In Season 1, Episode 5 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by two guests. She speaks with Cameron Hudson, the former US government expert on Sudan, about the mercenary pedigree of one of the two main belligerent parties, the Rapid Support Forces, and the determinative impact this has had on the current conflict in Sudan. By fighting as mercenaries in Libya, and especially Yemen, the RSF secured a cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army, it forged regional relationships that are now central to its resupply, and it has committed crimes and abuses in the conduct of the war which represent a detached mercenary mindset.

Alia also chats with Professor Munzoul Assal of the University of Khartoum about the danger of two parallel governments emerging in Sudan along the lines of the bifurcation in Libya; the presence of RSF fighters at the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic where the Wagner Group is deeply entrenched; and the clear and alarming possibilities of a regional conflagration.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

Further reading

MENASource Jun 28, 2023

The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?

By Mark N. Katz

The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

MENASource Jun 1, 2023

Is Egypt planning a full-scale invasion of Sudan? 

By Shahira Amin

With the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are that an Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent.

East Africa Middle East

MENASource May 11, 2023

Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here

By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Africa East Africa

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

Public Event Wed, June 28, 2023 • 3:00 pm ET

USAID Administrator Samantha Power on advancing LGBTQI+ inclusive development

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on the United States’ efforts to advance global LGBTQI+ human rights and USAID’s commitment to global inclusion.

Human Rights Resilience & Society

The passage of Uganda’s law criminalizing LGTBQI+ identity is only one recent example of efforts to turn the global human-rights agenda “on its head,” said Samantha Power, administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). And “it’s not just happening in Uganda,” she warned.

Power spoke at a Pride Month special edition of Atlantic Council Front Page on Wednesday, where she discussed USAID’s role in advancing LGBTQI+ inclusive development globally.

She addressed some of the agency’s most difficult challenges when it comes to achieving its inclusive development goals, including anti-LGBTQI+ discrimination—legal or otherwise—that prevents vulnerable communities from receiving needed services. “Even where there’s not a law,” Power said, discrimination is “a deterrent” that often stops people from accessing care and assistance.

Power also discussed USAID’s efforts to promote the development of a more inclusive postwar Ukraine. “Ukraine’s work to liberalize and build checks and balances and build in human-rights protections”—including for LGBTQI+ rights—“has accelerated,” she said.

She also argued for prioritizing LGBTQI+ human rights on the global stage. If the United States “[goes] quiet,” she said, “I think we would really shortchange what is distinguishing about American foreign policy.”

Power also previewed a new USAID policy promoting LGBTQI+ inclusive development, which she said would be the “first-of-its-kind.”

Below are more highlights from the discussion on USAID’s efforts to advance LGBTQI+ human rights and inclusive development, moderated by Washington Post and MSNBC journalist Jonathan Capehart.

Steps back—and leaps forward

• Uganda’s recently passed Anti-Homosexuality Act “would set back not only the health of LGBTQI+ communities,” but the health of all Ugandans, Power said. The Biden administration has publicly criticized the bill, joining leaders in thirty-one other countries in condemning the Ugandan law.
• Power explained that USAID works with local actors when determining how to best oppose discriminatory laws. “It’s the communities that are going to be affected by these laws that provide cues to us on how vocal to be” against anti-LGBTQI+ legislation, the USAID administrator said. Otherwise, the United States could risk becoming the center of attention and “potentially triggering nationalism and other forces.” Such a backlash, Power said, is “just what people who would seek to repress or terrorize vulnerable communities would like to see happen.”
• Despite challenges and setbacks in some countries, there are nevertheless signs that international LGBTQI+ human-rights norms are gaining ground, Power explained: Same-sex marriage legalization, as was recently accomplished in Estonia, as well as the decriminalization of same-sex relations in countries such as Barbados and Singapore indicate that “these principles are getting traction,” she said.

Inclusive reconstruction in Ukraine

• Power explained that Ukraine has made progress on LGBTQI+ rights since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion; she said it is “remarkable that a country that’s fighting for its life and its people” has also managed to extend LGBTQI+ protections through legislative measures, regulations, and judicial vetting.
• Power argued that Ukraine’s mission to “[integrate] into Europe,” will encourage the Ukrainian legal and social ecosystems to increase their support for LGBTQI+ communities. “The criteria that Ukraine is going to need to meet, the roadmap and so forth, is going to entail much stronger protections than have existed in the past,” she said.
• The commitment to inclusive postwar reconstruction in Ukraine is in line with the Ukrainian peoples’ motivation for resisting Russian aggression, Power argued. “Part of what Ukraine is fighting for and part of what Russia is trying to squelch is liberalization, is [a] broad understanding of who human rights protections apply to,” she said.

The role of LGBTQI+ human rights in US foreign policy

• Prioritizing LGBTQI+ human rights is consistent with the United States’ economic development and foreign policy interests, Power said. “It is in our interest to fight repression,” she said. “It is in our foreign-policy interest to stand up for our values.”
• Power argued that the United States’ human-rights commitments obligate it to advocate LGBTQI+ rights in its foreign policy, leaving no room for neutrality on the issue, Power said. “Imagine the counterfactual,” she said. A US foreign policy that did not promote LGBTQI+ rights would “legitimate some of the [anti-LGBTQI+] rhetoric and actions and legal measures that are being put forward,” she said.
• Power pushed back on the criticism that promoting global LGBTQI+ human rights abroad interferes with other countries’ affairs. She said that the United States hears such complaints about interference often from Russia—even as it invades Ukraine—as well as from countries that sell surveillance technology and spread disinformation beyond their borders. “The noninterference claim is usually made in a selective way,” she said.

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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The initiative is rare enough to draw some sarcasm about African presidents who are seeking to stop a European war when they can’t stop wars closer to home. For those critics—who overlook the work done in an effort to end the conflict in Ethiopia last year—it is hard to remember the last time such a delegation of African presidents assembled together to respond to a war on African soil. They point to cases in Khartoum, Sudan, and Goma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where any conflict-resolution efforts were ineffectual.

Other observers see this new delegation of African leaders as an attempt by South Africa to distract people from troubles at home. The announcement of the delegation came just days after US Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety’s allegation that a Russian cargo ship stocked up on ammunition and arms at a port in Cape Town in December 2022.

The recent (albeit cautious) support from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, Washington, and European capitals—along with the varied geopolitical positions of these African countries—lent enough credit to the initiative to give it a chance. In the United Nations General Assembly’s recent vote to condemn Russia over its invasion of Ukraine—held on February 23 this year, around the one-year mark of the full-scale invasion—thirty African countries voted to condemn Russia, twenty-two countries abstained, and two supported Russia. These African leaders, representing both countries who voted to condemn Russia and countries who abstained, form the optimal group to propose a peace plan, as several of them see this as an opportunity to justify their varied positions—including neutrality—and find a diplomatic end to the war.

What does this peace plan say? Frankly, not much—at the moment. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa spoke of vague preparations and of having separate phone calls, but avoided critical details. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said he was looking forward to seeing the delegation’s “concrete initiatives.”

What African leaders are weighing

Russia’s links to the African continent date back to the Cold War and a desire to support communist regimes (in places such as Guinea, Congo, and Ethiopia) and social-democratic or socialist political movements (in places such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe). The Soviet Union deployed forty thousand advisers across Africa between 1970 and 1975, and, over the course of the Cold War, received about sixty thousand African students—notably at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, which drew students from developing countries across the world. Some major African infrastructure projects are products of partnerships with the Soviet Union, Russia, or Russian companies. Those include the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the Capanda hydroelectric dam, and power plants planned in Congo and Nigeria. These are all countries that Putin hopes to rely on in order to find the support he lacks in the Global North.

Yet, while the USSR and, later, Russia have supported Africa in these ways, Africans are unlikely to blindly align themselves with Russia. It is impossible to ignore that previous support was more inspired by a desire to compete against the United States than by a love for freedom or Africa. Today, outside observers and African publics alike cannot ignore the humanitarian cost posed by Russia’s Wagner Group militias in the Sahel, Libya, the Central African Republic, or Mozambique. It is also difficult to see African youth seduced by the Russian way of life rather than the American dream, the latter of which has been able to increase its appeal to African youth via Netflix and Silicon Valley.

In fact, even if the West can’t see what Russians could seriously offer to Africans now, it has not been very difficult for Russia to fuel the very real African resentment towards the West. For Russia and the West, Africa is a coveted asset—one that holds 28 percent of the votes at the United Nations. In the post-Cold War period, Ukraine had neither the resources nor the geopolitical interest to engage in Africa like Russia did. That gave Russian views justifying aggression a hearing in Africa that it otherwise would not have received.

The complicated relations between African countries and also between African countries and global competitors such as Russia, the United States, and others leaves African policymakers in a bind. Those policymakers must carefully balance their economic interests and historical ties.

Further complicating the choice for African policymakers is the overwhelming US and Western support for Ukraine, in contrast to the lack of support and attention for African countries facing conflict. African countries, out of national interest, are looking to diversify their partnerships; they will need to balance their specific needs and local contexts in this geopolitical chaos.

A change in the narrative

The delegation of African presidents aiming to bring an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a unique opportunity for these leaders to be a part of the solution to a global problem and no longer rest on the sidelines of geopolitics as collateral victims.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a considerable increase in the price of grains, worsening food security particularly in the Horn of Africa; at the same time,it has also allowed Africa to step up as an alternative producer of some critical goods. For example in the energy sector, as Europe diversified away from Russian energy supplies, Africa helped fill the void, with Algeria now among the top four exporters of gas to Europe and with Egypt also bolstering its gas-export capacity, according to its Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. Recent hydrocarbon discoveries in Senegal and Mozambique are set to come online in the years ahead. These significant actions show that Africa is playing a leadership role and refusing to sit on the sidelines as a victim of geopolitical fallout.  

Africa has the peace and conflict-resolution experience to put forward in ending Eastern Europe’s geopolitical crisis. Even if African efforts have not always been successful, these efforts are valuable; the leaders behind them still have crucial experience in conflict management. Some might argue that the existence of countless conflict resolution tools, demobilization programs, peace-building mechanisms, and strategic frameworks such as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union indicate that African leaders fail to settle the conflicts and wars happening in their own countries; but in reality, the existence of these initiatives shows that African leaders have created dialogue where there were voids, demobilized fighters so they could return home, and, in some cases, helped societies address the horrors of war and build a lasting peace. Several of the leaders in the African peace delegation have participated in responding to violent conflict or have worked to end conflict. That experience may be usefully applied to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

By bringing the unique peace initiative together, African presidents are attempting to advance their leadership on the global stage. This is an incredible challenge for a continent that has often been applauded for its potential, but which must now deliver.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

AfricaSource Jun 21, 2022

How Africa is responding to the war in Ukraine

For the 2022 Africa Day, the Atlantic Council was happy to host top top DC think tank voices for a discussion on Africa and the new geopolitical order.

Africa Politics & Diplomacy

AfricaSource Jun 16, 2022

The Ukraine war is giving Europe a chance to reset ties with Africa

By Rama Yade

The war in Ukraine has sent shock waves throughout the international system. For both Europe and Africa, it means a strengthened relationship is more imperative than ever.

Africa Energy & Environment

AfricaSource Aug 30, 2022

Inaction to reform the international development system is not an option anymore

By Rama Yade

Africans are looking at the United States’ focus on the war in Ukraine and on tensions in the Indo-Pacific, and they’re wondering: Will the United States truly consider African countries as strategic partners as China and Russia claim to do?

Africa International Financial Institutions

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Give Africa’s peace delegation for Ukraine a chance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the fighting erupted in mid-April, at least 259,000 people have crossed over from Sudan into neighboring countries—namely Egypt, Chad, Eritrea, and the Central Africa Republic—according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). But Egypt—which shares its southern border with Sudan—is the worst affected.  

A primary destination for people fleeing the violence, Egypt has received more than fifty thousand people from across the border. Hundreds of thousands more are expected to cross into the country in the coming months if the fighting continues. The mass influx not only threatens to aggravate the humanitarian crisis on Egypt’s side of the border, but it also threatens to overstretch the country’s resources at a time when it faces a deepening economic crisis, which risks further disgruntling its disaffected population.   

But the Egyptian government has a lot more to worry about than rising public discontent caused by the immense economic pressure. The possible infiltration of extremist groups into Egypt is currently a prime concern for authorities. It’s a case of once bitten, twice shy.

Over the past decade, the Egyptian army and police have been the target of multiple terrorist attacks by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated jihadists that crossed into Egypt from the shared eastern border with the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, troops have been deployed along Egypt’s Western border with Libya to curb terrorist infiltration and a repeat of similar attacks. The recent release of pro-Muslim Brotherhood figures from a prison in Sudan has heightened Cairo’s fears of the opening of a new front in Egypt’s war on terrorism. 

Another major concern for Egypt is the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) strong ties with Ethiopia. Egypt has sought the backing of Sudan in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the downstream country’s share of Nile waters. This, following the construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), considered by Egypt to be an “existential threat.” Should Egypt decide to use the military option against Ethiopia at any time in the future, it may have to do so unilaterally, as it would no longer have Sudan on its side.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has ruled out any intervention in Sudan, arguing that the Sudanese crisis was an “internal” matter. He has also pledged that Egypt would not take sides in the conflict and has offered to mediate between Sudan’s rival factions. However, skeptics suggest that Egypt is already deeply involved in Khartoum. They affirm that the Egyptian military backs the Sudanese army with which it forged strong ties following the overthrow of the Islamist-leaning former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2019.  

Some analysts argue that the stakes are too high for Cairo to stand idly by and watch as the situation deteriorates.

It is no secret that Cairo has long backed the Sudanese army with the conviction that it is the sole institution that can restore stability in Sudan. Egypt cemented its ties with the Sudanese army by conducting joint military exercises with Sudan after Bashir was deposed by the military in the wake of mass protests in Sudan. Egyptian authorities are looking to Abdel Fattah El-Burhan, Sudan’s de facto military leader, to quash the nascent pro-democracy movement that emerged during Sudan’s 2019 mass uprising and to restore security and stability in Sudan—moves that Cairo perceives as serving its interests. 

The capture of two hundred Egyptian soldiers—the majority of whom were air force personnel—at a military base in the northern Sudanese town of Meroe by the RSF in mid-April, as well as a leaked video showing the soldiers in a state of defeat, were perceived as an act of provocation by Cairo. The humiliating episode also provoked an outcry on social media platforms. 

The RSF believed Egyptian soldiers were siding with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) but later apologized for releasing the video. Meanwhile, in an apparent attempt to save face, Sisi insisted that the Egyptian troops were in Sudan “for training purposes” and gave the RSF a seventy-two-hour ultimatum to return the soldiers home safely. The troops were indeed sent back to Egypt on April 19, but some analysts believe that the incident has not been forgotten and are guessing Cairo may be waiting for the right moment to retaliate.      

There have been unconfirmed reports that Egypt has provided the SAF with military intelligence and tactical support. Sources have also cited unconfirmed bombings of RSF positions by Egyptian fighter jets and say Egypt is contemplating invading Sudan to fight the powerful paramilitary forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, known as Hemetti. 

If the reports are accurate, this will this pit Egypt against the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—Egypt’s longtime ally and principal financial backer—which has thrown its weight behind the RSF. It would also pit Egypt against Libyan warlord General Khalifa Haftar,  another RSF supporter, whose forces control much of eastern Libya and who was backed by Egypt and the RSF during his failed onslaught on Tripoli in 2019.

All of this puts Egypt in a dilemma. On the one hand, it would like to see stability and security restored in Sudan for fear of violence spilling over into its territory. On the other, Sudan’s northern neighbor does not wish to risk ruffling the feathers of the UAE by overtly taking an opposing side in the conflict. Cash-strapped Egypt has been selling government-owned assets to the wealthy Gulf nation to shore up its troubled economy. Agitating the UAE may cause it to halt its investments in Egypt, denying the North African country the cash it badly needs to plug a financing gap of $17 billion over the next four years.  

It is safer for Egypt to continue to support the SAF covertly or indirectly without publicly announcing its anti-RSF position. Still, with the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are rife that a full-scale Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent—assuming the conflict drags on. According to some analysts, invading Sudan would give Egypt an opportunity to reassert its leadership role in the region.

By brokering a truce between rival factions in Sudan, Egypt also stands to win favor with global powers—the United States in particular—which had been pinning their hopes on a  handover of power to a civilian government. A return to civilian rule had been a bone of contention between Burhan and the RSF, with the latter accusing Sudan’s military leaders of clinging to power. 

Helping end the conflict in Sudan would also allow Egypt to align its foreign policy and interests with the United States, reversing a previous trend of having conflicting viewpoints on regional issues. This would pave the way for greater cooperation between the US and its longtime Middle Eastern ally, and would undoubtedly help in defusing tensions over opposing stances on several issues, including Egypt’s backing of Haftar during the civil war in Libya and recently leaked reports of Egypt’s secret plans to supply rockets to Russia.  

Egypt’s strategic relations with Russia have irked the United States the most. It may now be the time for Cairo to show the Biden administration that Egypt’s cooperation with Russia—which has included arms deals and a contract for a civilian nuclear facility—is not an attempt to turn its back on US support, but rather, diversify its sources of support. 

Thus, while there are many complex factors that might dissuade Egypt from intervening overtly in Sudan, the possibility of an invasion cannot be ruled out. The chance to smooth over ties with the US is a juicy incentive, as are the benefits that would arise from bringing stability and security to the surrounding region. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

The post Is Egypt planning a full-scale invasion of Sudan?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we cover:

• New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit.
• How the United States is tackling export controls circumvention and what should improve moving forward.
• The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap.
• The failure of the US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment from 2022 indicated that forty out of fifty-two components recovered from the Iranian Shahed-136 drone that was downed in Ukraine last fall had been manufactured by thirteen different American companies, while the remaining twelve were made in Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Taiwan, and China. The case revealed that it was not enough to impose sanctions and export controls on Russian defense companies. Not only was Iran providing drones to Russia, but also certain entities and individuals in countries such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein have procured materials on Russia’s behalf. This is why the United States released a new sanctions package ahead of the G7 summit, targeting a much wider international network of Russia sanctions and export controls evasion. 

Finland, Switzerland, Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, India, Singapore—these are just a few locations associated with individuals and entities included in the Treasury Department’s newest designations against Russia. Entities and individuals located in these countries have aided Russia’s circumvention efforts or provided materials for Russia’s military procurement. Among the sanctioned individuals are Swiss-Italian businessman Walter Moretti and his colleagues in Germany and India, who have sold advanced technology to Russian state-owned enterprises. Liechtenstein-based Trade Initiative Establishment (TIE) and its network of two companies and four individuals have been procuring semiconductor production equipment for sanctioned Russian entities since 2012. 

Along with the United States, the United Kingdom also imposed sanctions against eighty-six individuals and entities from Russian energy, metals, financial, and military sectors who have been enhancing Russia’s capacity to wage the war. Additionally, the European Union (EU) is developing its eleventh package of sanctions which will reportedly, for the first time, target Chinese entities facilitating Russia’s evasion efforts. Coordinating the designation and enforcing processes among the G7 allies will be key in synchronizing the targeting of Russia’s evasion and procurement networks.

Export controls circumvention: How the US is tackling it and what should improve moving forward

While sanctions aim to cut entities and individuals procuring technology for the Russian military out of the global financial system, export controls are designed to prevent them from physically acquiring components. G7 allies have levied significant export controls on Russia, but enforcing export controls is easier said than done. Third countries from Russia’s close neighborhood have stepped up to fill Russia’s technology shortages caused by other countries complying with export controls. Central Asian and Caucasus countries had a significant uptick in exports of electronic components to Russia, while Turkey, Serbia, and Kazakhstan have been supplying semiconductors to Moscow. Even if exported electronic components are not designed for military application, Russians have been able to extract semiconductors and electronic components for military use even from refrigerators and dishwashers. The sudden boost in electronic equipment exports from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Russia can only be explained by Russia’s efforts of repurposing them for military use. 

In response to Russia’s efforts to obtain technology by all means possible, the US Departments of Commerce and Justice have jointly launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force. The goal of the Strike Force is to prevent Russia and adversarial states such as China and Iran from illicitly getting their hands on advanced US technology. The Strike Force recently announced criminal charges against individuals supplying software and hardware source codes stolen from US tech companies to China. The Strike Force embodies the whole-of-government approach the United States has been taking in investigating sanctions and export controls evasion cases. The prosecutorial and investigative expertise of the Justice Department, coupled with the Treasury’s ability to identify and block the sanctions evaders from the US financial system, will amplify the impact of the Commerce Department’s export controls and enhance their investigations and enforcement.  

The US Department of Commerce has also teamed up with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to publish a joint supplemental alert outliniing red flags for potential Russian export controls evasion that financial institutions should watch out for and report on, consistent with their compliance reporting requirements. The red flags include but are not limited to:

• Payments for dual-use goods to companies located outside of the Global Export Controls Coalition (GECC) countries. 
• A new customer who trades in the nine Harmonized System (HS) codes, is located outside of the GECC countries and was incorporated after February 24, 2022. 
• A consumer who refuses to provide details to banks about end users or company ownership. 

Providing information to the public in the form of alerts and advisories is an effective step to increase awareness, financial institution reporting, and compliance with Western sanctions and exports controls. The Disruptive Technology Strike Force should consider issuing a multilateral advisory on export control evasion with G7 allies to bring in foreign partner perspectives, similar to the multilateral advisory issued in March on sanctions evasion by the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force (REPO)

Regarding third-country intermediaries suspected of supplying Russia with dual-use technology, G7 allies should prioritize capacity building and encouraging political will in these countries to strengthen sanctions and customs enforcement. Building up their capacity to monitor and record what products are being exported to Russia could be the first step towards this goal. For example, Georgian authorities returned goods and vehicles destined for Russia and Belarus in 204 cases. However, registration certificates did not identify the codes of returned goods in fifty cases, and clarified that the goods were sanctioned only in seventy-one cases. Developing a system for identifying controlled goods and making the customs data easily accessible to the public could both salvage Georgia’s reputation and enhance export control enforcement against Russia.

The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap

The US Department of the Treasury recently published a report analyzing the effects of the oil price cap, arguing that the novel tool has achieved its dual objective of reducing revenue for Moscow while keeping global oil prices relatively stable. A recent study by the Kyiv School of Economics Institute backs up this statement with detailed research of the Russian ports and the payments made to Russian sellers. However, Russian crude oil exports to China through the Russian Pacific port of Kozmino might be examples of transactions where the price cap approach does not hold.

In response, the Department of the Treasury warned US ship owners and flagging registries to use maritime intelligence services for detecting when tankers are disguising their port of call in Russia. Meanwhile, commodities brokers and oil traders should invoice shipping, freight, customs, and insurance costs separately, and ensure that the price of Russian oil is below 60 dollars. 

Despite China’s imports of Russian crude oil, the world average price for Russian crude oil in the first quarter of 2023 was 58.62 dollars, which supports the claim about the success of the oil price cap, at least for now. Notably, Russia’s energy revenues dropped by almost 40 percent from December 2022 to January 2023, likely in part due to the price cap combined with lower global energy prices.

Beyond Russia: The failure of US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

While the world has been focused on the G7 summit, the crisis worsened in Sudan. In April 2023, President Biden issued Executive Order 14098 (EO 14098) authorizing future sanctions on foreign persons to address the situation in Sudan and to support a transition to democracy and a civilian transitional government in Sudan. The use of sanctions to support policy goals in Africa is not new. In the case of EO 14098, policymakers seek to use future sanctions on individuals responsible for threatening the peace, security, and stability of Sudan, undermining Sudan’s democratic transition, as well as committing violence against civilians or perpetuating other human rights abuses. 

Much has been written and studied about the effectiveness of sanctions programs in Africa with many programs suffering from being poorly designed, organized, implemented, or enforced. Sudan faced statutory sanctions from its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism from 1993 to 2020 and US Treasury sanctions from 1997 to 2017 both of which produced limited results due to ineffective enforcement and maintenance of the program. A near-total cut-off of Sudan from the US financial system pushed Sudan to develop financial ties beyond the reach of the US dollar.

Sanctions in Sudan can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in these relevant countries. Cutting off those links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply weapons, and pay their soldiers, which could force them back to the negotiating table.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @KDonovan_AC.

Maia Nikoladze is the assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @Mai_Nikoladze.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Castellum.AI partners with the Economic Statecraft Initiative and provides sanctions data for the Global Sanctions Dashboard and Russia Sanctions Database.

Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

Explore Here

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post Global Sanctions Dashboard: US and G7 allies target Russia’s evasion and procurement networks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

Fellow

Patrick Quirk

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

The post Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the scope of fighting widens and the number of Sudanese refugees grows, neighboring countries fear the impact on their populations, potentially igniting political turbulence. While there have been diplomatic efforts to coordinate a ceasefire, it’s unclear whether it will hold and what could be done otherwise to stop the fighting.

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Benjamin Mossberg: ‘The United States must continue to prioritize the Sudanese people’

Alia Brahimi: Libya’s Haftar is resupplying the conflict in Sudan

Thomas Warrick: ‘Governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges’

Shahira Amin: Sudanese are fleeing to Egypt while the country’s resources are overstretched

R. Clarke Cooper: The conflict in Sudan will have broad transregional impacts

‘The United States must continue to prioritize the Sudanese people’

The significant policy failure that the United States faces in Sudan cannot be understated. The importance of Sudan’s stability to Africa, Europe, and the Middle East is closely linked to the events inside the country as it faces ongoing fighting, the potential for a significant humanitarian disaster, and human rights abuses. While there is no easy solution to help Sudan exit this period of instability, the international community must act.

There appears to be little popular support for the violence facing the people of Sudan, as a majority of the Sudanese people face significant challenges in securing food, water, electricity, and shelter. Significant pressure must be brought to bear on General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the commander of the RSF, and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the SAF, to encourage a firm cessation of hostilities and a return to negotiations over the civilian-led future of the country.

The announcement of an Executive Order—“Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition”—on May 3 by the United States can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers who do not work on Africa specifically must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in the relevant countries. Cutting off these links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply their arms, and pay their soldiers, which would force them back to the negotiating table. 

The United States must continue prioritizing the Sudanese people and rely on Sudanese leaders that have support and roots in the country. While it is unlikely that either the SAF or RSF can win a decisive military victory, the United States should not abandon the country regardless. Geopolitical competition by China, Russia, and others continues to play out in Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa. It is critical that the United States continue to assert its values, communicate its interests, share its redlines consistently, and avoid the transactional nature of relationships that its geopolitical competitors value.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

Libya’s Haftar is resupplying the conflict in Sudan

Libya is particularly exposed to developments in Sudan. The first point of vulnerability is the heavily partisan role of General Khalifa Haftar, who controls the east of Libya and large parts of the south and is a central node in the alliance between the UAE, Hemedti, and the Wagner Group. External support to the RSF ideally runs through southeastern Libya, a vast area largely in the grip of Haftar proxies. The border between Libya and Sudan, for example, is manned by Subul al-Salam, a Salafist militia in the pay of Haftar’s fourth son, Saddam. Additionally, Haftar’s 128th Brigade controls many of the transit routes in central and southern Libya. It is led by Hassan al-Zadma, who has strong personal links with Darfuri militias and has taken charge of sourcing mercenaries for Haftar from Sudan and Chad.  

Haftar’s role in the resupply of the RSF is more than a detail in this conflict—it is important to the war’s viability. There have already been documented reports of ammunition shipments, missile deliveries, and intelligence sharing. However, fuel is the critical resource for Hemedti’s Darfur-based fighters who must cross great tracts of the desert by truck to reach Khartoum. Thus, Saddam Haftar has personally overseen the effort to divert Libyan fuel towards the RSF, redirecting the refining capacity at the Sarir oil field—ten thousand barrels a day—over the border to Hemedti. 

The second point of danger is Libya’s status as an optimal rear base. Libya is a major black market logistics hub—for weapons, food, fuel, fighters, fresh dollars—and, thus, an ideal base to launch attacks into Sudan or Chad. If Hemedti retreats from Khartoum to Darfur, tribal fighting within the Darfur region and the collapse of the peace deal there threatens to pull Libya into a regional conflagration. 

The third source of vulnerability is a lesson that might be drawn from the descent into war in Sudan. The international community may rightly conclude that the strategy of dealing with warlords—empowering them as legitimate “stakeholders” in democratic transition—has been exposed as deeply flawed by Sudan. Most Libyans would agree. At the same time, Haftar will note that Hemedti was an integral part of the United Nations-approved power-sharing deal and a party to official political agreements. However, his position was ultimately insecure. Haftar and his sons may, therefore, recommit to growing their military power and leveraging their relationship with the Wagner Group to obtain a preponderance of military power in Libya. This would upend the delicate balance in Libya and portend a regional war.  

Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs.

‘Governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges’

I have two memories of Sudan. The first is in 2016, when I was just about to fly out to Khartoum to lead the first high-level US government delegation to Sudan in a decade. My boss called me into his office to give me the benefit of his experience leading such a delegation more than a decade earlier. “The people are warm and friendly towards Americans,” he recalled, “but their government has a history of disappointing them.”

My second memory is of when I was there to discuss rebuilding counterterrorism ties with the Sudanese government. They helicoptered us to an important remote base in the northwest that lay astride one of Africa’s major human smuggling routes from east Africa to southern Europe. As we flew out of Khartoum, a US official with years of experience there pointed out the two bridges over the White Nile: “You do realize that the government’s remit stops at the west end of that bridge?”

Seven years later, and after a brief period of hope, governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges. The popular support for civilian leaders who came to power in 2019 was undercut by generals vying for power, each afraid that “second place” meant “last place.” Yet Sudan remains strategically important to the United States, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East because of its role at a crossroads. During the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) time controlling parts of Syria and Iraq, Sudan was a transit country for ISIS operatives and money transiting in and out of Libya. Human traffickers carried Ethiopians and others toward Libyan ports, taking advantage of false hopes of leaving behind drought and food crises.

Sustained pressure now needs to be brought by the Quad—the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and UAE—and others on the countries supporting the warring generals in order to reach a resolution that will benefit the Sudanese people. They deserve better than another decade of disappointment.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Sudanese are fleeing to Egypt while the country’s resources are overstretched

Concerns are rising in Egypt as the fighting in neighboring Sudan rages on. Since the outbreak of the conflict in mid-April, tens of thousands of Sudanese fleeing the violence have crossed over into Egypt through a shared southern border with Sudan. The mass influx threatens to put an additional strain on Egypt, which is already facing an acute economic crisis.

But the added burden on Egypt’s already-overstretched resources isn’t Cairo’s only concern. Egyptian leadership is even more worried about prospects of a Muslim Brotherhood resurgence next door, which may, subsequently, pave the way for infiltration over the border. This follows the April 26 release of imprisoned, key figures from Sudanese ex-President Omar al-Bashir’s deposed regime. The SAF reportedly ordered the release of members of the former Islamist regime after protests by inmates broke out inside Kober prison, where they had been jailed after Bashir’s overthrow by the military in 2019. 

Egypt’s army is already stretched thin: troops have been deployed on Libya’s western border to guard against foreign infiltrators. Moreover, after more than a decade of battling an insurgency fueled by Islamic State militants—many of whom had allegedly crossed into Northern Sinai from the Gaza Strip by way of underground tunnels—the last thing the Egyptian military wants is a new front in its war on terrorism.  

The ongoing conflict also pits Egypt against its longtime ally, the UAE, which backs the RSF (the powerful paramilitary forces embroiled in a power struggle with the SAF, which is backed by Egypt). Supporting opposing sides may cause tensions between the two countries at a time when Egypt is in dire need of financial backing to shore up its ailing economy. The sale of Egyptian assets to Gulf countries, including the UAE, has provided Egypt with the lifeline it needs to avert economic collapse and a looming debt default (so far, at least).

Egypt has also relied heavily on Sudan’s support in the ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which sources say threatens to exacerbate Egypt’s water shortage challenge. There are growing concerns in Egypt that the instability in Sudan may overshadow or even derail the negotiations with Ethiopia.

While the Egyptian leadership has insisted it is not taking sides in the conflict, Cairo is watching the developments in Sudan with trepidation, as the unfolding crisis may have far-reaching implications for its northern neighbor. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

The conflict in Sudan will have broad transregional impacts

As with previous civil wars in Sudan, the collapse of security and the displacement of the population will have broad transregional impacts beyond immediate neighboring states. Some internally-displaced Sudanese may eventually return home, while others will seek permanent refuge anywhere outside of Sudan—be it on the African continent or further afield in Europe or North America. Exasperating an already fragile security environment, the disruption from the weeks-long conflict is already enabling a more permissive environment for transnational crime and illicit trafficking and terrorism.

Unfortunately, in the multilateral space, there is diminishing capacity to properly address Sudan’s increasingly dire humanitarian and security issues. War in Ukraine, earthquake recovery in Turkey, and flood relief in Pakistan already occupy significant amounts of attention and resources from United Nations agencies, various NGOs, and the national governments of the world. Still, beyond the immediate humanitarian appeal to help the civilian populous of Sudan, this latest iteration of civil conflict also requires global attention in the peacekeeping, security, and conflict resolution space. If ignored, Sudan’s humanitarian and security crisis will manifest itself elsewhere in the world well beyond the Middle East and North Africa.

Absent conflict resolution led by a group of responsible states or a multilateral body, there is an increasing risk that the conflict will become a regional war. Neighboring states have already aligned with either of the two generals and, bizarrely, in some cases, aligned with both sides. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has the affirmed support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The UAE, and General Haftar of Libya, however, support the RSF. As other international actors assess where to align, a united front of regional and Western states is required to stop the march toward greater conflict, and the time for such a united front is now. 

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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The summit and recent visits by high-ranking Biden administration officials to Africa were the culmination of an effort led by the White House to strengthen the relationship between the United States and the African continent in a wide variety of aspects.

This approach by the Biden administration is quite different from the one adopted by the Donald Trump administration, which saw the continent as a playground for superpower rivalry between China, Russia, and the United States. As part of this great power competition, the Biden administration seeks to enhance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation to block Chinese and Russian influence in Africa.

However, one area both administrations completely ignore is Iran’s growing influence on the continent and the need to formulate a policy that will work to limit Tehran’s freedom of action in Africa.

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979—and even more so following the heavy political pressure on Tehran—Africa has become an attractive continent for the Islamic Republic. Iran views the African continent as a “battleground” for influence, power, and territory against Saudi Arabia, and has also sought to counter Western influence—particularly that of the United States—within Africa, working with elements that are opposed to colonialism and seeking to chart a more independent course.

