In the June 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the complexity of recovering manned spacecraft from orbit and landing them on other bodies in the solar system.

Fellow

Marco Tantardini

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Italy Space

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Tantardini in Longitude on the future of human spaceflight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the June 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the state of the space industry work force. He noted that the average age of many employees of aerospace companies is rising closer to retirement and that there is competition from other sectors for qualified engineers.

Fellow

Marco Tantardini

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Italy Space

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Tantardini in Longitude on the space workforce appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the May 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the budding involvement of Central and Eastern European countries in the European Space Agency and in commercial space activities. He noted that concerns about European security have been reflected in an increased focus on outer space.

Fellow

Marco Tantardini

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Italy Space

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Tantardini in Longitude on Central and Eastern European involvement in space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

ISSUE BRIEF

The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.¹ Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come.

However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.² This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.³ Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration.

This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.

Current space exploration efforts

Over the next few decades, US and allied space exploration will integrate uncrewed (robotic) and crewed missions to achieve scientific discovery, technological advancement, economic benefits, national prestige, and planetary defense.

Uncrewed space exploration missions generally focus on expanding fundamental scientific knowledge and laying the foundation for future activities such as resource extraction. Collaborators include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA) and member space agencies, and the space agencies of India, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with public-private partnerships delivering additional capabilities.⁴ Several missions to Mars will study the planet’s geology, atmosphere, and possible past or current life, with sample-return missions currently scheduled by NASA and the ESA for the early 2030s.⁵ The search for conditions suitable to life will be extended to other locations in the solar system, such as the moons of Jupiter and Saturn. Robotic missions will continue to increase understanding of the Sun, Mercury, Venus, the Moon, asteroids, Jupiter and its moons, and deep space. Observational studies of planets outside our solar system, black holes, comets, stars, and galaxies will be enabled by space telescopes and other imaging modalities. Uncrewed exploration goals are also being pursued by the China National Space Administration, with particular attention to its planned International Lunar Research Station.⁶ Note that important technological gaps in robotic space exploration—such as dust mitigation⁷ and space situational awareness⁸ —are being tackled by critical research and development by US partners and allies.

Crewed space exploration objectives for the United States and its allies and partners are encapsulated by the Moon to Mars roadmap,⁹ an integrated strategy that, over the next several decades, will synergize exploration goals in low-Earth orbit (LEO), cislunar space, and Mars. Within this roadmap, for which all timelines may shift, the Artemis program will return humans (including the first woman and person of color) to the Moon no earlier than 2025, with the long-term goal of establishing a sustainable human presence on the lunar surface.¹⁰ The Artemis program will use the heavy-lifter Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion spacecraft to send astronauts and payloads to a space station in lunar orbit called the Gateway. From there, the Human Landing System will transport them to and from the Artemis Base Camp on the lunar surface (note that mission details are still being refined). The program involves crucial contributions from allied governments and industries. Hardware, software, and lessons learned from the Artemis program and other activities in LEO and on the ISS will lay the foundation for Mars:¹¹ human exploration (generally projected for the 2030s), scientific investigation, and eventual permanent settlement.¹² In particular, the Gateway serves important roles in infrastructure development (e.g., supply chains) and better understanding of the effects of extended deep-space missions on the human body—both crucial aspects of crewed space exploration.

International partners are critical for the success of the Artemis program. They are providing expertise, technology, and funding across the spectrum from basic science and engineering to specific software and hardware mission deliverables. A few examples highlight the benefits of leveraging the capabilities of US allies and partners.¹³ The ESA is contributing to the construction and operation of the Gateway and the Orion service module. Canada is delivering several critical components of the Gateway,¹⁴ while Japan and the ESA are building important components of habitation modules. Navigation, tracking, and communication capabilities are key contributions from Australia; an ESA program will also provide lunar telecommunications and navigation.¹⁵ Other important hardware, subsystems, and expertise will be supplied by space agencies such as those of Italy¹⁶ and the United Kingdom. Moreover, allied companies are partners in the design, development, and deployment of capabilities underlying the Artemis program.

Today, US and allied cooperation in space rests on the Artemis Accords,¹⁷ a set of principles, guidelines, and best practices for peaceful civilian space exploration building on the Outer Space Treaty of 1967¹⁸ and subsequent policies. Key principles include peaceful operations, transparency, interoperability, and commitments to deconfliction and the collaborative management of orbital debris and space resources. The original group of eight signatories in 2020 has since expanded to twenty-three as of March 2023, with representation across the globe from the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, and Africa.

Signatory nations host mature or developing industries directly or indirectly pertinent to space exploration (see Table 1), signaling strong potential for bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Notably, neither Russia nor China—the two largest competitors to allied space exploration—have signed, nor appear likely to sign, the Artemis Accords. Thus, it is imperative for the United States to follow through on its commitments to its allies and partners, demonstrating that it remains the partner of choice for open and transparent space exploration and scientific inquiry.

To project leadership in space exploration, the United States and its allies and partners ought to be first in returning humans to the Moon and landing astronauts on Mars. Most experts interviewed for this paper agreed that—with China and Russia also racing to these benchmarks—achieving these “firsts” is important for prestige, diplomacy, and establishing a strong foundation for a rules-based order in outer space, similar to that seen across traditional domains, with the goal of promoting long-term freedom and prosperity. Failure to achieve these “firsts” could arise due to Chinese achievements, insufficient allied funding and political will, geopolitical events, a catastrophic mission failure, or from the United States underutilizing the capabilities of its allies and partners, both in the public and private sectors. The latter becomes more likely due to protectionist policies, including caps on foreign contributions, and political interference in competition. Overall, early stakeholders in this new phase of space exploration will set the culture, norms, and standards that will underpin space activities for years to come—a major reason to strengthen the systems and processes that enable US-led collaboration with allies and partners.

Technological opportunities and challenges

There are numerous opportunities to facilitate, enrich, and expand collaboration in space exploration between the United States and its partners and allies. At the same time, important challenges hold back current efforts to harness allied capabilities, pointing to opportunities to improve collaboration in the coming years.

Allied opportunities in space exploration

Continuing to advance space exploration by both machines and humans requires costly, sophisticated, interdisciplinary technology development across sectors; this can only be done through the aggregate efforts of the United States and its allies and partners from start to finish.¹⁹ Such international cooperation, and cooperation between the public and private sectors, will not only overcome the major technical, logistical, and scientific challenges of space exploration, but also complement Earth-focused innovation initiatives in critical technologies (see Table 1).²⁰ For example, formal and informal strategies to leverage biotechnological advances for the expansion of bioeconomies²¹ have been formulated for the United States,²² Germany,²³ United Kingdom,²⁴ European Union,²⁵ India,²⁶ and others—including China.²⁷ Together, allied and partner space agencies play crucial roles as early funders of the science, engineering, and business development of space and space-adjacent products and services that will both benefit from and drive space exploration in the coming decades; they also serve as early (and often sole) clients for these products and services.

Autonomous robotic system²⁸ are an illustrative example of how collaboration around a major technology objective for space exploration can overcome a series of challenges and deliver benefits across both Earth and space. Such systems rely on sophisticated integration of sensors, robotics, microelectronics, imaging, and computation. Depending on the target application, they must withstand extremes in temperature, radiation, gravity, pressure, resource constraints, and other parameters. Autonomous operation is imperative because of the vast distances that signals must travel (the one-way time delay for operating a robot on the asteroid closest to Earth that may be suitable for mining, 16 Psyche, is at least ten minutes).²⁹ Trusted (cybersecure) autonomous robotic systems will be critical for resource extraction, safety, human health, and sustainability in space environments; related technology development is benefiting Earth-based applications such as mining, surgery, supply chains, and transportation. The European Space Resources Innovation Center—a partnership of the Luxembourg Space Agency, the Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology, and the ESA—is running an incubation program for early projects around utilizing space resources,³⁰ a salient example of how public and private entities can cooperate to drive capabilities for exploration and commercialization. All experts interviewed for this paper agreed that the quicker pace, receptiveness to risk, and sensitivity to costs and markets of commercial endeavors can benefit public-private partnerships for space exploration.

Challenges to allied space exploration

Despite the affordances of international cooperation, systems and processes can make it difficult to harness allied capabilities. Protectionist activity by the United States and its allies and partners can arise when a single government has made large investments in research and development, hindering the transfer of technologies, personnel, information (including unclassified information), and data across borders. Many of the technologies shown in Table 1 appear on lists of critical, emerging, and breakthrough technologies from the United States,³¹ European Union,³² and other public and private organizations. This complicates collaboration, as many of these technologies are dual use and under intense Chinese scrutiny/competition, and are thus subject to export regulations—in some cases, even to US allies.

Notably, space exploration and the technology segments in Table 1 support concentrated, high-paying jobs with strong economic impact,³³ and are therefore subject to political protection from competition, from allies, and/or between the public and private sectors. For example, the US Congress’s NASA Authorization Act of 2010 called for the reuse in the SLS of components of the Space Shuttle, with reliance on legacy suppliers, infrastructure, and personnel.³⁴ The resulting SLS is not reusable, and a single launch may cost upward of $1 billion.³⁵ In contrast, SpaceX (one of several companies developing rockets) claims that its Starship is fully reusable, has a larger payload, has much lower development costs (which have been partially funded by NASA), and—controversially—may have operational costs of less than $10 million per launch within the next few years.³⁶ Several experts interviewed for this paper suggested that a healthy sense of competition between the public and private sectors could encourage government space agencies to support ambitious timelines and budgets while upholding their commitment to safety.

Harnessing allied space capabilities will be key for constraining duplication of efforts and optimizing value creation, resource sharing, technology transfer, and costs. Over time, the hardware, software, and data from exploration missions will support off-Earth communities of increasing size, complexity, and duration in LEO, cislunar space, the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and beyond—underscoring the importance of harnessing allied capabilities in these technology areas for space exploration today.

Table 1: Allied and partner offerings in key space exploration technologies

This table includes select nations with a strong history of space- and/or Earth-related success within a specific technological segment (examples labeled “Now”) and/or have burgeoning commercial sectors worth examining (examples labeled “Next”). Note: This table is not exhaustive.

Recommendations and conclusions

Harnessing allied capabilities is crucial for future space exploration, with major potential benefits to life on Earth as well. The US government, working alongside allied and partner governments, should therefore consider the following next steps:

Recommendation #1: US government actors—including Congress, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, the State Department including its Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the Defense Technology Security Administration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense—should reexamine and reform Export Administration Regulations. Priority should be given to potential reforms that strengthen the United States’ position as an orchestrator of complex international collaborations and supply chains, in contrast to a paradigm of the United States as a globally dominant, unilateral player. Support from executive- and ministerial-level offices is essential.

Recommendation #2: NASA and the National Space Council should collaborate with allied space agencies, both national and international, to identify opportunities to engage in space exploration at whatever level of contribution is individually appropriate, given the state of maturity of allied sectors (see Table 1) and geopolitics. For example, allies could contribute commodities or launch locations rather than mature costly software or hardware. Attention should be paid to maturing industries to identify opportunities for early relationships and processes that will accelerate space exploration.

Recommendation #3: The Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of the Secretary of Commerce, Department of Defense, and other US interagency actors should identify and support synergies between technology development for space exploration and for Earth-focused innovation in critical technologies. New multistakeholder (cross-border) grants, fellowships, seed funding, and prizes should be modeled on current international efforts like XPRIZE and the Deep Space Food Challenge. Programs such as the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts and the ESA Open Space Innovation Platform, which incubate early-stage innovations in space exploration, should be expanded to noncitizens.

Recommendation #4: Through organizations like the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, international stakeholders in space exploration—including space agencies, companies, philanthropic groups, and nongovernmental organizations—should formulate an actionable, unified multilateral space strategy that goes beyond the Artemis Accords. For example, while the Artemis Accords recognize “the global benefits of space exploration and commerce,” they do not explicitly address commercial activity, and commercial enterprises are not signatories. Action is urgently needed, as it is conceivable that extraction and exploitation of lunar resources could begin in the very short term—in the mid 2020s. An expanded space strategy must include the commercial sector.

In conclusion, just as no one could have foreseen the precise progression from the Wright brothers’ first flight to today’s rapidly exploding telecommunications and space industrial ecosystems, one cannot expect to accurately predict the progression—or the ramifications—of today’s space exploration to tomorrow’s future. Nonetheless, international collaboration is certainly key to success. Now is the time to enhance the processes, relationships, and shared vision for space exploration, thereby expanding humankind’s knowledge of the universe, improving life on Earth, and setting the stage for a reliable, routine, and prosperous space economy for all.

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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ISSUE BRIEF

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.¹

The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.² Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment.

The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.³ Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.⁴ In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris.

This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.

The security environment in space

The changing security environment in space is driving the United States and allies’ collective desire to cooperate in the national security space. Several recent statements and actions demonstrate potential adversaries’ plans and intentions to dominate the space domain. China and Russia have demonstrated offensive and defensive counterspace capabilities. In 2021, the two countries announced plans to build a joint International Lunar Research Station on the moon, although the path forward on this effort may have been impacted by the Russian invasion of the Ukraine.⁵ The US Space Force notes this action would give those nations control of cislunar space, an area of balanced gravity between the Earth and moon. The movement of potential adversaries to cislunar space changes the strategic environment by forcing the United States to maintain surveillance of that region of space. In addition, Russia and China have threatened to destroy entire US orbital regimes.⁶ China has also expressed its intention to be the world’s leading space power by 2045.⁷ In 2022, Chinese researcher Ren Yuanzhen of the Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications led a People’s Liberation Army study to counter SpaceX’s Starlink small satellite constellation. Ren boasted they had developed a solution to destroy thousands of satellites in the constellation.⁸

Benefits of collaborating in space

Collaborating may be defined as coordinating development programs and operational efforts of current or projected allied and partner space and related capabilities.⁹ US interests would be to ensure these programs and operational efforts support US national security space strategy and planning objectives. Allied nations’ interests are in leveraging extensive US space capabilities and establishing collective security. The United States, allies, and partners have a shared interest in establishing behavioral norms in space. Collaboration between allies in space capabilities would have numerous benefits, including the following.

Altering the calculus for offensive actions. A hostile nation or nonstate actor risks a stronger response from multiple nations when attacking a coalition (versus a single nation). If the United States and allies had interoperable or integrated space capabilities, then an attack on any single country’s space systems would no longer be solely against the United States and would have impact on the collaborating or integrated systems of allies and partners. Changing the calculus for offensive actions could lead to increased deterrence against foreign aggression: “Partner capabilities increase both resilience and the perceived cost to an adversary, when an attack on one partner is seen as an attack on all,” according to the US Air Force.¹⁰

Accessing geostrategic locations. Access to global geographic locations also provides access for ground-based space situational awareness (SSA); telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C); and increasing launch resilience. Ground-based SSA requires globally distributed telescopes and radar systems. Allied collection systems operating in Japan, Australia, and territories of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and others ensure all partners have access to global SSA data. Given that the United States has only two major space launch facilities, natural or manmade disasters could significantly erode the US ability to provide responsive space launch. Use of allied launch facilities could lessen US reliance on limited launch sites and thus mitigate that risk.

Burden-sharing in space. Allied investments in less costly smaller satellites, along with other space technologies, would increase their security and potentially reduce the financial burden on the United States to maintain space security. There have been positive developments in this realm, including Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which identified several new space systems the country intends to procure.¹¹ Given Russia’s military aggression and the success of Space-X’s Starlink satellites in supporting Ukraine, the European Union (EU) recently adopted the proposal to develop the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection, and Security by Satellites (IRISS) constellation to provide broadband connectivity via up to 170 satellites.¹² The system, with an expected deployment date in 2025, expects to employ quantum cryptography and be available to governments, institutions, and businesses (in 2027). Canada’s Department of National Defense is developing the Redwing optical microsat to provide space domain awareness (SDA).¹³

Establishing global norms and standards. The space domain lacks adequate rules of the road to regulate the behavior of spacefaring nations. As the United States and its allies and partners coordinate and perhaps integrate national security space systems, they also are in the position to shape norms and increase pressure on potential adversaries to accept global standards for acceptable space behavior.

Crisis management in space. Several allies have expressed the need to ensure their strategic autonomy—that is, not being wholly dependent on the United States and therefore free to act in their own interests. The EU’s IRISS “system aims to enhance European strategic autonomy, digital sovereignty, and competitiveness.”¹⁴ Still, institutions such as NATO and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue offer an avenue to explore collective options for crisis management in space by establishing agreed-upon terminology, codes of conduct, and response policies and procedures for emergencies or crises in the space domain.

Resiliency in the face of conflict. While seemingly unlikely, a conflict in the space domain would result in attrition of space-based services. Yet, unlike in other domains, a stockpile of space systems does not exist. The emerging commercial small satellite market now provides an opportunity for resiliency in space systems. Interoperable or integrated use of allied and US government and commercial space capabilities would provide improved resiliency in response to accident or attack.¹⁵

Bolstering industrial partnerships and reducing supply chain vulnerabilities. If cybersecurity standards are put in place, integrating allied manufacturing capabilities could diversify the US supply chain and reduce existing vulnerabilities. As a first step, the space-industrial supply chain must transition away from China and toward US allies and partners, who would then be able to enhance their production capabilities by contributing to interoperable or integrated space and associated systems. However, despite a long record of international procurement collaboration between the United States and its allies and partners, the outcomes of past programs have often been mixed.¹⁶

Existing efforts toward allied integration

Collaboration does not merely mean standardization and interoperability. Rather, the effort to create an overall US and allied space vision is a necessary first step in integrating allied space capabilities in order to obtain interoperability. Through various partnerships and efforts, the US Space Force has led efforts with six allies and partners to create a unified vision for national security space cooperation.

Combined space operations vision 2031

In 2022, the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom signed the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Vision 2031, which aims to “generate and improve cooperation, coordination, and interoperability opportunities to sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and prevent conflict.” This shared vision establishes a framework to guide individual and collective efforts.¹⁷

CSpO participants’ shared-objectives effort is a framework to guide individual national and collective efforts:

• Develop and operate resilient, interoperable architectures to enable space mission assurance and unity of effort.
• Enhance command, control, and communications capabilities and other operational linkages among CSpO participants.
• Foster responsible military behaviors, discourage irresponsible behavior, and avoid escalation.
• Collaborate on strategic communications efforts.
• Share intelligence and information.
• Professionalize space cadres and training.¹⁸

Training to fight together

Since 2018, the United States has been integrating allies and partners into space warfighting plans, most notably through Operation Olympic Defender, a US effort to synchronize with spacefaring nations to deter hostile acts in space. The annual Schriever Wargame—designed to explore critical space issues and advance space support across domains—also allows select allies and partners to coordinate defense-related space activities with the United States. In August 2022, US Space Command conducted its Global Sentinel exercise, which serves as US Space Command’s premier security cooperation effort, with twenty-five participating countries. Over a one-week period, this series simulated scenarios focused on enhancing international partnerships, understanding procedures and capabilities, and integrating global SSA. These scenarios further allow participants to understand allies’ and partners’ capabilities and operating procedures, serving as a foundation for future collaboration.¹⁹

To date, the joint training efforts between the United States and its allies have been limited to tabletop exercises, thereby restricting participants’ experience in real-world applications of offensive and defensive counterspace measures. Tabletop exercises do not test capabilities or demonstrate how well an ally or partner might perform in crises or conflict scenarios. Space capabilities are integrated into major military exercises conducted with allies but do not address offensive or defensive counterspace measures.²⁰

Challenges and barriers to integration

While the United States recognizes the value of working with allies and partners in the space domain, myriad hurdles stand in the way to fully realize the competitive advantage space alliances and partnerships offer.

In total, US allies could bring a significant fraction of US capabilities. A systemic problem is how to leverage those capabilities in a coherent way. Limited coordination limits the values of those allied capabilities. Those capabilities are only additive to United States if there is good integration and understanding on how they will have a contributing effect.²¹

Lack of strategy to execute the vision for space. While a shared vision exists among the defense establishments of select allies and partners, there is little in the way of strategy or planning to fully realize that vision. Perhaps the greatest problem with the US approach to working with its allies and partners in space is that there is no coherent strategy for integrating allied space capabilities. Several subject matter experts interviewed for this study noted US public statements around the value of and desire to integrate allies, yet no interviewee was able to identify an existing strategy or plan to do so at any level of US government.

Bureaucratic impediments. Collaborating with allies is far easier than integrating multinational space capabilities. Allied integration must be done through a national-level strategy, integrating what, to date, are largely disconnected efforts between the National Space Council, National Security Council, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, US Space Command, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Department of State. While each organization is credited with making strides in integrating allies (with varying degrees of success), the efforts are disjointed and lack connectivity and unified goals and strategy.²²

Mind the gap. Allies and partners are attempting to understand existing gaps in the US national security space architecture and the capabilities they could provide to fill those gaps. Ironically, the CSpO Vision 2031 states that allies will collaborate “through identification of gaps and collaborative opportunities.” With the onus almost exclusively placed on the ally or partner, interviewees noted nations’ repeated requests to the United States to identify capability gaps in its projected architectures. The lack of information is due to the sensitivity of US defense gaps, with classified information making it more feasible for allies and partners to provide add-on capabilities rather than fully integrating assets.

Some level of gap analysis should be done by the United States to identify the niche areas that allies and partners could fill in the national security space architecture. That analysis should cover a period of at least five to ten years, thereby allowing allies to budget, develop, and deploy capabilities. Identifying capability gaps as requested by allies would ensure a future interoperable or integrated architecture. Primary focus areas should include space situational awareness, on-orbit servicing, communications, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), and cybersecurity. Each of these areas are baseline capabilities that should be interoperable or integrated between the United States and its allies and partners.²³

Classification issues. There exists a widespread belief that the United States’ overclassification of intelligence is hindering US and allied space security. This issue has been publicly acknowledged by several senior US military leaders. Misclassification might be a better word to describe the problem. In addition, the US system for sharing intelligence is cumbersome, requiring an exception to the normal production processes to share intelligence with allies. Experts (including myself) note cases where sharing space-related intelligence with allies was difficult due solely to organizational culture, established processes, poorly administered policies, and other bureaucratic impediments.²⁴

Many of these classification-related problems have existed for decades—and the United States should not wait to figure out how to share information until its hand is forced by a crisis or war. There is an inability to share information, particularly information that can be integrated into a kill chain for weapon systems. The United States has integrated information-sharing systems in other warfighting environments, but as of yet, not in space. This lack of imagination even spreads down to the US combatant commands (COCOMs): allied integration would be enhanced if US COCOMs had joined with allied space personnel providing integrated PNT and communications.²⁵ Moreover, the US Space Force could deploy space attachés to select embassies, perhaps under the Office of Defense Cooperation, to further embed space security interests across the globe. ²⁶

Communications and data integration. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars to build the Joint Mission System to track satellites and space debris, the US Department of Defense still has no automated means to seamlessly integrate SSA data provided by allies into the US space surveillance system. One particularly high-level interview with a close ally called out the biggest issue as being communications, noting that it is impossible to discuss interoperable deterrence until this issue is addressed.²⁷

Fifteen NATO members recently signed a memorandum of understanding to launch a Space Center of Excellence in Toulouse, France. This body could provide a mechanism for data integration and operational coordination. The Toulouse center is in addition to the already operating NATO Space Centre at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, which serves as a single point for the requests and production of NATO space products.²⁸ As of February 2023, the US and Canadian governments are not founding members of the Toulouse Space Center effort.

Case study: US-Japanese space integration

While allied integration has seen success across other warfighting domains, the same cannot be said for the space domain.²⁹ Space collaboration with Japan is illustrative of the challenges in integrating efforts.

Overclassification of information related to US programs and operation capabilities makes allied integration even more difficult. For example, France and Japan have publicly stated their intentions to build geo satellites for space domain awareness. Currently, a strategy to coordinate those systems with the operating US geosynchronous space situational awareness program (GSSAP) does not exist, demonstrating a lack of plans for data sharing, burden sharing, or coordination of mission operations.³⁰ However, Japan and the United States have agreed that space domain awareness data will be shared between the Japan Air-Self Defense Force and US Space Command starting in federal year 2023.

In 2022, the government of Japan approached the United States about its interest in playing a role in the Space Development Agency’s “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,”³¹ as Japan intends to launch a similar constellation of satellites for missile defense purposes. However, the United States has been unresponsive to Japan on how it could achieve integration. This is partly because the United States maintains concerns about Japan’s level of information security, despite Japan’s commitment to “strengthen and reinforce information security practices and infrastructure.”³² Yet, Japan has the world’s third largest defense budget and is a spacefaring nation with launch infrastructure, years of experience, and advanced satellite manufacturing capabilities. In addition, Japan faces increasing threats from China and North Korea, providing incentive to expand its security relationship with the United States.³³ In 2010, the United States came to agreement with Japan to integrate SSA sensors into the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) PNT system.³⁴ However, to date, there is no plan on how to integrate the data.³⁵

Policy recommendations

There are several key actions the United States can take to integrate allies and partners into national security space efforts.

Recommendation #1: The US Space Force should conduct a gap analysis to guide allied investments into space capabilities, prioritizing capabilities such as SSA, on-orbit servicing, communications, PNT, and cybersecurity. This gap analysis should identify in which areas the United States wants to collaborate with allies, identify opportunities for interoperability, and which areas are open to integration of capabilities.

Recommendation #2: It would benefit the US Space Force to have an outside entity analyze its internal policies, procedures, bureaucratic obstacles, and human capital levels to determine why the effort to integrate allies has been so minimally effective.

Recommendation #3: The US National Space Council should lead an interagency working group to develop a US government integrated strategy that establishes goals for and metrics to assess US and allied space capabilities and integration efforts.

Recommendation #4: The US Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence should form a working group to establish best practices for sharing classified information with allies.

Recommendation #5: US Space Command should develop real-world exercises with allies and partners to test SDA, electronic warfare, and space control capabilities—all of which will be critical to deterring and, if necessary, responding to future space conflicts.

Recommendation #6: The US Departments of Defense and State should work toward consistency of approach in terms of governance of space activities, including through establishment of multilateral engagement and national regulations to allow flexibility and transportability of launch access at short notice.

Recommendation #7: The National Security Council should lead an interagency effort to establish consistency of national regulations between allies and partners (comparable laws and/or standards) so that systems and operations are transferable and receive mutual recognition and acceptance.

Conclusion

The United States and its allies and partners are moving toward sharing SSA data, understanding each other’s policies and procedures, and collaborating on space operations. Still, much work needs to be done to expand collaboration and achieve interoperability (if desired) between rising space powers. Without a strong indication from the US government of what exactly it wants from its allies and partners—as well as what it is prepared to give in return—the United States will not be able to effectively harness the competitive advantages offered by allied space capabilities. It is incumbent on the United States and its allies to immediately embark on a way forward to jointly ensure a safe and secure environment in space. Failure to change current practices and act in a timely fashion will lead to increased space threats and diminished national and economic security.

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Nicholas Eftimiades

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The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action.

This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities:

Robert Murray examines the state of the commercial space market and key drivers, considering how government investments in enabling activities can support broader national imperatives.

Tiffany Vora analyzes current US space exploration goals and the capabilities that will be critical to achieving them, highlighting arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned for integration.

Nicholas Eftimiades assesses the potential benefits to US national security offered by allied integration, identifying pathways for cooperating with allies and partners on their space capabilities.

