021, Lasso assured his audience that Ecuador has “fully returned to democracy.” He said his victory came against “a populist model characterized by penetrating power and then producing an implosion of democratic institutions.”

Economy on the rise

• Lasso said that in the past eighteen months his government has furthered a recovery for an economy that was in shambles, with a budget deficit of almost 7 percent of Ecuador’s gross domestic product (GDP) because of the COVID-19 pandemic. “We currently have a deficit of 3 percent [of GDP] that is expected to decrease even more in 2023. Fiscal deficits are a curse to the future of the nation, as it is debt that will eventually be assumed by our children and grandchildren. Our mission is to make sure that value is as low as possible.”
• Lasso touted how last week the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced the successful completion of Ecuador’s twenty-seven-month program and authorized the final disbursement of seven hundred million dollars. It is the second time in twenty years that Ecuador has successfully completed an IMF program.
• The president also pointed out that Ecuador—which uses the US dollar as its currency—has the second lowest inflation in the Americas and the highest economic growth projection for 2023 in the region. Under his government, Lasso said, the economy “is in very good health.”

Security on the brink

• That economic success means Lasso’s main concern, as he put it, is “internal security.”
• He explained that the fight against drug trafficking “is not easy,” but he boasted of having seized three hundred tons of drugs, figures much higher than those of previous governments.
• Lasso noted that organized crime networks have responded to his aggressive enforcement with “violence in prisons and violence in the streets.” But he assured the audience that his government is working non-stop to confront the issue utilizing both the armed forces and the National Police.

Isabel Chiriboga is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and is originally from Quito, Ecuador.

Watch the full event

The post Why Ecuador’s president announced his re-election plans in Washington appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Lipner quoted in Financial Times: How will Israel’s most rightwing government yet wield its power? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Now, President Saied is presiding over a country that has expressed its complete disapproval of his one-man rule through the lowest parliamentary voter turnout in Tunisia’s recent history. Considering the widespread dissatisfaction, President Saied has no other option but to step down, and Western democracies should fiercely condemn the vote and establishment of the new parliament.

It is arguable that Saied is merely attempting to install a semi-presidential system not too dissimilar to the French one. However, it is difficult to see such similarities after the drastic measures the president has taken to reduce legislative power and the fact that impeachment is still possible in the French system. It’s also worth noting that the 1958 French constitutional vote that transformed the country into a semi-presidential system saw a voter turnout of 84.9 percent.

The main opposition parties, trade unions, and electoral watchdog civil society organizations mounted a widespread boycott of the vote, which undoubtedly impacted the low voter turnout. The Tunisian political group, the National Salvation Front, which includes Tunisia’s largest opposition party, Ennahda (among others), called for a boycott of the vote in September, accusing President Saied of orchestrating a coup d’état. The boycott led to widespread demonstrations across the country in September. The powerful Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) also announced its opposition to the December 17 vote, citing “ambiguity” over Saied’s “individual rule” after the president cut government subsidies affecting millions of Tunisians. Just days before, on December 13, the parliamentary watchdog Al Bawsala announced that it would “refuse to be a false witness to a…puppet parliament” and its intent to delegitimize the president.

The country’s dire economic situation has led Tunisians to become more preoccupied with finding basic food supplies rather than casting a vote. The war in Ukraine and COVID-19 pandemic have caused inflation to skyrocket while supermarkets have experienced empty shelves and food shortages. Viral videos on Twitter of Tunisians at supermarkets hoarding bread in late September caused widespread shock and initiated calls for action by political activists. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is due to help subsidize the country’s economic woes through a $1.9 billion bailout package. However, talks are stalled due to the UGTT’s fierce opposition to the IMF’s demands for public spending cuts.

Tunisians have also grown disillusioned by their leadership’s inability to deliver on their promises for a better future following former Tunisian President Ben Ali’s fall in 2011. Tunisian youth unemployment is almost at a staggering 40 percent, with more youth leaving the country for better opportunities abroad. Social protection schemes to help the more vulnerable are largely funded by external donors, such as the World Bank, United States, and UNICEF, all of which contributed over $60 million to expand Tunisia’s national Social Safety Net plan.

The Tunisian people’s lack of trust also comes on the backdrop of President’s Saied crackdown on the judiciary, his overtake of the country’s electoral commission (ISIE), and the detention of the main opposition leader, Rached Ghannouchi. Former Prime Minister and Vice President of Ennahda, Ali Larayedh, was imprisoned just days after the December 17 vote on alleged terrorism charges, a move which opposition parties are labeling a “flagrant attempt” to distract the country from the election’s dismal results.

It is clear President Saied has lost all legitimacy to rule over a country that was once deemed as the sole survivor of the Arab Spring. The fierce opposition to his rule and widespread popular discontent and disaffection that lead to the lowest turnout in Tunisia’s history since the 2011 uprisings are a testament to Saied’s loss of popular support.

Western democracies should stand clear from further endorsing him, as this will weaken the Tunisian path towards democratic rule. US President Joe Biden’s photo opportunity with President Saied at the US-Africa Leaders Summit on December 16 sent a worrying message to a people striving for democracy by pardoning a president fighting to undermine it. State Department Spokesman Ned Price’s December 18 statement applauding the parliamentary elections as an “essential initial step towards restoring the country’s democratic elections” is, at best, a naïve attempt to undo a democratic backsliding that President Saied has long pushed for—all at the expense of the Tunisian people, whose voices remain unheard and inhibited. 

Alissa Pavia is the associate director for the North Africa Initiative within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post It’s time for Tunisia’s president to resign. Here’s why. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While many countries are still on the rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic, new crises—and their effects—are emerging, and are expected to continue into the next year. From global inflation to a costly energy crisis, and from food insecurity to new political shifts, how can the region meet changing dynamics head-on? And how might risks turn into opportunities as we enter a highly consequential 2023?

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we look at some of the key questions that may shape the year ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean, then take our signature annual poll to see how your opinions shape up against our predictions.

How might new regional collaboration take shape across Latin America and the Caribbean with a wave of new leaders? What decision points might shape government policy? Will Bitcoin continue to see the light of day in El Salvador? Are the harmful economic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the rearview mirror for the region, or is the worse yet to come? Will China’s new foreign policy ambition translate to closer relations with LAC?

Take our ten-question poll in less than five minutes!

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The post What might be ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023? Take our ten-question poll and see how your answers stack up appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Did the system succeed against a constitutional crisis? What’s next for the South American nation after the chaotic presidency of an untested political newcomer? Our Latin America experts break it all down.

Jump to an expert reaction

Jason Marczak: Watch for more political uncertainty ahead

Hugo de Zela: Castillo misspent his energy clashing with Congress—instead of on real policy change 

Érika Rodríguez: Peru’s top trends: Political instability and institutional degradation

María Fernanda Bozmoski: An unfortunate new low for Peru

Watch for more political uncertainty ahead

Castillo tried to play his hand today in the longstanding tradition of an autogolpe—a self-coup. His incompetence—seen throughout the chaos of his one and a half years as president—made it clear that he was not going to succeed. The rural teacher turned union leader also could not count on popular support, with an approval rating of just 19 percent in some cities. The ill-thought-out move to attempt to dissolve Congress rather than let Congress consider an impeachment motion against him thankfully backfired—symbolic of his short-lived presidency.  

What else was part of the recipe for maintaining democratic order? The military and police vocally warning Castillo not to make his move, ministers resigning in the wake of his announcement, and Congress moving up its impeachment vote (which passed with the support of 101 of 130 legislators). Reaction from the region was tepid. Brazil’s president-elect, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, called the actions today “regrettable,” while Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador blamed Peru’s elite, saying their hostility toward Castillo led resulted in “an environment of confrontation and hostility has been maintained against him.” Colombia’s government said it “condemns any attack against democracy.” 

Peru has been embroiled in political chaos for quite some time. It took four presidents to complete the last presidential term (from 2016 to 2021), and Peru is now on to its second president, its first female president, in this current five-year term. The fractious relationship between Congress and the president—and the ease with which Congress can call for impeachment—are some of the factors leading to such political uncertainty. Add to that the need for a revamping of a political structure that has lost the confidence of many Peruvians especially when many of its leaders are seen as corrupt.  

What’s next? The new Peruvian president, Boluarte, called immediately for a dialogue among all political actors. That’s easier said than done. Boluarte does not belong to any political party after being expelled from the Perú Libre party last January. The last Peruvian president to not belong to a political party—Martín Vizcarra—was impeached by Congress in 2020, leading to a wave of protests. 

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Castillo misspent his energy clashing with Congress—instead of on real policy change 

The ending of Castillo’s presidency was not totally surprising. His way of governing always gave a sense of improvisation and lack of planning.  

Besides the obvious problems of widespread corruption scandals that plagued his government, one of the main issues was a nonworking government apparatus and a total lack of a strategic approach to find solutions to the country’s many problems. 

At the same time, Castillo’s everyday confrontations with Congress drained the energy that could have been used to promote initiatives and to advance the policy changes promised during the electoral campaign. The result was an increasing and all-consuming confrontation with the parliamentarians and, in recent days, with the judiciary, the attorney general, and the constitutional court. A byproduct of that: accelerating decline in his popular support, even in the regions more prone to support him in the country’s south. 

The recent avalanche of corruption allegations involving the president and his family and the increasing support for the impeachment process in Congress resulted in Castillo’s attempt to take absolute power, close the Congress, and reform the judiciary. But this once again amateurishly improvised attempt failed and resulted with Castillo in jail. 

—Hugo de Zela served as Peru’s vice minister of foreign affairs from 2018 to 2019 and as Peru’s ambassador to the United States from 2019 to 2021. He has frequently spoken at the Atlantic Council. 

Peru’s top trends: Political instability and institutional degradation

Peru is a dysfunctional democracy in which a coup was, for a short time, a plausible option given the precarious situation of the president who had lost the support of his parliamentary group and was only sheltered by a part of the opposition. However on this occasion, the Congress, a usual source of instability, has managed to save the situation. An impeachment with 101 votes in favor removed Castillo from power, and he was promptly detained. The presidency has been assumed by his vice president, Dina Boluarte.

Castillo’s decision to dissolve Congress, which Boluarte called a coup, is absurd. He was incompetent in filling his role, and his presidency was tainted by high-level corruption scandals. The former president had been investigated by Peru’s attorney general regarding allegations of “influence peddling” and “collusion.” In addition to that, prosecutors opened other criminal investigations against Castillo, including one for possibly “obstructing justice.” The prosecutor’s office had even opened a constitutional complaint in Congress against Castillo to determine whether he committed crimes as president.

By dissolving Congress, instead of allowing the Congress to proceed with a motion to move forward with the impeachment vote, Castillo created the situation that would end up, in a few hours, with him detained by security forces and taken to a police station. He did it alone; no one accompanied him in his most recent anti-democratic drift, not his cabinet, not the army, and not his supporters. For Peru, this is just another episode in a dramatic trend of political instability and institutional degradation. Nine out of the ten Peruvian presidents of the last three decades have ended up accused of corruption. The economy grows, but the country remains socially broken.

—Érika Rodríguez is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, a member of the Center’s Venezuela Working Group, and a special advisor for Latin American affairs to the high representative and vice president of the European Commission.

An unfortunate new low for Peru

After inaugurating four presidents in less than a year, Peru has reached an unfortunate new low in its political and institutional crisis. Castillo’s unilateral move to dissolve Congress received no support—a silver lining in the tragic denouement of Castillo’s short and unpopular sixteen-month administration. The initial reactions and condemnations of today’s actions in Peru from former cabinet members and other key actors is also a good omen for the democratic outlook of the country. Immediately, however, the constitutional crisis that the former president has unleashed will likely exacerbate longstanding political fatigue and social unrest in the country. The hours following are crucial and will determine whether trust in Congress and the country’s institutions will strengthen or erode. These institutions, with the support of the international community—including the business sector—have an important role in helping Boluarte navigate the next chapter of Peru.

—María Fernanda Bozmoski is the deputy director of programs at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Further reading

Fast Thinking

Jun 18, 2021

FAST THINKING: A political ‘wake-up call’ for Latin America

By Atlantic Council

Where will Pedro Castillo take Peru? What does his victory mean for the Latin American left and global investors? Our experts break down how the barefoot candidate will govern.

Democratic Transitions Elections

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US President Joe Biden’s party had a strong showing, but the second two years of his term will likely look markedly different from the first two with Republicans controlling the House. What will become of US aid to Ukraine? Will there be a new approach to homeland security and foreign relations? What should we expect from forthcoming fights over appropriations and the debt ceiling? Will there be unlikely areas of cooperation?

Experts from across the Atlantic Council weighed in with their views.

Click below to jump to an expert reaction

Ukraine aid will keep flowing

Counter to previous expectations, the outcome of the midterm elections does not portend a change in US policy towards Ukraine. Prior to the vote, some analysts predicted that a strong Republican victory with populist candidates in the vanguard would strengthen the hand of those who want to sharply decrease US assistance to Ukraine. While it was never certain that such an election result would have led to those consequences, it appears that the Republican wave never materialized. While the Republicans will hold the majority in the House in January, it will not be a large one; and the Democrats held the Senate. Another factor is the underperformance of the populist or Donald Trump wing of the party; this suggests that their influence in Congress—and possibly against aid to Ukraine—will not increase. Bottom line? Strong support for Ukraine will continue. The outgoing Congress will likely ensure adequate funding for Ukraine through 2023 during the lame-duck session; and the incoming Congress is also likely to maintain that support.

—John Herbst is the senior director of the Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

There’s a fight brewing over the debt limit. Here’s what to watch.

The shift of a few seats in the House could have major real-world global economic repercussions. The most pressing challenge is finding a way to raise the debt ceiling. According to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the United States may reach its limit as soon as the summer of 2023. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised before then, the consequences could be credit downgrades, spiraling interest rates, and shocks in the stock market. Of course, both parties know this, and no one wants to increase pain during an economic slowdown. Instead, a looming default can be used as negotiating leverage on other priorities such as spending cuts. The question is: Will Congress play chicken with the debt limit amid the possibility of a global economic recession? The world will be carefully watching this fight play out over the coming months and hoping cooler heads prevail. One thing to watch out for is an effort by Democrats to pre-empt the battle by raising the debt limit during a lame-duck session before the new Congress is sworn in. Biden may be hoping that they can push the issue past the 2024 election. Markets would breathe a sigh of relief, but there are only a few weeks to pull it off and complicated legislative maneuvers to make it work. 

No matter what the final count looks like, the new Congress will be focused on the Federal Reserve. Both parties have given Chairman Jay Powell a fair amount of deference during the pandemic. He was confirmed to a second term just last year. But if inflation stays high or the United States enters a recession, expect tougher hearings and sharper questions directed at the Fed. That may be one rare issue of bipartisan consensus in the new Congress.

—Josh Lipsky is senior director of the GeoEconomics Center and a former International Monetary Fund advisor.

One area for bipartisan hope: Energy-permitting reform

As Congress tilts right, hope remains that new House leadership may actually help to stimulate permitting reform that would further anchor the United States’ status as a major conventional and, increasingly, clean energy superpower. Admittedly, the energy and climate setting that the members of the 118th Congress will inherit in 2023 is bleak. Induced by a pernicious mix of post-pandemic economic pain and Russia’s war in Ukraine, short-term energy market volatility has the world on edge, frustrating an already dire outlook for global efforts to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The magnitude of these challenges, however, may be cause for political optimism. After all, there is precedent for energy and climate compromise despite political division between the executive and legislative branches in Washington. 