Moreover, Iran seeks to utilize their worldwide network of religious and cultural organizations, including universities and charities, to increase its influence over the vast Shia minorities in Africa, using them for political support, fundraising, and even to recruit to terrorist cells.

But Iranian terrorist activities in Africa are not the only problem. Iran is not hesitating to interfere in the internal affairs of many African countries to preserve its interests and protect the individuals who serve its policies. A prominent example is the unprecedented Iranian involvement in 2019 to free Shia cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky from his detention in Nigeria, with Iran using its control on Hausa TV to push for his release.

The Iran-West Africa Economic Summit in Tehran, which was held on March 7, is another indication that Iran is seeking to enhance its relations with African countries and strengthen its foothold, especially in the west of the continent. This is part of President Ebrahim Raisi’s vision regarding relations between West African countries and Iran, which was exemplified in his visit to Guinea-Biassau in August 2021, when he pledged to continue expanding ties between Iran and the continent. In many regards, this activity resembles the policy of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Africa, which sought to improve relations significantly.

Apart from Iran’s traditional interests in Africa, several new ones have emerged that must be considered in the context of preventing Iran from consolidating its interests in the continent.

First and foremost is the campaign that Tehran is waging against US allies in Africa that dared to take part in the normalization efforts with Israel: Sudan and Morocco. In order to achieve this goal, Iran has enhanced its military and diplomatic ties with Algiers and increased military aid to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. The latter contribution has improved the front’s ability to inflict severe damage on the Moroccan army and challenge Moroccan control over the territory. Iran is also working in Mauritania and sees this country as a priority zone for its influence schemes in the Sahara region, which is extremely important for Moroccan security.

In the case of Sudan, Iran’s bid to further its influence in the strategic Horn of Africa suffered after Khartoum joined the Abraham Accords. In order to change this negative trend, Iran is blaming Israel for causing political instability in Sudan’s domestic issues. Furthermore, Iran is still actively trying to spread its Shia doctrine in the country while conspiring to create a political vacuum in Sudan that will weaken the forces who agreed to sign a normalization agreement with Israel.

Through its actions, Tehran is demonstrating that there is a price for joining the Abraham Accords and that it can pose a direct or indirect threat to Sudan and Morocco. Iran is also conducting a powerful political campaign to prevent Israel from enhancing its relations with other African countries and improving its diplomatic presence in various African institutions, such as the African Union.

In addition to the illegal arms smuggling network that Iran managed to build in the Horn of Africa, which allows Tehran to smuggle weapons to the countries of the continent, it also appears to be planning to significantly increase its sales of Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) to the African continent. Evidence of this can be seen in Iran’s involvement in the civil war in Ethiopia and the sale of Mohajer-6 UAVs to the Ethiopian army.

Against the background of Iranian involvement in Ukraine and Tehran’s desire to increase sales of its military equipment in the war in Ukraine, Africa is a natural continent for this desire, and the transfer of these capabilities to the Polisario Front constitutes another indication of that.

Third, there is a need to pay close attention to the plots that were revealed in several African countries after the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020—the foiled plot to assassinate the US ambassador in South Africa, chief among them. During the past year, several plans were discovered in which Iran sought to harm American or Israeli interests in Africa or use its presence in the continent to recruit terrorists.

In order to protect its allies in Africa and preserve its interests in the continent, the Biden administration cannot focus solely on the growing presence of China and Russia. It must also consider Tehran’s deepening foothold in Africa, which is a growing challenge to US policy on the continent. The administration must prepare an orderly work plan with the cooperation of African countries—and possibly Gulf countries—that are very disturbed by Iranian expansion. The goal of this would be to reduce Iranian influence in Africa and prevent Iran from using African countries to achieve its interests.

Looking to the future, Africa will continue to be an attractive target for Iranian policy under Raisi. Without a well-thought-out action plan, the US will have minimal ability to push Tehran out of Africa and prevent it from coordinating with China and Russia, with the latter having engaged in an unprecedented rapprochement with Tehran in recent months. Thus, countering Iran’s influence in Africa must become a priority for the Biden administration sooner rather than later.

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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On March 10, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest column, they discuss the recent leak of sensitive government documents, the ongoing conflict in Sudan, and North Korea’s recent advancements in nuclear weapon capabilities. Specifically, in light of the developments in North Korea, the pair debate the utility and feasibility of nuclear disarmament.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate responses to advancements in North Korean nuclear capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.

Neither the SAF nor RSF is capable of a decisive victory, particularly given Sudan’s size and its fractured political landscape. Barring decisive intervention, the most likely scenario is a long and bloody multisided civil war and a staggering humanitarian disaster, like ones seen in Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. This disaster would not be limited to Sudan; it could also destabilize the greater region and drive tens of millions of Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states, the Middle East, and Europe.

That scenario needs to be prevented in a way that ensures the political and military calculations of Hemedti, Burhan, and their supporters change when serious negotiations to restore a civilian government resume. Simply calling for ceasefires or evenly applying diplomatic pressure is not enough. This would only preserve the rough parity of military power between the RSF and SAF. This is not to suggest that either Hemedti or Burhan is “better.” Both have failed the Sudanese people and should be encouraged to move on from power. However, international partners must aim to immediately stop the fighting, bring back negotiations for a transition to civilian government, and then ensure both generals honor their public pledges to hand over power.

Thus, international and regional leaders must, in coordination, begin to strategically apply pressure by freezing Sudanese bank accounts and temporarily blocking the business activities of Sudanese leaders and their forces. This cutoff in money and revenue will impact those actors’ abilities to pay their soldiers and allies to fight and resupply. More importantly, it will impact their calculations about their willingness to return to serious negotiations and to compromise. Given the RSF is unlikely to prevail against the SAF with its heavy weapons and support from Egypt, the least bad option to stop the fighting is to first apply pressure on Hemedti’s business empire, which funds the RSF—his soldiers are loyal because they are paid better, not for any ideological reason. External actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (where, because of past Western sanctions, most Sudanese have their bank accounts and base their businesses), should freeze known RSF and Hemedti-family bank accounts and business activities until RSF leaders commit to rapidly integrating their troops into the SAF. Some of the most important assets have been identified and others are known by the Emirati and Saudi governments. Similarly, international partners must quickly freeze the assets of known Bashir-regime/Islamist leaders who are inciting violence in an effort to return to power. 

Finally, partners should identify foreign-held SAF assets and business interests for possible freezing and seizure in case the army does not honor its pledge to hand over power—or perpetuates the historic political and economic dominance of elites from Khartoum at the expense of Sudanese people living in the rest of the country. Only in this way is a sustainable ceasefire and peace possible.

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a former senior advisor to the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and former deputy Africa Program director at the International Crisis Group.

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The situation is, in part, being made worse by climate change, which is increasing temperatures and changing weather patterns, compounding the hardship already caused by droughts. According to the International Monetary Fund, a third of the world’s droughts occur in Sub-Saharan Africa; meanwhile, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Horn of Africa is experiencing the longest and most severe drought on record. These conditions are weakening food systems across Sub-Saharan Africa, an area in which agriculture, forestry, and fishing make up 17.2 percent of the gross domestic product—and substantially more in countries like Sierra Leone and Chad.

But there’s more to this food insecurity trend than climate change; Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused uncertainty in the global food market, disrupting the production and trade of key commodities. Russia and Ukraine are significant suppliers of oil, wheat, and maize, and disruptions to the supply chain, combined with local conflicts in some countries, have caused inflation to soar, with food prices increasing as much as 55.6 percent in the Horn of Africa.

Fighting these rising levels of food insecurity requires a whole-of-nation approach. But countries in these food-insecure regions aren’t doing enough to harness the economic and agricultural potential of half their populations: women. For example, discriminatory laws that hamper women’s access to land and financial services are still in place in some countries. In order to fight food insecurity in full force, these countries must ensure that women are equipped with the exact same resources as men: both land itself and the decision-making power to determine how to use that land in the most productive way possible. Policymakers in these food-insecure countries should take the following actions:

Equalize inheritance rights

Some countries in these food-insecure regions have made significant strides recently in passing reforms that impact women’s lives in some respects—but they have faltered in passing meaningful reforms related to improving access to assets and entrepreneurship opportunities for women.

According to the Center for Global Development, agriculture accounts for 56 percent of employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, and women account for 57 percent of agricultural workers. The informal sector accounts for 50 to 80 percent of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa—activity that includes the sale of food. And like the agricultural sector, the informal sector is a major employer of women: In Africa, 89.7 percent of employed women work in the informal sector. Yet despite the roles that women play in these sectors, only 30 percent of women own land in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The discrepancy in land ownership extends in part from inheritance laws. In some of these food-insecure countries, inheritance plays the primary role in determining land ownership. Some inheritance laws across the region are—or were initially—patriarchal, favoring men in the division of property. There have been some signs of progress in protecting women’s rights to inherit property; for example, in Uganda, lawmakers recently amended the Succession Act to ensure equal inheritance rights between men and women.

However, Uganda’s Succession Act was the first inheritance reform implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa since Mali’s in 2011, according to the World Bank, demonstrating the slow pace of progress. More countries must follow suit by implementing their own amendments or fresh, new laws on inheritance rights.

Support women’s entrepreneurship

Owning land goes hand-in-hand with access to financial services. In countries across these food-insecure regions of Africa, farmers must have land titles in order to access the credit necessary to increase agricultural productivity by hiring workers, purchasing animals or farming equipment, and covering transportation and storage costs of their goods. Credit supports entrepreneurship, which promotes innovation and the accumulation of wealth—both of which are integral to fighting food insecurity in the region. However, just as women’s rights to own land are hindered in some countries, their rights to enterprise are sometimes hindered as well.  

According to the World Bank, 71 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have laws that prohibit financial institutions from discriminating based on gender, and women often face more stringent loan arrangements than men when they do access credit. Furthermore, according to the International Monetary Fund, in Sub-Saharan Africa, just 37 percent of women own bank accounts compared to 48 percent of men. If a woman must rely on a man to open a bank account, take out a loan, or register a business, she cannot fully exercise her rights as an entrepreneur to hire workers or freely determine the agricultural methods she uses with the hopes of increasing output.

All countries in these food-insecure regions of Africa should criminalize gender-based discrimination with regard to credit. Allowing women an equal opportunity to receive loans encourages entrepreneurship, leading to more production and competition in the agricultural market. Benin’s Order No. 2349-5—which was implemented in 2022 and prohibits credit, banking, and decentralized financial systems from using discriminatory practices in granting access to credit—can serve as a model for other countries.

Putting the law into practice

Laws are only part of the solution. Guaranteeing equal access to land and credit requires systemic change. Localities and financial institutions need to make a concerted effort to ensure that women are aware of their rights and encourage them to embrace the opportunities to own land or become entrepreneurs.

Activists and government officials should work with local leaders to hold seminars for women, outlining their rights to own land and offering to process land titles. In the private sector, financial institutions can create campaigns specifically marketed towards women, publishing advertisements in print, social, and broadcast media that encourage women to apply for credit.

By taking concrete steps to ensure that women have equal access to land and entrepreneurship, countries can empower their full populations, bringing major benefits for the economy, agricultural productivity, and food security.

James Storen is the program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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To ensure that Sudan’s transition to democracy succeeds, its leaders must put limits on the power of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). For a successful political transformation, the SAF, led by Burhan, and the paramilitary RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan. Absent meaningful reform to rein in the existing power of the security services, institutional tension between the services could spark a wider conflict that would destabilize the country and threaten the transition to democracy.

Reform of the security services will not be easy, and it is the subject of ongoing debate as the factions try to strike a deal on a transitional government. But there are steps Sudan’s leaders and those who support Sudan’s transition to democracy can take now.

The struggle for reform

Sudan’s military has played a major role in the political landscape of the country since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came into power in a military coup and, following thirty years of autocratic rule, was removed in 2019 by another military coup. Following his ouster, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for fundamental reforms of the security sector, but Sudan continues to struggle with attempts at reform.

During the transition to democracy since 2019, the SAF and RSF have both cooperated and competed with one another for power in the country. For example, in an October 2021 coup ousting Sudan’s civilian leadership led by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, the SAF and RSF joined forces with an array of Sudan’s armed movements and marginalized groups. At the same time, the RSF and SAF compete with each other behind the scenes to retain as much economic and political power, influence, and control as possible.

Managing the tension between the SAF and RSF will be a paramount concern for Sudan’s leadership as it seeks to avoid future conflict between the security forces that could trigger greater violence. This is a key element to establishing peace, security, and sustainable development in the country while allowing for the development and modernization of Sudan’s security institutions.

Meaningful security sector reform must address the role of the SAF and the professionalization and integration of the RSF into the SAF. It must also place the security services firmly under civilian control and oversight. In the security sector, reforms to Sudan’s legal framework must include formally establishing the role of the security forces and a single national army trusted by local communities across Sudan, especially in the conflict areas of the country.

Another critical step is untangling the military institutions from the economy. This will be very difficult and will require careful planning, as the SAF and RSF currently dominate nearly all facets of political, economic, and media power in Sudan—and work to protect this influence. Civilian authorities should seize the moment and take steps to address the challenges of security sector reform in Sudan during the transition to civilian leadership. The Bashir regime created a vast array of expensive, corrupt, and ineffective security forces accused by critics of operating outside of the law, committing human-rights abuses, and creating an economy that directly benefits the security institutions—preventing more robust economic reform and development. To set the country on a better path, Sudan’s civilian leaders must enact reforms that begin to disentangle the military from the construction, telecommunication, aviation, and banking sectors.

Steps Sudan’s military and civilian leaders should take

In concert with the new civilian leadership, the military must commit to reform that helps modernize and develop the SAF. This includes ensuring that the SAF is tasked with protecting civilians and is accountable to the country’s civilian leadership. The SAF needs to be respected and not feared by those it is assigned to protect.

Civilian and military leaders must adopt legislation that addresses the specific gaps in Sudan’s transitional documents. Using the legal framework, civilian authorities should work with the military leadership to scale down the size of the SAF, find meaningful economic opportunities for former fighters, identify core priorities for its mission, and deploy a military that is able to meet the needs of the country. Sudan’s authorities should also identify funding to create and support a broad disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy that avoids a sole focus on the reintegration of militia fighters and includes appropriate financial oversight.

Outside of these efforts, civilian authorities must look for ways to reform Sudan’s economy that help to disentangle the vast array of companies linked to the security services, create opportunity to improve the business environment, and send the signal to investors, banks, and credit rating agencies that Sudan is open for business. Civilian authorities must take steps to increase transparency and accountability in the illicit gold trade to disrupt illicit financial flows to Sudan’s militias, including the RSF.

As Sudan’s economy faces uncertainty due to elevated food, fuel, and transportation prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank must balance the need for economic reforms in the country with the imperative to not destabilize a new civilian-led government. This government will need to walk a difficult line to implement reforms that address economic mismanagement by the SAF, the rising cost of living, and stubbornly high prices for basic goods that have further complicated efforts to secure international funding and support for the economy.

Steps the United States should take

The United States can help Sudan’s transition to democracy and help facilitate security sector reform. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, elevating Sudan on the foreign policy agenda and sending a signal to Sudan’s new leadership that the United States is ready to support Sudan as it enacts difficult reforms. This law is an effective messaging tool, encourages a coordinated US government response to support the civilian leadership, and can direct public reporting on sensitive issues, support a sanctions regime, and show the private sector that Sudan is not open for business as usual. Policymakers can use this legislation to support Sudan’s economic reforms, stability, and oversight of the security and intelligence services in the short term while seeking to hold human-rights abusers, spoilers to the transition, and those seeking to exploit Sudan’s natural resources accountable for their actions.

Working with other countries, the United States can also play a leading role to encourage international financial institutions to carefully leverage the approval of World Bank projects, consider withholding IMF disbursements, and institute public reporting to ensure that economic and security sector reforms remain on track. The diplomatic community must continue to apply coordinated pressure on Sudan’s authorities to ensure that they follow through on their verbal commitments and work with key external actors—including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—to encourage them to be meaningful contributors to Sudan’s democratic progress.

Sudan’s transition to democratic leadership provides another critical opportunity for security sector reform in the country. As the transitional government moves forward, Sudan’s civilian leadership can show investors, banks, and its people that greater connectedness to the global economy, a modern security apparatus, and a commitment to fighting corruption is in its long-term interest. Doing so would solidify a path toward a peaceful and democratic Sudan.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

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This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. 

The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent.

In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively.

The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). 

Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.

Explore the data in the Issue Brief

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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“It’s a good incentive… to invest in all these green infrastructures,” Pouyanné said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday.

Pouyanné agreed with many Europeans that the IRA is protectionist and undermines the transatlantic relationship, saying that this is part of a “trend” in which the United States, by creating its own rules, seems to be believing less and less in the multilateral trading system built on World Trade Organization agreements. But he also said that the law is a “clear political decision by the United States” made because “they want that green industries will take place on their territory.” For example, he noted, nearly 90 percent of solar panels are manufactured in China, creating “another problem of dependency” for both Europe and the United States in the future.

According to Pouyanné, the United States took advantage of an “opportunity” in the energy transition by passing the IRA, so “let’s do the same in Europe.” To avoid a future in which Europe relies heavily on imports, he said, the continent “must take decisions” to guarantee “that green industries [will] be located in Europe.”

Below are more highlights from the event, moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, where Pouyanné discussed the role of oil and gas in the energy transition and the energy impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“No way to escape” natural gas

• Pouyanné said that because this year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP28) in the United Arab Emirates is being hosted by a major oil-producing country, “it raises the bar for the whole oil and gas industry… [We have] to engage, as a lot of stakeholders are expecting us to do.”
• At COP26 in Glasgow, US President Joe Biden released a plan to tackle methane emissions from the oil and gas industry; Pouyanné said that TotalEnergies can lower methane emissions by 80 percent by 2030, while keeping an eye on lowering all other emissions from the production process. “If I can produce oil and gas with no emissions, I’ve done my job in production” to cut emissions, he argued.
• “Natural gas is a fundamental energy for the transition” because it emits half the methane that coal does, Pouyanné explained. Natural gas, he added, will also help provide a consistent source of energy to fill the gaps of intermittent wind and solar power while new infrastructure to support energy storage and transmission is brought up to scale.
• This year, with Russia’s war in Ukraine raising questions about the global energy supply, Pouyanné said that the world discovered how important energy reliability, affordability, and sustainability are—and how much reliability depends on gas. “On one side, the Biden administration [said] one year ago, ‘you need to diminish your emissions,’ and then we hear ‘you need to drill more.’” That, Pouyanné said, shows how the world will “need gas for very long.”

The global divide

• While TotalEnergies had invested fifteen billion dollars in Russia, it has begun withdrawing from its Russian investments. “We have impaired almost all of our Russian assets,” Pouyanné explained. “We have step-by-step progressively retracted from almost all of our business in Russia.”
• As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, Pouyanné warned, the West must “be careful” to avoid believing that the rest of the world sees the conflict as a fight between democracy and autocracy. “It’s not the dominant [narrative] today in the Middle East, in Asia, [or] in Africa,” he said, explaining that leaders in the Global South are more focused on developing their economies than the war. He recalled how there have been mixed responses from countries to imposing sanctions on Russia and to voting on condemning Russia in the United Nations.
• Pouyanné noted that he sees a similar division between the West and the rest in the climate debate with each passing COP. “It should not be” so divided, he said, “Let’s avoid antagonism. Let’s keep humility. Let’s listen to these [Global South] leaders.”

Investing in renewables—and fossil fuels

• A day after TotalEnergies posted a record yearly net profit, Pouyanné talked about the French oil major’s plan to spend the increased profits. The company plans to invest sixteen to eighteen billion dollars of its capital, with around five billion going toward low-carbon energies and about twelve billion going toward hydrocarbons. “With twelve billion dollars,” Pouyanné explained, the “objective is to continue to maintain… stable production for this decade and continue to grow our liquefied natural gas business.”
• But, he noted, it will be “very important” to “continue to invest in oil and gas” to keep profits and investments high across the energy sector: “If I can invest five billion dollars in low-carbon energy in 2023, it is because I have made money from oil and gas,” he explained.
• Pouyanné said that the biggest investment opportunities lie in emerging economies such as Brazil, India, and African countries. TotalEnergies, he explained, has invested in new oil fields in Brazil and new projects, including a $3.5-billion pipeline, in Uganda.
• While people in the West “complain about the Chinese influence in Africa,” he said, that influence is growing because of China’s more long-term approach to investing in the continent—rather than exporting natural resources right away.
• The TotalEnergies head said the company will take some of the profits made in Uganda, Mozambique, and elsewhere to “invest in Africa.” That includes the electric grid. “When you don’t have electricity in the country, it is difficult to [improve] economic growth,” he said.
• Pouyanné explained that with technologies such as electric vehicles gaining in popularity, “the oil market at a certain point will begin to decline… this is why we invest in electricity, because this is a growing market.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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The international community then committed to supporting Sudan’s transition toward democratization, reconstruction, and sweeping reforms across politics, economics, and the security structure to meet the aspirations of the country’s people after the revolution.

Yet the transitional process began to unravel almost immediately after the overthrow of the government of Omar al-Bashir on April 11, 2019, amid turmoil and instability. The Transitional Military Council—the military junta that took power after Bashir’s ouster—and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)—a coalition of civilian and rebel groups—agreed on the Constitutional Charter and on the formation of a Sovereignty Council to lead the country during the transition to democracy through fresh elections. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) between the transitional government and rebel groups in October 2020 appeared to be cementing those gains toward peace and democracy.

On October 25, 2021, however, a military coup upended that progress. Now, as the international community and domestic Sudanese actors, including the military and civilian groups, work toward a restoration of democracy, a number of challenges confront them. How they address them could either make or break the dreams of the young Sudanese behind the 2019 revolution.

A fresh start

The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have helped restart dialogue and have initiated a road map for transition. On December 5, 2022, the army, FFC, other political forces, civil society organizations, and some youth resistance committees signed a framework agreement to establish a civilian government to manage a democratic transition for two years, ending with free and fair elections.

Planning for general elections after a short transitional period must incorporate creative arrangements that account for the multiple political, security, and economic crises that Sudan faces.

The prospects for elections in Sudan must be discussed within the framework of the transition process as a whole. A crucial decision to be made by the political actors is the timing and sequencing of the election in relation to other transitional tasks, including peace-making and implementation or revision of the JPA, transitional justice, dismantling the power structures of the previous regime, economic reform, and constitution-building.

The election dilemma

The relationship between elections and constitution-building is particularly important. If elections are to be held, the question is to what? There must be some body—with a defined constitutional structure, powers, roles, and terms of office—that is being elected, and which once elected can fulfil its mandate.

Holding credible elections means more than the elections themselves being free and fair. It also means that the parameters defining the body to be elected must be broadly accepted and legitimate. Without that, losers of the election will challenge the legitimacy of the elected institutions, while the winners will push their victory to extremes and potentially have no limits in power. It’s an invitation to instability.

There is no scope for elected institutions under the 2019 Constitutional Charter. In August 2022, the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) proposed a new draft constitution as a framework for restoring the democratic path and regulating the procedures of the transitional period. This draft did not provide provisions for holding elections. All its institutions are appointed, not elected. This is because, until now, it has always been assumed that the transition will culminate with elections, rather than elections being part of a broader transitional process. The requirement for elections to be held at the end of the transitional period is specified in Article 13 of the JPA.

This is unusual. Often elections happen at some point in the middle of a transition process. In many cases, transitional institutions—such as a constituent assembly—are elected under a transitional constitution, and a final or permanent constitution is then developed by that elected body.

Elections or Constitution: What comes first?

The requirement that elections will happen only at the end of the transition places a huge burden on unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution before elections can take place.

Holding elections after the transitional period, and not in the middle of it, also means the transitional period has to be relatively short. Elections, which are vital to public legitimacy and to the establishment of normal institutionalized politics, cannot be postponed indefinitely. At some point the people of Sudan must decide on who and how they will be governed.

Yet there is reason to be concerned that there might not be enough time to develop a permanent constitution, based on a sufficient consensus, before the planned end of the transitional period.

There are only three (non-attractive) possible solutions:

1. Amend transitional constitutional documents, to allow for elections to transitional institutions, before the end of the transition process, with a permanent constitution to be developed after the election—although that is against Article 13 of the JPA.
2. Rush permanent constitution-building, to get a constitution in place before the scheduled end of the transition, with necessary compromises on the quality of document and on the extent to which the process can be fully inclusive.
3. Delay elections indefinitely until after the completion of permanent constitution-making, which may result in the ebbing away of the legitimacy of transitional institutions and raise the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention.

Whatever the case, the signatories to the Framework Agreement have begun to hold stakeholder conferences to discuss four fundamental issues necessary for signing the final political agreement: security sector reform, transitional justice issues, the regional case of eastern Sudan, and the issue of amending the JPA.

It is important to make use of these ongoing consultations to discuss extending the transitional period to accommodate institutional and legislative reforms and the necessary logistical preparations for elections. The international community, including UNITAMS, can help transfer technical expertise, international experiences, lessons learned, and resources to assist a democratic transition and plan elections, and to support sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

Aside from the constitution, Articles 12 and 13 of the JPA establish other preconditions for the holding of credible elections. They include:

• arrangements for international monitoring
• implementation of the agreed-upon plan for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees
• the conduct of the population census, “in an effective and transparent manner before the end of the transitional period, with international support and oversight”
• the enactment of a Political Parties Law
• the formation of the Electoral Commission

Similar preconditions are also specified in the draft constitution presented by the SBA. Additionally, it is necessary to conduct a campaign to make voters aware of the new constitution and of the electoral system.

This is a lot to do, and Sudan is starting from a low baseline. If the transition period is to be just two years, Sudan will require considerable technical support, and investment of resources, to meet the requirements of the JPA and the SBA’s draft transitional constitution.

Role of the international community

Since the formation of the transitional government in August 2019, a broad international campaign has been launched to support the democratic transition in Sudan. My organization, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), has joined this effort by providing technical support to the transitional government, especially in supporting the formation of the Electoral Commission and the Constitution Making Commission, and in enacting laws related to these commissions. This support from international institutions must continue and be consistent with the political changes that occur.

There is a mandate for such support. Security Council Resolution 2425 of 2020, establishing UNITAMS, gave the UN mission in Sudan a mandate to provide assistance related to the transition and peace. Given the scale of the task and tight deadline, such financial and programmatic support must be provided urgently. Much of the preparatory work, both on elections and on the constitution, can be started now, for example the formation of working groups and technical committees.

There is also precedent for this support. The Electoral Assistance Mission in Iraq was formed within the larger Iraq mission, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2576 (2021), to provide advice, support, and technical assistance to Iraq in planning, preparing, and conducting elections and referendums. Similarly, the European Union delegation assisted Jordan (2016) and Lebanon (2022). The African Union deployed, in May 2019, a team of observers and a team of technical experts ahead of the elections in Malawi.

The threats that may result from holding elections amid challenging security conditions—including the weaknesses and divisions within the state’s security institutions—cannot be overlooked. In addition to financial and logistical assistance, an international assistance mission should provide a qualified, trained, and experienced security force.

No time to waste

It is necessary to start soon and move fast to help build political consensus around the design of the process and the sequencing of the transition.

Failure to reach a political agreement on the electoral processes, on the constitutional structures that give rise to elections, and on legal rules regulating elections, may cause political tension, which could disrupt the elections and undermine the democratic transition.

The opportunities currently available to the Sudanese people to discuss issues of democratization, including the issue of organizing free and credible elections, with the help of the international community, might not last forever.

The international community needs to provide substantial support for the coming elections in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. This is vital for security, peace, and political stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Failure to do so would create security, political, and social risks that are difficult to count—or predict.

Sami A. Saeed is the head of the Sudan program at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. He previously served at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan from 2006–2020.

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The initiative has been applauded by domestic groups, stakeholders, and the international community. It demonstrates the importance of professional institutions and trade unions in bringing political organizations together and restoring the democratic transformation process. The draft constitution provides that the new transitional government be entirely civilian, thereby avoiding one of the mistakes of the 2019 Constitutional Charter, which established a civilian-military partnership. However, there are key issues that require further discussion and inclusion in the draft constitution.

The transitional constitution, by definition, is intended to govern the transitional period, during which the government should embark on a proper comprehensive, inclusive, transparent, and participatory constitution-making process to construct a permanent and democratic constitution. The current SBA constitution-production process does not, in any event, substitute the proper democratic constitution-making process that the transitional government should organize.

The most important point that the constitution drafters and reviewers should consider is that any re-established transitional period should not be a conventional transitional period. Rather, it is a foundational transitional period that should address as many fundamental problems of Sudan as possible. Historically speaking, during transitional periods, caretaker governments have only been empowered to organize elections and run the country in the interim, before handing power over to the party or parties that won the elections. Similarly, the discussion of the fundamental problems of the Sudanese state, such as the relationship between state and religion, language policies, and the constitutional relationship between the central government and the peripheries, has been pushed back to the post-transitional period.

However, experiences of other African nations—such as Ethiopia and South Africa—demonstrate that addressing these issues during the transition contributes to laying the foundations for democracy, peace, and stability. Learning from their experiences, conventional Sudanese political organizations, which tend to be politically conservative, should, therefore, not be allowed to make Sudan’s next transitional period another failure in the political and constitutional history of the country.

What a draft constitution must entail

Another equally important point is the need for the draft constitution to reasonably address and rectify the shortcomings of the previous transitional period, which had partially resulted from the deficiencies of the 2019 Constitutional Charter. A clear example was the charter’s silence on the powers of the state or regional governments and their relationship with the central government; this proved to be extremely problematic, as neither level had clear limitations on the powers they exercised, creating confusion and tensions between them.

It seems that the SBA draft constitution has not learned from the 2019 charter in this regard, as it also fails to mention this significant distribution of powers. This exclusion is particularly perplexing given that the SBA explicitly establishes a federal state in which the exclusive and concurrent powers of the federal and state or regional units should be expressly set out.

The draft constitution should contain a detailed article on citizenship, which is the indispensable foundation of any modern democratic state. For a nation that has been destabilized and embroiled in civil wars because of ethnic and religious dichotomies, enshrining universal citizenship principles and rules in the transitional constitution would be a necessary indication that the ethnic, religious, cultural, and regional policies that have fragmented the Sudanese nation and caused the deterioration of the state have no place in Sudan.

Relatedly, the article on the nature of the state should provide for establishing an impartial state that does not adopt a religious, ethnic, cultural, or regional identity. The drafters and reviewers of the new transitional constitution should consider the historical demands of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, led by Abdulaziz Alhilu, calling for the separation of state and religion. In this regard, the progress made during the transitional period, namely, the signing of a declaration of principles that separated the state from religion, should be reflected in and reaffirmed by the draft constitution.

Finally, the draft constitution should not overlook the linguistic diversity of the country—both ensuring that ethnic groups have the right to use their vernacular languages and dedicating a separate foundational article that conspicuously recognizes the right of state and regional governments to adopt a vernacular language as a working or official language. It should recognize the right of any state or region to adopt such a language as the language of instruction in its local schools.

In this regard, Sudan should learn from the Malaysian experiment, where the use of vernacular languages is constitutionally recognized, while at the same time promoting English and Malay as linguae francas and mediums of instruction in higher education institutions. To support these efforts, the draft constitution should establish a board, similar to that established by the South Africa Constitution, to ensure the continuous promotion of the use of vernacular languages as well as its development.

Technocratic government

The experience of the second government (February 2021-October 2021) during the previous transitional period (August 2019-October 2021) indicated that the participation of political parties in the government would spark unnecessary, paralyzing political differences and conflicts. It is, therefore, important that the draft constitution unequivocally provide that the transitional government be technocratic. That is the only way to avoid the repetition of the political differences and conflicts that the transitional governments witnessed in the months that preceded the October 25, 2021 coup, which would have probably been impossible had those differences and conflicts not existed.

The SBA draft constitution provides that political forces sign the political declaration, according to which the draft constitution shall be adopted, and nominate individuals for the senior positions of prime minister, Sovereignty Council member, and cabinet roles, among others. The draft constitution, surprisingly, goes as far as enabling those forces to nominate and appoint the members of the independent commissions, chief justice, president, members of the Constitutional Court, and judges of the Supreme Court.

Vesting the power to nominate the prime minister and members of the Sovereignty Council in the political forces that sign the political declaration will, undoubtedly, ignite deep and irreconcilable political differences that might make the establishment of the transitional government impossible. Furthermore, the nomination of the members of the independent commissions, the chief justice, the president and members of the Constitutional Court, and the judges of the Supreme Court is obviously incompatible with the principles of democracy, as well as the independence of these institutions and positions.

To avoid political differences or impossibility of agreement between the Central Committee of the Forces for Freedom and Change and other political groups, and to ensure the independence of the institutions that should be independent in a democratic and open society, the draft constitution should consider creating independent and impartial mechanisms, such as a committee or council of wise persons, that will have the power to select the prime minister and nominate individuals for the other high constitutional positions. 

More significantly, providing for a federal system without constitutionally enshrining the detailed exclusive and concurrent powers of each level or unit of the federal union undermines the very idea of federalism. It is, therefore, extremely important that the draft constitution contain three comprehensive lists of exclusive and concurrent powers of the federal and regional or state governments: one for the federal government (exclusive federal powers); a second for the state or regional governments (exclusive state or regional powers); and a third for both levels of government (concurrent powers).

Finally, the Bill of Rights of the draft transitional constitution, which is, in fact, taken almost verbatim from the 2005 Interim Constitution and the 2019 Constitutional Charter, should be more elaborate and comprehensive, explicitly providing for the procedures and principles that ensure the actual protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms by state institutions, especially the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court. It should also empower lower courts across the country to admit and decide human rights cases in some specific situations, as is the case in the United States.

In this regard, an alternative comprehensive and detailed new bill of rights, ideally based on and adapted from the 2010 Kenyan Constitution Bill of Rights, should seriously be considered by the Sudanese Bar Association or the reviewers of its draft constitution. The Kenyan Constitution’s Bill of Rights is one of the most comprehensive and elaborate bills of rights on the African continent.

In essence, the initiative undertaken by the Sudanese Bar Association and its production of a draft constitution has created robust political momentum. Additionally, it has created real possibility for uniting pro-democracy forces at a critical point in history—something that would put the pro-democracy civilian camp in a strong position to establish an entirely civilian government.

