The Caucasus - Atlantic Council

Why deepening Russia-Azerbaijan ties should worry the United States

Sheila Paylan — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 16:01:21 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has left it with few friends, but Azerbaijan is an important exception. In fact, Moscow and Baku are effectively allies now. Just two days before the February 2022 invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a wide-ranging political-military agreement, following which Aliyev declared that the pact “brings our relations to the level of an alliance.” A few months later, Azerbaijan signed an intelligence-sharing agreement with Russia.

This has proven catastrophic for Armenia, which has maintained close security ties with Russia since joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1992. In September 2022, Azerbaijan launched what the European Parliament called a “large-scale military aggression” against Armenia and, according to Armenia’s foreign minister, took over 150 square kilometers of Armenian territory. But the CSTO—to which Azerbaijan does not belong—refused to intervene on Armenia’s behalf. Washington stepped in to broker a ceasefire, and the European Union (EU) followed suit by sending a monitoring mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, much to Russia’s and Azerbaijan’s discontent.

The Putin-Aliyev partnership has also spelled disaster for the breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, whose remaining 120,000 ethnic Armenians live under Russian protection after Azerbaijan’s 2020 offensive to reclaim the territory. Forty-four days and thousands of deaths later, Russia brokered a ceasefire stipulating the five-year deployment of 1,960 Russian armed peacekeepers along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and in control of the “Lachin Corridor,” the only road linking it to Armenia. At the time, analysts opined that Putin’s imposition had cemented Russia’s role in the region. According to the decree authorizing the deployment, Russia’s reason for sending peacekeeping troops was to “prevent the mass death of the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh.”

But the deployment has not prevented Azerbaijan from continuing to try to expel ethnic Armenians from what’s left of Nagorno-Karabakh. Last December, a group of Azerbaijanis set up a roadblock along the Lachin Corridor claiming to advocate for environmental rights in the region. But the roadblock in effect slowed the flow of goods into Nagorno-Karabakh, creating a humanitarian crisis. The United States and the EU, as well as Human Rights Watch and others, have called for Azerbaijan to unblock the Lachin Corridor. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ordered Azerbaijan to do the same.

Instead, Azerbaijan solidified the blockade by installing an armed checkpoint at the mouth of the Lachin Corridor, thus effectively seizing control over it. The move was further condemned by the United States and EU, and led Armenia to seek renewed intervention from the ICJ. Russia issued tepid statements and then replaced its peacekeeping force commander in Nagorno-Karabakh. But such a fundamental change in the regime over the Lachin Corridor could not possibly exist without approval—however tacit—from the Kremlin. Video footage taken last month purports to show Russian peacekeepers accompanying Azerbaijani forces to install a concrete barrier near the checkpoint and hoist an Azerbaijani flag in adjacent Armenian territory.

Since the blockade began, traffic along the Lachin Corridor has been reduced to an all-time low. This makes it more difficult for essential humanitarian aid to pass into Nagorno-Karabakh. In the last seven months, Nagorno-Karabakh has turned into an open-air prison, with ethnic Armenian inhabitants increasingly deprived of food and medicine, and energy resources almost entirely drained. They may soon be forced to flee their ancestral homeland for good just to survive.

What the United States should—and shouldn’t—do

In May, Aliyev demanded the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, suggesting that he might offer them amnesty should they accept Azerbaijani rule. Oddly, the US State Department praised Aliyev’s remarks on amnesty, glossing over other parts of his speech in which he threatened violence if the authorities did not surrender: “[E]veryone knows perfectly well that we have all the opportunities to carry out any operation in that region today… Either they will bend their necks and come themselves or things will develop differently now.”

But Washington’s seemingly tactful acquiescence to Azerbaijan’s growing aggression against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in fact hurts US efforts to curb malign Russian influence and end Moscow’s war on Ukraine. The Russo-Azeri pact provides for enhanced economic ties, including in the gas and energy sectors, and has proven successful in helping preemptively circumvent Western sanctions against Russia. A deal between Baku and Brussels in July 2022 to double the flow of gas to Europe to wean it off Russian gas was soon followed by a deal in November 2022 between Baku and Moscow to increase gas imports from Russia to enable Azerbaijan to meet its new obligations to Europe.

In May, Russia and Iran agreed to complete a railroad that would link Russia to the Persian Gulf through Azerbaijan, thus providing a route through which Iran can directly send Russia more weapons and drones. One week later, during a summit of the Eurasian Economic Union, in which Aliyev participated as a guest for the first time, Putin stated that cooperation on developing this North-South railway is carried out “in close partnership with Azerbaijan.” Baku knows it can play both sides because it has backing from Moscow, while the West is blinded by non-Russian energy imports and dreams of regional stability.

If the West seeks to reduce tensions in the South Caucasus, it needs to step up its pressure on Azerbaijan. In the short term, this might include the threat of sanctions in response to further military action against Armenia and the continued refusal to unblock the Lachin Corridor, as well as lending support to Russia. By law, Azerbaijan cannot receive US military or foreign assistance unless it eschews military force to solve its disputes with Armenia, but the White House keeps letting Azerbaijan off the hook by waiving Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act and sending millions of dollars in military aid to Baku. Washington should treat Baku’s actions against Armenia as attempts at coercion, just as it does with Russian aggression against Ukraine.

For its part, Armenia has sought to unwind some of its security arrangements with Russia. Yerevan has refused to host CSTO military drills, send a representative to serve as CSTO deputy secretary general, sign a CSTO declaration to provide defense aid to Armenia, or accept the deployment of a CSTO monitoring mission in lieu of the EU-led mission. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has even threatened to terminate or freeze Armenia’s CSTO membership.

Even so, the West cannot reasonably expect Armenia to leave the CSTO and break with Russia without significantly helping Armenia diversify and mitigate its security, energy, and economic reliance on the Kremlin. As part of this, the United States may want to consider inviting Armenia to become a Major Non-NATO Ally. Washington should provide training and equipment to enhance Armenia’s defense capabilities and help it develop a more robust and independent security apparatus. The United States could also push forward on the prospect of building a small modular nuclear power plant in Armenia, providing an incentive for Armenia to decide against partnering with Russia on energy.

The West has stepped up its diplomatic efforts to facilitate a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is good, but these efforts should not come at the cost of abetting the unfolding humanitarian disaster in Nagorno-Karabakh. Now is the time to compel Baku to cease its bellicose rhetoric and consent to an international presence in Nagorno-Karabakh to mediate dialogue with residents there and promote a more meaningful transition from war to lasting peace.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and former legal advisor to the United Nations. She is currently a senior fellow in international law at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia.

The post Why deepening Russia-Azerbaijan ties should worry the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How is China mitigating the effects of sanctions on Russia?

Maia Nikoladze, Phillip Meng and Jessie Yin — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 14:42:28 +0000

China and Russia’s leaders have signaled a deepening strategic and economic partnership, but the reality hasn’t always matched the rhetoric. Following two high-level visits–Xi’s trip to Moscow in March and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishutin’s trip to Beijing last month–both countries announced new trade, investment, and industrial production initiatives. But despite Xi and Putin’s public proclamation of a ‘no limits’ partnership, China and Russia’s economic ties are limited by Beijing’s strategic interests.

How are these growing economic ties impacting Moscow’s ability to withstand G7 sanctions and maintain its invasion of Ukraine—and where do Beijing’s interests diverge from Moscow’s?

Below we outline six trends that have defined the two countries’ relations since the invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s access to the yuan has bolstered its wartime economy. However, when it comes to trade and financial support, Beijing has been less accommodating.

Chinese yuan is Russia’s friendliest currency.

China is mitigating the impact of sanctions on Russia by providing Moscow an alternative currency for transactions. Chinese yuan supplanted the dollar as Russia’s most traded currency in early 2023. The switch came after the United States imposed sanctions on a few banks in Russia that were still allowed to make cross-border transactions in dollars. As the Group of Seven (G7) sanctions constrain Russian financial institutions’ ability to transact in the world’s leading reserve currencies, like dollars, euros, and yen, the yuan is arguably the only relatively stable, widely traded currency issued by a non-sanctioning authority that enables Russia to make international transactions.

Central bank currency swap lines play a major role in increasing the circulation of the yuan in the Russian economy. Although China’s capital controls make it difficult for foreigners to obtain yuan, Beijing has supported Russia’s growing yuan marketplace by backing currency swap facilities. Through these swaps, Russia and China’s central banks exchange rubles for yuan. Major Russian commercial banks then tap into their central bank’s accounts to introduce the yuan into the Russian economy. Furthermore, as China’s banks have accumulated Russian assets, they have also likely increased the amount of yuan in local circulation.

Russia’s linkages to the Chinese financial system also allow it to mobilize its currency reserves. G7 countries froze most Russian reserves held by sanctioning jurisdictions. However, Russia has been able to access its central bank reserves held in China (nearly 18 percent before the conflict), which are largely denominated in yuan. As a result, Russia has been able to use yuan-denominated reserves to conduct foreign exchange transactions to manage the value of the ruble. Moreover, Russia increased the permitted share of yuan in its National Welfare Fund up to 60 percent last year and plans on selling more yuan from the wealth fund to make up for the lost energy revenues and cover budget deficit.

Vital trade links

Russia has compensated for lost market share in the West by exporting more energy to China. Beijing has increased spending on Russian energy from $57 billion in the year prior to the invasion to $88 billion in the year after and allowed Moscow to make up for the lost revenues in the EU market. Russian crude oil exports to China could increase even further in 2023, as China’s state-run refiners have been increasing purchases of Russian oil, and Beijing has signaled that it may allow a further ramp-up. However, China maintains informal quotas on crude oil imports to limit exposure to any individual energy exporter. These sit at 15 percent of overall imports or around two million barrels a day per country. Another component of China’s energy imports from Russia is natural gas. Natural gas is more dependent on existing infrastructure and is thus harder to rapidly increase in imports. Russia is expected to deliver 22 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline in 2023, eventually increasing to full capacity of 38 billion cubic meters in 2027. However, even though Russia has pushed for the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, Beijing has shown hesitation and has, in fact, negotiated a new pipeline through Central Asia. Whether Russia keeps exporting more oil or natural gas to China will depend on Beijing’s decisions on quotas or new pipelines, making Russia asymmetrically dependent on its economic partnership with China.

Russia has imported electronic equipment from China to offset the effects of export controls but is struggling with obtaining advanced technology—even from Beijing. Integrated circuit imports from China have increased from $67 billion in 2021 to $170 billion in 2022, but most electronics exports from China to Russia are made up of basic computers and transport equipment. Notably, Beijing has banned the export of advanced Loongson microprocessors. The West’s imposition of export controls on advanced semiconductors against China in October 2022 signals that Beijing will become even more protective of advanced technology and less likely to transfer them to Russia.

China is not the only country whose trade with Russia has increased. Although Beijing has provided a lifeline to the Russian economy, countries such as India and Turkey have also expanded trade with Russia. In fact, India has become the second largest destination of Russian crude oil exports after China. Meanwhile, Central Asian and Caucasus countries’ exports of electronic equipment to Russia ballooned in 2022 and Serbia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan have provided semiconductors to Russia throughout the last year. China might be the largest economy supporting Russia but other countries’ trade relations with Russia should be as closely monitored as Beijing’s.

Limits in the ‘no-limits’ partnership

China has generally avoided steps that could trigger secondary sanctions or that greatly increase its own strategic dependence or risk exposure to Russia. For example, Chinese banks have not become creditors to the Russian government. Likewise, China has hedged against dependence on Russian energy imports and has restricted the flow of advanced technology to Russia. The notion of a “no limits” partnership remains rhetorical for now.

Maia Nikoladze is the assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @Mai_Nikoladze.

Phillip Meng is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Jessie Yin is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post How is China mitigating the effects of sanctions on Russia? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Global Sanctions Dashboard cited by Transparency International Georgia

mrashid — Fri, 09 Jun 2023 19:45:56 +0000

Read the full article here.

The post Global Sanctions Dashboard cited by Transparency International Georgia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 13:53:17 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

International response

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

One week after the incursion in the Belgorod region allegedly orchestrated by Russian Volunteer Corps, Russia’s border has become more permeable to Ukrainian attacks. Nearly a month after the first attack against the Kremlin’s Senate building in Moscow, another drone attack was reported in the morning of May 30.

Reports posted on Telegram channel SHOT revealed footage taken by civilians showing drones and explosions in suburban Moscow. Throughout the day, Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin confirmed several drones had struck various locations, which resulted in evacuation of civilians. According to Russian media outlet Mediazona, drones hit residential buildings in three different parts of the city. Two civilians were reportedly injured, although their condition did not require them to be hospitalized; there were no reported fatalities.

Russian officials, including government spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, accused “the Kyiv regime” of orchestrating the attack as “retaliation for effective drone attacks against Kyiv’s decision-making centers on Sunday [May 29]”. This theory was also embraced by Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose comments also referenced the “effective work of the air defense systems.” Meduza reported that the Kremlin ordered Russian media to cover the drone attacks using specific talking points, though this has not been independently confirmed. In contrast, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office recommended that bloggers and the media refrain from commenting on the incident, as unverified claims would be punishable by law. The Moscow Investigative Committee launched an investigation into the drone attacks as an act of “terrorism.”

Meduza additionally geolocated drones that appeared in open-source footage, and estimated that between five to seven UAVs were downed in the Moscow area. Other unconfirmed reports from the opposition Telegram channel Baza claimed twenty-five drones took part in the attack, while Telegram channel SHOT reported on thirty-two drones. These figures remain unconfirmed, however. There were also conflicting estimates on the number of drones successfully intercepted by Russian air defense systems; while Russia’s defense ministry claimed only eight drones were shot down, SHOT reported nineteen drones as intercepted and destroyed.

Although Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attack, one piece of footage points at an alleged UJ-22 airborne drone of Ukrainian fabrication. Despite circumstantial evidence which could indicate Ukraine’s direct involvement, presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak denied the allegations. Information posted by opposition media outlet Agentstvo quoting a tweet by Foreign Policy Research Institute Senior Fellow Rob Lee, indicated that the drones responsible for the May 30 attack appear to be the same ones that conducted another attack on May 26 in Russia’s Krasnodar region.

Meanwhile, a report posted by Mediazona quoting a list published by Russian MP Alexander Khinshtein regarding the alleged locations of the drone suggested they may have targeted the houses of oligarchs in Moscow’s wealthy Rublyovka neighborhood. While this has not been confirmed, a separate report posted by the Telegram channel Baza alluded to an orchestrated attack in the same area.

This is the second drone attack reported in the Russian capital city since the May 3 drone attack against the senate building of the Kremlin. The DFRLab reported on that incident and assessed that defense countermeasures, including a ban on flying commercial drones, would likely be enforced as a defensive measure. GPS interference data also indicated elevated levels of GPS interference on May 30 in the Moscow area. This information would be consistent with an assessment expressed by Russian businessman and former Roskosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin, who proposed suspending GPS across Russia.

Lastly, on June 1, multiple sources reported movements of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Free Russia Legion in the villages Shebekino and Novaya Tavolzhaka in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, adjacent to the Ukrainian border. The oblast’s governor reported shelling by Grad rockets and initiated an evacuation of the local population to Belgorod Arena stadium, in the region’s capital. The DFRLab will continue to monitor the situation.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Speaking at the GLOBSEC forum in Bratislava, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili claimed that NATO enlargement was to blame for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a long-standing Kremlin narrative used to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“I think everybody knows the reason… one of the main reasons was NATO, NATO enlargement,” Garibashvili said, adding that “Ukraine’s determination” to become a NATO member state had its “consequences.” According to recent polling by IRI, 80 percent of Georgians support the country joining NATO.

Several Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin outlets quoted Garibashvili and used his remarks to reinforce pro-war narratives. The outlets also reported on additional comments made by the prime minister during GLOBSEC on how the Georgian government is “setting a good precedent by maintaining peace and stability in a turbulent environment.”

The DFRLab has previously covered how the Georgian Dream-led government and the Kremlin spread similar narratives blaming the West for orchestrating protests in Georgia.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Belgorod incursion brings deluge of online mockery of Russia’s defenses

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 25 May 2023 19:09:42 +0000

Tracking narratives

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

International response

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Drone imagery from a burning border control outpost in the Russian region of Belgorod sparked a frenzy on social media this week. According to Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps and other Russian nationals crossed from Ukraine into Belgorod Oblast and attacked a border outpost in Grayvoron. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, claimed responsibility for the attack; the Free Russia Legion also claimed responsibility.

An assessment by Russian news outlet RBC regarding the broader situation in Belgorod indicated an armed incursion, with shelling and artillery fire reported. On the evening of May 22, Russian government declared a state of counterterrorist emergency in Belgorod Oblast. Although the governor of the oblast did not officially issue an order to evacuate the civilian population immediately, footage and photographs posted on social media indicated that at least some residents evacuated to other areas in the region. Meduza also reported several drone strikes on the city of Belgorod itself.

Conflicting reports emerged on May 23 after Russian officials lifted the counterterrorist alert. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have “liquidated” around seventy “saboteurs,” reporting from the news outlet Mash indicated the deployment of additional Russian law enforcement in nearby Bryansk Oblast. In an effort to support their assertions of having eliminated the insurgency, Russian news outlets also released photos of military-class vehicles allegedly used by the insurgents stuck in the mud; some open-source analysts, however, questioned the authenticity of the photos. Russian media chased these reports with claims of destroyed Ukrainian tanks, while the Russian Volunteer Corps posted footage to Telegram seemingly showing intact military equipment.

Shortly after the news broke out, footage of a drone attack on the local Russian border outpost, APP Grayvoron, appeared on the outpost’s Google Maps profile, though it was later deleted. At the time of writing, it had been replaced with footage showing a convoy of vehicles, one flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps.

The Google Maps profile for a Russian border outpost in Belgorod featured a video of a mechanized convoy flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps. (Source: Google Maps/archive)

Simultaneously, trolling reviews appeared on the border outpost’s Google Maps profile, calling the border guards “friendly” and the facilities “understaffed.” These too have been deleted, though not before they were documented by the Saint Javelin Twitter account and other Twitter users.

Trolls post mocking reviews of Russia’s Belgorod border post. (Source: @SaintJavelin/archive)

Other trolls took to Twitter, where members of the NAFO meme movement, a pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian community on the platform, renamed their account to “Government of The Bilhorod’s Peoples Republic” as a joking reference to the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics. “Bilhorod” is the Ukrainian name for Belgorod.

NAFO meme account @nitro19820 changes its Twitter name and bio to joke that it now represented a new “People’s Republic” in Belgorod. (Source: @nitro19820/archive)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Following the apparent border incursion into Belgorod Oblast and subsequent attacks on the region, pro-war military bloggers condemned Moscow’s handling of the war in Ukraine, including its border defenses.

Telegram channel Vоенкор Котенок Z (“Milblogger Kitten Z”) criticized the Kremlin for being late in declaring a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod and not knowing how to fight “for real.” “There is a war, and in Russia … they are afraid to call the war a war,” stated the Telegram post.

The channel ДШРГ Русич (“DShRG Rusich”) questioned “commanders of all levels” on how the incursion happened. It also blamed Russia’s intelligence services for failing to reveal “plans of an enemy.” The channel added that as long as there is no photographic evidence of corpses or burned equipment, “the enemy has no losses, and the [Russian] propagandists crapped themselves a little, saying that everything is fine.”

The Kotsnews Telegram channel addressed pro-Kremlin pundits who dismissed military blogger concerns as “hysteria” by insisting that the threat to Russian territory is real and that there are uncomfortable questions around Russia’s defensive capabilities that nobody wants to ask. “What is happening with our technical equipment at the border, surveillance systems, tracking, motion detection?” the channel asked. “What about the mining of potentially dangerous areas? What about anti-tank weapons? Why did the enemy armored group calmly penetrate deep into our territory?”

As Russia’s war against Ukraine has dragged on, the frequency and intensity of pro-war military bloggers’ criticism have increased and become bolder. The DFRLab has previously covered how Russian military bloggers criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Ministry of Defense.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

On May 20, a series of so-called “World Wide Freedom Rallies” took place in many cities around the world. The Telegram account for Simeon Boikov, a pro-Kremlin activist and blogger in Australia, claimed to have organized the Sydney edition of the rally, part of a decentralized movement that originated in 2021 to express dissatisfaction with COVID security measures. Boikov promoted a poster for the event on April 6, a day before the event announcement on the movement’s official Telegram channel.

The rally ostensibly focused on demanding the release of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who is currently being held in London facing potential extradition to the United States. After the event, however, Boikov highlighted a speech by Assange’s father, John Shipton, in a video showing scenes from the rally and emphasized that Shipton was wearing a “double headed eagle and St George’s ribbons,” both of which are Russian symbols. Additional videos and images from the rally showed many people carrying Russian flags and wearing pro-Kremlin symbols.

Kremlin-controlled media outlets emphasized in their headlines not just the pro-Russia nature of the event, but also claims of anti-NATO sentiment, which appear to have been exaggerated. Reviewing footage from the event, the DFRLab identified only one instance of someone sporting anti-NATO messaging. Nonetheless, Russian media embraced the event as specifically anti-NATO, including state outlets Gazeta.ru, TASS, RIA Novosti, and Komsomolyskaya Pravda, and pro-Kremlin media such as News Front, Inforeactor, Ekonomika Segodnya. Additionally, The Eastern Herald, an Indian media outlet, and Belarus state-controlled television both framed the event as anti-NATO in their English-language publications.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

On May 22, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had amended its list of sanctioned entities and individuals by adding seventy-one entities that the US government had determined to be acting “contrary to [US] national security or foreign policy interests.” Alongside Russian companies, one Kyrgyz company, Tro.Ya LLC, and one Armenian company, Medisar LLC, were included in the amended list. According to the Department of Commerce, both companies engaged in conduct that “prevented the successful accomplishment of an end-use check.” In other words, the Department of Commerce suspected that the final destination for the products was Russia but the companies themselves had obfuscated this information.

Medisar LLC, which was registered in Armenia in 2001, is an importer of chemicals and laboratory equipment. The company is one of the thousand largest taxpayers in Armenia, paying about one million dollars in taxes in 2022. It also has a longstanding trade history with Russian companies. On its website, Medisar indicates that one of its trading partners, dating back to 2011, is Russian company Minimed.

Screenshot from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) Aleph database, made available through Friends of OCCRP access, about Medisar’s trade. The third and fourth companies on the list are both OOO Minimed, a Russian company with a long-term trading relationship with Medisar. (Source: DFRLab via OCCRP)

On May 20, Armenian investigative website Hetq reported that data obtained from the country’s customs service showed that in 2022, Medisar exported equipment from Armenia to Russia, including electronic integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices.

A company executive who did not want to be identified acknowledged to RFE/RL that Medisar imported chemicals and laboratory equipment from the United States and the European Union and re-exported them to Russia.

Medisar is the second-largest company registered in Armenia to be sanctioned by the United States. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the other firm, TAKO, in April. The company is in the wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts. TAKO, spelled TACO in Armenia’s legal entities register, was registered in May 2022 in Armenia and is fully owned by a Russian citizen, according to public registry records.

On April 18, the New York Times reported that in 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more chips and processors from the United States and 212 percent more from the European Union than in 2021, and that Armenia exported 97 percent of those same products to Russia.

During a May 22 press conference, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that despite Armenia’s “strategic” relationship with Russia and membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, the country “cannot afford to come under Western sanctions.” Pashinyan underscored that if Armenia faced sanctions, “it wouldn’t be good for any of our allies, while we would ruin our relations with our Western partners.”

A joint “compliance note” issued on March 2 by the US Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, titled “Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls,” mentioned Armenia, along with China, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, as “transshipment points commonly used to illegally redirect restricted items to Russia or Belarus.”

According to the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, Russian-Armenian trade soared in 2022, including exports to Russia, which nearly tripled to $2.4 billion.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Belgorod incursion brings deluge of online mockery of Russia’s defenses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Global Sanctions Dashboard: US and G7 allies target Russia’s evasion and procurement networks

Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze, Benjamin Mossberg and Castellum.AI — Thu, 25 May 2023 13:42:39 +0000

A few days ago, the Group of Seven (G7) allies met in Hiroshima and reasserted their determination to further economically isolate Russia and impose costs on those who support Russia’s war effort. To do so, they will have to close loopholes in existing sanctions and export control regimes, which in turn requires enhancing interagency coordination within the US government and developing a common vernacular among allies on the targeting of sanctions and export control evasion networks.

In this edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we cover:

New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit.
How the United States is tackling export controls circumvention and what should improve moving forward.
The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap.
The failure of the US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment from 2022 indicated that forty out of fifty-two components recovered from the Iranian Shahed-136 drone that was downed in Ukraine last fall had been manufactured by thirteen different American companies, while the remaining twelve were made in Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Taiwan, and China. The case revealed that it was not enough to impose sanctions and export controls on Russian defense companies. Not only was Iran providing drones to Russia, but also certain entities and individuals in countries such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein have procured materials on Russia’s behalf. This is why the United States released a new sanctions package ahead of the G7 summit, targeting a much wider international network of Russia sanctions and export controls evasion.

Finland, Switzerland, Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, India, Singapore—these are just a few locations associated with individuals and entities included in the Treasury Department’s newest designations against Russia. Entities and individuals located in these countries have aided Russia’s circumvention efforts or provided materials for Russia’s military procurement. Among the sanctioned individuals are Swiss-Italian businessman Walter Moretti and his colleagues in Germany and India, who have sold advanced technology to Russian state-owned enterprises. Liechtenstein-based Trade Initiative Establishment (TIE) and its network of two companies and four individuals have been procuring semiconductor production equipment for sanctioned Russian entities since 2012.

Along with the United States, the United Kingdom also imposed sanctions against eighty-six individuals and entities from Russian energy, metals, financial, and military sectors who have been enhancing Russia’s capacity to wage the war. Additionally, the European Union (EU) is developing its eleventh package of sanctions which will reportedly, for the first time, target Chinese entities facilitating Russia’s evasion efforts. Coordinating the designation and enforcing processes among the G7 allies will be key in synchronizing the targeting of Russia’s evasion and procurement networks.

Export controls circumvention: How the US is tackling it and what should improve moving forward

While sanctions aim to cut entities and individuals procuring technology for the Russian military out of the global financial system, export controls are designed to prevent them from physically acquiring components. G7 allies have levied significant export controls on Russia, but enforcing export controls is easier said than done. Third countries from Russia’s close neighborhood have stepped up to fill Russia’s technology shortages caused by other countries complying with export controls. Central Asian and Caucasus countries had a significant uptick in exports of electronic components to Russia, while Turkey, Serbia, and Kazakhstan have been supplying semiconductors to Moscow. Even if exported electronic components are not designed for military application, Russians have been able to extract semiconductors and electronic components for military use even from refrigerators and dishwashers. The sudden boost in electronic equipment exports from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Russia can only be explained by Russia’s efforts of repurposing them for military use.

In response to Russia’s efforts to obtain technology by all means possible, the US Departments of Commerce and Justice have jointly launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force. The goal of the Strike Force is to prevent Russia and adversarial states such as China and Iran from illicitly getting their hands on advanced US technology. The Strike Force recently announced criminal charges against individuals supplying software and hardware source codes stolen from US tech companies to China. The Strike Force embodies the whole-of-government approach the United States has been taking in investigating sanctions and export controls evasion cases. The prosecutorial and investigative expertise of the Justice Department, coupled with the Treasury’s ability to identify and block the sanctions evaders from the US financial system, will amplify the impact of the Commerce Department’s export controls and enhance their investigations and enforcement.

The US Department of Commerce has also teamed up with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to publish a joint supplemental alert outliniing red flags for potential Russian export controls evasion that financial institutions should watch out for and report on, consistent with their compliance reporting requirements. The red flags include but are not limited to:

Payments for dual-use goods to companies located outside of the Global Export Controls Coalition (GECC) countries.
A new customer who trades in the nine Harmonized System (HS) codes, is located outside of the GECC countries and was incorporated after February 24, 2022.
A consumer who refuses to provide details to banks about end users or company ownership.

Providing information to the public in the form of alerts and advisories is an effective step to increase awareness, financial institution reporting, and compliance with Western sanctions and exports controls. The Disruptive Technology Strike Force should consider issuing a multilateral advisory on export control evasion with G7 allies to bring in foreign partner perspectives, similar to the multilateral advisory issued in March on sanctions evasion by the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force (REPO)

Regarding third-country intermediaries suspected of supplying Russia with dual-use technology, G7 allies should prioritize capacity building and encouraging political will in these countries to strengthen sanctions and customs enforcement. Building up their capacity to monitor and record what products are being exported to Russia could be the first step towards this goal. For example, Georgian authorities returned goods and vehicles destined for Russia and Belarus in 204 cases. However, registration certificates did not identify the codes of returned goods in fifty cases, and clarified that the goods were sanctioned only in seventy-one cases. Developing a system for identifying controlled goods and making the customs data easily accessible to the public could both salvage Georgia’s reputation and enhance export control enforcement against Russia.

The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap

The US Department of the Treasury recently published a report analyzing the effects of the oil price cap, arguing that the novel tool has achieved its dual objective of reducing revenue for Moscow while keeping global oil prices relatively stable. A recent study by the Kyiv School of Economics Institute backs up this statement with detailed research of the Russian ports and the payments made to Russian sellers. However, Russian crude oil exports to China through the Russian Pacific port of Kozmino might be examples of transactions where the price cap approach does not hold.

In response, the Department of the Treasury warned US ship owners and flagging registries to use maritime intelligence services for detecting when tankers are disguising their port of call in Russia. Meanwhile, commodities brokers and oil traders should invoice shipping, freight, customs, and insurance costs separately, and ensure that the price of Russian oil is below 60 dollars.

Despite China’s imports of Russian crude oil, the world average price for Russian crude oil in the first quarter of 2023 was 58.62 dollars, which supports the claim about the success of the oil price cap, at least for now. Notably, Russia’s energy revenues dropped by almost 40 percent from December 2022 to January 2023, likely in part due to the price cap combined with lower global energy prices.

Beyond Russia: The failure of US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

While the world has been focused on the G7 summit, the crisis worsened in Sudan. In April 2023, President Biden issued Executive Order 14098 (EO 14098) authorizing future sanctions on foreign persons to address the situation in Sudan and to support a transition to democracy and a civilian transitional government in Sudan. The use of sanctions to support policy goals in Africa is not new. In the case of EO 14098, policymakers seek to use future sanctions on individuals responsible for threatening the peace, security, and stability of Sudan, undermining Sudan’s democratic transition, as well as committing violence against civilians or perpetuating other human rights abuses.

Much has been written and studied about the effectiveness of sanctions programs in Africa with many programs suffering from being poorly designed, organized, implemented, or enforced. Sudan faced statutory sanctions from its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism from 1993 to 2020 and US Treasury sanctions from 1997 to 2017 both of which produced limited results due to ineffective enforcement and maintenance of the program. A near-total cut-off of Sudan from the US financial system pushed Sudan to develop financial ties beyond the reach of the US dollar.

Sanctions in Sudan can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in these relevant countries. Cutting off those links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply weapons, and pay their soldiers, which could force them back to the negotiating table.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @KDonovan_AC.

Maia Nikoladze is the assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @Mai_Nikoladze.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Castellum.AI partners with the Economic Statecraft Initiative and provides sanctions data for the Global Sanctions Dashboard and Russia Sanctions Database.

Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

Explore Here

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post Global Sanctions Dashboard: US and G7 allies target Russia’s evasion and procurement networks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all fear a Russian defeat in Ukraine

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 23 May 2023 14:44:33 +0000

There is no question that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has dramatically undermined Russia’s global standing, but it is also true that international responses to the war have been far from uniform. The democratic world has almost universally condemned Russia’s invasion and has united in support of Ukraine, while many in the Global South have preferred to maintain a more neutral position.

Only a handful of countries have actually been prepared to stand with Russia and defend Moscow’s actions. Four nations in particular have emerged as key allies at a time when Vladimir Putin faces mounting international isolation. China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all have different motivations for supporting the Kremlin, but they are united by a common fear of what a Russian defeat in Ukraine might mean for their own countries.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

In recent months, China has sought to play an active role in efforts to negotiate a peace between Russia and Ukraine. However, many in Kyiv and throughout the West remain skeptical of China’s apparently contradictory views on the peace process. Critics have accused China of publicly supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity while also indicating the need for Kyiv to cede land as part of any potential settlement.

While stopping short of outright support for Russia’s invasion, China has adopted a public position that could be termed as Kremlin-friendly neutrality, and has accused the West of provoking the war. This posture is unsurprising. Beijing shares Moscow’s goal of challenging Western dominance and replacing it with what they see as a more multipolar world. China fears that if Russia loses the current war, it will greatly strengthen the West while undermining the global standing of China and other authoritarian regimes.

More specifically, a Russian defeat would considerably complicate any future Chinese efforts to invade Taiwan. If Western military aid helps Ukraine to secure victory over the once vaunted Russian army, this will increase the chances of similar Western support for Taiwan against possible Chinese aggression. The disastrous performance of Putin’s army in Ukraine has already undermined Russia’s claims to military superpower status and significantly boosted Western confidence. China is not eager for this unwelcome trend to gain further momentum.

On Russia’s western border, Belarus has emerged as something of a captive partner in the attack on Ukraine, with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka serving as the single most vocal backer of Russia’s war while also allowing his country to be used as a platform for the invasion. Russian troops flooded into northern Ukraine from Belarus on the first days of the war in February 2022; Russia continues to launch airstrikes on Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory.

Lukashenka has little choice but to back Putin. He only remains in power because Russia intervened in 2020 to prop up his regime in the wake of pro-democracy protests over a fraudulent presidential election. Lukashenka’s brutal Kremlin-backed crackdown against the Belarusian protest movement left him internationally isolated and heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would likely reignite domestic unrest inside Belarus and would almost certainly spell doom for the Lukashenka regime.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

While the failure of Putin’s invasion could lead to regime change in Belarus, some in Armenia sees the prospect of a Russian defeat in Ukraine in starkly existential terms. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reportedly warned Armenians recently: “If Russia loses the war in Ukraine, I have no idea what will happen to Armenia.”

Many Armenians remain heavily invested in the traditional view of Russia as a protector of the country against the perceived threats to national security posed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. This thinking has shaped Armenian politics and foreign policy for much of the post-Soviet era. The country is a founding member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and backed out of an association agreement with the EU a decade ago following Kremlin pressure, instead joining Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia maintains military bases in Armenia and has dominated efforts to regulate the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan’s concerns are unsurprising but short-sighted. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would potentially allow Armenia to pursue a more independent foreign policy while expanding economic and political ties with the European Union. Alarm over the threat of renewed hostilities with Azerbaijan is understandable, but there is little prospect of Armenia itself being invaded, especially if US and EU-brokered talks produce a peace treaty that recognizes the Armenian-Azerbaijani border while providing satisfactory guarantees for Karabakh’s Armenian population.

As a staunch opponent of the West and critic of perceived Western influence over global affairs, Iran shares China’s geopolitical motivations for supporting Russia’s invasion. Many in the Iranian leadership are also fearful that a Russian defeat in Ukraine could increase demands for democratic change inside Iran itself and fuel a new round of domestic protests.

There are additional practical reasons for Tehran’s pro-Russian stance. Faced with tightening international sanctions and cut off from Western technologies, Russia has turned to Iran as an alternative source of military assistance. In exchange for Iranian drones and other supplies, Moscow is believed to be providing Tehran with everything from fighter jets to air defense systems, while also assisting Iran’s nuclear program.

This burgeoning military partnership between Russia and Iran is proving deadly for Ukraine, with Iranian drones regularly used to strike civilian targets across Ukraine. It also poses a significant threat to Israeli national security and has sparked heated debate over Israel’s apparent reluctance to provide military support to Ukraine. If cooperation between Moscow and Tehran continues to intensify, Russian air defense systems could limit Israeli operations in Syria and complicate any future preventative strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, there appears to be little chance of an outright Russian victory of the kind envisaged by Putin when he first gave the order to invade in February 2022. Instead, the most likely scenarios are now either some form of stalemate or a Ukrainian military victory.

If Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the consequences will reverberate around the globe. China is powerful enough to survive such a shock but would be geopolitically weakened. The Belarusian and Iranian regimes would face a far more uncertain future and might not survive. Meanwhile, Armenia may find that despite its current misgivings, the defeat of Russia could allow Yerevan to return to the path of European integration.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

The Kremlin has employed a mixture of carrot and stick tactics in order to retain and strengthen its influence across the former USSR. Measures have ranged from elite enrichment, customs unions, and security cooperation to trade wars, military interventions, and the creation of “frozen conflicts.”

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The 2014 invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and Donbas region was a major landmark in Russia’s post-Soviet empire-rebuilding efforts, but the full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later was to prove the biggest turning point of all. Since February 24, 2022, countries throughout the former Soviet Empire have rallied in support of Ukraine and have sought to distance themselves from an increasingly isolated and humbled Russia.

Throughout the war, the three Baltic states have supplied large amounts of defense, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while welcoming thousands of Ukrainian refugees. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have also been very supportive of Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership bids. During a recent Kyiv visit, Estonian PM Kaja Kallas underlined this backing, commenting, “For peace in Europe, we need Ukraine in the EU and NATO. The way to lasting peace is to end grey areas in European security.”

In the South Caucasus region, Russia’s status has clearly been diminished by the invasion of Ukraine and the embarrassing failures of Putin’s once-vaunted military. The Kremlin has long served as peacekeeper and arbiter between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the region, maintaining a significant military presence in Armenia. However, the war in Ukraine has prevented Russia from fulfilling its commitments, with Moscow unable to stop renewed fighting. This has encouraged the Armenians to reconsider their relations with Russia.

With Russian influence in decline, the Armenian government has deepened cooperation with both the United States and the European Union, including the opening of a new EU Mission in Yerevan. Armenia has also begun to distance itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-led military bloc bringing together six former Soviet republics.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

In Central Asia, the invasion of Ukraine has amplified existing distrust of Russia. This is most apparent in the region’s largest nation, Kazakhstan. Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan has a significant ethnic Russian population, leading to concerns that the country could become the next target of Russian imperial aggression. These fears have been further fueled by Kremlin propagandists, who have warned that Kazakhstan will pay a high price for the country’s alleged disloyalty to Moscow. Kazakh officials appear unmoved by these threats, and have recently canceled Victory Day celebrations for the second consecutive year in what many see as a direct snub to Putin.

Since the invasion of Ukraine began, Kazakhstan has attempted to strengthen ties with China, Turkey, the EU, and the US, while questioning its relationship with Russia and the CSTO. This geopolitical shift was perhaps most immediately obvious in summer 2022, when Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made international headlines by rejecting recognition of Russian territorial claims against Ukraine while standing alongside Putin at a flagship economic forum in Saint Petersburg.

Over the past fifteen months of the invasion, Kazakhstan has demonstrated its support for Ukraine via the donation of considerable quantities of humanitarian aid. Other countries throughout the former Soviet world have done likewise. Azerbaijan has sent nearly €20 million in humanitarian and medical assistance. Turkmenistan has dispatched a cargo plane filled with medicines and medical supplies. Uzbekistan sent several tons of humanitarian aid. Given continued Russian leverage in the region and Moscow’s traditional expectations of loyalty, these relatively innocuous moves should be seen as bold gestures that reflect a changing geopolitical climate.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed the extent of Kremlin control over Belarus, with Russia using its neighbor as a platform for airstrikes against Ukraine and the failed Kyiv offensive of early 2022. However, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has so far resisted pressure to directly enter the war, despite being heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival. With the Belarusian public and military both believed to be strongly against any direct participation in the invasion, Lukashenka finds himself in a difficult position. He understands that if he were to involve Belarusian forces in the war, this would likely lead to a strong and unpredictable domestic backlash.

Putin saw the invasion of Ukraine as a key step toward rebuilding the Russian Empire. Instead, it has forced countries across the former Soviet Union to distance themselves from the Kremlin. These countries feel able to do so in part due to the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine, which has made a mockery Moscow’s claims to military superpower status while reducing Russia’s ability to intimidate its neighbors. The invasion of Ukraine is still far from over, but the damage done to Russia’s regional influence and to Putin’s own imperial ambitions is already impossible to ignore.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He can be found on Twitter @MTemnycky.

Tracking narratives

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

International response

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

After months of heavy fighting in which Russian forces failed to fully capture Bakhmut, the Ukrainian army is likely preparing its counteroffensive. Ukrainian ground forces commander Oleksandr Syrskyi said on his Telegram channel that Russian forces “are losing considerable strength and are running out of steam” and “very soon we will take advantage of this opportunity.” The DFRLab has observed indications of a Ukrainian counterattack and is closely monitoring the developments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to exert pressure on Ukraine. Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian troops will likely focus on targets of military importance in their next missile strikes. Particular attention is being paid to areas with troop concentration, oil depots, airfields, supply routes for military equipment from allied countries, and other logistical facilities. In addition, the possibility of repeated attacks against energy infrastructure or other objects of significant economic importance for Ukraine cannot be ruled out.

A Russian slowdown in Bakhmut could mean that Moscow is diverting its troops and resources to other regions. Russian troops have made gains further north, partially regaining control over the axis to the town of Kreminna. Intense battles have also been underway in the south. Further, Russian forces have become more active in the regions of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Russian troops are conducting offensives in the direction of Avdiivka with the aim of establishing control over Avdiivka and Marinka.

In the occupied Crimean town of Dzhankoi, an explosion reportedly destroyed cruise missiles utilized by Russia’s Black Sea navy to target Ukraine, according to a March 21 statement from Ukrainian military intelligence. The strike appeared to have originated from a drone. A video of the explosion published on March 20 shows the blast was immediately preceded by a loudly buzzing engine which bears audio similarities to the sound made by Iranian-made drones. The DFRLab cannot confirm whether an Iranian drone caused the blast.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Video footage of a missile strike against a nine-story residential building in the center of Zaporizhzhia emerged on Telegram on March 29. The DFRLab identified the location of the missile strike and the apartment complex it struck using geolocation and geospatial analysis. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described in a tweet, the strike occurred near a residential area near a mall.

Geolocated images of the residential apartment building in Zaporizhzhia struck by a Russian missile. (Source: Valentin Châtelet)

A photograph shared online indicates that an S-300 missile system fired the missile from the Russian-occupied southern bank of the Dnipro River. This location was corroborated by other open-source investigators, including the GeoConfirmed project, which reported that the missile likely came from the southeast direction. Reports claimed the attack caused the death of seven people.

Later that same day, counternarratives emerged on the pro-Kremlin English-language Telegram channel Slavyangrad and spread to a French-language channel. The narrative claimed that the strike resulted from a Ukrainian S-300 system failure while attempting to intercept a Russian missile. Russian news outlets and pro-Kremlin amplification channels have repeatedly used similar narratives to obfuscate Russian culpability in incidents involving civilians.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Following the International Criminal Court issuing an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin leader paid a defiant visit to the occupied Ukrainian city of Mariupol. The Kremlin shared a thirty-minute video of the visit, which reportedly took place on March 18. During the visit, Putin reportedly examined restoration work under way in the city. Approximately twenty minutes into the footage, Putin has a short conversation with individuals described as residents of Mariupol.

Footage of the visit published by state-owned news outlet RIA included frames cut out of the Kremlin video. The RIA footage includes an extended version of Putin’s interactions with alleged residents. During the filmed conversation, an unidentified female voice can be heard in the background shouting at Putin, approximately eighteen seconds into the clip. Meduza reported that the woman yelled, “This all is not true! It’s all for a show!” While the women’s comments do sound similar to Meduza’s interpretation, the voice is muffled and difficult to interpret with certainty. Immediately after the woman shouts, the officials accompanying Putin react and begin to look around the streets. The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds earlier, switching to another woman speaking with Putin.

A woman can be heard yelling in the background eighteen seconds into this video clip, causing Putin’s entourage to look around for her. (Source: RIA Novosti)

The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds before the woman starts yelling. (Source: Kremlin.ru)

According to Meduza, a Russian journalist described the district visited by Putin as “virtually the only one rebuilt” in the city destroyed by Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

On March 20, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, the head of Russia’s interior ministry, said that in 2022, “Particular attention was paid to preventing the discreditation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” The ministry reported that last year police documented five thousand offenses and forty-one crimes related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army. In addition, they documented almost ninety cases of “deliberate false publications” about the Russian military.

“In cooperation with Roskomnadzor, the dissemination of about 160,000 false and other prohibited information was stopped,” Kolokoltsev added.

The DFRLab has previously reported on Russian attempts to tighten control of the internet in order to prevent the spread of content the Kremlin considers undesirable.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

According to independent Russian pollster Levada, 77 percent of Russians supported the war in February 2023, the highest level of public support since March 2022. Only 17 percent of Russians currently disapprove the war, Levada reported.

The number of people supporting the continuation of hostilities has steadily increased since October 2022 “as the shock of the announcement of partial mobilization passed,” Levada concluded.

Seventy-one percent of Russians perceive the return of Luhansk and Donetsk to Ukraine as unacceptable conditions for a peace treaty, while 67 percent see the return of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as unacceptable. In addition, 76 percent of respondents perceive Ukraine’s accession to NATO as unacceptable.

Since November 2022, the share of respondents who believe that the “special military operation” is advancing successfully increased from 54 to 65 percent.

The Levada research center, labeled a foreign agent by Russia, published its assessment on March 13. Russia has cracked down on public dissent since the start of the war; it remains unclear whether this crackdown impacted Levada’s poll results.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

On March 24, the Armenian Constitutional Court gave its blessing to the parliament’s ratification of the Rome Statute, noting that the country’s obligations to the International Criminal Court do not contradict the national constitution. The decision is final and went into effect immediately.

Armenia’s plans to ratify the Rome Statute had been complicated by the International Criminal Court’s recent decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. On December 29, 2022, Armenian parliament approved the draft law, “On Ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” which then made its way to the constitutional court. Armenia signed the statute in 1999 but did not ratify it at the time.

Armenia’s recent push to ratify the ICC charter appears motivated by the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia initiated the ratification to take Azerbaijan to the ICC over alleged war crimes committed by Azerbaijani troops during the September 2022 invasion, but some observers thought the constitutional court would rule against it due to the Putin arrest warrant.

Human rights defender Artur Sakunts told Caucasus news outlet Jam News that Armenia would end up in a “miserable position” if it did not continue on course to ratify the statute. “We will remain in the status of an ally of a fascist regime – where Belarus is now,” Sakunts added. “And such regimes have no allies, they only have subordinates, colonies, zones of influence.”

Armenia’s Speaker of Parliament, Alen Simonyan, told reporters on March 20 that Armenia had begun the ratification process months before the ICC decision. When asked about the possibility of arresting Putin on a visit to Armenia, Simonyan said, “First, let’s ratify the Rome Statute for now, and then we’ll decide what to do next. I wonder what they will do in other countries in case of his arrival. I just physically can’t imagine it [the arrest].”

—Ani Mejlumyan, Research Assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Global Sanctions Dashboard: What to do with sanctioned Russian assets

Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze — Fri, 24 Mar 2023 12:07:38 +0000

In this edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we answer the most controversial question about the blocked Russian state assets: to seize them or not to seize them? We propose a solution that would transfer funds directly and quickly to Ukraine without triggering a host of legal obstacles in the United States and Europe. We also look into Georgia and its ruling party Georgian Dream’s attempt to pass the foreign agent law, which has prompted widespread global criticism.

Russian oligarch assets should be used now to support Ukraine

The European Commission estimates that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war has caused an estimated $650 billion (converted to dollars from the original source) of damage to the Ukrainian economy. There is broad international agreement that Russia should pay for the damage it has caused. However, the debate remains as to how and when Russia should pay. It is important to distinguish between immobilized Russian state assets and blocked Russian oligarch assets. Currently, the authority does not exist to seize state assets and transfer them to Ukraine. It would require new legislation or amendments to existing law. It could also erode non-Western countries’ perception of the United States as a safe place for parking their reserves. Meanwhile, the United States and European Union (EU) member states already have the legal authorities and mechanisms to seize and transfer sanctioned oligarch assets.

What are the immediate steps?

Seize the blocked fifty-eight billion dollars’ worth of sanctioned oligarch assets and expedite their transfer to Ukraine. The multilateral Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarch (REPO) Task Force, run by finance and justice ministries of Western ally states, recently reported that REPO member states have blocked fifty-eight billion dollars’ worth of sanctioned Russian oligarch assets. Fortunately, in the United States the legal process for seizing sanctioned assets is already in place: a judge in Manhattan federal court recently ordered the confiscation of $5.4 million from sanctioned Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev. The forfeited funds will be transferred to the State Department to provide assistance to Ukraine.

Additionally, last month, the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) KleptoCapture Task Force filed a civil forfeiture complaint against six properties owned by sanctioned Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg, worth seventy-five million dollars. DOJ is aggressively moving forward with its civil and criminal forfeiture tools and new authorities to seize sanctioned Russian assets to make them available to Ukraine. The same steps should be repeated across REPO member states with asset seizure authorities for the rest of the fifty-eight billion dollars held in their jurisdictions on an expedited timeline.

There is also likely more Russian oligarch money abroad that has not yet been identified and frozen. Western authorities should use existing mechanisms and processes to locate these assets, freeze them, seize them, and transfer them directly to Ukraine.

One potential challenge to this plan is that prosecutors will need to provide evidence of oligarch assets’ involvement in international money laundering and sanctions violations. This could limit the pool of forfeitable money. However, the successful transfer of millions of dollars from Malofeyev and Vekselberg to Ukraine will prove that this path is worth going down.

Make Russia pay for reparations. Not seizing Russian state assets right now does not mean that Group of Seven (G7) allies will simply transfer them back to Russia once the war is over. The United Nations (UN) General Assembly has already adopted a resolution calling on Russia to pay reparations for its damage to Ukraine. State assets can remain immobilized until Russia agrees to pay and if Moscow fails to do so, sovereign assets can then be seized as collateral.

Further, it is important to remember that allies have rightfully provided significant amounts of funding to support Ukraine in its efforts to fight back against Russian aggression. The top ten contributors have pledged approximately $131 billion in military and financial assistance. The reparations discussions should include requirements for Russia to pay the United States, EU, and other contributors back.

Leverage the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its existing channels for funding Ukraine. Just this week, the IMF moved forward with a $15 billion loan package for Ukraine, the first ever lending to a country at war in the seventy-seven year history of the institution. This significant step provides Ukraine with an amount nearing 10 percent of its total gross domestic product. Due to the existing transmission and oversight mechanisms between the IMF and Ukraine, the loan can be delivered and administered quickly. This is the kind of aid which can make an immediate difference, and more aid can—and should—be given through these existing channels. Further, Russian state assets could be used as a collateral on Ukraine’s IMF loans.

Concerns with immediate confiscation of Russian state assets

Legal obstacles cannot be dismissed. At a time when Western unity is key in countering Russian aggression, the potential value gained from seizing Russian state assets may not be worth the internal disagreements and tensions it would cause within the EU and the United States. EU member states can confiscate assets only if there is evidence of a specific criminal offense. This rule does not cover blocked sovereign assets. Seizing Russian state assets in this instance would require new legislation and while not insurmountable, gaining consensus among twenty-seven EU member states will be a challenging and lengthy process at a time when other coordination between Western allies is needed including on military aid.

Similar legal challenges exist in the United States. Former senior US officials and Atlantic Council colleagues argue that the United States has legal justification for moving forward with seizing Russian sovereign assets. They cite the implementation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) through Executive Order (EO) in 1992 in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. EO 12817 directed US financial institutions to transfer any Iraqi state funds they held to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in compliance with a UN resolution, and to eventually disperse those funds to affected countries.

However, this precedent does not apply today. In 1991, the United States Congress authorized the use of military force in the Gulf War consistent with a UN Security Council (UNSC) Chapter VII Resolution. It was “engaged in armed hostilities” with Iraq, triggering the IEEPA authorities that allowed the President to confiscate foreign-owned property. Today, the United States is not engaged in armed hostilities with Russia, Russia has not attacked the United States, and there is no UNSC Chapter VII Resolution because Russia and China hold veto power. These distinctions matter. While the moral case for transferring Russian sovereign assets now to support Ukraine is strong, the legal case is more nuanced. The legal challenges cannot be dismissed because they will potentially delay delivery of aid for years.

Third-party states might perceive the United States as an unsafe destination for parking their reserves in the future. Meanwhile, Washington worries about discouraging other central banks from using the dollar as a reserve currency. That is one of the reasons why the Biden administration is resisting proposals from congressional lawmakers allowing seizure of sovereign assets in certain cases. Central banks choose locations for parking reserves based on a risk-based approach and their perceptions of how secure and accessible those assets are going to be. If non-Western countries are worried about getting sanctioned by the United States one day, they will work toward diversifying their portfolios with non-dollar and digital currencies. This could accelerate the recently emerged dedollarization trend and weaken the power of US economic statecraft tools in the future. While countries in the Global South have viewed the blocking of assets warily, it is likely they would view the seizing of assets as a significant escalation.

Private banks would likely be involved in the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) asset seizure process. In 2021, CBR held most of its reserves in the form of government securities. Currently, we don’t know the location of about two-thirds of the blocked $300 billion Russian state assets. There is a likelihood that at least a portion of these assets is still kept as government securities in European commercial banks. All of this will require extra steps and a new directive from the government to the private sector in any forfeiture action.

Georgia on the radar

Finally, let’s zoom in on a country we have never covered in the Global Sanctions Dashboard before: Georgia. Several days ago, experts in Washington called on the United States and Europe to sanction members of the ruling Georgian Dream party if they pass the proposed foreign agent law. The controversial draft legislation, which would require organizations to register as “foreign agents” if they received 20 percent or more of their funding from foreign donors, passed the first parliament hearing. This triggered massive protests in Tbilisi and the Georgian Dream, under pressure, stated it would pull the draft law.

The draft legislation, based on a similar infamous law in Russia, is yet another sign of Georgia’s democratic backsliding under the rule of the Georgian Dream party. It goes against the aspirations of strongly pro-Western Georgian people and if passed, could tilt Georgia’s future away from the West and closer to the Kremlin.

Although the Georgian Dream said that it will withdraw the draft law, many strongly pro-Western Georgians are continuing demonstrations to ensure the ruling party delivers on the promise. The situation in Tbilisi remains volatile, and whether we will see individual sanctions against Georgian Dream members may depend on how they vote during the second parliament hearing.

Castellum.AI provides sanctions data for the Global Sanctions Dashboard.

Global Sanctions Dashboard

Explore Here

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post Global Sanctions Dashboard: What to do with sanctioned Russian assets appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Calls to appease Putin in Ukraine ignore the lessons of history

Arman Mahmoudian — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 21:07:04 +0000

As the full-scale invasion of Ukraine entered its second year last month, Western leaders were keen to demonstrate their continued determination to prevent a Russian victory. At the same time, with no end in sight to what is already by far the largest European conflict since World War II, calls are mounting for a compromise that would end the fighting. Such proposals typically assume a land-for-peace formula that would see Ukraine surrendering part of its sovereign territory and millions of its citizens to permanent Russian occupation.

While the desire for peace is perfectly understandable, calls to appease Putin by handing him a partial victory in Ukraine ignore the lessons of history and would almost certainly lead to more war. If the experience of the 1930s taught the world anything, it is that appeasement merely encourages dictators to go further. Like Hitler before him, Putin will not stop until he is stopped.

Long before last year’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, observers were already noting the obvious parallels between Russia’s trajectory under Vladimir Putin and the rise of Nazi Germany. Both regimes were deeply revisionist, with Hitler’s quest to avenge German defeat in World War I mirrored by Putin’s bitter resentment over Russia’s perceived humiliation following the Soviet collapse.

In foreign policy, the similarities were even more striking. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula drew widespread comparisons with Hitler’s early foreign policy successes, such as the Anschluss with Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland. In an alarming echo of 1930s diplomacy, these early examples of Russian aggression met with a similarly underwhelming international response. Just as Hitler was encouraged by the appeasement policies of the West to swallow the rest of Czechoslovakia and invade Poland, the weak Western response to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine set the stage for last year’s full-scale invasion.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Like Hitler before him, Putin has framed his attack on Ukraine as a campaign to defend ethnic compatriots who have found themselves beyond the borders of the motherland. Given the extent of the Russian diaspora throughout the former USSR and beyond, this creates considerable scope for further expansionist wars.

Putin’s self-assumed position as guardian of Russians abroad, along with the Kremlin’s conveniently flexible interpretation of who qualifies as “Russian,” potentially endangers a long list of countries with significant Russian minorities including Kazakhstan, Moldova, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia. All have prior experience of the Russian and Soviet empires; all remain vulnerable to Kremlin influence and potential military intervention.

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has been promoting its imperial agenda via the so-called “Russian World” ideology, which envisions Russia as the guardian of a unique civilization extending beyond the borders of today’s Russian Federation and united by the Russian language, Slavic ethnicity, and the Orthodox faith. In 2007, the Kremlin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF) to serve as a platform for Russia’s influence operations. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev referred to the RMF as the “key instrument of Russian soft power.”

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, the countries most immediately at risk are Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The latter two both have authoritarian regimes that currently enjoy Moscow’s support but are nevertheless nervous about Russia’s expansionist ambitions.

Kazakhstan is vulnerable due to its isolated geographical position between Russia and China as the world’s largest landlocked country. Russian nationalists have long identified border regions in northern Kazakhstan with large ethnic Russian populations as potential targets for a new imperial adventure. With the Kazakh leadership refusing to publicly back the invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists have recently begun discussing the possibility of future military intervention.

Belarus is already deeply involved in the attack on Ukraine and served as a launch pad for the invasion in February 2022. This role as junior partner in Putin’s war reflects Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s dependence on the Kremlin, which intervened to prop up his regime following a pro-democracy uprising in August 2020. Members of Belarus’s exiled opposition argue that the country is already effectively under Russian occupation. While some would question this conclusion, today’s Belarus is clearly in danger of being either officially or unofficially annexed by Russia.

Meanwhile, undeterred by Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine, the Kremlin has recently begun escalating its rhetoric against Moldova. In early February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the West seeks to turn the country into an “anti-Russian project” and warned that Moldova could become “the next Ukraine.” Weeks later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Russia of plotting to overthrow her pro-EU government.

At present, it is difficult to predict where Russia is most likely to strike next. The one thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that if Moscow is not defeated in Ukraine, it will continue to pursue expansionist policies. In other words, the future peace and stability of Eurasia hinges on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

All those currently calling for compromise with the Kremlin in Ukraine would be wise to recall that policies of appeasement toward Hitler were widely popular at the time among populations desperate to avoid another world war. We now know how disastrously misguided those policies were and have no excuses for repeating the mistake. Defeating Putin in Ukraine will not be easy, but it is the only way to secure a lasting peace and convince Moscow that the era of easy victories over vulnerable neighbors is over.

Arman Mahmoudian is a PhD candidate and international affairs researcher at the University of South Florida.

Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

Frenzy befalls French company accused of feeding Russian forces on New Year’s Eve

Former head of Russian space agency injured in Donetsk, mails shell fragment to French ambassador

Sputnik Lithuania’s former chief editor arrested

International response

New year brings new military aid for Ukraine

Ukrainian envoy to Georgia discusses deteriorating relations between nations

Russian forces claim control of strategic Soledar

Russia said on January 13 that its forces had taken control of the contested city of Soledar. Recent fighting has been concentrated in Soledar and Bakhmut, two cities in the Donetsk region that are strategically important to Ukrainian and Russian forces. Moscow has been trying to take control of the two cities since last summer. Over the past week, Russia has increased its presence on the fronts with the support of Wagner units. Russia wants control of the Soledar-Bakhmut axis to cut supply lines to the Ukrainian armed forces.

On January 10, Russian sources claimed that Wagner forces had advanced into Soledar. Interestingly, Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied the claim and said the forces were still engaged in fighting. Wagner’s presence was established in a camp near Bakhmut. Soldiers from the Wagner Group and other special forces deployed to Bakhmut after other military units had failed to break through the Ukrainian defense.

On January 11, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Anna Malyar said that heavy fighting was taking place in Soledar and that Russian forces had replaced the unit operating in the city with fresh troops and increased the number of Wagner soldiers among them. The same day, Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces had taken control of Soledar. The Ukrainian defense ministry denied the allegation. On January 12, Ukrainian sources shared unconfirmed footage of soldiers driving on the main road connecting Bakhmut and Soledar with Sloviansk and Kostyantynivka to as evidence that the area remained under Ukrainian control.

Elsewhere, on January 11, the Kremlin announced that Valery Gerasimov would replace Sergei Surovikin as commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. The unexpected move could be interpreted as evidence of a struggle for influence in Russian military circles. Surovikin is considered close to Prigozhin’s entourage, which has criticized senior officers recently, including Gerasimov. Some analysts believe that the change signals a possible military escalation from Russia.

Furthermore, on January 8, Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian offensive the vicinity of Makiyivka and Stelmakhivka. Further north of Lysychansk, on January 11, Ukraine also repelled an attack on the city of Kreminna. In the neighboring Kharkiv region, aerial threats remain high. On the southern front, the city of Kherson and several cities across the Zaporizhzhia region remain targets of Russian attacks.

Lastly, a new Maxar satellite image from nearby Bakhmut exemplifies the brutality of war on the frontline in Donetsk. The image shows thousands of craters, indicating the intensity of the artillery shelling and exchange of fire between Ukrainian and Russian forces.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

In December 2022, the Wagner Group organized a hackathon at its recently opened headquarters in St. Petersburg, for students, developers, analysts, and IT professionals. Wagner announced the hackathon on social media earlier that month. Organizers created the promotional website hakaton.wagnercentr.ru, but the website went offline soon after. A December 8 archive of the website, accessed via the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, revealed that the objective of the hackathon was to “create UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] positioning systems using video recognition, searching for waypoints by landmarks in the absence of satellite navigation systems and external control.” Hackathon participants were asked to complete the following tasks: display the position of the UAV on the map at any time during the flight; direct the UAV to a point on the map indicated by the operator; provide a search for landmarks, in case of loss of visual reference points during the flight and returning the UAV to the point of departure, in case of a complete loss of communication with the operator.  

On December 9, Ukrainian programmers noticed that hakaton.wagnercentr.ru was hosted by Amazon Web Services and asked users to report the website to Amazon. Calls to report the channel also spread on Telegram, where the channel Empire Burns asked subscribers to report the website and provided instructions on how to do so. Empire Burns claims hakaton.wagnercentr.ru first went offline on December 9, which tallies with archival posts. However, there is no evidence that reporting the website to Amazon resulted in it being taken offline.  

Snapshots of hakaton.wagnercentr.ru from the Wayback Machine show the website was created in a Bitrix24 online workspace. A snapshot captured on December 13 shows an HTTP 301 status, which redirects visitors to Wagner’s main website, wagnercentr.ru. The Wagner website appears to be geo-restricted for visitors outside Russia.

On December 23, a Wagner Telegram channel posted about the hackathon, claiming more than 100 people applied. In the end, forty-three people divided into twelve teams attended. The two-person team GrAILab Development won first place, the team SR Data-Iskander won second place, and a team from the company Artistrazh received third place. Notably, one of Artistrazh’s co-founders is Igor Turashev, who is wanted by the FBI for his connection to computer malware that the bureau claims infected “tens of thousands of computers, in both North America and Europe, resulting in financial losses in the tens of millions of dollars.” Artistrazh’s team comprised four people who won 200,000 Russian rubles (USD $3,000). OSINT investigators at Molfar confirmed that the Igor Turashev who works at Artistrazh is the same one wanted by the FBI.

Wagner said that one of the key objectives of the hackathon was the development of IT projects to protect the interests of the Russian army, adding that the knowledge gained during the hackathon could already be applied to clear mines. Wagner said it had also invited some participants to collaborate further. The Wagner Center opened in St. Petersburg in early November 2022; the center’s mission is “to provide a comfortable environment for generating new ideas in order to improve Russia’s defense capability, including information.”

– Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Frenzy befalls French company accused of feeding Russian forces on New Year’s Eve

A VKontakte post showing baskets of canned goods produced by the French company Bonduelle being distributed to Russian soldiers on New Year’s Eve has sparked a media frenzy in France. The post alleges that Bonduelle sent Russian soldiers a congratulatory package, telling them to “come back with a win.” The post quotes Ekaterina Eliseeva, the head of Bonduelle’s EurAsia markets. According to a 2019 Forbes article, Eliseeva studied interpretation at an Russian state security academy. 

Bonduelle has issued several statements denying the social media post and calling it fake. However, Bonduelle does maintain operations in Russia “to ensure that the population has access to essential foodstuff.” 

French broadcaster TV 5 Monde discovered that Bonduelle’s Russia division participated in a non-profit effort called Basket of Kindness, sponsored by the Fund of Presidential Grants of Russia. Food and supplies were gathered by food banks to be delivered to vulnerable segments of the population. However, during the collection drive, Dmitry Zharikov, governor of the Russian city of Podolsk, posted on Telegram that the collections would also serve military families.  

The story was shared on national television in France and across several international outlets. The Ukrainian embassy in France criticized Bonduelle for continuing to operate in Russia, claiming it was “making profits in a terrorist country which kills Ukrainians.”

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Former head of Russian space agency injured in Donetsk, mails shell fragment to French ambassador

Dmitry Rogozin, former head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos, said he was wounded in Ukrainian shelling on December 21, 2022, at the Shesh hotel in Donetsk while “celebrating his birthday.” In response, Rogozin sent a letter to Pierre Lévy, the French ambassador to Russia, with a fragment of the shell.  

In the letter, Rogozin accused the French government of “betraying [Charles] De Gaulle’s cause and becoming a bloodthirsty state in Europe.” The shell fragment was extracted from Rogozin’s spine during surgery and allegedly came from a French CAESAR howitzer. Rogozin requested the fragment be sent to French President Emmanuel Macron. His message was relayed by Russian news agencies, and on Telegram by pro-Russian and French-speaking conspiracy channels. 

At the time of the attack, Rogozin was accompanied by two members of his voluntary unit, “Tsar’s wolves,” who were killed in the attack, according to reporting from RT, RIA Novosti, and others. 

– Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Sputnik Lithuania’s former chief editor arrested

On January 6, Marat Kasem, the former chief editor of Sputnik Lithuania, was arrested in Riga, Latvia, on suspicion of “providing economic resources” to a Kremlin propaganda resource under EU sanctions.

The following day, pro-Kremlin journalists held a small demonstration in support of Kasem in front of the Latvian embassy in Moscow. Russian journalist Dmitry Kiselyov and politician Maria Butina attended the event.

The demonstration was filmed by Sputnik and amplified with the Russian hashtag #свободуМаратуКасему (#freedomForMaratKasem) on Telegram channels operating in the Baltic states, including the pro-Russian BALTNEWS, Своих не бросаем! | Свободная Балтика!, and on Butina’s personal channel. The news of Kasem’s arrest also reached the Russian Duma’s Telegram channel, which re-shared Butina’s post.

– Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

New year brings new military aid for Ukraine

International efforts in support of Ukraine are continuing in full force in 2023. On January 4, Norway announced it had sent Ukraine another 10,000 155mm artillery shells. These shells can be used in several types of artillery units, including the M109 self-propelled howitzer. On January 5, Germany confirmed it would provide Ukraine with Marder fighting vehicles and a Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery. German news outlet Spiegel also reported that talks are underway to supply Ukraine with additional Gepard anti-aircraft guns and ammunition.

In addition, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly said the British government would supply Ukraine with military equipment capable of delivering a “decisive” strike from a distance. At the end of 2022, UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace discussed the possibility of transferring Storm Shadow cruise missiles, with a range of up to 250 kilometers. Finland also reported that it is preparing its twelfth package of military assistance to Ukraine.

US aid to Ukraine is also being reaffirmed with a $2.85 billion package on top of weapon deliveries. Additionally, the US plans to deliver fourteen vehicles equipped with anti-drone systems as part of its security assistance package. The company L3Harris is part of the Pentagon’s contract to develop anti-drone kits. This equipment would help protect Ukrainian civil infrastructure, which has been a frequent Russian target since October 2022.

On January 6, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would supply Ukraine with units of the light AMX-10RC armored reconnaissance vehicle. These vehicles were produced in 1970 and have been used in Afghanistan, the Gulf War, Mali, Kosovo, and Ivory Coast. The French defense ministry also announced that the country was to deliver twenty units of ACMAT Bastion armored personnel carriers.

On January 11, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Presidents Andrzej Duda of Poland and Gitanas Nauseda of Lithuania in Lviv. During the visit, Duda announced that Poland would deliver fourteen units of the much-awaited German Leopard combat tanks, and Nauseda announced that his country would provide Ukraine with Zenit anti-aircraft systems.

Meanwhile, the largest manufacturer of containers for the transport of liquified natural gas has ceased operations in Russia. French engineering group Gaztransport & Technigaz (GTT) said it ended operations in Russia after reviewing the latest European sanctions package, which included a ban on engineering services for Russian firms. The group said its contract with Russian shipbuilding company Zvezda to supply fifteen icebreakers to transport liquefied natural gas was suspended effective January 8.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Ukrainian envoy to Georgia discusses deteriorating relations between nations

On January 9, Andrii Kasianov, the Ukrainian Chargé d’Affaires in Georgia, published an article discussing the deteriorating relationship between the two countries. The article stated that the top issues affecting relations were military aid to Ukraine, bilateral sanctions against Russia, visa policies for fleeing Russians, and the legal rights of Mikheil Saakashvili, the imprisoned third president of Georgia, who is also a Ukrainian citizen.

Kasianov noted that Tbilisi declined Kyiv’s request for military help, specifically for BUK missile systems, which were given to Georgia by Ukraine during Russia’s 2008 invasion. The diplomat said that the weapons request also included Javelin anti-tank systems supplied to Georgia by the United States.

“Despite the fact that the Georgian government categorically refused to provide military aid, Ukraine opposes the use of this issue in internal political disputes and rejects any accusations of attempts to draw Georgia into a war with the Russian Federation,” Kasianov said.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Georgian Dream-led government has accused Ukraine, the US, and the EU of attempting to drag Georgia into a war with Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Vladimir Putin: 2022 Loser of the Year

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 13 Dec 2022 09:13:22 +0000

For the first time since the event was launched a decade ago, Vladimir Putin will not hold his flagship end-of-year press marathon this month. The surprise cancellation is the latest indication that all is not well in the Kremlin. For the past ten years, Putin’s annual press marathon has been a carefully curated propaganda spectacle allowing the Russian dictator to demonstrate his mastery of world affairs. However, with his invasion of Ukraine unraveling amid unprecedented losses and mounting military defeats, Putin is clearly in no mood to face even the most docile of audiences.

While Putin hides from the cameras, his arch-rival is ending the year on a wave of international acclaim. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has already been named Person of the Year by an ever-expanding list of media outlets including TIME magazine and the Financial Times newspaper, and is now being routinely touted as one of the world’s most influential politicians. Zelenskyy’s rising profile is recognition of his wartime leadership and also reflects global admiration for Ukraine’s courageous resistance to the Russian invasion.