Nearly seven years ago, the Obama administration enabled Republicans to repeal the forty-year-old ban on exporting US crude oil in exchange for extensive renewable energy tax incentives. The conditions prompting progress in 2015 pale in comparison to the alarming outlook today, and the White House and Congress have motivation to act. Without permitting reform, Biden’s signature energy and climate legislation—the Inflation Reduction Act—will fail to achieve its full potential. The same web of environmental reviews constraining construction of oil and gas pipelines and associated infrastructure is hindering development of clean energy infrastructure critical to decarbonizing the world economy. 

In this manner, Republicans may be a surprising key to climate progress. Driven by a renewed focus in Western capitals on reducing reliance on Russian and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) energy supply, Republicans are likely to see the merit in accelerating permitting reform that has previously been stopped by the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. Political posturing, of course, can frustrate reforms, especially as attention shifts to the 2024 presidential election, but the stakes are high for ensuring the United States retains its position as a reliable supplier to the global market in the face of Russian aggression. Accordingly, look for permitting reform to gain renewed attention in the next Congress—and potentially in the lame-duck session.

—Landon Derentz is the senior director of the Global Energy Center and a former director for African and Middle Eastern affairs in the US Department of Energy.

For NATO and Europe, a sigh of relief

Nervous European allies wondering if the US midterms would return a wave of Donald Trump-inspired, NATO-wary members of Congress are likely heartened by the results of the election. While national security was not directly on the agenda in these local races, recent threats that a Republican congressional majority would curtail aid to Ukraine stoked concerns in Brussels and beyond that a decisive Republican showing would be a harbinger of the kind of turbulence for transatlantic security seen during the Trump years. This concern was pronounced enough that senior European officials traveled to Washington before election day seeking insights about how to navigate such a dynamic. 

Given the razor-thin Republican majority in the House and a closely divided Senate where support for Ukraine remains strong across the aisle, it seems that worse-case scenarios have been avoided for proponents of NATO and Ukraine. And the fact that recent polling shows American voters still strongly supportive of US aid to Ukraine is another encouraging indicator that the Kremlin-curious crowd lacks any broad-based support. Europeans will also be encouraged that many election deniers were defeated, a sign of resilience for US democracy after the shame of January 6th and a boon for democratic institutions such as NATO. 

Of course, all these positives for NATO are counterbalanced by Trump’s announcement that he will run for president again, which is likely to come with a recirculation of his anti-NATO worldview during the course of his campaign.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former principal director for European and NATO policy at the Pentagon.

Europe won’t be on the chopping block, but may face new pressure on defense and security

Over the past two years, repairing the relationship with Europe has been a mainstay of Biden’s broader foreign policy agenda. He’s let Germany off the hook in terms of defense spending, lauded European nations’ efforts to wean themselves off of Russian energy in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and even committed to permanently station US troops in Poland. To everyone’s surprise, the Donald Trump-inspired “MAGA” wing of the Republican Party was largely trounced in the midterms. Had that segment been more successful, it wouldn’t have surprised me to see the US-European relationship under greater strain with the Republicans in control of the House.

Instead, with Republicans’ narrow House margin and Democrats controlling the Senate, I think Congress will have bigger fish to fry (focusing on domestic issues such as the economy, and even infighting within the Republican Party), so Europe won’t be on the chopping block the way it was during Trump’s presidency. It will still be important, however, to watch the trade and competition space—especially with regard to the Inflation Reduction Act and the accusations of protectionism being levied by Europe. As the war in Ukraine grinds on, we also might see more criticism from Capitol Hill accusing Europe of failing to pull its weight on defense and security. To “future proof” the relationship, it is imperative that Europe continue to step up to the plate and play a more forward-leaning role as a global power.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center.

Republicans will challenge Biden’s China policies—starting with export controls

House Republicans will use their new majority to target a number of critical issues associated with the US-China relationship. Expect an initial focus on technology competition, supply-chain resilience, and a very close examination of the overall efficacy of US export controls. 

Many Republicans see the recent export restrictions placed on China’s largest semiconductor manufacturing companies as a continuation of the “whack-a-mole” approach to export controls. To help identify new approaches to this decades-old technology and national security challenge, the House Foreign Affairs Committee will start a ninety-day review of the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) handling of export controls. As part of this investigation, a particular emphasis will likely be placed on examining the export-approval process, with many Republicans highlighting that BIS approved the export of over $61 billion of US semiconductor technology to companies on the export blacklist in 2021 alone.  

Pending the results of the ninety-day review, a Republican-led House could propose significant new changes to existing export control legislation. Ideas currently being floated include bureaucratically empowering BIS by separating the office from the Commerce Department and creating a direct reporting chain to the president (similar to the Office of the United States Trade Representative), creating a new intelligence office within BIS to more efficiently act on classified information, and expanding end-use controls on emerging and foundational technologies. 

Overall, a Republican-led House will view US-China technology competition as a key priority, and policy watchers should expect the introduction of new legislation that will have a significant impact on research security, trade, and supply-chain resilience. 

—Kit Conklin is a nonresident senior fellow at the GeoTech Center and former US national-security official.

The new Congress won’t change Biden’s course on Iran

Foreign policy, particularly toward Ukraine and the Middle East, has been fairly bipartisan in Biden’s first two years. Given that the “red wave” was barely a dribble, I don’t expect much impact on US foreign policy toward either. Congress will still not be in position to block an Iran nuclear deal, should one ever materialize, or to force additional sanctions on an administration that is already being proactive in support of Iranian protesters and in opposition to Iran’s provision of drones and missiles to Ukraine.

However, expect House Republicans to amplify the expected hawkish views of Benjamin Netanyahu, newly returned as Israeli prime minister. For Netanyahu, Iran remains a useful foil and way to deflect attention from Israeli-Palestinian tensions and US criticism over Israeli treatment of the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. 

—Barbara Slavin is the director of the Future of Iran Initiative.

While the Senate stays the course, House Republicans may force Biden’s hand on Venezuela and Central America

With Democrats retaining control of the Senate, a top priority must be quick approval of the remaining US ambassador-designees for posts in Latin America and the Caribbean and the multilateral institutions focused on the region: the Inter-American Development Bank and the Organization of American States. China has its diplomats in place in countries across the Americas, so should the United States. Senate holds on US ambassadors only serve to undermine US influence and policy.

The change in leadership in the House of Representatives, albeit by slim margins, will likely result in new pressure points for the Biden administration with regard to two key policy areas: Venezuela and Central America. In Venezuela, President Nicolás Maduro’s jumping on to the world stage at the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP27) last week reflects a new confidence by Maduro and a new acceptance of his administration by a growing number of countries around the world, including new leaders in Latin America. Following the release of US hostages, and as preparations continue for a return to the Mexico City negotiations between the Maduro government and opposition leaders, momentum may be building for a re-evaluation of what is the most effective US policy to advance political freedom and human rights. But with Republicans taking control of the House, and with eyes on Florida and the 2024 presidential election, expect hearings and legislation to seek to handcuff any potential easing of the more hard-line policy toward Venezuela. Although any potential legislation passed in the House will be dead on arrival in a Democrat-controlled Senate.

The new House will also advance numerous inquiries into US immigration policy, including calling for investigations into actions taken at the Department of Homeland Security. These moves will put a new laser focus on the Biden administration’s policies in Central America that have sought to advance short and long-term solutions to decrease migration from these countries. Those include diplomatic efforts such as the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection put forward at the Summit of the Americas in June. Hearings and investigations will focus on DHS but will draw in the administration’s broader policy priorities in Central America.

Most important is that policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean be bipartisan in its goals and actions. With China’s growing presence and influence in the region, any increase in partisan division on Latin America and Caribbean policy will only harm long-term US interests.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Republicans may agree with Biden on trade policy

A Republican-run House will argue that the United States’ past policy toward developing countries based on financial aid and trade preferences should be replaced by a policy promoting economic partnerships. It will insist that US policies abroad must result in clear benefits for Americans. 

Financial aid to developing countries is often delivered through international governmental and non-governmental organizations that are themselves a problem. Some have been co-opted by China and other malicious actors. Others pursue their own goals rather than helping recipient countries. And many government aid recipients are corrupt.

Republicans are likely to insist that future aid be delivered through civil-society partners such as corporations, business associations, and faith-based organizations.

US policy has traditionally assumed that trade deals open foreign markets for US exports and thereby increase domestic prosperity, while other countries will become more democratic through trade with the United States, which in turn leads to peace in the world. But the economic globalization of recent decades has led to manufacturing job losses that have impoverished many Americans, and neither communist China nor dictatorial Russia has become more democratic or more peaceful.

Republicans will argue that preferential trade deals should remain an option but be used selectively. Instead, they are likely to promote economic partnerships with benefits for other countries but also very clearly for the people of the United States—partnerships in which the private sector has a key role. Republicans and Democrats are likely to find common ground in this area as neither the Trump nor the Biden administration has been enthusiastic about new preferential trade deals. 

One partnership example is friend-shoring, moving US corporate supply chains from increasingly adversarial China to friendly countries that offer economic incentives to US companies. Another is the Biden administration’s recently signed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, which brings together twelve countries representing 40 percent of world gross domestic product. No US aid or preferential trade access to the US market is involved. Instead, the agreement establishes fair rules and business standards for key sectors of the world economy, for the benefit of all.

—Dan Negrea is the senior director of the Freedom and Prosperity Center and a former special representative for commercial and business affairs at the US State Department.

The lame-duck session could be an opening to improve congressional oversight of homeland security

The dust is still settling on control of the new Congress, but the implications will be considerable for the homeland security enterprise—keeping the United States safe from non-military threats ranging involving cybersecurity, borders and immigration, domestic terrorism, climate change, and more. Just as important as which party controls which house of Congress is who will chair the eleven key congressional committees in the House and nine committees in the Senate that have authority over all or part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These numbers alone show the high hurdle that the Congress faces in trying to address problems at DHS.

If Congress wants to be effective, there are steps that the leaders in each house can take that need to be decided before the 118^th Congress convenes in early January. Both the House and the Senate control committee jurisdiction by rules that are adopted at the start of each congressional session. On the House side, the speaker should re-affirm the memorandum of understanding that applied during the 117th Congress: that other House authorizing committees need to coordinate with the Committee on Homeland Security over any DHS-related authorizing legislation. On the Senate side, the majority leader should consider dividing up the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee into two separate committees. This would mirror the approach in the House. Oversight of DHS and conducting investigations are important, separate missions that require dedicated focus.

—Thomas Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

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Although the Sweden Democrats are not formally part of Sweden’s new government, the ruling minority coalition will depend on parliamentary support from the far-right party, giving them influence over government policy for the first time. This represents a clear shift to the right for a country with a long history of social democratic governments. How will this change Sweden’s international profile? And are the Sweden Democrats likely to have any real influence over Sweden’s foreign and defence policy?

Director for Northern Europe Anna Wieslander gives her insights to Chatham House.

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Against that backdrop, Mario Draghi had brought about a sense of steady leadership, presided over economic growth, and instituted a strong European and transatlantic agenda, leading with competence and resolve since entering office in Italy in February 2021. Underscoring his role as an internationally respected leader, Draghi propelled Italy to the forefront of European Union (EU) decisionmaking, securing hundreds of billions of dollars for COVID-19 relief, drafting a path for Italy’s independence from Russian natural gas, and helping lead the bloc’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And yet, seemingly overnight, his short stint in office ended.

Following the country’s September snap election, a center-right coalition led by Giorgia Meloni (leader of the right-wing Brothers of Italy party) won an outright majority—but it has been plagued by scandals and infighting ever since. As the EU’s third-largest economy and a member of the Group of Seven (G7), Italian domestic politics risk spilling across borders and testing EU and NATO unity in the face of Russian aggressions.

Parting from more traditionally domestic-focused agendas, there has already been friction among governing coalition parties over Italy’s continued policy of support toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In fact, two of the three parties in the ruling coalition are publicly and privately calling into question Italy’s support for Ukraine, and in doing so jeopardizing the governing alliance’s unity and the country’s response to continued hostilities.

At a time when the country and Europe at large are preparing for a difficult winter plagued by an energy crisis, Italy seems poised to plunge back to its historical pattern of political instability.

Meloni has gone to great lengths to paint herself as a leader who is a Brussels skeptic, but at the same time is pro-European and an anti-Vladimir Putin transatlanticist. Calling for Italy to exit the EU just years ago, she is now making public appearances arguing for Italy’s immovable role within the bloc and NATO. Last week she visited Brussels to meet EU leaders, and then this week she hosted NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Chigi Palace. However, her coalition partners are her biggest weakness in this effort. And throughout the campaign, Meloni tied herself to these partners, presenting a unitary agenda and often making joint appearances at rallies.

Matteo Salvini, head of Italy’s The League party is positioning himself as a pacifist, calling for peace talks as the only possible end to the war. While pacifism is likely a political stunt, as Salvini has historically been close to Italy’s branches of the military and a firearms enthusiast, The League’s ties to Putin’s United Russia party are no secret. Salvini’s own party loyalists have been reported to have taken repeated secret meetings at the Kremlin for years. Salvini himself claimed to have secretly met with the Russian ambassador to Italy since the beginning of the war.

Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party, the coalition’s other partner, has turned into Meloni’s biggest headache. Forza Italia’s second-in-command, Antonio Tajani, will become the country’s next minister of foreign affairs, but his appointment has been overshadowed by Berlusconi.

Since election day, Berlusconi—who is arguably the country’s most pro-Putin major public figure—has repeatedly gone on national television (on which he has a near-monopoly, controlling the country’s largest TV network, Mediaset, and having a say over the political appointment of the heads of the state-owned network, Rai) to amplify Kremlin propaganda. He has suggested that Ukraine brought the war upon itself. In secret recordings now made public, he has gone as far as to say his dear friend Putin is being treated unfairly and praised him for a recent birthday gift, while blaming Zelenskyy for escalating violence in the Donbas.

Now as prime minister, Meloni is forced to distance herself from Salvini’s and Berlusconi’s comments. Where they see in the war in Ukraine an opportunity to tap into Italians’ frustrations with rising costs of living and shift support away from Brothers of Italy for added leverage within the governing coalition, Meloni sees a path to swift recognition and support from the broader Western international establishment, just months after many feared her rise to power.

With no end in sight to the ongoing center-right coalition internal fights, Draghi’s time as prime minister makes one thing clear: The transatlantic alliance and Europe need a stable and constructive partner in Rome now more than ever. Yet as the bloc prepares to face what will surely be a difficult winter, with energy and geopolitical crises looming, Italy still lacks a unified government. With newly elected pro-Russian legislators and politicians known to have been soft on Russia now appointed to key ministries, Rome risks further emboldening a growing segment within European politics that is calling for disengagement from the conflict. Were this segment to succeed, it would shed light on the extent to which Russian narratives have infiltrated European politics over the past decade.

Draghi helped lead Europe’s response to the war in Ukraine and worked behind the scenes to mediate between France and Germany, as the two other main European powers continue clashing on their responses to the energy crisis. Now, Meloni faces the difficult task of trying to build on Draghi’s European legacy while being hobbled by alliance partners who don’t share her views on either the EU or Russia. There’s much at stake—and at risk—for Meloni, Italy, and Europe.

Nick O’Connell is assistant director for business development at the Atlantic Council. A native of Italy, he previously worked for Migrants of the Mediterranean, an Italy-based nonprofit focused on EU migration policy, and a number of political campaigns in Northern Italy.

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The snap poll, which is intended to offer a semblance of progress toward a competitive political environment in Kazakhstan, is the latest step in President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s makeover of the country’s politics—an effort to both strengthen Kazakhstan’s position on the world stage and shore up the regime’s domestic foundations.