For this draft constitution to be a solid foundation for a new democratic transformation process, its provisions should be based on an important assumption that the transitional period is a foundational period and not merely conventional transitional period, where a caretaker government runs the state and organizes elections within a year or so. The resolution of some of Sudan’s historical problems—such as the relationship between state and religion, addressing its diversity management issues, and rectifying the deficiencies and shortcomings of the previous transitional period and those of the 2019 Constitutional Charter—should be genuinely considered as much as possible by the SBA draft constitution. 

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is Sudan’s former justice minister.

Mutasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wellenberg Center for Human Rights, based in Washington, DC.

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1. What do you make of this peace deal, and what should we be watching to see if it holds?

Less than forty-eight hours before the two-year anniversary of the conflict, it is a step forward that has created great hope. It is also a salutary break for the civilian populations after almost two years of conflict. Since November 2020, the war has displaced more than two million Ethiopians and plunged hundreds of thousands into famine. But this agreement is not yet peace: It is the cessation of hostilities. The composition and determination of the members of the committee responsible for the implementation of the agreement will be decisive. Above all, major questions remain unresolved, including the question of Eritrea. The neighboring nation’s role in the peace deal is not clear after it joined the war on Ethiopia’s side, which is cause for concern considering all the crimes Eritrean soldiers have committed in Tigray over the past two years. Can there be peace without justice? This is the question that Tigrayan civilians must ask themselves these days.

—Rama Yade is senior director of the Council’s Africa Center.

The peace deal is excellent news; bringing an immediate end to this particularly cruel war is good for everyone. It remains to be seen, however, if the Tigrayans will uphold their promise to disarm, and if the Ethiopians will open access so that aid organizations can bring desperately needed help to civilians. We also have to watch the actions of the Eritreans, who are a party to the conflict but have not been included in the peace deal. Are they going to suspend their military operations? Will they go home and demobilize?

—Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center.

2. What role will outside countries in Africa or the West, or institutions such as the African Union and United Nations, need to play going forward? What guidance would you give them?

This is a success for African Union head and Senegalese President Macky Sall, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who all helped broker the deal. The implementation of the road map will be crucial. While the agreement claimed that TPLF combatants will be “disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated,” fighting has been continuing in Tigray, where Ethiopian federal troops, backed by the Eritrean army and forces and militias from the neighboring Amhara and Afar regions, have been advancing since mid-October.

—Rama Yade

The West and international organizations like the UN and AU can play a vital role in monitoring the three sides of the conflict (the third being Eritrea) and holding them accountable. They of course need to be balanced, but that does not mean they can’t be tough—they shouldn’t pull their punches.

—Michael Shurkin

3. How can and should Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed move forward with governing the country as a whole? What kind of mark does this conflict leave for him?

Among the main points of the declaration signed by the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, the two sides committed to “safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia” and “restore constitutional order in the Tigray region.” This is a fundamental question. It is up to Abiy to prove that the Nobel committee was not wrong by awarding him its most prestigious recognition: The Peace Prize.

—Rama Yade

Abiy has to try to calm militants on all sides and ensure that everyone benefits from what should come next: reconstruction and development. On a regional level, a successful end to the war does not resolve other issues such as Ethiopia’s development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egypt and to a lesser extent Sudan oppose. That was put on the back burner because of the war but may now return to the fore.

—Michael Shurkin

The post What to watch next on Ethiopia’s peace deal in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sudan’s transitional government, formed in 2019 following the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir, was like an airplane that after a rocky takeoff, was just about to level off when it was shot down. Under former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the transitional government struggled to address a variety of deep security and economic challenges, such as tribal conflicts, multiple armies, the involvement of the military in non-military industries, poor governance and rule of law, and an inefficient economic regulatory regime. The Sudanese people, who had taken to the streets in bold defiance of a brutal thirty-year dictatorship, expected an immediate improvement in their economic situation after the collapse of al-Bashir’s regime. However, economic conditions, aggravated by extensive smuggling of fuel and other commodities and instability in the local currency, continued to deteriorate. The Sudanese pound depreciated further, and national fuel shortages remained as dire as they had been under al-Bashir’s regime.

After Hamdok’s government unified the exchange rate in March 2021 and lifted subsidies that June, the situation changed significantly. Fuel queues disappeared and for seven continuous months from March to October 2021, the Sudanese pound stabilized and maintained its strength in the face of the US dollar—for the first time since South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011.

Encouraged by these domestic reforms, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States, and the European Union started providing financial support. It was expected that the country would receive more than four billion dollars in assistance by the end of the 2022 fiscal year. This economic and political stability would have encouraged private sector investment in the country. The government’s constitutional reform and transitional justice efforts, as well as infrastructure plans to end chronic power outages and increase oil production, were in advanced stages.

The military coup on October 25, 2021, upended the progress Sudan was slowly making. So why did the military risk international censure and isolation by overthrowing the transitional government? The coup leaders might have thought that they would be supported by Middle Eastern countries with whom, it is believed, they have close ties—namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, and Egypt. The role of these countries is, therefore, pivotal as far as the undermining or restoration of Sudan’s democratic transitional process is concerned.

The two most important Middle Eastern countries in this regard, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have thus far taken positions that have certainly disappointed the military. Neither country has provided any public financial assistance to compensate for the withdrawal of aid from international financial institutions and Western partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe.

Rather, both countries joined the United States and United Kingdom in affirming on November 1, 2021, the four “countries’ stance with the people of Sudan and emphasiz[ing] the importance of supporting their aspirations for a democratic and peaceful nation.” The statement called for “the full and immediate restoration of… civilian-led transitional government and institutions.” Saudi Arabia also joined the United States in facilitating a meeting between the leaders of the coup and the Central Committee of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a political coalition of the political and civil society organizations and groups that led the protests leading to al-Bashir’s ouster. The FFC had previously refused to join the so-called Tripartite Mechanism talks mediated by the United Nations, African Union, and Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD), due to the participation of political forces previously part of al-Bashir’s government, which undermined the credibility of the talks, but not that of the whole process.

Still, the international community must keep its eyes on the Middle Eastern nations that the coup leaders might have expected help from. It was reported on June 20 that the UAE, in collaboration with a Sudanese businessman, would invest six billion dollars to build a port in Sudan and provide a three-hundred-million-dollar deposit to the Central Bank of Sudan, which would help to slightly ease the economic pressure faced by coup leaders. The Abu Dhabi Port Company denied that it signed any agreements to build a port, but stated that preliminary discussions are taking place with Sudanese authorities. The existence of such discussions is worrisome, as they, if successful, would embolden the military in any negotiations with the civilian forces.

More ambiguous still is Israel’s stance vis-a-vis the coup, as pro-democracy forces in Sudan interpreted Israel’s failure to condemn the coup as tacit support for the military government and a sign of its intention to proceed with normalization efforts, started under the transitional government in 2020. While Israel is thought to have remained in contact with Sudanese military leaders, there is no indication that it is actively working on finalizing the normalization process under the current circumstances. This is in line with the US position, which has urged for the process to be halted until Sudan returns to a democratic transformation process under the leadership of a civilian government.

Egypt’s position meanwhile remains quite unclear, although its support is unlikely to make a huge difference as it is itself embroiled in an unprecedented economic crisis and is not in a position to offer the Sudanese military financial support. In addition, Egypt’s geopolitical influence has declined vis-a-vis the rise of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey, which are now increasingly playing bigger regional roles.

Against this backdrop, it is extremely important that the Troika of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway—which has consistently supported democratic civilian rule in Sudan—jointly coordinate its efforts with these states. The Troika should involve both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in efforts to help restore the transition process. It should encourage Israel, which maintains communications with Sudan’s military leaders, despite not having diplomatic relations, to reinforce the messages of the international community that the undermining of Sudan’s democracy is unacceptable and that practical steps must be taken to establish a purely civilian, popularly supported government.

This coordination between the Troika and these three states should focus on what shouldn’t be done, as well as on what should be done to help the Sudanese people restart the democratic transition process. The UAE should refrain from engaging in any potential investment discussions with a de facto government that is continuously and persistently resisted by the vast majority of the Sudanese people. It should halt discussions with Sudanese authorities to build a port in Sudan. Instead, the UAE should join the United States and Saudi Arabia in their efforts to end the current political crisis, an important step for the stability and development of Sudan, as well as for the creation of a suitable environment for sustainable foreign investments.

Efforts by the Troika, joined by Saudi Arabia and possibly the UAE, should also be undertaken to revive and strengthen the Tripartite Mechanism by fostering greater involvement by the special envoys and representatives of these countries. Alternatively, there should be a new international initiative to facilitate negotiations between the Sudanese parties. As for Israel, the decision to not finalize the normalization of relations with Sudan is also one that should be applauded and strongly encouraged.

The revival and strengthening of the Tripartite Mechanism or establishment of an alternative one is profoundly important following the recent announcement by the military leadership that it won’t be a part of any dialogue with civilians and that it would hand over power to civilians only if they reach a consensus. The aim of this position is to undermine regional and international endeavors to facilitate negotiations between the pro-democracy forces that struggle for political freedom and civilian rule, on the one hand, and the military that upended the transition, on the other. It indicates that the military does not intend to give up power, as reaching a consensus under the current circumstances is impossible. The military will most likely use this impossibility as a justification for establishing a government that it can control. It might, in anonther likely scenario, hold elections for which the country is not ready, which is a common practice to legitimize the status quo.    

The history of Sudan demonstrates that the people have always won the battle for freedom and democracy against dictators. The Middle Eastern countries that are interested in establishing political relations with Sudan, such as Israel, and those that are interested in investing, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, should therefore stand on the side of pro-democracy civilian forces. At the very least, they should not hinder the continued struggle of the Sudanese people to defeat the coup and return to a democratic transition.

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Mustasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wellenberg Center for Human Rights, based in Washington, DC.

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Odinga has said he will challenge the result in court—adding to Kenya’s spotty recent history of contested elections. But in the meantime, we asked Atlantic Council Africa Center nonresident senior fellows Constance Berry Newman and Aubrey Hruby to paint a bigger picture of what this East African powerhouse faces in the longer term.

This election has been characterized as a test of democracy in East Africa. Why? 

Since East Africa includes politically troubled countries such as Eritrea, South Sudan, and Somalia, where would one go to seek a model of democracy? Maybe Kenya. Since 1992, it has had uneven election experiences—some in which the results were contested, yet in the end were accepted by citizens—but it has had a functioning multiparty democracy since 2002. Even the election crisis of 2007-08 resulted in a workable democratic compromise through a government of national unity, which laid the basis for a new reform constitution. So there is reason to hope that Kenyan democracy and its elections will become models. More broadly, the country is home to many positive trends, including one of the highest literacy rates in Africa, a growing middle class, and some of the most vibrant media on the African continent.

—Constance

Given the concerns around democracy that emanate from Kenya’s neighbors, mainly Uganda and Rwanda, it is natural to look to Kenya as a democratic stronghold in East Africa. Yet still, seeing this election as a test of democracy is a bit too general; more accurately, it is a test of the institutional reform (particularly in the judiciary) that came in the new constitution promulgated in 2010 after the post-election political violence in 2008 that killed 1,200 Kenyans. As Odinga challenges the election outcome in court, the judiciary will have to stand strong against heavy political pressure and maintain its independence and faith in the integrity of the process.  

—Aubrey 

The economy drove many voters’ concerns. Is Ruto equipped to reverse Kenya’s fortunes? 

As a candidate, Ruto indicated his commitment to building one hundred thousand affordable housing units for poor Nairobi residents, creating four million jobs a year, and providing national hospital health insurance for all Kenyans—including those in the informal sector—within the first one hundred days of his presidency. These are extremely ambitious commitments for Kenyans who are all too familiar with disappointment. But Ruto knows the good, the bad, and the ugly of Kenya; therefore if anyone can manipulate the levers of government and the private sector to make life better for the Kenyans, it is him.

—Constance

Like many countries around the world, Kenya is struggling with high inflation and slower growth as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the reduction in tourism in African markets, and the war in Ukraine. Inflation crested 8 percent in July—a more than five-year high—and youth unemployment is rampant. Growth slowed in 2022 and is expected to end up somewhere between 5 and 6 percent, down from the 7.5 percent of 2021. Election uncertainty will be the enemy of business in all of East Africa, which is why the heads of neighboring states moved quickly to congratulate Ruto. As investment has slowed and the strong dollar has made additional borrowing on the Eurobond market prohibitively expensive, it will be critical for the new president to play a strong commercial-diplomacy role abroad with the aim of attracting investment into critical sectors such as agriculture and financial services. Domestically, he will need to focus on expanding credit for small and medium-sized enterprises and making agriculture more productive and climate resilient. 

—Aubrey 

What else should the new administration expect to accomplish in the coming weeks and months? What challenges will they face? 

Key to effective elections is the citizens’ acceptance of the results; this is the responsibility of the election commission, media, opposition, and, importantly, the citizens themselves. Because the results of the election will likely be challenged in court, Ruto must encourage calm while the judicial process unfolds. Depending on the results of the process, whoever is inaugurated will face the challenge of fostering national unity by demonstrating genuine commitment to govern in the interests of all Kenyans. The general population will be concerned about social spending (for example, education and health care) and public discussions about the options could be encouraged. Although debt relief is not a bread-and-butter issue, it will affect all citizens—while the new administration will likely be required to restructure public expenditures, thanks to the terms of a $2.3 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund in 2021.

—Constance

Early indications show Nairobi quite calm despite the challenges to the election, perhaps as a result of the still-fresh memories of 2007. Given that Kenya has been a fast-growing economy over the past decade, whether or not Ruto can deliver economic advancement for the “hustler nation” in the near term will be determined by three factors: how long election uncertainty lasts (and if the election has to be rerun), how quickly he can earn the trust of the Nairobi business and political elite, and his ability to effectively attract investment to fuel Kenya’s return to growth. 

—Aubrey 

What does a stable and functional Kenya mean for the rest of the region? 

The following words describe the role of a stable Kenya: “peacebuilder,” “critical trader,” and “strategic partner.” The country is usually thought of as the regional player to address conflicts (except when it needed help in addressing its own conflict in 2007). In 2005, for example, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the civil war in Sudan was largely brokered because of Kenyan perseverance. It has also had historically close political ties with the United States, China, and India, which makes its stability important for East Africa.

—Constance

Kenya is the dominant player of East Africa, constituting more than 40 percent of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP) and playing home to Mombasa—the coastal city through which most trade with the region happens. As much as 85 percent of Ugandan imports and exports go through Mombasa, and the further expansion of the standard gauge railway in the region will serve to deepen the economic connections. That’s why a stable Kenya is absolutely critical for the region. It is not only the connector of the Horn to the mineral richness of eastern Congo, but also the economic, financial, and logistical hub of East Africa more broadly.

—Aubrey

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The US deployment of about 450 Special Operations troops back to Somalia will help Washington’s local counterterrorism partners pressure the increasingly dangerous al-Shabaab terrorist group—which most Americans do not realize has become al-Qaeda’s largest, wealthiest, and deadliest franchise. Apart from the decision to send US forces to shore up NATO’s defenses against Russian aggression in Europe, the Somalia deployment may represent the largest new commitment of US forces overseas by President Joe Biden.

As counterterrorism professionals with more than fifty-five years of national-security experience between us—in the White House and three cabinet departments, and under four presidents from both parties—we are increasingly concerned about the popular perception that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have been defeated. As far back as 2018, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism foresaw that groups such as ISIS and al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia, would continue to threaten US interests, and that terrorists would seek to gain control of safe havens in countries whose governments are too weak or distracted to contain them without outside help. Premature declarations of victory are dangerous. 

This is why Somalia is an important story. The recent election of president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud represents progress, but al-Shabaab—whose leaders frequently call for attacks on Americans—is gaining power in southern and central Somalia and is close to being able to mount external operations targeting the United States. One such plot was already disrupted: In December 2020, the Department of Justice unsealed an indictment for a plot by al-Shabaab’s leaders to carry out a 9/11-style aircraft hijacking in the United States. The Philippines extradited an alleged al-Shabaab operative to the United States to stand trial for the scheme.

Al-Shabaab also has a history of luring young Somali-Americans to Somalia to fight foreign invaders, then using them for terrorist attacks against civilians. Such attacks have reached beyond Somalia, killing sixty-seven at a shopping mall in 2013 and 147 at a university in 2015, both in Kenya. A plot to bring down a passenger plane in February 2016 failed only by good luck and a skillful aircrew. And in 2020, Al-Shabaab killed three Americans who were training Kenyan counterterrorism forces.

For all these reasons, Biden’s order to resend US service members—which reversed a December 2020 decision by the Trump administration to withdraw the then-remaining 750 US military personnel in Somalia—was the right move. Conditions on the ground in 2020 did not justify confidence that Somali forces were ready to take on al-Shabaab without help. Early that year, US Africa Command said publicly (and repeated it just before then President Donald Trump’s decision) that al-Shabaab “remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.” 

Since the US withdrawal, al-Shabaab has grown in power and wealth. Open sources estimate that the group has grown to seven thousand fighters and receives annual revenues of $130 million from criminal activities, which have included forcing Somalis to give their charitable contributions to al-Shabaab instead of actual charities. For comparison, the Somali government’s total revenue in 2019 was $342 million. Given the number of people living in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, that makes the terrorist organization more than twice as rich per capita as the Somali government.

In February, when the United States carried out a drone strike in defense of Somali military forces being attacked by al-Shabaab, US forces advised and assisted Somali partners from outside the country. But this is hardly the best approach to working effectively with partner counterterrorism forces. 

The Biden administration’s decision will allow US troops to once again train and work alongside the Danab, Somalia’s most effective counterterrorism unit. This will result in better battlefield intelligence collection, especially the kind of gritty tactical intelligence from local human sources needed to successfully counter al-Shabaab. A persistent presence also enhances security for US diplomats and civilian specialists to carry out their vital work. 

A small footprint, especially of US Special Operations Forces, will strengthen and rebuild Somali counterterrorism capabilities in ways that an “over-the-horizon” presence never could. This will keep the pressure on al-Shabaab, limiting the group’s ability to plan and mount external operations that threaten Americans in the US homeland and overseas.

Experience has shown that we ignore growing terrorism threats in contested spaces at our peril. Biden’s decision to send a small number of US troops into Somalia with a limited mission needs to be given the credit and support it deserves. American lives may well depend on it.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, director of the Future of DHS Project, and co-director of the Future of Counterterrorism Project. He is a former senior official at the US Department of State and deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

Christopher P. Costa is the executive director of the International Spy Museum and a former career US Army intelligence officer. He served as special assistant to the president and senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council from 2017 to 2018. 

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Today, the country is on a knife’s edge. 

The promised road to reform is now fully blocked by security forces bent on what they claim is an effort to “save” the country from civilian leaders. But as these forces hold ever tighter to power, they are squeezing the life out of the country: Since their October 25 coup that effectively brushed aside the civilian transition and reignited a popular revolution, the economy has gone into a death spiral. Inflation is rising above 250 percent, the value of the country’s currency has plummeted against the dollar, and the price of key imported commodities in Sudan, such as wheat and fuel, have risen by more than 30 percent. 

In other words, a loaf of bread that cost two Sudanese pounds when civilians assumed office two years ago now costs more than fifty. The United Nations World Food Program projects that 40 percent of the country’s population will face “acute food insecurity” later this year if nothing changes, leading donors to begin planning for a new humanitarian emergency in the country’s urban areas.

As Sudan’s supporters watch this calamitous economic situation unfold, they are desperately searching for any defensible reason to restart lending and debt-relief programs to help avoid the coming financial collapse and humanitarian emergency. But, here too, the military has given no reason to show any leniency: Since the October coup d’état, dozens of leading political figures and protest leaders have been targeted for disappearance or arrest, while ninety-three pro-democracy demonstrators have been killed by security forces (which continue to use a nationwide state of emergency as justification for their brutality).

Last week, the country’s military leader, General Abdallah Fattah al-Burhan, even threatened to expel the head of the country’s UN peace-support mission for “lying publicly” and failing to report to the UN Security Council the supposed progress under the junta’s rule.

As the junta hunkers down internally, its emissaries are on a globetrotting tour of friendly capitals, from Moscow to Abu Dhabi, seeking political backing and a financial rescue. So far, no one has been willing to wager on the military or against the will of the Sudanese people, whose demands for democratic change have not abated.

But that could soon change. A series of recent meetings in Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi suggest that Sudan’s longtime friends are rapidly losing patience with the political deadlock and impending economic collapse, and are searching for a way to create a soft landing (even if it comes at the expense of the Sudanese population’s democratic aspirations).

For Gulf partners, who bought up Khartoum real estate and commercial holdings at fire-sale prices in the waning days of the Omar al-Bashir regime (and since his ouster), Sudan’s unraveling would spell disaster for their investments. Egypt, which continues to view Sudan as its vassal, fears a mass exodus of Sudanese northward and political chaos on its southern border. Khartoum’s ability to stay in political lockstep with Cairo in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam negotiations with Ethiopia—Egypt’s single biggest foreign-policy priority—is also a major question.

Considering Sudan’s political history, the time appears ripe for another notorious elite deal, with regional buy-in, that walks the country back from the financial brink—but, in the process, short-circuits any hope that the bottom-up political movement will lead to genuine civilian rule and democracy.

Washington needs to get serious

For weeks, Khartoum has been awash in rumors that the hapless former prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, seen as capable of putting financial markets at ease, could return. The re-establishment of a civilian and technocratic—but compliant—cabinet, which puts a more acceptable face on the regime, might also follow. But most concerning is the discussion of the establishment of a new Security and Defense Council that would ensure security interests remain firmly in the military’s hands and separate from civilian-led ministries. This would leave the military with ultimate executive authority. 

Such a set-up would pave the way for quick elections, which the military and its political allies would surely dominate, and thereby provide new surface-level legitimacy for unreformed security interests and their foreign backers. As they likely see it, the only real losers under such a deal are the 44 million Sudanese not in the military or associated with the previous regime, who will once again see their aspirations for a peaceful, democratic future dashed by political expediency and regional stability.

Sudan’s dedicated pro-democracy movement would categorically reject any deal engineered with outside backing and did not emerge from a process they were fully a part of—but that doesn’t mean that the military and their allies might not still try. Importantly, it is not too late to prevent this scenario. But it requires the United States and partners to step up and demonstrate a strategic focus on long-term change and a return to core principles that bring it into greater alignment and allegiance with Washington’s true partners: the Sudanese people.

First, the international community must remind itself that Sudan’s revolution was never merely about overthrowing a dictator or dismantling his party; it was about undoing the corrupt, racist, and authoritarian power structures that have governed Sudan since independence. 

Western calls for the military to enact “confidence-building measures” only plays into the existing discriminatory power dynamics in the country and elevate the security services as an equal, if not legitimate, part of Sudan’s political future (and therefore undermines a core tenet of the revolution). Instead, the military should be getting constant reminders that their days are numbered and a return to the pre-coup, pre-revolution status quo is both impossible and unacceptable.

Second, Washington needs to improve its public messaging in the face of the military’s political double-dealing. It is no longer enough for the United States to say it’s “on the side of the protesters.” If it were, it would call out every single abuse and death suffered by pro-democracy activists at the hands of the security services, as well as demand an investigation of crimes committed under the coup government. Instead, Washington’s numbness to the sustained deluge of crimes normalizes the deaths of innocent people and reinforces the military’s hold on power.

Third, the United States needs to start listening to the demands of the people and let them inform its public statements. Calling for a “return to civilian-led transitional government” or the “full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement,” as recent US and Troika statements have, reflects deafness to popular calls for a new way forward, tells allies on the ground that stability is more important than transformation, and suggests that Washington would rather save face by salvaging formulas it once endorsed rather than seeing the writing on the wall and changing tack.

Lastly, it is well past time that the United States rebalance the negotiating table by imposing targeted sanctions on the individuals directing these abuses and profiting from the current stalemate. Since the military’s coup, those most responsible for the disruption of the transition and human-rights abuses have suffered no direct consequences for their actions. While symbolic, the recent sanctioning of Sudan’s Central Reserve Police by the US Treasury was short on impact and rang hollow with both the victims and the perpetrators: With no dollar-denominated bank holdings or large physical presence outside of Sudan, the sanctions have little to no practical effect. And by targeting an institution with far less responsibility for Sudan’s failing state than the military, even the symbolism of the action was lost on most. 

Instead, Washington continues to betray a lack of real understanding of what is happening on the ground, who is responsible, and how to impact the calculations of the principal belligerents. But it is not too late to correct the course. Making clear the conditions required to restart lending and avoiding sanctions, conceived in consultation with its democratic allies on the streets, could help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact and demonstrate that Washington is giving real weight to the popular will.

In the long run, this is what is required to achieve actual stability—not the cheap imitation Sudan has always known.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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Exploitation of social platforms

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance  

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops

Documenting dissent

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine 

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires  

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

Security

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire 

Regional reactions

Ugandan general tweets support for Russia

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context 

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance  

Google, Meta, and Twitter are taking action against Russian state-owned media accounts to limit the spread of harmful information online. At the request of the European Union, Meta will restrict access to Kremlin-owned outlets RT and Sputnik across the EU. Earlier, Meta announced it would also restrict access to several Russian state media accounts in Ukraine at the government’s request. In addition, the company has demonetized the accounts of Russian state-owned media organizations and prohibited them from posting ads on Facebook and Instagram.  

In a similar move, Google has blocked RT and Sputnik’s YouTube channels across Europe. It will also prevent RT and other relevant outlets from receiving funding from ads on their websites and apps.  

Meanwhile, Twitter announced actions to reduce the spread of articles from Russian state-affiliated media. Links to Kremlin media will now include a “stay informed” label. Since the start of the invasion, there has been an uptick in the sharing of Kremlin media articles on Twitter, with more than 45,000 tweets a day directing users to state-affiliated outlets. 

Twitter also said that advertisements in Ukraine and Russia are on pause to ensure that critical public safety information is “elevated.” To this end, users in the two countries will no longer see tweet recommendations from accounts they don’t follow. 

Responding to social media companies’ increased moderation efforts, the Russian government ordered companies to comply with a new law that mandates social media platforms operating in Russia must set up local offices and register with Russia’s media watchdog, Roskomnadzor.  Under this legislation, local representatives could be held liable if Russia feels platforms are not abiding by local laws. These actions have been widely condemned by digital rights experts, as the law could be used as justification to intimidate employees with the threat of arrest and pressure companies to engage in censorship. 

Both Russian independent news outlets and Tik Tok have already fielded requests from the government to take down content related to the war in Ukraine. In response to what Russia claims is “censorship” by social media companies, Roskomnadzor announced restrictions on access to Facebook, and access to Twitter appears to be limited as of February 26. 

Over the weekend, Facebook and Twitter removed two covert influence operations targeting Ukrainians. One operation was tied to Russia, and another had connections to Belarus. Facebook also said the pro-Belarus hacking group Ghostwriter was targeting Ukrainians, including the military.

—Jacqueline Malaret, Assistant Director, Washington, DC

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington, DC

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops 

Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, approved a proposal by the Security and Anti-Corruption Committee to draft a law introducing criminal liability for sharing “fake” content related to Russia’s armed forces. Members of the ruling United Russia party previously proposed introducing such a bill, citing “a lot of disinformation” on social media.  The bill passed its first reading on March 2 and is expected to be presented for its second reading in several days.

The draft law states that the punishment for sharing fake content about Russian troops would be fifteen years in prison. The move could be a reaction to the increasing amount of footage showing Russia targeting civilian areas in Ukraine, which Russia denies. The law might intimidate Russian internet users and discourage them from sharing or saving such footage, particularly anything documenting war crimes. Meanwhile, Karim Khan, a prosecutor with the International Criminal Court, announced that he would investigate Russia for possible war crimes or crimes against humanity in Ukraine. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

On March 1, Wikipedia shared a notice they received from Russia’s Roskomnadzor information agency threatening to block the crowdsourced platform due to its Russian-language article on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The notice cited the inclusion of information about Russian military personnel casualties and Ukrainian civilian victims. In response, Wikipedia shared workarounds for users if Wikipedia does become blocked in Russia. 

That same day, Russian users found themselves unable to access the websites for the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and the independent broadcaster TV Rain. Around the same time, the Russian Prosecutor General’s office released a statement on Telegram saying they had submitted demands to Roskomnadzor to restrict access to both channels. The statement accused the outlets of calling for extremism and violence, spreading “false information” regarding Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, and calling for “mass public events.” 

The Prosecutor General’s office stated that the restrictions could legally be put in place due to Article 15.3 Federal Law No. 149-FZ Paragraph 1, “On Information, Information Technologies and Data Protection,” which covers the restriction of access to information inciting mass riots, extremist activities, and participation in mass public events. According to Article 15.3, the Russian government must first notify the online publication hosting the problematic content and request that it be removed; if the content is not immediately removed, they may then proceed with restricting access to the online publication.

TV Rain posted on Telegram that the Prosecutor General’s office did not identify specific materials on their website that violated Russian laws. It also said it strictly followed legal standards and used trusted sources when covering events in Ukraine.

Both Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain began trending on Twitter in Russia as these events unfolded. 

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington DC 

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets  

On February 24, Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor stated that Russian media outlets were “obliged” to rely on information received from Russian official sources while covering Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine. The statement also argued that Roskomnadzor would block all attempts of disseminating “knowingly false information” on the internet. Considering the fact that Russia has generally avoided disclosing information about the exact number of casualties and military loss in Ukraine, Roskomnadzor’s announcement might be an attempt to prevent independent media from reporting casualty statistics. Having said that, Kremlin outlet RBK reported on March 2 that Russia had experienced a total of 498 deaths and 1,597 injuries since the invasion, according to the Ministry of Defense.

On February 28, Roskomnadzor claimed that it found instances of Google Ads being used to spread “unreliable socially significant information” about Russian and Ukrainian casualties. Consequently, Roskomnadzor demanded that Google restrict access to such materials, and warned Russian Internet sites against distributing such ads to avoid administrative fines or website bans. Roskomnadzor did not specify what false information it had found, but its statement suggests it wishes to prevent the distribution of any kind of information about Russian casualties to prevent public outrage. 

Russian authorities have already taken actions against multiple independent media outlets. On February 28, Roskomnadzor blocked to access to Current Time and Krym.Realii, both projects of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as the New Times. Following the ban, Current Times wrote that they were accused of “spreading unreliable socially significant information about the Russian military allegedly killed and captured within the territory of Ukraine.” RFE/RL President Jamie Fly assessed the Kremlin’s move as “an attempt to hide the terrible truth about the human price of Putin’s criminal war against Ukraine.”  

On top of blocking internet resources, journalists at independent media outlets also face physical threats. On February 24, Interfax journalist Dmitry Gavrilov was arrested during an anti-war rally in Saint Petersburg while he was taking a photograph of an anti-war banner. Gavrilov showed his press credentials to police but was nonetheless detained.  The following day, Russian police arrested three RFE/RL journalists covering anti-war protests in Moscow, even though they too had all the necessary credentials to work during mass protests.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland  

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine

Videos of a February 27 protest in Belarus have surfaced on social media. The protests were in response to several recent developments in the country, including Belarus joining the war against Ukraine, serving as a transit point for Russian weapons, and Belarus revoking its non-nuclear status after a February 27 constitutional referendum. Crowds gathered near the defense ministry chanting “Glory to Ukraine!” and “Long live Belarus.” The Belarusian government responded aggressively, sending in riot police to detain protesters.   

Meanwhile, Belarusians living in Vilnius, Lithuania climbed over the fence of the Belarusian embassy and replaced the official state flag hanging outside the building’s entrance with the opposition nationalist flag and a Ukrainian flag.  

Lastly, a video of Belarusian lieutenant colonel Sakhashchik Valery Stepanovich discouraging soldiers from joining the war in Ukraine went viral online. “This is not our war,” he said. “Find a way not to follow criminal orders. Sometimes saying ‘no’ takes the most courage.”

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the cyber activist collective Anonymous announced their “war against the Kremlin.” Over the next several days they took credit for successful attacks on public services and state-controlled media in Russia and Belarus. As there is no official Anonymous account on Twitter, the collective used hashtags #OpRussia and #OpKremlin to share news and updates about the cyber-attack campaign.

On February 26, Anonymous claimed they had hacked Kremlin-owned TV channels, which suddenly started showing footage from Ukraine that contradicted the official Kremlin narrative. Many anonymous Twitter accounts reported on the hack.

The following day, Anonymous took credit for taking down a long list of Russian government websites, including the Russian pension fund, the State Service, the presidential administration, customs, the national government site, Moscow’s mayor, and the Chechnya Republic. As of March 2, many of these sites – Mos.ru, government.ru, customs.gov.ru, kremlin.ru, gosuslugi.ru, and pfr.gov.ru – remained offline. Chechnya.gov.ru had been restored, but now required users to demonstrate they were not automated bots using “captcha” tests before being allowed to proceed to the site.

On February 28, Anonymous claimed they had downed Russian propaganda websites, three Belarusian banks, and multiple Belarusian government sites, including the Information Ministry, Military Industry Authority, and Defense Ministry. While one Belarusian bank, Belinvestbank.by, has been restored, belarusbank.by and priorbank.by remained compromised at the time of writing, alongside the government sites mil.by, vpk.gov.by, and mpt.gov.by.

In additional to shutting down websites, Anonymous also took credit for leaking information from Russia’s Ministry of Defense and the Russian Nuclear Institute. 

Anonymous is not the only cyber activist collective attacking Russian and Belarusian infrastructure. The DFRLab previously reporting about the Belarusian Cyber Partisans hacking the Belarus Railway company, while the IT Army of Ukraine is also engaging in cyber activism.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia 

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

On March 1, a large rally in Tbilisi demanded the Georgian government’s resignation and snap elections. The latest protest took place in solidarity with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after he announced that Ukraine was recalling its ambassador to Georgia due to the government’s “immoral position” on sanctions and barring Georgian volunteers from flying to Ukraine.

Georgia has seen four consecutive days of protests, as thousands take to the street to express their solidarity with Ukraine and condemn the Georgian government’s position on Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky expressed support for the protesters when he tweeted on February 26, “Incredible Georgian people who understand that friends must be supported! Grateful to everyone in Tbilisi and other cities who came out in support of Ukraine and against the war. Indeed, there are times when citizens are not the government, but better than the government.”  

