Security

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

Tracking narratives

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

Media policy

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

International response

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol. 

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack. 

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge. 

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.” 

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner. 

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries. 

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny. 

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August. 

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.” 

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, our experts decode all the goings-on in Vilnius—and what they mean for Kyiv’s path to NATO membership, the war in Ukraine, Sweden’s forthcoming accession, the Alliance’s growing focus on China, and more.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Reactions from Wednesday, July 12

John Herbst: A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

Anca Agachi: A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Daniel Fried: The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

Hans Binnendijk: Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

Phillip Cornell: Energy issues took a backseat in the Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

Reactions from Tuesday, July 11

John Herbst: An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Christopher Skaluba: ‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership 

Daniel Fried: Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family 

Shelby Magid: Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

Rich Outzen: A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

Andrew D’Anieri: The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Rachel Rizzo: Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

David O. Shullman: The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

Ian Brzezinski: The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

There is significant overlap among the members of the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU). Four of the G7 nations are in the EU and six are in NATO. It is therefore no surprise that the general approach of the three organizations to Moscow’s war on Ukraine share similar characteristics. All three organizations have actively supported Ukraine since Moscow’s aggression began in February of 2014, and much more so when it intensified in February of 2022. All assert Ukraine’s right to enjoy the peace and stability that should be provided by the liberal international order. With the United States in the lead in NATO and the G7, both organizations have provided significant support to Ukraine, ensuring that Russian President Vladimir Putin could not achieve his goal of establishing effective political control in the country.  

At the same time, again with the United States’ decisive influence, the G7, like NATO, has avoided steps that might seem overly provocative to Moscow—a clear call for Ukraine’s victory against Moscow’s aggression or decisive steps that would lead to a faster Ukrainian victory. So the best way to look at the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine issued by the G7 on July 12 in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Vilnius is as a mostly US-influenced two-step. 

The NATO Summit produced an uninspiring communiqué on the Ukraine-NATO relationship that moved only slightly beyond the language of the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. The G7 Declaration was timed to the NATO Summit because the question of Ukraine joining NATO is linked with the issue of security guarantees. Both are meant to address the difficult question of how an independent Ukraine can live in peace and security alongside a hostile Russia. So it is no surprise that the G7 statement is a step forward toward enhancing Ukraine’s security but not a very large one. 

The declaration affirmatively states Ukraine’s right to choose its own course, join the West, and be free from intimidation and aggression. But it does not offer collective G7 action that might provide greater protection against future Kremlin provocations; instead, it encourages bilateral arrangements between Ukraine and individual G7 states. It places emphasis on the provision of weapons to Ukraine to make it a less appetizing target for a predatory Kremlin. This is a reasonable concept, but less effective than an actual guarantee by the G7 countries to respond forcefully to future Kremlin aggression. Yet even this step is undermined by the fact that all the G7 countries—with the possible exceptions of the United Kingdom and, perhaps now, France—have been reluctant to send Ukraine the more advanced weapons it needs to deliver that decisive blow to Russian forces on its territory.

Russian commentators have dismissed the NATO communiqué as a disappointment for Kyiv, but expressed some dissatisfaction with the G7 Declaration. Their real ire, though, is aimed at Paris, after the French decision to send SCALP long-range missiles to Ukraine. This underscores France’s differences with Washington, which is still unwilling to send Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). French President Emmanuel Macron’s boldness is welcome, but no substitute for strong US leadership.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Overall, the Vilnius summit stuck the landing, and to continue the metaphor, the gymnastic feat was about as tough as it gets. This was indeed a summit of unity, as US President Joe Biden had hoped, and the breakthrough regarding Sweden’s NATO accession especially contributed to that sense. The Alliance also successfully positioned itself as a global actor that understands that the security environment has fundamentally changed, and the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are inextricably linked. The attendance of the Asia-Pacific 4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and language in the communiqué elevating the role of partners is crucial in this regard.

However, the summit’s results were mixed on a range of other issues. Despite high hopes and a strong moral argument, Ukraine was not offered the clear path and timeline it was hoping for to join the Alliance, even as its future in the Euro-Atlantic family was reconfirmed. This outcome, while not surprising, was also likely the best achievable outcome at the moment given Allied differences. This hints at a tough road for NATO in making the ambitious progress necessary by 2024, especially if Ukrainian battlefield advances slow down. Eastern flank reinforcements to brigade-level will only happen “where and when required,” and the language on China was modest in advancing proposals for action, as it was more intent on defining the challenge Beijing poses. The Alliance generally make the most important progress quietly, and here is where I saw encouraging signs: the focus on resilience and securing critical infrastructure; important mentions of Allied enablement and sustainment; and cooperation with the private sector and defense industry to deblock defense supplies.

While kicking the can down the road offers some time, Allies need to start to work with aplomb now to deliver. If anything, the NATO Summit in Washington in 2024 will be an even higher order to rise to—morally and strategically.

—Anca Agachi is an associate director and resident fellow for Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

The G7 Joint Statement on Ukraine is out. It’s no Article 5 security guarantee. It’s a framework for negotiations of bilateral and G7 arrangements with Ukraine to provide military and economic assistance, as well as unspecified security commitments for that country. It includes a promise of consultations with Ukraine in case of a future Russian armed attack that could generate military and other forms of support. For its part, Ukraine commits in the statement to continue its democratic and rule of law transformation, as well as its military reforms. Notably, the statement makes clear that it is no substitute for NATO membership but is intended to help Ukraine while it pursues that goal.

Cynics can make a meal of the statement. It provides little beyond what G7 countries are already doing. But there is another way to look at it. The big strategic question that NATO, the G7, and the United States have faced is whether Ukraine is part of the transatlantic and European family and its institutions or whether it is part of a Kremlin sphere of domination. The Kremlin claims Ukraine as its own.There are many in Europe and the United States who tacitly (or overtly) agree and would cut a dirty deal with Moscow to that end.

Happily, that’s not where NATO and the G7 have come out. The NATO communiqué’s language on Ukraine could have been stronger and the G7 statement is no security guarantee. But they both rest on the premise that Ukraine is part of the European and transatlantic family. The details of how and when have yet to be worked out. The goal is clear: NATO membership for Ukraine. The G7 statement can serve as scaffolding for Ukraine while it works to get there. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

The NATO Summit in Vilnius was a success. But its success was limited, and it will be seen more as a bridging mechanism between last year’s Madrid summit and next year’s Washington summit. At Madrid, the allies agreed on the nature of the new threats and challenges emanating from both Russia and China. Madrid’s new Strategic Concept refocused the Alliance. 

Vilnius was to be an implementation summit. And it was. It recorded progress in multiple areas, from enhanced deterrence to hybrid war to climate change. But it stopped short on several key issues like Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, and managing the nuclear weapons threat posed by Russia and, increasingly, China.

The Vilnius summit took place in the midst of Europe’s most destructive war in nearly eight decades and a US effort to rebalance its relationship with China. This resulted in a degree of caution. Unity formed around lowest common denominator solutions. During the coming year between Vilnius and Washington, the bridge created this week will hopefully be strengthened enough to bear the weight that the Alliance will need to carry next year.

The most successful element of the Vilnius summit was enhancing NATO deterrence along its front line with Russia, from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea. With Finland in and Sweden soon to be in, there is a solid line of defense against Russian aggression. There is no clearer evidence of Russia’s strategic failure. NATO’s New Force Model, agreed upon last year, will provide clarity for nations with regard to their specific wartime responsibilities and incentives to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending floor. NATO’s forward presence in eight front line states needs further strengthening to include a continuous brigade-level presence in each. And the readiness and mobility initiatives need further attention.

The greatest disappointment at Vilnius was the inability to provide a more concrete path for Ukrainian membership after the war ends. But cautious steps were taken. The NATO-Ukraine Commission became a Council, giving Ukraine a stronger voice in NATO political affairs. The Council will be used to plan for future Ukrainian membership, which was again solemnly committed to “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This shortfall for Kyiv was somewhat offset by the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, which pledges additional long-term security commitments and arrangements. Hopefully by the Washington summit, that path can be paved with more concrete.

 —Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Energy issues took a backseat in Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

While the debate over membership (delayed for Ukraine, confirmed for Sweden) dominated the last-minute negotiations over the NATO Summit communiqué, the opening bulk of the document itself is rightly dedicated to reaffirming the traditional and newly relevant core tenets of NATO’s existence—collective defense, nuclear deterrence, and the production and logistics to achieve them. But about two-thirds of the way down, the communiqué turns to how the Euro-Atlantic security environment has shifted. 

The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed that “emerging security challenges” (in NATO parlance) have arrived, from the weaponization of energy to the widespread “digitalization” of warfare and the importance of resilience. 

Indeed, energy security and climate change are gaining renewed importance for the Alliance. Climate security issues are a personal priority of the secretary general, and a changing energy economy means that the pipeline politics of yesterday will look simple compared to the complex security implications of integrated power systems, critical digital infrastructure, supply chains for key inputs to transition, and the like. And while NATO wades into the tech innovation space with its own acceleration fund (DIANA), it has yet to grasp the power of military procurement for demonstrating, scaling, and standardizing technologies that will be key to mitigating emissions in the civilian space while also boosting military effectiveness. Meanwhile the energy transition itself will be a messy process, with pockets of volatility and economic mismatches that could directly impact political stability, popular support for a sustainable transition, and strategic relations.

The Vilnius summit is a turning point for many reasons, but perhaps the most fundamental for NATO as an institution is its shift from an internally focused bureaucracy with declining budgets fighting to justify its existence in the post-Cold War world, to one compelled to adopt a growth and ambition mentality. Where before it was simpler to ring-fence NATO’s military mission, concerns about climate change and strategic competition are imposing policy-driven global economic realignments. To fulfill its ambitions for leadership in that new environment, NATO needs the competence and reach to provide important security-related input to key decisions about infrastructure investment and managing new technology—and it needs to be convinced of its own relevance in those spaces.

—Phillip Cornell is a principal at Economist Impact and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Talk about the eleventh hour! The NATO Summit communiqué was finally released at approximately 6:40 p.m. in Vilnius, rather late for a summit document. There was a good reason for this: clear disagreement between a large number of East European, Nordic, and some Western European allies on the one side and the United States and Germany on the other about how forthcoming the Alliance should be about Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO. While the ad hoc coalition wanted clarity in hastening Ukraine’s membership, Washington and, to a lesser extent, Berlin were cautious. Given the weight Washington enjoys in NATO deliberations, this meant that the much larger number of allies could not get their preference. But given the importance of NATO unity, this meant that the United States and Germany had to move beyond their original position. 

The end result was not quite inspiring. The communiqué notes that Ukraine no longer needs to meet a Membership Action Plan, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission will become a NATO Ukraine Council: small steps in the right direction. On the crucial membership issue, the communiqué states, “the Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.” This is not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.  

It was no surprise that a few hours before the communiqué appeared, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted his dissatisfaction: “It’s unprecedented and absurd when [a] time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine.” This is somewhat sharp, but perhaps understandable from a man whose country is facing an aggression designed to destroy “Ukrainianness.”

While this denouement does not add luster to the Vilnius summit, there are other developments that make this a historic occasion. The main thing, of course, is the admission of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance. This greatly strengthens NATO security in the north. But also important is NATO finally recognizing  that  “the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests. The communiqué also directly addresses the Belarus problem: “Belarus’ support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia’s aggression. In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.”  

These two items portend a further strengthening of NATO policy against the Kremlin threat and in support of Ukraine. Vilnius also foreshadows what is to come in NATO dynamics and policy. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance will be celebrated at the NATO Summit next year in Washington DC. That event will give US President Joe Biden a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president. For that to occur, he will need to listen closely to the United States’ newly active East European allies and 1) provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield and 2) move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership 

The Vilnius summit is likely to be viewed as a landmark summit for two things that happened and two things that didn’t.

What did happen: The pending agreement by Turkey to ratify Sweden’s membership application will soon add a thirty-second ally to NATO’s ranks, making Vilnius, like Madrid before it, an enlargement summit. That every littoral Baltic Sea state, besides Russia, will be a member of the Alliance is a significant development for NATO’s defense of its northeastern flank. To that end, the adoption of some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for defense of NATO territory completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War.

Missing from the Vilnius communiqué, however, is any clear pathway for Ukraine’s membership. Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to “Council” status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments. But neither packs a political punch, nor will either move be viewed as real progress on the membership question. In fact, communiqué language stating “we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is as ambiguous as the infamous Bucharest statement from 2008 promising that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. It is a head-scratching and disappointing formulation. Moreover, the bilateral security guarantees that were broadly promised in the runup to the summit were missing from the final statement. The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department.

Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family 

It might have and should have been stronger. Nevertheless, the NATO communiqué language on Ukraine’s accession to NATO puts Ukraine within, and not outside, the transatlantic family. The “when” and “how” of Ukraine’s accession to NATO have yet to be worked out but, critically, the Vilnius summit has decided the “whether” of Ukraine’s NATO membership in the affirmative–something that the 2008 Bucharest summit did only at a high level of generality. “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is the key sentence from today’s communiqué. It’s weakened by the gratuitous qualifier “we will be in a position to” rather than a straightforward “we will extend an invitation.” Still, this offer—any offer—of an invitation to Ukraine is a step forward, and a big one compared to where the United States and most NATO member governments were even a few months ago.

Less noticed (and less debated) was the communiqué text that makes clear, without weakening qualifiers, that “we do not and will never recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea.” That language, though it reaffirms long-held positions, helps kill the temptation by some to push Ukraine into surrendering its territory in exchange for a dubious “peace” on Putin’s terms.

While NATO has now set out the goal—Ukraine in the Alliance—much depends on continuing to provide robust military support to Ukraine to help it fight back, and win, on the battlefield. Paragraph twelve of the communiqué notes that allies at the summit agreed on a “substantial package of expanded political and practical support” for Ukraine. It doesn’t provide details, but hopefully they will be announced soon, either by NATO or separately by allies.

Zelenskyy and a number of NATO allies have pushed hard (and pushed the Biden administration) to get the most from this summit. They were right to do so. Now they need to consolidate their gains and prepare next steps, including for next year’s NATO Summit in Washington DC.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

The Vilnius summit communiqué rightly places the Russian Federation as the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area due to Moscow’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, terrorism, war crimes, and horrific violations of international law and norms.

Just as Russia deserves to be so centrally acknowledged for its role as the critical threat to Euro-Atlantic security, Belarus deserves to be right beside it. Any disregard of the role Belarus plays as a threat to regional security and an accomplice to the unprovoked war in Ukraine would be a mistake. NATO smartly recognized the threat from Belarus, condemning Belarus’s instrumental support to the Russian war effort by allowing its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces for attacks into Ukraine.

While the communiqué notes Belarus’s complicity in this aggression, it’s critical to remember these crimes are committed and abetted by the illegitimate regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The dictator, desperately clinging to power, has driven Belarus deeper into the Kremlin’s clutches. NATO’s firm declaration of concern for the situation in Belarus is in part due to Lukashenka deepening the military integration between Russia and Belarus, potentially allowing the deployment of “so-called private military companies” to Belarus (the Wagner Group), as well as (perhaps too mildly put) “malign activities” without respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, and international law; the Alliance’s declarations are an important signal and sign of hope that Belarus will not be forgotten in the international agenda.

While it is good to see the declaration about threats within Belarus itself, what will surely frustrate many in the democratic forces (along with their supporters), is that there is no acknowledgement that these actions are taken by an illegitimate regime, nor mention of the democratic forces rallying against these actions, against the war, and against any deployment of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory.

While the communiqué’s comments on Belarus could have been stronger, there is hope NATO leaders and experts in Vilnius have listened in on conversations featuring the democratically elected leader of Belarus and Lukashenka’s rival in the widely disputed 2020 election, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who has been boldly speaking in Vilnius in side-events calling for commitments to Belarus and reminding the world that the Lukashenka regime does not represent the Belarusian people.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

The communiqué presents a clear-eyed snapshot of the Alliance in an era of great power rivalry and strategic competition. Russia receives thorough and excoriating attention as the shatterer of peace and a continuing threat. China is called out for challenging the norms, interests, and security of the Alliance and its members. New and prospective members in the room or at the doorstep (Finland, Sweden, and on a farther horizon, Ukraine) were appropriately hailed, as were Asian partners Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. NATO member Turkey will be pleased by paragraphs four and five, which appreciate Turkish support to Sweden’s accession process and mention Ankara’s preferred language on terrorism as a threat “in all its forms and manifestations” to the Alliance. Hard power, conventional deterrence, and readiness are key focal points, though emerging and nontraditional threats are treated as well. Surprisingly, energy security makes an appearance only in paragraph sixty-eight. All in all, though, the document shows energy, focus, and seriousness appropriate to the geopolitical moment.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Much of the conversation immediately ahead of the NATO summit in Vilnius focused on whether the allies would take concrete steps toward Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. On Sunday, Biden dumped cold water on Ukraine imminently joining NATO, but whispers in expert circles in Washington suggested that an intermediate initiative toward membership might make a splash at Vilnius. In fact, the communiqué itself caused barely a ripple: a new NATO-Ukraine Council that will formalize consultations between Brussels and Kyiv on Ukraine’s “aspirations for membership in NATO.”

A NATO-Ukraine Council is certainly a net positive step toward Ukrainian accession, but the fact that this was the centerpiece of the communiqué suggests it was the bare minimum step upon which allies could agree. The Alliance should have gone further and instead established a defense and deterrence partnership to provide Ukraine lethal aid and training (the renewed Comprehensive Assistance Package will help Ukraine become more interoperable with NATO, but provisions only five hundred million euros for nonlethal aid).

The signers also left open the question of when Ukraine will join the Alliance, writing only that Ukraine will be invited “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This ambiguity may help prevent Russia from blocking specific preconditions to Ukraine’s accession, but it could also create further indignation in Ukraine and in the Baltics if allies continue to disagree on whether Ukraine is “ready” for NATO. 

Pressure will grow on the White House and Western European capitals to elucidate their conditions for Ukraine’s membership, at least in private channels, as Kyiv no doubt campaigns for an invitation at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC. 

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

For many, the July 11 communiqué was along the lines of what was expected coming out of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. For others, hope was high that NATO allies would rally around Ukraine and show some clear steps not just in terms of whether the country will eventually join NATO, but exactly how and exactly when. NATO allies didn’t (and couldn’t) go that far, which shows continued disagreement at the highest levels as to Ukraine’s future relationship with the military alliance.

But it’s not all bad news—NATO allies were able to reaffirm their statements in the 2008 communiqué that Ukraine’s future is, indeed, in NATO. The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road. The communiqué language basically says that Ukraine can join when all allies agree and when conditions are met. That leaves a lot of room for interpretation. My sense is that in the future—whether it’s in a year at NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, or five years from now, or ten—NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality. 

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

While the communiqué naturally reflects NATO’s laser focus on the war in Ukraine and the proximate threat from Russia, it also confirms the Alliance’s renewed strength and growing attention to China and the broader Indo-Pacific region.  

Much attention will understandably be paid to the communiqué’s hedging on Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership. But for China, this week’s summit underscores that the war unleashed by its friends in Moscow has single handedly revitalized NATO, which Beijing only recently had viewed (happily) as sinking into irrelevance. This development throws a large wrench into China’s plans to dismantle the US-led alliance network, carve out a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific, and transform the rules-based global order.

The document reiterates language in last year’s Strategic Concept on China’s threat to NATO’s “interests, security and values;” “malicious” hybrid and cyber operations; disinformation; and efforts to control key tech sectors, critical minerals, and supply chains. The communiqué also builds on last year’s warnings about China’s “deepening strategic partnership” with Russia to call on Beijing to abstain from all forms of support for Russia’s war against Ukraine—particularly the provision of any lethal aid. 

The call for China to condemn Russia and adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter—paired with a clear refusal to recognize Russia’s illegal annexations—throws cold water on any hopes that Beijing would be welcomed to facilitate peace negotiations based on Putin’s terms.  

Beijing will be pleased that the document does not include a reference to the opening of a proposed NATO office in Japan, reflecting a lack of consensus on NATO’s role in Asia. But language on the importance of the Indo-Pacific to security in the Euro-Atlantic and specific praise for the contributions of the four Indo-Pacific countries whose leaders are present in Vilnius—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—reflect NATO’s growing recognition that the regions’ fortunes are linked. NATO cannot ignore the threat of war over Taiwan and, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently put it, “China is watching to see the price Russia pays, or the reward it receives, for its aggression.” 

—David O. Shullman is senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council and former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council.

The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

NATO fell short of placing Ukraine onto a clear track to Alliance membership, but that cause for membership gained unambiguous momentum at the Vilnius summit. The assertion in the summit communiqué that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” frustratingly provides no more clarity than the 2008 Bucharest declaration in which NATO first declared Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. While the Alliance dropped the requirement for Ukraine to jump through the hoops of a membership action plan (MAP)—as was done for the fast-tracked accession of Finland and Sweden—the communiqué states that Ukraine must implement “additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required” which infers an unnecessary de jure MAP.

What we must not overlook or underestimate is the fact that allies brought to the Vilnius summit unprecedented support for Ukraine’s membership aspirations. The warmth with which Zelenskyy was greeted demonstrated how Ukraine is regarded as part of the transtatlantic community. While full allied consensus—a requirement in NATO decision-making—was not achieved, the Biden administration found itself largely alone blocking efforts to provide Ukraine that roadmap to NATO. Even Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that “without a doubt, Ukraine deserves to be in NATO.”  

The key now is to ensure that Ukraine defeats Russia’s invasion quickly and decisively, and to build on the expanded and significant allied support behind Kyiv’s membership aspirations, leveraging the fact that Ukraine today meets the requirements. These are mutually reinforcing goals. Their achievement will make Europe more secure and NATO more powerful. The progress made in Vilnius should make us all the more determined to secure Ukraine’s accession to NATO at the Alliance’s 2024 Washington summit.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

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The extraordinary march of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s forces to within a couple hours of Moscow ended abruptly on June 24. But Prigozhin’s decision to stand down and move to Belarus will not be the end of the story.

While the immediate crisis for Russian President Vladimir Putin may dissipate, what scenarios should US and allied officials prepare for in the coming days, weeks, months, and beyond? Here are four possible paths for Russia’s future.

1. A weakened Putin rules

Putin restores order and effectively reduces the ability of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group to challenge his rule. Prigozhin stays in Belarus with a diminished force, while other Wagner fighters go home or join the ranks of the regular Russian armed forces.

Nevertheless, even if Putin remains in power for the foreseeable future, the façade of order and stability that he has constructed over two decades in power has been shattered, with Russia’s would-be tsar showing himself to be vulnerable to competing actors. Quick action to sideline Prigozhin dissuades potential internal challengers from following Wagner’s example, but Putin still needs to pay extra attention to keep different oligarchical interests and power brokers in line.

Russia’s internal dynamics will also shape, and be shaped by, the war effort in Ukraine. Overcoming the mutiny and preventing severe immediate challenges to his authority allows Putin to refocus to some degree on the war effort.

In this scenario, Putin is better positioned to concentrate his security forces on preventing major gains for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The rapidity with which the crisis was resolved, as well as the lack of successor crises within Russia, means that any effect on Russian soldiers’ morale is limited. Ukraine could still make some important gains in this counteroffensive, but its forces will receive less help from internal disarray in Russia.

The United States and its NATO allies see Putin as weak and potentially vulnerable, though they still must contend with him as Russia’s leader. Still, seeing his weakness, they are willing to continue supplying Ukraine and keep up the pressure on Moscow, with new weapons systems (e.g., long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS) possibly on the horizon.

Meanwhile, a weakened Putin grows more dependent on China, further reifying Russia’s status as China’s junior partner. China does not want to lose its primary strategic partner, and this scenario offers Beijing greater predictability, insofar as it is able to continue engaging with Putin. Chinese leader Xi Jinping may take note of Prigozhin’s mutiny and consider threats to his, and his party’s, rule in China; however, he also could feel reassured by how quickly the crisis passed.

2. A new regime rises

In the summer of 1991, Kremlin hardliners attempted a coup against Soviet President and General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev. The coup failed, but Gorbachev was weakened and out of power by the end of the year.

In this scenario, Putin suffers a similar fate. The Prigozhin challenge is sidestepped for the moment, but Putin’s political position is irreparable and rapidly deteriorates. Internal competitors line up, consolidating strength and waiting for the right opportunity to strike.

Faced with internal threats, Putin is distracted from the Ukraine war effort and even has to reallocate security forces to deal with his competitors. At the same time, the counteroffensive picks up steam. Ukrainian forces break through weak points in Russia’s lines, retaking substantial ground and severing the land bridge that Russia has created by occupying Ukrainian territory from the Russian border to Crimea. Morale flags among Russian troops, and disgruntled soldiers stream back into Russia, angry with the country’s political leadership for sending them to fight a bloody, failing war.

At this point, Putin’s adversaries strike. Perhaps Prigozhin and the Wagner Group reconstitute in Belarus and conduct another march on Moscow. In addition, or alternatively, other nationalist forces take advantage of discontented troops to build their own miniature armies outside the purview of the state. Regardless of the precise mechanism, political and military elites turn on Putin, who is killed or forced into “retirement.”

Even though chaos appears imminent, a new regime consolidates power quickly, preventing a civil war and restoring order in a post-Putin era. The war in Ukraine does not end immediately, but the exigencies of establishing order reduce the likelihood of any significant new Russian offensives in the near or medium terms, and the new regime instead focuses on salvaging some gains from the war while maintaining stability at home.

The United States and NATO adjust to this new reality, sizing up a new authoritarian regime. There might be an opportunity to ease tensions if a long-term peace agreement or ceasefire is reached in Ukraine, though a comprehensive thaw in relations is unlikely. Tough talk about the West may continue in propaganda outlets, but Russia’s weakened conventional military forces undermine its credibility to present a hard-power threat to NATO allies. Still dealing with the aftereffects of a power transition at home, the new regime is disinclined to conduct provocations abroad and instead could seek stability in its relations with external powers. Nevertheless, the behavior of the new Russian leadership is not wholly predictable, and NATO prepares to deter and defend against potential acts of aggression by the new regime.

This scenario presents unwelcome uncertainty for China, which must navigate relations with a post-Putin regime. The new regime may remain generally aligned with China, recognizing its need to rely more heavily on its foremost strategic partner. On the other hand, absent the strong Xi-Putin partnership, it is plausible that the new leadership chafes at being the junior partner vis-à-vis Beijing and the relationship between the two countries weakens, albeit while retaining a common distaste for the United States.

3. The tempest arrives

As in the previous scenario, there is a temporary pause in tensions, followed by a descent into civil war. Putin’s adversaries are emboldened by his apparent weakness, which is exacerbated by a deteriorating situation on the battlefield in Ukraine. In this case, however, no competitor is strong enough to consolidate power.

Russia fractures into competing power blocs. This could mean Putin retains power and loyalists in some parts of Russia, even as Prigozhin and nationalist leaders develop quasi-fiefdoms elsewhere. Further complicating this scenario would be the rise of secessionist movements that further divide Russia.

As one of the United States’ foremost geopolitical competitors fragments, this scenario raises other questions.

For example, what happens to Russia’s nuclear weapons? Russia has thousands of nuclear warheads, and a civil war opens up opportunities for different actors to take advantage of the chaos and access those weapons. Eager to avoid this proliferation, the United States and NATO seek to contain the civil war within Russia’s borders.

As for the war in Ukraine, an enduring civil war results in Russian lines quickly collapsing as command-and-control disintegrates. Competing power players vie for the loyalty of embittered but battle-hardened soldiers returning to Russia.

This scenario is particularly bad for China, as it witnesses its premier strategic partner reduced to disarray. Moreover, it compounds China’s regional nuclear proliferation concerns, while also creating instability at its border and a potential influx of refugees. China now needs to allocate substantial resources to securing a lengthy border that it previously did not have to worry too much about. Russia’s energy industry also suffers, meaning Beijing cannot rely on Moscow as much to meet its exorbitant energy demands and must look elsewhere. Furthermore, in this scenario especially, Beijing might become even more cautious regarding an invasion of Taiwan as it witnesses the regime-threatening internal instability that can be wrought by invasions gone awry.

4. Reformers seize the moment

A final scenario worth considering is the possibility of a reform-minded regime coming to power in Moscow. As in the previous two scenarios, the temporary reprieve in tensions following Wagner’s mutiny gives way to renewed challenges to Putin’s rule, accelerated by a declining situation on the battlefield.

Putin manages to keep power through the March 2024 Russian presidential election, which is marked by fraud and widely recognized among the populace as illegitimate. In this case, a more democratically inclined opposition, perhaps associated with Alexei Navalny, seizes the opportunity and manages to cultivate sufficient popular support, with rallies and protests across Russia promoting change. Under intense pressure, Kremlin elites express sympathy with the reformers, and Putin ultimately decides to step down. A reformist leader wins the ensuing constitutionally mandated presidential election.* After assuming and consolidating power, the new government seeks a quick end to the war in Ukraine, while focusing on implementing anti-corruption and political reforms in Russia.