In January, protests over rising fuel prices quickly spilled into all the country’s major cities. The regime was only saved after Tokayev called in supporting forces from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-led military alliance, and ordered the shooting and arrest of protesters whom he later denigrated as drug smugglers and terrorists.

Tokayev’s moves to establish a measured democratization in the wake of January’s unrest have staved off further large-scale protests. Leaders in Astana likely feel stuck: A return to greater authoritarianism would only cause the pre-January fissures in society to fester, while a rapid liberalization, they believe, would threaten an immediate reprisal of the chaos of January.

Since Kazakhstan became an independent state in 1991, it has been a target in the sights of Russian foreign policy. Kremlin aggression has been a consistent threat to Kazakhstan’s national sovereignty and even territorial integrity. But after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Astana distanced itself from Moscow, refusing to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory and harboring Russian citizens seeking to dodge the draft.

It is no coincidence that Tokayev is pursuing domestic liberalization at the same time. After the Kremlin invaded Ukraine, Western democracies have revealed themselves to be a competent counter to Moscow’s influence.

Ukraine secured Western support in no small part due to its burgeoning democratic institutions. Thus, authoritarian institutions have become a liability for Kazakhstan, jeopardizing Astana’s ability to leverage the West in opposing Moscow’s attempts to re-establish a sphere of influence in the region. As such, the liberalizing reforms of Tokayev are a step not only toward democracy but also toward the West and away from Russia.

Tokayev’s reforms carry symbolic weight because they promise to open a severely closed political system, but their practical effects are limited. The snap presidential election, for example, is supposed to be interpreted as the birth of a competitive political environment in Kazakhstan. In practice, however, the elections leave the opposition without time to organize and consolidate support, all but assuring Tokayev’s re-election and doing more to consolidate Tokayev’s authority than bring in any real competition.

If Tokayev’s reforms go no further, they risk falling short of their full potential as a geopolitical tool by alienating Western capitals, whose support is increasingly conditioned on serious democratic progress.

For leaders like Tokayev, close partnership with China presents an enticing counterbalance to both Russia and the West. The political model that China champions does not grant political freedom to the people, but it does preserve the elite in power and might unlock exponential economic growth.

China is also making efforts to court Kazakhstan, as Chinese leader Xi Jinping offered greater cooperation and support for Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity during his recent trip to the country.

In the process of exiting one imperial orbit, however, Astana does not seem eager to enter another. While Tokayev’s strategic ambiguity does not close the door to a closer alliance with Beijing—or a return to Moscow’s fold—it does open the window to Western alignment. But as long as Kazakhstan’s democratization stands incomplete, however, the West removing its support is an option; that would force Astana to choose between two autocratic spheres of influence.

Western engagement over the coming months and years is going to be crucial. After the snap presidential elections, Tokayev will find his domestic position stronger than ever. He’ll have the chance to halt or even reverse the changes he’s made to liberalize the country. But the West’s credibility and engagement provide a crucial incentive for Tokayev to continue his reforms and secure both democracy and sovereignty for Kazakhstan.

High-level visits to the country and economic partnerships could demonstrate Western interest in further engagement. Western countries can facilitate investment in the country and offer technical assistance for Kazakhstan’s leading private industries.

Western engagement should be Kazakhstan-specific and avoid viewing the country only through the lens of the wider Central Asian region. During that process, Western leaders should make clear what kind of democratic progress they would need to see in order to increase their engagement. Western diplomats should make clear that engagement is predicated on Kazakhstan’s reforms, and further partnership should be predicated on continued liberalization.

If Western attention is not forthcoming, the forces in Astana advocating for greater autocracy will only gain strength. They will argue that their fears have been realized, as elite power will be threatened by democratic forces without any geopolitical benefits to show for the effort.

It is up to Western leaders, then, to understand the situation that Kazakhstan’s leaders find themselves in and operate accordingly. They should support what nascent efforts exist and provide incentives to ensure continued liberalization. Western engagement and understanding with Kazakhstan will help to demonstrate the value of Tokayev’s moves, set clear expectations for what reforms are to accomplish, and spur the development of a Kazakh democracy.

The story of democracy in Kazakhstan has yet to be written, and at this critical moment, the West has a unique opportunity to determine whether Kazakhstan sees either the birth of a fledgling democracy or retrenchment to autocracy.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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On the domestic front, it must implement its legislative achievements and promulgate regulations which can both survive Supreme Court review and meet the timeline to avoid Congressional Review Act (CRA) reversal in a potential future administration.

The immediate task is to ensure that the funds provided by the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Democrat-led Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) are wisely and promptly spent. This is no easy task given the complexity of designating major projects like regional hydrogen hubs or maximizing the lending authorities of the Department of Energy Loans Program Office (LPO). Moving carefully and quickly is a balancing act indeed, especially when taxpayer monies are at stake. Equally crucial is the role of the Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, and other agencies tasked with crafting taxation regulations and clarifying complex legal provisions such as domestic content requirements, qualified sourcing, and more, as laid out in the original laws.    

On the regulatory front, the Biden administration is promulgating a host of important regulations with serious implications for energy and climate policy.  If these are published in final form more than 180 days before the end of the administration, they are likely to be the law of the land for multiple years while any differently-minded administration rewrites them. But if the Biden administration does not codify them in time, or cannot successfully defend them in a conservative Supreme Court using existing statutory authorities, they may not survive President Biden’s first term. Chief among these yet to be finalized rules are: a new power plant carbon dioxide emissions regulatory scheme (“Clean Power Plan 2.0”) and methane regulations for the oil and gas industry at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an updated social cost of carbon (and other greenhouse gases) estimate, a climate disclosure rule for publicly listed businesses at the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and an updated Certificate Policy Statement and GHG Guidance at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Additional agenda items could include vehicle performance standards and federal buildings efficiency standards, among other decarbonization regulatory efforts.

The makeup of Congress has little influence on the direction of these executive-level tasks. In practice, the parameters of these rules will be up to the agency heads themselves and perhaps ultimately the Supreme Court—which already reprimanded the EPA’s original Clean Power Plan approach earlier this year in its West Virginia vs. EPA decision. The Biden administration will be keen to finalize these regulations as soon as possible to avoid the threat of CRA in case of a GOP presidential win in 2024. Equally important will be disbursing federal monies promised in the IIJA and IRA, both to show concrete benefits to Americans in both laws ahead of 2024 and to prevent any efforts by a future unified GOP government to roll back the key funding components of these laws.

On the international energy front, the administration must manage the foreign policy challenges of a revanchist Russia, a freshly assertive China, a recalcitrant Iran, and souring relations with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Coast Countries (GCC). These tasks lie squarely in the authority of the executive branch, even while subject to congressional oversight and the appropriations cycle.

Indeed, major foreign policy challenges that are highly material to energy markets are ahead. Chief among these is the sweeping and punishing sanctions policy adopted by the United States and its allies targeting Russian exports of oil and gas—particularly as Europe weans itself off Russian natural gas supplies and prepares for years of supply insecurity as it recalibrates its internal infrastructure towards more liquefied natural gas (LNG). The ever-present tensions with Iran, and the issues facing a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the lifting of extant energy sanctions, is another strategic problem with vast market consequences. So, too, the US relationship with Iran’s geostrategic adversary, Saudi Arabia, in light of US disappointment in the recent OPEC+ production cut decision. Looming over all of this is the United States’ own role as an energy superpower and major exporter of oil and gas, its use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to calm markets, and the Biden administration’s oftentimes unclear approach with respect to approving expanded US energy exports. 

The international climate effort is no less complex. Efforts led by Special Envoy John Kerry to galvanize global action on emissions mitigation have been exemplified through the Global Methane Pledge and the First Movers Coalition targeting the multinational private sector, as well as robust US presences at COP26 and the upcoming COP27. But the international climate agenda has both inclusionary and exclusionary facets—the latter with regard to China. The Biden administration is working to diversify global clean energy supply chains (a key component of the IRA law), incentivize new supply chains for inputs like critical minerals, and ease China’s grip on clean energy technology manufacturing capacity. Ultimately, the direction of geopolitics will have enormous implications for US energy policy and, by extension, climate, but these decisions also lie squarely within the remit of the executive branch. 

Lastly, it must be remembered that the US is not one government, but rather dozens. State and local political developments have outsized influence on the direction of US clean energy buildout and broader decarbonization—particularly those “blue” states, such as California and New York, which are themselves charging ahead with innovative regulatory tools and investment in emerging fuels and technologies in the clean energy space. The US private sector plays an equally important and outsized role and often complements what all levels of US government are working on at any given juncture. The rapidly growing number of corporate “net-zero” commitments, now published in their securities filings, could have major impacts throughout their value chains. The to-be-awarded eight hydrogen hubs, similarly, will include multiple levels of public leadership and the participation of many private sector actors and investors.

As ever, unknown unknowns may lurk in the distance. But it is clear that after the major developments of the last two years, the next two will be equally consequential for the direction of the US energy system and its potential transformation—whoever holds the gavel on the Hill.

David L. Goldwyn served as Special Envoy for International Energy under President Obama and Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Relations under President Clinton. He co-edited Energy & Security: Strategies for a World in Transition (Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press 2013), Editions 1 and 2. He is chair of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Advisory Group.

Andrea Clabough is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and an associate at Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC.

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The most widely reported comments came from senior Republican and House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, who indicated in early October that a future Republican-controlled Congress would not be prepared to offer Ukraine any more “blank checks.” Meanwhile, a letter sent to President Biden by a group of 30 progressive Democrat lawmakers calling for a Ukraine ceasefire push was hastily withdrawn in late October following a strong backlash.

While the political debate continues, survey data indicates strong US public backing for policies in support of Ukraine. A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted in early October found that 73% of Americans believed the United States should maintain support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, 66% of respondents said Washington specifically should continue providing weapons to Ukraine, up from 51% in a similar poll two months earlier. The latest University of Maryland poll reached similar conclusions.

With the outcome of Russia’s Ukraine war still very much in the balance, the coming US vote has the potential to shape the geopolitical landscape for the coming years. The Atlantic Council invited a range of experts to share their views on what the midterm elections might mean for Ukraine.

Daniel Fried, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council: If the Republicans take Congress (or even one House), the domestic political dynamic in Washington will shift toward confrontation with Republicans spending time on investigators, allegations, and accusations.

In foreign affairs, the Republicans will be split between neo-Reaganist and Trumpist wings. Both will attack the Biden Administration and push it to be tougher on China and Iran. Both wings will also push for greater burden sharing (meaning defense spending) by US allies. The neo-Reaganites will urge more push back against Putin while the Trumpists will either argue for pulling back from support for Ukraine or, in extreme cases, argue that accommodation with Russia is in the US national interest. Their stance will resemble the “isolationist” position of indifference to Hitler’s rise in the late 1930s.

The Democrats and neo-Reaganite Republicans will generally support Ukraine. Democrats may split, with a few hard left Democrats taking positions similar to Republicans who want to distance the US from Ukraine. But they will be few in number. Republicans who oppose continued aid to Ukraine will be larger in number. But Congress is unlikely to follow their lead.

Calls for negotiations on Putin’s terms, meaning that the US should push Ukraine to surrender its people and land to Russia, will grow but are unlikely to prevail as long as Putin keeps demanding the fruits of victory over Ukraine that he has not and may never attain. In short, US support for Ukraine will continue as Russian atrocities continue and as Ukrainians continue to resist effectively.

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Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy learned the hard way in 2019 how much domestic US politics can affect Ukraine’s reality. He and his team would be right to worry about next week’s polls. Whether or not the GOP will follow through on its threats to scale back Ukraine aid is impossible to predict, but it is definitely a real possibility.

This was Putin’s plan all along. He has aimed to cause an energy crisis that would drive up inflation and thereby trigger popular dissatisfaction that would result in the fall of governments and leaders opposed to him and his war in Ukraine. If the Republicans take the House and proceed to cut or reduce US support for Ukraine, they will be acting in Putin’s interests. Let us hope that threats to do so are campaign posturing and nothing more.

It is possible to argue that US President Joe Biden and his advisors have fallen short in their handling of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, helping Putin in his self-proclaimed genocidal conquest of an emerging European democracy is absolutely the wrong way to voice legitimate criticisms of US foreign policy. Whatever the outcome of the midterm elections, the US must not enable Putin.

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Kristina Hook, Assistant Professor, Kennesaw State University: American public opinion on Ukraine is remarkably bipartisan and durable, with 73% of Americans agreeing in a recent Reuters/Ipsos poll that the US should continue to support Ukraine despite Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling. Two-thirds of Americans say they are closely following the war, which is particularly notable as coverage has declined and reporting has transitioned away from gripping human interest stories to focus on important military dynamics.

These numbers imply that consensus surrounding Ukraine has held throughout the routine politicization of an election cycle. Regardless of the midterm results, I therefore expect the majority of US politicians across the aisle to reflect the public sentiment of their voters, who correctly understand the moral stakes of Russia’s brutal violence against Ukrainians.

As the politicking of the US election cycle declines after the midterms, I expect an increase in bipartisan articulations of the strategic importance of a clear Russian defeat for the preservation of the rules-based global order that underpins US political stability and economic success. Ukraine’s struggle for independence from a ruthless adversary resonates with American voters, yet a key post-midterm question remains if and how new and returning Congressional leaders will convey the national security impetus for Ukraine’s victory.

Doug Klain, Nonresident Fellow, Atlantic Council: Support for Ukraine is one of the few issues that has managed to remain largely bipartisan in the United States. Regardless of the midterm elections, the American public is still overwhelmingly in favor of continued aid to Ukraine. It’s also likely that the majority of Congress will remain in favor of further aid to Ukraine, no matter the outcome on November 8.

That’s the good news. However, within both parties there are prominent voices calling for a shift in policy that would embolden Russia and put Ukraine in a worse position at the negotiating table, when that day eventually arrives. This is the reason why the Biden Administration is reportedly mulling a legislative blitz during the lame-duck session to lock in another critical package of Ukraine aid. We’ve seen in the past how vocal minorities in Congress have been able to gum up the works and stop major legislation from sailing smoothly to the President’s desk. Continued aid for Ukraine may become a target if these factions grow their numbers in Congress.

While the consensus in Washington is likely to remain in favor of steadfast support for Ukraine, a more vocal opposition to aid means that Ukraine’s friends need to step up efforts to communicate with the American public about why this aid is in the interests of the US. This means making clear that Ukraine’s success is also a win for the United States.

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We asked our experts to weigh in on what’s in store for Israel’s democracy, its ability to balance opposing domestic forces, and its relations with regional partners.

Jump to an expert reaction:
Ambassador Daniel B. Shapiro: Netanyahu’s effect on growing Arab-Israeli relations in light of the Abraham Accords
Barbara Slavin: Netanyahu’s impact on the Iran nuclear deal
Mark N. Katz: The impact of Netanyahu’s prime ministership on Russia-Israel relations
Richard Le Baron: Bibi’s message to prospective regional Arab partners: ‘There’s nothing to see here’
Thomas Warrick: Prioritize joining the US visa waiver program
Jean-Loup Samaan: Netanyahu’s far-right alliance might imperil the Abraham Accords

Shalom Lipner: Netanyahu’s tightrope act
Jonathon Panikoff: Victory, but at what cost?