The contrasting fortunes of the Russian and Ukrainian leaders underline the self-defeating folly of Putin’s decision to launch Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II. His original plan envisaged a short and victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, he now finds himself an international pariah with his country’s reputation as military superpower in tatters and his Ukrainian enemies looking forward with growing confidence to the very real prospect of an historic victory in the coming year. By almost any measure, Vladimir Putin is comfortably the biggest loser of 2022.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Putin’s woes can be traced directly to the battlefields of Ukraine. His invading army has performed disastrously over the past ten months and has lost a series of key engagements including the Battle of Kyiv, the Battle of Kharkiv, and the Battle of Kherson. More than one hundred thousand Russian soldiers are believed to have been killed or wounded, while thousands of Russian tanks and armored vehicles have been captured of destroyed. These losses have forced Putin to launch his country’s first mobilization since 1945, a move that has destabilized Russia and brought the war home to previously supportive domestic audiences.

Russia’s international image has also been badly tarnished by revelations of widespread war crimes committed against the Ukrainian civilian population. Russian troops stand accused of carrying out mass executions and engaging in sexual violence, abductions, and torture throughout occupied Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation, while policies of indiscriminate bombardment have left tens of thousands dead and reduced dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble. In recent months, Russia has begun the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure with the express intention of depriving Ukrainians of access to heating, electricity, and water during the depths of winter.

Many international observers see these policies as nothing short of genocide, especially as they have been accompanied by a steady stream of openly genocidal invective from regime propagandists and Kremlin officials in Moscow. Others have been appalled by Putin’s readiness to engage in nuclear saber-rattling. On multiple occasions, the Russian leader has issued thinly veiled threats alluding to the possible use of his country’s vast atomic arsenal. This nuclear blackmail has provoked a strong backlash, with US officials promising “catastrophic consequences” and even the normally supportive Chinese rebuking Russia.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

All this has left Russia more internationally isolated than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution a century ago. In a revealing recent exchange, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov admitted, “nobody likes us and they don’t intend to start liking us.” Peskov may have had the Western world primarily in mind, but his comment also reflected the wider reality of Russia’s increasingly unfavorable international position. Moscow’s isolation is most immediately obvious at the United Nations, where a series of General Assembly votes condemning the invasion of Ukraine have passed with resounding majorities. Tellingly, only a handful of fellow pariahs such as North Korea and Syria have been prepared to stand with Russia.

Closer to home, the Kremlin is visibly losing influence throughout the former Soviet Empire. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan is openly distancing itself from Russia while strengthening ties with China, Turkey, and the West. In the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan is increasingly ignoring Russia’s nominal role as regional peacekeeper while Armenia bristles over Moscow’s failure to provide any meaningful protection. Even Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who depends almost completely on the Kremlin for his political survival, has so far managed to resist Russian pressure to directly participate in the invasion of Ukraine.

On the wider international stage, the United States has succeeded in consolidating Western support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Putin’s efforts to weaponize energy exports have backfired and forced European countries to turn decisively away from reliance on Russia. The BRICS nations (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) continue to purchase Russian resources, but are now doing so on their own heavily discounted terms. Beyond this pragmatic trade, they have refused to back Russia or provide Moscow with much-needed weapons. This has forced the Kremlin to seek replacement tanks, artillery shells, drones, and missiles from the likes of Iran and Belarus.

What can Putin look forward to in 2023? He appears to believe the international alliance opposing his invasion may still eventually lose interest and is pinning his hopes on Western leaders forcing Kyiv into some kind of compromise deal that would allow Russia to snatch a victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat. However, with most of Ukraine’s backers publicly stating that they will let the Ukrainians themselves decide when to negotiate, this outcome looks unlikely. After all, no Ukrainian government could conceivably condemn millions of their compatriots to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation.

A far more realistic scenario would see the well-armed and highly motivated Ukrainian military continue to steadily liberate occupied territory while Russia suffers heavy losses among poorly trained and badly equipped conscript troops. This is a recipe for disaster for the Putin regime. The Russian army in Ukraine is already deeply demoralized and struggling to mount localized offensives. Further attrition in the coming months will raise the prospect of a more comprehensive military collapse that could have grave consequences for the future of the Russian Federation itself.

As 2022 draws to a close, it is already obvious that Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine was one of the biggest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. His dream of shattering the post-1991 settlement and rebuilding the Russian Empire has made him the single greatest threat to global security and placed him in direct confrontation with a formidable coalition of the world’s most powerful nations, who have reluctantly come to recognize the necessity of his defeat. Putin enters 2023 with few friends and fewer options. The coming year is shaping up to be the darkest of his entire reign. It may also be the last.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

The underlying market context is how countries are managing their gas balances. The table below examines how Europe has rebalanced while losing around 80 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian supply:

Additionally, storage has been rebuilt, which in effect means parking current supply for tomorrow’s demand. On the other side of the rebalancing sheet, the principal components are falling demand and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. Pipeline imports increased only marginally. Interestingly, the 74 bcm demand fall is very close to the 15 percent reduction targeted by the EU Commission, and achieved through reaction to high prices, not government decree.

Europe has been lucky. Asia has taken less LNG and November was warm. EU total storage capacity in November was 95 percent full; by the end of November it had hardly moved, down to 94 percent. In effect, Mother Nature gave Europe a whole storage month.

Next year will be harder. There will be a full year of reduced (possibly zeroed-out) Russian gas, Asian LNG demand might return, storage will need to be rebuilt, and it might get cold in Q1 2023.

The Commission has spent considerable effort touring pipeline-exporting countries, like Norway, Algeria, and Azerbaijan, in search of more supply. In July, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson were in Baku and came back with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor for more gas—from 12 billion cubic meters per year (bcma) to 20 bcma by 2027.

The other part of the equation is Azerbaijan. The table below sets the scene:

With Shah Deniz nearing full production now, Azerbaijani output will be up 5-6 percent in 2022. Exports will be up too, roughly unchanged to Turkey but up for Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) markets Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria. Energy Minister Shahbazov recently talked about 11.5 bcm to Europe, and this looks realistic. Note, TAP volumes recently have been at 12 bcma.

Source: ENTSOG daily flows at https://transparency.entsog.eu/#/map

With reasonable expectations of a small rise in domestic demand and unchanged underground storage levels, Azerbaijan needs imports to balance.

In January 2022, a scheme involving Turkmenistan’s gas exports to Azerbaijan via an Iran 1-2 bcma swap started. Then in November came disclosure that Russia would supply Azerbaijan with 1 bcm between November and March. Exact volumes flowing have not been reported, but the balance above suggests at least 1.2 bcm is needed in 2022. A cynical view would be that Azerbaijan has successfully maneuvered to buy in gas at one price and sell it spot at high European prices.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijani gas exports to Turkey remain down from the 2020 level of 11.5 bcm as a result of only a partial renewal of the Shah Deniz Stage 1 contract, with Azerbaijan preferring to retain some volumes for export flexibility. While commercially this makes sense, it may not politically. In an election year in 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will want to ensure maximum gas flows this winter, and Ankara is pressing Baku for an extra 10 bcm.

Erdogan is scheduled to hold tripartite talks with Turkmenistan’s President Berdimukhammedov and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on December 14. According to a Bloomberg report on December 9, senior Turkish officials have said Erdogan would revive the idea of shipping Turkmen natural gas to Azerbaijan for subsequent insertion to the SGC. Almost certainly, the Turkish idea is based on using compressed natural gas (CNG) for the shipments, which would require construction of compression facilities and either specialized tankers or specialized storage cylinders for loading onto barges. In 2010, the International Energy Agency estimated it would likely cost around $1.40 to $2.00 per MBtu to ship 5 bcma of CNG across the Caspian, compared to costs of around $0.70 to $0.80 for/MBtu for gas transported by pipeline. Commercial sources in Ashgabat told one of the authors at that time they considered CNG transport would be roughly four times as expensive as pipeline gas. The authors regard a CNG Trans-Caspian value chain as being a non-starter.

Source: Turkey regulator at https://www.epdk.gov.tr/Detay/Icerik/3-0-95/dogal-gazaylik-sektor-raporu

Azerbaijan is therefore in a curious position. As a major gas producer, it has signed an MOU to carry more gas from Baku to Europe but lacks a clear path to providing all or most of the necessary input itself. Meanwhile, it has to import gas from Turkmenistan via Iran and Russia to help it meet its domestic and export commitments. And while Apsheron Stage 1 should come on-stream in 2023, its 1.5 bcma output is already earmarked for the domestic market.

The key issues

a.) Infrastructure and production requirements

Some sections of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) can currently handle a little more gas. There is perhaps 4-5 bcma of spare capacity on the sections from Azerbaijan to Turkey, but precious little thereafter. The EU-Azerbaijan MOU of July 2022 to take exports from the current 12 bcma to 20 bcma will require investment in compressors and, perhaps, some parallel pipelining (looping). The costs remain unknown but can be reckoned in billions of dollars or euros. TAP has already announced market test plans for 2023 to see whether suppliers are prepared to commit volumes for throughput that would justify the expansion costs.

On production, Azerbaijan has a long list of potential offshore gas developments: Apsheron, ACG Deep, Shah Deniz Stage 3, Shafag Asiman, and Socar’s Umid/Babek. At present, the only ones actually proceeding are Socar’s own Umid block, which is already producing at around 1-2 bcma, and the 1.5 bcma Apsheron Stage 1, although Socar sources say that discussions with Apsheron’s operator, France’s Total, for full field agreement are very close to completion and that an agreement could be concluded early in 2023. If so, this should add 3 bcma to Azerbaijani export-focused output in or around 2026.

All the others require either further exploration or a development plan and project commitment—in other words, a final investment decision (FID). Eventually—there is no clear timeframe—Socar hopes to produce up to 5 bcma from its Babek field while Socar sources say discussions on ACG Deep are “on track” and that the field, considered capable of producing up to 5 bcma, could start to come on stream in 2027-28. bp, the operator, is engaged in discussions with Socar on enhancing production at Shah Deniz, but there is no indication concerning either the volumes or timeframe for any increase in output.

b.) Timeframe

Getting a project ready for FID requires planning, engineering, project finance, commercial gas sale agreements, and contracts for platform construction and local infrastructure as well as for SGC pipeline expansion. Unless this process is already well under way, there is no hope for any additional export-oriented production from Azerbaijan for the next 4-5 years.

c.) Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan does have gas available. It can supply gas both to help Europe meet its urgent requirements for gas in 2023-24 and to cover any shortfall in Azerbaijani gas supply for an expanded SGC. Although the current swap via Iran demonstrates that gas from Turkmenistan can already reach Azerbaijan by pipeline, either directly or indirectly, lack of transparency and a 3 bcma limit to Iranian pipeline capacity render it almost irrelevant in the context of European supply.

That places the focus on a trans-Caspian pipeline, a subject raised by Baku in countless talks with Ashgabat. The problem is the near-total mismatch between European requirements and Turkmenistan’s aspirations. Europe wants gas now. In technical terms, this could be accomplished in relatively short order, such as through the Trans Caspian Connector project. This would link Turkmenistan’s and Azerbaijan’s offshore facilities with a 78-km pipeline, and could be put in place at an estimated cost of around $400-600 million within a few months of securing the necessary approvals of both countries and the necessary financing.

However, Turkmenistan has informed US diplomats that it is not interested in the Connector project and is signaling that it won’t get out of bed for anything less than the decades-old idea of a 30 bcma pipeline. Building such a line, and more importantly arranging the onward transportation and sales in Turkey and EU, would be far more complicated than a simple connector. A new 30 bcma system from Turkmenistan to Italy, roughly twice the size of the SGC, would cost vastly more than the $20 billion required for the SGC’s initial pipeline components.

Moreover, Turkmenistan would probably demand a long-term contract structure which the EU itself cannot provide, and which European companies might be reluctant to sign. Overall, nothing could be completed before 2030, by which time the EU should have resolved its current supply crisis and be far along the path to a renewables-based energy future.

d.) The role of Turkey

Turkey’s gas demand is soaring, amounting to 46.2 bcm in 2020, 57.3 bcm in 2021, and roughly the same in 2022. It wants more Azerbaijani gas and would also like gas from Turkmenistan in its supply portfolio. But Turkey is already a highly competitive market with multiple pipeline supply options from Russia (Blue Stream, Turk Stream), Iran, and Azerbaijan, while LNG routinely accounts for around 25-30 percent of all imports.

Moreover, while imports currently account for 99 percent of supply, it is developing its giant Sakarya field in the Black Sea, discovered in 2020, with first gas expected in March 2023, well in time for both the presidential election next June and for the centenary of the Republic next October. The build-up to planned 15-bcma plateau production in 2027 appears quite realistic. So the landscape for a Caspian producer looking at Turkey is becoming ever more competitive.

e.) The Balkans and the Trans Balkan Pipeline

Expansion of the SGC may well involve more than simply expanding the SGC, notably the addition of substantial new capacity to carry gas to demand centers in Northern Italy. When the SGC FIDs were signed in late 2013, Italy was importing around 7 bcma from Algeria and there was spare capacity for the system to accept gas from TAP. But Italian imports from Algeria are now running at around 21 bcma. Azerbaijan clearly worries that any expansion of SGC’s TAP section needs to be accompanied by several hundred kilometers of expensive new pipeline infrastructure within Italy.

There are alternatives. All the Russian gas which once flowed down the Trans Balkan pipeline system through Romania or Bulgaria and then to Greece, North Macedonia, and Turkey has, since January 2020, been diverted into Russia’s Turk Stream pipeline. So the 20-25 bcma Trans Balkan System is now only partially used. For instance, it currently carries around 2 bcma of Russian gas in reverse-flow mode from Turk Stream via Bulgaria to Romania. Using it as an alternative or complementary route to TAP is possible, although this would involve new marketing arrangements if substantial amounts of Caspian gas, for example the 8 bcm noted in the EU-Azerbaijan MOU talks in July, were involved.

Conclusion

Azerbaijan has no production projects that can deliver extra gas to Europe right now, and its strictly limited output prospects mean that if wants to inject as much as 8 bcma into an expanded SGC by 2027, then work, not talk, needs to start today.

Turkmenistan constitutes the only immediate source for new Caspian gas supplies in 2023. But while this could be inserted into a small but straightforward connector, and is backed by Azerbaijan, such an approach is rejected by Turkmenistan, which is waiting for Europe to come along with money and a long-term contract for 30 bcma. That simply will not happen.

On November 25, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev delivered the most pertinent summary of the current impasse. Asked by one of the writers of this piece about the status of discussions on a trans-Caspian Pipeline, Aliyev said it was up to Turkmenistan: “They have to make a decision. They want us to do it. They will have to take some action. We will not initiate action.”

John Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and a member of the UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Group of Experts on Gas.

Julian Bowden is a former economist with BP specializing in gas markets in SE Europe and the Caspian, and is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow with the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies OIES.

The authors acknowledge that they are on the advisory board of a project to lay a 78-kilometer connector pipeline between the Petronas-operated Magtymguly field in Turkmenistan and gas-gathering facilities operated by BP in the Azerbaijan’s Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oilfield.

EnergySource Nov 1, 2022

How Europe can salvage its climate credibility at COP27

By Michał Kurtyka and Paddy Ryan

Europe’s recent energy policies have begotten accusations of climate hypocrisy, as the continent blocks access to financing for gas projects in developing countries yet scours those countries for gas supplies for its own use. At COP27, Europe can—and should—responsibly reconcile those contradictions.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

EnergySource Apr 25, 2022

The EU’s plans to replace Russian gas: Aspiration and reality

By John Roberts and Julian Bowden

The implementation of the EU’s REPowerEU plan looks to be a monumental task. The authors offer insight into the EU’s various options in its effort to remove Russia from its gas balance and greatly reduce its hold over the continent.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Mar 20, 2022

Removing Russia from the European gas balance: A major role for Caspian gas

By John Roberts and Julian Bowden

Exporting more Caspian gas to Turkey could free up precious LNG cargoes for consumption in the EU market. Three Caspian options in particular would go a long way to ensuring the EU can get out from under Russian gas hegemony.

Energy & Environment Europe & Eurasia

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

learn more

The post Europe and the Caspian: The gas supply conundrum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia must stop being an empire if it wishes to prosper as a nation

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 06 Dec 2022 17:17:01 +0000

When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the Russian Federation embraced more or less exactly the same imperial identity that the Bolsheviks had inherited from their Czarist predecessors generations earlier. Until this changes, Russia will remain a source of global instability and a threat to European security while failing to achieve its own true potential.

Since the early 1990s, modern Russia has consistently called on the West to acknowledge the former USSR (excluding the three Baltic states) as its exclusive sphere of influence. This reflects strong imperial instincts inside the Kremlin and throughout Russian society. It also highlights the ongoing confusion among the Russian public and the country’s elites over exactly what constitutes “Russia.”

This is hardly surprising given that Russian and Soviet identities had been virtually indistinguishable within the USSR. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Russian Federation simply took control of Soviet institutions in Moscow and began the process of post-Soviet state-building. Russia’s reluctance to completely disassociate itself from the USSR was already obvious in December 1991 when Moscow pushed for the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Throughout the 1990s, civic attachment to the Russian Federation remained weak. Meanwhile, more overtly imperial forms of identity proved to be far more popular, leading to calls for a return to the Soviet and Czarist eras or for a resurgent Russia to lead a new Eurasian empire. This trend was evident even before the Soviet Empire fell, with celebrated dissident author Alexander Solzhenitsyn calling in 1990 for a new Russian Union of the three Eastern Slavic nations (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus). This concept would be revived and broadened almost two decades later to serve as the basis for Putin’s “Russian World” ideology.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The continued popularity of supra-national imperial identities in post-Soviet Russia was clear during the 1993 constitutional crisis, which saw an alliance of communists and extreme nationalists attempt to overthrow President Yeltsin. Three years later during the Russian presidential election, Yeltsin embraced the imperial agenda of a union state with Belarus to help counter strong revanchist support for Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov.

By the time KGB veteran Vladimir Putin became president at the turn of the millennium, Russia was already visibly shifting away from its brief flirtation with European integration. Putin openly embraced Russia’s imperial identity and laid claim to Eurasia as the Kremlin’s exclusive sphere of influence. He was reportedly obsessed from the very start of his presidency with the idea of bringing Ukraine firmly back into the Russian orbit.

Putin’s position was perhaps predictable. The Soviet KGB where he spent the formative years of his professional career was a strikingly chauvinistic institution that openly embraced a sense of Russia’s imperial mission. This mentality was passed on to the KGB’s post-Soviet successor agencies, which assumed a dominant role in Russia following Putin’s rise to power.

Among policymakers in Putin’s Russia, other former Soviet nations such as Ukraine were never credited with real agency or genuine sovereignty. Instead, they were routinely regarded as part of modern Russia’s informal empire. Such ideas enjoyed widespread support among the Russian public and were heavily promoted in the carefully curated Russian mainstream media.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

In 2012, Putin returned to the presidency with the goal of entering history as the gatherer of Russian lands. In practice, this meant completing the reintegration of Belarus and Ukraine. Putin had always viewed these two East Slavic states are core members of his envisioned Eurasian Economic Union. With Crimea annexed in 2014 and Belarus transformed into a Russian puppet state in 2020, the last and decisive step in this historic process was to be the complete subjugation of Ukraine in 2022.

Unfortunately for Putin, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan. Far from completing his historic reunification mission, the rapidly unraveling attack on Ukraine has shattered Russia’s reputation as a Great Power and as a military force to be reckoned with. As a consequence, many now view Russia as a declining power.

Moscow’s ability to project influence throughout its former empire has suffered accordingly. This presents Russia’s neighbors and the Western world with a golden opportunity to encourage the evolution of a post-imperial Russian identity that could serve as the basis for Russia’s reintegration into the wider international community.

In order to achieve this goal, the democratic world must rethink its own policies toward Russia and stop informally acknowledging Moscow’s claims to a sphere of influence. This outdated and unhelpful approach merely serves to legitimize Russia’s imperial ambitions. Instead, the West should treat Russia as an ordinary nation state and hold Moscow to the same standards applied to others.

Western leaders should also encourage the non-Russian states of the former USSR to stop buttressing Russia’s supra-national identity and end their participation in post-Soviet structures whose main purpose is to prolong Russia’s regional dominance. Members of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and Eurasian Economic Union should be encouraged to withdraw. Armenia should be encouraged to return to the EU Association Agreement it abandoned under Russian pressure in 2013.

Another key step toward a post-imperial Russia is elimination of the grey zone between NATO and the EU on one side, and a Russia-dominated Eurasia on the other. While the current war in Ukraine cannot continue forever, a fresh Russian invasion is virtually inevitable unless Ukraine in offered a clear road map toward NATO membership. Ukraine’s current position in the geopolitical grey zone helps keep Russia’s imperial aspirations alive and makes a lasting peace in Europe unattainable.

Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU would rule out any further Russian invasions and dramatically reduce the scope for new imperial adventures. This would lead to a decline in support within Russia for aggressive imperial ideologies and discredit the entire notion of Putin’s “Russian World.” Instead, we would likely witness the growth of Russian civic identity.

Three decades after the fall of the USSR, Russia is currently in real danger of losing its Great Power status. The disastrous invasion of Ukraine has exposed internal weaknesses and sparked an unprecedented collapse in Russian influence throughout the former Soviet Empire. It is clearly in the interests of the democratic world to encourage this process of imperial retreat. The transformation of Russian national identity into a post-imperial and civic form would pave the way for a new era of European peace and productivity. The ultimate beneficiaries of this would be the Russian people themselves.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His forthcoming book is “Genocide and Fascism, Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Grady Wilson — Tue, 11 Oct 2022 20:06:00 +0000

original source

The post Arslan joins TRT World to discuss the themes of the Atlantic Council’s Regional Clean Energy Outlook Conference appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Vladimir Putin has little reason to celebrate on his seventieth birthday

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 07 Oct 2022 12:16:50 +0000

Vladimir Putin marks his seventieth birthday on October 7 but the Russian ruler has little reason to celebrate. For much of his 22-year reign, Putin has been credited with rejuvenating Russia and returning the country to the forefront of world affairs following the humiliations of the 1990s. However, his decision to invade Ukraine has made him personally toxic and left Russia more internationally isolated than ever. In less than one year, Putin the Great has become Putin the Pariah.

Few could have envisioned this turn of events on February 24 when Putin launched his attack on Ukraine. Most observers in Russia and the West confidently expected Ukrainian resistance to collapse in a matter of hours, allowing Moscow to install a Kremlin-friendly puppet in Kyiv. This was to be Putin’s greatest achievement, correcting what he and millions of Russians fervently believed to be the injustice of the post-Soviet settlement.

Unfortunately for Putin, Ukraine fought back. The courage and determination displayed by the Ukrainian nation during the tumultuous first days of the invasion won the admiration of the watching world and transformed international perceptions. A conflict that Putin had sort to portray as a “Special Military Operation” to address legitimate Russian security concerns was now widely recognized as a brutal and entirely illegitimate war of imperial conquest.

Russia’s battlefield fortunes have continued to deteriorate ever since. Putin’s army was beaten in the Battle of Kyiv and forced to retreat entirely from northern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces then fought his troops to a standstill in eastern Ukraine and have since achieved stunning counter-offensive successes on both the eastern and southern fronts. Moscow has suffered staggering losses including tens of thousands of soldiers and dozens of commanders. The once vaunted Russian military has become a laughing stock, its tanks towed away by Ukrainian tractors and its frequent retreats disguised as “goodwill gestures.”

This has taken a heavy toll on morale. Fleeing Russian troops have abandoned so many vehicles and arms depots that Moscow is now officially Ukraine’s main weapons supplier. With large numbers of Russian troops simply refusing to fight, Putin was recently forced to introduce draconian new penalties for deserters while also announcing Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. It not clear whether these desperate measures will enable Putin to stop the rot within his army. International sanctions make it difficult for Russia to replace the vast amounts of equipment lost or expended in Ukraine, while many question the military value is poorly trained and demoralized conscripts against the increasingly well-armed and superbly motivated Ukrainians.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Putin’s woes are not limited to the battlefields of Ukraine. His rapidly unraveling invasion has also gravely undermined Russia’s international standing. Countries throughout Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence have been encouraged by the poor performance of the Russian military and are now openly defying the Kremlin.

Kazakhstan has sided with the West over the war and is at the same time drawing closer to China. In the southern Caucasus, Russia has been exposed as toothless amid a new flareup in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Baltic states have emerged as key champions of the Ukrainian cause and have imposed tough entry restrictions on all Russian citizens, while even Kremlin-dependent Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has resisted Russian pressure to join the invasion. At this stage, it looks like Ukraine will become the graveyard of Putin’s imperial ambitions.

The Russian dictator’s efforts to divide the West have also backfired. Transatlantic cooperation has been reinvigorated by the invasion of Ukraine, while Europe has responded to Moscow’s energy blackmail by slowly but surely moving to end its dependence on Russian oil and gas. Worst of all, NATO has expanded on Russia’s doorstep, with both Sweden and Finland abandoning decades of neutrality and applying for membership of the military alliance.

Even Putin’s traditional partners appear to be getting cold feet. The Chinese and Indian leaders have both recently expressed their concerns over the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, while only a handful of fellow pariah nations are currently prepared to stand with Russia during voting at the United Nations.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Putin’s current plight is all the more striking as it is almost entirely self-inflicted. His well-documented obsession with Ukraine has clearly clouded his judgment and led him into a series of disastrous decisions that have undone the progress made during the early years of his reign. This obsession is rooted in Putin’s conviction that the emergence of a genuinely independent Ukraine is an historical aberration that poses an existential threat to Russia itself. Haunted by the Soviet collapse, he is convinced that the consolidation of a democratic and European Ukraine will act as a catalyst for the next chapter in Russia’s imperial retreat.

Despite his best efforts to contain the conflict within Ukraine, there are signs that instability is indeed coming to Putin’s Russia. For now, the Russian public is largely voting with its feet. An estimated 700,000 Russians fled the country in the first two weeks following the announcement of mobilization. However, there are also indications of a mounting protest mood, particularly in poorer regions such as Dagestan where ethnic minorities have already suffered disproportionate losses during the first seven months of the invasion.

More worryingly for Putin, there is growing evidence of infighting among the Kremlin elite. In recent days, key regime loyalists such as Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and the founder of the mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have launched highly unusual public attacks on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Russian military commanders leading the Ukraine invasion.

This rising tide of discontent is also evident on Russian state television. The carefully choreographed political talk shows that dominate Russia’s mainstream media are widely viewed as a barometer of the mood within the Kremlin. For months, the regime’s favorite propagandists remained upbeat about the war. However, the tone has become noticably darker in recent weeks following Russia’s bruising defeats in the Kharkiv and Kherson sectors. At present, the critics are focusing their fire on the military. However, if Moscow’s battlefield losses continue to mount, it is surely only a matter of time before the Russian public acknowledges that the problem is Putin himself.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Putin illegally annexes Ukrainian territory

On September 30, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially annexed four Ukrainian oblasts, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, effectively incorporating all of southeastern Ukraine into Russia. “There are four new regions of Russia,” he told the assembled audience at the Kremlin, and insisted that annexing the regions was “the will of millions of people.” After a brief history lesson in which he lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “catastrophe,” he called for Ukraine to accept a ceasefire. Putin was open to negotiating a settlement, he continued, but added that he would defend the newly annexed territories “by all means available.” In reference to the possible use of nuclear weapons, he said the US “created a precedent” for their use when it bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

Prior to the annexation ceremony, Reuters and the Guardian reported Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov discussing how Russia would “’de jure’ incorporate parts of Ukraine which are not under the control of Russian forces into Russia itself.” Russia would therefore consider Ukrainian attacks on annexed areas that Russia does not even control as an attack on Russia itself.

Response to today’s developments have been swift. UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace declared on Twitter, “The UK will never recognise Russia’s illegal annexations in Ukraine.”

The UK will never recognise Russia’s illegal annexations in Ukraine. Russia doesn’t even control some of these oblasts. The truth is Russia is losing in Ukraine and their incompetent Generals are sending thousands to their deaths to please President Putin’s imperialist fantasy.
— Rt. Hon Ben Wallace MP (@BWallaceMP) September 30, 2022

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas lambasted the move as a “land grab” and put the annexation into stark geographic terms:

Let’s look at the magnitude of Russia’s illegal annexation. Russia will announce that around 20% of Ukraine’s territory is annexed to Russia. It is the size of 108 800 km2 – this is comparable to Austria and Belgium combined. Or Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands combined. Or 30% of Germany. Or the size of the Republic of Korea. If you add Crimea to it, the territory is comparable to three Belgiums and the Netherlands combined. And around 40% of Germany.

And let’s call things with the right names. Russia tries to rewrite the map of Europe. It’s a land grab. It’s theft. Putin hopes to add legitimacy to his invasion with this step. The international community will never recognize it.
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas

US President Joe Biden also condemned Putin’s annexation move. “Make no mistake: these actions have no legitimacy,” he said in a statement. “The United States will always honor Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders.”

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Ukraine attempts to encircle Lyman; civilian convoy hit in Zaporizhzhia

Russian and Ukrainian analysts on Telegram are predicting that Lyman could fall into Ukrainian control, as Ukraine continues its efforts to encircle the Russian-controlled city. A Ukrainian armed forces spokesman told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the encirclement of Lyman is “nearing its completion.” There are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces are attempting a pullback from the city.

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1575792380468658176

In recent days, Russian army shelling was most active in the front areas of the front near Bakhmut and Pokrovsk. In the Bakhmut area, Toretsk and Svitlodarsk came under fire. There is a Ukrainian breakthrough reported in Stavky, the liberation of Yampil which reportedly fell under Ukrainian control on this morning, and a blockade of Drobysheve, which is important for the Russian defense of the city.

Outside of Zaporizhzhia, a missile struck a civilian convoy of residents attempting to relocate. Initial reports from the scene suggest a death toll of more than two dozen people, but at the time of writing had not been confirmed.

The news from the front comes against the background of the Kremlin’s announcement to annex four more areas of Ukraine after self-styled referendums condemned by Ukraine and the West as a sham. It is worth noting that Russia does not fully control any of the four regions it has decided to annex. Although most of Luhansk remains under Russian control, Moscow only controls 60 percent of Donetsk. The capital of the southern region of Zaporizhzhia is under the control of Ukraine’s government while the frontlines in Kherson remain unstable.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Russian men resist mobilization across the country

Against the backdrop of Ukrainian pressure on the front lines in the Donbas, signs of resistance in the Russian Federation against the announced mobilization continue to emerge. Authorities detained an individual after an arson incident took place at the military enlistment office in Uryupinsk. At least fifty-four arson incidents have been document documented in recent weeks, according to Russian independent media outlet Mediazona.

On September 26, a Russian man lit himself on fire at a bus station in Ryazan while yelling he didn’t want to take part in the Ukraine war. In another incident that same day, a commander was killed at a military enlistment office in eastern Russia. A video emerged of a Russian man opening fire and killing the commander in the city of Ust-Ilimsk, who was also the head of the local draft committee.

Meanwhile, the number of Russians attempting to leave the Russian Federation has increased since Putin declared a partial mobilization. The Finnish Border Guard, for instance, reported an increase of 37 percent on September 24 compared with the previous weekend at the immigration checkpoints Salla and Raja-Jooseppi in Lapland. Further south, where Finland has several cross-border roads to Karelia and the St. Petersburg region, traffic was reportedly higher. A total of 38,444 Russian citizens entered Finland at land border checkpoints last week, the Border Guards stated. Considering the mass exodus from Russia, Novaya Gazeta reported that 261,000 men had left the country since mobilization, according to the FSB; most had fled to Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. Especially dire is the situation on the Georgian border, where the Russian army even established mobile barricades to stop those of military age from departing the country. Several outlets reported that Russian authorities could close the border for military-aged men as soon as this week. These reports also suggested that Putin will make the final decision on a departure ban and the possible introduction of martial law prior to addressing both chambers of parliament today.

Some Russian officials are going even further to convince more recruits. Kirill Kabanov, a member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, proposed to depriving residents from Central Asia of Russian citizenship if they refuse military service. This proposal would also affect people who had received citizenship within the last ten years, as well as their immediate family, thus raising the possibility that they would be stripped of their citizenship.

Russian Muslims announced protests against the mobilization on September 30 after Friday prayers. They also planned to express solidarity with Dagestan, whose population was among the first to protest earlier this month. In recent days, over 100 people have been arrested during protests in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, and tensions between residents and security forces continue to rise. Arrests were also reported in the Republic of Tuva following local protests.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia-based Facebook operation targeting Europe with anti-Ukraine messaging revealed

In August 2022, the DFRLab discovered a network consisting of six inauthentic Facebook pages purchasing ads to promote posts about Germany’s impending energy crisis and called for the lifting of sanctions on Russian gas imports. An independent review of these assets by Meta, along with others separately identified by German media, led to the discovery of a much larger network consisting of 1,633 accounts, 703 pages, twenty-nine Instagram profiles, and one Facebook group. These assets promoted Kremlin interests beyond Germany, also targeting France, the UK, Italy, Ukraine, and Latvia.

It was “the largest [network] of its kind we’ve disrupted since the war in Ukraine began,” Meta said in its report.

The network exhibited an overarching pattern of targeting Europe with anti-Ukraine narratives and expressions of support for Russian interests. It manifested multiple indicators of previous Russian influence operations, including the amplification of pro-Kremlin and anti-Ukraine or anti-Western narratives; the paid promotion of content; calls for action on petition sites and other forms of audience engagement; amplification across multiple languages reflecting inaccurate and non-native grammar; impersonating real people or institutions or creating fake ones; and generating names with detectable patterns.

The timing and narratives of the posts coincided with policy decisions made by the targeted countries pages regarding the war in Ukraine. For example, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz went to Canada for talks about liquified natural gas supplies on August 21, 2022. On August 22 and 23, five pages in the network posted a cartoon portraying Europe as a character named “Dr. EuroReich,” who is seen cutting Russian gas to a patient representing Germany’s economy. Similarly, in June 2022, France completed its first delivery of Caesar self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine. At the end of that month, four pages posted an image of the howitzer and suggested that France was getting itself involved in war crimes allegedly committed by Ukraine.

Meta concluded that the network originated in Russia and spread out across multiple platforms beyond Facebook and Instagram. It spent the equivalent of about $105,000 in advertising on Facebook and Instagram, primarily in US dollars and euros.

Some of the Facebook pages within the network posted links to websites of Russian origin, as well as links spoofing the domains of legitimate media organizations, including Bild and Welt in Germany, 20minutes in France, ANSA in Italy, RBC in Ukraine, and the Guardian in the UK. EU DisinfoLab, together with the Swedish non-profit foundation Qurium Media Foundation, were able to identify fifty-six spoofed domains that were part of the network.

Read the full report

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin spins quotes from the Western leaders to blame the US in Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline explosions

Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), demanded on her Telegram channel that US President Joe Biden “answer whether the United States realized its threat on September 25 and 26, 2022, when an emergency occurred on the three lines of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, which is tentatively qualified as a pipeline rupture, suggesting that they were blown up.” Zakharova referred to a press conference on February 7, 2022, when Olaf Scholtz visited the White House. During the that meeting, President Biden said, “If Russia invades, that means tanks or troops crossing the — the border of Ukraine again, then there will be — there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2.” After a journalist asked to clarify on how exactly the US will stop Nord Stream 2, which is under German control, Biden said, “We will — I promise you — we will be able to do it.”

Zakharova took out the video fragment of the press briefing and posted it on her Telegram. The post garnered more than 850,000 views, 85 shares to other Telegram channels and chats, 3,6000 forwards and 492 comments, according the TGStat.ru, a Telegram analysis tool.

Screenshot of Maria Zakharova’s Telegram post’s engagement data retrieved from TGStat.ru (Source: @nikaaleksejeva/DFRLab via TGStat)

Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a German right-wing political party, used Facebook advertisements to promote the video fragment with Biden suggesting that the US might be behind the attack.

Screenshot of Facebook ad paid by AfD and translated to English from German by Google translate. (Source: Meta Ad Library)

Zakharova also used a tweet by Radek Sikorski, the former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, now Member of the European Parliament, in which he posted the bubbling surface of the Baltic Sea and wrote, “Thank you, USA.” Sikorski’s Tweet was amplified by the Russia’s MFA on Twitter to further suggest US involvement in the gas pipelines’ disruptions.

Screenshot of Russian MFA’s quote tweet of Radek Sikorski’s tweet. (Source: @mfa_russia/archive)

Sikorski later deleted this tweet but left another tweet celebrating the gas leak. Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw, attempted to explain that what Sikorski might have meant was thanking the US for warning that such gas pipeline explosions might happen. Previously, on September 28, 2022, Spiegel, the German mainstream media outlet, wrote that the CIA warned Germany about possible attacks on the gas pipelines.

Russian gas deliveries to Western Europe through Nord Stream 1 pipeline were among the Kremlin’s leverage over sanctions put on Russia after Russia invaded Ukraine. On September 5, 2022, Russian state-owned Gazprom company shut down Nord Stream 1 due to “necessary repairs.” Nord Stream 2 was never in use, as Germany decided to freeze the project amid Russia’s recognition on two breakaway regions in Eastern Ukraine. Putting both pipelines out of order does not change much for Western European countries in terms of gas supply, while the Kremlin has lost direct access to a large part of the European gas market.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Thousands of Russian citizens flee to neighboring Georgia, raising security concerns among Georgian civil society

Putin’s partial mobilization order on September 21 has led to a second wave of mass exodus from Russia. Tens of thousands of Russian citizens have left the country. According to statistics published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, up to 79,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia between September 17–26, out of which 53,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia since September 21, after the mobilization announcement in Russia. This is the second large wave of Russian influx in Georgia. The first wave followed shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24 and peaked in summer. Between March and August, up to 800,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia. The visa-free regime was introduced by the previous Georgian administration. The Georgian Dream-led government has expanded the visa-free stay in the country from ninety days to one year.

Footage emerged on social media platforms depicting thousands of Russian citizens trying to cross the border with Georgia at the Upper Lars border crossing. Maxar Technologies published satellite imagery from September 27 depicting a sixteen kilometer traffic jam near the Lars border checkpoint. The Insider also published drone footage of long lines near the border crossing.

Our latest #satelliteimagery, from today, Sept 27, along the #Russia – #Georgia border and the extensive (~16 km in length) traffic jam approaching the Upper #Lars border checkpoint (lat/lon: 42.768, 44.631) as well as the Lars border crossing (lat/lon: 42.740, 44.627). pic.twitter.com/chG2ZzJYT6
— Maxar Technologies (@Maxar) September 27, 2022

What is going on in front of the Upper Lars border crossing: drone footage
Many kilometer traffic jams, drivers wait in front of the border for 40-50 hours. Scuffles keep sparking from time to time in the queue pic.twitter.com/1EReyhhyHs
— The Insider (@InsiderEng) September 26, 2022

The latest influx of Russian citizens has raised concerns among civil society actors and democracy activists in Georgia. On September 28, activists held a protest rally near the Georgia-Russia border demanding closure of the checkpoint. Citizens also started to mobilize on Facebook. A Facebook group called “ჩავკეტოთ ლარსის გზა“ (“Let’s block the Lars road”) was created on September 27 and garnered 9,300 members in two days. The group has already organized two events on Facebook to demand the closure of the Lars checkpoint.

The Georgian Dream-led government has not been responsive to the situation. Earlier in August, Georgian Dream party chairperson Irakli Kobakhidze accused opposition parties, media, and civil society actors of holding “xenophobic” and “chauvinistic” attitudes towards Russian citizens. On September 27, the Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri stressed that about 60 percent of Russian entrants had already left the country. “Russians have always entered Georgia…why should this become a problem today?” – he added.

On Telegram, the increase in mentions of “Ларс” (Lars) following Putin’s September 21 “partial” mobilization announcement peaked on September 27, with 4,502 mentions and up to 88 million views.

Screengrab from a TGStat query showing the increase of mentions (gray) and reach (blue) of “Ларс” (Larsi) following Putin’s announcement of “partial mobilization.” (Source: DFRLab via TGStat)

Various Russian Telegram channels and groups with “Lars” in their titles have been growing audience and garnering engagement. The groups include “ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ” (Upper Lars chat), ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ | ГРУЗИЯ (Upper Lars chat | Georgia), ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС (Upper Lars ), among others. The subscribers of the channels and groups have been sharing information about where to get products, water, and petroleum; advertising the private services of transportation from Russia to Georgia; posting images and videos of people crossing Georgian border; and giving various tips to each other.

For instance, ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ | ГРУЗИЯ (Upper Lars chat | Georgia) had around 11,000 members at the end of August; by late September the number reached 36,000.

Screengrab from TGStat showing the participants number growth (top) and number of messages (bottom) in the Telegram group Upper Lars chat . (Source: EtoBuziashvili/DFRLab via TGStat)

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Putin illegally annexes Ukrainian territory appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s nuclear ultimatum is a desperate bid to freeze a losing war

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 21 Sep 2022 16:48:15 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin presented the international community with a nuclear ultimatum on September 21 as he dramatically raised the stakes in his faltering Ukraine invasion. In a rare address to the nation, Putin made clear that he plans to annex large swathes of Ukraine in the coming week and is prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend his gains. “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will without doubt use all available means to protect Russia and our people. This is not a bluff,” he warned.

Putin’s comments follow on from the September 20 announcement that snap referendums on joining the Russian Federation will take place in the four regions of Ukraine currently under partial Russian occupation. Voting is scheduled to begin on Friday in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions and southern Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

The outcome of these referendums is not in any doubt. Indeed, most observers assume the results have already been determined in advance by the Kremlin. Once landslide “yes” votes are inevitably confirmed, the occupied regions of Ukraine will be officially annexed and incorporated into the Russian Federation. Moscow is then expected declare that any further Ukrainian military action will be regarded as an attack on Russia itself, hence Putin’s threat of a nuclear response.

The Russian ruler is betting that the possibility of a nuclear escalation will persuade Western leaders to stop arming Ukraine and convince them instead to pressure Kyiv into accepting a negotiated settlement that would leave around 20% of Ukrainian land under Russian control. Putin’s readiness to engage in such direct nuclear extortion is a sign of his mounting desperation as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

When Putin launched his invasion on February 24, most Russians anticipated a short and victorious campaign that would bring the era of Ukrainian independence to an end and force the country firmly back into the Kremlin orbit. This proved to be a disastrous miscalculation.

Far from welcoming invading Russian soldiers as liberators, the Ukrainian nation united against a common enemy and rose up in resistance. Russian troops were defeated outside Kyiv and forced to retreat from northern Ukraine. They were fought to a standstill in the south and the east. Worst of all, Putin’s army was completely routed in northeastern Ukraine in early September and fled the region in disarray.

Almost seven months since the invasion of Ukraine began, it is becoming increasingly obvious that Russia is heading toward what would be one of the most humiliating military defeats in the country’s history. Things are looking so grim for the Kremlin that international observers have begun to debate whether the Putin regime or the Russian Federation itself can survive such a debacle.

The Russian army has suffered catastrophic losses in Ukraine. Tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed, while more than 1000 tanks have been captured or destroyed. Unsurprisingly, Putin’s invasion force is deeply demoralized, with reports growing of mass resignations and desertions. Tellingly, mobilization measures announced in parallel to Putin’s nuclear ultimatum also extended current military service contracts indefinitely while increasing penalties for soldiers who refuse to fight.

As Russia’s fortunes in Ukraine go from bad to worse, the Kremlin’s broader international position is also collapsing. The Western world has imposed unprecedented sanctions in response to the invasion and finally seems to have reached the conclusion that it must end years of growing energy dependence on Moscow. Russian troops are under investigation for war crimes and Putin himself is increasingly seen as an international pariah.

Closer to home, Moscow’s influence in the post-Soviet region is visibly receding on an almost daily basis. Kazakhstan has publicly split with Russia and recently signaled that it now sees China as its key partner. In the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan has renewed hostilities with Armenia in open defiance of Russia’s peacekeeping role. On Russia’s western borders, Finland and Sweden are poised to join NATO and the Baltic states have imposed visa bans on Russian citizens. Even Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who is almost entirely dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival, has resisted relentless Russian pressure to join the invasion.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

As things currently stand, the Russian invasion of Ukraine may well be the biggest geopolitical blunder of the twenty-first century. The gravity of the situation can no longer be denied and now appears to have finally penetrated Putin’s personal information bubble of courtiers and sycophants. After months of insisting that everything was going “according to plan,” the Russian dictator has been forced to acknowledge that drastic measures are required in order to avert disaster.

Putin insists his threat to use nuclear weapons is not a bluff. There is no way of knowing in advance whether this is true or not. Despite this uncertainty, it is crystal clear that the international community simply cannot allow itself to be intimidated in this manner.

If the West were to respond to Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling by abandoning Ukraine, it would have devastating consequences for international security and the entire concept of nuclear nonproliferation would be consigned to the dustbin of history. Instead, we would enter a dangerous new era of chronic instability marked by nuclear blackmail and wars of aggression. The only way to avoid this fate is by confronting Putin before it’s too late.

In the coming days, the West must send an unambiguous message to Moscow that nuclear weapons are not acceptable bargaining tools. They must spell out the crushing costs Russia will face if it dares to cross the nuclear red line, and they must convince the Kremlin that they are most certainly not bluffing. Now is also the time to emphasize that support for Ukrainian statehood is non-negotiable by ramping up weapons supplies.

Putin knows he is heading toward disaster in Ukraine but is hoping the West’s collective fear of a nuclear apocalypse will allow him to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Despite the setbacks of the past seven months, he remains convinced that the democratic world is weak at heart and will ultimately back down. If Western leaders do not stand up to him now, they will regret it for decades to come.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Evidence of Russia’s declining influence can be seen throughout the post-Soviet world. On the frontlines in Ukraine, Putin’s invasion force is suffering from increasingly obvious manpower shortages that make a mockery of attempts to portray Russia as the world’s number two military power. Moscow has been forced to withdraw troops from deployments across the former USSR while also recruiting soldiers from among the Russian prison population.

Russian military withdrawals from Central Asia have led to renewed border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The changing dynamic in the region was also on display at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan, with the leaders of India and China both expressing concerns over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the President of Kyrgyzstan keeping Putin waiting prior to their bilateral meeting. Putin was once notorious for making world leaders wait, but the shoe is now on the other foot.

Russia’s withdrawal of nearly 1,000 troops from Armenia to bolster the faltering invasion of Ukraine was a signal to the countries of the South Caucasus that Kremlin influence in the region is in decline. Armenia has so far refused to see the writing on the wall and continues to place all its eggs in the Russian basket. Azerbaijan, which has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy and has not joined Russian-led initiatives, has used Moscow’s waning influence to launch a military operation against Armenia.

The European Union has tried but so far failed to broker a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would recognize the border separating the two nations and end three decades of intermittent conflict. Meanwhile, Armenians have protested in Yerevan over the possible signing of a peace treaty, but it is difficult to see how Armenia could hope to defeat its wealthier and militarily stronger neighbor without Russian support.

Russia’s retreat from the region also has major implications for nearby Georgia and the country’s dominant figure, pro-Kremlin oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Under Ivanishvili’s influence, Georgian democracy has stagnated. Notably, the country was not offered EU candidate status alongside Ukraine and Moldova in summer 2022.

Georgia has not officially backed Ukraine over the Russian invasion and has instead joined Armenia in helping Moscow evade sanctions. This stance is out of step with Georgian public opinion, with a clear majority of Georgians supporting Ukraine. Indeed, the largest international military unit fighting Russia in Ukraine is the Georgian Legion. Georgia is now believed to be contemplating whether to use the collapse in Russian power to intervene against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two Kremlin-controlled breakaway Georgian regions recognized by Moscow as independent states.

Moldova is also watching events in Ukraine closely and eyeing its own Kremlin-orchestrated frozen conflict. Russian troops have been stationed in the Transnistria region of Moldova since the early 1990s. Ukraine’s military successes are now sparking debate over whether the time has come to challenge the continued presence of this small and isolated Russian army outpost.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia’s retreat is nowhere more immediate or obvious than in Ukraine. Putin’s brutal invasion was supposed to derail Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and force the country firmly back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, it has turned Ukrainian public opinion decisively against Russia while also uniting Ukrainians. Polls now consistently indicate similar attitudes throughout both western and eastern Ukraine toward Russia, national identity, language, and foreign policy. Rather than destroying the Ukrainian nation, Russian aggression has dramatically accelerated the country’s nation-building progress.

Throughout the former USSR, Russia’s only remaining loyal allies are Belarus and Armenia. The Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union no longer appear to be functioning in any meaningful sense.

Ukraine and Moldova are now firmly within the EU sphere of influence. Azerbaijan has cemented a strategic alliance with Turkey and is a rising economic and military power whose energy resources will become increasingly important to the EU as Europe seeks to end its dependency on Russia. Georgia’s unnatural pro-Russian stance is crumbling. Meanwhile, China has replaced Russia as the preeminent power in Central Asia. Russia’s humiliating military setbacks in Ukraine and economic isolation from the Western world have confirmed its status as China’s junior partner.

Thirty years on from the disintegration of the USSR, Russia is in the midst of another imperial collapse. Countries that spent the past three decades as part of Moscow’s informal empire are now turning away from Russia and taking control of their own destinies. Unsurprisingly, Europe, Turkey, and China are now all seen as more attractive partners.

Once again, it is Ukraine that is serving as the catalyst for Russia’s retreat. Putin’s invasion was meant to extinguish the Ukrainian state once and for all. Instead, Russian imperial influence is in danger of receding to levels not witnessed in hundreds of years.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide: Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

War crimes and human rights abuses

Ukraine says hundreds of dead civilians unearthed in Izyum

Tracking narratives

Kremlin claims Russian troops are ‘regrouping’

Moscow police investigate journalist for ‘gay propaganda’

Fake RAND Corporation document promoting US conspiracy to weaken Germany spreads online

Russian War Report: Ukraine secures new territory as Prigozhin recruits Russian prisoners

Ukraine has successfully pushed back Russian forces over the last several weeks, launching counteroffensives in the regions of Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Kherson. With active fighting concentrated in the eastern and southern parts of the country, there has been an increase in civilians attempting to flee hard-hit areas. The Ukrainian army regained 600 square kilometers in the Kherson counteroffensive, according to Ukrainian media reports. In Kharkiv, Ukraine retook roughly 300 settlements across 3,000 square kilometers and liberated 150,000 people from Russian occupation. The frontline of the battle in the Kharkiv region is reaching closer to occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. On September 13, reports claimed that Russian army units had abandoned Kreminna in Luhansk oblast; while partisans raised the Ukrainian flag over the town, as of September 14, Ukrainian forces had not entered the city.

Separate attacks have also affected humanitarian assets in Donetsk oblast. On September 12 and 13, the Russian army shelled cities on the frontline of Sloviansk, killing at least one person and injuring another. An agricultural technical school and eight buildings were damaged in the shelling. Russian rockets also hit a hospital and a private residence in Kramatorsk. The town of Hostre, in area of Kurakhove, also came under fire. Meanwhile, Russia has shelled Avdiivka for several days in a row. Russian forces also launched an airstrike on Siversk on September 12.

As the counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces continues, Russia is attempting to obstruct Ukraine’s progress in various parts of the country. Ukrainian sources reported that eight Russian missiles struck targets in Kryvyi Rih, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, resulting in flooding. The water level of the Inhulets River, which runs south of Kryvyi Rih, rose as result of the strike on the Kherson-Mykolaiv axis, flooding area homes. The target of the attack was likely the Karachun dam.

Meanwhile, Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin was filmed making an appeal to convicts, promising amnesty if they sign up to fight in Ukraine. In the footage, Prigozhin revealed that prisoners have already been fighting on the frontlines with the Wagner Group. “In the first attack in Ukraine using forty prisoners, three died and seven were injured….Nobody goes back behind bars,” he said. “If you serve six months, you are free.” Russian law does not permit commuting prison sentences for military service, though it is unclear if exceptions can be made during wartime. Prigozhin is mobilizing combat power for the Russian army, which has suffered heavy losses in recent weeks. Prigozhin’s comments are not just about recruiting mercenaries; they are also an indication that Russia is seeking further mobilization, a practice that, even in Soviet times, relied on prisoners.

Ex-convict and human turd-beetle Prigozhin, who sued @Bellingcat in normal court (and lost) and in kangaroo Russian court (and won) over us reporting he runs and funds the Wagner PMC, here on video recruiting Russian convicts for his "own private PMC" Wagner. pic.twitter.com/YjKdyLBYSr
— Christo Grozev (@christogrozev) September 14, 2022

Prigozhin’s comments coincide with increasing domestic pressure on the Kremlin to mobilize more recruits and to officially declare the “special operation” in Ukraine a war. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called on regional governors in Russia to carry out self-mobilization and not wait for the Kremlin’s decision. Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Russian communist party, joined the calls for a nationwide mobilization.

These recent developments indicate that paramilitary formations, like those in Syria who fought alongside the forces of President Bashar Assad’s regime, may be emerging in Russia. In Syria, amid the worst fighting in the civil conflict, the government allowed businessmen to gain influence in the state apparatus in exchange for sponsoring and creating local militias to support the army. The latest developments in Russia indicate that a similar process could be unfolding.

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, officials in the occupation administration of Crimea and southern Ukraine have begun to secretly evacuate their families to Russia, indicating that the state of security in Russian-occupied territories is poor. These claims have not been independently confirmed.

Meanwhile, the first visual confirmation of Iranian drones being used by Russia in Ukraine surfaced this week. A Shahed-136 (Герань-2) drone was most likely used in Ukaine’s Kupiansk region. This is a critical revelation that strongly suggests Tehran is sending Russia military aid, despite earlier denials. It also indicates that Russia may be experiencing a shortage of high-tech equipment and weapons.

In addition, global sanctions may further hinder the Kremlin’s military efforts, as the group of seven nations is working to cap the price of Russian oil in an attempt to limit Moscow’s ability to fund its invasion of Ukraine. Currently, Russia relies on revenue from exporting energy resources to Asia.

Lastly, Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers approved the draft budget for 2023, Minister of Finance Serhiy Marchenko announced on Facebook. The 2023 state budget is the budget of a country that will become stronger, strengthen its defense capabilities, be able to rebuild after damage caused by Russian armed aggression, and also take care of those citizens who need it,” he said.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Renewed clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan as Armenia calls for Russian military aid

On September 13, the Armenian Ministry of Defense reported that Azerbaijani Armed Forces shelled Armenian military positions in Goris, Sotk, and Jermuk. Azerbaijan reportedly used large-caliber artillery, small arms, and drones in the attack. Azerbaijan reported fifty casualties, while Armenia said 105 Armenian servicemembers were killed in the strikes. Prior to the recent escalation, both parties had accused each other of planning and organizing a large-scale provocation. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that Azerbaijan had gained ten square kilometers of Armenian territory this week. For comparison, in May 2021, Azerbaijan occupied forty square kilometers of Armenian territory. OC Media reported at least nineteen different Armenian locations along the border with Azerbaijan were hit by missiles this week.

Amid renewed clashes, Armenian authorities asked the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military block, to aid in restoring the territorial integrity of Armenia. Pashinyan stated that Armenia was invoking Article 4 of the agreement, which stipulates that an attack on a member state is an act of aggression against other member states. In response to this request, CSTO held an emergency meeting and proposed the creation of a working group to assess the situation on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Armenia previously invoked Article 4 in May 2021, when Azerbaijan made advances in Armenia’s Gegharkunik and Syunik provinces; in response, CSTO advocated diplomatic negotiations. Armenia also asked Russia to provide military aid under the Russian-Armenian treaty on mutual defense that was signed in 1997. The Kyiv Independent reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin had declined to provide military assistance to Armenia, but did not cite a source.

On September 13, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged Azerbaijan to stop the military operation along the border with Armenia. State Department Spokesperson Ned Price noted that the US has seen “significant evidence of Azerbaijani shelling inside Armenia and significant damage to Armenian infrastructure.” Freedom House also called for Azerbaijani armed forces to stop their attacks on Armenia.

On September 13, Armenian media reported that mobile providers had blocked access to TikTok, but the app remained accessible via cable internet. The DFRLab used OONI Explorer to reviewed the connectivity of TikTok’s website in Armenia; we found that DNS tampering/spoofing began on September 13 at 4:03pm local time. OONI Explorer also showed that DNS spoofing of TikTok’s website took place in Azerbaijan on September 14. Azerbaijan’s State Security Service announced that it had temporarily suspended TikTok in Azerbaijan due to the fact that information published on the platform “casts a shadow on the successes of our army, contains military secrets, and aims to create a wrong opinion in the society.” Samvel Martirosyan, co-founder of Armenian CyberHUB, said that in order to prevent people from using virtual private networks (VPNs), state-aligned Azerbaijani bloggers were spreading rumors that major VPN services were controlled by Armenia.

On September 14, Pashinyan announced that he was willing to recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, as long as Armenia’s Soviet-era border was recognized. He added that he was willing to sign an agreement with Azerbaijan. “Many people will criticize us, curse us, call us traitors, the people may even decide to remove us from power, and we will be grateful if as a result of this,” he said. “Armenia will get lasting peace and security with an area of 2,800 square kilometers.” Following the release of the statement, Armenian citizens gathered in front of the National Assembly building to protest the comments, with some demanding Pashinyan’s resignation. Pashinyan later clarified that no such document had been signed as of yet, and any claims to the contrary were rumors propagated by “external unfriendly forces.

Armenia and Azerbaijan negotiated a ceasefire that took effect at 8pm local time on September 15.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland.

Ukraine says hundreds of dead civilians unearthed in Izyum

Ukrainian officials said they had found 440 bodies in woodlands near the city of Izyum. They said most of the dead were civilians, and that the site proved war crimes had been committed by Russian occupiers. Video from Izyum showed a pine forest dotted with graves. Wooden crosses marked the locations. One handwritten sign read, “Ukraine armed forces, seventeen people, Izyum city, [taken] from the morgue.”

If confirmed, this would be the largest mass grave identified in Europe since Tomašica, where the Bosnian authorities uncovered a mass grave in September 2013. It contained the remains of 435 people, mostly war victims, who were killed by the Bosnian Serb forces in various places around Prijedor from 1992 to 1995.

Reports from Kupiansk also indicate potential Russian war crimes, including instances of torture. In jail cells at a local police station, Ukrainian forces found blood on the floor and stains on mattresses. Russian occupation forces hastily abandoned the police station after destroying records they had kept there.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Kremlin claims Russian troops are ‘regrouping’

After a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive forced Russian troops to retreat from the vicinity of Kharkiv, Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources rebranded the withdrawal as “regrouping.”

As Ukraine regained territory, Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense, said the MoD decided to “regroup” Russian forces in the areas of Balakliia and Izyum “to build up prospects at the Donetsk level.” The MoD continued, “During this operation, a number of distraction and demonstration activities were carried out with the designation of the real actions of the troops.”

Meanwhile, Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin media outlets attempted to justify Russia’s retreat as a strategic decision. Outlets such as iz.ru, vz.ru, crimea.ria.ru, topcor.ru, and rk-news.com published interviews with pro-Kremlin pundits who offered varying justifications for the Russian withdrawal. In one interview, a “military expert” claimed that Russia’s MoD “carried out a whole range of measures to mislead the Armed Forces of Ukraine, creating the illusion that we had a weak defense.” Another interview reinforced the claim that Russia retreated to “mislead the enemy.” A third interview alleged that the “regrouping” took place because there was a “need to concentrate forces and strengthen positions in the Donbas.”

Online mentions of the word “Перегруппировка” (“regrouping”) skyrocketed on September 10 and 11, according to a query conducted using the social media monitoring tool Meltwater Explore.

Online mentions of the word “перегруппировка” (“regrouping”) skyrocketed during Ukraine’s counteroffensive. (Source: DFRLab via Meltwater)

In addition, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed, “The regrouping of troops in the Kharkiv region is a forced measure, which is explained by military strategy and the goal of saving human lives.”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Moscow police investigate journalist for disseminating ‘gay propaganda’

Moscow police are investigating TV personality Ksenia Sobchak for disseminating “gay propaganda,” Russian state-owned media outlet RIA reported on Monday.

According to RIA, the investigation was initiated after a Russian citizen contacted police to “examine publications shared on the channel of journalist Ksenia Sobchak for LGBT propaganda among minors.” RIA reported that the case is being investigated under Article 6.21 of the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses, which pertains to the “promotion of non-traditional sexual relations among juveniles.” Article 6.21 carries a fine of up to 100,000 rubles ($1,676) for individuals and up to one million rubles for legal entities, in addition to a possible 90-day work suspension.

Ksenia Sobchak is the daughter of the late Anatoly Sobchak, the former mayor of St. Petersburg and mentor to Vladimir Putin. In 2018, she ran as a presidential candidate against Putin, but some argued that Sobchak was a decoy candidate who only ran to create the illusion of a democratic election.

On her Telegram channel, Krovavaya Barynya (“Кровавая барыня,” “Bloody Lady”), Sobchak suggested that police might be investigating her YouTube channel after she published an interview with Russian tennis player Daria Kasatkina, who recently came out as gay. “Now even just a conversation with LGBT people about their lives might be considered LGBT propaganda,” Sobchak added. The police have not confirmed which of Sobchak’s platforms is being examined. Sobchak’s YouTube channel has more than three million subscribers, and the interview with Kasatkina garnered more than 1.5 million views.

Earlier this month, Russian internet regulator Roskomnadzor announced its support for a draft law “on administrative responsibility for propaganda of LGBT people and pedophilia.” The bill was introduced by Alexander Khinshtein, the head of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy.

Last month, Russia revealed plans to construct an online surveillance system that could hunt down “homosexual propaganda,” among other “prohibited data.” In addition, Runiversalis – the Russian analog of the internet encyclopedia Wikipedia– announced that it will not cover “homosexual propaganda” on its platform.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Fake RAND Corporation document promoting US conspiracy to weaken Germany spreads online

On September 11, the Russian television program Vesti Nedeli reported on what it claimed was a “confidential document” from the RAND Corporation, a US think tank. The document claimed the US had planned the war in Ukraine in advance and had deliberately provoked Russia. Reporter Mikhail Antonov argued that the document, said to be dated January 25, 2022, outlined a US strategy to force Germany into applying sanctions against Russia, in an attempt to weaken Germany’s economy. Antonov cited the German outlet Weltexpress as the source of the document.

A screencap from Vesti Nedeli showing the fake RAND report. (Source: Vesti Nedeli on smotrim.ru).

RAND Corporation denied the allegation. “A supposedly leaked RAND report about a bizarre U.S. conspiracy to ‘weaken Germany’ is fake,” it said in a statement.

Weltexpress, the first German language outlet to publish about the document, titled their article, “The economic crisis in Germany is the result of a deliberate provocation by the USA. The Americans collapsed the German economy to destroy a competitor.” Two days later, Weltexpress published in English what they claimed to be an excerpt from the alleged RAND report.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Ukraine secures new territory as Prigozhin recruits Russian prisoners appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To re-engage in the Black Sea, the US must look to Turkey

Arnold C. Dupuy — Thu, 01 Sep 2022 07:59:24 +0000

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the notion that when the United States fails to lead, or when it leads ineffectively, instability will follow. Washington wields the kind of unprecedented global influence that many allies and partners need to enhance their own security. This principle applies to the wider Black Sea region, which includes the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, a geographic space of vital strategic importance to the United States and its NATO allies—but where Washington’s involvement has waned in recent decades. The results have been predictable: an aggressive and resurgent Russia, growing Chinese influence, and Iranian opportunism have combined to create an environment of unprecedented instability on Europe’s southeastern flank.

This wasn’t always the case. The early post-Cold War era could be seen as a “golden age” of US-Black Sea engagement, when Washington’s support for the newly independent former Soviet states of the region included promoting democratic transition, non-proliferation, demilitarization, and free market reforms. Perhaps the most effective display of its determination during this period was helping Azerbaijan, a major regional oil and gas producer, to become independent of the Russian energy infrastructure by facilitating the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Those provided Europe with non-Russian oil and gas while allowing Azerbaijan and transit nations Georgia and Turkey to benefit.

But those days are long gone. Recently, a retired diplomat from the region privately lamented to me that the United States is now “invisible” in the Black Sea. Similar sentiments have been expressed by other leaders and regional experts. Arguably, Washington’s abandonment began after the September 11 attacks, while others claim the US “pivot to Asia” distracted its attention. Regardless of the blame—which transcends both political parties—greater US-led pushback to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 could have deterred President Vladimir Putin from his most recent Ukrainian adventure.

The result for the Black Sea region is a vacuum that Russia, China, and Iran have been happy to fill. While Russia’s historical dominance is more deeply entrenched, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative has the potential to challenge Moscow’s status there. Iran, although the weaker of the three, leverages both overt and covert means to play a greater role at the expense of the United States and broader regional security. All this erodes Washington’s longstanding role as Europe’s primary security guarantor.

Today, however, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents an opportunity for Washington to reengage and redirect its focus in the region. For instance, a post-war Ukraine will need to be rebuilt, while other Eastern European countries shaken by the Russian invasion will spend big on defense and related infrastructure. US leadership should include the application of both soft and hard power; the latter in the form of weapons sales, joint exercises, and military-to-military exchanges, and the former through ever-stronger sanctions against Russia as well as commercial ventures with Black Sea nations. These ventures could include loan guarantees and lines of credit to rebuild, expand, and strengthen infrastructure.

But for any successful re-engagement effort, the United States will need tacit Turkish cooperation that will require Washington to repair relations with Ankara. Having simmered for years, these tensions are complex and rooted in Turkey’s frustration with US support for Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militants fighting the Islamic State and arms embargoes over the purchase of Russian S-400 air-defense systems. Ankara’s acquisition of the latter led to its expulsion from the F-35 fighter jet program, while US reluctance to sell and upgrade F-16s for Turkey has further inflamed tensions. For its part, Washington is concerned by Turkey’s illiberal drift and its operations in Syria against the YPG.

Central to any US-Turkish rapprochement will be to focus on areas of common interest—notably the central theme of regional stability and both nations’ respective roles in securing it. Washington should make clear that its wider re-engagement in the Black Sea will complement Turkey’s regional aspirations, not be seen as challenging them. The war in Ukraine has reinforced Turkey’s geostrategic importance, and Ankara has re-emerged as a natural counterbalance to Russian power in the region. A cornerstone of this dynamic is Turkey’s continued engagement with NATO, which has benefited from its membership in the Alliance and reinforced its own security. Indeed, a Turkey firmly embedded in NATO, working in cooperation with the United States operating as an honest broker, is vital to long-term regional stability. Ultimately, both parties must recognize that neither side will get exactly what it wants and move forward with what it can secure.

A wider Black Sea region under pressure from Russia, China, and Iran can only lead to greater instability on Europe’s southeastern flank, further jeopardizing Washington’s broader strategic goals. US support to Ukraine has been positive—but was slow in getting started and still falls short of what Kyiv needs. Now that Ukraine has demonstrated the battlefield prowess to stop and push back the Russian forces, military and economic aid should be accelerated and enhanced. US support to Ukraine should be the impetus for even greater regional engagement. Washington must recognize that redirecting attention to the Indo-Pacific cannot be accomplished at the expense of its traditional transatlantic relationship. In the Black Sea, it has not had a long-term regional vision for nearly two decades, but it must finally wake up to the challenge.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and Chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability”.

The post To re-engage in the Black Sea, the US must look to Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Killer in the Kremlin: New book explores Vladimir Putin’s bloody reign

John Sweeney — Fri, 15 Jul 2022 20:41:44 +0000

Twenty-two years ago, I walked into a hospital and saw an eight-year-old Chechen girl with a horribly burnt face, the only survivor of seven people in a car blown up in a Russian army attack on a refugee column. Just over two decades later in Ukraine, I saw countless cars with the word “Children” scrawled on them similarly shot up by Russian troops. War crimes on repeat.

I wrote my new book “Killer In The Kremlin” in an attempt to somehow make sense of the man behind the snuffing out of so many innocent lives. There is no doubt in my mind that the Moscow apartment bombings of September 1999 were a black flag operation by the Russian security services to make Vladimir Putin, an insipid spy, look strong. Three hundred people died in Moscow and cities in southern Russia. Putin blamed Chechen terrorists and launched the Second Chechen War in which around 80,000 died.

Putin subsequently invaded Georgia and hundreds more lives were lost. He helped Assad in Syria kill around half a million. In 2014, he invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine leading to 15,000 deaths. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine this February has added to the butcher’s bill: maybe 40,000 Russian soldiers, 15,000 Ukrainian troops and many thousands of Ukrainian civilians have died so far. Leaving aside Syria, the master of the Kremlin is directly responsible for the deaths of some 150,000 people.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Widely suspected of having blown up the Moscow apartments in 1999, Putin is also closely linked to at least two more suspected black flag operations, the Moscow Theatre Siege of 2002 where around 170 people were killed, and the Beslan siege of 2004, which claimed 333 lives, many of them children. Common to all three mass killings inside Russia was a total lack of transparency about the investigations into what took place. Numerous journalists and politicians who asked difficult questions were poisoned or shot.

Yuri Shchekochikhin was a Russian MP and journalist investigating these mass killings. He had courage, tremendous energy, a nose for a story and, I’ve been told, a fondness for Armenian brandy. In January 2003, he told a friend, “For the first time in my life I feel frightened.”

In an interview in early 2003 he described Putin’s Russia in a nutshell: “The mafia has put on uniform. The gangsters are boy scouts compared to our security services. Today it is precisely the people who are supposed to be fighting crime who are corrupt. This has not bypassed the secret police. The protection that they provide, the enormous amounts of money that they receive, the control that they exercise.”

Such an independent spirit could not be allowed to exist. In 2003, Shchekochikhin was still asking questions about the Moscow apartment bombings on behalf of a Russian-American woman whose mother had been killed in one of the blasts. But then he started feeling unwell. He went ahead anyway with his trip to Ryazan but grew feverish and felt as though his head was on fire. When he returned to Moscow, he became dizzy and his throat burned. His blood pressure dropped, his skin turned red. The next day his skin began to peel off and his hair started to fall out. He was rushed to the Central Clinical Hospital, known by its nickname “the Kremlinka” because it looks after the power elite and, sometimes, those who cross them. The doctors diagnosed “toxic agents of an unknown origin.”

Shchekochikhin’s girlfriend Alyona Gromova recalled: “On the day he was taken to hospital, he felt very weak. After he had a shower, his hair was a mess. I went to stroke it and great handfuls of hair came out in my hand. The symptoms were confusing. First, it seemed like a cold but his face was very red, as if he had sunburn, then lumps of his skin started to flake off.”

A friend wrote: “Yuri’s condition worsened by the hour. His temperature rose continuously. His mucous membranes were swollen and his kidneys were failing. Then the worst began. His skin began to peel off as though he had suffered severe burns. Even a layman could see what was happening: it was either due to radiation or to some unknown poisons.”