For the United States and NATO, this scenario increases the likelihood of Russia becoming a more responsible member of the international system and reducing military tensions between the Alliance and Moscow. That said, change will not happen overnight, and a reform-minded Russia will have to wrestle with deeply entrenched corruption and economic issues. China, for its part, finds this scenario disastrous, as it faces a nuclear-armed state on its border that is ideologically more sympathetic to the West.

These scenarios do not exhaust all possibilities, but they account for four plausible futures US and allied policymakers should consider in their strategic planning. A scenario in which a reform-minded opposition comes to power is the least plausible, as Russia has long proven resistant to extensive political reforms, and it is unclear that there is a movement sufficiently organized and with broad enough support to take advantage of a power vacuum. The first scenario is the closest to the status quo, and Putin has been remarkably resilient as a leader; on the other hand, Putin has also never appeared weaker, and external pressure wrought by Ukrainian success on the battlefield could help to facilitate his downfall.

Jeffrey Cimmino is the deputy director of operations and a fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This article was updated to clarify the circumstances under which a reformist leader could come to power in scenario four.

The post Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus. 

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101^st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.” 

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense,  and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

—Daniel Suárez Pérez, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels. 

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country. 

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted. 

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions. 

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.” 

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed. 

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”  

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine. 

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort. 

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime. 

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 25, 2023

Short-lived Wagner mutiny will undermine Russia’s Ukraine invasion

By Peter Dickinson

The short-lived Wagner mutiny was over in less than two days but it will have a long-lasting consequences for Russia, for a weakened Vladimir Putin, and for the already faltering invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 4, 2023

Russia’s Wagner Group is a feature not a bug of the Putin regime

By Allen Maggard

Russian private paramilitaries like the Wagner Group are a symptom of the institutionalized corruption at the heart of Putin’s regime and not just another instrument in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox, writes Allen Maggard.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jun 27, 2023

Ukrainians have good reason to cheer Russia’s Wagner rebellion

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Ukrainians have good reason to cheer the short-lived Wagner mutiny, which has removed Russia’s most effective military units from the battlefield while exposing the weakness of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How did Prigozhin’s rebellion get as far as it did? And how will its aftermath affect Putin’s hold on power and the war in Ukraine? Read analysis below from Atlantic Council experts on what these breakneck developments in Russia mean for the Putin regime, the Ukrainian counteroffensive, and the Moscow-Beijing partnership.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Brian Whitmore: If Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price, Putin’s regime is in serious danger

Olga Khakova: Russian instability further endangers Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Yevgeniya Gaber: The Russian colossus is standing on feet of clay

Daniel Fried: Is it 1917 or 1991?

Ariel Cohen: Frankenstein’s monster cooks up a coup

Doug Klain: In the mutiny’s aftermath, Russia’s soldiers face a crisis of trust

Hanna Liubakova: For Lukashenka, a short-term win that could undermine his long-term standing in Belarus

John “Buss” Barranco: Ukraine can take advantage of Russian confusion

William F. Wechsler: “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”

John K. Culver: A stumbling Russia means greater isolation for China

Joseph Webster: Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know

Rama Yade: Without Wagner, Putin loses a substantial part of his African foothold

Jacob Mezey: What does Prigozhin’s coup attempt mean for Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Vladislav Davidzon: This is the start of the end of the war

If Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price, Putin’s regime is in serious danger

Prigozhin’s rebellion needs to be viewed in several contexts. First, the war against Ukraine has divided the Russian elite into two factions—hawks who want nothing short of the conquest of Kyiv and a military parade on the Khreshchatyk and kleptocrats who want to go back to the pre-February 24, 2022 world. Neither of these things are going to happen, so nobody is happy. Of these two factions, the hawks are by far the more powerful and the more serious threat to the regime. This has put Putin in a very precarious position regardless of how Prigozhin’s rebellion is resolved.

Second, Prigozhin’s rebellion also illustrates the perils of Putin’s “venture-capital foreign policy,” which outsources key tasks to nominally private-sector actors outside the normal chain of command. The Russian system is based not on institutions but on informal patronage networks with Putin as the ultimate arbiter. When Putin is strong, this approach works, to a point. But when Putin is weakened, it can spin out of control.

Third, Prigozhin’s kryshas in this informal system appear to be abandoning him. General Sergei Surovikin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have already disavowed him. It is also hard to imagine another alleged ally, Rosgvardia leader Viktor Zolotov, siding with Prigozhin over Putin. This probably accounts for Prigozhin’s tactical retreat. But even if the immediate crisis is resolved, its underlying cause will continue to weaken the regime.

Fourth, if Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price for his rebellion, it will put the Putin regime in serious danger. This is because political change comes to Russia when three factors are present: a divided elite (check), a dissatisfied public (check), and an absence of fear. If fear is removed from the equation, then the regime will be in peril. 

Finally, this crisis will further undermine Russia’s warfighting capabilities in Ukraine just as Kyiv is ramping up its counteroffensive. The Russian elite is not behaving like it expects to win this war.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and founder and host of the Power Vertical Podcast.

Russian instability further endangers Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Despite the internal power struggle, Prigozhin and Putin are unified by their dedication to the continued assault on Ukraine, including crimes against humanity at scale, albeit through diverging approaches. This shared interest is of particular concern, as Ukraine is once again raising alarms about the ticking time bomb of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’s unsafe conditions. Russia’s leadership instability is heightening these risks and could lead to contradictory or unclear orders for the plant’s illegal occupiers. Moreover, Russia has been emboldened by the weak response by the West to their destruction of the Kakhovka dam, and the absence of unity in calling out Russia’s culpability in the horrific incident, notwithstanding ample evidence pointing to Russia. Zaporizhzhia’s safety can only be guaranteed when the Russians give up control of the plant, which they are unequipped to manage. The international community must prioritize securing this transfer in order to prevent a looming catastrophe.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center (GEC). She leads GEC’s portfolio on synchronizing climate and energy security efforts through transatlantic cooperation.

The Russian colossus is standing on feet of clay

Prigozhin’s mutiny has exposed Russia’s major defense blind spots and highlighted Putin’s weakening grip on power. The Kremlin’s strongman turned out to be a strawman; and a colossus of Russian military power appeared to be standing on feet of clay.

While this may sound reassuring to Ukrainians, who may have an easier time fighting against a demotivated army of conscripts and convicts rather than against well-paid professional mercenaries, Kyiv and the West must nevertheless face a sobering reality.

It took sixteen months of fighting, three successful Ukrainian counteroffensives (in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson), and occasional raids by pro-Ukrainian Russian groups into the Belgorod region to ruin the myth of Russian military power. It required the flagship cruiser Moskva to be sunk, Ukraine to spend months waiting for Western weapons and EU candidate status, and Finland to join NATO before the West began to question the credibility of the Kremlin’s “red lines.” 

While the West has spent months trying to de-escalate, save Putin’s face, mitigate nuclear threats, and avoid provoking Russia, a rival warlord with a criminal past showed how easy it was to overtake the Russian military’s initiative and paralyze state structures. In its current state, Russia is likely to face an internal power struggle with more destabilization in sight. Putin will most likely use Prigozhin to present himself as the “best out of the worst,” and to redirect public attention from internal turmoil to more violence in Ukraine, including new acts of ecocide and nuclear saber-rattling. This must not be allowed.

The West’s choice is not between two Russian war criminals, who are equally engaged in the crimes of genocide and mass murder in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. The choice is between maintaining illusions of European stability and taking the steps that are necessary to secure it. These include abandoning self-deterrence, developing a clear-eyed Russia strategy, and equipping Ukraine to win the war, with full-fledged NATO membership as a key element of Kyiv’s long-term victory.

The Russian colossus, as it is now, is likely to collapse sooner rather than later. Ukraine is the only country in the region that can protect NATO from its ruins when it finally falls apart. 

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey. She worked as a foreign policy advisor to the prime minister of Ukraine from February to December 2021.

Is it 1917 or 1991?

What does the fast and apparently ended Prigozhin mutiny mean for Putin and for Russia’s war against Ukraine? Was it a 1917 moment or a miserable failure like the attempted coup against the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991?

In terms of numbers of forces available, Prigozhin didn’t stand a chance. Putin commands the regular Russian army and airforce, the National Guard, and other armed groups theoretically at government command. But Tsar Nicholas II also had a preponderance of force when he fell in February 1917; so did the Provisional Government when it fell to Lenin’s Bolsheviks in November 1917. The problem the tsar and Provisional Government leader Alexander Kerensky faced was not the availability of forces in theory but forces in practice. The tsarist regime was decrepit, hollowed out by many things, but especially by its failure in World War I. Kerensky’s government stuck with that war and also failed. By the time they were overthrown, the tsar and Kerensky had lost the confidence of Russian society and huge portions of the state they nominally commanded.

That was Putin’s problem: Prigozhin mounted a mutiny in protest of another failing Russian war, Putin’s war against Ukraine.

And now Prigozhin has announced he is turning around his forces short of Moscow. He seems to have worked out some sort of deal.

But a deal with whom and for what? Does this deal include a change of Russia’s military leadership that had been prosecuting the Russo-Ukrainian War that Putin launched? Prigozhin has been attacking Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for their failures in Ukraine. But why would Putin cave to pressure by accepting such demands? What does that do to Putin’s authority? It’s Putin’s war in any case. 

Whatever arrangements Prigozhin has extracted, Putin’s authority is diminished, as was Gorbachev’s after Boris Yeltsin defeated the 1991 coup attempt. And this is worse: In 1991 the coup failed. But Prigozhin seems to have pulled off something. 

Russia’s war against Ukraine has not been going well, and Prigozhin’s attack on it as unjustified and incompetently led is now stronger than ever. 

It may not be a 1917 moment for Russia. But the hot breath of failure is coming closer to Putin. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

Frankenstein’s monster cooks up a coup

In his effort to bypass Russia’s regular military and governance structures, while personally dipping into the country’s military budget, it appears that Putin has created a monster that threatened the very foundations of his security services–based regime, and possibly the scope of his personal power. 

Prigozhin, once known as “Putin’s cook” and head of the private military Wagner Group, demonstrated that he can run circles around Shoigu and Gerasimov. He and his Wagner military company quickly captured Rostov-on-Don, a large Russian city in the south, which is the headquarters of the Russian southern military district. Wagner then rapidly extended their control all the way up to Voronezh and to the boundaries of the Moscow region—850 kilometers.

During Wagner’s lightning advance, Russian ground forces failed to oppose them, and only minimal aerial attacks were conducted against them.

For a moment it appeared that Putin had left Moscow and Prigozhin might enter the city and finish off a coup despite the lack of outright support from any representatives of the Russian ruling circles. Yet, many Russian leaders, including the powerful Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev refrained from criticizing Prigozhin, suggesting that he may have at least some support at the highest echelons of power.

And then Prigozhin stopped. He turned around his troops, amid claims of a deal brokered by Lukashenka. Putin’s press secretary Dmitri Peskov confirmed that the criminal charges of incitement to armed rebellion against Prigozhin would be dropped, he would be allowed to move to Belarus (and pursue his African business), and the Wagner members would be pardoned. 

The Wagner rebellion is the most serious challenge to the Russian state’s foundations since 1993, when the Supreme Soviet rebelled against Boris Yeltsin, who brought in tanks to suppress the attempted coup. 

Prigozhin has demonstrated just how weak the Putin regime is and how the Russian president’s own “chef” could potentially put nuclear-armed Russia into the hands of a fragile and extremely dangerous dictatorship of former KGB officers and hardened criminals—Vory v Zakone. 

Russia’s international stature, and its future military performance in Ukraine, are likely to suffer from these events, as will Putin’s power.

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

In the mutiny’s aftermath, Russia’s soldiers face a crisis of trust

Plainly, it’s difficult to tell what on earth happened in Prigozhin’s supposed twenty-four-hour rebellion, now apparently called off after negotiations with the Belarusian strongman Lukashenka. How Putin and his elites rally to reassert dominance after an open challenge will prove decisive for determining what comes next and whether Russian forces substantially waver in the battlefield in Ukraine. Authoritarian regimes like Putin’s rely on creating a sense of invulnerability, and challenges from warlords like Prigozhin call that myth into question.

While Prigozhin claims he called on his forces to stand down to avoid spilling Russian blood, it’s likely that the Wagner Group chief received significant concessions personally or serious enhancements to Wagner’s role in the war effort. At the end of the day, this “rebellion” was purportedly about a disagreement over how best to prosecute Russia’s unprovoked war of annihilation against Ukraine.

If Prigozhin’s challenge does indeed come to a speedy conclusion with Wagner returning to the front, Kyiv may not get the all-out chaos it was likely hoping to exploit for battlefield gains. But even so, the fact that a significant portion of Moscow’s fighting force is not apparently loyal to Russia and can be swayed will have real impact on the battlefield, with Russian army forces having to question to an even greater extent than before just how much they can trust those they’re supposed to be fighting alongside.

Putin’s regime may have survived Prigozhin’s challenge, but almost every aspect of this episode indicates that the Russian system is more brittle than ever. This all occurred because Russia is performing disastrously in its war—and Ukraine’s main effort in the counteroffensive is still to come.

—Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where he focuses on Russia’s war on Ukraine, authoritarianism in Russia, and Ukraine’s democracy-building process.

For Lukashenka, a short-term win that could undermine his long-term standing in Belarus

In a stunning turn of events on Saturday, Lukashenka said he had negotiated with Prigozhin an end to the movement of his mercenary troops inside Russia in order to deescalate the situation.

Prigozhin himself confirmed the turning back of the Wagner columns of the mercenaries and returning them to field camps in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

While Lukashenka’s position could be strengthened by this unexpected mediation, in the longer term, his regime will face the repercussions of the insurrection led by the Wagner paramilitary group.

The growing demotivation and demoralization regarding Russia’s actions may raise concerns among the power vertical, military, and elite circles within Belarus. Such chaotic developments in the neighboring country will lead to questioning Lukashenka’s policies and decision making. With Putin’s authority weakened, the regime in Minsk may find itself with reduced backing and support from Russia. 

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Lukashenka has declared unwavering loyalty to the Kremlin, allowing attacks and using Belarusian territory as a training ground, disregarding the will of most Belarusians.

Lukashenka placed a risky bet on Russia’s swift victory in the war against Ukraine, essentially banking everything on that outcome. Pro-regime propaganda in Belarus claimed the notion that Russia was incapable of losing. However, this strategy could potentially have negative consequences. Prigozhin’s armed rebellion indicates a political crisis within Russia and shatters the myth of Russia’s invincibility and overwhelming power. 

The Belarusian democratic forces and the Kalinouski regiment fighting in Ukraine against the Russian troops used these chaotic developments to appeal to the elites and the military to side with them. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Lukashenka’s rival in the disputed 2020 election, has stated once again that this is an opportunity to free Belarus from dictatorship. The Wagner insurrection will become yet another argument for her to present Russia as a source of instability and conflict. It appeals to Belarusians who want to keep away from the war against Ukraine.

—Hanna Liubakova is a freelance journalist and researcher from Belarus. She is currently a journalist with Outriders, an international multimedia platform that produces in-depth multimedia and interactive reporting and focuses on solutions journalism.

Ukraine can take advantage of Russian confusion

Is the Wagner Group marching on Moscow or heading back to the front? Is Prigozhin attempting a coup d’etat, part of a false flag operation to allow Putin to purge his failing military leadership, or is he trying to change the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense, as he claims, perhaps to prevent them from absorbing his private militia into the Russian Army? It is impossible to know for sure, but we do know that the recent turn of events in Russia could not come at a better time for Ukraine.  

Ukraine’s best chance for a successful counteroffensive is to attack deep behind the current Russian front line and force the Russians to fall back from their six hundred miles of layered defense-in-depth fighting positions to prevent Ukraine from cutting Russia off from its supply lines. It is unlikely even the most audacious among the Ukrainian military leadership ever envisioned launching an attack on Russia’s Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, where Russia’s war in Ukraine is being run, but that is precisely what the Wagner Group’s sudden rebellion has done.  

Whatever Prigozhin’s real motivations are, or the outcome of his revolt and then apparent about-face, a few things remain clear: Massive amounts of confusion have been sown in Russia’s rear area, and whatever confidence rank and file Russian soldiers had left in their leadership is gone. Once an army loses confidence in its leaders, morale collapses and the will to fight goes with it. The Wagner Group will almost certainly be gone soon as well, and it was the most effective unit fighting for the Russians in Ukraine, admittedly a low bar. Whether it is absorbed into the Russian army or disbanded, its members reassigned piecemeal to various units, remains to be seen. Still, it is hard to imagine Prigozhin holding onto his private army or his life.  

—John “Buss” Barranco was the 2021-22 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

“When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”

Some things are constants in this changing world, and one of them is that only a relatively small number of people make all of the important decisions in Russia, and they each have lots of money, lots of guns, or both. At certain points in history, these elites compete among themselves to determine who leads, resulting in one person in charge, some dead, and the others falling into line. Recent events should be understood as the latest episode in this centuries-long storyline.

But today’s agreement that halted the immediate Wagner threat to Moscow and consigned Prigozhin to Belarus is not likely to be the end of this story, but just the beginning. On the surface it may appear to be a victory for Putin, but he has been weakened by both the very fact that it occurred and the reality that it was resolved only through a negotiated compromise rather than a public demonstration of physical power. The military, historically the institution most esteemed by the Russian people, has been humiliated once again under Putin and shown to be corrupt, ineffective, and led by lackeys. As has been the case since his failure to take Kyiv last year, Putin’s primary focus must be to secure his standing, and thus his survival, among that small number of Russians who matter, with shows of strength. Thus, those who stubbornly hope for a negotiated resolution to Putin’s war in Ukraine will continue to be disappointed. As for Prigozhin, he will need to reflect on Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous admonition, “when you strike at a king, you must kill him.” Indeed, for the time being he may want to steer clear of any upper-floor windows, as in recent years Putin’s adversaries tend to be especially clumsy around them. In any case, as this story continues to develop, the people behind the 2017 movie The Death of Stalin should be busy taking notes in case there’s soon need for a sequel.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent government position was US deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.

A stumbling Russia means greater isolation for China

Chinese President Xi Jinping is famous for proclaiming that “the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century!” Yet his prognostication probably didn’t include Putin’s former caterer and mercenary army founder/funder Yevgeniy Prigozhin directing an armed assault toward Moscow.  

I hesitate to call relationships between autocrats “friendships,” but to the extent either Putin or Xi has friends, their bond is certainly stronger and more substantive than others. They seem to share a view of the world as straining against “American hegemony,” and poised to accelerate toward a multipolar order where both Russia and China can dominate respective spheres of influence free of “Western interference.” But Xi—being more traditionally Marxist—saw this new world emerging over the course of this century, while Putin undertook direct actions—in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, and Ukraine again—to hasten changes and reassert Russia’s position as a great power. Beijing’s reaction can be summarized as “Bold! But strategically incompetent!”

But as I noted in a recent Atlantic Council publication, “Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power… Most importantly, Beijing has a strategic need to keep Russia from internal turmoil or international setbacks that could result in the rise of a regime that is hostile to China. One of the greatest gifts to Beijing of the Sino-Russian rapprochement [has been] a passive 4,200-kilometer border.”

In that context, China will support Putin if he remains in charge in Moscow. If Putin falls, Beijing will wait for the dust to settle and cultivate the new power structure, perhaps with a fresh chance to counsel that Russia extricate itself from Ukraine and refocus on long-term competition with the United States/Western alliance. 

But for Xi and China, Russian internal turmoil and stumbles in the face of successful Western-backed Ukrainian military opposition and sanctions will further threaten greater isolation. A pragmatic option would be to reduce tensions with the United States and Europe, but Xi has proven to be more ideological than his recent predecessors. The loss of China’s main strategic partner is more likely to deepen strategic mistrust of the United States rather than greater diplomatic or economic accommodation. 

—John K. Culver is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior intelligence officer with thirty-five years of experience as a leading analyst of East Asian affairs, including security, economic, and foreign-policy dimensions.

Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know

While China has been preparing for a range of political and military outcomes amid the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it appears surprised by Prigozhin’s astonishing rebellion. 

Beijing will seek to avoid taking any public side in the Russian domestic political struggle, at least explicitly. Still, authoritative state media such as the People’s Daily, are hinting that Beijing prefers that Putin prevail over Prigozhin. It’s not hard to understand why: Putin has been a reliable supporter of the relationship with China, has deep personal connections with the Chinese leadership, tacitly accepts Moscow’s “junior partnership” with Beijing, and has, up to now, largely maintained political stability within Russia. 

Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know. The head of the Wagner mercenary group has a mercurial (arguably volcanic) temperament which the Chinese leadership could find difficult to manage. Beijing was also likely troubled by his comment that Russia “needs to take a page out of North Korea’s book for a certain number of years,” as China can ill afford another nuclear-armed pariah state on its borders. 

Beijing will struggle to find ways to assist Putin, however, although it appears, as of this writing, that he has prevailed over Prigozhin, who has reportedly accepted exile in Belarus. 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) intelligence support for Putin seems risky and unlikely if Prigozhin resumes his apparent coup attempt. While Prigozhin has a complicated and often fraught relationship with the Russian security services, he appears to have ties with elements of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service, as well as other elements of the force structures. Wagner Group’s stunning advance before Prigozhin’s about-face implies at least the tacit compliance of some figures in Russian military intelligence. Moreover, Wagner and the GRU shared a base in Russia’s Krasnodar district as late as 2020. Accordingly, if Chinese security services share intelligence with their Russian counterparts on anti-Putin coup plotters, they face a high probability of discovery and risk long-term damage to bilateral relations if an “anti-Putin” ascends to the power vertical in Russian politics. Moreover, sharing any intelligence on potential coup plotters would not only risk the compromise of methods and sources but also be an admission that PRC security services are spying within Russia. 

If matters escalate again, Beijing might attempt to enable the Kremlin to rush troops back to Moscow from Central Asia, in a tacit, unspoken arrangement with Russia. Tajikistan hosts up to seven thousand Russian troops, while another five hundred are reportedly deployed to Kyrgyzstan (some troops have already been shifted to the front in Ukraine). China could offer security guarantees to Central Asian governments, indirectly enabling the Kremlin to further draw down in the region and shift forces to Moscow. This measure carries risks for the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai, however, and may be ineffectual. Putin’s fate will largely be determined by the loyalty of his subordinates, not the number of military personnel in Moscow. 

If tensions between Putin and Prigozhin escalate again, Xi might decide that a direct or implied expression of support for Putin, perhaps through a phone call, is his best course of action. An intervention into Russian domestic politics would mark a bold step, however, and risks damaging bilateral relations with Putin’s eventual successor.  

Unless it chooses to run significant risks, Beijing has little ability to influence events in Russia. Despite the considerable risks a Prigozhin regime would hold for the PRC, the Chinese leadership will likely observe events, rather than attempt to shape them. 

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads the center’s efforts on Chinese energy security. Webster edits the China-Russia Report, an independent, non-partisan newsletter exploring developments in Sino-Russian relations.

Without Wagner, Putin loses a substantial part of his African foothold

Prigozhin has not been defeated yet. The way he decided to turn around to avoid bloodshed gives the impression that he controls not only the narrative, but also the future of Putin’s twenty-three-year hold on power. Should Putin leave Prigozhin out there without arresting him? What about his actions and influence in Africa, where he has ongoing military operations?

Undoubtedly this rebellion will impact the African theater, particularly Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Sudan where Wagner has settled its troops. Whereas until now the interests of the Russian government and the Wagner group aligned, it will now be necessary for these countries to do business with two Russian actors with rival interests. This rivalry will put their African allies in an awkward position.

Prigozhin’s uprising will lead to a clarification on the nature of Russia’s partnership with these African countries. Moscow, which knows how influential Wagner is in these countries, may be tempted to cut off its supplies on the continent. These governments born from military coups rely on Wagner mercenaries to keep their power and/or secure their countries against jihadist movements. Wagner made very profitable deals in Mali, Sudan, and CAR on everything from gold to coffee to sugar to diamonds. 

The rebellion of Wagner’s boss and the need for Putin to show that he still has the situation under control could force Bamako and Bangui to distance themselves from Prigozhin in order to maintain their alliances with Moscow.

Indeed beyond Wagner, Moscow has become the leading exporter of arms in Africa, but also of wheat. Russian state-owned companies are also active in the mining, hydrocarbons, and even civil nuclear sectors. But if Russia seems to be a more reliable partner, what about Putin, whose power seems weakened?

Finally, Wagner’s most visible impact is actually on the information front: Prigozhin—who was closely tied with the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service—used CAR and Mali to foster anti-Western sentiment, gain sympathy for Putin, and fuel his propaganda via RIA FAN, the flagship of Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group. Without this powerful tool, I’m not sure that the Russian influence will remain strong in these countries.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

What does Prigozhin’s coup attempt mean for Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

How will Prigozhin’s brief mutiny against the Russian Ministry of Defense ultimately impact the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive? On the immediate frontline, many obstacles facing Ukrainian forces such as landmines, fortifications, and the Russian troops defending them will likely remain unchanged. However, Wagner’s disruption of Russia’s military command and logistics network may increase the possibility of a Ukrainian breakthrough on the battlefield. 

Wagner’s seizure of the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, which has largely served as the forward command center for the Russian war effort, will degrade the timely command and control of Russian forces. A confused or disrupted chain of command will significantly impact the Russian military’s ability to conduct an effective defense-in-depth and prevent a coordinated response to Ukrainian offensive efforts. Roadblocks set up by the Russian government, and even deliberate damage to the M4 highway, designed to contain the Wagner group, will also restrict its military’s ability to shift forces and supplies between fronts in Ukraine. Evidence that Wagner fired on military helicopters will require Russian aviation in the area to operate more cautiously and complicate their ability to strike Ukrainian forces. Reports that some Russian units did not oppose Wagner’s initial march may also lower Moscow’s confidence in the loyalty of its forces and officers. While Prigozhin’s rebellion ultimately may be short-lived, his actions will create weaknesses within the Russian military’s command structure which Ukraine can exploit on the battlefield.

—Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This is the start of the end of the war

The attempted coup d’etat that the Wagner mercenaries sprung on the Kremlin in the middle of the evening on Friday has come to a rather unexpected and dissatisfying conclusion. What looks like a backroom deal allegedly brokered by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has turned the Wagner convoy around. The Wagner group had a serious battle plan with the Russian armed forces and security services seemingly unconsolidated enough to respond quickly. Prigozhin and the Kremlin both let loose the cry of war and stepped over their own self-proclaimed red lines before Prigozhin decided to fold the operation at seemingly the last moment. However, this rebellion has shown that the Putin regime was on its last legs (though they may now reconsolidate the power structures with Prigozhin holding a great deal more power than before). 

That the rebel forces were even able to get as far as they did with little opposition and to take over Rostov-on-Don—which is also the headquarters of the Russian war against Ukraine—has shown the Putin regime to be weak and incoherent beyond all previous suppositions. It is hard to know how the Putin regime can regain its legitimacy after this. Putin had voiced his fears when he compared the situation to 1917, although 1905 may have been a better parallel. One way or the other, this is the payout stage of the gamble to invade Ukraine and this is the start of the end of the war. The Russian population and Putin’s elites had countenanced this war when it was far away—they will certainly think twice about doing so again after the conclusion of this farce.

—Vladislav Davidzon is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, based in France. Since 2018, he has served as a co-producer for a television series on the effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The post Experts react: What Russia’s Wagner Group rebellion means for Putin, Ukraine, China, and more appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Only a handful of countries have actually been prepared to stand with Russia and defend Moscow’s actions. Four nations in particular have emerged as key allies at a time when Vladimir Putin faces mounting international isolation. China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all have different motivations for supporting the Kremlin, but they are united by a common fear of what a Russian defeat in Ukraine might mean for their own countries.

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In recent months, China has sought to play an active role in efforts to negotiate a peace between Russia and Ukraine. However, many in Kyiv and throughout the West remain skeptical of China’s apparently contradictory views on the peace process. Critics have accused China of publicly supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity while also indicating the need for Kyiv to cede land as part of any potential settlement.

While stopping short of outright support for Russia’s invasion, China has adopted a public position that could be termed as Kremlin-friendly neutrality, and has accused the West of provoking the war. This posture is unsurprising. Beijing shares Moscow’s goal of challenging Western dominance and replacing it with what they see as a more multipolar world. China fears that if Russia loses the current war, it will greatly strengthen the West while undermining the global standing of China and other authoritarian regimes.