Carmiel Arbit: Perils of an extremist coalition
Ali Bakir: Netanyahu’s victory on progress in Turkish-Israeli relations
David Daoud: Netanyahu willing to kick out the Israeli democratic system’s guardrails
Andrew Peek: For Netanyahu, safety secures trust and victory
Ariel Ezrahi: The prospect of regional climate change efforts in light of new Netanyahu leadership
Yulia Shalomov: Netanyahu’s too far right-hand man?
Jonah Fisher: Splintering of center, left, and Arab parties paves way for far-right Israeli government

Netanyahu’s effect on growing Arab-Israeli relations in light of the Abraham Accords

Israel’s election results did not resolve the sharp divide among Israelis over Benjamin Netanyahu’s suitability for leadership. But they did deliver Netanyahu a plausible coalition due to greater cohesiveness in his camp and greater division among his opponents. That cohesiveness through the election will be challenged when governing, posing possible challenges for Israel’s ability to expand its growing relations with the Arab world.

Netanyahu, of course, signed the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain while prime minister in 2020, and added a normalization accord with Morocco later that year. But he did so as the head of a coalition that included centrist elements, like then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi. They provided critical restraint on policies—such as the proposed annexation of large portions of the West Bank—that could have stymied Israel’s relationships with its new Arab partners. The UAE, ahead of its normalization deal, made that trade-off explicit.

There will be no such restraints in the likely coalition to emerge, unless they come from Netanyahu himself. Far-right members of the coalition, like the Religious Zionist party’s Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, whose popularity has risen in parallel with a wave of Palestinian terrorist attacks, do not prioritize expanding Israel’s relations with Arab states. They will demand policies that make the preservation of a future two-state solution with the Palestinians impossible. Netanyahu, dependent on them for his coalition and possibly for legislation to shut off his corruption trial, will be challenged to navigate their demands, and the messages he will receive from Abu Dhabi, Manama, Rabat—and Washington. If Arab states believe they will be embarrassed by close ties with a government of this character, progress on deepening the Abraham Accords, and expanding them to new countries, will be an uphill climb.

Daniel B. Shapiro, director N7 Initiative and former US Ambassador to Israel.

Netanyahu’s impact on the Iran nuclear deal

Netanyahu’s likely victory is more bad news for the Iran nuclear deal, which was already hanging by a thread because of Iranian intransigence and domestic turmoil. Given his long obsession with Iran,

Netanyahu can be expected to increase pressure on the Joe Biden administration to intensify sanctions enforcement and to work with Israel to prepare more violent options to try to degrade and delay Iran’s nuclear program. Netanyahu will also derail any US hopes for a more enlightened Israeli policy toward the Palestinians while pressuring Washington to help expand the Abraham Accords.

Netanyahu’s trickiest topic will be Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, given his long association with President Putin. US-Israel relations will remain close but are likely to be bumpier, especially if Bibi tries to put his thumb on the scale of US politics in support of Republicans as he has in the past.

Barbara Slavin, director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The impact of Netanyahu’s prime ministership on Russia-Israel relations

If Benjamin Netanyahu resumes the prime ministership, as now seems likely, he may not be able to have as good a relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin as he did before. During his long previous stint as prime minister, Netanyahu frequently met Putin in person and talked with him on the phone.  Russian-Israeli relations were basically good, despite Moscow’s close ties with Tehran. As a result of the deconfliction agreement between Russian and Israeli forces regarding Syria, Moscow turned a blind eye to Israel targeting Hezbollah and even Iranian positions there. But while Tehran previously had to put up with this, Putin’s dependence on Iran for armed drones for use in Ukraine may put Tehran in a position to demand that Moscow be less tolerant of such Israeli attacks in Syria. 

Netanyahu may argue to American audiences that he cannot afford to do much to help Ukraine for fear of how Moscow might treat the vulnerable Jewish population in Russia. But Netanyahu will not want to antagonize Washington as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have done by collaborating closely with Moscow either. With the war in Ukraine having led to Russian ties with Iran becoming much closer and the Russian-American relationship becoming much worse, Netanyahu may be less able than he was before to have the same good working relationship with Putin or to successfully maneuver between Washington and Moscow.

Mark N. Katz, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Bibi’s message to prospective regional Arab partners: ‘There’s nothing to see here’

In a recent interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, the presumptive new Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that his “chief diplomatic goal” will be normalization of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu contended that Riyadh is inching towards normalization anyway, with its authorization of Israeli overflights in 2018. He also noted that there was “no way” the Gulf states that have normalized ties with Israel—the UAE and Bahrain—could have done so without the “approval of Saudi Arabia.” Bibi contended that the Saudis overriding interest is defense against Iran and that they will not allow a Palestinian veto over their actions.

When asked in the same interview whether ultra-right anti-Arab parties in his coalition would be a liability, Bibi said, “I decide the policy.” He claimed that his party’s thirty seats in the Knesset and his prior history of controlling coalition partners would be determining factors. So basically, Netanyahu is saying to its present and prospective Arab partners, “There’s nothing to see here; the elections don’t matter in terms of our relationships.”

Given the fragility of recent Israeli ruling coalitions of all stripes, Arab governments and observers might be a bit skeptical about where relations with Israel go from here. The radical right elements of Bibi’s coalition don’t have much interest in foreign policy. They don’t believe Arabs have any place in Israel, which they define as extending far beyond current international boundaries, and they will need to balance expedient subservience to their prime minister against expectations of the people who voted for them. They also are not above direct actions to pursue their objectives. Arab diplomats in Jerusalem have their work cut out for them in analyzing how their countries’ interests are best served in this new environment.  

Richard Le Baron, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Prioritize joining the US visa waiver program

One piece of unfinished business the new Israeli government will need to prioritize, whoever leads it, is making the final changes to Israeli laws to allow Israel to join the United States Visa Waiver Program.

This valued program, run by the US Department of Homeland Security, allows visa-free travel from many European and other democratic countries to the United States without the hassle or expense for most of their citizens of traveling to a US embassy or consulate to get a business or tourist visa. Israelis want this, and the Biden administration is committed to working with Israeli officials to understand what it will take to fulfill the program’s requirements.

However, as US ambassador to Israel, Tom Nides, has said publicly, necessary legislation was blocked in the Knesset these past few months by the party of the next likely Prime Minister, Bibi Netanyahu. Moving from opposition to government often causes political parties to change positions when popular programs are on the line—and that is exactly the case here. The new Israeli government, whoever leads it, should prioritize the changes to Israeli law that will allow Israelis, and the United States, to benefit from Israel joining the Visa Waiver Program.

Thomas Warrick, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Netanyahu’s far-right alliance might imperil the Abraham Accords

Although Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to power was expected, the strong result of the Religious Zionism party alliance of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich was the real big news of Israel’s election—making them the third largest party in the Knesset. Their likely participation in the next government will have implications beyond domestic politics: Israel’s far-right leaders not only rejected the idea of any territorial concession to the Palestinians, but also made West Bank annexation a cornerstone of their platform.

Netanyahu already promised to annex parts of the West Bank in 2020, before retracting it after signing the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain. Since then, Netanyahu has repeatedly played around with the idea to appeal to far-right voters.

The resurgence of such a plan could have dramatic consequences for Israel’s foreign policy. It would stir unnecessary tensions with the Biden administration at a time when the Iran nuclear conundrum should be the focus of attention. More importantly, the annexation of the West Bank could also derail the rapprochement between Israel and Arab countries, who back in 2020, explained to their population that the signing of the Abraham Accords prevented West Bank annexation.

Officials in Abu Dhabi and Manama have already expressed concerns about Netanyahu’s alliance with the religious Zionist movement. If a new coalition government in Jerusalem returns to the 2020 plan, this would be perceived as an affront to Israel’s Gulf partners, who may have no choice but to put rapprochement on hold. Likewise, it could also damage Israel’s recent efforts toward reconciliation with Turkey. This scenario is not inevitable. When facing the risk of jeopardizing one of Israel’s biggest foreign policy achievements in recent years and one he actually worked for, Netanyahu may favor strategic pragmatism instead of campaign tactics. 

Jean-Loup Samaan, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Netanyahu’s tightwire act

Israelis overcame their PTSD from voting in four elections in less than two years, and showed up dutifully—with a surprisingly high turnout rate of 71.3 percent—to cast ballots once again. Although the electorate remains sharply divided on the question of Benjamin Netanyahu’s fitness to serve as prime minister, the mechanics of Israel’s 3.25 percent electoral threshold served ostensibly to eliminate some of his rivals from being seated in the next Knesset, and thus illuminate an apparent path for him to power. That said, even if Netanyahu’s bloc does prevail and constitute a majority, the process of negotiating deals with his potential coalition parties stands poised to be excruciatingly difficult. With his survival as premier dependent fundamentally upon the cooperation of both Ultra-Orthodox parties (Shas and United Torah Judaism) and, more particularly, the Religious Zionism alliance—positioned to be the third-largest faction in the incoming parliament—Netanyahu will be at their mercy, compelled to submit to their wishes if he hopes to stay in office. Kowtowing to their staunchly conservative demands in the realms of defense and foreign policy, and concerning the role of religion in public life, will put him on a likely collision course, however, with many of Israel’s friends in foreign capitals and among the mostly non-Orthodox Jewish communities around the world. If not for Netanyahu’s immediate desire to wage his personal legal battles from the privileged perch of the executive suite in Jerusalem, it’s not impossible to imagine him forgoing the dubious pleasure of managing this hot potato on his professional plate.

Shalom Lipner, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Victory, but at what cost?

The Israeli right’s victory has solidified Benjamin Netanyahu’s comeback, but it may be a pyrrhic one for Israel. The rise of the Religious Zionist bloc was long predicted in this election. But the likelihood of its members, including Itamar Ben-Gvir, being welcomed into a Netanyahu cabinet will complicate Israel’s foreign and domestic policy. At best, having someone of Ben-Gvir’s historically racist views will challenge relations with longtime allies—including the United States—risking Israel once again being viewed in increasingly partisan terms by Democrats and Republicans. At worst, someone such as Ben-Gvir could threaten to fundamentally undermine Israel’s still burgeoning relationships with Arab countries. Both those with fully normalized relations with Israel—such as Jordan, Egypt, and those who normalized recently through the Abraham Accords—and countries whose relations remain under the table on business and security matters, such as Saudi Arabia.

But even if Netanyahu can somehow overcome the foreign policy challenges he will face, his accession threatens to fundamentally undermine Israeli democracy if Religious Zionist members push forward with their plan to implement legislation that undermines Israel’s judicial authority. Ben-Gvir insists on pursuing legislation that will end Netanyahu’s trial for corruption and bribery. Bezalel Smotrich may well seek to follow through on his commitment to undermine Israel’s judicial authority, including drastically reducing the High Court’s ability to strike down legislation that passes the Knesset but is viewed as contrary to Israeli basic law.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has the victory he sought. Israel’s future, however, will depend on whether members of the coalition are willing to stand up for the country’s democratic institutions, even in the face of domestic politics.

Jonathan Panikoff, director of Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Perils of an extremist coalition

After the brief tenure of one of Israel’s most diverse governing coalitions in history, Israel is now on the precipice of forming its most extreme. Absent a surprise compromise with the center, the new coalition will be made up of right-wing, ultra-Orthodox, and extremist parties. Gone are the Arabs, women, and Druze whose participation in the last government presented a fresh face of Israel to the world. That the right—which continues to grow in size and influence—would secure a victory in this election comes as little surprise.

The left is shrinking in population size, and its parties—which refused to ally to form larger blocs that would ensure their inclusion in the government—are in disarray. So far, both sides also refuse to pursue a national unity government, creating a vacuum for extremists to reign. The results will be suboptimal for Netanyahu, who would prefer to helm a strong centrist government, so long as it keeps him out of prison. He knows a far-right government will be difficult to govern and strain Israel’s international relationships.

Ben Gvir and Smotrich are caricatures of how Israel’s enemies view it. Their hate-mongering and extremist positions have been widely censured—by the Biden administration, Democratic members of Congress, and Jewish leadership alike, both publicly and privately. The new Israeli government may find allies among a projected Republican-led Congress, and extreme voices in the party are likely to find kinship in their Israeli counterparts. But tensions with Washington will ensue and be reminiscent—if not worse—than tensions between Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama.

Israel’s new coalition may find strengthened alliances in like-minded far-right or authoritarian governments—but those partnerships come at the expense of alliances with the rest of the free world. At home, Israel’s democracy has already been struggling from paralysis and instability alongside threats to core institutions like the judiciary. Under the leadership of a new far-right coalition, Israel would join a growing club of democracies cannibalized by extremist elements, leaving the country only further in peril.

Carmiel Arbit, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Netanyahu’s victory on progress in Turkish-Israeli relations

Netanyahu’s likely victory is not necessarily a pleasant development for the Turkish–Israeli relations. During most of his period, Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated significantly. One primary reason is Netanyahu’s aggressive policies towards the Palestinians and his involvement in an anti-Turkey bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The absence of chemistry between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Benjamin Netanyahu adds to the poisonous equation. The two leaders often engage in a war of words, further complicating the ties between their countries.

The defeat of Netanyahu in the previous general elections removed a significant obstacle from the normalization process between Ankara and Tel Aviv and accelerated diplomatic efforts. Additionally, the recent normalization between the two countries boosted security cooperation and coordination on matters of regional urgency, especially concerning Iran.

While it is still early to judge whether Netanyahu will opt to follow the same old policies and thus undermine the already achieved progress in Turkish-Israeli relations, or if he will choose to adapt to the current situation and maybe build on the progress, the current economic and intelligence cooperation between Turkey and Israel will likely continue in the same pace.

However, when it comes to political and diplomatic relations, Netanyahu’s actions towards Turkey, the Palestinians, and some hot regional issues, such as the case in the Eastern Mediterranean, will decide in which directions the relations will go following his ascendance to power. Netanyahu might also adopt a “wait and see” strategy towards Ankara until the outcome of Turkey’s presidential and general elections in June 2023 are clear.

Ali Bakir, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Netanyahu willing to kick out the Israeli democratic system’s guardrails

Benjamin Netanyahu will soon return to the premiership, his victory owing to his accomplishments for Israel’s security, economy, and regional and global acceptance. He is also undoubtedly an unrivaled campaigner, running a clever, personable, and at times funny campaign. Most importantly, he united a whole bloc of parties—beyond just Likud—around one message: Rak Bibi (Only Bibi).

To regain power and avoid a potential jail sentence, Netanyahu is willing to do the most dangerous thing in a democracy: kick out the system’s guardrails. Israel has endured much in its short history. One election cycle will not determine its fate or future—but its strength and durability depend on maintaining state institutions and the people’s trust in them.

The pro-Bibi bloc has targeted Israel’s judiciary and media, respectively, the pillar of human rights and check on the unbridled populism and majoritarian tyranny instincts of any legislative body, and the fourth estate in any democracy. While Bibi once hewed to Menachem Begin’s and Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s absolute respect for the rule of law, his personal interests now dictate otherwise, and his coalition seems intent on shrinking the judiciary’s authority without simultaneously constraining the Knesset through amending Israel’s basic laws. This would check one branch of the government, without a balance on the other.

This “judicial revolution” could change the very nature of Israeli democracy and erode the classical liberalism that its main parties once agreed was essential to its health. Bibi may continue to deliver material benefits and prosperity to Israel, but that is no substitute for eroding the institutions that have underpinned the Jewish state’s durability and longevity for almost seventy-five years.

David Daoud, nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

For Netanyahu, safety secures trust and victory

Bibi Netanyahu has made a political career out of keeping his countrymen safe. His return is due as much to the vagarities of coalition management as anything else, but it is a good thing for Israel’s security. The widely disparate political coalition that pried Netanyahu out of office in 2021 was united on little but a shared desire to see the end of him, and once he was gone, it was not long before collapsing.