The official verdict was Lyell’s Syndrome or a severe allergic reaction. Shchekochikhin died on June 3, 2003. By then, he had practically no skin left on his body. A friend wrote: “The word poison was never pronounced, although everyone took it for granted. Fear kept people quiet.”

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Alyona went to say goodbye to her lover in the morgue. “It was a big place, a huge hall. There were bodies on slabs due to be buried the next day. I looked around. There were about 20 people but I couldn’t find Yuri. I went up to the supervisor and explained that I might be in the wrong place as I couldn’t find him. Through the corner of my eye I saw a dear old lady lying on a slab. The strangest thing, she reminded me of my grandma who passed away a long time ago. The curious resemblance of the two old ladies hit me. In my worst nightmares, I could never, ever have imagined that the dear old lady was in fact Yuri.”

Her lover was so unrecognisable that Alyona could not find him in the morgue until the supervisor pointed out his name tag to her. This was in 2003. The poisonings and the shootings had only just begun. Investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya? Poisoned, later shot. Human rights activist Natasha Estemirova? Shot. Politician Boris Nemtsov? Shot. Opposition leader Alexey Navalny? Poisoned, now in jail.

Navalny is still alive. Why so? Because Putin fears an uprising if he has him killed. The master of the Kremlin is far weaker than his propaganda suggests. For similar reasons, he dare not call his war a war. The phrase “special military operation” is a signal that he is afraid of telling Russians the truth about the war in Ukraine. The lack of universal conscription shows this fear; the lack of soldiers from Moscow and Saint Petersburg underlines it. I do not believe that Putin would dare press the nuclear button. He is morbidly afraid of his own death. If he tries, I believe the Kremlin’s machinery would not function.

If you study Putin’s career, you realise that we are dealing with a hyper-aggressive psychopath whose word cannot be relied upon. He is a man who identifies compromise as weakness; who sows dissent and mistrust in the West; who likes killing. The idea that we can negotiate with Putin is foolish. Nobody in the West will be safe until he and his killing machine are stopped. Period.

John Sweeney is a British investigative journalist and writer. His new book “Killer In The Kremlin” is published by Transworld Books on July 21.

By Atlantic Council

NATO Politics & Diplomacy

In the News Sep 3, 2020

Benitez quoted in The New York Times on allies’ fears of Trump- NATO exit

Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

In the News Oct 16, 2019

Benitez quoted in Yahoo Finance on NATO’s restrictions to punish Turkey

By Atlantic Council

NATO Security & Defense

Fellow

Jorge Benitez

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

The post Benitez in Breaking Defense: Turkey lifts hold on Sweden, Finland joining NATO, following wide-ranging concessions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Goodwill gestures and de-Nazification: Decoding Putin’s Ukraine War lexicon

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 30 Jun 2022 18:20:24 +0000

Ever since Russian troops first crossed the Ukrainian border on February 24, the Kremlin has employed characteristically euphemistic language in order to downplay the criminal nature of the unfolding invasion. This has led to the creation of an entire alternative reality where Russian troops are noble liberators waging a chivalrous campaign against dastardly Ukrainian Nazis who bomb themselves and stage fake atrocities by massacring their own civilian population.

While the official Russian version of events is self-evidently absurd, an understanding of the true meaning behind Moscow’s preferred terminology is essential for international audiences looking to make sense of the often bizarre statements coming out of the Kremlin. From “goodwill gestures” to “de-Nazification” and “reclaiming Russian lands,” here are some of the key phrases from the lexicon of Putin’s Ukraine War decoded into plain English.

Special Military Operation: When is a war not a war? When it is a Special Military Operation. This would appear to have been Putin’s logic when he announced his “Special Military Operation” against Ukraine in the early hours of February 24. Despite waging the largest and most widely reported European war since the days of Hitler and Stalin, the Russian dictator remains so paranoid over the negative connotations of the “w” word that he has banned its use entirely in the Russian media.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

De-Nazification: Putin has stated that the main goal of his “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine is the “de-Nazification” of the country. This attempt to justify the invasion by portraying it as a crusade against far-right extremism mirrors historic Kremlin efforts to discredit the Ukrainian independence movement by equating it with fascism. Putin’s “de-Nazification” claims are emotionally appealing to Russian audiences haunted by the horrors of WWII but they are also deeply misleading. Today’s Ukraine is actually an emerging democracy with a Jewish president and a far-right fringe that struggled to secure 2% of the vote in the country’s last national election.

In reality, the often savage actions of Russian troops in Ukraine have confirmed that the Kremlin views anything identifiably Ukrainian as “Nazi” and makes no distinction between the two. Putin’s proclaimed “de-Nazification” actually means “de-Ukrainianization,” as this prominent wartime article from Russian state news agency RIA Novosti makes abundantly clear. As far as most Ukrainians are concerned, the only Nazis in the country are the Russian soldiers waging a genocidal war on behalf of an unhinged dictator.

Military Objects: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been accompanied by a massive aerial campaign of bombings and missile strikes across the country. Meanwhile, Putin’s slowly advancing troops are heavily reliant on indiscriminate and overwhelming artillery attacks that have left thousands dead and reduced dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble.

While the whole world can see that much of Ukraine now lies in ruins, the Kremlin remains extremely sensitive to accusations of war crimes and continues to insist that Russian forces only ever target military objects. Based on the experience of the past four months, Russia’s understanding of “military objects” apparently includes Mariupol Drama Theater, Kramatorsk Railway Station and Kremenchuk Shopping Mall along with hundreds of schools, hospitals and residential buildings throughout Ukraine. With international war crimes investigations already underway, Russia’s claims regarding “military objects” will likely be tested in court.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Goodwill Gesture: Russia expected a quick and victorious war in Ukraine, but things have not gone according to the Kremlin plan. Rather than capturing Kyiv within a few days as anticipated, Russian forces have encountered robust resistance and suffered a series of painful battlefield losses. In a desperate attempt to disguise these defeats and protect Russian dignity, the Kremlin has taken to officially describing its retreats as “goodwill gestures.”

The first “goodwill gesture” came in late March when Russia retreated entirely from northern Ukraine after suffering defeat in the Battle for Kyiv. Following Russia’s most recent retreat from strategically vital Black Sea outpost Snake Island on June 30, the Kremlin similarly declared that it was withdrawing as a “goodwill gesture” to Ukraine. Ukrainians will be hoping for many more such “goodwill gestures” in the weeks ahead as they seek to dislodge Russian forces from the south and east of their country.

Reclaiming Russian Lands: In the months leading up to the Russian invasion, Putin pretended to be primarily concerned with NATO expansion into the former USSR. He has since abandoned this pretense and declared himself the heir to Peter the Great. Speaking in early June, Putin compared the current war to the eighteenth century conquests of the celebrated czar and stated that like Peter, he was now also engaged in the historic endeavor of “reclaiming Russian lands.”

Putin has never made any secret of the fact that he views the territory of modern Ukraine as historically Russian land. For years, he has denied Ukraine’s right to exist while claiming that all Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). The real question is which other sovereign nations might also fit Putin’s definition. He recently set off alarm bells by commenting that the entire former Soviet Union was historically Russian territory.

Nor is it clear if Putin’s appetite for reclaiming Russian lands is limited to the 14 non-Russian post-Soviet states. Imperial Russia once also ruled Finland and Poland, while the Soviet Empire after WWII stretched deep into Central Europe and included East Germany. One thing is clear: unless he is stopped in Ukraine, Putin’s imperial ambitions are certain to expand.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

But apparently there were no takers. Other than Putin and Lukashenka, no other leaders raised the war in Ukraine during their public remarks. According to a report in Meduza, the conflict was discussed behind closed doors but a joint statement issued after the summit did not mention Ukraine at all, nor did it refer to Russia’s so-called “special military operation” there.

CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas told reporters that the prospect of deploying troops from alliance members to Ukraine was not discussed. Kazakhstan, which has the second largest military in the bloc after Russia, has repeatedly ruled out sending CSTO troops to Ukraine. Kazakhstan has also refused to help Russia evade Western sanctions imposed in response to Putin’s invasion.

The lack of support from the six-member bloc underscored Russia’s deepening international isolation, something that is becoming clear even to the Kremlin’s staunchest supporters. “We are in total geopolitical isolation and the whole world is against us, even if we don’t want to admit it,” Mikhail Khodaryonok, a retired colonel and a pro-Kremlin columnist, said in a remarkable show of candor on Russian state television earlier this week.

Nevertheless, as the CSTO summit wrapped up, Lukashenka moved to demonstrate his usefulness and loyalty to Putin by massing his own troops along the Belarusian border with Ukraine. The move appeared to be an attempt to distract Ukrainian forces away from opposing Russia in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, a report by British military intelligence stated.

“Following exercise activity earlier this month, Belarus has announced the deployment of special operations forces along the Ukraine border, as well as air defense, artillery and missile units to training ranges in the west of the country,” the UK Defense Ministry said in a public bulletin. “The presence of Belarusian forces near the border will likely fix Ukrainian troops, so they cannot deploy in support of operations in the Donbas.”

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

While Lukashenka may be Putin’s last remaining ally in the former Soviet space, he is also an erratic one.

As I have written in this space, Lukashenka’s survival instincts simultaneously drive him in opposite directions on the Ukraine war. His near total dependence on Putin for political survival drives Lukashenka to embrace the war. At the same time, the fact that the war is going poorly, is unpopular in Belarus, and exposes him to additional sanctions and deeper international isolation encourage Lukashenka to distance himself from the conflict.

According to British intelligence, the Belarusian dictator is walking a very thin line. Lukashenka is “likely balancing support for Russia’s invasion with a desire to avoid direct military participation with the risk of Western sanctions, Ukrainian retaliation, and possible dissatisfaction in the Belarusian military,” British military intelligence concluded.

Being one of Putin’s few remaining friends has already proven costly for Belarus. Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko said on May 15 that Western sanctions have cost Belarus at least USD 16 billion and possibly as much as USD 18 billion in export revenues. “Because of the sanctions, almost all of Belarus’s exports to the countries of the European Union and North America have been blocked,” he commented.

The discord that was evident at the CSTO summit in Moscow demonstrates how Western sanctions and pressure on Russia and Belarus are working. Lukashenka himself appeared to acknowledge this in his remarks at the summit, complaining about “hellish sanctions” and saying, “Belarus and Russia are being defamed and excluded from international organizations at the whim of the West.”

After witnessing the pain and isolation that Belarus is suffering for supporting Putin’s war, with costs ranging from economic sanctions to exclusion from international sporting events, Russia’s other erstwhile allies in the CSTO are clearly thinking twice about giving the Kremlin even token support.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Tracking Narratives

Russian media presents civilian evacuation from Mariupol as Putin’s success and Zelenskyy’s failure

Pro-Kremlin Telegram exploits Ukrainian reporting error

Russian Telegram channel undermines Ukraine-Poland relations with an apparently forged letter

Kremlin increases video content as a source for spreading disinformation and propaganda

Ukraine accuses Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan of negotiating with Russia to re-export Russian products

New fires and alleged sabotage operations across Russian territory

Over the past several days, numerous strategic facilities on Russian territory have caught fire. The reason of the fires in most cases were not officially confirmed, though many of them are suspected to be sabotage operations. At the same time, Siberia is experiencing massive seasonal wildfires, which Russia has lacked enough manpower to keep under control.

On May 3, videos surfaced showing a massive warehouse caught fire in Bogorodskoye, northeast of Moscow. Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations also provided photos showing the scale of the fire, which reportedly spanned an area of more than three hectares. The warehouse was reportedly leased by the Prosveshchenie publishing house, which manufactures most of Russia’s school textbooks. That same day, another video showed a polyethylene waste storage area burning in the region of Krasnoyarsk. The fire, which reportedly spanned around 500 square meters, was also covered by Kremlin media.

On May 2, videos captured a fire at a munitions factory facility in Perm, near the Ural Mountains, roughly 1,500km east of Moscow. The factory reportedly manufactured Grad and Smerch rocket munitions, which have played a significant role in destroying cities in Ukraine. And on May 1, videos documented fuel-oil tanks burning in Mytishchi. The location of the fuel depot is reportedly only thirty minutes from the Kremlin.

Map showing the distance from the Bogorodskoye and Mytishchi fires to the Kremlin. Green shows the oil depot in Mytishchi, pink shows the warehouse in Bogorodskoye, blue marks the Kremlin. (Source: GoogleMaps, green; GoogleMaps, pink; GoogleMaps, blue)

On April 30, a GRES-2 120-megawatt coal-fired power plant was reportedly sabotaged and caught fire in the Sakhalin region of the Russian far east. A video captured the massive destruction at the plant.

https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1520283961678729216

Footage from the power plant fire. (Source: @igoresushko/archive)

https://twitter.com/BWhiteSwan/status/1521127121971777536

A map showing the explosions and fires of various facilities on Russian territory since the beginning of Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Source: @BWhiteSwan/archive)

Meanwhile, photos surfaced on May 1 suggesting that a railway bridge in Russia’s Kursk region was destroyed due to sabotage. The bridge reportedly was used to transport Russian troops and military equipment to Ukraine. Kremlin media outlet RIA Novosti reported on the incident without providing the cause of the “partial collapse.”

At the same time, Siberia is currently experiencing massive seasonal wildfires. Videos that surfaced on May 2 captured the enormous scale of the wildfires. Ukrainian journalist Denis Kazansky reported that the fires continue to burn as there is no one to put them out, because the military unit responsible for extinguishing fires in the region is currently fighting in Ukraine. But Russian officials insist they had extinguished more than six hundred fires encompassing 37,000 hectares nationwide as of last week.

В Сибири сейчас так. Масштабные пожары некому тушить, ведь есть дела поважнее – тупая захватническая война в Украине.
Все деньги и ресурсы идут на убийство граждан чужой страны. А на свою этим идиотам насрать. Пусть горит. pic.twitter.com/7g4l6FeFu7
— Денис Казанський (@den_kazansky) May 2, 2022

A video showing the wildfires in Siberia, Russia. (Source: @den_kazansky/Archive)

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russian media presents civilian evacuation from Mariupol as Putin’s success and Zelenskyy’s failure

Ukrainian and Russian officials reported that around one hundred civilians evacuated from the Azovstal steel works in Mariupol over the weekend of April 30. The evacuation was carried out in collaboration with the United Nations and the International Committee of Red Cross after UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres visited Moscow and Kyiv the previous week.

On May 1, the Russian Ministry of Defense wrote that eighty civilians had been evacuated from Azovstal “thanks to the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin.” The statement claimed that evacuated civilians who “express a wish to go to regions under Kyiv regime control will be passed over to the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross.”

This came less than an hour after Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelenskyy tweeted on Twitter that an initial group of one hundred civilians had been evacuated. “Tomorrow we’ll meet them in Zaporizhzhia,” Zelenskyy wrote. “Grateful to our team! Now they, together with #UN, are working on the evacuation of other civilians from the plant.” The UN separately noted that one hundred civilians had been allowed to leave during the first phase of the operation.

According to Reuters, the first batch of civilians arrived in Bezimenne village in the separatist-controlled Donetsk People’s Republic. On May 2, Russia’s MoD wrote that “eleven liberated citizens” decided to stay in the breakaway territory “voluntarily,” while the remaining civilians were passed to the UN and ICRC and were heading to Zaporizhzhia. Ukrainian Military Police posted photos of “over a hundred” civilians arriving in Zaporizhzhia.

Kremlin-owned Sputnik Kyrgyzstan portrayed the evacuation as solely a Russian rescue effort. Another Kremlin outlet, Vesti.ru, misleadingly wrote that Zelenskyy acknowledged the civilian evacuation from Azovstal “three hours later,” even though Zelenskyy’s tweet that came out an hour prior to the Russian MoD report about the mission. RIA Novosti, meanwhile, published comments by Azovstal employee Natalya Usmanova, who said that the Ukrainian military were not allowing civilians to leave the steel works factory after the corridor was announced. Usmanova was also cited by the BBC in Russian, which gave the additional context that that she came to hide in the factory bunker voluntarily but was not allowed to exit, as “the shelling was so intense that there was no oxygen by the exit of the bunker.” People “were afraid to go and get a fresh air,” she added.

On April 29, pro-Kremlin outlet Voennoe Obozrenie claimed the evacuation is being used by the Ukrainian military to escape the siege and that Zelenskyy was not in control of the situation. The article falsely stated that Zelenskyy is unpopular in Ukraine and would lose support if the military surrendered Avostal. Recent independent polling in Ukraine suggested that Zelenskyy would receive 82.5 percent of votes if a presidential election were held again.

The following day, Russian Duma member Viktor Vodolacky told media without evidence that evacuation corridors “may be used by the West to rescue foreign mercenaries” fighting in Ukraine against Russia.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Pro-Kremlin Telegram exploits Ukrainian reporting error

On the afternoon of April 30, Ukrainian Telegram channel News Odesa and information agency UNIAN published a video of a ship presumably hitting a floating mine, with audio commentary remarking, “A Russian ship goes to hell.” Both channels, which published within a minute of each other, wrote, “Reportedly it is a Russian ship near Odesa. Waiting for official messages.” But their reports were incorrect. Twelve minutes later, News Odesa acknowledged the footage was actually six years old, depicting the deliberate sinking of a decommissioned US ship. UNIAN updated their reporting twenty-one minutes later, also clarifying that the original video was six years old, and the audio had been added recently.

Multiple Ukrainian channels forwarded or copied the message from both channels, then later updated or deleted their initial posts within a short period after realizing the reporting was in error. Several channels provided corrections within minutes of their original publication.

However, pro-Kremlin channels used the reporting error to “prove” that Ukrainian sources intentionally fabricate information. Kremlin-tied Telegram channel Legitimniy published a debunk of the story after News Odesa’s correction. Legitimniy claimed that some “media department” made up “victories” for Ukraine because there are no real ones that Ukraine’s presidential office could provide to these outlets.

A few hours after the original outlets’ corrections, additional Russian Telegram channels entered the debate, blaming the Ukrainian side for intentional fabrications and claiming that it was Ukrainian propaganda. The Russian outlet Izvestia also covered the story. Meanwhile, the War on Fakes Telegram channel, which has become notorious for publishing pro-Russian disinformation framed as fact-checking, released an “investigation” into the incident the following day.

As reporting mistakes are inevitable in the fog of war, it is vital that outlets acknowledge them in a timely fashion and provide corrections. Nonetheless, pro-Kremlin channels took advantage of this particular mistake to spin the narrative that Ukrainian sources should not be trusted in any context.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russian Telegram channel undermines Ukraine-Poland relations with an apparently forged letter

On May 2, Kremlin-tied Telegram channel Gossip Girl published what appears to be a forged document ordering Polish armed forces to prepare airborne units to enter the Ukrainian territories of Lviv and Volyn oblasts and take critical infrastructure objects under their control. The document featured a Ukrainian Intelligence logo, presumably to allege that the agency intercepted it. The document was amplified by a pro-Kremlin propagandist, an open-source research account, and other Twitter accounts. Several accounts doubted its authenticity but shared it anyway.

The document featured multiple elements suggesting its inauthenticity. First, the signature of Polish General Jarosław Mika is wrong and does not correspond with his actual signature. Second, the letter is addressed to Brigadier General Grzegorz Grodzki. According to the document, dated April 27, he is responsible for executing the orders contained within it, even though he has not been the commander of the airborne units in question since April 6. Third, the seals were most likely copy-pasted from another document, as Polish internet sleuths found signs of editing where text overlapped the seals on the second document. The signature of another general was stolen from this source document as well. Notably, Russian foreign intelligence chief Sergei Naryshkin claimed on April 28 that Poland intended to divide Ukraine.

The Telegram channel Legitimate forwarded Gossip Girl’s post and claimed without evidence that Ukraine had already agreed with Poland that the latter would move its forces to the Western part of Ukraine to move Ukrainian troops to the frontline in the Eastern part of Ukraine. Legitimate also provided spurious “insider” information that Western countries prevented Ukraine from signing a peace agreement with Russia that would result in the loss of territory. The logic behind Legitimate’s claim is that Warsaw would benefit from the partition of Ukraine, annexing the western parts of the country. The Russian narrative that Western neighbors intend to partition Ukraine for their individual gain has been debunked multiple times.

This would not be the first attempt by Russia to attack Polish-Ukrainian relations, as Russia consistently tries to undermine them.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Kremlin increases video content as a source for spreading disinformation and propaganda

Amid YouTube’s blockage of Russian state-affiliated channels and Russia’s threats to ban the platform in the country, Kremlin media is expanding its video output through alternate means.

On its website, the Kremlin-owned RT has launched a section titled “Join the Information Home Guard.” The section leads to the Telegram channel Videos in Different Languages, which currently has more than 35,000 subscribers. The channel was created on April 21 and became operational on the same day. In its about section, the channel states, “With your help, we will break through the information blockade around the events in Ukraine. The whole truth in the most important videos from Ukraine in 17 foreign languages. Share these videos with your friends abroad. Join the Information Home Guard!”

Videos with short descriptions are posted in numerous European languages, as well as in Chinese, Turkish, Vietnamese, Persian, and Japanese.

Screengrab showing a section run by Kremlin propaganda platform RT that calls on readers to “Join the Information Home Guard.” (Source: russian.rt.com)

Separately, in an attempt to justify Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, RT released a “documentary” called “Maidan: Turn to War” (“Майдан: поворот на войну”), based on anti-Ukraine disinformation narratives long spread by the Kremlin. First released on March 5, it was promoted by RT Editor-In-Chief Margarita Simonyan on her Telegram channel nearly two months later. “On May 2, 2014, supporters of Euromaidan [the Ukrainian pro-democracy revolution] drowned pro-Russian protests in blood in Odesa,” she wrote. “Dozens of people died.” She added that “the terrible footage of the massacre” should be sent to “everyone who does not believe in [existence of] nationalism in Ukraine.”

The RT video, available in Russian and English, is based on commentaries given by pro-Kremlin actors, including journalists and former officials. It spreads multiple Kremlin narratives, including that Ukrainian ultranationalists had been planning a revolution long before the 2014 Euromaidan protests, and that they were trained and equipped in military camps to suppress pro-Russian sentiments in Eastern Ukraine by killing and robbing Russian-speaking civilians.

The video was uploaded by at least five YouTube channels on May 2. RT also promoted the movie that same day using more than fifteen different VK communities to amplify the content.

Screengrab showing the RT “documentary” was uploaded at least by five YouTube channels on May 2. (Source: YouTube)

Screengrab showing the RT “documentary” being amplified by the VK network. (Source: VK)

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Ukraine accuses Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan of negotiating with Russia to re-export Russian products

On May 1, the Ukrainian MoD’s Chief Directorate of Intelligence said that Moscow is negotiating with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to re-export Russian products to international markets. According to the statement, the supply is planned to be made under the guise of Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani products to avoid international sanctions. It also claimed that two hundred companies have already been registered for this purpose in the three countries.

The Ukrainian MoD statement also said that Moscow plans to organize the production of component parts for the military and dual-use purposes in Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states. The CSTO is currently comprised of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. According to the MoD statement, Armenia has created favorable conditions for Russian companies to do business there, especially in the IT sector.

Irakli Kobakhidze, chairman of the ruling Georgian Dream party, commented that the MoD statement lacked evidence. “This is another sad case when such a statement is spread by the Ukrainian authorities without facts,” he said. “It also has a very simple reason – people who are in the radical opposition here [in Georgia], are in power there [in Ukraine].”

Previously on April 4, the Ukrainian MoD accused Georgia of allowing Russia to smuggle illegal goods through its territory. Georgian authorities promptly denied the allegations.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: New fires and alleged sabotage operations across Russian territory appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia falsely accuses Ukraine of provoking conflict even after it knew war was coming

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Mon, 18 Apr 2022 19:51:08 +0000

Tracking narratives

Statements from Ukrainian officials misrepresented in pro-Kremlin media, used as evidence of Ukraine provoking war

Russia presents new “evidence” of Ukrainian biolabs “activity”

International response

Leader of Georgian breakaway region announces referendum to join Russia

Statements from Ukrainian officials misrepresented in pro-Kremlin media, used as evidence of Ukraine provoking war

Telegram channel MediaKiller, which was among a broader set that published a falsified BBC video on April 13, deliberately distorted a Ukrainian official’s comments in order to blame Ukraine for Russia’s invasion.

In an April 13 interview with BBC Ukraine, Oleksiy Danilov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said the country anticipated Russia to start its invasion on February 22. “To accuse us of not preparing is completely incorrect. We could not go out and publicly say to the population: ‘Friends, on February 22, the war begins.’ These are unacceptable things from the point of view of public administration. But we were preparing,” he said. However, Danilov said Ukraine did not expect Russian forces to attack from Belarusian territory.

In the interview, Danilov also said that Ukraine had not expected Russia to attack civilian targets. “We could not even imagine in a nightmare that they would kill our women and children, pregnant women, the elderly… If you are an army, you have to fight the army, not the civilians.”

Following the interview, MediaKiller cited Danilov’s comments in a post that blamed the Ukrainian government for the war. The channel said Ukraine knew the war would happen yet continued to provoke Russia by allowing protests and insulting it in the media. After MediaKiller published its post, Kremlin–tied Telegram channel Rezident forwarded it and added an allegation that Ukraine received advance notice of the war from the United States and the United Kingdom, allowing authorities to evacuate their relatives ahead of the invasion.

In another attempt to discredit the Ukrainian government, multiple pro–Kremlin media outlets cited an April 14 BBC Russia interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. During the interview, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine’s war with Russia started in 2014. “That is why we wanted to join NATO…. We started this war even earlier,” he said. As the fact-checking organization StopFake noted, the quotes from Zelenskyy’s interview were taken out of context by pro-Kremlin media, which cited the quotes as evidence that Ukraine had been preparing an offensive against the separatist regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, Crimea, and Belarus. Another pro-Russian Telegram channel cited Zelenskyy quotes while blaming Ukrainian authorities for “not evacuating civilians and using them as a living shield.”

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russia presents new “evidence” of Ukrainian biolabs “activity”

An official from Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the first time presented a list of names for those involved with laboratories in Ukraine that are allegedly being used to develop biological weapons. Along with the list, the MoD also claimed – without any evidence to support its allegations – that the United States planned to infect Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Moldova with typhus and hepatitis.

In a press briefing, Igor Kirillov, Chief of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, declared that the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) is one of the elements in the “[US] scheme for coordinating the activities of biological laboratories and research institutes in Ukraine.” It seems, however, that Kirillov used transparent and public information found on the organization’s website as a basis to gin up new, unsubstantiated allegations to support the Kremlin’s broader claim of US bioweapon research on Russia’s borders.

According to Kirillov, STCU publicly presents itself as a nonprofit organization unrelated to the Pentagon, but “it turned out to be an international intergovernmental organization created for preventing the dissemination of knowledge and experience related to weapons of mass destruction.” For its part, STCU also does not hide its affiliation with the United States, the European Union, or Ukraine: its website lists US, European Commission, and Ukrainian officials as a part of its governing board, and board minutes indicate the participation of many different departments and ministries within partner governments.

Kirillov added that the offices for the STCU are located in Baku, Azerbaijan; Chisinau, Moldova; Tbilisi, Georgia; as well as in Kharkiv and Lviv, Ukraine, implying that each location is complicit. The STCU website lists offices in Baku, Chisinau, Tbilisi, and Kyiv.

Screencap of the STCU website showing its transparent listing of field offices in Baku, Azerbaijan; Kyiv, Ukraine; Chisinau, Moldova; and Tbilisi, Georgia. (Source: STCU/archive)

Kirillov also presented new “findings,” again without evidence, that US and European scientists were taking water samples from the major rivers of Ukraine in order to find pathogens of cholera, typhoid fever, hepatitis A and E, and “spread infection by water not only in the territory of Russia, but also to infect the entire water area of the Black and Azov Seas and even Belarus, Moldova, and Poland.”

In his unsupported claims, Kirillov stated that the United States has spent more than $350 million on STCU projects in recent years and that the US Departments of State and Defense, in particular, are sponsors. That numerical value, however, was possibly an inflation of one found on STCU’s website, the landing page for which includes an animated graphic that, at one point, declares that it has received “over $300 million USD” in total, with no mention of source, over its lifetime.

Screencap of the STCU website indicating, in part, that it has coordinated more than $300 million USD in research over its lifetime. The website, however, does not clarify the source of that funding. (Source: STCU/archive)

In a readout of the briefing by Kremlin-owned media outlet RIA, the outlet mentions that the identities of people involved in “experiments” had been discovered as a result of what the Kremlin still refers to as a “special military operation in Ukraine.” The article named people who are all listed on the STCU website in some fashion but whom the DFRLab will not name, as the organization appears primarily to function as coordinating funding for scientific research between researchers and governments.

There is no evidence that STCU is aiding in biological warfare research, as implied by both Kirillov and RIA. As such, this represents only the latest statement by Russian MoD attempting to justify Russia’s war on Ukraine using false-flag narratives that the latter was planning to use biological research laboratories to produce bioweapons.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC, and Iain Robertson, Deputy Managing Editor, Washington DC

Leader of Georgian breakaway region announces referendum to join Russia

On April 17, Anatoly Bibilov, the “president” of Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia – the head of the separatists is elected as “president” of the region, but the elections occur outside the bounds of Georgia’s official constitution – announced plans to hold a referendum to approve the region’s incorporation into Russia. According to Bibilov, more than 3,000 signatures supporting the referendum have already been collected. “When many turn their backs, we are heading [toward Russia] because this is our world. Russia is our historical homeland, and we must never forget this,” said Bibilov.

The group seeking to hold the referendum comprises twenty-six individuals, all of whom registered with South Ossetia’s election officials on April 6. The group includes Bibilov and former presidents Ludvig Chivirov, Eduard Kokoity, and Leonid Tibilov, Civil.ge reported.

The process to hold a referendum was outlined by Civil.ge: the group has three months to collect signatures; election officials review the signatures before being sending them to the “president;” the “president” forwards the documents to South Ossetia’s top court to determine whether the request is compliant with the region’s extralegal “constitution;” and, if the referendum is approved, the “president” sets a date for the referendum within ten days.

Bibilov voiced his support for South Ossetia joining Russia on March 30, ten days before the region’s election for “president” were held; many considered this a strategic pre-election tactic. After the first round of elections on April 10, opposition candidate Alan Gagloev received 38.55 percent of the votes, while Bibilov garnered 34.95 percent. The second round of voting is set for April 28.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russia falsely accuses Ukraine of provoking conflict even after it knew war was coming appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Videos appear to show missiles striking Russian oil depot

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 01 Apr 2022 19:47:04 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the US, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Videos appear to show missiles striking Russian oil depot

South Ossetian soldiers depart Ukraine, returning to Georgia

Tracking narratives

Accusations fly as Russian deputy threatens Azerbaijan with nukes and Azerbaijan puts him on Interpol wanted list

Russia falsely accuses Hunter Biden of funding Ukrainian biolabs – again

Poll suggests Putin’s popularity is rising in Russia

Media policy

Russia’s IT regulator attempts to silence Wikipedia for the second time

Documenting dissent

Russians condemning the war in Ukraine face harsh backlash

International response

South Ossetia announces plans to unify with Russia as Abkhazia intends to remain independent

Videos appear to show missiles striking Russian oil depot

On April 1, reports and videos surfaced online showing a possible attack on Russia’s Belgorod oil depot. The facility in question is located roughly thirty-five kilometers from the border with Ukraine. While facility owner Rosneft gave no information about the cause of the fire, Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov blamed the attack on the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Reuters reported. “Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, said he could not confirm or deny reports of Ukrainian involvement in the strike as he did not have military information,” the report added. “The Ukrainian Defense Ministry and the general staff did not respond to requests for comment.”

In one video, several missiles appear to strike the facility as two helicopters fly over it. The DFRLab geolocated the video and confirmed that it was filmed just north of the Belgorod oil refinery. According to timestamps on CCTV footage from the scene, the attack was carried out around 5:43am local time.

Geolocation of the video showing a possible attack on the Belgorod oil refinery. The video recording was taken just north of the facility. (Source: Google Maps, left, bottom; @RaLee85/archive)

Other videos and drone footage of the oil depot showed several fires at the site. There is speculation that an attack was carried out by two Mi-24 attack helicopters, launching multiple S-8 unguided missiles. This is supported by footage that shows helicopters flying at a low altitude.

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1509792735997349889

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

South Ossetian soldiers depart Ukraine, returning to Georgia

On March 31, reports emerged in Georgian Telegram channels that up to 300 South Ossetian soldiers left their posts and hitchhiked back home after being sent to fight against Ukraine. The former president of the Russian-occupied region of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, confirmed that some soldiers had traveled back to South Ossetia. “Nobody has the right to judge these guys or accuse them of cowardice,” Kokoity said. “We need to look at the root causes of what happened and find out how their participation was organized. We will deal with this in the most serious manner.”

Images circulated in Telegram channels allegedly depict the returned South Ossetian soldiers near the Russia-South Ossetia border. The DFRLab geolocated the images to Nizhny Zaramag, a border checkpoint between South Ossetia and North Ossetia.

300 Russian-Ossetian soldiers reportedly left Ukraine on their own and returned to Tskhinvali region.

According to Ukraine's General Staff in total, 1200 troops (3 BTG) from "South Ossetia" and 800 (2 BTG) from Abkhazia were deployed in Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/mo3B7yNsWV
— Visioner (@visionergeo) March 30, 2022

The Telegram channel VChK-OGPU (ВЧК-ОГПУ), which describes itself as a platform exposing the “secrets of officials, oligarchs, gangsters, and strongmen,” offered an explanation for the South Ossetian soldiers’ return. According to the channel, the soldiers did not run away but were brought back by Kokoity. The channel claims that the soldiers sent to Ukraine were listed as volunteers and not as servicemen of the Russian 58th Army. In addition, the soldiers reportedly lacked bulletproof vests and traveled to Ukraine without weapons or equipment. At this time, the DFRLab cannot independently verify these claims.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Accusations fly as Russian deputy threatens Azerbaijan with nukes and Azerbaijan puts him on Interpol wanted list

On Monday, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would launch an investigation into the actions of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh. The decision came after the Russian Ministry of Defense accused Azerbaijan of violating the Nagorno-Karabakh peace agreement by occupying the village of Parukh (Farukh in Azerbaijani) before eventually evacuating it. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense accused Russia of spreading false claims, saying they had not evacuated the village, while Armenia expressed frustration at Russia for making the same claim. This indicates that Armenia and Azerbaijan both have concerns about Russian peacekeepers, who have been deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh since November 2020, following a six-week war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The previous day, Mikhail Delyagin, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Economic Policy in the Russian State Duma, escalated matters when he told the Rossiya24 TV show “60 Minutes” that Russia needed to “punish Baku” because Azerbaijan aggravated the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is occupied with Ukraine. Following the broadcast, Delyagin posted a poll on his Telegram channel with the question: “Do you think it would be justified to use tactical nuclear weapons to eliminate the oil industry of Azerbaijan due to its aggression triggered by belief in the powerlessness of Russia, whose military resources are diverted to Ukraine?” As of March 31, more than 21,000 users had voted in the poll, with 56 percent of them selecting “no, it is unacceptable” and 31 percent selecting “yes, this is necessary – Turkish proxies in Baku will not understand anything else.”

In response to the provocative poll, Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office has opened a criminal case against Delyagin and added him to an international wanted list through Interpol. Azerbaijan is charging Delyagin with using the media to call for aggressive war; threats to commit an act of terrorism; and incitement of national hatred by threatening the use of force. The prosecutor’s office stated that Azerbaijan had sent requests to several partner countries to arrest and extradite Delyagin if he traveled to their territory.

Delyagin has since apologized for his statement and claimed the comments and Telegram poll were not addressed to the Azerbaijani people or state, but targeted at a part of the Azerbaijani bureaucracy, which he said had decided to take advantage of Russia’s focus on Ukraine and neglect its peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh.

On March 28, the Press Council of Azerbaijan criticized Russia for blocking Azerbaijani media outlets due to their reporting on Ukraine. The council said that Azerbaijani media websites were blocked because Russia is unhappy with them taking an objective position on the Russia-Ukraine war. The council underlined that Russia neglects freedom of speech and expression and prevents Russians from receiving objective information. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Russian censor Roskomnadzor blocked access to four Azerbaijani media websites, including Haqqin.az, Minval.az, baku.ws, and Oxu.az. Some news organizations said their websites were blocked without any formal notice from Roskomnadzor. In response to Roskomnadzor’s actions, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Digital Development and Transport hinted that it might block Russian media websites if they disseminate information against Azerbaijan’s interests and territorial integrity.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia falsely accuses Hunter Biden of funding Ukrainian biolabs – again

The Russian Ministry of Defense is attempting to breathe new life into the debunked conspiracy theory that the US and Ukraine are using biolabs to weaponize deadly viruses. In the latest iteration of the conspiracy, the Russian MoD claims that Hunter Biden, son of US President Joe Biden, is working with the Pentagon to fund a “military biological program in Ukraine.” The Russian MoD prepared slides that allegedly connected the US president’s son with “secret biolabs” in Ukraine.

In the slides, the Russian MoD shared biographies of Americans it believes are working on the biolabs program, including US Defense Threat Reduction Agency staff. The slides also included several images of documents that are difficult to read due to their size. Among these were one titled, “Risk evaluation of dangerous pathogens transmitted by birds during migration,” while another focused on the potential epidemiological threat of laboratory research taking place in Kherson. The slides also shared an authentic US patent for a mosquito-delivering drone called a “toxic mosquito aerial release system.”

Another slide discussed Baykar, the Turkish company that produces the Bayraktar TB2 drone. A question-and-answer style document alleges to show responses from Baykar to Motor Sich, a Ukrainian airplanes engine manufacturer. The Russian MoD highlighted a question about the ability of the drone to carry and spray liquid or aerosols from a 20-liter container, implying the Ukrainians intend to use the drones to spray biological weapons. While the document’s legitimacy is questionable, Baykar’s response to the question was simply “No.” Furthermore, the document is written in Russian and English, which suggests it is not authentic as a genuine copy would more likely be written Ukrainian and English.

The biolabs conspiracy has been widely debunked. Hunter Biden’s alleged involvement was also debunked by the Washington Post. The US Embassy in Ukraine has also addressed the conspiracy by noting that its partnership with Ukraine aims to reduce biological threats.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Poll suggests Putin’s popularity is rising in Russia

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating in the country has increased since the start of the war, according to independent Russian pollster Levada Center. The center, which Russia has labeled a foreign agent, published its latest poll on March 30.

According to the poll, Putin’s approval rating had reached 83 percent, a twelve-point rise since February. It is Putin’s highest rating since 2017, after which his popularity dropped due to pension reforms. Only 15 percent of Russians currently disapprove Putin, a 12-point decrease from February.

Meanwhile, the amount of respondents who believe that the country is generally moving in the right direction increased from 52 percent in February to 69 percent in March, while those who think it is moving in the wrong direction decreased from 38 percent to 22 percent.

Trust in Putin rose from 34 percent to 44 percent. He remains the most trusted individual in the country, followed by Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, whose trust rating increased from 12 percent to 28 percent. Trust in Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and ultranationalist lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky also rose in the latest poll.

For the first time since October 2015, the share of those who approve of the State Duma (59 percent) surpassed the share of those who do not (36 percent). Seventy percent of Russians approve of the government’s activities, while 27 percent did not, a change of 15 points in each direction since February.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russia’s IT regulator attempts to silence Wikipedia for the second time

Russian communications watchdog Roskomnadzor announced on March 31 that it is fining Wikipedia RUB 4,000,000 (more than USD $48,000) for not deleting “false information on the subject of a special military operation of the RF Armed Forces in Ukraine, aimed at misinforming Russian users.” Wikipedia’s Russian branch said that it was not clear who would be the recipient of the fine. “Perhaps it will be the Wikimedia Foundation,” the local branch speculated. Earlier, on March 29, Wikipedia’s Russian branch said it had received a notification demanding it delete the article “Russia’s Invasion in Ukraine (2022).”

This is the second time Roskomnadzor has demanded that Wikipedia delete an article about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On March 1, the Russian Wikipedia branch published the first notification they received from Roskomnadzor, which threatened to block Wikipedia in Russia. In response, Wikipedia published an article in Russian explaining what to do if Wikipedia is blocked.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Russians condemning the war in Ukraine face harsh backlash

On March 31, various Telegram channels belonging to independent media outlets in Russia reported on a schoolteacher facing ten years in prison for condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine. On March 18, Irina Gen reportedly tried to explain to two of her eighth-grade students why they were prohibited from attending karate and swimming competitions in Europe. Gen became emotional and condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, saying that it was “right” to ban Russia from sports competitions in Europe. “Until Russia starts behaving in a civilized way, this will continue forever,” she said.

Someone in the classroom recorded Gen’s words and submitted the audio recording to local police. On March 30, police reportedly detained her. Gen pleaded guilty and is now facing a ten-year sentence.

Elsewhere in Russia, on March 31, the documentary festival Artdocfest opened with the theme “No war!” According to Current Time, an independent television program now banned in Russia, a festival theater was evacuated fifteen minutes prior to the start of a documentary. As attendees filed out to the street, an unknown man with a coffee cup approached festival organizer Vitaly Mansky and said provocatively, “I suggest that you hold this festival in the Donbas, where people have been dying for eight years…Why didn’t you do anything there?” Mansky turned away and did not respond. The unknown man proceeded to throw a red substance from the coffee cup on Mansky’s back, as seen in a video on the pro-Kremlin RTVI Telegram channel. Later, Mansky published a video from a kitchen where the festival organizers had gathered after the incident, announcing the immediate closing of the festival. “There is no freedom beyond the kitchen in Russia,” Mansky said. The festival has faced pressure from Russian authorities since 2014.

On March 31, Anna Netrebko, a Russian opera singer, wrote on Facebook: “I expressly condemn the war on Ukraine, and my thoughts are with the victims of this war and their families.” Two days later, the Novosibirsk State Academic Opera and Ballet Theater announced that Netrebko’s June 2 concert had been canceled due to her condemnation of Russia. “We are sure that the truth is with us,” the theater’s announcement concluded. “We should not be afraid that there are cultural figures who renounce their homeland. Our country is rich with talents, and yesterday’s idols will be replaced by others with a clear civic position.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

South Ossetia announces plans to unify with Russia as Abkhazia intends to remain independent

On March 30, Anatoly Bibilov, the Kremlin-backed leader of the Russian-occupied region of South Ossetia, said that the region will take “appropriate legal steps in the near future” to ensure unification with its “historic homeland – Russia.”

Andrei Klimov, deputy head of United Russia’s international cooperation commission, said that South Ossetia should hold a referendum to unite with Russia, Civil.ge reported. Following Klimov’s statement, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Moscow would treat the proposed referendum with respect. “We have not taken any legal or other actions in this regard. But at the same time, in this case, we are talking about expressing the opinion of the people of South Ossetia, we treat them with respect,” said Peskov.

On March 31, US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that the US would not recognize any results “of any effort by Russia or its proxies to divide sovereign Georgian territory.” He added, “Just as the United States did not recognize Russia’s illegal seizure and attempted annexation of Crimea in 2014 and just as we did not recognize the Kremlin’s cynical attempt to recognize independence of the so-called DNR [Donestk People’s Republic] and LNR [Luhansk People’s Republic] in eastern Ukraine, just before it launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, we will not recognize the results of any effort by Russia or its proxies to divide sovereign Georgian territory.”

Following the South Ossetia announcement, Aslan Bzhania, the head of occupied Abkhazia, stated that Abkhazia does not plan to join Russia and will remain independent. “Sovereign, independent Abkhazia is growing and will continue to grow brotherly, allied relations with Russia,” he added.

The previous day, RT editor-in-chief and Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan visited Abkhazia. She stated in her Telegram channel that she met with Bzhania and opened a media center. She then questioned why Russia and Abkhazia needed a border crossing. “Millions of Russians who annually cross this border and our allies are now shedding blood for us,” she added. Telegram commenters supported Simonyan, replying that there should be no border between Abkhazia and Russia and that Abkhazia should follow the example of South Ossetia on becoming part of Russia. The post garnered 968 comments. Margarita Simonyan’s Telegram channel has more that 219,000 subscribers.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Videos appear to show missiles striking Russian oil depot appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hundreds of Belarusians join Ukraine’s fight against Russian imperialism

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 30 Mar 2022 21:21:29 +0000

If Alyaksandr Lukashenka ever sends Belarusian troops to join Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine, there is a pretty good chance that they could end up fighting against other Belarusians.

That is because hundreds of Belarusian volunteers have already joined a paramilitary group in Ukraine called the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, named after the nineteenth century Belarusian leader of an uprising against the Russian Empire. Hundreds more have expressed interest in joining and the group is using its Telegram channel to recruit fighters.

In a post on March 21, the group declared: “the voice of conscience called us to fight, because we could not be on the sidelines when fraternal Ukrainian people were being killed. Today the fate of our people is being forged in battles with the Moscow aggressor. With our blood we lay the foundation for freedom and the revival of our Motherland, a successful Belarusian breakthrough in the future.”

On March 26, the group posted a video of its members taking an oath to become part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It has also posted videos showing seized and burned out Russian tanks. “Here is captured equipment and there is destroyed equipment. There are a lot of trophies,” a fighter says on the video.

The participation of Belarusian volunteers fighting against the Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrates that the stakes of Vladimir Putin’s war extend far beyond the current battlefield. Ukraine’s David-and-Goliath struggle to defend its sovereignty and independence has become an inspiration for many in the former Soviet Union who seek to resist Russian imperialism and autocracy in favor of Western-style liberal democracy.

Just as the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War became a battleground for the competing ideologies in Europe in the early twentieth century, Russia’s war on Ukraine has become a proxy, a metaphor, and a lightning rod for the political struggles of the former Soviet space. And nowhere is this truer than in Belarus.

“If Ukraine should fail, and I hope that will not happen, Lukashenka’s line to the Kremlin will feel much stronger and our fight will be very difficult. But when Ukraine wins it will be much easier for people in Belarus to realize that we can change a lot in our country and we will have this window of opportunity,” Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya recently told The Independent.

Likewise, Sergei Bespalov, a former dissident journalist from Minsk who went into exile in Kyiv and joined the Kalinouski Battalion, told The New York Times: “We have a common enemy, Putin and Lukashenka. These are the two people who unleashed this war. If Kyiv falls, it will be bad for everyone, including Belarus.”

Put simply, it is not only the fate of Ukraine hanging in the balance of Putin’s war, it is also the fate of Belarus.

If Putin’s campaign to subjugate Ukraine fails, it will severely undermine his reputation in the region. Defeat in Ukraine would blunt the attractiveness of Russia’s autocratic model while emboldening liberal and democratic forces. It may also weaken Putin’s standing at home, as Russia has historically not been kind to leaders who lose wars.

“Kyiv is being bombed and we realized this is probably the only such chance, the last chance, to win back Belarus, protect Ukraine, and actually make this world a better place,” Konstantin Suschik, a Belarusian graphic designer who joined the fight in Ukraine, told The New York TImes.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Belarusians are not the only citizens of former Soviet states to join Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression. Hundreds of volunteers from Georgia, which itself was invaded by Russia in August 2008, are also fighting in Ukraine. The Georgia Foreign Legion, commanded by Mamuka Mamulashvili, has recruited soldiers from dozens of countries including his native Georgia. “I need only one motivation, to save people and save civilians,” Mamulashvili told Politico.

The volunteers from Belarus and Georgia are fighting for Ukraine in defiance of their own governments.

Wary of antagonizing Moscow, the Georgian government, despite claiming to be pro-Western, has been hesitant to provide support to Ukraine and has not joined Western sanctions against Russia. On February 28, the Georgian authorities prevented a charter flight from landing in Tbilisi that was set to take volunteers to Ukraine. The Georgian volunteers were then forced to take a bus, delaying their arrival by several days and prompting Mamulashvili to call his government “slaves of Putin.”

In Belarus, where the Lukashenka regime is actively supporting and enabling Putin’s war, volunteer fighters face arrest should they be caught trying to join the fight on Ukraine’s side.

Putin launched his war in Ukraine on the false pretense of protecting Russian speakers and ethnic Russians. In reality, at its most basic level, the war is about Ukraine preserving its sovereignty, independence, and resistance to imperial expansion. But at another level, it is a struggle between those who support democracy across the former Soviet space and those who oppose it.

Brian Whitmore is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels in Ukraine aim to undermine peace talks

Questions swirl regarding explosions at Russian ammunition depot near Belgorod

Pro-Kremlin commentators accuse Azerbaijan and Turkey of attempting to open a “second front” against Russia in the South Caucasus

Media policy

Millions of Russian internet users still use Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter

War crimes and human rights abuses

Russia falsely claims to have captured Ukrainian soldiers accused of shooting Russian POWs

Contradictory reports of Russian vehicles returning to Belarus

On March 29, video evidence emerged suggesting that some Russian forces were returning to the territory of Belarus. A video showed Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) moving northward from the Belarusian border town of Rechitsa toward the city of Gomel, where they were loaded onto railway platforms. The second part of the video showed large Russian military formations, allegedly in Gomel, near railway tracks. While the exact location of the military vehicle formation is unknown, it was accompanied by a Belarusian police car, suggesting it was filmed in Belarus. Additional videos of alleged Russian withdrawal have surfaced over the past few days on social media, though they have yet to be confirmed.

Russian lines in the North of Ukraine are starting to collapse. Surviving Russian vehicles withdraw to Belarus. Ukraine must keep the momentum. #Ukraine #Kyiv pic.twitter.com/YJKds2Wt8b
— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) March 29, 2022

In contrast, Twitter user @MarQs__ noted another video, originally posted by MotolkoHelp, appearing to show Russian vehicles going in the opposite direction, heading south to Rechitsa. “The convoy consists of mostly of trucks so either they will pick up soldiers in #Ukraine or they move in soldiers / supplies,” they wrote. MotolkoHelp later reported an additional video showing a column of Russian trucks heading toward Rechitsa.

This Russian convoy is moving towards Rechitsa, so the other way. The convoy consists of mostly of trucks so either they will pick up soldiers in #Ukraine or they move in soldiers / supplies. pic.twitter.com/P3g908cmsN
— marqs (@MarQs__) March 30, 2022

Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych said that a withdrawal would demonstrate that Russia was unable to persuade Belarus to send its own troops into Ukraine. According to Arestovych, the probability of Belarus joining the war is currently low.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels in Ukraine aim to undermine peace talks

Multiple pro–Kremlin Telegram channels are spreading narratives that downplay or discredit the ongoing peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Turkey. The Telegram channel Legitimniy (“Legitimate”) published a post stating that talks between Ukraine and Russia had ended and “there will be no results.” Seven minutes later, the channel published a rumor claiming that if the diplomatic negotiations did not bring any results, Russia would launch a massive attack in all directions.

As the Ukrainian delegation in Turkey outlined its proposals, pro-Kremlin Telegram channels tried to diminish them. The Legitimniy channel said that even though the bombardment of the Ukrainian cities continues, “the Ukrainian side started accelerating news of victory.” The channel claimed that Russia had established a police force within its occupied territories, concluding that it is not “profitable for Russia to make concessions now.” Finally, the channel argued against the peace negotiations by claiming that sanctions relief would not happen unless Russia admitted defeat and paid reparations to Ukrainian authorities.

Another Kremlin-linked Telegram channel, ZeRada, claimed that the Kremlin agreed to hold peace talks in Turkey to postpone Turkish ally Azerbaijan from launching an offensive against Armenia. The channel argued that Turkey would not support another conflict while the peace talks were happening. It also questioned Ukraine’s intentions to hold a referendum to finalize the country’s security status. The channel accused Ukraine of lying and questioned why Ukraine would suggest a referendum if it was winning the war.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Questions swirl regarding explosions at Russian ammunition depot near Belgorod

On March 29, videos surfaced of a blast at an ammunition storage facility near the Russian city of Belgorod. The videos show large explosions and detonating munitions in the town of Oktyabrsky, fourteen kilometers away from the Ukrainian border.

Rumors swirled on social media that the explosion resulted from a Ukrainian missile attack. However, Belgorod emergency services said the blast was caused by “a human factor,” suggesting human error.

Russian-owned news outlet TASS reported on its Telegram channel that four servicemen were injured after a projectile hit a military camp and that “according to preliminary information, the shelling happened from the Ukrainian side.” A pro-Kremlin Ukrainian Telegram channel repeated that narrative. Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin outlet RIA confirmed the injury of four servicemen, citing the “human factor” explanation.

While Russia has not provided any additional information about the explosion, spreading multiple explanations about an incident aligns with the Kremlin’s tactic to distract both its citizens and external observers by polluting the information space with numerous explanations that blur the line between truth and fiction.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Pro-Kremlin commentators accuse Azerbaijan and Turkey of attempting to open a “second front” against Russia in the South Caucasus

On March 24, various reports emerged about the renewal of clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenian forces, which Armenia claims resulted in the death of three soldiers and fifteen wounded. Azerbaijani forces reportedly entered the village of Farrukh (Armenian name Parukh), which is currently under the control of Russian peacekeepers. The peacekeepers were deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020, after a six-week war between Azerbaijan and Armenia ended with a peace deal brokered by Russia.

On March 26, the Russian Ministry of Defense accused Azerbaijan of violating the Nagorno-Karabakh peace agreement, stating that the Azerbaijani military entered the area and fired at units of the Nagorno-Karabakh army from Turkish drones. The following day, the defense ministry reported that Azerbaijan had withdrawn its military units.

However, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense argued that Russia’s statement did not reflect reality, claiming that it had not changed positions near the village. Azerbaijan also denied violating the ceasefire and reminded Russia that the use of the term “Nagorno-Karabakh” was “disrespectful to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” and that it had disrespected the Declaration on Allied Interaction signed by the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan on February 22, 2022.

In view of this, the latest reports about escalation between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been assessed by pro-Kremlin commentators as an attempt by Azerbaijan and Turkey to open a ”second front” against Russia in the South Caucasus. Tsargrad claimed that Azerbaijan, under Turkey’s influence, is trying to test Russia to see if it had enough military strength to engage in the region. It also reported that by opening a second front, Turkey and the United States want to significantly weaken Russia’s forces while it is focusing on “liberating Ukraine from neo-Nazis.” Pro-Kremlin outlet Reporter asserted that Azerbaijan is abetted by Turkey, and given that the latter is the largest supplier of drones to Ukraine, Russia should expect unfavorable moves from Turkey at any time. Regnum wrote that Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the West are trying to create a second front for Russia in the South Caucasus, and that the Armenian government is also helping under the pressure from its “Western sponsors.” Rossiya 24 TV host Olga Skabeeva, meanwhile, also discussed the topic of a second front in the South Caucasus and asserted that Azerbaijan’s denial need to be clarified.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Millions of Russian internet users still use Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter

Millions of Russians are still using Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, despite the social media platforms being blocked in the country. An analysis published by the pro-Kremlin online outlet RBC.ru analyzed social media usage over a period of nearly three weeks, including the ten days following Russia’s ban on Western social networks.

At the request of RBC, the research company Mediascope calculated the daily audience of the most popular social networks in Russia from February 24, the day when Russia invaded Ukraine, to March 15. According to the report, the number of daily users decreased following the ban, with a drop of approximately five million users on Instagram and four million on Facebook. Despite the decrease, Instagram had retained approximately 34.2 million daily users, while Facebook had retained around 5.5 million users. Twitter use dropped by more than 50 percent, from 2.6 million users to fewer than 1.3 million after the blockage. The research also showed an increase in the use of Russian social networks Vkontakte, Telegram, and Odnoklassniki. Telegram experienced the most dramatic jump, growing from 31.2 million users to 45.5 million users over the tracking period, a jump of more than 45 percent. TikTok remained relatively unchanged with more than 33 million daily users.

RBC concluded that the proliferation of virtual private networks (VPNs) in the country explained the continued activity of Russian users on Western social media platforms, as VPNs allow users to route their internet connections anonymously through other countries. The DFRLab has previously reported on the increased demand for VPNs in Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russia falsely claims to have captured Ukrainian soldiers accused of shooting Russian POWs

On March 29, Vladimir Shamanov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee for the Development of Civil Society, claimed that Russian special forces had captured the Ukrainian soldiers accused of shooting Russian prisoners of war in the legs. Shamanov said the captured Ukrainians were Sergey “Chili” Velichko and Konstantin Nemichev, who are battalion commanders of the Kharkiv branch of the Azov territorial defense.

Later that same day, Velichko and Nemichev released a video to prove they were not being held captive. In the video, Nemichev stated without evidence that the footage showing the Russian soldiers being shot was “propaganda” and that all Russian prisoners of war are being treated “humanely.”

The DFRLab could not confirm whether Velichko or Nemichev are in the graphic five-minute video, that appears to show Russian POWs being taunted and shot in the legs at close range.

Additionally, Vladimir Medinsky, the head of the Russian delegation attending peace talks in Turkey, said that Russia raised the video with the Ukrainian delegation. Ukraine “promised to take the hardest measures if they find them first – those who did these war crimes,” he said.

Previously, Oleksiy Arestovich, an adviser to the Ukrainian President’s Office, wrote on Telegram that the video was being verified.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Contradictory reports of Russian vehicles returning to Belarus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Additional units from Georgian breakaway regions join Russian offensive

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Mon, 28 Mar 2022 20:31:16 +0000

Security

Additional units from Georgian breakaway regions join Russian offensive

Ukraine Army claims units of Russian forces retreating and regrouping in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Luhansk separatist leader announces plans to hold referendum joining Russia

Russian officials, media propose going beyond Ukraine and target other countries, including NATO states

Media policy

Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta suspends operations after warnings from state censor

Spotify ends all service in Russia after a month of compromises

War crimes and human rights abuses

Ukraine launches investigation into video alleged to show soldiers shooting Russian POWs

Additional units from Georgian breakaway regions join Russian offensive

On March 25, Vladimir Anua, de-facto defense minister of the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia, confirmed that Abkhazia would provide military support to Russia. The statement was released after Abkhazian leader Aslan Bzhania met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow.

On March 26, an additional 150 troops were sent to Ukraine from Tskhinvali, the occupied capital of the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Over the past week, footage has emerged online depicting the movement of military units from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

On March 19, TikTok footage depicted the mobilization of military units from Russia’s 7th military base in Gudauta, Abkhazia. The DFRLab geolocated the footage to Gudauta central railway station, moving northwest towards Russia. The convoy appears to have arrived in Russia by March 24, as the Telegram channel ДвіЩ (“two” in Ukrainian) posted a video reportedly of the same convoy heading to Ukraine via Sochi, Russia.

The DFRLab geolocated the video to an area near the village of Chemitokvadzhe in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai region.

Geolocation of troops from Abkhazia near the village of Chemitokhvadzhe in Krasnodar Krai, Russia. (Source: ДвіЩ, left; Google Earth, top right, bottom right)

Google map showing the distance that units from Russia’s 7th military base traveled. The military convoy was first spotted at Gudauta railway station in Abkhazia, Georgia. Five days later, the convoy was spotted in Chemitokvadzhe, Russia. Note that the time depicted is for civilian trains; trains carrying military equipment would likely move slower. (Source: Google Maps)

Images published by Yuriy Butusov, a Ukrainian journalist and editor at Censor.net, suggest that some units from Russia’s 7th military base were in Ukraine as of March 21. According to Butusov, documents from Russia’s 7th military base were discovered after a Ukrainian airstrike targeted Russian units near the villages of Pisky and Konstyantynivka in Mykolaiv Oblast.

Meanwhile, on March 26, footage appeared on South Ossetia Telegram channels and Facebook pages showing a military convoy leaving Russia’s 4th military base in Tskhinvali. That same day, a tank with an Ossetian flag was spotted in Melitopol, Ukraine. The Twitter user @visionergeo geolocated the footage to the city’s southern entrance. The tank is likely heading towards Mariupol or Huliaipole, according to Kirill Mikhailov, a researcher with the Conflict Intelligence Team.

A tank with an Ossetian flag was spotted in occupied Melitopol. pic.twitter.com/vtFYQbOlEN
— Visioner (@visionergeo) March 26, 2022

On March 27, another video allegedly depicting South Ossetian fighters appeared on Telegram channels. The video caption said that South Ossetian fighters fired a 9M113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missile at Ukrainian positions. The exact date and location of the alleged strike are unknown.

North Ossetian units are also fighting in Ukraine. North Ossetia is firmly part of Russia, while South Ossetia is a Georgian region that Russia recognized after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. The Ossetian tricolor flag is used by both North and South Ossetia. This means that it is challenging to attribute emerging footage to North or South Ossetian units without further details.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukraine Army claims units of Russian forces retreating and regrouping in Belarus

On March 27, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that Russian units in northern Ukraine were withdrawing to Belarus to regroup. According to the report, Russian units from the 35th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District have retreated to Belarus through the Chernobyl exclusion zone. The Ukrainian Army said Russian troops were regrouping and restoring armor capabilities because of “significant losses inflicted by Ukrainian forces.”

There is limited open-source evidence to confirm the Ukrainian Army’s statement. However, some civilian footage surfaced online on March 27, showing the Russian military moving toward Mazyr, Belarus, along the R-31 highway. These vehicles may be coming from Naroulya, a Belarusian town close to the border with Ukraine, but at the time of writing, the DFRLab could not confirm whether these units came from Ukraine or had remained in Belarus. Western media outlets, including The Hill and the New York Times, reported on the alleged Russian retreat.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russian military leaders not Luhansk separatist leader announces plans to hold referendum joining Russia in public for weeks

Leonid Pasechnik, head of the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) said on March 27 that the republic plans to hold a referendum on the region joining Russia. However, after Pasechnik’s statement, his foreign policy advisor, Rodion Miroshnik, clarified that it could be challenging to conduct a referendum amid ongoing military activities. Miroshnik said that despite 90 percent of LNR territory being “liberated,” some large cities remain under the control of the Ukrainian army, and LNR authorities want all residents to have the opportunity to participate in the referendum, which at the moment seems to be impossible.

Russian officials have differed in their response to the supposed LNR referendum. Russian Senator Andrey Klishas argued that since Russia has recognized the LNR as an independent state, it has the right to make independent decisions based on its constitution. Meanwhile, Leonid Kalashnikov, head of the Duma’s committee on relations with the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States, believes “it is not the right time” to hold a referendum in the LNR. He argued that holding a referendum was unwise because most of the population of LNR and the People’s Republic of Donetsk (DNR) had been evacuated.

On March 25, General Sergei Rudskoy, Deputy Chief of Russia’s General Staff, announced that Russia had completed the “first stage” of its military “operation” in Ukraine. Rudskoy said the focus would shift to “achieving the main goal – the liberation of Donbas.” He also shared the misleading claim that Russia attacked Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities to prevent Ukrainian forces from “strengthening their grouping in Donbas” until Russia could completely liberate the DNR and LNR. Russia may give the green light to hold a referendum if the separatists gain control of the Donbas territories currently under Ukrainian control.

Crimean authorities held a similar “referendum” in 2014 on the reunification of Crimea with Russia, which led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia. The Crimean referendum was declared illegitimate by Ukraine, and most countries have not recognized the results.

A 2019 poll conducted by the Centre for East European and International Studies found that 55 percent of people living in the separatist-held areas of Donbas expressed an interest in becoming part of Ukraine, while 27 percent preferred to join Russia but maintain a special autonomous status.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian officials, media propose going beyond Ukraine and target other countries, including NATO states

Deputy of the Moscow City Duma Sergei Savostyanov proposed that Russia should expand its “special operation for denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine” and include the Baltic countries, Poland, Moldova, and Kazakhstan. According to Savostyanov, “demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine” would improve security for the people of Russia, but targeting additional countries would ensure Russia’s security even more so.

Kremlin media and commentators have previously suggested going beyond Ukraine and targeting NATO countries. On the TV show hosted by the Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyev, Kremlin commentators recently threatened Europe with a nuclear strike if NATO deployed a peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta suspends operations after warnings from state censor

On March 28, Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta announced it was suspending operations until the end of Russia’s “special operation on the territory of Ukraine” after Russian watchdog Roskomnadzor issued it a second warning for violating Russian law. Roskomnadzor stated that Novaya Gazeta was issued the second warning due to publishing a material on its website in which the outlet had failed to properly mark a non-profit organization listed as a “foreign agent” in Russia.

Roskomnadzor issued its first warning to Novaya Gazeta on March 22 for the same reason and demanded from the outlet to immediately edit text and identify an NGO as a “foreign agent” organization in accordance with Russian legislation. After receiving the first warning, Novaya Gazeta commented that they were not aware of what Roskomnadzor was referred to in its warning. According to Russian legislation, receiving two warnings from Russian watchdog within a one-year period can result in Roskomnadzor revoking an outlet’s publishing license. Novaya Gazeta has previously complied with Russian media restrictions and abstained from using the word “war,” replacing it with “special operation” in quotes in its coverage of the war in Ukraine.

On March 22, before the outlet received the first warning, Novaya Gazeta editor-in-chief of Dmitry Muratov announced he was planning to auction his Nobel Peace Prize medal to support Ukrainian refugees. And the day prior to suspending operations, Muratov asked several Russian journalists interviewing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to ask a number of questions on behalf of himself and Novaya Gazeta. Roskomnadzor and Russia’s prosecutor’s office prohibited Russian media outlets from publishing Zelenskyy’s interview.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Spotify ends all service in Russia after a month of compromises

On March 25, the music streaming platform Spotify announced that it would be suspending all service in Russia. Spotify launched in Russia in July 2020. As of late 2021, the Spotify smartphone app was receiving more than 600,000 downloads per month in the country. Spotify cited Russia’s March 11 “fake news” law as the impetus for this decision, which criminalized speech against the Russian military with up to fifteen years in prison. Complying with this law would likely have required significant censorship of Spotify’s catalogue of music and podcasts.

This decision marks the end of a month-long balancing act in which Spotify had weighed mounting boycott pressures against its desire to maintain the “global flow of information” for Russian users. On February 26—two days after the invasion began—Spotify was still committed to establishing a legal entity in Russia in compliance with the demands of the Russian state censor. By March 3, Spotify had reversed course, closing its Russian office and removing RT and Sputnik content from its service globally. And on March 10, Spotify demonetized all Russian services in order to ensure compliance with US sanctions. With its March 25 announcement, Spotify has ceased streaming entirely.

In early March, Spotify emerged as an unlikely front in the information conflict between Russia and Ukraine. USA Today reported on the rise of seemingly pro-Russian playlists with titles like “Ukraine will have to be bombed” and “Songs that hit harder than Russia’s nuclear weapon in Ukraine.” The Ukrainian government, meanwhile, pressured Spotify to allow artists to re-upload their album covers with Ukrainian flags.

—Emerson T. Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington DC

Ukraine launches investigation into video alleged to show soldiers shooting Russian POWs

On March 27, a graphic video began to circulate on Telegram allegedly showing Ukrainian soldiers mocking and shooting Russian prisoners of war in the legs. The earliest instance of the video, identified by Mediazona, an independent Russian media outlet now banned in Russia, appeared on the subreddit Ukraine War Report at about 2am GMT.

Journalists working for Kremlin-owned media outlets, such as Aleksandr Kots, Yevgeny Poddubniy, and Andrey Medvedev, wrote about the video on their personal Telegram channels, describing it as a war crime conducted by “Ukrainian Nazis.” All three journalists published their opinions on March 27 between 9am and 10am Moscow time.

Later, the video was shared on Twitter by Maria Dubovikova, a pro-Kremlin political analyst. Eliot Higgins, the founder of Bellingcat, quote-tweeted Dubovikova saying, “A very serious incident that will require further investigation, maybe the videos in this thread can be geolocated?” Twitter user @zcjbrooker geolocated the possible location to Malaya Rohan, a village close to Kharkiv. The user corroborated his assessments with open-source reports about the village’s liberation on March 25.

On March 27, the Investigative Committee of Russia launched an investigation into the possible war crime. The announcement on the committee’s website speculates that the video was filmed in Kharkiv Oblast.

On the evening of March 27, Valery Zaluzhny, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, wrote on Facebook that the video was “staged” and urged everyone to “consider the realities of information and psychological war.” Later, Oleksiy Arestovich, an advisor to the Ukrainian President’s Office, wrote on Telegram that the video was being verified. “If not fake, the guilty will be punished. If it’s fake, we’ll be more vigilant. Materials like this, and other kinds, have been seen already,” he wrote.

Julian Röpcke, the managing editor for politics at German tabloid BILD, said on Twitter that he believed the video to be real. Ropcke debunked the argument that there was no visible blood by sharing a segment of the footage where blood is clearly seen streaming from the injured men. Olga Skabeeva, the host of the Kremlin propaganda show 60 Minutes, cited BILD’s report and Ropcke’s Twitter account on her Telegram channel.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Additional units from Georgian breakaway regions join Russian offensive appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russian Duma members falsely claim Ukraine is creating ethnicity-targeting bioweapons

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 23 Mar 2022 19:35:11 +0000

Tracking narratives

Russian Duma members falsely claim Ukraine is creating ethnicity-targeting bioweapons

Undercover Russian reporter identifies anti-Ukraine “troll farm”

South Ossetian officials spread Kremlin bioweapon narratives in Georgia

Russian tabloid publishes and deletes casualty figures, blaming hack

Media policy

VK reports sharp user growth even as it intensifies censorship of anti-war content

Security

Troops from Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia arrive in Donbas

Documenting dissent

Activists in Poland, Lithuania block cargo trucks from entering Belarus

War crimes and human rights abuses

International Criminal Court seeks to charge South Ossetian officials with war crimes over 2008 war

Russian Duma members falsely claim Ukraine is creating ethnicity-targeting bioweapons

On March 22, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia proposed an investigation into Ukraine’s supposed role in the COVID-19 pandemic and accused the country of creating bioweapons. The LDPR faction in the Russian Duma unanimously supported the initiation of a parliamentary commission to investigate the activities of biolabs in Ukraine. The false narrative claiming Ukraine was involved in the creation of COVID has been debunked.

Aleksey Didenko, a deputy leader of the LDPR, falsely claimed, “Ukrainian traces can be found in the dissemination of COVID in recent years.” He added that the Pentagon funds COVID-19 related research in Ukrainian biolabs. Didenko said that Americans should pay for the economic damages caused by COVID-19, arguing that the US should be a co-defendant alongside Ukraine for “encouragement of anti-humanity activities.”