More specifically, a Russian defeat would considerably complicate any future Chinese efforts to invade Taiwan. If Western military aid helps Ukraine to secure victory over the once vaunted Russian army, this will increase the chances of similar Western support for Taiwan against possible Chinese aggression. The disastrous performance of Putin’s army in Ukraine has already undermined Russia’s claims to military superpower status and significantly boosted Western confidence. China is not eager for this unwelcome trend to gain further momentum.

On Russia’s western border, Belarus has emerged as something of a captive partner in the attack on Ukraine, with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka serving as the single most vocal backer of Russia’s war while also allowing his country to be used as a platform for the invasion. Russian troops flooded into northern Ukraine from Belarus on the first days of the war in February 2022; Russia continues to launch airstrikes on Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory.

Lukashenka has little choice but to back Putin. He only remains in power because Russia intervened in 2020 to prop up his regime in the wake of pro-democracy protests over a fraudulent presidential election. Lukashenka’s brutal Kremlin-backed crackdown against the Belarusian protest movement left him internationally isolated and heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would likely reignite domestic unrest inside Belarus and would almost certainly spell doom for the Lukashenka regime.

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While the failure of Putin’s invasion could lead to regime change in Belarus, some in Armenia sees the prospect of a Russian defeat in Ukraine in starkly existential terms. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reportedly warned Armenians recently: “If Russia loses the war in Ukraine, I have no idea what will happen to Armenia.”

Many Armenians remain heavily invested in the traditional view of Russia as a protector of the country against the perceived threats to national security posed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. This thinking has shaped Armenian politics and foreign policy for much of the post-Soviet era. The country is a founding member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and backed out of an association agreement with the EU a decade ago following Kremlin pressure, instead joining Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia maintains military bases in Armenia and has dominated efforts to regulate the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan’s concerns are unsurprising but short-sighted. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would potentially allow Armenia to pursue a more independent foreign policy while expanding economic and political ties with the European Union. Alarm over the threat of renewed hostilities with Azerbaijan is understandable, but there is little prospect of Armenia itself being invaded, especially if US and EU-brokered talks produce a peace treaty that recognizes the Armenian-Azerbaijani border while providing satisfactory guarantees for Karabakh’s Armenian population.

As a staunch opponent of the West and critic of perceived Western influence over global affairs, Iran shares China’s geopolitical motivations for supporting Russia’s invasion. Many in the Iranian leadership are also fearful that a Russian defeat in Ukraine could increase demands for democratic change inside Iran itself and fuel a new round of domestic protests.

There are additional practical reasons for Tehran’s pro-Russian stance. Faced with tightening international sanctions and cut off from Western technologies, Russia has turned to Iran as an alternative source of military assistance. In exchange for Iranian drones and other supplies, Moscow is believed to be providing Tehran with everything from fighter jets to air defense systems, while also assisting Iran’s nuclear program.

This burgeoning military partnership between Russia and Iran is proving deadly for Ukraine, with Iranian drones regularly used to strike civilian targets across Ukraine. It also poses a significant threat to Israeli national security and has sparked heated debate over Israel’s apparent reluctance to provide military support to Ukraine. If cooperation between Moscow and Tehran continues to intensify, Russian air defense systems could limit Israeli operations in Syria and complicate any future preventative strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, there appears to be little chance of an outright Russian victory of the kind envisaged by Putin when he first gave the order to invade in February 2022. Instead, the most likely scenarios are now either some form of stalemate or a Ukrainian military victory.

If Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the consequences will reverberate around the globe. China is powerful enough to survive such a shock but would be geopolitically weakened. The Belarusian and Iranian regimes would face a far more uncertain future and might not survive. Meanwhile, Armenia may find that despite its current misgivings, the defeat of Russia could allow Yerevan to return to the path of European integration.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all fear a Russian defeat in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin first announced his intention to transfer part of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal to Belarus in March. The news sparked an international backlash, including a thinly veiled rebuke from China. Preparations for the stationing of nuclear weapons in Belarus are expected to be complete by the beginning of July. The move is part of an expanding Russian military presence in the country that has been likened to an “creeping annexation,” with Tsikhanouskaya declaring in late 2022 that Belarus was under de facto “military occupation.”

Moscow’s growing military footprint in Belarus reflects a broader expansion of Russian influence in the country that has been underway since the Kremlin intervened in August 2020 to rescue the regime of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka amid nationwide protests over a rigged presidential election. In exchange, Lukashenka has pledged total loyalty to Moscow while permitting Russia to increase its economic, political, and military dominance over Belarus.

The strategic significance of this unequal alliance between Lukashenka and Putin increased considerably during the buildup to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka acquiesced to the transportation of Russian troops and military equipment across Belarus, which served as the gateway for Moscow’s failed Kyiv offensive during the initial weeks of the war. The country has continued to play an important role in the ongoing conflict, providing logistical support, training Russian troops, and supplying weapons, while also serving as a launch pad for Russian airstrikes across Ukraine.

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Belarus’s involvement in the invasion of Ukraine has led many to brand Lukashenka as Putin’s last remaining ally. While other leaders have refused to condemn the Russian dictator, Putin’s Belarusian counterpart remains one of the few still prepared to publicly defend him. However, while much of the outside world sees Belarus as Russia’s little brother, notions of a passive population fail to recognize the significant opposition Belarusians have already expressed over their country’s contributions to Russia’s war.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, Belarusian opposition groups have employed a wide range of tactics to disrupt the Russian war effort. This has included a campaign to sabotage Belarusian railroads being used to transport Russian troops, equipment, and ammunition to Ukraine. Hackers have also accessed Russian military networks and logistical operations. In February 2023, Belarusian anti-war partisans claimed responsibility for an attack that caused significant damage to a Russian spy plane based at an airfield close to Minsk.

Belarusians are also fighting shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainians against the Russian invasion. Although exact numbers are difficult to determine, the Belarusian contingent is believed to be among the largest of the foreign volunteer forces fighting for Ukraine, and includes the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion. Many of the Belarusians currently fighting alongside the Ukrainian military believe that defending Ukraine is a stepping stone toward a free Belarus and are convinced that victory over Russia in Ukraine will lead to the fall of Lukashenka in Belarus.

Meanwhile, exiled Belarusian opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya remains an outspoken opponent of Lukashenka and has proven a staunch critic of his role as Putin’s junior partner in the invasion of Ukraine. Tsikhanouskaya has repeatedly underlined that Ukrainians and Belarusians share a common enemy in their struggle to shake off Russian authoritarianism and embrace European democracy. “The war won’t be over until both our countries are free,” she declared in March 2023.

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Moscow and Minsk are both well aware of the dangers posed by public opposition in Belarus to their country’s involvement in the invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka’s violent suppression of anti-regime protests in 2020 succeeded in forcing activists to retreat from the streets of Belarus’s major cities, but discontent still simmers just below the surface. If Putin pushes Lukashenka to become more directly involved in the war, it could spark a new round of unrest with unpredictable consequences for both dictators.

Potential triggers include the planned deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. The presence of Russian nukes would deepen existing Belarusian concerns over Moscow’s increasingly overt military presence in the country. This could potentially destabilize the Lukashenka regime at a time when Russia already finds itself overstretched in Ukraine and lacking the spare resources to rescue its ally once again.

Meanwhile, speculation continues over the possibility of Belarusian troops joining the invasion. So far, Lukashenka has resisted Kremlin pressure to send his army across the border into Ukraine, but Putin’s patience may eventually run out. Any attempt to force Belarusian troops to enter the war would represent a huge gamble for the two authoritarian rulers. Numerous commentators have questioned whether the Belarusian military could be relied upon to follow orders, with some arguing that many soldiers would be likely to mutiny or switch sides and fight for Ukraine.

Direct Belarusian participation in the Ukraine invasion would also dramatically increase the chances of domestic instability inside Belarus. Alyaksandr Azarau, who leads the BYPOL organization of exiled former Belarusian military and security service officers, believes wartime realities would rapidly reignite the flames of the 2020 protests. “If small Belarus starts getting coffins from Ukraine, it will inevitably stir up protests that the authorities barely managed to stifle with mass repressions,” he told the Associated Press in late April.

This represents something of a conundrum for Putin. Faced with mounting international isolation and struggling to advance in Ukraine, he is understandably eager to strengthen his grip on neighboring Belarus and force Lukashenka to join his faltering invasion. However, if Putin pushes too hard, the outcome could be disastrous for his last remaining ally.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

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NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Placing Russian nukes in Belarus could destabilize Putin’s last ally appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Days earlier, Putin had made global headlines by announcing an agreement with Minsk to station Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. This was widely viewed as a further escalation in Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling tactics as he attempts to discourage the West from continuing to arm Ukraine.

At the same time, the move to place nuclear weapons in Belarus will also advance the Kremlin goal of consolidating informal control over the country. While Putin was at pains to stress that the decision to move nukes across the border came in response to a direct request from Lukashenka, few were convinced. Instead, news of the planned deployment has served to underline Belarus’s status as a client state of Russia.

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While Belarus likely had little say in the matter of hosting Russian nuclear weapons, the country will experience significant consequences if Moscow proceeds as planned. Brussels has already warned Minsk of further sanctions due to what it terms as an “irresponsible escalation and threat to European security.” Belarus could also find itself a target for retaliatory strikes if the war in Ukraine spreads to neighboring NATO member states. In such circumstances, Belarusian nuclear weapons storage facilities, military airfields, and other military infrastructure could become potential targets.

Lukashenka has often been critical of his country’s early 1990s decision to hand over the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR, and has suggested the international community would treat Belarus differently if it was still a nuclear power. Nevertheless, until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he had consistently stated that nuclear weapons would only be based in Belarus in response to similar threats from the West.

The Russian attack on Ukraine has led to a dramatic change in Lukashenka’s position on the issue of nuclear weapons. Days after the start of the invasion, he staged a sham referendum on changes to the Belarusian Constitution which scrapped the country’s official nuclear-free status. This was followed by news that Russia was modifying Belarusian military aircraft to carry nuclear warheads and transferring nuclear-capable missile systems to the country.

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By agreeing to host Russian nuclear weapons, Lukashenka has strengthened perceptions of his country as an indivisible element of the military threat posed by Putin’s Russia. This is shaping attitudes toward Minsk throughout the democratic world. For much of Lukashenka’s almost three decades in power, Western policymakers had sought to cultivate ties with him in order to counter Russian influence in Belarus. That era now appears to be over. Instead, Lukashenka is seen as a Putin proxy who must be treated as such.

Lukashenka’s status as junior partner in Putin’s Ukraine War has also brought the curtain down on his clumsy attempts to act as peacemaker between Moscow and Kyiv. During the early stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine following the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Lukashenka positioned himself as a neutral figure and offered his country as a venue for peace talks. However, these claims to neutrality were undermined by Lukashenka’s growing dependence on the Kremlin, which intervened to rescue his regime in August 2020 following nationwide protests in Belarus over a rigged presidential vote. Lukashenka repaid Putin for his support by allowing Belarus to become a platform for the invasion of Ukraine.

The deployment of nuclear weapons would be the latest in a series of steps since 2020 to expand Russia’s military presence in Belarus. Russian troops are already stationed across the country, with Lukashenka neither willing nor able to force their departure. The establishment of a fully-fledged Russian military base complete with nuclear weapons would significantly increase Moscow’s leverage over Belarus and cement Putin’s grip on the country. In such circumstances, any subsequent attempts by Lukashenka to distance himself from Putin or assert his independence from the Kremlin would be political suicide.

Although Lukashenka himself appears obliged to accept the gradual takeover of his country, the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus could have negative domestic consequences that neither he nor Putin can entirely disregard. While opinion polls are notoriously difficult to conduct in dictatorships, research carried out by Chatham House in 2022 found that around 80% of Belarusians opposed the idea of hosting Russian nukes. This tallies with other anecdotal evidence indicating strong opposition to the growing Russian military presence in Belarus and emphatic rejection of any Belarusian involvement in the invasion of Ukraine.

The terror tactics employed by Lukashenka in recent years make it unlikely that Belarusians will take to the streets in protest over Russian plans to place nuclear weapons in their country. However, this latest strengthening of Moscow’s already dominant position will further erode the legitimacy of the Lukashenka regime while highlighting Russia’s creeping annexation of Belarus. This could help fuel a new wave of Belarusian opposition, especially if Russia suffers further military setbacks in Ukraine.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Russian nukes in Belarus: Putin’s creeping annexation continues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Webster in The China-Russia Report: China-Belarus trade surged in January and February appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack against Russian consulate

On April 4, Belarusian state-controlled TV channel ONT aired a documentary titled “Loud failures of the Ukrainian special services in Belarus. Gaspar did not get in touch.” Reports from Belarus’ State Security Committee (KGB) informed much of the program, which asserted that, under the leadership of Ukrainian special services, a network of Russian and Belarusian citizens planned several terrorist attacks in the Belarusian city of Grodno. The alleged perpetrators reportedly planned to target several facilities, including the Consulate General of Russia, a military enlistment office opposite Zhiliber Park, a military unit in southern Grodno, and two oil depots. 

The KGB claimed that Vyacheslav Rozum, an alleged employee of the Main Directorate of Intelligence in the Ukrainian defense ministry, planned the attacks. Ukrainian authorities had not commented on the accusations at the time of writing. According to the documentary, Rozum asked Russian citizen Daniil Krinari, known as Kovalevsky, to form a network of people to carry out terrorist acts. Krinari was reportedly arrested in Grodno in December 2022 and extradited to Russia at the request of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He was charged in Russia for cooperating with Ukraine and acting in the interests of Ukraine. The Belarusian KGB asserted that, before his extradition, Krinari managed to recruit at least two people, Russian citizen Alexei Kulikov and Belarusian citizen Vadim Patsenko. Kulikov had allegedly fled Russia in 2022 to avoid conscription and moved to Belarus. 

The ONT documentary includes interviews with Kulikov and Patsenko, who argue that Rozum asked them to take photos and videos of the target facilities in Grodno. Moreover, Patsenko argued that Vyacheslav tasked him with blowing up an oil depot with a drone. The program claims Ukrainian special services promised Kulikov and Patsenko $10,000 each. While Patsenko and Kulikov allege that Ukrainian security services were involved in the operation, the ONT program does not include concrete evidence to prove this claim. 

The documentary also contains an interview with Nikolai Shvets, the main suspect behind a February 26, 2023, attack on an AWACS A-50 Russian military aircraft at Machulishchy airfield in Belarus. Shvets is reported to be a Russian-Ukrainian dual citizen and served in the Ukrainian army. In the ONT interview, he claimed he was working with a person from the Ukrainian security service while planning the sabotage. The Belarusian independent media outlet Nasha Niva reported that Maxim Lopatin, one of arrested suspects in the Machulishchy attack, had a broken jaw when he filmed the ONT doumentary. Nasha Niva suggested that he was possibly beaten by Belarusian law enforcement authorities. Belarus arrested more than twenty people in connection to the February aircraft incident and announced on April 3 that the suspects were charged with committing an act of terrorism, for which the maximum sentence is capital punishment. However, the ONT program again provides no concrete evidence linking Shvets to Ukrainian security services. 

In addition, the ONT documentary aired on the same day that Alyaksandr Lukashenka met Sergey Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, in Minsk to discuss joint counterterrorism measures undertaken by Belarus and Russia. 

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Identifying potential host sites for Russian tactical nuclear weapons

On March 28, Belarus confirmed it would accept Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The announcement came after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25 plans to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, promising to build a nuclear weapons storage facility in the country. Putin made the comments after the United Kingdom said it would supply Ukraine with ammunition containing depleted uranium. “The heavy metal is used in weapons because it can penetrate tanks and armour more easily due to its density, amongst other properties,” Reutersreported. On April 4, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu reported the transfer of Iskander-M tactical missiles, which are nuclear capable and have been utilized by the Russian military against Ukraine. 

Two days after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 26, 2022, Belarus approved via referendum constitutional amendments to remove the country’s non-nuclear status. The constitutional change allows Belarus to host nuclear weapons for foreign states. 

Amidst the speculation surrounding Russia’s nuclear deployment to Belarus, the most pressing questions concern the potential location of airfields capable of nuclear deployment and which type of equipment is nuclear capable in terms of maintenance and modernization efforts.  

Along with the confirmed transfer of the Iskander-M missiles (a mobile, short-range ballistic missile system with a range of up to 500 kilometers), Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets are also a top contender in the Russian and Belarusian aviation arsenals. This aircraft is capable of carrying two nuclear bombs, which the Russian military categorizes as “special aviation bombs.” In June 2022, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka personally called on Putin to help upgrade and retrofit the Belarusian Su-25 fleet to be nuclear-capable. This resulted in a long-term project to enable Belarusian nuclear capabilities, legalize hosting Russian nuclear technology and nuclear-capable craft, enable joint-training programs for aviation sorties, and direct training for Belarusian pilots.

In conjunction with the Su-25’s capabilities against Ukraine’s current air defence networks and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear policy, Belarus’ acceptance of Russian tactical nuclear weapons can be viewed as escalatory. Video footage showed the Su-25’s capacity to evade Ukraine’s man-portable air defence system (MANPAD).

On April 2, the Russian envoy to Minsk announced that the nuclear weapons deployment would occur along Belarus’ western border. The exact location has not been specified, but Belarus has a number of bases along its western border, including Osovtsy, Ross, and Bereza. However, Lida is a primary staging base for the Belarusian fleet of SU-25s, and open-source researchers have confirmed a large presence of the aircraft on the base. Currently, Osovtsy is not one of the highly utilized bases in Belarus, but its proximity to the western border, especially in terms of proximity to Poland and the northern border of Ukraine, makes it a primary location to watch for potential signs of development, land-clearing operations, and heightened military activity.

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

Individuals linked to Russian army form ‘angry patriots club’

On April 1, former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov (also known as Igor Girkin) published a video announcing the formation of the “angry patriots club” (Клуб рассерженных патриотов). According to Strelkov, the club aims “to help Russian armed forces” and “meet the stormy wind that will soon whip our faces as one team.” In the video, Strelkov says that Russia “is moving toward military defeat” because “we got into a long, protracted war for which our economy turned out to be completely unprepared. Neither the army nor the political system was ready for it.” In a Telegram post, Strelkov said the club “was created two weeks ago. So far, organizational issues have not been resolved publicly.” Strelkov previously played a crucial role in forming a separatist movement in the Donbas region.

The video also featured a statement from Pavel Gubarev, who in 2014 proclaimed himself the commander of the Donbas People’s Militia. In the video, he says, “We are angry that we are going from one defeat to another, and nothing changes.” He called the system in Russia “thievish and corrupt” and said the Russian elite are “elite in catastrophe.” 

The video further featured Vladimir Grubnik, who in 2015 was arrested in Ukraine in connection to an explosion near a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) building in Odesa; in 2019, he was part of a prisoner exchange and returned to the Russian forces in Donbas. Grubnik said that defeat would lead to Russia falling apart. 

Vladimir Kucherenko, an Odesa-born Russian propagandist better known by his pen name Maksim Kalashnikov, said, “We are not afraid to criticize the actions of the government. Why? Because it can somehow help victory. Otherwise, they will do nothing, they will not move.” He called the Russian elite “looters,” “resource grabbers,” and “corrupts.” He predicted the war would turn into “carnage to death” and that the “corrupt Russian elites” would organize a coup that would “betray the country” by agreeing to Russia’s “separation” and “giving up of nuclear arms” in order to “earn the forgiveness of the West.” In 2015, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture included Kucherenko in the list of Russians “threatening national security.”

Another figure in the video is Maksim Klimov, a pro-Kremlin military expert, who said, “The authorities do not know the real situation.” He added, “They do not hear nor see what is happening in the special military operation zone.” Klimov also did not rule out Russia’s defeat. 

The video gained some traction online, garnering 177,000 views on YouTube at the time of writing and 623,600 views and 2,500 shares on Strekov’s Telegram channel. According to TGStat, most of the shares on Telegram came from private accounts. Many Ukrainian media outlets reported on the newly founded club. The DFRLab did not identify any mainstream Russian media outlets reporting on the club besides Kommersant, a Kremlin-approved media outlet focused on business. 

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

Russian propaganda reaches Ukrainian users via Facebook ads

This week, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) and Ukrainian civil society members reported that Facebook advertising campaigns are being used to spread negative content about Ukraine. The ads range from posts that claim “Romania wants to annex Ukrainian territories” to videos that claim “This is the end. There are no men to fight for Ukraine.” While these campaigns were quickly de-platformed and the pages sharing them were banned, the DFRLab was able to investigate some of the ads via the Facebook Ad Library. The DFRLab previously reported on Facebook ads promoting pro-Russia disinformation to Ukrainian users.

The ads included links to the website luxurybigisland.net, with some ads sharing variations of the URL, such as luxurybigisland.net/rbk or luxurybigisland.net/pravda. The website was built using the Russian website builder Tilda, and its the landing page featured German text that translates to, “Nothing that can’t be removed. We care for your textiles as gently as possible with the utmost care, iron and steam, so that you can enjoy your clothes for a long time. We care.” The same phrase appeared on the now-defunct Tilda-made website google-seo-top.com and the website of a German textile care company. Registration data for luxurybigisland.net is redacted, but WhoIs data for google-seo-top.com shows that the website was registered in Russia. Both luxurybigisland.net and google-seo-top.com include metadata, shown in Google results, that states, in German, “the USA are against the entire world.”

One URL shared in the ads, luxurybigisland.net/pravda, remained online at the time of writing. The URL redirects to a forged article mimicking the Ukrainian news outlet Pravda. The article shared in the ads never appeared on the authentic Pravda website, but its byline cited a genuine journalist working at the outlet. The DFRLab confirmed the article was a forgery by reviewing the journalist’s author page on the authentic Pravda website, reviewing Pravda’s archived section, conducting a Google search for the forged headline, and then a more specific website search via Google.

Visually the forged website is identical to the authentic one and even features links to contact information copied from the original website. However, the forged website’s image format is different. The text of the forged article claims that the Ukrainian economy is heavily damaged and that “continuation of the war will lead to even greater losses in the economy.” The data shared in the article appears to be copied from multiple media sources and is not false, but the article’s framing contains pro-Russian sentiments as it calls for Ukraine’s surrender.

A second forged article, discovered by CSCIS, was shared on the now-offline URL luxurybigisland.net/RBK. The article mimicked the website of the reputable Ukrainian outlet RBC. 

Meta itself has taken – and continues to take – action against similar cross-platform, pro-Russia networks that push users to websites designed to impersonate legitimate news organizations. The DFRLab could not tie its identified assets to those previous Meta actions, but there is some probability that they were related given the similarity of behavior.

A Facebook page with “Cripto” in its name shared some of the ads. The DFRLab identified another Facebook page with the word Cripto in the name sharing pro-Kremlin narratives via Facebook ads. The ads pushed a false story claiming there was a “riot in Kyiv over losses.” CSCIS previously debunked another narrative pushed by a similarly named page that also fomented anti-Ukrainian military sentiment.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Poland and Ukraine sign cooperation deal for production of tank shells

During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Poland, Polish manufacturer Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Ukroboronprom signed a cooperation agreement for the joint production of 125-mm tank ammunition. The agreement assumes that the deployment of new production lines will be in Polish cities and the agreement indicates that they plan to produce a large amount of ammunition for 125-mm guns. The decision to start production in Poland was made due to the high risks of Russian missile attacks on production facilities if they were to be based in Ukraine. In place of locating the production in the country, the Ukrainian side will provide technologies and highly qualified specialists with experience in production. This will be the second factory that will produce 125-mm tank shells.

The supply of shells is of particular importance to Ukrainian forces, which are preparing a counter-offensive in southern and eastern Ukraine as heavy fighting with the Russian army continues in the Bakhmut and Donetsk regions.

Separately, German manufacturer Rheinmetall is building a service center for Western military equipment used by Ukraine’s armed forces in Romania, Reuters reported on April 2. The construction for the center is already underway in the Romanian city of Satu Mare, close to the country’s border with Ukraine. The hub is expected to open later this month. 

This development is happening against the background of diplomatic activity and statements. Ukraine is not ready to sign any peace agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the war could end as early as this year, according to an April 5 interview with  Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksii Rezniko, who said, “I think this war will end soon. Of course, I would like it not to start, but I personally believe in this year as a year of victory.”

Rezniko also commented on a statement made in March by Czech Republic President Petr Pavel, who claimed that Ukraine had only one chance to conduct a successful counter-offensive this year. “I think that the president of the Czech Republic now speaks more like a military man than a politician, and the logic of the military is such that they constantly calculate the worst options. But even if this is his assessment, it is subjective, and he still lays down useful for us. The message is that European countries should unite more powerfully and strengthen assistance to Ukraine,” said Reznikov. Later, Andriy Sybiha, an adviser to Zelenskyy, told the Financial Times that Kyiv is willing to discuss the future of Crimea with Moscow if its forces reach the border of the Russian-occupied peninsula.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Allegedly produced by Putin’s Presidential Administration with input from the Russian intelligence services and armed forces, the 17-page internal strategy paper was made public in early 2023 by an international consortium of journalists. It serves as a comprehensive guide to the unofficial annexation of Belarus via a combination of economic, military, political, and social measures, with the objective of full absorption into a so-called “Union State” with Russia by 2030.

The Russian takeover of Belarus as outlined in the document appears to closely mirror Moscow’s plans for Ukraine, albeit by less direct means. “Russia’s goals with regard to Belarus are the same as with Ukraine. Only in Belarus, Russia relies on coercion rather than war. Its end goal is still wholesale incorporation,” commented Michael Carpenter, the US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, following publication of the leaked document.

The strategy document for Belarus envisions the comprehensive russification of Belarusian society along with a sharp reduction in the influence of nationalist and pro-Western forces, which are viewed by Russia as virtually indistinguishable in relation to both Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian political, financial, business, and education systems would be fully integrated into Russia, with a network of pro-Russian media, NGOs, and cultural institutions established to aid this integration process.

In the military sphere, the Belarusian army would become de facto part of the Russian military, with Belarus increasing the number of Russian bases in the country and allowing Moscow to dramatically expand its military presence. Putin’s recently announced intention to base Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus are an indication that this plan is already advancing.

The publication date of this alleged Russian blueprint for the takeover of Belarus is particularly interesting. It was reportedly produced in summer 2021 at a time when Putin’s mind seems to have been turning toward grand visions of imperial conquest. Increasingly isolated due to the Covid pandemic and surrounded by a shrinking circle of imperial hardliners and sycophants, Putin appears to have made the fateful decision in mid 2021 to extinguish Belarusian and Ukrainian independence once and for all.

Efforts to unofficially annex Belarus were well underway by this point. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was already heavily reliant on Russia following a Kremlin intervention to prop up his tottering regime in the wake of nationwide protests over the country’s rigged August 2020 presidential election.

As Kremlin officials were busy drawing up plans to incorporate Belarus, Putin himself was penning a 6000-word treatise outlining his denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood and his insistence that Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). Putin’s July 2021 essay was widely seen as a declaration of war against Ukrainian independence. His lengthy article laid the ideological foundations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began seven months later.

Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine share many common features with his vision for the takeover of Belarus. Following the anticipated military conquest of Ukraine, Russia intended to install a puppet ruler in Kyiv who would replace Zelenskyy and play the same role as Lukashenka in Belarus. For both countries, Moscow’s ultimate goal is the same: Complete absorption into a new Russian Empire.

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire have been evident since his first term in office but became more obvious following his formal return to the presidency in 2012. From this point onward, Putin began to openly embrace an imperialistic brand of nationalism that positioned him as the latest in a long line of Kremlin rulers celebrated as “gatherers of Russian lands.” In the contemporary context, this meant incorporating fellow East Slavic states Belarus and Ukraine into a new Russia-led union.

The idea of a union between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was not new and first gained prominence during the collapse of the USSR when promoted by Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. East Slavic unity had both ideological and practical appeal for Putin. It would secure his place in Russian history while also creating a solid basis for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s alternative to the EU.

Initially, Putin hoped to absorb Ukraine without a fight. Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, the Kremlin adopted many of the same tactics later used in Belarus to strengthen Russia’s grip on the country. However, post-Soviet Ukraine had a far stronger sense of national identity than Belarus, with a majority of Ukrainians seeing themselves as Europeans and embracing the country’s fledgling democratic traditions. This was to prove a major obstacle for Putin’s imperial project.

As Ukraine prepared to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union in last 2013, Moscow unleashed a trade war and began pressuring Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych to reject Brussels in favor of Moscow. When Yanukovych attempted to do so, mass protests erupted in Ukraine that escalated into a full-scale revolution in support of democracy and European integration. Within three months, Yanukovych found himself deserted by his allies and escaped to Russia.

Russia responded to the success of the Euromaidan Revolution by occupying Crimea and attempting to orchestrate uprisings throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Targeted regions of Ukraine were rebranded by the Kremlin using the old Czarist-era imperial term of “Novorossiya” or “New Russia.” This strategy was only partially successful, with Kremlin-backed uprisings defeated in most major Ukrainian cities except for Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Kremlin control was secured with the assistance of the invading Russian army.