That there are great changes afoot in the Middle East is without question. The perceived withdrawal of America from the region, a new generation of Gulf leadership, the growth of Iran’s regional presence, and the collapse of America’s military deterrent in the wake of Afghanistan have spurred local actors to look elsewhere for their security.  

Netanyahu can be a polarizing figure in the United States, and he has not always had a deft touch. He has been returned to office over and over because, at a fundamental level, Israelis trust him to keep them safe.  None of the region’s new structures have yet been tested in an extreme crisis. But surely it is better, when they are, for America’s closest friend in the region to have not just a tested leader that understands them, but a united coalition based around more than just someone they hate. For all of his faults, Israelis basically trust Netanyahu to do that, and that is why he is back.

Andrew Peek, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The prospect of regional climate change efforts in light of new Netanyahu leadership

With the war in Ukraine raging, the Iranian threat to peace and stability in the Middle East and beyond, rising sea levels, raging fires, rising temperatures, major energy supply deficits,  and economies around the world heading toward a recession, this is a critical time for cooperation across political aisles and borders to face these gargantuan challenges. The new government in Israel does not seem intent on placing climate change at the top of its agenda. Already, future coalition partners are calling for abolishing the tax on disposable plastic plates (a common staple amongst the ultra-orthodox who are key coalition partners of the forthcoming government).

Additionally, Israel’s President Isaac Herzog, who recently launched the Renewable Middle East Forum and has been pushing for regional cooperation in fighting climate change, may find himself distracted by infighting to safeguard the basic sanctity of the separation of the three branches of government, the rule of law, and avoiding civil strife in Israel. Renewed tensions in the Palestinian territories in the absence of any prospects for a political solution will likely hamper cross-border energy cooperation between the Israelis and Palestinians, especially in the West Bank, and between Israel and its other Arab neighbors. This could stifle any prospect of cooperation in tackling climate change.

The recent maritime agreement brokered by the Biden administration was a striking example of national security necessity and pragmatism for Lebanon and Israel trumping over historic nationalistic tribal sentiments. With COP27 only days away, it is critical for Israel to consider what message it will be sending to the world on its priorities in years to come and how it proposes to tackle the impending national security threats from climate change to itself, the region, and the world at large.

Ariel Ezrahi, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Netanyahu’s too far right-hand man?

With most votes tallied, the outcome of Israel’s fifth election in four years hinges on the ability of a handful of minority parties—left-wing Meretz and the Arab party Balad—to clear the electoral threshold. Should they garner enough votes, Benjamin Netanyahu—whose coalition of religious and right-wing parties is currently poised to capture sixty-five seats—may be blocked from forming a governing coalition. But more is at stake than just Netanyahu’s return.

His coalition features far-right and extremist figures Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, who are almost certainly guaranteed to hold cabinet positions. Ben Gvir, who has requested control of the public security file, has promised a no-holds-barred crackdown on terrorism and increased police and border security presence, putting into stark contrast the previous government’s ‘economy for security’ policies which saw a relaxation of restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. RZP, which has consistently stoked domestic ethnic and societal tensions, may also push for a mobilization in settlement construction and erosion of Palestinian rights. Tensions in the West Bank, which have been steadily rising, will undoubtably grow.

The bigger question that looms is the impact such a coalition will have on the country’s normalization efforts. Originally instigated to thwart annexation of the West Bank, normalized countries, as well as longstanding partners Egypt and Jordan, have repeatedly stressed the Palestinian issue as a core tenet of normalization. Prospective countries like Saudi Arabia have likewise reiterated that normalization is contingent on a two-state solution, an increasingly remote reality under a Likud-RZP government.

Netanyahu’s new government will thus find it hard to separate domestic Israeli politics from broader regional goals. This puts Netanyahu in a precarious position, as he strives to balance the extremist demands of his coalition partners with Israel’s foreign policy needs, making such outcomes less deterministic and more beholden to day-to-day decision-making.

Yulia Shalomov, associate director N7 Initiative.

Splintering of center, left, and Arab parties paves way for far-right Israeli government

Following a historically diverse coalition government, the center, left, and Arab parties that managed to break Benjamin Netanyahu’s ten-year reign in the prime minister’s seat are paying the price for their unwillingness to play nicely in the sandbox together. With the astronomical rise of Itamar Ben Gvir’s far-right party, the unlikely bedfellows that kept Netanyahu out of power splintered into small sub-parties leading up to the election, rather than build a united front against the far-right political wave knocking on their door.

In many ways, the fate of the election was sealed on September 15 when the Arab joint list party disbanded, and the left-wing Zionist parties of Meretz and Labor decided not to run on a joint platform. With 85 percent of the votes counted, both Sami Abu Shahade’s Balad party and Zehava Gal-On’s Meretz party are falling below the electoral threshold. Although nearly half of overall votes went to parties committed to keeping Netanyahu out of power, the right-wing and religious parties are slated to build a stable coalition of sixty-five out of 120 seats due to the inability of the “Anti-Bibi” parties to overcome their differences and rally around a common cause.

Interestingly, when a recording surfaced of Ben Gvir’s running mate, Bezalel Smotrich, calling Netanyahu a “liar,” Bibi was quick to publicly forgive Smotrich, prioritizing their shared interests over their personal animus. The opposition’s inability to overcome their differences in this way ultimately cost them the election.

In the coming weeks, many fingers will be pointed between the center, left, and Arab political camps for failing to hold onto their fleeting dream of a Netanyahu-less Israeli government. However, if those leaders continue to place ego above strategy, they will watch from the sidelines as a religious, right-wing government centralizes power and erase their political gains.

Jonah Fisher, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership Program.

The post Experts react: Bibi is back—back again for now appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 2022 midterm elections thus come at a critical point and raise key questions for the Biden administration. What impacts, if any, will the midterms outcomes have on the administration’s ability to implement its landmark laws? What ideas will Republicans, with divergent views on the United States as an energy superpower and its climate leadership role, bring to the legislative table? Perhaps most crucially, can a divided government come together on outstanding opportunities and challenges in domestic and international energy policy?

The makeup of Congress is one piece of a multifaceted puzzle around US energy and climate governance, and the midterm results must be understood in that context. Three possible electoral outcomes are detailed below.

Scenario 1: Democrats retain united control

If Democrats manage to overturn the historical pattern of midterm cycles for a new presidency, united control of Congress would give the Biden administration significant breathing room to run its domestic and foreign policy energy agenda with minimal congressional interference.

But this scenario does not necessarily mean that new climate legislation is imminent. Crucially, the Biden administration achieved its key goals on this front through the IIJA and the IRA already. While tweaks to the latter may theoretically be possible with unified control of Congress (especially in light of the chorus of international opposition to some of the IRA’s on-shoring and “friend-shoring” provisions), the White House is not under political pressure to pass another major climate bill. A litany of other important issue areas—healthcare, reproductive rights, gun control and more—are highly motivating to the Democratic base and would thus be next on the agenda (though the minority GOP will be in no mood to assist with passing legislation via regular order). 

The key benefit of unified control where it concerns energy and climate is what it would avoid—specifically, the prospect of intra-congressional disputes and brinksmanship over must-pass pieces of legislation (such as omnibus packages and government funding). Unified control would keep arguments over controversial inclusions in said bills among friends. While GOP leadership might rail against legislation or new executive actions from the sidelines, they would lack the ability to meaningfully obstruct policies they disagree with until 2024. This is especially true of the Senate, where the GOP would not have the numbers to prevent the confirmation of the president’s executive appointments—or any new Supreme Court justices. The latter, in particular, could have important long-term implications for the future of Biden-era energy and climate regulations, many of which remain in development now.

Scenario 2: The GOP takes the House, but not the Senate

If the GOP captures the House of Representatives, the Biden White House would face a murkier political situation akin to that which former President Donald Trump faced after 2018. A divided Congress would not afford the GOP meaningful power to push a legislative agenda via regular order or budget reconciliation—both of which would require at least a Senate majority.

But a Republican-controlled House could create deep frustrations for the Biden administration as it attempts to push through its executive-level agenda. The House retains the “power of the purse” and is the foundation for all budgetary functions in the federal government. Republican control of the House could thus reignite legislative battles over the debt ceiling, continuing resolutions, and keeping the government open for business if these matters are not addressed in the lame duck session. The GOP could threaten shutdowns over any new line items in must-pass legislation perceived as climate spending (e.g., any US monies for overseas climate finance, like the Green Climate Fund or any future loss-and-damage mechanism), or they could make their own demands for inclusions perceived as favorable to fossil fuels.

An open question is the hope, albeit dim in the current political environment, that a divided Congress might yield bipartisan compromises in the energy and climate space—specifically, around the ever-thorny prospect of bipartisan permitting reform. It remains plausible that Democrats, using their current numbers in Congress, will attach a permitting reform resolution to lame-duck session legislation later this autumn after the midterm results are confirmed. If they do not, however, the considerable disparity between Democrats and Republicans on acceptable permitting reform measures—as showcased in the competing permitting reform bills released by Senators Joe Manchin (D-WV) and Shelley Capito (R-WV), neither of which made real progress in the wake of the IRA passage—makes an opportunity for a grand compromise limited indeed.

It is likelier, however, that there could be bipartisan compromise on foreign policy affairs adjacent to the energy sector—specifically, a NOPEC bill or legislation which targets China. On the former, the recent OPEC+ production cut decision has spurred murmurings in Washington that the long-tabled anti-cartel legislation could be refreshed as US-Saudi relations sour. Though the impacts of a NOPEC bill would be complex, the Biden administration is perhaps less averse to signing such a law than any administration has ever been previously. Anti-China posturing is another rare source of bipartisan unity, and a divided Congress might follow up on the 2022 CHIPS Act with another piece of legislation. Both Democrats and Republicans are concerned with Chinese science and technology advancements (especially in the space and cyber realms), Chinese foreign investment in the United States, intellectual property theft, and Chinese-centric supply chains, among manifold other issues. There is, for example, mounting concern in Congress over Chinese investment in US liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facilities.

A bipartisan compromise on new anti-China legislation, akin to the CHIPS negotiations earlier this year, is plausible and could be a legislative win for both parties. At the same time, another anti-China bill at a time of already heightened tensions would make bilateral dialogue on matters of shared interest—namely, climate change mitigation and energy market stability—all the more difficult.

Scenario 3: The GOP takes both chambers

The prospect of unified GOP control of Congress gives Republicans the most momentum to push their vision of an energy and climate agenda. Such an agenda was previewed earlier this autumn in Senator Capito’s proposal for federal permitting reform legislation. Its key provisions closely reflect the energy priorities of the Trump administration, and could be interpreted as “Energy Independence 2.0” with fresh resonance for the post-Russian invasion of Ukraine era. Senator Capito’s Simplify Timelines and Assure Regulatory Transparency (START) Act would codify the Trump administration’s modernized National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations, limit state authorities to block or circumvent major energy projects through their Section 401 Clean Water Act authorities, prohibit the use of interim (and presumably future) social cost of carbon estimates in permitting decisions, and immediately approve the Mountain Valley Pipeline, among other measures. Most of the provisions in the START Act are perceived by Democrats as undermining state, local, and tribal stakeholders in energy and environmental management, overly permissive to conventional energy infrastructure developers, and detrimental to environmental justice (EJ) communities which have long been shut out of infrastructure decision-making in the United States.

That said, even unified GOP control of Congress does not mean such a permitting reform proposal will become reality. Though the electoral outcomes are as yet unknown, it is highly unlikely that the GOP will achieve veto-proof majorities in either chamber such that a version of the Capito bill could become law by force of Republican willpower alone. Rather, Republicans would need to adopt a more moderated, bipartisan approach that incorporates some of the Democratic permitting wish list while tempering some GOP inclusions—perhaps garnering enough Democratic votes to pass via regular order. This outcome is more plausible given the president’s own vocal support of permitting reform and that of many prominent Democrats who recognize its necessity for clean energy deployment. Such a compromise is possible in either a divided Congress, or one in which the GOP controls both chambers, but the latter seems likelier to facilitate a concerted effort in this direction. Either way, such negotiations in the new Congress are likely to be circuitous and are thus unlikely to bear fruit immediately.

Republican control of the Senate would also give the GOP new tools to frustrate the Biden administration in addition to those afforded by House control alone. Senate control becomes most important with respect to confirmation-mandated appointments to major positions such as most members of the presidential Cabinet. Senate GOP leadership will be eager to block, slow, or place conditions on such confirmations, which in turn slows action at the agency level and could force the Biden administration to select candidates more palatable to Republicans than it otherwise would have. But perhaps the most consequential aspect of this authority is the power to confirm Supreme Court justices, which enabled the Trump administration to appoint three during its tenure. If President Biden is presented with an opportunity to appoint another justice, GOP control of the Senate could outright prevent him from doing so—perhaps pushing another nomination to a potential, future GOP presidential administration pending the outcome of 2024.

Another key facet of unified Republican control is that of intensive oversight of federal government actions in both chambers. Committee chairs can demand hearings, call witnesses, and even disrupt the business of the federal government with requests for testimonies and explanations. Such scrutiny would likely target recipients of government spending for low- and zero-carbon energy projects, which Republicans might see as wasteful, and use to bolster their arguments for focusing federal support for conventional energy sources. This style of oversight is more frustrating than it is a serious roadblock for a presidential administration, but any draw on public attention and officials’ time will not be appreciated.

Past as prologue?

Rare is the modern presidential administration which enjoys full control of Congress for four years; like his predecessors, President Biden faces the serious prospect of a divided government very soon. If so, his administration will have to carefully calibrate its priorities vis-à-vis climate and energy—particularly at the executive level—as it approaches the second half of this term.

While an unexpected complete Democratic victory in both chambers could yield new opportunities, it is more likely that forward momentum on the Biden administration’s climate agenda amid divided government will be concentrated in the (significant) authorities of the agencies and executive powers, to be covered in Part II of this series.

David L. Goldwyn served as Special Envoy for International Energy under President Obama and Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Relations under President Clinton. He co-edited Energy & Security: Strategies for a World in Transition (Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press 2013), Editions 1 and 2. He is chair of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Advisory Group.

Andrea Clabough is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and an associate at Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC.

Meet the authors

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David L. Goldwyn

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Global Energy Center

Caribbean Climate Change & Climate Action

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Andrea Clabough

Nonresident Fellow

Global Energy Center

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

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All ballot counts are considered preliminary until final tallies are certified later in the week, but, requisite caveats notwithstanding, the Israeli public—based on the combined showing of all competing parties—remains deadlocked on the question of whether or not Netanyahu deserves to hold the reins of power in Jerusalem. Less than ten-thousand votes are separating between the two camps. (Israel’s decidedly conservative-leaning electorate has not been split equally along traditional “right-left” lines for many years already). The real drama, however, is not taking place between the largely static pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs, but within them.

Pendulum swings between Netanyahu’s Likud and Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid, on the one hand, and their respective satellite lists on the other were, from an early stage in the exercise, a defining phenomenon of the race. Conflicting priorities to maximize the performance of their own anchor slates and also strengthen the market shares of their allied factions—with which they would aspire to craft ruling coalitions—were the source of schizophrenic messaging by Likud and Yesh Atid, which left voters to choose in whom to place their trust. Those decisions shaped the current playing field.