The way forward for US and allied coordination in space

Several common themes emerge across this series. First, outer space is characterized by a transforming landscape and market. Commercial tech advancements—including the introduction of small satellites, advancements in Earth observation and asteroid mining, and the rise of space tourism—drive the development of what Murray terms the “NewSpace” market. The way in which the United States and its allies do business in space is changing, with the private sector leading in capability development and the government becoming the consumer. The burgeoning space sector, totaling $464 billion in 2022, is attracting allies and adversaries alike to invest in and expand their space operations. Strategic competitors recognize they can now target US and allied commercial and national security imperatives from space.

Second, this increasingly competitive environment further accentuates the value of alliances and partnerships in space. As Vora highlights, US and allied cooperation in space today rests on the Artemis Accords, which advances shared principles for space activity, and is a key mechanism for the international transfer of expertise, technology, and funding. The US Department of Defense also houses the Combined Space Operations Vision 2031, which offers a framework to guide collective efforts with several allies, and a host of collaborative exercises and wargames. Eftimiades describes the cross-cutting benefits of this collaboration: it alters the decision calculus for hostile actors, threatening a response from a coalition of nations; offers the ability to share capabilities, responsibilities, and geostrategic locations; and creates consensus in setting the norms for responsible space behavior. Current collective efforts in the space domain are limited, albeit expanding, considering the benefit allies and partners bring to the table.

Third, in order to promote stronger collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners, it is necessary to address and overcome the barriers that stand in the way. Vora identifies protectionist policies and regulations that act as hurdles to the transfer of key technologies and information. Murray explains that lengthy government contract timelines, coupled with insufficient investment in technologies critical to NewSpace, hinder US and allied commercial advancement. Eftimiades argues that the United States has yet to articulate a strategy for space coordination, highlighting a lack in transparency with allies and partners on capability and data gaps.

The authors put forth ideas to pave the way forward for US and allied space development. Recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners include conducting gap analysis on where allied investments can complement existing US capabilities, establishing a “space bank” to support NewSpace actors, and formulating a US and allied strategy for space development, building upon the Artemis Accords. To maintain its competitive advantage in space, the United States cannot go at it alone.

Read the full papers:

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

By Robert Murray

Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

By Tiffany Vora

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

By Nicholas Eftimiades

Acknowledgements

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and consultations. Listed below are some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

• Allen Antrobus, strategy director, air and space, Serco
• John Beckner, chief executive officer, Horizon Technologies
• Dr. Mariel Borowitz, associate professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology
• Steven J. Butow, director, space portfolio, Defense Innovation Unit
• Chris Carberry, chief executive officer and co-founder, Explore Mars
• Darren Chua, EY space tech consulting partner and Oceania innovation leader, Ernst & Young Australia
• Kenneth Fischer, director for business development North America, Thales Alenia Space
• David Fogel, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Dr. Yasuhito Fukushima, senior research fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
• Peter Garretson, senior fellow in defense studies, American Foreign Policy Council
• Sqn Ldr Neal Henley, chief of staff, Joint Force Space Component, UK Space Command
• John Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense
• Komei Isozaki, Japan Chair fellow, Hudson Institute
• Mat Kaplan, senior communications adviser, The Planetary Society
• Cody Knipfer, director of government engagement, GXO, Inc.
• Dr. Jerry Krasner, independent consultant, US Department of Defense
• Massimiliano La Rosa, director, marketing, sales, and business, Thales Alenia Space
• Ron Lopez, president and managing director, Astroscale U.S. Inc.
• Douglas Loverro, president, Loverro Consulting, LLC; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, US Department of Defense
• Russ Matijevich, chief innovation officer, Airbus U.S. Space & Defense, Inc.
• Jacob Markish, vice president, strategy and corporate development, Thales North America
• Brig Gen Bruce McClintock, USAF (ret.), lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative, RAND Corporation
• Col Christopher Mulder, USAF, active-duty officer, US Air Force; 2020-2021 senior US Air Force fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Dr. Eliahu Niewood, vice president, Air and Space Forces Center, MITRE Corporation
• Dr. Jana Robinson, managing director, Prague Security Studies Institute
• Audrey Schaffer, director for space policy, National Security Council
• Paul Szymanski, director, Space Strategies Center
• Dr. Christian Willmes, doctor of philosophy, University of Oxford

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About the authors

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Tiffany Vora

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Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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In the April 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the history and future of lunar and Cislunar or xGEO (the area between the Earth geosynchronous orbit and the Moon) space missions. Tantardini discusses how this zone could become the next frontier of economic and security competition.

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The post Tantardini in Longitude on the competition for Cislunar space. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the March 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the future of point-to-point suborbital travel and transportation. As the cost of launch decreases, Tantardini discussed how the private market for rocket travel and transportation may evolve.

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Marco Tantardini

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The Biden administration’s recent National Defense Strategy set the DOD on a mission to reduce adversaries’ disruptive ability by “fielding diverse, resilient, and redundant satellite constellations.”

The announcement of the CASR represents the logical next step for bolstering defense in space. Moving forward, a civilian reserve satellite fleet could, in alignment with the Biden administration’s “deterrence by resilience” goals, minimize the fallout from hostile action against US satellite networks and thus reduce the temptation for adversaries to mount an attack.

The US military has relied on satellites for more than thirty years. From Global Positioning System-enabled, precision-guided munitions that helped the US military destroy Iraqi tanks to spy satellites that helped track down al-Qaeda training camps, space assets were a crucial part of the first Gulf War and war on terror.

China and Russia recognize how much the US military depends on satellites. Both have developed a wide range of ASAT capabilities that can disable or destroy US space assets. These capabilities include electronic warfare, cyber operations, jamming, directed energy, and destructive kinetic ASAT weapons. China also possesses commercial and scientific satellites with maneuvering capabilities that could serve as ASATs by violently colliding with US space assets.

To mitigate the threat from adversary ASATs, the US Space Development Agency is bolstering space resiliency by purchasing hundreds of small (and cheap) low-Earth orbit satellites. Rather than relying on large, expensive geosynchronous-orbit satellites, this new approach will require any adversary seeking to disrupt US space capabilities to knock out not just a few exquisite satellites but a few hundred small satellites.

By announcing CASR, the United States is beginning to take steps to improve its resilience even more: Rather than relying on government-owned space assets numbering in the hundreds, the United States is hoping to enlist massive commercial satellite constellations numbering in the tens of thousands for use in emergencies.

Commercial satellites have proven their utility for security purposes during the war in Ukraine. SpaceX’s Starlink is providing the Ukrainian military with high-speed internet, allowing forces to stay in contact with each other and with Ukrainian high command. It also allows units to deploy weapons systems such as precision-guided artillery, drones, and loitering munitions. Commercial satellites have also tracked the Russian military buildup and revealed Russian atrocities in the Ukrainian cities of Izyum and Bucha. The Ukraine example shows that a civil reserve satellite fleet would thus not only increase resiliency but also expand capabilities that the US military can draw upon in times of crisis.

A civil reserve fleet is not a new concept. The US Air Force has the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, which allows the United States to expand its capacity quickly during wars or national emergencies. In twenty-first-century warfare, militaries are exceedingly reliant on a stream of satellite-provided data and services. A civil reserve satellite fleet will ensure that stream remains steady.

In setting up a civil reserve satellite fleet, the US government should do the following:

1. Create a preferential contract award system for private-sector participants in the program.
2. Create fixed payment structures for the services private-sector participants provide.
3. Indemnify companies for financial losses sustained as a result of participation.

These steps would create financial carrots for satellite operators while simultaneously lowering risk, incentivizing them to participate. The payments and preferential contract awards that this program would provide can serve as crucial support for many smaller satellite and launch companies; with the US government serving as an anchor client, space companies would have the time and capital they need to grow a civilian client base. That could make the difference between commercial success or failure.

Corporations should participate in the following ways:

1. Maintain a significant percentage of satellite constellations capable of providing communications and intelligence-gathering services on short demand to the US military.
2. Commit to providing the US government with access to satellite networks if called upon during a conflict or emergency.

Doing so would provide the US military with the resiliency it needs to deter aggression in space, and, should deterrence fail, fight and win.

The US government and corporations should work together in the following ways:

1. Create common software and hardware standards to allow communication between government and commercial satellites and receivers.
2. Assign specific roles to participating commercial satellites in the event of crisis.
3. Conduct military exercises using commercial satellites to improve the efficiency of the system and demonstrate its capabilities to adversaries.

Unlike many other technologies that the military procures, commercial satellites have already proven their utility. The United States should prioritize formalizing its relationship with satellite providers so that, should an emergency arise, the satellites of the civil reserve fleet will be ready to immediately and seamlessly support US warfighters.

Aidan Poling is a research analyst at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. In fall 2022, he was a young global professional in the Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post How a fleet of private satellites can help secure the US military’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 25, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Mir Sadat and Assistant Director Julia Siegel’s issue brief on space traffic management (STM) was cited in a RAND report on cross-domain lessons for STM.

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Mir Sadat

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Julia Siegel

Associate Director

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Now, adversaries aiming to disrupt or destroy US and allied space operations are moving away from physical attacks and toward cyber attacks, electronic warfare, and jamming. Below, the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense experts give their sense of the latest challenges to space security and how the United States must face the future.

Jump to an expert reaction

Clementine Starling: Prepare for unexpected attacks from competitors—and clashes with debris

Christopher P. Mulder: Look out for Chinese space developments

Marco Tantardini: Watch the democratization of space, as capabilities may fall into the wrong hands

Julia Siegel: Beware the regulatory vacuum

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Securing space: Preparing for future space contingencies

Defense experts and officials discuss the transforming space threat environment and its implications for the future of space security as part of the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense Forum.

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Prepare for unexpected attacks from competitors—and clashes with debris

The United States should join with spacefaring allies and partners to urgently address two serious challenges for the future of the space domain. First, the proliferation of orbital space debris is a major threat to future space activity if not mitigated effectively. Tens of thousands of large pieces of debris (ten centimeters or above) and millions of smaller pieces exist in low-Earth orbit (LEO), which can be catastrophic for space missions. The challenge of existing debris is compounded by the creation of new debris from anti-satellite (ASAT) tests. Russia’s dangerous ASAT test in November 2021, which created debris that put seven astronauts and cosmonauts in danger, demonstrates the impact of flagrant debris creation.

In addition, with the growth of commercial satellite capabilities and demand, the number of satellites in already-crowded orbits is projected to grow exponentially. If Kessler’s Syndrome is to be believed, the amount of debris in orbit could reach a point where it just creates more and more space debris—and if LEO becomes too dangerously crowded, the United States will be hard-pressed to launch into and conduct safe activity in outer space. While some progress has been made to mitigate orbital debris, the impending challenge of increasingly congested orbits requires better international coordination and alignment of regulatory frameworks.

Second, the proliferation of counterspace capabilities creates ongoing threats to space security that the United States must prioritize addressing in order to ensure the continuance of its space activity. The United States is reliant on space for all manner of things critical to its security, including positioning and navigation; civil and military communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and tracking, assessing, and communicating military commands. China and Russia understand the asymmetric nature of the United States’ reliance on space for defense and security purposes and thus are increasingly developing counterspace capabilities to place US space and terrestrial assets at risk. China’s and Russia’s development and testing of direct-ascent ASAT capabilities and soft-kill satellite attacks such as dazzling and lasing should be carefully studied.

The United States must continue to lead the international community in setting norms and standards for safe and responsible space conduct and to enhance the resiliency of its space and ground-based assets, especially for US missile early warning, data relay, and electronic intelligence satellites that adversaries could place at risk.

—Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Look out for Chinese space developments

China’s multi-faceted and accelerated approach to conquering the space domain is the greatest challenge and gravest threat for the foreseeable future. In 2016, Chinese leader Xi Jinping stated that becoming an aerospace power has “always been the dream” for China. That dream requires China to dominate the domain and increase its influence over other countries’ policy decisions. With China’s desire to achieve this end state by 2045, the United States will require a “North Star vision” and “whole-of-nation action plan” to remain in the lead, wrote the authors of the State of the Space Industrial Base 2022 report.

China’s space ascension has military, economic, and political implications. After all, China’s race to become the leading space power is one critical step toward becoming a global superpower. To accomplish this, China is employing its entire suite of means and resources in space to advance its global ambitions, putting humanity at risk on Earth and in space. One way the United States can specifically counter Chinese investments is by ensuring that it has a resilient space-launch capability. When the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) became reliant on Russia for astronaut space launches in 2011 after the Space Shuttle program was retired, the United States quickly realized the national security implications. Thankfully, there are now more players in the cargo and human space-launch arena. However, with China’s clear space aspirations, the United States continues to accept too much space-launch risk in the form of supply-chain disruptions, reliance on China’s rare earth minerals, tainted rocket fuel, and limited US launch locations—all of which threaten the sustainability of the country’s space missions.

The most logical path forward for the United States is to radically improve space-security cooperation across most space activities. Limiting the risk involved in space launch is a good place to start—that can be done by boosting supply-chain, rare-earth-mineral, and rocket-fuel resiliency with allies and partners. Moreover, the United States can utilize or develop alternate launch locations and new space-launch technologies with other leading spacefaring countries. If the United States is unable to access space (with cargo or human flight), it will inevitably hand over the space keys to China. 

—Christopher P. Mulder served as the 2020–2021 US Air Force fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He now serves at the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the US government or other organization.

Watch the democratization of space, as capabilities may fall into the wrong hands

The entities possessing space capabilities once constituted a very small and exclusive club. But this is no longer the case, as the cost of “membership” is decreasing quickly. For example, the development and demonstration of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 vehicle wound up costing up to ten times less than NASA had projected, demonstrating a shift toward cheaper production and space launch—a shift that has only become steeper with time. Furthermore, the technical workforce capable of building a rocket and launch pad from scratch is now widely available across the world and, often, just one LinkedIn connection away. In addition, space personnel—from the West and the East—are much more mobile than in the past decades. The growing accessibility of this sector is putting space capabilities in new hands, with about seventy countries hosting national space agencies and more than ten thousand space companies in existence globally.

While such advancements have fostered great strides in humankind’s development of outer space, they are also making space accessible to myriad new actors, including malign actors who aim to leverage space for nefarious purposes. Moreover, the small launch vehicle industry in the Western world has been unable to keep up with the proliferation of human resources proficient in space technology; with a proportionally larger space workforce, more experts are willing to work as consultants across myriad smaller projects, including on jobs offered by non-aligned countries, putting US and allied space resources and knowledge in the wrong hands. This means that “space terrorism” could emerge as a large challenge in the next decade. Organized groups, operating through a network of small cells, could acquire the capacity to deliver small objects in LEO, thereby enabling them to detonate rudimentary devices in order to disrupt space operations and destabilize a growing economic sector.

In the case that deterrence fails, the United States and its allies and partners should be prepared to quickly respond to terrorist activities in space. To do so, US and allied strategy and operative plans must support a timely reaction in the event that one or multiple bombs are discovered to be in orbit. If disabling kinetic weapons in space proves unsuccessful, the United States must prevent a potential snowball effect by developing the capability to quickly clean debris created from attacks. Robotic explosive ordnance disposal squads and space firefighters must be ready to be called upon for duty to ensure such a scenario never becomes reality. 

—Marco Tantardini is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former advisor for space policy to the Italian government.

Beware the regulatory vacuum

Current space governance is far behind the wave of technological advancement sweeping the domain. Proliferated LEO, or building megaconstellations of small satellites in LEO, is crowding the orbit and could render it unusable in the decades to come. Spacefaring entities are also trekking further into the galaxy and considering how to utilize and preserve cislunar space—or the space between Earth and the Moon’s orbit. With industry leading the way, the commercialization of space is driving down the cost of launch and revolutionizing both who can operate in space and for what purposes. However, the $386 billion global space economy remains inadequately protected and, as General James Cartwright noted at our latest Forward Defense Forum, “where there is money, there is mischief.” In the absence of regulation, outer space is at the mercy of revisionist rivals China and Russia looking to advance an alternate international order.

Despite multiple companies championing best practices for the sustainable use of space, few international standards exist today. International space law is largely built upon the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which lacks adequate guidance or guardrails for modern space activities. More recent standards, such as the United Nations’ nonbinding guidelines for long-term space sustainability, lack teeth or do not match the pace of current development, as is demonstrated by the twenty-year gap between the United States’ 2001 standards for de-orbiting satellites (which were reaffirmed in 2019) and the guidance passed just this fall.

Norms can provide parameters for acceptable behavior in a growing ecosystem, making it possible to identify and penalize actors who refuse to follow the rules. The National Space Council is taking steps forward, aiming to submit a new regulatory framework in March. The group is holding learning sessions to better understand commercial missions and craft a flexible regulatory approach that both fosters and protects a growing commercial space industry. The United States must proactively lead in the development of space norms, meaningfully engaging the commercial entities at the forefront of space advancement from the start.

—Julia Siegel is an assistant director at the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

The post How the US and its allies should respond to evolving space threats appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The December issue of Longitude, an Italian magazine on foreign affairs issues, included an article by Marco Tantardini. The article discusses how the distributed relationship between European states and European Space Agency (ESA) results in a focus on industrial policy, whereas in the United States the allocation of budget by Congress to the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) is seen as a bureaucratic nonevent.

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The post Tantardini in Longitude on the impact of differing space agency organizational cultures. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The November issue of Longitude, an Italian magazine on foreign affairs issues, included an article by Marco Tantardini. The article discusses various rules and space debris removal systems that could be used to mitigate the growing problem of space debris.

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Marco Tantardini

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Tantardini in Longitude on orbital debris mitigation and removal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The post Guevara in El Heraldo de México: on the effectiveness of state’s strategic capabilities (in Spanish) appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 24, Julia Siegel wrote an article with Kelly Grieco for Breaking Defense. The article considered airpower lessons learned from the war in Ukraine that could be applied to the defense of Taiwan.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Siegel in Breaking Defense on the future of airpower appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 15, Julia Siegel was quoted in a Newsweek article by James Bickerton on how the Starlink satellite constellation is helping to enable Ukrainian forces.

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Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Siegel quoted in Newsweek on the role of Starlink satellites in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The October issue of Longitude, an Italian magazine on foreign affairs issues, included an article by Marco Tantardini. The article discusses the history and future prospects of on-orbit refueling.

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Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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This event included opening remarks by Forward Defense Deputy Director Clementine Starling and Maxar Chief Technology Officer Walter Scott; a keynote address by Deputy Commander of US Space Command Lt Gen John E. Shaw, USSF, who characterized the transition from military- to civilian-led space traffic management (STM); and a panel discussion featuring Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Mir Sadat, Associate Professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology Mariel Borowitz, and Walter Scott.

The panel articulated the urgency of STM and the role both commercial and government entities can play in addressing the problem.

Why is now the time for action?

As several panelists emphasized, humanity is quickly reaching a “tipping point” in space. This tipping point will come with both tremendous benefits and new challenges. Lieutenant General Shaw observed that “if space in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s was the Arctic Ocean—rather sparse, traveled by rather few platforms, and many of them national security related—then the space of tomorrow is the Mediterranean: It is being crisscrossed by actors, and platforms, and capabilities of every conceivable kind.” The report notes that an exponential growth in satellites and space objects in orbit is underway with a projected increase from 4,800 to 25,000 satellites. Of course, the more objects in space, the greater the risk of collision between objects. Mitigating this danger is where STM comes into play.

What is space traffic management?  

Lieutenant General Shaw defined STM by breaking it into its two component parts: “space traffic” and “management.” He first characterized the “space traffic” component as those objects and electromagnetic spectrum entering, exiting, or moving over one hundred kilometers above sea level. He then noted that “management” encompasses not only space object tracking and collision warnings, but also the creation of “rules of the road” and behavioral norms. All panelists agreed with the General, stating that the creation of norms is central to achieving a functional STM system.

How is STM different from Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Domain Awareness (SDA)?

While often used interchangeably, STM, SSA, and SDA all have important differences. According to Borowitz, SSA is foundational to STM but more limited in scope as it encompasses the monitoring of space objects. SDA, while similar, is the more targeted tracking of space objects for national security purposes. Essentially, if SSA equates to air traffic control radar, SDA is equivalent to military early warning radar.

Moving from the Department of Defense to the Department of Commerce

Under Space Policy Directive-3, the Department of Defense (DoD) was instructed to shift its responsibility for STM to the Department of Commerce. This change was necessary, as highlighted by Lieutenant General Shaw, due to the changing nature of the space environment. The military infrastructure and systems that currently handle STM were originally designed to track a much smaller number of satellites while providing early warning against a nuclear first strike. Lieutenant General Shaw noted that fulfilling STM functions is becoming increasingly taxing to DoD resources that are otherwise needed to fulfill its original SDA mission set. With the Department of Commerce assuming authority over SSA and STM, DoD can now refocus on SDA.

Moreover, Borowitz observed that the switch will allow for the creation of a space traffic management system that, by its nature, is more open and responsive to commercial and international partners. However, all the panelists expressed the same concern: The Department of Commerce needs not just the authority, but also the resources, to adequately implement a new STM infrastructure.

The role of the private sector

All panelists agreed that the private sector will play a leading role in paving the way forward for space traffic management. Scott repeatedly emphasized that private-sector satellite companies are leading by example when it comes to creating norms and rules of behavior, highlighting Maxar’s longtime practice of sharing its orbit and maneuvering data with the DoD. Moreover, commercial companies can also contribute to STM by providing SSA data as a service, such as LeoLabs’ recently announced a data-sharing partnership with the Department of Commerce. Importantly, Scott pointed out that the creation of norms for STM should not be seen by industry as burdensome, given standardization reduces uncertainty and increases stability when it comes to operating space.

Working with international partners

Outer space is, by its nature, a shared environment that requires cooperation. As Sadat noted, “if people don’t get along in space, then nobody gets to benefit from space.” Unfortunately, the creation of international STM norms is stymied by the lack of clearly appropriate international forums for the purpose. Borowitz and Sadat argued that US engagement with likeminded allies and partners on a bilateral and multilateral basis would be valuable, as it could serve as the basis for larger international frameworks regarding responsible STM practices. 

Leading by example: Next steps in STM

Given the difficulty of establishing an international STM regime, the panelists agreed that the most concrete next steps would require the US government and industry to lead by example. A strong emphasis was placed on promoting transparency and data sharing. Sadat noted that different countries and companies often calculate the risk of conjunctions differently. Publicly sharing how the risk of a conjunction is calculated would help reduce tensions while simultaneously promoting STM as a global standard. Similarly, robust data sharing between governments and the private sector regarding planned orbits and maneuvers would help improve the accuracy of conjunction calculations.

You can re-watch “Space traffic management: Time for action” here. You can also read the issue brief here. For more information about the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense practice or to read our latest reports, op-eds, and analyses, please visit the website here. You can also sign up for updates from Forward Defense to hear the latest on the trends, technologies, and military challenges shaping tomorrow.

Aidan Poling is a Young Global Professional for Forward Defense in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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These companies are sharing visuals that only governments were privy to just years ago and, since the war erupted in Ukraine, US and allied governments have doubled down on their purchase of commercial low-Earth orbit (LEO) imagery. Today’s satellites capture details as small as road markers or the quality of muddy terrain (which impacts military planning). Just as air power theorists recognized the value of air weapons following World War I, experts today are realizing the unrivaled advantage offered by commercial satellites. For these reasons, space companies may be viewed as legitimate targets in future wars.

SpaceX’s satellite Internet constellation, Starlink, has proved to be an especially formidable opponent for Moscow, due to both its unprecedented speed of deployment and its continued resilience against attack. A few days after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainian vice prime minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, used Twitter to urge SpaceX founder Elon Musk to supply satellite Internet to Ukraine. Within hours, Musk tweeted back, “Starlink service is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route.” Now, eleven thousand Starlink stations are keeping over one-hundred fifty thousand Ukrainians connected to their country and the outside world daily.

Satellites in combat

Satellites support crucially important military operations. The Turkish Bayraktar TB2S, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) critical to denying Russian air superiority, relies on space-to-ground communications to operate in a larger range. The Starlink constellation is especially critical to Ukraine’s ability to execute attacks in geographic areas lacking sufficient infrastructure or Internet connection. Ukrainian drones successfully strike enemy forces, troops send encrypted messages back and forth, and soldiers remain connected to their loved ones with help from Starlink.

Meanwhile, Russia began targeting commercial space companies in the earliest phases of war. When Russia invaded Ukraine, it hacked the US satellite company Viasat, a communications provider for the Ukrainian military, degrading Ukraine’s ability to act on space intelligence. Throughout the war, Moscow has focused its efforts on jamming and degrading critical UAVs and small satellites to conceal its own troop movements. Early in the war, one US company discovered that UAVs in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine were experiencing global positioning system (GPS) jamming by the Russians. However, commercial satellite constellations are quickly adaptable—as was seen when Starlink demonstrated a new software update to lower energy consumption and thus bypass jamming transmitters amid Russian non-kinetic attacks. Commercial satellites bolster US and allied airpower: their agility, coupled with the fact that special overflight permissions do not apply to LEO, means that military officials can rely on satellites for intelligence and situational awareness.

Eyes in the skies

Commercial satellites are also players in the public sphere, denying Moscow’s attempts to alienate Ukraine from the rest of the world. Satellite imagery of bases in ruins, bombed bridges, and the aftermath of missile attacks provide a snapshot of war to a global audience and expose Russian falsehoods and atrocities. Such images can influence public opinion and thus foreign policy—as was seen when commercial imagery uncovered Chinese missile silos last year and North Korean missile facilities in 2019. Additionally, satellites allow Ukrainians to tell their own story. US officials gave Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky a satellite phone to stay connected, and he uses Starlink to give speeches that are accessible worldwide. Satellite Internet allows Ukrainians to communicate with one another and with the outside world, winning a victory against Russia in the information domain.

Don’t shoot the messenger

Commercial satellites have been critical to Ukrainian military and civilian communications throughout the war thus far, and they will probably be targeted on the future battlefield. The United States and its allies and partners must consider the extent to which commercial space may become under threat, as well as the role of governments and militaries in protecting it.

First, as launch costs decrease, the democratization of space means that more nations—both friends and foes—are joining in orbit. Although the sharing of satellite imagery has advanced US and allied interests during the war in Ukraine, this might not be the case with every actor or scenario in the future. US and allied militaries need to consider how much intelligence should be shared in open-source environments and set appropriate standards for commercial space actors—especially pertaining to US companies sharing information with foreign governments.

Second, small-satellite constellations are resilient against anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, with each individual satellite being less powerful on its own and thus a less-worthy target. Adversaries are adapting their own models in response. While Russia and others have kinetic counterspace capabilities (as was demonstrated by Russia’s ASAT testing last November), non-kinetic counterspace measures (e.g., jamming, electronic warfare, and cyberattacks) are likely to cause the most chaos. Moreover, kinetic ASATs generate space debris, which poses a threat to the sustainability of all LEO operations. Because many nations—including Russia—rely on LEO for national security imperatives, kinetic attacks are mutually destructive and therefore less likely to be undertaken. Currently, there is no clear process for reporting or responding to an anti-satellite attack.