Over the next eight years, Putin attempted to rebuild Russia’s political influence inside Ukraine while pressuring the country to accept a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the February 2015 Minsk Accords, which had brought the worst of the fighting to an end in eastern Ukraine without establishing a durable peace. Moscow’s vision for the implementation of the Minsk Accords would have transformed Ukraine into a dysfunctional Russian satellite, but this outcome met with resistance from successive Ukrainian presidents.

By early 2021, Putin had come to the conclusion that his strategy was failing and appears to have recognized that Ukraine was slipping irreparably out of the Russian orbit. At this point, he and other Kremlin leaders began referring to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” and portraying the country as an intolerable outpost of NATO and US interests on Russia’s borders. The available evidence suggests that by the time Putin published his notorious essay in summer 2021, he was already fully committed to crushing Ukrainian independence by military means.

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In a clear echo of the strategy adopted for Belarus, Russia’s FSB security service was tasked in 2021 with preparing plans for the military occupation and pacification of Ukraine. However, a combination of FSB corruption, wishful thinking, and misplaced stereotypes about modern Ukraine resulted in a series of disastrous miscalculations.

Collaborators within the Ukrainian government told FSB agents what they wanted to hear with no regard for the realities on the ground, while the Kremlin’s networks of Ukrainian informants, NGOs, and other “experts” assured their Russian colleagues that the invading Russian army would be welcomed. Meanwhile, FSB officers confidently predicted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would soon be captured or forced to flee, with organized Ukrainian resistance unlikely to last longer than a few days.

These intelligence failures persuaded Putin to embark on the biggest gamble of his presidency with a wholly inadequate force of less than 200,000 troops. This was regarded as sufficient to install a pro-Russian regime and place Ukraine on the same path as Belarus toward absorption into the Russian Federation.

Captured documents, prisoner accounts, and the actions of the Russian occupation forces in regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control now make it possible to produce a comprehensive picture of Russia’s plans for the subjugation of the country. These plans share many features with Moscow’s approach to the creeping annexation of Belarus, while employing infinitely more direct and brutal methods.

The events of the past year make clear that Russia’s stated invasion objective of “de-Nazification” actually means the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or otherwise silencing of anyone deemed to be a Ukrainian patriot. Those targeted since the invasion began in February 2022 have included elected officials, civil society activists, educators, journalists, army veterans, and cultural figures.

The systematic suppression of Ukrainian national identity has been undertaken alongside intensive russification efforts, including the introduction of a Kremlin-approved Russian school curriculum and the promotion of an imperial identity. In parallel, local businesses have been forced to integrate into the Russian economy, with the wider population in occupied Ukraine obliged to accept Russian citizenship.

The obvious similarities between the Kremlin’s long-term Belarus strategy and the tactics being employed in occupied Ukraine undermine Russian efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a defensive measure driven by valid security concerns. Instead, a picture emerges of Vladimir Putin’s overriding ambition to absorb both countries and secure his place in history as a “gatherer of Russian lands.”

While his approach to each country may currently differ in the details, Putin clearly aims to bring both Ukrainian and Belarusian independence to an end, and has placed these imperial ambitions at the heart of his entire reign. This makes a mockery of calls for a compromise with the Kremlin. Instead, Western leaders must recognize that peace in Europe will remain elusive until the Russian dictator is forced to abandon his dreams of empire.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the newly published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2023

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

By Anders Åslund

The ICC decision to indict Putin for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad, writes Anders Åslund.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s plan for a new Russian Empire includes both Ukraine and Belarus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Webster in China-Russia Report: Putin to put tactical nukes in Belarus, with PRC’s apparent approval appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the desire for peace is perfectly understandable, calls to appease Putin by handing him a partial victory in Ukraine ignore the lessons of history and would almost certainly lead to more war. If the experience of the 1930s taught the world anything, it is that appeasement merely encourages dictators to go further. Like Hitler before him, Putin will not stop until he is stopped.

Long before last year’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, observers were already noting the obvious parallels between Russia’s trajectory under Vladimir Putin and the rise of Nazi Germany. Both regimes were deeply revisionist, with Hitler’s quest to avenge German defeat in World War I mirrored by Putin’s bitter resentment over Russia’s perceived humiliation following the Soviet collapse.

In foreign policy, the similarities were even more striking. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula drew widespread comparisons with Hitler’s early foreign policy successes, such as the Anschluss with Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland. In an alarming echo of 1930s diplomacy, these early examples of Russian aggression met with a similarly underwhelming international response. Just as Hitler was encouraged by the appeasement policies of the West to swallow the rest of Czechoslovakia and invade Poland, the weak Western response to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine set the stage for last year’s full-scale invasion.

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Like Hitler before him, Putin has framed his attack on Ukraine as a campaign to defend ethnic compatriots who have found themselves beyond the borders of the motherland. Given the extent of the Russian diaspora throughout the former USSR and beyond, this creates considerable scope for further expansionist wars.

Putin’s self-assumed position as guardian of Russians abroad, along with the Kremlin’s conveniently flexible interpretation of who qualifies as “Russian,” potentially endangers a long list of countries with significant Russian minorities including Kazakhstan, Moldova, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia. All have prior experience of the Russian and Soviet empires; all remain vulnerable to Kremlin influence and potential military intervention.

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has been promoting its imperial agenda via the so-called “Russian World” ideology, which envisions Russia as the guardian of a unique civilization extending beyond the borders of today’s Russian Federation and united by the Russian language, Slavic ethnicity, and the Orthodox faith. In 2007, the Kremlin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF) to serve as a platform for Russia’s influence operations. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev referred to the RMF as the “key instrument of Russian soft power.”

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, the countries most immediately at risk are Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The latter two both have authoritarian regimes that currently enjoy Moscow’s support but are nevertheless nervous about Russia’s expansionist ambitions.

Kazakhstan is vulnerable due to its isolated geographical position between Russia and China as the world’s largest landlocked country. Russian nationalists have long identified border regions in northern Kazakhstan with large ethnic Russian populations as potential targets for a new imperial adventure. With the Kazakh leadership refusing to publicly back the invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists have recently begun discussing the possibility of future military intervention.

Belarus is already deeply involved in the attack on Ukraine and served as a launch pad for the invasion in February 2022. This role as junior partner in Putin’s war reflects Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s dependence on the Kremlin, which intervened to prop up his regime following a pro-democracy uprising in August 2020. Members of Belarus’s exiled opposition argue that the country is already effectively under Russian occupation. While some would question this conclusion, today’s Belarus is clearly in danger of being either officially or unofficially annexed by Russia.

Meanwhile, undeterred by Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine, the Kremlin has recently begun escalating its rhetoric against Moldova. In early February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the West seeks to turn the country into an “anti-Russian project” and warned that Moldova could become “the next Ukraine.” Weeks later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Russia of plotting to overthrow her pro-EU government.

At present, it is difficult to predict where Russia is most likely to strike next. The one thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that if Moscow is not defeated in Ukraine, it will continue to pursue expansionist policies. In other words, the future peace and stability of Eurasia hinges on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

All those currently calling for compromise with the Kremlin in Ukraine would be wise to recall that policies of appeasement toward Hitler were widely popular at the time among populations desperate to avoid another world war. We now know how disastrously misguided those policies were and have no excuses for repeating the mistake. Defeating Putin in Ukraine will not be easy, but it is the only way to secure a lasting peace and convince Moscow that the era of easy victories over vulnerable neighbors is over.

Arman Mahmoudian is a PhD candidate and international affairs researcher at the University of South Florida.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jan 28, 2023

Poland is leading Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

By Diane Francis

Poland was the unsung hero of the recent landmark decision by Berlin and Washington to provide Ukraine with tanks as Polish leadership continues to shape the European response to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Calls to appease Putin in Ukraine ignore the lessons of history appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Webster quoted in China Digital Times on China’s economic support for Belarus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lukashenka’s support for Moscow covers five key areas: providing logistical and material support for Russian forces; acting as a launchpad for missiles against Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory; broadcasting propaganda and disinformation against Ukraine; hosting Russian military hospitals on Belarusian soil; and the suspected regime-sponsored orchestration of cyberattacks against Ukrainian infrastructure.

The impact of this support has been significant. Russian troops deployed to Belarus on the eve of the invasion played a key role in the Kyiv offensive during the first month of the war, with the horrendous atrocities in Bucha and other Kyiv suburbs carried out by Russian units which had crossed over from Belarus. During the initial assault on Kyiv, logistical support from Belarus allowed Russia to resupply and replenish its troops as they fought to capture the Ukrainian capital.

Since the Russian retreat from northern Ukraine in late March and early April 2022, Belarus has continued to provide safe harbor to Russian soldiers while supplying Russia with weaponry and other military equipment. Lukashenka has also hosted joint military exercises and provided training facilities for mobilized Russians.

Belarus has helped to spread propaganda and disinformation about the war, often echoing Kremlin narratives defending Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade and backing his false justifications for the conflict. Indeed, the propaganda is so pervasive and the information space so controlled inside Belarus that many Belarusians still do not realize the true scale of the war. Instead, many view it as a “special military operation,” seemingly distant from Belarus.

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The Belarusian pro-democracy movement is fighting back, confident that Putin’s defeat in Ukraine will weaken Lukashenka’s ability to maintain his hegemony over his own people. By disrupting Russia’s war effort and exhausting its resources, the Belarusian pro-democracy movement is chipping away at the edifice of the Putin-Lukashenka axis and eroding the very resources Russia needs in order to prop up its dependent ally.

As Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya argues, there is a clear connection between the fate of Ukraine and the fate of Belarus. She contends that when the people of Ukraine prevail over Russia, Belarusians will see Putin’s feet of clay and will be inspired to reject the vassal status that Russia has imposed on their own country.

For this reason, Belarusian democratic activists are contributing to anti-war activities. The Cyber Partisans initiative has disrupted the Belarusian regime’s technical infrastructure, while the railway partisans movement complicated Belarusian logistical support for Russian forces during the early months of the war. Activists are also working to combat disinformation and propaganda by communicating the truth about the war to Belarusian citizens.

Eurasia Center events

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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It is imperative that Ukraine’s friends and allies in the West punish Lukashenka’s regime for its role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Doing so will help support Ukraine’s defense by imposing greater costs on Belarus and forcing Minsk to think twice before carrying out instructions from Moscow. It will also help the Belarusian pro-democracy movement in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Belarusian people by exposing how Lukashenka’s support for the war is directly responsible for growing insecurity and economic hardship in Belarus.

To begin with, the US and other democratic partners should continue to provide robust support for the Belarusian democratic movement, which is making significant contributions to the anti-war effort in Belarus. Historically, resources to support the Belarusian democracy movement have come in peaks and valleys, often surging following key political events only to dwindle in subsequent periods. Support has remained strong since 2020, when a fraudulent presidential election brought hundreds of thousands of Belarusians to the streets in protest. Now that the country’s democratic forces have embarked upon a longer-term movement for change, consistent and strong financial support is all the more crucial.

This investment must be paired with a high-level diplomatic initiative to signal both to the Lukashenka regime and to the Belarusian democratic opposition that the US and EU commitment to a democratic Belarus will not waver and is linked directly to the defense of democracy throughout the region. To this end, the US should assign another Special Envoy for Belarus at the ambassadorial rank to continue the important work of former US Special Envoy to Belarus Ambassador Julie Fisher, who was a steadfast supporter of the democratic movement during her tenure from 2020-2022.

In light of the fact that the Belarusian authorities refused to renew the visa and accreditation of the EU’s former Head of Delegation to Belarus, Dirk Schuebel, the EU should consider appointing a remote-based Special Representative for Belarus instead. These new envoys would serve as crucial interlocutors between Washington, Brussels, and the leaders of the Belarusian opposition.

Targeted support should also be leveraged for Belarusian volunteers fighting against Russia in Ukraine. Greater material support for the more than 1,000 Belarusian volunteers fighting under Ukrainian military leadership would serve to strengthen their ability to aid in the defense of Ukraine at a time of increasing risk of further attacks from Belarusian territory. It would also show members of the Belarusian military that there is an alternative outlet to serve for those who recognize the risks posed to their country and do not wish to be dragged into an unjustified war against a peaceful neighbor.

As the specter of greater Belarusian involvement in the war grows, so too does the imperative for Washington and Brussels to act now to support the Belarusian democratic forces in undermining Belarusian support for Russia’s war machine, countering propaganda and disinformation, and joining Ukrainian forces on the frontline of democracy. The Belarusian democratic movement understands that their fate will now be decided on the battlefields of Ukraine. They have the will and capacity to aid their Ukrainian compatriots in securing victory as soon as possible. They just need the tools to do so.

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Eurasia at the International Republican Institute (IRI). Mark Dietzen is the IRI resident program director for Belarus, based in Vilnius, Lithuania.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 6, 2023

Ukrainians are united in rejection of any compromise with the Kremlin

By Mariia Zolkina

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians have faith in their country’s victory and reject the idea of a compromise peace with the Kremlin, writes Mariia Zolkina.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Feb 6, 2023

Hero Ukrainian medic: “Russia will not stop until it is stopped”

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian military medic Yulia Paievska has a simple message for anyone who still believes in the possibility of a compromise peace with Putin’s Russia. “They will not stop until they are stopped,” she says.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Feb 1, 2023

Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

By Botakoz Kassymbekova

Vladimir Putin’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine has exposed modern Russia’s unapologetically imperial identity but could yet lead to the collapse of the Kremlin’s broader imperial ambitions, writes Botakoz Kassymbekova.

Belarus Central Asia

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post The Belarusian opposition can help defeat Putin in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

According to research conducted by Russia’s internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, Russian public support for the war remained above 70% throughout 2022. Speaking to Germany publication Der Spiegel in early 2023, Levada Center scientific director Lev Gudkov observed that mounting evidence of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine had made virtually no impact on Russian public opinion. “The Russians have little compassion for the Ukrainians. Almost no one here talks about the fact that people are being killed in Ukraine.”

Much of the available evidence supports these poll findings and points to a remarkable absence of empathy. Millions of Ukrainians have friends and family in Russia. Many report being shocked by the lack of compassion they have encountered since the start of the invasion. Rather than sympathy or concern, they have been confronted by cold indifference, outright denials, or pro-Kremlin propaganda tropes.

The hundreds of thousands of Russians who fled the country over the past year have not staged any major anti-war rallies while in exile, despite no longer being subject to draconian Kremlin restrictions. Inside Russia itself, there have been no significant protests since the first weeks of the war. The contrast provided by mass anti-government rallies over the past twelve months in other repressive dictatorships such as China and Iran has cast the silence of the Russian population in an even more unfavorable light.

This apparent lack of empathy for the victims of Russian imperial aggression is nothing new. Many Russians displayed similar attitudes toward the two Chechen wars of the early post-Soviet era and the 2008 invasion of Georgia. More recently, the 2014 invasion of Crimea was widely cheered and remains arguably the most popular single event of Putin’s entire 23-year reign. Such thinking reflects the unapologetically imperial identity which the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet and Czarist eras.

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Modern Russian national identity remains firmly rooted in notions of a sacred imperial mission that perceives Russia as being a unique civilization locked in an eternal struggle against various constructed foreign enemies. Hundreds of years ago, the messianic vision of the czars gave rise to the idea of Russia as the Third Rome and leader of Orthodox Christianity. In the twentieth century, this belief in imperial exceptionalism was harnessed to identify Russians as the nation that would save the world from capitalism and lead a global communist revolution.

Under Putin, the lyrics may have changed but the tune remains largely the same. Indeed, it is telling that while Soviet communism has long since been consigned to the ash heap of history, today’s Russia has seamlessly inherited the USSR’s Cold War-era animosity toward NATO, the United States, and the Western world in general.

The sense of imperial mission pervading modern Russian society has helped nurture values of sacrifice and obligation at the expense of individual human rights. Many Russians take it for granted that they are destined to rule over other nations and interpret their colonialism as fundamentally benevolent, even when it is obviously unwelcome. Russia’s victims must be liberated, whether they like it or not.

Whether driven by the Orthodox faith, the communist ideology, or Putin’s far vaguer notions of a “Russian world,” this highly paternalistic brand of imperialism grants Russians the right to speak on behalf of their subject peoples. Accordingly, there is no need to actually listen to these conquered peoples or empathize with them, even while proclaiming them as “brothers.” Those who oppose this holy crusade are logically understood to be representatives of evil. It is no coincidence that a whole host of senior Russian officials include Putin himself have sought to frame the invasion of Ukraine as a battle against Satanists.

While Russian opposition figures are often critical of the Putin regime, they are typically far less outspoken on the topic Russian colonialism, the root cause of the current genocidal Ukraine invasion. Instead, some seek to portray themselves as the real victims of the Kremlin while failing to make the obvious connection between the authoritarianism they claim to oppose and the imperialism they choose to ignore. By blaming everything on Putin, they embrace the same convenient victimhood that the Kremlin itself promotes when faced by the negative consequences of its imperial policies.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The national mythologies of today’s Russia and Ukraine could hardly be more different. While many Russians readily embrace their country’s imperial identity, imperial ideas do not resonate in Ukraine. Even before the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion one year ago, Ukrainians already tended to define their national identity in terms of resistance to the narrative of submission, while prioritizing personal freedoms over obligations to the state.

Since the early 1990s, Ukraine’s post-Soviet nation-building journey has been shaped by a struggle for true independence. This has led to the merging of civic and anti-colonial resistance movements, with the country’s two Maidan revolutions serving as important landmarks on the road toward internal and external freedom.

For almost two decades, Ukraine’s trajectory has been viewed with mounting anger and alarm in the Kremlin. Haunted by the Soviet collapse of the late twentieth century, the Putin regime regards Ukraine’s democratization as an existential threat to its own authoritarian model and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat.

For the time being, other post-Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan act as alternatives to Ukraine’s anti-colonial identity. In these countries, domestic democratic development has been stifled by Kremlin-backed regimes that have chosen not to break decisively with the imperial past. However, there are signs that the current status quo may not be as stable as Moscow would like to think.

Ukraine’s defiant resistance to Russia’s invasion is energizing civil society throughout the former USSR and fueling unprecedented debate over the role of Russian colonialism. On the international stage, the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has introduced contemporary global audiences to the realities of modern Russia’s imperial identity.

Commentators around the world are now actively discussing the practical implications of a post-colonial Russia. Such talk is no longer considered entirely fanciful. On the contrary, many now believe that defeat in Ukraine would deal a decisive blow to hopes of a new Russian Empire and transform the entire Eurasian political landscape. Ultimately, It is up to Russian society itself to dismantle the country’s imperial identity in order to reckon with the horrors of Russia’s past and address the crimes of the current genocidal war.

Botakoz Kassymbekova is Assistant Professor of Modern History at the University of Basel.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 28, 2023

Poland is leading Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

By Diane Francis

Poland was the unsung hero of the recent landmark decision by Berlin and Washington to provide Ukraine with tanks as Polish leadership continues to shape the European response to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Jan 18, 2023

Putin’s nuclear blackmail must not prevent the liberation of Crimea

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Putin’s nuclear threats have led some analysts to argue against attempts to liberate Crimea but bowing down to the Russian dictator’s nuclear blackmail would have dire consequences for global security, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Jan 17, 2023

How Europe can help Ukraine defeat Russia and win the peace in 2023

By Andreas Umland

Continued European support for Ukraine will be crucial in 2023 and must feature a combination of intensification and innovation if Vladimir Putin’s invasion is to be decisively defeated, writes Andreas Umland.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Security

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Tracking narratives

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

International response

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

On January 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed its forces had taken control of Soledar and could encircle Bakhmut, threatening Ukrainian supply lines. In the statement, the MoD praised the efforts of aviation, artillery, and airborne troops, but did not mention the notable role Wagner played in securing Soledar.

Moscow’s announcement highlighted a long-simmering tension between Wagner and the official structure of the Russian MoD. On January 17, an old letter written by Valery Gerasimov, commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, re-circulated online. The letter, dated December 29, 2022, stated that Wagner is not included in the structure of the Russian armed forces. Gerasimov wrote the letter in response to an inquiry to the Russian MoD made by Evgeny Stupin, a lawyer for the Moscow City Duma. On January 15, President Vladimir Putin also attributed the Soledar success to the MoD.

On the day that Russia claimed Soledar, military bloggers affiliated with the Kremlin claimed there was an ongoing conflict between the MoD and Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. On January 15, Prigozhin awarded medals to Wagner soldiers for the capture of Soledar. On January 16, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dispelled reports of an ongoing conflict between Prigozhin and Russian army command, claiming the reports are “products of information manipulation.” Later in the day, when asked about Peskov’s comments, Prigozhin also dispelled the reports, saying, “I see no reason not to trust Peskov.”

On January 19, Prigozhin said that Wagner soldiers were concentrating on taking the suburban city of Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. This information has yet to be confirmed by the Russian MoD.

Elsewhere, on January 14, Ukrainian officials reported that Russia conducted fifty missile and three air strikes against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, and other settlements in West Ukraine. Ukrainian forces said that Russia used S-300 and S-400 systems against ground targets in Kyiv in the morning and later launched high-precision weapons, including twenty-eight cruise missile strikes using Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-59 guided air missiles and the sea-based 3M-14 Kalibr.

In Marinka, the Ukrainian army repelled renewed Russian attacks on January 17 and 18. Russian forces have been storming the settlement since last March, resulting in widespread destruction. The Russian forces also conducted raids in the area of Bilohorivka in Luhansk oblast and Krasna Hora, Bakhmut, Klischiyivka, Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pobieda in Donetsk oblast.

Chechen volunteer forces have become increasingly active in the fight around Bakhmut. There are at least two battalions of Chechens—the Sheikh Mansur Battalion and Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion—fighting for the Ukrainian army on the Bakhmut frontline. On a tactical level, the Chechen battalions are working together in some areas, like in Opytne, where they attacked Russian positions. The Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion also maintains a reconnaissance unit, “Adam,” currently located in Donetsk oblast.

On January 16, a Russian rocket struck a civilian building in Dnipro, killing at least forty-five people, including six children, marking the single deadliest civilian attack since the war began. Ukraine said it does not have air-defense systems that can intercept Russian KH-22 missiles; to ward off future missiles would require Western partners to donate advanced air defenses such as the US MIM-104 Patriot missile system.  

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

On January 18, Russian shelling intensified on the southern frontline in Ukraine, which stretches from Kamianske in the Zaporizhzhia region to Vuhledar in the south of Donetsk oblast. After a night of heavy shelling, videos and photos emerged online showing that the Russian army had used what appears to incendiary ammunition in city of Kherson and nearby Beryslav.

The morning after the strike, videos and photos shared online showed the resulting damage. A local Kherson newspaper reported that a religious youth center had burned down as a result of the shelling. The DFRLab geolocated the youth center and confirmed that it was along the pathway of the airstrike but cannot confirm whether incendiary munitions were involved.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Fragments of a Russian missile targeting Ukraine fell on Moldova territory on January 14 in the town of Larga, Briceni district. According to Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, a warhead fueled with approximately eighty kilograms of explosive material was also discovered among the debris. The next day, authorities reported that specialist teams had carried out controlled detonations of the remaining explosives. The Ministry of Defense noted that the army’s aerial surveillance system did not record a violation of Moldovan airspace, however.

Authorities in Chisinau have strongly condemned the attacks on neighboring Ukraine. “This is the reality of war, imposed by the aggressor, right here in our region,” stressed Moldovan President Maia Sandu. “The missiles reach Moldova as well—the fragments discovered yesterday in the Briceni district testify to this. We strongly condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Attacks on urban infrastructure and the killing of civilians are war crimes; they have no justification.”

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also condemned Russia’s January 14 missile attacks on Ukrainian cities. “There is no political, historical, and even more so moral justification for killing civilians and attacking the infrastructure that ensures the survival of the population,” she said. “I express my deep indignation at the new massive attack on Ukraine. I express my support for the heroic Ukrainian people and our support for the victims of Russia’s barbaric attacks.”

This is the third time missile fragments have landed in Moldova, which is not a member of the European Union or NATO. On December 5, Moldovan border police discovered a missile in an orchard, also in the Briceni district. In October 2022, a Russian missile shot down by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft system fell in the village of Naslavcea, located along the border with Ukraine, shattering windows of several residences as a result of the explosion.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

An animated video showing a Wagner operative helping West African countries defeat zombie French soldiers began circulating on social media and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels this week. While the origin of the video is currently unknown, it appears to have first shown up on Twitter on January 14th, then migrated to alternative video platforms before being shared across pro-Russian Telegram channels.

By depicting Wagner forces as heroes, the video promotes a pro-Russian, anti-French narrative that has spread in recent years across West African social media. The animation depicts Wagner soldiers assisting local militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso in removing French forces, represented in the animation as hordes of zombies and a giant cobra. In Mali, a Wagner operative parachutes into the zombie horde and provides ammunition to a Malian soldier who is subsequently able to defeat the undead, while in Burkina Faso, Wagner provides a rocket-propelled grenade to kill the French cobra.

Russia’s involvement in West Africa does not come in the form of simple weapons deliveries, however. Recent reports indicate that since Russia’s deployment in Mali more than one year ago, violence against civilians has significantly increased, and extremist forces have grown stronger.

The video ends with Wagner forces heading towards Côte d’Ivoire, where French zombies overwhelm an Ivorian soldier. The imagery implies that Wagner aims to send forces to the coastal country.

This is not the first time Wagner has created animated propaganda. In another animation, France was represented as a rat killed by Wagner. And in a comic strip spread in Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner operatives are again depicted fighting zombies, however in the case of CAR the zombies do not represent the French.

Support for France has declined significantly in Francophone Africa, while calls for Russian assistance to fight jihadists has increased.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

On January 18, a helicopter crash in Brovary, near Kyiv, killed sixteen people, including three children, Ukraine’s interior minister, his deputy, and the ministry secretary. The helicopter crashed near a kindergarten. Ukrainian security services investigating the crash are considering three possible scenarios, including a violation of flight rules, a technical malfunction, or intentional sabotage. In the meantime, pro-Kremlin sources are already sharing conflicting narratives about the incident.

One of the first narratives to emerge suggested that Ukraine’s air-defense systems shot down the helicopter. The claim was amplified by pro-Kremlin TV host Olga Skabeyeva on her Telegram channel. Another pro-Kremlin Telegram channel added more details to the claim, saying that “unofficial Ukrainian sources” said the aircraft was shot down by the Stinger or Igla air-defense systems. The claim was also shared on Twitter by a pro-Kremlin account, spreading the narrative to English-speaking audiences. At the time of writing, the English tweet had more than one million views.

Other sources took the claim further. The pro-Kremlin Russian outlet Regnum hypothesized that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was behind the crash, publishing a story with the headline, “The crash of the helicopter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Brovary – executed by Zelenskyy?”

Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin reporter Sasha Kots reported that European countries had suspended the helicopter model, either a Eurocopter EC225 Super Puma or a H225M, after a 2016 crash in Norway. While it is true that the European Aviation Safety Agency grounded both aircraft type after the Norway crash, it allowed flights to resume roughly six months later. Helicopters of this type are used by both military and civilian operators in France, Brazil, Vietnam, and many other countries. Kots also claimed that after the two models were grounded, France sold its supply to Ukraine, implying that France is also responsible for the tragedy.

In December 2021, Romania and Ukraine entered into an agreement to upgrade five of these helicopter models.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

On January 16, the state-controlled TV channel Belarus 1 reported that Belarusian security services had arrested Georgian citizen Giorgi Zirakishvili for allegedly trying to enter Ukraine via Belarus to fight against Russia. Belarus 1 reported that the Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia had advised Zirakishvili to travel from Georgia to Ukraine through Belarus. The broadcaster also claimed that Zirakishvili had planned to meet Igor Kizim, Ukraine’s ambassador to Belarus, upon arrival to receive instructions on how to reach Ukraine and join the Georgian Legion, a paramilitary unit mostly comprised of ethnically Georgian volunteers who fight for Ukraine. Belarus 1 also broadcast an alleged recording of a phone conversation in which Zirakishvili believes he is speaking to representatives from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. However, Belarus 1 reported that Zirakishvili was actually speaking to representatives from Belarusian security services, who discovered Zirakishvili’s alleged intentions and connected with him by impersonating Ukrainian embassy staff. The report also contains a video recording of Zirakishvili’s meeting with representatives from Belarusian security services, who he apparently believed were representatives of the Ukrainian embassy.