On Lapid’s side of the ledger, some key partners to his transitional government found themselves hovering around the minimum 3.25 percent electoral threshold, managing barely (if at all) to return to the Knesset. Meanwhile, the effect of this symbiosis on Netanyahu’s squad altered that landscape entirely, spawning a new kingmaker in the guise of the Religious Zionism Party (RZP), led by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Determined to back Netanyahu’s candidacy, but also to block any possibility of him favoring the option of a unity cabinet that would adopt a more conciliatory agenda, right-wing constituencies flocked to RZP—forecasted to finish as the third-largest grouping in parliament—as a hedge. With its promise to reform the judicial system and fight terrorism uncompromisingly, RZP attracted the support of those disappointed with the perceived failure of mainstream factions to deliver on similar commitments.

Netanyahu had anticipated “ingesting” a significant chunk of RZP’s cachet, growing the Likud ultimately at the expense of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir. But RZP turned the tables on Netanyahu, outflanking him and beating him at his own game. As Netanyahu brandished his ideological credentials, they upped the ante on him. For example, Netanyahu’s denials of personal involvement in efforts to rescind the corruption indictments for which he is standing trial were met by Ben-Gvir’s explicit confession that he himself would shepherd legislation to halt Netanyahu’s prosecution.

In the end, two numbers decreed the way forward: turnout and threshold, together filtering which demographics will be represented in the composition of the next Knesset and government. The record 71.3 percent turnout—the highest since 2015—served to demonstrate that the public, mostly unmoved during the four-month-long campaign, may have been cynical and apathetic about electioneering, but not about their engagement in the democratic process. The pronounced level of participation on Election Day lifted the absolute quantity of votes required to cross the threshold, thus, imperiling the lists now in danger of elimination.

Assuming that existing trends hold firm and Netanyahu secures a path to victory, the horse-trading with his potential RZP and Ultra-Orthodox teammates is not predicted to proceed smoothly. (An alternate future, in which the teetering parties are able to survive, could propel Israel toward another impasse in the 120-seat parliament, but its probability is becoming increasingly remote.)

With a more fundamentalist approach to matters of religion and state, and, in the particular case of RZP, a more pugnacious attitude toward defense and foreign affairs than the Likud, these core members of Netanyahu’s proposed coalition will be driving very hard bargains. In fact, the component parts of RZP, Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ)—with little to fear from the empty threat of a repeat election, in which their followers would undoubtedly reward their steadfastness on issues of principle—have every incentive to demand the fulfillment of their every wish.

The road ahead stands to be precarious for Israel. President Isaac Herzog foreshadowed the fraught nature of this moment in recent appeals to Biden administration officials and US Jewish leaders to withhold passing judgment on Israel’s election results, also putting forth the possibility that extremists may be inclined toward greater moderation once in office.

Challenged persistently by more strident elements of his high-maintenance—if relatively homogenous—coalition, Netanyahu will find it difficult to navigate a steady course. The ability of RZP, Shas or UTJ to bring about the collapse of his government independently should any of their budgetary, territorial or other expectations go unfulfilled will put Netanyahu at a governance deficit within his own ranks. Damaging pushback is also likely to come from otherwise sympathetic quarters of the globe, including Jewish communities around the world, where Smotrich and Ben-Gvir are considered toxic. The other half of Israel’s population that contests Netanyahu’s resurgence will almost certainly mobilize to unseat him as soon as possible.

Whichever scenario materializes, it’s not impossible that Israelis could yet find themselves summoned to vote in a sixth election before 2023 is up.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on Twitter @ShalomLipner.

The post As the election fog clears, Netanyahu poised to ride a hungry, far-right tiger appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s back to the future. Left-wing former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro on Sunday in a closely contested runoff election that portends a huge policy shift for Latin America’s largest country on everything from protecting the Amazon rainforest to social justice. How will Brazil reposition itself on the world stage? Our experts peer into the future that awaits.

• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
• Tatiana Prazeres: Director of trade and international relations for the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo and columnist for the Folha de São Paulo newspaper
• Valentina Sader (@valentinasader): Associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Left turn?

• Lula joins a growing set of left-leaning leaders across the continent, including Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, Gabriel Boric in Chile, Gustavo Petro in Colombia, and Alberto Fernández in Argentina. But Jason says that “characterizing Lula’s election as part of a shift to the left in the region oversimplifies the state of regional politics.”
• Instead, the voters’ verdict is about the need for leaders who can deliver. “People want leaders who they think will govern with a deeper interest in making the average person’s life better, especially as inflation and high food and energy prices take hold,” Jason adds. The “clear frustration in Brazilian society with the status quo”—reflected in the fact that Bolsonaro has now become the first president since Brazil transitioned to democracy to not win re-election— mirrors results “in democracies around the world.”

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Southern hospitality

• When he was in office the first time, from 2003 to 2010, “Lula cast himself as the leader of the Global South,” Jason tells us, and we can expect a return of that brand of “South-South diplomacy.” But at the same time, look out for a Lula-led Brazil to deepen its partnerships with the United States and Europe “in the areas of trade and environmental cooperation,” he adds.
• Tatiana predicts that Lula will see the BRICS grouping of emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa—as “an important platform not only to improve dialogue among its participants but also to influence global discussions,” though she notes that “it is unclear how the new administration will see China’s push to expand BRICS and shape it as a counterweight to the West.”
• While Tatiana expects more cooperation between Brasília and Beijing relative to the Bolsonaro years, she said the jury is out on whether Brazil will join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): “Brazil could consider collaborating with or supporting BRI projects, including in other countries, without formally joining the initiative, in a [show of] somewhat hedged support.”
• More broadly, “a key challenge for Lula is to leverage Chinese investments and technologies to help reinvigorate Brazilian industry,” Tatiana adds.

Sigh of relief—for now

• While there were outbreaks of violence late in the campaign that had the world “on edge,” Jason notes that election day “passed without major incidents.”
• And Valentina said the biggest winner may have been Brazil’s electronic voting system. “It allowed for confidence in the results being released within hours of voting sites closing, effectively constraining any credible questioning of the result,” she says.
• The results showed that Lula won with about 51 percent of the vote, a margin of some two million votes, but as of this writing Bolsonaro had yet to concede—after intimating for months that he planned to challenge any loss at the ballot box.
• US President Joe Biden issued a congratulatory statement within minutes of the election being called in Lula’s favor by the Superior Electoral Court, helping legitimize the result. It was, Jason tells us, “an important step” to “shore up the importance of US-Brazil ties.”
• To seal the deal, Jason hopes that the Biden administration will “send a steady stream of high-level representatives” to meet with the incoming administration, just as it has done in Colombia.

The post Lula is back in Brazil. Here’s what’s coming. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This post will be updated as the news develops and more reactions come in.

Jump to an expert reaction

Jason Marczak: A critical moment to shore up US-Brazil ties

Tatiana Prazeres: Expect closer cooperation between Brazil and China

Valentina Sader: The biggest winner? Brazil’s electronic voting system

Abrão Neto: Lula’s environmental stance will bring closer US ties

A critical moment to shore up US-Brazil ties

Brazilians and the world were on edge on Sunday, uncertain of how voting would play out following violence and polarization during the campaign. While there were a few incidents—which included highway police making it difficult to get to the polls in certain Lula strongholds—the day passed without major problems.

Lula’s win by over two million votes is a major development for Brazil: Bolsonaro is now the first president in the democratic history of Brazil to not win re-election. The rejection of an incumbent president—although by smaller margins than expected—shows the clear frustration in Brazilian society with the status quo, which continues to play out in democracies around the world.

When Lula becomes president again on January 1, 2023, his third term will signal a likely return to the South-South diplomacy that characterized his previous terms, in which Lula cast himself as the leader of the Global South. It is expected that he will increase collaboration between Brazil and other governments with similar perspectives such as those in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Colombia. Characterizing Lula’s election as part of a shift to the left in the region oversimplifies the state of regional politics. Rather, the shift is a sign that people want leaders who they think will govern with a deeper interest in making the average person’s life better, especially as inflation and high food and energy prices take hold. 

As in Colombia, the Biden administration will hopefully send a steady stream of high-level representatives to Brazil to meet with Lula and his team. It’s an essential moment to shore up the importance of US-Brazil ties. The White House took an important step in that direction with a quick statement congratulating Lula soon after he was declared the winner. With concerns about whether the results would be as expected, this was an important move by the United States; many European and Latin American governments have done the same. Lula has made it clear that he sees the United States and Europe as valuable partners for Brazil, especially in the areas of trade and environmental cooperation. In the next administration, Brazil’s engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean will depend on ideological affinity but also on pragmatic areas of collaboration. 

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Expect closer cooperation between Brazil and China

Under Lula, two new priorities are likely to emerge in Brazil’s foreign policy: sustainability, from a substantive standpoint, and South America, from a geographical one. Both priorities mark a departure from Bolsonaro’s worldview; both reflect Lula’s understanding that Brazil needs to rebuild its international reputation as well as its ability to influence global and regional discussions. Lula’s narrative is likely to put significant emphasis on restoring Brazil’s credibility abroad.

In addition, Lula is expected to take a different approach to China-Brazil relations, deepening bilateral relations in areas beyond the economy. 

Despite negative rhetoric against China during the Bolsonaro administration, trade and investment between the two countries evolved largely undisturbed. However, the political noise generated by the anti-China discourse prevented the deepening of bilateral relations in other policy areas, such as science and technology. The strong economic relationship between the two countries does not match their less intense political relationship; this deepened in Bolsonaro’s years. Under Lula, we can expect Brazil and China to explore other areas for cooperation.

The future of the BRICS grouping of developing economies may also take a different turn under Lula. While Bolsonaro has never rejected fellow BRICS countries, his priorities focused elsewhere, particularly on promoting Brazil’s accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It is unclear how the new administration will see China’s push to expand BRICS and shape it as a counterweight to the West. It is clear though that the Lula administration will see BRICS as an important platform not only to improve dialogue among its participants but also to influence global discussions. 

Some analysts are betting that, under Lula, Brazil would join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It remains to be seen how far Lula would go in that regard. It may well be that Brazil takes a more positive approach toward the Chinese initiative. Having said that, Brazil could consider collaborating with or supporting BRI projects, including in other countries, without formally joining the initiative, in a somewhat hedged support.

Lula’s efforts to promote Brazil’s reindustrialization may cause some friction with China but, by and large, that should not derail bilateral relations, in part because of the powerful agribusiness sector. A key challenge for Lula is to leverage Chinese investments and technologies to help reinvigorate Brazilian industry. Sustainability also provides renewed opportunities for cooperation with China, which Lula would be keen to explore.

—Tatiana Prazeres is director of trade and international relations for the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo and a columnist for the Folha de São Paulo newspaper.

The biggest winner? Brazil’s electronic voting system

With a two-million-vote difference between Lula and Bolsonaro, Brazil is clearly split down the middle. The hyperpolarization that marked the months leading up to the election was reflected in tonight’s results. As such, the biggest winner tonight may not have been Lula, but Brazil’s electronic voting system. It allowed for confidence in the results being released within hours of voting sites closing, effectively constraining any credible questioning of the result. The once again newly elected President Lula will be tasked with uniting a country that is split in half, and he must confront much more difficult economic and political circumstances than he faced when he was first elected in 2002. But if there is anything Brazilians should appreciate tonight, it is the efficiency and reliability of their voting system.

—Valentina Sader is the associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Lula’s environmental stance will bring closer US ties

The election of Lula as president for a third term will lead, among other things, to a substantial change in Brazil’s environmental agenda. As a consequence, this is likely to benefit Brazil’s external image and improve its relationship with several countries, including the United States.

US-Brazil economic relations will continue to be driven by pragmatic mutual interests. The fact that bilateral trade and investment flows are so important to each of the countries is favorable for continuous and constructive engagement. A renewed stance from the Brazilian government on climate change and other environmental issues might offer an extended avenue for bilateral cooperation, with positive spillovers for the overall political and economic relationship between the United States and Brazil.

—Abrão Neto is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, executive vice president of Amcham Brasil, and former secretary of foreign trade of Brazil.

The post Experts react: Lula defeats Bolsonaro in Brazil. What should the region and the world expect? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Liz, they no longer trust. UK Prime Minister Liz Truss resigned on Thursday, after just forty-four days in office, continuing the political upheaval that has roiled Britain in recent months. As the Conservative Party—which rebelled against her leadership following a tax-cut plan that sent markets plunging—prepares to name a new prime minister next week, what will it take to right the ship of state? Could a Brexit reversal be on the table? You can always trust our experts to bring the insight.

• Frances Burwell (@FranBurwell): Distinguished fellow at the Europe Center
• John M. Roberts: Nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center
• Peter Westmacott (@PeterWestmacott): Distinguished ambassadorial fellow at the Europe Center and former British ambassador to the United States
• Livia Godaert (@liviagodaert): Nonresident fellow at the Europe Center

Briunion?

• Thursday’s dramatic developments offered another data point, Fran tells us, in Britain’s “devolution towards becoming a less relevant partner for the United States and its European allies.” She says that process can be attributed to the “civil war” over Brexit within the Conservative Party that dates to 2013, when the referendum was first announced—and the “deception” of pro-Brexit leaders who “maintained that constructing barriers with Britain’s largest economic partner would not have any serious consequences.”
• And now, six years after British voters chose to leave the European Union (EU), John predicts that we may start to see Conservative and Labour politicians discussing whether Britain should try “to regain access to the single European market, even if they no longer aspire to full EU membership.” 
• In recent years, even those who supported the “remain” cause have been hesitant to talk of reversing Brexit. “But as the United Kingdom’s politics and economy have turned head over heels in the last few weeks, maybe this last taboo will be broken,” John notes. 

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Not great

• Peter laments that the United Kingdom has become “a source of amusement, disbelief, pity, and schadenfreude abroad. It’s humiliating for a country which has for so long been a model of functioning democracy.”
• It also appears to have become an unreliable partner. While “the same wheels will keep turning” with respect to Britain’s global presence under the next prime minister, Livia says, “alliances and partnerships are built on trust—trust that an ally will answer when called, but also trust from within. This latest political crisis deals a blow to the UK’s international relationships, but it is also a blow to national self-confidence.” 
• Livia adds that amid this persistent political and economic instability in the country, “we can expect a rise in nationalist and independence movements in the coming months” within the United Kingdom. 
• Without a strong economy to support robust defense spending, Fran says, the United Kingdom can’t maintain its lead role in supporting Ukraine. “In the White House corridors, officials must be wondering how much longer this British drama will continue and what it will mean for Britain’s contributions to meeting the current geopolitical challenges,” she says. 

Who’s up next?

• The oddsmakers favor Rishi Sunak—the runner-up to Truss in this summer’s Conservative Party contest—to take over at 10 Downing Street following a vote next week among members of Parliament. Leader of the House of Commons Penny Mordaunt is also in the mix. But Peter says it’s “not impossible” that we could witness the return of Boris Johnson, who quit his own scandal-scarred premiership less than four months ago.
• While Johnson does retain considerable support among the Tories, John points out that a Boris comeback “would probably prove incredibly divisive both in the party and in the country at a time when all candidates will be calling for stability and unity.” One possible unity candidate? Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, according to John, “is one of the few ministers with a consistently respected reputation under different Conservative administrations.”
• What about Labour Party leader Sir Keir Starmer? Peter notes that Starmer is pushing for an early general election “on the grounds that whoever governs the country needs a democratic mandate.” But the Conservatives are “unlikely to agree since the polls overwhelmingly favor Labour.”

The post Can Britain pull out of its political turmoil? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Jump to an expert reaction

Ben Judah: One Truss legacy—a Britain more nervous to borrow and more keen to tax 

Peter Westmacott: Humiliation for the United Kingdom—and democracy

Frances Burwell: Disunity sends the UK spiraling toward irrelevance as a partner

John M. Roberts: Could Brexit be partially reversed? 