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Multiple Russian TikTok users published now-deleted videos with the hashtag #давайзамир (#letsgoforpeace), in which they included near-identical phrases such as “All are blaming Russia, but close their eyes that Donbas has been under fire for eight years,” and “Please check all the news, we’re fighting for peace.” Notably, the text in many of these videos was also extremely similar, and on some occasions identical, strongly suggesting either coordination or the distribution of talking points for Russian video creators. Indeed, some Russian TikTok users pushed back publishing messages claiming they were offered payment to post peace symbols and express the message that Russia is stopping the war rather than starting it, and that the world has ignored the Donbas for eight years.

The scope of the narrative operation caught the eye of other TikTok users, who compiled videos of TikTokers voicing similar statements, then shamed them for being corrupt. Some of these TikTokers muted comments to avoid criticism, while others ultimately deleted their videos.

Not long after this first wave of similar narratives, a second wave appeared, when multiple users published videos featuring the lines, “In 2015, a new memorial named Alley of Angels was built in Donetsk” and “Russia wants to bring peace.” These videos were available at the time of publishing but may soon be deleted as well.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires

Georgian far-left groups are promoting the narrative that the war in Ukraine is a battle between two empires over Ukrainian resources. The narrative portrays the US and Russia as equal threats to Ukraine. On February 24, Politicano, a Facebook page known for Soviet Union nostalgia and affiliated with the Kremlin-linked News Front Georgia, posted that Ukraine has become a battleground for Western and Russian empires. Another Facebook page, “ნაპერწკალი“ (“Spark”), which describes itself as an “independent Marxist collective initiative,” posted that the war in Ukraine is a conflict between Russian and Western imperialists, fighting over spheres of influence and resources. 

The narrative that Ukraine is stuck between the imperial interests of the West and Russia aligns with messaging coming from far-right Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin. On February 27, Dugin posted, “This is not a war with Ukraine. This is a confrontation with globalization…on all levels, including geopolitical and ideological.” According to him, Russia is creating a global resistance zone. “When we win, everybody benefits from it,” he said.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

On February 28, the KGB of South Ossetia issued a statement claiming that there is raise of neo-Nazi and nationalistic sentiments in Georgia. The claim refers to Georgians willing to join Ukraine’s international legion of territorial defence, that allows foreign volunteers to support Ukraine’s defense efforts. The South Ossetia KGB described Georgian volunteers as “aggressive Georgian volunteers from the ranks of [former President] Mikheil Saakashvili’s radical followers.” It continued, “Instead of recognising its responsibility for crimes committed against humanity from 1920s till 2008, the Tbilisi regime expresses support for Ukrainian Banderovtsi [followers of the 20^th century Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera] who in turn are nurturing their own revanchist goals.”

That same day,  South Ossetia’s information agency published a story with the headline, “South Ossetia and Russia unite against Nazism.” The article claimed that citizens of South Ossetia launched a flash mob on social networks with the hashtag #Мирбезнацизма (“World without Nazism”). As of March 2, the DFRLab could not find a single public post on either Facebook or Twitter featuring the hashtag during the alleged time span of the flash mob.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire

On the morning of February 28, the Kyiv Independent reported that the first Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft was expected to deploy Belarusian paratroopers into Ukraine. Meanwhile, reports of ballistic missiles launched from Belarus into Ukraine continue to surface, with some reports suggesting the use of Iskander missiles. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka later confirmed missiles were launched from Belarus on February 27.  

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Ugandan General tweets support for Russia

Ugandan Lieutenant General Mahoozi Kainerugaba, son of President Yoweri Museveni and leader of the country’s land forces, tweeted on February 28, “The majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine.”  The DFRLab previously identified a network of inauthentic Facebook assets working to prime Lt. Gen. Kainerugaba as the next president of Uganda.

The Ugandan Embassy in Moscow called on nationals living in Ukraine to remain cautious and follow instructions issued by the Ukrainian government. The embassy said, “It is our prayer that the situation will be short lived, and that normality will soon be restored.” The presidency has yet to issue any further comment on the war. 

On February 24, Vladlen Semivolos, Russia’s ambassador to Uganda, spoke to Uganda’s permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Waiswa Bagiire, about developing bilateral cooperation in the United Nations. 

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context

The deputy head of Sudan’s military council, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, was quoted by Russian media outlet FAN as having recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Daglo, who visited Moscow last week, was quoted saying, “The whole world must realize that it is [Russia’s] right to defend herself.” However, the Sudan Tribune reported a statement from Sudan’s Foreign Ministry claiming Daglo’s quote was taken out of context and used as a “cheap attempt to fish in troubled waters.”  

On February 27, Sudan’s state news agency reported that the meeting between Sudanese and Russian officials had been scheduled prior to the war in Ukraine, and that Sudan called for de-escalation “on both sides.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

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Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Not long after dawn on February 24, tanks were recorded moving into Ukrainian territory from southwestern Belarus, crossing over at the Senkivka checkpoint. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Russian heavy flamethrower systems can be identified in the videos. Videos showing missiles being launched from the Mogilev area towards Ukraine have also surfaced, yet have not been specifically geolocated as of now. CNN and Newsweek reported that Belarusian troops are also taking part in the attack against Ukraine, despite previous insistence from Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Belarus would not participate in any military action against the country.

In an urgent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lukashenka announced that they had agreed to keep Russian troops stationed in Belarus. Lukashenka previously denied that Belarusian troops would take part in the Ukrainian invasion. He also proclaimed that Ukraine is losing the war and offered to host talks in Minsk.

New Maxar satellite imagery released the day before the attack showed Russian military deployment changes on February 21 and 22. The new images revealed Russia had deployed more than one hundred vehicles and dozens of troop shelters at Bolshoi Bokov airfield in southern Belarus, near the city of Mazyr. This new deployment is less than twenty kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The same set of new images also documented ground being cleared southwest of Belgorod, Russia, in the general vicinity of where Russia later began its attack on Kharkiv.

That same day, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service announced the implementation of a number of security measures along its borders with Russia and Belarus. The new measures included limiting vehicle traffic; using radio stations, drones, and filming and taking pictures; as well as keeping non-residents away from the border zone. Meanwhile, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya urged Western countries to impose tougher sanctions on both Russia and Belarus to deter them from further aggression. According to her, the current sanctions packages are not enough, as Russia and Belarus are not showing any responsiveness to them.

Viktor Gulevich, head of the Belarusian army, previously stated on February 21 that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus would depend on regional NATO troop withdrawals. According to Reuters reporting, Gulevich said Minsk believed it was within its rights to demand that US and NATO member forces withdraw from near Belarusian borders, including from near borders with neighboring countries Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Lastly, new footage has surfaced of Russian Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-24P combat helicopters in the Gomel region of Southeastern Belarus, potentially near the R-35 highway; however, this video has not yet been geolocated. Additional as-yet-unverified videos suggest that the southern Belarusian border where Russian troops are stationed is becoming more muddy, which might impact the tactical capabilities of Russian ground troops in the region.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

A pair of cyberattacks targeted Ukrainian banks and government websites during the twenty-four hours leading up to the Russian invasion. Targets included the web pages for the Ukrainian parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Cabinet of Ministers.

According to the internet monitoring website IsItDownRightNow.com, the websites for the MFA and Cabinet of Ministers were temporarily taken offline on Wednesday. Over several hours, the DFRLab also observed that Ukraine’s security services website would only partially load. 

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, confirmed a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack had occurred. He claimed that unknown actors attacked Ukrainian banks, state servicer provider Diia, and the websites for the Ukrainian parliament, the MFA, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Fortunately, many of the services continued working despite the ongoing attack.

Fedorov confirmed that cyberattacks continued throughout the night and were ongoing. He claimed that all information sources in Ukraine were under attack, but assured citizens that the situation was under control. As of Thursday morning, the websites were accessible from Ukraine.

Meanwhile, open-source research collective InformNapalm also reported a DDoS attack on their webpage. A similar attack was directed at Censor.net, a popular Ukrainian online media outlet. The organizations successfully defended against the attacks and webpage performance was not impacted.

Lastly, cybersecurity firms Symantec and ESET said they had discovered a new destructive malware wiping data from Ukrainian machines.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

On February 24, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reported that columns of Russian tanks entered the Luhansk region of Eastern Ukraine through Krasna Talivka, Milove, and Horodyshche. According to the Border Guard, the columns were led by white cars bearing the logo for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has monitored the conflict on a daily basis for years.

The OSCE previously announced on February 13 that it was pulling out its staff from eastern Ukraine. At the time, Kremlin outlet RT reported that OSCE had evacuated their car fleet but left behind armored vehicles.

At the time of writing, the OSCE had not commented on the matter and the DFRLab cannot independently confirm whether the OSCE vehicles allegedly being used by Russia are authentic or were Russian vehicles with OSCE logos affixed to them.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Twitter cited “human error” after suspending the accounts of several open-source researchers on Wednesday. The social media company dismissed rumors that the removals were the result of a mass reporting campaign. “A small number of human errors as part of our work to proactively address manipulated media resulted in these incorrect enforcements,” said Yoel Roth, head of site integrity at Twitter. “We’re fixing the issue and reaching out directly to the affected folks.”

Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters published a thread listing more than a dozen legitimate accounts that Twitter had suspended. Those with suspended accounts included Roman Burko, the founder of the open-source research collective InformNapalm; Kyle Glen, OSINT researcher and cofounder of Conflict News; Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian right-leaning activist from Odesa; and Maria Avdeeva, research director at the European Expert Association. By Thursday, all of the accounts cited by Waters except @ukrwarreport had been restored.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Shortly after Putin recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples republics on February 21, a pro-Russia online flash mob began tweeting using the hashtags #СвоихНеБросаем (#WeDoNotAbandonOurPeople) and #МыВместе (#WeAreTogether). The campaign expressed support for people living in Donetsk and Luhansk, alleging that they are suffering under Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Twitter campaign created the impression that there is public support for Putin’s decision.

Open-source evidence suggests Putin’s United Russia party could have initiated the flash mob. United Russia started using the #СвоихНеБросаем hashtag on February 20, the day before the Putin’s announcement, calling on its audience to give humanitarian assistance to people evacuated from Donbas to Rostov Oblast. Later, United Russia continued to use the hashtag for other purposes. 

The DFRLab analyzed the hashtags on Twitter and found 59 percent of the mentions were original tweets (1005 out of 1709). Each tweet received an average of 26.4 engagements, suggesting the campaign failed to go viral. The most popular tweet had 223 engagements.

Analyzing the hashtags on Facebook using the monitoring tool CrowdTangle, the DFRLab found that the most engaged–with content came from United Russia accounts or the accounts of their prominent members. The highest number of engagements a post received was 1,300 reactions, 140 comments and 124 shares, which is not considered particularly high. A CrowdTangle query identified 202 posts on Facebook pages, public groups, and verified profiles that received an average of 39 engagements. Meanwhile, a CrowdTangle analysis of Instagram found that 509 posts have used the hashtag since February 20, receiving an average of 720 engagements.

The DFRLab found the hashtag was also used on other social media platforms, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, and Telegram, but has yet to determine their levels of engagement. 

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Anatoly Bibilov, president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, announced a “combat alert” after an emergency security council meeting on Thursday. According to Bibilov, all units of the Ministry of Defense “must be ready to advance to concentration points.” Bibilov also ordered full cooperation with the Russian military base in the region. He cited the Treaty of Alliance and Integration between South Ossetia and Russia, signed in 2015, when reiterating South Ossetia’s “full support” for Russia’s actions.

Bibilov also said security forces were monitoring the situation along the Georgian border “to ensure readiness to respond to all provocations potentially originating from Georgia.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

On February 22 in Moscow, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev and Vladimir Putin signed a declaration regarding allied cooperation. Azerbaijan’s state information agency Azertag published a Russian version of the declaration, which reiterated cooperation between the two states in different fields, including the economy, energy, transportation, trade, health, and education.

Notably, three sections of the declaration mention military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia:

• Paragraph 11 of the declaration states that Russia and Azerbaijan will suppress activities of organizations and entities on their territory, targeting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each party.

• According to paragraph 13, “The parties will deepen cooperation between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat trainings, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.”

• Lastly, in paragraph 16, they state, “In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military support on the basis of the UN Charter, different international agreements and considering the existing international-legal obligations of each party.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksiy Reznikov called on all Ukrainians “who are ready and able to hold a weapon” to mobilize. According to a statement posted on Facebook early Thursday morning, Ukraine has entered “total defense mode.” Reznikov said all that is required to join the ranks of the armed forces is a passport. “The enemy is attacking, but our army is indestructible,” he added.

Following the defense minister’s statement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted a similar statement: “We will give weapons to anyone who wants to defend the country. Be ready to support Ukraine in the squares of our cities.”

Also Thursday, Ukraine banned all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country. “This regulation will remain in effect for the period of the legal regime of martial law,” the State Border Guard Service said.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty Thursday, triggering consultations with Alliance members. Article 4 states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Following initial consultations, NATO issued a statement saying “we have decided, in line with our defensive planning to protect all allies, to take additional steps to further strengthen deterrence and defense across the alliance.”

This comes as NATO held an emergency meeting to discuss Russia’s assault on Ukraine. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Russia’s attack on Ukraine “is a grave breach of international law, and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

On February 24, the official website of the Russian presidency published a video in which Vladimir Putin effectively declared war on Ukraine, announcing that he was ordering the Russian armed forces to conduct a special military operation in Ukraine in accordance with Article 51 of United Nations Charter and in pursuance of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.

After the video’s release, Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta wrote on Facebook and Twitter that the speech had been recorded on February 21, based on an analysis of the recording’s metadata. The story was quickly picked up by the Russian edition of Delfi Estonia media outlet on Facebook, by Ekho Moskvy on Twitter, and Turkish state-controlled media TRT’s Russian language Facebook page.

However, CNN journalist Gianluca Mezzo wrote that when he checked the metadata of Putin’s video, he concluded that it was recorded on February 24 at 03:35:44. He also published a screenshot of metadata info of a file from the website metadata2go.com.

The DFRLab team could not download a video from Kremlin’s website to independently verify its metadata; at the time of writing, Kremlin.ru was no longer functional.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Facebook restricted the page of Zvezda TV, the Russian state-owned TV channel run by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Zvezda published a screenshot of a restriction notice from Facebook on its website, saying that the page is restricted from the platform for ninety days for “repeatedly publishing false information.”

StopFake, the Ukrainian fact-checking organization, had previously flagged two publications from Zvezda on Facebook as false information. The first article claimed that Russia had already suppressed the air-defense forces of Ukraine, while the second reported that Ukrainian military border guard units did not resist Russian forces.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

The commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as “Hemedti,” arrived in Moscow for bilateral talks with senior Russian government officials on February 23. According to the RSF Twitter account, Dagalo will act in his capacity as deputy head of the military-led ruling council, leading a delegation of ministers. Dagalo and the RSF led a military coup in Sudan last October, which has seen sustained violent protests over the last four months.

According to VOA News, Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Khalid Farah said, “This visit was scheduled ahead and has nothing whatsoever to do with what is happening in Ukraine.” Similarly, Dagalo tweeted in Arabic that he hopes the trip will “advance relations between Sudan and Russia to broader horizons and strengthen the existing cooperation” between the two countries.

The DFRLab previously uncovered a network of inauthentic accounts with links to the Internet Research Agency that worked to amplify pro-Russian content in Sudan, promoting Russia as a friend to the Sudanese people.

—Tessa Knight, DFRLab Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, issued a statement warning the media and online outlets against spreading “unverified information.” Roskomnadzor referred to Article 49 of Russia’s Mass Media Law, which obliges editors to verify the authenticity of their reporting prior to publishing it.

According to Roskomnadzor, “When preparing their materials and publications related to the conduct of a special operation in connection with the situation in the Lugansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, they are obliged to use information and data obtained from official Russian sources.”

Roskomnadzor also noted, “The dissemination of knowingly false information entails liability under Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of up to 5 million rubles.” The statement warned that failure to follow this law would result in “immediate blocking of such materials by Roskomnadzor in accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law No. 149-FZ, ‘On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.’”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

The official Telegram channel of Venezuela’s government-owned TV network posted a news update about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, written in alignment with Kremlin messaging. The post stated, “Russia launches special operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. Last Monday, after recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, President Vladimir Putin announced the dispatch of Russian troops with the aim of demilitarizing and denazifying the regions.” 

The post by the Venezuelan government TV network also aligned with President Nicolas Maduro’s February 22 Twitter broadcast, in which he stated, “The Bolivarian Revolution is with Russia…. We know that Putin is defending the right to peace and dignity of the Russian people and the peoples of the world and the world balance.” He continued, “Imperialism and NATO have tried to bury diplomatic agreements based on international law to disrespect Russia. Patiently, President Putin has raised the breach of these agreements and the danger that NATO deploys its weapons offensive, including its atomic weapons aimed at Russia.”

—Iria Puyosa, DFRLab Visiting Fellow, Ann Arbor, Michigan

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But today, the evolving crises in their countries have exposed Washington’s lack of a clear and coherent policy for the region. Whether in Ethiopia’s year-old insurgency or amid Sudan’s military coup, the United States was ill-prepared to respond.

As a keen observer of the region through my regular contacts with officials in both Ethiopia and Sudan, and as a longtime colleague of Hamdok’s, I’ve seen this dynamic up close. By not being visible and sufficiently engaged, Washington could lose the capacity to influence policy and action to address the region’s many vexing problems. 

As the HoA undergoes dramatic changes, including sustained economic growth, a rising middle class, and a transition to stable democracy, Washington would be wise to rethink its approach to regional cooperation and use of sanctions—among other issues—and lay out a more inclusive, values-driven, and future-oriented strategy for the region. 

‘Either you’re with us or against us.’ 

During the Cold War, US engagement in the region centered on containing communist encroachment. In the ensuing years, US policy became static over several administrations and lacked strategy and coherence—not a good fit for a rapidly changing region. Then, shortly after the collapse of communism, the tragic fallout from the US intervention in Somalia stunted enthusiasm for engaging more actively in the region. 

American attention was only refocused after a string of terrorist attacks—including the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 11 attacks—and incidents of maritime piracy. The superseding objective became disrupting local Islamic extremists linked to a global jihadi network, and the full might and resources of the United States and its Western allies descended on the region. 

But combating terrorism and promoting trade held preeminence over all pretense of interest in addressing what Africans deemed to be more pressing priorities, such as combating drought and desertification, alleviating poverty, and promoting good governance. 

The implicit US mantra of “either you’re with us or against us” coaxed countries to choose sides in a conflict which did not offer neutrality as a position. In return for prioritizing counterterrorism and trade, countries were offered ample humanitarian aid, assistance for democratic governance, and enhanced foreign direct investment (FDI). As the war on terrorism intensified, the United States established Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002 as the region’s operational centerpiece.

In the absence of an overarching framework to understand and address complex regional priorities, the United States pursued singular agendas and responded to challenges and crises when and where they arose—preferring to focus on individual countries rather than adopting a comprehensive regional strategy. This broad agenda was deficient in depth and obligation, and as a result, long-term vision and regional diplomacy declined. 

Without clear direction and purpose, Washington was accused of abetting African despots bent on prolonging their power, either through election-rigging or violating term limits, in exchange for their cooperation in the war on terror. This dented US credibility and its ability to inspire popular policymaking and civic-minded diplomacy among the local populations. 

For example, the United States cozied up to the Meles Zenawi regime in Ethiopia and that of his successor—fully aware of their stained human-rights records and reprehensible governance. A 2018 mass uprising that drove out the US-backed Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front caught Washington flat-footed and short on credibility to influence the turn of events. Abiy Ahmed, the charismatic new leader installed in Addis Ababa, lost no time in seeking broad international support and championing Ethiopia’s interest. 

Why messaging matters

Another consequence of the lack of a clearly articulated US regional policy is the inadvertent message Washington conveys to both democratically installed governments and insurgents-in-waiting: Coming to power through free and fair elections matters—but other interests and priorities take precedence over democratic governance. 

In Ethiopia, for instance, US hesitancy to vigorously condemn a rebel assault on a democratically installed government and constitutional order was the oxygen that fueled the conflict there. The muted response by Washington and Brussels to the aggression emboldened the rebels to set their eyes on Addis Ababa, and the forcible ouster of Abiy became their end game. 

On a continent where political leaders and regional institutions have, at least officially, banned all forms of unconstitutional power grabs, the subdued US response to the unfolding rebel attempt was diplomatically unsettling and politically misguided. 

Ethiopia: The trouble with sanctions

Today, Ethiopia is mired in internal conflict with Tigrayan forces seeking to forcibly replace a democratically elected government. Faulting the United States for overt and covert assistance to one side over the other, both warring parties are snubbing Washington’s appeals and warnings at will. Daily pleas from the Pentagon and White House to cease fire and come to the negotiating table continue to fall on deaf ears. Meanwhile, the new White House special envoy to the region, Jeffrey Feltman, learned the hard way that being the US president’s emissary no longer carries the same sway it once did—and he announced this month that he’s stepping down.

While the war has quieted down somewhat as the rebels have withdrawn to Tigray, sporadic airstrikes and artillery exchanges continue to cause collateral damage. In what is nothing less than a diplomatic mea culpa, US President Joe Biden spoke directly to Abiy by phone on Monday. Biden expressed his concern about recent civilian deaths from the conflict and Abiy briefed him on efforts to address humanitarian assistance, human rights, and reconstruction. Such a gesture, though highly welcome, is unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict and events in the region, given the United States’ limited leverage.

Before expending sufficient diplomatic energy to reconcile the conflict, the United States has expelled the Abiy government from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for violating that trade pact’s prohibition on human-rights abuses—a clear case of punitive economic policy gone astray. 

First, many of the allegations have since been investigated by the United Nations (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, which accuse all sides of the conflict of committing them. Investigators also accused all sides of blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid and stated that they could not verify whether starvation was used as a weapon of war, as previously alleged by the UN and the US State Department. Investigators were barred from entering certain parts of Tigray and proposed further investigation into claims of forced starvation by government forces as well as gross human-rights violations in areas under rebel control. 

Second, the enforcement of AGOA violations has been selective and inconsistent. Past US administrations have been mute in the face of similar violations committed by other AGOA beneficiaries. This is why the haste to terminate Ethiopia’s eligibility before giving bilateral and multilateral diplomacy a sufficient chance to succeed has far-reaching consequences, including on US business and strategic interests in the region. 

The American-Ethiopian Public Affairs Committee estimates that termination potentially means a loss of some two hundred thousand jobs, with young factory workers—mostly poor young women and the heads of households—hard-hit, along with the mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises that supply and service those factories. An AGOA termination “would deal a serious blow to the welfare of millions of low-income workers,” Mamo Mihretu, Ethiopia’s chief trade negotiator, wrote in Foreign Policy.

Moreover, the impact will disproportionately fall on the poorest of the poor, who can least survive such a punitive action and who can least influence the war. In the longer term, this will significantly set back Ethiopia’s long-term trajectory to become the region’s manufacturing hub. 

Beyond Ethiopia, the termination would also disrupt countless livelihoods in Djibouti, Kenya, and Somaliland—neighbors whose ports Ethiopia uses for the import and export of raw materials and finished products. 

It is not lost on US policymakers that effective economic punishments must be smart and purposely targeted. Coupling trade agreements with imprecise political conditions is counterintuitive and achieves neither objective. Coming at a period of turbulence in the HoA, the termination of the trade deal throws into question the resourcefulness of US foreign policy to resolve political disputes through mature diplomatic insight before resorting to punitive measures. 

It is worth pointing out that smart sanctions and other economic tools can address specific policy goals and objectives. But sanctions should never be the first tool out of the box to resolve bilateral disputes; rather, they should be a diplomatic standby of last resort. Nor should they be applied uniformly in vastly different circumstances around the world. 

In the final analysis, hastily designed and poorly targeted economic penalties attest to the failure of diplomatic endeavors and portray a global power gradually losing influence over events and actors on the ground.

Sudan: Tuning out the US

The unfolding crisis in Sudan, where longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir was ousted in a 2019 revolution, is proving to be just as risky for the United States. 

The Trump administration’s endorsement of a debt-relief package helped the country financially recover, while the Biden administration helped strengthen the transition by supporting a hybrid Sovereignty Council. The West, along with Sudan’s Gulf neighbors, lavished Hamdok (who resigned on January 2) with promises of economic aid and FDI—on the condition, of course, that he implement painful structural reforms including removing food and fuel subsidies, harmonizing the exchange rate, cracking down on corruption, signing the Abraham Accords normalizing relations with Israel, and transitioning to elections in 2023. 

Legions of US, EU and other international officials—including Feltman, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, and US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power—descended on Khartoum for endless consultations. The pace and substance of the transition excited the world about the promise of a new Sudan. Meanwhile, the country’s political and military posture, guided mainly by the generals in the Sovereignty Council, pulled further away from traditional allies in the Horn and closer to Egypt. 

They conducted provocative military exercises with Cairo just miles away from Sudan’s borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea—a move that ratcheted up regional tensions at a time when Egypt and Ethiopia are feuding over a dam on the Nile River. The Trump administration’s botched attempt to mediate the Nile dispute was oddly led by the US Treasury at the exclusion of the State Department. The White House attempt to coerce Ethiopia into signing a three-way peace agreement caused the latter to withdraw from the negotiations and disqualified the United States as an honest broker. The collapsed mediation process was replaced by an African Union (AU) initiative focused on the pursuit of African solutions for African problems. 

The US strategy in Sudan is being defined without input from Ethiopia and Eritrea, consequential neighbors with a long history of influencing peace in Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan are presently in a low-intensity dispute over their long and unmarked border. This is not the first time such disputes have arisen, and both countries are committed to peacefully resolve the conflict through the Joint Border Commission. But, regrettably, neither party can mediate in each other’s internal matters. 

However, there is a bigger lesson here for Washington: Short-lived and frequently recurring rows among neighbors should not cause the United States to exclude regional influencers and neighborhood peacekeepers from its national and regional calculus, or from the list of countries to consult. 

Following a round of “successful” meetings with both sides of the Sovereignty Council, and hours after Feltman’s departure from Khartoum, the generals staged a successful coup d’état in late October. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power, arrested the prime minister, dissolved the council and suspended the coalition government. 

Working with limited intelligence on the ground and fewer friends in the region, Washington strategists were once again caught off guard. Condemned by the United States and its allies—with the exception of Egypt—and threatened with sanctions and other punitive measures, the generals continued to pay only lip service, claiming that the army had acted to prevent a civil war.

Within weeks of Hamdok’s reinstatement as prime minister and amid a deadlock with the generals over the appointment of a technocratic government, the differences in the end proved insurmountable. He finally resigned his position on January 2, and in a televised address, he told his people that Sudan’s very survival was questionable and that he had tried “to avoid the country from sliding into disaster” and wanted to “give a chance to another man or woman.” 

The voices of democracy continue to denounce any power-sharing with the military and call on it to immediately hand over power to a civilian government. For its part, the military on December 30 announced the reinstatement of the notorious national intelligence service—now rebranded as the General Intelligence Service. This can only mean more civil unrest on the streets in the coming days and the grim prospect of the use of deadly force to squelch it. 

Once again, escalating tensions in Khartoum expose a US Africa policy with limited diplomatic sway and few allies in the region who could be implored to mediate peace in Sudan. The United States must expend robust diplomatic energy to fully grasp the problems in their totality. It must also work with countries in the region in pursuit of a lasting solution. Barring that, the threat of sanctions and punitive economic measures in lieu of effective diplomacy will simply ring hollow and not give it the eminence and influence it seeks. 

Meet the new powers

The US goal of regaining commanding heights in foreign policy within the first one hundred days of Biden’s administration was an ambitious target. It is now evident that it takes more than an “America is back” mantra to reverse Washington’s eroded leadership position in the HoA.

Non-traditional partners, driven by geo-strategic interests and economic opportunism, have branded themselves as credible alternatives in the economic, political, and security spaces.

Gulf countries, plus Turkey, India, and Iran, view the Red Sea as a lifeline of global maritime logistics and seek to gain a military and commercial foothold in the region. Turkey, in particular, is quickly gaining new commercial and military traction. Distant powers such as China and Russia view the Red Sea and countries in the vicinity as an opening into the rest of Africa, a potential source of tomorrow’s raw materials, and a market for their goods and services. Supporting voices in global politics and establishing strategic military footholds are also a consideration.

In return, these new partners offer African countries financial and technical assistance, defense agreements, and access to their markets. But most important—and perhaps a key differentiator from the United States—is their policy of “non-interference” in their partners’ internal affairs. While these partners are not even a distant second to the United States in terms of foreign aid and technical, financial, and military superiority, they provide sufficient support to cause African countries to believe they have a choice of credible alternative partners. 

For instance, with thirty-nine African countries signed up, China’s dominance in infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative is a case in point. This is an alarming trend the United States cannot afford to ignore. 

After decades of alliance with the United States on regional and global matters—consider, for instance, Ethiopia’s UN Security Council vote to approve the 1991 Gulf War when the evidence wasn’t compelling—most African countries regrettably claim they’ve gained little in return for their longstanding ties to Washington. In 2021, the same Security Council discussed the Tigray conflict almost a dozen times, but the United States did not once support Ethiopia’s position. 

A forward-looking US-HoA engagement policy must embrace strategic competition and cooperation with new partners that have gained a new foothold in the region. As in the recent past, containing the advance of an adversary—China, in this case—is no longer a sufficient objective for engaging with the region. 

In a geo-strategic theater with competition from China and other entrants, it’s essential for the United States to assert its values and clearly communicate the interests it stands for (including the red lines in any relationship that cannot be crossed). Africans must know this with a degree of certainty, and well beyond the four-year election cycles. Consistency and predictability are imperative in international relations. 

Since early December, the US embassy in Addis Ababa, out of an abundance of caution following the collapse of Kabul, has flooded US citizens with alerts about the deteriorating security situation and encouraged them to leave the city. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China flew into the same Addis Ababa and reaffirmed his government’s support for the government and people of Ethiopia, while also discussing other regional interests. Then after a sweeping visit to several countries in the region in early January, Wang announced that China would name a new special envoy to the Horn of Africa, garnering an enthusiastic reception. This is the contrasting friendship and influence that the United States is missing out on. 

The way forward

A progressive reset of US relations with the continent is long overdue. A new Africa policy between partners, anchored in a framework of shared principles and a vision centered on economic, social, and environmental justice, as well as the democratic aspirations of citizens, would be a good place to begin. There should be relationships in which both parties recognize that each side has something to offer and gain. 

Compelling Africans to choose between the United States and new partners is a relic of the Cold War; twenty-first century Africans are capable of defining and articulating their interests and partners of choice. The Prosper Africa trade initiative is an example of a positive pivot away from the traditional donor-recipient model to bilaterally negotiated trade and investment pacts. It allows countries to benefit from their US ties and also uphold their right to cooperate with other partners. But for this to work, all sides must actively invest in building the capacity of African countries and institutions to negotiate from a position of strength and close the knowledge and information asymmetry. 

A defining feature of the HoA is its high degree of interconnectedness, both organically and by design. In 2020, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia agreed to form a new regional bloc—the Horn of Africa Cooperation, with other neighbors to possibly join later. A regional bloc within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—built on a convergence of economic and social interests as well as political, military, and security priorities—it deserves weighty consideration in Washington as part of its HoA engagement strategy. 

Going forward, a US-HoA policy must pay particular attention to the role of African institutions at various levels. It must focus on strengthening the capacity of African-led regional bodies such as the AU, IGAD, and the African Continental Free Trade Area. Such institutions serve to develop and enforce neighborhood consensus and standards of good governance while also collectively repelling assaults on democracy and constitutional orders. 

Biden’s remarks at the February 2021 AU summit struck the right foreign-policy chords, centering on democracy, human rights, and mutual prosperity. The administration has since declared a policy focus on counterterrorism and security, climate change, the pandemic, inclusive democracy and constitutional rule, and rebuilding post-COVID economies. But these lofty pronouncements must now be backed by resources and action on the ground. 

An Afrobarometer survey in 2019-20 showed that Africans prefer to follow the United States’ development model rather than China’s by 32 percent to 23 percent. Meanwhile, 68 percent of African citizens prefer democracy over other forms of government. Despite its convergence of values with Africans, the United States still lags behind the new partners. 

The Biden administration is well-placed to reverse past missteps and set HoA-US relations on the right course. But the fast-changing region will not wait for the United States to catch up; US rhetoric must be backed with action and signal a perceptible change of course, anchored on mutual trust and tilted toward shared values. 

Building loyal allies and gaining influence in the Horn will take time. Even then, the United States may not win over all the countries nor solve all the region’s problems. But either way, tomorrow’s US foreign policy must sufficiently exploit the HoA-US values convergence, a unique advantage not enjoyed by new entrants. This requires a shift from the transactional brand of yesterday and building on shared values and principles. 

Gabriel Negatu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center, managing director at Invest Afrique Inc., and a former Eastern Africa director general for the African Development Bank.

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Yet there’s no road map for what comes next.

Since the October 25 military coup that led to Hamdok’s detention, Sudan’s democratic transition has existed in name only. Upon seizing power, the military stacked state and federal institutions with generals and other allies, dismantled civilian committees aimed at seizing the former regime’s assets, reinstated the powers of the domestic intelligence services to arrest and detain, and, most significantly, ratcheted up pressure on pro-democracy protesters. Since the coup more than fifty unarmed protesters have been murdered, dozens have been raped, and hundreds more injured and illegally detained.

With billions of dollars in international assistance suspended and the country’s historic debt-relief process in serious doubt, the military succeeded in undoing two years’ worth of progress in a matter of weeks and shredded an internationally recognized political road map that would have seen civilians gradually assume greater executive authority in the lead-up to national elections in 2023.

Donor governments were quick to welcome the surprise reinstatement of Hamdok in late November, which seemingly resuscitated the political deal into which they’d invested so heavily and allowed the military to keep up the guise that Sudan’s was still a civilian-led transition. But lasting damage to both the transition and Hamdok’s personal standing—thanks to the deal’s seeming absolution of the military’s many crimes—had been done.

In retrospect, Hamdok faced an uphill battle from the outset. With his lack of political acumen and inability to harness and transform the raw power of the streets into a true agenda for bold action, the affable former United Nations bureaucrat became a political prisoner within a system he helped establish—caught between political forces unable to reach consensus on the way forward and a military regime increasingly bent on undermining the democratic process.

Either way, Sudan’s formal transition to democracy is over, even though its revolution lives on in the hearts of millions of peaceful pro-democracy protesters. Washington and its international partners have now lost the final pretense of what allowed them—for too long—to frame their engagement in terms of supporting a “civilian-led transitional government.”