Belarus 1 did not provide any concrete evidence that Zirakishvili had communicated with anyone from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. Despite this, the report claims that Kizim is actively recruiting foreign fighters to send to Ukraine. The ambassador responded to the allegations, saying the Belarus 1 story was “nonsense” and “lies, manipulation, and hypocrisy.” He added that the Ukrainian embassy was in contact with the Belarusian foreign affairs ministry regarding the matter.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

A January 17 Telegram post published on Yevgeny Prigozhin’s press channel claimed that Wagner forces tracked down and killed a Ukrainian member of the French Foreign Legion in Donetsk. The channel also shared identity cards belonging to a YevheniiKoulyk, including a Ukrainian driver’s license, a French military card, and a French train card.

The post was reshared by the Telegram channel WarDonbass and the pro-Russian news outlet DonbassInsider. The Russian press agency TASS also reported on the claim. Several Russian-owned media outlets and Telegram channels shared the post, garnering at least 647,000 views at the time of writing.

The story was then picked up by the Russian news outlet Argumenty I fakty (Arguments and facts), which claimed Koulyk was a NATO agent. One VK post suggested Koulyk was a foreign mercenary and accused Ukraine of not disclosing the number of foreign soldiers killed in the war. The author compared Koulyk’s death to that of Hryhorii Tsekhmystrenko, a Ukrainian-born Canadian volunteer reported killed in Ukraine this week.

According to French journalist and military expert Philippe Chapeleau, the French Foreign Legion allowed its Ukrainian-born fighters a period of leave so they could safely resettle their families in neighboring countries. Those who did not return would be considered deserters. According to that same source, Koulyk had been missing since August 2022 and was therefore considered a deserter.

Koulyk’s death was previously reported as early as January 12. As of January 19, there were a total of 189 posts across news outlets and social media discussing Koulyk.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

In a TV interview on January 16, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic criticized Wagner Group for its attempts to recruit Serbian citizens to participate in the Ukraine war. Vucic slammed Wagner, saying, “Why do you do that to Serbia? Why do you, from Wagner, call anyone from Serbia when you know that it is against our regulations?” He also noted that Serbian legislation prohibits its citizens from participating in foreign armed conflicts and denied recent allegations that Wagner has a presence in Serbia. On January 17, Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that there are no Serbian citizens active in Wagner and that Wagner has never been active in Serbia. The DFRLab previously reported on claims made by Wagner that it was establishing a presence in Serbia.

Vucic also condemned a Wagner advertisement published by the newly established Serbian arm of RT. On January 5, RT Balkan reportedly published an article with the headline, “Wagner published an ad for volunteers, the conditions are more than tempting.” The article, which is no longer available on RT Balkan’s website, allegedly said that Wagner was looking for volunteers ages twenty-two to fifty who are not citizens of Ukraine or any EU or NATO member states. Volunteers were required to be physically healthy, interested in learning, patriots, and strong in spirit; in turn, “everything else will be taught by Wagner members.”

A Google search for the original headline, “Vagnerovci objavili oglas za dobrovoljce, uslovi više nego primamljivi,” retrieved an article with the same title, but the original URL now leads to a different article about Russian prisoners who joined Wagner, fought in Ukraine, and peacefully returned to Russia, where all charges against them were dropped.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Ukraine will receive an unspecified number of Archer systems from Sweden, with Swedish media reporting that Kyiv will receive twelve units. Stockholm will also send fifty CV90 vehicles. Latvia will deliver another military aid package to Ukraine that includes Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters, small arms, and drones.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced on January 10 that the country would donate more NASAMS air-defense systems to Ukraine. These systems will enable Ukrainian forces to enhance ground protection around troop deployments and civilian infrastructure. Canada will also transfer another two hundred armored LAV ACSV Super Bison vehicles to Ukraine.

According to the New York Times, the Pentagon is tapping into a stockpile of US ammunition in Israel to help meet Ukraine’s need for artillery shells. The arms and ammunition stockpile is typically reserved for the Pentagon to use in the Middle East. Meanwhile, on January 19, the Pentagon announced a $2.5 billion security package for Ukraine, including for the first time ninety Stryker armored personnel carriers. These mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles could help infantry advance further into the frontlines. Additionally, the US will provide energy equipment to help Ukraine deal with energy shortages. The $125 million support pack would include turbines, backup power banks, and high-voltage transformers.

On January 14, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and announced that the United Kingdom will send Ukraine fourteen Challenger 2 battle tanks and artillery systems. As of 2021, the British army possessed 227 battle tanks. Sending additional tanks is likely to increase pressure on Germany to send its own Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, though Germany’s defense minister said Friday that Berlin has not yet decided on the Leopard 2.

Russian citizens living in Bulgaria donated three pickup trucks to the Ukrainian army. They will be used by the Freedom of Russia Legion, a battalion made up of Russian citizens who defected to fight for Ukraine’s Foreign Legion.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner Group fights French ‘zombies’ in cartoon propaganda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Monday’s meeting between Lukashenka and Putin came following weeks of reports indicating a growing Russian troop presence in Belarus, and as the Belarusian military was completing national battle readiness exercises. Ukraine is certainly taking the issue seriously, with Kyiv strengthening its defenses along the Belarusian border on the eve of Putin’s Minsk trip.

Ukrainian officials are increasingly voicing concerns that Moscow may be preparing to repeat the February 2022 offensive against Kyiv, which saw Russian troops use Belarus as a launchpad for an assault on the Ukrainian capital. In a recent interview with Britain’s The Economist magazine, Valery Zaluzhny, the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, said he had no doubt Russia “will have another go at Kyiv” in the first few months of 2023.

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Following their three-hour meeting, Putin and Lukashenka did not make any major announcements. Instead, they spoke of ongoing negotiations over a series of bilateral trade, economic, and defense issues. Putin noted that both countries would proceed toward deeper security integration and said they would continue intensifying joint military exercises. Meanwhile, Lukashenka confirmed that Belarus has received Russian missile and air defense systems.

Both strongmen played down earlier suggestions that Russia was poised to annex Belarus or was planning to force the country to join the invasion of Ukraine, with Putin instead speaking of the strategic partnership between the two authoritarian regimes. These denials were echoed by Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, who appeared to rule out the possibility of full-scale Belarusian involvement in Russia’s ongoing invasion.

There remains no real clarity over what was discussed behind closed doors in Minsk. Many observers believe talks regarding a possible join offensive against Ukraine must have been the focus of negotiations and note that Putin’s presence would hardly have been required for the official agenda of relatively routine discussions on non-essential matters. However, others have suggested that the Minsk meeting may have been nothing more than an opportunity for both parties to demonstrate their loyalty to each other at a time when each ruler is confronted by deepening international isolation.

If military matters were indeed discussed, this does not necessarily indicate plans for Belarus to directly participate in a new Kyiv offensive. Other options could include an expansion of the current Belarusian role as a base of operations for the Russian military or the provision of armor and ammunition from the Belarusian arsenal. Alternatively, the entire episode may be part of an elaborate ruse to pin down Ukrainian forces and prevent their redeployment to current invasion hot spots in southern and eastern Ukraine.

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Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Lukashenka is already widely seen as a party to the conflict after allowing Putin to use Belarus as a gateway for the initial invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For the past ten months, he has permitted Russia to base troops in Belarus and launch airstrikes from the country against Ukrainian targets. Following the announcement in September of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II, Belarus also began to serve as a training base for mobilized troops.

Despite this obvious involvement, the Belarusian leader bristles at claims that he is a junior partner in Putin’s invasion. Ever since the outbreak of hostilities, he has denied that Belarus is actively participating in the conflict and has instead sought to position himself as a potential mediator. At the same time, in an apparent nod to his Kremlin patrons, Lukashenka has made a number of public declarations acknowledging the need to support neighboring Russia.

This awkard balancing act is understandable. There is little public enthusiasm in Belarus for the invasion of Ukraine, leading to doubts over the reliability of the Belarusian army if Lukashenka does give the order to cross the Ukrainian border. However, the Belarus dictator is almost entirely dependent on Moscow for his political survival and risks becoming expendible if he refuses direct Russian demands to join the war.

For the time being, Putin and Lukashenka’s intentions remain shrouded in mystery. Few are prepared to take their denials at face value, but it is still too early to identify any specific preparations for a major new offensive. Ukrainian military planners certainly cannot afford to dismiss this threat. They will be spending the Christmas holiday period watching the situation closely while preparing for a potential escalation on the northern front.

For Putin, forcing Belarus to join the war would be a desperate gamble that could easily backfire. He has already suffered catastrophic losses in Ukraine and can ill afford another humiliating military defeat. However, with his invasion plans rapidly unraveling and his options narrowing, Putin may decide that it is worth the risk.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 22, 2022

Russia’s defeat is the top global priority for 2023

By Oleksii Reznikov

Ensuring that the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends in defeat is vital for the international security system and must be the strategic priority for 2023, writes Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Dec 13, 2022

Vladimir Putin: 2022 Loser of the Year

By Peter Dickinson

Russian leader Vladimir Putin is the biggest loser of 2022. His disastrous decision to invade Ukraine has left Russia internationally isolated and shattered the country’s reputation as a military superpower.

Belarus Central Asia

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2022

Battle of Kherson: Russian retreat confirms Putin is losing the war

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The war is still far from over, but Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kherson may eventually come to be seen as one of the key turning points in the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Will Putin force Belarus to join the Russian invasion of Ukraine? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While Putin hides from the cameras, his arch-rival is ending the year on a wave of international acclaim. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has already been named Person of the Year by an ever-expanding list of media outlets including TIME magazine and the Financial Times newspaper, and is now being routinely touted as one of the world’s most influential politicians. Zelenskyy’s rising profile is recognition of his wartime leadership and also reflects global admiration for Ukraine’s courageous resistance to the Russian invasion.

The contrasting fortunes of the Russian and Ukrainian leaders underline the self-defeating folly of Putin’s decision to launch Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II. His original plan envisaged a short and victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, he now finds himself an international pariah with his country’s reputation as military superpower in tatters and his Ukrainian enemies looking forward with growing confidence to the very real prospect of an historic victory in the coming year. By almost any measure, Vladimir Putin is comfortably the biggest loser of 2022.

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Putin’s woes can be traced directly to the battlefields of Ukraine. His invading army has performed disastrously over the past ten months and has lost a series of key engagements including the Battle of Kyiv, the Battle of Kharkiv, and the Battle of Kherson. More than one hundred thousand Russian soldiers are believed to have been killed or wounded, while thousands of Russian tanks and armored vehicles have been captured of destroyed. These losses have forced Putin to launch his country’s first mobilization since 1945, a move that has destabilized Russia and brought the war home to previously supportive domestic audiences.

Russia’s international image has also been badly tarnished by revelations of widespread war crimes committed against the Ukrainian civilian population. Russian troops stand accused of carrying out mass executions and engaging in sexual violence, abductions, and torture throughout occupied Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation, while policies of indiscriminate bombardment have left tens of thousands dead and reduced dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble. In recent months, Russia has begun the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure with the express intention of depriving Ukrainians of access to heating, electricity, and water during the depths of winter.

Many international observers see these policies as nothing short of genocide, especially as they have been accompanied by a steady stream of openly genocidal invective from regime propagandists and Kremlin officials in Moscow. Others have been appalled by Putin’s readiness to engage in nuclear saber-rattling. On multiple occasions, the Russian leader has issued thinly veiled threats alluding to the possible use of his country’s vast atomic arsenal. This nuclear blackmail has provoked a strong backlash, with US officials promising “catastrophic consequences” and even the normally supportive Chinese rebuking Russia.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

All this has left Russia more internationally isolated than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution a century ago. In a revealing recent exchange, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov admitted, “nobody likes us and they don’t intend to start liking us.” Peskov may have had the Western world primarily in mind, but his comment also reflected the wider reality of Russia’s increasingly unfavorable international position. Moscow’s isolation is most immediately obvious at the United Nations, where a series of General Assembly votes condemning the invasion of Ukraine have passed with resounding majorities. Tellingly, only a handful of fellow pariahs such as North Korea and Syria have been prepared to stand with Russia.

Closer to home, the Kremlin is visibly losing influence throughout the former Soviet Empire. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan is openly distancing itself from Russia while strengthening ties with China, Turkey, and the West. In the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan is increasingly ignoring Russia’s nominal role as regional peacekeeper while Armenia bristles over Moscow’s failure to provide any meaningful protection. Even Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who depends almost completely on the Kremlin for his political survival, has so far managed to resist Russian pressure to directly participate in the invasion of Ukraine.

On the wider international stage, the United States has succeeded in consolidating Western support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Putin’s efforts to weaponize energy exports have backfired and forced European countries to turn decisively away from reliance on Russia. The BRICS nations (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) continue to purchase Russian resources, but are now doing so on their own heavily discounted terms. Beyond this pragmatic trade, they have refused to back Russia or provide Moscow with much-needed weapons. This has forced the Kremlin to seek replacement tanks, artillery shells, drones, and missiles from the likes of Iran and Belarus.

What can Putin look forward to in 2023? He appears to believe the international alliance opposing his invasion may still eventually lose interest and is pinning his hopes on Western leaders forcing Kyiv into some kind of compromise deal that would allow Russia to snatch a victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat. However, with most of Ukraine’s backers publicly stating that they will let the Ukrainians themselves decide when to negotiate, this outcome looks unlikely. After all, no Ukrainian government could conceivably condemn millions of their compatriots to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation.

A far more realistic scenario would see the well-armed and highly motivated Ukrainian military continue to steadily liberate occupied territory while Russia suffers heavy losses among poorly trained and badly equipped conscript troops. This is a recipe for disaster for the Putin regime. The Russian army in Ukraine is already deeply demoralized and struggling to mount localized offensives. Further attrition in the coming months will raise the prospect of a more comprehensive military collapse that could have grave consequences for the future of the Russian Federation itself.

As 2022 draws to a close, it is already obvious that Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine was one of the biggest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. His dream of shattering the post-1991 settlement and rebuilding the Russian Empire has made him the single greatest threat to global security and placed him in direct confrontation with a formidable coalition of the world’s most powerful nations, who have reluctantly come to recognize the necessity of his defeat. Putin enters 2023 with few friends and fewer options. The coming year is shaping up to be the darkest of his entire reign. It may also be the last.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 17, 2022

Putin’s blackout blitz: Russia aims to freeze Ukrainians into surrender

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

Russia is seeking to plunge Ukraine into darkness ahead of the winter heating season by destroying the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s partners must step in to make sure Ukrainians are not frozen into surrender.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2022

Battle of Kherson: Russian retreat confirms Putin is losing the war

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The war is still far from over, but Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kherson may eventually come to be seen as one of the key turning points in the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Nov 1, 2022

Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower

By Taras Kuzio

Vladimir Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion has dramatically undermined the credibility of modern Russia’s Great Power pretensions and exposed the dysfunctional reality behind the Kremlin’s claims to superpower status.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Vladimir Putin: 2022 Loser of the Year appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month’s topline events

China’s Party Congress. At a momentous gathering of the Chinese Communist Party Congress, President Xi Jinping secured a third term as general secretary of the party, breaching the customary two-term limit. Xi consolidated his authority at the top of the Chinese political system, replacing several Politburo officials with close allies. In a speech before the congress, he stated that the country faced “dangerous storms” ahead, and made clear that while it seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan, China would decide how and when to bring this about and that it reserved the right to use “all measures necessary.” 

• Shaping the Order.  Xi’s consolidation of power and his remarks prioritizing national security issues over economic growth suggests that China will likely play an increasingly disruptive role in the global order over the foreseeable future. Beijing’s determination to seek unification with Taiwan could lead to a military confrontation – a concern magnified by CIA Director William Burns’ recent assessment that Xi has instructed the Chinese military to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan before 2027.
• Hitting home.  With Xi pursuing a policy of dual circulation – prioritizing increased self-reliance while still engaging in foreign trade – and US officials encouraging greater supply chain resilience, American businesses will need to prepare to reduce trade dependencies on China, especially in critical sectors. 
• What to do.  Washington should coordinate closely with allies, both in Europe and Indo-Pacific, on a common strategy to deal with Beijing, while taking more pro-active measures to deter a potential Chinese attack against Taiwan.

Ukraine in the Dark.  Russian forces initiated an intense aerial bombardment campaign across Ukraine, targeting power systems and other critical infrastructure and leaving large portions of the country without water or electricity. Separately, in calls with his American, British, and French counterparts, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu accused Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb,” a claim rejected by Western officials as a pretext for possible further Russian escalation. G7 leaders warned that any use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with “severe consequences.”

• Shaping the Order.  Facing significant battlefield setbacks, Russian president Vladimir Putin appears to have embarked on a new strategy aimed at demoralizing the Ukrainian civilian population by denying them water and power and instilling fear over the potential use of a radiological or nuclear device. Russia’s approach so far has failed to break the will of the Ukrainian people and appears unlikely to impact Ukraine’s steady advances on the ground.  But Putin may be hoping that Western support for Kyiv will weaken, as energy prices rise with winter approaching and political winds potentially shift.
• Hitting home.  Russia’s use of a nuclear or radiological device would mark a major escalation and could trigger a military response by the United States and its allies.
• What to do.  While continuing to provide military equipment to Ukraine, the US and NATO should offer assistance to help repair damaged power and water systems. At the same time, Washington and its allies should continue to stand up to Putin’s threats of escalation, nuclear and otherwise.

Biden’s New Strategy.  In his new National Security Strategy (NSS), President Joe Biden made clear that the primary goals of the United States over the coming years will be “outcompeting China and restraining Russia.”  To deal with these and other transnational challenges, the strategy sets forth a “dual track-approach” that involves deepening US cooperation with democracies and like-minded states, while seeking the broadest possible coalition to tackle any given issue. The administration also released its National Defense Strategy, outlining US defense priorities for dealing with Russia, China, and other major security threats. In response to the NSS, Beijing accused Washington of “Cold War thinking.” 

• Shaping the Order.  The new strategy embraces the notion that the world has entered an era of strategic competition between democracies and autocracies, rooted in alternative visions of the global order.  But it also calls for the US to work with all nations, including non-democracies, that support the rules-based order. In implementing the strategy, the US will need to grapple with how to seek cooperation and competition with rival powers at the same time and how to gain the support of nations in the global South, including many, such as India, that prefer to remain “non-aligned.” 
• Hitting home.  The strategy also prioritizes action on the home front, arguing that the source of American strength in this global competition will come from reaffirming the nation’s democratic traditions and making new investments in industry and innovation.
• What to do.  The Biden administration should ensure that the strategy is backed by the resources necessary to successfully implement it, especially defense and technology investments.

Quote of the month

“We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order… Autocrats are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad… We will partner with any nation that shares our basic belief that the rules-based order must remain the foundation for global peace and prosperity.” 

– President Joe Biden, foreword to the National Security Strategy, October 2022

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↑)

• Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, who governed on a populist agenda that critics suggested had undermined the country’s democratic norms, was narrowly defeated by former president Lula da Silva in a runoff election. Bolsonaro had made unsubstantiated claims of widespread election fraud during his campaign, but tacitly acknowledged defeat as his government began to facilitate an orderly transition of power.
• The UN Human Rights Council voted against a resolution sponsored by the US, France, Germany, and other democracies that would have allowed debate on China’s widespread human rights abuses against the Uyghurs in Xingang. Eighteen nations joined Beijing in voting down the resolution, while India, Brazil and Mexico were among those that abstained.
• Widescale anti-government protests continued in cities and universities across Iran, despite the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ultimatum warning against any further demonstrations, as security forces deployed tear gas and gunfire in an effort to violently suppress the uprisings.

On balance, with the electoral developments in Brazil, the democracy pillar was strengthened.

Security (↓)

• Russian forces initiated an intense aerial bombardment campaign targeting critical infrastructure across Ukraine, while concerns over Russia’s potential use of a nuclear or radiological weapon increased after Moscow bizarrely accused Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb” on its own territory. 
• In another sign of its military difficulties, Russia began recruiting former Afghan security forces, including those trained by the US military, to join what some have referred to as a Russian “foreign legion” to fight in Ukraine. 
• A potential Chinese military invasion of Taiwan appeared more likely in the coming years as CIA Director William Burns stated that Xi Jinping has instructed the Chinese military to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan before 2027. 
• North Korea test fired a ballistic missile over Japan potentially capable of reaching the US territory of Guam in the western Pacific – reportedly, the longest test ever conducted by Pyongyang.
• In a bid to counter Chinese regional influence, President Biden hosted a summit with the leaders of 14 Pacific Island nations and announced a partnership agreement that included stronger security and economic ties. 

On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade () 

• The US announced sweeping new restrictions on the sale of semiconductor technology to China, a move aimed at preventing China’s military, intelligence, and security services from acquiring sensitive technologies with military applications.
• After a drone attack on Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet, Moscow withdrew from, and later returned to, a UN-brokered deal to allow grain shipments through the Black Sea.
• Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined Russia in an OPEC decision to cut oil production by 2 million barrels a day – a move that could raise gas prices worldwide and bolter Russia’s ability to finance its war in Ukraine

On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

• Ahead of the opening of a global climate summit in Egypt, the UN issued a report assessing that under current pledges, there is “no credible pathway” to keep the rise in global temperatures below the key threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius.
• Russia was voted off the International Civil Aviation Organization’s governing council, a measure aimed at holding the Kremlin to account for violating Ukraine’s sovereign airspace and other core principles of global aviation.

Overall, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

• Meeting virtually with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, G7 leaders maintained their strong solidarity with Ukraine, warning that any use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with “severe consequences.”
• The defense ministers from the US, Japan, and Australia jointly condemned China’s recent ballistic missile launches across the Taiwan Strait and agreed to strengthen defense ties amid the ongoing threats from Beijing.  
• Hungary and Turkey remained the only two NATO members yet to ratify the applications of Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, as Ankara insisted it would not move forward without further extraditions of suspects it considers terrorists.

Overall, the alliance pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, speaking at Brookings, calls for a new economic “alliance of democracies” to counter authoritarianism and facilitate friend-shoring in the face of economic bullying from the world’s dictators.
• John Austin and Elaine Dezinkski, in Foreign Policy,  contend that the US and its allies need a shared global agenda, including a robust ally-shoring plan, to maintain a democratic rules-based order.
• Thomas Mahnken, in Foreign Affairs, argues that the US needs to restructure its defense planning to prepare for the possibility of being drawn into simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Fred Kempe, in the Atlantic Council’s Inflection Points, suggests that while there is a growing consensus among global leaders on the historic dangers facing the world, common action is falling far short of what is needed.
• Dan Fried and Brian O’Toole, in the New Atlanticist, present viable economic and political options for the United States and its allies to pursue if Russia uses a nuclear weapon against Ukraine.
• Matthew Kroenig, Amanda Rothschild, Paul Miller, Ash Jain, Jeffrey Cimmino, and other Atlantic Council experts assess and comment on the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy.

• Hung Tran, in an Atlantic Council Issue Brief, provides a comprehensive guide to friend-shoring in five critical sectors.
• The Atlantic Council, in cooperation with the US State Department, hosted the ninth meeting of the D-10 Strategy Forum, which brings together policy planning and strategy officials from ten leading democracies to bolster unity and cooperation. The meeting took place amid a range of pressing global challenges, including those posed by Russia and China.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Jeffrey Cimmino – Associate Director
Danielle Miller – Program Assistant
Otto Hastrup Svendsen – Georgetown Student Researcher

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing October 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Heavy fighting expected in Kherson, Prigozhin aims to boost Wagner operations

Tracking narratives

Russia again accuses Ukraine of plotting to use a “dirty bomb”

Facebook ads spread pro-Russian narratives

Polish Senate declares Russia a terrorist regime

Heavy fighting expected in Kherson, Prigozhin aims to boost Wagner operations

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated on October 21 that Russian forces are actively transferring ammunition, military equipment, and units from the Dnipro River’s west bank to the east bank. Russian forces are likely not fully withdrawing from the upper Kherson region but preparing to defend the city. Humanitarian facilities in Kherson have also reportedly ceased operations. 

Russia continues to use missiles and drones against critical infrastructure in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that on October 23 Russia conducted at least two missile strikes and twenty-five airstrikes. Ukrainian forces also said they shot down twelve Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. Civilian infrastructure in Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Novotavrycheske were among the targeted areas.  

Meanwhile, Russian bloggers reported that Yevgeny Prigozhin, the main financier of the Wagner Group, is sponsoring the formation of a volunteer battalion, with recruitment led by former Russian officer Igor Girkin. Girkin is a critic of the Russian military command and a prominent figure among the Russian nationalists who participated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Russian army is depending more heavily on Wagner fighters to gain territory in Bakhmut, which Russia has been trying to seize for months. Additionally, according to Russian sources, Wagner is recruiting crews for Pantsir-S1 and S-300 missile systems, Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), electronic warfare, Su-25 aircraft, and other equipment. While Wagner fighters utilize the infrastructure of the Russian military, the group’s equipment and operations are funded separately. It appears that Wagner’s command wants to strengthen the unit’s independence on the battlefield. 

There is also an increasing possibility of ethnic conflicts among soldiers as racial discrimination emerges among Russian military ranks. Footage released on October 24 showed a Russian officer beating a Muslim soldier allegedly for attempting to pray. Russian commentators have denied the authenticity of the clip. However, this is not an isolated case, as two Tajikistan nationals are suspected of being behind a deadly shooting at a training ground in Russia’s Belgorod region on October 15.  

In addition, General Oleksiy Gromov, a senior Ukrainian military official, said on October 27 that Belarus is preparing for an escalation. As evidence, he said that Russian officers are now checking the degree of combat readiness of Belarusian military units and that “secret transfers of personnel, equipment and military maneuvers continue in the country.” 

Gromov’s claims have not been independently verified.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia again accuses Ukraine of plotting to use a “dirty bomb”

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on October 27 that Ukraine is plotting to use a “dirty bomb,” reigniting a narrative that has spread through pro-Kremlin sources since the early days of the war. Russian state media outlets amplified the latest iteration of the claim.   

In remarks delivered to the Kremlin-associated Valdai Discussion Club, Putin acknowledged that Russian intelligence services intentionally published information about Ukraine’s “dirty bomb.” He said that Kyiv authorities “are doing everything to cover up the traces of the preparation.” Putin also stated that he “instructed [Russian Defense Minister] Shoigu to call all of his colleagues and inform them.” Shoigu indeed called his Western counterparts on October 23 to warn that Ukraine was planning to use a “dirty bomb.”  

Along with Putin, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Ukraine’s goal “is to blame Russia for using weapons of mass destruction,” while simultaneously planning to use WMDs against Russia.  

On October 26, the Kremlin-owned outlet RIA published an article, based on an anonymous source, that claimed Kyiv had “already completed the technical preparations for the dirty bomb provocation.” The article stated that Ukraine’s state-owned rocket manufacturer “prepared a mockup of a rocket, which is planned to be filled with radioactive material, then supposedly to shoot it down over the exclusion zone of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and announce the launch of a nuclear charge by the Russian armed forces.” 

On October 24, Igor Kirillov, chief of the radiation, chemical and biological defense forces of the Russian army, claimed that “Kyiv possesses the scientific base for creating a dirty bomb.” According to Kirillov’s comments, the “dirty bomb” can be prepared at the research base research base of the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology. He added that this institute participated in the nuclear program of the Soviet Union. 

Along with these statements from Russian officials, Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin media outlets have amplified the accusation. While some outlets explained the mechanics and usage of dirty bombs, others claimed that the United Nations Security Council has already stopped Ukraine from deploying a “dirty bomb.” 

The DFRLab has previously reported on Russia’s attempts to propagate the narrative that Ukraine plans to utilize “dirty bombs.”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Facebook ads spread pro-Russian narratives

This week, the DFRLab observed multiple Facebook ads spreading pro-Russian narratives that criticized Ukrainian anti-air defense systems, claimed that Ukraine is under external control, called for the removal of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and discredited the Ukrainian government. User comments responding the ads expressed anger towards their content, with some accounts saying they were reporting the ads. The narratives are another example of how ad platforms can be exploited in influence operations. The DFRLab has previously reported on how Facebook ads are used to spread disinformation.

The DFRLab identified at least four different pages that amplified disinformation through Facebook ads. The pages have abstract names and profile pictures. They published and advertised a single post in Russian featuring poorly made caricatures, usually stolen from Russian or Belarusian sources. The pages have only a few followers but are not newly created, with some dating prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24. 

As all of the ads and pages were removed at the time of publication. As all of the ads and pages had been removed at the time of writing, the DFRLab could not establish its precise reach, but one ad in the library received between 200,000 and 250,000 impressions. Other ads received between 800 and 1,000 engagements.

The Facebook ads and pages appear to be linked to a network based in Russia identified by the DFRLab and other outlets earlier this fall. According to a spokesperson for Facebook’s parent company, Meta: “We detected and removed these ads and the associated Pages. We’ve also blocked hundreds of domains as part of our ongoing work to prevent the networks we took down from reconstituting on our platform. As we said last month, this operation is persistent in trying to set up new domains spoofing news organizations and drive people across social media to these websites. The majority of this operation’s accounts, Pages and ads on our platforms were detected and removed by our automated systems. We keep updating our threat report, including the list of spoofed domains, to help inform open-source research by security researchers and our industry peers.”