As adversarial targeting of commercial and dual-use satellites becomes commonplace, US and allied militaries need to establish their roles in protecting—and responding to attacks on—commercial space assets. Some officials have recommended that the United States produce a “comprehensive, national space power vision,” articulating the industrial outputs required to maintain the US and allied military edge in space. Although this is a step in the right direction, such a strategy must acknowledge the barriers to public-private space cooperation and consider the ways in which militaries will safeguard commercial satellites with military applications.

Commercial satellites will continue to act as enablers for the warfighter, and US and allied space companies require protection from adversarial attacks. Although Russia’s unsophisticated fleet of satellites poses little challenge today, China’s more advanced and growing counterspace arsenal will prove a threat to the United States’ and allies’ use of space tomorrow. If commercial space remains defenseless, the United States and its allies will have to prepare to fight blindly in future wars.

***

Julia Siegel is an assistant director in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Read more essays in the series

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Commercial satellites are on the front lines of war today. Here’s what this means for the future of warfare. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A second space race emerges

Director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) Michael Brown set the stage for the discussion by harkening back to the US-Soviet space race during the Cold War, which marks the last time in which the United States set out a definitive national strategy and vision for space. Brown noted that these investments, while large at the time, produced later economic and strategic benefits that were indiscernible at the time. He argued that there is a second space race today, this time against China as it catches up to the United States with its rapid research and development programs.

Brown highlighted recommendations from the report, including the need for the United States to increase its space technology investments both within the government and through private partnerships to maintain the United States’ edge in space. The United States must rely on private companies because they are able to research and produce innovative space technology far faster than the US government. For example, Brown stated that there will be an estimated one thousand commercial satellites for every government satellite by 2030. The United States has a history of engaging the private sector to achieve national aims such as it did with the transcontinental railroad. Today, the US government can provide the foundational investments to encourage private innovation and production.

What has changed in the space domain since 2021?

Dr. Mir Sadat, a nonresident senior fellow with Forward Defense moderated the ensuing conversation between the panelists on the State of the Space Industrial Base 2022 Report. Panelists Steven J. Butow, director of DIU’s Space Portfolio, and Maj Gen John M. Olson, USSF, both discussed how the United States has grown in the space domain since 2021. They pointed out notable achievements such as NASA’s new James Webb Space Telescope, the upcoming launch of the Artemis I, and a record-setting $15 billion investment into the commercial space sector. However, they also noted that industry leaders believe that the United States should be moving faster in research, development, and production by outlining a national strategy that sets out a “whole-of-nation” approach. Mandy Vaughn, chief executive officer and founder of GXO, Inc, agreed, stating that industry representatives are waiting on a national plan and funding on space innovation from the government.

The China factor. When asked by Dr. Sadat about China’s recurring theft of US intellectual property, Col Eric J. Felt, USSF, relayed that there is worry among some experts that China is now reaching a stage of its technological innovation in which it may be able to leapfrog the United States in innovation rather than rely on reproducing from stolen designs. There must be a balancing act in protecting intellectual property throughout the research and development process. Vaughn agreed, arguing that private companies need better training and education, particularly for new start-ups before they go into the classified space of research and development with the government.

The Artemis Accords and private industry. Next, Maj Gen Olson and Col Felt laid out the critical nature of unity with allies and partners in pursuing a comprehensive space strategy. Col Felt noted that since 2021, more nations have signed unto the Artemis Accords that sets out rules and guidelines for exploring and extracting resources in space. Vaughn added that private companies are excited to join the US government in its space strategy. Investors are waiting on cues from the US Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) that they will support investments into space technology and exploration. Speaking from his experience within the Pentagon, Maj Gen Olson agreed that policies within the DoD need to be changed to provide incentives to investors and private companies to support space innovation.

The time for change is now

The panel closed out its discussion on their favorite recommendation from the State of the Space Industrial 2022 report. Overall, the panelists overwhelmingly agreed on the need for the United States to urgently tear down government barriers such as over-classification and bureaucratization to allow for smoother cooperation with allies, partners, and the private industry. The State of the Space Industrial 2022 report comes out at a critical time, as the United States continues competing for space superiority with adversaries like China and Russia, concepts of warfare (and targeting in space) are changing, and climate change threatens US and allied security objectives. In the words of the report authors, “in order to save the planet, you have to get off the planet.” This report lays out how the US government can partner with the private sector to do just that.

You can re-watch “State of the Space Industrial Base 2022: Advancing prosperity, sustainability, and US leadership in outer space” here. You can also read the report here. For more information about the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense practice or to read our latest reports, op-eds, and analyses, please visit the website here. You can also sign up for updates from Forward Defense to hear the latest on the trends, technologies, and military challenges shaping tomorrow.

Delharty Manson is a Project Assistant for Forward Defense in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Explore Forward Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes the debate around the greatest military challenges facing the United States and its allies, and creates forward-looking assessments of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare.

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The post “An analogous gold spike”: Harnessing the space industrial base for twenty-first century prosperity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat 

Tracking narratives

Forged Kuleba letter asks Poland to name street after Stepan Bandera

Media Policy

Russia announces plans to build online system to detect prohibited content

War crimes and human rights abuses

Russian occupation administration conducts campaign of arrests in Kherson

International response

Russia and Turkey spar over alleged weapons contract

Ukrainians crowdfund Finnish satellite for armed forces

Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat

The Russian occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant continues to provoke fear among the international community in light of renewed shelling around the plant. Russian command in the area employs the facility for housing troops and military equipment, effectively using the plant as a shield against any possible Ukrainian attempt to retake the area. Ukraine and Russia have exchanged accusations about who is behind the shelling, both issuing warnings that the opposing side might attack the plant. 

Earlier this month, independent Russia-focused publication The Insider published a video in which Russian military trucks enter the territory of the nuclear power plant and unload cargo. The column of trucks reportedly arrived on August 2. According to the video, Russian forces are mining the territory around the nuclear power plant. The Insider also reported that about 500 Russian soldiers are stationed at the Zaporizhzhia plant, alongside military equipment, including armored vehicles, anti-aircraft installations, and equipment for radiochemical detection. New footage also emerged on August 18 showing military trucks inside the plant. 

Russia has accused Ukraine of preparing a “provocation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant” during UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s visit to Ukraine this week. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that the Ukrainian 44th Artillery Brigade from Nikopol would strike the Zaporizhzhia plant on August 19. No evidence was provided to support either accusation. Ukraine’s Energoatom, which oversees the country’s nuclear plants, has established a crisis headquarters to handle any possible incidents at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Meanwhile, Ukrainian military intelligence issued a statement on Facebook on August 18 warning against a false-flag operation by Russia on August 19. 

Located in the city of Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe. Since March 2022, it has been under the control of Russian troops. The UN has urged Russia to withdraw troops from the nuclear power plant and to establish a safe perimeter. The pro-Russian administration of the Zaporizhzhia region has been silent on the subject. 

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army continues to attack Russian forces along frontlines and occupied territories. A Russian base was reportedly destroyed in Amvrosiivka, Donetsk region, on August 17. On the same day, a Russian base in Lysychansk was also attacked. The Ukrainian government also admitted that it was behind recent explosions in Crimea. On August 16, reports arose of thick smoke and multiple explosions at Gvardeyskoe airbase in Crimea. On the evening of August 18, Russian air defenses stopped a Ukrainian drone attack in the Kerch area.  

In Kherson, the occupying Russian administration the telecommunication company Norma-4, which could signal an attempt to cut off residents of the region from the outside world. After Russian forces took control of Kherson’s internet in May, several service providers went dark as Russia rerouted internet traffic from Kherson through Russian networks. 

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria 

Forged Kuleba letter asks Poland to name street after Stepan Bandera

On August 16, the Russian Telegram channel Джокер ДНР (“Joker DNR”) published a forged letter falsely attributed to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. In the letter, Kuleba is portrayed as asking Polish authorities to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw, where the Russian Embassy is located, to Stepan Bandera Street, after the controversial far-right leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in World War II. The forged letter claims that changing the street name to Stepan Bandera street would be seen as a gesture of support for Ukrainians. The letter highlights that Russia changed the names of the streets in Moscow where the embassies of the United States and the United Kingdom are located. The letter is not dated, and Dmytro Kuleba’s signature appears to be copied from a publicly available letter signed by him in 2021.  

On August 17, the Telegram channel published another forged document, allegedly signed by Marcin Przydacz, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The document contains several orders allegedly issued by Przydacz, including an order for the president of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance to provide a written expert opinion on the possibility of changing the name of the street in Warsaw “to honor the national hero of Ukraine Stepan Bandera.” It also proposes a campaign to increase the popularity of Stepan Bandera among Polish citizens. 

Marcin Przydac confirmed on Twitter that the document was a forgery. “The linguistic errors clearly point to the potential authors of this provocation,” he said.

The Joker DNR Telegram channel also published a post that contained screenshots of Facebook posts from the accounts of Polish nationals Piotr Górka, an expert in the history of the Polish Air Force, and Dariusz Walusiak, a Polish historian and documentarian. Górka has previously written a book that was published by the Institute of National Remembrance, the organization mentioned in Przydacz’s forged document. Górka’s Facebook post claims that he fully supports the Polish government’s decision to change the name of Belwederska Street to Stepan Bandera Street. At the time of writing, Górka’s Facebook account was no longer available.  

Dariusz Walusiak shared Górka’s Facebook post on the timeline of more than twenty Facebook users, including Adam Kalita, who works at the Krakow branch of the Institute of National Remembrance; Jan Kasprzyk, head of the Office for War Veterans and Victims of Oppression; and Alicja Kondraciuk, a Polish public figure living in Krakow. He also shared the post on Facebook groups. At the time of writing, Walusiak’s Facebook account was no longer available, but the DFRLab was able to archive Facebook posts before they disappeared.

The Joker DNR Telegram channel frequently publishes documents that it alleges are “leaked.” Some of these documents contain personal information about Ukrainian soldiers. According to cybersecurity firm Mandiant, the Telegram account is a Russia-aligned hacktivist group with connections to another threat actor, Ghostwriter. The tactic of taking over social media accounts to push false or leaked documents is quite similar to Ghostwriter’s tactics. The DFRLab has previously reported on an information operation attributed to Ghostwriter in which social media accounts of Polish nationals were hacked to plant false information.  

The possibility exists that the owners of the Joker DNR Telegram account hacked the accounts of Górka and Walusiak, but the DFRLab is unable to confirm this. The selection of people the Walusiak account shared Górka’s post with indicates there may have been an effort to alert people who would have strongly opposed the “plan” to change the street name.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia announces plans to build online system to detect prohibited content

Russian censor Roskomnadzor has allocated 57.7 million rubles (nearly USD $1 million) to launch the Oculus internet surveillance system for detecting “prohibited data” by mid-December, Russian outlet Kommersant.ru reported. 

According to the report, the surveillance system will be built on neural networks and will “analyze photos, videos and texts on websites, social networks and messengers for prohibited information, including homosexual propaganda and the manufacture of drugs and weapons,” Kommersant stated. 

The system is expected to have a capacity of analyzing 200,000 images per day, meaning that Oculus could be able to analyze two frames per second, Russian outlet RBC reported. Prohibited content that would be a subject to Oculus monitoring includes extremism and terrorism materials, calls for “illegal” mass gatherings, expressions of “clear disrespect” for the state and official symbols, and the “promotion of non-traditional sexual relations.”  

An unnamed source from “a large IT company” told Kommersant that the implementation of such a project under the suggested budget and timeline is “almost impossible.”  

The development of the Oculus system appears to the next step in Russia’s domestic internet surveillance and censorship toolbox.  

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian occupation administration conducts campaign of arrests in Kherson

Reports of abuse and arrests are increasing in southern Ukraine territory occupied by Russia. Recently published reports and witness testimonies from the city of Kherson document Russian troops going door-to-door to search belongings, mobile phones, and documents. The Russian occupation administration arrests anyone it suspects of assisting Ukraine against the Russian forces in the region. 

Witness testimonies also show that the Russian administration holds civilians and members of the Ukrainian administration in basements, including the mayor of Kherson.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria 

Russia and Turkey spar over alleged weapons contract

Dmitry Shugaev, head of Russia’s federal service for military-technical cooperation, announced on August 16 that Turkey had signed a new contract to purchase a “second batch” of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. Ismail Demir, president of Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency, which is responsible for procurement, was quick to deny the allegation. “There is no new development. According to the agreement made on the first day, the process continues, ” Demir said. The initial deal between Russia and Turkey was struck in 2017. 

An unnamed Turkish defense official also told Reuters that there were no new agreements. “The original contract that was signed with Russia for the purchase of S-400s already included two batches. The purchase of a second batch was included in the original plan and the related contract.”

Kremlin-controlled media outlets such as RIA Novosti, RBC, and Izvestiya reported on August 18 that Russia had started fulfilling the contract with Turkey by delivering the second batch of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. 

One day before Shugaev’s announcement, the Russian Minister of Industry and Trade, Denis Manturov, told Kremlin-controlled news agency Interfax that negotiations about the delivery of a “new batch” of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems were “continuing.” 

Turkey, a NATO member state, purchased Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in December 2017. In response, the US prohibited the transfer of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey in 2019. Most recently, the US approved the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, after Turkey dropped objections to Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Kremlin’s media campaign about the “new” S-400 deal with Turkey may be an attempt to sow divisions among NATO member states.  

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Ukrainians crowdfund Finnish satellite for armed forces

A Ukrainian foundation launched by popular TV host Serhiy Prytula announced on Thursday that it had signed a deal with Finnish satellite company ICEYE to purchase a radar satellite for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

A crowdfunding effort launched by the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation raised USD $20 million in June to buy Bayraktar drones for the Ukrainian military. However, Turkish defense firm Baykar refused to accept the money and donated three military drones to Ukraine instead. Prytula said that after consulting with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, the charity foundation purchased a satellite with the money that had been raised for the Bayraktar drones. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC 

The post Russian War Report: Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

ISSUE BRIEF

Introduction

Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space.

The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.

It is no longer sufficient to know the location of spacecraft and space debris; instead, it is imperative to have a common understanding of and management over maneuver in a congested environment. As space activity proliferates, the increased risk of collision between spacecraft and with space debris jeopardizes national security imperatives. Outer space underpins the success of US and allied military operations, with satellites providing crucial intelligence and communications services to the warfighter.

Competitors like China and Russia recognize this and are growing their operational space fleets and increasing their presence in outer space. While sustainable growth is welcomed, hostile capabilities threaten free and open access to space, as was seen most recently in November 2021 when a Russian anti-satellite (ASAT) test resulted in more than one thousand five hundred fragments of debris. The first-ever collision between two satellites occurred in February 2009 when an inactive Russian communications satellite (Cosmos 2251) collided with a satellite operated by US-based Iridium Satellite LLC, causing more than two thousand pieces of debris, much of which will remain in orbit for decades. Such collisions will only become more common as launch costs decrease, increasing the number of satellites entering Earth’s orbit. Collisions disrupt US and allied government and military services and can threaten the sustainable use of outer space in the long term.

Purpose

This analysis advances the position that the United States should urgently lead on a globally coordinated policy framework for STM, else the space domain will remain on an unsustainable path endangering national imperatives. The authors consider the role of key stakeholders involved in STM, identify the elements required to lay the foundation for progress on this issue set, and advance policy recommendations to help guide a comprehensive approach to STM. STM here is defined as the ability of international and national authorities to track spacecraft and space debris, to regulate where space operators position their spacecraft, and to oversee debris mitigation and remediation efforts.

The ecosystem of STM

A policy framework for STM will require close coordination between national and international government and commercial entities from the outset.

International coordination

More than twenty spacefaring nations (those with launch capabilities) exist today, in stark comparison to three such nations at the height of the US-Soviet space race in 1966. Many more national and subnational entities have active satellites. As space launch and systems costs decrease, the number of national space programs will continue to skyrocket. An effective framework for STM must build a community standard for those already acting in the space domain and those expected to join soon. Leveraging its technological edge in space, the United States should lead in promoting global standards for STM, just as it did for air traffic control.

The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space adopted guidelines in 2019 for long-term space sustainability, but they lacked real consequences for transgression. The United States can model positive behavior and go a step further by shaming those who do not follow. In April 2022, the United States announced a national commitment not to conduct direct-ascent ASAT testing, referencing Russia’s destructive ASAT missile test in November 2021 and a similar Chinese test in 2007. This decision signals the value of space sustainability and further denounces ASAT testing on the global stage, differentiating US standards from those of Russia and China without sacrificing needed US counterspace capabilities. The United States could further find ways to hold accountable actors who do not use space responsibly. For example, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) regulation of frequency licensing within the United States can be wielded as a punishment. The FCC is not required to protect a foreign nation’s spectrum—or access to radio frequencies critical to space communications—so it could give away spectrum rights in response to malign behavior.

While unilateral action can set a strong international precedent, multilateral dialogue is required for a global issue like STM. The United States can work within the international community to put forth shared objectives for space sustainability. Effective SSA on a global scale will be a preliminary step toward any STM framework. The Space Data Association provides a promising model, as it “collates independently pooled data from operators to prevent collisions.” However, participants opt into the program, limiting its effectiveness. Discussing ways to formalize or incentivize participation in space data-sharing organizations can help maximize the value of these programs. Additionally, international agreements to deorbit old rocket launchers and defunct satellites can help clean up existing space junk. The European Space Agency is championing the world’s first-ever active debris removal system, and the international community should continue developing deorbiting capabilities and conducting assessments on the highest-risk areas to inform capability development.

While the United States should largely focus its efforts on likeminded nations—namely, its allies and partners—there may be areas for limited cooperation with China, Russia, and other noncooperative actors. Space debris poses a great risk to all space activity, so starting the conversation with a shared vulnerability may elicit some cooperation from China and Russia. However, it is unknown whether such cooperation would extend to data sharing and other essential elements of STM. Nonetheless, an STM model is possible without buy-in from every single actor, as was seen in the air domain: The Soviet Union avoided membership in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)—established in 1947—until 1970, and China did not take part until 1971.

Public-private collaboration

Public and private space operators all agree on one thing: “satellite collisions are bad for business, and bad for space.” Commercial space companies can and should be included in conversations on STM policy, especially as they are at the forefront of today’s space developments and will benefit from protecting the future growth of the space sector. A notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) is one avenue to incorporate industry in broader policy making discussions when an administration is preparing to issue regulation. Moreover, in the United States, industry actors often provide comments in foras facilitated by the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Companies can also engage with the US government through organizational bodies promoting a mix of industry and academic advisers. One such model is the National Space Council Users’ Advisory Group, which ensures that industry and non-federal stakeholders are represented at the national level.

A shared interest in minimizing satellite collisions could support a US mandate to ensure spacecraft meet minimum safety standards. Such mandates must be designed to minimize the compliance cost to industry in order to maximize broad adoption. For example, while the US government might require spacecraft to demonstrate widely available (and cheaper) capabilities, it should incentivize tougher (and more costly) capabilities like deorbiting. This will set a standard that can be adopted internationally and does not leave small stakeholders and start-ups on the sidelines. The automotive industry provides an apt example: Seat belts did not exist until the government mandated them—and now no one will buy a car without seat belts. This policy change did not cost the government a dime, and—while it resulted in short-term resistance—everyone from consumers to insurance companies to the automotive industry benefitted in the long term.

Commercial actors already engage in SSA and STM conversations. Several industry players have already signed onto best practices for STM. For example, the Space Safety Coalition’s 2019 “Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations” was endorsed by myriad space industry players—including companies leading in deorbiting, space launch, and in-orbit satellite services—and included a recommendation to “strive to deorbit all spacecraft after their orbital life.” Moreover, commercial space is well-suited to tackle many of the technical challenges of STM, with “companies eager to provide necessary data and analytic services to government and commercial space operators.” However, while industry actors are able and willing to fill technological gaps, the current regulatory vacuum causes unpredictable market signals for solving issues like space debris.

Principles for regulating STM

The global community has been slow to develop a common set of rules for—or understanding of—STM despite the urgent need to develop regulations and support capabilities to manage proliferating spacecraft and debris. The following elements should form the basis of any STM deliberations.

Lessons from other domains

In paving the way forward for STM, policy makers may draw parallels from the traditional domains of air and maritime. The air domain offers a promising model for an international coordinating authority, with each nation’s equivalent of the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representing national interests on the global stage through the ICAO. Additionally, visual flight rules in the air domain—which ensure an aircraft operates in clear visual conditions and prevents commercial flights around designated areas like airports in special weather conditions—could translate into guidance for spacecraft confined to specified altitudes. However, the dual-use nature of space activity, blurring the distinction between commercial and military activity, makes the civil air model an imperfect fit for information sharing and traffic management.

Additionally, maritime data-sharing models can inform a framework for STM. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) was created by the United States and its allies and partners, and it requires ships of a certain size to provide geographic locational data. AIS was initially a coalition of the willing: Ships that agreed to use AIS were initially given updated National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) map systems and weather data for free. AIS provides a promising model for space operators to build upon. However, automated transponders can make a satellite vulnerable to adversarial targeting and would require further security safeguards.

Apart from traditional transport and commerce domains, a tested model for global data sharing can be found in weather monitoring. STM and weather forecasting both concern data with value outside of national boundaries. To arrive at current practices for weather monitoring, the international community long deliberated on a model for coordinating data and deciding on what must be openly available, obligating warnings and alerts, and considering underlying ethical concerns. Moreover, weather services include a mix of public- and private-sector actors, similar to the space community today. Investigating early conversations on data sharing for weather purposes can help inform today’s STM discussions.

Technical components of STM

STM requires the capability to track space objects, communicate between space operators, and remove space junk or debris. US and allied space operators must develop these technical capabilities to support the space regulatory environment. While the US government is investing in capabilities for tracking and, when necessary, removing space objects from orbit, the United States still lacks a viable technical capability for STM. Currently, there are no integrated systems that can provide comprehensive domain awareness on par with the air or maritime domains for the space domain, which is more complex than the other two domains. The US Space Force is currently developing a number of domain awareness tools, including the Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept (DARC), which is used to detect and track deep space objects in GEO, and the Space Fence, a radar making one hundred and thirty thousand observations per day in LEO.

US Space Command is tracking thirty-five thousand space objects, representing just 0.01 percent of objects orbiting Earth and only a subset of the debris that can harm spacecraft. Situational awareness sensors underlie the US government’s ability to track space objects, and adding additional sensors on Earth and in space can support an enhanced SSA capability. Next, a reliable mechanism for communication with and between spacecraft is required to connect with space traffic control. Finally, debris removal systems must be created to collect and deorbit debris, prioritizing those large objects that present the highest risk to spacecraft. The United States needs a number of technical abilities for enhanced debris removal capabilities, including passive and active aids for tracking satellites and finding dead satellites. Technologies like optical telescopes, radars, GPS or equivalents, and satellite receivers and transmitters will help determine a satellite’s location and whether it is in operational use. Standardized “hooks” or attachment points will help capture known dead satellites. To achieve these technological advancements, the United States and the international community at large must invest in research and development for STM.

Recommendations and conclusion

An international framework for STM is crucial to protecting a future of security and prosperity in the space domain. Accordingly, the following steps are recommended in order of priority:

1. The United States and its allies should engage the broader international community to authorize an international coordinating authority to lead on STM. This could be through the expansion of an existing organization, such as the ICAO, or the creation of a new organization with necessary authorities.
2. Given the proposed funding and granted authorities for the DoC on STM matters, the US Congress should examine whether the Office of Space Commerce is equipped to lead on STM matters, ensuring it has the correct structure, mandate, and funding to accomplish effective oversight of national STM.
3. Through fora like the UNOOSA, the international community should reach consensus on the definitions of STM, SSA, and related terms. This will create baseline consensus on which to base future rules for STM.
4. The US government must recognize its allies and partners, as well as US and allied industries, as equal partners in STM framework deliberations. NPRMs and OSTP-facilitated fora are worthwhile mechanisms to give industry leaders a voice in the debate. Moreover, the National Space Council should conduct a survey to further elicit feedback and open a dialogue with commercial space companies and the international community on the future of STM.
5. The FAA’s space launch licensing requirements should be updated to include requirements to report planned maneuvers, and operators should be further incentivized to demonstrate deorbiting and debris mitigation capabilities. Both these measures can help mitigate the risk of collision. The international coordinating authority could then take charge on reporting of planned maneuvers and, in the longer term, requirements for deorbiting or moving satellites to graveyard orbits.
6. The United States and its allies should rally the international space community to determine a common set of rules surrounding the disposal of defunct satellites. The burden should be placed on satellite operators, and solutions should prioritize the incentivization of private-sector engagement on active debris removal solutions. The US government’s ODMSP provides a helpful baseline, and periodically revising this document can provide an avenue for updating international standards.
7. The US Congress should appropriate additional funds for research and development of capabilities relevant to effective STM, to include ground-based and space-to-space sensors and communications capabilities, passive and active deorbiting mechanisms, and the ability to track small space objects. Such efforts must be reinforced by global policy discussions on the requirements and responsibilities of spacefaring entities.
8. The US government should provide standards for satellites that lack maneuvering capability to be launched to orbits 400 kilometers or lower, or just below the ISS, when feasible. The 400-kilometer boundary should be reassessed on a regular basis to account for space developments to include crewed missions. The lead US agency for STM should coordinate with satellite operators and, when appropriate, assign orbital altitudes that avoid collision with major national space assets. This can be modeled off the air domain, wherein special flight rules surround designated areas like airports.
9. The United States should lead by example in outer space. US departments and agencies can encourage international cooperation by incentivizing positive behavior—similar to how maritime vessels using AIS were initially rewarded with free NOAA maps and weather updates—and discourage malign actions by leveraging diplomacy and all the other instruments of national power.

Achieving security, economic, and societal objectives in the twenty-first century hinges on free and open access to outer space. The current regulatory vacuum on STM leaves room for malign activity and unsustainable business practices. If space development remains on its current trajectory, and the global community fails to advance an effective STM framework, humankind will jeopardize its use of outer space, modern ways of living, and all the corresponding benefits on Earth. Now is the time to act and protect a future of security and prosperity in space.

Methodology

The authors employed a qualitative research methodology, constructed around a set of key research questions and drawing from a review of authoritative literature and spoken remarks on STM. Expert groupings were consulted on key research questions while drafting this issue brief. The study was guided by a senior advisory panel, which helped to frame and refine the findings and recommendations.

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About the authors

Fellow

Mir Sadat

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Dari

Staff

Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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While the decision wasn’t a total surprise, its timing—as tensions flare over the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine—raises questions about the future of partnership and security in an erstwhile apolitical domain.

So we reached out to Christopher Mulder, a former US Air Force fellow at the Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Mir Sadat, a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice, to find out more about Moscow’s extraplanetary plans.

Haven’t Russia and the international community cooperated in space for decades? What’s the significance of this decision?

That’s right. Russia and the United States’ joint involvement in space goes back to the early 1990s, soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In recent years, there has been some uncertainty as to how long the ISS would remain operational. Russia even announced as far back as 2015 that it would depart the ISS program in 2024; this most recent announcement is convenient strategic messaging on its part and isn’t necessarily surprising. 

—Chris

We mustn’t mirror our values on others who do not share our views on sustaining the environment, the dignity of human rights, and the upholding of democracy. Russia’s decision is a wake-up call for everyone who continues to cling to the idea that space is being used only for peaceful purposes. The United States’ strategic competitor does not view space only as a diplomatic instrument of national power. Russia is effectively ending a very successful diplomatic endeavor built on the progress and expansion of humanity. The US Department of Defense realized this unfortunate evolution about six years ago, when it recognized space as another warfighting domain. 