Livia Godaert: Expect a rise in nationalist and independence movements

Andrew Marshall: Chaos calls into question the UK’s choice between Europe and the world

James Batchik: Truss’s gains with Europe face setbacks with ongoing dysfunction

One Truss legacy—a Britain more nervous to borrow and more keen to tax 

Liz Truss will go down in history as a piece of pub quiz trivia—who was Britain’s shortest-serving prime minister? Considering that the previous holder of the title, George Canning, briefly first minister of King George IV, died in office in 1825, her failure is in fact even more stark. Trussenomics, however, as a phrase, an insult, or a warning in political life—that a British budget is dangerously uncosted and might spook the bond markets—will last a lot longer than her forty-four days in office. Fear of repeating her mistakes will curtail the ambition not only of the next leader of the Conservative Party that succeeds her, but almost certainly the next Labour prime minister, too. Her legacy—rightly or wrongly, given that market moves were not in fact straightforward—will be a Britain more nervous to borrow and more keen to tax. 

Of the country’s fifty-six prime ministers since the office is usually said to have begun in 1721 under Lord Walpole (who also was the longest-serving, with a monarchical twenty years to his name), Truss will join Lord North, “who lost America,” and Anthony Eden, who saw then US President Dwight Eisenhower humiliate Britain over the Suez Crisis, as a byword for disaster. A politician who lost control of her message, then her budget, then her party to the point that the Labour opposition was breaking records in the opinion polls with hypothetical vote shares of 54 percent. Every disastrous prime minister becomes a teachable lesson in British politics: Lord North’s lesson is not to get stuck trying to stop the anti-colonial tide by any means possible; Eden’s is not to defy the United States. Trussenomics will be remembered for reminding governments that any electoral coalition risks implosion when the public blames them for sharply rising mortgage costs. Her possible successors may be gleeful today, but this is what will be worrying them as soon as next week—when the Conservative Party is slated to have chosen its latest prime minister.

—Ben Judah is the director of the Europe Center’s Transform Europe Initiative. 

Humiliation for the United Kingdom—and democracy

The prime minister had hoped to be able to stay on until the new chancellor of the Exchequer, Jeremy Hunt, issues his medium-term fiscal plan on October 31. A further day of political chaos on Wednesday made that impossible. Liz Truss thus becomes the shortest-serving British prime minister ever. 

She survived this long in part because there was no agreed “unity candidate” to succeed her: It has been clear for weeks that neither the country nor the markets would accept two more wasted months of non-government while the Conservatives re-run their leadership contest under the usual rules. So Truss has agreed with party grandees that a successor will be chosen in just a week, probably by a fast-track process requiring all candidates to accept whoever does best in a single round of voting by MPs.  

It is not impossible that that person will be Boris Johnson, though the bookmakers’ favorite is Rishi Sunak. The one certainty is that Hunt, who has undone all of Truss’s ill-fated economic strategy since becoming chancellor of the Exchequer, will stay at His Majesty’s Treasury. 

The opposition Labour Party is calling for an early general election, on the grounds that whoever governs the country needs a democratic mandate. The Conservative Party, which still has a majority of seventy-one in the House of Commons, is unlikely to agree since the polls overwhelmingly favor Labour. 

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom is a source of amusement, disbelief, pity, and schadenfreude abroad. Humiliating for a country that has for so long been a model of functioning democracy. 

—Peter Westmacott is a distinguished ambassadorial fellow with the Europe Center and a former British ambassador to the United States, among other countries.

Disunity sends the UK spiraling toward irrelevance as a partner

With the resignation of Liz Truss and the beginning of a new leadership contest, the (dis)United Kingdom continues its devolution towards becoming a less relevant partner for the United States and its European allies.

Since the Brexit referendum of 2016—indeed since Prime Minister David Cameron’s announcement of that referendum in 2013—British politics has been driven by a civil war within the Conservative Party. Those who argued for “taking back” Britain from Europe never laid out a strategy for success as a global economic player but instead maintained that constructing barriers with Britain’s largest economic partner would not have any serious consequences.   

That deception has made it impossible for Conservative prime ministers to acknowledge that Brexit has stalled UK economic growth. But until Britain finds a way to move forward economically, its global role will be at risk. A strong defense stance requires economic growth and a strong budget over time, as does an active and global diplomatic role. The defense and rebuilding of Ukraine will require significant contributions from all allies; Britain has been a leader in this, but that cannot last without a stable government and healthy economy.  

US President Joe Biden has expressed his thanks to Truss for “her partnership‘’ and has reiterated his faith in the continuation of the US-UK relationship. But in the White House corridors, officials must be wondering how much longer this British drama will continue and what it will mean for Britain’s contributions to meeting the current geopolitical challenges. 

—Frances Burwell is a distinguished fellow with the Europe Center and a senior director at McLarty Associates.

Could Brexit be partially reversed?

Liz Truss has resigned, and Britain will have a new prime minister a week from now. 

There is no clear favorite for who will take over from someone who may well go down in history as Britain’s worst-ever prime minister. 

In just forty-four days, Truss has seen her program for growth destroyed by the reaction of international markets to the fact that she failed either to explain how she would fund her expensive program or to allow it to be scrutinized properly by either the Office for Budget Responsibility or the Bank of England, which handles monetary policy. 

In a chaotic premiership, she has sacked two of her most important lieutenants, Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng and Home Secretary Suella Braverman.  

Her failures contributed directly to massive poll leads, some of more than thirty points, for the opposition Labour Party, whose leader, Sir Keir Starmer, is now calling for an immediate general election—although the current Conservative Party mandate means there is no automatic requirement for an election until January 2025. 

The key question over the next few days is how the markets will react. It was the markets that destroyed the Truss administration after her chancellor’s disastrous mini budget was released on September 23. Markets hate instability, and there are still eleven days to go before Kwarteng’s replacement, Jeremy Hunt, is due to deliver his major financial statement. Hunt, who was himself a serious contender to take over from Truss but who has now said he will not stand, has already undone almost all of the Kwarteng mini budget.  

These are difficult days for the United Kingdom, which has in a few short weeks lost its reputation for both political and financial stability. 

Perhaps the most important immediate issue is how Conservative candidates for the premiership—which include former Chancellor Rishi Sunak and rising star Leader of the House of Commons Penny Mordaunt—conduct themselves during the campaign. There is a lot of support among Conservative MPs for Boris Johnson to return, but that would probably prove incredibly divisive both in the party and in the country at a time when all candidates will be calling for stability and unity. If there is to be a unity candidate, it might be Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, who is one of the few ministers with a consistently respected reputation under different Conservative administrations.  

There is little doubt that the biggest reason for the United Kingdom’s current economic disarray is the failure to secure substantial and sustained economic growth in the wake of Brexit. It is now almost two years since the United Kingdom effectively left the European Union (EU), a decision which the respected Institute for Fiscal Studies has said resulted in a 4 percent hit to its GDP.

The big question now is whether politicians from both the Conservative and opposition Labour parties will start to publicly raise the issue of whether the United Kingdom should seriously consider trying to regain access to the single European market, even if they no longer aspire to full EU membership. 

So far, for many politicians who voted “remain” in the referendum on European Union membership in 2016, revising or reversing Brexit is the thing politicians don’t want to talk about in public. But as the United Kingdom’s politics and economy have turned head over heels in the last few weeks, maybe this last taboo will be broken. 

And if Boris Johnson were to stand—and he is now reported to be taking soundings on that—his role in curtailing the United Kingdom’s relationship with its biggest trading partner is bound to come under close scrutiny. 

—John M. Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow with the Global Energy Center and senior partner with energy consultancy Methinks Ltd.

Expect a rise in nationalist and independence movements

Liz Truss was hardly in place long enough to drastically change the United Kingdom’s foreign policy strategy. When the new Conservative prime minister moves into 10 Downing Street on October 28, the United Kingdom’s broad global presence will remain the same. Ukraine will still be a priority and will receive support from the new government. The United Kingdom will still be a committed NATO ally and European security guarantor, a member of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, and building a greater presence in Asia. Tensions over Northern Ireland and the post-Brexit trade agreements haven’t gone away, and the fight over foreign-aid spending continues. Not to mention, the country is still facing an energy and cost-of-living crisis that will need to be solved and will take up the majority of the new prime minister’s attention. We can expect a new staff, changes to the cabinet, and so on, but the same wheels will keep turning.  

How should we understand Truss’s resignation, then? Today is just the latest loop in a years-long political and economic roller coaster that has engulfed the United Kingdom. Since the Conservatives first took power in 2010, the United Kingdom has had four prime ministers, seven chancellors, five home secretaries, and seven foreign secretaries—all amid a global pandemic, multiple financial crashes, and the Brexit referendum, which sits at the center of most of the United Kingdom’s recent chaos. The United Kingdom’s democratic institutions have thankfully held fast, but it is hard to articulate the disorder that this level of turnover creates. This continued political upheaval continues to be the biggest driver of Britain’s declining standing in the world. Europe, the United States, and the transatlantic relationship need the United Kingdom—a stable United Kingdom. Developing long-term strategies and solutions to serious global challenges with partners and allies is difficult when one is not sure who will be in charge and for how long.   

Ultimately, alliances and partnerships are built on trust—trust that an ally will answer when called, but also trust from within. This latest political crisis deals a blow to the United Kingdom’s international relationships, but it is also a blow to national self-confidence. The United Kingdom is divided within itself, and this division must be resolved before it can reach its full potential on the world stage. This means political and economic stability, a solution to compounding domestic crises, and some resolution on the state of the union—we can expect a rise in nationalist and independence movements in the coming months.  

Just over eighteen months ago (an age in British political time) the United Kingdom published an integrated review, a whole-of-government approach to Britain’s post-Brexit global posture. That government rightly made commitments to prioritize defense in coordination with allies and partners, to build consensus on the greatest global challenges, and to act as a force for good across sectors and policy competencies. But before the United Kingdom can do any of that, it must right the ship at home.

—Livia Godaert is a nonresident fellow at the Europe Center. 

Chaos calls into question the UK’s choice between Europe and the world

British ministers and diplomats will want to make sure that the United Kingdom continues to be seen as a dependable ally, and that message is important. 

The British defense minister, Ben Wallace, visited Washington this week for discussions believed to be about Ukraine and some of the war’s worst-case scenarios. Wallace is unlikely to change roles in any future government—while he is mentioned as a possible leader, it is more likely that he would remain at the helm at the Ministry of Defence where he and his team have played an important role in supporting Kyiv by providing materiel, training, intelligence, and communications support.  

There will inevitably be speculation about an election and a change of government. No election is necessary until January 2025, but the current chaos makes a change of government in the short term a possibility.  

In the opposition Labour Party, there is a diversity of opinion about the United Kingdom’s relationship with the United States, but the current leadership is Atlanticist and highly supportive of NATO. The shadow defense minister recently visited Washington and spoke about the importance of meeting NATO obligations. It is possible that a new government would be faced with budget constraints for defense—but that will be the case for any government. A Labour government would have to equally make hard choices about a European focus versus the more global focus that the Conservatives have pushed. Labour would probably avoid approaching the European question for some time. It would get closer to EU partners over foreign policy—but that has started to happen even under the Conservatives. 

—Andrew Marshall is senior vice president of engagement for the Atlantic Council. 

Truss’s gains with Europe face setbacks with ongoing dysfunction

“No one should or can be happy about the political & economic turmoil in the UK,” tweeted Michel Barnier, the EU’s former lead on Brexit negotiations, following the resignation of Liz Truss. He’s right. Britain’s allies, and especially Europe, stand to gain nothing from Britain’s continued dysfunction. 

Before her untimely departure, Truss oversaw genuinely positive developments in London’s relationship with the continent—likely in no small part because her domestic political situation was so unforgiving. Truss reversed course and joined the first meeting of the European Political Community in Prague, where she and French President Emmanuel Macron met separately to declare their friendship and announce a UK-France summit for 2023. More recently, the EU unanimously approved the United Kingdom’s application to join the PESCO project on military mobility. Even on Brexit, Truss’s minister of state for Northern Ireland apologized both to the EU and Ireland, claiming the United Kingdom disrespected “legitimate interests” of Dublin and Brussels. Taken together, these engagements and cooperation between the United Kingdom and Europe marked an uptick in relations with Europe.

The good news is that most of these positive markers won’t go away automatically, but chaos and dysfunction in London won’t help their progress either. Leadership from the top will be required to improve Britain’s relationship with Europe and runs the risk of being put on the back burner in the face of an economic meltdown and an energy crisis. UK-European relations are also especially at risk if a new Tory prime minister decides to channel public anger back across the Channel or even deprioritize relations with Europe. 

Britain may be an island, but it isn’t alone. Europe and the United Kingdom need each other, and need focus and political will to forge a productive relationship. Another leadership change in London won’t be helpful in that effort.

—James Batchik is an assistant director at the Europe Center.

The post Experts react: What the resignation of UK Prime Minister Liz Truss means for Britain and the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine has long been an example for democratic progress in the wider region. This is perhaps Vladimir Putin’s greatest fear, lest the autocrat’s own misruled people notice the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy and seek similar change inside Russia itself. As Ukraine’s armed forces continue to liberate the country, it is critical that Ukraine’s military success is buttressed by continued democratic progress.

The legacy of the current war will be determined by Ukraine’s and the international community’s ability to honor the sacrifices of those Ukrainians killed in the war by accelerating the nation’s democratic development. Post-war democratic progress must be multifaceted and include further advances on decentralization, political pluralism, freedom of the press, adherence to the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, and democratic elections. These efforts will be key to realizing Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions and maintaining international support for critical economic and military assistance.

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Ukraine has rarely been out of the news in recent years, but the headlines seldom show that the country has made significant democratic strides since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This was a watershed moment that drove Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from power for his turn away from Ukraine’s European, democratic path.

Ukrainian democracy has advanced amid occupation and continued aggression by an authoritarian neighbor who fears that Ukraine’s progress will serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia. Vladimir Putin sees democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and legitimate elections on his borders as existential threats to his own personal survival. Ukraine has come to embody all of these threats.

While Ukraine’s post-war democratic recovery and progress must indeed be multifaceted, one aspect will need particular attention: post-war elections. Competitive and honest elections are essential to democracies. For some nations, they are a means to a democratic transition. For others, they are a bellwether for the health of long-standing democratic traditions, systems, and institutions.

Ukraine’s most recent transitions of power, namely the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019 and local elections in 2020, were regarded by international observation missions as demonstrating significant progress. Moreover, these elections and the electoral reforms that preceded them were recognized by the European Parliament, Freedom House, and the annual Democracy Index produced by The Economist as core indicators of the nation’s advancement. These achievements in political pluralism further enhanced Ukraine’s standing as an example of what is possible for the region and beyond.

While Ukraine should be commended, continued vigilance is essential to ensure that the nation can sustain and even expand its success after the war. Safeguarding, institutionalizing, and expanding Ukraine’s electoral progress is pivotal to realizing the nation’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions, and is a foundational prerequisite for all other democratic reforms. Progress in this area will strengthen international confidence in Ukraine and prove that democracy is sustainable even in wartime and during the post-war recovery period.

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Ukraine must not only win the war, but also win the peace. The integrity of its post-war elections will be closely watched for a range of performance indicators such as whether lawmakers advance pending electoral reforms in a timely and inclusive manner. These reforms include enhancements to the unified election code, a new political party law, and restoration of political party financial reporting, a key condition that previously led to Ukraine-EU visa liberalization.