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Polish Senate declares Russia a terrorist regime 

On October 26, the Polish Senate passed a resolution declaring Russia a terrorist regime. Eighty-five senators voted in favor of the resolution while fifteen others abstained. The resolution states that Russian armed forces “unleashed a brutal war with Ukraine” and that the purpose of the conflict is to “wipe out a sovereign country from the map and destroy the Ukrainian nation.” The Senate condemned Russian aggression and called “all countries in favor of peace, democracy and human rights to recognize the authorities of the Russian Federation as a terrorist regime.” The Senate also praised all institutions and organizations that undertake research and document war crimes committed against Ukraine.  

On October 27, Senate Marshal Tomasz Grodzki announced that a “strong” cyberattack on Senate servers was underway and added that he did not know if the attack was related with the adoption of the resolution on Russia or whether it was a coincidence.  

On October 18, the Parliament of Estonia also adopted a resolution declaring Russia a terrorist state, following Lithuania and Latvia, who have also designated Russia as a terrorist state. On October 13, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe  also passed a resolution declaring Russia a terrorist regime.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

The post Russian War Report: Heavy fighting expected in Kherson as Prigozhin aims to boost Wagner operations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Wagner sends vehicles to Kherson while Iran increases military support

Russian troops arrive in Belarus as joint force announced

Belarusian Telegram channels say a flurry of increased military personnel activity is raising concerns of a possible mobilization

War crimes and human rights abuses

Putin declares martial law in annexed parts of Ukraine

Russian deputy prime minister boasts of forced deportations from Kherson

Wagner sends vehicles to Kherson while Iran increases military support

The DFRLab is continuing to monitor reports of Wagner Group activity in Ukraine, where the Kremlin-aligned private military company is assisting Russian forces in fighting and fortifying positions in the Donbas. A video posted on October 13 shows Russian servicemen of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet in the Kherson region complaining that they have been fighting in the area since the beginning of the war without relief or troop rotation. After the video circulated, a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel announced on October 14 that Wagner fighters would transfer vehicles to the 126th Coastal Defense Battalion in support of their efforts to hold the frontline in Kherson.  

There are also signs of a possible rift between the Russian military and pro-war bloggers. On October 14, Russian military blogger Semyon Pegov announced the existence of “hit lists,” reportedly originating with the Russian Defense Ministry, that target bloggers and journalists for their coverage of the war in Ukraine. Pegov, who is part of the WarGonzo Telegram channel, accused “individual generals and military commanders” from the Russian defense ministry of developing a list of bloggers who the ministry intends to prosecute for “discrediting” Russia’s handling of the war in Ukraine. One day later, he retracted the claim. At the time of writing, Pegov’s original post had garnered more than 2.8 million views. His claim was amplified by several other prominent pro-war bloggers and generated a discussion about censorship. 

Further, new revelations this week indicate that Iran is playing an increasingly large role in aiding Russia’s war against Ukraine. Ukrainian and Russian Telegram channels reported that Russia has purchased an unknown number of Arash-2 drones, which are purportedly faster and more destructive than the Shahed-136 drones that are currently in use by Russian forces against critical infrastructure in Ukraine. Reports that the Russian army is receiving munitions from Tehran are in line with a report from the US Treasury Department stating that Russia is running out of microelectronics, essential to maintaining its military operations, due to the impact of sanctions. The US warned it will sanction “people, companies, or countries” that provide ammunition or support to Russia’s military. It also alleged the presence of Iranian trainers on the ground in Crimea, assisting Russia in drone operations, though this has not been independently verified. Iran, meanwhile, also promised to provide Russia with surface-to-surface missiles, in addition to more drones.  

On October 19, the US Department of Justice charged five Russians with sanctions evasion, oil smuggling, and organizing a money laundering scheme. One of the accused is Artyom Uss, the son of the governor of Krasnoyarsk. The other accused are Yury Orekhov, Svetlana Kuzurgasheva, Timofey Telegin, and Sergey Tulyakov. Orekhov was detained in Germany on October 17 and Uss in Italy, both at the request of the US, which will seek extradition. In addition to the Russians, the scheme allegedly involved two Venezuelans, Juan Fernando Serrano Ponce and Juan Carlos Soto, who reportedly helped broker the sale of oil, organizing illegal transactions with Venezuela’s state owned oil company PDVSA, in violation of sanctions. According to the US Department of Justice, Orekhov and Uss were co-owners of the German company Nord-Deutsche Industrieanlagenbau GmbH (NDA GmbH). 

In addition, a Russian citizen on his way to Svalbard was detained by Norwegian police after taking photographs at the Tromsø and Kirkenes airports. The arrest comes only days after another Russian, found with two drones in his possession, was detained at the Storskog border checkpoint. Norway also arrested the son of Vladimir Yakunin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, for illegally flying a drone at Svalbard.  

Lastly, a hack targeted Bulgaria in the early hours of October 15, which prosecutor general Ivan Geshev said came from Russia. The cyber attack comes after Russia accused Sofia of being involved in the Kerch bridge explosion. The hacker collective KillNet, which has carried out similar hacks against other European and NATO countries in the past few months, is believed to be behind the attack, which affected Bulgarian government websites.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian troops arrive in Belarus as joint force announced

On October 10, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka announced that Belarus had reached an agreement with Russia to deploy a joint Russian-Belarusian grouping of troops on Belarusian territory. He said the formation of this group began two days before the announcement and that more than 1,000 Russian troops would be deployed to Belarus. To justify the joint military group, Lukashenka alleged that Ukraine was preparing strikes against Belarus. One week before the announcement, Lukashenka claimed that Ukraine had moved 15,000 service members to the Belarusian border. According to the BBC’s Russian service, the number of the permanent Russian service members stationed in Belarus was around 1,000 people until recently. 

On October 15, the first group of Russian forces arrived in Belarus, reportedly accompanied by MiG-31 fighter interceptors. According to the independent Belarusian Hajun Project, Russian military groups arrived at the Palonka, Zaslonava and Losvida rail stations, none of which are close to the border with Ukraine. 

Valery Revenko, head of international military cooperation for the Belarusian defense ministry, said on Twitter, “The total number [of] arrived military personnel in Belarus will be up to 9,000 personnel, about 170 tanks, up to 200 armored combat vehicles and up to 100 guns and mortars with a caliber of more than 100 mm.” Belarusian journalist Tadeusz Giczan reported that the Russian trains arriving in Belarus weren’t carrying heavy equipment – “only trucks, petrol tankers and passenger cars with soldiers.” On October 16, Gazeta.ru published a video supporting this claim, showing the arrival of a Russian train in Belarus with only military trucks visible on the train. On September 29, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that Belarus was preparing facilities to accommodate 20,000 mobilized people from Russia. 

According to Meduza, the motives behind the Belarus-Russia joint group include distracting Ukraine’s army away from other fronts; allowing Russia to conduct more precise aerial attacks from Belarusian territory; preparing for any provocations from the West; and allowing Russia to open new fronts in the north or west of Ukraine. 

After the announcement, Poland recommended its citizens leave Belarus “with available commercial and private means” as soon as possible. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked G7 countries to send international observers to the Belarusian border to monitor the security situation. He also stated that Ukraine is not planning military actions against Belarus.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Belarusian Telegram channels say a flurry of increased military personnel activity is raising concerns of a possible mobilization

On October 15, Belsat, an independent Belarusian media outlet, reported that military-eligible men in Rogachev and Gomel Oblasts received letters asking them to report to military enlistment offices to verify their personal information. Some men reportedly received a call to attend “urgent gatherings” (срочные сборы); according to Pavel Latushka, a Belarus opposition activist in exile, President Lukashenka employs the phrase to avoid referring to a “mobilization.” The Telegram channels Realynaya Belarus and Basta! also published similar information about men receiving letters from military offices in Gomel Oblast. The Realynaya Belarus channel noted that “men who previously served in interior troops and air forces” received the notes. The Basta! channel cited an anonymous source who works in the agriculture industry in Gomel, who claimed that department heads were told to send men under the age of fifty to report their personal information. “These are almost all drivers and tractor operators,” the source said.  

The Motolyko Pomogi Telegram channel published similar observations. The post noted that all of the men who served in the 5th brigade of the Belarusian special operations forces in Marina Gorka, Minsk Oblast, had received letters to gather for “retraining.” On October 17, the Realynaya Belarus channel said seventeen special forces service members had mustered in Pinsk. 

Additionally, on October 15, Motolyko Pomogi reported that some Belarusian companies received orders to provide a list of eligible conscripts to authorities. The authorities reportedly asked one company in Brest Oblast to provide information about vehicles that the company could provide for “transportation of the mobilized.” The post also mentioned the creation of an “alert headquarters” at one unnamed Belarusian company in Brest. All mobilization notices would be sent to the headquarters, which would carry the duty of alerting conscripted employees. The involvement of state-owned companies and other types of organizations in military conscription is a legally mandated procedure in Belarus. 

Belarus holds an annual military record verification process. On October 19, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense claimed on its Telegram channel that latest actions were part of the annual military record verification and not part of a mobilization effort. The DFRLab could not verify reports of individuals being forced to join Belarusian military. While Belarusian authorities are seemingly acting within legal bounds, questions arise when considering that Belarus recently announced it will join Russians in the war against Ukraine.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Putin declares martial law in annexed parts of Ukraine

During a meeting of Russia’s Security Council on October 19, President Putin announced he had signed a decree implementing martial law in illegally annexed Ukrainian territory. Martial law would apply in four Ukrainian regions – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson – in the wake of sham referendums held last month that have not been recognized by Ukraine or the broader international community.  

According to pro-Kremlin outlet Kommersant, martial law “is introduced in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or a direct threat of aggression.” According to the outlet, martial law provides Russia with the authority to impose curfews; compulsory screening of citizens and detention for up to thirty days; seizure of property; military censorship of postal services and the media; control of phone conversations; expulsion of foreigners; suspension of the activities of political parties, foreign and international organizations “whose propaganda undermines the security of the country”; and restriction of entry, exit, and freedom of movement. Kommersant added that Russia will suspend its obligations under international treaties regarding the rights of citizens after the introduction of martial law.  

The last time Russia implemented martial law was during World War II, when the Soviet Union imposed it in 1941.  

In addition to martial law, Putin declared the Kremlin would apply security measures based on three different tiers – basic, medium, and increased. Russian regions close to the Ukraine border require a medium response level, while Moscow falls under the increased category. According to these response levels, Russia can gain control over different sectors like communications and automated systems and repurpose them for the military needs.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian deputy prime minister boasts of forced deportations from Kherson

Russia continues to conduct massive, forced deportations of Ukrainians. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin stated on October 14 that “several thousand” children from the Kherson region are “already in other regions of Russia, resting in rest homes and children’s camps.” As noted by Human Rights Watch, “deportation has been recognized as a crime against humanity in each of the major international criminal instruments.” 

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Wagner sends vehicles to Kherson while Iran increases military support appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month’s topline events

Putin Annexes Parts of Ukraine.  In a choreographed ceremony at the Kremlin, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed decrees claiming annexation of four Ukrainian provinces in the south and east of the country, even as Russian troops continued to lose ground in these areas. Despite apparent doubts about the war from the leaders of China and India, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 additional troops, committing to defend the claimed territories and hinting at the possible use of nuclear weapons, a prospect that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan warned would result in “catastrophic consequences” for Russia. The G7 issued a strong statement vowing never to recognize the annexations or the “sham” referendums that preceded them. 

• Shaping the order. Putin’s actions represent a doubling down on the war in Ukraine, indicating that he is prepared to risk escalating causalities and domestic political unrest in what appears to be an increasingly desperate effort to achieve his war aims.  But with Russia’s continuing military setbacks, the moves also suggest that Putin has been forced to narrow his immediate aims, at least for now, from “denazification” and regime change to defending territory that Russian troops have attempted to seize.  At the same time, Putin’s 37-minute diatribe against the “imperialist West” could mark a potential expansion of the conflict and a deepening of Cold War-like tensions with the United States and its allies.
• Hitting home.  Polls indicate continued bipartisan support for Ukraine among the American public, as Congress approved its third significant aid package that expands the delivery of advanced weapons systems to Kyiv.
• What to do.  The US should provide the weapons that Ukrainian forces need to reverse Russia’s territorial gains, while continuing to warn against the use of nuclear weapons. At the same, Washington and its allies should prepare for potential responses if discuss Moscow resorts to a nuclear strike in Ukraine or engages in disruptive, asymmetric attacks against the US or its NATO allies.

Axis of Autocracy.  Meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Uzbekistan, Putin and Chinese president Xi Jinping renewed their commitments to expand bilateral cooperation. While Putin publicly recognized China’s concerns about the war in Ukraine, Xi underscored Beijing’s “strong support on core interests” of Russia.  The SCO summit brought together the leaders of China, Russia, Iran, Belarus, and other anti-Western autocracies, but also India and Pakistan, and resulted in a joint statement of cooperation on counter-terrorism and other issues. Earlier, Chinese military forces participated in Russian-led exercises in the Sea of Japan, and North Korea offered to provide weapons to Russia to support the war in Ukraine.

• Shaping the Order.  Despite Beijing’s apparent uneasiness over Russia’s struggling miliary efforts in Ukraine, the meeting between Putin and Xi reinforced the strategic partnership announced by the two leaders in February and their joint determination to push back against the rules-based democratic order.  The SCO summit served to undercut efforts by the West to isolate Putin, though some of Russia’s Central Asian partners, including Kazakhstan, appeared reluctant in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
• Hitting home.  The efforts by China and Russia to undermine the US-led global order could lead to a world that is more dangerous for US citizens and less hospitable for American businesses.
• What to do. The US and its allies should increase penalties on states that provide material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, and seek new approaches to incentivize India and other democracies to join in Western sanctions and pressure Russia to end the war.

Iran’s Nationwide Protests.  In the country’s largest anti-regime protests since 2009, Iranians took to the streets following the death of a young woman who died in the custody of Iran’s “morality police” after failing to comply with strict veiling laws for women.  In response to the protests, which were led by students across more than 45 cities, many shouting “death to the dictator,” Iranian security forces killed scores of protestors. With the Iran nuclear talks stalled, President Biden stated that the United States stands with the “brave women of Iran,” and the US and the EU considered new sanctions against the regime.

• Shaping the Order. The potential downfall of Iran’s fundamentalist Islamic regime, which has ruled the country since 1979, would mark a significant turning point for the future of the democratic world order. But as the world enters its 16^th consecutive year of democratic recession, autocratic regimes have learned from each other, employing effective countermeasures to clamp down on pro-democracy movements, and the Iranian government may well be able to ride out the storm.
• Hitting home.  American values are better protected in a world where democratic norms and human rights are respected.
• What to do.  Working closely with allies, the Biden administration should seek to bolster support for Iranian opposition groups, including by ensuring that they have continued access to the internet, as part of a broader strategy to constrain authoritarian governments and assist non-violent civil resistance movements across the world. 

Quote of the month

“This is not only a war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine. This is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future. This is about autocracy against democracy.” 

– EU President Ursula Von der Leyen, EU State of the Union Address, September 14, 2022

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy ()

• After holding sham elections, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the purported annexation of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk, four Ukrainian regions that Russia has partially seized during its seven-month long invasion.
• Protests continued in several cities across Iran over the killing of a young woman while in police custody because she refused to wear a hijab, while human rights groups estimated scores of casualties as Iranian security forces sought to suppress the  demonstrations. 
• The European Commission moved to suspend certain funding to Hungary over allegations of widespread corruption, and the European Parliament declared that Hungary can no longer be considered a “full democracy” and was “in serious breach” of EU democratic norms
• Giorgia Meloni was set to become prime minister of Italy, after her Brothers of Italy party won the most seats in the country’s parliamentary elections. While the party has roots in the neo-fascist supporters of Benito Mussolini, Meloni has branded herself as a mainstream conservative who will stand up to Moscow and support NATO and the EU.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

• Following several successful Ukrainian counteroffensives, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 reserve troops to help Russia defend the newly annexed territories. 
• North Korea joined Iran in offering to provide Russia with military supplies for its war in Ukraine, including millions of artillery rockets and shells, while the Pentagon indicated it was providing an additional $1.1 billion in security aid for Ukraine, including 18 more HIMAR rocket systems.
• Moscow was suspected of causing the mysterious gas leaks in the Nord Stream One and Two pipelines, which NATO concluded was the result of deliberate sabotage.
• In their first meeting since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan and pledged their mutual cooperation, though Beijing has stopped short of providing military assistance for Russia’s war in Ukraine. 
• Despite Moscow’s war of aggression in Ukraine, China, India, and four other nations joined Russia for a series of military exercises in the coastal areas around the Sea of Japan and the western Pacific, including around 50,000 personnel. 
• For the fourth time as president, Joe Biden stated explicitly that American forces would defend Taiwan if China invaded the island, though the White House later indicated this did not represent a change in US policy. 
• In an bid to counter Chinese regional influence, President Biden hosted a summit with the leaders of 14 Pacific Island nations and announced a partnership agreement that included stronger security and economic ties. 
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade ()

• Seeking to limit the Kremlin’s ability to finance its war in Ukraine, the G-7 announced an agreement to cap the import price of Russian oil, and will seek to use insurance and shipping markets to force down the price of oil purchased by other importers, including China and India.
• Officials from the United States and 13 other member states of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework met in Los Angeles to launch formal negotiations on the four pillars of the initiative – trade, supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy — though India indicated it would not participate in the trade pillar. 
• On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

• 
  With broad bipartisan support, the US Senate ratified a global treaty that would sharply limit the emissions of hydrofluorocarbons — pollutants from air conditioners and other types of refrigeration that have played a significant role in accelerating climate change.   
• Concerned about the ruptures to the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, the United Nations Environment Programme estimated that the leaks likely represent the biggest single release of climate-damaging methane ever recorded.
• Overall, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

• The US and its G7 allies issued a joint statement vowing never to recognize Russia’s “sham referenda” in Ukraine. 
• In response to Russia’s annexation, Ukraine formally requested an “accelerated accession” to join NATO, though it appeared unlikely that NATO members would take up the request anytime soon. 
• While Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi appeared to criticize Russia for its war in Ukraine, telling Putin publicly this “is not an era of war,” India later abstained on a resolution at the UN Security Council condemning Russia’s proclaimed annexation of Ukrainian territories.
• Overall, the alliance pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Larry Diamond, in Foreign Affairs, contends that the world needs the United States to support democracy, and despite its problems at home, the United States needs a more muscular and imaginative approach to spreading it.
• Anne Applebaum, in The Atlantic, argues that the West needs to have a plan for the day after a Ukrainian victory and the potential downfall of Vladimir Putin.
• Dan Sullivan and Dan Twining, in Foreign Affairs, suggest that to engage in a generational struggle to defend the free world, the United States must build a bipartisan foreign policy consensus around the imperative of countering authoritarian aggression.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Matthew Kroenig, in an Atlantic Council Memo to the President, sets forth how the United States can deter Russia from employing nuclear weapons in Ukraine and should respond in the event that deterrence fails. 
• Dan Fried, in Just Security, argues that Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine cannot be dismissed, the US and its allies should not give in to Putin’s nuclear blackmail.
• Fred Kempe, in CNBC, suggests that Russia’s battlefield failures represent an opportunity for world leaders to accelerate efforts to ensure Putin’s defeat and Ukraine’s defense.
• Sayeh Isfahani, in the Atlantic Council’s IranSource, contends that the current protests in Iran are a watershed moment as a women’s revolution spanning class and ethnic divides could spur the toppling of the Islamic Republic.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Jeffrey Cimmino – Associate Director
Danielle Miller – Program Assistant
Otto Hastrup Svendsen – Georgetown Student Researcher

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing September 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With hundreds of thousands of Russians now being called up for military service, there are growing concerns that Moscow may send a significant portion of these newly mobilized forces to Belarus in order to launch a second assault on Kyiv. Russian troops marched on the Ukrainian capital from Belarus during the first month of the invasion in early 2022 but suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat. Nevertheless, the capture of Kyiv remains central to Putin’s goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood.

Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has played a supporting role in the attack on Ukraine ever since the weeks preceding the February 24 invasion. He allowed his country to serve as a gateway for invading Russian troops, and has also permitted Russia to launch air raids and missile strikes against Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory.

This role has not been entirely voluntary. For the past two years, Lukashenka has depended on the Kremlin for his political survival after Putin intervened in 2020 to save his neighbor when Belarus was rocked by anti-regime protests. In exchange for Moscow’s support, Lukashenka has agreed to abandon his earlier criticism of Russian aggression against Ukraine and has instead become something of a junior partner in Putin’s war.

Despite this limited room for maneuver, Lukashenka has so far managed to avoid direct involvement in the war and has resisted Kremlin pressure to send the Belarusian army into Ukraine. In public, he has played down his involvement in the conflict and has instead sought to portray himself as a potential peacemaker, telling the Associated Press during a May interview, “I want to stress one more time: I feel like this operation has dragged on.”

At the same time, Lukashenka remains one of Putin’s most frequent guests and appears obliged to regularly demonstrate his loyalty. On September 28 he visited Abkhazia, a region of Georgia controlled by the Kremlin and recognized by Russia as an independent state. This controversial visit was downplayed by the Belarusian state media but was widely interpreted as the price of Putin’s continued backing. The next test will be whether Lukashenka officially recognizes Russian attempts to annex Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.

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If Russia does decide to deploy large numbers of troops to Belarus with a view to opening up a new northern front in the invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka would find himself under enormous pressure to crush any domestic dissent. During the initial stages of the war when Russia used Belarus as a key staging post for the invasion, grassroots Belarusian opposition included cyber-attacks and a group known as the railway partisans who sabotaged the country’s train network to disrupt the transit of Russian troops and military equipment.

In May, Lukashenka responded to this sabotage campaign by introducing the death penalty for partisan attacks on railways. While repressive measures against political opponents are regarded as routine in today’s Belarus, the crackdown would likely intensify significantly if the country plays host to a new Russian invasion force in the coming months.

There are also fears that Lukashenka may order mobilization in Belarus itself if pressured to do so by Putin. According to recent data from Narodny opros, which surveys opposition supporters in Belarus, 40% are already concerned about the possibility of a mobilization, while 67% believe mobilized men would either flee the country or go into hiding rather than joining the military.

Any attempt to force Belarusians to join the invasion of Ukraine would be fraught with dangers for the Lukashenka regime. An August 2022 poll conducted by Chatham House found that just 3% of Belarusians supported their country’s participation in Russia’s war. Numerous experts have argued that currently serving Belarusian military personnel would either refuse orders to invade Ukraine or would switch sides and join the Ukrainians. Meanwhile, exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has recently called on military officers and other personnel of the Belarusian army to sabotage any offensive actions and report plans for mobilization to the independent media.

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Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

While Belarusians worry about their country being dragged into Putin’s faltering invasion, some Russians who are seeking to avoid a similar fate are making their way to Belarus. The most popular destinations for draft-dodging Russians appear to be Georgia, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, but anecdotal evidence indicates significant numbers of Russians are also using Belarus as a safe haven or transit point for destinations within the EU.

This has not gone unnoticed by the authorities. Details have emerged in recent days of an enhanced law enforcement presence on the streets of Minsk in order to detain Russian citizens fleeing mobilization. On September 27, five Russian men were reportedly removed from a train entering Belarus. This would seem to indicate that Lukashenka has agreed to aid Putin in rounding up draft-dodgers and returning them to Russia.

It is not yet clear whether Putin’s decision to proceed with mobilization will once again place Belarus at the heart of Russia’s Ukraine invasion. Any attempt to launch a new assault on Kyiv via Belarus would likely encounter domestic opposition and could create a range of new threats for Lukashenka’s fragile regime. Nevertheless, with Russia now clearly losing the war and Putin increasingly desperate to regain the initiative, Lukashenka may ultimately find himself with little choice but to support his patron.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 3, 2022

European unity is essential as Putin prepares to weaponize winter

By Kira Rudik

European unity will be vital in the coming months as Russia attempts to weaponize winter in order to convince EU leaders to abandon their support for Ukraine and end their opposition to Vladimir Putin’s ongoing invasion.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Sep 13, 2022

Ukrainian victory shatters Russia’s reputation as a military superpower

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The stunning success of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region has exposed the rotten reality behind Russia’s military superpower reputation and convinced many that a decisive Ukrainian victory is now possible.

Conflict Corruption

UkraineAlert Sep 21, 2022

Putin’s nuclear ultimatum is a desperate bid to freeze a losing war

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine is a sign of the Russian dictator’s mounting desperation as his invasion continues to unravel and his country’s geopolitical isolation deepens.

Central Asia Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Will Putin send mobilized Russians to Belarus for a new Kyiv offensive? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the early 1990s, the Kremlin has insisted that the West recognize the former Soviet Union as Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence. This demand predates Vladimir Putin’s rise to power by nearly a decade and is one of the central pillars of modern Russian foreign policy. In other words, Moscow never truly accepted the verdict of 1991 and has always sought to retain its imperial influence throughout the former USSR.

Beginning in the early 1990s, Russia used the vast army it inherited from the USSR to impose frozen conflicts and military bases on its weaker post-Soviet neighbors, while also forcing them to maintain deep economic ties and join Russian-led political and security structures. This Russian dominance is now finally being challenged. The reason is simple: Ukraine’s military victories have debunked Moscow’s claims to great power status and shattered the myth of Russian military might.

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Evidence of Russia’s declining influence can be seen throughout the post-Soviet world. On the frontlines in Ukraine, Putin’s invasion force is suffering from increasingly obvious manpower shortages that make a mockery of attempts to portray Russia as the world’s number two military power. Moscow has been forced to withdraw troops from deployments across the former USSR while also recruiting soldiers from among the Russian prison population.

Russian military withdrawals from Central Asia have led to renewed border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The changing dynamic in the region was also on display at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan, with the leaders of India and China both expressing concerns over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the President of Kyrgyzstan keeping Putin waiting prior to their bilateral meeting. Putin was once notorious for making world leaders wait, but the shoe is now on the other foot.

Russia’s withdrawal of nearly 1,000 troops from Armenia to bolster the faltering invasion of Ukraine was a signal to the countries of the South Caucasus that Kremlin influence in the region is in decline. Armenia has so far refused to see the writing on the wall and continues to place all its eggs in the Russian basket. Azerbaijan, which has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy and has not joined Russian-led initiatives, has used Moscow’s waning influence to launch a military operation against Armenia.

The European Union has tried but so far failed to broker a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would recognize the border separating the two nations and end three decades of intermittent conflict. Meanwhile, Armenians have protested in Yerevan over the possible signing of a peace treaty, but it is difficult to see how Armenia could hope to defeat its wealthier and militarily stronger neighbor without Russian support.

Russia’s retreat from the region also has major implications for nearby Georgia and the country’s dominant figure, pro-Kremlin oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Under Ivanishvili’s influence, Georgian democracy has stagnated. Notably, the country was not offered EU candidate status alongside Ukraine and Moldova in summer 2022.

Georgia has not officially backed Ukraine over the Russian invasion and has instead joined Armenia in helping Moscow evade sanctions. This stance is out of step with Georgian public opinion, with a clear majority of Georgians supporting Ukraine. Indeed, the largest international military unit fighting Russia in Ukraine is the Georgian Legion. Georgia is now believed to be contemplating whether to use the collapse in Russian power to intervene against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two Kremlin-controlled breakaway Georgian regions recognized by Moscow as independent states.

Moldova is also watching events in Ukraine closely and eyeing its own Kremlin-orchestrated frozen conflict. Russian troops have been stationed in the Transnistria region of Moldova since the early 1990s. Ukraine’s military successes are now sparking debate over whether the time has come to challenge the continued presence of this small and isolated Russian army outpost.

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Russia’s retreat is nowhere more immediate or obvious than in Ukraine. Putin’s brutal invasion was supposed to derail Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and force the country firmly back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, it has turned Ukrainian public opinion decisively against Russia while also uniting Ukrainians. Polls now consistently indicate similar attitudes throughout both western and eastern Ukraine toward Russia, national identity, language, and foreign policy. Rather than destroying the Ukrainian nation, Russian aggression has dramatically accelerated the country’s nation-building progress.

Throughout the former USSR, Russia’s only remaining loyal allies are Belarus and Armenia. The Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union no longer appear to be functioning in any meaningful sense.

Ukraine and Moldova are now firmly within the EU sphere of influence. Azerbaijan has cemented a strategic alliance with Turkey and is a rising economic and military power whose energy resources will become increasingly important to the EU as Europe seeks to end its dependency on Russia. Georgia’s unnatural pro-Russian stance is crumbling. Meanwhile, China has replaced Russia as the preeminent power in Central Asia. Russia’s humiliating military setbacks in Ukraine and economic isolation from the Western world have confirmed its status as China’s junior partner.