Time to get tough

With no political agreement or civilian leader left to undermine, Washington and its allies should now pursue a more hardline approach toward the military that holds it accountable for the October coup and the deadly response to peaceful protests since then. That should mean sanctions against figures such as Yasser Mohammed Osman, the director of military intelligence; Jamal Abdelmagid, the director of the General Intelligence Service; and Abdarahim Daglo, the deputy commander of the notorious Rapid Support Forces. All played a direct role in orchestrating the deadly crackdown on demonstrators.

Beyond punitive measures, Washington needs to more actively shape an outcome that meets the demands of the Sudanese people, supports US strategic interests in the region, and reflects President Joe Biden’s own purported commitment to democracy and human rights. 

First, the Biden administration must announce a nominee to serve as US ambassador to Sudan—a promise made two years ago by then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo but still not fulfilled—and challenge the Senate to fast-track the confirmation process. For too long, Washington has done itself a great disservice by not sending an appropriately senior official to ensure international consensus on the ground and to navigate Sudan’s complicated political environment.

In the meantime, the administration should dispatch Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman, who has been largely underutilized in the current crisis, to Khartoum with a letter from Biden explaining the logic behind US sanctions and giving the generals a choice: Engage in a credible, transparent, and inclusive political dialogue to select a new prime minister; refrain from any further abuses against peaceful protesters; and return to full implementation of the 2019 Constitutional Declaration—or face a new wave of sanctions targeting regime leaders and their vast network of financial interests and military companies. 

But to be credible, this choice must have the backing of Sudan’s other international partners, from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to Cairo and Ankara.

Lastly, Washington must move beyond tired bromides claiming to “stand with the people of Sudan” and unabashedly throw its weight behind the country’s pro-democracy movement in tangible and meaningful ways that will begin to swing the balance of power more in the protesters’ favor. That involves funneling some of the currently frozen financial assistance to resistance committees and neighborhood committees to help them better organize, communicate, and develop their own political platform—to become a more formal part of the political process. 

Ultimately, Sudan’s people will decide what the road ahead looks like. But Washington can give them a fighting chance by seeing this moment of peril for what it is: an opportunity to rebalance its approach, recommit to the fundamental ideals of the revolution, and expose the military for what it has always been—not a partner in politics or a defender of the revolution, but a malign force bent on its own wealth and survival at the expense of the country’s well-being.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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Last week, the White House unveiled the first-ever United States Strategy on Countering Corruption, which outlines a plan to curb abuse of US jurisdiction for illicit financial purposes. The announcement from the White House came just days before the Summit for Democracy on December 9th, giving political legs to overdue regulatory reform, such as tightening reporting requirements for the real estate sector, a notorious loophole to stash ill-gotten cash or to launder criminal proceeds. Real estate reporting requirements dovetails with ongoing efforts to implement the beneficial ownership legislation that came out of the 2021 defense authorization.

Preventative measures go hand in hand with sanctions enforcement. US authorities have had little ability to track whether sanctioned actors move money within the US despite best efforts by commercial banks. This is a question of government priorities. In focusing on punitive measures versus prevention, the US has effectively operated as if the hard work is issuing the sanction itself when in reality, that is the easy part. Implementation and compliance are actually where the success of any policy hangs in the balance, as well as the ability and willingness of the private sector to cooperate. 

Democracy Summit

The Summit pledged a hefty $424 million in anti-corruption assistance last week, while Treasury rolled out a series of high-profile designations against nationals from Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. On the same day, the State Department—pursuant to its Section 7031(c) visa restriction authority—designated nine individuals over similar corruption charges. Amongst State’s designees were Isabel dos Santos, daughter of former Angolan dictator José Eduardo dos Santos and formerly the richest woman in Africa, and Oleksandr Tupytskyi, the former Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. 

In recognition of the annual global Human Rights Day, OFAC designated fifteen individuals and ten entities from Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia over their involvement in widespread human rights abuses. Notably, these designations included two officials linked to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau—the entity responsible for facilitating the ongoing genocide in China’s westernmost province. OFAC released Global Magnitsky sanctions every single day last week, underscoring that financial corruption erodes the validity of democratic governance and civil society.

Focus Africa

As the crisis in Tigray worsened in September, President Biden issued Executive Order 14046, authorizing sanctions on those responsible for the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Last month, OFAC sanctioned four entities and two individuals for undermining the stability and integrity of the Ethiopian state, including the Eritrean Defense Force and Eritrea’s ruling political party—the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, criticized EU member states for not following suit. But the EU did introduce a new Mali sanctioning authority as French troops withdrew from the region after eight years, implicitly replacing military involvement with the spectre of financial remediation.

The EU has also sanctioned eight individuals and three entities linked to the Russian private military contractor, Wagner Group (including a sanction against the group itself). The organization, led by Vladimir Putin’s close associate Yevgeny Prigozhin, recently expanded its operations to conflict zones in Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and the Central African Republic. According to EU officials, three of the Wagner mercenaries sanctioned were designated for their activities in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions were welcomed by Washington, where Wagner and its affiliated individuals have been sanctioned since 2017. But it was the Group’s expansion into Africa that in the end triggered the EU designation. 

Sanctions on African state or semi-state actors can be very impactful because many countries maintain limited access to Western financing, particularly through correspondent banking relationships. Sanctions by the US and Europe can sever financial systems overnight, but they also risk exacerbating humanitarian crises and incentivize banks to de-risk from countries or entire regions because they see greater liability than profit. Our projection map shows a complicated web of sanctions by a wide array of global actors. 

Belarus

After flying in over 8,000 migrants in an effort to force them into the Schengen area through Poland, the US, EU, and UK took coordinated action against those responsible in Minsk. In a remarkably quick response, the EU also agreed to impose sanctions on Belavia, the airline primarily responsible for flying the migrants in from the Middle East. OFAC joined its European partners with sanctions against 20 individuals, 12 entities, and three aircraft. After over a decade of Western sanctions and pause in IMF assistance, the US has relatively little leverage over Belarus and must decide carefully when to pull the levers it does have. US prohibitions on debt and equity in secondary markets and on the potash sector shows that a fabricated migration crisis was reason enough.

More crypto sanctions… 

In coordination with both Latvian and Estonian authorities, Treasury designated another virtual currency exchange. The designation against the Latvia-based Chatex follows an inaugural round against Russia-based Suex. According to Treasury, the two exchanges have direct ties with each other, and Chatex has been “using Suex’s function as a nested exchange to conduct transactions.” Both exchanges have been used to launder the proceeds of ransomware by cyber criminals. 

These actions are part of the Biden administration’s broader efforts to counter a number of recent ransomware attacks. As part of this package, OFAC also designated Ukrainian national Yaroslav Vasinskyi and Russian national Yevgeniy Polyanin, both of whom perpetuated recent ransomware attacks carried out by REvil—the group responsible for the attack against the IT firm Kaseya Limited in July of this year. These actions are further examples of sanctions used as tools of law enforcement. 

On the radar

As fears swell regarding a second possible incursion by Russian military forces in Ukraine, the United States and its partners are finalizing a slate of punitive measures they hope will deter the Kremlin from following through. Much analysis has been written over the past weeks that many of our readers are surely following. The most impactful is likely to be potential restrictions on Russian debt on the secondary market, which would inhibit the ability to clear dollar-denominated transactions. As touched upon previously in our Dashboard, sanctions against Russian oligarchs are also an untapped resource given their ties to Russian state assets. The US and EU partners are projecting a more decisive response now than in 2014– but escalation options are tricky to work out if the Kremlin doesn’t choose war, but something in between. And none of these options come without repercussions. Western investors see a downside risk now that they have re-entered Russian markets. As the US ramped up pressure on Iran, Venezuela and China over the past five years, investors came to view Russia as a relatively stable emerging market. In fact, US markets may be even more exposed to financial market restrictions than they were before little green men touched the Donbas the first time. 

Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

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At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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On December 13, Emma Ashford was featured in Inkstick’s Adults in a Room column, writing on the Biden administration’s review of sanctions policy.

“The Biden administration’s recently released sanctions review was emblematic of a core problem faced by advocates of sanctions reform. To the surprise of many, the review laid out extremely clearly some of the problems with existing sanctions frameworks. It then created a clear, if vague, set of guidelines for implementing future sanctions that are more likely to be effective, and less likely to have substantive humanitarian impacts. In a town where it can be hard even to get people to acknowledge that a policy has failed, this should be viewed as a win for reformers. At the same time, the review did not address the question of existing sanctions regimes.”

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Emma Ashford

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Economic Sanctions

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Al-Mahdi dissected the evolving political crisis in her country at an event hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on Monday. She said she heard the news of the agreement on television before meeting with Hamdok and other members of his cabinet Monday to express her surprise and disagreement. In the end, all except five of the ministers who attended the meeting submitted their resignations, al-Madhi told the Atlantic Council.

In doing so, they reminded Hamdok that “the democratic transition is inevitable,” Mahdi recounted.

Kholood Khair, managing partner of Khartoum-based think tank Insight Strategy Partners, and Mohanad Hashim, former director of content for Sudan’s national radio and TV broadcaster, also joined in to share their perspectives on how Sudan’s protest movement is reacting to the recent developments, as well as to offer advice on how the United States and western allies can better support the pro-democracy movement.

Below are more highlights from the event, which was moderated by Africa Center nonresident senior fellow Cameron Hudson, including an update on pro-democracy protests and al-Mahdi’s message to international supporters.

The road to democracy

• Sunday’s agreement “didn’t take into consideration” serious developments on the ground in Sudan, such as the escalation of violence by authorities at street protests, said al-Mahdi. On November 17, for example, security forces killed at least fifteen people. She added that the agreement marked a “setback in trust” specifically from Sudanese youth—who are driving the pro-democracy movement and now have more trust in the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) political coalition, which refused to recognize the deal.

• Khair added that the “agreement itself is not that significant” because it “doesn’t really mention the ‘how’s’ or the timeframes” for the promised political transition, making it “difficult to implement.”

• Khair, meanwhile, explained that although the agreement met the international community’s demands, the street protesters were left unsatisfied. “The deal itself is kind of unstable,” she said. “The international community needs to get behind the street or get out of its way.”

• Hashim added that the base which provided the prime minister legitimacy “has just walked away” from him because of the deal. “They view that this… is a continuation” of the prior 2019 coup. “Hamdok might have miscalculated this big time,” he said.

Call for back-up

• Al-Mahdi said international support for the people of Sudan is “overwhelming,” particularly because partners were “well-prepared by the first coup attempt” in September. Even countries she suspected “wanted to support the coup”—such as Egypt and Israel—didn’t do so outwardly.

• The White House and US Congress seemed united in “one line in support of the revolution of Sudan and the transition,” al-Mahdi said, praising the United States for its support. That support, she said, went beyond mere words and extended to key meetings between US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman and Sudanese leaders.

• Hashim argued that US support “seemingly is cautious, perhaps even timid,” pointing to the fact that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in the region last week but didn’t visit. “There hasn’t been a clear US policy for Sudan,” he said.

• But “we need for the United States to continue with us,” al-Mahdi urged, and the United States must tell the military—“while not frightening them”—that it “cannot mess with political parties” because it would pose a “serious threat to democratic transformation” in Sudan.

What’s to come

• Al-Mahdi explained that the coup “was not really, in essence, a surprise” and that she had a sense it could take place “at any moment since the early months of 2020.” But it was still a crime: “All the violators should be put into jail and…condemned,” she said.

• In order to secure this transition period, the FFC should work with the military to clarify its role to protect the state and constitution and at the same time “stop the killing in the street.” And after the first post-coup election, it’ll be important for “everyone to go and abide by their role as agreed [upon] by everybody” to build a strong state and continue Sudan’s democratic transition, al-Mahdi said.

Katherine Walla is the assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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The tide is turning quickly. Northern rebels are rapidly advancing on Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declares a state of emergency and issues a call to arms for regular citizens. The reversal in the country’s brutal year-long war comes as the United States is moving to revoke Ethiopia’s trade privileges because of the government’s human-rights violations in the Tigray region, detailed in a new United Nations report. What moves does Abiy have left? What role is US policy playing? What other dominos may fall in the region? Our experts keep you ahead of the curve on this fast-moving story.

• Cameron Hudson (@_hudsonc): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and former director of African affairs at the National Security Council

• Aubrey Hruby (@aubreyhruby): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and investor in African start-ups

• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Director of the Africa Center

On the march

• Originally involving limited strikes against Tigrayan separatist leaders, Abiy’s war has since spiraled out of control—with Ethiopia now facing potentially tragic consequences. “State-sponsored genocide and even state collapse remain frighteningly real scenarios,” Cameron tells us. 

• Abiy, the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize-winner, appears to have overplayed his hand by underestimating his opponents, who have traditionally been among the Ethiopian army’s best fighters and tacticians. “The government has slowly seen its overwhelming strategic advantage eroded against a rump force more adept at insurgency combat and clearly more motivated by a fight for its literal survival,” Cameron adds.

• Meanwhile, a government blockade of the Tigray region has left nearly one million civilians in danger of famine as the conflict has expanded to neighboring regions—as “hateful and dehumanizing speech” villainizing Tigrayans more broadly suggests that Abiy and his loyalists may be “inciting genocide as part of [their] last-ditch defense effort,” Cameron believes. Case in point is Abiy’s speech today, in which he declared: “We will bury this enemy with our blood and bones and make the glory of Ethiopia high again.” 

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Sullied success story

• That’s all the more tragic considering Ethiopia has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, Aubrey notes, averaging nearly 10 percent growth per year for the past decade. But the war’s crippling effect on the economy has led to soaring food prices while “scarce foreign exchange has halted production and curtailed access to basic imported goods,” she adds. The National Bank of Ethiopia ordered the suspension of commercial lending, drying up credit and choking off investment.

• In response to Abiy’s offensive, the United States slapped sanctions on his government in September and this week moved to terminate duty- and quota-free access to the US market as part of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Aubrey believes that while the trade restrictions probably won’t compel Abiy to end the fighting, they “will likely result in the loss of around two hundred thousand direct jobs, mainly for women working in factories, and a million or so additional jobs servicing export-oriented factories—another cause of suffering for everyday Ethiopians.”

• At this point, Cameron adds, any US effort to bring about a ceasefire through the threat of additional sanctions “rings hollow in what has emerged as an existential battle for survival for both sides.”

• And the “dire economic consequences” of the violence won’t stop at Ethiopia’s borders, Aubrey warns, with the recent military takeovers in Guinea and Sudan combining to spook investors: “The already-skewed perception of risk in African markets will sadly only intensify.”

A new geopolitical order

• A year ago, Abiy appeared to be aiming for a swift and limited “blitzkrieg” in Tigray, Rama tells us. But “from day one, it has been a regional war,” drawing in neighboring Eritrea and sending tens of thousands of refugees spilling across borders.

• The outcome is all the more jarring, Rama says, because Ethiopia has long been a “hub of stability in a volatile area” afflicted by conflicts in the Sudans, Somalia, and Eritrea. Now that Ethiopia has become the main source of instability in the Horn of Africa, she expects to see a broader “blast effect.”  

• Zooming further out, Rama points to how rampant instability in the region has created an opening for outside influence beyond traditional players like the United States and European powers. These new influencers, she says, include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Israel, and China, which is heavily invested in a railroad linking Addis Ababa to the sea via its Belt and Road Initiative.

• “What the increasingly noisy presence of these (re)emerging regional powers reveals is not a simple destabilization,” Rama tells us, “but a new global geopolitical order” with a focus on Africa.

The post FAST THINKING: Ethiopia is on the brink appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Monday morning, a state of emergency had been imposed, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was detained, and critical parts of the country’s transitional constitution were suspended.

Since June, Hamdok, a civilian technocrat, had been warning about exactly this turn of events. In perhaps its most transparent act of its takeover, the military had even signaled to observers at home and abroad that a coup d’état remained a lifeline of last resort, as pressure mounted on the military to transfer its chairmanship of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council to civilian leadership. That message came in the form of a foiled coup attempt earlier this month which many observers viewed as a trial balloon to test local and international reaction.

The response could not have been more clear: International envoys descended on Khartoum, warning of aid suspensions, targeted sanctions, and delays in international assistance on critical needs such as debt relief.

The public’s response was equally swift and clear. More than one million pro-democracy protesters took to the streets across Sudan. Demand for civilian rule hasn’t dimmed since 2019. If anything, military efforts to blame civilian leaders for the slow implementation of reforms and sclerotic economic progress have failed—instead fueling demand for democratic governance as the only way out of the country’s morass.

The only surprise from this week’s development is the timing—coming just hours after Sudan’s military head of state assured US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman that he remained committed to the core tenets of the transition to civilian rule, and was prepared to work cooperatively with Sudan’s fractious political parties to advance the most controversial and unimplemented aspects of the transitional charter.

That promise unraveled quickly. 

New realities in Africa

Few could argue the United States was insufficiently engaged in Sudan, or that it hadn’t brought its highest-level actors to bear on the events leading up to the coup. Between multiple visits from Feltman and high-level calls from both National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Washington has rarely been as coordinated and consistent in its message as it has been with Khartoum.

Instead, this may reflect a new era for US diplomacy in Africa—one in which the United States is one of many powerful actors vying for influence to shape political outcomes. In a context where Washington’s voice is diluted amid competing powers, Sudan has emerged as the ultimate battleground. Although Sudan has always sat at a strategic crossroads, the revolution has re-shuffled the political deck in the country, and opportunity has emerged for new global players eager to exploit more than just the country’s rich gold deposits or strategic location.

Egypt has long looked paternalistically at Sudan, and while its official statements have called for calm, no one expects Cairo to demand a restoration of civilian rule or adherence to the transitional constitution considering the circumstances of General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s own rise to power. Similarly, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have long seen Sudan as a national-security imperative—not only as a vital security partner across the Red Sea, but as a principal source of the livestock and grain that those desert societies demand in abundance. 

Though late to the party, Russia has shrewdly engaged Sudanese security officials through negotiations over a naval basing agreement and growing informal ties between Sudan’s notorious Rapid Support Forces militia and the Russian mercenary group Wagner. Underpinning Moscow’s engagement has been a sustained and sophisticated information campaign—which has provoked three Facebook takedown actions so far—intended to sow doubt in the minds of Sudan’s youth over the efficacy of civilian rule.

The not-so-hidden hand of Turkey, Qatar, and Kuwait—all in search of bigger military contracts, investment opportunities, or political leverage against larger Gulf states—has only widened the options available to Sudanese leaders searching for a lifeline.

All these influences now explain the flurry of phone calls to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others from US officials seeking guarantees that these countries’ leaders gave no nod to the military’s move. While US influence in Sudan may be diluted, there still seems to be hope that Washington can impress upon backers of factions among Khartoum’s power players that Sudan won’t know stability—and that their interests there will remain at risk—as long as popular demands for democratic rule remain unmet.

But it feels like misplaced hope to expect genuine assistance from countries that have never hidden their preference for like-minded military rulers and which likely fear the domestic consequences of civilians successfully overthrowing a military in the Arab world. Even more misplaced would be the expectation that the streets of Khartoum would accept a deal bearing Riyadh or Abu Dhabi’s fingerprints.

Time to get tough

After the West failed to prevent the seemingly inevitable coup last week, the prospects for reversing it now appear even more dim.

That’s because the military, which was fully aware of the consequences of its takeover, believes it has chosen the only path available to ensure its own security. Knowing the United States would suspend its $700 million financial assistance program—the vast majority of which was going to subsidize incomes and basic foodstuffs for Sudan’s poorest—it has once again cravenly put its own survival above that of its people.

For the United States and its partners, this black eye will not quickly fade and could well create lasting ripple effects across the region. If hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid and intensive diplomatic engagement can’t convince Sudan’s military to stay the democratic course, what chance does Washington have in countries like Guinea, Mali, or Chad—where Western diplomats are also pushing back against military takeovers in favor of civilian regimes?

That’s why it’s critical that Washington rejects any other deal among international elites that relieves the growing near-term pressure, but which ultimately betrays the demands of the millions of Sudanese calling for genuine change. While it has a painful history of thirty years of sanctions in Sudan, the United States must seriously consider targeted measures against military leaders and their political allies (and even external actors) that have aided the takeover and undermined civilian rule.

The United States must also redouble its efforts to support Sudan’s vibrant civil society groups, which have become virtually the last hope for the country’s revolution, by funneling money to sustain their work and skirt the military’s insidious control of the internet.

Another attention-grabbing move would be a US State Department designation of the country’s Rapid Support Forces—a paramilitary force responsible for the arrests and torture of several prominent politicians and activists this week—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, a precedent set when the Trump administration designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Further isolating and discrediting Sudan’s ultimate bad actor would show solidarity with the streets and would help remove a perennial spoiler from the country’s political future.

Lastly (and as odious as it may be), the United States must remain open to the possibility of facilitating a soft landing for military leaders in exchange for their exit from the political and economic space they control. While they clearly can’t imagine a Sudan they don’t totally control, Sudan’s military brass likely also can’t imagine a future for themselves in which the threat of accountability hangs over them as it does now. Legislation absolving military leaders of past crimes and granting them immunity is a betrayal to Sudan’s many victims of atrocity and oppression, to say nothing of the blow it levels against international criminal justice. But it may be required to send the army back to the barracks.

As Sudan rests on a knife’s edge, there are no simple solutions. But as the United States contemplates a way forward, it should learn from hindsight—namely, that if two years of transition hasn’t changed the military’s fundamental nature, nor will two more years of shared governance with civilians. 

US policy must recognize that Sudan’s military is bent on its own survival above all else. The military fooled Washington once—and cannot be allowed to do so again.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

The post Sudan’s coup wasn’t a failure of US diplomacy. It was the dawn of a new era in Africa. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On Monday, Sudan’s military arrested the country’s civilian leaders—including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok—in an apparent coup that’s likely to stymie the country’s already-slow progress toward political reform. The move comes just weeks after a failed takeover attempt by loyalists to ex-dictator Omar al-Bashir and amid repeated warnings that tensions between Sudan’s civilian and military leaders were reaching their breaking point. What’s next for Sudan and the global partners in its state-building project? Our experts weigh in.

• Cameron Hudson (@_hudsonc): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan

• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Director of the Africa Center

• Will Wechsler (@WillWechsler): Director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs

Out of balance

• The delicate balancing act of Sudan’s political transition had “hit a wall” lately, Cameron tells us. And the writing for the coup was on that wall. For months, the transitional governing structure—split between the civilian leaders who helped topple Bashir in 2019 and Sudan’s powerful security services—had been unraveling, with the military particularly fearful of losing its grip on power.

• “Civilian leaders had essentially reached the limits of their ability to reform the political and economic space without the military giving an inch,” Cameron adds.

• Now, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken charge, dissolving that structure and declaring a state of emergency. The military says it will install a new technocratic government until the country holds elections in July 2023. Which makes Rama wonder: “Who will run? A soldier? A Sudanese Sisi?” referring to the Egyptian strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 

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Money matters

• As Sudan’s economy spiraled in recent weeks—inflation, for instance, has topped 400 percent—the military seized the moment to “accuse the government of ignoring the people’s needs,” Rama notes.

• While foreign aid has helped Sudan muddle along, Cameron adds, “a full-fledged recovery… was never going to be achieved without the military relinquishing its control over the major revenue-generating parts of the economy,” from port operations to gold mining to livestock exports.

• As for the Western countries expressing shock and dismay at the upheaval in Sudan, Rama recommends they look in the mirror, considering the strictures that came with Sudan’s International Monetary Fund loans in recent years. “On the economic front, they should perhaps have supported this government rather than suffocating it with tough austerity measures that ended up plunging the population into despair and offering the military the ideal pretext they wanted to pull off this coup,” she tells us.  

• And even tougher economic times are likely ahead as a result of the coup, Cameron predicts, since “international assistance will be quickly suspended, including Sudan’s debt-relief process” with the IMF.

Regional rumblings

• The military’s power grab will reverberate far beyond Sudan, Will says. Most regional powers “with interests in Sudan have never fully shared Washington’s commitment to a democratic transition,” he notes, and “some neighbors will undoubtedly quietly welcome the coup and its supposed promise of greater stability” in a country that has now suffered some sixteen coup attempts since 1956.

• It also throws into question the country’s much-vaunted normalization with Israel, Will adds. Sudanese Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari met with Israeli officials on the margins of our N7 Conference earlier this month, “the first multilateral gathering between Israel and the six Arab states that have announced normalizations,” Will points out. 

• But a formal normalization ceremony, for which the Biden administration had negotiated a substantial US aid package for Sudan, had been waylaid by scheduling problems, Will says. And now he thinks it won’t happen “anytime soon,” particularly since US law prevents most kinds of foreign assistance following a coup. The State Department announced Monday that it was halting $750 million in aid.

• Meanwhile, Cameron advises against any expectations that the West can push back against the coup. In fact, he says, just hours before the coup Burhan told Jeffrey Feltman, the US special envoy to the Horn of Africa, that he’d stay committed to civilian rule. “The military took this decision knowing full well the likely consequences of their actions,” Cameron explains. “So while the [international] condemnation will be quick and unanimous, it is unlikely to be sufficient to reverse this setback.”

The post FAST THINKING: What’s behind the coup in Sudan? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Just months after the April 2019 ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir, Hamdok traveled to Washington—the first Sudanese head of government to be welcomed by US officials since 1985—where he appeared at the Atlantic Council.

In an address and subsequent discussion with nonresident senior fellow Cameron Hudson, a hopeful Hamdok outlined his country’s challenging transition from dictatorship.

Perhaps most striking was his statement about the delicate governing structure between the civilian leaders who helped topple Bashir and the country’s powerful military. While praising the “homegrown” nature of the compromise, Hamdok also warned that any backsliding could lead to “a failed state.”

“It will be Yemen. It will be Libya. It will be Syria. It will be all those,” he warned.

Watch the full video:

The post Sudan’s prime minister warned of a ‘failed state’ in 2019. Now he’s under arrest. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Inflation stands at a record-high 34 percent, the nation’s debt has reached a crippling $30 billion, and efforts to privatize some of the country’s corporate crown jewels, such as Ethio telecom, have floundered amid allegations of genocide and predictions of mass starvation as the conflict over the country’s Tigray region rages on. With the country’s trade benefits under the US African Growth and Opportunity Act likely to be suspended by the end of the month, what was once one of the world’s fastest growing economies suddenly finds itself on life support.

Cheering crowds and soaring rhetoric cannot hide the fact that Abiy’s troubles run deeper than just one restive region.

Since war broke out nearly a year ago in the northern region of Tigray, Ethiopia’s ethnic patchwork has only unraveled even further. Ethnic-based violence in the regions of Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Oromia, Afar, Amhara, and Southern Nations all suggest that Abiy’s original political ideology of “medemer”—an Amharic expression to convey a coming together beyond ethnic identity—has failed. Facts on the ground demonstrate that a military response alone will not suffice in addressing these mounting security threats and the level of displacement they’ve engendered.

As part of his “new beginning,” Abiy pushed through a new parliament—94 percent of which is controlled by his Prosperity Party—as well as the appointment of new cabinet ministers at the finance, defense, and peace ministries, nominally from opposition groups, in a move spun by his office as his “commitment to inclusivity.” But in tapping close allies and former subordinates, the move has prompted many to instead view the personnel change as style over substance—a deliberate attempt to re-assert control over key ministries involved in the war effort in advance of a new offensive intended to achieve a total victory.

Abiy’s biggest promise this week to mollify domestic opponents and international critics has been to convene a national political dialogue, which he claims will address the shortcomings associated with his original vision of “medemer.”

But nothing suggests the dialogue will fundamentally alter the failed attempt to create a unitary Ethiopian state and dismantle the system of ethnic federalism that lies at the heart of Ethiopia’s current crisis. With his strongest opposition likely to be excluded from that dialogue—particularly armed groups from Tigray and Oromia, which have been labeled terrorist organizations—there is reason to question the sincerity of any reconciliation process that does not engage the specific grievances that caused Abiy’s foes to take up arms.

Lower on Abiy’s list of priorities, but no less important, should be an effort to re-establish some goodwill with the international community before actors such as the United States make good on the punitive measures they’ve long threatened. With the expulsion earlier this month of seven high-level United Nations (UN) officials from Ethiopia on grounds—labeled by the UN secretary-general himself as baseless—of meddling in the country’s internal affairs, Abiy has instead put himself on a collision course with countries that questioned the legality of that decision and have demanded the officials’ reinstatement.

Will Abiy budge?

If he fails to abide calls to bring back UN officials, it’s difficult to imagine that the United States won’t designate top Abiy aides under the sanctions regime it introduced last month. But it’s even harder to imagine Abiy publicly relenting at this point in the face of international pressure after ignoring so many off-ramps to avoid punitive measures.

His government’s continuing humanitarian blockade of Tigray—beyond the widespread human-rights abuses that prompted the US government to open a genocide investigation—means that any national reconciliation must be preceded by mediation, peace-building, justice, and accountability for all the transgressions of the past year.

Judging by the triumphalism of Abiy’s remarks this week, that feels like an unlikely scenario. As the rainy season ends this month, fueling fears of a massive new government offensive, the situation on the ground in Tigray is likely to get far worse before it gets better. As the already dire humanitarian and human-rights situations worsen, so too will Ethiopia’s foreign relations.

But with an electoral victory, a vast parliamentary majority, and a seeming mandate to lead, Abiy now has some of the political capital he might need to begin to escape from the corner into which he’s painted himself.

As a first step—and on the advice of the three African members of the UN Security Council—he could compel his compliant parliament to rescind the terrorist designations against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front, an essential first step toward ceasefire talks and eventual political dialogue. It is also entirely within his power to lift the blockade of Tigray and save as many as one million lives in the process.

To help him on this path, the African Union recently deployed a lifeline in the form of its new Horn of Africa envoy, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. Privately, Ethiopian officials seem open to an African solution to their decidedly African problem: They appear to have faith in Obasanjo’s ability to keep Western powers at bay while offering Abiy a face-saving way to de-escalate, going so far as to invite him to establish a backchannel to the TPLF. As he builds out his team, Washington would do well to communicate its support for Obasanjo’s mission—but also stay at arm’s length, since any American fingerprints on this process could well undermine it.

Abiy’s call for “a new beginning” suggests at least an acknowledgement that Ethiopia is at a perilous point in its history. Although he continues to blame and punish those who oppose him, we must hope he realizes that more of the same war-making, ethnic division, and human-rights abuses will only produce more of the same poor results for the economy and his foreign relations. Abiy still has the possibility to live up to the spirit of the Nobel Peace Prize he received in 2019 for making peace with neighboring Eritrea. Let’s see whether he can do the same within his own country.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council.

The post Time is running out for Abiy’s ‘new beginning’ in Ethiopia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Then came today’s executive order—the latest in a long series of escalatory efforts by the White House to push the belligerents toward ceasefire talks and to allow in humanitarian aid. Repeated press statements expressing the administration’s “grave concern” looked more like platitudes than policy, which is why it faced increasing pressure from human-rights activists to act.

The administration chose to issue what the Treasury Department calls an “empty EO,” meaning a sanctions regime is now in place but the executive order does not designate any individuals or companies. Instead, the Biden team has launched its final and most elaborate warning shot, effectively giving both sides a few more weeks to engage in serious negotiations, cease their attacks on civilians, and open up the free flow of humanitarian assistance before sanctions are imposed. US officials have been clear to say that designations will come “in weeks not months” if progress isn’t made quickly.

The order goes further than sanctioning only human-rights offenses, as is allowed under the Global Magnitsky Act. Instead, the order is purpose-built to create a sanctions regime specific to the conflict in Ethiopia, giving the administration broad authority to target asset freezes at not just those committing rights abuses, but also those blocking humanitarian aid, inhibiting ceasefire negotiations, undermining democratic processes, engaging in corruption, and targeting civilians and international aid workers.

While we don’t know who will be targeted, it will likely include a representative sample of all the warring sides, including Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials, Amhara state representatives and militia leaders, as well as Tigrayan political and military figures.

Abiy under fire?

If the United States chooses to sanction Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his close associates before his expected reappointment as prime minister in the coming weeks, it could plant serious doubt about his leadership in the minds of his supporters. Such a move—though it’s unlikely—would probably also be met with renewed accusations that the United States was meddling in Ethiopia’s internal political affairs and effectively seeking regime change.

Because Washington has been accused of taking sides against Addis Ababa, today’s order takes great pains to appear even-handed by recognizing the complicity of all sides in committing rights abuses and prolonging the conflict. The order singles out not just Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials but also “the TPLF, the Amhara regional government or the Amhara regional or irregular forces,” essentially any party alleged to have committed abuses to date.

In a smart move, the administration also rolled out wide carveouts to those sanctions for “personal remittances to non-sanctioned persons, humanitarian assistance to at-risk populations, and longer-term assistance programs and commercial activities that address basic human needs.” That suggests it has learned from past cases, in which broad unintended consequences followed sanctions by hurting civilians.

Beyond the direct effect of sanctions, the reputational effect associated with them will also likely be substantial. Ethiopia will now be associated with neighbors such South Sudan and the Central African Republic on the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list of sanctioned countries—company it will surely not want to keep when just two years ago it found itself on a very different list: the International Monetary Fund’s ranking of the world’s fastest-growing economies.

Although today’s announcement is a serious step forward on pressuring the Abiy government, it still leaves open the possibility that progress on the ground can be made over the next several weeks and that the worst of Washington’s sanctions can be avoided.

Timing is everything

As fighting has become increasingly widespread over the last few months, many fear the war could quickly escalate and get dramatically worse for non-combatants, who have borne the brunt of the violence.

Moreover, East Africa’s rainy season will end in a few weeks, allowing for heavy weapons and larger troop deployments to wider, previously unreachable swaths of the country. While the TPLF currently appears to be on its back foot, the coming start of the dry season will level the battlefield once again. US officials estimate that all sides are preparing major new offenses next month.

Ethiopia will also be concluding parliamentary elections, which were delayed this summer in several regions due to the fighting. This will be followed almost immediately by a party congress for Abiy’s Prosperity Party, which he hopes will not only renew his mandate but also give him support to press forward with the war. To that end, the Biden administration’s order leaves Abiy with a choice: Use that new mandate to push for total victory, or initiate some type of political settlement.

Lastly, coming just days before the start of the United Nations General Assembly—and as former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo heads to Ethiopia as the African Union’s new Horn of Africa envoy—today’s effort could catalyze a new and concerted international diplomatic push for ending the fighting.

All sides have expected this announcement for some time. Still, US-Ethiopia relations are sure to nosedive even further as a result. Just hours after today’s sanctions announcement, Abiy issued an open letter to US President Joe Biden in which he stridently proclaimed that “Ethiopia will not succumb to consequences of pressure engineered by disgruntled individuals.”