Sergey Leonov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Healthcare Committee, alleged that Ukraine is preparing biological weapons and claimed that Ukraine was researching “regional infections aimed at Russian regions.” He mentioned “Crimean fever” as an example, likely referencing Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, which was first documented in Crimea in 1944. The World Health Organization has reported that Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever “is endemic in all of Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia,” contradicting Leonov’s statement. He also amplified the debunked claim that a recent spike in tuberculosis cases in separatist areas is connected to Ukrainian biolabs. Leonov stated that Ukraine is researching ethnicity-targeting biological weapons, another disinformation narrative that echoes the Soviet-era campaign Operation Infektion. Viruses cannot be controlled or restricted to targeting a specific region or ethnicity.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Undercover Russian reporter identifies anti-Ukraine “troll farm”

An investigation by Fontanka.ru, a pro-Kremlin media outlet in St. Peterburg, has uncovered details of a coordinated information campaign intended to counter “Ukrainian fakes.” An undercover reporter responded to an advertisement on the Telegram channel Kiber Front Z (“Cyber Front Z”), seeking people to “fight back in the information field.” The undercover reporter contacted a Telegram user named Aleksander Kapitanov and met him for a job interview the next day. The job was “unofficial” and without a contract. The monthly salary was RUB 45,000 ($431.96). The schedule consisted of two working days followed by two days off. The job entailed writing about 200 comments per day addressing “Ukrainian disinformation” on social media platforms like YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram. Employees were given access to fake accounts and told what to write and where to post it.

Fontanka’s undercover reporter said they were told to leave comments on an interview between historian Tamara Eidelman and Yury Dudy, a popular Russian independent blogger; briefings from Zelenskyy advisor Aleksey Arestovich; a news broadcast from the independent Russian media outlet Current Time (now banned in Russia); and other content that does not support Kremlin narratives. The undercover reporter shared one of the comments they were told to leave: “The weapons that the Westerners hand over to the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not reach the front but are smuggled out at the border states of the EU. The weapons then fall into the hands of criminal gangs.” In addition, the Fontanka reporter said they were told to leave positive comments under a March 18 broadcast of a pro-war rally at Moscow’s Luzhniki Stadium.

The people behind this operation remain unknown. However, when the reporter skipped one day of work, they received a phone call asking if they would continue working on the project. The reporter investigated the phone number and found it belonged to Aleksey Nekrilov, who works for companies linked to Project Lakhta, which the US government has linked to Russian influence operations.

The workplace was a building named Arsenal, which was previously used as an arms manufacturing center. Oleksandr Yanukovych, the son of the former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, reportedly rented out the building for his company Arsenal Invest in 2014. The reporter described this as a “coincidence.”

As of March 23, the Telegram channel Kiber Front Z had 54,461 subscribers. The pinned post on the channel calls on subscribers to amplify different types of content, including political information; exposing Ukrainian and Western “propaganda”; eyewitness reports from Donbas separatist republics; briefs about the frontline; information about “traitors” who are against the “military operation”; and visual media, such as posters, videos, and stickers.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

South Ossetian officials spread Kremlin bioweapon narratives in Georgia

The so-called State Information Agency of Russian-occupied South Ossetia published a statement from the local KGB titled “Biolaboratories – a threat to yourself.” The statement warned Georgians of the “danger of a US biological laboratory” in Georgia, asking “Georgian citizens and patriots” to provide information about US weapons of mass destruction stockpiled in the country, as well as evidence of biological sabotage, coverups, or sample collection in the country.

The Kremlin has amplified bioweapons and biolab threat narratives as a justification for war in Ukraine and potential false flag operations. The statement of the South Ossetian KGB appears to be an attempt to spread the narrative to Georgia, which has previously been targeted by similar Kremlin narratives.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian tabloid publishes and deletes casualty figures, blaming hack

On March 20, the pro-Kremlin Russian tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda published an article claiming nearly 10,000 Russian soldiers had died in the Ukraine war. “According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9,861 people, 16,153 people were injured during the special operation in Ukraine,” it stated.

The outlet later walked back the claim by saying the website had been hacked, and that they immediately deleted the “inaccurate information.”

Throughout the war in Ukraine, Russia has obscured information about its casualties. The only public acknowledgment from Russia about its casualties came on March 2, when the Ministry of Defense reported 498 deaths and 1,597 injuries. On March 16, the New York Times, citing Pentagon officials, reported 7,000 Russian troops had been killed in Ukraine, while Ukrainian officials placed the Russian death toll at 13,500.

The DFRLab found that the casualty figures were not included when Komsomolskaya Pravda first published the article at 18:09 GMT on March 20. The first archived snapshot of the article was captured by the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine at 18:14 GMT and does not include the paragraph about Russian casualties. This is further confirmed using a cached version of the article, captured at 18:17 GMT on March 20, which does not include the paragraph about Russian casualties. The second archived version of the article was captured by the Wayback Machine at 12:13 GMT on March 21, and it includes the paragraph about Russian casualties. This indicates the casualty figures were added sometime between March 20 at 18:17 GMT and March 21 at 12:13 GMT.

The paragraph containing information about Russian casualties remained in the article until at least 18:48 GMT on March 21. The article was removed from Komsomolskaya Pravda’s website by 18:52 GMT. However, an article without the casualties figures reemerged on the website between 18:54 GMT and 19:29 GMT. Later, on March 22 between 00:07 and 03:44 GMT, Komsomolskaya Pravda’s editors released a statement claiming that Komsomolskaya Pravda’s website had been hacked and false information was planted.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

VK reports sharp user growth even as it intensifies censorship of anti-war content

VKontakte (VK), long described as the “Russian Facebook,” has seen a sharp increase in web traffic following the Russian government’s ban on Facebook and Instagram and its impending ban on YouTube. According to a VK press release, VK’s daily user base increased by 8.7 percent between February 1 and March 10. The platform now has over 50 million daily users.

This growth comes at a time that VK has essentially become a state-controlled social media network. On December 3, 2021, Gazprom—Russia’s state-owned energy conglomerate—acquired majority control over VK. At the same time, Vladimir Kiriyenko (son of Sergey Kiriyenko, a former Russian prime minister and longstanding apparatchik of Vladimir Putin) was named VK’s new CEO. This change placed VK’s content moderation policy firmly under the control of the Russian government.

Consequently, VK has responded immediately and without objection to state censorship requests. According to tracking conducted by Meduza journalist Kevin Rothrock, VK has blocked numerous independent media outlets as well as fan pages of public figures who have opposed (or simply not publicly supported) the war. VK has also removed popular anti-war videos without explanation, including the video address by former Russia One journalist Marina Ovsyannikova in which she articulated her decision to protest the Russian invasion during a live broadcast on March 14.

Even as VK’s user base expands, Russian citizens’ freedom of expression grows more constrained.

—Emerson Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington DC

Troops from Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia arrive in Donbas

Anatoly Bibilov, president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, confirmed on March 20 that military contractors from Russia’s 4^th Military Base in Tskhinvali had been sent to fight against Ukraine. Bibilov wrote on his Telegram channel that he did not give the official order, as the military base is controlled by the Russian Army, but he expressed his support for Russia.

Bibilov’s Telegram post was accompanied by an image showing a military convoy of South Ossetian units with “death is better than shame” written on the Ossetian flag. The DFRLab found that the image is a frame from a video that has circulated online since at least March 17. The video included a URL for the Telegram channel The video was posted that day in the pro-Russia channel Война История Оружие (“War History Weapons”) by a user named Stanislav Belenky. The video caption reads, “Ossetian volunteers in a convoy heading to Ukraine. The writing ‘death instead of shame’.”

Screengrabs from a video showing a South Ossetia convoy. Anatoly Bibilov confirmed on March 20 that South Ossetian units were sent to Ukraine. The video was posted on March 17. (Source: Anatoly Bibilov, left; War History Weapons, right).

The Война История Оружие Telegram channel was created on October 17, 2020, and has more than 600,000 subscribers. The channel owner is Riga-based Russian blogger Kirill Fyodorov, who posts under the nickname Alconafter. According to Latvian public broadcaster LSM.lv, Latvian security services detained Fyodorov on March 17, accusing him of justifying Russia’s war in Ukraine and targeting Latvian citizens. On March 22, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded Fyodorov’s “immediate release.

A screengrab shows that the owner of the TG channel Война История Оружие is Russian blogger Kirill Fyodorov. (Source: Война История Оружие, left; Kirill Fyodorov, right)

On March 17, another video of the South Ossetian convoy emerged online and was geolocated by Twitter user @doppelot, who verified the convoy was moving north towards Russia and Ukraine.

@GeoConfirmed 43.013637, 44.224721

Confirmed, South Ossetian column moving north pic.twitter.com/hXaYCx1N91
— Doppelot (@doppelot) March 19, 2022

On March 20, a third video emerged online of South Ossetian units claiming to have arrived in Donbas. The two-minute-long video depicts soldiers in uniforms bearing the Ossetian insignia and holding Ossetian flags. At the beginning of the video, one of the soldiers says, “Hello from Donbas.”

Ossetians appear to have already arrived in Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/1NaMgNvkSj
— Visioner (@visionergeo) March 20, 2022

According to South Ossetia’s government information agency RES, three volunteers from South Ossetia saved a woman’s life in the Donbas town of Volnovakha. RES also published an image depicting the three South Ossetian soldiers. The DFRLab geolocated the image to Volnovakha’s Liberation Memorial Park.

An image depicting three South Ossetian soldiers was taken at Liberation Memorial Park in Volnovakha. (Source: Agency Res, right; Google Maps, top right, bottom right)

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Activists in Poland and Lithuania block cargo trucks from entering Belarus

Protesters in Poland and Lithuania are blocking traffic on the Belarusian border to prevent trucks from entering Belarus.

On March 22, activists reported around 950 trucks were blocked at the Polish-Belarusian border. A drone video and numerous videos on the ground, including some taken by truck drivers, were posted on social media showing the scale of the blockade. A group of protesters in Poland blocked the road at the Koroszczyn border crossing and demanded the Polish government ban trade with Russia and its ally Belarus. Many of the demonstrators are displaced Ukrainian refugees. Some reports claim there are 1,500 trucks stuck on the border. The situation intensified as angry drivers confronted the protesters.

The previous day, protesters in Lithuania carried out a similar but smaller-scale demonstration. Protesters aimed to send a message to the Lithuanian government “to cut trade links with the Belarusian regime,” according to LRT English. Roughly 150 Russian and Belarusian truck drivers approached the protesters, provoking them, ridiculing Ukraine, shouting pro-Russia slogans such as “Glory to Russia,” and threatening the protesters. The blockade, which lasted forty minutes, was dispersed by Lithuanian Police.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

International Criminal Court seeks to charge South Ossetian officials with war crimes over 2008 war

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has filed requests for arrest warrants for three officials from the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia. The ICC is accusing the three officials of committing war crimes in South Ossetia during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. According to ICC prosecutor Karim Khan, the three officials bear criminal responsibility for “unlawful confinement, torture, inhuman treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, hostage taking, and unlawful transfer,” Civil.ge reported.

The three officials are Mikhail Mindzaev, the de facto interior minister between 2005-2008; Hamlet Guchmazov, the head of the preliminary detention facility under the Interior Ministry; and David Sanakoev, the de facto presidential representative for human rights in South Ossetia.

On March 22, the authorities of South Ossetia said they would not cooperate with the ICC, calling it a “politically biased” organization.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian Duma members falsely claim Ukraine is creating ethnicity-targeting bioweapons appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Putin endorses plan to bring 16,000 “volunteers” from the Middle East to fight in Ukraine

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 11 Mar 2022 20:20:52 +0000

Security

Putin endorses plan to bring 16,000 “volunteers” from the Middle East to fight in Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russia spreads conspiracies about US and Ukraine biological weapons program

Memes and sarcasm on Russian social media after Lavrov claims Russia “didn’t attack Ukraine“

Pro-Kremlin Ukrainian Telegram channels paint Ukraine’s Western allies as untrustworthy

Media policy

Russia blocks access to Instagram, citing misleading Reuters headline

As international sanctions restrict the global internet, civil society urges for clarity, transparency, and caution

Documenting dissent

Georgian leader of anti-Russian protests sentenced to four days in prison

War crimes and human rights abuses

Kremlin attempts to justify attack on maternity hospital in Mariupol

International relations

Georgia’s pro-Kremlin political parties call on UN Security Council to support neutral status of Georgia and Ukraine

Putin endorses plan to bring 16,000 “volunteers” from the Middle East to fight in Ukraine

During a March 11 meeting of Russia’s Security Council, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that more than 16,000 “volunteers” from the Middle East had expressed interest in joining Russia’s “liberation movement” for the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. He emphasized that they are not financially motivated and are participating on a voluntary basis. Shoigu said many of the volunteers fought alongside Russia in the fight against ISIS.

In response to Shoigu’s announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that if people from the Middle East want to help the people in the Donbas voluntarily and are not interested in money, then Russia should facilitate their deployment to the combat zone. He also slammed Western countries for permitting “mercenaries” to join the conflict on the Ukrainian side and accused them of violating international law.

The Pentagon previously reported that Russia is trying to recruit people from Syria to fight in Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal noted that Syrian soldiers are already fighting in Ukraine alongside Russians but did not specify how many fighters have been deployed. Syrian outlet DeirEzzor24 wrote that Russia is seeking fighters for six-month contracts and offering a salary of $200 to $300 per month.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia spreads conspiracies about US and Ukraine biological weapons program

On March 10, Igor Kirillov, the head of the Russian Armed Forces’ nuclear, chemical, and biological defense, once again accused Ukraine and the United States of working together to develop biological weapons. The latest version of this narrative began on March 6, when Russia’s Ministry of Defense claimed it had obtained documentary proof that the US and Ukraine collaborating to develop biological weapons.

Igor Kirillov said that the obtained documents revealed that more than 140 containers of ectoparasites of bats were transferred overseas from a biological laboratory in Kharkiv. He said that all high-risk research occurring in Ukraine’s biological laboratories is conducted under the guidance of US specialists, and that the US is interested in studying bats as biological weapons. Referring to the obtained documents, Kirillov said that the US spent $1.6 million in Ukrainian labs to study the transmission of infections by migratory birds. Kirillov added that in addition to Ukraine, the project is implemented in “Georgian biological laboratories controlled by the Pentagon,” claiming that the research is being conducted “in the immediate vicinity of the borders of Russia.” Kirillov also blamed Ukraine and the US for the COVID-19 outbreak.

That same day, Russian Foreign Minister of Sergei Lavrov demanded explanations for “US biological activities in Ukraine.” Lavrov claimed that “the Pentagon has created several dozen military biological laboratories on Ukrainian territory, as part of its program to create such military-biological laboratories around the world, in violation of the relevant convention on the prohibition of biological, toxin weapons.” Russia’s top diplomat also said that experiments in Ukrainian laboratories were not peaceful but aimed at creating “ethnically oriented” biological weapons.

Avril Haines, the US Director of National Intelligence, responded by explaining that there is a difference between a biological weapons lab and labs created for public safety and biodefense, noting that the latter are intended to ensure an adequate and efficient public health response during health emergencies like COVID-19. Haines said Ukraine operates a dozen biological research labs for public health purposes, and the US has provided bio-safety assistance. “We do not assess that Ukraine is pursuing either biological weapons or nuclear weapons, which have been some of the propaganda that Russia is putting out,” she said.

China has echoed Russia’s false claims about the US-run biological weapons labs in Ukraine. The US Department of Defense has denied the allegations, stating that Russia and China are “falsely accusing use of biological weapons against Russians.”

“There are five biological research laboratories in Kyiv,” Pentagon officials added. “Their work focuses on diagnostics, therapeutics, treatments, prevention, and vaccines, not on military use as the Russians and Chinese accuse.”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Memes and sarcasm on Russian social media after Lavrov claims Russia “didn’t attack Ukraine“

At a March 10 press conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared, “We are not planning to attack other countries. We didn’t attack Ukraine, either.” This denial comes after Lavrov participated in unsuccessful ceasefire negotiations with his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba in Turkey.

Lavrov’s claim that Russia did not attack Ukraine was covered by pro–Kremlin and Belarusian media, in addition to Ukrainian and foreign media. The statement also inspired several memes on Facebook, which was recently banned in Russia.

Screenshots of memes on Facebook about Lavrov’s statement, translated from Russian. (Source: Boris Gs, left; Tea with raspberry jam, middle; Olena Mozgova, right)

On the popular Russian social media platform VKontakte (VK), some users expressed support for Lavrov while others used sarcasm to describe the absurdity of the statement. Pro-Kremlin pages posted identical messages in support of Lavrov. In the comments, users wished Lavrov and other Kremlin leadership God’s blessing and good health, and expressed pride about being represented by Lavrov and other Kremlin officials. Few comments directly addressed Russia’s statement denying the war in Ukraine.

Screenshots of identical posts from pro-Kremlin pages on VKontakte (translated from Russian). (Source: News of the President of Russia/archive, left; Vladimir Putin/archive, middle; FOR PUTIN AND THE REVIVAL OF THE SOVEREGN HOMELAND!/archive, right)

Pro-Kremlin outlets reporting Lavrov’s remarks on VKontakte received sarcastic user comments. For example, one commenter wrote, “Black is white. War is peace. 2×2=5,” while another said, “War is peace, ignorance is strength, freedom is slavery.” Some comments on these posts suggested Lavrov was using drugs.

Screenshots of posts about Lavrov’s statement on VKontakte (translated from Russian) (Source: Liberty News/archive, left; RUSSIA/archive, middle; RBC/archive, right)

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Pro-Kremlin Ukrainian Telegram channels paint Ukraine’s Western allies as untrustworthy

Ukrainian Telegram channels linked to the Kremlin continue to publish reports that seek to undermine trust in Western countries allied with Ukraine. For example, the Kremlin-tied channel Rezident wrote that the West has distanced itself from Ukraine, and condemned the European Union for not transferring frozen funds from the Russian Central Bank to Ukraine. Another Kremlin-associated channel, ZeRada, claimed that Western countries would prefer to appropriate the frozen funds for themselves rather than give them to Ukraine.

Another post in the Rezident channel also claimed that Western countries would not accept Ukraine into the EU because it would force EU countries to pay for Ukraine’s recovery. The post noted that NATO won’t provide fighter jets and refuses to enact a no-fly zone over Ukraine. “The bottom line, Ukraine received a destroyed country and empty promises of help,” they added. The channel does not mention that the EU and NATO have imposed severe sanctions on Russia and sent weapons and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

In another message, Rezident wrote that the EU “does not want to impose new sanctions and provide real help,” arguing that Ukraine should base its foreign policy decisions on the “axiom” that “no one wants to accept us to the European Union.”

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russia blocks access to Instagram, citing misleading Reuters headline

The Russian state censor has announced a ban on Instagram, effective March 14. The ban follows an announcement that the Russian Prosecutor’s Office had requested that Meta, the parent company of Instagram, be declared an “extremist organization.” Instagram has long been a popular service in Russia; this move represents a significant curtailment of Russian digital life and a far more consequential move than the Russian ban on Facebook instituted last week. Meta’s remaining platform, WhatsApp, will remain operational in Russia for now. Some observers speculate that, because WhatsApp constitutes an estimated 60 percent of messenger activity in the country, Russia is not yet in a position to implement or enforce such a ban.

The immediate impetus for the Instagram ban was a story, first published by Reuters, which found that Meta has temporarily relaxed its prohibition against calls to violence in Ukraine and the Baltic States. Users of Facebook and other Meta platforms may issue unspecific calls for violence (i.e. no evidence of specific planning) against Russian soldiers and against Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka. They may also issue calls for violence against “Russians” when the context is understood to be Russian soldiers. They may not issue calls for violence against Russian civilians, nor circulate content that dehumanizes Russians as a nationality or ethnicity.

UPDATE – Reuters changed the headline after initial publishing from "against Russians" to "invading Russians." pic.twitter.com/ENUqhmwo4E
— Disclose.tv (@disclosetv) March 10, 2022

Reuters initially ran this story with the headline, “Facebook and Instagram to temporarily allow calls for violence against Russians, calls for Putin’s death.” This headline provoked widespread outrage among human rights activists and Russian immigrants and expatriates, who assumed that this was a generalized policy of xenophobia. Reuters later amended the headline to read, “Facebook temporarily allows posts on Ukraine war calling for violence against invading Russians or Putin’s death”—a distinction lost on the tens of thousands of people who had already reacted to the article.

While Russia appears to have been preparing to institute an Instagram block for some time, it leapt on the opportunity provided by the Reuters headline. The subsequent Reuters correction, as well as the specifics of Meta’s policy, have gone unmentioned by Russian state media.

—Emerson Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington, DC

As international sanctions restrict the global internet, civil society urges for clarity, transparency, and caution

The invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the norms surrounding content moderation and content removal, with several technology platforms around the world continuing to take voluntary actions to de-rank, label, and de-monetize conflict-related content. Further, some internet infrastructure companies have terminated all business and sales in Russia citing US sanctions, while others are severing ties to sanctioned entities and users.

Increasingly, government sanctions are playing a role in both content moderation decisions, and corporate operations servicing Russian users; in absence of clear implementation rules, civil society coalitions and experts are calling for greater clarity, transparency, and a proactive effort to prevent the splintering of the global internet. On March 10, civil society organizations published an open letter calling on the Biden Administration and other governments to carefully weigh measures that could restrict the Russian public’s access to the internet, noting the need for clear carve outs to sustain online civic spaces, support for digital security and independent media, and human rights-based assessments of the impact of domestic tech regulation on international users.

—Jacqueline Malaret, Assistant Director, Washington, DC

Georgian leader of anti-Russian protests sentenced to four days in prison

Shota Dighmelashvili, a leader of the Shame Movement, a group of activists organizing anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protests in Georgia, has been sentenced to four days in prison. Open Caucasus Media reported that police detained Dighmelashvili on March 8, after he threw an egg at a government administration building in Tbilisi. The previous day, Georgian residents took to the streets to demand the cancelation of the visa-free regime for Russians, a ban on Russian state-affiliated media, and the closing Georgian airspace to Russian planes.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Kremlin attempts to justify attack on maternity hospital in Mariupol

As widely reported this week, Russian forces bombed the Mariupol Territorial Medical Association of Child and Women’s Health hospital on March 9. While Russia did not deny the attack, it claimed militants had taken over the hospital. According to Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, “This maternity hospital was long captured by Azov Battalion and other radicals. All pregnant women, nurses, and other personnel were kicked out. It was an ultraradical Azov battalion base. We got this data three days ago.”

Multiple pro–Kremlin and Kremlin–owned media outlets published alleged debunks of the bombing to justify the atrocity. Kremlin-controlled media reported on March 5 that Ukrainian soldiers from the Azov Battalion had established their base in maternity house number one. The bombed building is a separate building formerly known as children’s hospital number three.

Kremlin-controlled media also accused Marianna Vyshemirskaya, a beauty blogger from Mariupol, of playing a victim in an allegedly staged rescue operation. In an article published by Mariupol regional media outlet 0629.com.ua, Vyshemirskaya’s friends explained how she had arrived at the hospital for an ultrasound prior to the bombing. “Marianna found a good doctor in a maternity hospital on the left coast of Mariupol, she had to give birth there,” one of them explained. “But on the day when she was supposed to go there for the last ultrasound scan, shelling began, and there were explosions.”

Additionally, pro-Kremlin KP.ru and REN TV falsely claimed that Vyshemirskaya had changed outfits and put on make-up to play two different victims. REN TV went so far as to make a side-by-side comparison of photos of two pregnant women, claiming both were Vyshemirskaya.

In two photos taken after the blast, Vyshemirskaya is clearly seen with consistent facial bruises and carrying the same blanket.

Visual comparison of photos of pregnant women who were injured in the bombing. The red circles (left) show the false comparison by REN TV. The pink arrows point at the same pattern on the blanket (top left and bottom right). Green frames compare matching bruises on Vyshemirskaya’s face. (Source: REN TV/archive, left; KP.ru/archive, right)

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgia’s pro-Kremlin political parties call on UN Security Council to support neutral status of Georgia and Ukraine

Irma Inashvili, the leader of the pro-Kremlin Georgian political party Alliance of Patriots, published an open letter on March 10 addressing the UN Security Council. The letter, signed by fifty-five pro-Kremlin organizations, called on the UN Security Council to support Georgia and Ukraine becoming neutral.

“The tragic conflict in Ukraine clearly shows that neutrality is the best solution for the countries like Georgia and Ukraine, especially taking into account the fact that the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin repeatedly stated that the neutrality is the best solution for Ukraine,” said the letter.

On February 21, three days before Russia invaded Ukraine, the same group of pro-Kremlin organizations addressed Vladimir Putin and called on the Georgian government to announce its neutrality.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Putin endorses plan to bring 16,000 “volunteers” from the Middle East to fight in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia escalates nuclear and chemical false-flag allegations

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 09 Mar 2022 20:06:34 +0000

Tracking narratives

Russia escalates nuclear and chemical false-flag allegations

Kremlin releases “proof” of a secret Ukrainian plan to invade the Donbas

British tabloids amplify unverified rumors that Putin has cancer

Security

Visual evidence of Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilians

Ukraine says threat of ‘large-scale involvement’ of Belarus persists

Media policy

Russian internet access increasingly imperiled; Cloudflare defends decision to serve some Russian citizens; Twitch celebrities consider fleeing the country

Refugees and migration

Pro-Russian Instagram network tried to revive anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland

Foreign Policy

Pro-Kremlin Georgian MP says Georgia should join Russian payment system Mir

Russia escalates nuclear and chemical false-flag allegations

In remarks to Russian media on March 9, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova escalated Kremlin claims that Ukraine intended to use nuclear or biological weapons against Russia. According to the Foreign Ministry Twitter account, Zakharova said that Russia decided to capture the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants “exclusively to prevent any attempts to stage nuclear provocations, which is a risk that obviously exists.”

Meanwhile, Zakharova went on to “confirm” that Russian special forces had collected proof that Ukraine and the US Department of Defense attempted to destroy evidence of a biological weapons program at the start of the Russian invasion. “We confirm that the special military operation in Ukraine revealed facts of the emergency eradication by the Kiev regime of traces of the military biological program implemented by Kiev with funding from the US @DeptofDefense,” the Foreign Ministry Twitter account quoted her as saying. Zakharova’s remarks reinforced claims made by Russia’s Defense Ministry on March 6.

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Kremlin releases “proof” of a secret Ukrainian plan to invade the Donbas

The Russian Ministry of Defense Telegram channel released a set of documents on March 9 it claims is “proof” that Ukraine intended to stage an invasion of the Donbas region. The documents, which were amplified by the Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, TASS and elsewhere, were “acquired” by a Russian special operation, according to MoD spokesman Major General Igor Konashenkov. He described them as “the original secret order of the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, Colonel General Mykola Balan, dated January 22, 2022,” adding, “The document contains the original signatures of the officials responsible for the fulfillment of the tasks of the command of the National Guard of Ukraine.”

Screenshot of the March 9 document release on the Russian MoD Telegram channel. (Source: @mod_russia_en/archive)

In response, the National Guard of Ukraine told Ukrainian fact-checking outlet StopFake that the documents released by Russia had nothing to do with the Donbas and instead discussed annual training exercises near Lviv. They also added that the stamps and signatures affixed to the top of the documents do not match the procedures used to mark a document as secret.

Today’s document release is the latest in a series of unverifiable or debunked claims used by the Kremlin to justify its invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has a history of utilizing forged documents to support its interests.

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

British tabloids amplify unverified rumors that Putin has cancer

Unverified allegations that Russian President Vladimir Putin has cancer were prominently displayed on the March 6 cover of British tabloid The Daily Star. The article comes after other UK outlets such as The Telegraph, The Sun, Yorkshire Post, and Meaww.com reported that Putin is seriously ill with cancer, often citing non-medical experts. Previously, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed claims that Putin had health issues.

In an article titled “Vladimir Putin ‘dying in agony from terminal cancer’ and pics show his pain, say sources,” The Daily Star cited an unnamed “ex-military intelligence officer now working at the Pentagon” who said, “In the past, we have seen him [Putin] smile, but in 2022 there are few pictures of him looking happy. His look suggests he is in pain and our people suggest his angry look is most likely as a result of him being in agony. Our people are confident he is ill – he is concerned about Covid as he keeps his staff at a distance.”

The article went on to quote former UK Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen, who claimed on Times Radio that Putin’s face shape had changed as a result of using steroids. Lord Owen made similar comments on BBC Newsnight, claiming that Putin is using steroids that increase aggression and reduce immunity, citing this as an explanation for Putin’s fear of COVID-19.

The Sun and Meaww.com cited political scientist Valery Solovei, the former head of the public relations department at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, who reportedly said, “Putin is suffering from cancer along with Parkinson’s disease.” Meanwhile, Yorkshire Post’s article was based on comments from retired Rear Admiral Chris Parry, who claimed that Putin was in a rush to invade Ukraine because he may have cancer. “He has been using these very long tables to interview people. I think his immune system might be suppressed at the moment,” Parry added.

Previously, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi told MSNBC, “I have talked with heads of state who have talked with him [Putin]….They are not taking a diagnosis of his health. Some people say he has cancer, some people say he has brain fog from COVID, other people just think he is a complete raging bully.”

Many other English–language tabloids amplified allegations that Putin has cancer, based on the Daily Star’s article. Since March 2, social media accounts on Facebook and Twitter have also spread the rumor.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Visual evidence of Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilians

Russian indirect fire continues to impact civilian population centers all throughout Ukraine. The DFRLab put together a map of documented and geolocated imagery relating to the indiscriminate shelling of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city. The map showcases artillery impacts or related damage caused throughout the span of seven days. Individual points are grouped by day, and contain links to the imagery that was geolocated. Viewers are warned that some footage may at times be graphic.

On March 8, the DFRLab geolocated a video which was published to a popular Russian war correspondent channel, which showed Russian national guard troops firing mortars on the outskirts of Kharkiv. On the same day, video evidence emerged from the outskirts of Kyiv, showing a Russian BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle attacking a civilian vehicle unprovoked. The attack killed the driver.

—Michael Sheldon, Research Associate, Washington DC

Ukraine says threat of ‘large-scale involvement’ of Belarus persists

On March 7, Israeli media reported that a wave of defections and resignations prevented the Belarusian military from invading Ukraine alongside Russian forces. The report cited Belarusian opposition leaders in exile, who said the plan to invade Ukraine was disrupted when several military officers resigned and fled to the neighboring countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Baltic states, to avoid military service.

Meanwhile, reports of Belarusians in-exile joining the war to fight alongside Ukrainians continues to surface. The Black Storks, a militant anti-government group from Belarus known for using homemade armed drones against riot police in Belarus, reportedly joined Ukrainian forces in fighting Russia.

Despite these reports, the Ukrainian Armed Forces warned on March 8 that Belarusian troops could directly attack Ukraine, saying, “The possibility of large-scale involvement of Belarus in the war on the side of Russia still persists.”

In addition, open source researchers continue to observe movement of Russian equipment within Belarusian territory. For example, footage on March 8 showed the 104th Guards Air Assault Regiment of the elite 76th Air Assault Division moving via trains passing through Cheryoha station in the Gomel region, as verified by Conflict Intelligence Team.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russian internet access increasingly imperiled; Cloudflare defends decision to serve some Russian citizens; Twitch celebrities consider fleeing the country

Russian access to the global internet is increasingly imperiled. On March 8, Lumen—one of the world’s largest internet backbone companies, headquartered in the US—announced that it would end all business relationships in Russia. Between this and a similar termination announcement from Cogent Communications last week, Russians are quickly losing access to any internet infrastructure that is not under the control of the Russian government.

At the same time, Cloudflare—a US-based company that provides protection against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks—announced that it would continue to operate its services in Russia. Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince emphasized that Cloudflare had terminated services for all entities sanctioned by the US government, but that the company would continue to support internet access for Russian citizens, citing a “dramatic” increase in Russian network requests to worldwide media as Russians seek information about their country’s actions. Cloudflare’s decision comes after an intensive lobbying effort by the Ukrainian government to remove Russia from its services entirely.

Finally, Twitch, a videogame streaming platform, and OnlyFans, an adult content platform, each announced that they will withhold payments from Russian content creators. This development was made almost inevitable by previous service suspension decisions by Mastercard, Visa, and most recently PayPal, upon whose payment systems Twitch and OnlyFans heavily rely. Twitch is particularly popular in Russia. Most prominent Russian Twitch celebrities have either expressed opposition to the invasion or refused to comment on it, while some are in the process of fleeing the country.

—Emerson Brooking, Resident Senior Feellow, Washington DC

Pro-Russian Instagram network tried to revive anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland

On March 7, Instagram took down a coordinated network of several accounts masquerading as city news portals for seven Polish cities. The accounts had similar logos and names, each including the name of a Polish city. Among those identified were Bydgoszcz_online, Kielce_online, Krakow_online, Rzeszow_online, Lublin_online, Katowice_online and Olsztyn_online. The oldest account, @kielce_online, was registered in October 2019, while other accounts were created in 2020. While these accounts previously published genuine stories about Polish cities, on March 6 they started publishing identical anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian posts.

The DFRLab found screencaps of some of their posts on the Polish social network Wykop.pl. These posts spread false statements from police claiming that Ukrainian refugees in Poland had organized mass fights with Poles in different Polish cities, and that refugees from Ukraine committed over 780 crimes in Poland within the first ten days of the war. Other posts openly expressed support for Russia and accused Ukraine of plotting to destroy Europe using biological weapons.

Instagram accounts that posted anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian content. (Source: Voltaire/archive via Wykop.pl)

Twitter user @gromotapl and Polish fact-checking portal Demagog verified the registration emails of these Instagram accounts and found that they were hosted on Russian domains.

Screencaps show that Instagram accounts were registered via Russian email domains. (Source: Demagog/archive)

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Pro-Kremlin Georgian MP says Georgia should join Russian payment system Mir

On March 9, Fridon Injia, a pro-Kremlin member of Georgian Parliament, said Georgia should join the Russian payment system known as Mir. This comes after Visa and Mastercard said they would suspend operations in Russia. Injia claimed that joining Mir would increase Georgia’s gross domestic product and added that Ukraine is on a verge of collapse, noting that Russia has recognized the People’s Republics of Donestk and Luhansk as independent. Injia said these changes should prompt Georgia to consider strengthening its economy.

On March 7, Georgian Airways added MIR to its payment system. The head of the airline, Tamaz Gaiashvili, told Radio Free Europe that Georgian Airways is not participating in sanctions against Russia and will continue to offer direct flights to the country.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russia escalates nuclear and chemical false-flag allegations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Kremlin recycles old narratives to claim Ukraine is constructing dirty bombs and bioweapons

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Mon, 07 Mar 2022 21:20:46 +0000

Tracking narratives

Kremlin recycles old narratives to claim Ukraine is constructing dirty bombs and bioweapons

Journalists in Odesa receive threatening emails for “dissemination of Nazi propaganda”

Ukrainian social media accounts misinterpret Putin video as fake

Security

Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities

Russia continues to launch attacks on Ukraine from Belarus

Media policy

TikTok suspends video uploads and livestreams on its platform in Russia

RFE/RL instructs Russians how to bypass censorship of news websites

Concerns arise that Ukrainian invasion is accelerating internet fragmentation

Documenting dissent

Belarusian fighters continue to join Ukrainian resistance

Refugees and migration

Georgian citizens worry about Russian influx, demand cancellation of visa-free regime

International relations

Russia claims it will partially lift sanctions on Georgia

Kremlin recycles old narratives to claim Ukraine is constructing dirty bombs and bioweapons

In a further attempt to justify its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin once again accused Ukraine of provoking Russia by developing dirty bombs and biological weapons. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on March 6 that the Security Service of Ukraine and Azov Battalion “mined a reactor at an experimental nuclear facility at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology” in order to “accuse Russia of creating an ecological catastrophe.” The claim was based on an “alert” from Russia’s Ministry of Defense and quotes from the Kremlin-owned outlet Sputnik. The accusation is the latest in a series over the last two weeks in which Russian officials and Kremlin media have claimed without evidence that Ukraine was creating a dirty bomb.

That same day, the Russian Defense Ministry asserted that it had obtained documentary proof that Ukraine and the US had collaborated to develop biological weapons. According to Major General Igor Konashenkov, who made the announcement, “In the course of a special military operation, the facts of an emergency cleansing by the Kyiv regime of traces of a military biological program being implemented in Ukraine, funded by the US Department of Defense, were uncovered.” According to TASS, the US and Ukraine attempted to destroy samples of “plague, anthrax, tularemia, cholera and other deadly diseases” on February 24, the day of Russia’s invasion. TASS published digital scans of several documents the defense ministry claimed were evidence of the bioweapons program, though did not elaborate further on their provenance.

The Kremlin has repeatedly used forged documents, including false signatures, as part of previous influence operations, notably the campaign that the DFRLab referred to as Operation Secondary Infektion in its 2019 investigation of Russian influence activities.

On February 7, the Kremlin doubled down on its allegations. According to TASS, Ukraine operated bioweapon facilities in Kharkiv, Poltava, and Lviv, and shared “thousands of patient serum samples, primarily those belonging to the ‘Slavic ethnic group,’” with the Walter Reed Naval Hospital near Washington DC. TASS quoted Igor Kirillov, Chief of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the RF Armed Forces, who stated, “Analysis of acts of destruction shows the work with the pathogens of plague, anthrax and brucellosis in the Lviv biological laboratory, pathogens of diphtheria, salmonellosis and dysentery in laboratories in Kharkiv and Poltava.”

The Kremlin has a long history of accusing the West of developing biological agents, going back to the Cold War. In 2020, pro-Kremlin media attempted to blame the US for the COVID pandemic, suggesting it was either manufactured in a biolab in Tbilisi, or at Ft. Detrick, Maryland.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Journalists in Odesa receive threatening emails for “dissemination of Nazi propaganda”

Media outlets in the Ukrainian port city of Odesa received threatening emails on Friday from an anonymous sender using the email odezzarus@protonmail.com. The email’s subject line stated, “your chance to be saved.” The message urged outlets to give up anti-Russian activities and place a pro-Kremlin banner on their websites spelling Odesa with a “Z” instead of an “s.” The letter Z has become a symbol adopted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s supporters to express solidarity with the invasion, as Russian forces have used the Z marking on their military equipment, likely to avoid so-called friendly fire incidents. The email claimed that these actions would “soften the inevitable punishment for Nazi involvement.”

The next day, Odesa journalist Konstantin Gak said he received a second email from the same sender. The email included multiple Z’s and claimed local journalists bear personal responsibility for the “betrayal of Russian identity” and “dissemination of Nazi propaganda.” The sender claimed “redemption” is inevitable and to “soften the sentence,” journalists should “riot.”

Gak noticed that the sender forgot to delete a part of the email that provided instructions for how to compose the message. According to the instructions, senders are told, “add here a few paragraphs on local specifics,” “these emails should be disseminated every day to crush the morale,” “send emails individually, not to a list,” and “think about painful dots to push on.” These instructions suggest the emails could be part of a broader campaign to threaten Ukrainian journalists.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukrainian social media accounts misinterpret Putin video as fake

The office of Russian President Vladimir Putin published a video on March 5 showing a meeting between the Russian leader and Aeroflot flight attendants ahead of International Women’s Day. Both Kremlin–owned and Western media outlets covered the meeting.

The Kremlin-owned television program Rossiya 24 published a video clip from the meeting, in which Putin discusses the possibility of NATO imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine. A poor-quality version of the video was posted on Reddit, with the user drawing attention to how Putin’s hand appears to “pass through” his microphone. The user claimed this was evidence that Putin used a green screen to be edited into the video. The post garnered 25,600 engagements on social media, according to a query conducted on BuzzSumo, a social media listening tool.

However, all evidence points to the video glitch resulting from compressing a low-resolution video. US media outlet Mother Jones reviewed the video and compared it with a higher-quality version. Putin’s hand does not pass through the microphone in the higher resolution video, proving that the illusion was likely due to video compression. Reporting from other western media outlets supports the compression theory as well.

Side-by-side comparison of poor-quality video on Reddit and better-quality video on YouTube by Mother Jones. (Source: Mother Jones/archive)

The Reddit post was eventually deleted by the individual who uploaded it.

Nevertheless, many Ukrainian media outlets amplified the story. For example, Ukrainian media outlet NV.ua went further and claimed that the reflection in Putin’s teapot shows empty chairs; therefore, the outlet argued, Putin did not meet the flight attendants in person. While the reflection in the teapot is too blurry to be conclusive, it seems likely that the so-called empty chairs are actually the flower petals from the table’s floral arrangement.

NV.ua claimed that Putin did not meet the Aeroflot flight attendants in person. (Source: NV.ua/archive)

https://twitter.com/galitglockmn/status/1500464401454931970

Despite the debunks of the “passing through the mic” theory, pro-Ukrainian social media accounts exploited allegations of the video being staged. For instance, a Twitter account named Ukrainian Meme Forces combined the low-compression clip with a video showing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pushing a microphone away.

pic.twitter.com/7kjY3yVRwQ
— Ukrainian Memes Forces (@uamemesforces) March 5, 2022

Video meme alleging that video of Putin meeting with Aeroflot flight attendants was staged. (Source: Ukrainian Meme Forces/archive)

The claim that Putin’s hand passed through the mic due to intentional editing was likely considered plausible because the Kremlin has manipulated videos in the past, while Putin’s now-infamous use of enormously long tables has sparked allegations that he is paranoid about meeting with people.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities

Russian artillery and aerial bombardments of civilian areas continued throughout the weekend. On March 6, an evacuation route for civilians was shelled in the northwestern Kyiv suburb of Irpin. As many as eight people died in the attack. In Pyatikhatki, a suburb of Kharkiv, a busy supermarket was hit with artillery fire, according to local media citing the Ukrainian prosecutor-general; at least four were killed and fifteen injured as a result of the shelling. Indiscriminate shelling continued against Izium, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Severodonetsk, Mariupol, and many more cities. Russian forces took the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant on Friday, damaging the facility and risking disaster in the process.

—Michael Sheldon, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russia continues to launch attacks on Ukraine from Belarus

On March 7, the Ukrainian Armed Forces announced that Russians are using airfields located in Belarus to conduct airstrikes on Ukraine. Independent Belarusian media outlet Flagshtok reported on the same day that Russia is disguising the transportation of missiles by using standard freight trains. On March 6, the large-scale departure of Russian aircrafts from Belarus to Ukraine was reported.

On March 7, the Russian Ministry of Defense proposed routes for “humanitarian corridors” that lead to Russia and Belarus. Ukraine rejected the proposal. Meanwhile, James Cleverly, the UK Minister for Europe and North America, called the proposed Russian routes “cynical beyond belief” and “nonsense.”

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

TikTok suspends video uploads and livestreams on its platform in Russia

On March 4, Chinese social media platform TikTok announced that the company will indefinitely ban users in Russia from live-streaming or uploading new content due to Russia’s recently enacted ”fake” news law. However, the company underlined that the new restrictions would not impact the platform’s in-app messaging service. According to the new law, people who disseminate false information about the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine face up to fifteen years in prison.

TikTok also announced a labeling policy for accounts run by Russian state media. So far, the accounts Soapbox, GetWasteed, and InTheNow have all received the label. Earlier, TikTok announced that it was restricting access for Russian state-controlled media accounts within the European Union. In response, Russian information agency Roskomnadzor wrote a letter to TikTok demanding the company to clarify why it had removed videos by state-controlled news agency RIA Novosti.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

RFE/RL instructs Russians how to bypass censorship of news websites

After Russia blocked the news outlet Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the organization took to Twitter to provide tips on bypassing Russian censors to access its website. Among the various options, RFE/RL suggested its readers use a VPN or a Tor browser to access the dark web version of their website. RFE/RL also encouraged readers in Russia to subscribe to their Telegram channel. The BBC provided similar guidelines last week to help users circumvent Russia’s blocking of its website.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Telegram founder publicly declares he won’t share Ukrainian user data with Russia

On March 7, Telegram founder Pavel Durov posted a statement on his official Telegram channel in which he made clear that he will not share Ukrainian Telegram user data with Russian authorities. Durov, who is Russian but lives abroad, explained that his mother is Ukrainian and he has family in the country. He then noted, “Some people wondered if Telegram is somehow less secure for Ukrainians, because I once lived in Russia. Let me tell these people how my career in Russia ended.”

Durov continued by explaining how the Russian security agency tried to pressure him in 2013 to release Ukrainian user data from the social network VK, which he also founded. “I refused to comply with these demands, because it would have meant a betrayal of our Ukrainian users,” he explained. “After that, I was fired from the company I founded and was forced to leave Russia.”

He concluded the statement by writing, “When I defied their demands, the stakes were high for me personally. I was still living in Russia, and my team and my old company were also based in that country. Many years have passed since then. Many things changed: I no longer live in Russia, no longer have any companies or employees there. But one thing remains the same – I stand for our users no matter what. Their right to privacy is sacred. Now – more than ever.”

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Concerns arise that Ukrainian invasion is accelerating internet fragmentation

Following last week’s sanctions decision, RT and Sputnik remain banned in the European Union, and Russian state media remains labeled, de-ranked, and defunded across numerous international social media platforms. International technology companies such as Apple and Microsoft have suspended sales within Russia. As the international community moves to shut down Russian disinformation, fears have arisen that Russia may take increasing steps to wall off its internet and slow the sharing of international information in turn.

As previously noted, Kremlin recently passed a law criminalizing the sharing of “fake news,” an arbitrary designation that will be used to police any unfavorable or critical speech and has heavily impacted independent journalists operating in country. In addition to the policing of speech, there are signals that the Russian government may move towards the technical separation of its internet from the global internet. Prior to the conflict, Russia has passed laws which give Roskomnadzor more control over digital architecture, creating a legal and technical basis for the establishment of an insular, or “sovereign” domestic internet, though evidence of success is limited. Recently, the Ministry of Digital Development ordered that all government websites and telecommunications providers switch to the Russian domestic DNS, hosts, and providers.

This follows a request from the Ukrainian government to ICANN, the international nonprofit that manages global internet operability, to suspend the main Russian domain name .ru. While ICANN rejected this request, global debates about the role of governments in the administration of the internet are growing. Currently, Russian and Chinese officials are campaigning for the International Telecommunication Union, the UN body responsible for communication and information technologies, and governments to assume more control over internet administration and function.

—Jacqueline Malaret, Assistant Director, Washington, DC

Belarusian fighters continue to join Ukrainian resistance

Reports continue to surface showing that Belarusians are joining Ukrainians to fight against Russia. On March 5, a Belarusian volunteer in Kyiv, Vadzim Prakopyeu, reported that 200 Belarusians are currently fighting with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and an additional 300 volunteers are planning to join the Foreign Legion. These claims are supported by online videos of Belarusian volunteers holding drills in Ukraine.

According to the Belarusian opposition, there are signs that the Belarusian army is avoiding direct confrontation with the Ukrainians. According to Franak Viačorka, a senior advisor to Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian forces were supposed to enter Ukraine in late February, “but something went wrong.” These claims are supported by the recent resignation of Deputy Defense Minister Major General Viktor Gulevich. He reportedly resigned on March 6 due to not being able to “support the current Russian invasion of Ukraine.” According to Tsikhanouskaya, Lukashenka has effectively ceded the control of the Belarusian military to the Kremlin.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Georgian citizens worry about Russian influx, demand cancellation of visa-free regime

Georgian citizens are raising alarms bells on social media over reports that Russian citizens are moving to Georgia to escape the toll of international sanctions. Some examples of the posts include a video of Russian citizens standing in ATM lines in Tbilisi, real estate agents sharing posts from homeowners who refuse to host Russian citizens, and private companies refusing to provide services to Russian citizens.

Last week, Georgian citizens launched a petition calling on the government to cancel the visa-free regime with Russia, in order to differentiate between those fleeing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime and other visitors from Russia.

According to iFact, an investigative journalism organization, 201 Russian citizens applied to the Georgian Public Registry between March 1 and March 4 to start a business.

In response, Irakli Kobakhidze, Chairman of the Georgian Dream ruling party, said, “the campaign against Russians is a manifestation of discrimination and chauvinism.” He added that perpetrators of such action would be punished. Civil society actors harshly criticized this statement. In addition, activists criticized the decision to bar journalist Mikhail Fishman, a Dozhd TV host, from entering Georgia.

On March 7, citizens took to the streets with another similar demand, calling on the government to ban Russian state-affiliated media and close the sky to Russian planes. Four activists were arrested right after the demonstration ended. A policeman told media that activists were detained because they were throwing toilet papers at the administration building of the Government of Georgia and insulted police, but footage demonstrates that the protesters were detained while they were leaving the territory. One of the protesters was detained while he was live-streaming arrests.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia claims it will partially lift sanctions on Georgia

Rosselkhoznadzor, Russia’s veterinary supervision agency, said it would permit fifteen Georgian companies to export dairy products to Russia, a claim that Georgia’s economic minister Levan Davitashvili denies. According to the agency, the decision comes after negotiations between the heads of Rosselkhoznadzor and Georgia’s National Food Agency. However, according to Georgian online media outlet Civil.ge, one of the largest Georgian dairy companies, Sante GMT, refused to export their products to Russia.

The Ukrainian embassy in Georgia said that Russia decided to partially lift sanctions on Georgia on the condition that Georgian authorities disapprove of sanctions against Russia. “We believe the promotion of trade relations with Russia, whose armed forces are attacking peaceful Ukrainian cities with missiles and bombs, killing innocent civilians, including children, to be unacceptable in the strongest terms,” the embassy statement said.

The embassy also called on the Georgian government to distance itself publicly from Russia, “whose leadership is violating international law and perpetrating war crimes in Ukraine.” The wrote, “Due to the 2008 Russian armed aggression against Georgia, the Georgian people, unfortunately, are well aware of the horrors of war that Ukrainians are forced to go through now. At the same time, it appears that the Georgian authorities must have forgotten all that and are now trying to seize the moment to cater for their own interests.”

Contrary to Rosselkhoznadzor’s statement, Levan Davitashvili said there had not been any communications about exporting dairy products to Russia since 2020.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin recycles old narratives to claim Ukraine is constructing dirty bombs and bioweapons appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian Hybrid War Report: Social platforms crack down on Kremlin media as Kremlin demands compliance

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 02 Mar 2022 20:41:51 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian Hybrid War Report.

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops

Documenting dissent

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

Security

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire

Regional reactions

Ugandan general tweets support for Russia

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance

Google, Meta, and Twitter are taking action against Russian state-owned media accounts to limit the spread of harmful information online. At the request of the European Union, Meta will restrict access to Kremlin-owned outlets RT and Sputnik across the EU. Earlier, Meta announced it would also restrict access to several Russian state media accounts in Ukraine at the government’s request. In addition, the company has demonetized the accounts of Russian state-owned media organizations and prohibited them from posting ads on Facebook and Instagram.

In a similar move, Google has blocked RT and Sputnik’s YouTube channels across Europe. It will also prevent RT and other relevant outlets from receiving funding from ads on their websites and apps.

Meanwhile, Twitter announced actions to reduce the spread of articles from Russian state-affiliated media. Links to Kremlin media will now include a “stay informed” label. Since the start of the invasion, there has been an uptick in the sharing of Kremlin media articles on Twitter, with more than 45,000 tweets a day directing users to state-affiliated outlets.

Today, we’re adding labels to Tweets that share links to Russian state-affiliated media websites and are taking steps to significantly reduce the circulation of this content on Twitter.

We’ll roll out these labels to other state-affiliated media outlets in the coming weeks. pic.twitter.com/57Dycmn8lx
— Yoel Roth (@yoyoel) February 28, 2022

Twitter also said that advertisements in Ukraine and Russia are on pause to ensure that critical public safety information is “elevated.” To this end, users in the two countries will no longer see tweet recommendations from accounts they don’t follow.

Responding to social media companies’ increased moderation efforts, the Russian government ordered companies to comply with a new law that mandates social media platforms operating in Russia must set up local offices and register with Russia’s media watchdog, Roskomnadzor. Under this legislation, local representatives could be held liable if Russia feels platforms are not abiding by local laws. These actions have been widely condemned by digital rights experts, as the law could be used as justification to intimidate employees with the threat of arrest and pressure companies to engage in censorship.

Both Russian independent news outlets and Tik Tok have already fielded requests from the government to take down content related to the war in Ukraine. In response to what Russia claims is “censorship” by social media companies, Roskomnadzor announced restrictions on access to Facebook, and access to Twitter appears to be limited as of February 26.

Over the weekend, Facebook and Twitter removed two covert influence operations targeting Ukrainians. One operation was tied to Russia, and another had connections to Belarus. Facebook also said the pro-Belarus hacking group Ghostwriter was targeting Ukrainians, including the military.

—Jacqueline Malaret, Assistant Director, Washington, DC

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington, DC

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops

Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, approved a proposal by the Security and Anti-Corruption Committee to draft a law introducing criminal liability for sharing “fake” content related to Russia’s armed forces. Members of the ruling United Russia party previously proposed introducing such a bill, citing “a lot of disinformation” on social media. The bill passed its first reading on March 2 and is expected to be presented for its second reading in several days.

The draft law states that the punishment for sharing fake content about Russian troops would be fifteen years in prison. The move could be a reaction to the increasing amount of footage showing Russia targeting civilian areas in Ukraine, which Russia denies. The law might intimidate Russian internet users and discourage them from sharing or saving such footage, particularly anything documenting war crimes. Meanwhile, Karim Khan, a prosecutor with the International Criminal Court, announced that he would investigate Russia for possible war crimes or crimes against humanity in Ukraine.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

On March 1, Wikipedia shared a notice they received from Russia’s Roskomnadzor information agency threatening to block the crowdsourced platform due to its Russian-language article on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The notice cited the inclusion of information about Russian military personnel casualties and Ukrainian civilian victims. In response, Wikipedia shared workarounds for users if Wikipedia does become blocked in Russia.

That same day, Russian users found themselves unable to access the websites for the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and the independent broadcaster TV Rain. Around the same time, the Russian Prosecutor General’s office released a statement on Telegram saying they had submitted demands to Roskomnadzor to restrict access to both channels. The statement accused the outlets of calling for extremism and violence, spreading “false information” regarding Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, and calling for “mass public events.”

The Prosecutor General’s office stated that the restrictions could legally be put in place due to Article 15.3 Federal Law No. 149-FZ Paragraph 1, “On Information, Information Technologies and Data Protection,” which covers the restriction of access to information inciting mass riots, extremist activities, and participation in mass public events. According to Article 15.3, the Russian government must first notify the online publication hosting the problematic content and request that it be removed; if the content is not immediately removed, they may then proceed with restricting access to the online publication.

TV Rain posted on Telegram that the Prosecutor General’s office did not identify specific materials on their website that violated Russian laws. It also said it strictly followed legal standards and used trusted sources when covering events in Ukraine.

Both Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain began trending on Twitter in Russia as these events unfolded.

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington DC

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets

On February 24, Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor stated that Russian media outlets were “obliged” to rely on information received from Russian official sources while covering Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine. The statement also argued that Roskomnadzor would block all attempts of disseminating “knowingly false information” on the internet. Considering the fact that Russia has generally avoided disclosing information about the exact number of casualties and military loss in Ukraine, Roskomnadzor’s announcement might be an attempt to prevent independent media from reporting casualty statistics. Having said that, Kremlin outlet RBK reported on March 2 that Russia had experienced a total of 498 deaths and 1,597 injuries since the invasion, according to the Ministry of Defense.

On February 28, Roskomnadzor claimed that it found instances of Google Ads being used to spread “unreliable socially significant information” about Russian and Ukrainian casualties. Consequently, Roskomnadzor demanded that Google restrict access to such materials, and warned Russian Internet sites against distributing such ads to avoid administrative fines or website bans. Roskomnadzor did not specify what false information it had found, but its statement suggests it wishes to prevent the distribution of any kind of information about Russian casualties to prevent public outrage.

Russian authorities have already taken actions against multiple independent media outlets. On February 28, Roskomnadzor blocked to access to Current Time and Krym.Realii, both projects of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as the New Times. Following the ban, Current Times wrote that they were accused of “spreading unreliable socially significant information about the Russian military allegedly killed and captured within the territory of Ukraine.” RFE/RL President Jamie Fly assessed the Kremlin’s move as “an attempt to hide the terrible truth about the human price of Putin’s criminal war against Ukraine.”

On top of blocking internet resources, journalists at independent media outlets also face physical threats. On February 24, Interfax journalist Dmitry Gavrilov was arrested during an anti-war rally in Saint Petersburg while he was taking a photograph of an anti-war banner. Gavrilov showed his press credentials to police but was nonetheless detained. The following day, Russian police arrested three RFE/RL journalists covering anti-war protests in Moscow, even though they too had all the necessary credentials to work during mass protests.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine

Videos of a February 27 protest in Belarus have surfaced on social media. The protests were in response to several recent developments in the country, including Belarus joining the war against Ukraine, serving as a transit point for Russian weapons, and Belarus revoking its non-nuclear status after a February 27 constitutional referendum. Crowds gathered near the defense ministry chanting “Glory to Ukraine!” and “Long live Belarus.” The Belarusian government responded aggressively, sending in riot police to detain protesters.

Meanwhile, Belarusians living in Vilnius, Lithuania climbed over the fence of the Belarusian embassy and replaced the official state flag hanging outside the building’s entrance with the opposition nationalist flag and a Ukrainian flag.

Lastly, a video of Belarusian lieutenant colonel Sakhashchik Valery Stepanovich discouraging soldiers from joining the war in Ukraine went viral online. “This is not our war,” he said. “Find a way not to follow criminal orders. Sometimes saying ‘no’ takes the most courage.”

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the cyber activist collective Anonymous announced their “war against the Kremlin.” Over the next several days they took credit for successful attacks on public services and state-controlled media in Russia and Belarus. As there is no official Anonymous account on Twitter, the collective used hashtags #OpRussia and #OpKremlin to share news and updates about the cyber-attack campaign.

On February 26, Anonymous claimed they had hacked Kremlin-owned TV channels, which suddenly started showing footage from Ukraine that contradicted the official Kremlin narrative. Many anonymous Twitter accounts reported on the hack.

The following day, Anonymous took credit for taking down a long list of Russian government websites, including the Russian pension fund, the State Service, the presidential administration, customs, the national government site, Moscow’s mayor, and the Chechnya Republic. As of March 2, many of these sites – Mos.ru, government.ru, customs.gov.ru, kremlin.ru, gosuslugi.ru, and pfr.gov.ru – remained offline. Chechnya.gov.ru had been restored, but now required users to demonstrate they were not automated bots using “captcha” tests before being allowed to proceed to the site.

On February 28, Anonymous claimed they had downed Russian propaganda websites, three Belarusian banks, and multiple Belarusian government sites, including the Information Ministry, Military Industry Authority, and Defense Ministry. While one Belarusian bank, Belinvestbank.by, has been restored, belarusbank.by and priorbank.by remained compromised at the time of writing, alongside the government sites mil.by, vpk.gov.by, and mpt.gov.by.

In additional to shutting down websites, Anonymous also took credit for leaking information from Russia’s Ministry of Defense and the Russian Nuclear Institute.

Anonymous is not the only cyber activist collective attacking Russian and Belarusian infrastructure. The DFRLab previously reporting about the Belarusian Cyber Partisans hacking the Belarus Railway company, while the IT Army of Ukraine is also engaging in cyber activism.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

On March 1, a large rally in Tbilisi demanded the Georgian government’s resignation and snap elections. The latest protest took place in solidarity with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after he announced that Ukraine was recalling its ambassador to Georgia due to the government’s “immoral position” on sanctions and barring Georgian volunteers from flying to Ukraine.

Georgia has seen four consecutive days of protests, as thousands take to the street to express their solidarity with Ukraine and condemn the Georgian government’s position on Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky expressed support for the protesters when he tweeted on February 26, “Incredible Georgian people who understand that friends must be supported! Grateful to everyone in Tbilisi and other cities who came out in support of Ukraine and against the war. Indeed, there are times when citizens are not the government, but better than the government.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Multiple Russian TikTok users published now-deleted videos with the hashtag #давайзамир (#letsgoforpeace), in which they included near-identical phrases such as “All are blaming Russia, but close their eyes that Donbas has been under fire for eight years,” and “Please check all the news, we’re fighting for peace.” Notably, the text in many of these videos was also extremely similar, and on some occasions identical, strongly suggesting either coordination or the distribution of talking points for Russian video creators. Indeed, some Russian TikTok users pushed back publishing messages claiming they were offered payment to post peace symbols and express the message that Russia is stopping the war rather than starting it, and that the world has ignored the Donbas for eight years.

The scope of the narrative operation caught the eye of other TikTok users, who compiled videos of TikTokers voicing similar statements, then shamed them for being corrupt. Some of these TikTokers muted comments to avoid criticism, while others ultimately deleted their videos.

Not long after this first wave of similar narratives, a second wave appeared, when multiple users published videos featuring the lines, “In 2015, a new memorial named Alley of Angels was built in Donetsk” and “Russia wants to bring peace.” These videos were available at the time of publishing but may soon be deleted as well.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires

Georgian far-left groups are promoting the narrative that the war in Ukraine is a battle between two empires over Ukrainian resources. The narrative portrays the US and Russia as equal threats to Ukraine. On February 24, Politicano, a Facebook page known for Soviet Union nostalgia and affiliated with the Kremlin-linked News Front Georgia, posted that Ukraine has become a battleground for Western and Russian empires. Another Facebook page, “ნაპერწკალი“ (“Spark”), which describes itself as an “independent Marxist collective initiative,” posted that the war in Ukraine is a conflict between Russian and Western imperialists, fighting over spheres of influence and resources.

The narrative that Ukraine is stuck between the imperial interests of the West and Russia aligns with messaging coming from far-right Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin. On February 27, Dugin posted, “This is not a war with Ukraine. This is a confrontation with globalization…on all levels, including geopolitical and ideological.” According to him, Russia is creating a global resistance zone. “When we win, everybody benefits from it,” he said.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

On February 28, the KGB of South Ossetia issued a statement claiming that there is raise of neo-Nazi and nationalistic sentiments in Georgia. The claim refers to Georgians willing to join Ukraine’s international legion of territorial defence, that allows foreign volunteers to support Ukraine’s defense efforts. The South Ossetia KGB described Georgian volunteers as “aggressive Georgian volunteers from the ranks of [former President] Mikheil Saakashvili’s radical followers.” It continued, “Instead of recognising its responsibility for crimes committed against humanity from 1920s till 2008, the Tbilisi regime expresses support for Ukrainian Banderovtsi [followers of the 20^th century Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera] who in turn are nurturing their own revanchist goals.”

That same day, South Ossetia’s information agency published a story with the headline, “South Ossetia and Russia unite against Nazism.” The article claimed that citizens of South Ossetia launched a flash mob on social networks with the hashtag #Мирбезнацизма (“World without Nazism”). As of March 2, the DFRLab could not find a single public post on either Facebook or Twitter featuring the hashtag during the alleged time span of the flash mob.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire

On the morning of February 28, the Kyiv Independent reported that the first Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft was expected to deploy Belarusian paratroopers into Ukraine. Meanwhile, reports of ballistic missiles launched from Belarus into Ukraine continue to surface, with some reports suggesting the use of Iskander missiles. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka later confirmed missiles were launched from Belarus on February 27.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Ugandan General tweets support for Russia

Ugandan Lieutenant General Mahoozi Kainerugaba, son of President Yoweri Museveni and leader of the country’s land forces, tweeted on February 28, “The majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine.” The DFRLab previously identified a network of inauthentic Facebook assets working to prime Lt. Gen. Kainerugaba as the next president of Uganda.

The Ugandan Embassy in Moscow called on nationals living in Ukraine to remain cautious and follow instructions issued by the Ukrainian government. The embassy said, “It is our prayer that the situation will be short lived, and that normality will soon be restored.” The presidency has yet to issue any further comment on the war.

On February 24, Vladlen Semivolos, Russia’s ambassador to Uganda, spoke to Uganda’s permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Waiswa Bagiire, about developing bilateral cooperation in the United Nations.

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context

The deputy head of Sudan’s military council, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, was quoted by Russian media outlet FAN as having recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Daglo, who visited Moscow last week, was quoted saying, “The whole world must realize that it is [Russia’s] right to defend herself.” However, the Sudan Tribune reported a statement from Sudan’s Foreign Ministry claiming Daglo’s quote was taken out of context and used as a “cheap attempt to fish in troubled waters.”

On February 27, Sudan’s state news agency reported that the meeting between Sudanese and Russian officials had been scheduled prior to the war in Ukraine, and that Sudan called for de-escalation “on both sides.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

The post Russian Hybrid War Report: Social platforms crack down on Kremlin media as Kremlin demands compliance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian Hybrid War Report: Belarus joins conflict against Ukraine

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 25 Feb 2022 03:13:00 +0000

As the crisis in Europe over Ukraine heats up, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian Hybrid War Report.

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Not long after dawn on February 24, tanks were recorded moving into Ukrainian territory from southwestern Belarus, crossing over at the Senkivka checkpoint. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Russian heavy flamethrower systems can be identified in the videos. Videos showing missiles being launched from the Mogilev area towards Ukraine have also surfaced, yet have not been specifically geolocated as of now. CNN and Newsweek reported that Belarusian troops are also taking part in the attack against Ukraine, despite previous insistence from Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Belarus would not participate in any military action against the country.

In an urgent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lukashenka announced that they had agreed to keep Russian troops stationed in Belarus. Lukashenka previously denied that Belarusian troops would take part in the Ukrainian invasion. He also proclaimed that Ukraine is losing the war and offered to host talks in Minsk.

New Maxar satellite imagery released the day before the attack showed Russian military deployment changes on February 21 and 22. The new images revealed Russia had deployed more than one hundred vehicles and dozens of troop shelters at Bolshoi Bokov airfield in southern Belarus, near the city of Mazyr. This new deployment is less than twenty kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The same set of new images also documented ground being cleared southwest of Belgorod, Russia, in the general vicinity of where Russia later began its attack on Kharkiv.

That same day, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service announced the implementation of a number of security measures along its borders with Russia and Belarus. The new measures included limiting vehicle traffic; using radio stations, drones, and filming and taking pictures; as well as keeping non-residents away from the border zone. Meanwhile, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya urged Western countries to impose tougher sanctions on both Russia and Belarus to deter them from further aggression. According to her, the current sanctions packages are not enough, as Russia and Belarus are not showing any responsiveness to them.

Viktor Gulevich, head of the Belarusian army, previously stated on February 21 that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus would depend on regional NATO troop withdrawals. According to Reuters reporting, Gulevich said Minsk believed it was within its rights to demand that US and NATO member forces withdraw from near Belarusian borders, including from near borders with neighboring countries Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Lastly, new footage has surfaced of Russian Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-24P combat helicopters in the Gomel region of Southeastern Belarus, potentially near the R-35 highway; however, this video has not yet been geolocated. Additional as-yet-unverified videos suggest that the southern Belarusian border where Russian troops are stationed is becoming more muddy, which might impact the tactical capabilities of Russian ground troops in the region.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

A pair of cyberattacks targeted Ukrainian banks and government websites during the twenty-four hours leading up to the Russian invasion. Targets included the web pages for the Ukrainian parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Cabinet of Ministers.

According to the internet monitoring website IsItDownRightNow.com, the websites for the MFA and Cabinet of Ministers were temporarily taken offline on Wednesday. Over several hours, the DFRLab also observed that Ukraine’s security services website would only partially load.

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, confirmed a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack had occurred. He claimed that unknown actors attacked Ukrainian banks, state servicer provider Diia, and the websites for the Ukrainian parliament, the MFA, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Fortunately, many of the services continued working despite the ongoing attack.

Fedorov confirmed that cyberattacks continued throughout the night and were ongoing. He claimed that all information sources in Ukraine were under attack, but assured citizens that the situation was under control. As of Thursday morning, the websites were accessible from Ukraine.

Meanwhile, open-source research collective InformNapalm also reported a DDoS attack on their webpage. A similar attack was directed at Censor.net, a popular Ukrainian online media outlet. The organizations successfully defended against the attacks and webpage performance was not impacted.

Lastly, cybersecurity firms Symantec and ESET said they had discovered a new destructive malware wiping data from Ukrainian machines.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

On February 24, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reported that columns of Russian tanks entered the Luhansk region of Eastern Ukraine through Krasna Talivka, Milove, and Horodyshche. According to the Border Guard, the columns were led by white cars bearing the logo for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has monitored the conflict on a daily basis for years.

The OSCE previously announced on February 13 that it was pulling out its staff from eastern Ukraine. At the time, Kremlin outlet RT reported that OSCE had evacuated their car fleet but left behind armored vehicles.

At the time of writing, the OSCE had not commented on the matter and the DFRLab cannot independently confirm whether the OSCE vehicles allegedly being used by Russia are authentic or were Russian vehicles with OSCE logos affixed to them.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended

Twitter cited “human error” after suspending the accounts of several open-source researchers on Wednesday. The social media company dismissed rumors that the removals were the result of a mass reporting campaign. “A small number of human errors as part of our work to proactively address manipulated media resulted in these incorrect enforcements,” said Yoel Roth, head of site integrity at Twitter. “We’re fixing the issue and reaching out directly to the affected folks.”

Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters published a thread listing more than a dozen legitimate accounts that Twitter had suspended. Those with suspended accounts included Roman Burko, the founder of the open-source research collective InformNapalm; Kyle Glen, OSINT researcher and cofounder of Conflict News; Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian right-leaning activist from Odesa; and Maria Avdeeva, research director at the European Expert Association. By Thursday, all of the accounts cited by Waters except @ukrwarreport had been restored.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence

Shortly after Putin recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples republics on February 21, a pro-Russia online flash mob began tweeting using the hashtags #СвоихНеБросаем (#WeDoNotAbandonOurPeople) and #МыВместе (#WeAreTogether). The campaign expressed support for people living in Donetsk and Luhansk, alleging that they are suffering under Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Twitter campaign created the impression that there is public support for Putin’s decision.

Open-source evidence suggests Putin’s United Russia party could have initiated the flash mob. United Russia started using the #СвоихНеБросаем hashtag on February 20, the day before the Putin’s announcement, calling on its audience to give humanitarian assistance to people evacuated from Donbas to Rostov Oblast. Later, United Russia continued to use the hashtag for other purposes.

The DFRLab analyzed the hashtags on Twitter and found 59 percent of the mentions were original tweets (1005 out of 1709). Each tweet received an average of 26.4 engagements, suggesting the campaign failed to go viral. The most popular tweet had 223 engagements.

Analyzing the hashtags on Facebook using the monitoring tool CrowdTangle, the DFRLab found that the most engaged–with content came from United Russia accounts or the accounts of their prominent members. The highest number of engagements a post received was 1,300 reactions, 140 comments and 124 shares, which is not considered particularly high. A CrowdTangle query identified 202 posts on Facebook pages, public groups, and verified profiles that received an average of 39 engagements. Meanwhile, a CrowdTangle analysis of Instagram found that 509 posts have used the hashtag since February 20, receiving an average of 720 engagements.

The DFRLab found the hashtag was also used on other social media platforms, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, and Telegram, but has yet to determine their levels of engagement.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Anatoly Bibilov, president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, announced a “combat alert” after an emergency security council meeting on Thursday. According to Bibilov, all units of the Ministry of Defense “must be ready to advance to concentration points.” Bibilov also ordered full cooperation with the Russian military base in the region. He cited the Treaty of Alliance and Integration between South Ossetia and Russia, signed in 2015, when reiterating South Ossetia’s “full support” for Russia’s actions.