Attention will also be paid to the level of transparency and timeliness around transitions from military to civil administrations throughout Ukraine, and the development of a mechanism along with clear and objective criteria for canceling elections due to security concerns. Likewise, it will be crucial to make sure any restrictions on individuals and groups running in elections and joining election commissions are reasonable, objective, and timely.

Post-war Ukraine must maintain the positive progress achieved following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This includes guaranteeing stability within the country’s independent electoral institutions and making sure the election management body is able to complete its full term. New election technologies must prioritize integrity and security, while the enfranchisement of Ukraine’s internally and externally displaced communities will also be important.

Ukraine faces a torrent of elections in the post-war period. The road ahead will be arduous, but Ukraine must not go it alone. Ukraine has reminded the free world of who we are and what we believe in. It has also reminded us of what we must fight for and what we must fight against. To achieve an even stronger Europe based on the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values, Ukraine’s partners must redouble support not only for Ukraine’s military goals, but also its democratic ambitions. This increased support must happen now in order to lay strong foundations for continued democratic progress after victory.

Peter Erben is Principal Advisor at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (global) and Senior Country Director at IFES Ukraine. Gio Kobakhidze is Deputy Country Director at IFES Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 3, 2022

Will Putin send mobilized Russians to Belarus for a new Kyiv offensive?

By Alesia Rudnik

Vladimir Putin’s decision to order Russia’s first mobilization since World War II has revived fears in neighboring Belarus that the country could be dragged into the invasion of Ukraine and a new march on Kyiv.

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UkraineAlert Oct 18, 2022

Bowing to Putin’s nuclear blackmail will make nuclear war more likely

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Giving in to Putin’s nuclear blackmail would not end the war in Ukraine. What it would do is set a disastrous precedent that makes a future nuclear war far more likely while encouraging uncontrolled nuclear proliferation.

Arms Control Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 3, 2022

Is Russia preparing to target vital Norwegian energy exports to Europe?

By Thomas S. Warrick

Recent drone activity close to Norwegian energy infrastructure has sparked calls for urgent security measures to prevent potential Russian sabotage of vital oil and gas exports to Europe in the coming months.

Conflict Energy & Environment

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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In early February, the parties to watch would have been the populist “For a Humane Latvia” (PCL) party, which was gaining momentum on a Euroskeptic platform, and the social democratic Harmony (S) party, which caters to Latvia’s minority of ethnic Russian voters. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the tenor of these elections, and now, once-popular parties must reckon with changing voter sentiment.

In the case of PCL, voters lost interest in Euroskeptic rhetoric as early as April as news of the invasion highlighted the value of strong European and NATO ties and pushed the withering party to join the Alliance for Latvia (AL)—which along with S failed to clear the 5 percent threshold to enter parliament.

The ethnic-Russian party Harmony—once a frontrunner—tried to adapt to the times. Members of the party’s mainstream faction made clear their initial support for Ukraine and have become more moderate. But despite this shift toward the middle, the party has drastically lost popularity since winning 30 percent during the 2010 Saeima elections. Meanwhile, the small faction of pro-Kremlin hardliners have peeled off from Harmony to join the fringe and openly pro-Russian Latvian Russian Union (LKS), which depicts Latvia’s ethnic Russians as an oppressed minority.  

A victorious New Unity will likely seek to form a government with more or less the same coalition partners as the current government: the center-right, nationalistic, anti-Kremlin National Alliance (NA); the liberal-democrat, pro-European Union Development/For! (AP!); and the moderate-right, anti-corruption-focused Conservatives (K).  

By voting for continuity, Latvians are showing that they are rightly worried about the economic impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Heading into the winter, energy security remains top of mind as prices soar, threatening the ability of hospitals, schools, and individual households to afford heating. In these uncertain times, voters seem to favor consolidation to the known center rather than experimentation with fringe parties that could risk political instability during an already perilous autumn and winter to come. 

These hardships have only bolstered Latvia’s already strong support for Ukraine. For Latvia and the other Baltic States, Russia’s actions are an existential threat and reminiscent of Soviet annexation during the twentieth century. The war is fueling another wave of revulsion at the legacy of Soviet-occupied Latvia: Recently, a controversial Soviet-era monument was torn down in Riga because it had become “an ideologically charged symbol of the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union,” as the Riga City Council described it.  

Perhaps most significantly, the Saeima is considering legislation to establish Latvian as the country’s only official language, thereby removing the option to use Russian in schools and with service providers. 

More than likely, a second New Unity-led coalition government would continue the current government’s priorities of boosting the national defense service, countering the ongoing energy crisis, and increasing the defense budget. The new government will also be pressed to address the demands of teachers and health care workers who have been unsatisfied with their workload and pay. 

Given Saturday’s results, it’s clear that—at a time when their Italian and Swedish counterparts tossed moderate governments aside—Latvians aren’t interested in change for the sake of change. They have their eye on the bigger picture: the existential threat of Russian aggression, which requires a well-tested government that Latvians trust to carry them through the uncertain times ahead. 

Lisa Homel is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. 

The post Russia’s war pushes Latvia’s voters to the center appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What do the first-round results, with Bolsonaro closer to Lula than polls had indicated, tell us about the runoff?

If there is a winner from this first round of presidential elections in Brazil, it is Bolsonaro. Polls indicated that Lula could get close to winning in the first round by securing 50 percent of the vote. Not only did he not—which is not necessarily a surprise—but Bolsonaro had higher percentages than some may have anticipated. In addition to the presidential race, Bolsonaro’s former ministers and key supporters were successfully elected. Marcos Pontes and Damares Alves were elected senators to São Paulo and the Federal District, respectively; General Eduardo Pazuello was one of the highest vote-getters among federal deputies for the state of Rio de Janeiro, and Tarcísio de Freitas, although not elected, is leading heading into the second round for governor of São Paulo against Fernando Haddad from the Workers’ Party—ending almost thirty years of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party’s reign in the state. These results may ignite more energy for Bolsonaro’s supporters, increasing his chances on October 30. Lula will likely appeal to Simone Tebet of the Brazilian Democratic Movement for support after she finished in third place with about 4 percent of the vote. But if Lula is elected, with these newly elected Bolsonaro supporters in Congress, it could be challenging for him to pass legislation and govern effectively.

—Valentina Sader is an associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

What are the primary differences between the two candidates’ platforms?

We’ll know the night of October 30 who will be the next president of Brazil. Even though Lula received nearly 5 percentage points more votes tonight, that is by all means not an indication that he will have the same margins later this month. With a highly contentious electoral cycle, which will become even more polarizing in the next few weeks, Bolsonaro and Lula will each take extra steps to show differences in how they would govern.   

On the economic front, Bolsonaro proposes a continuation of his economic priorities, doubling down on a business-friendly, open-market economy and diminishing the size of the state through privatizations. Lula’s campaign has focused on how he would bring back the prosperous economic times under his watch when in office. His economic approach will aim to tackle hunger and poverty levels.

For both, regardless of who wins on October 30, the priority should be on fostering economic growth and sustainable development, while also maintaining fiscal responsibility. Guaranteeing a stable political environment and an attractive business climate will be critical for attracting foreign investment and advancing long-term prosperity.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

How would each candidate likely work—or not work—with the United States, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean once in office?

If the polarization that marked this electoral cycle is indicative of the next four years, what’s clear is the extremely different ways in which Bolsonaro and Lula would govern—and foreign policy is no exception. International affairs were not a central topic in this year’s debates, and the lack of attention to the implications of global developments is a testament to the inward gaze of Brazil in recent years. Don’t expect that to change as the campaigns dig in deeper for the second round.

Looking back to the prosperous economic times under his watch, Lula would again prioritize cooperation across the Global South and would work to regain the prominent role Brazil once had internationally. Lula would often prioritize a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States and Europe, but, as during his previous presidency, moments of tension are likely to arise. Common ground would certainly be found when it comes to adopting more ambitious climate commitments.

Bolsonaro would continue to lead Brazil’s foreign policy with an economic focus, prioritizing steps focused on an open-market economy. In Latin America and the Caribbean, where recent elections have shifted the political tendencies to the left, Bolsonaro’s right-leaning approach would be met with skepticism from some of the region’s newest leaders. Bolsonaro would have to either compromise to find common ground regionally or risk being an outlier. The next president must align his foreign policy to meet domestic demands and international challenges.

—Jason

Bolsonaro has already sowed seeds of doubt in Brazil’s electoral integrity. What can we expect to see from him during this runoff, and what does that say about Brazil’s democratic trajectory?

Bolsonaro’s questioning of the political system has ignited democratic institutions in Brazil to double down on their efforts to raise awareness and regain public confidence in their proper functioning. The United States and the international community have also recommitted their trust in Brazil’s electoral system and in the legitimacy of results. Sunday’s first round was a testament to how the Electoral Superior Court, among other institutions, have been getting ahead of any potential crisis by tackling disinformation and bringing in international observers at polling stations. These efforts will continue in the runoff. As democracies across the world experience declines in democratic freedoms and questioning of democratic principles even beyond elections, this is an opportunity for Brazil to strengthen its democratic institutions to ensure an even more robust democracy.

—Valentina

The post Lula vs. Bolsonaro: Your expert breakdown of Brazil’s presidential election runoff appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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On August 24, Thomas Warrick was quoted in Bloomberg on the race among congressional Republicans to be the next ranking member or chair of the Homeland Security Committee.

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Yet Meloni has come a long way since when she defined the EU as “rotten to its core” in 2016 and opposed sanctions against Russia following its 2014 annexation of Crimea. She defines herself and her Brothers of Italy party as conservative—supporting lower taxes and a more business-centric approach—has built strong connections in Washington, and has become a staunch supporter of sending military support to Ukraine. 

Today, Meloni’s position on the United States is clear and well-defined. She has recently struck an agreement with the US International Republican Institute to organize a major conference on Afghanistan in Rome. She is also a member of the Aspen Institute and participated in this year’s Conservative Political Action Conference. She has said that Italy and the United States have “shared roots” and goes on the record with leading American newspapers to defend her positions.

She also seems to have reversed her once Kremlin-friendly positions, recently criticizing Russia on multiple occasions for its “unacceptable” invasion of Ukraine. She was one of the biggest supporters of current Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s stance on sending weapons to Kyiv, pitting herself against populist politician Matteo Salvini from the right-wing League party (who once entered the European Parliament wearing a Putin T-shirt). 

Yet still, Meloni’s rhetoric at home offers a more complicated picture and begs the question: Can the United States really trust her?

Although she portrayed herself and her party to Washington’s ruling elites as a conservative, they have time and again refused to renounce the party’s ties to Italian fascism. When Italy’s parliament voted to dismantle the neo-fascist party Forza Nuova in October 2021—after it orchestrated a violent attack against one of Italy’s leading unions—the Brothers of Italy abstained from voting. More recently, a video of a young Meloni resurfaced in which she claimed that dictator Benito Mussolini was a “good politician” and that “there have not been other politicians like him.” The Brothers of Italy’s logo even strongly resembles that of Italy’s neo-fascist, post-World War II party, the Italian Social Movement.

But most importantly to American interests abroad, Meloni has long been a Euroskeptic; her seemingly pro-European stance, demonstrating unwavering support for Ukraine and hosting pro-EU conferences in Rome, is a recent phenomenon. Up until 2019, Brothers of Italy was a major proponent of dissolving the Eurozone and a strong supporter of Brexit. Party leaders also criticized the European Central Bank, often referring to the institution as a place of “usurers and lobbyists.” But during the 2019 European elections, Meloni ran with the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, becoming its president in 2020, and has since then made an effort to forge strong ties with European Parliament President Roberta Metsola.

The Warsaw-Budapest model 

If there’s one thing the United States has learned in recent years, it’s that far-right parties often go rogue—and do so very quickly. Consider the cases of Poland and Hungary. 

Following a long run of centrist governments, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party rose to power in 2015 and began opposing the EU, migration, and LGBTQ rights. However, much like Meloni’s party, PiS is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group and was founded largely on conservative principles inspired by the Ronald Reagan-era US Republican Party. Today, Poland under PiS is seeing an erosion of the freedom of expression, judicial independence, and women’s rights. 

In Hungary, meanwhile, Prime Minister Victor Orbán has corroded the country’s democratic stability since coming to power in 2010 by allowing himself more powers through constitutional reforms. He has also attacked the media and instituted anti-immigration policies. Similar to PiS, Orbán’s Fidesz party ran with the conservatives through the European People’s Party, the European Parliament’s center-right group—using it as something of a Trojan horse to break into European establishment politics.

Together, Poland and Hungary have taken steps in recent years to prevent the EU from implementing a post-pandemic recovery plan and the resettlement of migrants, thereby undoing the bloc’s cohesion. Budapest also sets itself apart from Brussels given its largely pro-Russian stance, refusing to send military aid to Ukraine and formalizing gas deals with the Kremlin. Moreover, its democratic backsliding has serious implications on the United States and the transatlantic partnership because it weakens their ability to strengthen economic ties, tackle common security threats such as Russia, and fight climate change.

Searching for Meloni’s true colors 

The deep cultural, trade, and security ties between Washington and Rome mean the White House will need to watch its Italian partner’s positioning closely. 

Strategically, Italy is a vital partner in securing NATO’s southern flank around the Mediterranean Sea, where the spillover effects of North Africa’s conflicts seriously risk destabilizing the Alliance. Italy also plays a crucial role in Libya by supporting peace negotiations in the country, where Russia has deployed mercenaries from the the Wagner Group to exert greater power over the region. Italy is also home to the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet in Naples, where more than 33,000 US service members are stationed.

Italy alone can do little to fend off American enemies abroad, secure US interests, and strengthen the transatlantic alliance. But it can have a great impact as a pillar of multilateral cooperation within the EU and NATO by creating a stronger bloc against Russia, securing a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, and find durable solutions to issues such as migration and climate change.  

But Meloni has given plenty of indications that she may not be that reliable partner. She showed her true colors after a European Parliament resolution called Hungary “a hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.” She criticized the vote, saying that “Orbán has won the elections” and therefore Hungary is a “democratic system.”

Meloni’s EU stance, though it has moderated a bit in recent years, also reflects an Orbán-style view. For instance, she opposes the primacy of EU over national laws, and during this year’s campaign, she stated that the defense of national interests over European ones remains paramount. She also vehemently opposes a new majority voting system in which individual EU members states would no longer have veto power. She recently declared that if Brothers of Italy were to win, “the joke will be over” and that Italy will start “defending its interests” just like “other countries.” 

Meloni’s open support for Orbán also begs the question of whether she will drift back toward Hungary’s position of opposing further sanctions on Russia. Just recently, she was photographed with a pro-Putin regional minister who in 2016 established a fake consulate for the Ukrainian breakaway Donetsk People’s Republic in Turin. Her likely coalition partners, Salvini’s League and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, have a history of fondness for Putin.

The Brothers of Italy’s track record is a giant warning sign that the party is likely to disrupt European unity—much to the detriment to the common fight against Russia and to Washington’s interests. This is why the Biden administration should adopt a more cautious approach toward Meloni than it has so far. 

For one, it should make clear to Meloni that democratic backsliding in Italy will not bode well for the transatlantic partnership. If Italy pursues anti-democratic policies at home and supports semi-autocratic leaders abroad, joining forces with the United States against Russia—as helpful as it may be—will do little in achieving an overall freer and more prosperous world. Washington should also firmly condemn all and any links between Brothers of Italy, neo-fascism, and pro-Putin ideologies and refuse to meet with members of her party who have a demonstrated history of supporting any such principles. 

Maintaining such a firm stance would send a clear message: The United States won’t tolerate another rogue European actor.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director for the North Africa Program within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and a native of Italy.

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