—Mir

Russia says it’s planning to build its own outpost. What should we expect that to look like?

In that same 2015 announcement, Russia stated that it would detach the ISS modules it maintains and operates to create its own outpost in low-Earth orbit to meet its national space objectives. But whether Russia will actually request to detach its ISS modules is unknown at this time. Generally, Russia is well-versed in space-station operations; it operated its own, Mir, from 1986 until it was decommissioned in 2001. Most likely, Russia will go all in on its planned International Lunar Research Station with China.  

—Chris

Russia is expected to launch the first module of its proposed new space station sometime between 2025 and 2030. Other modules, yet to be produced, will likely be launched between 2030 and 2035. But their current Soyuz spacecraft does not have the capability to reach China’s Tiangong space station; therefore, between 2024 and at least 2035, Russia cedes the capacity to put humans in low-Earth orbit. This vulnerability effectively undermines Russia as a space superpower because it seems increasingly likely that they would be a follower, rather than a leader, in space at least for the next decade.

—Mir

International cooperation seemed to be the standard for space exploration. What would a separate Russian space station mean for its future? 

To accomplish anything truly meaningful in space, partnerships are required. In Russia’s case, it is clearly moving away from accepted standards of behavior and further away from the West (as seen in the current conflict with Ukraine). The ISS may be the last mutually beneficial area in which Russia and the United States collaborate for the foreseeable future. Its decision to partner with China in space is also a clear signal that it will continue to diverge from the West. As Russia and China build upon their partnership in space, the United States needs to also leverage its vast partnerships, resourcefulness, competitiveness, and innovative spirit to advance its own interests there. 

—Chris

The environment in space is dangerous to all humans, which is why international cooperation is vital to human presence there. Whether or not Russia remains committed to operating its own station, its behavior has already raised concerns for human sustainability and security in space: Its reckless November 2021 anti-satellite test threatened the lives of even its own cosmonauts. The United States has invited spacefaring nations to participate in NASA’s Artemis program to explore the moon, and has repeatedly committed itself to the ISS. If Russia’s space-station ambitions are realized, it would not have a functional station until the mid-2030s. In the intervening period, cosmonauts might need to rely on rides to China’s Tiangong space station to maintain their human presence in low-Earth orbit. But Russia may also be growing tired of just floating around in low-Earth orbit; this is probably why it plans to tag along with China as it aims to establish a permanent research station at the lunar south pole. 

—Mir

What about when it comes to defense: Should Russia’s decision spark any security concerns?

The United States has already determined that space is a warfighting domain. Russia’s departure from the ISS may serve to clarify Russia’s intent. As when any partnership or relationship degrades, one can expect to see increased tension and stress in that area—outer space in this case. 

—Chris

Russia’s decision to withdraw highlights how peace and diplomacy in space is not a priority—just as they have exhibited by their “evil empire” strategy and tactics in Ukraine, Syria, on the high seas, and their trolling of US satellites in space. Russia has a higher threshold of acceptance for risk than the United States and our space partners.  

—Mir

The post Russia’s pulling the plug on space cooperation. Should the world be worried? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 20, Dexter Tiff Roberts was quoted in an article, “Elon Musk’s Starlink aid to Ukraine triggers scrutiny in China over US military links,” in the Financial Times. In this article, Roberts argues that China will begin imposing restrictions on foreign companies as a consequence of the threat that Starlink is posing to Beijing.  

Read more about the author:

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

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On June 16, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Timothy J. “TJ” White was quoted in CyberScoop saying that the Russian focus on information operations has been unyielding. White, however, argued that Russian information war objectives have been thwarted to a large degree by Starlink satellite internet and by the fact that many Ukrainians have virtual private networks. White remarked that, despite the centrality of information operations to the present conflict, the US defense community still lacks coherent definitions in this area.

“[W]e haven’t decided yet what is or isn’t information operations, information warfare, cyberspace operations, operations in cyberspace that enable information operations”

TJ White

Fellow

Timothy J. “TJ” White

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The post White in CyberScoop on Russia and information operations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is the opportunity?

The international community has entered a new era in space. The year 2021 marked an inflection point exemplified by: US and Chinese land rovers (and a US helicopter) on Mars; a Russian anti-satellite (ASAT) test creating some 15,000 pieces of space debris; space tourism and private-sector activities such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX launches and SpaceX’s Starlink mini-satellites nearly colliding with a Chinese space station; and not least, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) launch of the spectacular Webb telescope into orbit around the sun in cislunar space—the vast area between the Earth and just beyond the Moon’s orbit. The explosive growth of activities in space will accelerate in this decade, making for an increasingly crowded and contested domain.

Currently 4,852 satellites from some eighty nations are in Low Earth Orbit (LEO); roughly half of these are US commercial and government/military satellites. They are essential for everything from nuclear command and control, climate observation to GPS, and the internet, streaming video, and ATMs. Moreover, an already crowded LEO is getting more so. The burgeoning private sector is driving the new space economy enabled by innovation, new technologies like relaunchable orbital space vehicles, and miniaturized satellites, such as the aforementioned mini-satellites. Google and Elon Musk’s SpaceX alone plan to launch some 50,000 Starlink satellites in this decade.

These incidents reflect a troubling anarchy in the cosmos, from a burgeoning Wild West–scramble for space resources to a full-blown militarization of space. The problem is clashing ambitions and a deficit of rules governing behavior in space—a domain like sea, air, and cyber that constitute global commons. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the one foundational accord signed by all major space-faring nations, totaling 111. They agreed to the principles in the OST, which states:

“Exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means and shall be the province of all mankind.”

Unfortunately, the treaty is sadly outdated by technology, politics, and competing major powers’ space ambitions. The United States and China plan to create Moon bases (which will compete for real estate at the Moon’s water-rich north and south poles). Several nations have passed laws appropriating the right of private-sector firms to exploit minerals on asteroids and planets. The treaty offers little guidance on collisions, the growing problem of space debris, or the intrusion or obstruction of a nation’s space assets and lacks any dispute-settlement mechanism. Some additional legal agreements are in effect under the United Nations’ (UN’s) Office for Outer Space: liability for damage caused by space objects; safety and rescue of spacecraft and astronauts; and registration of space activities. In theory, a Moon Treaty exists, but it has not been ratified by the United States, Russia, or China. The International Telecommunications Union regulates radiocommunications and orbital resources (satellites), but some doubt it will have the capacity to manage the exponential growth of space traffic.

NASA has embarked on a gallant effort to update rules for operations in space, the Artemis Accords, signed by 19 US allies and partners, but some major space powers—China, Russia, India, and Germany—have declined to join. The Biden administration has endorsed the Artemis Accords, initiated by the Trump administration, as the preferred vehicle to define rules and norms in Outer Space.

The accords are, in effect, principles that assert dominion over activities that, “. . . may take place on the Moon, Mars, comets and asteroids . . . as well as in the orbit of the Moon or Mars,” and in cislunar space. Most of Artemis’s principles are intended as public goods and would make sense as negotiated global norms. Nevertheless, though NASA has tried to ensure that the Artemis Accords are “in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty,” they assert the right to, in effect, claim real estate in the “global commons,” contrary to the Outer Space Treaty. In that sense, the accords may be viewed as an assertion of US primacy—whether intended or not—potentially hastening the trend toward fragmentation of global governance.

NASA had little choice but to exclude China from the accords—the 2011 Wolf Amendment bans NASA’s cooperation or coordination with any Chinese government–affiliated entities. This law has proved largely counterproductive, neither improving human rights nor constraining China’s space efforts. Instead, alarmed by NASA’s robust collaboration with SpaceX and other commercial partners, China has significantly accelerated investment in its own, largely parallel lunar exploration plans. Russia, though a longstanding partner in the International Space Station (ISS), has refused to sign the agreement, opting instead to partner with China on a Moon base and other space ventures. The divorce between Russia and its space-station partners has drastically accelerated due to sanctions on Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine.

Why now?

A growing number of emerging space powers, the increasing role of space in major powers’ military calculus, the burgeoning private-sector space economy, and the myriad risks—from space junk to space wars—all point to the urgent need to reach new understandings and create new modes of cooperation.

Prospective conflicts arise in Artemis’s language on the extraction of space resources. The accords state that the extraction of resources from the Moon and other celestial bodies “should be executed in a manner that complies with the Outer Space Treaty” before adding that “signatories affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.” Owning resources seems to be a dubious proposition given the OST language that says celestial bodies are not subject to “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.” The OST adds that the Moon or asteroids cannot be claimed “by means of use . . . or by any other means.” The accords do include provisions for consultation with non-Artemis parties, but no global-dispute settlement mechanism exists.

The private-sector space economy is exploding. Tens of thousands of asteroids are rich with rare-earth and other minerals, a potential $1 trillion market. Dozens of startups in the United States, EU, and Japan are gearing up for space-mining and removing space debris. China, too, is planning space-mining ventures.

A host of nations, including the United States, have already begun staking legal claims in the cosmos. For example, Luxembourg, seeking to become a European hub for space-mining, has enacted a law granting private firms the right to extract space resources, created a space-mining center, and invested in space-mining startups. The United Arab Emirates has adopted a similar law, as has the United States, with President Barack Obama’s signing of a commercial space law in 2015 granting US businesses the right to extract resources throughout the cosmos. President Donald Trump took this move a step further with a 2020 Executive Order authorizing the commercial development of space resources and explicitly rejecting the notion that space is a “global commons.”

Absent new global rules, the space resource issue is a prime area ripe for conflict between space-faring nations.

These laws assert the right to assign property rights on celestial bodies to space-mining companies—but on what legal basis can nations unilaterally grant property rights to such companies, or, for that matter, build manned stations on the Moon or Mars, given that celestial bodies are not subject to sovereignty claims? Nobody owns the Moon. What would preclude China, India, or the EU from granting the right to mine minerals to their state firms if they got there first, or from claiming prime real estate on the Moon’s water-rich north or south poles for their manned bases? Absent new global rules, the space resource issue is a prime area ripe for conflict between space-faring nations.

Similarly, there are a dearth of rules on how to deal with space debris, or codes of conduct for military satellites vulnerable to disabling or destruction by cyberattacks, stalking by other satellites, and ASAT counterspace weapons. ASAT tests have produced thousands of pieces of space debris that pose an immediate threat.

Russia’s ASAT test in November 2021, which destroyed one of Russia’s own defunct military satellites, creating a cloud of some 1,500 pieces of space debris, illuminates the problem. Even small pieces of debris, traveling at some 17,000 miles per hour, can cause crippling damage to satellites, potentially disrupting the space infrastructure, the nervous system of modern life. Moscow’s test forced astronauts—and its own cosmonauts—on board the ISS to take emergency safety measures for fear of collision.

Russia’s test followed a similarly dangerous Chinese ASAT test in 2007, as well as a US ASAT test (though designed to minimize long-term orbital debris) in 2008. More recently, China protested small shoebox-sized satellites launched by SpaceX’s Starlink project to facilitate global broadband WiFi when one of the satellites almost collided with China’s space station, so close that Beijing protested to the UN last December after having to take evasive action. An explosion of private-sector space business—from satellite launches and space shuttles to the quest for mining asteroids and planets—has blurred the line between civilian and military activities, racing ahead of any duly considered global regulation. President Joe Biden’s recent unilateral ASAT test ban offers a chance to lead by example in fostering new norms.

How to make it happen

Of all the unresolved questions about space activities, the most urgent need—and most promising area for new cooperation—is alleviating the threat from space debris. Nations can cooperate, pooling risks and burdens when they perceive that their interests intersect. The threat of space debris to all nations’ vital economic and national security assets in space would, like climate change, seem to be such an instance. Space junk does not recognize whose space assets it damages or destroys.

In December 2021, the White House issued a document billed as the “US Space Priorities Framework.” One of its principles is that “the US will lead in strengthening global governance of space activities.” There is no better opportunity than on space debris.

The US Department of Defense’s Space Surveillance Network is the premier mechanism for monitoring space junk. Moreover, in addition to its unrivaled Space Surveillance capacity to monitor debris, the United States has already signed space-sharing agreements with over 100 nations to provide data and notifications to avoid collisions. It has aided China in this regard. These are important global public goods that can provide diplomatic leverage for shaping space rules and standards on space debris.

In addition, private-sector firms and startups in Japan, the United States, and Europe are devising ways to remove space debris in what appears to be a coming sector of the space economy. The US Space Force’s technology arm is already exploring the possibility of funding private firms to remove space debris. Methods of space-junk removal include satellite magnets, nets, harpoons, and even spider-like webs, all being developed by private contractors that are bearing the risks of research and development.

All these steps create possibilities for new cooperation on space junk, great-power competition notwithstanding. The most expeditious course would be an ad hoc multilateral initiative, not a UN institution. There are only a handful of high-performance space-faring states—the United States, Russia, China, the EU countries, Japan, and India.

As discussed above, the United States is well positioned as first among equals to launch an ad hoc public-private coalition of space powers—call it the Space Six—partnering with the private sector to pool resources and (nonnational-security-sensitive) capabilities to better monitor, clean up space debris, and seek mutually acceptable codes of conduct and rules for such activities. If there is agreement among the United States, China, Russia, and the EU, the UN Security Council (UNSC) could pass a UNSC resolution, as was the case in similar ad hoc efforts (e.g., the two-plus-four talks on German reunification and the six-party talks on North Korea). It should be an open architecture, based on the principle of form follows function, and open to emerging space powers such as South Korea, Brazil, Israel, and others.

Over the coming decade, multifarious activities and presence in cislunar space and on the Moon will unfold. If left untended, the probability of conflicts over competing Moon presences, space-mining, and military activities is significant, if not inevitable. Given the magnitude of the space-debris problem—existential for all activities in space—a space debris-focused coalition could catalyze a favorable political climate and might eventually evolve into a forum to address other space-governance issues. Building on the US unilateral ban on ASAT testing, for example, could produce a consensus for a moratorium on ASAT tests among the Space Six and beyond.

Conceptually, the long-term vision should be to negotiate an agreement analogous to the UN Law of the Sea Treaty that defines property rights on the Moon and other celestial bodies, though such would likely be an arduous, protracted undertaking—the Law of the Sea negotiations began in 1973 and ended in 1982, and the treaty still has not been ratified by the United States, Canada, Israel, Turkey, and other states.

Negotiations between the alliance associated with the Artemis Accords on the one hand and China, Russia, and nonaligned space powers like India or Brazil on the other will be a tough road to hoe. Yet the prospect of a lunar version of Wild West–range wars over valuable real estate should give the international community pause. Unregulated resource exploitation on the Moon will probably lead to the competitive deployments of military forces on the Moon’s surface and in the vastness of cislunar space.

To avoid a full-blown military competition, it will be necessary, however difficult, to develop a number of confidence-building, if not arms control measures. One possibility is to internationalize the demanding requirements for situational awareness in cislunar space. This might include the creation of one or more command centers or intelligence cooperation clearinghouses on the Earth and Moon that have access to a multinational fleet of surveillance spacecraft.

Developing an information-sharing clearinghouse to maximize transparency of human activities in and around the Moon would be a good first step. Another area of potential conflict is military activities in space. The United States, China, and Russia would be wise to begin talks to define military activities in space, starting with interactions of their respective military satellites. A code of conduct for such activities, including notifications of movements of satellites along the lines of the Cold War US-USSR Incidents at Sea agreement could be a model.

The ISS has become an emblem of successful science collaboration on space issues, an area of agreement between the respective space agencies of the United States, Russia, EU, Japan, and Canada. Washington recently announced that it will extend the operations of the ISS until 2030; despite the looming divorce from Russia, other partners appear supportive.

China has accelerated its robust space-exploration activities, including a planned Moon base. Diminished Russian space capabilities will most likely be another consequence of the Ukraine war, making Moscow a less appealing space partner to Beijing. There are many aspects of space exploration, to which China is deeply committed, that do not necessarily clash with US interests. After the near-collision of its space station with a Starlink satellite, there were hints of Chinese interest in cooperation to avoid such risks. The Biden administration should invite China to accede to the ISS, and its affiliate, the Tiangong Space Station, to explore possible areas of space cooperation. For that to happen, the United States would need to abolish or amend the 2011 Wolf Amendment banning collaboration between NASA and the Chinese space agency. Given the challenges of space and space governance, some degree of cooperation with China on civil space activities will almost certainly be necessary and need not compromise national security. The United States has an opportunity to catalyze global efforts to manage space technologies and activities before risky confrontations ensue.

Assumptions Testing Series

The New American Engagement Initiative’s Assumptions Testing series explores some of the foundational beliefs that guide US foreign policy. By questioning the conventional wisdom, and exposing these assumptions to close scrutiny, the series aims to open a new seam in the policy debate and generate a more lively, fruitful, and effective strategic dialogue – one that is capable of producing a sustainable, nonpartisan strategy for US global engagement.

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The New American Engagement Initiative’s Reality Checks are short briefs dedicated to exploring a particular policy or set of policies, assessing their efficacy, and, where appropriate, proposing alternatives. Reality Checks are published regularly and tied to the news of the day or derive from NAEI’s Assumptions Testing series. All are succinct and straight-to-the-point. The briefs are designed for busy professionals anxious for pragmatic and timely policy options.

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The New American Engagement Initiative’s Engagement Reframed policy briefs reimagine and reframe the US approach to the world beyond traditional, narrow notions of US military dominance to fashion an achievable and sustainable form of US leadership in a world of many capable actors.

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Maritime search-and-rescue (SAR) operations start in space, with satellites detecting signals of distress. But this military branch relies on aging space-based infrastructure with spotty global coverage that limits its ability to conduct swift and effective SAR, particularly in the vast Arctic Ocean. To provide adequate coverage in an increasingly trafficked region, the Coast Guard must invest in small satellite technology.

The urgency is only growing. Maritime traffic in the Arctic has increased as climate change continues to warm this area at a disproportionately high rate. Since 1979, there has been a substantial decline in the amount of sea ice in the Arctic; now, some portions are almost ice-free in September and ships regularly transit during the summer. It is a valuable shipping route: For example, it is more efficient to go from the coast of China to Europe through the Northern Sea Route (of which Russia considers itself the sole regulator) than the traditional route through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the Northwest Passage, which hugs the Arctic coast of North America, has seen a growth in tourism. Since the inaugural cruise ship in 2016 carried 1,700 passengers, cruise lines are reportedly preparing to meet what’s expected to be increased demand for Arctic tourism. 

With this traffic growth comes a higher risk of ships in distress—thus necessitating a larger Coast Guard presence to render humanitarian aid to commercial and passenger vessels, some of which carry Americans. 

The case for CubeSats

The Arctic presents the Coast Guard with multiple obstacles to providing effective SAR operations. US territorial waters in the Arctic Ocean, plus those associated with its Exclusive Economic Zone, make up around one million square miles. This is a vast amount of geography for the Coast Guard to cover. 

Since 1982, it has relied on a satellite-aided international search-and-rescue system known as COPAS-SARSAT, which is sponsored by Canada, France, Russia, and the United States and provides global coverage for distress beacons. The system has saved more than 44,000 lives but has experienced significant time delays in receiving and triangulating distress beacons. The Coast Guard is developing a medium Earth orbit system (MEOSAR) to replace COPAS-SARSAT, but it will not be fully operational until the mid-to-late 2020s. 

To bridge that gap and to test the effectiveness of small satellites, the Coast Guard (which is under the Department of Homeland Security) launched its Polar Scout program. Its mission was to enhance telecommunications coverage in the Arctic to support SAR and maintain effective domain awareness by using cube satellites (CubeSats). These objects are about the size of a shoebox, compared with the minivan-sized COPAS-SARSAT system. 

To support the Polar Scout program, the DHS, in partnership with private firm SpaceX, launched two CubeSats, Yukon and Kodiak, into low-Earth orbit in December 2018. They were programmed to detect a distress signal, determine its location, and send the information to the nearest rescue hub. While the Coast Guard was aiming for a three-year lifespan, the Yukon stopped transmitting after just a few weeks and the Kodiak stopped transmitting in April 2019. 

But this effort was not a failure. The Kodiak was still able to successfully detect distress signals for several months for a fraction of the cost compared to the COPAS-SARSAT or the forthcoming MEOSAR system. Small satellites are cheaper and easier to build with the commoditization of small-satellite components; the cost of launching satellites has also decreased due to reusable rockets and ride-sharing programs. The Yukon and Kodiak CubeSats were both launched in a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket, which was being reused for the third time. 

Companies such as SpaceX and Planet, an Earth imaging company, continue to improve the transmission reliability and processing power of small satellites. These companies have a quick turnaround timeframe from development to launch to ensure that the latest technology is in place. Therefore, the Coast Guard should see the Polar Scout program as a success story and seek to replicate it on a wider scale and expand its partnerships with the space industry.

Boosting the budget for space capabilities 

But to support its SAR operations, the service needs to appropriately house and fund its space-based assets. First, it needs to designate an office dedicated to the proper maintenance, research, acquisition, and funding of its space programs. It should establish a space-assets program office under the purview of the assistant commandant for engineering and logistics (who is the chief engineer of the Coast Guard), rather than keep it in the Office of Aeronautical Engineering, which focuses primarily on aircraft—not spacecraft. 

Second, the Coast Guard must increase its budget for space assets and adapt its acquisition process. For the first time, the Coast Guard’s 2023 budget request to Congress included $775,000 for research and development for “Space-based Technology.” But this funding is relatively minuscule compared to other missions, such as cyber operations. The Coast Guard essentially has two options: Buy a few high-quality satellites or buy many adequate satellites. To provide continuous coverage of the Arctic, it should choose the latter and invest in creating a small constellation of these advanced, shoebox-sized satellites.

Such a set-up would be more reliable, as it ensures that even if a couple units go offline there will still be continued coverage. This constellation, like the stars to ancient mariners, should be central in setting the Coast Guard’s course. 

Madison Littlepage is a spring 2022 Young Global Professional within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice. She is a graduate student in security policy studies at The George Washington University.

The post A shoebox-sized solution: How small satellites can help the US Coast Guard appeared first on Atlantic Council.

21^st Century Security is really about… connecting and moving data.

James Taiclet

On April 29, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense (FD) practice hosted Lockheed Martin Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer James D. Taiclet for a conversation on “Understanding the Challenges of US & Allied Defense Innovation.”

This was the inaugural event of the new Forward Defense Forum, designed for defense visionaries to put forth creative ideas for the future of US and allied security. The Forum is part of FD’s recently launched project on “21^st Century Security,” generously supported by Lockheed Martin, which will advance the dialogue on how the United States and its allies and partners can deter and, if necessary, fight and win future wars.

As the leader of the world’s largest defense contractor, Taiclet has a unique perspective on emerging security and defense challenges. He joined Forward Defense in conversation with Courtney Kube, a national security and military correspondent with NBC News. They discussed how the United States and its allies and partners can integrate existing weapon systems and sensor networks to deter and defeat adversarial aggression.

Read on for some key takeaways from the Forum:

The US is taking notes on the Russia-Ukraine war.

Advanced, expendable weapons play a critical role in warfare.

The Javelin has become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance, proving essential to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian tanks and get within range of Russian troops. The dramatic impact of Javelins and similar fire-and-forget munitions, such as kamikaze drones, has underscored the notion that cheaper yet advanced weapons can have a sizable impact on the battlefield.

Military power hinges on aerospace dominance.

Ukraine has also demonstrated the importance of mobile, layered air defense, utilizing potable Stingers, short-range Tor surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and long-range S-300 SAMs to deny the Russian Air Force. In anticipation of greater demand from the United States and its allies, and to replenish stores depleted by the war, Lockheed is ramping up production of Javelins and air defense systems, such as THAAD and Patriot missiles.

Integrated defense is key.

On a larger scale, the war in Ukraine has also underlined the importance of integrated defense: optimizing the sensor-to-shooter pipeline by connecting existing technologies. To achieve integration, the defense enterprise will need to make use of 5G network speeds, predictive artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, satellite constellations, and advanced weapons. This open architecture Internet of Military Things (IoMT) will connect the dots in existing systems and lay the groundwork for US and allied deterrence.

COVID-19 exposed core supply chain vulnerabilities.

Over two years since the start of the pandemic, defense contractors are still recovering from chip shortages. Even before the war on Ukraine began to drain weapon stockpiles, COVID-19 was already effecting shortages in microprocessors—that is, computer chips that allow modern weapons systems to function. As the number one chip producer, Taiwan remains critical to the US defense supply chain—but Chinese aggression could threaten access to Taiwanese chipmakers in the future, underscoring the need to secure the supply chain today to protect 21^st century security challenges tomorrow.

China is the big picture threat.

While Russia poses an acute threat, China remains the pacing challenge to the United States. In addition to Javelins, Stingers, and other affordable, portable weapons, Lockheed also anticipates rising demand for more complex, advanced weapons systems—such as the Patriot and THAAD missiles, F-16 multi-role fighter aircraft, counter-battery radars, sixth-generation aircraft, and other capabilities with lengthy production timelines. For the time being, however, networked systems of existing capabilities can help bridge the divide, multiply, and set the stage for the long play. Integrated, networked defense, in coordination with allies and partners, will be critical to the United States’ ability to combat simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

The key to secure networks is partnering with the private sector.

So we can apply this concept of really bringing together the Newtonian world, the technologies that the defense and aerospace industry’s really good at, and this digital world, where companies like Microsoft and Verizon and AT&T and others [excel]—and let’s bring them together and solve national problems.

James Taiclet

Private companies will always have the edge over public defense contractors, in their ability to attract talent and innovate at speed. Partnership between the commercial and defensive realms can help accelerate defensive capabilities and solve sticky problems. Rather than innovating separately, defense contractors can team up with private industries to bring cutting-edge technologies and security to national defense. In other words: connecting the “Newtonian” and digital worlds.

21^st century security is more than just defense.

Connecting platforms across domains is a concept that can be applied to more than just defense: in fact, 21^st century security means integrating technologies across industries, to safeguard national interests at every level. Taiclet defines 3 key areas of focus:

Defense

21^st century defense connects fifth-generation fighters with advanced missile batteries, cutting edge radar systems, and human operators. Integrated defense is a force multiplier for the Department of Defense because it amplifies existing technologies in order to meet current and future threats from competitors and adversaries.

Climate

Climate change is an emergent challenge to national security: it threatens citizens, property, and utilities. Taiclet brought in the example of wildfires: right now, it takes around twenty- four hours for fire commanders to receive updated thermal infrared satellite data on a fire. Using airborne, ground-borne and spaceborne sensors, it is possible to predict, prepare for, and monitor fires—but that information is not getting where it needs to go, because of a lack of data infrastructure.

Space

Finally, Taiclet identifies latent opportunities in space, where 21^st century security concepts can help reinforce US interests on the next frontier of innovation. Combining autonomy, battery life extension, next-generation communications, and artificial intelligence, a lunar rover would be able to operate independently between astronaut missions. Satellites can secure communications on earth, increase data speeds, and enable other technologies. Innovation in space feeds into scientific discovery, but also rolls back into defense, and reinforces the entire national security pipeline.

The bottom line

As competition creeps into new spheres, 21^st century security will help protect US citizens and interests against a broad spectrum of growing threats. The US defense-industrial base must leverage existing technologies, develop future capabilities, and reach across the aisle to work with commercial enterprise, in order to fend off simultaneous threats and edge out multi-fronted competition. 