Bibilov also said security forces were monitoring the situation along the Georgian border “to ensure readiness to respond to all provocations potentially originating from Georgia.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

On February 22 in Moscow, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev and Vladimir Putin signed a declaration regarding allied cooperation. Azerbaijan’s state information agency Azertag published a Russian version of the declaration, which reiterated cooperation between the two states in different fields, including the economy, energy, transportation, trade, health, and education.

Notably, three sections of the declaration mention military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia:

Paragraph 11 of the declaration states that Russia and Azerbaijan will suppress activities of organizations and entities on their territory, targeting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each party.

According to paragraph 13, “The parties will deepen cooperation between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat trainings, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.”

Lastly, in paragraph 16, they state, “In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military support on the basis of the UN Charter, different international agreements and considering the existing international-legal obligations of each party.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksiy Reznikov called on all Ukrainians “who are ready and able to hold a weapon” to mobilize. According to a statement posted on Facebook early Thursday morning, Ukraine has entered “total defense mode.” Reznikov said all that is required to join the ranks of the armed forces is a passport. “The enemy is attacking, but our army is indestructible,” he added.

Following the defense minister’s statement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted a similar statement: “We will give weapons to anyone who wants to defend the country. Be ready to support Ukraine in the squares of our cities.”

Also Thursday, Ukraine banned all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country. “This regulation will remain in effect for the period of the legal regime of martial law,” the State Border Guard Service said.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty Thursday, triggering consultations with Alliance members. Article 4 states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Following initial consultations, NATO issued a statement saying “we have decided, in line with our defensive planning to protect all allies, to take additional steps to further strengthen deterrence and defense across the alliance.”

This comes as NATO held an emergency meeting to discuss Russia’s assault on Ukraine. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Russia’s attack on Ukraine “is a grave breach of international law, and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security.”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

On February 24, the official website of the Russian presidency published a video in which Vladimir Putin effectively declared war on Ukraine, announcing that he was ordering the Russian armed forces to conduct a special military operation in Ukraine in accordance with Article 51 of United Nations Charter and in pursuance of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.

After the video’s release, Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta wrote on Facebook and Twitter that the speech had been recorded on February 21, based on an analysis of the recording’s metadata. The story was quickly picked up by the Russian edition of Delfi Estonia media outlet on Facebook, by Ekho Moskvy on Twitter, and Turkish state-controlled media TRT’s Russian language Facebook page.

However, CNN journalist Gianluca Mezzo wrote that when he checked the metadata of Putin’s video, he concluded that it was recorded on February 24 at 03:35:44. He also published a screenshot of metadata info of a file from the website metadata2go.com.

The DFRLab team could not download a video from Kremlin’s website to independently verify its metadata; at the time of writing, Kremlin.ru was no longer functional.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Facebook restricted the page of Zvezda TV, the Russian state-owned TV channel run by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Zvezda published a screenshot of a restriction notice from Facebook on its website, saying that the page is restricted from the platform for ninety days for “repeatedly publishing false information.”

StopFake, the Ukrainian fact-checking organization, had previously flagged two publications from Zvezda on Facebook as false information. The first article claimed that Russia had already suppressed the air-defense forces of Ukraine, while the second reported that Ukrainian military border guard units did not resist Russian forces.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

The commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as “Hemedti,” arrived in Moscow for bilateral talks with senior Russian government officials on February 23. According to the RSF Twitter account, Dagalo will act in his capacity as deputy head of the military-led ruling council, leading a delegation of ministers. Dagalo and the RSF led a military coup in Sudan last October, which has seen sustained violent protests over the last four months.

According to VOA News, Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Khalid Farah said, “This visit was scheduled ahead and has nothing whatsoever to do with what is happening in Ukraine.” Similarly, Dagalo tweeted in Arabic that he hopes the trip will “advance relations between Sudan and Russia to broader horizons and strengthen the existing cooperation” between the two countries.

The DFRLab previously uncovered a network of inauthentic accounts with links to the Internet Research Agency that worked to amplify pro-Russian content in Sudan, promoting Russia as a friend to the Sudanese people.

—Tessa Knight, DFRLab Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, issued a statement warning the media and online outlets against spreading “unverified information.” Roskomnadzor referred to Article 49 of Russia’s Mass Media Law, which obliges editors to verify the authenticity of their reporting prior to publishing it.

According to Roskomnadzor, “When preparing their materials and publications related to the conduct of a special operation in connection with the situation in the Lugansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, they are obliged to use information and data obtained from official Russian sources.”

Roskomnadzor also noted, “The dissemination of knowingly false information entails liability under Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of up to 5 million rubles.” The statement warned that failure to follow this law would result in “immediate blocking of such materials by Roskomnadzor in accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law No. 149-FZ, ‘On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.’”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

The official Telegram channel of Venezuela’s government-owned TV network posted a news update about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, written in alignment with Kremlin messaging. The post stated, “Russia launches special operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. Last Monday, after recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, President Vladimir Putin announced the dispatch of Russian troops with the aim of demilitarizing and denazifying the regions.”

The post by the Venezuelan government TV network also aligned with President Nicolas Maduro’s February 22 Twitter broadcast, in which he stated, “The Bolivarian Revolution is with Russia…. We know that Putin is defending the right to peace and dignity of the Russian people and the peoples of the world and the world balance.” He continued, “Imperialism and NATO have tried to bury diplomatic agreements based on international law to disrespect Russia. Patiently, President Putin has raised the breach of these agreements and the danger that NATO deploys its weapons offensive, including its atomic weapons aimed at Russia.”

—Iria Puyosa, DFRLab Visiting Fellow, Ann Arbor, Michigan

The post Russian Hybrid War Report: Belarus joins conflict against Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian Hybrid Threats Report: Despite debunking of false flags, Putin recognizes breakaway republics

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Tue, 22 Feb 2022 16:58:56 +0000

Putin recognizes DNR and LNR during angry speech after security council meeting

Russian forces move closer to Ukraine

Russian troops to stay in Belarus as joint drills end

Russian-backed separatists record evacuation announcement video days before release

TikTok blocks account of Russian state-media outlet RIA “by mistake,” reports RIA

Luhansk internet provider warns of service disruptions

Ukraine separatists release doctored video of Polish-speaking “saboteurs” trying to blow up Donbas chlorine tank

Leaked documents from Donetsk detail media coverage instructions

Ukraine accuses Russia of using false messages to provoke conflict

Suspicion surrounds last week’s car explosion in Donetsk

Georgia’s pro-Kremlin political parties call on the government to announce military neutrality

Georgia’s breakaway regions express readiness to support Ukrainian separatists

Putin recognizes DNR and LNR during angry speech after security council meeting

On February 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an angry speech in which he recognized the independence of the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics (DNR and LNR) while simultaneously challenging Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state. The speech touched upon many of the same arguments and grievances he outlined in his July 2021 essay in which he insisted that Ukraine and Russia have always been historically linked, and that Ukraine as an independent state was both a twentieth century invention and a disastrous mistake for Russia. He ended the speech with a chilling warning “to the Kyiv elite that has usurped power: Stop any military activity, or you will be responsible for the bloodshed that will ensue.” Within hours, the Kremlin confirmed it was sending “peacekeepers” into the breakaway republics, later adding that they consider Ukraine-occupied regions of the Donbas as DNR/LNR territory, including the Ukrainian city of Mariupol.

The speech came shortly after Russian state media interrupted normal programming to broadcast an ad-hoc session of the Russian Security Council. The meeting concerned formal Russian recognition of the DNR and LNR, a move that would effectively mark Russian abandonment of the Minsk accords. The meeting was ostensibly a response to televised appeals by Russian-backed separatist leaders Denis Pushilin (Donetsk) and Leonid Pasechnik (Luhansk) for Russian recognition and support.

The meeting, held in the vast Hall of the Order of St. Catherine in the Grand Kremlin Palace, appeared to be highly choreographed. For roughly ninety minutes, Putin quizzed Russian security officials on the state of Russian-Ukrainian relations. In turn, the officials cited Russian-orchestrated false flags and disinformation in order to claim Ukrainian aggression. Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service, claimed that Ukraine had directly attacked Russian territory. Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu asserted that Ukraine had launched a war of aggression against Dontesk and could soon pose a nuclear threat.

The most noteworthy exchange came between Putin and Sergei Naryshkin, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Naryshkin was visibly uncomfortable as he spoke about how Russia might leverage the threat of Dontesk and Lunhansk recognition to strengthen the Russian negotiating position. Putin dismissed this, pressing him repeatedly to state his support for the immediate recognition of the separatist-controlled regions. Naryshkin ultimately endorsed this position, as did every other official who spoke.

WTH is this? Putin humiliating publicly the chief of SVR, who literally lost his speaking faculties in fear. This is something out of @SachaBaronCohen's The Dictator. pic.twitter.com/LZygwqXbcG
— Christo Grozev (@christogrozev) February 21, 2022

The broadcast ended as Putin declared that “a decision will be taken today.”

Although the Russian Security Council broadcast appeared to follow the appearances by Pushilin and Pasechnik, it appears to have been recorded about five hours in advance, as the time displayed on Shoigu’s watch did not match the time the speech was broadcast.

—Emerson T. Brooking, DFRLab Senior Fellow, Washington DC

Russian forces move closer to Ukraine

Russian forces along the Russian and Belarusian borders with Ukraine, as well as in Crimea, continue to move from temporary camps into smaller holding areas closer to Ukraine. Equipment in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts has been spotted with a painted-on zig-zag or “Z” pattern, believed to be intended as a means to identify friendly units in the event of an offensive. Satellite imagery of Belgorod Oblast, which has enjoyed mostly clear weather recently, showed more than a dozen confirmed and suspected military positions across the border from the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv. Only two of these locations contained military equipment prior to February 2022. Similar positions are likely present throughout Kursk and Bryansk oblasts, as well as in Belarus.

Satellite imagery showing Russian military positions in Belgorod Oblast. (Source: ESA / SentinelHub)

In addition to the increased ground-force presence, satellite imagery also revealed three new improvised heliports to house dozens of attack and transport helicopters. Reports from local residents claimed that helicopters flew low overhead day and night, particularly in Shebekino, which lies just six kilometers from the border with Ukraine.

Satellite imagery showing improvised heliports in Belgorod Oblast. (Source: ESA / SentinelHub)

Large-scale deployments of rotary-wing assets were also detected in Crimea, Rostov Oblast, and Belarus.

Additionally, BMD-2 airborne infantry fighting vehicles packed with parachutes were spotted moving in the direction of Khotilovo air base in Tver Oblast, located in western Russia.

—Michael Sheldon, DFRLab Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian troops to stay in Belarus as joint drills end

Belarusian Defense Minister Victor Khrenin announced on February 20 that Russian troops would stay in Belarus despite completing the “Allied Resolve” joint exercises. “Due to increased military activity near the borders and escalation in Donbas, Belarus and Russia decided to continue joint inspections of response forces,” he said said in a statement. This contradicts the February 16 announcement from Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makey, who said the entire Russian military would leave Belarus after the end of the drills.

According to the New York Times, an estimated thirty thousand Russian soldiers remain in Belarus. Local Belarusian activists have referred to the situation as an “occupation with [President Alyaksandr] Lukashenka’s permission.” These strategic deployments also make the Baltic states anxious, said Marius Laurinavicius, a Lithuanian analyst: “We [the Baltics] are becoming West Berlin, as a smaller country surrounded by an enemy that has much more military might.”

Meanwhile, on February 19, eyewitness reports emerged of heavy drinking, black-market sales of fuel supplies, and littering from Russian soldiers in southeastern Belarus during the military drills.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russian-backed separatists record evacuation announcement video days before release

Following the February 18 release of two videos by the leaders of the DNR and LNR announcing an emergency mass evacuation, open-source investigators at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Russian service and Bellingcat discovered that the footage contained metadata suggesting they were filmed on February 16, two days before the emergency evacuation was ordered. Ukrainian authorities responded by saying they had no plans to conduct military operations in the Donbas region.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

TikTok blocks account of Russian state-media outlet RIA “by mistake,” reports RIA

On February 19, Russian state media outlet RIA reported that the video platform TikTok blocked its account after removing a video from DNR leader Denis Pushilin that called for an emergency evacuation in eastern Ukraine. RIA shared a screengrab of TikTok’s notice, which stated, “Your account was permanently closed due to multiple violations of the community guidelines.” RIA said TikTok did not provide a specific reason for closing the account.

Later, RIA reported that Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, “intervened in the situation,” and as a result, TikTok unblocked RIA’s account and restored the deleted video of Pushilin. The Kremlin-owned outlet stated that TikTok “clarified that the blocking occurred by mistake.” At the time of publication, RIA’s TikTok account was accessible.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Luhansk internet provider warns of service disruptions

On Sunday, Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin online outlets reported a possible disruption to mobile and internet connectivity in Luhansk, Ukraine. The outlets cited a statement from Lugacom, an internet provider which provides service to eastern Ukraine via Russia. “Due to the current circumstances, in the near future, there may be a lack of mobile communications by Lugacom and the Internet throughout the republic,” the statement said, before it was later taken down. The pro-Kremlin outlet Life.ru reported that employees of Lugacom followed a call to mobilize and “went to the military commissariats of the LNR in accordance with the decree issued by the head of the republic.”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukraine separatists release doctored video of Polish-speaking “saboteurs” trying to blow up Donbas chlorine tank

As noted in our February 18 threat report, Kremlin media and DNR officials claimed that DNR forces had prevented an attempt by a Ukrainian sabotage group to blow up a chlorine tank at a treatment plant in Horlivka. According to the DNR, the “people’s police” opened fire on the group, killing two and injuring three, then forced the rest to retreat.

The people’s police also claimed to have found a camera that belonged to the so-called saboteurs. They published a recording from this camera in a Telegram channel, saying it depicted a confrontation between the people’s police and the Ukrainian and Polish saboteurs. Kremlin-controlled media outlets in Russia also amplified this story.

However, the video’s metadata revealed it was recorded on February 8, not February 18 as the people’s militia asserted. The metadata also showed that the video was edited in Adobe Premiere Pro and that audiovisual assets were added to it, giving additional credence to the argument that the video is inauthentic. The footage is likely a montage composed of different video and audio files.

The metadata also showed the name “M72A5 LAW and APILAS live fire.mp4” under the “pantry ingredients file path,” which includes details about the elements used in a composed file. Twitter user @foodz found a 2010 YouTube video with the same file name and featuring similar audio of explosions. Journalist August Graham and Twitter user @mistercw conducted a spectral analysis to compare the explosion sounds in the DNR’s footage and the 2010 YouTube video. They found that the two videos’ timing, waveforms, and spectrogram details were in sync, indicating that that explosion audio from the YouTube video was likely used in the video released by the DPR people’s police.

In addition, metadata from the Telegram video revealed that some of the assets in the video were stored in a folder named Проекты\2021\02 Февраль\2021-02-04 ДРГ (“Projects/2021/February 2/2021-02-04 DRG”) with the dates in the folder name suggesting the video had been in the works for more than a year.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Leaked documents from Donetsk detail media coverage instructions

On February 20, Ukraine’s Centre for Strategic Communications published a leaked DNR document covering four strategic narratives and how the media should cover them over the weekend of February 19. The narratives included mobilization, evacuation, how the DNR government functions, and Ukrainian crimes in the Donbas. The document, titled “Republican Temnik,” listed names of speakers and organizations that would be the best fit to cover each topic. Each topic included multiple talking points.

The word temnik describes when authorities provide instructions to media about what topics should be covered or avoided, and whether this coverage should be positive or negative. First coined in Ukraine in the early 2000s, the temnik phenomenon is believed to be actively used in Russia to control coverage of specific topics in mainstream media and on Telegram channels.

While it is hard to prove the document’s authenticity, examples of the messages described in the document have previously been observed in separatist messaging. The “mobilization” section included talking points such as “We need to stand up for protecting our land” and “We didn’t give out our land in WW2 or 2014, so won’t do it now.” On February 20, multiple billboards were placed in Donetsk with similar concepts, including “We won in 1943, we’ll win now” and “Everyone for the defense of the Motherland.”

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate, Kyiv, Ukraine

Ukraine accuses Russia of using false messages to provoke conflict

On February 19, multiple Russian and pro-Kremlin outlets reported that three Ukrainian projectiles exploded in the Rostov region of Russia, two of which, they claimed, hit buildings. The reports identified the projectiles as originating from a Grad rocket launcher, presumably launched from Ukraine.

The Investigative Committee of Russia opened a criminal case into the matter. Reports from the committee and Russian media state that the first projectile landed three hundred meters from an unoccupied residence in the village of Mityakinskaya, the second landed on an unoccupied building in Mityakinsky, and the third landed in an unspecified area in the Tarasovsky district of Rostov. The presumed poor accuracy of these alleged attacks prompted social-media users in Rostov to raise doubts about their veracity.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the accusation that it launched rockets on Rostov. Lieutenant General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, also denied the allegation. He underlined that Ukrainian artillery units are stored more than twenty-one kilometers from the contact line, so those Rostov sites would exceed the maximum firing range of the Ukrainian Grad systems. He also provided a screenshot of a Russian article from 2014 claiming shelling in the same location in Rostov. “Invaders blow up infrastructure in the occupied territories themselves, conduct chaotic shelling of civilian objects and provoke false messages,” Zaluzhnyi concluded.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the explosion “a provocation and lie.” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova retorted that only a “soulless cynic” could have only made such a statement.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate, Kyiv, Ukraine

Suspicion surrounds last week’s car explosion in Donetsk

As noted in our previous threats report, Kremlin–controlled media reported an explosion in downtown Donetsk center. The explosion occurred around 7pm next to DNR administrative headquarters. The car reportedly belonged to Denis Sinenkov, head of the DNR people’s police.

Semyon Pegov, a pro-Kremlin war correspondent, broadcasted live from the reported scene of the explosion, calling it a “terror act” and accusing Kyiv of “stepping out of any imaginable and unimaginable boundaries.” The pro-Kremlin TV show “60 Minutes” broadcasted Pegov’s footage and also referred to the incident as a “terror act.”

Later that evening, Anton Pustovalov, a writer at the independent Russian media outlet Mediazona, tweeted a side-by-side comparison of the damaged car and another newer, more expensive car. Both vehicles had the same license plate number, “ДК 0101.” Pustovalov wrote a Twitter thread suggesting that the DNR militia switched license plates and blew up an older model of the UAZ car, sparing Sinenkov’s expensive car. The license plate was prominently displayed in many public images of the vehicle remains.

Kremlin-owned outlets were quick to report on the incident. The source code of the articles reveals that RIA Novosti published its first report at 7:04pm Moscow time, followed by TASS and RT Russia six minutes later.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgia’s pro-Kremlin political parties call on the government to announce military neutrality

Irma Inashvili, the leader of the pro-Kremlin Georgian political party Alliance of Patriots, published an open letter on February 21 addressed to Vladimir Putin. The letter, signed by fifty-three pro-Kremlin political parties and organizations, stated that confrontation with Russia is detrimental for Georgia, and it called on the Georgian government to declare full military neutrality and amend the constitution accordingly. The letter also claimed that Georgia is not an independent state and that it cannot face regional and global challenges without Russia.

The letter went on to criticize Georgian authorities for proposing Georgian territory for NATO military exercises, stating that this is contrary to the country’s national interests and presents a direct challenge to Russia. “Georgia is long entangled by the network of foreign organizations that conduct false opinion polls and paint a picture of a common aspiration to join NATO,” the letter stated.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Georgia’s breakaway regions express readiness to support Ukrainian separatists

On February 20, Aslan Bzhania, president of the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia, said that Abkhazia is ready to provide military and humanitarian aid to Donetsk and Luhansk. According to Bzhania, Ukraine, encouraged by “Western curators,” is purposefully engaged in provocations that threaten the whole region’s security.

The previous day, seven organizations established a unified headquarters in Abkhazia to support Donetsk and Luhansk. A statement released by the groups claimed the DNR and LNR face an “unprecedented military situation on their borders from Ukraine and NATO.” They also stated that the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which they say are coordinated by the US and NATO, carried out massive shelling against civilians over the past twenty-four hours.

Meanwhile, Anatoly Bibilov, the president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, had a telephone call with DNR leader Denis Pushilin. According to the South Ossetia state news agency Agency RES, Bibilov condemned the “shelling of peaceful civilians” and expressed readiness to receive and accommodate orphaned children from Donetsk. Bibilov also said that countries supporting Ukraine “gave the go-ahead for the start of open hostilities.” The parliament of South Ossetia also supported the Russian State Duma in its resolution to recognize of DNR and LNR as independent states.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian Hybrid Threats Report: Despite debunking of false flags, Putin recognizes breakaway republics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian Hybrid Threats Report: Will Moscow provide weapons and passports to breakaway Ukrainian regions?

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Tue, 01 Feb 2022 15:41:01 +0000

Lukashenka says Belarus would go to war if attacked, as Russia transports blood and food supplies near Ukraine border

Russia’s ruling party pressures Putin to supply weapons to breakaway regions

Russian politician claims residents of Ukrainian separatist regions received Russian passports

Russian narrative criticizes “insanity” of Western media

Report: Network of Twitter accounts could predict Russian military build-up

Kremlin-controlled media portrays China as Russia’s strongest ally

Kremlin-controlled media exploit Hungary’s NATO statement

Georgia: Debate over Ukraine resolution intensifies

Lukashenka says Belarus would go to war if attacked, as Russia transports blood and food supplies near Ukraine border

On January 28, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said in a televised address that Belarus would go to war if attacked. He confirmed that Belarus would also support Russia if it were attacked, promising to host “hundreds of thousands” of Russian troops in the event of war.

On January 29, new open-source evidence suggested that Russia is continuing its military build-up in Belarus and its own territory along Ukraine’s borders. Satellite imagery and videos shared on social media indicated that the Russian military moved blood supplies and other medical aid. Additional movements of troops, missiles, and essential supplies like food were also reported along Ukraine’s border.

On January 29, additional footage showed the arrival of Russia’s Pantsir missile system, likely transported from Russia’s far east. The same day, Belarusian military media outlet Vayar reported that Russian Eastern Military District Commander Alexander Chaiko visited the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade in Brest.

Meanwhile, Russian military news outlet TV Zvezda announced that the Western Military District completed its scheduled readiness check. The outlet cited Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlev, who said that planned combat training activities on the training grounds in Belarus would continue despite the readiness check.

Lastly, on January 31, new videos showed the arrival of pontoon bridge units in Belarus, also likely shipped from the Russian far east. Additionally, four Project 03160 Raptor patrol boats were spotted moving south near Rogachevka, Voronezh Oblast in southwestern Russia, likely toward the Sea of Azov.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels

Additional reading:

Russian equipment flows into Belarus, January 27, 2022

Russia’s ruling party pressures Putin to supply weapons to breakaway regions

On January 26, the head of the ruling United Russia party in the State Duma expressed support for sending weapons to Ukrainian separatist regions Donetsk and Luhansk. Vladimir Vasiliev said his party is “very concerned about the issue of protecting the lives of Russian citizens and compatriots living in the territories of the LPR [Luhansk People’s Republic] and DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic].”

Andrey Turchak, secretary of United Russia’s general council, claimed that Kyiv is preparing a military attack on the separatist regions and that Russia must assist in deterring aggression from Ukraine. He cited the delivery of British and American anti-tank missile systems and grenade launchers as evidence that Kyiv is preparing to attack Donetsk and Luhansk. This claim is misleading, however, as Ukraine has only received defensive weapons from the United Kingdom and United States.

Representatives of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic promptly responded to the appeal from United Russia. DPR head Denis Pushilin argued that Donetsk primarily requires air-defense systems from Russia to withstand attacks from Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles, which Ukraine has been buying from Turkey since 2019. Quoting sources from Ukrainian breakaway regions, Izvestia reported that separatists might request an R-330Zh jamming communication station (also known as a Zhitel), Osa-AKM anti-aircraft missile systems, and multiple BM-21 Grad-M rocket launchers from Russia. However, the volunteer-run monitoring website InformNapalm reported in 2020 that R-330Zh electronic warfare systems were already visible in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Andrei Gurulev, a member of Russia’s State Duma defense committee, told Interfax that Russia should also consider supplying mines to Donetsk and Luhansk to help prevent an invasion using armored vehicles. And Viktor Vodolatsky, deputy chairman of the State Duma committee on relations with neighbors, said that military aid would arrive within hours if President Vladimir Putin approved the decision to supply arms to Donetsk and Luhansk.

It appears the United Russia party did not hold consultations with other stakeholders before announcing its support for supplying weapons to Donetsk and Luhansk. Dmitry Kozak, Putin’s deputy chief of staff, argued that United Russia did not consult him before requesting the arms shipments, but he added that if other countries are arming Ukraine, then a logical question arises why Donetsk and Luhansk should not be supported.

Russia has covertly supplied weapons and military equipment to the separatist regions since 2014. Multiple organizations have spotted various types of Russian weapons in Donetsk and Luhansk.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw

Russian politician claims residents of Ukrainian separatist regions received Russian passports

On January 27, Vasily Golubev, governor of Russia’s Rostov region, told reporters that 720,000 people from the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics have received Russian passports. At the same time, Putin ordered the State Duma to consider providing an opportunity for Russian passport holders in the separatist regions to apply for public benefits through Russia’s state service system. Meanwhile, Vodolatsky claimed that residents of the Ukrainian breakaway regions could be drafted into Russia’s armed forces if they have registered themselves on Russian territory.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate, Kyiv

Russian narrative criticizes “insanity” of Western media

On January 31, RIA published a piece criticizing media organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom, saying their reporting doesn’t “intersect with reality,” and that “the media controlled by [Western] oligarchs are making a fuss about an aggressive Russia.” The article, written by Victoria Nikiforova, contended that the United States sees a Russia-Ukraine war as a “means of saving the American economy” by allowing the media and Pentagon contractors to expand their budgets. In addition, the piece criticized the United States for making energy deals with Europe. This is a continuation of a narrative that the cessation of conflict between Ukraine and Russia is disadvantageous for the United States.

Similar attacks on the quality and credibility of the Western media appeared on anonymous Telegram channels, some of which the Ukrainian Security Service previously identified as connected to Russia. The channels claim that Western journalists “imagine a mythical military invasion” and publish any “trash” without fact-checking. The Economist, the Washington Post, Reuters, Forbes, and the Guardian are among the ridiculed media. Previously, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pushed similar narratives suggesting “excitement” in Western media over Ukraine had “reached the stage of insanity.”

Elsewhere, multiple Russian media outlets amplified a narrative shared by the so-called People’s Police of the Luhansk People’s Republic that argued Ukraine is creating staged videos of a Russian attack. This comes two months after a Russian disinformation campaign used a staged video to allege that Ukraine’s border patrol forces were shooting refugees.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate, Kyiv

Report: Network of Twitter accounts could predict Russian military build-up

Coordinated networks of Twitter accounts are increasingly amplifying anti-Ukraine, anti-US, and anti-NATO disinformation and propaganda, according to a report from Mythos Labs, a platform focused on countering mis- and disinformation.

Using artificial intelligence software, Mythos Labs identified a network of 153 Twitter accounts, retweeting from a common set of seventeen source accounts, posting an exceptionally high volume of tweets related to Russian military aggression against Ukraine. Mythos Labs grouped the accounts based on the narratives they spread and found a cluster of fifty-eight accounts specifically spreading anti-US and anti-NATO narratives while promoting Russian interests.

According to the report, the activity of the Twitter network increased more than 3,300 percent in November 2021, when the accounts tweeted disinformation and propaganda targeting Ukraine an average of 213 times a day. By comparison, the accounts tweeted six times per day between January and October 2021.

Mythos Labs found a possible correlation between the increased Twitter activity and Russian military build-up. On two occasions, the networks ramped up their anti-Ukraine disinformation prior to Russian military build-ups. This suggests that these accounts “could predict a surge in troop levels two weeks in advance,” according to the report.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Kremlin-controlled media portrays China as Russia’s strongest ally

Pro-Kremlin outlet Lenta.ru interviewed Boris Yulin, a Russian war historian, who said that too much pressure on Moscow would leave China to face the United States alone. He argued that it benefits China to align with Russia, ensuring the two countries have a partner when taking on the United States.

Pyetr Akopov, an author for the Kremlin-owned RIA Novosti, wrote a similar opinion, republished on Sputnik Latvia. Akopov referenced Victoria Nuland, the US undersecretary of state for political affairs, urging China to use its influence with Russia to address Ukraine. In the piece, Akopov argued that Nuland “humiliated” herself with this request because Beijing supports Moscow’s security demands. He referred to an official statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which said, “To solve the Ukrainian issue, it is necessary to return to the starting point of the Minsk-2 agreement.” He also stated that the United States is as hostile towards China as it is to Russia.

Lastly, pro-Kremlin outlet Putin Today republished a translated opinion piece from Zhang Hong, a research fellow at the Institute of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Hong portrayed the Kremlin as patient and seeking to improve relationships with the United States, who, he argued, “kept the Cold War mentality” and is now “provoking a security crisis.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-controlled media exploit Hungary’s NATO statement

Multiple Kremlin-controlled media outlets spotlighted Hungarian Defense Minister Tibor Benke saying that Hungary does not need additional NATO troops since there is no immediate threat to its security. Benke made the statement on Hungary’s InfoRadio in response to a CNN report claiming that Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary are among the countries considering accepting NATO troop deployments.

Outlets like MK.ru, Life.ru, Izvestiya, Lenta, REN TV, Pravda.ru, and Vzglyad largely reported on Benke’s statement in a straightforward manner, while fringe pro-Kremlin outlet Russkaya Vesna published its coverage under the inflammatory headline, “Hungary pushed NATO back hard.”

Additionally, Kremlin-controlled media picked up on Benke saying that Hungary initially supported Ukraine’s admission into NATO but changed its opinion after Ukraine “did not provide the same rights to Hungarians living in the Transcarpathia region as Hungary provided to Ukrainians living in Hungary.” Benke was possibly referring to Ukrainian special forces searching the offices of Hungarian non-governmental organizations in Transcarpathia in 2020. Outlets like PolitEkspert and News Front emphasized Benke’s statement about Ukraine’s admission to NATO.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgia: Debate over Ukraine resolution intensifies

Discussion around the Georgian Dream party’s draft resolution over the Ukrainian crisis continues. The DFRLab previously reported that the resolution underwent harsh criticism for not mentioning Russian aggression. In an interview with Georgian Public Broadcasting, Giorgi Khelashvili, a party member and deputy chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, said Russia was not mentioned because Ukraine’s situation is extremely tense. He said the party did not want to create an “unnecessary provocation” that could worsen Russian aggression. This aligns with a comment from Mamuka Mdinaradze, one of the leaders of the party, who said that the resolution text avoided “populist and provocative rhetoric.”

A Sputnik Georgia article argued that the United States is a warmonger, and there is no Russian military presence in Ukraine. The author claimed that the United States is trying to destroy Ukraine’s economy by dragging it into military conflict. Another Georgian pro-Kremlin outlet, affiliated with the disinformation publisher News Front, furthered the narrative about Ukraine’s economy suffering by claiming “US fairy tales about a Russian invasion have cost the Ukrainian economy twelve billion dollars.” The article also blamed US media for spreading “fake” information to increase tensions along the Ukrainian border and frighten foreign investors.

—Sopo Gelava, DFRLab Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian Hybrid Threats Report: Will Moscow provide weapons and passports to breakaway Ukrainian regions? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Countering the growing Russian naval threat in the Black Sea region

Skyler Blake — Mon, 17 Jan 2022 14:53:23 +0000

A week of high-stakes talks between Russian and Western officials have failed to reduce the geopolitical tension in Eastern Europe, where Moscow has concentrated over 100,000 troops on the border with Ukraine and is threatening unspecified “military-technical measures” if its ultimatums on ending Ukrainian-NATO cooperation are not met.

While the Baltic Sea has received considerable attention from NATO strategic planners in recent years, the need for a cohesive NATO Black Sea Defense Strategy is now more evident than ever. As current unclassified intelligence suggests, Russian-occupied Crimea could be used as a military staging ground for the southern flank of a potential full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Growing Russian dominance in the Black Sea also raises the possibility of a naval blockade targeting merchant shipping or amphibious landings along Ukraine’s southern coastline in the region around Odesa.

Unfortunately, the current NATO strategy to deter Russian aggression in the Black Sea region is dangerously underdeveloped. The region’s three NATO member states Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey have so far been unable to establish a comprehensive Black Sea security strategy together with NATO partners Ukraine and Georgia to counter the challenges posed by Russia.

The kind of cooperation required for an effective NATO Black Sea Defense Strategy has so far proved elusive amid political differences between member states. While there is little prospect of progress in Ukraine and Georgia’s membership bids, these two NATO partner nations also have an important role to play in the alliance’s Black Sea strategy.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

An achievable first step towards a more coherent NATO position in the Black Sea would be greater Western assistance in rebuilding Ukrainian and Georgian maritime strength.

The 1936 Montreux Convention makes maintaining a consistent NATO Black Sea presence difficult, as Turkey retains control over the straits and places considerable constraints on the number, transit time, and tonnage of naval vessels. This enhances the potential role of Black Sea partners Ukraine and Georgia.

Ukraine lost the majority of its navy to the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, while much of Georgia’s navy was destroyed during the country’s 2008 conflict with Russia. Additional funding would enable Ukraine and Georgia to rebuild their naval capabilities according to NATO standards. This would result in more vessels permanently stationed in the Black Sea.

This is already happening to a degree, but efforts need to be expedited with regards to the current crisis. The West, however, should be wary of supplying Ukraine and Georgia with corvette-class ships, as larger vessels are expensive to operate. They are also more vulnerable to Russia’s superior naval strength, while the shallow water ports of Odesa and Mykolaiv do not provide suitable infrastructure.

With this in mind, the West should continue assisting Ukraine in the assembly of a fleet capable of carrying out its mosquito defense strategy. This should include small, inexpensive patrol boats, amphibious boats capable of landing infantry, and missile attack vessels capable of preventing Russian troop landings.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

In the event of a major military escalation by Moscow, the NATO goal in the Black Sea would be to adopt an effective “sea denial” strategy. This strategy would entail a force that is capable of at least limiting Russian freedom of navigation in illegally occupied areas. To achieve this presence, NATO could further merge military exercises with its partners Ukraine and Georgia.

At this point, Romania is by far the most enthusiastic supporter of a greater alliance presence in the region and, after signing a 10-year cooperation agreement with the US, can be considered a stable anchor for NATO in the Black Sea.

The NATO maritime presence in the Black Sea has been steadily decreasing after the initial years of Russian aggression against Ukraine. In February 2017, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pledged to increase the NATO presence in the region, but progress has been suboptimal.

The Romanian, Ukrainian and Georgian navies could contribute to the establishment of a permanent Black Sea presence in line with the Montreux Convention, with significantly increased size, scale, and sophistication of their current exercises. It is imperative that a unified land, air, and sea defense strategy should not be excluded. NATO in this area could attempt to replicate the contemporary strategy for the Baltic Sea in the Black Sea.

Ukraine holds a regular Black Sea exercise with NATO known as Sea Breeze, as well as the Rapid Trident land exercise and several others. Georgia hosts the Noble Partner army exercise, while the US and Romania jointly organize Saber Guardian. Ben Hodges of the Center for European Policy Analysis has suggested that these should not be isolated exercises, but instead should be linked together as a show of unified Black Sea regional defense.

Western planners must remember that Russia respects strength above all else. The fact that there is currently no unified policy within NATO on Black Sea security is a major weakness. Internal differences within the alliance present Russia with opportunities at a highly inopportune moment in relations with the Kremlin.

Many in NATO are currently looking for ways to re-engage with Russia by combining deterrence with dialogue. A clear and coherent strategy in the Black Sea would project the kind of strength that Moscow understands and respects.

Skyler Blake is a Research Assistant Intern at the New Europe Center in Kyiv.

For thirty years, Russia has been imposing its will throughout the post-Soviet world while openly obstructing progress. Nevertheless, Moscow is still afforded what amounts to an unofficial veto over the EU and NATO membership aspirations of neighboring countries.

Today’s talk of a potential future response ignores the fact that Russia has already annexed Crimea and is waging an ongoing war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. This hands the initiative over to the Kremlin and risks rewarding Russia for choosing not to escalate its eight-year war against Ukraine.

By overlooking Russia’s long list of international crimes and restricting itself to promises of future penalties, the West inadvertently lends credibility to Kremlin claims that Ukraine is somehow not entirely sovereign. The same twisted logic also applies Georgia, another independent country that has been partially occupied by Putin and has become the target of Kremlin attempts to unilaterally impose a Russian veto on its foreign policy.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Putin’s apparent indifference towards Western warnings is understandable. He has been hearing the same empty promises of decisive action, typically accompanied by expressions of grave concern, ever since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.

This did not prevent Moscow from occupying and then formally recognizing the independence of Georgian regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Likewise, firmly worded Western statements of condemnation did not deter Putin from seizing and annexing Crimea. Nor have they succeeded in facilitating the withdrawal of Russian forces from eastern Ukraine or Moldova.

It is now clear that the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest was a watershed moment in terms of Moscow’s dysfunctional post-Soviet relationship with the West. When Russian pressure succeeded in preventing Georgia and Ukraine from receiving membership action plans from the military alliance, the Kremlin was encouraged to become far bolder in its foreign policy objectives.

We are currently witnessing the logical continuation of this historical process, with Russia’s ambitions now extending to all the countries of the former Warsaw Pact.

Putin’s recent list of security demands makes clear that he seeks to reassert Russian domination throughout the post-Soviet space. This will enhance Russia’s claims to superpower status while exposing the inability of the Western powers to keep their promises. Crucially, it will also allow Putin to safeguard his own political future.

Despite Putin’s frequent claims that the West poses a mounting military challenge to Russia, his actions are not motivated by fear of NATO forces moving closer to his country’s borders. Instead, Putin wishes to insulate Russia against successful examples of democratic transition. The emergence of Georgia as a stable and increasingly prosperous European democracy poses an intolerable threat to Putin’s authoritarian regime. The same is equally true of Ukraine.

Success is infectious and inspirational. Putin and his colleagues in the Kremlin are well aware that the successful democratization of post-Soviet countries like Georgia and Ukraine will serve as a powerful precedent for Russian society. This is their greatest fear and the driving force behind Russia’s aggressive foreign policy of recent decades.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia’s bold and belligerent conduct calls for immediate international action and not merely ambiguous talk of a “decisive response” at a later date. In other words, the Western world must match Putin’s boldness while also making good use of its overwhelming military and economic superiority.

In response to Russia’s demands for a veto over regional foreign policy decisions, NATO needs to act resolutely and open the door to membership for Georgia and Ukraine. This is exactly the kind of strength and decisiveness that Russia least expects and is most unable to answer.

For far too long, Moscow has assumed that it can literally get away with murder in neighboring countries. The West’s inadequate response to successive examples of Russian aggression has fueled this sense of impunity. As a result, we now find ourselves facing the very real prospect of the largest European conflict since World War II.

None of this was inevitable. Like all bullies, Putin retreats when confronted by genuine strength and advances only when he senses weakness. For years, his readiness to use force has enabled him to intimidate the international community and punch well above his geopolitical weight. However, in reality, modern Russia is no match for the democratic world. In order to cut Putin back down to size, all that is necessary is for Western actions to finally match Western words.

Tinatin Khidasheli is the Chair of Georgian think tank Civic IDEA. She previously served as Georgian Minister of Defense.

Coalson continued that “with the 20/20 hindsight of a century’s distance, 1922 emerges as a fateful year for the peoples of Russia and its neighborhood,” adding, “in terms of politics, foreign affairs and culture, events transpired and decisions were made that laid the rails for decades of institutionalized totalitarian oppression.”

Is 2022 shaping up to be a similarly fateful year? In addition to being cognizant of the symbolic power of anniversaries, with the West divided and distracted and the United States largely preoccupied with the threat from China, Putin also appears to see an opportunity at the moment to establish hegemony over some of the former Soviet space.

Russia has spent the past one-and-a-half years tightening its grip on Belarus by steadily expanding its economic, political, and military footprint there in a process I have called a “soft annexation,” meaning a slow, stealthy, and methodical operation that will be complete before most people even know it is happening.

And in addition to establishing hegemony over Belarus, the Putin regime has also turned it into a military platform to threaten Ukraine. As well as facing off against the more than 100,000 troops Russia has massed on its border, Kyiv is also confronted by a very real threat on its frontier with Belarus.

The Belarusian Defense Ministry announced on November 29 that it would conduct joint military exercises with Russia near the Ukrainian border in early 2022. Likewise, Belarusian autocrat Alyaksandr Lukashenka has declared that Minsk “will not stand aside” in Moscow’s confrontation with Kyiv, stating, “it is clear whose side Belarus will take.”

By turning Belarus into a de facto extension of Russia’s western military district, Putin has established a new front against Ukraine. In addition to being able to attack Ukraine in the east and southeast from Russia, and from the south via the annexed Crimean peninsula, Russia can now also threaten Kyiv in the north from Belarus.

And then there is Kazakhstan, where Belarusian forces recently joined a contingent of so-called Russian “peacekeepers” under the auspices of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to help put down an anti-government uprising.

The unrest appears to have been related to a power struggle between Kazakhstan’s current President Tokayev and his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbaev. The situation there remains fluid, but the upheaval and Moscow’s intervention appear to be a harbinger of greater Russian influence in the strategically vital Central Asian nation.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Signs that many in Moscow view 2022 as the new 1922 are also visible in public discourse, with several leading figures openly calling for Russian imperial expansion and a restoration, at least in some form, of the Soviet Union.

In a widely circulated article in November 2021, longtime Kremlin aide Vladislav Surkov argued that the cure for Russia’s domestic political troubles is imperial expansion.

“Social entropy is highly toxic. It is not recommended to work with it at our home. It needs to be taken out somewhere far away, exported for disposal in a foreign territory,” Surkov wrote, adding, “For Russia, constant expansion is not simply an idea but a genuine existential reality of our historical existence.”

Surkov concluded that in the coming years, “Russia will receive its share of new lands, as was the case in the era of the Third Rome or the Third International. Russia will expand not because it is good, and not because it is bad, but because it is physics.”

Likewise, in a televised interview in November, Russian film director Nikita Mikhalkov said, “the ideal Russia of the future” should be “the unification of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.”

Whether or not it is related to the centenary of the Soviet founding, the idea of imperial expansion is very much in the air and very mainstream in Moscow. Russia’s soft annexation of Belarus was the first successful step in the current process. But it won’t necessarily be the last.

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 Dec 2021 17:01:00 +0000

original source

The post Temnycky in Focus Ukraine: Democracy Summit Can Help Georgia and Ukraine with Their NATO Aspirations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Temnycky in the National Interest: Can Armenia and Azerbaijan Settle Their Differences at the Eastern Partnership Summit?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 13 Dec 2021 16:59:00 +0000

original source

The post Temnycky in the National Interest: Can Armenia and Azerbaijan Settle Their Differences at the Eastern Partnership Summit? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iranian war games on the border with Azerbaijan were really a message to Israel

Abbas Qaidari — Fri, 08 Oct 2021 10:18:16 +0000

In recent years, Iranian politicians have viewed neighboring Azerbaijan as Israel’s proxy, which may explain why Iran named its most extensive ground military exercise in recent years on the Iranian-Azeri border, “Khyber Conquerors.”

Khyber refers to the door of an ancient Jewish fortress on the Arabian Peninsula that was conquered by Imam Ali, the first Shia Imam. Therefore, from Iran’s point of view, Azerbaijan is today’s version of that same fortress and its door is the Zangezur corridor—proposed by Azerbaijan to connect the rest of the country with its Nakhchivan enclave via Armenia’s southern Syunik region. According to Iranian hardliners, the crossing could be a gateway for Israel and NATO’s direct entry into the Caucasus and, therefore, would violate Armenia’s territorial integrity and also threaten Iran.

The 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which led to Baku’s recapturing of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave from Yerevan, had significant consequences for Tehran. Contrary to expectations, during the war, Iran provided political and military support to Azerbaijan—due to Iran’s sizeable Azeri minority population, which includes the country’s Supreme Leader—and not to Armenia, despite Iran long being geopolitically aligned with Yerevan. This was in part because Iran recognized Baku’s military superiority over Armenia. Nevertheless, a year after a ceasefire was declared, defense, security, and geopolitical developments in the region have evolved in a way that has angered Tehran.

The October 1 Khyber military exercises by the Iranian armed forces on the seven hundred-kilometer northwestern border with Azerbaijan have only added to tensions. The story began when Baku imposed a “road tax” and detained two Iranian truck drivers entering the Nagorno-Karabakh region—a path truck drivers must take to transport fuel and goods to Armenia.

The war games were allegedly prompted after comments made by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to the Turkish Anadolu Agency on September 28. During the interview, Aliyev accused Iran of violating Azerbaijan’s sovereignty by hiding the identity of the Iranian trucks heading to Armenia. To substantiate his claims, Aliyev cited satellite, drone, and ground imagery of what he called “illegal” Iranian actions. This interview came as Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey conducted military exercises on September 12 in Baku.

Upon news of the Iranian military maneuvers on its border, the first since the fall of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev said: “Every country can carry out any military drill on its own territory. It’s their sovereign right. But why now, and why on our border?”

The military exercises

Initially, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) ground forces conducted a tactical practice on the border by sending hundreds of combat battalions, including infantry, rocket artillery, and armored and electronic warfare units. The ground forces deployed in less than forty-eight hours, which is surprising given that they arrived from numerous provinces. It was also a highly unusual deployment since divisions and combat units are typically deployed from the same area as the military exercises. When the IRGC announced the end of the military drill, it left the combat battalions situated by the border area in a state of readiness.

Iran’s campaign sent a fiery message to Azerbaijan on the first anniversary of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. It was also extraordinary because the drill didn’t appear to be of the traditional sort held to test new equipment. Contrary to official military statements, Iran did not need to send large armored, mechanized, and infantry units to the region. Moreover, unlike when these forces were sent, there is no news of the return of combat battalions to the provinces where they belong. Therefore, it can be concluded that the real goal was to deploy the military force needed for a possible armed conflict under the guise of a military drill.

Tehran’s main concern with Azerbaijan is the increasing military capabilities provided by its patrons Israel and Turkey. This is changing the geostrategic balance to Iran’s detriment. Tehran is also worried that if Azerbaijan succeeds in imposing the Zangzur corridor on the Armenian government, Baku could easily connect to Turkey, Israel, and the European Union by land, thus, excluding Iran from its transit equations. Iran sees this as further expanding the presence of Israel and NATO on its borders and undermining Iran’s relations with Armenia.

On September 30, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian told Azerbaijan’s new ambassador to Tehran that Iran had a right to hold war games on the border, adding, “We do not tolerate the presence and activity against our national security of the Zionist regime next to our borders and will take any necessary action in this regard.” Sabotage attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the assassination of its nuclear scientists—including most recently Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020—have widely been attributed to Israel. Azerbaijan denied the allegations.

Similar comments were made by the commander of the Iranian army’s ground forces, General Kioumars Heidari. “Since the arrival of this regime, our sensitivity to this border has increased and their activities here are fully under our observation,” said Heydari, in reference to Israel. He also noted that Iran was concerned about “terrorist forces that came to the region from Syria,” an apparent reference to reports that Turkey recruited jihadists to help Baku in Nagorno-Karabakh. Heydari claimed that Iran was uncertain whether these groups had left the Caucasus.

On October 5, Azerbaijan reportedly closed a mosque and office in Baku linked to Iran’s Supreme Leader.

Why Iran is worried

The high self-confidence of Azerbaijani authorities today, the coldness of Tehran-Yerevan ties due to Iran’s support of Baku during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the growing influence of Turkey and Israel in the Caucasus have made Iranian officials concerned about the possibility of a limited conflict in the region that would drag northwestern Iran into sectarian warfare—possibly over the severance of Armenia’s land connection with Iran. Nevertheless, this situation results from Iran’s lack of a clear and planned defense policy in border areas such as the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.

It is unclear to what extent the new Ebrahim Raisi government and Supreme National Security Council can formulate a clear defense and security policy in the face of the security challenge with Azerbaijan. However, what is clear is the possibility of an aggressive defense and foreign policy given that tensions in the Middle East and the Caucasus are much higher than last year. Despite there being a new prime minister in Israel, its security policy toward Iran has not changed. The destruction of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure due to alleged covert Israeli actions has increased the risk of Iranian retaliation against Israeli citizens and its interests in the Middle East. This would certainly explain why Iranian officials are constantly talking about their intention to repel the Israeli threat in the Caucasus region.

Abbas Qaidari is a researcher on international security and defense policy. Follow him on Twitter: @AbbasQaidari.

IranSource Nov 9, 2020

Nagorno-Karabakh: An unexpected conflict that tests and perplexes Iran

By Borzou Daragahi

More likely than not, a resurrection of a decades-old war on Iran’s sleepy northern border between two countries friendly to Iran was not high on the agenda of imminent threats—if on the list at all.

Iran Middle East

IranSource Jan 4, 2021

Iran’s railway ambitions go beyond Afghanistan

By Maysam Bizaer

The first railway between Iran and Afghanistan was launched in December 2020. The project represents a major step toward increasing Afghan-Iran trade and opening landlocked Afghanistan to the rest of the world through the Iranian port of Chabahar.

Iran Middle East

IranSource Aug 2, 2021

The ‘Balkanization’ of Iran is a fantasy. Here’s why.

By Raz Zimmt

Despite the profound differences between the various ethnic groups, Iran has existed as a separate political and cultural entity with a unique national identity for centuries, unlike most Arab nation-states, whose borders were shaped by Western powers after World War I.

Iran Middle East

The post Iranian war games on the border with Azerbaijan were really a message to Israel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Saakashvili arrest overshadows Georgian ruling party’s election win

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 05 Oct 2021 14:58:19 +0000

Georgia’s ruling party Georgian Dream secured a convincing victory in October 2 local elections that were widely seen as a referendum on the current authorities. However, the imprisonment of returning former president Mikheil Saakashvili on the eve of the vote leaves little realistic chance of an end to the political tensions that have plagued the country in recent years.

According to an EU-brokered agreement reached in April 2021 that aimed to resolve Georgia’s long-running political crisis, early parliamentary elections would be called for 2022 if Georgian Dream failed to secure at least 43% of the vote in Saturday’s local elections. Based on preliminary results from the country’s Central Election Commission, Georgian Dream comfortably passed this threshold with 46.7% of votes.

The election itself was somewhat overshadowed by the headline-grabbing arrest of Georgia’s ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili, who unexpectedly appeared in Tbilisi on October 1 following a seven-year exile from the country he had previously led for two presidential terms until 2013. Saakashvili was handed a six-year jail sentence during his absence on charges including abuse of office that he says are politically motivated.

Saakashvili’s incarceration has sparked international concern and looks set to deepen domestic divides within Georgian society as the country braces for a series of second round run-off votes in major cities including Tbilisi. The former president remains defiant and has called on supporters to mobilize ahead of coming run-off ballots, while the authorities have rejected calls for his release.

What are the implications of Georgian Dream’s election success and Saakashvili’s imprisonment?

John Herbst, Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council: Not surprisingly, Georgia missed an opportunity last weekend to restore confidence in the country’s devotion to democracy. For years, the intense competition for influence between Georgian Dream and its principal opponents has not always included due respect for democratic norms. Sadly, the conduct of this weekend’s local elections continued this trend.

The verdict of the OSCE/ODIHR team was clear but nuanced. While not claiming the vote was invalid, it noted numerous flaws such as “widespread and consistent allegations of intimidation, vote-buying, pressure on candidates and voters, and an unlevel playing field.” And while noting that “the legal framework is generally conducive to democratic elections and preparations for the elections were transparent and professionally managed,” it complained about “intimidation and violence against journalists” and “significant imbalance in resources, insufficient oversight of campaign finances and an undue advantage of incumbency.”

While recognizing the “orderly and transparent” conduct of the elections, the OSCE/ODIHR team also pointed to abuses such as “groups of individuals potentially influencing voters outside some polling stations.” Claims of fraud were made by Georgian Dream, UNM, and other parties. In short, another messy but not undemocratic outcome.

Matters were made messier by Mikheil Saakashvili’s joining the drama just before the vote. His return to Georgia and arrest on the eve of the election served only to heighten the polarization of Georgia’s political class. Whatever charges the government has against former president Saakashvili, his arrest is not a good look for Georgian democracy, particularly after the arrest of UNM leader Nika Melia in February. The Georgian government made the wise move to release Melia in May. This is a useful precedent.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Daniel Fried, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council: It could have been worse. Georgia’s local elections were marred by various irregularities and an uneven playing field, according to the preliminary (and usually accurate) assessment of the OSCE’s election observer mission. But these were contested elections and in that sense real elections, not the mockery of elections that Russia experienced in September.

The ruling Georgian Dream Party did well, with early indications of 46-49 percent of the vote, more than the 43 percent threshold that would have triggered early parliamentary elections under an agreement brokered by the EU (and supported by the US) earlier this year. The opposition United National Movement, former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s party, did well enough to force run-off elections in Tbilisi, Batumi, Rustavi, and some other Georgian cities.

Still, it’s hard to be much cheered. Georgian politics remains both polarized and personalized. The elections were overshadowed by Saakashvili’s sudden return to Georgia and his prompt arrest. Arresting former presidents is generally not a good thing for democracy. To defend itself, the Georgian government may point to the conviction and prison sentence handed out in France to former President Sarkozy. But the result may be to further inflame Georgian politics.

The government could now take its win and try to lower the temperature. It could seek to regain ground lost earlier this year due to a series of confrontational steps including the seeming defense of beatings of LGBTQ activists and spats with the EU that have damaged Georgia’s standing with its friends in Europe and the US. Maybe the Georgian government could try delivering for Georgian society, as Saakashvili did in his better days as president, and not focus on confrontation and harassment of the opposition, a baleful trend that has marked too much of Georgian politics in recent years.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Miriam Kosmehl, Senior Expert Eastern Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany: The exiled former president’s return causes even more tension in an already worrying political stand-off that has long plagued Georgia. Any hopes of calming the political situation seem to have been dashed for the time being.

The EU-brokered deal holding out the prospect of early parliamentary elections if the Georgian Dream share of the vote in the local poll fell below 43% helped ensure that Saturday’s vote was particularly highly charged. Saakashvili, who had toyed with the idea of returning to Georgia for many years, irresponsibly jumped at the opportunity and seems to have prevented the country from entering calmer waters following Georgian Dream’s election victory.

Saakashvili’s staged return and arrest will likely fuel the protest mood, especially as he has declared a hunger strike. With more tension and new protests set to dominate the political agenda in the country, there is a danger of further destabilization. This does not bode well for the weeks to come when there will be a number of second round run-off votes in key cities including the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, which is home to around one-third of the population.

I fear that Georgia will remain divided, with Saakashvili playing an active role in contributing to this split. The power struggle with billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, the man behind the ruling party, will take center stage. Meanwhile, the most serious issues facing the country will remain tragically unattended, such as the Covid crisis, unemployment, and poverty. With political drama set to dominate, these topics will be pushed into the background.

We can also expect international ramifications. Saakashvili’s Ukrainian citizenship and his ties to figures within the Ukrainian establishment mean that his imprisonment will inevitably place a strain on the strategic partnership between Georgia and Ukraine, whether this is intentional or not.

Terrell Jermaine Starr, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: The opposition performed fairly well in Saturday’s local elections, given the well-documented and reported violations allegedly perpetrated by Georgian Dream. Their game plan of focusing on winning the biggest, self-governing cities in the country has worked so far. Around ten key mayoral races including Tbilisi will go into a second round. That is the biggest success for the opposition. Where they must improve is in their efforts to unite around local issues that voters care about. They must also figure out a way to work around alleged violations (including the use of state resources and intimidation of voters) to win future elections, namely parliamentary elections.

While the second round city elections are between UNM and Georgian Dream, the parties who placed lower have power, too. They can rally support behind either remaining candidate. What that process will look like is still in motion, so there is much work to do before the run-off votes take place on October 30.

The wild card in this whole thing is the arrival of Mikheil Saakashvili, who had promised for years to return to Georgia but never did. Given how polarizing the ex-president is, it remains too early to determine whether his presence in a Georgian prison is more beneficial for the opposition or Georgian Dream. Speaking in Tbilisi, one Georgian Dream official assured me that if this becomes a battle between Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili and Mikheil Saakashvili, the ruling party expects to win every time. Meanwhile, a UNM party member told me she is confident Saakashvili’s presence in Georgia will galvanize support for the opposition.

We’ll see. Georgian Dream won overall, so they should be happy. At the same time, current polls show support for Georgian Dream at around 30 percent, a very horrible number for a party that has been in charge since 2012. If I were advising them, I’d warn the leadership not to rest on their laurels or feel too confident. During my recent time in the country, most Georgians I spoke with had little faith in Georgian Dream because of their handling of the pandemic and the poor economy. They may have won last weekend’s vote, but the real question is whether the coming second round elections will hand the ruling party a defeat that could start to unravel their hold on power.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

James F. Jeffrey: Absent US support, Turkey’s position in Syria is under threat

Matthew J. Bryza: Putin’s orbit play: Push from NATO, pull toward Moscow

Julia Friedlander: A frank reminder: “There’s no winning here”

Putin’s balancing act continues

The Putin-Erdoğan meeting in Sochi did not resolve Russian-Turkish differences over Syria, but did seem to prevent them from getting any worse. For Putin, relations with Erdoğan have long amounted to a balancing act between opposing Turkish moves that threaten Russian interests in Syria, Libya, the Armenia-Azerbaijan arena, and Ukraine on the one hand and avoiding inducing Erdoğan to reverse his hostility toward America and Europe (which Putin wants to encourage) on the other.

Instead, this meeting seemed to indicate that Putin now sees the process of deteriorating relations between Ankara and the West as having progressed to such an extent that Moscow no longer needs to make any significant concessions to Turkey in Syria or elsewhere. Indeed, Erdoğan’s determination to purchase more Russian S-400s—and perhaps other Russian weapons systems, despite the likely application of US sanctions as a result—has reduced Putin’s need to accommodate Turkish interests in Syria.

Now, the danger for Putin is that he might become overconfident in his belief that Erdoğan needs him more than he needs Erdoğan. After all, Erdoğan is capable of harming Russian interests despite his estrangement from the West. Two recent factors of Erdoğan doing so were Ankara’s support for the official government in Libya against the Russian-backed forces of General Khalifa Haftar, and its support for Azerbaijan in that country’s war against Armenia. Stoking Erdoğan’s ego by meeting him—when Biden would not at this month’s UN General Assembly—is definitely worthwhile for Putin.

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a professor of government and politics at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government.

Absent US support, Turkey’s position in Syria is under threat

The September 29 Sochi meeting between presidents Erdoğan and Putin is the latest in a series of bilateral meetings particularly focused on Syria. The key issue was the northwest Syrian enclave of Idlib, home to more than three million Syrians fleeing President Bashar al-Assad, Syrian opposition forces, the terrorist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Turkish forces, all sharing the goal of keeping Assad’s forces out. There has been, apart from a breakdown in 2020, a ceasefire in Idlib since mid-2018, the centerpiece of the freezing of the Syrian conflict since then. But Turkish leaders made clear they feared this Sochi meeting would be different, with Russia pushing for either a Turkish and opposition withdrawal from southern Idlib, or a new Russian-supported Assad offensive.

The two sides’ bland post-meeting comments do not document anything so dramatic, but what was new in this meeting is the role of the United States. The Idlib ceasefire resulted from US diplomacy supporting Turkey’s and Israel’s military actions in Syria, and keeping US troops there, to pressure Russia and Assad for a comprehensive compromise settlement of the conflict. But the Biden administration, while supposedly still “reviewing” Syria policy, prioritizes a minimalist approach focused on fighting the Islamic State and humanitarian assistance. Russia appears to have a green light, as seen with the collapse of another ceasefire in Dara’a in the southwest, to pursue its goals no longer restrained by Washington. The next weeks could see dramatic change in Syria—and not for the better.

—James F. Jeffrey is chair of the Wilson Center’s Middle East Program. Previously he has served as US Ambassador to Turkey, US special representative for Syria engagement, and special envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

Putin’s orbit play: Push from NATO, pull toward Moscow

The September 29 meeting between Erdoğan and Putin occurred amidst significant tension between Turkey and Russia on several security matters. In Syria’s Idlib province, Turkish drone and artillery strikes brought Russian- and Assad-regime troops to a standstill in March 2020, and then did the same in Libya two months later. Moscow and Damascus may now be planning to resume their offensive, which could generate new flows of refugees toward Turkey, where four million refugees, mostly Syrian, have already found shelter. Meanwhile, Moscow has been expressing dismay with Ankara’s growing cooperation with Ukraine on military technologies.

Putin and Erdoğan avoided public comment on these differences in Sochi, highlighting economic cooperation instead. Putin announced that bilateral trade between Russia and Turkey had increased 55 percent during the first nine months of 2021. He also underscored the reliability of Russian natural-gas shipments to Turkey. Erdoğan, meanwhile, hailed next year’s opening of a Russian-built nuclear-power plant in Turkey.

Underlying this economic cooperation, of course, is Putin’s desire to drive a strategic wedge between Turkey and its NATO Allies, especially the United States, as evidenced by Moscow’s sale of S-400 surface-to-air systems to Ankara.

But Turkey can only drift so far, relying heavily on NATO to deter aggression by the country against which it has fought more wars than any other country dating back to the Ottoman Empire.

Still, the announcement in Sochi that Russia and Turkey will collaborate in developing submarine and jet-engine technologies is significant, especially for Black Sea security. Whether Erdoğan views this new area of military technological cooperation with Russia as a means to balance Turkey’s similar collaboration with Ukraine or whether it marks a more significant shift in Ankara’s strategic calculus remains to be seen.

—Matthew J. Bryza is a nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council’s IN TURKEY program, the Global Energy Center, and Eurasia Center. He is also a former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and former deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia.

A frank reminder: “There’s no winning here”

The threat of congressionally mandated sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act failed to deter Erdoğan from procuring S-400 systems for two main reasons. The first was the disconnect between congressional policy, which sought to deter the purchase and then punish the sale, and the Trump administration’s botched efforts to cajole Ankara to reconsider the move by making side deals. The chest thumping of the Hill stood in stark contrast to Trump’s freeform rejection of sanctions he thought were designed to box him in (primarily on Russia). His message to Erdoğan was not to mind all that. And in the middle stood everyone else, trying to avoid sanctions against a NATO Ally but fully cognizant what the S-400 meant for the F-35 program.

The second is a more academic and frank question about whether financial sanctions writ large can deter a military sale of such strategic importance to the buyer, who faces an unstable Syria, a strengthened Assad, and an unfettered Iran—to a large extent at the hands of the United States. Short of sanctioning Erdoğan himself, congressional policymakers have not internalized the limits of financial-asset freezeson an autocracy determined to test Washington’s ire.

The current US administration’s warning that further acquisition of Russian materiel would trigger sanctions shows Washington’s hands as tied: It’s not good policy, but we’ll do it anyway for lack of alternative. Carefully crafted export-control restrictions limit Turkey’s access to select equipment and protect US and European military and intelligence equities but make Russian contracts even more appealing. Further limiting Turkey’s access to US dollars via swap lines or other measures makes Ankara further dependent on the Gulf countries. There is no winning here.

—Julia Friedlander is the C. Boyden Gray senior fellow and deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Expert react: What the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan means for Turkey

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has changed the regional landscape. For Turkey, a NATO member that has made significant contributions to the mission in Afghanistan, here’s what that will mean, straight from our experts.

Afghanistan Conflict

TURKEYSource Aug 27, 2021

What Afghanistan’s fall means for the future of NATO and Turkey

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Former Turkish Ambassador Alper Coşkun joins the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY to discuss the implications of recent developments in Afghanistan to the NATO alliance and the future of Turkey’s foreign policy and engagement with Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Conflict

TURKEYSource Jul 1, 2021

Can energy be the key to Turkish-US relations in the Biden era?

By Eser Özdil

In spite of ups and downs in the political relationship, the United States and Turkey have always shared mutual interests on energy including through the Southern Gas Corridor and emerging LNG trade. Shared priorities on developing renewables and cooperation to strengthen the energy security of Eastern Europe are now emerging areas of cooperation.

Climate Change & Climate Action Economy & Business

The post Experts react: The key takeaways from the Erdoğan-Putin meeting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Putin’s green light

Peter Dickinson — Sat, 07 Aug 2021 20:08:33 +0000

On August 8, 2008, Russian forces began the invasion of Georgia, marking the start of Europe’s first twenty-first century war. The conflict itself was over within a matter of days, but the repercussions of the Russo-Georgian War continue to reverberate thirteen years on, shaping the wider geopolitical environment.

The international reaction to Russia’s military campaign in Georgia was to prove remarkably muted, with Moscow suffering few negative consequences. On the contrary, EU leaders led calls for a ceasefire that appeared to favor Russian interests, while the US under the new Obama administration was soon calling for a reset in relations with the Kremlin.

Understandably, many in Moscow interpreted this accommodating approach as an informal invitation for further acts of aggression in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Six years after the Russo-Georgian War, Russia embarked on a far more comprehensive military campaign against Ukraine, where Moscow continues to occupy Crimea and large swathes of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

The 2008 Russo-Georgian War is now widely recognized as a landmark event in the transition from the era of post-Soviet cooperation between Russia and the West towards today’s Cold War climate. The Atlantic Council invited a range of experts to share their views on the legacy of the conflict and its impact on the international security environment.

John Herbst, Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council: Thirteen years ago, Europe experienced major power aggression for the first time since Hitler’s defeat in 1945. Russian troops attacked and defeated Georgian forces in a short war that Moscow and its proxies in South Ossetia provoked. The reaction of the West was slow and weak. French President Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated ceasefire terms that Moscow largely violated without consequence. The Kremlin learned that the West preferred to ignore or at least minimize Russian bad behavior in the so-called Near Abroad.

Moscow applies this lesson in Georgia today as it regularly moves the demarcation line between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia a few meters further into the country. Russia also applied the lessons of 2008 in Crimea and Donbas. It took the West some time, and the July 2014 shooting down of the MH17 passenger airliner, to impose serious sanctions on Moscow for its aggression in Ukraine.

If US President Joe Biden would like to demonstrate the fresh resolve in dealing with Moscow that he promised as a candidate, he should announce contingency sanctions that the US will apply the next time Moscow “adjusts” that internal demarcation line in Georgia.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Matthew Bryza, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: The weak international response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia greenlighted Russia’s subsequent military assault on Ukraine.

Many senior officials of transatlantic governments with whom I worked to mediate the conflicts over Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia condemned Russia’s invasion, but also blamed then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili for provoking Vladimir Putin.

Hence, the ceasefire agreement brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy was one-sided in favor of Moscow, while the subsequent EU report about the five-day war (incorrectly) blamed Georgia for firing the first shots. Later in 2008, Paris announced plans to sell Russia a Mistral-class helicopter carrier, prompting a Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff to declare how much easier it would have been to defeat Georgia with the ship already in Russia’s arsenal.

But neither did Washington do much to deter future Russian military aggression in the Black Sea region. Days after the ceasefire in Georgia, the Bush administration rejected Tbilisi’s request for anti-tank and air defense weapons. And a few months later, the new Obama administration awarded Moscow with its “Russia Reset” policy. Based on this reaction, Putin could only have concluded that the benefits of invading Ukraine would exceed the costs.

Alexander Vershbow, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council: Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia brought the West’s relations with Russia to their lowest point since the 1980s. Coming less than six months after NATO’s Bucharest Summit, which had declared that Georgia and Ukraine would be NATO members one day, the invasion was a direct challenge to both countries’ right to choose a Euro-Atlantic future.

The invasion of Georgia should have been a wake-up call to the international community, a clear signal that Western efforts since the fall of the Berlin Wall to integrate Russia in a collective security framework had failed. Yet a year later, the US and its allies decided to try again, to “reset” relations with Moscow, and to continue to treat Russia as a strategic partner rather than an adversary.

Only after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the launch of Moscow’s hybrid war in eastern Ukraine did the West finally acknowledge that Putin’s Russia had become a revisionist power seeking to reestablish its dominion over the eastern half of Europe. We can only speculate whether a firmer and more clear-eyed Western response in 2008 could have prevented the tragic events of 2014.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Daniel Fried, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council: Putin wanted the war. In the summer of 2008, he kept provoking then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili until, against US advice, Saakashvili gave the order for Georgian forces to push back Russian-controlled South Ossetian forces that were shelling Georgian villages. The Russian army, prepared and with its pretext in hand, crossed into Georgia in strength.

The Georgian army held out for two days, but on the third day its lines broke and it retreated toward Tbilisi. The Russians advanced but, with the Georgian army prepared to fight for the capital, stopped short. French President Nicolas Sarkozy then negotiated a flawed ceasefire. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice flew to France and Georgia with fighting still flaring, worked out corrections to the ceasefire, and obtained Saakashvili’s signature.

Putin wanted at a minimum to slap down Georgia, and at maximum to get rid of Saakashvili and put Georgia under de facto Kremlin control. Saakashvili, talented but mercurial, had rescued Georgia from the verge of becoming a failed state. Elected President in January 2004 after the first of the post-Soviet “color revolutions” the previous December, Saakashvili improved the economy, launched major reforms, and pushed hard for Georgia to advance toward eventual NATO membership. He also refused to accept Russian de facto control over two breakaway Georgian provinces, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and engaged in a shadow conflict there.

Putin wanted Saakashvili gone but Georgia did not collapse. The Bush administration in the US, with the help of then-Senator and Vice Presidential candidate Joe Biden, organized a financial rescue package. Saakashvili remained President of Georgia until voted out of office in 2012, and presided over a peaceful transfer of power.

The conflict provided a number of lessons. First, Putin was prepared to start a war in order to force a country that he regarded as within Russia’s sphere of influence to heel. Putin repeated this with Ukraine in 2014. Second, the US was not able to prevent the conflict (though it tried), but was able to prevent Putin from destroying Georgian sovereignty in the immediate aftermath. The US was able to do much the same for Ukraine: it could not reverse Russia’s immediate gains in Ukraine, but did help Ukraine prevent Putin from destroying Ukrainian sovereignty.

Thirdly, while Georgia successfully defended its sovereignty with US and European support, it did not use the time gained to strengthen the country from within. Saakashvili’s successor, the Georgian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, won election by capitalizing on Saakashvili’s shortcomings, but has neither continued Saakashvili’s most successful reforms nor launched his own. Georgia’s politics have drifted, with Russian influence slowly growing. Ukraine has done somewhat better maintaining, albeit unevenly, its own reforms, even though it remains under even greater threat of Russian aggression than Georgia.

The bottom line is this: Georgia, like Ukraine, fought to maintain its sovereignty. But it is unclear what they will do with the time that their patriots gained for them. The ultimate winner of the Russo-Georgian War is not yet clear.