However, viewed from Washington, diplomacy alone hasn’t worked either. The question is whether Abiy will see this latest move from Washington as the end of the road—or as an exit ramp to avoiding even greater pain.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading

AfricaSource May 25, 2021

Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it?

By Rama Yade

Biden can further build ties with Africa: He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations, but also because they offer innovative solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19.

Africa Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Apr 21, 2021

A world apart: How wealthy nations can strengthen the COVID safety net

By Jeremy Mark and Vasuki Shastry

The international community has delivered important progress in combating the impact of COVID-19, but much more is needed to assist low-income countries. While the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights are a good start, G20 nations must help restructure the debts of developing nations and fund vaccine distribution.

Africa China

AfricaSource Mar 3, 2021

The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan

By

Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies.

Africa Conflict

The post Biden finally gets bold on Ethiopia. But will it bring peace? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month’s topline events

Taliban Takeover. Afghanistan’s Western-backed government collapsed as the Taliban took control of Kabul and declared the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, while President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. Nearly twenty years after being toppled in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban returned to power having capitalized on the Biden administration’s (and previously, the Trump administration’s) decision to withdraw all US forces from the country. After evacuating most of their citizens, as well as tens of thousands of Afghans who assisted their mission, US and NATO troops completed their final withdrawal at the end of August.

• Shaping the Order. The return of the Taliban is a tragedy for Afghans who sought to live in an open society and a setback to the advance of a rules-based order — underscoring that despite two decades of sustained US and NATO combat support and economic aid, the establishment of a stable, democratic government proved out of reach. The developments in Afghanistan could embolden America’s adversaries, as China and Russia sought to portray the United States as a weak and defeated power upon which US allies cannot confidently rely.

• Hitting Home. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan puts an end to US involvement in the “forever war” that most Americans felt had dragged on far too long. But the re-emergence of the Taliban could provide a safe haven to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups – potentially threatening the security of Americans in the region and even in the homeland.

• What to Do. The Biden Administration should make clear that its withdrawal from Afghanistan is not a sign of retreat from US global leadership nor an abandonment of efforts to advance democracy and a rules-based order. Building on Biden’s initial remarks after the fall of Kabul, the administration should reinforce its determination to work with NATO and its Asia-Pacific treaty allies to strengthen U.S. alliances, while taking affirmative steps to support front-line democracies, such as Ukraine, and pro-democracy movements around the world.

US-Israel Realigned. In his first meeting with Israel’s new prime minister Naftali Bennett, at the White House, President Biden provided a forceful recommitment to Israeli security, vowing that the US and Israel have an “unshakeable partnership.” The two leaders reportedly agreed on a common strategy to halt Iran’s nuclear program, creating a joint team at the national security advisers level, while Biden indicated his administration would be prepared to move to “other options” if diplomacy fails to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

• Shaping the Order. A strengthened US-Israeli partnership can serve as an anchor for stability in the Middle East, facilitating more effective cooperation to advance shared interests in regional security, nonproliferation, and a rules-based order. But the Israeli government’s unwillingness to relaunch peace talks with the Palestinians and work toward a two-state solution could be a thorny obstacle in the US-Israeli relationship.

• Hitting Home. A nuclear-armed Iran would constitute a direct security threat to the United States and its allies and could lead to a more dangerous world.

• What to Do. Working through their newly-created joint team, the US and Israel should expand cooperation to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, while countering Iran’s destabilizing influence across the region. To ensure a unified front, these efforts should also be coordinated with other regional allies, as well as the G7 or D-10.

Democracy Summit. The Biden administration announced that it plans to host a virtual Summit for Democracy this year, with invited heads of state coming together on December 9-10 to focus on three main themes: defending against authoritarianism, fighting corruption, and promoting respect for human rights. The White House aims to organize a follow-up summit one year later, in-person if feasible, providing a venue to take stock of commitments made during the initial convening.

• Shaping the Order. Coming on the heels of the fall of Afghanistan, the Summit could serve as a timely opportunity for the Biden administration to rally support for democratic norms and showcase common resolve among the world’s democracies, at a time when democracy has suffered significant setbacks around the world.

• Hitting Home. A more democratic world is likely to provide greater security and stability for the United States and generate increased trade and economic opportunities.

• What To Do. To ensure the Summit’s success, the Biden administration should limit the guest list to leaders of democracies (as opposed to friendly non-democracies) that are prepared to set forth meaningful commitments in support of the Summit’s core themes. The outcome should include a democracy charter, in which participating leaders pledge to take active measures to counter authoritarianism and bolster support for democratic norms.

Quote of the Month

“[W]e all recognize that the decision to leave Afghanistan was extremely difficult. It entailed risks. But that doesn’t change the fundamental value of U.S. and Europe being committed to each other, especially in a time where we see the rise of China and the shifting global balance of power that makes it even more important, both for Europe and United States, to stand together in an alliance as NATO.”

– Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General

State of the Order this month: Weakened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• The fall of the Afghan government, despite nearly 20-years of military and economic support from the US and its NATO allies, represents a significant blow to efforts to advance democracy, especially in the Islamic world.
• With President Nicolas Maduro tightening his grip on the country, Venezuela’s main opposition parties announced an end to their three-year boycott of elections, abandoning one of the main tactics of their ongoing struggle against the country’s dictatorship.
• Poles took to the streets to protest a parliamentary bill widely viewed as an effort by the country’s nationalist ruling party to silence government criticism by an independent television network (owned by the US-based media company Discovery), a leading source of news for many in Poland.
• The United States imposed a new round of sanctions against Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka—timed to mark the one-year anniversary of his fraudulent re-election. The US also issued new sanctions against Cuban officials involved in the crackdown on anti-government protestors in July.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↓)

• The re-emergence of Taliban rule in Afghanistan could provide a safe haven to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups that could pose a direct threat to the United States and Europe, as well as India and other nations in the region.
• Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous nation and a longstanding US partner against Islamist militancy, descended into an escalating civil war between the ruling government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. In May, the Biden administration imposed sanctions against Ethiopian officials for their role in abetting human rights atrocities.
• Particularly in light of developments in Afghanistan, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

• The United Kingdom indicated that it aims to start negotiations on a free trade agreement with India by the end of the year, while India also expressed interest in free trade agreements with the European Union and Australia.
• The global economic recovery from the pandemic has begun to wane, as the widespread outbreak of the Delta variant negatively impacted manufacturing centers in East Asia.
• Overall, the global trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↓)

• A major scientific study by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessed that human activity is changing the climate in unprecedented and irreversible ways, underlining the urgent need for global action as the United Kingdom prepares to host an upcoming global climate summit (COP26) in November.
• In its first Indo-Pacific naval voyage in twenty years, Germany deployed a frigate intended to cross the South China Sea in the coming weeks, joining the US and other democratic allies in efforts to reaffirm freedom of navigation amid China’s maritime ambitions.
• Overall, the global commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↓)

• The US withdrawal from Afghanistan drew criticism from US allies, particularly in Europe, where many expressed disappointment with the level of consultation ahead of the decision to withdraw. President Biden sought to assuage allies in a special G7 summit meeting convened virtually by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in the wake of the Taliban takeover.
• Frustrated with the continuing US travel ban on European travelers, the European Union recommended reinstatement of restrictions on US travelers, citing the significant increase in coronavirus cases across the United States.
• As discussed above, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett’s visit to the White House strengthened relations between the two allies.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was weakened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Anne Applebaum, in The Atlantic, defends the value of fighting for liberal democracy, a potent ideology opposed by America’s adversaries.
• Anders Fogh Rasmussen, writing in Foreign Affairs, argues that despite the Afghan government’s collapse, America and its allies cannot abandon the fight for democracy.
• Kevin Rudd, in Foreign Affairs, suggests that the success of the Indo-Pacific Quad poses a threat to Beijing’s long-term ambitions to dominate the East Asian region.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Barry Pavel, in the New Atlanticist, suggests that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan could be even more dangerous than it was prior to September 11, 2001.
• Dan Fried, in the New Atlanticist, suggests that despite its failure in Afghanistan, the United States can come back strong to advance the cause of freedom and democracy, just as it did after its debacle in Vietnam.
• Amanda Rothschild offers recommendations to the Biden administration in The Dispatch on how to avert a growing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan.
• Dan Fried and Brian O’Toole, in the New Atlanticist, suggest that the new series of US sanctions on Belarus will not be powerful enough to rattle the autocrat Lukashenka.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing August 2021 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Kamal Alam with BBC Somali: Reconciliation of war: “How will the Taliban deal with resistance in the Panjshir Valley?” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the past two decades, the Sub-Saharan Africa region (SSA) has gained significant importance in Chinese state-directed industrial and trade policies, leading to an increasing share of China in SSA’s total trade and vice versa. China’s total merchandise trade (referred to for simplicity here as “trade”) with SSA has increased by a whopping 1,864 percent between 2001 and 2020. As shown in Figure 1, China has been emerging as a major trade partner for SSA in the past two decades, while the commercial ties of the European Union and mostly that of the United States with SSA has been on the decline. Specifically, the share of China in SSA’s total trade – imports and export – has increased from 4 percent in 2001 to 25.6 percent in 2020, while during the same period the share of the EU and the United States in SSA’s total trade declined from 30.3 to 22.3 percent and from 15.5 to 5.6 percent, respectively.

Minerals, metals, agricultural products, and crude oil are the main exports of SSA economies to China. Specifically, in 2019, SSA accounted for more than 16 percent of all crude oil imported by China, and the size of SSA crude exports to China grew by more than 100 percent between 2008 and 2019 – 0.7 million barrels per day in 2008 to 1.5 million barrels per day in 2019. 

It is critical to note here that China overtook the United States as a trading partner of SSA immediately after the 2007-09 global financial crisis (GFC). Less affected by the GFC, the size of China’s trade with SSA continued to increase during GFC, while that of the United States declined sharply and has continued to decline since 2011 (see Figure 2). In this way, there is a stark similarity between SSA and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions as China’s trade with MENA also overtook US-MENA trade immediately after the GFC (see Figure 2). One reason has been diverging trends in energy imports: while there has been growing demand in China for energy imports in the past two decades, US crude and natural gas imports started declining from their peak in 2007 as the United States took serious steps towards energy independence after the GFC through the expansion of shale oil and gas production – justified by the high oil prices through most of the 2007-14 period. Moreover, China’s investment has also been increasing in similar sectors across the two regions in the past decades: energy, metals, real estate, and transportation. The glaring similarity of China’s growing role in investment and trade in SSA and MENA points to a shifting of balance and realignment from West to East in these regions, at least in economic and trade fronts.

Not only has China become an increasingly strategic trade partner for SSA in the past two decades, SSA’s share in China’s total trade has also increased during the same period: from 1.48 percent of China’s total trade in 2001 to 3.18 percent in 2020. At the same time, SSA’s weight in the EU’s total trade stayed relatively the same – 1.3 percent in 2001 and 1.2 percent in 2020 – while it experienced a decline in the United States – 1.5 percent in 2001 to 0.85 percent in 2020 (see Figure 3). In other words, SSA’s weight in China’s total trade increased by more than two-fold in the past two decades, while it remained relatively constant for the EU and declined for the United States.

This is further illustrated by the fact that in 2019, out of the forty-two SSA countries with available trade data, China was the top exports destination and imports origin for thirteen and twenty-six SSA economies, respectively. Moreover, China was among the top three exports destinations and imports origins for twenty-two and thirty-nine SSA economies, respectively. In the same year, China accounted for more than 20 percent of a country’s imports and exports for sixteen SSA economies, while more than 50 percent of imports of eight SSA countries were originated from China (see Figure 4).

Finally, similar to the findings on Chinese investment and construction in SSA, on average, while SSA countries with access to seaports have an advantage over the landlocked ones when it comes to trade with China, the commercial ties of forty-five out of forty-nine SSA economies experienced substantial growth rates ranging from 439 to 184,101 percent in the past two decades (see Figure 5).

The evidence highlighted above suggests that SSA and China view each other as increasingly strategic trading partners, and the commercial ties between SSA and the US and EU has relatively declined in the past two decades. While the EU has negotiated a set of free trade agreements with most of SSA economies, such agreements have done little to slow down the growth of commercial ties between SSA and China, even though the EU has clear advantages over China in terms of geographic proximity and historical ties to the region. Moreover, Brexit has introduced some challenges in the ability of the EU to successfully negotiate as one common market with SSA. In the case of the United States, since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has provided eligible SSA economies with tariff-free access to 1,800 products in the US market. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), thirty-eight countries were eligible for AGOA program in 2020. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, the commercial ties between the US and SSA have deteriorated, and China has been filling up most of this gap.

The increasing presence of China in SSA alongside the relative decline of commercial and economic ties of the United States and EU in this region have increased the risk of supply chain disruptions for the United States and the EU in many strategic commodities, such as Cobalt. At the same time, China’s growing economic activities and investments in SSA has meant greater access in the region, with Beijing eying many SSA countries as potential political and military allies, posing serious geo-security challenges for the United States and the EU in the long run. As a result, the growing strategic importance of SSA for the United States and the EU necessitates a common US-EU front to face China’s expanding commercial, investment, and construction activities in this region. The latest joint action of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the EU to impose sanctions on Chinese entities who are believed to be associated with serious human rights violations in Xinjiang region of China, is an example of US collaborating with its close allies to confront China’s human rights violations. Although, this move has threatened the ratification of China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on both ends, it has sent a clear signal to China, that despite their disagreements, the United States and the EU are once again ready to partner in confronting China’s human rights violations and global ambitions. The recent launch of Build Back Better World (B3W) by President Biden and G7 leaders is an example of a partnership model that could show the commitment of the United States, the EU, and their allies to the development of SSA – and other less developed regions – while also confronting China’s seemingly limitless expansion in SSA and the developing world. Complementing B3W initiatives in SSA with bilateral and multilateral trade agreements could restore dwindling economic ties between the United States and strategic SSA economies. It is true that Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is eight years ahead of B3W and 139 countries – including Italy – are formally affiliated with it, but there remains significant infrastructure gaps in SSA for initiatives such as B3W to address. After all, it is better late than never.

Related content

Blog Post

Jun 10, 2021

Development finance in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Chinese model

By Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou

In recent years Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has outpaced distributions by the World Bank Group by more than $20 billion USD. These investments have been focused in energy, transport, metals, and real estate imply a modern bartering system is at play where developing countries in these regions pay for Chinese investment and construction in their economies through guaranteed long-term supply of hydrocarbons, agriproducts, or minerals.

Africa China

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post China and Sub-Saharan Africa trade: A case of growing interdependence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Africa Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region as well as former US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, moderated the conversation, opening with a discussion on the evolution of Prof. Autesserre’s distinguished career from identifying flaws in international peacebuilding norms and practices to offering an alternative localized solution, noting that her often provocative work has influenced policy discussions at some of the highest levels in international organizations and governments.  

In Prof. Autesserre’s remarks, she highlighted the need to move peacebuilding away from the traditional practices of premature elections and a focus on elite-bargaining, towards a process that is locally led and prioritizes local definitions of peace, democracy, and justice. She also spoke of the growing support for localized peace processes but noted that international organizations often merely “talk the talk” when it comes to supporting genuinely locally driven peace processes.

Prof. Autesserre also engaged on the role of locally led peace processes in Idjwi (DRC), Somaliland, and lessons that can be brought from these contexts to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (​MINUSMA), whose annual mandate renews on June 30 and which Amb. Pham noted, has “found progress difficult to come by” despite the “billions of dollars spent since 2013 and the hundreds of lives lost, making MINUSMA the deadliest ‘peacekeeping’ mission in the world today.”

Further reading

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In his remarks, the Minister provided a readout of his February and April trips to the region, describing stakeholder meetings and the status of humanitarian access and reporting. He also commented on the negotiations surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), due for its second filling this summer, and regional border disputes.

Throughout the subsequent discussion, participants engaged the Minister on election implications, expectations around Prime Minister Abiy’s post-election policy, the role of regional organizations, and the parameters for a credible national reconciliation. Hudson closed, remarking that the conversation is a reflection of the importance of US and EU cooperation on key regional issues.  

Further reading

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Responding to acute challenges in the Horn of Africa, with Finnish FM Pekka Haavisto appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“May this convention of union last 1,000 years,” the Ethiopian leader said, while Angola and Mozambique (still Portuguese colonies) along with South Africa and South Rhodesia (under apartheid rule) were fighting for their freedom.

Since then, that union has been succeeded by the 55-member African Union, “inspired by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States,” according to its Constitutive Act.

If Africa seems geographically distant to Americans, it shouldn’t; the United States wouldn’t be what it is today without the labor force of Africans brought to the country as part of a bloody multi-century transatlantic trade. As the US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently pointed out, that experience is “just three generations back from me.”

Rather than being defeated by this mass depopulation—which cost it one-hundred million of its own, directly or indirectly, according to the macabre accounting of W.E.B Du Bois—Africa survived. Now it is the new frontier, full of all the promise presented by its youth, its dynamism, and its universalism despite the persistent presence of poverty on the continent.

As it re-engages with the world, Joe Biden’s United States will find a vigorous and uninhibited Africa, at least in the civil-society sector and among young generations, that does not expect leadership from the United States but rather a win-win partnership. With each passing day, Africa grows more critical for the United States in national-security and especially economic terms.

US policy in Africa has been thrown off course by China, which is methodically implementing a grand, 21st-century Marshall Plan for the continent through its Belt and Road Initiative. And Beijing is hardly to blame. As home to a large share of the world’s water resources, untapped arable land, and by 2050 nearly 25 percent of the world’s population, Africa has emerged as the most important piece on the geopolitical chessboard. Without a drastic shift in strategy, the United States is on the verge of being on the outside looking in for decades to come.

China is playing the long game in Africa and has strategically invested in infrastructure projects including railroads, ports, dams, and hydropower-generation sources. But these investments could be the warm-up act for China’s entry into fields traditionally dominated by the United States—namely technology and banking—where it aspires to compete with American heavyweights like Microsoft, Boeing, Google, and General Electric. Such game-changing moves would play into China’s larger ambition of unseating the US dollar.

All of these measures reflect the coming surge in economic demand from Africa. As the population grows, so too does its pool of potential consumers and clients. The African middle class, which stood at 355 million people in 2010, will reach 1.1 billion by 2060.

From Morocco to Ethiopia, Africa has become the workshop of the world. It was home to six of the world’s ten most dynamic economies in 2018. The world’s largest free-trade zone—the African Continental Free Trade Area—was launched in 2019 to put an end to the dramatic effects of the old colonial policy that prevented Africans from trading with each other. A cosmopolitan billionaire class has sprouted, largely from the tech sector, as Africa has experienced the largest telecommunications revolution in the world. Kenya is a global leader in developing mobile-payment systems. Smart cities are cropping up in Ghana and Angola. And companies like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon invested two billion dollars in African tech ventures in 2019.

Encouragingly, the new generation of Africans driving this change do not want to live in a Leninist system. They want democracy, an open market, and free trade. This gives the United States an opening—if it is willing to act on it.

The Biden administration has sent strong signals that it is eager to engage. Biden earned positive reviews following his appearance at the 34th African Union Summit—his first international forum in office—during which he committed to stand as Africa’s partner and support African nations’ entrepreneurship and innovation.

A new policy toward Africa needs to chiefly reflect the realities that competition among global powers (Russia, Turkey, and others are vying with China for influence on the continent) and the major changes underway in African societies have a significant impact on the strategic long-term interests of the United States. The continent should be viewed through the lens of opportunity rather than risk. The Chinese have maximized the opportunity by being explicit with their investments, which prioritize long-term projects that minimize risk. As Senegalese President Macky Sall puts it, “What handicaps the continent is prejudice and the stigmatizing gaze on it. When it comes to investing in Africa, the perception of risk is always exaggerated, which further increases the cost of investment and debt. In fact, the risk in Africa is no higher than in many other parts of the world.”

China’s rapid advance in infrastructure investments will be difficult for Americans and Europeans to match. But Americans should invest in an area where they don’t yet have a competitor: cultural soft power. Fashion, entertainment, and even sports convey values of fair play, freedom, and success. During the Cold War, they enabled the American way of life to spread everywhere. Culture proved stronger than nuclear weapons. And that’s a good thing: Africa’s cultural industries are in dire need of investment. From the African Development Bank to the African Export-Import Bank, pan-African investors are working to address this. To launch this cultural and geopolitical revolution, the United States has a tremendous asset: its African American community, whose interest in the African continent is growing. Cooperation is beckoning from both sides of the Atlantic—from one new world to another.

Biden can further build ties with Africa by working to give its nations more influence on the global stage. He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations—including the UN Security Council—but also because they offer innovative yet often unnoticed solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19. African marginalization is no longer an option, and its nations will not soon forget who gave them a long-overdue seat at the table.

A new start with Africa is possible for the United States. It turns out that the world’s oldest continent is also the youngest. In this dual capacity, Africa has much to say. It’s time to listen to it.

Ambassador Rama Yade is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @ramayade.

Further reading

AfricaSource Apr 23, 2021

Climate change will not be fixed without Africa

By Rama Yade

When Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi spoke at the virtual Leaders Summit on Climate this week, he had the force of the continent behind him. And his message was that developed countries must do more. As the summit comes to a close, the world still has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

AfricaSource Apr 6, 2021

Keys to African recovery: Vaccines, debt, and commodities

By Rabah Arezki

In the wake of COVID-19, African markets are consumed by uncertainty about the economic recovery. Because of its large population—1.2 billion people—developments in Africa will weigh heavily on the world. The recovery from COVID-19 in Africa will depend on three factors—vaccines, debt, and commodities.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Dec 22, 2020

African outlook 2021: The Africa Center reflects on 2020 and looks ahead

By Africa Center

African nations have mostly escaped the heavy death toll and hospital bed shortages faced by Western countries, but the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a disproportionately severe blow to the continent’s economic ambitions. Fortunately, robust collaboration between African public and private sectors, and particularly innovative financing measures from African development institutions—including members of the Africa Center’s […]

Africa Coronavirus

The post Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month, senior government officials who gathered virtually under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank authorized the issuance of $650 billion of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a reserve asset that will be exchangeable for hard currency. In addition, the Group of Twenty (G20) governments agreed to extend until the end of this year a moratorium on debt-service payments by the poorest countries on loans from G20 lenders. That moratorium already has freed up $5.7 billion for forty-three countries since it went into effect a year ago, with another $7.3 billion of deferral possible by the end of June, according to World Bank President David Malpass.

However, these measures will not be enough. Low-income countries were hit by the same recession that the advanced and emerging-market economies experienced in 2020, but the IMF projects that their rebound will be much slower. So the tens of millions of people in low-income countries who have fallen back into extreme poverty because of the pandemic have little hope for improvement in the coming year. More action is needed in several areas:

• No rich nations have stepped up to offer new country-to-country assistance to help poor nations counter the public-health and economic impacts of the pandemic. This presents a stark contrast to the willingness of Group of Seven (G7) countries to provide bilateral aid to African countries at the height of the 2008 global financial crisis.

• The G20 has made little concrete progress on implementing its framework for restructuring the debts of countries whose loan obligations have become unsustainable during the pandemic.

• The G20 so far has not responded to the failure of private-sector creditors—who hold a major portion of low-income country debt—to join its debt-relief and debt-restructuring initiatives.

• A broad swath of the globe has little prospect of gaining significant access to COVID vaccines before 2022, or even 2023, meaning that the virus and its variants could continue to spread, mostly affecting low-income countries.

These intertwined issues, if left unaddressed, could lead to a long delay in the resumption of growth across the developing world at levels that could offset the human impact of the crisis, meaning debt burdens will deepen. The IMF has offered a brighter economic outlook for 2021 than many would have expected a year ago, with global growth now expected to reach 6 percent this year, largely because of a resurgent US economy. But the fund issued a stark warning that the debts of countries that have achieved emerging-market status could become a serious burden if the pandemic continues. “The future presents daunting challenges,” wrote IMF Chief Economist Gita Gopinath. “The pandemic is yet to be defeated and virus cases are accelerating in many countries. Recoveries are also diverging dangerously across and within countries.”

The agreement to issue SDRs can help, although many bureaucratic obstacles remain. This summer the IMF will make available the equivalent of about $21 billion in SDRs to low-income countries as reserves—an allocation from the total $650 billion that represents their weighting in the global economy. But the assets will not be immediately available as currency. First, the fund’s membership will have to agree on the procedures for each country to make use of its allocations by exchanging them for other currencies. Second, the members will have to agree on how wealthier countries may redistribute their own SDR allocations to low-income countries. In the absence of significant bilateral assistance from wealthy countries—either grant aid or low-interest loans—the transfer of SDRs could be crucial to help low-income countries respond to the pandemic. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has said that the United States looks forward to discussing ways to deploy SDRs to support low-income countries.

Debt restructuring remains another serious hurdle. Three African countries—Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia—have asked to restructure their debt burdens under a Common Framework for Debt Treatments agreed to by the G20 last year, and more countries are expected to follow. But that process has remained stalled by procedural issues like the composition of creditor committees that would negotiate with the debtor governments. Governments involved in the negotiations over the Common Framework are still unsure how much money and influence China—the largest bilateral creditor to low-income countries, with hundreds of billions of dollars in loans—is prepared to commit to the restructuring.

There are also differences over the role of private-sector lenders, which range from Eurobond holders in Ethiopia, Zambia, and other countries to the commodities trading and mining giant Glencore, which holds the largest single portion of Chad’s debt. Private-sector lenders have declined to participate in the G20 debt-service moratorium in the absence of country-by-country negotiations, and their role in debt restructuring remains unclear.

While the private sector’s role merited several mentions in the communiqués issued this month by the G20 finance ministers and IMF, there was little evidence at the respective meetings that the governments were prepared to take a harder line against the financiers. However, officials have suggested that private-sector participation in the Common Framework will be an integral and unavoidable part of the G20’s overall strategy in dealing with debt distress. It is likely only a matter of time before we see the official sector deploy the necessary carrots (and sticks) to bring a recalcitrant private sector into the restructuring process. Over the past year, senior officials have spoken of mandating the participation of private bondholders in any restructuring of sovereign debts. Private-sector misgivings about the Common Framework forcing them to disclose proprietary information have also been discounted because officials see the public and private interest best served through greater transparency on all debt owed by low-income countries, but officials are prepared to be flexible about how certain categories of debt data are released publicly. 

Finally, there is the issue of “vaccination, vaccination, vaccination,” as Swedish Finance Minister Magdalena Andersson declared during an IMF press conference. Only a tiny percentage of COVID vaccines so far have been made available to developing countries. Pandemic-fighting tools for low-income countries, including the COVAX Facility to supply vaccines, face a $19 billion funding shortfall, even after the Biden administration, the World Bank, and other donors have chipped in $14.1 billion. India’s commitment to provide millions of shots to other countries has ground to a halt as it struggles with a severe resurgence of the virus, and questions have arisen about the effectiveness of China’s Sinovac vaccine, which has been supplied to countries from Indonesia to Turkey and Brazil. By some estimates, dozens of countries across the Global South will not receive adequate supplies of vaccines until 2023.

While the IMF has made important progress in finding ways to assist low-income countries during the pandemic, many others—especially creditor governments and private lenders—have failed to respond adequately. That means the developing world faces a deepening crisis just as some countries begin to gain the upper hand against COVID-19. Those diverging fortunes do not bode well for a global recovery.

Jeremy Mark is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center. He previously worked for the IMF and the Asian Wall Street Journal. Follow him on Twitter @JedMark888.

Vasuki Shastry, formerly with the IMF, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Standard Chartered Bank, is the author of the book Has Asia Lost It? Dynamic Past, Turbulent Future. Follow him on Twitter @vshastry.

The post A world apart: How wealthy nations can strengthen the COVID safety net appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In recent weeks, the United States and its European allies have launched a diplomatic campaign to convince Ethiopia’s once-venerated prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, to relent in his campaign to vanquish militarily his greatest political threat in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). I once feared the onset of a bloody struggle for control over Tigray that would pit near-equally matched foes against each other in something approximating conventional, interstate war. But what has instead emerged is a widespread TPLF insurgency that could drag on and take as many lives through deprivation as it does through combat.

The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies. Indeed, it is this possible unintended consequence of Abiy’s “law and order operation” in Tigray that could well do the most extensive damage in the region. In contrast to the conflict in Tigray, however, it is not too late for the United States and its allies in the region and beyond to do something to prevent a border war that would amount to a historic strategic blunder.

The seeds of this potential calamity were planted at the start of the last century when the border between Ethiopia and Sudan was first agreed to, though never formally demarcated, by modern Ethiopia’s founding father, Emperor Menelik II, during the British-Sudanese condominium. Since 1993, a patch of agricultural land on the Sudanese side of the border, referred to as the al-Fashqa Triangle, has been occupied by Amhara farmers. Many of them were relocated there by the Sudanese government in recognition of historic claims to the area by this powerful minority group. Since 2008, a de-facto agreement has existed whereby Ethiopia has acknowledged the historic legal boundary putting al-Fashqa inside Sudan, while Sudan has granted Amhara farmers continued rights to cultivate the land. Efforts to definitively demarcate the border have been stalled since the last meeting of an ad-hoc border commission last year, but Sudan’s designs on the region have never abated. Indeed, as recently as August 2020, in remarks by the head of the Sudanese army and chairman of the transitional government’s Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to the Army General Command, he predicted that they would “raise the flag of Sudan above al-Fashqa… and not waste one inch of the homeland.”

What has broken that decade-plus status quo is the onset of conflict in Tigray and a series of strategic and tactical calculations by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Unlike many outsiders, senior-level Sudanese officials claim not to have been surprised by the brutal assault by the TPLF on the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) Northern Command outpost in Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, on the night of November 4. Only a week prior, a delegation led by the deputy head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, General Mohammed “Hemedti” Dagalo, met with Abiy in Addis, where the restive Tigray region, mounting border tensions, and the stalemated negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) were all reportedly topics of discussion.

More surprising to the Sudanese was the Ethiopian government’s near-immediate need for supplementary troops—pulled in from Ethiopian deployments in Somalia and, most notably, the al-Fashqa Triangle—to respond to the TPLF attack in Mekelle. The subsequent entry into the Tigray conflict of Eritrean forces and Amhara state militias further indicated that the ENDF was unable to subdue the TPLF uprising on its own and was operating from a greater position of relative weakness than was perhaps anticipated. 

By December, as primarily SAF forces gathered along the Sudanese side of the border to monitor the crossing of Tigrayan refugees and possible retreating TPLF forces, SAF and ENDF troops found themselves in closer proximity than ever before—increasing the risk of clashes. Multiple ENDF surprise assaults on SAF army officers prompted SAF forces to move in on the night of December 29. In that incursion, SAF forces reportedly destroyed Ethiopian army outposts and administrative centers while also displacing Amhara farmers and destroying crops in their successful bid to reclaim the entirety of the al-Fashqa Triangle. 

Sudan has presented its tactical decision as a legitimate response in light of the ENDF’s own unprovoked incursions against Sudanese patrols and Khartoum’s historic and legal claims to the area. But there is no question that the SAF, which has witnessed its traditional importance in Sudan’s body politic decline substantially under the country’s civilian-led transitional government, see in their defense of Sudan’s territorial integrity an opportunity to once again assert its primacy as the protector of the Sudanese state. 

It is also true that in its effort to change facts on the ground, whether justified or not, the SAF has now further aggravated an inherently unstable situation in the region and may have disrupted the delicate balance among security forces inside Sudan that has kept the transition there on track.

As bellicose rhetoric by both sides has increased in recent weeks, Khartoum and Addis have come to frame the threat of territorial loss in national-security and even existential terms—similar in certain respects to how each side has recently described the contentious and protracted GERD talks. Sudan’s ambassador to Ethiopia was recently recalled to Khartoum, and various peace envoys and proposed mediators from the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, South Sudan, and the African Union (AU) have all largely seen their willingness to help the parties achieve a negotiated solution rebuffed. Even Eritrea, whose peace agreement with Ethiopia has emerged as more of a mutual-security pact, tried unconvincingly to paint itself as a peacemaker in a letter last week from President Isaias Afwerki to Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Sudan’s newly appointed foreign minister, Mariam al Saddig, suggested in late February that Sudan would be open to talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But that regional body, currently chaired by Hamdok and historically controlled by Ethiopia, has not yet offered its good offices and likely lacks the independence to offer impartial mediation.

In the absence of concerted external mediation, both sides risk turning their cold war much hotter. And with such intertwined politics and long histories, both sides have the points of leverage to do it. Ethiopia currently supplies the totality of troops (more than five thousand) to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Abyei, the highly contested region along the Sudan-South Sudan border that remains at the heart of the tensions between those two countries. Concerns abound that Ethiopia could withdraw those troops, potentially forcing the SAF to fill a security vacuum there that could well spark renewed conflict with Juba. There are also worries that Sudan could unilaterally expel those forces out of fear that Ethiopia could use these forces as a fifth column in the event of a sustained outbreak of violence along its border—opening a new front against Sudan and vastly expanding their zone of conflict. Addis, for its part, is right to fear Khartoum’s ability to re-arm and re-supply TPLF rebels should Sudan wish to open its own additional front in a border conflict.

Adding to the volatility has been an influx of allied armies and militias into the border zone between Sudan and Ethiopia. On the Ethiopian side, it is not just the ENDF, but also Amhara militias and Eritrean Defense Forces. Similarly, on the Sudanese side of the border, the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have also been identified in increasingly large numbers.

Given the lack of interoperability among many of these forces, coupled with the fact that the vast majority of this mobilization is occurring in a narrow band along the border that is only a few kilometers wide, the chances are high that the slightest misstep or miscalculation could result in a large-scale outbreak of violence and a rapid escalation among three national armies and many state and national militias. This is particularly true inside Sudan, where the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have even turned on each other in the past year in areas like Darfur and Kordofan when they have been deployed in close proximity.

Absent some kind of international monitoring, there are simply too many well-armed forces in too close proximity with too little experience working with each other to discount the risk of a cataclysmic conflict breaking out.  

The tense standoff has bred rumors that additional outside forces could light the spark that ignites that conflict. Egypt, which has grown increasingly frustrated with the state of GERD negotiations, is often identified as a prime potential instigator. But while there is no question that Egypt has sought to use its historic ties to Sudan to produce a GERD outcome to its liking, Egyptian officials privately express a clear-eyed understanding that an Ethiopia wracked by internal war and interstate conflict will be incapable of focusing on, let alone reaching, a binding political and technical agreement on the demanding issues that the GERD presents. 