Caroline Steel is a Young Global Professional with the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Online Event Fri, April 29, 2022 • 1:00 pm ET

Understanding the challenges of US & allied defense innovation: A conversation with James D. Taiclet

President, Chairman, and CEO of Lockheed Martin James D. Taiclet discusses the urgent need for the United States and its allies to innovate or fail on the future battlefield for the inaugural Forward Defense Forum.

China Conflict Defense Industry Defense Technologies

The Forward Defense Forum is designed for defense visionaries to put forth novel ideas for how the United States and its allies and partners can adapt, innovate, and win on the future battlefield. Built for creative thinking, this interactive public forum provides a space for the defense community to engage on issues core to the future of US and allied security.

About Forward Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Lockheed Martin CEO James D. Taiclet on 21st century security and the Russia-Ukraine war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 5, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice launched a report, generously supported by Thales, and hosted a virtual event on “The National Security Implications of Small Satellites.”

The event included opening remarks by Atlantic Council president and chief executive officer Frederick Kempe and Thales North America chief executive officer Alan Pellegrini, along with a panel of experts and officials from across the space community. Featured on the panel were author of the report and Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades; Space Development Agency policy chief and legislative affairs director Paula Trimble; space policy and warfighter expert at the University of Leicester Dr. Bleddyn Bowen; and chief executive officer of COMSPOC Paul Graziani. Moderated by SpaceNews senior staff writer Sandra Erwin, the panel articulated the importance of harnessing small-satellite developments to guarantee US competitive edge in the future of warfare.

What’s the big deal with small satellites?

Today’s small satellites provide the same–if not more–capabilities than traditionally large satellites at a fraction of the cost and size. Small satellites provide for critical US government functions and facilitate the everyday lives of Americans (from communications to remote sensing). Small satellites enhance space situational awareness (SSA), and large constellations of small satellites foster redundancy and resilience. While traditionally large space assets provided one “big juicy target” ripe for attack, small satellite constellations make it difficult for adversaries to target and shut down a system with just one strike. These constellations also provide back-ups in case of inadvertent collisions knocking out communications.

Can we sustain the influx of small satellites?

As more and more companies launch small satellites into space, the congestion and likelihood of collusion in low-Earth orbit (LEO) increases. According to Dr. Bowen, little research has been done to determine the actual orbital capacities of LEO and, furthermore, he raised concern that a general trend toward disposable satellites will only increase the amount of space debris clogging up LEO. To account for the influx of satellites in space, experts advocate for the establishment of a space traffic management (STM) system to prevent collusions. However, while STM continues to be conceptualized, it is not yet implemented. Graziani argues that part of the problem is that STM implies that there will be a unilateral manger–with the connotation being that the United States will lead. Instead of STM, Graziani, proposes the term space traffic coordination to promote multilateralism.

Where does China fit in?

According to Eftimiades, the United States will lose space superiority–continued safe and secure access to the space domain–to China in ten years at its current rate. Currently, the US Space Force maintains superior global SSA as it maintains over a hundred SSA agreements with allies and partners. While China’s current SSA is comparatively weaker to the United States, Eftimiades believes this balance of power will soon shift. Over sixty countries are participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its Digital Silk Road program. If half of the world is depending on China for space capabilities and information, then this could inhibit US counterspace actions. The capabilities of small satellites could push back the timeline of Chinese space superiority to ensure Americans and allies continued access to critical space assets like communication and early missile warning satellites.

How are small satellites faring during Russia’s war in Ukraine?

In March 2022, Elon Musk provided Starlink satellite terminals to aid Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion, which have since been recognized as a game-changer for Ukraine’s offensive. Graziani agrees that small satellites have revolutionized the conflict, asserting that, because Ukraine is facing an existential threat, Ukraine was pressed to effectively adopt small satellites technology to survive. Conversely, while the United States is faced with multitude threats, Graziani doubts they will be enough to drive the US military to widely adopt small satellites.

However, Dr. Bowen disagrees that the use of small satellites in Ukraine is groundbreaking. Rather, he argues that it is simply a continuation of militaries integrating space assets into warfighting, a common practice since Operation Desert Storm. The current war illustrates an interesting example: While the conflict has seen an abundance of open-source intelligence, and Russian military locations and assets are commonly broadcasted to the public, the same cannot be said of Ukrainian locations and assets. States can control the flow of information–even with private companies–and Dr. Bowen concludes that there must be information blocking in Russia’s war.

How does the current acquisition process help or hinder the United States?

To maintain US space superiority, the US government must acquire small satellites. However, Graziani asserts that the traditional acquisition systems reinforce failure. While companies are paid for a finished product in the commercial sector, defense contractors are not paid until they deliver a government solution. This outdated model can incentivize defense contractors to purposefully stall innovation as they receive a steady paycheck, whereas companies spend their internal research and development (IRAD) funds without the guarantee of a profit. Until this mindset changes, the commercial sector innovation will always exceed that of the US government.

To speed up the acquisition process, the Space Development Agency (SDA) has made their acquisition process more flexible. According to Trimble, SDA is prioritizing speed and staying on schedule over cost and performance in the procurement process. To address past complaints of private space companies, SDA now clearly outlines their material needs and corresponding time frame from development to launch. This timeline enables the Department of Defense (DoD) to get critical assets into orbit and stimulates the commercial space industry.

The DoD has a mutually beneficial relationship with space industry, as the DoD gets its hands on the latest technology to fill vulnerability gaps and the companies make a profit. One way that SDA is streamlining the acquisition process is with its warfighter council. The council works with practitioners to understand what their near-term needs are so that SDA can being the research and development process early. The acquisition process is critical for the DoD to create a resilient warfighting capability in space.

You can watch “The national security implications of small satellites” here and you can read the corresponding report here. For more information about Forward Defense, visit the website here and subscribe for more.

Madison Littlepage is a Young Global Professional for Forward Defense in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Read the report

Report

May 5, 2022

Small satellites: The implications for national security

By Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades considers how the US government can better leverage commercial satellites to enhance space security.

China Defense Industry

Explore Forward Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Viva la space: Why the commercial small satellite revolution matters for the US government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 5, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades released his latest report titled “Small Satellites: The Implications for National Security.” Since then, Eftimiades’ report has been cited in a variety of news outlets including Defense Daily, SpaceNews, and Executive Gov. The articles highlight how the US government needs to adopt small satellites to maintain its space superiority over China and enhance its resiliency in space.

Staff

Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Eftimiades in the news on small satellites appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 12, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Mir Sadat was cited in a SpaceNews article titled “Melting Arctic ice opens new front in strategic power competition.” Sadat asserts that current US Arctic military strategies suffer because they do not sufficiently address the implications of the space domain.

Staff

Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Sadat in SpaceNews on the Arctic and space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 12, Preble joined his co-hosts on the Net Assessment podcast to discuss space policy and to what extent cooperation on space governance is feasible at this point in time. 

“People all over the world are ever-more dependent on assets in space for normal activity in their daily lives, but there are few rules of the road in place to manage space behavior. Will it be possible to develop a system of cooperation that allows for freedom of movement in space but also protects the economic and national security of all countries? Should we be concerned about the rapid growth of private satellites and related equipment in space? Secretary of Defense Austin said that ‘Space is already an area of great power competition.’ Given the interests of China, Russia, and the United States in space, are we heading into a space arms race?

“Chris has an attaboy for a thrilling victory at the Kentucky Derby, Zack remembers a friend who has departed too soon, and Melanie doubles down on America.”

More about our expert

Former staff

Christopher Preble

Former Co-Director, New American Engagement Initiative

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Preble on Net Assessment: Threats from out of this world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

REPORT LAUNCH

The small satellites revolution, or the commercial-led launch of smaller and lower-cost satellites, is impacting space security. This Forward Defense report, authored by nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades and produced in partnership with Thales, explores how the US government can leverage small-satellite developments to ensure safe and secure access to and within space.

You can read the Executive summary and select report excerpts below. To read the full report, please click the “Download PDF” button above.

Executive summary

If the United States is to maintain space superiority, it will need to make substantive cultural, doctrinal, and operational changes to its multidimensional relationship with the commercial space industry.

Nicholas Eftimiades

This report examines the relationship between what is often called the commercial “small-satellite revolution” and US national security. The relationship is complex and has many dimensions, not the least of which are organizational behavior, government’s lack of understanding of commercial markets, outdated institutional processes, and a defense bureaucracy unwilling or unable to adapt to the changing environment. It may be worth noting that several of these same problem areas brought about the catastrophe of September 11, 2001. This is not to suggest a “Space Pearl Harbor” event is imminent. However, the threat to space systems will increase proportionately to the degradation of the United States’ ability to maintain space superiority; that is, the ability to ensure safe and secure access to, and in, space.

If the United States is to maintain space superiority, it will need to make substantive cultural, doctrinal, and operational changes to its multidimensional relationship with the commercial space industry. This is because, over the next decade or so, commercial space activities will increase the number of operational satellites by nearly a full order of magnitude, mainly through the development of small satellites. With the growth in the number of satellites come increased capabilities in remote sensing, communications, data processing, and on-orbit operations. A new space ecosystem is coming into being, with profound implications for the world’s security and economic development. The speed at which commercial space companies are putting thousands—soon to be tens of thousands—of satellites into orbit presents unique challenges for US security in space, as well as for deployed armed forces. There will be increased congestion in certain orbits, competition for communications bandwidth, new types of space operations, increased transparency, and a changing threat paradigm. Competing in this changing environment will require the United States to make substantial changes in long-established defense acquisition processes, research and investment strategies, data classification and distribution, and the commercial space regulatory environment.

Key findings

This report explores the trends and technological developments defining the future of the space domain. In doing so, it arrives at six key conclusions.

1. The United States will most likely lose space superiority to China within the next decade.
2. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC) are trying to take advantage of the small-satellite revolution. The IC is increasingly investing in commercial small-satellite data, to increase collection capabilities and provide military support.
3. The DoD does not generally take a “buy commercial first” approach to space services. Rather, there is an established culture that ignores legislated “commercial first” mandates, and that behavior has become increasingly detrimental to national security interests. Over the last decade, this negative culture has eroded US space superiority, and will continue to do so as the world moves toward quickly developed and deployed, low-cost commercial space systems. For decades, presidential policies directed the executive-branch agencies to buy commercial goods and services before developing government solutions. Almost all of the government and industry experts interviewed for this study believe DoD and the IC ignore those mandates for commercial space capabilities.
4. To date, no commercial small-satellite service has proven itself viable without government support. Yet, the growth of this industry will dramatically impact US national security.
5. DoD acquisition processes are designed to reduce risk and, as a result, are ill prepared for the high-speed commercial space environment. Senior DoD leaders are making efforts to speed up acquisition processes for small satellites and associated technologies. The results to date are mixed.
6. The US Department of Commerce (DoC) Office of Space Commerce (OSC) has made little progress over the last year in executing its responsibilities for Space Traffic Management (STM) and on-orbit mission authorities. Being subordinate to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) does not allow the office to function at the level required to effectively execute its mission.

Commercial space development trends

Adversarial space developments

Constellations of hundreds of satellites change the targeting dynamics for US and foreign counterspace capabilities. It is easier for a foreign anti-satellite capability to attack one large target than hundreds of smaller ones… A LEO constellation can suffer the loss of one satellite, or even multiple satellites, and still maintain a degraded capability.

Nicholas Eftimiades

Gen. David Thompson, the Space Force’s vice chief of space operations, has stated that the Space Force responds to “reversible attacks” on US government satellites “every single day,” Thompson further opined that China would surpass the United States as the world’s global space power by the end of the decade.¹ This report concurs with that assessment.

Any foreign small-satellite service, whether government owned or commercial, could put secondary payloads on its satellites to collect against or destroy US systems. For example, on July 15, 2020, Russia demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities by detaching a small subject from its satellite Cosmos 2543 to trail a US National Reconnaissance Office satellite.² Russian satellites conducted similar tests in 2017. These actions threaten US satellites because they can characterize capabilities, interfere with operations, or even destroy the US satellites.

Determining capabilities on foreign small satellites would require exquisite intelligence collection and characterization capabilities, which are difficult now and will be much more so when the numbers of potential threats exponentially increase. The difficulty in determining satellite capabilities was noted as recently as November 2021. The US Space Force reported China’s Shijian 21 in elliptical geostationary transfer orbit as high as 35,813 kilometers above Earth, with an inclination of 28.5 degrees to the equator.³ On November 3, a new object with the international designator 2021-094C was cataloged alongside Shijian (SJ)-21 by Space Force’s 18th Space Control Squadron. The object was believed to be an apogee kick motor (AKM) used to modify its transfer orbit to enter geostationary orbit.

Uncharacteristically, SJ-21 and the AKM flew alongside each other, which was unusual for a discharged AKM. Based on the synchronized orbits, the unidentified object was suspected to be conducting counterspace operational testing, to include rendezvous and proximity operations or manipulation using SJ-21’s robotic arm.⁴ If the AKM had performed maneuvers, it would not be the first time China deployed a small satellite that flew in formation with its larger host. The Tongxin Jishu Shiyan-3 (TJS-3) satellite released a payload in 2018 that performed coordinated maneuvers (perhaps an attempt to confuse space-tracking networks).⁵ In January 2022, the SJ-21 maneuvered to capture a defunct Chinese satellite (Compass G2) and towed it to a higher (graveyard) orbit. The SJ-21 then returned to its original geosynchronous orbit.

China’s National Defense in the New Era report stated in 2019 that “Outer space is a critical domain in international strategic competition.”⁶ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) incorporated its plans for space development in its foreign and economic policies. For example, the flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a trillion-dollar global infrastructure-development program engaging one hundred and thirty-eight countries. This program is generally considered the largest of its kind in history.

One component of China’s BRI is the Space Information Corridor. In addition to supporting all the companies China has in the BRI, the Space Information Corridor provides remote sensing, communications, and position, navigation, and timing data to all nations.⁷ The Space Information Corridor almost certainly supports the newly established Belt and Road National Security Intelligence System, which is China’s Ministry of Public Security using private security companies to provide force-protection information relative to the global BRI infrastructure.

In 2015, Beijing launched the Digital Silk Road (DSR) as an integrated part of the BRI and the Space Information Corridor. Chinese telecommunications companies (Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, etc.) develop the DSR, which supports BRI companies operating overseas. The DSR develops countries’ “telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, and smart cities.”⁸ Some reports assess one third of BRI participants have contracts for DSR support.⁹ Press reports over the years identified instances in which collected data through the DSR have been sent to China. China’s cybersecurity law requires Chinese companies to store all data in the People’s Republic of China. China’s National Intelligence Law mandates that Chinese companies assist the government when requested.

The BRI includes other space-related initiatives, including university collaborations and engineering education throughout the emerging world. Through BRI, DSR, and the Space Information Corridor, China has effectively integrated its space programs, intelligence collection, economy, and foreign policy. This is being achieved throughout emerging economies globally by weaving space capabilities and digital infrastructure into China’s global strategy for economic growth and development. If participation continues to grow as expected, China will democratize space for the world. In so doing, it will also dominate space information globally.

Adversarial governments are likely to leverage commercial small satellites for military and intelligence purposes. This threat is difficult to assess, because there is so little information in the public domain and competitor commercial small-satellite networks are not yet fully deployed. It is likely that the threat to US space systems will increase based on

• Russia’s use of small satellites to surveil US reconnaissance platforms;
• China’s on-orbit proximity operations (testing); and
• China’s Academy of Military Science writings on the use of national security space, along with similar publications like the 2019 Defense White Paper and Space Science & Technology Plan 2050

Recommendations

The following key recommendations address areas of US space policy, the regulatory environment, coordination and cooperation with US allies, and support for the commercial space industry. These recommendations have the same goals: to enhance global space security and advance the US commercial space industry. Advancing the US commercial space industry is a critical component of maintaining global space leadership, and ensuring the safety and security of space systems and national security.

US military, government and civil space

Department of defense and intelligence community

1. The DoD should ensure the resilience of US space systems by using commercial systems, including responsive space launch and satellite architectures across multiple orbits, and incorporating allied space capabilities.¹⁰
2. Congress should direct DoD and ODNI to conduct a study to identify national security missions that can be accomplished through commercial space, related services, space communications, and SSA.
3. Congress should earmark DoD and IC funds for the purchases of those commercial services. This action will force compliance with US law and increase commercial space services driving innovation through competition.
4. Congress and the administration must conduct rigorous oversight to ensure DoD and Intelligence Community organizations enforce policies (including their own) to “buy commercial first.”
5. DoD should prototype and acquire small-satellite and related cyber capabilities using OTA and Section 804 authorities. Use of other standard acquisition processes should require a waiver.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should establish a program to ensure OPSEC is integrated into doctrine and operational activities employing current awareness of commercial space remote-sensing capabilities and intelligence. This program should include training on foreign and commercial technical capabilities to defeat OPSEC. The program should also be integrated with DoD Perception Management and denial and deception efforts.
7. To ensure deterrence against hostile nations, DoD should develop, coordinate, and exercise response strategies to cyberattacks against US and allied commercial space systems. These CONOPS should be done with the IC, DHS, allies, and private industry. This activity could include the National Guard.
8. Protocols, treaties, operating rules, etc. will eventually be established by commercial companies as well as governments. The US government (particularly DoD OSD/Space Policy, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Intelligence Community) should have a well-developed, well-thought-out, brilliantly designed plan for verification and compliance (sensors, networks, analysis standards, communication protocols, etc.) This plan should recognize that much of the data will necessarily be shared globally and, therefore, must be unclassified. The plan will support overall US national security and commercial space strategies.

Other US government actors

DHS plays an important role in supporting the commercial space industry in developing standards and best practices. In May 2021, DHS Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) established a Space Systems Critical Infrastructure Working Group. The working group is a mix of government and industry participants developing strategies to minimize risks to space systems that support the nation’s critical infrastructure.¹¹ CISA has also produced several cybersecurity publications and recommended standards relevant to small-satellite systems.

1. DHS should lead a study to determine if space systems should be included as one of the national critical-infrastructure sectors. If so, Congress should designate space systems as critical infrastructure, with Department of Commerce as the Sector-Specific Agency.
2. DHS should continue to strongly advocate private industry’s adoption of the NIST SP 800-37 Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy. This document provides a recommended cybersecurity risk-management framework for commercial satellite operators.
3. DHS should work with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to develop programs that enhance supply-chain security in the commercial space industry.
4. Programs should include training and information sharing enabled through the Space ISAC.

Department of commerce

The DoC plays a significant role in regulating, overseeing, and advancing the US commercial small-satellite industry. It also has a critical function in establishing US leadership in global Space Traffic Management.

1. The DoC should purchase commercial SSA data and services, to the maximum extent possible, and secure international data-sharing agreements. DoC should incentivize the private sector to develop innovative analytical tools and advanced services to conduct STM.
2. Move the Office of Space Commerce out from under NOAA. OSC’s recently expanded responsibilities for STM and mission authorities make it a poor fit under an entity focused on oceanographic and atmospheric administration. Being buried in NOAA puts the OSC in poor position to conduct the required interagency and international coordination.
3. Congress should affirm that the DoC Office of Space Commerce has the requisite on-orbit authorities to allow it to promulgate regulations for on-orbit mission operations that fall outside the current licensing and supervision framework.
4. Congress should ensure DoC has appropriate funding to conduct the STM mission and execute it with a “commercial first” approach.
5. OSC should fully embrace commercial SSA providers through contracts. It is imperative that this office live up to the requirement to “buy commercial first,” which it has not done to date.
6. The OSC should provide clear, deliberate direction to acquire, prioritize, implement, and deploy existing commercial SSA and STM services.

Commercial space actors

One of the challenges facing the small-satellite industry is educating and helping to reorient the DoD and IC. For generations, the US defense and intelligence communities had little concern for economic security and advancing domestic commercial industries. A hostile and competitive rising China has altered the global situation, necessitating closer cooperation between the US national security community and commercial space providers.

1. Small-satellite and related industry associations should enhance and coordinate efforts to educate relevant government departments on capabilities, emerging technologies, and the market case for commercial satellites.

US allies and partners

The US faces many foreign policy challenges, including a rising hostile authoritarian China and aggressive military actions from Russia. Space security is a foundational element of ensuring peace with these strategic competitors. The United States must expand its efforts in space diplomacy to ensure coordinated action with allies and establish global standards with partners.

1. The Department of State, DoD Office of Space Policy, and Department of Commerce should enhance space diplomatic efforts with the following goals.
2. Increase the urgency to establish behavioral norms for space systems, particularly
3. Rendezvous and proximity operations;
4. notifications and guidelines;
5. orbital debris and guidelines; and
6. cybersecurity standards.
7. Support commercial space industry efforts to enhance Track 2 international collaboration and coordination.
8. Establish the US as the global leader and provider of STM.
9. Develop an interagency process for unclassified and classified STM and SSA data to be used in international forums.

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Associate Director

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On April 24, Robert Manning published an article in the National Interest with Peter Wilson concerning international space activities. They argue that space is becoming increasingly anarchic, and advocate for a return to heavier international regulations on humanity’s final frontier.

“It is a sign of the times that NASA, whose accords would be a strong draft to base global rules on, eschewed the path of negotiating a wider international pact to codify principles and guidelines for civilian space agencies. The accords are, in effect, rules that assert dominion over activities that, ‘…may take place on the Moon, Mars, comets and asteroids … as well as in the orbit of the Moon or Mars,’ and in cislunar space. Yet, to date, they do not include some major space powers—China, France, Germany, and India. Europe remains divided on the Artemis Accords. In the case of China, NASA had little choice—the 2011 Wolf Amendment bans its cooperation or coordination with any Chinese government-affiliated entities. It has proved largely counterproductive, neither improving human rights nor constraining China’s space efforts. Instead, alarmed by NASA robust collaboration with SpaceX and other commercial partners, China has significantly accelerated investment in own, largely parallel lunar exploration plans.”

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On March 9, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense (FD) practice hosted a virtual event featuring Commander of US Space Command (USSPACECOM) General James H. Dickinson as part of its Commanders Series, generously supported by Saab.

As commander of USSPACECOM, General Dickinson is responsible for defending US and allied interests in space while providing space-enabled combat readiness to warfighters around the globe. He joined Forward Defense in conversation with Defense One national security correspondent Jacqueline Feldscher to answer pressing questions on twenty-first century space security.

The bottom line? Space is vital to daily life: Everything from banking, to farming, to mapping and beyond rely on space-enabled capabilities. US private- and public-sector entities are dependent on space-based assets, and key competitors like China and Russia recognize this and are challenging free and open access to space. Through surveying the skies, USSPACECOM provides military actors with a comprehensive understanding of trends shaping the galaxy.

What threats exist in space?

USSPACECOM is responsible for a vast “geographic” AND “astrographic” area and operates in a constantly evolving space threat environment, notes General Dickinson.

Strategic competition launching into space. In November 2021, Russia successfully tested its Nudol ground-based anti-satellite weapon, which consequently created myriad space debris and endangered space-based assets in low-Earth orbit. Meanwhile, the Chinese have developed dual-use on-orbit technologies as seen with the SJ-17 and SJ-21 satellites, which are equipped with robotic arms to move or disable other satellites. China is also working to field non-kinetic and directed energy counterspace capabilities to blind adversaries’ space domain awareness (SDA). Russia and China have both tested hypersonic glide missiles and satellites similarly capable of endangering US interests in space.

To cislunar space and beyond. USSPACECOM’s area of responsibility extends from a hundred kilometers above the Earth’s surface to infinity. As competitors expand operations into cislunar space, the United States will need to determine a strategy for this novel domain of operations (as Forward Defense recommends in The Future of Security in Space: A Thirty-Year US Strategy). However, cislunar space is a new ground for USSPACECOM to survey, and expanded operations further complicate the need to achieve space situational awareness.

Why is outer space worth defending?

Space is crucial for the United States’ ability to effectively deter conflicts—and respond should deterrence fail—as the US military relies on satellites for communications, tracking of forces, and missile warnings. Adversaries recognize the US dependency on space and intentionally seek to weaponize this domain.

That’s where USSPACECOM comes in. Space is now a military operational domain, thereby warranting a national security responsibility to protect US and allied interests. According to General Dickinson, USSPACECOM is “supraglobal,” meaning that it encompasses relevant military and political activities on Earth and in space. Created in 2019, USSPACECOM reached initial operational capability in August 2021 and is still working towards full operational capability today.

Where does USSPACECOM fit into the picture?

USSPACECOM’s strategy rests upon three foundational pillars: countering competitive influence, strengthening relationships with partners, and building and maintaining a competitive edge. According to General Dickinson, SDA is the top priority, as it enables the United States to attribute and track activities in space.

Leveraging the Joint Force. USSPACECOM has curated a joint, combined, and partnered team by leveraging its relationships with the other military services, the intelligence community, the commercial sector, and international partners to develop effective SDA.

Working with allies and partners. General Dickinson explains USSPACECOM’s successful model for leveraging US allies and partners in space through formal forums and exercises. USSPACECOM is also working with the United Nations to establish global space norms in response to the exacerbated issue of space debris. Over the past couple years, multiple allies and partners have established their own space commands and/or created a Space Force equivalent. Furthermore, USSPACECOM is looking to form a pathway to partnership with states in Africa and South America.

Employing commercial tech innovations. General Dickinson explains his role as the global sensor manager, utilizing sensors to enhance SDA. Working with commercial sector leaders, USSPACECOM is improving its identification and incorporation of nontraditional sensors into US missile defense radars. Location is key to effective sensors, so SPACECOM has been working closely with the commercial sector to gain access to vital sensor locations. SPACECOM is working to incorporate all US terrestrial sensors and space-based assets to create one common operating system in order to have constant uninterrupted data. Similarly ripe for private-sector partnership is the small satellite market. General Dickinson recognizes that the transition from “big, juicy targets” to constellation of smaller satellites builds a redundant and resilient space security architecture.

You can watch “Navigating the New Strategic Realities of Space: A Conversation with Commander of US Space Command General James H. Dickinson” here. To watch other events in the Commanders Series, visit the webpage here. For more information about the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense practice, visit the website here and subscribe for more.

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On February 22, Kelly Grieco published an article in SpaceNews, cautioning against space alarmism. She argues that such space race concerns can drive misperceptions and unnecessary spending and that the United States should focus on cooperation in space over competition.

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On February 17, Kelly Grieco was published in Space News Business with an article on why space alarmism is wrong and dangerous. Grieco explains that the United States has near-superiority in space technology, and that reports comparing adversaries’ space capabilities are often exaggerated or overblown. She argues that US space policy should embrace cooperation with other space-faring states, which could yield huge benefits around the world.

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On January 28, Forward Defense distinguished fellow Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF (Ret.) published an article in DefenseNews on the pressing need to equip and train the US Space Force, entitled “Empower our Space Force, just as we do for the other armed services.” In the article, Chilton argues that the Space Force can fill a critical deterrence role, matching adversarial advances and empowering warfighting and operational needs across the DoD.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s New American Engagement Initiative (NAEI) has a twofold mission: to challenge prevailing assumptions underpinning US foreign policy; and to point to alternative paths, different priorities, and a re-allocation of resources when needed to support new modes of US global engagement with allies and partners to shape the global future.