Thirty years on from the disintegration of the USSR, Russia is in the midst of another imperial collapse. Countries that spent the past three decades as part of Moscow’s informal empire are now turning away from Russia and taking control of their own destinies. Unsurprisingly, Europe, Turkey, and China are now all seen as more attractive partners.

Once again, it is Ukraine that is serving as the catalyst for Russia’s retreat. Putin’s invasion was meant to extinguish the Ukrainian state once and for all. Instead, Russian imperial influence is in danger of receding to levels not witnessed in hundreds of years.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide: Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 13, 2022

Ukrainian victory shatters Russia’s reputation as a military superpower

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The stunning success of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region has exposed the rotten reality behind Russia’s military superpower reputation and convinced many that a decisive Ukrainian victory is now possible.

Conflict Corruption

UkraineAlert Aug 23, 2022

A strong Ukraine is the best solution to Europe’s Russia problem

By Oleksii Reznikov

Ukraine’s courageous response to Putin’s invasion has inspired the world but some Western leaders remain in denial over the threat posed by a hostile Russia, writes Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Aug 10, 2022

Putin is running out of excuses as Ukraine expands the war to Crimea

By Peter Dickinson

Russian officials have denied that Ukraine was behind an audacious August 9 attack on an airbase in occupied Crimea but Moscow’s excuses are beginning to wear thin as Vladimir Putin’s invasion continues to unravel.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s Russian Empire is collapsing like its Soviet predecessor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The conference in the Lithuanian capital was timed to mark the second anniversary of nationwide protests which rocked Belarus in the wake of the country’s August 2020 presidential election. With strong backing from Moscow, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was eventually able in suppress the 2020 protest movement. However, he now finds himself heavily dependent on the Kremlin and has been forced to play a supporting role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine that few Belarusians welcome.

Lukashenka’s status as junior partner in Putin’s Ukraine war has helped to reinvigorate the Belarusian opposition while also forcing its leaders to rethink strategy. The 2020 protests succeeded in attracting mass participation but the movement proved no match for the unprecedented repressive measures unleashed by Lukashenka. Despite the violence of the regime response, opposition leaders remained committed to peaceful and lawful protests. 

Decisions taken recently in Vilnius highlight how Belarusian opposition leaders are now addressing the effectiveness of peaceful protests and exploring their options in light of the war in Ukraine. A key outcome of the conference was the formation of a transition cabinet including a number of more militant figures who had previously been relegated to the fringes of Belarus’s anti-Lukashenka movement.

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The new transition cabinet follows on from the creation of an anti-war movement to unite all Belarusians in support of Ukraine, which was announced by Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya during the first days of the Russian invasion. This initiative sought to unite Belarusians in Belarus itself with members of the diaspora and opposition figures in exile.

Others have already gone further in their opposition to Belarusian participation in Putin’s war. The most effective domestic opponents so far have been the railway partisans, a group of Belarusian activists who sabotaged the country’s rail network to prevent the transit of Russian troops and military equipment to Ukraine. Their activities proved hugely embarrassing for Lukashenka and led to legislative changes in late May that made attacks on rail infrastructure potentially subject to the death penalty.

Belarusian volunteers are also fighting for Ukraine in a number of units including the Belarusian Regiment of Kastus Kalinouski. Many of these volunteers believe a Ukrainian victory will open the way for a free Belarus. They also recognize that if Putin achieves his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood, this would condemn their own country to a new era of Russian domination.

The growth of both the railway partisan movement and Belarusian volunteer participation in Ukraine has helped spark a broader debate over the need to embrace a more direct approach to opposing the Lukashenka regime. Other more militant groups such as the Supraciu (“Resistance”) movement and the ByPol organization of former Belarusian police officers have also seen their profiles rise in recent months against the backdrop of the Ukraine war. A recent independent opinion poll by Narodny Opros found that Belarusians view ByPol and the Belarusian Regiment as being five times more relevant for the opposition movement than recognized opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya.

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The recent shift within the ranks of the Belarus opposition towards a more militant stance was evident in the composition of the transition cabinet created in Vilnius, which will feature input from ByPol, Supraciu, Cyberpartisans, and the Pahonia Regiment. The cabinet member responsible for defense and security is Valery Sahashchyk, a former Belarusian army officer who is best known for a video address calling on members of the Belarusian military to change sides.

There is an understanding among members of the Belarusian opposition that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed their country’s fragile independence in grave danger. Lukashenka has already allowed Putin to invade Ukraine via Belarus. He has also permitted the use of his country as a platform for air raids and missile strikes against Ukrainian targets. Opponents of the Lukashenka regime now fear that Moscow may seek to officially consolidate its current informal control over Belarus. 

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the six-month mark, it is clear that the war is having a profound impact on the political climate in neighboring Belarus. Members of the Belarusian opposition are rethinking their former commitment to exclusively non-violent protest and are now increasingly acknowledging the need to prepare for more active forms of resistance.

At present, this change in tone is most immediately evident in the activities of groups like the railway partisans and the volunteers who have travelled to Ukraine to fight against the Russian invasion. If the mood of militancy continues to spread to the wider opposition movement, it will likely be met with harsher domestic repression. Ultimately, the fate of the Lukashenka regime may hinge on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. 

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 16, 2022

Putin’s Ukraine genocide is rooted in Russian impunity for Soviet crimes

By Alexander Khara

Failure to hold anyone accountable for the crimes of the Soviet era has fostered a climate of impunity in modern Russia that has paved the way for the genocidal invasion of Ukraine, writes Alexander Khara.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jun 30, 2022

Goodwill gestures and de-Nazification: Decoding Putin’s Ukraine War lexicon

By Peter Dickinson

From “goodwill gestures” to “de-Nazification” and “reclaiming Russian lands,” the Atlantic Council’s Peter Dickinson decodes some of the key phrases from the lexicon of Putin’s Ukraine War into plain English.

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UkraineAlert Aug 12, 2022

Guide to wartime Kyiv: City on the frontlines of European history

By Andreas Umland

Visiting wartime Ukraine is certainly an extreme option but a trip to today’s Kyiv offers an opportunity to witness world history in the making while providing Ukrainians with meaningful moral and material support.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia’s Ukraine War is forcing the Belarus opposition to rethink strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian air and missile strikes from Belarusian territory and airspace hit a Ukrainian kindergarten and an apartment complex on June 25. The attacks killed a 37-year-old man and injured his wife and seven-year-old daughter. Additionally, according to Ukraine’s northern military command, at least 20 rockets launched from Belarus struck the village of Desna, 70 kilometers north of Kyiv in the Chernihiv region.

“Russian bombers ‘worked’ directly from the territory of Belarus,” Ukraine’s Defense Ministry wrote in a post on its Facebook page, adding that six aircraft had launched 12 missiles from Belarusian airspace. “The strikes were carried out in Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions.”

The wave of air and missile strikes against Ukraine from Belarusian territory this past weekend are the latest indication that, despite frequent protestations to the contrary, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s autocratic regime is a full and willing combatant in Vladimir Putin’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.

The strikes from Belarus came as Lukashenka and Putin met in Saint Petersburg. During their meeting, the Kremlin leader announced that Russia would soon transfer nuclear-capable Iskander-M missile systems to Belarus and also upgrade Minsk’s Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets to allow them to carry nuclear weapons. Moscow and Minsk say the moves are ostensibly to counter an alleged threat to Belarus from Poland and Lithuania.

The bellicose moves by Russia and Belarus came as G7 leaders were meeting Germany and as NATO was preparing to hold its summit in Madrid. They also reflected rising tensions between Russia and Lithuania as Vilnius moved to impose European Union sanctions against Moscow by blocking the shipment of some goods to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

Russia has already positioned its own Iskander missiles in Belarus. The Ukrainian General Staff announced on May 24 that Russia had deployed a division of nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles to the Brest region of Belarus near the Ukrainian border. The missiles have a range of 400-500 kilometers, which puts large parts of central and western Ukraine within striking distance. Ukraine’s General Staff announced that in addition to the Iskanders, Russia has also deployed Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft gun systems and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in Belarus.

Offering up Belarusian territory as a platform for Russia to kill Ukrainian civilians isn’t the only way Alyaksandr Lukashenka has become Vladimir Putin’s partner in war crimes. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on June 27 that Belarus is resupplying Russia’s war effort in Ukraine with ammunition. The most recent consignment involving up to 20 wagon loads of ammunition was recently sent to Russia’s Belgorod Oblast near the Ukrainian border.

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Speaking after the latest escalation in deadly airstrikes, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made it clear that Belarusians who aid and abet Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, from Lukashenka down to rank-and-file troops, would be held accountable.

“All pilots, dispatchers, mechanics, and other people who ensure the launch of missiles at Ukraine must understand: We will find you all. Each of you will be held responsible for these strikes. And if someone thinks they will evade responsibility by saying that they were just following orders, they are mistaken,” Zelenskyy said in a speech on June 26.

“When your missiles hit residential buildings, these are war crimes. Trial is what awaits you all. And there will be nowhere to hide for you, neither on the shores of the Caspian Sea, over which your missiles are launched, nor in Belarus. Nowhere.”

These latest attacks demonstrate not only that Lukashenka is a full and willing participant in Putin’s aggression against Ukraine and that his collusion with the Kremlin is escalating, but also that the two autocrats are conspiring to terrorize and kill innocent Ukrainian civilians. Both Putin and Lukashenka, as well as the relevant officials and soldiers in their respective chains of command, should be charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.

The United States and its allies should also designate Russia and Belarus as state sponsors of terrorism. Zelenskyy has long asked Western nations to apply this designation to Russia. And a bipartisan group of US lawmakers in both the House and Senate have called on the administration of US President Joe Biden to do so.

But why stop with Russia? Just as aiding and abetting a war criminal is a war crime, aiding and abetting a state sponsor of terrorism is terrorism. Lukashenka and his regime need to be held fully accountable for assisting Putin’s campaign of terror against Ukraine.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Further reading

BelarusAlert May 10, 2022

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

By Steven Pifer

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has warned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could go nuclear. If Vladmir Putin deploys nuclear weapons there is reason to believe that Belarus itself would soon be in the firing line.

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BelarusAlert May 11, 2022

Belarusian volunteers see Ukraine war as stepping stone to a free Belarus

By Alesia Rudnik

The hundreds of Belarusians who are currently fighting for Ukraine believe that defeating Vladimir Putin’s invasion is their best chance of liberating Belarus itself and bringing the Lukashenka dictatorship to an end.

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BelarusAlert Jun 21, 2022

Axis of autocrats versus democratic Europe

By Brian Whitmore

Vladimir Putin will pay a rare visit to his last remaining ally Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus next week as the two dictators face the reality of mounting international isolation over the criminal invasion of Ukraine.

Belarus Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s partner in war crimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lithuanian officials have recently sparked fury in the Kremlin by implementing EU sanctions on goods transiting through the Baltic nation to Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave. The move has dramatically heightened tensions between the two countries amid Lithuania’s strong support for Ukraine and recent debate in Moscow about the need to cancel recognition of Lithuanian independence.

For both geographical and geopolitical reasons, Belarus has a prominent role to play in the unfolding drama between Moscow and Vilnius. Belarus is sandwiched between Russia and Lithuania, making it the obvious location for Kremlin saber-rattling. Meanwhile, Lukashenka’s personal reliance on his political patron Vladimir Putin means that he has little option but to serve as sidekick to the Kremlin strongman in this latest geopolitical standoff.

Underlining the threat posed Russia’s unofficial annexation of Belarus, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda last week called for a more visible NATO presence in the Baltic region. Speaking to Politico on June 24, he described Belarus as an “additional province” of Russia and warned that Putin’s military could now do whatever it wants in the country. 

With fears rising over a new flashpoint in the Baltic, it is important not to underestimate the possibility of Belarus entering Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Belarus served as a platform for the northern front of the initial invasion in February 2022. Lukashenka has since allowed Russia to launch hundreds of airstrikes against Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory and the country’s airspace. The recent escalation in Moscow’s air war on June 25-26 saw dozens of missiles fired from Belarus.

Speculation continues that Belarus may soon join the ground war with troops entering Ukraine from the north. The Belarusian military began a new round of nationwide exercises on June 22 with a focus on the transition from peacetime to wartime. The drills inevitably sparked comparisons with the early 2022 joint exercises with Russia that served as cover for preparations ahead of Moscow’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine.

Independent observers have also noted heightened military activity in the Homiel region of southern Belarus close to the Ukrainian border. This has included the deployment of Russian missile systems. Ukrainian defense officials have recently claimed that work is underway on the construction of a Russian army base in the region amid an increased Belarusian military presence throughout the border area.

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Putin sparked concerns over a possible further escalation during his June 25 meeting with Lukashenka in Saint Petersburg. The Russian dictator promised to deliver nuclear-capable Iskander-M tactical missile systems to Belarus in the coming months.

The two authoritarian leaders are expected to meet again on June 30-July 1 at the Regional Forum of Belarus and Russia. The event will take place in Belarusian city Hrodna, just a few kilometers from the border with Lithuania. This will be Putin’s first trip outside Russia since he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and will underline Belarus’s status as Russia’s last remaining reliable ally.

While details are not yet available, there are expectations that a range of cooperation and integration agreements will be signed at the Forum related to aspects of the Union State agreement between Belarus and Russia. This bilateral pact has been in place since the late 1990s but has remained somewhat vague. However, with Russia now locked into a long-term confrontation with the Western world and Lukashenka no longer able to detach himself from the Kremlin, Putin may seek to place the merger of the two countries on a more official footing.

Many Belarusians will view their country’s involvement in the escalating confrontation between Russia and Lithuania with dread. There is already widespread disquiet and anger within Belarusian society over Lukashenka’s junior role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Numerous polls have indicated strong anti-war sentiment in Belarus, while opposition has also resulted in efforts to sabotage the Belarusian railway network in order to prevent the transit of Russian troops and military equipment.

The unpopularity of Russia’s Ukraine war among ordinary Belarusians is believed to have helped discourage Lukashenka from directly participating in the invasion. The Belarus dictator is anxious to avoid upsetting the country’s military and fears potential mutiny if he gives the order to invade. He is also acutely aware that the anti-regime mood that sparked nationwide protests in 2020 has been suppressed but not extinguished, despite the presence of over 1,200 political prisoners currently languishing in Belarusian prisons.

Lukashenka has good reason to avoid deeper involvement in further Russian acts of international aggression but he may ultimately have little choice. This poses grave security challenges for both Ukraine and Lithuania. It is also potentially disastrous for the Belarusian population, which continues to face the grim consequences of Lukashenka’s surrender of sovereignty to the Kremlin.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Further reading

BelarusAlert May 10, 2022

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

By Steven Pifer

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has warned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could go nuclear. If Vladmir Putin deploys nuclear weapons there is reason to believe that Belarus itself would soon be in the firing line.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert Jun 15, 2022

Renewed Belarus military buildup is a sign of Lukashenka’s desperation

By Brian Whitmore

Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka is saber-rattling on the Ukrainian border once again but it is unclear whether he is genuinely preparing to invade Ukraine or merely seeking to demonstrate his loyalty to Putin.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert May 11, 2022

Belarusian volunteers see Ukraine war as stepping stone to a free Belarus

By Alesia Rudnik

The hundreds of Belarusians who are currently fighting for Ukraine believe that defeating Vladimir Putin’s invasion is their best chance of liberating Belarus itself and bringing the Lukashenka dictatorship to an end.

Belarus Civil Society

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Belarus caught up in Putin’s plotting on Ukrainian and Lithuanian fronts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Russian media reported that Putin will visit the western Belarusian city of Hrodna on June 30 to attend the Union State Regions Forum with Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Both the symbolism and timing of the trip are significant and revealing.

First the symbolism. Putin’s trip to Belarus will be his first in three years. In contrast, Lukashenka has made numerous trips to Russia, visiting Sochi, St. Petersburg, Moscow, and even a cosmodrome in the Russian Far East, in order to show his fealty to the Kremlin leader. This asymmetry reflects the true balance of power within the Putin-Lukashenka axis of autocrats.

The fact that Putin will now travel to a provincial Belarusian city to meet Lukashenka does not necessarily suggest a change in power dynamics between the two dictators. But it does indicate that with his troops bogged down in Ukraine’s Donbas region, his international isolation increasing, and his conflict with the West intensifying, Putin needs Lukashenka more than he would probably care to admit.

In terms of symbolism and timing, Putin’s visit will also come as the European Union is moving quickly to grant EU candidacy status to Ukraine and Moldova. The EU is scheduled to vote on candidacy status for the two countries at the 27-nation bloc’s summit on June 23-24, in what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called a “historic week” for his country.

The juxtaposition of Ukraine and Moldova triumphantly achieving their long-coveted goal of EU candidacy with the image of two aging, ailing and isolated dictators meeting at a meaningless conference in Belarus provides an apt split-screen moment that illustrates the growing gap between democratic Europe and the continent’s autocratic outliers in Moscow and Minsk.

It also illustrates Lukashenka’s utter lack of legitimacy as his country’s ruler. As Lukashenka grovels before his only patron, himself an international pariah, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is justifiably being treated in Western capitals like an honored head of state. She addressed the Kalinowski Conference at the European Parliament in Brussels on June 21, a meeting also attended by prominent members of the Belarusian opposition. The group was established by European lawmakers as a forum to advance the cause of a democratic Belarus.

As I have previously written in this space, the United States and its allies should get ahead of the curve and recognize Tsikhanouskaya’s government in exile as the legitimate government of Belarus.

Eurasia Center events

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Putin’s trip to Belarus will coincide with the NATO Summit in Madrid, which Zelensky will address via video link. The summit, the alliance’s first since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, will be historic for several reasons, not least of which are the membership applications of Sweden and Finland. It will also come at a time when Moscow is threatening NATO member Lithuania over Vilnius’s enforcement of EU sanctions by blocking the transit of some goods to Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad.

This is yet another juxtaposition and split-screen moment that does not favor the Putin-Lukashenka axis of autocrats. We can likely expect the 30-member Western alliance to demonstrate unity and resolve in Madrid. The alliance will almost certainly stand behind Lithuania which, after all, is only enforcing sanctions that have already been enacted by the EU. And despite Turkey’s concerns, we can also ultimately expect unity over Finland and Sweden’s membership applications.

Whatever photo ops, announcements, or declarations come out of the Putin-Lukashenka meeting in Hrodna, they will appear weak compared to the Western unity and resolve that is likely to be on display in Madrid.

The contours of the new Europe are coming into focus. The EU is set to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidacy. The European Parliament is demonstrating its strong support for democratic change in Belarus. Tsikhanouskaya is being treated like the legitimate head of state she may soon become. And NATO is poised for an historic enlargement in response to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Meanwhile, two washed-up dictators are planning to meet at a meaningless conference in Hrodna.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Further reading

BelarusAlert May 10, 2022

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

By Steven Pifer

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has warned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could go nuclear. If Vladmir Putin deploys nuclear weapons there is reason to believe that Belarus itself would soon be in the firing line.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert May 11, 2022

Belarusian volunteers see Ukraine war as stepping stone to a free Belarus

By Alesia Rudnik

The hundreds of Belarusians who are currently fighting for Ukraine believe that defeating Vladimir Putin’s invasion is their best chance of liberating Belarus itself and bringing the Lukashenka dictatorship to an end.

Belarus Civil Society

BelarusAlert Mar 16, 2022

Ukrainian military successes force Belarus to rethink role in Putin’s war

By Brian Whitmore

The fierce Ukrainian resistance to Russia’s invasion is getting inside the heads of Belarusian military leaders and causing them to question the wisdom of joining Vladimir Putin’s war.

Belarus Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Axis of autocrats versus democratic Europe appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The move highlighted continuing concerns in Kyiv over the threat posed by Putin’s closest ally, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. In his latest hint at a possible forthcoming military intervention, Lukashenka warned on June 17 that he may be forced to “defend” western Ukraine from Poland.

Menacing rhetoric of this nature is nothing new. Nor can it be written off as mere saber-rattling. When Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, the main thrust of the attack came from Belarus toward Kyiv. Throughout the first month of the war, Belarus continued to serve as a launch pad for Russia’s ultimately failed attempt to seize the Ukrainian capital.

Members of the Belarusian opposition have long argued that the underwhelming international reaction to Lukashenka’s ruthless crackdown on the country’s 2020 pro-democracy protest movement was a dangerous mistake that has left Europe significantly less secure. They claim this inadequate response set the stage for Belarus’s current supporting role in Putin’s Ukraine War.  

At the time, the Ukrainian authorities condemned Lukashenka’s brutal response to the protests and welcomed fleeing Belarusians. However, Kyiv also maintained economic ties with the regime and adopted a cautious approach towards exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

There are indications that this strained relationship with the Belarusian opposition persists. In a recent interview with the independent Belarusian media, Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak claimed Ukraine did not understand Tsikhanouskaya’s position on Russia. He accused the Belarusian opposition leader of making “rather strange statements that, to put it mildly, were no different from the statements coming out of official Minsk and in some aspects were even more pro-Russian.”

Podolyak’s comments reflect lingering disquiet in Kyiv over Tsikhanouskaya’s initial attempts in 2020 to avoid criticism of the Kremlin in a bid to deter Putin from backing Lukashenka. His claims angered many Belarusians who accused Podolyak of ignoring the opposition leader’s more recent pro-Ukrainian statements. Since the invasion began in February, Tsikhanouskaya has spoken out frequently in support of Ukraine while attacking Russian aggression and condemning Lukashenka’s support for the war. 

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Tsikhanouskaya is one of many Belarusians who have demonstrated their opposition to the invasion of Ukraine. Despite the threat of severe penalties, hundreds of Belarusians used the occasion of a February 27 national referendum to protest the war in Ukraine. Throughout Europe, the Belarusian diaspora has mobilized to support Ukrainian refugees.

Meanwhile, hundreds of Belarusians have travelled to Ukraine to join the fight against Russian aggression, with Tsikhanouskaya recently estimating the overall number of volunteers at 1,500. The presence of so many Belarusians within the ranks of the Ukrainian military has drawn praise from Kyiv. For example, presidential advisor Oleksiy Arestovych called the Belarusian battalion one of the most effective units in the Ukrainian army and praised them as “examples of personal courage, bravery and military conduct.”

On the domestic front, significant numbers of Belarusians have joined an underground anti-war movement that has targeted the country’s rail network and is credited with significantly disrupting Russian military logistics moving through Belarus. This sabotage campaign proved so embarrassing for Lukashenka that he introduced changes to the country’s capital punishment legislation in May allowing the death penalty for railway partisans.

Ukraine’s mixed messaging on Belarus has created the impression that there is still some reluctance in Kyiv to cut all ties with Lukashenka despite his deep involvement in Putin’s invasion. However, attitudes may now be hardening. As the international community seeks solutions to the mounting global food crisis sparked by the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, Zelenskyy recently ruled out the possibility of sending Ukrainian grain to Baltic ports via Belarus. “We understand why we were offered this but we are not ready to help our “friendly” neighbors,” he noted sarcastically.

This was an encouraging step that suggests a more uncompromising stance toward Belarus. The international community must now maintain this pressure on the Belarusian authorities while supporting the country’s democratic opposition and imposing further costs on Lukashenka for aiding Putin’s war effort and engaging in domestic human rights abuses.

Lukashenka’s participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine has underlined the security threat posed by the authoritarian regime in Minsk. Without a fundamental political transition in Belarus, the country will continue to provide support for Putin’s policies of imperial aggression and will remain a source of regional instability.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Further reading

BelarusAlert May 10, 2022

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

By Steven Pifer

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has warned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could go nuclear. If Vladmir Putin deploys nuclear weapons there is reason to believe that Belarus itself would soon be in the firing line.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert Mar 16, 2022

Ukrainian military successes force Belarus to rethink role in Putin’s war

By Brian Whitmore

The fierce Ukrainian resistance to Russia’s invasion is getting inside the heads of Belarusian military leaders and causing them to question the wisdom of joining Vladimir Putin’s war.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert May 11, 2022

Belarusian volunteers see Ukraine war as stepping stone to a free Belarus

By Alesia Rudnik

The hundreds of Belarusians who are currently fighting for Ukraine believe that defeating Vladimir Putin’s invasion is their best chance of liberating Belarus itself and bringing the Lukashenka dictatorship to an end.

Belarus Civil Society

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post A democratic Belarus is vital for Ukrainian and European security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka said on June 10 that Belarus may be forced to enter the war to fight for the west of Ukraine so that it is “not chopped off”  by NATO. The Belarusian dictator’s remarks came as Minsk was reinforcing its electronic warfare capabilities along the Ukrainian border, according to a Facebook post by the Ukrainian General Staff. “Combat engineering tasks are being performed to reinforce checkpoints and deploy additional electronic warfare equipment in the areas near the border between Belarus and Ukraine,” the General Staff wrote.

Additionally, Belarus has been conducting military exercises in the area and Lukashenka has announced the creation of an operational command for troops on the border with Ukraine. Russia has recently deployed nuclear-capable Iskander missiles, Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft gun systems, and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems near the frontier. Alongside these developments, Lukashenka has announced  the purchase of S-400s and Iskanders from Russia. The Belarusian autocrat has also ordered the creation of a “people’s militia.”

According to a confidential unpublished report by the Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, Lukashenka met in early June with Ihar Shunevich, the former Interior Minister who now heads the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen, and ordered him to provide five thousand men for the militia. The report also noted that Russian Private Military Companies like the Wagner Group have been actively recruiting Belarusians recently.

There is much speculation over whether this heightened military activity in Belarus indicates that Russia is preparing to launch a new offensive into northern Ukraine. The Atlantic Council’s Peter Dickinson wrote recently in this space that “skeptics see the moves as an elaborate Kremlin-choreographed Belarusian bluff with the objective of forcing Ukraine to strengthen its northern defenses while preventing the redeployment of Ukrainian troops to the current focal point of the war in the country’s eastern Donbas region.”

Likewise, Scott Rauland, the former chief of mission at the US Embassy in Minsk, told The Daily Beast that Lukashenka appears to be staging an elaborate show of loyalty to Putin. “The only explanation for him taking whatever action has been taken or that is being contemplated is that he is under duress from Putin to demonstrate loyalty and that he is probably expecting additional financial support from the Kremlin,” Rauland said.

Nevertheless, the authorities in Kyiv appear to be taking the threat seriously. Mykhailo Podoliak, an advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said in an interview with the Belarusian newspaper Zerkalo that Kyiv is preparing “for different scenarios” and that Ukrainian intelligence is “monitoring all movements, initiatives, training, and distribution of weapons to hunters.” Podoliak added that “if Belarus wants to see what mass deaths of military personnel look like, then perhaps it should enter Ukraine.”

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Regardless of whether Belarus is preparing to enter the war, is engaged in an elaborate bluff, or if Lukashenka is simply performing an over-the-top ritual to demonstrate his loyalty to Putin, the recent military activity highlights the impossible position the Belarusian dictator now finds himself in.

If Russia’s war in Ukraine is successful and Putin is strengthened as a result, Belarus’s sovereignty and independence will likely be in grave danger and Lukashenka will become dispensable. Alternatively, if Russia loses the war in Ukraine and Putin is weakened, Lukashenka will lose his only patron and protector making him vulnerable to the wrath of his own people. Either way, Lukashenka is poised to lose out and he likely understands this.

In an interview with Newsweek, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said the same guerilla tactics Belarusian dissidents used to disrupt Russia’s war against Ukraine, which included hacking and sabotaging rail lines, can also be used in what she called “the last fight” against Lukashenka. The dictator “understands that more and more people are against him because he is selling our independence. I’m sure that when we feel this moment, at the weakest point of the regime, people will rise up again,” she said.

In this sense, the battle for Ukraine is also a battle for the future of Belarus. The United States and its allies should get ahead of the curve and recognize Tsikhanouskaya’s government in exile as the legitimate government of Belarus.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Further reading

BelarusAlert May 10, 2022

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

By Steven Pifer

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has warned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could go nuclear. If Vladmir Putin deploys nuclear weapons there is reason to believe that Belarus itself would soon be in the firing line.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert May 11, 2022

Belarusian volunteers see Ukraine war as stepping stone to a free Belarus

By Alesia Rudnik

The hundreds of Belarusians who are currently fighting for Ukraine believe that defeating Vladimir Putin’s invasion is their best chance of liberating Belarus itself and bringing the Lukashenka dictatorship to an end.

Belarus Civil Society

BelarusAlert Jun 13, 2022

Belarus dictator targets trade unions amid fears over anti-war mood

By Hanna Liubakova

Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has initiated steps to shut down the country’s independent trade unions amid growing disquiet on the domestic front over the Belarusian role in Putin’s Ukraine War.