So where do we go from here? It seems unlikely that ad-hoc bilateral demands for de-escalation and withdrawal from contested areas will be sufficient at this stage. Late last month, AU Commission Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat dispatched retired Mauritanian diplomat Mohamed Lebatt to Addis and Khartoum to probe each side’s willingness to accept outside meditation on the brewing border conflict. While no progress was made, it is a conversation worth building on.

Coordinated, high-level outside mediation is urgently required to avert the potentially dire consequences of a conflict for not just the civilian populations in the border area, but also the countries at the center of the dispute and the Horn of Africa as a whole. Sudan recently proposed outside mediation for the final phase of the GERD negotiations that would include the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union. Some sponsorship of border mediation by this grouping—under the leadership of an eminent, empowered figure—is worth pursuing given the substantial risks to international peace and security and the potential for the parties’ largest donors to bring financial leverage to efforts to reach a resolution.

While all these disputes are linked, there is no single process, individual, or institution that will be able to untangle the overlapping and complicated politics of the competing conflicts. What is essential is coordination. Any process that can be put in place to help with the de-escalation of war in Tigray should be kept on its own track. So too with the GERD. And so too with a process for unwinding the military buildup and tensions on the border, which should be narrowly defined and time-limited so as not to be exploited as a potential leverage point in any other mediation processes. But these must all be coordinated by a central Contact Group with the power, leverage, and legitimacy to advance options for resolution and enforce outcomes that contribute to overall peace.

Such processes must be jumpstarted now to avoid a downward spiral, and there are several immediate steps that Washington can take to do just that. In a fortunate coincidence, the United States took up the presidency of the UN Security Council in March. The newly installed US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, should prioritize a special session of the Security Council to discuss the manifold crises emerging in the Horn of Africa, with added attention to the still-unfolding conflict in Tigray and the stalemated GERD talks. Given the many competing interests at play in the Horn from all manner of external powers, the session should include discussion of an International Contact Group that can promote dialogue and transparency and ensure that potential spoilers remain in the tent rather than outside of it.

To support and complement this effort, the United States should also appoint a Horn of Africa envoy who is capable of both setting the policy agenda in Washington and corralling leaders in Europe and the region in the near term. In the long run, an envoy can only succeed if he or she is equipped with a clear set of policy objectives and the tools to advance them. In contrast to its approach in the Great Lakes or Sahel regions, Washington has for too long viewed the countries in the promising but volatile Horn of Africa in a vacuum or else simply provided wide berth to the area’s anchor state, Ethiopia, to project its power and influence to police regional disputes. With Addis having lost the ability to play that role any longer, the burden has shifted to Washington to become more actively involved in protecting its interests in the region. 

That process promises to be complicated and messy. But preventing a war is surely more attractive an enterprise than ending one.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

The post The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Responding to questions, Dr. Nega described Ethiopia’s general election, slated for June, as a historic moment, with implications for the broader Horn of Africa region. He outlined his party’s unique non-ethnic platform and grassroots approach, while reflecting on the campaign environment, the timeline of the election, political participation, and how the United States and others could play a role in supporting the National Electoral Board’s capacity.

Dr. Nega concluded with the hope that by the end of June, the people of Ethiopia will have spoken and that the election results will reflect the will of the people. This would need to be built upon further but would represent a significant step in Ethiopia’s democratic growth.

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Dr. Berhanu Nega speaks on expectations for Ethiopia’s upcoming elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In his remarks, Gov. Beasley briefed participants on the humanitarian situation in the Horn and the latest from his conversations with regional leaders. He placed considerable weight on the developments in Ethiopia, where his visit facilitated an initial agreement on humanitarian access. This issue of access remained a point of interest for participants, representing the US government, diplomatic community, and humanitarian NGOs. Gov. Beasley also reflected on Sudan’s progress and the continued humanitarian need in South Sudan.

Looking ahead, Beasley underscored that the WFP has helped get the ball rolling but that more progress will be needed, toward which the United States and others can play a constructive role.

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Responding to questions, the Minister outlined Sudan’s position on issues including the status of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), tensions on the border with Ethiopia and the need to deescalate the situation in Tigray, and the security environment in Darfur. Particular interest was also given to the role the United States and other friends of Sudan could play in contributing to reform efforts.

Hudson closed by reflecting that Sudan remains at the heart of both the opportunities and challenges facing the Horn of Africa, but that he is reassured that US stakeholders, including those in attendance, are committed to seeing Sudan succeed.

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Sudan’s outgoing state minister of foreign affairs reflects on regional issues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In his remarks, H.E. Demeke focused on the government’s humanitarian response and the status of regional refugees, while providing an update on the government’s law enforcement operation. He was joined for comments by H.E. Redwan Hussein, state minister for foreign affairs and state of emergency spokesperson, and H.E. Tesfahun Gobezay, director general of Ethiopia’s Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs. Among other contributions, H.E. Tesfahun reported on the status of four key refugee camps near the border with Eritrea and the latest efforts to restore full access and services.

In the ensuing discussion, participants across government, the diplomatic corps, and relevant non-profit organizations engaged the Deputy Prime Minister on a variety of topics. These included issues related to humanitarian and journalistic access, the alleged role of Eritrean forces, the potential for border conflict with Sudan, and the timetable on restoring telecommunications to affected areas. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton closed the session, thanking all speakers and participants for convening under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.  

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister provides humanitarian update appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hudson quoted in the Financial Times on relations between Sudan and Western countries appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hudson quoted in The National on the relationship between Sudan and AFRICOM appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In his remarks, Mr. Abdirizak addressed issues of security, governance, elections, and regional relationships from Somalia’s perspective, emphasizing that Somalia itself must be the key actor in building a better future for the country. Regional ambassadors in attendance were offered the opportunity to respond to the Minister’s remarks, providing reflections of their own on regional relations and the role of regional institutions such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Dignitaries in attendance included H.E. Ali Sharif Ahmed, ambassador of Somalia; H.E. Lazarus Amayo, ambassador of Kenya; H.E. Nureldin Satti, ambassador of Sudan; and Berhane Solomon, chargé d’affaires of the Embassy of Eritrea to the United States.

Others in attendance included current State Department officials, former US ambassadors to African countries, African and European diplomats, and the senior leadership of relevant non-profit organizations, among others. Participants took advantage of the forum to ask the Minister questions on a wide variety of topics, including civil society, journalistic freedom, regional integration, relations with key partners, and efforts to combat Al-Shabaab. Mr. Negatu closed the conversation by emphasizing his hope for stronger regional relationships through dialogue and collaboration on important challenges, as well as by pledging to continue further discussions on Somalia and the Horn of Africa throughout 2021 under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Atlantic Council hosts foreign minister of Somalia for a high-level roundtable appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hudson quoted in Bloomberg on US policy in the Horn of Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hudson quoted in African Business on the normalization of diplomatic ties between Israel and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hudson joins NPR to discuss US support of Sudanese debt relief appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hudson joins PRI’s The World to discuss the impact of debt relief on Sudan’s transitioning government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Hudson quoted in Bloomberg on increased border tensions between Amhara militias and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Africa Center’s Coronavirus: Africa page documented the early impact of the pandemic, and our virtual convenings with the leadership of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Food Programme highlighted the early successes and agency of African stakeholders in combatting the crisis. The likelihood of greater pan-African collaboration in the wake of COVID-19 was a key finding of the Center’s report on great power competition in Africa in the post-COVID landscape. That report was the result of a newly-launched collaboration with the Policy Center for the New South, which seeks to explore and reframe perceptions of Africa through a series of paired research papers written from both North and South lenses.

COVID-19 did not slow the pace of political developments in Africa this year. Sudan’s transitional government achieved a watershed when the US State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) designation was finally lifted and a massive aid package was bestowed on the nation in exchange for normalization of relations between Khartoum and Tel Aviv. The Africa Center’s convenings and analysis on this topic provided thought leadership across the political spectrum that helped steward the SST lifting to a successful conclusion. The Center’s robust analysis of the conflict in northern Ethiopia between the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and members of the former authoritarian regime helped to shape perceptions of the dispute both regionally and in Washington, DC.

Looking ahead, it’s clear that in 2021 the new Biden administration will be challenged by the need to repair and reinvigorate key bilateral relationships on the continent (including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa), and there is a major question mark over how many of the former administration’s initiatives will be abandoned. Prosper Africa’s launch was problematic, but in concert with the launch of the new US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its equity capability, it signaled a concrete shift in US priorities to “trade, not aid” that was long overdue. The Africa Center marked that transition with a summit-level conference hosted in cooperation with the DFC, which laid out the United States’ all-of-government approach to Africa policy and, importantly, underscored both the strong bipartisan support for Prosper Africa’s expanded toolkit and the essential role of African development finance institutions in the process.

An event under the auspices of our new Afro-Century Initiative—which unites a coalition of African development finance institutions in an effort to forge a more authentic, optimistic narrative on Africa—capped the Center’s year of programming. An esteemed panel of economists and business leaders offered the following observations and predictions for what 2021 has in store for Africa’s economies:   

What to watch for in 2021:

• African markets have an advantage in 2021 and beyond, says Renaissance Capital’s Global Chief Economist Charlie Robertson, because the continent has been the least hurt by COVID-19 relative to other regions (a story similar to that of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis). Consequently, low interest rates in the West could push more institutional investors to chase high yields in Africa by increasing portfolio exposure in African fixed income and equities.

• Getting Africa to “catch up” is the wrong framing, says AfroChampions Co-Founder Edem Adzogenu. To him, the attitude must rather be: “can you turn in a completely different direction and perfect another model that passes the others but also learns from them.”

• The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can be a “game-changer,” says the Africa Finance Corporation’s Chief Economist Rita Babihuga-Nsanze, but there is still a lot of work that needs to be done to build an enabling environment, especially when it comes to infrastructure.

• While China will remain a key financing partner, the scaling back of Belt and Road Initiative lending will provide space for new international lenders and other financial institutions to support the continent’s growth ambitions, says Standard Chartered Bank’s Chief Economist for Africa Razia Khan. According to Babihuga-Nsanze, African development finance institutions can play a critical role in closing the financing gap that emerges.

• Chinese growth—not lending—is going to lift the whole continent, says Robertson, but African countries need to invest in the right infrastructure. China’s GDP is likely to grow about $2.3 trillion next year and another $2.3 trillion the year after: equaling the size of the entire African market. This growth could help drive commodity price increases and create a lever for wealth creation in Africa, lifting the whole continent. Yet, key to cashing in on this Chinese growth will be Africa’s ability to build infrastructure to enable it, while forgoing projects that do not.

• Value addition and industrialization are two critical trends, according to Babihuga-Nsanze. The post-COVID reset will provide a push to shore up local supply chains and double down on the building of local industrial parks, which can promote investment.

• Ghana is a market set for growth, Khan and Robertson agree. But Nigeria must make good on its diversification promises, while South Africa’s political reforms will have investors watching.  

• Observers are missing the huge SME-driven informal sector, notes Adzogenu, as well as the huge creatives space. For African Development Bank Chief Economist and Vice President Rabah Arezki, the bottom-up wave of fintech and innovation will transform the continent, including in rural areas where growing digitization could be critical for improved agriculture. To Africa Center Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby, digitization is the single most significant trend coming out of 2020 for Africa.

The last word:

• “For a continent that has the youngest population, [Africa] should be the center of the world. I mean this should be the center for the freshest ideas for innovation and everything, and the center for which people can come and bring their ideas to bring growth that will benefit the entire world as well.” –Edem Adzogenu, AfroChampions

Explore highlights from the Africa Center’s year of programming

New Atlanticist Oct 16, 2020

The US government makes its big push for investment in Africa

By David A. Wemer

Buoyed by bipartisan commitment and a new government agency, the United States has taken new and significant steps to help drive investment in Africa, strengthen the region’s dynamic economies, create lucrative opportunities for US and African businesses, and advance US foreign-policy goals in the region.

Africa Future of Work

New Atlanticist Jun 18, 2020

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta says his country needs ‘fiscal space’ amid the COVID-19 crisis

By Larry Luxner

“Coronavirus is mainly a health issue, and our key focus is ensuring that we keep our people safe,” Kenyatta said. “But this is also an economic crisis because it has resulted in some key sectors hugely affected by lockdowns. We were forced to close our airspace, which affected tourism, a very critical part of our economy.”

Africa Coronavirus

Report Nov 30, 2020

African agency in the new Cold War: Traditional power competition in the post-COVID-19 African landscape

By Bronwyn Bruton

In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020

Reducing Africa’s infrastructure deficit: An interview with AFC President & CEO Samaila Zubairu

By Africa Center

The Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), a pan-African development finance institution, has been developing and financing infrastructure, natural resources, and industrial assets to increase economic prosperity and growth across the continent since 2007. Watch Samaila Zubairu, president and chief executive officer of the Africa Finance Corporation, join Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby for an interview to discuss AFC’s investment philosophy, innovation, and future growth, along with the critical role of African development finance institutions in improving economic prosperity.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 15, 2020

An interview with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy

By Africa Center

US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador Tibor Nagy, joins Atlantic Council Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton to discuss bipartisan support for increased US trade and investment in African countries.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020

Financing African trade and development: An interview with TDB Group President & CEO Admassu Tadesse

By Africa Center

The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB) has been financing trade and development projects and promoting economic integration and prosperity in the region since 1985. Watch an interview below between Mr. Admassu Tadesse, president and chief executive officer of TDB Group and Ms. Aubrey Hruby, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Mr. Tadesse covers what makes TDB unique and different, the role African development finance institutions (DFIs) play in returning the African continent to economic growth post-COVID, how TDB can interface with US investors, and ways DFIs can be catalytic in increasing capital flows to African markets.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist May 8, 2020

WFP’s David Beasley warns of dire famines in Africa, Mideast if COVID-19 supply chains damage continues

By Larry Luxner

Up to 300,000 people could starve to death every day if the COVID-19 pandemic ruptures global food supply chains—even more than the roughly 275,000 people who have died of the disease worldwide so far.

Coronavirus International Markets

AfricaSource Nov 13, 2020

Calls for negotiation are driving Ethiopia deeper into war

By Bronwyn Bruton

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Prize for his peacemaking with Eritrea, has confounded allies by resisting all attempts to dampen the ongoing military confrontation with a powerful northern insurgent group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF effectively controlled the Ethiopian government from 1991 until February 2018, when it was driven […]

Africa Conflict

New Atlanticist Apr 29, 2020

Africa still sees a massive pandemic in its future, but partnerships may lessen blow

By Katherine Walla

With an uncertain future for the pandemic that lies ahead, the Africa CDC is encouraging pivotal partnerships to act quickly to secure Africa amid haphazardly understood policies, little access to water and sanitation, and resource constraints.

Africa Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020

Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis

By David A. Wemer

A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Jul 10, 2020

Dr. Dambisa Moyo, panel reinvigorate debate on a Marshall Plan for Africa

By Africa Center

On Friday, July 10, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on whether the time has come for a Marshall Plan for Africa. The panel featured Global Economist and Author Dr. Dambisa Moyo, former US Congressman Dr. David Brat, and Africa Center Senior Fellow Ms. Aubrey Hruby. The virtual conversation was moderated by Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu, with opening and concluding remarks given by the Center’s Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton.

Africa Corruption

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The first session, viewable here, focused on external influence in the Red Sea region. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton moderated the panel, which included Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu, alongside PCNS International Relations Specialist Ms. Maha Skah and PCNS Senior Fellow Dr. Khalid Chegraoui. The event served as an opportunity to highlight the role of foreign actors in multiple arenas across the region, including in negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, the lifting of Sudan from the US state sponsors of terrorism list, and maritime trade diplomacy, among other topics.

Dr. Chegraoui gave opening remarks by providing a comprehensive overview of how emerging powers—such as the Gulf countries, Turkey, Iran, and others—are wielding influence in different parts of the region, and how the new relations between Israel and Arab states could create a new security dynamic in East Africa. Mr. Negatu then followed up by discussing how the situation in Ethiopia marks the beginning of a post-TPLF-dominated Ethiopia, which creates the opportunity for an Ethiopia-Eritrea alliance that could redefine the region’s outlook. Though an inward-looking trend in Ethiopia, as the country reconstructs and rehabilitates the Tigray region, could open the Horn to further strategic competition as external powers look to capitalize. Lastly, Ms. Skah reflected on the role of Emirati port building, Turkey’s enhanced commercial role in Somalia, and how Horn countries are essential to Israel’s commercial and strategic interests, creating an impetus for further engagement. Ms. Bruton concluded the discussion by striking a hopeful tone that the shifting regional security arrangement will bring newfound economic prosperity to countries in the region.

The second session, viewable here, zeroed in on the Sahel region, another geostrategic flashpoint where external powers are wielding influence. PCNS Senior Fellow Dr. Khalid Chegraoui moderated the panel, which included Africa Center Senior Fellows Dr. Pierre Englebert and Mr. Abdoul Salam Bello alongside PCNS Senior Fellow Mr. Rida Lyammouri. The event presented an opportunity to discuss the ongoing security situation in the region, how local, state, and regional governments are responding, and the role foreign actors are playing in the military and economic spheres.

Mr. Bello opened his remarks by framing the conversation around population growth trends and how they are putting pressure on Sahel countries to provide basic services to their population. The role of state governments is weakened by their inability to provide security, education, healthcare, and jobs, creating a void for non-state actors—including prominent terrorist groups—to gain legitimacy by providing some basic services to populations in rural areas. Dr. Englebert then followed up by emphasizing how foreign military interventions in the region, such as France’s Operation Barkhane, are band-aid solutions to the structural crisis posed by weak state institutions. Dr. Englebert suggested short and long-term solutions to improve security and governance in the region, both of which include granting more agency and capacity to African institutions rather than relying on external powers. Mr. Lyammouri reiterated these points by emphasizing that international solutions to address the Sahelian crisis have largely failed, contributing to a pervasive sense of mistrust between citizens and state governments.

Dr. Chegraoui then stepped in to pose various questions to the panelists around where external powers—namely China, Russia, and the United States—are engaged in the region, if France can remain the major external player in the Sahel, and how the COVID-19 pandemic may affect humanitarian efforts. Dr. Chegraoui concluded the discussion by thanking the panelists and expressing his hope further collaboration between the Africa Center and PCNS.

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020

Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis

By David A. Wemer

A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Dec 9, 2020

Startup Acts are the next form of policy innovation in Africa

By Jordan Wolken

Africa’s COVID recession certainly hasn’t hit the continent’s tech industry. In fact, as countries adapt to the expanding digital universe created by COVID-19, technology ecosystems across the continent are booming—and global investors have noticed. Attempting to cash in, African countries are trying to bolster their own innovation ecosystems through supportive legislation.

Africa Economy & Business

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The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Leaving aside for a moment the last-ditch effort by the Trump Administration to exploit Sudan’s efforts to remove the terror designation to expand its own Middle East peace plan, the Administration should be acknowledged for betting on the prospects of democratic transition in Sudan. From the early days of the transition, Washington and many other capitals were skeptical that the civilian half of the transitional government was strong enough to stay the course and to keep at bay revanchist forces within the security sector. Equally questionable was the prospect that Sudan’s security forces would not overstep their constitutional limits and remain partners in steering Sudan toward a definitive, civilian-led future. While the transition is not yet complete, and faces increasingly stiff headwinds, today’s removal of the terror designation should be seen as affirmation that the sometimes-competing wings of the transitional government have and are largely abiding by the principals of the revolution: Freedom, Peace, and Justice.

Procedurally, today’s announcement is the culmination of a process of bilateral negotiations that started early this year that saw Sudan meet policy and statutory requirements demonstrating that it no longer supported international terrorism and would work with US counterterror efforts going forward. It removes perhaps the greatest sticking point and inconsistency in US policy and the bilateral relationship: the US treatment of Sudan as both a reliable counterterror partner and a terrorist state. For nearly two decades, this has been the first and last talking point of every Sudanese official in any bilateral conversation with an American diplomat. With this hypocrisy removed, the chances for deeper and more serious bilateral relations are at last possible.

Statements today from Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Risch both suggest that with the terror restrictions out of the way, the United States will lean forward on arrears clearance, bridge loans, and ultimately debt relief to revive Sudan’s failing economy. This represents perhaps the most tangible and immediate prize associated with Sudan’s delisting. Other promises—such as trade delegations, investment summits, and subsidized staple imports, offered as part of the Administration’s Israel gambit—may not materialize in the waning days of Trump’s term. But setting in motion a multilateral process that allows Europeans and the international financial institutions to move forward this critical engagement is what is most necessary now.

But despite today’s news, challenges in this terror saga still remain. Negotiations are still ongoing over when and how Sudan will have its sovereign immunity restored and be granted the legal peace it seeks to be protected against future terror-related claims. The greatest impediment to sovereign immunity stems from a claim from a group of 9/11 victims who have tried to argue that because of Sudan’s complicity in other al-Qaeda orchestrated terror attacks, like the USS Cole and the US Embassy bombings, Sudan should now also be tried for its possible involvement in the September 11 attacks. 

Ironically, these claims have emerged now because 9/11 victims felt for the first time that Sudan had recognized the legitimacy of the US justice system over them and were prepared to pay large sums of money to meet the political demands for getting off the terror list. Under Omar al-Bashir, 9/11 families never thought their suits would go anywhere and never thought Sudan could be compelled to pay, so they chose not to pursue their suits when the opportunities were abundant. But that all changed under the transitional government, which has showed a willingness to negotiate and make amends. The idea that the Sudanese are now being potentially punished for their cooperation is regrettable. That these groups have found champions among the Senate’s Democratic leaders is even more disheartening. 

Good faith efforts to resolve the obstacle to a final settlement appear to be continuing within the Senate and among victim groups. The Trump Administration has even offered substantial financial settlements—from US taxpayer funds—to compensate victims who don’t even have a legal court judgement in their favor. If they don’t succeed, Sudan could be faced with future lawsuits from terror claimants and US businesses could have liens placed on the repatriation of revenues coming from Sudan. This would undermine and deter the kind of reputational cleansing and investment promotion removal from the terror list was intended to promote. It would also represent another self-inflicted wound to US policy of the kind that today’s announcement was trying to correct.

But in the end, today’s announcement ultimately moves the US out of the way of Sudan’s own success or failure. As inflation soars and the Sudanese pound continues its precipitous decline, what Sudan makes of this opportunity is now up to its leaders.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

By

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021

Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021

WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip

By Africa Center

On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Africa Conflict

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Once considered unlikely by regional experts, military confrontation along the Nile is a growing possibility, as a diplomatic solution to the Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian stand-off recedes. Outside observers may not understand why Egypt considers the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) an “existential threat” to its existence, but, regardless, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his advisors see it as such.

A new Atlantic Council issue brief, “The Temperature is Rising, the Fever White Hot: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as Flashpoint between Egypt and Ethiopia,” authored by Christopher D. Booth, describes the relationship between water scarcity and government stability in Egypt. The current Egyptian government is aware of the the role that water scarcity may have played in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, and of the continuing threat that water issues pose nearly ten years later, particularly in light of Egypt’s political and economic challenges. 

Booth warns that, given the inconclusive diplomacy of the West regarding the threat the GERD poses to Egypt, the Egyptian regime may determine that it has no other choice but to take up arms against its “oppressors” and roll the dice in an attack against the dam.

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Fast Thinking Nov 20, 2020

FAST THINKING: Get up to speed on the crisis in Ethiopia

By Atlantic Council

A fast-developing crisis in Ethiopia has the crucial US ally edging closer to all-out war, just two years after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office promising democratic reforms and a year after he won the Nobel Peace Prize. So what happened? Today we’re turning to Cameron Hudson, an expert on the region and former US diplomat and intelligence officer, for a look behind the headlines.

Africa Conflict

Issue Brief Sep 29, 2020

The impact of COVID-19 on either shore of the Mediterranean

By Karim Mezran, Emily Burchfield, Paolo Alli, Emadeddin Badi, Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Alessia Melcangi

This report draws on case studies of Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and migration to the EU to illuminate the key challenges faced in the Mediterranean community, and warns of the undesirable outcomes ahead if international inaction toward the region persists.

Coronavirus North Africa

MENASource Jul 10, 2020

Nile Basin’s GERD dispute creates risks for Egypt, Sudan, and beyond

By Amal Kandeel

Competition for the Nile Basin’s freshwater has been growing markedly for three decades. In 2011, it intensified after Ethiopia started building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Ethiopia North Africa

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The event served as an opportunity to discuss the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region between government-led forces and forces allied with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The event was opened by Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, followed by introductions from Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu and moderation by Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Cameron Hudson.

H.E. Gedion provided opening remarks to frame the conversation around the Ethiopian government’s strategy to reclaim TPLF strongholds in Tigray, following the attempted seizure of military assets by TPLF forces earlier this month. Participants, representing the US government, Congressional offices, think tanks, and not-for-profits, then directed questions to both H.E. Gedion and Mr. Mihretu about limiting civilian casualties in the region; the conflict’s economic impact on Ethiopia; coordination with humanitarian agencies; and repatriating refugees who fled to neighboring Sudan. Mr. Hudson concluded the discussion reflecting on hope for peace, stability, and justice while pledging to maintain regular discussions regarding Tigray under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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A fast-developing crisis in Ethiopia has the crucial US ally edging closer to all-out war, just two years after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office promising democratic reforms and a year after he won the Nobel Peace Prize. So what happened? Today we’re turning to Cameron Hudson, an expert on the region and former US diplomat and intelligence officer, for a look behind the headlines.

• Cameron Hudson: Former director for African affairs at the National Security Council and senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center

The backstory

Abiy’s governing coalition has from the start faced resistance from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the core element of the former ruling party based in the country’s north. Months of tensions boiled over after an alleged TPLF attack on government forces. Abiy has dispatched troops to the northern region and hundreds of people have been killed in the fighting. The prime minister has so far refused calls for international mediation, calling the conflict an “internal law and order operation.”

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What’s Abiy up to?

• “He’s trying to reform the Ethiopian state. He came to power in 2018 with a popular mandate to break with decades of authoritarian rule and ethnic politics. But his vision of a pan-Ethiopian political and social movement has been stymied by the TPLF.”

• “Abiy has proven to be a perplexing figure. A PhD in peace and conflict resolution, his image as prime minister was made by early moves to make peace with neighboring Eritrea and the release of his own domestic political prisoners. But he rose to positions of authority through military intelligence under an authoritarian system.”

Did the Nobel Committee get Abiy wrong?

• “The prize was premature. In retrospect it represented more of a celebration of Ethiopia’s move away from authoritarianism and the prospects of a democratic transition and stable Horn of Africa than the fully realized product of his vision.”

What should we make of the TPLF?

• “There should be no love lost for the TPLF. Under their long rule, Ethiopian media was censored, political opponents were jailed, and a vast security state kept the country’s 110 million population largely in check. But they also present legitimate grievances with respect to Abiy’s reform agenda, which are shared in part by other ethnic groups.”
   
• “Unlike those other groups, the TPLF has the military hardware and the experience of as many as 250,000 battle-hardened troops to not only present an alternative political vision, but aggressively pursue it.”​​​​​​

• “While Abiy came to power through a popular protest movement, he does not govern with an electoral mandate. When he canceled national elections earlier this year due to the COVID pandemic—elections that would have legitimized and formalized not only his rule but his broader reform agenda—he became, in the eyes of the Tigrayan leaders, an illegitimate leader serving in violation of the constitution. In response, this fall, Tigray held its own regional elections, contravening federal authorities, and thus calling into question their own legitimacy in the eyes of Abiy’s government.”

What role does Ethiopia play in regional stability?

• “Ethiopia has been the lynchpin of security in the Horn of Africa region for the better part of two decades—whether contributing peacekeepers under UN and African Union mandates to conflict zones around the continent; partnering with the US on counterterror operations, most notably in neighboring Somalia; using its political leaders to intervene and mediate in hot conflicts in places like Sudan and South Sudan; or simply playing host to the African Union headquarters. Reversing this trend—or worse, seeing Ethiopia become a net exporter of violence and instability—will most assuredly have a devastating effect.”

What should we watch to understand where the conflict is headed next?

• “First, the degree to which ethnicity is being weaponized. Underpinning this entire conflict is Ethiopia’s troubled history of managing ethnic diversity. If the conflict spreads to Ethiopia’s other ethnic regions and we see score-settling based on ethnic divides, many are cautioning that we could quickly see the dissolution of the Ethiopian state, akin to the breakup of Yugoslavia.”

• “Second, many regional actors will have a stake in the outcome of an Ethiopian civil war—including Egypt, which has been in heated negotiations with Abiy over the use of Nile waters, and Eritrea, which fought a long border war against mostly Tigrayan troops and is now allied with Abiy. In a battle of near-equals, outside actors could be the difference-maker.” 

What can a Biden administration do?

“This conflict is a reminder that Ethiopia, along with Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa, are the continent’s ‘too big to fail’ countries. Considerable diplomatic effort needs to be put into repairing the Trump administration’s ill-advised record of non-engagement in the region so that we once again have influence and credibility. Biden will face calls to appoint a first-ever Horn of Africa envoy, which makes increasing sense. The US needs a coherent strategy for this region and the capacity to carry it out.”

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On November 18, Forward Defense and Middle East Center non-resident senior fellow Thomas Warrick wrote an op-ed for the Houston Chronicle titled “Trump gambles with national security by removing troops.” In this piece, Warrick argues that President Trump is taking significant risks by withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, which will most likely not pay off.

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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But there is a worse alternative: and that is the very realistic prospect that the two sides will fight each other nearly to the death, then agree to negotiations that will allow both sides to heal and re-arm, until some provocation inevitably retriggers a new round of conflict, which will lead to another conflagration with immense costs to human life, and so on, as the cycle endlessly repeats itself. This is the scenario that has played out time and again in South Sudan, and it is by far the likeliest outcome of current demands for negotiation between the TPLF and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF).

The reason for this is simple: the TPLF has good reason to think that it can attack the Ethiopian government forces, and yet not be held accountable by the Western democracies that wield so much influence in the country.

Despite the massive human rights violations that were associated with the TPLF’s rule—despite the authoritarianism and theft, the imprisonments and the torture that have been laid at its door—the TPLF’s international allies have never repudiated it, nor examined their inappropriate investment in the TPLF’s welfare. International analysts have pointedly and repeatedly failed even to raise the TPLF’s maladministration and intransigence in their assessments of this current crisis. This has created an attitude of impunity in the TPLF, but it has also undermined the Ethiopian leadership’s faith that international mediation and diplomacy can work on their behalf. And that is an awful tragedy, because if Abiy had any reason to believe that the international community could fairly and impartially mediate his conflict with the TPLF, he might actually be persuaded to stand down.

An unfinished revolution and the road back to insurgency

The TPLF took power in Ethiopia in 1987. Its leader, Meles Zenawi, effectively ruled Ethiopia unilaterally until his death in 2012, although he exercised his power through a four-party ethnic-based coalition called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was successful in producing a period of seeming ethnic calm and economic prosperity in Ethiopia; but it lost popular elections in 2005, at which time it took an alarming authoritarian turn, and grew increasingly repressive. Under Zenawi and his successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, the EPRDF effectively outlawed the freedoms of assembly and speech, banned most civil society organizations, and imprisoned tens of thousands of youths, Muslims, political opposition members, and journalists. Many of these individuals were cruelly tortured in prison. During this time period, the EPRDF—under the TPLF’s influence—launched a misguided invasion of Somalia and refused to withdraw its forces from Eritrean territory, violating the terms of a peace agreement and the ruling of a United Nations-backed border commission. Both of these actions have produced profound instability in the greater Horn of Africa region—in Somalia, by bringing the extremist al Shabaab militia to power, and in Eritrea, by prolonging a two-decade period of cold war that has isolated and impoverished the Eritrean people. But because the TPLF was widely viewed as an ally of the United States’ war on terrorism, it was insulated from international criticism, and also benefited from immense flows of foreign aid, which in turn allowed it to build a massive military and intelligence apparatus that was helpful in controlling the Ethiopian population, and further prolonged the EPRDF’s nondemocratic rule.

After years of public uprisings, in which many Ethiopians lost their lives, Desalegn was forced to resign as prime minister and the TPLF lost much of its hold on power. The group was largely forced to withdraw to its northern enclave, where it retained an arsenal of weaponry vastly disproportionate to its presumed political constituency (which represents approximately 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population). Though these allegations have not been definitively proved—and should therefore be referenced with caution—the new Ethiopian government has repeatedly and credibly accused the TPLF of working to incite ethnic conflicts and to undermine the new political order. Tensions have continued to rise, and have been aggravated by the global COVID-19 pandemic, which has prevented the timely holding of national elections that might have produced some consensus on proposed reforms to the federalist system and the Ethiopian constitution.

In its impatience, the TPLF defied government orders and called Tigrayans to the polls. The lack of observers and the nature of the announced results—which showed the TPLF winning 98 percent of the popular vote—prevent this exercise from being described as an election.

The international community failed at that point—and at innumerable points leading up to it—to condemn the TPLF’s goading and irresponsible actions, and in particular, its blunt refusal to recognize the authority of Abiy’s administration. This international silence has persuaded the TPLF that it has retained the sympathies of its old international backers, and has inadvertently emboldened the hardliners at the top of the party. Prime Minister Abiy, who could have chosen to ignore what was at best a flimsy provocation, likewise chose to escalate rather than defuse the situation. He retaliated by cutting funding to the TPLF leadership. That in turn, appears to have goaded the TPLF into attacking an Ethiopian Defense Forces base located in the Tigray region. Non-Tigrayan soldiers, in a foreshadowing of ethnic-based violence by TPLF-aligned forces to come, were allegedly executed during the attack, and other federal soldiers still remain hostage.

And yet, at no point has any Western or African power called for the TPLF to lay down its arms. At no point have Western powers discussed leveling sanctions on the TPLF officials who authorized the attack. In fact, pointed op-editorials in premier publications have actually blamed the Prime Minister for “marginalizing” the TPLF from power, and held him equally responsible for the escalating tensions.

In fact, Abiy has been right to call the TPLF’s assault on federal forces a “red line” provocation. There is no government in the world that would tolerate such an assault. The moment that it took up arms against the federal government, and oversaw the execution of federal soldiers, TPLF forfeited its status as a political party and regional administration, and returned to its old roots as a rebel movement. There is thus no precedent in international law for calling its military assault an act of war. It is an act of insurgency; it is an act of armed revolt; and most dangerously, it is a revolt being prosecuted on ethnic lines, as the TPLF is politically isolated and lacks any political constituency outside of Tigray. TPLF forces—having consumed the narrative of ethnic-based persecution being fed to them by the TPLF leadership—have subsequently been implicated in the massacre of scores or hundreds of innocent non-Tigrayan bystanders at Mai-Kadra (though we should absolutely assume, given the previous conduct of the Ethiopian Defense Forces in Oromia and elsewhere, that there will be atrocities on both sides).