Our work is premised on the view that the United States—indeed, the world—is at a notably disruptive moment in history. An unprecedented technological revolution has accelerated the redistribution of global wealth and power in a multipolar world. Global institutions have frayed and fragmented, and America’s military and economic preeminence has begun to erode. By questioning underlying assumptions, the NAEI team will stimulate new ways of thinking about US foreign policy and recommend solutions that employ all elements of American power and influence.

NAEI’s Assumptions Testing series of issue briefs delves into major assumptions guiding US policies, including the motivations and behavior of revisionist powers; the US role in sustaining the global order; the effectiveness of coercion and deterrence; and the importance of democracy promotion. These in-depth briefs in turn inform two types of short policy briefs aimed at busy policymakers and opinion leaders:

• The first, NAEI’s Reality Check series, focuses on specific flaws in current policy. The series has covered a range of issues—from the US military posture in the Persian Gulf to the provision of security-sector assistance to foreign partners—and identifies specific needed reforms as well as pitfalls to avoid.
• NAEI’s newest publication series, Engagement Reframed, will suggest new ways to frame and execute America’s global role. As the title implies, the series will reimagine and reframe US engagement in the world beyond traditional, narrow notions of US military dominance to fashion a viable type of leadership in a world of many capable actors.

The Engagement Reframed series will develop new approaches for nonmilitary engagement with allies and partners, including rethinking the institutions of US foreign policy making and implementation, the specific issues and problems the United States faces, and the ways in which the scaffolding of the international system might be renovated or reengineered. These concise policy briefs will address how to employ the full range of tools at the disposal of the United States and its like-minded network. All follow a basic structure:

1. What are the challenges and opportunities? What opportunities for engagement are US policymakers currently missing? How might different modes of engagement—or new methods of interacting with others—alter or improve existing US policy?
2. Why now? The field of debate on US foreign policy is crowded with urgent problems. The Engagement Reframed series will stress important issues, explain the critical need for change, and highlight why a particular opportunity is worthy of policymakers’ attention.
3. How to make it happen. The United States is no longer the world’s sole dominant power; this series is aimed at operationalizing the concept of primus inter pares (first among equals). Learning how to operate in this multipolar world of many capable actors involves making choices. Engagement Reframed will inform these choices by considering when to take the lead or share burdens with others—solving collective-action problems through diplomacy and identifying how to enfranchise other actors to find a stable balance of interests.

The Engagement Reframed briefs planned for 2022 include:

Vaccinate the world by Mathew Burrows and Evan Cooper

The United States remains the best-positioned country to lead a global vaccination drive to counter the spread of COVID-19. With poor countries in serious need of vaccines, and China’s Sinopharm, Russia’s Sputnik, and the Johnson & Johnson vaccines deemed ineffective in initial trials at fighting the Omicron variant, the United States could reap a significant diplomatic, economic, and public health windfall if it contributes to the global vaccination effort more aggressively by donating its effective vaccines, increasing foreign production capacity of such vaccines, and bringing together donor countries to revamp the global health system. In the short-to-medium term, such measures could significantly help stem the financial costs of the pandemic by preventing economies from shutting down. Over the longer term, such an effort would yield diplomatic gains by establishing the United States as a responsible leader in global health and as the premier developer of medical innovations.

Appoint a European SACEUR by Kelly Grieco

Like every American president for six decades, President Joe Biden has called for Europe to shoulder a larger part of the defense burden. US efforts to press Washington’s European allies to do more have largely fixated on one measure: defense spending levels. At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, NATO members pledged to spend at least two percent of their gross domestic product on defense by 2024. Despite demanding that its European allies contribute more to their own defense, Washington has thus far refused to seriously consider a more equitable distribution of leading positions in NATO’s military organization. Put differently, the United States cannot have it both ways; it cannot demand that Europe do more yet still retain full military leadership of the alliance. This paper explores arguments for the appointment of a European Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and offers recommendations for rebalancing NATO responsibilities and commands.

Engage on Ukraine’s Future by Emma Ashford

In recent years, Ukraine has become a core flashpoint between Russia on the one hand and the United States, as well as Washington’s European allies, on the other. From the George W. Bush administration’s 2008 attempt to bring Ukraine into the NATO membership process, to the 2014 dispute over a European Union (EU) association agreement that prompted the Maidan Revolution, the question of whether Ukraine will move toward the West or retain its traditionally close ties to Russia has been fraught with controversy. The end result has been a war on Ukrainian soil and political and economic limbo for Ukraine, which cannot benefit fully from its ties with either Russia or the West. This paper steps back from security questions to explore novel ideas for economic integration of Ukraine into Western markets—giving the country the access it desires—while reassuring Russia that this will not necessarily entail full EU membership or the cessation of trade with Russia itself.

Move beyond great-power competition in Africa by Aude Darnal and Ambassador Rama Yade

Following two decades of US foreign policy primarily dominated by the global war on terrorism, Washington’s strategic competition with Beijing has motivated a shift in US engagement with the rest of the world. In Africa, the United States retains its military and security approach toward armed conflicts and instability, but the US government has increasingly framed its exchanges with the continent within the concept of great-power competition. Though the Biden administration recently affirmed that it will not ask African countries to choose between China and the United States, it has also warned some of them about their partnerships with the Asian power. Framing US engagement with the continent through the lens of great-power competition is a mistake because it implies that African countries are merely pawns in the international system. This brief explores opportunities for greater US engagement with African countries in such sectors as diplomacy, technological innovation, trade, global health, and climate change—all issues where they are valuable partners.

Bring back America’s diplomatic superstars by Evan Cooper

American culture has tremendous influence around the world, but successfully leveraging that power for diplomatic gain requires that the US government work strategically with American artists and businesses. The Jazz Ambassadors program of the 1950s and 60s—sponsored by the Department of State to promote US values globally—provides a useful model that should be applied to how the department approaches cultural diplomacy today. By partnering with some of the most popular American artists and companies, the State Department could facilitate exhibitions of American freedom of expression and artistic talent, advancing US values while helping to improve damaged perceptions of the United States abroad.

Rethink space governance by Robert A. Manning

We have entered a new era in space that is racing ahead of the world’s ability to govern it. 2021 marked an inflection point, as US and Chinese rovers explored Mars, and a Russian anti-satellite weapons test created 15,000 pieces of space debris. Private sector activities ramped up, too, including Elon Musk’s Space X activities and the Starlink mini-satellites nearly colliding with a Chinese space station. Not least, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) launched the spectacular Webb telescope. In short, the already explosive growth of activities in space will only accelerate in this decade. Yet the only universally subscribed law governing space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, now outdated by both technology and politics. Meanwhile, nations are passing laws to grant claims on moon real estate and resources, the private sector is gearing up to mine asteroids and the moon, and increasing space debris threatens space assets on which the functioning of civilization increasingly depends—from global positioning systems and military command and control to the Internet and automatic teller machines. NASA has embarked on a noble effort to update rules for operations in space, the Artemis Accords, signed by thirteen US allies and partners, but the agreement omits major space powers: China, France, Germany, India, and Russia. All parties should begin with a recognition of their mutual vulnerability and admit the urgent need to manage and remove space debris. Beyond that, the United States has an opportunity to lead efforts with partners and allies to update global space governance before space becomes a Wild West free-for-all.

Expand US relations with the Caribbean by Aude Darnal and Wazim Mowla

In recent years, the United States’ engagement in the Caribbean has been largely inconsistent and limited to only a handful of countries. From the limited and delayed collaboration during the COVID-19 crisis, to the poor response to migration flows from the Caribbean, Washington has shown the limits of its current strategy to partner with the region. In parallel, increased engagement in the region by rival powers has raised the Caribbean’s profile inside the Beltway. Although the Biden administration should not look at Caribbean countries through the prism of great-power competition, it should seize the opportunity to strengthen and redefine, when necessary, a comprehensive strategy grounded in mutual interests. From climate change to trade, investment, and diplomacy, the Caribbean and the United States share common challenges and opportunities that can only be addressed or transformed into gains through cooperation.

Get creative on European security architecture by Emma Ashford

Six months ago, the Biden administration began the process of re-engaging with Russia on questions of strategic stability, including the core issues of arms control and cyber warfare. Talks have been ongoing, and a number of working groups have been set up on specific topics. Recent events, however, suggest the need for engagement on a broader set of issues rather than exclusively on arms control. Repeated Russian military buildups near Ukraine—and Moscow’s proposed outline of a revised European security architecture—suggest that the time might be ripe for revisiting the conversations from the 1990s about conventional security in Europe. Nonetheless, Moscow’s proposed language for such an agreement is likely to be largely unacceptable to Western states. This paper explores the Russian proposal for a new European security architecture and suggests areas where compromise might be found.

Other topics to be explored in the series include demographics and immigration, a plan for improving global infrastructure, relations with North Korea, governance in space, and US public attitudes toward trade, while working with allies and partners to build leverage to reshape world order.

Assumptions Testing Series

The New American Engagement Initiative’s Assumptions Testing series explores some of the foundational beliefs that guide US foreign policy. By questioning the conventional wisdom, and exposing these assumptions to close scrutiny, the series aims to open a new seam in the policy debate and generate a more lively, fruitful, and effective strategic dialogue – one that is capable of producing a sustainable, nonpartisan strategy for US global engagement.

Reality Check Series

The New American Engagement Initiative’s Reality Checks are short briefs dedicated to exploring a particular policy or set of policies, assessing their efficacy, and, where appropriate, proposing alternatives. Reality Checks are published regularly and tied to the news of the day or derive from NAEI’s Assumptions Testing series. All are succinct and straight-to-the-point. The briefs are designed for busy professionals anxious for pragmatic and timely policy options.

Engagement Reframed Series

The New American Engagement Initiative’s Engagement Reframed policy briefs reimagine and reframe the US approach to the world beyond traditional, narrow notions of US military dominance to fashion an achievable and sustainable form of US leadership in a world of many capable actors.

The post Engagement Reframed: Introduction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 19, Kelly Grieco published an opinion piece in The Diplomat analyzing the supposed space race between the United States and China.

She laid out the case that there is not actually an ongoing space race and that the United States has demonstrated it is far more advanced in space technology, with fears about China overtaking the United States in that domain being misplaced. 

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On January 3, the Dallas Morning News published a piece by Scowcroft Center senior advisor Nate Morris arguing that a Russian anti-satellite missile test highlights a growing threat to US space superiority. Moreover, the article warns that space waste poses a severe threat to US assets in low-earth orbit.

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On December 10, Forward Defense distinguished fellow Gen. Kevin P. Chilton USAF (Ret.) moderated the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Forum event with Lt Gen John E. Shaw, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Space Command. They discussed the development of space warfighting doctrine, what it means to have an area of responsibility (AOR) in space, and the future of the U.S. Space Command.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Chilton moderates panel on space warfighting at Mitchell Institute appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 21, FD nonresident senior fellow Mir Sadat was quoted by Politico in an article titled “Battle brews over creating Space National Guard.” Sadat commented on how the proposal has become a point of political contention and has several challenges to overcome before it can move forward.

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Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The post Sadat in Politico on the attempt to create a Space National Guard appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the October 20 issue of ROOM Space Journal, 2020-21 Senior Air Force Fellow Lt Col Christopher Mulder, Forward Defense Deputy Director Clementine Startling, and Assistant Director Mark J. Massa published an article titled “A US space strategy for 2050: shaping a domain on the cusp.” Their article outlined recommendations for a long-term approach to space designed to promote the security, stability, and commercial viability of international space use. The article’s recommendations focused on enhancing space governance, defending space access, accelerating space commerce, and embracing Cislunar space. You can download the full article below.

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Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

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The post Mulder, Starling, and Massa on the future of space strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Transcript Jun 23, 2021

Brian Deese on Biden’s vision for ‘a twenty-first-century American industrial strategy’

By Atlantic Council

National Economic Council Director Brian Deese spoke about how the Biden administration can strengthen US economic recovery by working with the private sector and global allies.

Economy & Business Future of Work

GeoTech Cues Aug 10, 2021

Contextualizing COVID-19 and its implications for the future of work

By Matthew Gavieta

As workers around the world adapted to a new normal amid a public health crisis, remote work took on a new meaning. However, questions about how to structure long-term telework arrangements remain. The current landscape of data reveals a tenuous relationship between well-being and telework. To secure a brighter future for our labor force, we must continue developing worker-centered technology policy and doing research on how to improve life at work.

Digital Policy Future of Work

Blog Post Jul 27, 2021

The time for US immigration reform is now

By Jeff Goldstein

The US is currently grappling with a multi-decade long trend of declining population rates leading to fewer and fewer workers. To meet the challenges of the future, US policymakers must manage declining population growth – and one of the best arrows in their economic policy quiver is comprehensive immigration reform.

Future of Work Macroeconomics

The post GeoTech commissioner Vint Cerf and others release the report, “Strategy toward a solar system internet for humanity” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 23, Foreign Policy published a biweekly column featuring Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and New American Engagement Initiative senior fellow Emma Ashford discussing the latest news in international affairs.

In this column, they discuss the future commercialization and militarization of space, calling for cooperation and international standards to help guide future space exploration and technology development. They further considered the exportation of the Israeli surveillance software Pegasus to authoritarian leaders and its implications; China’s state-sponsored hacking and the need to bolster U.S. cyber defense capabilities; and the prospect of providing internet access to protesting Cubans.

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Nate Morris

Senior Advisor

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Economy & Business Entrepreneurship

The post Kroenig and Ashford consider the future of war in outer space and cyber space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 21, Forward Defense Senior Advisor Stephen Rodriguez participated in a panel with the Heritage Foundation titled “Revolutionary technology for U.S. dominance in space.” In the panel, Rodriguez discussed the role of emerging space technology companies, and how those can be leveraged to give the US a competitive advantage in space.

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Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Rodriguez at the Heritage Foundation on the future of US technology in space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 20, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Mir Sadat commented to Politico on the future of space travel after Jeff Bezos’ New Shepard rocket took its first flight. He discussed the future of civilian space travel in the context of Bezos’ plans to expand the Blue Origin program, calling the perspective “visionary” and “altruistic.”

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Sadat in Politico on the future of space travel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 16, Forward Defense deputy director Clementine G. Starling, assistant director Mark J. Massa, and program assistant Julia Siegel gave a lecture for New Space New Mexico‘s 2021 State of the Space Industrial Base Hybrid Workshop titled “The future of US security in space.” In this lecture Starling, Massa, and Siegel discuss Forward Defense’s recently released Atlantic Council Strategy Paper titled The Future of Security in Space: A Thirty-Year US Strategy.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Starling, Massa, and Siegel present at the State of the Space Industrial Base Workshop on the future of space security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Everybody is racing to space – not just nations, but private companies and even individuals. As this becomes more commonplace, where will the responsibility fall when it comes to space ventures, and can we put aside the competition to uniformly address both orbital and Earth-bound issues?

Atlantic Council experts David Bray and Inkoo Kang of the GeoTech Center discuss the future of space governance, China and Russia’s independent missions, and the inevitable commercialization of space travel.

Former fellow

David Bray

Former Distinguished Fellow

GeoTech Center

Economy & Business Technology & Innovation

Staff

Inkoo Kang

Research Consultant

GeoTech Center

Geopolitics & Energy Security Security & Defense

The post FAST THINKING: What’s next for space travel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 15, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Mir Sadat gave a lecture for New Space New Mexico‘s 2021 State of the Space Industrial Base Hybrid Workshop titled “Geopolitical Strategic Competition.” In this lecture, Sadat discussed the state of great power competition in the space domain.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Sadat presents at the State of the Space Industrial Base Conference appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On a recent joint Georgetown and Atlantic Council masters’ class, GeoTech Director Dr. David Bray shared his insights on the seminar’s question: “Cybersecurity of Space-Based Assets and Why This Is Important.” This masters’ class also featured GeoTech Fellows and experts Dr. William Jeffrey, Chuck Brooks, and Dr. Divya Chander.

We invite you to watch the informative recording below:

Read more about our expert:

Former fellow

David Bray

Former Distinguished Fellow

GeoTech Center

Economy & Business Technology & Innovation

Former fellow

William Jeffrey

Action Council Member

GeoTech Center

Cybersecurity Defense Industry

Former fellow

Divya Chander

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoTech Center

Cybersecurity Digital Policy

Transcript Jun 23, 2021

Brian Deese on Biden’s vision for ‘a twenty-first-century American industrial strategy’

By Atlantic Council

National Economic Council Director Brian Deese spoke about how the Biden administration can strengthen US economic recovery by working with the private sector and global allies.

Economy & Business Future of Work

GeoTech Cues Aug 10, 2021

Contextualizing COVID-19 and its implications for the future of work

By Matthew Gavieta

As workers around the world adapted to a new normal amid a public health crisis, remote work took on a new meaning. However, questions about how to structure long-term telework arrangements remain. The current landscape of data reveals a tenuous relationship between well-being and telework. To secure a brighter future for our labor force, we must continue developing worker-centered technology policy and doing research on how to improve life at work.

Digital Policy Future of Work

Blog Post Jul 27, 2021

The time for US immigration reform is now

By Jeff Goldstein

The US is currently grappling with a multi-decade long trend of declining population rates leading to fewer and fewer workers. To meet the challenges of the future, US policymakers must manage declining population growth – and one of the best arrows in their economic policy quiver is comprehensive immigration reform.

Future of Work Macroeconomics

The post Cybersecurity of Space-Based Assets and Why this is Important appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month’s topline events

Biden Rallies the G7. On his first overseas trip as president, Joe Biden joined the leaders of the G7 group of democracies in Britain for a summit, resulting in commitments to provide one billion COVID-19 vaccines to developing nations, as well as agreements on a global minimum tax and a major new initiative to finance infrastructure projects in the developing world to counter the influence of China. Biden later traveled to Brussels for his first summit with NATO leaders, and separately, with EU leaders, securing joint statements of concern over China and Russia and pledging to work together to advance a rules-based international order. 

• Shaping the order. Biden’s participation in this sequence of summit meetings showcased a renewed US commitment to democratic alliances and signaled that America is back as a multilateral leader on the global stage. The summit statements reflect shared concerns over Russia and China and an emerging consensus among allies on the need to prepare for an era of strategic competition between democracies and autocracies, though the US and Europe continue to differ in certain areas on how assertively to deal with Beijing. 
• Hitting Home. Closer cooperation with allies could help place the United States in a stronger position to act on key challenges at home, including pandemic recovery, and to defend against threats to American security and economic interests.
• What to do. Biden should continue to push for a common strategy among allies to deal with China and Russia, strengthen and update global trade norms, and seek to create new mechanisms to promote democratic cooperation, including a potential D-10 and a technology alliance to harness advanced technologies and develop common norms and policies consistent with democratic values.  

A New Atlantic Charter. While in London, Biden joined British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in signing a New Atlantic Charter that sets forth a statement of shared values and common aspirations. Like the original Atlantic Charter signed by Britain and the US in 1941, the new document lays out eight fundamental principles for a stable and secure global order, including the need to address new challenges such as emerging technologies, cyber threats, and climate change.  The document was criticized by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov as “ideologically tainted” and by China’s Global Times as “misreading the trend of time.”

• Shaping the order. The New Atlantic Charter offers an affirmative vision in stark contrast to a world dominated by autocracies like China and Russia and could serve to galvanize the free world to act together to address shared challenges. But what made the original Atlantic Charter so compelling was the action it inspired, including new rules and norms governing the behavior of states, and new institutions that the United States and its allies and partners used to defend and enforce these rules. To succeed in shaping a revitalized global order, this same spirit will be required again today. 
• Hitting Home. As with the original document, the Atlantic Charter 2.0 could provide a blueprint for organizing a world that fosters a new era of security and prosperity for America and its citizens.
• What to do. Biden should encourage other leading democracies that share the charter’s vision to sign on and work together to support it. The administration should follow by taking concrete steps to create new institutions that would advance the charter and rally the world’s democracies to action behind the principles in the charter.

Biden-Putin Meeting.  Biden ended his visit to Europe by meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Geneva. During the nearly three hours of talks, Biden reportedly raised concerns over Russian cyberattacks; human rights violations, including the imprisonment of opposition leader Alexey Navalny; and aggression against Ukraine. The two leaders agreed to launch a strategic stability dialogue to deal with issues such as arms control and cyberattacks, and to send ambassadors back to each other’s capitals.

• Shaping the order. Biden’s call-out of Russia’s behavior on human rights  and foreign interference suggests that US-Russia relations are likely to continue to be framed as a clash of values and interests, in the context of US support for an international rules-based order. Despite the launch of a new strategic dialogue and efforts by the Biden administration to cast the meeting as “positive” and “constructive,” the Kremlin appears undeterred from its current course of malign activities.
• Hitting Home. As demonstrated by recent ransomware attacks against US companies, including Colonial Pipeline, cyberattacks originating from Russia continue to pose threats to the US and could disrupt Americans’ daily lives
• What to do. Washington should continue to press Moscow to take action against cybercriminals based in Russia, release Navalny, and cease its broader efforts to undermine the rules-based order, while working closely with allies on a common strategy to raise costs on Moscow for such behavior.   

Quote of the Month

“America is better positioned to advance our national security and our economic prosperity when we bring together like-minded nations to stand with us… Our alliances weren’t built by coercion or maintained by threats.  They’re grounded on democratic ideals and a shared vision of the future … where the rights of all people are protected… where nations are free from coercion or dominance by more powerful states; [and] where the global commons … remain open and accessible for the benefit of all.” 

– President Joe Biden, United Kingdom, June 9, 2021

State of the Order this month: Strengthened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↑)

• In response to Belarus’ forced landing of a Ryanair flight in May and the government’s ongoing crackdown against pro-democracy protestors, the United States, European Union, United Kingdom and Canada announced coordinated sanctions on dozens of Belarusian individuals and entities, with additional sanctions likely to come.
• G7 leaders, joined by the leaders of Australia, India, South Africa, and South Korea, signed an Open Societies Statement that reaffirmed shared commitments to democratic values, human rights, and freedom of expression.
• Hong Kong’s largest pro-democracy newspaper, Apple Daily, was forced to shut down and its editors faced arrest as Beijing expanded its assault on democratic institutions in the autonomous territory.
• With the actions against Belarus and the priority placed on support for democracy at the G7, NATO, and EU Summits, the democracy pillar was strengthened.

Security (↑)

• Meeting in Brussels, NATO leaders reaffirmed their commitments to collective defense and advancing a rules-based order, while citing a range of traditional and evolving security challenges, including those posed by Russia and China.
• Conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi, a protégé of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, was elected as Iran’s next president, in a move widely seen as orchestrated by Khamenei to ensure that his hardline vision for Iran, contentious with the United States and the West, is maintained.
• China and Russia announced the extension of a friendship and cooperation treaty, originally signed in 2001, that Chinese President Xi Jinping said demonstrated the importance of strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in defending their common interests on the global stage.
• Ransomware attacks, reportedly organized by groups based in Russia, continued to target American companies, including the world’s largest meat supplier, JSB Foods, which paid $11 million to the hackers. 
• In light of the NATO summit pronouncements, the overall security pillar was strengthened.

Trade (↑)

• After years of negotiations, G7 nations agreed to a new global minimum tax of 15 percent on multinational corporations, regardless of where their headquarters are located. Over 130 nations, including all members of the G20, have now endorsed the agreement.
• The United States and the European Union agreed on a temporary resolution of a 17-year dispute over aircraft subsidies to Boeing and Airbus, suspending tariffs for five years and committing to a more open and transparent process for research and development funding.
• The United States and the EU also agreed to create a new Technology and Trade Council, aimed at devising new standards for emerging technology, promoting democratic values online, and advancing collaboration on cutting-edge research.
• With these important developments, the global trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons (↑)

• G7 leaders pledged to provide one billion coronavirus vaccines to the developing world over the next year, with the United States committing to half of this amount.
• The G7 also agreed to step up action on climate change by committing to cut emissions in half by 2030 and renewing a pledge to raise $100 billion a year to help developing countries move to cleaner energy sources. 
• China launched a rocket to send the first astronauts to its new space station, a significant step in what could become an intensifying space race between China and the United States.
• Overall, the global commons pillar was strengthened.

Alliances (↑)

• As discussed above, President Biden joined G7 leaders for a summit in Britain that reaffirmed US relations with key democratic allies. 
• Biden also joined NATO leaders for a summit in Brussels that showcased allied solidarity and resulted in a strongly-worded communique in which allies agreed to language calling out Russia and highlighting the “systemic challenges” posed by China.
• Biden participated in a separate US-EU summit meeting in Brussels demonstrating strong US support for the EU after years of sharp criticism by former president Trump, and which set forth a “Joint Transatlantic Agenda” aimed at building a more democratic world and upholding a rules-based order, potentially bringing together EU and US regulatory power.
• Overall, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Joe Biden, in a Washington Post op-ed, contended that his trip to Europe was about rallying democracies to meet the challenges and deter the threats of a new age.
• Hal Brands, in Foreign Affairs, argues that Biden’s emerging foreign policy doctrine focuses on a grand strategy of fortifying the democratic world against the most serious set of threats it has confronted in generations.
• Mira Patel, writing for the Indian Express, suggests that the New Atlantic Charter is being seen as a rebuke of China and Russia and could help renew the US-UK “special relationship.”

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• In an Atlantic Council report, From the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges, Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig, in collaboration with Tobias Bunde, Sophia Gaston, and Yuichi Hosoya, suggest a new D-10 to foster strategic alignment and coordinated action among like-minded and influential democracies.
• Fred Kempe, writing for CNBC, contends that Biden’s trip to Europe was aimed at providing a narrative thread and building common cause among the world’s leading democracies against authoritarianism
• Andrew Marshall, in the New Atlanticist, provides an analysis of the New Atlantic Charter.
• In an op-ed in The Hill, David Gordon and Ash Jain contend that Biden needs a D-10 to rally the democracies in an era of strategic competition.
• Lisa Aronsson and Brett Swaney, in the New Atlanticist, highlight three priorities for NATO’s new Strategic Concept in light of increasing competition with Russia and China.
• Nilofar Sakhi, in the New Atlanticist, suggests that China, Russia, and Iran are seeking to expand their influence in Afghanistan, which they view as a battlefield for strategic competition with the United States.
• Dan Fried, in the New Atlanticist, analyzes whether Biden’s building of a foreign policy doctrine around democracy is likely to succeed.
• In a Fast Thinking commentary, Dan Fried and Ash Jain discuss the potential implications of the New Atlantic Charter.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing June 2021 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 8, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Mir Sadat gave a lecture for The Institute of World Politics titled “A Space Vision To Guide America’s Strategic Competition with China.” In this lecture, Sadat discusses the modern space race with China, and the high-stakes economic consequences of this competition.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Sadat speaks with the Institute of World Politics on today’s space race appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 30, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Tate Nurkin was quoted in an article in the Sydney Morning Herald titled “If the US went to war with China, who would win? It depends how it starts.” In the article, Nurkin argues that a conflict between the US and China would involve strikes against opposing forces from the very beginning.