Brian Whitmore, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: In 2008 Russia invaded Georgia, occupied 20 percent of its territory, and got away with it. As a result, today we are all Georgians, in the sense that we are all victims of various forms of Russian aggression emanating from an emboldened Kremlin. The August 2008 invasion of Georgia was a Beta test for future aggression against Russia’s neighbors and a dry run for the tactics and strategies that would later be deployed in the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

Another important lesson from the invasion of Georgia is that we need to pay close attention to what Russia does to its neighbors because this is often a harbinger of what Moscow will soon be doing to the West. When Russian forces attacked Georgia on the night of August 7-8, 2008, it was preceded by a cyberattack, a disinformation campaign, and an all-out effort to meddle in that country’s domestic politics. These are all tactics that are now very familiar to the United States and its allies. Thirteen years ago, a new era of Kremlin aggression began and it went unchecked. Today we are paying the price.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

By Atlantic Council

NATO Politics & Diplomacy

In the News Sep 3, 2020

Benitez quoted in The New York Times on allies’ fears of Trump- NATO exit

Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

In the News Oct 16, 2019

Benitez quoted in Yahoo Finance on NATO’s restrictions to punish Turkey

By Atlantic Council

NATO Security & Defense

Fellow

Jorge Benitez

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

The post Benitez in Stars and Stripes: Russian actions in Black Sea show ‘increasing aggression,’ says top US admiral in the region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Infrastructure cooperation could hold the key to Armenia’s future security

Ani Yeghiazaryan — Tue, 20 Jul 2021 19:58:36 +0000

As the South Caucasus looks to move on following last year’s Nagorno-Karabakh War, shared infrastructure projects could help foster greater regional stability and improve the chances for a sustainable peace. In particular, Armenia could benefit from participation in the ambitious Middle Corridor international railway infrastructure initiative, which envisages a transit route stretching from China to Europe via Turkey.

The almost 9,000 kilometer proposed route of the Middle Corridor includes stretches in Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is hoping to convince Beijing that the corridor can serve as one of the main routes for China’s One Belt, One Road drive. This would strengthen the Turkish position as a regional energy, trade, and economic hub while deepening the country’s ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia regions, which Ankara regards as areas of vital national interest.

According to Turkish officials, as well as potentially helping to establish Turkey as one of the world’s top ten economies, the Middle Corridor initiative could also significantly reduce transit time between China and European markets. The corridor offers the possibility of a 12-day freight time frame. This compares favorably to the 20-day travel time via Russia or more than 30 days via existing maritime options. The Middle Corridor would also benefit from modern infrastructure and relatively favorable terrain.

Turkey argues that the route has significant geopolitical advantages over alternative corridors passing through Russia and Iran, which both currently have tense relations with the Western world. Concerns exist that a future worsening of these ties could have a negative impact on the transit of freight through either country to the West. Erdogan also sees the Middle Corridor initiative as a way of promoting the delivery of Central Asian gas to Turkey and Europe.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Given the importance of the Middle Corridor initiative for Turkey, it is no surprise that Erdogan is interested in establishing a lasting peace in the South Caucasus region following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. This is vital for his ongoing efforts to persuade the Chinese that the South Caucasus is the most profitable transit route to Europe.

In order to strengthen his argument, Erdogan is reportedly now trying to initiate a new branch of the Middile Corridor in the South Caucasus. In addition to the envisaged Georgian Corridor, the Turkish leader seeks to add an alternative Armenian Corridor (Syunik Corridor), which would have transport and energy components. During a recent visit to Azerbaijan, Erdogan spoke about the need to create a Six-Country Regional Cooperation Platform featuring Armenia, Iran, Georgia, Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan. He also noted that tensions between Georgia and Russia are problematic.

The Turkish leader appears to be concerned over the potential for a serious crisis in Georgian-Russian relations and the threat this would pose to existing oil, gas, and rail infrastructure running through Georgia. This is one of the reasons why there is now active discussion over the need for an additional Armenian Corridor.

It is preferable for Turkey that any future railway and gas pipeline from China and Central Asia pass through south Armenia rather than the north of the country, despite the fact that the southern route is longer. This would help to integrate Azerbaijan’s isolated Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic into the infrastructure of the wider region, while also not requiring the full normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Armenian involvement in the Middle Corridor initiative would strengthen Turkish claims that the South Caucasus region is a reliable transit route. Prior to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Turkey had struggled to overcome Chinese concerns regarding the possibility of a fresh conflict in the South Caucasus. The post-war environment now creates opportunities to develop the Middle Corridor with renewed vigor.

Turkey’s geopolitical interest in the stability of the South Caucasus represents a trump card for Armenia as the country seeks stability and security after war. It creates the basis for pragmatic dialog with Turkey towards mutually benefitial cooperation.

The potential advantages for Armenia of participation in the Middle Corridor are considerable. It would generate welcome additional revenues for the country while also creating trade opportunities and helping with the diversification of energy supplies. Crucially, the corridor would also increase Armenia’s regional and geopolitical role while dramatically boosting interdependence between the countries of the region, thereby decreasing the likelihood of a return to open conflict.

This makes it hard to argue with recent Turkish statements that Armenia and the Armenian people will have the most to benefit from deeper international cooperation in the South Caucasus. International infrastructure initiatives such as the Middle Corridor and Persian Gulf–Black Sea International Transport and Transit Corridor offer Armenia a viable route towards greater security and prosperity.

Ani Yeghiazaryan is a doctoral candidate at the Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena, Germany.

Armenian voters offered false choice between security and democracy

Lusine Hakobyan — Sat, 19 Jun 2021 13:29:03 +0000

Armenians will go to the polls on June 20 in snap parliamentary elections that could have a decisive impact on the country’s geopolitical trajectory for the coming decade and beyond. Two recent events in Armenian history loom large over the election campaign: the country’s 2018 pro-democracy revolution, and defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The forces of Armenia’s old guard lost political power amid the country’s democratic awakening of 2018. With emotions still running high due to last year’s disastrous military reversals, they are now attempting to mount a comeback, and are seeking to position the upcoming vote as a straight choice between democracy and security.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

This Sunday’s vote comes during a dramatic phase in the democratization of Armenia. The process began with the tumultuous events of spring 2018, which saw a popular revolution bring an end to almost thirty years of post-Soviet authoritarian rule. The guiding principles of the 2018 uprising were sovereignty, democracy, and the rule of law.

While the revolution was a landmark event for Armenia, it did not transform the situation in the country overnight. The economy remains largely in the hands of a small group of power brokers, while most of the country’s strategic resources and infrastructure are still under Russian control.

Prior to 2018, successive previous Armenian administrations had enabled Russia to steadily expand its influence. In exchange, they were able to maintain their own grip on power, while also securing Russian pledges to prevent any escalations in the simmering conflict with Azerbaijan.

Anger over last year’s military defeat is now being exploited to argue that the democratic transition of 2018 fatally undermined Armenian security. As election day draws near, members of the country’s former political establishment are promoting the myth that Armenia cannot ensure its own security and arguing that only deeper integration with Russia can prevent further wars.

This narrative benefits from the old guard’s influence over much of Armenia’s mainstream media. Key messages include the idea that Russia was offended by Armenia’s democratic transition and therefore chose not to intervene decisively in last year’s fighting. Meanwhile, Armenia’s Western partners such as the European Union are accused of sitting on the sidelines during the conflict.

Closer ties with Moscow are being portrayed as entirely natural, with this implied retreat from Armenian independence justified by the claim that only Russia is capable of preventing the country from being overwhelmed by Turkey. The objective is to create the impression of a direct choice between security and democracy. In a nation still mourning last year’s losses and deeply uncertain of the country’s future, this is proving a powerful message.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Despite these efforts to weaponize the post-war climate for the purposes of counter-revolution, there is still considerable public support for the democratic changes ushered in three years ago. The current government has defiantly refused to reverse course, despite resignation demands from a range of authority figures in Armenian society including former presidents, members of the military, and religious leaders.

Many Armenians question the wisdom of trading sovereignty for Russian protection. There are also doubts over the kind of security Russia could actually provide. The current Russian military presence in Armenia failed to prevent the defeats of 2020. Meanwhile, if integration with Moscow deepens, few are enthusiastic about the prospect of Armenians being sent to fight in Russia’s many military campaigns in places like Ukraine and Syria.

Nor is everyone convinced that Armenia has no alternative options in the international arena. In recent months, there have been growing signs of support from the democratic world that bode well for the Armenian security environment. In particular, French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed his willingness to provide Armenia with military assistance.

Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden’s recent decision to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide was perceived as a highly significant event. This was not only a welcome step towards historical justice; it was also an indication that America stands with Armenia and is prepared to support the country on the global stage, even at risk of damaging relations with Turkey. Biden’s gesture resonated loudly in Yerevan.

The available polls ahead of Sunday’s vote lack credibility, but most observers expect the country’s pro-democracy forces to do well despite the traumatic backdrop to the current campaign. Many Armenians remain committed to the national course set in 2018 and reject the entire notion of a choice between democracy and security. On the contrary, they see the further democratization of the country as an essential step towards greater national security. This weekend’s election will provide an indication of whether this vision is shared by a majority of Armenians.

Lusine Hakobyan is a member of the board at the Alliance of Democracy Defenders For the Republic.

Murtazashvili: Democracy Denied—The False Promise of Afghanistan’s Constitutional Order

Atlantic Council — Wed, 05 May 2021 14:08:50 +0000

original source

The post Murtazashvili: Democracy Denied—The False Promise of Afghanistan’s Constitutional Order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig and Ashford discuss the global implications of Biden’s climate change agenda

Atlantic Council — Fri, 30 Apr 2021 14:07:06 +0000

original source

On April 30, Foreign Policy published its biweekly column featuring Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and New American Engagement Initiative senior fellow Emma Ashford discussing the latest news in international affairs.

In this column, they discuss the Biden administration’s approach to tackling climate change, Biden’s acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide, and the US response to India’s surge in Covid-19 cases.

People talk about climate change as an area for U.S.-China cooperation, but it is simply another zone of competition. Making progress on this issue will require coercing Beijing to stop building coal-fired power plants.

Matthew Kroenig

It’s more complicated than that. China is certainly a big offender. But so are many other states, including U.S. allies and partners. India announced last week that it will build a number of new coal-fired plants. Australia is the world’s biggest exporter of coal; the Australian prime minister wasn’t allowed to speak at this climate summit because the country refuses to set climate targets.

Emma Ashford

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

Former staff

Emma Ashford

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Economic Sanctions

The post Kroenig and Ashford discuss the global implications of Biden’s climate change agenda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Murtazashvili launches new report on Afghanistan’s constitutional order

Atlantic Council — Tue, 27 Apr 2021 14:08:00 +0000

original source

The post Murtazashvili launches new report on Afghanistan’s constitutional order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Starr in Foreign Policy: Georgian Democracy Stumbles Onward After Parliament Deal

Atlantic Council — Mon, 26 Apr 2021 19:39:28 +0000

original source

The post Starr in Foreign Policy: Georgian Democracy Stumbles Onward After Parliament Deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fighting for the hearts and minds of Sakartvelo: The Georgian information environment during the 2020 parliamentary election

Mon, 19 Apr 2021 20:11:00 +0000

In Georgia, foreign interference is an existential issue. The small post-Soviet democracy was invaded by Russia in 2008, continues to have occupied territories, and the varying degree to which its northern neighbor exerts influence and is received in Georgian domestic affairs remains a point of contention between the primary political factions in the country. The Georgian domestic information environment, however, is relatively resilient in the face of Russia’s efforts, as the country’s populace is well aware of the Kremlin’s influence attempts and holds some skepticism toward anything perceived as overtly pro-Russian. Domestic attempts to manipulate the information environment, however, have gained prominence and complicated Georgians’ access to fact-based, nonpartisan information.

The pre-election period in Georgia was characterized by a high degree of societal polarization, which was largely reflected in the country’s information environment. Domestic political actors undertook multiple inauthentic activities on Facebook to advance their political goals and mislead people. Beyond the domestic operations, the strategic public release of stolen documents ahead of elections by external actors was a new phenomenon for Georgia, as was the release generated widespread controversy and confusion. Georgian elections were also the target of Kremlin-led disruptions online whose primary objective was to instill a sense of vulnerability and demoralize Georgian voters.

Read the full report

Report launch

In conjunction with the report’s launch, the DFRLab hosted a panel discussion about the key trends of online influence operations in the lead up to 2020 Georgian parliamentary elections. Experts included authors Eto Buziashvili and Givi Gigitashvili and experts from the National Democratic Institute, European Values Center for Security Policy, and Voice of America. Opening remarks were provided by USAID for Georgia Mission Director Peter Wiebler. This conversation includes an overview of Georgians’ the national information environment and an examination of the interplay between recent foreign and domestic influence operations.

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

In partnership with:

The post Fighting for the hearts and minds of Sakartvelo: The Georgian information environment during the 2020 parliamentary election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Power Vertical Podcast: The Guns of April

Atlantic Council — Fri, 09 Apr 2021 18:26:12 +0000

original source

The post Power Vertical Podcast: The Guns of April appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Murtazashvili: The Endurance and Evolution of Afghan Customary Governance

Atlantic Council — Thu, 01 Apr 2021 14:10:00 +0000

original source

The post Murtazashvili: The Endurance and Evolution of Afghan Customary Governance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Power Vertical Podcast: The Georgian Front

Atlantic Council — Thu, 18 Mar 2021 15:03:00 +0000

original source

The post Power Vertical Podcast: The Georgian Front appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Shaffer in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Armenia’s nuclear power plant is dangerous. Time to close it.

jbekenstein — Fri, 05 Mar 2021 19:58:00 +0000

original source

The post Shaffer in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Armenia’s nuclear power plant is dangerous. Time to close it. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: What’s behind the crisis in Georgia?

Doug Klain and Shelby Magid — Wed, 24 Feb 2021 01:35:12 +0000

Georgia is once again in a political crisis.

On February 23, Georgian police broke into the offices of the United National Movement (UNM) opposition party to arrest UNM leader Nika Melia on what his team says are politically motivated charges. Melia was arrested shortly after former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Garibashvili assumed the office of prime minister—after his predecessor, Giorgi Gahkaria, resigned over plans to arrest Melia. After protests broke out over the arrest, Garibashvili issued a statement proposing that “all reasonable opposition forces enter parliament so that we may use the country’s legislature as the main platform for discussion.”

Melia’s arrest is the latest in a series of political disputes in Tbilisi, stemming from last fall’s parliamentary elections. International observers called the elections flawed but ultimately legitimate. Many opposition groups, including UNM, rejected the results as fraudulent and have refused to take their seats in parliament despite the urging of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) that they take their seats in the Georgian parliament.

Below, experts react to this week’s news and what it means for Georgia’s future:

Georgia needs de-escalation from all parties

Over the past 18 years, Georgia has emerged as a raucous democracy that at times appears to tilt back in an authoritarian direction. That tilt has been more prominent at times in the past few years. Last year, Georgian Dream and the United National Movement reached an important compromise on election reform for the parliamentary elections. While competent international observers called those elections flawed, but not irreparably so, UNM unfortunately chose not to accept their legitimacy. Today the Georgian government chose to arrest UNM leader Nika Melia on charges dating back to the controversial events surrounding the riots that broke out when Russian parliamentarians addressed the Georgian parliament two years ago. While Georgian authorities claim that the arrest was a matter of simple justice, it looks much more like political payback. It is surprising that they took this step, particularly after Prime Minister Gakharia stepped down rather than preside over Melia’s arrest. The Georgian government should release Melia immediately and seek democratic means to manage its political competition with UNM. Georgia’s NATO and EU aspirations are worthy of support since it is a democratic state. But if it slides back into authoritarianism, the case for Georgia is much-diminished.

Ambassador John Herbst, director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

The West’s task is to de-escalate the crisis

The arrest of Nika Melia makes an already tense political environment worse, but on its own is not a dramatic change in Georgia’s political situation. This arrest, but equally importantly the boycott of Parliament by political parties after losing a flawed but reasonably legitimate election, is part of the larger context of democracy in Georgia being stalled for several years now.

It is immediately clear what the US can do. The arrest of Melia is ultimately a reasonable and defendable, if not exactly wise, move by the government. Additionally, the West has weakened its position by seemingly never recognizing the reality of criminality around some in the United National Movement. Both sides in Georgia, as well as Western powers like the US, should focus not on proving they are right—whatever that means—but on finding ways to de-escalate.

Lincoln Mitchell, adjunct research scholar at Columbia University

Stay up-to-date with events, news, and publications for all of Eurasia with the Eurasia Center’s weekly newsletter.

Georgia’s democracy is at stake

Georgia’s freedom and democracy are at stake today. The country is choosing between democratic values and rule of law on the one side and authoritarianism and unfreedom on the other. Georgians made their choice for democracy and a Euro-Atlantic future a long time ago. For this reason, ordinary citizens were defending the leader of the opposition at his office. They understand that building strong and independent institutions is the only right path for the country. The people’s choice is under threat, regrettably, because of a ruling party that does not demonstrate the will to resolve the crisis and harms the country’s reputation. Due to political persecutions, an assault on independent media, and backsliding on democracy, Georgia’s membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions will be put in question—and it will be the interests and future of the Georgian people that will suffer.

Eto Buziashvili, Caucasus research associate at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab

Georgian Dream wants closer ties with Russia—this is the next step

Georgia is ruled not by the president or prime minister, but by Georgian Dream party chairman Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire businessman who lives in an imposing compound above Tbilisi. Georgian Dream’s electoral success in recent years has gone hand-in-hand with a crackdown on dissent. Nika Melia became a prime target after he led the “Gavrilov night” protests in 2019 to protest against the visit of a Russian MP, Sergei Gavrilov, who was invited to speak to Georgia’s parliament. Many Georgians, remembering the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, objected. However, Georgian Dream has long wished for closer relations between Georgia and Russia, feeling that they are in the best interest of the country. Bidzina Ivanishvili also made his fortune in Russia.

Tuesday’s actions stem from that June night in 2019. Georgian Dream has repeatedly accused Melia of launching a “coup.” He was found guilty and placed under house arrest. In 2020, Melia took off his arrest bracelet and helped to lead protests against Georgian Dream’s alleged stealing of the recent parliamentary elections. Appointed chairman of the opposition UNM party, Melia provides strong leadership and continues to be persecuted by Georgian Dream, which appears to be turning into an authoritarian nightmare. This is only one step in an ongoing process, but it appears to be attracting a far more high-level rebuke from the Biden administration than previous steps received from the Trump administration.

Mitchell Orenstein, professor of Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pennsylvania and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Georgia’s top oligarch is the country’s chief obstacle

This crisis is the culmination of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s long-held and publicly expressed belief that his oligarchic vision for the country requires reformation of the political opposition to his tastes. The acknowledgment by former Prime Minister Gakharia of the politicization of law enforcement, and his resignation over it, should clarify that the governing decision-maker is Ivanishvili. If the Western aspirations of the Georgian people are to be realized and the will to defend democracy within Russia’s neighbors still exists, then intervention cannot be limited to the government and opposition, or supporting media and NGOs, but directed at Ivanishvili specifically.

Luis Navarro, Eurasia program fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute

Georgians won’t tolerate a democratic backslide

While Melia’s arrest is alarming, the bright side is that the Georgian people have been here before. When I was in Georgia in 2003, Georgians took to the streets after numerous irregularities in that year’s parliamentary elections. Former and late president Eduard Shevardnadze was seen as an entrenched figure who many did not see leaving power outside of dying. Hundreds of thousands of people took to the street and peacefully forced his removal. There are very few nations in the former USSR that can match the independent spirit of the Georgian people. Yes, this is a bad situation and the US should engage Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili’s government and remind him of its commitment to democratic values with forceful diplomacy. But, again, as someone who has lived in the country and witnessed the Rose Revolution, if any nation’s people can mobilize themselves against a backslide in democracy, it is the Georgians.

Also, the “good news” is that it does not appear that the Kremlin is creating this drama.

Georgia is arguably the most stable democracy in the Caucasus. Armenia’s democracy is strong, but perhaps messier than Georgia’s. Azerbaijan is authoritarian. Then you have Russia, Georgia’s northern neighbor, that is authoritarian and has its troops in 1/5 of Georgia’sterritory. Through it all, Georgia has managed to hold itself together—sometimes barely.

Though Georgia is backsliding, it is in better shape than any of the aforementioned nations. For America, keeping Georgia politically stable is of great importance. Georgia is not a full democracy, to be sure, but the progress it has made since 2003 can’t be taken for granted or be allowed to backslide to pre-Rose Revolution years. Nothing would please the Kremlin more than to see an unstable Georgia whose political situation can be easily manipulated.

Terrell Jermaine Starr, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and senior reporter at The Root

Georgia‘s hardliners need to compromise

Georgian politics is in a deadlock and has been since late November-December 2020 when the political parties failed to reach any agreement in four rounds of talks over electoral disputes. Georgians found themselves in a deadlock because the opposition was too quick to jump to a total boycott of the new parliament and the ruling Georgian Dream party was too slow and inefficient to respond to valid grievances—and neither party was willing to compromise.

In the last two to three months, all major political parties, including Georgian Dream, have seen shifts in leadership and internal turbulence. Both in Georgian Dream and in the United National Movement, hawkish members came to leadership and the logical result is further escalation. Arrest of a major opposition leader is a bad move, especially in a crisis like Georgia now faces—and the inevitable tensions and protests that will follow are clearly the government’s responsibility. However, all sides must take a step back and take their share of responsibility.

The Georgian public is tired and apathetic. A public opinion poll published in December 2020 showed that 54% of voters believe no party represents their views. In a situation like this, even the proposed snap elections are not a panacea. Georgia needs compromise and a power-sharing agreement between both sides, and that is what international partners should urge all sides to do.

Nino Ghvinadze, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

Morningstar quoted in AzerNews on Southern Gas Corridor

jbekenstein — Thu, 28 Jan 2021 20:12:00 +0000

original source

The post Morningstar quoted in AzerNews on Southern Gas Corridor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

End the Russian veto on Georgian accession: NATO 20/2020 podcast

Transatlantic Security Initiative — Tue, 05 Jan 2021 14:12:14 +0000

Admitting Georgia to NATO without extending an Article 5 guarantee to the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Regions can fulfill the promise of the Bucharest Summit.

Listen on

About this episode

At NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, the allies refused to go along with a US push to offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP), but agreed that it would someday become a member of the Alliance. Germany and France intended for this equivocation to allay Russian objections, yet it was seized upon by Vladimir Putin as an opportunity to block Georgia’s path to the Alliance. In August 2008, a mere four months after the Bucharest Summit, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied twenty percent of its internationally recognized territory. With some creativity and bold political will, however, Georgia’s accession into NATO is still feasible, despite the Russian occupation.

Watch the video

Key takeaways

1:55: Luke talks about the Bucharest Summit of 2008 and why Georgia was denied a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to join NATO
10:27: Luke talks about what it takes for a country to attain a Membership Action Plan and why Germany and France didn’t want Georgia in the Alliance
12:54: Luke also shares why he thinks it is time to establish new mechanisms (aside from MAP) for inviting countries to join NATO
15:35: Alexis gives three reasons why she thinks Georgia should be in NATO
17:41: Luke explains what NATO wants from Georgia to make it a member of the Alliance
20:39: Luke explains why NATO allowed Montenegro and North Macedonia in but still left Georgia out
21:41: Luke talks about the roles of Articles 5 and 6 in terms of Georgian accession protocols
25:13: Alexis and Luke also talk about how Russia is likely going to feel threatened if Georgia were able to get a MAP
28:56: Alexis explains why there is little appetite to invite Georgia into the Alliance
29:47: Alexis explains what would happen if Georgia got tired of waiting for NATO to allow it to be a member
30:30: Luke talks about the importance of US leadership on extending NATO membership to Georgia
32:17: Luke talks about what Georgia and NATO need to do together to resolve the issue and what role Georgian officials have to play in this
35:07: Luke shares his thoughts on the possibility of the Biden’s Administration’s role in helping develop a responsible, realistic and reasonable path for Georgia to join the Alliance

Read the essay

NATO 20/2020

Oct 14, 2020

End the Russian veto on Georgian accession

By Luke Coffey and Alexis Mrachek

Admitting Georgia to NATO without extending an Article 5 guarantee to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region can fulfil the promise of the Bucharest Summit.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

Explore the podcast series

NATO 20/2020 Podcast

NATO 20/2020 is a weekly podcast that explores 20 bold ideas to push NATO to be more visionary, more capable, and more self-evidently valuable to the security of more people.

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Ramp up on Russia

By Alexander Vershbow

NATO needs to increase the costs for Russian aggression while building back crucial dialogue if there is any prospect for improved relations with Moscow.

Arms Control Defense Policy

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Seek membership for Mexico

By Christopher Skaluba, Gabriela R. A. Doyle

Building a relationship between NATO and Mexico may be the key to keeping a rapidly changing America invested in European security.

Europe & Eurasia Mexico

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Reimagine the Washington Treaty

By Damon Wilson and Will O’Brien

Reexamining NATO’s founding charter can be an exercise in creating an Alliance fit for a new geopolitical era.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Explore the Initiative

The post End the Russian veto on Georgian accession: NATO 20/2020 podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia in retreat as the Soviet collapse continues

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 10 Dec 2020 18:22:39 +0000

Three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process is still far from over. Officially, of course, the USSR ceased to exist in 1991. In reality, Moscow has never come to terms with the loss of empire and has spent the past thirty years fighting to reverse the verdict of history. This struggle between Russian revanchism and the nation-building efforts of the former Soviet republics has shaped the political landscape of the post-Soviet world for a generation, but there are signs that the tide may now be turning decisively against the Kremlin.

2020 proved disastrous for Vladimir Putin and his dreams of informal empire. It was supposed to be a year of triumphant posturing dominated by events marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Instead, Putin spent much of his time hidden away from the public as Russia struggled with one of the world’s most severe coronavirus outbreaks. There was also little to cheer in the wider neighborhood as Russian interests in the post-Soviet space experienced a series of setbacks.

In Central Asia, unrest in Kyrgyzstan led to the collapse of a pro-Russian government. This sparked fears of a further decline in Kremlin influence in a region where Moscow already finds itself competing against the growing presence of China.

In Moldova, the pro-Russian incumbent was handily defeated by a pro-Western candidate in the country’s presidential election. Moldova’s new president-elect Maia Sandu is exactly the kind of politician Moscow fears. An English-speaking, Harvard-educated economist, she seeks to pursue membership of the European Union and has called on Russia to withdraw its occupation forces from the Kremlin-backed breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The most stunning blow to Russian interests came in the South Caucasus region, where Turkish backing allowed Azerbaijan to wage a victorious six-week war against Kremlin ally Armenia. Putin was eventually able to broker a peace agreement which allowed Russia to deploy a peacekeeping mission in the war zone, but this face-saving gesture could not disguise the fact that Moscow had been forced to accept the presence of a rival power in a region where Russia had previously reigned supreme for over a century. Turkey’s involvement in the Azerbaijani-Armenian War was a watershed moment in post-Soviet history that transformed the balance of power in the South Caucasus and shattered illusions regarding Russia’s ability to dictate military outcomes within the boundaries of the former USSR.

If events in Azerbaijan came as a shock to Russia, developments in neighboring Belarus struck even closer to home. The protest movement that has emerged over the past four months following Belarus’s flawed August 9 presidential election may not be overtly geopolitical in nature, but the pro-democracy demands of the protesters are nevertheless anathema to Moscow, which remains haunted by the Soviet collapse and views people power movements as a direct threat to the Kremlin’s own authoritarian model.

Opposition leaders in Belarus have bent over backwards in their attempts to convince Russia it has nothing to fear, but there is little doubt in Moscow that a democratic Belarus would inevitably turn towards the West if not physically prevented from doing so. Putin has therefore reluctantly intervened to prop up Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, providing financial lifelines and teams of advisers while also publicly promising to deploy Russian security forces if necessary.

There is a sense of sad inevitability surrounding Putin’s support for Lukashenka. Kremlin policymakers appreciate that by backing the deeply unpopular and increasingly violent Lukashenka regime in Minsk, they are turning millions of previously sympathetic Belarusians against Russia. However, in the civilizational contest for hearts and minds that is playing out across the post-Soviet world, Moscow simply has no answer to the infinitely more appealing prospect of European-style democracy. This leaves the Kremlin with few viable options other than the use of force.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia’s inability to sell itself as an attractive alternative to the West has been most immediately apparent in Ukraine. During the 2013 debate over Ukraine’s proposed EU Association Agreement, Moscow made almost no attempt to promote the relative advantages of closer ties with Russia. Instead, the Kremlin embarked on a unilateral trade war and blustered about dire consequences, while at the same time backing an inept anti-EU campaign that included playground homophobia and scaremongering over same-sex unions. As Ukrainians prepared to make the most meaningful geopolitical decision of the entire post-Soviet era, Russia had nothing to offer except anti-Western nonsense and thinly veiled threats.

The poverty of Russia’s present position is no secret to Putin. Unable to offer a coherent vision for the future, he has responded by fighting over the past. However, while rose-tinted Soviet nostalgia and WWII mythology play well inside Russia itself, they are no match for the everyday aspirations found elsewhere in the USSR among populations where relatively few share modern Russia’s sense of wounded imperial pride.

The foreign policy defeats that have beset Moscow over the past year fit into a far broader pattern of Russian retreat dating back to 1991. Landmarks along the way include EU and NATO membership for the Baltic nations, and Ukraine’s two post-Soviet revolutions. The recent Azerbaijani-Armenian War and Belarus’s ongoing national awakening may also deserve places on the list.

This retreat will continue until Moscow learns to shed its imperial outlook towards the post-Soviet world. Russia’s reliance on force has succeeded in establishing pro-Kremlin enclaves in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, but it has also alienated tens of millions of post-Soviet citizens who represent Moscow’s natural allies. Continuing to pursue such counterproductive policies would be the height of folly. Instead, Russia must ditch coercion in favor of persuasion. Building mutually beneficial partnerships is not something that comes naturally to the Kremlin, but it is a skill Russian policymakers must learn if they are avoid many more years like 2020.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Over the intervening quarter of a century, the economic paths of Azerbaijan and Armenia have diverged dramatically. While Armenia struggled to build a modern economy, Azerbaijan embraced policies of broad international economic cooperation and adopted the latest technologies. The country built a new generation of strategic energy pipelines and systematically modernized its infrastructure.

This national upgrade paid dividends. By 2010, oil production had risen to more than five times higher than the lows of the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s GDP continued to expand until it dwarfed that of Armenia. Anyone visiting the two countries today would be left in no doubt about which of these South Caucasus neighbors is booming and which is stagnating.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

With its Old Testament credentials and large global diaspora, Armenia is often compared to Israel. Both countries also share similar locations in hostile neighborhoods encircled by multiple unfriendly countries. However, the similarities between Armenia and Israel do not extend to the economic sphere.

Unlike Armenia, Israel has managed to expand its economy and surpass those of its neighbors despite beginning just over seventy years ago from a low base. One of the key factors driving Israel’s success has been its ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), which reached USD 18.2 billion in 2019. In contrast, comparatively poor Armenia received five times more money in remittances last year than it did via FDI.

It is no coincidence that Israel is currently the world’s tenth largest exporter of state-of-the-art military equipment, while Armenia continues to rely on old-fashioned Russian and Soviet era military hardware. This is the inevitable outcome of the contrasting economic approaches adopted by the two countries.

I would argue that the recent Azerbaijani victory is not only a result of military progress. It also reflects the economic advances made by Azerbaijan over the past few decades. At first glance, the rapidity and comprehensive nature of Azerbaijan’s gains in the recent six-week conflict seem to underline the fact that military solutions can still succeed in redrawing borders.

In reality, any successful military campaign must be underpinned by economic superiority. In Azerbaijan’s case, it took approximately a quarter of a century for the country to learn the lessons of its painful defeat in 1994, modernize its economy, form a strong network of regional alliances, and then eventually strike back decisively.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Azerbaijan’s economic experience offers valuable lessons for Ukraine. Rather than focusing attention on immediate military action or unfavorable settlements negotiated from a position of weakness, it would be far wiser for Ukraine to turn its energies towards modernizing the country’s economy and infrastructure. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities must do everything possible to attract international investment and establish the country’s position as an important player in global production chains.

It is no longer a viable long-term strategy to rely on the talents, money, and patriotic sentiments of the Ukrainian population, or those Ukrainians who currently work abroad and send home huge sums in remittances every year. Instead, Ukraine must look to establish an economic model that will prove attractive to international investors seeking opportunities to profit from the the country’s vast untapped potential. Ultimately, this will serve as the basis for a far stronger Ukrainian state.

A long-term approach is particularly important for Ukraine as there is every reason to believe Russia will find itself in a far weaker position within the space of 20 to 25 years. With enormous geopolitical changes currently taking place across Eurasia and the global economy moving slowly but steadily away from its current reliance on fossil fuels, Russia’s oil- and gas-based economic model is already beginning to look vulnerable. If the economic disparities between the two countries begin to narrow, Ukraine’s position will strengthen accordingly.

When looking at the outcome of the Azerbaijani-Armenian War, it is vital for Ukrainian policymakers to recognize the long years of economic innovation and modernization that preceded Baku’s recent victory. Azerbaijan achieved what some historians have previously referred to as “embracing defeat.” In other words, they were able to learn from a traumatic national defeat and apply the lessons to their ultimate advantage.

Ukraine should now seek to adopt a similarly far-sighted approach towards its current confrontation with Russia. There should be no rush to retake Russian-occupied Crimea or eastern Ukraine, nor should there be any hurry to accept costly compromise solutions. Instead, Ukraine’s leaders must borrow from Azerbaijan’s experience and look to create a strong economy built on modern technologies and broad international cooperation. This can then serve as the basis for a consolidated national recovery and the eventual reincorporation of the Ukrainian regions that are now under Russian occupation.

Vladislav Inozemtsev is a Senior Associate with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC.

This common Russian threat is a strong argument for deepening cooperation. By strengthening the defense capabilities of Ukraine and Georgia, NATO will also succeed in boosting the security of alliance members and deterring Russia’s aggressive behavior beyond the borders of the former USSR.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The most powerful signal NATO could send to Ukraine and Georgia would be to present both countries with Membership Action Plans. This prospect has been under discussion ever since the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, but consensus within the alliance remains elusive.

The elephant in the room, of course, is Russia. Moscow made no secret of its bitter opposition to any further expansion of NATO in the former Soviet Union. Indeed, the issue of possible NATO membership was used by the Kremlin to help justify Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014.

However, any move to deny Kyiv and Tbilisi the prospect of further integration would represent a de facto Russian veto over NATO enlargement. This would rob individual countries of their right to seek membership and strike a blow at one of the alliance’s core principles.

While nobody within NATO is prepared to grant Moscow unofficial veto powers, the ongoing Russian occupation of significant regions of Ukraine and Georgia creates practical obstacles to membership roadmaps for either country. Nevertheless, the arguments for greater integration remain convincing. As NATO policymakers explore the alliance’s priorities for the coming decade, the task now is to identify realistic opportunities to enhance strategic relations with Ukraine and Georgia.

One key issue is the need to continue clearly identifying Russia as the main long-term threat to the security of NATO and its partners. This messaging should include equal emphasis on the hard and soft dimensions of this threat, along with the need to identity a spectrum of responses. With their extensive experience of dealing with Russian hybrid warfare, Ukraine and Georgia can play a prominent role in identifying threats and formulating effective collective responses.

It would also make sense to elaborate on an updated Black Sea security strategy with the participation of Ukraine and Georgia. This could begin with a joint assessment of the security challenges in the region. Moving forward, the alliance should pay special attention to maintaining a sustained Black Sea forward presence featuring integrated maritime, land, and air components.

Ultimately, NATO should seek to bring its Black Sea activities to a level comparable with its presence in the Baltic Sea. This would create balance and eliminate any gaps in the defense of the alliance’s eastern flank. One specific idea worth exploring is the possible establishment of a NATO logistical and training center in Georgia.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

At the practical level, NATO should look to enhance interoperability with the Ukrainian and Georgian militaries in the coming years and promote the further adoption of the alliance’s standards through an intensification of joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and other forms of common activity. By increasing its institutional investment in cooperative security with Ukraine and Georgia, NATO will be able to augment its own collective defense and improve the alliance’s crisis management capabilities.

Moving forward, NATO can demonstrate its continued commitment to an open door policy by developing credible road maps for Ukraine and Georgia that lead towards eventual membership. While it might not be initially possible to establish specific timelines, it is of paramount importance that both countries feature prominently whenever NATO addresses the issue of the alliance’s open door policy or discusses further expansion and potential future members.

A clearer vision of the the road towards NATO would provide a significant boost to the reform agendas in Kyiv and Tbilisi, which would also have the effect of expanding the community of stable and predictable democracies in the region. Joining NATO may not be a realistic short-term objective for either country, but they both have much to offer the alliance and share a range of strategic interests with NATO member states that make further integration mutually desirable.

Alyona Getmanchuk is the Director of the New Europe Center. Irakli Porchkhidze is Senior Vice-President of the Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies. Sergiy Solodkyy is First Deputy Director of the New Europe Center. Their recent analysis of the NATO 2030 Reflection Process and the prospects for Ukrainian and Georgian integration can be downloaded here.

Ukraine can learn from Azerbaijan’s recent victory

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 17 Nov 2020 21:25:20 +0000

Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the recent six-week war between the two countries looks to have ended decades of stalemate and transformed the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus region. It has allowed Baku to regain control over parts of Azerbaijan that had been under Armenian occupation for over a quarter of a century, while forcing Russia to accept the reality of growing Turkish influence in the region.

The renewal of full-scale military hostilities in Azerbaijan in late September marked a dramatic thaw in what was one of the former USSR’s oldest frozen conflicts, dating back to the early 1990s. The course and outcome of the war offer some potentially important lessons for Ukraine, which is home to the most recent of the many little wars to erupt amid the ruins of the Soviet Empire.

Since 2014, successive governments in Kyiv have failed to find a path towards peace that would end the six-year Russian occupation of eastern Ukraine and bring the region back under Ukrainian control. While the circumstances in Ukraine and the Southern Caucasus are by no means directly comparable, Azerbaijan’s success nevertheless provides a number of pointers for Ukrainian policymakers to consider.

Perhaps the most obvious conclusion is that internationally-backed post-Soviet peace-making forums are no longer credible. The Minsk Group that was established under the auspices of the OSCE in the 1990s to address the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process failed to make any progress despite the involvement of Russia, France, and the US. After decades of diplomatic deadlock, military force proved decisive in a matter of weeks.

There are obvious parallels here for Ukraine, which in engaged in its own ineffectual Minsk peace process. The agreements signed in the Belarusian capital in September 2014 and February 2015 by Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France were designed to serve as a road map towards a settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Instead, the terms agreed in Minsk have yet to be fully implemented.

The international signatories of Ukraine’s Minsk Agreements have never inspired confidence in the prospects for peace. Moscow’s energies appear to be focused primarily on exploiting the Minsk process in order to deny involvement in the conflict and promote the fiction of observer status. Meanwhile, of the two participating EU countries, Paris in particular has made no secret of its interest in normalizing relations with Russia as soon as possible.

Nor are there any great expectations in Kyiv regarding broader Western diplomatic efforts to resolve the country’s undeclared war with Russia. Ukrainian policymakers well remember how the West advised Ukraine in no uncertain terms not to resist Russia’s invasion of Crimea in early 2014. This was very much in line with the Western approach towards previous post-Soviet conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. On each prior occasion, the West collectively sought to “freeze and forget” conflicts instigated by Russia, thereby rewarding the Kremlin for its readiness to launch hybrid wars against its neighbors.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Another important conclusion from the recent war is the vital role of geopolitical alliances for nations seeking to resist Russian pressure. Azerbaijan’s victory was possible in large part due to strong Turkish backing, which was a major factor in deterring Russia from direct or indirect intervention in support of Armenia.

Azerbaijan’s close cooperation with Israel also proved crucial. Azerbaijan has long been touted as Israel’s closest ally in the Muslim World. The value of this partnership was evident during the recent conflict, not least in terms of the Israeli drones that were deployed to great effect against Armenian targets.

This should cause Ukraine to attach greater significance to its own regional relationships. Kyiv is already engaged in a deepening strategic partnership with Ankara. Following Turkey’s success in the South Caucasus, cooperation with Ukraine is now likely to increase.

Ukraine and Turkey are in many ways natural allies. The two Black Sea neighbors have no significant geopolitical differences of opinion and share a common interest in reducing Russia’s regional influence. Furthermore, they can both bring complementary military technologies to the table. Turkey’s leadership role in drone warfare was confirmed during the recent Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, while Ukraine possesses aerospace expertize that Ankara covets.

Ukraine has already acquired a small fleet of state-of-the-art Turkish battle drones, with Kyiv now understandably eager to purchase more. Meanwhile, talks are underway over possible joint production of new models in Ukraine. Ukrainian engineering will also play a key role in the development of Turkey’s next-generation cruise missile.

This strengthening security sector cooperation is in line with a series of bilateral agreements signed by Turkey’s President Erdogan and Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy during an October 2020 meeting in Ankara. In light of recent events in Azerbaijan, Kyiv will want to continue further along this path.

Ukraine may also see value in mirroring Azerbaijani defense policy by bolstering security cooperation with Israel. While Israel’s strategic relationship with Russia could prove an obstacle, Ukraine’s own shared history with Israel may help facilitate closer security ties. A significant portion of the Israeli population trace their roots back to Ukraine, which has traditionally served as one of the great centers of European Judaism and remains home to a large number of sacred sites. The two countries have also recently concluded a free trade agreement, paving the way for stronger ties.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The recent conflict in the South Caucasus was a clash between Azerbaijan’s twenty-first century tactics and Armenia’s twentieth century military. The result was a rout. NATO member Turkey’s superior military training and equipment gave Azerbaijan a decisive edge and completely overwhelmed Armenian forces with their Russian training and supplies. This outcome underlines the need for Ukraine’s own military to proceed further towards the adoption of NATO standards, even if there is still no clear prospect of a Membership Action Plan to join the military alliance.

In the wider international arena, the war has seriously undermined Russia’s credibility as a dependable ally. In recent weeks, Armenians have learned from bitter experience that Moscow cannot always be relied upon to intervene, despite expectations in Yerevan that Russia would ultimately prevent Azerbaijan from achieving a military solution to the long-simmering conflict in the South Caucasus.

While Putin has sought to emphasize his role in brokering the peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, there is no disguising the fact that the conflict represents a watershed moment in the Kremlin’s loss of influence over the former Soviet domains. Moscow has now tacitly accepted a Turkish presence in the South Caucasus, a region where Russia previously tolerated no rivals.

This shift in the geopolitical balance of power will not have gone unnoticed in Kyiv. Many Kremlin loyalists in Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk may also be wondering whether they are wise to rely so heavily on the fidelity of the Kremlin.

Baku’s success does not offer a blueprint for the military reconquest of Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine. After all, the Kremlin’s hybrid forces stationed in east Ukraine are infinitely superior to anything the Armenian military can muster. They are also backed by a formidable conventional Russian military presence that is poised to advance at a moment’s notice from positions just across the border.

Nevertheless, the Azerbaijani-Armenian War has proven revealing. It has exposed the ineffectiveness of post-Soviet peace-making diplomacy and posed serious questions about the reliability of Russian guarantees, while at the same time demonstrating the importance of strong regional security partnerships and the value of military innovation. These are all lessons Ukraine cannot afford to ignore.

Taras Kuzio is a non-resident fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and a professor at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. He is also author of “Putin’s War Against Ukraine” and co-author of “The Sources of Russia’s Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order”.

Peace at last? Assessing the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh

Andrew D’Anieri — Fri, 13 Nov 2020 14:06:05 +0000

After six weeks of warfare, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia agreed to a peace deal on November 10 that seems to be more durable than prior agreements. The agreement was finalized after Azerbaijani troops advanced within miles of Stepankert (Khakendi), the capital of Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to agree to terms.

The peace deal allows for Russian troops to remain as peacekeepers in the region, giving Moscow a toehold for influence in another “near abroad” location. The war leaves Armenia and Azerbaijan with dramatically different domestic situations and a new regional security order, with Russia and Turkey as major players and the United States and Europe on the periphery.

We asked two former US diplomats to analyze what the peace deal means for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and how the involvement of outside powers has changed the balance of power:

Subscribe to Fast Thinking email alerts

Putin has cemented Russia’s role in its “special sphere of influence”

“For nine months in 2017, I was the US co-chair for the Minsk Group Process for Nagorno-Karabakh of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the other two co-chairs being Russia and France. We traveled frequently to Armenia and Azerbaijan and into Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Established in the early 1990s to solve the historic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minsk Group had by the second decade of the 21^st century evolved into a process that put out occasional bush fires but, otherwise, just maintained the status quo. However, during my months of listening to the leadership in Yerevan, Baku, and even Khakendi/Stepanakert, I privately came to the conclusion that eventually war would be inevitable for a “solution,” because all sides were so adamantly dug in to their positions. And now that has happened with the result being dramatic change but no solution.”

“The current war is often reported to have begun on September 27, although it actually began on July 12 when Armenia bombed Azerbaijani territory outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, some say egged on by Russia to “send a signal” to Azerbaijan. Once the war took off in September, the three OSCE co-chair capitals attempted ceasefires, none of which held longer than the time it took to announce them. But now Russia has accomplished not only a ceasefire but has also changed the history of the past twenty-eight years. Armenia will withdraw from the seven Azerbaijani territories it has occupied around Nagorno-Karabakh itself; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will oversee the return of refugees and displaced people; and Russia’s border guards, reportedly with Turkish assistance, will set up a five-year peacekeeping operation that can then be renewed for another five years. All of this is a stunning reversal for Armenia, and it is still unclear whether Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan can survive this dramatic reversal.”

“However, the current understanding, as dramatic as it is, does not “solve” Nagorno-Karabakh that has long been listed with the other “prolonged conflicts” of the former Soviet Union in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Russian President Vladimir Putin has frequently declared the countries of the former Soviet Union to be Russia’s “special sphere of influence.” With his imposition/achievement of the current Nagorno-Karabakh understanding, he has cemented Russia’s role in the region.”

Ambassador Richard Hoagland, former interim co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group coordinating peacemaking efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh.

A durable resolution?

“The cease-fire agreement negotiated by Russia creates major changes in the South Caucasus security landscape. The Armenian military will withdraw from the occupied territories and displaced Azerbaijanis will be able to return to their homes. Meanwhile, Russian peacekeepers are being dispatched to Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin Corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh. The bottom line is that Azerbaijan regains the occupied territories and the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh will be protected.”

“For many years Russia prevented a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, because a low-level conflict allowed maximum Russian leverage over both countries. But the situation drastically changed over the last few months. Azerbaijan recovered much of the occupied territories militarily and threatened to overrun Nagorno-Karabakh. Only through Russian intervention did Nagorno-Karabakh avoid collapse and Armenia a much more devastating defeat. As a result, Azerbaijan will finally reach its goal of recovering its occupied territories, and Nagorno-Karabakh with Russian protection will maintain on a de facto basis its link to Armenia. This is close to what a final resolution ought to be and will remain in place for the foreseeable future. Western observers hope that Russia will not overreach and try to extend its influence in the two countries beyond its peacekeeping mission.”

Ambassador Richard L. Morningstar, founding chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, former US ambassador to the European Union, and former US ambassador to the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Putin gains and loses from Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire deal

By John E. Herbst

The ceasefire deal has weakened Moscow’s position in the region, but it also served as a diplomatic victory for Putin, as Russian peacekeepers will enforce the agreement, and the United States remained on the sidelines.

Conflict Russia

New Atlanticist Oct 31, 2020

Armenia and Azerbaijan should seize chance for peace

By Matthew Bryza

As fighting intensifies, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan would be wise to embrace the political cover their Russian and Turkish counterparts might provide.

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

New Atlanticist Oct 10, 2020

Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire revives “Basic Principles” and demonstrates Putin’s continued sway

By Matthew Bryza

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The post Peace at last? Assessing the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s Karabakh victory sparks alarm in Ukraine

Anders Åslund — Thu, 12 Nov 2020 02:40:34 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have achieved a significant victory this week in Nagorno-Karabakh that threatens to alter the geopolitical balance throughout the former Soviet space in his favor.

By brokering a Kremlin-friendly peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Putin has succeeded in considerably expanding Russia’s military presence in the strategically important Southern Caucasus region. Crucially, he has done so without encountering any Western pushback. This unchecked advance should set alarm bells ringing in other ex-Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.

The big lesson of the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace settlement is that military power rules. In a matter of weeks, the use of force has achieved what decades of diplomacy failed to deliver. The only two relevant international players in the South Caucasus region are Russia and Turkey. The United States has taken leave, while the European Union is a paper tiger without troops.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan was one of four so-called frozen conflicts that erupted during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Joseph Stalin paved the way for hostilities decades earlier when he transferred the ethnically Armenian autonomous territory of Nagorno-Karabakh (which means “mountainous black garden”) to Azerbaijan. The aim was to encourage confrontation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis and keep them in check.

Ethnic tensions flared up in 1988 and eventually led to a full-scale war between the two fledgling independent states amid the ruins of the Soviet Empire. The war was halted by a precarious ceasefire in 1994, when Armenian troops controlled not only Nagorno-Karabakh itself but also seven other nearby districts of Azerbaijan, forcing approximately one million Azerbaijanis to flee.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was supposed to resolve this conflict diplomatically. It formed the so-called Minsk Group, which was co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France. This format persisted but achieved no real breakthroughs despite many meetings. Meanwhile, bloody fighting continued to erupt periodically along the front lines of the barely frozen conflict, without ever leading to any major shifts in the military balance.

In the eyes of most outside observers, the heavily outnumbered and increasingly outgunned Armenians appeared to hold a losing hand. Azerbaijan is far larger than Armenia and has benefited greatly from rising oil riches since around 2000. It also has a powerful ally in Turkey, which borders on Armenia and has kept its border closed. This unfavorable predicament fueled calls for Armenia to seek a sustainable settlement that would allow the country to hold onto Nagorno-Karabakh while giving up other Azerbaijani territories.

Nor did Armenia have any obvious reason to occupy all the Azerbaijani land it held beyond Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia hosts a Russian military base and has a defense pact with Russia, but this pact covers only internationally recognized Armenian territory.

The obvious conclusion was that sooner or later, Azerbaijan would use its growing military superiority to carry out a serious attack on Armenia and retake its territories. On September 27, Azerbaijan launched such an attack. Equipped with new Turkish and Israeli drones, it overcame Armenia’s defenses. Azerbaijani troops advanced steadily, and on November 9 took the ancient fortress town of Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian forces seemed close to complete collapse.

After a number of prior diplomatic overtures, Putin now stepped in decisively and seemingly with Turkish consent. He concluded a joint declaration between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to end the fighting. It was signed by Putin, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev.

In the first paragraph of the declaration, the three parties declared: “A complete ceasefire and cessation of all hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone is announced from midnight, Moscow time, November 10, 2020. The Azerbaijani Republic and the Armenian Republic…will stop at their current positions.”

Essentially, Azerbaijan has retaken the territories it lost in 1994, and it has captured a corner of Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, the agreement promises Azerbaijan a transportation link through Armenia to the Azerbaijani district of Nakhichevan, which lies beyond southern Armenia. In territorial terms, this settlement makes sense and may prove durable.

Putin has promised to deploy a peacekeeping contingent of “1,960 soldiers with small arms, 90 armored personnel carriers, and 380 vehicles and other special equipment,” which will serve along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and guard the Lachin Corridor for an initial period of five years. Meanwhile, the Armenian armed forces will withdraw.

Russian special forces, many of whom fought in eastern Ukraine, began arriving in Armenia in IL-76 transportation planes on November 10. By sending these special forces as peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, Putin has made tiny Armenia even more dependent on Russia, leaving it looking less like an independent nation and increasingly like a Russian protectorate.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

This outcome fits well with Russia’s foreign policy goals in the old Soviet neighborhood.

Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan came to power via a democratic uprising in 2018 and is no favorite of Putin, who is allergic to people power movements and much preferred the country’s previous kleptocratic rulers. By refusing to provide Russian military support to Armenia earlier, Putin has cut Pashinyan down to size.

Angry Armenian nationalists stormed government buildings in Yerevan as news broke of the agreement with Russia and Azerbaijan, but Pashinyan clearly saw no better alternative than accepting a humiliating peace deal. It remains to be seen whether the Armenian kleptocrats from Nagorno-Karabakh who are favored by Putin will now regain power in Yerevan. Whatever comes next, Moscow has the satisfaction of seeing a champion of post-Soviet democracy disgraced and discredited.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also emerged from the conflict victorious. The only international actors of consequence involved in this conflict and its resolution were Russia and Turkey. Turkey backed Azerbaijan strongly and Putin consulted with Erdogan, though the ceasefire agreement itself excluded Turkey. This leaves all arbitration between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Kremlin’s hands, even if the declaration does not spell this out.

Meanwhile, the Minsk Group, the OSCE, the United States, France, and the European Union have all been rendered irrelevant in the region. The United States looks particularly ridiculous, since the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers were in Washington on October 23. Both had separate meetings with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, but they did not see one another and no agreement was concluded.

The nature of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict reflects a changing international environment. The United States seems to have withdrawn from global affairs; the EU has no military muscle; and the West in general has grown alienated from Turkey. This has left the way open for authoritarian rulers like Putin and Erdogan to seize the geopolitical initiative. Indeed, recent events in the Southern Caucasus hark back to nineteenth century German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s words: “The great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions but by iron and blood.”

In geopolitical terms, the most important outcome of the conflict is the appearance of a significant Russian military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian “peacekeeping” missions already exist in three other “frozen” post-Soviet conflicts. They are present in Moldova’s Transnistria region, along with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. A similar Russian military force is now firmly established in the heart of the Southern Caucasus region, fulfilling one of Moscow’s long-term objectives in the region.

For Ukraine in particular, the passivity of the West during the Karabakh War is ominous. As a consequence, Russia has been able to expand its military presence within the borders of the former Soviet Empire without facing any serious opposition from the West. As Ukrainian columnist Vitaly Portnikov warns, this considerably increases the risk of Russian “peacekeepers” appearing in eastern Ukraine.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington. His latest book is “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Aliyev, however, recognized that further military operations would risk thousands of civilians’ and soldiers’ lives on both sides, and likely earn Azerbaijan international pariah status. He instead agreed to a ceasefire whose terms secure virtually all of Azerbaijan’s political objectives at no additional human or financial cost. Key among these is the return to Baku’s control of all seven Azerbaijani districts surrounding Nagorno Karabakh that Armenia has occupied since the early 1990s, in breach of four United Nations Security Council Resolutions. (Azerbaijan’s military had already regained four of these during the past six weeks, but the remaining three would have required treacherous mountain fighting.) Azerbaijanis displaced during fighting in the early 1990s will also be able to return to their former homes, while Azerbaijan maintained that Armenian residents can remain in their current homes.

Aliyev has also left open the possibility, at least on paper, that Nagorno Karabakh might eventually acquire a legal status other than part of Azerbaijan, meaning independence or officially joining Armenia. The mere prospect of these possibilities irks millions of Azerbaijanis; but it also provides Armenia a chance to save face.

Aliyev’s approach matches the war aims he has articulated since fighting resumed on September 27, namely, a peace agreement based on the “Basic Principles” of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, which mediates the conflict. These include:

Withdrawal of all Armenian troops from the seven Azerbaijani districts surrounding Nagorno Karabakh and return of these regions to Baku’s control;
Reopening of all transit routes between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey;
An “interim legal status” for Nagorno Karabakh itself followed by a “final legal status” ratified by a future popular vote, (which is not explicitly included in the November 10 agreement);
Return of displaced Azerbaijanis;
A secure transport link between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh (e.g, “the Lachin Corridor); and
International peacekeepers.

Armenia and Azerbaijan preliminarily agreed to the Basic Principles in January 2009 but never finalized them. Last year, Pashinyan reversed course, announcing Armenia was replacing this “land for peace” formula with a new approach of “new wars for territories.” In the end, Azerbaijan’s battlefield victories, coupled with Putin’s intense political pressure, compelled Pashinyan to accept the Basic Principles in the form of the November 10 peace agreement. Tragically, this could have been achieved months ago, without any wartime deaths.

Russia, along with Turkey, are now filling a diplomatic vacuum in the South Caucasus left by the United States’ inactivity after serious military clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in July. Putin has convinced Aliyev to accept Russian peacekeepers on Azerbaijani territory to secure this peace agreement. This is a high price to pay, given the nefarious role of such troops in destabilizing frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.

But the November 10 agreement also opens the way for Turkey to counterbalance Russia’s regional influence, as Ankara may participate in the peacekeeping operation. And with Armenia’s transit routes with Turkey, as well as Azerbaijan, set to reopen under the peace agreement, Turkey and Armenia may resurrect their 2009 agreement to normalize relations. This could open new opportunities for trade and investment that would catalyze economic growth and help citizens of Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan build a prosperous and peaceful future together.

Matthew Bryza is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He served as a US diplomat for over two decades, including as US ambassador to Azerbaijan, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, and as a former US mediator of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Putin gains and loses from Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire deal

By John E. Herbst

Conflict Russia

New Atlanticist Oct 31, 2020

Armenia and Azerbaijan should seize chance for peace

By Matthew Bryza

As fighting intensifies, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan would be wise to embrace the political cover their Russian and Turkish counterparts might provide.

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

New Atlanticist Oct 10, 2020

Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire revives “Basic Principles” and demonstrates Putin’s continued sway

By Matthew Bryza

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The post Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal could be the diplomatic breakthrough the region needs appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin gains and loses from Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire deal

John E. Herbst — Tue, 10 Nov 2020 21:39:07 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin brokered another ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in their war over Nagorno-Karabakh, but unlike the three previous ceasefires negotiated in October, this one is likely to hold. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed it, and Pashinyan noted publicly that it involves painful concessions. So painful in fact, that his office was besieged by angry demonstrators.

What we know of the ceasefire agreement suggests a major victory for Azerbaijan. It is a ceasefire in place, which means that the gains made by Azerbaijan’s military in taking back its sovereign territory in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas will hold. This includes the city of Shusha (Shushi in Armenian), the second largest city in Nagorno-Karabakh which overlooks the capital of Stepanakert. The agreement also includes the return to Baku’s control of some additional land near Nagorno-Karabakh. All of this will be overseen by 2,000 Russian peacekeepers who are already deployed in the region.

What explains this new status quo? When the Soviet Union imploded, Armenia won a war over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian ethnic enclave in Azerbaijan, taking control of that region as well as surrounding territories that make up about 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally-recognized territory. The takeover prompted ethnic cleansing that displaced nearly a million Azeris. There was a sad irony in this development because, as Putin noted last month, the conflict began with Azeri attacks on ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan in the last days of the Soviet Empire.

The negotiations that began with the Minsk Group since the mid-1990s have yielded no significant progress towards a settlement. In control of Nagorno-Karabakh and substantial additional Azerbaijani territory, Yerevan had no interest in a settlement based on recognizing Azerbaijan’s sovereignty in Nagorno-Karabakh. And even with 20 percent of its territory under Yerevan’s control, Baku had no interest in a settlement that did not assert their sovereignty in Nagorno-Karabakh.

But Azerbaijan had and has one advantage Armenia lacked: hydrocarbons. And while not a wealthy country, Azerbaijan’s economic prospects are better than Armenia’s; and military power is ultimately based on economic wherewithal. The initial Armenian military advantage, based in part on Russian armor and missiles, began to ebb. In this fall’s conflict, Azerbaijan has benefitted from drones and other high-tech equipment coming from Turkey and Israel. Just as Armenian military superiority established the original status quo, Azerbaijani military superiority has established a new outcome on the ground.

But other factors have also been in play. Azerbaijan’s long-time alliance with Turkey paid dividends. So too did its carefully cultivated ties with Israel. In fact, the second big winner in this new status quo is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He projected Turkish influence into this long simmering standoff, and appears to have at least partially offset Russia’s predominance in the Southern Caucasus.

This is not to say that this outcome is a defeat for the Kremlin. Yes, it is true that Moscow has long both facilitated and benefitted from the long stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh meant that it needed Russian protection from Azerbaijan and Turkey; and Moscow could use this support for Armenia to dissuade Baku from moving too close to the West. The successful Azerbaijani offensive has threatened to upend this calculus for both sides and has weakened Moscow’s position in the region.

But not completely. At the end of the day, it was Putin who imposed a settlement on the parties. And it is Russian peacekeepers who will enforce it. That gives Moscow a new lever to use. So this counts as a diplomatic victory for the Kremlin; even if it strengthens the influence of its principal outside competitor (Turkey) in the region. But Moscow will also take comfort from the fact that the United States has not played a decisive role in the settlement.

Moscow may have had one more reason for not acting decisively earlier to stop the fighting. Strongman Putin does not like it when civil society ousts other authoritarian leaders who maintain power by manipulating elections. So he was always skeptical of Prime Minister Pashinyan, who came to power after peaceful demonstrations. By allowing Azerbaijan to take back significant swaths of its own territory, Moscow has weakened Pashinyan’s position.

This is a difficult outcome for Armenia, as the demonstrations in Yerevan underscore. Armenia’s leadership and perhaps its population had gotten used to a status quo that their economic and military potential could not sustain. The presence of Kremlin peacekeepers makes Yerevan more dependent on the Kremlin. As Armenia’s leader when this happened, Pashinyan now faces a major challenge. How does he acclimate his people to the new reality?

While reveling in his victory, Aliyev also faces an important task. He has said before and during the conflict that the issue for Azerbaijan is its territorial integrity, and that Azerbaijan would make sure that its ethnic Armenian citizens in Nagorno-Karabakh and elsewhere were treated equally and would face no threats to their persons or livelihood. He must make good that promise.

John E. Herbst is the director of the Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Armenia and Azerbaijan should seize chance for peace

By Matthew Bryza

As fighting intensifies, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan would be wise to embrace the political cover their Russian and Turkish counterparts might provide.

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

New Atlanticist Oct 10, 2020

Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire revives “Basic Principles” and demonstrates Putin’s continued sway

By Matthew Bryza

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

New Atlanticist Sep 28, 2020

Explainer: What’s behind the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

By Ariel Cohen and Hayley Arlin

COVID-19, plague, and now war. As if 2020 was not cruel enough, fighting erupted on September 27 between Armenia and Azerbaijan along the contact line of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, leading Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to declare martial law and total mobilization. President Ilham G. Aliyev of Azerbaijan addressed his nation, and partial martial law was declared in a number of Azerbaijani regions, including the capital Baku.

Conflict The Caucasus

The post Putin gains and loses from Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bryza joins VOA Russia to discuss relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia

cmunns — Sun, 08 Nov 2020 18:27:51 +0000

original source

The post Bryza joins VOA Russia to discuss relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Armenia and Azerbaijan should seize chance for peace

Matthew Bryza — Sat, 31 Oct 2020 12:05:28 +0000

Azerbaijan seems poised to capture a crucial city that could end the military phase of its war with Armenia. Securing a political victory in the war, however, will require Azerbaijan’s restraint to avert a humanitarian catastrophe that could arise were its forces to press all the way into the capital of the region.

On October 29, the leader of Nagorno Karabakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, issued an ominous warning that Azerbaijani troops were within 5 kilometers of the city of Shushi. He then appealed to all residents of Nagorno Karabakh to join the fight to hold the city, stressing, “As in 1992, when our victory began with the liberation of Shushi, today, our victory depends on the defense of Shushi.”

Known to Azerbaijanis as Shusha, this city within Nagorno Karabakh is of great importance to both sides. Culturally, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis consider the city a cradle of their respective cultures. Militarily, it sits atop commanding heights above Nagorno Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert (or Khankendi for Azerbaijanis). Whoever controls Shusha controls the “Lachin Corridor,” the lifeline linking Armenia to Stepanakert via the occupied Azerbaijani district of Lachin.

During the past month, Azerbaijan’s army has been decimating Armenian forces. Initially, Azerbaijan relied on precision drone strikes (using drones purchased from Turkey and Israel) to destroy Armenia’s high-value military assets (e.g., air defenses, tanks, and artillery) and regain its districts of Fuzuli and Jabrayil, which, like five others that surround Nagorno Karabakh, had been occupied by Armenia since the first Karabakh war. Azerbaijani forces then achieved a military breakthrough along the border with Iran about two weeks ago. Azerbaijan subsequently shifted to a combined arms operation that has pushed northward, regaining its regions of Zenglian and Gubadli, and now pressing into Lachin and toward Shusha.

Azerbaijan’s battlefield successes have sparked fears that the Azerbaijani military might now press its advantage to Shushi and beyond to Khankendi, spurred on by Azerbaijani citizens’ newfound nationalist fervor. Such sentiment has intensified as civilian casualties have mounted from Armenian shelling (including by tactical ballistic missiles) of Azerbaijani towns far from the conflict zone. These attacks have been accompanied by Azerbaijani shelling of Armenian civilians in Stepanakert/Khankendi.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, however, has consistently proposed more restrained goals, namely to:

Regain political control of Azerbaijan’s seven districts that surround Nagorno Karabakh;
Facilitate the return of displaced Azerbaijanis to their former homes in Nagorno Karabakh and its seven surrounding Azerbaijani reasons;
Rebuild these regained territories; and
Resume negotiations with Armenia about the future legal status of Nagorno Karabakh, with the region’s Armenian residents free to remain in their homes after their former Azerbaijani neighbors return.

Convincing Armenians to remain in Nagorno Karabakh will be difficult. They fear for their physical security and loathe being forced to become citizens of Azerbaijan if Nagorno Karabakh returns to Baku’s control.

In an October 29 interview to Russia’s Interfax News Agency, however, President Aliyev suggested a way forward. On security, Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan is “…ready to stop all military operations immediately” if Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan commits to withdraw all Armenian troops from the conflict zone. It is important to recognize that Aliyev insisted only on a commitment by Yerevan to withdraw its troops rather than actual withdrawal.

On citizenship rights, Aliyev reiterated his call for negotiations to end the conflict on the basis of the so-called “Basic Principles.” First tabled in November 2007 by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, the Basic Principles allow inter alia for Nagorno Karabakh’s Armenian residents to claim they are not citizens of Azerbaijan because they live in a region whose legal status is ambiguous and not necessarily part of Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan will resist accepting these conditions. He has already declared “There is no diplomatic solution” to the war over Nagorno Karabakh and publicly abandoned the Basic Principles and their fundamental formula of “land for peace,” instead embracing a formulation of “new territories for new wars.” President Aliyev also faces political danger at home if he defies intense popular sentiment for total military victory.

As they fill a diplomatic vacuum in the region, Russia and Turkey may now be planning to counsel their respective partners to show restraint. In the October 10 ceasefire agreement Russia brokered between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russian President Vladimir Putin apparently compelled Pashinyan again to embrace the Basic Principles, (which his predecessor and President Aliyev informally accepted in January 2009). Meanwhile, Turkey’s Daily Sabah newspaper reports that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has told Putin that Russia could lean on Armenia while Turkey could do the same with Azerbaijan to end the fighting.

The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan would be wise to embrace the political cover their Russian and Turkish counterparts might provide. To survive politically, Pashinyan needs Putin’s public support if he is to stop the fighting by committing to withdraw all Armenian troops and proceed with peace talks in line with the Basic Principles. But by doing so, Pashinyan would save many Armenian soldiers’ lives and provide Nagorno Karabakh’s Armenian residents a chance for a peaceful and prosperous future. He would also bring Armenia into compliance with four United Nations Security Council Resolutions calling for its troops to withdraw from the Azerbaijani regions they occupy. And if Aliyev is willing to defy the Azerbaijani public’s demands for military vengeance, he will spare his country international pariah status while enabling Azerbaijan to attract the international support it will need to rebuild its recovered lands.

Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire revives “Basic Principles” and demonstrates Putin’s continued sway

By Matthew Bryza

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

New Atlanticist Aug 27, 2020

Russia and Turkey may fill in the diplomatic vacuum on Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict

By Matthew Bryza

In the absence of US or EU leadership, it may be up to Turkey and Russia to redirect Azerbaijan and Armenia away from the battlefield and toward the negotiating table.

Conflict The Caucasus

New Atlanticist Sep 28, 2020

Explainer: What’s behind the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

By Ariel Cohen and Hayley Arlin

Conflict The Caucasus

The post Armenia and Azerbaijan should seize chance for peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Georgia’s parliamentary elections are surrounded by uncertainty

Nino Ghvinadze and Laura Linderman — Tue, 27 Oct 2020 18:09:20 +0000

While attention remains fixed on the outcome of the US presidential election on November 3, voters in the Caucasus nation of Georgia will also go to the polls on October 31 in an important electoral contest. Amidst a global pandemic and the sudden escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia is holding its first parliamentary elections since hard-fought electoral reforms were approved in June 2020 and several dramatic developments have increased uncertainty about the outcome.

A constitutional compromise

Constitutional changes initially proposed and but then voted down by the ruling Georgian Dream party, sought to transform Georgia’s electoral system from a mixed set-up—where some seats were allocated by proportional totals, while others were elected in first-past-the-post districts—to a fully proportional system. After popular protests and months-long negotiations between Georgian Dream and the opposition coalition mediated by international partners, Georgians reached a compromise—only thirty single-mandate seats up for grabs, down from seventy-three in past cycles, and a 1 percent threshold to gain representation in parliament. This change ensures a more pluralistic parliament and fewer chances for a single political party to hold onto disproportionate power. In other words, there is a chance Georgia will have to form a coalition government for the first time in its history. While this is something majority of the voters may want, there are no signs forming a coalition will be an easy process in current political landscape.

The global pandemic

The pandemic is creating great uncertainty worldwide, impacting Georgia’s elections by threatening to decrease voter turnout and raise questions about transparency. Although the country managed to keep new cases of COVID-19 around an average of a dozen per day from March through August, the past two months have seen cases rise sharply, reaching 1,872 new daily infections on October 26. With an increasing number of cases, many fear that turnout could be much lower than normal. The pandemic has also created a hurdle that is guaranteed to present a challenge for a democratic election: the expected absence of international election observers. Although citizens and political observers expect Georgia will hold credible and democratic elections overall, local watchdog organizations are reporting an increase in reports of voter intimidation and threats against civil servants, activists, and opposition politicians.

Before the pandemic hit, the ruling Georgian Dream party was on shaky political ground: only 20 percent of the population supported the party, disgruntled with a poor economy, the party’s inability to pass sweeping electoral reforms, and the Georgian Parliament’s hosting of a speech by Russian Member of Parliament Sergei Gavrilov. Between 100,000 and 200,000 Georgians have lost their source of income due to the pandemic, according to varying estimates, and not all of them have qualified for temporary government assistance. According to the World Bank, the Georgian economy is predicted to contract by 6 percent this year. It is not surprising that the government is reluctant to introduce a second lockdown—at least not until after Election Day—in order to avoid losing more political favor. Moreover, even though the government’s swift response to the COVID-19 first wave and effective cooperation with the Georgian National Center for Disease Control in implementing lockdowns increased voters’ trust in their government, that trust may be fleeting: as a second wave is gaining force and daily infections are reaching two thousand cases, more people are asking whether the government used the time spent in lockdown to effectively prepare the country’s economic, education, and healthcare systems.

Escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The late-September escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has increased fears that Russia is strengthening its influence and presence in the South Caucasus. A short-lived ceasefire announced in Moscow on October 10 was another symbolic display of Russia’s critical role in post-Soviet conflicts. These tensions were coupled with a surprise investigation into the Georgian-Azerbaijani border demarcation case launched in the beginning of October. The case is widely seen as politically motivated and timed to influence Georgian voters’ national sentiments in favor of the ruling Georgian Dream right before the election. Despite this, reviving sensitive border disputes at a time when Azerbaijan is involved in a war further plays into the fears of the Georgian public and makes the country more vulnerable to external interference.

What the polls say

Different polls conducted in July and October 2020 suggest the Georgian Dream party has a significant lead; however, it is not certain that the party will be able to form a government independently. New rules require one party to gain 40.6 percent of votes to form a one-party government. A compilation of five different opinion polls below in Graph 1, commissioned by both pro-government and pro-opposition television channels and nonpartisan organizations, all clearly show that a large proportion of the electorate is still undecided. An estimate based on an expert poll by the Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) does not include the high number of undecided voters, but similar to the opinion polls, it gives the top three polling spots to Georgian Dream, United National Movement, and European Georgia as shown in Graph 2.

Graph 1: Compilation of different opinion polls

Graph compiled by authors.

Graph 2: Corridor of expectations

Source: Georgian Institute of Politics October 2020 Expert Poll, issue #13

All opinion polls demonstrate that Georgians are united on most domestic and foreign policy issues. Voters even have a consensus on what divides the country—personalities rather than policies. The history of Georgia’s elections reflects only one transition of power through the election, in 2012. With so much uncertainty surrounding the 2020 election, it is imperative for the government to conduct a transparent election and that politicians work to form a healthy coalition government, if indicated by the will of the people on October 31.

Nino Ghvinadze is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Laura Linderman is a senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Five big questions as America votes: Eurasia

By Eurasia Center

Easy answers to the Eurasia region have long eluded both a Trump administration and Vice President Biden when he served in the Obama administration—will an electoral victory now give the next US president the momentum needed to manage these foreign policy challenges?

Belarus Conflict

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

End the Russian veto on Georgian accession

By Luke Coffey and Alexis Mrachek

Admitting Georgia to NATO without extending an Article 5 guarantee to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region can fulfil the promise of the Bucharest Summit.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

New Atlanticist Oct 10, 2020

Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire revives “Basic Principles” and demonstrates Putin’s continued sway

By Matthew Bryza

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The post Georgia’s parliamentary elections are surrounded by uncertainty appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Five big questions as America votes: Eurasia

Eurasia Center — Mon, 26 Oct 2020 18:30:47 +0000

As part of the Atlantic Council’s Elections 2020 programming, the New Atlanticist will feature a series of pieces looking at the major questions facing the United States around the world as Americans head to the polls.

The issues facing the Eurasia region have largely stayed out of the closing days of the US presidential election, but these will undoubtedly be some of the most pressing tests for the victor on November 3. Rapidly developing crises like the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and ongoing mass protests to oust Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka are matched by the lasting challenges of Vladimir Putin’s resurgent Russia and Ukraine’s fight for reform and an end to the war in the Donbas. Easy answers to the Eurasia region have long eluded both a Trump administration and Vice President Biden when he served in the Obama administration—will an electoral victory now give the next US president the momentum needed to manage these foreign policy challenges?

Below are the five major questions facing the United States in Eurasia as the US elections approach, answered by top experts:

What measures can the United States take to help resolve the boiling conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh?

The current military phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should finish within the next few weeks, with Azerbaijan potentially regaining a significant amount of its seven districts that surround Nagorno-Karabakh. At that point, Washington’s most immediate concerns should be: (1) the safety and security of ethnic Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh; and (2) political negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh’s future, including its legal status, the return of internally displaced Azerbaijanis, and peaceful coexistence of its (future) Azerbaijani and (current) Armenian residents. Washington should, therefore, take a leading role in assembling a multinational peacekeeping force under the auspices of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but without troop contributions from Russia, the United States, or France, who co-chair the conflict’s international mediating body, the OSCE’s “Minsk Group.” Washington should also elevate its mediation to the highest political level, aiming to finalize the Minsk Group’s “Basic Principles” for a political settlement that takes into account the territorial integrity of states, self-determination of peoples, and non-use/non-threat of force.

President Trump might welcome a chance to work with Russian President Vladimir Putin on this but should resist any push for Russian peacekeepers, given their nefarious record of stoking tension in Georgia and Moldova. If Joe Biden succeeds President Trump, the new president will be intellectually prepared and strategically disposed toward driving a multinational mediation effort but may feel politically constrained by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s reluctance to embrace the Basic Principles.

Matthew Bryza, senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, former US ambassador to Azerbaijan, and former deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.

How can the next administration take advantage of political and economic reforms in Central Asia to further US interests in a region dominated by Russia and China?

Most observers may not realize it, but Central Asia thirty years after independence is a success story. Most analysts focus on the authoritarian politics, corruption and, in most places, poverty that predominate in Central Asia. They take for granted the stability and, largely, neighborly relations that the five post-Soviet “Stans” enjoy. This stability is more remarkable given the region’s location, bordering the world’s two largest revisionist powers, Russia and China. The next US president should build on the thirty years of consistent US policy, and more energetically project US influence in the region to further bolster the five countries as China more aggressively pursues its Belt and Road Initiative, and Russia hawks the Eurasian Economic Union.

The natural partner here is Uzbekistan, which under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has opened up to its neighbors and which has since 1990 looked with prudent suspicion on the designs of its large neighbors. If Trump wins, he should reach out shortly after the election; if Biden wins, shortly after the inauguration. The pitch should be to enhance intelligence cooperation, in the first instance against terrorism, and to offer Uzbekistan both training and equipment for counter-terrorism operations. To do this, the United states will also have to work more closely with Tashkent on improving its human rights performance, something President Mirziyoyev is already addressing. Both sides can also discuss improving the economic relationship—and increasing American direct investment—if Uzbekistan moves on economic reform.

The other large Central Asian state, Kazakhstan, shares a long border with Russia, has a substantial number of Russian citizens, and therefore has always been more accommodating to Moscow. But a larger US role in Uzbekistan would likewise encourage Kazakhstan to seek closer cooperation with Washington, albeit within limits—another good result. At some point—when it recognizes that revisionism in the Near Abroad is not a vital Russian concern—Moscow will come to understand that a larger US role in Central Asia will serve Russian interests by deterring the real giant in the room: Beijing.

John E. Herbst, director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Ukraine has made major progress since the 2014 Maidan Revolution, but serious challenges remain on its path to reform and in the ongoing war with Russia. What can we expect from each candidate in how they would approach policy toward Ukraine?

With some anomalies and nuances, US policy towards Ukraine has been consistent since the Maidan Revolution led to the flight of authoritarian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. The United States has helped Ukraine withstand Kremlin aggression in Crimea and Donbas by sanctioning Moscow and providing military assistance. In conjunction with the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank, Washington has likewise encouraged reform in Ukraine by providing advice and substantial, conditional financial assistance. This policy has produced real, but limited results. Ukraine has fought Moscow to a standstill in Donbas; Moscow pays an economic price for its war; and Ukraine has achieved substantial, but incomplete and fitful reform. Right now, the reform process is largely stalled. Since the United States has a vital interest in stopping Kremlin revisionism in Europe, the president elected November 3 should maintain and sharpen current policy. That means more military aid for Ukraine, ensuring the failure of Nord Stream II, and imposing additional sanctions if Moscow escalates in Ukraine. Such escalation could be a significant increase of Moscow’s harassment of shipping to and from Ukraine’s ports in the Sea of Azov or any offensive seizing more land from Ukrainian control. Whoever wins the presidency should invite President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Washington for an official visit early in the year and should use the occasion to announce the nomination of a new US envoy for the negotiations on peace in Donbas.

John E. Herbst, director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

How would US policy towards Russia change under President Trump’s second term, or in a Biden administration?

The start of a new presidential administration, whether a Trump 2.0 or Biden 1.0, is an opportunity for a more coherent US policy toward Russia. With Trump, coherence is the opposite of what we have seen over the past four years. While his administration deserves good marks for deterring Russia along NATO’s eastern flank and enforcing Congressional sanctions, Trump has trashed relations with Allied leaders, encouraged Russian interference in our elections, and ignored Russia’s payment of bounties to the Taliban. Rather than “getting along” with Russia, we face a Putin who feels undeterred as he continues his political war against Western democracy, destabilizes his neighbors, expands Russia’s footprint in the Middle East, and even uses chemical weapons against his political enemies—and then lies about it. A re-elected Trump, free of “adults in the room” and not facing another election, could go even further in making Russia great again, potentially withdrawing from NATO and acquiescing in Russia’s full subjugation of Ukraine, Belarus, and other neighbors—a new Yalta.

Prospects for containing Russian aggression and stabilizing relations are brighter under a Biden presidency. He will end the mixed signals that have emboldened Putin and make clear that improved relations hinge on Russia ending its aggressive behavior, not another superficial reset. To change Putin’s calculus, Biden will renew US alliances, revitalize NATO’s defense posture, and work with allies to impose higher costs on Russia for its aggression and interference in Western democracies. He will invest in stronger cyber defenses, block the flow of Russian dirty money in our banking systems, and boost efforts to counter Russian manipulation of social media. Biden will increase US political and military support for Ukraine and Russia’s other beleaguered neighbors and urge Allies to tighten sanctions until Russia stops occupying their sovereign territory (at which point sanctions can be swiftly lifted). He will step up US diplomatic engagement to break the stalemate in the negotiations and secure a just peace.

Biden’s challenge will be to increase the pressure on Russia and restore US credibility while offering Russia a pathway back to normal relations. To get the ball rolling, he could take a page from the Cold War playbook and lay out a comprehensive agenda for arms control, confidence-building, and risk-reduction measures, starting with extension of the New START Treaty. These measures could help manage the competition and reduce the risk that a crisis could escalate to military confrontation. His administration could seek Russian cooperation on problems where our interests overlap, such as denuclearization of North Korea and a successor to the Iran nuclear deal. Agreements in these areas could improve the atmosphere for talks on sensitive issues like Ukraine.

Alexander Vershbow, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former deputy secretary general of NATO and US ambassador to Russia.

How can the United States best support protestors in Belarus?

The United States can support Belarusian protesters in three ways. First, at the political and diplomatic level, US officials can meet on a regular basis with the protestors’ leadership (both in Belarus and in exile, in Vilnius and Warsaw, currently), treating them as we did the leaders of Poland’s Solidarity movement in the 1980s—as a legitimate voice of Belarusian society and potential future leaders of the country. US leaders should encourage the EU and European governments to do the same. Second, at the grassroots level, the United States can establish and fund programs (with civil society taking the lead) to support civil society, human rights defenders, and independent media. That should include increasing student and other exchanges. Finally, the Belarusian protest movement can be effectively supported at the presidential level—with the victor of the November election speaking out on their behalf, and act in ways that show we mean what we say. Above all, listen to the protesters, who know best what they need. Take their requests, and cautions, seriously. Either a Trump or Biden administration could undertake these actions, but President Trump is unlikely to mean it, and European governments would know that—as would Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Daniel Fried, Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

Learn more

The post Five big questions as America votes: Eurasia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

End the Russian veto on Georgian accession

Luke Coffey and Alexis Mrachek — Wed, 14 Oct 2020 18:00:02 +0000

download pdf

listen to the podcast

nato 20/2020

all episodes

At NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, the allies refused to go along with a US push to offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP), but agreed that it would someday become a member of the Alliance.¹ Germany and France intended for this equivocation to allay Russian objections, yet it was seized upon by Vladimir Putin as an opportunity to block Georgia’s path to the Alliance. In August 2008, a mere four months after the Bucharest Summit, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied twenty percent of its internationally recognized territory. With some creativity and bold political will, however, Georgia’s accession into NATO is still feasible, despite the Russian occupation.

The consequences of the five-day war in 2008 are still felt today. Thousands of Russian troops occupy Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region (more commonly known as South Ossetia),² both of which Moscow recognized as sovereign states after the war in flagrant violation of international law and the principles of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). To this day, Russian aggression continues with “creeping annexations”³ of even more Georgian territory. Russia also carries out cyberattacks⁴ and disinformation campaigns⁵ in an attempt to discredit the Georgian government and undermine state institutions. However, the most lasting negative impact of the 2008 war has been the de facto veto Russia now holds over Georgia’s NATO membership.

To be sure, NATO members have legitimate concerns about Georgia joining the Alliance. For example, considering its geography, could NATO develop a realistic plan to reinforce and defend Georgia if called upon? Turkey is very important to this issue. There are also concerns about whether Georgia’s democracy and political stability have developed enough to justify membership. One of the biggest concerns shared by North American and European policy makers alike is Russia’s occupation of Georgian territory. Many allies are worried that if Georgia were to be granted membership, then NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee could mean an immediate conflict with Russia over these occupied regions. However, this challenge is not insurmountable.

One idea worth considering is inviting Georgia—including Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region—to join NATO, but only covering the areas outside of the two occupied regions under NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee.

Soldiers participate in a drill as part of the US-Georgian bilateral Georgia Defence Readiness Programme during a visit to Georgia by NATO’s Military Committee.

(Source: NATO Flickr)

One idea worth considering is inviting Georgia—including Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region—to join NATO, but only covering the areas outside of the two occupied regions under NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee. This would persist for at least the foreseeable future and strike a reasonable compromise between a Georgia “whole and free” in NATO and addressing concerns over security guarantees in the contested regions.

To make this work, NATO would need to amend Article 6 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which defines where Article 5 applies, to temporarily exclude Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. This amendment could be made during Georgia’s accession-protocol process. Accession protocols are essentially “amendments or additions to the Treaty, which once signed and ratified by Allies, become an integral part of the Treaty itself and permit the invited countries to become parties to the Treaty.”⁶ However, it should be made clear that the amendment to Article 6 would only be a temporary measure until Georgia’s full and internationally recognized territory is restored by peaceful means.

Despite sounding quixotic, the proposal has merits. In 2010, Georgia unilaterally pledged not to use force to restore its control over the two regions under Russian occupation.⁷ If Georgia will not use its own armed forces to liberate these regions, there is no need for an Article 5 security guarantee that covers Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region.⁸

Watch the video

This would not be without precedent as Article 6 has been amended and modified before. In 1951, just two years after NATO’s formation, it was modified prior to Greece and Turkey joining the Alliance. In 1963, Article 6’s meaning was amended when the North Atlantic Council acknowledged that the “Algerian Departments of France” no longer applied since Algeria had gained independence. The Council decided to keep the wording but stripped the words “Algerian Departments of France” of their legal impact.⁹ Similar modifications could be made for Georgia.

Moreover, there are countless examples of NATO members that do not have all their territory under the protection of Article 5, including the United States with its territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean, the United Kingdom with the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean, and France with Réunion Island in the Indian Ocean.

At the time of admitting Greece and Turkey into NATO in 1952, World War II hero and US Army Gen. Omar Bradley, while serving as the first chairman of the NATO Military Committee, made the case to US senators that Greece and Turkey would bolster [US Army Gen. Dwight D.] Eisenhower’s southeastern flank and would “serve as powerful deterrents to aggression.”¹⁰ Today, the same case could be made for Georgia. Georgia’s geostrategic location in the South Caucasus, its professional and capable military (and its political will to use it), and its commitment to liberty and democracy would make it a powerful addition to the stability of the transatlantic community.

Georgia’s geostrategic location in the South Caucasus, its professional and capable military (and its political will to use it), and its commitment to liberty and democracy would make it a powerful addition to the stability of the transatlantic community.

However, the onus to make this case does not fall solely on the United States and its NATO allies. Georgians, too, must take action to speed along their nation’s membership prospects. First, the Georgian government should, at least privately, acknowledge to NATO members that it is willing to join the Alliance without Abkhazia or the Tskhinvali Region under Article 5 protection until these occupied regions have been peacefully returned to Georgia. Tbilisi must first find the political will to support the idea of amending Article 6. Until signals are sent to allied capitals that the Georgian government is on board, do not expect movement on this issue from the Alliance.

Second, the issue of NATO membership must remain above domestic party politics in Georgia. It must be perceived as a unifying national effort. The leaders of all of Georgia’s major political parties should sign a joint letter that explicitly states their support for the country’s transatlantic aspirations and temporarily amending Article 6. In addition, the official Georgian delegation to the next NATO Summit should include the leaders from opposition parties who support Georgian membership in the Alliance—something that should become routine practice. These measures will show NATO members that even though Georgia is a politically divided country (like most democracies around the world), there is political unity on the issue of NATO membership. These proactive efforts from Georgia would energize NATO capitals on the issue.

Unfortunately, this proposal is not without its challenges. Russia is likely to launch a disinformation campaign to claim that amending Article 6 to temporarily exclude the occupied regions is proof that the Georgian people do not want them back. While Russian tactics are a legitimate concern, it should not prevent policy makers from pursuing this proposal. Russia is conducting perpetual disinformation campaigns against the Georgian people and will continue to do so, regardless of whether or not Article 6 is amended. Further, countering Russian disinformation will be crucial for the success of this proposal.

Instead of succumbing to Russian efforts to mislead, Georgian and NATO authorities can get ahead of the debate by launching a public relations campaign to explain the proposal and how it would mutually benefit Georgia and the Alliance. It should be made crystal clear that NATO and both the Georgian and US governments are not changing their policies on Georgia’s territorial integrity. Such a decisive response will imbue the proposal with a spirit of defiance and clear political will, extend the collective security umbrella against Russia’s de facto veto, and at the very least, surprise Moscow. At best, it would welcome a new member into the transatlantic community that is fiercely committed to enduring deterrence. Equally valuable, admitting Georgia would cement NATO’s open-door policy for qualified countries as an important contribution to transatlantic security since the first round of enlargement in 1952. This policy has helped to ensure the Alliance’s central place as the prime guarantor of security in Europe and admitting Georgia would extend that guarantee further in the contested Black Sea region.

Some NATO members may not immediately support amending Article 6. Since NATO makes all of its major decisions by consensus, the process of welcoming Georgia into the Alliance under the terms outlined here would require strong leadership, intense diplomatic negotiations, and, perhaps most importantly, patience. Policy makers should not expect universal support overnight. As the NATO powers historically most reluctant to offer Georgia a MAP, Germany and France will likely object to this proposal early in the process. This is to be expected, but if nothing else, there will finally be a meaningful debate about a responsible and realistic way to welcome Georgia into the Alliance. The debate would push Germany and France to put forward an alternative proposal, which thus far they have failed to provide.

Finally, it is crucial that the United States play a leadership role by building a coalition of support for this proposal inside the Alliance. Washington can leverage its “special relationship” with the UK and focus on outreach to NATO’s Central and Eastern European member states, which will be generally supportive. This should also include working with Turkey, one of the Alliance’s strongest supporters of Georgian membership.¹¹

Key to selling NATO members on the proposal will be dispelling the myth that Georgia cannot join the Alliance until the issue of its disputed territory is peaceably resolved. This is a common misconception that has its roots in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement carried out by the Alliance. A closer reading of this document shows that a territorial dispute does not necessarily prevent a country from joining the Alliance. Here is what the study says on the matter:

“States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.”¹²

While it is in NATO’s best interest that any outstanding border disputes be resolved before members join the Alliance, the last sentence of the aforementioned paragraph clearly states that the resolution of such disputes would be “a factor,” and not the factor, in determining whether to invite a country to join NATO.

Russia likely will not end its occupation of Georgian territory in the near future, so creativity regarding Georgia’s future NATO membership is necessary. Amending Article 6 to state that Russian-occupied regions would be temporarily excluded from the Article 5 security protection is a realistic, responsible, and reasonable way to admit Georgia into NATO while accounting for concerns on both sides of the Atlantic. Equally important, it will send a strong message to Moscow that it no longer has a de facto veto on NATO enlargement.

* * *

Luke Coffey is the director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation.

Alexis Mrachek is a research associate for Russia and Eurasia at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation.

Explore the podcast series

NATO 20/2020 Podcast

NATO 20/2020 is a weekly podcast that explores 20 bold ideas to push NATO to be more visionary, more capable, and more self-evidently valuable to the security of more people.

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Ramp up on Russia

By Alexander Vershbow

NATO needs to increase the costs for Russian aggression while building back crucial dialogue if there is any prospect for improved relations with Moscow.

Arms Control Defense Policy

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Seek membership for Mexico

By Christopher Skaluba, Gabriela R. A. Doyle

Building a relationship between NATO and Mexico may be the key to keeping a rapidly changing America invested in European security.

Europe & Eurasia Mexico

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Reimagine the Washington Treaty

By Damon Wilson and Will O’Brien

Reexamining NATO’s founding charter can be an exercise in creating an Alliance fit for a new geopolitical era.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

Explore the Initiative

Subscribe for events and publications on transatlantic security

Sign up for updates from the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, covering the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

1 Hugh Williamson, “Germany Blocks Ex-Soviets’ NATO Entry,” Financial Times, April 1, 2008, https://www.ft.com/content/ab8eb6a6-ff44-11dc-b556-000077b07658

2 The term “South Ossetia” is commonly used to describe the area north of Tbilisi that is under illegal Russian occupation. This name is derived from the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast created in 1922 by the Soviet Union. In 1991, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast declared independence from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, which resulted in the 1991–92 South Ossetia War. When Georgia regained its independence from the Soviet Union later in 1991, it established eleven internal subdivisions (two autonomous republics and nine regions). The area in Georgia that attempted to break away in 1991, that now has been under Russian occupation since 2008, is commonly referred to as “South Ossetia.” However, “South Ossetia” is not one of the eleven subdivisions of Georgia, but instead includes parts of Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Shida Kartli, Imereti, Racha-Lechkhumi, and the Kvemo Svaneti regions. Since using the term “South Ossetia” feeds into Russia’s propaganda, this essay will refer to this region as the “Tskhinvali Region.” (Tskhinvali is the largest city under Russian occupation.)

3 McCain Institute, “McCain Institute Unveils Tracker of Russian ‘Borderization’ in Georgia,” October 16, 2019, https://www.mccaininstitute.org/news/mccain-institute-unveils-tracker-of-russian-borderization-in-georgia/; McCain Institute, Heritage Foundation, and Economic Policy Research Center in Georgia, “Russian Borderization in Georgia,” October 2019, https://uploads.knightlab.com/storymapjs/183ab9d69fc702c33a79bfcd27b7b4d8/russian-borderization-in-georgia/index.html

4 Ryan Browne, “US and UK Accuse Russia of Major Cyber Attack on Georgia,” CNN, February 20, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/20/politics/russia-georgia-hacking/index.html.

5 McCain Institute, “Tracking and Refuting Disinformation in Georgia: Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report,” November 2019, https://www.mccaininstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/final-report_disinformationgeogia.pdf

6 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), “NATO Enlargement,” last updated May 5, 2020, https://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/05-enlargement.html

7 Civil Georgia, “Georgia Makes ‘Unilateral Pledge’ of Non-Use of Force,” November 23, 2010, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22880

8 A similar proposal would not apply to Ukraine because Kyiv does not have a non-use of force pledge regarding Russian-occupied Crimea and the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine. While the fate of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine were linked in 2008, more than a decade later, it is time for a decoupling. This is not meant to be a criticism of Ukraine; NATO should aspire to bring Ukraine into the Alliance someday. This is merely a reflection of the different realities in the two countries.

9 Antoaneta Boeva and Ivan Novotny, “Scope and Historical Developments of Article 6,” Emory International Law Review, 34 (2019): Rev. 121, https://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-34/issue-special/articles/scope-historical-developments-article-6.html

10 George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s NATO Entry Contained the Soviets (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), p. 88, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-1-349-20503-5_6.pdf

11 Luke Baker, “Turkish Foreign Minister Calls for Enlarged NATO, Georgia Membership,” Reuters, January 23, 2020, https://mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKBN1ZM1HB

12 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), “Study on NATO Enlargement,” last updated November 5, 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm

The post End the Russian veto on Georgian accession appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire revives “Basic Principles” and demonstrates Putin’s continued sway

Matthew Bryza — Sat, 10 Oct 2020 17:03:22 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin filled a diplomatic vacuum in the South Caucasus on October 9 by cajoling the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to agree to a ceasefire in their long-time war over Nagorno Karabakh, which resumed on September 27. While dubbed a temporary humanitarian ceasefire to enable prisoner exchanges and recovery of fallen soldiers’ bodies, Putin likely intends it to be permanent and to pave the way for renewed negotiations of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group. While Azerbaijan would have preferred to continue pressing its military advantage, it will now have a chance to return to negotiations from a new position of strength. The agreement also suggests that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was forced to retract several provocative statements that had torpedoed the peace talks as the price for Azerbaijan ceasing its military operations.

Assuming the agreement holds (despite mounting reports of ceasefire violations hours after it went into effect), its third and fourth points commit Azerbaijan and Armenia to return to negotiations under mediation by the OSCE’s Minsk Group according to the “Basic Principles” preliminarily agreed (though never finalized) in January 2009. Both countries also commit to the “immutability” of the negotiating format.

The “Basic Principles” call for the return to Azerbaijan’s control of all seven Armenia-occupied territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh in exchange for Nagorno Karabakh gaining a temporary legal status, which would be finalized at an indeterminate time in the future by a vote of the region’s population. The ethnic Armenian residents of Nagorno Karabakh would also obtain security guarantees in the form of international peacekeepers and a transit corridor connecting Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia. This was thus a variant of the classic formula of “land for peace.”

The negotiating format, meanwhile, is an OSCE-led discussion between the countries of Azerbaijan and Armenia and without participation by representatives of Nagorno Karabakh, a political entity that is not recognized by any country, not even Armenia.

When Pashinyan came to power in 2018, he originally committed to try to finalize the “Basic Principles.” He even issued a joint statement with Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev following their first meeting committing them both to strengthen the previous ceasefire of 1994 and to “prepare their populations for peace,” which meant, to convince their citizens to accept the “Basic Principles.” During the past eighteen months, however, Armenia has reversed course. In May 2019, Pashinyan and his minster of defense, Davit Tonoyan, publicly declared the approach of “land for peace” had been replaced by a new doctrine of “new wars for new lands.” Then, in August 2019, Pashinyan announced, “[Nagorno Karabakh] is Armenia. Period.” Finally, Pashinyan publicly repudiated the “Basic Principles,” calling instead for a fresh start to peace negotiations in a new format that would include representatives of Nagorno Karabakh as equal participants with those of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Prime Minister Pashinyan’s new approach thus constituted an attempt to obtain Armenia’s maximal goal, Nagorno Karabakh’s independence, before negotiations even began. President Aliyev rejected this precondition out of hand.

By now agreeing in the October 9 ceasefire agreement, however, to return to negotiation of the “Basic Principles” and in the original negotiating format, Prime Minister Pashinyan has retracted his previous provocative statements, beating a diplomatic retreat that will likely damage him politically, perhaps severely. This was apparently the price President Aliyev extracted, presumably with Putin’s support, in exchange for not pressing Azerbaijan’s military advantage on the ground.

Aliyev’s agreement to cease military operations, however, is deeply unpopular in Azerbaijan, where nationalist sentiment for a “total military victory” (meaning Armenia’s full withdrawal from Nagorno Karabakh and all seven surrounding territories) had reached fever pitch. Aliyev can contain popular disappointment by arguing that Azerbaijan has won a preliminary victory by successfully using military force to compel Pashinyan to retract his provocative statements (and for which Aliyev had demanded an apology) and to return to the negotiating table with Azerbaijan now enjoying a new and stronger position. Indeed, Azerbaijan has now recovered significant swaths of its territory in the occupied districts of Jabrayil and Fizuli, as well as the district of Agdere inside Nagorno Karabakh itself. These gains also enable Aliyev to argue to his citizens that Azerbaijan has now recovered an unprecedentedly large portion of its lands, which will enable hundreds of thousands of displaced persons to return to their homes.

What President Aliyev is less likely to argue publicly is that the October 9 ceasefire agreement also resolves two challenges related to Azerbaijan’s military operations. First, the agreement removes Azerbaijan’s need to manage its growing number of Armenian prisoners of war, with the International Committee of the Red Cross now stepping in to conduct prisoner exchanges between both sides. Second, the agreement allows Azerbaijan, at least for now, to consolidate its military gains while conserving soldiers’ lives and weapons, just as fighting was moving from flat lowlands into more difficult terrain in hills and mountains.

The big winner at the moment, however, appears to be Putin. By taking control of negotiations and issuing a surprise summons to Moscow for the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Putin has demonstrated once again that he is the diplomatic kingmaker of the South Caucasus. No other international leader was either willing or able to persuade Azerbaijan to stop its military offensive, which was gaining ground and prompting desperation in Armenia. By doing so, Putin will now be seen as living up to Armenia’s expectations of support from its treaty ally under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but without involving Russia directly in the fighting. Moreover, by avoiding a “total victory” by Azerbaijan, Putin has averted the political challenges of both a Baku that might become too difficult for Moscow to manage, as well as accusations of having “abandoned Armenia.”

In short, the October 9 ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a diplomatic masterstroke for Putin in pursuit of his perennial goal with regard to the “frozen conflicts around Russia’s periphery, “to keep the pot stirred, but not let it to boil over.”

Matthew Bryza is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He served as a US diplomat for over two decades, including as US ambassador to Azerbaijan and deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.

Author’s translation of the agreement follows below:

A ceasefire is enacted as of 12:00 on October 10 2020 for humanitarian reasons to exchange prisoners and other detained persons as well as bodies of those who have perished, under mediation by and in accordance with the criteria of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Concrete parameters of the ceasefire regime will be additionally agreed.

The Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Armenia, with mediation by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group of the OSCE and on the basis of the Basic Principles of regulation of the conflict, will enter into substantive negotiations with the goal of rapidly reaching a peaceful regulation of the conflict.

The sides confirm the immutability of the negotiating process’s format.

Russia and Turkey may fill in the diplomatic vacuum on Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict

By Matthew Bryza

In the absence of US or EU leadership, it may be up to Turkey and Russia to redirect Azerbaijan and Armenia away from the battlefield and toward the negotiating table.

Conflict The Caucasus

New Atlanticist Sep 28, 2020

Explainer: What’s behind the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

By Ariel Cohen and Hayley Arlin

Conflict The Caucasus

New Atlanticist Mar 19, 2020

Azerbaijan’s strongman senses opportunity in coronavirus pandemic

By Doug Klain

While many countries are scrambling to protect the public from COVID-19, authorities in Azerbaijan are using the virus as a pretext to continue their harassment of opposition groups.

Civil Society Coronavirus

The post Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire revives “Basic Principles” and demonstrates Putin’s continued sway appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bryza joins CNN International to discuss the Nagorno- Karabakh dispute

Nicole Meir — Tue, 29 Sep 2020 19:36:56 +0000

Explainer: What’s behind the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

Ariel Cohen and Hayley Arlin — Mon, 28 Sep 2020 16:07:06 +0000

The current escalation is the most serious since 1994. Armenian Deputy Defense Minister Artur Sargsyan has announced preliminary figures suggesting that sixteen Armenians have already been killed, with over 100 wounded. Azeri sources report “liberation” of up to eight villages and one regional center. The escalation comes two months after a three-day flare-up in the Tovuz/Tavush region of Azerbaijan/Armenia respectively, hundreds of kilometers from Karabakh.

Nagorno-Karabakh, which translates to “mountainous black garden,” is an amalgam of Russian and Turkic words. It is a landlocked region within Azerbaijan’s borders, occupied by Armenia and surrounded by a militarized buffer zone. The region’s geography is further complicated by the exclave of Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic within Armenia, located southwest of Nagorno-Karabakh near the Iranian border. Any massive Azerbaijani action against Karabakh may result in an Armenia offensive against Nakhichevan.

Following the USSR’s dissolution, longstanding tensions over the conflicting claims bubbled over. In 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh National Assembly voted to become part of Armenia, sparking widespread violence between Azeri and Armenian forces and ethnic cleansing on both sides. The international community did not recognize the vote, as it accepted the territorial integrity of the states that emerged from the Soviet Union.

A referendum held in 1991—boycotted by the region’s Azeri residents—declared independence from Azerbaijan. By 1992, the conflict expanded into a full-scale war, resulting in between 20,000 and 30,000 military deaths and over one million displaced people.

The Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents signed a Russian-brokered ceasefire in 1994, leaving Nagorno-Karabakh under nominal Armenian control. That same year, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) formed the Minsk Group, tasked with facilitating a lasting peace between the two nations. The organization’s co-chairs—France, Russia, and the United States—do not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-proclaimed independence yet oppose surrendering the area entirely to Azerbaijan before a negotiated solution.

Despite the efforts of the Minsk Group diplomats, the two belligerents refuse to solve the conflict peacefully. Nagorno-Karabakh’s location on the far eastern fringe of Europe, the United States and Europe’s preoccupation with the Middle East and North Africa, and the challenges of diplomatically engaging authoritarian regimes have limited progress. Divergent interests among the Minsk Group’s principals have transformed the peace platform into a forum for posturing rather than peacebuilding.

“War has started between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was as predictable as it is unnecessary,” Richard Kauzlarich, the former US Ambassador to Azerbaijan, told us. “The poor people of Armenia and Azerbaijan are paying the price for uninspired leadership in Baku and Yerevan that refused to seize opportunity after opportunity to peacefully deal with the conflict regarding Nagorno Karabakh. Now the war is no longer about Nagorno Karabakh. How this will end is uncertain, but one thing is sure—Azerbaijanis and Armenians will die because of this unnecessary tragedy. [This is an example of how] the commitment of outside powers to a peaceful resolution won’t work if it is greater than the commitment of the two parties to the conflict—Armenia and Azerbaijan.”

Tensions have yet again erupted into violence on an unprecedented level, and regional powers have taken sides, with Turkey coming to the aid of Azerbaijan while traditionally Armenia-aligned Russia has called for a renewed ceasefire and further peace talks. “Launching a new attack against Azerbaijan, Armenia has once again shown that it constitutes the biggest threat against peace and comfort in the region,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on September 27. Russian President Vladimir Putin called for an immediate end of hostilities after talking to the Armenian Premier Nikol Pashinyan. Russia is an historic ally of Armenia and the Karabakh flare-up could be another stress-test for the complex Moscow-Ankara relationship.

Oil is important in this conflict as well. Two pipelines carry oil and gas from Azerbaijan through the Caucasus, both of which pass only 60 km from Nagorno-Karabakh. The oil and gas rich Caspian region has only two export routes to the West: one through Russia, and one through the Caucasus. Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh could endanger the two pipelines: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Oil Pipeline and the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline. Europe’s hopes of tapping the Caspian’s resources to reduce its dependence on Russian crude oil sources may be in danger. Under its Southern Gas Corridor strategy, the EU hopes to see an additional 16 billion cubic meters of Caspian gas come through the Southern Caucasus Pipeline.

Azeri-leaning sources are reporting Armenia’s deployment of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters close to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor in this recent outbreak of violence, while pro-Kurdish and Russian sources report the deployment of Turkish-supported Muslim militias from Syria to Azerbaijan—to fight Armenians.

Iran is now stepping in, demanding peace and claiming its intentions “to use all its capabilities to help talks to start.” This might prompt the United States to take a proactive role in negotiating a ceasefire.

Russia has its hands full. It has complicated relations with Pashinyan, who came to power in a “velvet revolution” without Moscow’s blessing. It enjoys strong ties with Baku, including arms sales. It is preoccupied with the opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s poisoning, support of the Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and the upcoming US election. The Kremlin will need to balance its desire to protect its political-military influence in the region with securing its strategic and economic interests vis-à-vis Turkey.

Passions are high in both Baku and Yerevan. The risk of further escalation is great and the conflict could also drag in Moscow and Ankara. That is in nobody’s interests. The United States should activate the Minsk Group immediately to establish a stable ceasefire. Inaction is too dangerous.

Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and director of the Energy, Growth and Security Program at the International Tax and Investment Center (ITICnet.org). He is the founding principal of International Market Analysis Ltd.

Hayley Arlin is an intern with the International Tax and Investment Center.

Activists fight COVID-19 disinformation in the Caucasus

By Larry Luxner

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia now face a new and growing threat: the steady stream of propaganda related to how and why COVID-19 is spreading throughout the Caucasus.

Disinformation The Caucasus

New Atlanticist Jul 2, 2019

For Armenia’s Pashinyan, Poroshenko’s presidency should serve as a cautionary tale

By Colby Galliher

The fate of Ukraine’s former president Petro Poroshenko, another post-revolutionary leader in a former Soviet state, should illustrate for Pashinyan the perils of failing to keep promises to combat judicial corruption.

Corruption Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Mar 19, 2020

Azerbaijan’s strongman senses opportunity in coronavirus pandemic

By Doug Klain

While many countries are scrambling to protect the public from COVID-19, authorities in Azerbaijan are using the virus as a pretext to continue their harassment of opposition groups.

Civil Society Coronavirus

The post Explainer: What’s behind the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia and Turkey may fill in the diplomatic vacuum on Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict

Matthew Bryza — Thu, 27 Aug 2020 14:07:00 +0000

Last month, Armenia and Azerbaijan had their second most serious flareup in fighting since their 1994 ceasefire during their war over Nagorno Karabakh. These latest clashes may have unleashed a dangerous new geopolitical dynamic: heavy weapons fire near strategic transportation assets, military posturing between Russia and Turkey, and lack of an appropriate mediation mechanism. In the absence of US or EU leadership, it may be up to Turkey and Russia to redirect Azerbaijan and Armenia away from the battlefield and toward the negotiating table.

Who shot first on July 12 remains unclear. Both sides agree a pair of Azerbaijani soldiers were riding that night in a jeep along the two countries’ un-demarcated international border. Yerevan claims its troops warned the two Azerbaijani soldiers to retreat and Azerbaijan responded with artillery fire; Baku claims Armenian artillery fired unprovoked. Ultimately, fifteen Azerbaijani soldiers, including a general, were killed, along with one civilian in Tovuz Province. Four troops and one civilian perished across the border in Armenia’s Tavush Province.

The location of these latest clashes is significant. Tovuz is far from Nagorno Karabakh, which, along with its seven surrounding regions, is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but occupied by Armenia. Frustrated by Armenia’s non-compliance with four United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding Armenia withdraw immediately, Baku has threatened to liberate these territories by force. But Tovuz is different. It is one of the last places Baku would want to see fighting because it lies directly on strategic transportation lines that are essential to Azerbaijan’s independence, economic vitality, and strategic significance. These are the:

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, delivering primarily Azerbaijani crude oil to Mediterranean and Black Sea ports (respectively);

South Caucasus natural gas pipeline, a key element of the EU’s Southern Corridor that will soon pump Azerbaijani gas to the EU via Georgia and Turkey;

Azerbaijan-Georgia highway, part of Europe’s second-longest road project, the E60, which connects France’s Atlantic coast to Kyrgyzstan-China border;

Kars-Tbilisi railroad, providing similar strategic connectivity; and

Fiberoptic cables linking Europe with Central Asia and beyond.

This infrastructure is also strategically important to the United States and NATO. Washington has promoted these oil/gas pipelines for twenty-five years to help its European allies reduce their dependence on Russia, while also avoiding Iran. Meanwhile, the road and rail lines and airspace above comprise a crucial US logistics channel into Afghanistan, enabling one-third of all non-lethal supplies to NATO troops at the height of the Afghan war. And by providing alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, these transit links can also help the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus maintain their own financial independence.

Russia, of course, opposes these routes, seeking to maximize flows of energy, goods, and data via its own networks. Tehran, meanwhile, is expanding its trade corridor into Armenia and onward to post-Soviet and European markets thanks to Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (led by Russia) and its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU. Iran has also reportedly been delivering fuel to Nagorno-Karabakh via Armenia, while Iran’s airspace was essential for Russia’s delivery of weapons to Armenia following its clash with Azerbaijan in July.

Azerbaijan’s shelling of Armenia’s sovereign territory in Tavush, even if in self-defense, provides a justification for Yerevan to request military assistance from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance that includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Armenia’s leaders have long tried to leverage the CSTO against Azerbaijan. They were unable to do so during larger military clashes in April 2016 because that conflict occurred on Azerbaijani territory (near Nagorno-Karabakh). At that time, then-Secretary General of the CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha explained that the CSTO could assist Armenia only if an attack occurred on Armenia’s internationally recognized territory.

Last month’s fighting, in contrast, occurred partially on Armenia’s sovereign territory, which provided Yerevan an opportunity to request an emergency session of the CSTO. Yerevan quickly withdrew its request, however, as an evenhanded CSTO statement on July 14 criticized the “…violation of the ceasefire agreed by the leaderships of [both] Armenia and Azerbaijan.”

Russia nevertheless responded unilaterally, launching its own snap combat drills in Armenia during July 17-20, drawing on its 102^rd military base in Gyumri, Armenia.

Turkey also responded firmly. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan noted on July 14 that “Turkey will never hesitate to stand against any attack on the rights and lands of Azerbaijan, with which it has deep-rooted friendly ties and brotherly relations,” and condemning what he termed “Armenia’s reckless and systematic attacks” on Azerbaijan. Turkey’s Defense Minister Hulusi Akar then warned on July 16 that Armenia will be “brought to account” for its “attack” on Azerbaijan. Large-scale Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises followed during July 29-August 10.

While Turkey and Russia square off in the South Caucasus just as they are in Syria and Libya, neither seeks further escalation. Russia was fought to a standstill by NATO’s second largest military in Syria last February and Libya in May. Turkey, meanwhile, has historically preferred to deter rather than confront Russia’s military adventurism, while preserving the countries’ strong economic relations.

The existing international mediation mechanism to contain conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, does not seem fit-for-purpose. The Minsk Group of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has mediated between Azerbaijan and Armenia since 1992. It is co-chaired by the United States, Russia, and France. (I was the US co-chair during 2006-2009). The group’s mandate, however, limits its focus to Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven surrounding Azerbaijani regions rather than to Armenian territory. Even if its mandate were broadened, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev both seem to have given up for now on the Minsk Group. Pashinyan affirmed during an August 14 BBC TV interview that he had abandoned the basic principles of a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement negotiated by the Minsk Group to which his predecessor informally agreed in January 2009. Aliyev, meanwhile, cited “meaningless negotiations” with Armenia when he fired his respected and veteran Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov on July 16. This occurred against the backdrop of tens of thousands of protestors in Baku demanding a revenge attack against Armenia for what they viewed as a military provocation in Tovuz.

It may therefore fall to Ankara and Moscow to fill a diplomatic vacuum and convince their respective allies to return to the negotiating table. Despite sharp differences with Russia and Turkey on many fronts, the United States and its European allies would be wise to encourage and shape such a forum. The alternative could be a mutual escalation of emotions and military tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan could sustain a full-scale war, even a more limited armed conflict could knock out strategic assets on which NATO and the EU depend. The only beneficiaries would be Russia, Iran, and perhaps China and its Belt and Road Initiative.

US foreign policy and Euro-Caspian energy security: The time is now to build the Trans-Caspian Pipeline

By Matthew Bryza, Robert M. Cutler, and Giorgi Vashakmadze

The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) represents a historic success for Azerbaijan and the European Union (EU) in regard to their common quest for new energy supply sources and routes. Over the last decade, the EU has intensified its efforts to expand the SGC, seeking to attract gas from Turkmenistan. The time is now ripe to connect Turkmen gas with SGC infrastructure and the European market through a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline.

Central Asia Energy & Environment

New Atlanticist Mar 19, 2020

Azerbaijan’s strongman senses opportunity in coronavirus pandemic

By Doug Klain

While many countries are scrambling to protect the public from COVID-19, authorities in Azerbaijan are using the virus as a pretext to continue their harassment of opposition groups.

Civil Society Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Jul 2, 2019

For Armenia’s Pashinyan, Poroshenko’s presidency should serve as a cautionary tale

By Colby Galliher

Corruption Democratic Transitions

The post Russia and Turkey may fill in the diplomatic vacuum on Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Morningstar interviewed in Naval Postgraduate School event on energy and challenges in the Caucasus region—August 12, 2020

Richard L. Morningstar — Mon, 24 Aug 2020 16:57:35 +0000

Remarks from a Naval Postgraduate School interview with Amb. Richard Morningstar of the Global Energy Center on energy security and challenges in the Caucasus region, with Dr. Daniel Nussbaum and Prof. Brenda Shaffer, senior fellow in the Global Energy Center.

Transcript (Modified for the web)

Dr. Daniel Nussbaum: Ambassador Morningstar; You’ve spent over 25 years of your life promoting the East-West Energy and Infrastructure Corridor. How did a nice guy like you get involved in a business like that?

Ambassador Richard Morningstar: Well, I can get into that. But first, before getting into that, let me thank you, Dan. And thank the Diplomatic Academy and all my friends in Azerbaijan. I wish I were with you in person in Baku. It is hard to believe that it’s been six years since Faith and I left Baku and I had been ambassador. And we certainly have many wonderful memories of Azerbaijan—such a beautiful country, such a wonderful people. I had the opportunity many times to speak at ADA. I remember so many wonderful conversations with Hafiz Pashayev. I just learned that his wife had passed away recently, she was just a very generous and kind person who we knew very well when we were in Baku. Our condolences go out to his family. I could go on, Dan, for a half hour with memories of Azerbaijan, but I know you want to get to your questions, and I’ll do so.

How did I get involved? It was somewhat random. Back in the nineties, I’ll give a shorthand description of what I was doing. I was special advisor to the president, coordinating all of our programs in the former Soviet Union. And right from the beginning we all felt very strongly, including the president and the vice president—Vice President Gore was very much certain that developing the Caspian resources was extremely important. And I had and I guess still have a big mouth and I was pushing at the highest levels that we have a person whose job was dedicated to doing that and then Strobe Talbott, who was the deputy secretary of state at the time, said to me, “Well, you’ve got such a big mouth, you do it.” So that is literally how I got involved.

I had been involved tangentially, but that’s how I got fully involved, which was a full-time job, that was in 1998, and I’ve been involved ever since. So it’s really been 25 years since the deal of the century that I have been involved in the Caspian, and if somebody had told me before—I had a long career as a lawyer and in business before going into the government with the Clinton administration—if somebody had told me 10 years before that that I would be doing that, I’d say, “What, are you out of your mind?”

Nussbaum: So, when this Deputy Secretary of State Talbott said, “go off and do good things. Get out of my office.” Did he say that there were some US policy goals to be supported in this endeavor?

Morningstar: Yeah, absolutely. And that had been even before I was working full time on these issues. We wanted to develop Caspian resources—there were really three reasons at the time. At that time, we were thinking about and we really wanted there to be a diversity of pipelines, not just pipelines going through Russia. We didn’t want to see pipelines going through Iran—I could talk more about that if you like. But it was important that pipelines go west. And so at that time, the idea of a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline made a lot of sense. So diversification was one positive.

The second part of the policy is that it was only a few years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and we really wanted to emphasize and ensure the sovereignty of the new states, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Central Asian countries. That was very important. And we also felt that it was important that Turkey be involved in the region and BTC and Southern Corridor obviously involves Turkey. So that was the policy.

What was important is that this was a bipartisan policy. Republicans and Democrats both supported it. And it’s been consistent since that time. With all of the issues in the United States, all the fighting back and forth between Republicans and Democrats, our Caspian policy has been fully consistent for 25 years. And I think that’s been very important because it gave us credibility. It made it possible for us to work with countries in the region and to work with the EU, so it was very important. But it also couldn’t be done and then—interrupt me if I’m going on too long.

Nussbaum: You’re not, and I’m taking notes so I can come back with follow-ups.

Morningstar: It was also very important that there be regional cooperation and high-level leadership within the countries in the region, and there was. There was incredible support for the Southern Corridor going back to President Heydar Aliyev, President Shevardnadze in Georgia, and from President Demirel in Turkey. And they worked closely together. And when there were issues, they worked them out. I can remember one time sitting in President Demirel’s office in Ankara and something had come up. I don’t even remember what the issue was, but something that president Aliyev was concerned about. President Demirel said, “I’ll take care of that.” And literally, while I was sitting there, he got on the phone, I could hear him say, “Heydar bey what’s going on? What’s this issue all about.” Anyway, they talked for about three minutes and it was resolved.

The point being that, without that kind of high-level participation, it may not have been able to be done at lower levels, with people like me negotiating, for example, which I did a lot of. But the high-level participation was critical.

It happened again with gas. There were all sorts of issues with respect to the Southern Gas Corridor with for example, transit fees through Turkey. I was having really difficult conversations with BOTAŞ Turkey. They were acting in good faith; they were certainly looking out for Turkey’s interests, but the negotiations were difficult. It finally got resolved because President Ilham Aliyev and President Erdogan said this is going to be fixed, now you’ve got to come to an agreement. So this was all a very, very important part of it.

Nussbaum: So those goals that we had of diversification keep Turkey involved. Are they still true? That is, is the mix still sufficient for this cooperative enterprise to go forward?

Morningstar: I think so. The Southern Gas Corridor is very much continuing to be, I think, very much in the interest of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey. I know you have people on your program this week from Turkey and Georgia as well as Azerbaijan. And those countries have played and continue to play a critical role. I think that the Southern Gas Corridor has been an incredibly successful project. It’s come in under budget. Once it got up and going, things have gone very smoothly. Cooperation between Turkey and SOCAR has been incredibly successful. The TAP pipeline—Trans-Adriatic Pipeline—is just about completed. Uh, I could get into what I think about the future of the Southern gas corridor now, or later whether you ask me those questions.

Nussbaum: Well, before you answer that there has to be a community of interest which you’ve talked about—leaders in the area, US bipartisan support. But one other ingredient, I think, is necessary: if someone recognizes that community and can stitch it together. How did that happen? Were you the catalyst? Was there somebody at state or somebody who was a catalyst? Or was it magic?

Morningstar: Oh, you know, I’m not going to give myself credit for that. There are a lot of people who have been involved in the development of those resources. I had several successors in my envoy role after I left to do other things. But I do think that the US, as a government and in various administrations, has played an important role in doing that and has had the credibility to work on these issues and to push the issues during difficult times.

I’ll give you a very good example of this and it also relates the relationship between geopolitical and commercial issues, which I know Brenda has been talking about during your program. But when I came back into government when Obama was elected, Hillary asked me to be her energy envoy. Nabucco was the flavor of the month and there were all sorts of enthusiasts for a major Nabucco pipeline to go from the Caspian through Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and across into Europe. And it was going to be a 30 BCM pipeline and the geopolitics of that really supported it because it was an interest in Europe, the US, the Caucasus region and Azerbaijan for those kinds of volumes of gas to go to Europe and up into the Balkans. That pipeline would have gone from Turkey to Greece and up into the Balkans as opposed to what really did happen with it going to Italy. And it would have supplied a lot of gas to the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe and create an alternative to Russian gas.

But it quickly became apparent—certainly after I got involved, and I loved Nabucco—but it was “just wait a second, this doesn’t make any commercial sense, right?” There’s no way that there is going to be 30 BCM available or enough to justify a large, large pipeline into Europe. And that took a lot of diplomacy to work through. Frankly, we had spent a lot of time convincing the EU and some of the other companies involved that this wasn’t going to work. I remember Joschka Fischer, who is the former German foreign minister representing RWE, saying that “you gotta build trust, gotta build it. The gas will be there.”

Well, it really doesn’t work that way. So, we did change our position and said that we would support any pipeline that went to Europe, including what finally happened as long as the pipeline was expandable and had the capability of supplying some gas into the Balkans. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline was chosen. Right now, it’s only going to be 10 BCM, but has the ability to expand. And we had to play, I think played a major role in convincing all of the stakeholders that commercially, that was the only pipeline, at least at that time, that was going to make sense. So basically, in that case, the geopolitics fell to the commercial aspects. Any project has to be commercially viable. And I think we played a major role in that.

On the other hand, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan decision resulted from major geopolitical considerations. The companies really wanted a major pipeline going to Supsa on the Georgian coast and then out through the Bosporus. They recognized that not all the pipelines should go through Russia. Companies really didn’t want the pipeline to go through Iran. They wanted the Supsa-Bosporus route because it was the cheapest. But Turkey took the position that “No way. We are not having more tankers going through of Bosporus.” We took the position with the companies that yeah, commercially, maybe a pipeline to Supsa makes more sense.

And Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan did make sense. And if you want oil to leave the Caspian, that’s the only way it’s going to leave the Caspian. But having said that, we helped the commercial aspects. Turkey said that the pipeline would be a lot less expensive than the companies were saying. And so we said to Turkey, “Well, if you believe that, you guarantee the maximum cost.” And they did, they did agree. You know there were some issues later, but it basically worked out. So we always have to remember the importance of geopolitics and the commercial aspects. Any project has to be commercially viable, and I think diplomats have to understand that and can help. And I think we did a lot of that very well.

We helped push the process along. I’ll just say one of my favorite memories was when we had a meeting in the White House. The companies came in and the late Sandy Berger was the national security adviser at that time, and he and I were running the meeting. And one of the major companies, I won’t name the company, said that you have to let us go through Supsa because it’s cheaper. And I said to this fellow yes that may be, but it’s irrelevant. Turkey won’t let you have it.

Nussbaum: Exactly. And you need those catalysts who understand conditions of other folks and can bring them together. Diplomats can do that. When I read the newspapers, I almost never see the Caucasus mentioned in the newspapers. It’s never the news item of the day, or hardly ever. Yet, you have had a bi-partisan American policy. How did that happen?

Morningstar: Well, I agree with that. We don’t see enough news about the Caucasus.

One of the things that has occurred is that our policy towards Azerbaijan, maybe with a lot of countries, has become compartmentalized. Energy issues are something that we have agreed on. We have common interests. The US has the interests that we already spoke about, Azerbaijan has interests in wanting to maintain its sovereignty, not wanting to be dependent on Russia, wanting to get its oil out a different way. So, we were always on the same wavelength. There were other issues that are critically important, security issues. Look at where Azerbaijan is located.

Everybody on this call knows how close Azerbaijan is to Iran, and to the north Caucasus in Russia, and so we have security interests, which we have to look at. And, additionally, for example, Azerbaijan has been tremendously helpful in our getting our non-lethal equipment to Afghanistan. We have all sorts of security relations given its location. Karabakh is another area which I do have views on and could talk about. I think we need to pay more attention to Karabakh. I think that Russia takes the position that there should be no hot war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but that it is fine for the dispute to continue, because it allows Russia to maintain its leverage in the region. I think Russia has to play a major role to resolve this issue.

Finally, we’ve worked on other issues with Azerbaijan, including various democracy issues and so forth. So we have to look at these and keep them as important, separate issues. We need to recognize the importance and never forget the importance of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, the importance of the energy relationship, and the importance of the security relationship.

While we also talk about other issues, I would say we’re paying plenty of attention to the energy side. Maybe more needs to be paid to some of these other baskets, and I hope, whatever happens in this election, that attention will be much greater—that the Caucasus and Central Asia will play a much greater role in our overall strategy. It is critically important; we haven’t mentioned China and the importance in countering—trying to counter—China’s influence and creating balance of interests. So, a long answer. But I agree that it’s not enough attention.

Nussbaum: But, what about where is the press? Where is the interest in the region coming from there? Two possibilities: one, it comes from a top level of an administration, the other comes from a dedicated group deep within the State Department. And you said, whatever happens in this new administration or the new election, you are suggesting that the administration plays a role. This is not something that happens only in the bowels of the State Department. It’s the attention that the administration pays.

Morningstar: Yeah, I think the administration has to play a role. At the highest levels, we have to send the signal. that certainly happened during the Clinton administration, and to some extent, that even happened at Clinton’s level back in the nineties and to some extent at that level afterwards.

But there’s also a real opportunity. When I was at work and maybe I was somewhat in the bowels of the State Department. But the bottom line is, when I was a special adviser to the president and secretary of state, what did that mean with respect to Caspian issues. What it meant was in effect I had no boss. I may have talked to Clinton once, twice on these issues, I talked to Gore, to Madeleine Albright on occasion and Strobe Talbott on occasion, but basically as long as I wasn’t screwing up, they weren’t going to get involved. And so, if you have committed people taking initiative, there is I think the bandwidth on these kinds of issues to really get a lot accomplished. That may not be so on higher-visibility issues—arms control, weapons to Ukraine, Iran. But on these issues, it is possible.

Nussbaum: I’m switching topics a bit here now. There’s an old joke about the reason we formed NATO was to keep France in, Russia out, and Germany down. So I wonder if there’s some pithy remark about what we’re trying to do in this area, and it might be, for it might start with keep Turkey in.

Morningstar: I think that’s right. I think that definitely Russia and Turkey had an interest in being in and still have an interest in being in. Turkey because of the Turkic nations in the region and wanting to be a transit country, wanting to be a hub, always wanting more gas. So, Turkey certainly had an interest, and we supported Turkey’s interest of being in.

As far as Russia, I wouldn’t go so far. It’s wasn’t just to keep Russia out because Russia is never is going to be out of that region of the former Soviet Union. Given the geography and Russian’s interests, they’re clearly going to always be involved and should be involved in the Caucasus and Central Asia. But they shouldn’t have a monopoly in the region. And that’s why we thought that in the energy area that the support was important. I think Russia’s role is going to continue to be important even though there are agreements on Caspian boundaries which we’ll be talking about at some point. Oh, so yeah, Turkey in and Russia balanced. And let’s say the US and EU being involved.

Nussbaum: I’m going to propose a slight gloss on that—Turkey in, diversification of sources in. But that meant Russia balanced, and Iran balanced. Right?

Morningstar: The diversification. Yeah, right. Yeah.

Nussbaum: So, what do you think the next stage is? How can the corridor be expanded to further strengthen the independence of the states?

Morningstar: Well, that’s, you know, that’s an interesting question. We can’t ignore the elephant in the room, which is the pandemic and the reduction in demand of oil and gas and very low prices of both. And so, I don’t see a lot of expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor over the next couple of years—or any expansion. But I think that might change by 2022, 2023. As demand may increase and gas is going to continue to be very important. Even if prices continue to be low, I think gas is a necessary part of the energy transition, at least for the midterm.

So the question is what to do between now and say 2023. And I don’t think that projects should be ignored during that time. And maybe it’s an opportunity to really plan as to what makes sense and what strategies makes sense over the next over the next few years. I do think as far as expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor and there could be more from outside of the immediate region from the Eastern Med, LNG coming in and through Greece, and Turkey, at some point gas from the KRG. But from the standpoint of the Caucasus and Central Asia, I think that the most likely expansion is Azerbaijan continuing to develop its own resources. And I think there are opportunities for Azerbaijan to do that. The Trans-Caspian Pipeline—Brenda will laugh because she’s heard this for 20 years—I always said that’s not going to happen during my lifetime. My concern is that I am 75 years old and if all of a sudden, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline develops, I will put my affairs in order. But seriously, and I know there’s been a push on the Trans-Caspian Pipeline before the pandemic and in recent months. I know Azerbaijan feels positively about it because it could supply gas even domestically. And it would be potential transit fees and Turkmenistan seems to be a little more willing than in the past.

I still think there are major problems for a trans-Caspian pipeline. One who is going pay for it, who is really going to do it? I mean, if the price of gas is too low, if demand isn’t going up in huge amounts and prices remain low because of Russia competing with low gas prices, because of US LNG and other LNG, and generally the development of new green technologies, which will reduce dependence on fossil fuels. So who is going to invest in it? Why is it going to be a commercially viable project? At least the way things look right now.

And there are still issues within Turkmenistan. Berdimukhammedov, as was his predecessor, have not been the most consistent people. Would he allow production-sharing agreements, which may be necessary for a real project? I know we’re talking about small connections at the at the beginning, but is he going to insist, as he has over the years on 30 BCM coming from Turkmenistan. Where is the demand going to be? It may not make a whole lot of sense. I also still think, and some people disagree with this, that Russia will play a major role in dissuading any kind of trans-Caspian pipeline. In spite of Caspian boundary agreements, Russia can use a tremendous amount of political influence in the region to stop a pipeline. And they’ve always looked at a trans-Caspian pipeline as a red line. It is one thing with the Southern Gas Corridor which will deliver only 10 BCM to Europe, which is a factor, but maybe not as huge a factor as we would like. But 30 BCM, ultimately from Turkmenistan, would be something else. That’s something to watch.

Would I like to see a trans-Caspian pipeline? I’d love to see it, but I still have serious doubts. So I don’t see any major breakthroughs in the Southern Gas Corridor over the next few years during this time of low prices. But I do think Azerbaijan needs to continue to do its homework and develop its own resources, both for its own use as well as for ultimate exporting.

Nussbaum: Sure, so there are two competing threads of thought here. One is the commercialization is necessary, not geopolitics alone, Brenda said yesterday in the context of the Eastern Med. Great idea, but I don’t see any commercial firm stepping up, so until that happens, it’s not gonna happen.

Morningstar: Even apart from the geopolitics, for the same reasons that I’m saying with respect to the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, who’s going to build a pipeline in the Eastern Med right now?

Nussbaum: So, you need a necessary condition for getting to yes, is that it makes commercial sense and you’ll know that when a commercial firm shows up in your office as part of the conversation. On the other hand, the Russians will exert influence, not to have a trans-Caspian pipeline because that’s geopolitics. Those could be sort of competing imperatives. So can you deconflict them is it just the West that requires commercialization? And the other guys are doing geopolitics?

Morningstar: Well, as far as the Caspian goes, I don’t know. I have serious doubts whether Russia would allow anything major coming across the Caspian. Can you get them to agree? As part of some bargain. as part of some overall reset of relations with Russia. I doubt it. You know, things are pretty difficult with Russia right now. So, I again I have my doubts. Brenda, you’ve thought about it a lot you may want to pipe in.

Professor Brenda Shaffer: On the Trans-Caspian?

Nussbaum: Yeah, and also deconflicting with the Russians, but also deconflicting between the imperatives of the need for a commercial basis to get to Yes, but you also have the geopolitical argument which may not be aligned with the commercial argument, right?

Shaffer: It’s obvious that countries like Russia and Iran, Saudi Arabia, where their state oil companies that are subsidized by the state have an advantage over the West since our companies have bottom-lines. If you look for instance, when oil prices crashed this spring, the first production to be knocked out as the American production, since it doesn’t have a state backer. I’m not advocating that it should. But this is just stating the fact that companies that have state backers, have a certain advantage. They don’t have to be commercial. They can be an instrument of geopolitics. American companies can’t play this role because we’re guided by commercial considerations. We have had though an incredible renaissance in the US, like the shale revolution that is a product of American innovation and the free market, so not worth leaving this model. The Trans-Caspian Pipeline is more feasible if it is an intra-Caspian that wouldn’t go shore to shore. But in-between Azerbaijani and Turkmen fields in the Caspian Sea, which would be a lot cheaper and hopefully maybe a lot less politically sensitive. However, either way, the minute you make that link in the Caspian, there are some that are going to try to oppose it.

Morningstar: So we’ll see. You know what? One interesting development that could happen in the gas market, which I hope it won’t. Well, if Biden wins the election, will exports of US LNG be restricted? I’ve certainly made the argument against that. That would be a huge mistake from a geopolitical standpoint. US LNG and other LNG is critically important in a lot of places but particularly to Central and Eastern Europe to reduce dependence on Russian gas and to force Russian to operate competitively and transparently. But if somehow there was no US LNG around, well, that could have an effect on the marketplace. That’s something to watch. I hope that that will not happen and don’t think it will.

Nussbaum: What would the argument be in support of restricting exports?

Morningstar: Basically the environment. I think it would be the environmental argument against fracking gas, and I think there’s a conflict to some extent or could be a conflict between people looking—and I’m speaking for myself here—looking at environmental issues with respect to gas and those looking at it from a more practical national security standpoint.

Nussbaum: Well, that allows me to ask a question about what would your policy recommendations be for the next administration towards the South Caucasus and greater a Caspian? The first one is, do not restrict exports?

Morningstar: Well, one recommendation which indirectly relates. One, continue to support the Southern Gas Corridor and to work with countries in the region and other interested stakeholders like the EU and companies as to what the best strategy is as market conditions unfold over the next couple of years.

My recommendation with respect to US LNG is not to restrict exports. Not to ban fracking, but at the same time, to work with various stakeholders, whether it be the EU, the companies, the countries in the region, in the Caucasus region and really throughout the world, to work together to develop appropriate regulations and standards which would reduce the environmental footprint of gas, such as to reduce methane emissions, flaring, and encourage carbon capture so that gas, which I think does have an important role for all the reasons that we are talking about, would be more accepted, even more acceptable from an environmental standpoint.

[Democratic candidate for president Joe Biden has since stated that he does not support a general ban on fracking]

Nussbaum: So that environmental aspect was not part of our original vision when we got involved.

Morningstar: I think, in the nineties we weren’t thinking about that. So, I don’t know. I mean, I look at the present, I look at the present situation as an opportunity for gas if in fact, everybody can work together to reduce that footprint. And I think the companies are willing to work towards it. I think the US and the EU can play an important role in developing standards, working with stakeholders to reach those goals. It’s also going to be important that any carbon border adjustment mechanism, as the EU is proposing, be based on objective, transparent data. US LNG, Caspian gas, Russian gas shouldn’t be treated differently. Any carbon border adjustment or tariff must be non-discriminatory.

Nussbaum: So we’ve had some successes: Turkey involved. Diversification. Russia balanced Iran balance. There are still some things yet to be done. I’ll ask you about what’s yet to be done, but you’ve already addressed one of them, which is a newcomer, which is the climate piece. What else from our original plate is yet to be done or done better?

Morningstar: Well, the climate piece is important, and it goes more, even more than what I was talking about. I think the countries in the region are interested in reducing emissions, and I think that we can work with Turkey, with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Central Asian countries to develop green technologies and help these countries meet climate goals.

I think that if there is a Biden administration, they’ll be much more willingness to do that than with the present administration. That could be an important step, and then beyond that, I think countries like Azerbaijan have to continue to diversify their economies, so they are less dependent on energy resources. Those energy resources are going to continue to be important, should continue to be developed. I know that Azerbaijan is concerned and wants to diversify its economy. And I think we should be able to play a role there.

And I’ve already talked about Azerbaijan developing its resources. Issues with respect to whether or not there’s a trans-Caspian pipeline. And I’ll go back to one of your original points. I think it’s really important that more focus be put on the Caucasus and Central Asia with respect to the whole compartment of issues. All of the compartments that we talked about. The last thing we want, and we faced this at times in the past, is that Azerbaijan believes that America only cares about Azerbaijan for its energy. Well, it is a lot more than that. It is a lot, and I think we need to show that.

Nussbaum: So, as you say, Azerbaijan wants to diversify its economy. The Saudis were saying the same thing, right? Are the Russians saying that?

Morningstar: Well, frankly, I don’t know what they’re saying, how much they’re saying or not saying. I guess they’re getting into the vaccine business. But let’s put it this way. They have to and I’m sure somewhere that’s recognized.

Nussbaum: And as Brenda said, one of the advantages some countries have over the commercially driven West is that they have state backing, so they have this cushion to fall back on. But I wanted to ask you about the flip side of that. Both Ambassador Morningstar and Professor Shafer. Sometimes that’s a burden. It’s like when a country subsidizes gasoline. It just drains money from their treasury and there are opportunity costs; money put into energy subsidies can’t go into schools, hospitals, etcetera, etcetera.

Morningstar: Yes, I think that’s absolutely right. And I think that one of the areas that we we’ve been looking at in the Global Energy Center at the Atlantic Council are the consequences of peak oil and what happens when oil demand starts dropping off and maybe could drop off faster than people think, given the kinds of things even that we’ve been seeing in the last year, as green technologies develop, as policy decisions are made potentially to move away from fossil fuels. And what happens, for example, to Russia, if volumes decrease and the price of oil 10 years from now is $20 a barrel? Then if they’re if they’re not diversified, they could be in real trouble. The Saudis are trying to address this issue, but it’s a difficult issue for them. Saudi Aramco announced their earnings yesterday, which were beaten up terribly because of the present situation, so these are real issues, and we’re not going to have answers for them in this discussion. That’s something to which a lot of attention has to be paid.

Nussbaum: Yes. So, I’m hoping that, dear students, you have some questions also for the ambassador. I know that Alan is monitoring that. Maybe somebody knows about Azerbaijan’s attempt to diversify, or something about the Southern Gas Corridor, the Trans-Caspian. Things of that sort. For the Americans on here: Can you remember the last time you saw the Caucasus in a newspaper that you read online or real?

Morningstar: I will say Dan, on that—others can pipe in—there was a reasonable amount of publicity when things blew up on the line of contact a few weeks ago.

Nussbaum: Or that north of the line of contact.

Morningstar: Yeah, that got attention.

Audience: I had one question for our ambassador. We can say that you were one of the architects of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Well, yes, so during that period there were a lot of challenges and, like political and economical challenges. People in Azerbaijan who worked in oil fields had very little knowledge of English and people in Azerbaijan who knew English had very little knowledge of oil production and the oil industry. For today, which challenge other than geopolitics and economics are for Azerbaijan to be involved in such an international project?

Morningstar: Well, you know, I think that Azerbaijan, as you say, has been making a lot of progress, certainly with respect to language. And I know that the international companies that have that are located in Azerbaijan are very anxious to have more and more Azerbaijanis working within those companies and English is obviously an important part of it. So I think it’s getting better. I think it’s also important that Azerbaijani students get the opportunity to work or to study outside of Azerbaijan. As well as obviously in Azerbaijan as well. But hopefully go to Europe, United States to study for a period of time and take courses, relevant courses to what’s going to be important to Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, I know that’s become a little more difficult, given situations with respect to visas, but I do think progress has been made in that area. But I think Azerbaijan also has to look at other sectors. Agriculture is obviously a major possibility. Information technology is another area. So, there are opportunities.

Audience: Thank you. Thank you so much for your answer.

Nussbaum: Perhaps one of the students from Georgia wants to come in on the same frequency on the same line of questions. Diversification of the Georgian economy?

Shaffer: Students, It’s also your historical opportunity to get information. Ambassador Morningstar met with Heidar Aliyev, Shevardnadze and President Clinton and others, when all these issues were being planned. If you have any questions about what happened during this period, this is a great, great historical opportunity.

Nussbaum: That sounds like the title of a book. I was in the room. Yes, something from you.

Audience: I’ve read somewhere that in one off the conferences you answered a question about the Trans-Caspian pipeline. You mentioned that if it’s happened, you’re going to dance in the streets in Baku? Is that still valid? I understand from your comments that is still the case in terms of your position on the Trans-Caspian pipeline.