The urgent question is, how can the international community intervene to stop the fighting, and what actions can prevent a recurrence of the fighting?

Moving forward

First, the diplomatic community must recognize what is painfully obvious: that its lack of credibility has rendered it powerless to exercise influence on this conflict. This extends beyond the Western democracies to the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), who are equally guilty of abetting the abuses of the TPLF, especially insofar as Somalia and Eritrea are concerned.

But the United States, in particular, has for too long failed to confront the abusiveness of the TPLF ruling cadre. US President Barack Obama’s repeated references to the Ethiopian government as “democratically elected” in spite of the flagrant rigging of elections—in which the unpopular ruling party always won between 97 percent and 100 percent of seats in the parliament—was widely viewed in Ethiopia as a betrayal of fundamental American principles. The international community has also maintained a pointed silence about the TPLF since Abiy took power. Time and time again, as the TPLF has been implicated in serious acts of provocation and violence, as the TPLF has rejected the authority of the central government—and the popular will that brought the new dispensation into being—Washington and its allies, particularly those in the chattering classes, have utterly failed to repudiate the TPLF.

If any of these international actors wish to stand as credible mediators, they must admit to their previous bias and address the threat that the bias poses moving forward. They must acknowledge and act on the recognition that the international silence on the TPLF’s conduct has played a significant role in creating the conditions for this current crisis.

Second, the international community must understand that Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea have long understood that the TPLF would never be constrained or barred from a return to power by Ethiopia’s external allies. While analysts claim that “no military solution is possible,” the ongoing international toleration of the TPLF has convinced them that the very opposite is true—and that both Abiy and Isaias believe that they can quickly win this battle.

Abiy has been widely lauded for making peace with Eritrea after decades of near-war over a border dispute. But the alliance served a vital tactical purpose of containing the powerful TPLF in its northern corner, where it has been surrounded by unfriendly forces: the Eritreans, the rival Amhara ethnic police and militias, and the federal troops controlled by Abiy. This coalition of forces—as well as fears that too-aggressive action by the TPLF could trigger broad ethnic reprisals against the innocent Tigrayan population—combined for a few years to keep a northern insurgency in check. But the TPLF is thought to control several hundreds of thousands of soldiers and irregular militia, and has a powerful modern arsenal. Until now, Abiy has not had the military strength to confront it, even as the TPLF has been widely accused of fomenting ethnic unrest around the country.

But since the day he came to power, Abiy has been frantically working to reduce the TPLF’s stranglehold on Ethiopia’s military resources and manpower. He is a calculating leader, and his willingness to take action to confront the TPLF in its stronghold, after years of strategic patience, indicates that he believes that he can win. Here is why he may be confident:

First, the US Department of State has formally indicated its concern about reports of the TPLF attack on ENDF bases on November 3. This puts down a marker that the Trump Administration considers the TPLF to be the instigator of the current round of violence, and gives Abiy a political green light to quell the unrest. That may change when the Biden administration takes control of the US government, but Abiy surely expects the conflict to be over by then.

State Department personnel have also pointedly resisted the temptation to echo descriptions of the conflict between the TPLF insurgency and the ENDF a “civil war.” The term is widely being used in the press, but it is alarmist: Abiy’s assault on the TPLF is certainly a gamble, and there is a possibility that a prolonged conflict in the far northern corner of Ethiopia could eventually spark unrest elsewhere. But there is a better than even chance that the military confrontation will play out in a matter of days rather than weeks. Prime Minister Abiy’s round rejection of outside intervention suggests that he is indeed confident of this result. It’s also important to understand that the TPLF, regardless of its residual military strength, is a politically isolated faction with few internal or external allies. Its grievances are unlikely to spark widespread unrest, as long as the Ethiopian population can resist the temptation to act out reprisals on innocent Tigrayans around the country.

And in spite of speculation that the TPLF may attempt to push an attack towards Addis Ababa, the battle is unlikely to spread southward. Abiy came to power when millions on millions of Ethiopians took to the streets to overthrow the TPLF-dominated regime. Anger against the TPLF—and unfortunately, against the broader Tigrayan ethnic group, precious few of whom have truly benefitted from TPLF rule—ran so high in the months following Abiy’s rise that many feared that a genocide against the Tigrayans could be imminent. For all the popular disenchantment with Abiy’s government, a launch of TPLF forces towards Addis Ababa, for the explicit purpose of overthrowing the government by force, would almost certainly produce an avalanche of popular anger. Abiy seems to have done a pretty good job of convincing average Ethiopians that his military assault is indeed a law and order operation designed in the long run to reduce conflicts across the country. Abiy’s popular standing has also benefitted from the nationalist fervor rising over Egyptian threats against the GERD, and US President Donald Trump’s casual incitement of a conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia. (Another powerful reason, frankly, for the Ethiopian government to distrust any Western attempts at mediation.) The TPLF seems aware of this risk: apart from some bombast, its rhetoric has squarely emphasized a goal of self-defense.

A regional conflagration as a result of the fighting between the TPLF and ENDF is also unlikely. Neighboring states—all of whom have good relations with Abiy and poor relations with the TPLF—have so far resisted any impulse to insert themselves into the crisis. Sudan immediately closed its border with Tigray, and far more importantly, Eritrea has not launched troops into Ethiopian territory. (There have been unconfirmed reports of fighting between Eritrean and TPLF troops at various points along the border, but these have not been confirmed, and there is reason to think that Abiy and Isaias will resist Eritrea’s entry into the conflict unless it is absolutely necessary.) At a time of great uncertainty in Ethiopia, the restraint of the neighboring nations is a profoundly important asset: in Africa, “civil wars” are often sparked and aggravated by the meddling of foreign forces. Ethiopia’s strong relations with neighboring states are likely to prevent this outcome.

There is a risk that the TPLF may, out of desperation, attempt to push into Eritrean territory—as it did most recently in June 2016, at a time when the TPLF was at the height of its political and military power, in control of the entire Ethiopian military apparatus, and in possession of strong international support. (That attack also led to panicked headlines about the potential for a new war in the Horn.) But Eritrea successfully deflected the attempted invasion and is just as likely to be able to defend itself now. Plus, if the TPLF moves into Eritrean territory, Asmara will be able to justify a counterattack—and the TPLF will then be forced to fight powerful enemies on two fronts, with good reason to think that the ENDF and Eritrean forces would seek to coordinate their assaults. Again, that is not an outcome that the TPLF is likely to seek out.

This conflict has been years in the making, and it’s hard to see how it can be resolved through dialogue. By allowing most of the TPLF leadership to live unmolested in the north after losing power—without a truth and reconciliation commission, and with few attempts to hold the old regime accountable for human rights abuses or thefts of Ethiopian treasure—Abiy, willingly or not, had embarked on a grand experiment. The TPLF has not kept its side of that bargain. It’s true that if Abiy’s military gamble now misfires, Ethiopia and the rest of the region may be in for a miserable round of suffering. But neither can Abiy govern the country with an intransigent, heavily-armed spoiler in the north. There is no indication that any of these actors are willing to negotiate, and Abiy probably feels that this military confrontation is his best chance of achieving long-term peace.

Indeed, Abiy probably fears that if he fails to answer the TPLF’s overt attacks on the Ethiopian state and its citizens, it will cause him to lose control of his government. And all Ethiopia’s allies should fear that outcome, because we have no idea at all what might come next.

The most effective means of discouraging the continuation of this conflict is to finally put pressure on TPLF leaders—especially Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael—to stand down his forces in the interest of protecting the local population. Abiy urgently needs to be persuaded that he can rely on the international community—and not only his army—to ensure that the TPLF will be prevented from returning to power. Counterintuitively, the fastest way for the international community to do that is to stop calling for negotiations, and to start demanding accountability for the TPLF.

Calling for negotiations, as so many are advocating, will only encourage TPLF leaders to believe that violence will permit them to fight their way to a bigger chair at the table. That is not only a losing strategy in Ethiopia—it sets up an extraordinarily dangerous precedent for the next armed insurgency that wants to challenge central authority.

Bronwyn Bruton is the director of programs and studies of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @BronwynBruton.

AfricaSource Nov 11, 2020

Experts react: Understanding the conflict in Tigray

By Africa Center

As conflict breaks out in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, Africa Center experts react and analyze what this means for the country and its neighbors.

Africa Conflict

New Atlanticist Oct 16, 2020

The US government makes its big push for investment in Africa

By David A. Wemer

Buoyed by bipartisan commitment and a new government agency, the United States has taken new and significant steps to help drive investment in Africa, strengthen the region’s dynamic economies, create lucrative opportunities for US and African businesses, and advance US foreign-policy goals in the region.

Africa Future of Work

Elections 2020 Nov 7, 2020

Joe Biden just won the presidency: What does that mean for America’s role in the world?

By Atlantic Council

Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what the outcome of the 2020 election means for US foreign policy and America’s role in the world.

Economy & Business Elections

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Gabriel Negatu: War in the Tigray region of Ethiopia

Cameron Hudson: What impact will the fighting have on the Horn of Africa?

War in the Tigray region of Ethiopia

On November 4, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a military offensive against forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is the governing authority of the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray. Coming after months of rising tensions between the TPLF and the Abiy administration, the latest military action was precipitated by an alleged surprise night-time assault by the TPLF on a major Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) base in Tigray that resulted in the killing of non-Tigrayan soldiers and the attempted looting of heavy artillery and weapons. Declaring that the assault on the federal army base had “crossed the last red line,” Prime Minister Abiy maintains that his hand was forced by the TPLF leadership into sending the army “to save the country and the region.” More than a week on, the military operation is still reportedly targeting Tigray’s militia establishments and the TPLF leadership, and not its citizens—though there are worrying reports of civilian casualties, which are difficult to confirm due to an Internet and telephone blackout imposed by the government on the entire Tigray region. The Council of Representatives has also imposed a state of emergency on Tigray, effectively isolating it from the rest of Ethiopia.

For the judicious observer of Ethiopia’s ethnic politics, there have been signs of ominous tensions between Tigray and the central government since Abiy came to power two years ago. The TPLF had held a stranglehold on power for decades, since taking power in 1991. Following a months-long popular revolt that ushered him to power in early 2018, Abiy swiftly curbed the TPLF’s dominance over Ethiopia’s political and economic life, leaving its leaders feeling targeted and purged. The President of the Tigray region charged the Prime Minister with trying to ‘sideline and even criminalize’ the TPLF.

The TPLF had exerted power in Ethiopia through a governing coalition, composed of four ethnic-based parties, called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). But in 2019, shortly after Abiy took power, the other three parties annulled the EPRDF coalition and moved to replace it with a single national Prosperity Party that was not organized on ethnic lines. The TPLF countered by breaking away from the new governing coalition and launching a vain attempt to unite opposition forces under a new federalist coalition. Failing that, it has now isolated itself from the political process.

In March, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), an autonomous body accountable to the House of Peoples’ Representatives temporarily postponed the national and regional elections scheduled for August 2020 due to COVID-19 concerns. Legislators from Tigray, including the speaker of the Upper House, withdrew from the national parliament in protest. Relations soured further in September 2020 when the TPLF, in open defiance of the constitution and federal government, held elections in Tigray and reported a 98 percent victory in the popular vote. (The election was not overseen by international observers.) The newly-installed regional legislators in Tigray immediately declared that the federal government lacked legitimacy to govern the country and refused to recognize it.

The national assembly then countered by annulling Tigray’s election results and refusing to acknowledge the newly-elected leadership. Federal funding to the region was also slashed significantly, limiting the flow of resources only to local governments to protect basic services, and bypassing the TPLF. The leadership in Mekele, the capital of Tigray, called the cessation of their funding a declaration of war. Days before the assault by federal forces, the region’s president, Debretsion G. Michael, warned the public that the Prime Minister was planning an attack to punish Tigray for its defiance.

Having controlled all facets of state power incontestably for the twenty-eight years prior to its ouster in 2018, the TPLF views Abiy’s democratic reforms and liberalization zeal with a great deal of edginess. His interest in reforming the federalist structure of the Ethiopian state—which divides Ethiopia into nine self-governing ethnic territories—especially threatens to undermine the order that has historically permitted the small Tigrayan ethnic group to wield a power disproportionate to its population. Abiy is an Oromo by origin, and thus a member of Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, and his espousal of a broader nationalist agenda over narrow ethnic priorities is viewed by many of the smaller ethnic groups, and not only the TPLF, as eroding the right to self-rule, including secession, that is granted by the Ethiopian Constitution to ethnically organized regions. The TPLF is also uneasy with Abiy over his intentions to amend the Constitution, which provides the basis of the current ethnic federalism. 

Meles Zenawi, a founding member of the TPLF, created the Ethiopian constitution in the earliest days of his rule and the group’s present leaders sanction the constitution as a canonical text. They consider Abiy’s constitutional reform agenda as a ‘red line.’ The system of ethnic federalism under the EPRDF had privileged the TPLF as first among equals in a coalition government, according it an oversize share of political and economic power relative to its population size of 6 percent. Amending the constitution to redistribute power in proportion to population size would significantly reduce the TPLF’s share of power, which is something that Mekele is not prepared to concede. 

Lastly, Mekele remains highly suspicious of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, which includes the signing of a peace agreement and a promise by Abiy to honor a long-violated United Nations ruling on the demarcation of the border between Eritrea and Tigray. Rivalry between Eritrea’s ruling party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ, and formerly known as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, or EPLF) and the TPLF runs deep, dating back to their time in the bushes fighting the Derg. Both Addis Ababa and Asmara stand hostile to the TPLF, albeit for different reasons. Abiy’s cozying up to Asmara without including Mekele is viewed as forsaking Tigray in favor of Eritrea. Consequently, the TPLF accuses Asmara of siding with Abiy to attack Tigray in an effort to settle old scores. Despite TPLF claims to the contrary, however, there is currently no evidence of PFDJ action in this war. This is far from saying Eritrea would not retaliate if provoked. 

Since losing power in 2018, the TPLF has worked to undermine Abiy’s reform efforts. Hard evidence is scarce, but the TPLF is alleged to be behind much of the internal tensions and ethnic violence that has plagued Ethiopia since the Abiy administration took control. Whether or not these reports are true, social media networks in Ethiopia are rife with accusations that the TPLF, working mainly through surrogates and break-away groups, has been fomenting conflict by organizing, training, and financing forces opposed to the federal government. (The recent school yard massacre of Amharas in the Wollega region of Oromia sparked exactly such a round of accusations on social media networks.)

International analysts may be right to fear that, if extended indefinitely, the present conflict may possibly rouse discontented TPLF surrogates in various pockets of Ethiopia to rise against the Abiy government. In the meantime, however, the declaration of war seems to have the opposite effect. Media accounts suggest the rest of the country is galvanized behind what the Prime Minister describes as a ‘rule of law operation’ to guarantee peace and stability and to bring a group that is widely perceived as the perpetrators of instability to justice. Certain ethnic groups along the border could also specifically benefit from the conflict. Amharas living in areas bordering Tigray, for example, harbor territorial claims over land illegally annexed by the TPLF while it assumed power. Such groups have been drawn into the present conflict on the side of the government and are already celebrating the recapture of annexed territory. As of now, no such claims have been made on the Afar-Tigray Border.

The breakout in fighting comes at a time when Ethiopia is contemplating several sweeping reforms. But the two years since the TPLF was ousted from power have not been long enough for Abiy’s brand of politics, and his transformational agenda, to set down firm roots. The democratic opening he has unleashed is yet to fully address the many ethnic grievances that were bottled up under the TPLF, and sporadic ethnic flare-ups continue to occur across the country, even as the region struggles to cope with rising COVID-19 infections rates with consequential impact on economic and social life. The security forces now under Abiy’s control have been accused of not responding appropriately to many of these conflicts. Lastly, Ethiopia remains in the midst of protracted negotiations with Egypt and Sudan over the Grand Renaissance Dam. The recent phase of negotiations resumed days before the breakout of hostilities, attended by water ministers from the three countries and experts from the African Union, European Union, and the World Bank.   

The war in Tigray is unfortunate and could have tragic consequences, almost certainly including the loss of innocent lives. It is important for both sides to take extra measures to protect civilians. Abiy’s protestations that this is a war against the TPLF and not the people of Tigray will be credible only if the government also ensures the safety and wellbeing of Tigrayans in other parts of the country. Many are not at all affiliated with the TPLF or the war efforts, but they may yet be subjected to unwarranted reprisals. But as of now, at least, concerns that Eritrea may be drawn into the war, or that the war may escalate into a regional conflict, are unfounded, or premature at best.

Gabriel Negatu is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and former director general for eastern Africa at the African Development Bank. Follow him on Twitter @Gabnegatu.

What impact will the fighting have on the Horn of Africa?

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy’s November 4 decision to launch federal troops into the country’s western Tigray region have sent shockwaves across the Horn of Africa region and beyond. With a population of 110 million people, Ethiopia is the second largest country in Africa and borders six other African nations astride the Horn and East African regions. Chronic instability and acute humanitarian needs are rife across the region. A prolonged conflagration between well-armed factions inside of Ethiopia could send hundreds of thousands of refugees across borders, disrupt trade routes, and force Addis Ababa to abandon its role of regional anchor state, mediator, policeman, and peacekeeper. That would be a potentially cataclysmic scenario for a region ill-equipped to handle additional tumult or a humanitarian fallout that could affect more than nine million people, according to the UN this week. 

Nowhere are the threats of instability more acute than in neighboring Sudan, which two days after fighting began announced a closure of portions of its eastern border with Ethiopia, and reportedly began positioning more than six thousand of its own forces inside of Gedaraf state, which borders Tigray. Anecdotal reports from inside Sudan suggest that the normally heavy volume of trade at border checkpoints has already been curtailed, and that Tigrayan truck drivers are being prevented from bringing their shipments into Sudan out of fear that federal authorities in Addis could see this as an effort to aid in the Tigrayan resistance.   

Earlier this week, the first truckloads of Ethiopian refugees began crossing into Gedaraf state, according to local media, and will be housed in the first of what could be many new refugee camps being set up to receive people fleeing the fighting in Tigray. At the same time, shipments of arms and ammunition headed for Tigrayan forces were also stopped en route from Sudan, adding to the potentially explosive mix inside Sudan. Sudan’s far eastern states have already been witness to growing tribal and militia-led violence in recent months, and have even skirmished with forces on the Ethiopian side of the border. If Sudan has its own powder keg, it is here. A significant influx of weapons, fighters, and refugees to the area could well unleash substantial new tensions that Sudan’s transitional government has already been proven ill-equipped to handle.

In a table-turning moment last week, Sudanese Prime Minister Hamdok—who lived for the past twenty years in Addis and who benefitted at numerous points from Ethiopian mediation during Sudan’s still ongoing transition and internal peace process—reportedly reached out to his counterpart Abiy, as well as regional Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front leaders in their regional capital of Mekele, to urge caution and restraint. Sudan’s leading army general and leader of the country’s Transitional Sovereignty Council similarly offered to mediate a ceasefire and was rebuffed.

While neither of the two belligerents appear open to formal outside mediation at this time, Sudan is uniquely positioned to play such a role should an opening emerge. Riding high from the recent announcement to remove Sudan from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and benefiting from renewed backing from Gulf state actors who approved of Sudan’s equally recent announcement of a rapprochement with Israel, Sudan’s Prime Minister has some political capital to spend. As the current Chairman of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, he is positioned to marshal the often-underutilized mediation and peacemaking resources of that body to assist. Furthermore, as a party to the ongoing negotiations over Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance dam, and as an important buffer in those talks between Egypt and Ethiopia, Hamdok already has some credibility in seeking to find common ground on issues striking at the heart of Ethiopia’s national security interests.

No less affected by the potential consequences of a war between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF, but in no significant position to assist on the political front, are Somalia and South Sudan, both of which have sizable refugee populations inside Ethiopia as a result of their own on-again, off-again civil conflicts. Neither nation is prepared to have hundreds of thousands of their nationals repatriated in the near term as a result of an Ethiopian civil war. 

Both Somalia and South Sudan have come to rely on a substantial Ethiopian peacekeeping presence to help reduce sectarian bloodshed in their own countries. Last week, Ethiopia withdrew approximately six hundred of the troops it has deployed in Somalia’s western border region (though it has so far left its troop contributions to the African Union peacekeeping mission to Somalia intact). Though they are reportedly being replaced with Ethiopian police units, a United Nations security report obtained by Reuters warned that these “redeployments from near the border with Somalia will make that area more vulnerable to possible incursions by Al Shabaab,” which is the al Qaeda-linked insurgency trying to overthrow the government in Somalia. As Somalia’s presidential elections draw near—they are now slated for early 2021 after multiple postponements—a security vacuum in Somalia produced by a drawdown of Ethiopian troops could rapidly undo years of international efforts to bring a semblance of security and stability to the long restive nation. Admittedly, this is a worse-case scenario that will only occur if the fighting between the TPLF and Abiy’s federal forces is prolonged and requires a greater redeployment of Ethiopian military resources than has yet taken place. But the threat is alarming.

Ethiopia’s hard security presence among its neighbors is a source of stability in the region, but even more at risk is Ethiopia’s well-earned reputation as a peacemaker and mediator. In a region with a troubled history of political, military, and humanitarian crises, Ethiopia in recent years has been a net contributor to regional stability—even as internal fault lines were emergent.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

AfricaSource Oct 19, 2020

Sudan is removed from the terror list. Now what?

By

After twenty-seven years on the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list, President Trump today announced, via Twitter, that Sudan’s terror designation was at long last being removed. While many details of the deal struck between the Trump Administration and the transitional authorities in Sudan have yet to emerge, the announcement by itself should be welcomed as a major achievement for both Washington and Khartoum.

Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Oct 16, 2020

The US government makes its big push for investment in Africa

By David A. Wemer

Buoyed by bipartisan commitment and a new government agency, the United States has taken new and significant steps to help drive investment in Africa, strengthen the region’s dynamic economies, create lucrative opportunities for US and African businesses, and advance US foreign-policy goals in the region.

Africa Future of Work

AfricaSource Oct 15, 2020

An interview with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy

By Africa Center

US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador Tibor Nagy, joins Atlantic Council Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton to discuss bipartisan support for increased US trade and investment in African countries.

Africa Economy & Business

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On November 5, Foreign Policy published a biweekly column featuring Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and New American Engagement Initiative senior fellow Emma Ashford discussing the latest news in international affairs.

In this column, they discuss uncertain US presidential election results, the possibility that adversaries could take advantage of the United States while it is awaiting a definitive outcome, and the potential for civil war in Ethiopia.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

Former staff

Emma Ashford

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Economic Sanctions

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Sudan became the latest country to normalize its relationship with Israel on October 23, as an agreement between the two countries ended the official status of war between them. US President Donald Trump announced the agreement following a discussion with Sudanese Chairman of the Sovereignty Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The agreement comes at the same time as Trump announced that he will remove Sudan from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism List in recognition of the country’s progress towards democracy after the ouster of former leader Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and in return for a compensation package from Sudan for US terrorism victims. In a joint statement, the Trump administration said that the United States “will take steps to restore Sudan’s sovereign immunity and to engage its international partners to reduce Sudan’s debt burdens, including advancing discussions on debt forgiveness consistent with the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.” Israel and Sudan will also “begin economic and trade relations, with an initial focus on agriculture,” and will “meet in the coming weeks to negotiate agreements of cooperation in those areas as well as in agriculture technology, aviation, migration issues and other areas for the benefit of the two peoples.”

The normalization agreement follows similar agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as both the United States and Israel have sought to improve Israeli ties with countries across the region, especially as Iran continues its military aggression.

Atlantic Council experts react to the normalization between Sudan and Israel, and analyze what it means for both countries and the wider region:

Cameron Hudson: Normalization a watershed moment for Sudan.

Jonathan Ferziger: Netanyahu’s Africa strategy yields success.

Carmiel Arbit: Troubled history makes Sudan-Israel peace more meaningful.

Normalization a watershed moment for Sudan

“Today’s dual White House announcements that the Trump administration is both removing Sudan from the terrorism list and that Sudan and Israel are normalizing relations are both watershed events that will hopefully further Sudan’s political and economic transformation. While all sides would like to see these announcements as having been reached on their own merits, coming as they do only minutes apart, it is hard not to see them as linked. 

“To its credit, Washington lived up to its word and announced Sudan’s removal from the terror list after Khartoum met the last requirement of transferring $335 million to Washington’s settlement payment for the 1998 US Embassy bombings. This is a huge political win for Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, who came into office pledging to shed the legacy of Sudan’s terrorist past and remake its relations with the international community, but who in recent months has come under withering criticism for his inability to stabilize the country’s failing economy.  These announcement no doubt help to do that but could come at significant political cost to him as many at home will see Khartoum’s normalization with Tel Aviv as too high a price to pay for achieving its delisting. But Hamdok hopes that the extensive package of sweeteners that Trump and Netanyahu have attached to the normalization deal, including debt relief, development assistance, and huge investment guarantees, will be enough to mitigate the accusations that are certain to emerge that Sudan was “bullied” and “blackmailed” into an agreement that is not supported by the Sudanese public. Critical now for the prime minister will be to translate today’s announcement promises from Washington and Tel Aviv into lower bread prices, shorter fuel lines, and more abundant electricity—tangible signs to average Sudanese that the country is finally turning the corner. If those benefits can be felt quickly, then most will believe that the bargain was worth it.”

Cameron Hudson, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and previosuly served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration.

Netanyahu’s Africa strategy yields success

“After the on-again, off-again drama leading up to this agreement over recent weeks, as all the pieces of the $335 million compensation package for US terrorism victims were being put together by the Trump administration, this peace accord between Sudan and Israel is a significant and historic achievement. The question is whether it will hold, and there are good reasons to suggest it may not, considering the unstable nature of Sudan’s transitional government. One important precedent is the agreement Israel forged with the Republic of South Sudan in 2011, only to watch the fledgling country descend into a brutal civil war two years later. Peace with Sudan, which was actually in a state of war with Israel in contrast to the agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, is a success for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Africa strategy, in which he has built a wedge of support in eastern Africa. In contrast to the chill Israel encountered for years because of African support for the Arab boycott, Israel now adds a new ally to its fertile and growing relations with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, and Uganda that have given it a stronger anchor on the African continent.”

Jonathan Ferziger, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.   

Troubled history makes Sudan-Israel peace more meaningful

“Sudan is a welcome, if complicated, addition to the Abraham Accords. Unlike the UAE and Bahrain, Sudan has waged war with Israel. Its forces joined the Arab–Israeli War in 1948 and the Six-Day War in 1967, playing host to an Arab league summit after the latter that denounced recognition, peace, or negotiations with Israel. Its population is more fervently anti-Israel and, in many cases, anti-Semitic than it’s Gulf counterparts. Accordingly, peace with Sudan is that much more meaningful than the earlier normalization agreements. But the former Islamist state also finds itself amidst a major internal transformation, one that is far from complete. The decision by the caretaker government to enter this deal amidst internal controversy and uncertainty at home is risky at best.   

“The United States for its part is showing a willingness to keep raising the ante. In exchange for the deal, Sudan will be removed from the state sponsor of terror list and will enjoy millions if not billions of dollars of economic assistance from the UAE and the United States. Subsequent Arab countries contemplating peace—each with their own long list of demands—are sure to take note.” 

Carmiel Arbit, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Further reading:

AfricaSource Oct 19, 2020

Sudan is removed from the terror list. Now what?

By

After twenty-seven years on the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list, President Trump today announced, via Twitter, that Sudan’s terror designation was at long last being removed. While many details of the deal struck between the Trump Administration and the transitional authorities in Sudan have yet to emerge, the announcement by itself should be welcomed as a major achievement for both Washington and Khartoum.

Africa Democratic Transitions

MENASource Sep 11, 2020

Experts react: US brokers another deal in Middle East with Israel and Bahrain

By William F. Wechsler, Kirsten Fontenrose, Marc J. Sievers, Jonathan H. Ferziger, Barbara Slavin, Carmiel Arbit, Michel Duclos, Richard LeBaron, Mark N. Katz, Thomas S. Warrick, Sina Azodi, Joze Pelayo

Atlantic Council experts react to Bahrain agreement to normalize ties with Israel and what it means for the wider region.

Israel Middle East

New Atlanticist Aug 13, 2020

Will US-brokered agreement between UAE and Israel be a regional gamechanger?

By Atlantic Council

A US-brokered deal has seen Israel and the United Arab Emirates normalize relations for the first time in history. Atlantic Council experts discuss what the agreement means and what is next for the wider region:

Conflict Israel

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After twenty-seven years on the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list, President Trump today announced, via Twitter, that Sudan’s terror designation was at long last being removed. While many details of the deal struck between the Trump Administration and the transitional authorities in Sudan have yet to emerge, the announcement by itself should be welcomed as a major achievement for both Washington and Khartoum. The troubled relationship has officially been reset and a new chapter has begun.

For the increasingly beleaguered transitional government of Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, and the rest of Sudan, the news comes in the nick of time. With inflation exceeding 200 percent and the Sudanese pound falling to 262 against the dollar (down from 82 when the civilian government came into office only thirteen months ago), Sudan’s economy is in freefall. Bread and fuel lines across the capital, Khartoum, are longer today than when President Bashir was in office, and talk among the people stuck in those lines invariably is turning to disgruntlement over the government’s handling of the crisis. 

While Sudan’s removal from the terrorism list won’t do much in the short term to alleviate the economic pain, it provides a monumental political win for the transitional government, which came into office pledging to remove Sudan from the list and remake the country’s relationship with the rest of the world. Removal from the terrorism list was the government’s ultimate prize and brings with it a precious injection of political capital that, at a minimum, will provide more time for the government to try to get its economic house in order and make good on the promise of delivering a lasting democracy dividend to Sudan’s long-suffering population.

For Washington, the decision to remove Sudan from the list is significant for a number of reasons.  Many will view it as a vindication of the Administration’s “America First” approach to foreign policy, given the President’s framing of the deal as bringing in millions in compensation for American victims of Sudan’s past terrorist acts and the still-expected announcement of Sudan’s normalization of relations with Israel, perhaps as soon as this week. But Trump drove a hard bargain when hard bargaining wasn’t required.

In the end, the concessions won from Sudan come at a cost to the United States. Arguably, Washington’s hard-nosed approach to negotiations with Sudan over the last few months has served to alienate our friends and allies in Europe and Africa, who are themselves anxious to see the terror label lifted, and further contributed to a rising tide of anti-Americanism inside Sudan (which the United States now hopes to  partner with across a host of fields, from counter-terrorism to trade). Washington must now work to ensure that the cost of its achievement isn’t pyrrhic.

In the two weeks left before election day, the Administration would do well to frame Sudan’s unshackling from its terror list as not merely a one-off diplomatic win or an added vindication of its Middle East peace plan, but instead, as a step towards the greater cause of achieving peaceful democratic transition in the Horn of Africa and beyond. This would be a stark departure from the Administration’s overall indifferent approach to democracy promotion and a small, albeit, counter to the narrative that Washington values stability over democracy. Going forward, Sudan has the potential to demonstrate that these goals are not mutually exclusive and set an example for the wider region.

Washington should also immediately take steps to make good on the long list of inducements promised to Sudan in exchange for Khartoum’s likely soon-to-be announced normalization of relations with Israel. While the White House document detailing the specifics has yet to be released, the long list reportedly includes:

• Additional development and humanitarian assistance reportedly worth hundreds of millions more than even current aid levels, and including surplus wheat and medical supplies the Sudanese people desperately need;
• A US trade and investment conference for Sudan along with a high-level trade delegation to Sudan led by the Development Finance Corporation;
• A pledge to engage the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to support and fast-track discussions on restructuring Sudan’s $65 billion in external debt, clearing its more than $3 billion in arrears, and creating a pathway for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative;
• Earmarks in the 2021 budget for the US share of debt relief to Sudan, likely to cost in excess of $300 million;
• Removal of Sudan from the Administration’s travel ban list; and
• Engagement with Congress on legal peace legislation for Sudan that would finally resolve terrorist claims against it and provide for an orderly approach to addressing outstanding 9/11 victims claims.

In truth, most of these things would have already been in train if the Administration was truly committed to nurturing Sudan’s democratic transition, staving off financial collapse, and deterring the return of military rule.  Instead, the Trump Administration has kept the transitional government guessing, the Sudanese people’s frustration mounting, and the military poised to step in to secure a final deal if the civilian authorities did not. (To their credit, Sudan’s civilian and military leaders have largely kept their differing tactical approaches to these negotiations private, and have showed great discipline in forging a common position that hopefully leaves the transitional government stronger as a result.)

Fortunately, any sins Washington may be blamed for in its own negotiations will likely be quickly forgiven, assuming the Administration sets upon a quick and transparent implementation of the agreement. That must start with a formal notification to Congress as early as this week of its intention to remove Sudan from the terrorism list and immediate high-level engagement with Congress to ensure that it, in the first place, does nothing to derail the deal, and in the second, is able to reach its own agreement to grant Sudan its “legal peace” against any new terrorist claims. Coming in the midst of a re-election bid, the Supreme Court nomination, and COVID-19 relief negotiations, this could be asking a lot—but it is what is required if Sudan hopes to enjoy the maximum benefit from this agreement.

Similarly, the Biden campaign has a role to play in upholding this historic agreement. Khartoum remains rightfully anxious that a deal struck so close to a possible change in Administration could suffer a similar fate to the Iran nuclear deal. To put Sudan at ease and to signal to allies that the agreement has bipartisan appeal, Vice President Biden should offer an assurance that, should he inherit this deal next January, his Administration will abide by the its main points.

Ultimately, while this is a moment for congratulations and positive reflection on how much has changed in Sudan and in the US-Sudan relationship in the eighteen months since President Bashir was removed, it is also the time to look forward. With the anachronistic state sponsor of terrorism designation out of the way, expectations in Sudan are high, and the pressure for Sudan’s young government to capitalize on this opening and accelerate domestic efforts to undo, reform and modernize the political and economic life of the country are even higher.

While it is in the United States’ long-term national security interests to help in that endeavor, it can no longer be blamed for standing in the way.  That alone is significant progress.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

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The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

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