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Tate Nurkin

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Defense Industry

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Nurkin in the Sydney Morning Herald on a space-based conflict with China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 30, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Mir Sadat was quoted in an article for Space News titled “U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps service members selected to transfer to Space Force.” In this article, Sadat expressed his support for the new Space Force policy, arguing that these transfers will help build a culture and improve integration between branches.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Sadat quoted by SpaceNews on transfers to Space Force appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sixty years since the first human launched into orbit, what is the future of security and prosperity in space? On April 12, the International Day of Human Spaceflight, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice sought to answer this question with an engaging virtual public event featuring esteemed space experts and the launch of a new Atlantic Council Strategy Paper. 

The event began with a video connecting the nostalgic history of US space exploration with the boundless potential of space now and in the future for enhancing security and prosperity for the United States and allies. Consistent with Forward Defense’s mission to produce forward-looking assessments of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare, the video illustrated the ramifications of space for twenty-first century security challenges. 

Following the video, Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe offered remarks about the significance of the report, which outlines a thirty-year strategy to deal with challenges in space. He noted that most strategies are short and medium term, but few strategies grapple with the long-term ramifications of space.  

Starting off the workshop was a panel that examined some of the findings of the report itself. This first panel featured former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General James E. Cartwright, former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James, former NASA Administrator Charles Bolden, and former National Space Council Executive Secretary Scott Pace. General Cartwright and Secretary James, Atlantic Council Board Directors, also were co-chairs of the report. This panel was moderated by Jennifer Griffin of Fox News. This panel’s major themes included the importance of preventing US great-power competitors from seizing the upper hand in space, while also recognizing the importance of cooperation to facilitate space sustainability. General Cartwright began by discussing the significance of particular areas of space—such as the Lagrange points, which are areas of advantageous orbital stability in space. They have value from a military perspective, with the speakers claiming that they provide a beneficial location for permanently stationing satellites for research and military reconnaissance. Following General Cartwright’s comments, Ms. Griffin asked the panelists to name a key “aha” moment for them in their careers as space professionals. Secretary James discussed the “aha” moment she had following the First Gulf War, when she realized the military significance of satellites for warfare on the ground. She also noted that “[a]nybody who was alive in the year 1969 and was old enough will remember where they were when Neil Armstrong took that first historic walk on the Moon. That was my first aha moment…” Secretary James’ comments were followed by former NASA Administrator Bolden arguing that engagement in international fora related to space will be critical to shoring up US legitimacy abroad, as well as fostering norms conducive to US interests. As part of this, he claimed that “[e]verything in the report talks about US leadership, which requires we be willing to compromise and go to the table.” Finally, Dr. Pace claimed that cooperation with China can be pursued under conditions of reciprocity, transparency, and mutual benefit, but ruled out high-level cooperation in areas such as human spaceflight.  

During an interlude between the first and second panels, the audience was treated to two short discussions which lent a tangible connection to why humankind goes to space and what space adds to their day-to-day lives. First, NASA astronaut COL Andrew Morgan spoke with Forward Defense’s Senior US Air Force Fellow Lt Col Christopher P. Mulder. COL Morgan, who spent over 270 days on the International Space Station, observed that space “allows us to reap even more benefits for humanity,” with scientific experiments and exploration demonstrably improving life back on Earth. 

Following COL Morgan’s interview, a presentation on remote sensing was given by Debra Facktor, the Head of U.S. Space Systems for Airbus U.S. Space & Defense, Inc. Noting that space has “enabled us to learn so much more about Earth,” Ms. Facktor demonstrated the evolution in commercial remote sensing capabilities and the kinds of activities that Earth imaging from space can enable, from agriculture to national security.  

The event concluded with a discussion of the role of the commercial sector, led by a second panel featuring the H4X Lab’s Head of Naval Portfolio Ellen Chang, XPRIZE Director Gregg Maryniak, former Office of Net Assessment advisor Matthew Daniels, Space Security Program Director of the Prague Security Studies Institute Jana Robinson, and Ms. Facktor. This panel’s major emphasis was on the ways that the commercial sector could facilitate space activity, as well as the shift from space for exploration to space for its use for the long-term resilience of humankind. Ms. Chang began by claiming that private industry can only thrive when government policy is permanent, as opposed to transitory; this makes a thirty-year strategy of great importance to industry. The panelists discussed the raison d’être for going to space, with Mr. Maryniak noting that, while space activities were primarily intended to expand the horizons of human knowledge through exploration, space now is for survival and resource acquisition due to climate change and consumption challenges on Earth. At one point, Mr. Maryniak claimed that “[w]hat’s at stake is the entire future. More important than the commercial future is the future of our species. Survival of our next one hundred years depends on combatting threats such as climate change.” Discussing the significance of space in the US national consciousness, Dr. Daniels argued that the Apollo program represented a spirit of optimism and accomplishment. Dr. Robinson focused her remarks on space commerce and sustainability, noting that the biggest challenge to commerce will be debris and unsustainable space operations. 

You can rewatch “The Future of US Security in Space” here. To read the report, click here. For more information about the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense practice or to read our latest reports, op-eds, and analyses, please visit the website here. You can also sign up for updates from Forward Defense to hear the latest on the trends, technologies, and military challenges shaping tomorrow.  The report was authored by Forward Defense Deputy Director Clementine G. Starling, Forward Defense Assistant Director Mark J. Massa, Senior US Air Force Fellow Christopher P. Mulder, and Forward Defense Young Global Professional Julia T. Siegel. 

Raphael Piliero is a Young Global Professional for Forward Defense at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Watch the event

Read the report

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Apr 11, 2021

The future of security in space: A thirty-year US strategy

By Clementine G. Starling, Mark J. Massa, Lt Col Christopher P. Mulder, and Julia T. Siegel

Outer space is rapidly transforming as new actors test new limits. This Atlantic Council Strategy Paper calls for the United States and its allies and partners to secure space over the next three decades or risk wasting the promise of this emerging domain.

China Cybersecurity

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Achieving security in space: A recap of The Atlantic Council space strategy launch appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 10, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Mir Sadat spoke at an event for Aerospace titled “The space policy show: keeping the space workforce strong.” During the event, Sadat discussed the need for greater diversity and inclusion in the space workforce, and how to attract new talent to the field.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Sadat speaks with Aerospace on the US space workforce appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The decade to come will be the “GeoTech Decade,” in which the technology trends that began in previous years will become fixed in terms of their impact on society. After fourteen months of study and debate, the Atlantic Council’s Commission on the Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies and Data launched its first report with recommendations to guide leaders as they make choices regarding technology and data.

Here are a few key takeaways from the second session of the launch, moderated by David Bray, director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center, and Stephanie Wander, deputy director and senior fellow at the GeoTech Center.

Closing the digital divide and leading the pack

• In the opening fireside chat, Max Peterson, vice president of worldwide public sector at Amazon Web Services, outlined the unprecedented technological change in the last year as government and the private sector have pushed services to a quarantining country. He called for strong international cooperation, closing the digital divide, and building robust human capital. Commissioner Maurice Sonnenberg agreed on the value of international cooperation, saying, “We’re not on top of the world anymore,” so the United States must work with like-minded countries as we pursue technology leadership.

• David Treat, senior managing director at Accenture’s Blockchain and Multiparty Systems, also echoed Peterson’s call, referencing how the last year has shown the need for assured supply chains and data-driven decision making and innovation at a previously impossible pace. Yet, even as he described the “wildly powerful technology” society can now access, he warned, “I hope we don’t lose an ounce of focus that the digital divide is growing, and if we don’t use the power of public-private partnerships to drive digital inclusion, it will be irreparable.”

• Wander emphasized how to bring women into conversations around technology, saying that the best conversations are those where everyone is represented.

Watch the full event

Security and privacy for data and technology

• Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe introduced US Congresswoman Suzan DelBene (D-WA-1). “Technology has long been one of the strongest ways to improve and advance society,” she said, “but technology does not exist in a silo.” Technology has permeated our lives in the last year as people made use of telehealth and remote school, yet 46 percent of Americans feel that they have lost control of their data. “The concern around consumer data protection has been brewing for years,” DelBene noted, and there are still few federal standards. Her proposed Information Transparency and Privacy Data Control Act aims to clarify privacy policies and introduce audits to create a privacy ecosystem that showcases when data storage goes well, not just when it goes poorly. 

• US Congressman Michael T. McCaul’s (R-TX-10) prepared remarks highlighted how crucial assured supply chains are, touching on a subject covered in the second chapter of the report. He wrote, “The purpose of my [CHIPS for America Act] is to secure a domestic supply of advanced semiconductor chips. Without a secure supply of semiconductor chips, we are subject to the whims of the [Chinese Communist Party]. Without a secure supply of chips, we are unable to build any advanced technology. And without a steady flow of chips, we run the risk of falling behind in AI, quantum computing, and other bleeding-edge technology.”

• Internet pioneer and co-creator Vint Cerf added a new word to the discussion: In addition to security and privacy, the conversation around technology must also discuss safety. “The only reason anyone would trust all these systems is that they’re basically safe to use,” he said. “The real question is how do we construct safety out of components that are not necessarily individually trustable and safe?” Government, private, and personal systems are all at risk; to achieve a technical environment where all sectors are properly protected, all must collaborate, Cerf explained, adding that to move forward, the government must incentivize digital safety among the general public.  

Technology for good

• Ramayya Krishnan, dean of the Heinz College of Information Systems and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University, discussed how technology and policy will impact the future of work. While most think of technology as replacing jobs, that isn’t always the case. He discussed the example of bank tellers, who have seen new technologies increase the number of teller jobs as their work became augmented, not automated. This highlights the need for programs that teach employees new skills, as tellers now need new training in bridging and explaining technology to bank customers. At the same time, Krishnan said, “Where technology is making decisions that are social, you have the need for guardrails.”

• Sonnenberg and Bray concluded the discussion emphasizing the need to use the commission’s recommendations to inform US diplomatic activities globally, such as in building a coalition of democracies and partnering with global entrepreneurs on data and tech efforts to shape the future.

Rose Butchart is the senior advisor for national security initiatives at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center 

Read the GeoTech Commission Report

In-Depth Research & Reports

May 25, 2021

Report of the Commission on the Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies and Data

By The GeoTech Center

An in depth report produced by the Commission on the Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies, making recommendations to maintain economic and national security and new approaches to develop and deploy critical technologies.

Cybersecurity Defense Technologies

Catch up on part one of the report launch event

The post How to solve today’s tech challenges: secure data, close the digital divide, boost leadership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There are positive impacts like last year’s expedited development of a COVID-19 vaccine and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s successes on Mars. “There is so much potential, and we’re just scratching the surface,” said John Goodman, chief executive of Accenture Federal Services and co-chair of the GeoTech Commission. But with these new capabilities come increased threats like cyberattacks and the spread of disinformation. Goodman’s concern: “These threats put so much at risk, [like] our national security and economic wellbeing.”

Goodman issued a call to action at an event held by the GeoTech Commission to launch the Report of the Commission of Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies and Data. He joined leaders from industry and government to discuss the report’s findings and recommendations for achieving global scientific and technology leadership, securing data and communications, enhancing trust and confidence in the digital economy, and more.

So what can the United States do to reap the benefits of the GeoTech Decade and tame the era’s threats? Here are the key takeaways from the conversation.

The United States’ role

• Technology and data will determine the world’s ability to solve everything from climate change to wealth inequality, Goodman said. Thus, he argued that it is a “pivotal moment for the United States to reassert its leadership” with a national strategy, a global partnership with like-minded democracies, and collaborations with industry to “build trust in the digital fabric with which our world is going to be woven.”

• US Senator Mark Warner (D-VA) agreed that the United States would need to enlist the help of its partners to think through emerging problems like China and its technology agenda. “Too often, great Chinese technology companies work hand and glove with the Communist Party of China to create a surveillance state, a state that too often is repressive toward the kind of human values and transparency” that democracies represent, Warner said. He added that democracies worldwide should join on “technology development and on making sure that we… participate jointly in setting the rules, protocols, and standards for these new technologies.”

• US Senator Rob Portman’s (R-OH) prepared remarks (delivered by Maurice Sonnenberg, senior international advisor at Guggenheim Securities) pointed out that while the 2021 US National Defense Authorization Act enacted some proposals related to artificial intelligence, “ensuring that technologies are used in ways that also align with our values remains a challenge.” Navigating the implications of technological advancements for US prosperity, he added, continues “to be the work of our policymakers.”

• Shirley Ann Jackson, president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, stressed the importance of US leadership in quantum information sciences. It starts by addressing not only security and technological concerns—like the possibility that malicious actors take advantage of vulnerabilities in encryption systems or the general difficulty to build units of quantum information—but also standard-setting. “We want to be in the lead there,” she said, adding that “we need [to] flesh out and understand the national security implications of the use of these technologies by others.” She called on the US government to “develop policies for the sharing of data, findings, and capabilities with our allies and partners in conjunction with relevant federal agencies,” like the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of Commerce.

Watch the full event

What 2020 taught us about technological change

• Teresa Carlson, president and chief growth officer of Splunk and a GeoTech Commission co-chair, pointed out that during the pandemic, there was a rise in ransomware and other cyberattacks. She explained how data could help cyberattack victims by helping establish “a deeper understanding of what is happening” and assisting leaders in developing policies to plug security gaps.

• The GeoTech Commission Report explored ways to ensure supply chains stay resilient—a recommendation that comes after the pandemic wreaked havoc on global supply chains. “One thing it has taught us is [the extent of our] interdependence,” said former US Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, adding “in a way that’s good for global trade, but in a way that also exposes vulnerability.” Supply chains are so vulnerable, Chertoff said, not only because of the physical barriers to delivery that were strengthened by pandemic lockdowns and stockpiling of resources like vaccines, but also because supply chains aren’t resilient against cyberattacks such as those against SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange. He called for a US strategy to improve markets and invest in building alternative sources of supply for important software and hardware behind US information-technology infrastructure.

• With accelerated technological capabilities like AI-powered COVID-19 testing and tracing, Zia Khan, vice president for innovation at The Rockefeller Foundation said, “we saw how data and technology will play out in the future.” While this is exciting, it is also an important moment to create policies and foster a way of thinking about technological development to “make sure that innovations benefit everyone,” which requires investing in “inclusive digital public goods,” he said. He added that it is important to not only ensure technology benefits all, but also to reinforce democratic values, human rights, and transparency. “I think that the US has a role to… step up and lead in the setting of the infrastructure and regulations so that we can continue to project the values that are so important to our society around innovation [and] around democracy,” said Khan.

An investment in people as an investment in tech

• The public sector will also have to collaborate with the private sector, Dun & Bradstreet Corporation Senior Vice President and Chief Data Scientist Anthony Scriffignano explained, given the public sector’s ability to reach the public, launch discussions about technology, and improve access to education. “As digitalization continues to accelerate, the divide [in access] gets bigger,” explained Scriffignano. “There’s no guarantee that access to technology is going to be in any way better even tomorrow if the public sector and those in the private sector that can help enable that don’t focus on this problem.”

• Goodman noted that as technology like AI changes the future of work, “employees increasingly will have to become technologists or at least comfortable with technology when it comes to delivering their work,” and that companies will have to be vigilant in how they develop, train, and apply AI to guard against bias and misinformation. “Explainable AI becomes very important for transparency and for trust,” Goodman said, so “having a workforce with digital fluency is a critical priority… from getting more people access to broadband and early STEM education, and creating digital literacy education, to expanding access to opportunities and cultivating talent in underserved communities.”

• Sonnenberg and GeoTech Commission Executive Director David Bray stressed the importance of linking the commission’s work to US foreign policy efforts on tech and data investments. Bray said these efforts must advance with the mantra of “be bold; be brave; be benevolent” for the future ahead.

Katherine Walla is the assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Read the GeoTech Commission Report

In-Depth Research & Reports

May 25, 2021

Report of the Commission on the Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies and Data

By The GeoTech Center

An in depth report produced by the Commission on the Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies, making recommendations to maintain economic and national security and new approaches to develop and deploy critical technologies.

Cybersecurity Defense Technologies

Catch up on part two of the report launch event

The post New technologies will reshape the world in the next decade. What does that mean for the US? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 26, 2021 – The Atlantic Council’s bipartisan Commission on the Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies and Data today released a landmark report proposing recommendations for the US government and like-minded allies on global technology and data development policy.

The report’s recommendations are designed to maintain US and allied leadership in science and technology; ensure the trustworthiness and resilience of physical and IT supply chains, infrastructures, and the digital economy at large; improve global health protection; assure commercial space operations for public benefit; and create a digitally fluent and resilient workforce.

The report was developed over months of intensive study and debate by an esteemed panel of commissioners comprised of senior representatives from Congress, academia, industry, and former officials from recent administrations. Sens. Mark Warner (D-VA) and Rob Portman (R-OH) and Reps. Suzan DelBene (D-WA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) served as honorary co-chairs of the commission. John Goodman, Chief Executive Officer of Accenture Federal Services, and Teresa Carlson, President and Chief Growth Officer of Splunk, served as co-chairs. The commission was housed within the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center, which was launched in 2020 to champion positive paths forward to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

Today’s report comes amid the “GeoTech Decade,” in which new technologies and data capabilities will have an outsized impact on geopolitics, economics, and global governance. However, no nation or international organization has created the appropriate governance structures needed to grapple with the complex and destabilizing dynamics of emerging technologies. As a result, new approaches are required for developing and deploying critical technologies, cultivating human capital, rebuilding trust in domestic and global governance, and establishing norms for international cooperation.

Key recommendations from the report include:

• Global science and technology leadership: Develop a National & Economic Security Technology Strategy
• Secure data and communications: Strengthen the National Cyber Strategy Implementation Plan and accelerate quantum information science technologies operationalization
• Enhanced Trust and Confidence in the Digital Economy: Demonstrate AI improvements to delivery of public- and private-services
• Assured Supply Chains and System Resiliency: Broaden federal oversight of supply chain assurance
• Continuous Global Health Protection and Global Wellness: Launch a global pandemic surveillance and warning system
• Assured Space Operations for Public Benefit: Harden security of commercial space industry facilities and space assets
• Future of Work: Create the workforce for the GeoTech Decade and equitable access to opportunity

“The work of the bipartisan GeoTech Commission was 14 months in the making, representing the consensus of public and private sector leaders on practical steps forward for Congress, the White House, private industry, academia, and like-minded nations,” said Dr. David Bray, director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. “The sophisticated, but potentially fragile, data and tech systems that now connect people and nations mean we must incorporate resiliency as a necessary foundational pillar of modern life. It is imperative that we promote strategic initiatives that employ data and tech to amplify the ingenuity of people, diversity of talent, strength of democratic values, innovation of companies, and reach of global partnerships.”

“The U.S. stands at a crossroads. New technologies and ready access to data offer exciting opportunities to tackle the world’s greatest challenges. Yet there are also risks that threaten to undermine peace and prosperity in unanticipated ways,” said John Goodman, CEO of Accenture Federal Services. “For the US and its partners to remain economically competitive and protect national security, we must work together to build trust in the digital fabric of the GeoTech decade. We must act now to invest in these new technologies, to develop and expand our skilled workforce, and to establish norms to ensure that technology emerges as a powerful force for good.”

“The GeoTech Decade impacts all countries, people, communities, and businesses from global safety to security and more,” said Teresa Carlson, President, and Chief Growth Officer at Splunk. “The recommendations in this independent report are necessary for innovation in the years to come. With bi-partisan buy-in from U.S. Congress and top industry leaders, executing on these seven areas will help us combine the data and technologies required for success in this new age.”

“We’re in the midst of a titanic technological shift, from IT modernization to artificial intelligence, as organizations from all industries look to harness the power of data to solve complex challenges,” said Max Peterson, Vice President, Worldwide Public Sector, Amazon Web Services. “Advanced computing systems, faster and higher-bandwidth communications networks, and increasingly sophisticated technologies are digitizing the information around us and transforming the way we live, learn, and do business. Together, government and the private sector should work to ensure we grasp the innovative opportunities before us in ways that promote security, trust, and inclusion.”

Commission on the Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies and Data

Co-Chairs:
John Goodman, Chief Executive Officer, Accenture Federal Services
Teresa Carlson, President and Chief Growth Officer, Splunk

Honorary Co-Chairs:
Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA)
Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH)
Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-WA)
Rep. Michael T. McCaul (R-TX)

Commissioners:
Max R. Peterson II, Vice President, Worldwide Public Sector, Amazon Web Services
Paul Daugherty, Chief Executive – Technology & Chief Technology Officer, Accenture
Maurice Sonnenberg, Guggenheim Securities
Michael Chertoff, Former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security
Michael J. Rogers, Former Chairman of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Pascal Marmier, Head, Economy of Trust Foundation, SICPA
Ramayya Krishnan, PhD, Director, Block Center for Technology and Society, Carnegie Mellon University
Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, President, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Susan M. Gordon, Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
Vint Cerf, Internet Pioneer & “Father of the Internet”
Zia Khan, PhD, Vice President for Innovation, The Rockefeller Foundation
Anthony Scriffignano, PhD, Senior Vice President, Chief Data Scientist at Dun & Bradstreet Corporation
Frances F. Townsend, Executive Vice President, Activision Blizzard
Admiral James Stavridis, USN, Ret.

Executive Director:
David Bray, PhD, Director, GeoTech Center, The Atlantic Council

The Commission on the Geopolitical Impacts of New Technologies and Data was made possible by support from Accenture Federal Services and Amazon Web Services. The report’s full findings and recommendations can be found here.

For media inquiries, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post Atlantic Council releases landmark recommendations on the geopolitical impacts of new technologies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Conclusion

The increasing capabilities and availability of data and new technologies change how nations remain competitive and secure. In the coming GeoTech Decade, data and technology will have a disproportionate impact on geopolitics, global competition, and global opportunities for collaboration as new capabilities may eliminate a technical advantage or may enable new processes superior to current methods. The United States and like-minded nations must be able to adapt and demonstrate effective governance, at faster speeds, in employing data and new technologies to promote a more secure, free, and prosperous world.

In 1945, Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, transmitted a report, Science – the Endless Frontier, with the goal of answering a few key questions asked by then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt in November 1944. In the report, Bush elaborated:

• “With particular reference to the war of science against disease, what can be done now to organize a program for continuing in the future the work which has been done in medicine and related sciences?
• “What can the Government do now and in the future to aid research activities by public and private organizations?
• “Can an effective program be proposed for discovering and developing scientific talent in American youth so that the continuing future of scientific research in this country may be assured on a level comparable to what has been done during the war?”

Among its recommendations, the 1945 report called for the creation of the National Research Foundation. Bush concluded, noting the importance of action by Congress:

• “Legislation is necessary. It should be drafted with great care. Early action is imperative, however, if this nation is to meet the challenge of science and fully utilize the potentialities of science. On the wisdom with which we bring science to bear against the problems of the coming years depends in large measure our future as a nation.”

Now, almost seventy-six years later, the GeoTech Commission similarly seeks to promote freedom and security through initiatives that employ data and new technologies to amplify the ingenuity of people, diversity of talent, strength of democratic values, innovation of companies, and the reach of global partnerships.

There are several areas where data and technology can help, or hinder, the achievement of these goals:

• Communications and networking, data science, cloud computing
• Artificial intelligence, distributed sensors, edge computing, the Internet of Things
• Biotechnologies, precision medicine, genomic technologies
• Space technologies, undersea technologies
• Autonomous systems, robotics, decentralized energy methods
• Quantum information science, nanotechnology, new materials for extreme environments, advanced microelectronics

To maintain national and economic security and competitiveness in the global economy, the United States and its allies must continue to be preeminent in these key areas, and must achieve trustworthy and assured performance of the digital economy and its infrastructure. The GeoTech Commission provided recommendations in the following seven areas where the United States and like-minded nations must succeed:

• Global science and technology leadership
• Secure data and communications
• Enhanced trust and confidence in the digital economy
• Assured supply chains and system resiliency
• Continuous global health protection and global wellness
• Assured space operations for public benefit
• Future of work

The report’s recommendations embody several ideals. First, work to ensure the benefits of new technologies reach all sectors of society. Second, define protocols and standards for permissible ways to develop and use technologies and data, consistent with the norms of the United States and like-minded nations. Third, guide technology cooperation and sharing with nondemocratic nations based on respecting democratic values.

Just as Vannevar Bush urged in 1945, the United States must create new ways to develop and employ future critical and emerging technologies at speed, cultivate the needed human capital, and establish norms for international cooperation with nations. Such creation requires important action by Congress and the new administration to ensure that the United States has the wisdom with which to apply science to the challenges and opportunities of the coming years. If enacted, the report’s recommendations will enable the United States and like-minded nations to employ data capabilities and new technologies intentionally to promote a freer, more secure, and more prosperous world.

Appendices

Appendix A. Additional readings on identifying and countering online misinformation

Appendix B. Improving the software supply chains and system resiliency for the US government

Appendix C. Advancing a data fabric for achieving continuous global health protection

Appendix D. Additional readings on the history and future of global space governance

Appendix E. Informational GeoTech Center synopses

Appendix F. Additional readings and acronyms

Biographies of the GeoTech Commission co-chairs and commissioners

Co-chairs

John Goodman, Chief Executive Officer, Accenture Federal Services

John Goodman is the Chief Executive of Accenture Federal Services (AFS), which serves clients across all sectors of the US federal government – defense, intelligence, public safety, health, and civilian. Since joining Accenture in 1998, he has held a variety of leadership roles – including managing director of Accenture’s Defense & Intelligence portfolio, head of Management Consulting for the global Public Service Operating Group, and most recently Chief Operating Officer of AFS. John began his career at Accenture as a Member of the Communications & High Technology practice.

Prior to joining Accenture, John served for five years in the federal government as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs & Installations), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs), and a member of the staff of the National Economic Council, the White House office responsible for coordination of economic policy. He previously served on the Harvard Business School faculty.

John is co-chair of the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Commission and member of the boards of both the Atlantic Council and the Northern Virginia Technology Council, as well as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a member, and the immediate past chair, of the Executive Committee of the Professional Services Council, a former member of the Executive Committee of AFCEA, and the former chairman of the Defense Business Board. John was named Executive of the Year by the Greater Washington Government Contractors in 2018; a Wash100 inductee in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021; and a Fed100 Award winner in 2015. He has been awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, and the Department of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service.

John received his Bachelor of Arts, summa cum laude, from Middlebury College and his Master of Arts and Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Teresa Carlson, President and Chief Growth Officer, Splunk

As President and Chief Growth Officer at Splunk, Teresa Carlson leads our efforts to align and drive our ongoing business transformations across Splunk’s go-to-market segments. Most recently, Carlson served as Vice President, Worldwide Public Sector and Industries, for Amazon Web Services (AWS). After she founded AWS’s Worldwide Public Sector in 2010, Carlson’s role eventually expanded to include financial services, energy services, telecommunications, and aerospace and services industry business units.

Carlson has also been a strong advocate for empowering women in the technology field. That passion led to the creation of “We Power Tech,” AWS’s diversity and inclusion initiative, which aims to ensure underrepresented groups – including women – are reflected throughout all AWS outreach efforts. Carlson dedicates time to philanthropic and leadership roles in support of the global community. Prior to joining AWS in 2010, Carlson led sales, marketing and business development organizations at Microsoft, Keyfile/Lexign and NovaCare. Carlson holds a B.A. and M.S. from Western Kentucky University.