Belarus Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Renewed Belarus military buildup is a sign of Lukashenka’s desperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belarusian Attorney General Andrei Shved sent a petition to the country’s Supreme Court on June 10 demanding the closure of several independent trade unions and the criminalization of their activities. The list includes the Free Trade Union of Belarus, the Free Trade Union of Metalworkers, the Belarusian Independent Trade Union of Miners and Chemists, the Belarusian Trade Union of Radio-Electronics, and the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions.

According to the petition, union members have been engaged in “destructive activities,” have participated in “unauthorized mass events,” and are guilty of distributing “extremist materials.” The application was sent to the Supreme Court “in order to prevent further violation of the law.”

The move is seen by many as an indication of regime concerns over possible industrial action after union leaders spoke out against the war in Ukraine and called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus.

Lukashenka has allowed his country to serve as a staging post for the invasion of Ukraine and has also permitted Russia to use Belarus as a platform for hundreds of airstrikes against Ukrainian targets. This has not proved popular. Many Belarusians oppose their country’s supporting role in Putin’s war, with opposition extending to sabotage attacks on the Belarusian rail network to prevent the transit of Russian military personnel and equipment. Lukashenka recently expanded the country’s capital punishment legislation to include those engaged in such acts.

Belarus’s trade unions have been under mounting pressure from the regime ever since the outbreak of a nationwide pro-democracy protest movement in the wake of the country’s deeply flawed August 2020 presidential election. Many employees of state-controlled institutions ranging from TV stations to fertilizer producers responded to the rigged vote by organizing strikes and walkouts while demanding Lukashenka step down.   

The regime responded with a comprehensive crackdown. Strike leaders were targeted and threatened with dismissal, while some members of strike committees were reportedly abducted and pressured by the KGB. At least 13 prominent figures from within the strike movement have faced accusations of state treason. Many others fled the country.

While the authorities succeeded in suppressing the strike committees that sprung up in late summer 2020, Belarus’s independent trade unions enjoyed a modicum of protection due to their official status and were able to continue operating despite threats, arrests, and instances of intimidation. However, they now appear to be among the targets as Lukashenka seeks to stamp out any potential renewal in protest activity fueled by anti-war sentiment.

Eurasia Center events

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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On April 18, Lukashenka held an emergency meeting with Belarusian police and other law enforcement agencies to complain about an alleged lack of loyalty and stability. The response was immediate. The following day, police raided the offices of three independent trade unions.

The targets of these raids included the Belarusian Congress of Trade Unions, which is part of the International Trade Union Confederation and brings together the country’s independent trade unions. It has a membership of about 10,000 people. More than 20 union leaders were detained and accused of “organizing actions that grossly violate public order.” If convicted, they could face up to four years in prison.

In a further apparent attempt to criminalize the activities of independent trade unions, the Belarusian KGB labelled one union an extremist organization despite the fact that it is officially registered with the relevant state authorities. In recent months, hundreds of union members claim to have been subjected to harassment and intimidation while being pressured to leave their unions. Activists have been interrogated and union offices have allegedly been bugged.

These actions have not gone unnoticed internationally. During the recent annual conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Lukashenka regime was heavily criticized for the use of extreme violence to suppress peaceful protests and was accused of violating the labor rights of Belarusians.

There are now calls for greater international pressure on the regime as opposition figures warn that Lukashenka is seeking to suppress Belarus’s independent trade unions and shut down one more avenue of expression for ordinary Belarusians. The crackdown that began in 2020 appears to have gained new impetus following the onset of Putin’s Ukraine War. Further restrictions are now anticipated.  

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Further reading

BelarusAlert May 10, 2022

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

By Steven Pifer

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has warned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could go nuclear. If Vladmir Putin deploys nuclear weapons there is reason to believe that Belarus itself would soon be in the firing line.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert Mar 16, 2022

Ukrainian military successes force Belarus to rethink role in Putin’s war

By Brian Whitmore

The fierce Ukrainian resistance to Russia’s invasion is getting inside the heads of Belarusian military leaders and causing them to question the wisdom of joining Vladimir Putin’s war.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert May 11, 2022

Belarusian volunteers see Ukraine war as stepping stone to a free Belarus

By Alesia Rudnik

The hundreds of Belarusians who are currently fighting for Ukraine believe that defeating Vladimir Putin’s invasion is their best chance of liberating Belarus itself and bringing the Lukashenka dictatorship to an end.

Belarus Civil Society

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Belarus dictator targets trade unions amid fears over anti-war mood appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Not everyone is convinced that the threat from Belarus is genuine. Skeptics see the moves as an elaborate Kremlin-choreographed Belarusian bluff with the objective of forcing Ukraine to strengthen its northern defenses while preventing the redeployment of Ukrainian troops to the current focal point of the war in the country’s eastern Donbas region. Nevertheless, there is no denying the uptick in activity.

In recent weeks, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has announced the creation of a Southern Operational Command for the Belarusian army, which will be based close to the Ukrainian border. Ukrainian officials have noted intensifying reconnaissance and the deployment of additional units to border districts. Lukashenka has also recently permitted Russia to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles and other missile systems to southern Belarus. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s General Staff reported in early June that preparations are currently underway to increase the overall size of the Belarusian army from 45,000 to 80,000 troops.

Some believe this Belarusian saber-rattling is an indication that Moscow may be considering a new assault on Kyiv. In a June 3 interview with Current Time, Ukrainian MP and Special Forces commander Roman Kostenko said a second Russian attack on the Ukrainian capital was now being viewed as increasingly likely. “We regard this threat as high. Either the Russians will be able to enter there if they gather forces and announce a mobilization, or they talk the Belarusians into taking part.”

Kyiv was the initial priority target when Russia first invaded Ukraine on February 24, with a number of elite Russian military units ordered to seize the city and decapitate the Ukrainian government. However, Putin’s invasion force encountered unexpectedly fierce Ukrainian opposition and soon became bogged down in the towns and villages to the north of Kyiv. Following a month of minimal progress and heavy losses, the Russian military was forced to retreat entirely from northern Ukraine.

Belarus played a vital role in this failed offensive. The country served as a staging ground for the majority of Russian troops entering Ukraine from the north. It then acted as an ongoing logistical hub as the invasion unfolded and ultimately unraveled.

With battlefield casualties mounting throughout March, Belarusian hospitals and morgues were soon full of Russian dead and wounded. Many of the Ukrainian soldiers and civilians taken prisoner by Russian forces on the northern front of the invasion reported being brought across the border and held in Belarus. Throughout the conflict, Lukashenka has also allowed Russia to use Belarus as a launch pad for hundreds of airstrikes against Ukrainian targets.

Eurasia Center events

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Despite his obvious involvement in the Russian invasion, Lukashenka has continued to protest his innocence while claiming non-combatant status. These denials are in part motivated by a desire to avoid further international sanctions, but the Belarusian dictator is also acutely aware that Putin’s war is deeply unpopular among the Belarusian public.

Polls have consistently indicated that most Belarusians oppose the war and are particularly adamant in their opposition to the participation of the Belarusian military. Some Belarusians have even engaged in active sabotage of the Russian war effort including attempts to disrupt the passage of Russian troops and military equipment via the Belarusian rail network. Others have travelled to Ukraine and joined volunteer battalions fighting against Putin’s invasion.   

Public disquiet over the war and awareness of the catastrophic casualties suffered by Russian forces in northern Ukraine have helped raise serious doubts over the readiness of the Belarusian military to join the invasion. There have been numerous unconfirmed reports of senior Belarusian commanders resigning in protest over plans to participate in Putin’s war, while exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stated in a June 3 interview that Belarusian military chiefs had directly refused orders to invade.  

This places Lukashenka in a very difficult predicament. He knows that direct participation in the invasion of Ukraine would be deeply unpopular among Belarusians and must also fear that many soldiers would likely desert as soon as they crossed the Ukrainian border. At the same time, his hardline crackdown on the Belarusian pro-democracy movement since 2020 has made him and international pariah and left him almost entirely reliant on the Kremlin for his political survival. Lukashenka must therefore find a way to please his patron Vladimir Putin while resisting Russian pressure to join the war.  

Defeat in the Battle for Kyiv was a humiliating blow for Putin that he is no doubt eager to avenge. However, his only ally Alyaksandr Lukashenka is in all likelihood neither willing nor able to participate in any fresh attempt to seize the Ukrainian capital. While it would be reckless to completely write off the chances of a new Kyiv offensive, it is more probable that the recent bluster in Belarus is Lukashenka’s way of demonstrating his usefulness to his Kremlin sponsors while tying down Ukrainian forces which might otherwise be used to oppose advancing Russian troops in the east.   

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s BelarusAlert Service.

Further reading

BelarusAlert May 10, 2022

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

By Steven Pifer

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has warned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could go nuclear. If Vladmir Putin deploys nuclear weapons there is reason to believe that Belarus itself would soon be in the firing line.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert May 11, 2022

Belarusian volunteers see Ukraine war as stepping stone to a free Belarus

By Alesia Rudnik

The hundreds of Belarusians who are currently fighting for Ukraine believe that defeating Vladimir Putin’s invasion is their best chance of liberating Belarus itself and bringing the Lukashenka dictatorship to an end.

Belarus Civil Society

BelarusAlert Jun 7, 2022

Lukashenka plays chief enabler as Putin threatens to expand Ukraine war

By Brian Whitmore

Alyaksandr Lukashenka has publicly sought to distance himself from the Russian invasion of Ukraine but the Belarusian dictator is now once again becoming deeply involved as Vladimir Putin threatens to escalate the war.

Belarus Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Belarus bluff? Putin’s only ally sparks fears of possible new Kyiv offensive appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin said in an interview with Rossiya-1 state television on June 5 that Moscow would “strike at those targets that we have not yet been hitting” in Ukraine if the West follows through on its pledge to provide Kyiv with long-range weapons. As the autocrat in the Kremlin was delivering that menacing message, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was busy playing his tried-and-true role as Putin’s little helper and chief enabler.

Less than two weeks before Putin’s threat, on May 24, the Ukrainian General Staff announced that Russia had deployed a division of nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles in the Brest region of Belarus near the Ukrainian border. The missiles have a range of 400-500 kilometers, which puts large parts of central and western Ukraine within striking distance. And the day after Putin’s remarks, on June 6, Ukraine’s General Staff announced that in addition to the Iskanders, Russia had also deployed Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft gun systems and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems.

Putin’s threat, coupled with the recent deployments of military hardware to the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and the first airstrikes in weeks against Kyiv, have raised alarms that Russia may be about to renew its assault on the Ukrainian capital and revive its earlier more expansive war ambitions. These steps have also starkly illustrated the absurdity of Lukashenka’s frequent protestations that he is not a co-aggressor in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

As the Minsk-based political analyst Artyom Shraibman wrote recently, “on every possible occasion, Lukashenka reiterates that he has always been against the war and wants it to end as soon as possible.” Yet at the same time, “Russian troops, jets and missile systems have not been fully withdrawn from Belarus.”

Not only have they not been withdrawn, they are being augmented.

It is also worth noting that as Putin was threatening to expand the war in Ukraine and deploying nuclear-capable missiles and anti-aircraft systems to Belarus to make good on that threat, he was also seeking to leverage the escalating grain crisis he created by blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports in order to get Belarus relief from Western sanctions.

In remarks to Russian media on June 3, Putin said “the easiest and cheapest way” to export Ukrainian grain to the world is through Belarus. “From Belarus it can go directly into the ports of the Baltic states, to the Baltic Sea, and anywhere else in the world,” Putin noted. “But in order for this to happen, the sanctions against Belarus must be lifted. It’s not our call, but that’s how President Lukashenka would put it.”

This could easily be dismissed as trolling. But it also illustrates the degree to which Lukashenka’s Belarus has effectively become an appendage of Putin’s Russia.

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Lukashenka’s fate is now inexorably tied to Putin’s and to the outcome of his war against Ukraine. This is something the Belarusian opposition is very aware of as it plots its course in the event of a Russian defeat. If the war leaves Putin diminished, it will also leave Lukashenka vulnerable.

“If the Putin regime is somehow weakened to the point where it cannot subsidize its remaining allies and project military power in its immediate neighborhood, Belarus may well repeat the process seen in the region in the late 1980s,” Shraibman wrote. “Just as Central European communist regimes fell apart when the Soviet Union showed itself unable to prop them up, Belarus will be forced to reform and Westernize if Putin’s Russia becomes weak enough. Provided, of course, that Minsk has managed to keep its statehood intact up until that moment arrives.”

Which means that if Ukraine can defeat Russia and preserve its sovereignty and independence, this may also have the added benefit of sparking political change in Belarus as well. All the more reason for the West to stay the course in supporting Ukraine with all the weapons, training, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic assistance that it needs, Putin’s threats and Lukashenka’s enabling notwithstanding. This is not the time to worry about humiliating Putin or to press Ukraine into making concessions.

Putin began this year, the centenary of the founding of the Soviet Union, with dreams of restoring the old empire through a soft annexation of Belarus and the military subjugation of Ukraine. He may yet succeed. But with the year almost half over, it is not outside the realm of possibility that he could wind up with neither.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Further reading

BelarusAlert May 10, 2022

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

By Steven Pifer

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has warned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could go nuclear. If Vladmir Putin deploys nuclear weapons there is reason to believe that Belarus itself would soon be in the firing line.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert May 11, 2022

Belarusian volunteers see Ukraine war as stepping stone to a free Belarus

By Alesia Rudnik

The hundreds of Belarusians who are currently fighting for Ukraine believe that defeating Vladimir Putin’s invasion is their best chance of liberating Belarus itself and bringing the Lukashenka dictatorship to an end.

Belarus Civil Society

BelarusAlert Mar 16, 2022

Ukrainian military successes force Belarus to rethink role in Putin’s war

By Brian Whitmore

The fierce Ukrainian resistance to Russia’s invasion is getting inside the heads of Belarusian military leaders and causing them to question the wisdom of joining Vladimir Putin’s war.

Belarus Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Lukashenka plays chief enabler as Putin threatens to expand Ukraine war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Signs of renewed Belarusian troop movements towards Ukrainian border

Tracking narratives

Kremlin media spread claims of NATO officers being captured and murdered in Mariupol

Kremlin shifts blame to Western sanctions for growing global food crisis

Media Policy

Russia attempts to limit the use of VPNs and Tor

Signs of renewed Belarusian troop movements towards Ukrainian border

On May 26, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka ordered the creation of a new military command center in southern Belarus, which borders Ukraine. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on the new command post, saying that Belarus “has to practice defending its southern frontiers quickly.”  

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense said on May 25 that it had received intelligence that Belarus was taking practical actions to check “the combat readiness” of its armed forces and that exercises were planned at ten training grounds in Belarus, including Brest, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk. “As part of the same exercises, it is planned to remove weapons and military equipment from storage, as well as to carry out marches,” said Oleksandr Motuzianyk, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.  

On June 2, videos of Belarusian military equipment being transported via railway appeared online. Ukrainian journalist and former presidential spokesperson Iuliia Mendel said the video captures more than fifty units of military equipment being transported from Grodno in the north to Brest in the south. Mendel said the train carried thirty-seven infantry fighting vehicles and anti-aircraft missile systems. However, the DFRLab could not confirm these figures as the video features cuts and transitions that make it difficult to accurately assess the amount of equipment visible.

The DFRLab geolocated another June 2 video of military equipment in transit to an area near the rail station in Baranavichy, in the western Brest region.

It remains unclear how many Belarusian forces are being relocated to the Ukrainian border, what their purpose is, or how long their deployment will be. 

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin media spread claims of NATO officers being captured and murdered in Mariupol

On May 19, Veterans Today, a US-based website with a history of circulating antisemitic and conspiratorial content, published an article titled, “NATO Officers in Azovstal Murdered & Mutilated by Azov to Spare Western Governments Embarrassment?” The article suggests that the “Azov Brigade and other associated neo-Nazi groups” killed and disposed of the bodies of NATO officers who were trapped inside Mariupol’s Azovstal steelworks. After a three-month siege, Russian forces took control of the Azovstal plant on May 20. The article claimed the Russian army would not be able to find evidence of the NATO officers’ presence as “Moscow doesn’t have access to the DNA databases of Western military institutions,” and “it’s not clear that the stakes would be worth the bother.”  

Pro-Kremlin media outlets in Russia reported on the article, including Pravda.ru, Krasnaya Vesna, Narodnye Novosti, Yuzhny Federalny, Kurer Sreda, Yakutsk.ru, Politichesky Vestnik, OSN, and Gals.ru. Pravda.ru translated and published large excerpts on May 20. The rest of the listed publications published articles about the column the following day, except for Kurer Sreda, which reported on the article on May 25.  

The article also spread on Telegram. TGStat, a Telegram analysis tool, identified seventeen original posts and the reposts mentioning “Michael Brenner,” the person listed as the author of the article, in Russian from May 18 to May 25. Thirty-four channels that amplified the story were in Russia, while three channels were in Belarus and two in Ukraine. While most pro-Kremlin media wrote about the article on May 21, on Telegram, Brenner garnered the most mentions on May 23.

In late March, the narrative claiming that NATO officers were trapped inside the Azovstal steelworks first started to spread on pro-Kremlin Telegram channels and in pro-Kremlin media. On March 31, Tsargrad, a right-leaning pro-Kremlin media outlet, cited the Telegram channel Ukraina/Open Ukraine to claim that a “group of twenty American and British military advisors…did not manage to leave the city [of Mariupol] in time.” On April 1, Thomas Gast, a German YouTuber, claimed “High ranking NATO commanders” were in the Azovstal steelworks. On April 3, Gast’s video was translated and cited in a post on LiveJournal, a Russian-owned blogging platform. 

On April 5, English and Russian pro-Kremlin Telegram channels asserted there were “French, German, British and ‘neutral’ Swedish NATO officers” in the Azovstal plant. Pro–Kremlin media and fringe English-language media also spread the rumor. 

On April 6, false information began to circulate about the capture of Lieutenant Roger Cloutier, the chief of NATO’s Allied Land Command in Europe. The claim spread on social media, in English and other languages, and in Russian pro–Kremlin media. Reuters and Vox Ukraine debunked the claim. 

On May 22, Tsargrad falsely claimed that US Admiral Eric T. Olson and British Lieutenant Colonel John Bailey were captured alongside Ukrainian fighters inside the Azovstal steelwork. France 24 and Techarp debunked these claims.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin shifts blame to Western sanctions for growing global food crisis

As Russia blocks trade routes in the Black Sea halting all Ukrainian exports, Kremlin officials sought to blame sanctions imposed by Western countries for the growing threat to food security. On June 1, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the world was facing a food crisis “linked to the introduction of illegal restrictions against us [Russia] and the actions of Ukrainian authorities.” On May 18, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that the “rise in global food prices is a direct result of the senseless buildup of unilateral anti-Russian restrictions.”  

Russian Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin also echoed these claims. “By imposing illegitimate sanctions against Russia, these countries pushed up energy and food prices, and they are to blame for the current problems and future crises globally,” he said. On his Telegram channel, Volodin went so far as to claim that the US wanted to organize a “Holodomor” in Ukraine, in reference to the Soviet Union’s mass starvation campaign against Ukraine in the 1930s, because the US wants to sell Ukrainian grain to recoup its financial losses from investing in Ukraine’s defense.    

In May, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the war in Ukraine was “amplifying and accelerating” food insecurity and global hunger. The UN World Food Programme recently said, “When a country like Ukraine that grows enough food for 400 million people is out of the market, it creates market volatility, which we are now seeing.”   

Western officials have dismissed the claim that sanctions are to blame for rising food insecurity. United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the US and many other nations have exempted food, fertilizer, and seeds from sanctions. In May, Russia’s Union of Grain Exporters stated, “Sanctions and export controls against Russia do not and will not target essential exports of food and agricultural inputs to developing countries.” 

In reality, the growing food crisis can be linked to Russia’s decision to block all of Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea, effectively halting all Ukrainian exports. “The food supply for millions of Ukrainians and millions more around the world has quite literally been held hostage,” Blinken said. UK Foreign Minister Liz Truss added, “It is completely appalling that Putin is trying to hold the world to ransom, and he is essentially weaponizing hunger and lack of food amongst the poorest people around the world.”

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia attempts to limit the use of VPNs and Tor

On May 31, Russian communications regulator Roskomnadzor demanded that Google Play remove the Tor browser, a tool used to anonymize internet browsing, from its app store. Tor was banned in Russia in 2017 when the Saratov regional court ruled that the “anonymizer” makes it possible for an internet user to access illegal content in Russia. The ruling did not impact the availability of Tor in Russia until December 2021, when Roskomnadzor banned the Tor website. Weeks later, German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle’s Russian branch reported that Tor was still working in Russia due to user-generated “bridges” that served as proxies to help circumvent the blocks enacted by internet providers.  

In addition to Tor, Russian residents have used virtual private networks (VPNs) to access content restricted by Russian authorities. On May 29, Global Check, a service for monitoring outages and availability of online resources, said on Telegram that it had observed problems in some Russian regions with IPsec and IKEv2, the encrypted internet protocol technology used by VPNs. Global Check said that on some operators, including Rostelekom, one of Russia’s largest internet providers, “IPsec does not even pass between the server and the client in Russia. This is a big blow, including to corporate networks – many administrators of such networks are now urgently looking for solutions to bypass.”  

On June 2, Proton VPN tweeted, “The Russian government has blocked ProtonMail and ProtonVPN within Russia.” The company added, “It is likely that the local ISPs and the authorities are interfering with VPN connections, in which case it may not be possible for us to solve such issues.” 

This is not the first time Russian authorities have cracked down on VPNs. In March 2019, Roskomnadzor demanded that ten VPN services connect to federal government IT systems. Only one company, owned by Kaspersky Lab, complied with the request. In September 2021, Roskomnadzor demanded that six VPN services be blocked.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia  

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But despite all this, Belarusian autocrat Alyaksandr Lukashenka may have just discovered the perfect little escape hatch to free his regime from Western sanctions and international isolation. The key to Lukashenka’s potential liberation and rehabilitation lies in a problem that was created by his ally and patron, Vladimir Putin: the looming global food crisis that has resulted from Russia’s Black Sea blockade on Ukrainian grain.

Speaking at an extraordinary summit of EU leaders in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the food crisis is “only the fault of Russia,” accusing Moscow of blocking 22 million tons of grain from being shipped out of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.

In an effort to alleviate the crisis, European leaders are seeking alternative routes to bring Ukrainian grain to global markets. One option being considered is shipping the grain via rail to ports on the Baltic Sea. And therein lies the catch. To get to Baltic Sea seaports like the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda, most of that grain would need to pass through Belarus.

In remarks to reporters on May 10, Lithuanian Transportation Minister Marius Skuodis said the West needs to either confront Russia and “dare to unblock the ports” or “use the existing infrastructure and to transport grain via Belarus, which would allow us to use the full capacity of the port of Klaipėda, as well as the capacity of Latvian and Estonian ports. This would require a certain humanitarian corridor via Belarus.” Skuodis added that “if a Ukrainian shipment came from Belarus, we would accept it.”

And therein lies the unsavory dilemma. In order to solve a potentially catastrophic world food crisis that has been manufactured by Putin, the West may need to make a deal with Lukashenka.

Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš summarized the deal-with-the-devil problem succinctly, noting that on the one hand, Belarus would be the most efficient route to get grain to Baltic ports, which “have a lot of capacity.” But on the other hand, he added, “the question is what Belarus will ask in return. And that price may be too high.”

The price demanded by Minsk would almost certainly involve the easing of international sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Xavier Bettel called the idea of making such a deal with Belarus “a bit tricky.”

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There are alternative options available other than the Belarusian route for Ukrainian grain.

Officials have noted that some grain can be shipped from Ukraine to Baltic seaports via Poland, but capacity on this route would be limited due to logistical issues including a backlog of traffic, a shortage of suitable wagons, and the fact that Ukraine and Lithuania still use Soviet-standard rail gauges which are wider than the European-standard gauges Poland uses. As a result, according to Skuodis, only two or three trains per day can travel to Lithuania from Poland.

The Polish port of Gdansk and the Romanian port of Constanța are also being looked at as alternatives, but those options include the same logistical problems of shipping the grain to Lithuania via Poland. The most viable option from a logistical perspective is opening a corridor through Belarus, but this is also the most politically unsavory.

As Western leaders ponder their options, the Lukashenka regime continues to act like a facilitator and co-aggressor in Putin’s illegal and unprovoked war against Ukraine. Just days after allowing Russia to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missiles that could strike Ukraine from Belarusian territory, Lukashenka ordered the creation of a new military command in southern Belarus near the Ukrainian border.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has correctly said that Russia is trying to leverage the grain crisis it created in order to “blackmail” the West into lifting sanctions. Given Belarus’s near absolute economic and political dependence on Russia, easing sanctions on Belarus in exchange for helping export Ukrainian grain would, in effect, be the same as easing sanctions on Russia.

A deal with the devil to address the looming world food crisis may be tempting. But it is a temptation that should be avoided.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

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The post Putin’s Black Sea blackmail sets stage for Belarus “deal with the devil” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials underlined the symbolic importance of the switch and stressed the need to emphasize the difference between Belarus and Russia.

Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Anniken Huitfeldt first broke the news of the name change in a personal call with the exiled leader of Belarus’s democratic opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (pictured), on the eve of this year’s International Day of Solidarity with Belarus, which is marked annually on May 29. “Although there are both historical and linguistic arguments for writing “Hviterussland,” it is ultimately a political issue,” stated Huitfeldt. “We do this as a sign of solidarity with the Belarusian democratic movement. They will not be a continuation of Russia.”

Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya welcomed the Norwegian gesture, which she praised as “more than just symbolic.” Belarusian journalist Hanna Liubakova shared this sentiment, commenting that she saw Norway’s step as a sign of growing international recognition that referring to modern Belarus as “White Russia” was anachronistic and misleading.

Norway’s decision to begin using the name Belarus in official documents is part of a regional trend, with fellow Scandinavian countries Sweden and Denmark also making similar switches from their own outdated versions of “White Russia” in recent years. This reflects broader changes in international perceptions of the country following a 2020 pro-democracy uprising that thrust Belarus into the global headlines following decades spent in the post-Soviet shadows.

For much of the post-Soviet period, Belarus was perhaps best known internationally as the last dictatorship in Europe. It owed this dubious honor to Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who won election in 1994 before proceeding to dismantle the country’s fledgling democracy and reestablish a Soviet-style one-party state.  

For over a quarter of a century, Lukashenka was able to successfully suppress all domestic opposition and strengthen his grip on power while maintaining close ties with neighboring Russia. He faced the first serious challenge of his entire reign in August 2020 when heavy-handed attempts to rig the country’s presidential election served as a focal point for simmering public frustrations, leading to the eruption of mass protests across the country on the evening of the vote.

This pro-democracy protest movement gained momentum in subsequent weeks and caught the world’s imagination. It dominated international news coverage for much of late summer and early fall 2020, with many seeing the unprecedented people power uprising as the latest chapter in the slow-motion collapse of the Soviet Empire. The Lukashenka regime looked destined to fall until Russia intervened with a financial lifeline and a promise to send in the Russian security services if necessary.

Lukashenka has remained entirely dependent on Russian support ever since. In return, he has gradually surrendered his country’s sovereignty to the Kremlin, allowing Moscow to expand its political, economic, and military footprints in the country. In February 2022, Lukashenka permitted Putin to use Belarus as a platform for the invasion of Ukraine. Thousands of Russian troops flooded across the Belarusian border into Ukraine as part Putin’s failed attempt to seize Kyiv. The country has also served as a launch pad for the bombardment of Ukrainian towns and cities.

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Moscow’s role in propping up the Lukashenka regime has had a negative impact on traditionally friendly Belarusian attitudes toward Russia. It has also encouraged international audiences to rethink earlier impressions of Belarus as being virtually indistinguishable from Russia.

The recent renaming of Belarus by the Norwegian government is very much part of this ongoing process. For hundreds of years, countries like Belarus and Ukraine have been viewed by the outside world almost entirely through a Russian lens and have typically been regarded as regions of Russia itself. Decolonizing the spelling of people, places, and entire countries is a small but significant and long overdue step toward the international rejection of this Russian imperial narrative.

The crusade to derussify official spellings has been a particularly prominent feature of nation-building efforts in independent Ukraine. Indeed, in recent years the #KyivNotKiev social media campaign to secure recognition for the Ukrainian-language transliteration of the country’s capital city has attracted considerable international interest and helped fuel a lively debate over national identity and the legacy of Russian imperialism.

It remains to be seen whether the rejection of “White Russia” could play a similar role in Belarus’s own efforts to emerge from centuries of Russian domination and assert a more independent identity on the international stage. However, the fact that countries like Norway recognize the symbolic importance of ditching “White Russia” is a welcome indication that attitudes toward Belarus are already changing.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s BelarusAlert Service.

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