Morningstar: Yeah. You know why I have doubts about it, but I also don’t want to be misunderstood. I hope it happens. And I think it would be good for the region. But if it’s going to happen, I think Turkmenistan is going to have to take a very constructive approach. I think the countries in the region are, if there is opposition, for example, from Russia, are going to have to stand up to it.

Speaking of Heydar Aliyev, I think Heydar Aliyev in the nineties, was really very, very courageous because Russia during that time had no interest in there being a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. But he stood up to that. And the situation in the nineties, right after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia’s situation was a little different than it is today. But Russia didn’t like it and stood up to it. I remember in 1998, I was in Ankara, for, among other things, the 75th anniversary of Atatürk Revolution and I was introduced to Russian foreign minister Ivanov, who actually I got to know more since then. And actually, I like him very much.

But when I was introduced to him, he said, I don’t need to be introduced to Ambassador Morningstar. We know who he is. We don’t like what he’s doing. So you know Russia at that time wasn’t very happy about the pipeline. Russia, today, may be even more willing to really assert its influence than they were back then.

Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli: Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you. And I think we’re all looking forward at some point to read your book about your interactions and engagements with the different heads of state and for the different projects. That would be really fascinating reading for all of us.

Morningstar: You know, it’s funny you say that. My wife who wants to keep me busy, keeps telling me I need to write a book. But I think I have attention deficit disorder. Whether I have the concentration to ever do it, I don’t know. I appreciate your saying that; my wife would appreciate you saying that.

Nussbaum: By the way, I’m now wondering if we’re married to the same woman! Good, thank you. There’s a question in the chat. Please let me read it: It would be great to hear the ambassador’s reflections about the recent skirmishes from the impact on the critical infrastructure perspective. Do you think this could get worse? Does it have legs?

Morningstar: Well, you know, I hope it won’t get worse, it’s terrible that it erupted. My condolences to the families of the people who lost their lives in a very, very serious situation. And I think that is an area that the United States needs to pay even more attention to. But I really believe the Russians have a major role to play. And I wish they had more willingness to do so.

With respect to infrastructure, it has always been an issue of some concern. The pipeline isn’t far from that area. I think over the years, there has been concern about pipeline security in Georgia, but also in Azerbaijan, and basically, I think that the pipelines have escaped any serious damage in both cases. I would like to think that the parties involved, including the Armenians, would recognize that any interference with the pipeline will put them in an untenable political situation and create great risk. So, they never have, at least it is my understanding—somebody correct me If I’m wrong—I don’t know that they’ve ever attacked a pipeline and I hope that they never do it.

Likewise, in Georgia, in spite of disputes at various times, and war between Russia and Georgia, that was a red line which was not crossed. So I hope that that concern about raising the stakes by interfering with the pipeline, would basically keep that from happening. But I’ll never say never in this world. A good question, though, and something that we need to continue to be concerned about.

Nussbaum: Ambassador, you did say you had some thoughts about Nagorno-Karabakh. Did you want to share them in this forum?

Morningstar: Well, I alluded to them. I can certainly understand the frustration within Azerbaijan that for 26 years, 20 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan has been occupied and hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis have been displaced. And I can understand why Azerbaijan takes the position that this has been an outrageous insult to their sovereignty.

I do have a concern. To get it resolved, there has to be political will on both sides. Any solution will require politically difficult compromises.

I’ll also point the finger at Russia, because I really do think that Russia is content to let the situation go on as it is. They have security relationships in Armenia that you’re all aware of that and maybe doesn’t it get enough attention. It is selling weapons as I understand it to Azerbaijan. Maybe Russia is giving them to Armenia? I’m not sure. So they get the benefits from that. They have leverage over both countries. And I think if Russia ever made the determination that the situation needed to be resolved once and for all that that would be a major step forward. I hope that the US can play even more of a role. Look, it’s an incredibly difficult issue. There’s a long history. Hopefully, at some point it’ll be resolved. When Hillary Clinton sent me off to Baku, she said, “make sure there is no war.” I do think that the Minsk group has helped to minimize casualties, as bad as the casualties have been, but still, this whole situation needs to get resolved.

Nussbaum: There’s a question, Ambassador, from the audience. She’d like to ask what you think about the prospects of renewable energy in Azerbaijan. What possible directions could Azerbaijan take regarding the development of the renewable energy sector?

Morningstar: Well, I would think, and I haven’t looked into it very deeply, but I think it could be a major point of diversification in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has a lot of sun and solar energy should be able to play a role. Wind energy could play a role. I think that’s worth developing, and I think that the US should play a role in pushing – and Europe as well – in pushing that along.

Audience: Thank you. Ambassador, first thank you for you also provoking us on. And secondly, I have a question about the Soviet legacies. As you talk about the Caucasus becoming comparatively independent energy security wise on and the need for Central Asia to be more proactive, how possible it is for this country to do so, given Russia. Russia considers this country’s as its own backyard. China is considerably investing in energy in Central Asia and additionally, with the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, it appears that Central Asia is losing its momentum. Would it ever become appealing to the West to the US specifically to heavily invest in the region?

Morningstar: That question is very well put. I think it’s a really important question. You know, we can’t deny Russia is there. Russia is a two-hour drive from Baku? Azerbaijan has a history of being part of the former Soviet Union, Russia is a neighbor of the Central Asian countries, and so it would be naive to say that, countries in the region should be so independent that it doesn’t have to pay attention to Russia. Obviously, it does. And countries have to have at least a decent working relationship with Russia as a very powerful neighbor.

So, yes, you can’t ignore Russia. But I think that the policy of Azerbaijan has been relatively successful, which we need to keep pushing from a US standpoint. Azerbaijan maintains a balance of interests with its neighbors and the United States. Yes, Azerbaijan is going to have a relationship with Russia. It has to have a decent relationship with Russia. But that can’t be its sole foreign policy. Azerbaijan needs also to have a good relationship with the West, with the United States, Europe, Turkey, with which it has such a strong historical relationship. It has to have a relationship with Iran. I think Azerbaijan has done an incredible job maintaining that relationship and still having a very good relationship with Israel, which we haven’t talked about. So I think what the United States can do, recognizing, that Russia and China will play a major role in the region, is to continue its support for sovereignty of the countries in the region, and to work on the whole series of issues that we have talked about.

Audience: Thank you.

Nussbaum: So tell me, do you think that was an optimistic response or pessimistic response more or an objective response?

Audience: I think there are elements of these three paradigms in it. In general, these countries have found themselves in the particular stance after the collapse of the USSR. Some are being very successful with the support from the West, some are still struggling with becoming more energy independent, leaving their internal affairs asid., As the ambassador rightly pointed out, there should be a very fine balance. Some of the countries are being very successful in balancing all the powers and benefiting, and some of them are just working things out and not progressing as they should.

Nussbaum: Thank you, Ambassador. You do think that there is some recognition of that area within, the State Department and other parts of the US Government?

Morningstar: Yeah, you know, I think so. I don’t know whether it’s at the top priority list. But I do think it is. I think it’s generally recognized.

Nussbaum: Good. Are there other questions for the ambassador? Because if not, I know what time it is for you in Baku and what I’d like to do is on behalf of the Naval Postgraduate school and ADA University, Ambassador, thank you very much for sharing your time for sharing your wisdom and for all the service you’ve given both to the United States but also to the world and in particular, to this region. Let me reiterate my invitation to you to escape the heat and humidity of Massachusetts come to visit us in Monterey, California.

Morningstar: Well, thank you. And you’re overly kind. But I will just again emphasize how much I miss Azerbaijan. What a great experience my two years there was. What a wonderful country and it is a wonderful people. And it’s just terrific to have had the opportunity to reconnect, even if only virtually.

Nussbaum: Well, thank you. So, apparently, he’ll visit Monterey. But after Baku.

Morningstar: Right.

Nussbaum: I understand more wisdom. Well, thank you very much to everybody.

Global Energy Center

The Global Energy Center promotes energy security by working alongside government, industry, civil society, and public stakeholders to devise pragmatic solutions to the geopolitical, sustainability, and economic challenges of the changing global energy landscape.

The post Morningstar interviewed in Naval Postgraduate School event on energy and challenges in the Caucasus region—August 12, 2020 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US foreign policy and Euro-Caspian energy security: The time is now to build the Trans-Caspian Pipeline

Matthew Bryza, Robert M. Cutler, and Giorgi Vashakmadze — Fri, 12 Jun 2020 22:32:20 +0000

In the 1990s, newly independent Azerbaijan’s diplomatic strategy was shaped largely by cooperation with the West. Driven by energy projects, first oil exports and then also natural gas exports, it led the Caspian Sea region in developing important infrastructure that guaranteed its own independence as well as that of other newly independent states.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, following construction of the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil export pipeline, became the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). It was the first building-block of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). Thanks to this development, gas produced in Azerbaijan has already reached Albania and will soon reach Italy.

The SGC represents a historic success for Azerbaijan and the European Union (EU) in regard to their common quest for new energy supply sources and routes. Over the last decade, the EU has intensified its efforts to expand the SGC, seeking to attract gas from Turkmenistan, a country known for its gigantic onshore gas fields that currently supply only Chinese and Russian markets.

The necessary link connecting Turkmen gas with existing SGC infrastructure is the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP). The 180-mile long TCGP is an EU Project of Common Interest (PCI) and was supported by an EU grant in 2018.

The TCGP is a crucial link, a catalyst for potential changes that could affect the structure of the international system for decades to come. It could drive economic growth, promote regional stability, and limit both Chinese and Russian influence in Central Asia.

New American interest

The countries in the Caspian Sea region are responding to new American interest. For example, Hikmet Hajiyev, whose position is functionally equivalent to national security adviser to Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev, stated in Washington, DC in June 2019 that Azerbaijan is ready to support the TCGP by transiting Turkmen gas. Also in June, Georgia’s economy minister Natela Turnava declared her government’s support for the trans-Caspian link and the White Stream pipeline.

Remarkably, Vitaly Baylarbayov, deputy vice-president of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), speaking in a February 2020 Euractiv interview, was clear and specific about how there is room for Turkmen gas in the newly constructed SGC system, which he said could also be expanded further.

The planned TCGP would source natural gas onshore in Turkmenistan for transmission under the Caspian Sea and insertion into the SGC. Like the BTC and SCP, the TCGP would form a new investment corridor and attract interest in maritime transport and telecommunications. The TCGP would provide important opportunities for US exports of goods and services for gas transmission, related petrochemical projects, and other energy-industrial sectors.

In March 2019, President Donald Trump wrote directly to Turkmenistan’s president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, saying that he personally hoped Turkmenistan would soon export gas to the West. In May of the same year, he wrote to Azerbaijan’s president Aliyev, praising his country’s cooperation with the United States to “diversify European energy routes and sources.” A few months later, in December, he signed the “Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020,” which included, as its Title XX, legislation called the “European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019.”

This Act of Congress provides for funding from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), and the Countering Russian Influence Fund (CRIF). The DFC is the new agency that modernizes the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). It can and should offer technical development, debt and equity financing, and other instruments to the TCGP.

The TDA would be able to promote US private sector participation in the pipeline, providing opportunities for the use of US exports. Finally, the Act authorizes CRIF to support other US agencies providing assistance under the Act itself.

The TCGP satisfies all project eligibility and project preference criteria for government support identified in the Act.

Like the BTC oil export pipeline twenty years ago, the TCGP is a demonstration project. The BTC and SCP, besides being of great commercial benefit, established and strengthened the independence of participating South Caucasus countries.

The TCGP would do this over a broader geographic area and with deeper implications. Beyond Turkmenistan, benefits would extend also to other Central Asian countries. Plans are on the drawing board for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to join Turkmenistan in subsequent trans-Caspian energy projects, connecting them strategically to the West.

Gas from Turkmenistan costs much less than gas from Siberia. As European hydrogen demand develops, carbon captured from Turkmenistan’s natural gas can be easily stored in Azerbaijan’s and Romania’s depleted hydrocarbon deposits. Capturing and storing that carbon in Azerbaijan or Romania will facilitate the production of blue hydrogen for direct piping to Europe from Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan would welcome Turkmen gas to feed its own burgeoning petrochemical sector. But American political cover would be necessary so that Baku did not fear retaliation from Moscow. With the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea now in force, there is no reason why Turkmen gas or blue hydrogen (which could be produced from it) cannot be delivered to the EU in sizable quantities.

The current state of the trans-Caspian project

Azerbaijan will soon begin supplying relatively modest quantities of natural gas to European markets through the SGC. But SOCAR, which is majority stakeholder and operator of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) running from Georgia to Greece, needs to fill the pipeline to make a profit. It cannot do this soon with Azerbaijan’s offshore gas, which may take time to develop. Turkmen gas will accomplish this.

The TCGP’s economic potential has led to its inclusion in every European Commission PCI list since 2013. However, an intensive disinformation campaign, sustained by Gazprom’s monopoly interest, raised doubts about the project’s merits. Consequently, European buyers remained largely uninterested. Western capitals never gave it proper attention or adequate support. Thus, it remained on the back burner for many years.

An implementation road map agreed in 2017, which implied initial co-funding of the project promoter company by the Georgian government and the EU, did not develop as intended. The year 2019 saw renewed attempts to implement the so-called platform connection option. This shorter, limited concept for trans-Caspian gas was based on the idea of connecting Turkmenistan’s offshore platforms to Azerbaijan’s offshore platforms. It was not a large-volume shore-to-shore pipeline nor was it an official PCI, like the full TCGP, to which the European Commission had allocated grant monies.

Turkmenistan has always refused to accept any option other than the expandable shore-to-shore TCGP. Precisely because Turkmenistan is suffering its worst economic crisis in decades, this has not changed. Because natural gas is its only marketable commodity, Turkmenistan’s government insists on taking maximum advantage of prospects to supply Europe’s markets.

Turkmenistan has always been concerned that the smaller-volume platform option would lead nowhere else, despite whatever promises might be given, which is why it has insisted on the full pipeline.

Turkmenistan would welcome the chance to export to Europe but only through a shore-to-shore pipeline connecting its integrated onshore pipeline system, including the shut-in wells in the east of the country, to Azerbaijan’s onshore system.

Constructing the TCGP does not require Turkmenistan to enter into production sharing agreements (PSAs); the abundant gas deposits in the country’s east are already developed, the pipeline for transmitting the gas to Turkmenistan’s border already exists, and the business model for constructing the TCGP does not require them.

Turkmenistan constructed the East-West Pipeline (EWP) to bring gas right up to its coast on the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan will sell this gas there, at its border on the Caspian seacoast. The EWP is now capped, awaiting connection across the sea by way of the TCGP.

The TCGP itself will be built and operated by a pipeline company not owned by gas producers, following a standard industry business and financing model. An independent carrier will execute the technical studies leading to sales-purchase agreements between European buyers and Turkmenistan. PSAs are therefore also unnecessary for the TCGP’s construction.

In accordance with the Caspian Convention, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan alone will make the decision to construct the pipeline. The World Bank and European Commission completed a comprehensive environmental scoping study in 2014, determining that the route is environmentally safe. Potential impacts and mitigation measures have already been identified.

Additionally, Turkmenistan’s gas is coincidentally closer to existing infrastructure than any other new source of similar proportion and benefit. Only 180 miles separate Turkmenistan’s coast from the SCP infrastructure that provides access to TANAP and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Once the TCGP is built to the SGC, the projected White Stream pipeline under the Black Sea from Georgia to Romania can be constructed. It is the most direct link for Central Asian gas and blue hydrogen to European customers.

American, European, and Euro-Caspian common strategic interests

The TCGP is a strategic project for the United States, Europe, and the Caspian and South Caucasus states. It will counterbalance Chinese and Russian influence in the Caspian Sea region. It holds the promise of opening new horizons in Euro-Caspian energy development to run through mid-century.

Just as the BTC made the SCP and SGC possible, the TCGP will also signal for other trans-Caspian energy projects to go forward. The TCGP would enable countries in the region to secure greater sources of revenue independent of Russia and China.

Turkmen gas is the most economical new source of gas for Europe. Gas from Central Asia is less expensive than that from other sources, and its price remains fully independent of liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices. If Turkmenistan’s enormous gas export potential is not directed at European markets, then it would be in Russia’s best interest to purchase the Turkmen gas instead and re-export it to the growing market in China; this would be less expensive for Russia than developing its own West Siberian resources for Chinese consumption.

In fact, Gazprom has already been instructed to develop a pipeline system that could be used for facilitating these gas deliveries. These supplies would allow Moscow to compete more advantageously with American LNG exports to China. Failing to build the TCGP would thus end up diversifying China’s supply options rather than the EU’s.

Azerbaijan wants to benefit as an intermediary country that transmits Turkmen gas to European markets. Azertbaijan’s diplomatic influence has only grown over the years. Esmira Jafarova, deputy director of the Center for International Relations Analysis (Baku), recently noted convincingly that Azerbaijan may well be considered a nascent “middle power.”

TAP’s stakeholders seek new supplies for second-stage expansion in order to increase its value. This expansion would require no new construction, only installation of additional pumping capacity.

Turkmen gas fits the bill for TAP expansion. It would significantly improve energy security for many Balkan and Eastern European countries, even Ukraine, through well thought-out plans in synch with LNG imports.

The United States and the EU share a demonstrated community of interests in international energy development. The start of construction of the Baltic Pipeline from Norway to Poland, supported under the Three Seas Initiative, is just the latest example of how gas pipelines can still be implemented despite less favorable public perception of fossil fuels.

For over twenty years, Russia used spurious environmental and legal arguments as well as threats against Turkmenistan to oppose the TCGP. However, in August 2018, Russia signed the Caspian Convention along with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Iran.

The Convention codified every signatory’s right to build submarine pipelines if it so wishes. One clause specified that if two signatories, such as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, wish to build a pipeline between them that does not cross into a third country’s sector, no other signatory can veto the project. One would expect, given Russia’s ability to exert pressure behind the scenes, that it may do so. However, the EU, as Russia’s largest gas export market, enjoys considerable geo-economic leverage over Moscow, which, at least theoretically, the bloc could wield to help shield Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on the TCGP. Whether the EU is prepared to confront Moscow in this way and in defense of its own economic interests, however, remains unclear.

US policy action is key

In the United States, members of Congress have criticized Georgia’s energy security policy and its failure to keep promises to maintain a level political playing-field and an independent judiciary. Georgia makes little use of opportunities that its geographical location and free trade agreement with the EU provide. Even three decades after the Soviet Union disintegrated, Georgia still relies on Russian electricity imports, and its economy remains highly dependent on Russia. It is no secret that these energy-related trade flows open the door for Russia to export political corruption as well.

The first wave of political and economic reforms in post-Soviet Georgia were accelerated through close cooperation with the West as envisioned within the framework for the East-West Energy Corridor programs in the late 1990s and early 2000s. That momentum has flagged by now. Building the TCGP today, like the BTC then, will catalyze the next, necessary wave of reforms.

The TCGP’s implementation will drive necessary energy market reform in Georgia that would significantly improve the country’s economic prospects. First, it would bring renewed US attention and influence, which would both help to ensure the reforms take hold and benefit the United States in return. Such reforms would stabilize Georgia’s economic and political situation, increasing its autonomy.

Second, it would facilitate Georgia’s industrial expansion for exports to the EU under the free trade association agreement that it already enjoys but has not fully utilized. A flow of advantageously priced gas from Turkmenistan to Georgia would kickstart new EU-export oriented industries like fertilizer production in Georgia and decrease its dependence on Russia.

If Georgia is to be not just a partner but a strategic transatlantic ally for the United States, it must be free of such malign influences. The TCGP presents an opportunity for the United States and the EU to cooperate on energy security, and not just for themselves, but for the sake of their common interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

The TCGP is basically a shovel-ready project that just needs a decisive political boost: a boost that the EU cannot currently provide because it remains focused on hydrogen.

The coronavirus pandemic makes the introduction of Central Asian gas exports to the EU even more timely. The EU is set to use pandemic recovery funds to increase production of green hydrogen (from renewable energy) as well as blue hydrogen (from natural gas).

However, the cost of producing green hydrogen is still appreciably higher than for blue hydrogen. Although the EU’s objective is a full transition to green hydrogen, natural gas and blue hydrogen will still be required for many years to make the eventual green transition less expensive.

Consequently, the EU needs Caspian gas to bring down the costs of its energy transition. This is especially true for countries where energy costs remain politically sensitive. The current extremely low prices for natural gas make the pipeline’s construction even more affordable, especially since many energy infrastructure projects with less appealing economics will be delayed or even canceled.

The pandemic will decrease energy investment in general worldwide, which means serious progress on TCP will likely need to wait for a post-pandemic economic recovery. There will be a need to monitor the effects of the pandemic on investment in the TCGP, so as to reveal how soon EU buyers will be comfortable proceeding with sales-purchase agreements for Turkmen gas, facilitated by front-end engineering design and other required studies, as well as necessary environmental permits. Once the market has recovered and is ready to absorb new supplies, relatively inexpensive Central Asian gas could then be delivered by new and cost-effective pipelines, playing an important role in Europe’s post-COVID economic recovery, when environmental considerations are expected to be even more present in decision-making than before the pandemic.

It is now the ideal moment to ensure that Turkmen gas contributes to diversifying energy supplies in Europe (including Turkey and Ukraine), to cementing ties with the EU and the United States, and to increasing resilience in the Central Asian and South Caucasus countries. To facilitate this cooperation, the US Department of State should designate the TCGP as a project for support under the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019.

Robert M. Cutler is senior research fellow, NATO Association of Canada, and director of its Energy Security Program. He served as a US State Department speaker and specialist grantee for public diplomacy on East European and Caspian Sea region energy affairs.

Giorgi Vashakmadze is a former chief executive of the Georgian state enterprise responsible for Caspian East-West Energy Corridor projects. He served as Georgia’s representative to the Intergovernmental Implementation Commission for the BTC and SCP pipelines.

Russian cyberattack on Georgia shows why the US should pass the Georgia Support Act

George Tsereteli — Tue, 09 Jun 2020 12:45:35 +0000

On October 22, 2019, the US House of Representatives unanimously passed the Georgia Support Act (H.R.598), reaffirming continued US support for the independence and sovereignty of Georgia and asserting US opposition to Russian aggression in the region. Less than a week later, on October 28, Georgia was hit with a major cyberattack, which has since been widely attributed to Russian military intelligence. While it is not clear whether the cyber incident was a direct response to the newly passed act on the part of the Russian government, it certainly appears that way, and it is clear that US support for Georgia has been a point of contention in US-Russia relations for well over a decade.

When looking at the provisions of H.R.598, it becomes even more difficult not to draw such a conclusion, with one of the main focal points of the bill being US cybersecurity cooperation with Georgia. Once some semblance of normalcy returns to Washington, the Senate should show its support for a vulnerable strategic ally by passing H.R.598. This is especially vital as Georgia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in October, which will present yet another opportunity for Russia’s destabilizing cyber operations.

The Georgia Support Act directs the State Department to report to Congress on several topics related to the country’s security. A cybersecurity cooperation section posits that the US secretary of state should: (1) Provide Georgia such support as may be necessary to secure government computer networks from malicious cyber intrusions, particularly such networks that defend the critical infrastructure; (2) Provide Georgia support in reducing reliance on Russian information and communications technology; (3) Assist Georgia to build its capacity, expand cybersecurity information sharing, and cooperate on international cyberspace efforts.

The large-scale attack at the end of October disrupted and damaged servers within the Georgian president’s office, judicial system, government municipalities, and non-governmental organizations, and interrupted the broadcasts of at least two major television stations. The attack was widely condemned—the US Department of State and British Foreign Office took the rare measure of publicly attributing blame to the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre assessed with the “highest level of probability” that the GRU carried out the attack, and a Pentagon spokesperson described it as another example of “Russian malign behavior.” A number of other countries condemned the attack, including Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden.

Subscribe for the latest on the Caucasus

Receive updates for events, news, and publications on the Caucasus from the Atlantic Council.

Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized in a statement that “Georgia will continue to work closely with its partners to strengthen cybersecurity at the national level to minimize future risks and potential threats.” US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo similarly asserted that the United States would support Georgia in enhancing “cybersecurity and countering malicious cyber actors” and “offer additional capacity building and technical assistance to help strengthen Georgia’s public institutions and improve its ability to protect itself from these kinds of activities.” At the end of March, Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), charged with overseeing the election process in the country, announced it will enhance its cybersecurity capabilities with the support of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), a US-based non-profit.

This support is crucial, especially with Georgia’s upcoming parliamentary elections in October presenting yet another prime opportunity for the Russian government to sow discord and division among the Georgian population. General Tod D. Wolters—the commander of US European Command and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)—testified in front of the Senate Committee on Armed Services in late February that “Georgia continues to be a steadfast partner and contributor to global security.” But as he also stated, the Kremlin believes “chronic instability” in the South Caucasus is necessary for Russia to maintain regional hegemony. Cyber operations are simply another method to propagate this instability, along with constant military pressure and continuing “borderization” in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia).

The US Senate could take a significant step toward helping its vulnerable ally by passing the Georgia Support Act and ensuring its provisions are met. The multitude of statements supporting Georgia and condemning the Russian attacks are, of course, a politically positive message for Georgia—but to think statements can change or deter the Kremlin’s behavior is beyond naïve. Concrete actions, such as the passage and signing of H.R.598 into law, would be a message of support backed with real weight.

George Tsereteli is a Europe and Eurasia senior research associate at McLarty Associates. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Activists fight COVID-19 disinformation in the Caucasus

By Larry Luxner

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia now face a new and growing threat: the steady stream of propaganda related to how and why COVID-19 is spreading throughout the Caucasus.

Disinformation The Caucasus

New Atlanticist Dec 3, 2019

Don’t be fooled: Russia is still NATO’s greatest challenge

By David A. Wemer

NATO Northern Europe

New Atlanticist Jul 9, 2019

Georgia protests are not a showcase of Russophobia

By Tina Maglakelidze

Outside observers must resist conflating anti-Kremlin sentiment with Russophobia.

Democratic Transitions Political Reform

The post Russian cyberattack on Georgia shows why the US should pass the Georgia Support Act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Activists fight COVID-19 disinformation in the Caucasus

Larry Luxner — Tue, 19 May 2020 16:55:12 +0000

The three former Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—long beset by ethnic and regional tensions—now face a new and growing threat: the steady stream of propaganda related to how and why COVID-19 is spreading throughout the Caucasus.

Much of this disinformation is flowing directly from Moscow, warned experts speaking from Yerevan, Baku, Tbilisi, and Washington as part of a 360/Virtual discussion hosted May 19 by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

According to official statistics, Armenia as of May 19 had 5,041 coronavirus infections and sixty-four deaths, followed by Azerbaijan, with 3,387 cases and forty deaths. Georgia appears to be doing far better than its two Caucasus neighbors, with 702 cases and only twelve deaths.

Yet Eto Buziashvili, a research associate with the DFRLab, warned that various Russia-backed individuals have impersonated trusted Georgian health authorities in order to discredit pro-democracy activists and foment unrest.

For example, she said, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s propaganda machine is spreading the conspiracy theory that the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research in Tbilisi—opened in 2011 and widely praised for its genetic sequencing capabilities—is a “nest of viruses,” that it conducts illegal tests on Georgian citizens, and that the US-funded center is the crux of a Pentagon conspiracy to conduct biological weapons testing against Russia.

“We’ve observed various disinformation narratives originating in the Kremlin that the virus was manufactured by the Americans,” Buziashvili said. “On social media, thousands of Georgians have been discussing the alleged link between 5G technology and the spread of COVID-19. These false, misleading claims have led to material damage in other countries.”

Georgian soldiers patrol along a barbed-wire fence marking Russia’s occupation of South Ossetia. (Photo by Larry Luxner)

Buziashvili said a Georgian Facebook group “has even called on society to take on-the-ground action such as organizing massive protests against 5G. Georgia might be the next country witnessing people setting fire to masts and cell towers.”

A similar phenomenon is underway in Armenia, said journalist Karine Ghazaryan of the Media Initiatives Center in Yerevan.

“After a state of emergency was introduced in Armenia, the government tried to impose restrictions. It was prohibited for any journalist to report anything aside from official sources. The government justified these new rules with their desire to prevent the spread of fake information about COVID-19,” she said. “But this ban caused a lot of criticism—both internally and outside of Armenia. By mid-April, the limitations were abandoned completely, and the media could report anything they liked.”

As a result, Ghazaryan said, average Armenians don’t know what to believe.

“It’s like a Petri dish for hoaxes,” she said. “We have a lot of doctors who spread anti-vaccine conspiracies, and it’s very difficult to convince people that the doctors are lying. Armenia’s Ministry of Health has even filed a lawsuit against one of those doctors.”

Ghazaryan added: “Armenia’s National Center for Disease Control is a popular target for conspiracy theories about bioweapons and experiments on humans. Several Russian websites have reported that this center is actually the place from where the virus was disseminated in Armenia. These articles were translated into Armenian, and it spread like wildfire.”

Highway sign along E60 highway linking the Georgian capital of Tbilisi to Baku, Azerbaijan—and on to Tehran. (Photo by Larry Luxner)

Not all this disinformation comes from Russia, said Ghazaryan; some of the anti-vaccine content also originates from US websites—including some outlandish claims that Bill Gates intentionally created the pandemic in order to implant microchips into people.

In oil-rich Azerbaijan, whose population of 10.1 million far exceeds the combined population of Georgia and Armenia, lawmakers passed a bill in March prohibiting the dissemination of false information about the pandemic.

Leyla Mustafayeva, editor-in-chief of Fakt Yoxla, an independent media watchdog in Baku, said that early on, Azerbaijani authorities arrested several people for violating that law—including some who had posted on Facebook that the real number of cases was higher than official figures suggest. But this, she said, “was only an excuse for the government to win points from society and exaggerate their role as if they’re doing a lot to fight” COVID-19.

“Unfortunately, there are very few independent journalists left in Azerbaijan,” Mustafayeva told the panel. “In countries like ours, it is not about their professionalism as journalists, it’s about being a tool of government propaganda.”

Batu Kutelia, deputy chairman of the Atlantic Council of Georgia, said it’s no secret that Russia has long exploited world crises for its own gain—the current one being no exception.

“Pandemics are beloved events for authoritarian leaders. They allow them to implement, with a higher degree of legitimacy, some of the dirty work they wish to do, like curbing basic freedoms,” said Kutelia, a former Georgian ambassador to the United States.

Moscow’s main goal all along, Kutelia asserted, has been to drive a wedge between the US and the European Union, while getting citizens throughout its “sphere of influence” to question the vulnerability of their own leaders.

“Georgia has been exposed to this hybrid pressure for nearly thirty years,” he said, noting that one-fifth of Georgian territory remains under Russian military occupation following a brief 2008 border war between the two countries. “The idea is to subvert state institutions. That’s what they’re trying to do in Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Public trust is eroding, so rulers are easy prey for Russian pressure.”

That’s why independent journalists must be allowed to report the unvarnished truth about COVID-19, said Buziashvili.

“If someone’s telling you it’s raining outside and someone else says it’s not, you should look out the window and check if it’s raining or not,” she said. “This is how it should be. We believe explanation is the key in defeating disinformation.”

Larry Luxner is a Tel Aviv-based freelance journalist and photographer who covers the Middle East, Eurasia, Africa and Latin America. Follow him on Twitter @LLuxner.

US accuses Russia of “falsifying WWII history”

By Peter Dickinson

A strongly-worded new US joint statement issued together with foreign ministers from across Central and Eastern Europe takes aim at Russian attempts to rewrite history and sanitize the Soviet role in WWII.

Central Europe Disinformation

New Atlanticist Apr 3, 2020

The coronavirus infodemic in Latin America will cost lives

By Roberta Braga and Diego Area

Disinformation and misinformation, especially circulating within the biggest economy in Latin America (Brazil) and the country with the worst man-made humanitarian crisis in the hemisphere (Venezuela), can foment national catastrophes that will be felt well beyond the realms of the online information space and national borders.

Brazil Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Mar 16, 2020

Addressing the coronavirus “infodemic”

By David A. Wemer

“Information, including disinformation and misinformation about the novel coronavirus is spreading faster than the pandemic itself,” Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe explained. The sheer amount of information on the outbreak means that government and business leaders need to take specific actions to ensure that their citizens and employees receive important credible information.

Disinformation Economy & Business

The post Activists fight COVID-19 disinformation in the Caucasus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bryza joins CBC TV (Azerbaijani) to discuss the meeting of Azerbaijan and Armenia’s Foreign Ministers about Nagorno Karabakh

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Apr 2020 15:49:00 +0000

original source

The post Bryza joins CBC TV (Azerbaijani) to discuss the meeting of Azerbaijan and Armenia’s Foreign Ministers about Nagorno Karabakh appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why strongmen love the coronavirus

Atlantic Council Eurasia Center — Fri, 17 Apr 2020 13:00:00 +0000

Listen on

As the COVID-19 pandemic sweeps across the globe, autocratic governments are finding the crisis to be a useful pretext for strengthening their rule and tightening their grips. In Hungary, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Russia, strongman leaders are taking advantage of a distracted international community in order to advance and reinforce their own authoritarian agendas.

Melinda Haring and Doug Klain call up Ambassador Dan Baer, former US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Elspeth Suthers, Senior Program Officer for the South Caucasus, National Endowment for Democracy; Samuel Tadros, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; Anna Nemtsova, Moscow Correspondent, The Daily Beast; and Jacob Heilbrunn, Editor, The National Interest to discuss this troubling trend.

Related experts

Fellow

Daniel Fried

Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow

Economic Statecraft Initiative Eurasia Center

Eastern Europe Democratic Transitions

Staff

Kirsten Fontenrose

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Middle East National Security

Former staff

Benjamin Haddad

Europe Center

Defense Policy Disinformation

Fellow

Melinda Haring

Eurasia Center

Ukraine Civil Society

Learn more

The post Why strongmen love the coronavirus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Azerbaijan’s strongman senses opportunity in coronavirus pandemic

Doug Klain — Thu, 19 Mar 2020 12:47:08 +0000

While many countries are scrambling to protect the public from COVID-19, authorities in Azerbaijan are using the virus as a pretext to continue their harassment of opposition groups like the D18 Movement (D18).

On March 8, Azerbaijani journalist Tezekhan Mirelemli started live broadcasting from D18’s Baku office as police officers ordered the office closed, saying that the activists could not “gather en masse” due to fears of spreading the novel coronavirus. There were only four people in the office at the time and officers refused to provide a court order or other documentation for the closure.

This is nothing new for Azerbaijan. As elections approached in February, police detained opposition leaders in Baku— including D18’s leader Ruslan Izzatli—drove them hours outside of town, and left them in the middle of nowhere. Izzatli, who was himself running for parliament when he was detained, is threatening to sue the interior ministry.

Alex Rafouglu, an Azerbaijani-American journalist who also serves as Amnesty USA’s country specialist on Azerbaijan and Georgia told me that “it looks like the government is trying to take personal revenge and using every opportunity, including disasters like coronavirus, to silence these critics.”

Taking advantage of a deadly global pandemic to harass opposition groups may seem like blatant opportunism—and it is—but it’s also ordinary behavior for the Azerbaijani government. In 2014, the opposition Popular Front party accused the government of causing an explosion in their office. The government denied the accusations, and quickly moved to demolish the building on grounds that it wasn’t safe.

Subscribe to The future is here: A guide to the post-COVID world

Sign up for a weekly roundup of top expert insights and international news about how coronavirus is reshaping international affairs.

“It’s really cheap and easy to go after a group like D18, especially under the guise of public health. They can probably go after them like this without facing a big public backlash,” Elspeth Suthers, a senior program officer for Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy, told me.

Azerbaijan’s government has increasingly been flexing its authoritarian muscles as civil society and political groups like D18 try to increase civic and political participation in the country. “An organization like D18 is well positioned to help young people make the transition from…cleaning up beaches, to thinking about voting rights and observing elections and maybe even running for office one day,” Suthers said. “That would put them on the government’s radar as a potential threat.”

The world is grappling with a global crisis, and public trust in government is critical to public health tactics like self-isolation. Individual responsibility is proving to be critical for mitigating the virus, especially in countries where the pandemic is still in the early stages of spreading. People must be able to trust that when their government and health experts advise them to take certain precautions, the authorities have the best interests of the public in mind and take the threat seriously. If people doubt what they hear or do not take it seriously, they are far more likely to take unnecessary risks and make the pandemic worse.

So far, Azerbaijan only has thirty-four cases of COVID-19 confirmed, but the government is squandering what little credibility it has. If Baku starts to see the same levels of transmission in other world capitals, they will have to start minimizing public gatherings, closing restaurants, and asking people to quarantine themselves. What happens if Azerbaijanis interpret public health decrees from their government as just another meaningless political tool, or assume ulterior motives?

To some, trust in government has been eroded by acts like the D18 office shutdown. “I think everyone following this story understands that if you’re trying to shut down public gatherings and offices to fight coronavirus, why would you go after one specific opposition group?” asks Raufoglu. “When government offices and schools are still open, that is not consistent with your policy and your messaging.”

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev still maintains his grip over the country despite a cascade of threats to his legitimacy—accusations of paying off European politicians with a slush fund, vocal international criticism of its sham elections last month, and now a tumbling economy as the Russia-Saudi Arabia oil standoff plunges prices. As an authoritarian ruler, Aliyev will likely weather the storm. The coronavirus pandemic, however, is showing just how reliant we are on the actions of each government. What happens in one place affects us all. If an unmitigated outbreak occurs in Azerbaijan, it will not stay in Azerbaijan.

For its own good, the global community needs to act in defense of Azerbaijanis, first by calling out what is happening in Baku but then by going further.

Groups like D18 are pushing for an Azerbaijan that is more open and inclusive. They want Azerbaijan’s government to move past the corrupt post-Soviet shell Aliyev is trying to preserve—and at a time when the world faces a global pandemic, Soviet-style opaqueness and unnecessary harassment only makes people more likely to ignore critical public health recommendations.

On March 19, Aliyev openly threatened to “isolate” his political enemies during this crisis. “A state of emergency might be declared sometime,” he said in a statement. “In this case, isolation of the representatives of this fifth column will become a historical necessity… We cannot allow the anti-Azerbaijani forces, the fifth column, national traitors, taking advantage of this situation, to commit any provocation.” The world’s attention is focused on combating COVID-19 right now, but the way authoritarians use the crisis to consolidate power cannot be ignored.

The COVID-19 crisis presents a chance for the international community to make the connection between human rights and the hard realities of international relations. If the international community cannot call out human rights abuse in Azerbaijan when the only victims are Azerbaijani, maybe the global nature of this pandemic is the push it needs to find its voice.

Doug Klain is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on Twitter @DougKlain.

Coronavirus crisis: Ukraine needs IMF support not political purges

By Anders Åslund

President Zelenskyy’s sudden purge of his reformist cabinet has shaken confidence in the Ukrainian economy at a time when global markets are facing a mounting coronavirus crisis – could an IMF deal be the solution?

Coronavirus International Financial Institutions

MENASource Mar 5, 2020

The impact of coronavirus on Gulf economies

By Jonathan Fulton

Beyond the obvious public health crisis, the coronavirus has had a significant impact on Gulf economies, as it has with other countries around the world. What sets the GCC states apart is the damage that can be done by a Chinese slowdown.

Coronavirus Middle East

IranSource Mar 16, 2020

COVID-19: The latest shock to a battered Iranian system

By Barbara Slavin

How many shocks can a political system absorb and still remain in power?

Coronavirus Iran

The post Azerbaijan’s strongman senses opportunity in coronavirus pandemic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Greater Caspian region: A new Silk Road, with or without a new belt

Matthew Bryza — Sat, 29 Feb 2020 20:25:29 +0000

With the signing of a US-Taliban peace agreement, now might be a good time to look ahead to how Afghanistan might strengthen its economic connectivity with both its neighbors and more distant markets. Now, there will be a 135-day period of de-escalation of violence. If there are no major attacks, then the path will be clear to negotiate to add the Afghan Government to the agreement structure. This will be tricky, as today’s agreement also commits the Afghan Government to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners, and the Taliban to release 1,000 captured Afghan Army soldiers.

As a potential permanent peace inches closer in Afghanistan, US policy for the “Greater Caspian region,” the area stretching from India to the Black and Mediterranean Seas with the Caspian Sea at the center, needs to come into sharper focus. A key facet of this policy is the potential for new energy, cargo, and data logistics lines to help stabilize a post-peace Afghanistan and generate new patterns of cooperation that could either complement or compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.

This vision of an economic cooperation corridor from Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea is not new. I spent more than half of my twenty-three-year diplomatic career at the center of US government efforts to establish a network of oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and Mediterranean, working together with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, as well as BP, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), and other oil companies. These pipelines were:

Baku-Supsa for oil from Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea coast;
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) for oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast;
Baku-Novorossiysk for oil from Azerbaijan to Russia’s Black Sea coast;
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) for oil from Kazakhstan also to Russia’s port of Novorossiysk; and
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) for natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey, (which is expanding today into the European Union’s (EU) Southern Corridor).

These pipelines on the western side of the Caspian, however, represent only half of the strategic vision shared by Washington, Ankara, and eventually the EU: cross-Caspian export routes for Central Asian oil and gas, independent of Russian monopoly power, have been the second key element, but they have yet to materialize. Indeed, the CPC pipeline perpetuates Russia’s near-monopoly on oil exports from Central Asia, while Chevron and ExxonMobil have exported only modest oil volumes from Kazakhstan via tankers to Azerbaijan and BTC. And no Caspian natural gas has ever been exported westward other than via pipelines operated by Gazprom, which is controlled by the Russian government.

Despite Washington’s inclusion of two oil pipelines transiting Russia in its regional energy security strategy, Moscow has consistently opposed any pipeline that might weaken the monopoly power of either Gazprom or Transneft, (Russia’s state-owned oil pipeline monopoly). As a Russian deputy foreign minister told me privately in 2001, “The core of our Caspian energy policy is to maximize the flow of oil and gas through Russian pipelines.”

Moscow has proven adept at stifling a key project strongly supported by Washington and Ankara beginning since the mid-1990s, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP), intended to deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. The Kremlin has used both spurious environmental and legal arguments and brutal intimidation of Turkmenistan’s leaders to oppose TPC.¹ Moscow has also created facts on the ground. Gazprom’s Blue Stream Pipeline, proposed to Ankara at the end of 1997 and completed in 2002, delivers same volumes of gas delivered to Turkey that could have come from TPC, but via Russia and under the Black Sea.

These Russian efforts to thwart TCP received a boost from a purely economic source, BP’s 1998 discovery of the mammoth Shah Deniz natural gas (and condensate) field in Azerbaijan’s Caspian waters. This discovery eliminated Baku’s economic incentive to cooperate with Ashgabat on shipments of Turkmenistan’s gas, as Turkey became the main market for Shah Deniz as well.

TCP has therefore languished on strategic drawing boards for over twenty years. However, new glimmers of hope for the project may have emerged. Several participants cited renewed US political support for TCP by US President Donald J. Trump in his Novruz holiday letters last spring to President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov of Turkmenistan. More recently and during his early February visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stressed the United States’ desire to help Central Asian countries develop alternatives to China’s BRI and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union for building inter-regional economic cooperation. TCP could be one of those alternatives.

Moreover, Azerbaijan may now have an economic incentive to welcome TCP. Despite significant natural gas production at Shah Deniz and other fields, Azerbaijan is unable to meet industrial demand from domestic supplies alone, thanks to the country’s burgeoning petrochemical sector. Additional gas supplies from Turkmenistan could provide an answer.

There is hope that Russia might be softening its opposition to TCP in the wake of the August 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. That agreement, signed by Russia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Iran, resolved some of the territorial disagreements among the Caspian Sea’s littoral states that Moscow previously cited in opposing TCP. Unfortunately, this is not the case. On the contrary, Russia, together with Iran, continues to oppose TCP for political reasons, citing supposed concerns about the endangered Caspian seal and sturgeon, (ignoring the legacy of environmental degradation of Caspian waters from Soviet-era oil pipelines).

Beyond words, Moscow is also taking concrete action to maximize the flow of Central Asian crude through Russian pipelines rather than the Azerbaijan-Georgia corridor. Working with their state oil pipeline monopoly Transneft and state oil company Rosneft, Russian authorities have been investing heavily in the Caspian Sea port of Makhachkala, the capital of the Russian Republic of Dagestan. Oil imports into Makhachkala, thus increased by 200 percent in 2018 over the previous year, and then another 100 percent in 2019. Part of this latter increase resulted when oil shipments from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Baku were diverted to Makhachkala in January 2019 due to a dispute between SOCAR and the Swiss-Dutch oil trading giant, Vitol.

US sanctions could conceivably threaten the reliability of this new Makhachkala oil export route. The Russian owners of one Caspian tanker, VEB-Leasing OJSC, were already under US sanctions when Vitol chartered it in early 2019 to transport crude from Turkmenistan to Makhachkala. Then on February 17, 2020, the United States applied new sanctions against Rosneft, a key buyer of crude at Makhachkala, for supporting the Maduro regime in Venezuela.

Additionally, there is growing evidence of Russian intent to use Makhachkala to help circumvent US sanctions against Iranian oil exports. As reported in early 2019 in Dagjournal, an official publication of Russia’s Republic of Dagestan, Iranian oil could be shipped to Makhachkala and blended with crude from other suppliers, which would then be sold in Europe; in exchange, Iran would receive food, medicine, and other basic commodities. Although such a barter arrangement involving Iranian oil would violate US sanctions, the Financial Times reported in July 2019 that Moscow had signaled it would explore “ways to facilitate or finance Iranian oil exports.”

Subscribe for the latest on Central Asia

Receive updates for events, news, and publications on Central Asia from the Atlantic Council.

Given US sanctions against Russia’s and Iran’s oil sectors, the Azerbaijan-Georgia corridor to the Black Sea and Turkey would appear more reliable than the Makhachkala route. Indeed, for nearly twenty years, the US military has resupplied its forces in Afghanistan via this route, which parallels the BTC and SCP pipelines, then extends across the Caspian Sea into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan and onward to Afghanistan. Launched by then-President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev in a phone call to then-US President George W. Bush a day after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, this route grew to deliver one-third of all fuel and materiel destined for US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Today, this corridor is expanding, with a full range of cargo now complementing military logistics routes. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail connection, inaugurated in October 2017, is the shortest rail link between Europe and Asia. Data transport is also becoming part of the Greater Caspian Region’s transport corridors. Azerbaijani telecom company Azertelecom is establishing a fiber-optic link between southeast Europe and China that will traverse the Georgia-Azerbaijan corridor, travel under the Caspian Sea, and extend throughout Central Asia (a project that I am a strategic consultant for).

Afghanistan, however, remains on the periphery of these new trade flows. Afghanistan urgently needs new logistical connections to help catalyze economic stability and growth with the new peace agreement.

Turkmenistan can play a key role in providing these connections. To the northwest, Turkmenistan physically links Afghanistan to the Caspian Sea and transit links to Europe via the Black Sea and Turkey. To the southeast, Turkmenistan’s natural gas reserves (the world’s fourth-largest), can enable Afghanistan to become part of a regional energy trading network via the notional Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI).

Like TCP, TAPI has enjoyed periodic support from Washington since the early 1990s, when private oil company Unocal and the US government began drawing strategic lines on the map. TAPI would deliver Turkmenistani natural gas to energy-starved markets in Pakistan and India, with Afghanistan gaining transit revenues.

Despite several declarations that construction has begun, TAPI has never really gotten off the ground. The $8 to $10 billion project faces serious financing hurdles stemming from daunting political risks, especially its need to transit Taliban-controlled territory in Afghanistan’s Herat Province. Moreover, TAPI’s revenues would flow to the corruption-plagued Afghan government rather than directly benefiting local citizens of Afghanistan. As a result, TAPI is unlikely to generate the requisite local popular support required to deter attacks on the pipeline by militants who seek ransom payments from Kabul. Meanwhile, Russia and China are maneuvering to participate in TAPI, given the project’s high political profile, and thereby circumscribe the TAPI countries’ options for geo-economic influence independence.

There are plans for future projects that could mitigate these obstacles to TAPI, and maybe even generate geo-economic benefits for Afghanistan that far outweigh those of TAPI. TAPP, which is being developed by the private Turkish company Calik Enerji, aims to export electricity generated from locally produced gas in a power plant in Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in two phases.

TAPP’s first phase is crucial: it would comprise a modest transmission line to deliver electricity to Afghan people in Herat and other provinces who have never had access to electricity. Unlike a gas pipeline, whose transit fees would disappear into the Kabul bureaucracy, TAPP’s initial power line would provide tangible and life-changing benefits to individual citizens of Afghanistan, namely, their first-ever supplies of electricity. It can be assumed that Afghans would become supporters of a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan electricity corridor. And, because the Taliban’s ultimate goal is to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, the militants would be loath to destroy the power line.

Building on the positive political momentum of Phase 1, TAPP’s second phase would be a significantly larger transmission line to carry electricity from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan’s Balochistan, another region whose residents historically have never enjoyed sufficient access to electricity. If the project is successful in Pakistan, an extension to India could eventually be contemplated. Planning for TAPP is moving forward. While it will need political and regulatory support from the countries along its route, as well as possible security support from the United States, it is a commercial project. It, therefore, offers a free-market alternative to the state-centric approaches of Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and China’s BRI. And, if TAPP succeeds, it can help cement a hoped-for Afghan peace agreement, while accelerating the development of the other logistics corridors throughout the Greater Caspian Region that can provide optionality for the countries of South and Central Asia as they navigate their way through BRI and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Agreement with the Taliban: What next?

By James B. Cunningham

The agreement is the best opportunity available for the beginning of discussions among Afghans of Afghanistan’s future, and of peace after decades of conflict. Even if it proves passable, the road to peace will be long and difficult, as indeed the path to today’s opening of the door to negotiations has been. No one should underestimate the difficulty of reaching a peace agreement and thus the need for time, patience, and persistence.

Afghanistan Conflict

New Atlanticist Oct 21, 2019

Passing the baton in Turkmenistan

By Victoria Clement

The capital, Ashgabat, is whispering that the president plans to place his son Serdar in a leadership role, while he takes on the mantle of sage advisor, becoming the power behind the throne (rather than on it). In essence, Berdimuhamedow is securing hereditary succession for his son, while retaining power.

Central Asia Democratic Transitions

EnergySource Feb 19, 2020

TurkStream is South Stream 2.0—has the EU done its homework this time?

By Martin Jirušek

Flying largely under the radar, progress on the TurkStream pipeline has been met with little attention. This is quite unjust, as the project is a key piece of Gazprom’s future supply strategy.

Energy Markets & Governance Geopolitics & Energy Security

learn more

Learn more

1 In the autumn of 2000, then-President of Turkmenistan Sapamurat Niyazov told a US diplomatic colleague and me in his presidential office that Russian officials suggested they would destabilize Turkmenistan and perhaps threaten his life were he to proceed with TCP.

The post The Greater Caspian region: A new Silk Road, with or without a new belt appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bryza quoted in Trend News Agency (Azerbaijani) on negotiations about the Nagorno Karabakh conflict

Atlantic Council — Thu, 20 Feb 2020 00:50:05 +0000

original source

The post Bryza quoted in Trend News Agency (Azerbaijani) on negotiations about the Nagorno Karabakh conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bryza joins CBC TV (Azerbaijani) to discuss Nagorno Karabakh

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Feb 2020 18:36:00 +0000

Original source

The post Bryza joins CBC TV (Azerbaijani) to discuss Nagorno Karabakh appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Morningstar joins CBC TV News (Azerbaijani) to discuss peace negotiations over Nagorno Karabakh

Atlantic Council — Thu, 30 Jan 2020 19:11:00 +0000

Original source

The post Morningstar joins CBC TV News (Azerbaijani) to discuss peace negotiations over Nagorno Karabakh appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Don’t be fooled: Russia is still NATO’s greatest challenge

David A. Wemer — Tue, 03 Dec 2019 18:24:49 +0000

Seventy years after NATO’s birth, the Alliance is still confronting an existential threat to its east, several defense and foreign affairs ministers said on December 3. Although French President Emmanuel Macron has made waves by suggesting that terrorism, not Russia, was the biggest threat facing NATO today, the defense ministers from Estonia and Lithuania were clear that they still see Moscow as their biggest challenge.

“Russia has shown with its actions that it is a serious security threat,” Estonian defense minister Jüri Luik said during a panel discussion on Baltic and Black sea security during the NATO engages event in London on December 3. “For Lithuania, [Russia] is the only external existential threat we have,” added Lithuanian defense minister Raimundas Karoblis. While Macron has a legitimate concern in preventing terrorism in Europe, Luik argued that unlike terrorism, “Russia is the existential threat” because “it is a nation state.” NATO, he added, is “the only organization that can viably” deter Russian aggression against its neighbors.

Both ministers praised NATO’s efforts to protect the Baltic states from Russian attack and show Moscow that the Alliance would not leave them undefended. “Lithuania has never had such a great number of guarantees and allies as we have now,” Karoblis said. Luik warned, however, that persistence is key to staving off Russian aggression. “If we are serious in our actions, if we are clear and concise in our messaging, then the threat is quite low,” he explained. “But if we are weak, if we are wobbly, then the threat can go up.”

Both Karoblis and Luik suggested that NATO needs to do more to shore up its Baltic defense, including larger exercises to show “how we bring in additional troops if they are necessary,” as Luik suggested. Karoblis highlighted the need for “more precise defense planning,” a wish that has become controversial after a reported Turkish attempt to block new military plans for the Baltics and Poland until NATO recognizes Syrian Kurdish groups as terrorist organizations.

Despite the supposed Turkish opposition, neither Luik nor Karoblis were concerned that the proposed plans would be blocked more than temporarily. “The discussions are going on all the time,” Luik explained, adding that “if we don’t find a compromise here, we hopefully will find it a bit later. But I am absolutely sure we will find a compromise.” Karoblis promised “we will find a solution to this.”

Black Sea instability

But while the Baltics may remain firmly in NATO’s sights, Romania’s defense minister Nicolae Ciuca warned that the Black Sea region, the other vital part of the Alliance’s eastern flank, needs to be accounted for as well. “NATO and the EU need to have a very coherent approach to the whole flank,” rather than just tailoring solutions to either the Baltics or the Black Sea, he argued. In the latter especially, he continued, “we need to focus on strengthening the NATO and EU presence and NATO and EU cooperation in order to support the partnership countries,” such as Georgia and Ukraine, who have both faced invasion by Moscow in the last decade.

“Whether you like it or not, we defend your eastern flank,” Ukrainian foreign minister Vadym Prystaiko told the crowd in London, warning that the growing number of priorities for NATO in the Baltics and the Southern flank are causing the region to “believe that we are being left alone” despite being under daily pressure from Moscow. Georgian foreign minister David Zalkaliani agreed that the region must be one of importance for NATO because “without a secure Black Sea, there will be no security in the Euro Atlantic security space.”

Zalkaliani particularly lamented the failure of NATO leaders to approve the accession of either Ukraine or Georgia to NATO despite pledging to do so at the 2008 NATO Summit. Despite the prolonged wait, “Georgia is already acting like an ally,” Zalkaliani explained, as his country has met the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal and has contributed troops to NATO missions in Afghanistan and Europe.

“When a country like Georgia delivers it has to be reciprocated,” he argued. Prystaiko agreed, noting that the “indecisiveness” of NATO since the 2008 promise has given Moscow the greenlight to attack both countries. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Prystaiko argued, can only be deterred through the strength of NATO. “He still appreciates and respects the mightiness of the Alliance. That is actually the only language which Putin understands.”

David A. Wemer is associate director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

Subscribe for events and publications on NATO

Sign up for updates from the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, covering the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The post Don’t be fooled: Russia is still NATO’s greatest challenge appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Georgia protests are not a showcase of Russophobia

Tina Maglakelidze — Tue, 09 Jul 2019 15:32:07 +0000

On June 20, thousands of Georgians took to the streets of the capital, Tbilisi, to express their disapproval of a Russian lawmaker addressing the Georgian parliament from the speaker’s chair. Sergei Gavrilov, a Russian State Duma deputy and president of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, visited Georgia for the convening of the organization’s 26^th General Assembly, an event designed to foster relations between Orthodox Christian lawmakers. The procession, however, was cut short by opposition politicians who doused Gavrilov with water before he was escorted out of the building.

Relations with Moscow have remained a contentious issue in domestic Georgian politics since the 2008 Russian invasion of the Georgian states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Memories of the bitter conflict are still sensitive as hundreds perished and 250,000 were left internally displaced. Gavrilov’s presence in the nation’s parliament building was an unwelcome reminder for many Georgians that a fifth of their country is still occupied by the Russian military. Allegations made against Gavrilov regarding his participation in military activities on the territory of Abkhazia further compounded public outrage. While he denies such claims about his past, Georgian opposition politicians likened Gavrilov’s address to parliament to a “slap in the face to recent Georgian history.”

More importantly, Georgian demonstrators found the government’s decision to invite the Russian delegation as evidence of its disconnect from popular sentiment. The billionaire founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, attributed the invitation to an “error in protocol.” The head of the Georgian delegation for the Interparliamentary Session on Orthodoxy, Zakaria Kutsnashvili, has since resigned from his position.

Less than twenty-four hours after the first demonstrations, Irakli Kobakhidze, the speaker of Georgia’s parliament, also resigned, fulfilling one of the main demands voiced by protesters and the opposition. The demonstrators also called for Interior Minister Giorgi Gakharia to be dismissed and for snap parliamentary elections to be held via a proportional electoral system. Gakharia has not expressed an intent to resign his post and there are no plans so far for an earlier date for parliamentary elections. In an attempt to address protesters’ grievances, the government approved a change to the country’s electoral system from a mixed electoral system to a proportional one.

Although the government has made concessions, protesters have voiced additional demands since the initial June 20-21 riots. Rallies and hunger strikes have been held in support of the 305 demonstrators detained during initial protests and many have also joined the movement to protest police brutality in the capital. Despite graphic images disseminated by the international news media on June 21, Bakhtadze initially denied that police had used rubber bullets. That same day Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International condemned the unlawful and harsh conduct of law enforcement officers who failed to provide protesters with advance warning before using tear gas and firing rubber bullets into the crowd. The Office of the Chief Prosecutor announced that an investigation is underway and is soliciting video evidence from civilian demonstrators. Ten officers were detained on June 24.

On June 25, the Georgian prosecutor-general’s office charged member of parliament Nika Melia, a leader of former President Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement party, with inciting violence and stripped him of his immunity. The opposition politician could face up to nine years in prison and his bail has been posted at approximately $10,000.

The swift resignation of the speaker of parliament and the changes made to the electoral code are significant outcomes for the Georgian opposition. Nevertheless, these gains came at the cost of 240 injured and 305 detained, as well as economic blows dealt by the Kremlin.

Citing security risks, the Russian State Duma has called for the cancellation of flights to Georgia and recalled Russian nationals back to the homeland starting on July 8. Last year, approximately 1.4 million Russian tourists traveled to Georgia, spending around €632 million, nearing 10 percent of Georgia’s annual tourism revenue. Some experts estimate that Georgia’s tourism industry could lose $300 million annually from the travel embargo.

As an initial response, Georgian Minister of Economy Natia Turnava released a public statement affirming that Georgia is a safe destination for all tourists. Other countries also responded. The former president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, tweeted that Ukrainians should choose Georgia as their next travel destination. Additionally, Russian tourists in Georgia publicly praised the country’s hospitality.

The Kremlin has also targeted Georgian wine exports to Russia. Approximately 60 percent of the wine produced in Georgia last year was exported to Russia. On June 24, Russian state consumer watchdog, Rospotrebnadzor, released a statement detailing the “deteriorating quality” of eight Georgian wine exporters. Georgia’s former foreign minister, Irakli Menagarishvili, called Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent escalations a declaration of “economic war.” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov nevertheless maintained that this development is apolitical and has nothing to do with the Tbilisi protests. While Moscow looks to target major sources of revenue for the Georgian economy, Tbilisi has weathered this kind of punitive behavior from its neighbor before and seems confident in its capacity to do so again.

Tensions between the two governments have not been higher since the war in August 2008. Just last year, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev expressed ambitions for a “full-scale dialogue” between Moscow and Tbilisi. Last week, Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili posted a statement on Facebook labelling Moscow as the “enemy and occupier” and cautioned against the dangers posed by “the Fifth Column orchestrated by Russia.”

On June 20, Peskov condemned the Tbilisi protests as “Russophobic provocations.” Russian-state media has sought to blame the West for turning a blind eye to “ultra-nationalists” wreaking havoc and endangering Russian citizens residing in Georgia. However, there is a critical distinction between the memorialization of chosen national traumas and the “ultra-nationalism” that the Russian-state media cautioned against in Tbilisi. While the Kremlin desires to further blur these lines, the “anti-Russian” sentiments fueling the crowds are not directed toward Russian nationals.

The “anti-Russian” and “anti-Putin” placards and banners circulating online express Georgian enmity towards their neighbor’s encroachment of its territorial sovereignty. As one protester clarified: “[Georgians] are fighting against Putinism” and have “no problems whatsoever with the Russian people, we are not xenophobes.” Within Georgia, these riots are also a symptom of domestic political polarization in which a segment of society feels its government is disconnected from popular sentiment.

Outside observers must resist conflating anti-Kremlin sentiment with Russophobia. At the same time, the Georgian people have a responsibility to make explicit that these protests are not a violent manifestation of Russophobia, as the Kremlin has attempted to paint them. Georgians would burnish their international standing if they also demonstrated that domestic political disputes could be settled within the sovereignty of Georgia and through legitimate governmental institutions. If Georgia wishes to continue its path to the strategic West, all sides of the political spectrum should make deliberate efforts to reduce the degree of partisanship and accurately address the frustrations of Georgians. At the bare minimum, major political parties in Georgia must cooperate to withstand the predicted economic instability.

Tina Maglakelidze is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow the Center’s work @ACEurasia.

The post Georgia protests are not a showcase of Russophobia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For Armenia’s Pashinyan, Poroshenko’s presidency should serve as a cautionary tale

Colby Galliher — Tue, 02 Jul 2019 17:02:18 +0000

Armenia’s ongoing political drama intensified in mid-May when Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, reacting to a court’s decision to release former president Robert Kocharyan while he awaits trial on charges related to the government’s crackdown on protesters in 2008, called on his supporters to blockade the country’s courthouses to begin the “second phase” of the Velvet Revolution. On June 5, Pashinyan announced his plan to create a unified anti-corruption court with the aim of cleansing Armenia’s judicial system of corruption.

These developments underscore Pashinyan’s efforts to legitimize himself and his ruling coalition’s post-revolution vision for Armenia. To do so, Pashinyan and his government will need to pursue the key reforms he promised while leading the mass protest movement that deposed the former government and elevated him to Armenia’s premiership in April 2018.

Meaningfully tackling corruption is paramount among those reforms. The fate of Ukraine’s former president Petro Poroshenko, another post-revolutionary leader in a former Soviet state, should illustrate for Pashinyan the perils of failing to keep promises to combat judicial corruption. Poroshenko was soundly defeated by comedian Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a political newcomer, in Ukraine’s runoff presidential election in April. To ensure his own political survival, Pashinyan needs to prove himself as a consistent and tireless driver of reform in Yerevan and beyond.

Like Ukrainians, Armenians have for decades suffered from the consequences of widespread and mostly unchecked corruption. According to John Heffern, a former US ambassador to Armenia and a distinguished fellow for diplomacy and social entrepreneurship at Georgetown University, “the corruption problem has been a drag on Armenia’s development and a source of discontent among the Armenian people.” Armenia only scored thirty-five out of 100 on Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with zero being highly corrupt and 100 being clean.

Pashinyan capitalized on his predecessors’ inaction and the anguish generated by decades of corruption and economic stagnation to fuel his political ascendance in Yerevan last year. Like Poroshenko, Pashinyan reached out to disaffected Armenians by promising a break with the status quo. His new Armenia would be free of oligarchic control over political and economic opportunities. Politics would be done as never before, with competitive, transparent democratic elections and robust citizen participation in political discourse.

A little over a year after the Velvet Revolution, most observers seem to agree that Pashinyan and his government have thus far kept the promises of their campaign and remain sincere about plans to eradicate corruption. The government has criminalized illicit enrichment and in the summer of 2018 began an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign against businessmen linked to the former regime. Pashinyan’s confidence in his government’s progress was made clear when he declared in November of last year that “there are no oligarchs in Armenia anymore.”

Furthermore, and critically, Pashinyan has the domestic support and momentum to follow through on the progress made so far in reshaping Armenia’s political system. Snap elections in December of last year gave him and his party a formidable mandate in Yerevan. His widespread popularity has persisted, with the most recent polls reporting an 81.6 percent approval rating for Pashinyan and 75.8 percent of respondents listing anti-corruption efforts as the government’s greatest achievement of the past year. Heffern, the former US ambassador, hopes that Pashinyan and his government will continue these efforts aggressively and fairly.

But it is still early in Pashinyan’s term. During his 2014 election campaign, Poroshenko talked big on fighting corruption. He promised to cleanse Kyiv and critical sectors of the country’s flagging economy of oligarchic influence. Ukrainians responded positively to this and Poroshenko’s other promises, such as advancing Ukraine’s EU aspirations and repulsing Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, by awarding him a clinching 56 percent of the vote in 2014.

However, truly disassembling a politico-economic system built on corruption, which requires moving beyond partially fulfilled campaign pledges and weakly implemented anti-corruption laws, requires immense political will. According to John Herbst, a former US ambassador to Ukraine and director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, Poroshenko did move the needle on corruption, particularly in the gas, banking, and government procurement sectors. But in the areas where he commanded the greatest influence as president, namely the country’s courts and its prosecutorial system, the former Ukrainian president did little.

The consequences of Poroshenko’s inaction were dramatic. His approval rating dipped from nearly 50 percent in the summer of 2014 to just 17 percent at the end of 2015, with a dismal 5 percent of Ukrainians saying the president was doing enough to fight corruption. When Poroshenko ran as the incumbent in Ukraine’s recent presidential election, the glaring lack of meaningful change in the country vis-à-vis corruption cost him dearly. Despite his achievements in other domestic arenas, such as in stemming Russia’s advance in eastern Ukraine or securing the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, his electoral thrashing by the political neophyte Zelenskyy affirmed that failing to purge Ukraine of corruption was politically fatal.

Of course, Pashinyan is not Poroshenko. The former is a journalist turned revolutionary who spent time in prison after incurring the ire of the former regime; the latter is a career politician with a multibillion-dollar confectionary business who maintained connections to Ukraine’s most infamous oligarchs and the system they ran. But both rose to power by promising to overhaul the wildly corrupt political systems they inherited and to deliver a fairer and more transparent politics to their corruption-fatigued populations.

As such, Poroshenko’s political defeat should serve as a cautionary tale for Pashinyan and his government. Armenians took to the streets in 2018 to dismantle the old system and usher in an era of political, economic, and societal transformation, as their Ukrainian counterparts did four years earlier. If Pashinyan proves his initial steps are part of a committed and long-term effort to finally destroy corruption’s hold on Armenia, he, his government, and the Armenian people will reap the rewards of a new and hopeful status quo. However, if the obstacles prove too great or the urgency for swift reform unconvincing, Pashinyan may face the same fate as Poroshenko when Armenians head to the polls in 2023.

Colby Galliher is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. You can follow the Center’s work @ACEurasia.

The post For Armenia’s Pashinyan, Poroshenko’s presidency should serve as a cautionary tale appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anti-LGBT Facebook Posts Proliferate in Georgia Before Tbilisi Pride

Eto Buziashvili — Tue, 07 May 2019 12:17:02 +0000

May 7, 2019

A number of Georgian anti-Western and far-right Facebook pages began to disseminate anti-LGBT content, following the announcement of Georgia’s first-ever large-scale pride event, Tbilisi Pride, set to take place June 18–23, 2019. LGBT people often face rampant homophobia, violence, and discrimination in traditionally conservative countries such as Georgia. In 2018, LGBT rights activists canceled a series of planned rallies in Tbilisi following threats from several Georgian anti-LGBT groups.

Armenia Assailed by Deceptive “Fact-Checking” Groups, Part 2: The Coordination

Zarine Kharazian, Eto Buziashvili, and Yulia Reshitko — Thu, 02 May 2019 12:14:23 +0000

May 2, 2019

Two Armenian Facebook pages — AntiFake.am and Adekvad (Ադեկվադ) — masqueraded as impartial fact-checking organizations to spread biased narratives aimed at discrediting the government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Following on Part 1, this piece examines the nature and scope of coordination between the two pages. The AntiFake.am and Adekvad pages plainly coordinated in their effort to spread anti-Pashinyan narratives and inauthentic content. On April 15, the Adekvad Facebook page livestreamed leading representatives of both groups, including Narek Samsonyan, chairman of the NGO behind the AntiFake.am initiative, spray painting the hashtag #SutNikol on public streets in Armenia’s capital of Yerevan. Samsonyan, along with Artur Danielyan of Adekvad and Konstantin Ter-Nakalyan of BlogNews.am, were detained by police for defacing public property and were released later that day.

The Caucasus - Atlantic Council

Why deepening Russia-Azerbaijan ties should worry the United States

What the United States should—and shouldn’t—do

How is China mitigating the effects of sanctions on Russia?

Chinese yuan is Russia’s friendliest currency.

Vital trade links

Limits in the ‘no-limits’ partnership

Global Sanctions Dashboard cited by Transparency International Georgia

Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack

Security

International response

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Russian War Report: Belgorod incursion brings deluge of online mockery of Russia’s defenses

Tracking narratives

International response

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

Global Sanctions Dashboard: US and G7 allies target Russia’s evasion and procurement networks

New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit

Export controls circumvention: How the US is tackling it and what should improve moving forward

The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap

Beyond Russia: The failure of US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all fear a Russian defeat in Ukraine

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Further reading

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

Putin’s embarrassing one-tank parade hints at catastrophic losses in Ukraine

Andriy Yermak: Italy is defending common European values in Ukraine

Read more from UkraineAlert

Follow us on social media and support our work

Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire are unraveling in Ukraine

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Further reading

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

Read more from UkraineAlert

Follow us on social media and support our work

Russian War Report: Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Security

Tracking narratives

International response

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

Global Sanctions Dashboard: What to do with sanctioned Russian assets

Russian oligarch assets should be used now to support Ukraine

What are the immediate steps?

Concerns with immediate confiscation of Russian state assets

Georgia on the radar

Calls to appease Putin in Ukraine ignore the lessons of history

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Further reading

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

Poland is leading Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

Read more from UkraineAlert

Follow us on social media and support our work

Russian War Report: Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

Security

Tracking narratives

International response

Russian forces claim control of strategic Soledar

Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

Frenzy befalls French company accused of feeding Russian forces on New Year’s Eve

Former head of Russian space agency injured in Donetsk, mails shell fragment to French ambassador

Sputnik Lithuania’s former chief editor arrested

New year brings new military aid for Ukraine

Ukrainian envoy to Georgia discusses deteriorating relations between nations

Vladimir Putin: 2022 Loser of the Year

Eurasia Center events

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work