Honorary co-chairs

Mark R. Warner U.S. Senator from Virginia

Senator Warner was elected to the U.S. Senate in November 2008 and reelected to a third term in November 2020. He serves on the Senate Finance, Banking, Budget, and Rules Committees as well as the Select Committee on Intelligence, where he is the Chairman. During his time in the Senate, Senator Warner has established himself as a bipartisan leader who has worked with Republicans and Democrats alike to cut red tape, increase government performance and accountability, and promote private sector innovation and job creation. Senator Warner has been recognized as a national leader in fighting for our military men and women and veterans, and in working to find bipartisan, balanced solutions to address our country’s debt and deficit.

From 2002 to 2006, he served as Governor of Virginia. When he left office in 2006, Virginia was ranked as the best state for business, the best managed state, and the best state in which to receive a public education.

The first in his family to graduate from college, Mark Warner spent 20 years as a successful technology and business leader in Virginia before entering public office. An early investor in the cellular telephone business, he co-founded the company that became Nextel and invested in hundreds of start-up technology companies that created tens of thousands of jobs.

Senator Warner and his wife Lisa Collis live in Alexandria, Virginia. They have three daughters.

Rob Portman U.S. Senator for Ohio

Rob Portman is a United States Senator from the state of Ohio, a position he has held since he was first elected in 2010. Portman previously served as a U.S. Representative, the 14th United States Trade Representative, and the 35th Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In 1993, Portman won a special election to represent Ohio’s 2nd congressional district in the U.S. House of Representatives and served six terms before President George W. Bush appointed him as U.S. Trade Representative in May 2005. Portman currently serves as the Ranking Member on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, as well as on the Senate Finance and Foreign Relations Committees. He was born and raised in Cincinnati, where he still lives today with his wife Jane. Together they have three children: Jed, Will, and Sally.

Suzan DelBene. U.S. Congresswoman Representing Washington’s 1st District

Congresswoman Suzan DelBene represents Washington’s 1st Congressional District, which spans from northeast King County to the Canadian border and includes parts of King, Snohomish, Skagit, and Whatcom counties. First sworn into the House of Representatives in November 2012, Suzan brings a unique voice to the nation’s capital with more than two decades of experience as a successful technology entrepreneur and business leader. Suzan takes on a wide range of challenges both in Congress and in the 1st District and is a leader on issues of technology, health care, trade, taxes, environmental conservation, and agriculture.

Suzan currently serves as the Vice Chair on the House Ways and Means Committee, which is at the forefront of debate on a fairer tax code, health care reform, trade deals, and lasting retirement security. She serves on the Select Revenue Measures and Trade Subcommittees. Suzan also serves as Chair of the forward-thinking New Democrat Coalition, which is one of the largest ideological coalitions in the House, and is co-chair of the Women’s High Tech Caucus, Internet of Things Caucus, and Dairy Caucus. She is also a member of the Pro-Choice Caucus.

Over more than two decades as an executive and entrepreneur, she helped to start drugstore.com as Vice President of Marketing and Store Development, and served as CEO and President of Nimble Technology, a business software company based on technology developed at the University of Washington. Suzan also spent 12 years at Microsoft, most recently as corporate vice president of the company’s mobile communications business.

Before being elected to Congress, Suzan served as Director of the Washington State Department of Revenue. During her tenure, she proposed reforms to cut red tape for small businesses. She also enacted an innovative tax amnesty program that generated $345 million to help close the state’s budget gap while easing the burden on small businesses.
Suzan and her husband, Kurt DelBene, have two children, Becca and Zach, and a dog named Reily.

Michael T. McCaul, U.S. Congressman Representing Texas’ 10th District

Congressman Michael T. McCaul is currently serving his ninth term representing Texas’ 10th District in the United States Congress. The 10th Congressional District of Texas stretches from the city of Austin to the Houston suburbs and includes Austin, Bastrop, Colorado, Fayette, Harris, Lee, Travis, Washington and Waller Counties.

At the start of the 116th Congress, Congressman McCaul became the Republican Leader of the Foreign Affairs Committee. This committee considers legislation that impacts the diplomatic community, which includes the Department of State, the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Peace Corps, the United Nations, and the enforcement of the Arms Export Control Act. In his capacity as the committee’s Republican Leader, McCaul is committed to ensuring we promote America’s leadership on the global stage. In his view, it is essential the United States bolsters international engagement with our allies, counters the aggressive policies of our adversaries, and advances the common interests of nations in defense of stability and democracy around the globe. He will continue to use his national security expertise to work to counter threats facing the United States, especially the increasing threat we face from nation state actors such as China, Iran, Russia, North Korea, among others.

Prior to Congress, Michael McCaul served as Chief of Counter Terrorism and National Security in the U.S. Attorney’s office, Western District of Texas, and led the Joint Terrorism Task Force charged with detecting, deterring, and preventing terrorist activity. McCaul also served as Texas Deputy Attorney General under current U.S. Senator John Cornyn, and served as a federal prosecutor in the Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section in Washington, DC.
A fourth generation Texan, Congressman McCaul earned a B.A. in Business and History from Trinity University and holds a J.D. from St. Mary’s University School of Law. In 2009 Congressman McCaul was honored with St. Mary’s Distinguished Graduate award. He is also a graduate of the Senior Executive Fellows Program of the School of Government, Harvard University. Congressman McCaul is married to his wife, Linda. They are proud parents of five children: Caroline, Jewell, and the triplets Lauren, Michael, and Avery.

Commissioners

Max R. Peterson II, Vice President, Worldwide Public Sector, Amazon Web Services

Max Peterson is Vice President for Amazon Web Services’ (AWS) Worldwide Public Sector. In this role, Max supports public sector organizations as they leverage the unique advantages of commercial cloud to drive innovation among government, educational institutions, health care institutions, and nonprofits around the world.

A public sector industry veteran with thirty years of experience, he has an extensive background in developing relationships with public sector customers. He has previously worked with Dell Inc. as Vice President and General Manager for Dell Federal Civilian and Intelligence Agencies, as well as CDWG and Commerce One.

Max earned both a Bachelor’s Degree in Finance and Master’s of Business Administration in Management Information Systems from the University of Maryland.

Paul Daugherty, Accenture Chief Executive – Technology and Chief Technology Officer

Paul Daugherty is Accenture’s Group Chief Executive – Technology & Chief Technology Officer. He leads all aspects of Accenture’s technology business. Paul is also responsible for Accenture’s technology strategy, driving innovation through R&D in Accenture Labs and leveraging emerging technologies to bring the newest innovations to clients globally. He recently launched Accenture’s Cloud First initiative to further scale the company’s market-leading cloud business and is responsible for incubating new businesses such as blockchain, extended reality and quantum computing. He founded and oversees Accenture Ventures, which is focused on strategic equity investments and open innovation to accelerate growth. Paul is responsible for managing Accenture’s alliances, partnerships and senior-level relationships with leading and emerging technology companies, and he leads Accenture’s Global CIO Council and annual CIO and Innovation Forum. He is a member of Accenture’s Global Management Committee.

Maurice Sonnenberg, Guggenheim Securities

Maurice Sonnenberg has served as an outside advisor to five Presidential Administrations in the areas of international trade, finance, international relations, intelligence, and foreign election monitoring. In 1994 and 1995, he served as a member of the US Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, and from 1996 as the Senior Advisor to the US Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community. He was a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under President Bill Clinton for 8 years. In 2002, he was a member of the Task Force of Terrorist Financing for the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2007-2010, he served on the Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council and the Panel Advisory Board for the Secretary of the Navy from 2008-2015. In 2012-14, he served as co-Chairman of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs for the Intelligence Community. He has also served as an Official US Observer at elections in Latin America. This includes multiple elections in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Mexico. Sonnenberg has worked at the investment banking firms Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette, Bear Stearns, and J.P. Morgan, and at the law firms Hunton & Williams, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips. Currently, he is with Guggenheim Securities as Senior International Advisor. He is also a Senior Advisor to the Advanced Metallurgical Group, N.V.

Michael Chertoff, Former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security

Michael Chertoff is the Executive Chairman and Co-Founder of The Chertoff Group. From 2005 to 2009, he served as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Earlier in his career, Mr. Chertoff served as a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and head of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division. He is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of BAE Systems, Inc., the U.S.-based subsidiary of BAE Systems plc. In 2018, he was named the chairman of the Board of Trustees for Freedom House. He currently serves on the board of directors of Noblis and Edgewood Networks. In the last five years, Mr. Chertoff co-chaired the Global Commission in Stability of Cyberspace and also co-chairs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity. Chertoff is magna cum laude graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School.

Michael J. Rogers, Former Chairman of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Mike Rogers is a former member of Congress, where he represented Michigan’s Eighth Congressional District for seven terms. While in the U.S. House of Representatives, he chaired the powerful House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), authorizing and overseeing a budget of $70 billion that funded the nation’s seventeen intelligence agencies. Mr. Rogers built a legacy as a bipartisan leader on cybersecurity, counterterrorism, intelligence, and national security policy. Mr. Rogers worked with two presidents, congressional leadership, and countless foreign leaders, diplomats, and intelligence professionals. Before joining Congress, he served as an officer in the US Army and as a Special Agent with the FBI. He is currently investing in and helping build companies that are developing solutions for healthcare, energy efficiency, and communications challenges. He also serves as a regular national security commentator on CNN and hosted the channel’s documentary-style original series Declassified. Mr. Rogers is a regular public speaker on global affairs, cybersecurity, and leadership. He is married to Kristi Rogers and has two children.

Pascal Marmier, Head, Economy of Trust Foundation, SICPA

Pascal Marmier is head of SICPA’s Economy of Trust Foundation. Most recently, Marmier held several positions in the United States within Swiss Re, a global reinsurer, focusing on digital strategy and innovation management. Previously, he spent twenty years as a Swiss diplomat as one of the early leaders of the Swissnex network, a private–public partnership dedicated to facilitating collaboration with Swiss universities, startups, and corporations in all fields related to science, technology, and innovation. After spending a decade establishing key partnerships and activities in Boston, Marmier moved to China to establish the Swissnex platform in the region. He holds law degrees from the University of Lausanne and Boston University, as well as an MBA from the MIT Sloan School of Management.

Ramayya Krishnan, PhD, Director, Block Center for Technology and Society, Carnegie Mellon University

Ramayya Krishnan is the W. W. Cooper and Ruth F. Cooper Professor of Management Science and Information Systems at Carnegie Mellon University. He is Dean of the H. John Heinz III College of Information Systems and Public Policy and directs the Block Center for Technology and Society at the university. His scholarly contributions have focused on mathematical modeling of organizational decision making, the design of data driven decision support systems and statistical models of consumer behavior in digital environments. He advises governments, businesses and development banks on digital transformation technology and its consequences.

Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, President, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

The Honorable Shirley Ann Jackson, Ph.D., has served as the 18th president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute since 1999. A theoretical physicist described by Time Magazine as “perhaps the ultimate role model for women in science,” Dr. Jackson has held senior leadership positions in academia, government, industry, and research. She is the recipient of many national and international awards, including the National Medal of Science, the United States’ highest honor for achievement in science and engineering. Dr. Jackson served as Co-Chair of the United States President’s Intelligence Advisory Board from 2014 to 2017 and as a member of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology from 2009 to 2014. Before taking the helm at Rensselaer, she was Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from 1995 to 1999. She serves on the boards of major corporations that include FedEx and PSEG, where she is Lead Director.

Dr. Jackson holds an S.B. in Physics, and a Ph.D. in Theoretical Elementary Particle Physics, both from MIT.

Susan M. Gordon, Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

The Honorable Susan (Sue) M. Gordon served as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence from August 2017 until August 2019. In her more than three decades of experience in the IC, Ms. Gordon served in a variety of leadership roles spanning numerous intelligence organizations and disciplines, including serving as the Deputy Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) from 2015 to 2017. In this role, she drove NGA’s transformation to meet the challenges of a 21st century intelligence agency. Since leaving government service, Ms. Gordon serves on a variety of public and private boards, is a fellow at Duke and Harvard Universities, and consults with a variety of companies on technology—including cyber and space—strategy, and leadership, focusing on shared responsibility for national and global security.

Vint Cerf

Vinton G. Cerf is vice president and Chief Internet Evangelist for Google. Cerf is the codesigner of the TCP/IP protocols and the architecture of the Internet. He has served in executive positions at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the Internet Society, MCI, the Corporation for National Research Initiatives, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. A former Stanford Professor and member of the National Science Board, he is also the past president of the Association for Computing Machinery and serves in advisory capacities at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Cerf is a recipient of numerous awards for his work, including the US Presidential Medal of Freedom, US National Medal of Technology, the Queen Elizabeth Prize for Engineering, the Prince of Asturias Award, the Tunisian National Medal of Science, the Japan Prize, the Charles Stark Draper Prize, the ACM Turing Award, the Legion d’Honneur, the Franklin Medal, Foreign Member of the British Royal Society and Swedish Academy of Engineering, and twenty-nine honorary degrees. He is a member of the Worshipful Company of Information Technologists and the Worshipful Company of Stationers.

Zia Khan, PhD, Vice President for Innovation, The Rockefeller Foundation

As Senior Vice President for Innovation, Zia Khan oversees the Rockefeller Foundation’s approach to developing solutions that can have a transformative impact on people’s lives through the use of convenings, data and technology, and strategic partnerships. He writes and speaks frequently on leadership, strategy, and innovation. Khan has served on the World Economic Forum Advisory Council for Social Innovation and the US National Advisory Board for Impact Investing. He leads a range of the Rockefeller Foundation’s work in applying data science for social impact and ensuring artificial intelligence contributes to an inclusive and equitable future.

Prior to joining the Rockefeller Foundation, Khan was a management consultant advising leaders in technology, mobility, and private equity sectors. He worked with Jon Katzenbach on research related to leadership, strategy, and organizational performance, leading to their book, Leading Outside the Lines.

Zia holds a BS from Cornell University and MS and PhD from Stanford University.

Anthony Scriffignano, PhD, is Senior Vice President, Chief Data Scientist at Dun & Bradstreet Corporation

Anthony Scriffignano, PhD is Senior Vice President, Chief Data Scientist at Dun & Bradstreet Corporation. He is an internationally recognized data scientist with experience spanning over forty years in multiple industries and enterprise domains. Scriffignano has extensive background in advanced anomaly detection, computational linguistics and advanced inferential algorithms, leveraging that background as primary inventor on multiple patents worldwide. Scriffignano was recognized as the U.S. Chief Data Officer of the Year 2018 by the CDO Club, the world’s largest community of C-suite digital and data leaders. He is also a member of the OECD Network of Experts on AI working group on implementing Trustworthy AI, focused on benefiting people and the planet. He has briefed the US National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee and contributed to three separate reports to the president, on Big Data Analytics, Emerging Technologies Strategic Vision, and Internet and Communications Resilience. Additionally, Scriffignano provided expert advice on private sector data officers to a group of state Chief Data Officers and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Scriffignano serves on various advisory committees in government, private sector, and academia. Most recently, he has been called upon to provide insight on data science implications in the context of a highly disrupted datasphere and the implications of the global pandemic. He is considered an expert on emerging trends in advanced analytics, the “Big Data” explosion, artificial intelligence, multilingual challenges in business identity and malfeasance in commercial and public-sector contexts.

Frances F. Townsend, Executive Vice President, Activision Blizzard

Frances Fragos Townsend is the Executive Vice President of Corporate Affairs, Chief Compliance Officer and Corporate Secretary at Activision Blizzard. Prior to that, she was Vice Chairman, General Counsel and Chief Administration Officer at MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc. In her 10 years there, she focused internally on financial, legal and personnel issues, as well as international, compliance and business development across MacAndrews’ portfolio companies. Prior to that, she was a corporate partner with the law firm of Baker Botts, LLP. From 2004 to 2008, Ms. Townsend served as Assistant to President George W. Bush for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and chaired the Homeland Security Council. She also served as Deputy National Security Advisor for Combatting Terrorism from 2003 to 2004. Ms. Townsend spent 13 years at the US Department of Justice under the administrations of President George H. W. Bush, President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush. She has received numerous awards for her public service accomplishments. Ms. Townsend is a Director on the Board of two public companies: Chubb and Freeport McMoRan. She previously served on the Boards at Scientific Games, SciPlay, SIGA and Western Union. She is an on-air senior national security analyst for CBS News. Ms. Townsend previously served on the Director of National Intelligence’s Senior Advisory Group, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) External Advisory Board and the US President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. Ms. Townsend is a trustee on the Board of the New York City Police Foundation, the Intrepid Sea, Air & Space Museum, the McCain Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Atlantic Council. She also serves on the Board at the Council on Foreign Relations, on the Executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission and the Board of the International Republican Institute. She is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group.

Admiral James Stavridis, USN, Ret.

Admiral James Stavridis is an Operating Executive of The Carlyle Group and Chair of the Board of Counselors of McLarty Global Associates, following five years as the 12th Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He also serves as the Chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. A retired four-star officer in the U.S. Navy, he led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance in global operations from 2009 to 2013 as Supreme Allied Commander with responsibility for Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans, Syria, counter piracy and cyber security. He also served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command, with responsibility for all military operations in Latin America from 2006 to 2009. He earned more than 50 medals, including 28 from foreign nations in his 37-year military career. Admiral Stavridis earned a PhD in international relations and has published 10 books and hundreds of articles in leading journals around the world, including the recent novel “2034: A Novel of the Next World War,” which was a New York Times bestseller. His 2012 TED Talk on global security has close to one million views. Admiral Stavridis is a monthly columnist for TIME Magazine and Chief International Security Analyst for NBC News.

Biographies of supporting Atlantic Council staff

Dr. David A. Bray, Director, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

Dr. David A. Bray has served in a variety of leadership roles in turbulent environments, including bioterrorism preparedness and response from 2000 to 2005, time on the ground in Afghanistan in 2009, serving as a non-partisan Senior National Intelligence Service Executive directing a bipartisan National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the US Intelligence Community, and providing leadership as a non-partisan federal agency Senior Executive where he led a team that received the global CIO 100 Award twice in 2015 and 2017. He is an Eisenhower Fellow, Marshall Memorial Fellow, and Senior Fellow with the Institute for Human & Machine Cognition. Business Insider named him one of the top “24 Americans Who Are Changing the World” and the World Economic Forum named him a Young Global Leader. Over his career, he has advised six different start-ups, led an interagency team spanning sixteen different agencies that received the National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation, and received the Joint Civilian Service Commendation Award, the National Intelligence Exceptional Achievement Medal, Arthur S. Flemming Award, as well as the Roger W. Jones Award for Executive Leadership. He is the author of more than forty academic publications, was invited to give the AI World Society Distinguished Lecture to the United Nations in 2019, and was named by HMG Strategy as one of the Global “Executives Who Matter” in 2020.

Dr. Peter Brooks, Consultant, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

Peter Brooks is a senior researcher and national security analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a federally funded research and development center. For more than three decades, he has contributed to the understanding of critical national security issues for a wide range of government agencies. His broad expertise includes intelligence analysis, advanced technologies and applications, and joint force analyses, experimentation, strategy, and cost assessments.

Stephanie Wander, Deputy Director, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

Stephanie Wander is a technology and innovation strategist with a successful track record of launching large-scale projects to solve global grand challenges. Ms. Wander’s approaches integrate innovation best practices and mindsets, including design thinking, behavior change strategies, foresight techniques, and expert and public crowdsourcing.

Previously, Ms. Wander was a lecturer at the University of Southern California Suzanne Dworak-Peck School of Social Work where she taught graduate social work professionals in design, innovation, and disruptive technology.

Rose Butchart, Senior Adviser, National Security Initiatives, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

Rose Butchart is the senior adviser for National Security Initiatives at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

As a program manager for the Department of Defense’s National Security Innovation Network, she managed, designed, and scaled a variety of programs, including a technology, transfer, and transition (T3) program designed to bring breakthrough Department of Defense lab technology to market— and to the warfighter. She also managed a workshop series to tackle some of the military’s intractable problems and a fellowship which placed active duty military and Department of Defense civilians at technology start-ups.

Claudia Vaughn Zittle, Program Assistant, Atlantic Council GeoTech Center

Claudia Vaughn Zittle was a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. In this role, she managed a wide range of projects at the intersection of emerging technologies and dynamic geopolitical landscapes. She also conducted research and provided written analysis for publication on Atlantic Council platforms.

Originally from the Washington, DC, area, she received her BA in International Relations from Cornell College. She is continuing her education at American University’s School of International Service, where she studies International Relations with a concentration in US Foreign Policy and National Security.

Claire Branley, Program Assistant, Atlantic Council GeoTech Center

Claire Branley joined the Atlantic Council’s Geotech Center after graduating from the University of Washington with a BS in Public Health and Global Health. She was a research assistant in the Moussavi-Harami Lab, uncovering gene therapies for inherited heart disease. She is deeply passionate about the prevention of disease and has assisted several maternal and child health research projects and volunteered in farm-to-food pantry initiatives to decrease food insecurity in the Seattle area. Her interests include chronic disease burden, global food security, and promoting interdisciplinary solutions.

Biographies of the key contributors to the GeoTech Commission Report

Research and writing on misinformation

Dr. Pablo Breuer, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

Dr. Pablo Breuer is an information/cyber warfare expert and a twenty-two-year veteran of the US Navy with tours including the National Security Agency, US Cyber Command, and United States Special Operations Command. He is a cofounder of the Cognitive Security Collaborative and coauthor of the Adversarial Misinformation and Influence Tactics and Techniques (AMITT) framework.

Dr. Robert Leonhard, National Security Analysis, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Robert Leonhard is on the principal professional staff as an analyst in the National Security Analysis Department of Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). His main areas of focus are irregular warfare, nuclear deterrence, and game design. Prior to joining JHU/APL, he earned a PhD in American History from West Virginia University, a Master of Military Arts and Sciences from the US Army, an MS in International Relations from Troy State University, and a BS in European History from Columbus University. He is a retired Army infantry officer and planner. He is the author of The Art of Maneuver (Presidio Press, 1991), Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War (Praeger, 1994), The Principles of War for the Information Age (Presidio Press, 1998), Little Green Men: a primer in Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (JHUAPL, 2016), and The Defense of Battle Position Duffer: Cyber-Enabled Maneuver in Multi-Domain Battle (JHUAPL, 2016). He may be contacted at Robert.Leonhard@jhuapl.edu.

John Renda, Program Manager, Army Special Operations, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Col. John Renda, USA (Ret), is a program manager for Army Special Operations at the Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory. He graduated from Tulane University with a degree in Political Science and International Relations, and earned a MS in National Security from the US Naval War College. He served as a career Psychological Operations officer in US Army Special Operations. His key assignments included 75th Ranger Regiment Information Operations Officer, 1st Psychological Operations Battalion Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Director J39 National Capital Region, and National Security Council Staff, Director for Strategic Communication. He may be contacted at john.renda@jhuapl.edu.

Dr. Sara-Jayne Terp, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

Sara-Jayne Terp builds frameworks to improve how autonomous systems, algorithms, and human communities work together. At Threet Consulting, she creates processes and technologies to support community-led disinformation defence. She is an Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, CogSecCollab lead, and chair at CAMLIS and Defcon AI Village. Her background includes intelligence systems, crowdsourced data gathering, autonomous systems (e.g., human-machine teaming), data strategy, data ethics, policy, nation state development, and crisis response.

Appendix B

Stewart Scott, Assistant Director, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

Stewart Scott is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center, where he conducts research and provides written analysis for publication on Atlantic Council platforms and works on joint projects with other centers in the Atlantic Council. He earned his AB, along with a minor in Computer Science, at the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

We would also like to thank the following members of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative for their contributions to Appendix B: Trey Herr, Simon Handler, Madison Lockett, Will Loomis, Emma Schroeder, and Tianjiu Zuo.

Appendix C and writings on global health

Dr. Divya Chander, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

Dr. Chander is a physician and neuroscientist who trained at Harvard, University of California San Diego, University of California San Francisco, and the Salk Institute. She has been on the Anesthesiology Faculty at Stanford University since 2008 and Neuromedicine Faculty at Singularity University since 2010. Her postdoctoral training in optogenetic technology was conducted in the laboratories of Karl Deisseroth and Luis de Lecea at Stanford University, where she used light-activated ion channels inserted in DNA to study sleep and consciousness switches in brains. She is currently working on applications of neural wearable devices to crossover consumer and medical markets.

Appendix D

Inkoo Kang, Research Consultant, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council

US Air Force 2nd Lt. Inkoo Kang is a research consultant for the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. At the Atlantic Council, he conducts research and provides written analyses on the increasingly important role of outer space for social, economic, and military operations. His main interest focuses on how emerging technologies are merging military, diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic challenges and how the military must learn to adapt to such threats.

Appendix E

Borja Prado, Research Assistant, GeoTech Center Atlantic Council

Borja Prado holds an MS in Foreign Service (MSFS) from Georgetown University, where he concentrated in Global Politics and Security, focusing on the impact of disruptive technologies on governments, businesses, and societies.

He aims to apply his research experience, language skills, and strong background in technology and global affairs to help governments, businesses, and societies succeed in this increasingly uncertain era.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following members of the Commission Co-Chair teams for their assistance, expertise, and technical review of the report:

• Stoney Burke, Head of Federal Affairs and Public Policy, Amazon Web Services
• Ira Entis, Managing Director, Growth and Strategy Lead, Accenture Federal Services
• Geoffrey Kahn, Managing Director, Government Relations, Accenture
• Pamela Merritt, Managing Director, Federal Marketing and Communications, Accenture Federal Services
• Davis Pace, Professional Staff Member, House Foreign Affairs Committee
• Sean Sweeney, Manager, Government Relations, Accenture
• Clayton Swope, Senior Manager, National Security Public Policy, Amazon Web Services
• Carolyn Vigil, Senior Customer Engagement Manager, Amazon Web Services

We would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their review and commentary on relevant sections of the report: Laura Bate, Natalie Barrett, Pablo Breuer, Mark Brunner, Mung Chiang, Kevin Clark, Donald Codling, Carol Dumaine, Ryan G. Faith, Melissa Flagg, James F. Geurts, Jasper Gilardi, Bob Gourley, Bob Greenberg, Simon Handler, Henry Hertzfeld, Robert Hoffman, Erich James Hösli, Diane M. Janosek, William Jeffrey, Charles Jennings, Declan Kirrane, John J. Klein, Sandra J. Laney, John Logsdon, Robert Lucas, Lauren Maffeo, Jerry Mechling, Ivan Medynskyi, Ben King, Ben Murphy and the team at Reaching the Future Faster LLC, James Olds, Nikhil Raghuveera, Matthew Rose, Benjamin Schatz, Emma Schroeder, Jeremy Spaulding, Keith Strier, Daniella Taveau, Trent Teyema, Bill Valdez, and Tiffany Vora.

We also would like to express sincere appreciation to individuals both internal and external to the Atlantic Council for help in preparing this report for final publication. Their professional and dedicated efforts were essential to this work.

Lastly, we want to thank all the GeoTech Fellows and GeoTech Action Council members, each of whom embodies the spirit of the new Center as we look to the future ahead: Be bold. Be Brave. Be Benevolent.

Transcript Jun 23, 2021

Brian Deese on Biden’s vision for ‘a twenty-first-century American industrial strategy’

By Atlantic Council

National Economic Council Director Brian Deese spoke about how the Biden administration can strengthen US economic recovery by working with the private sector and global allies.

Economy & Business Future of Work

GeoTech Cues Aug 10, 2021

Contextualizing COVID-19 and its implications for the future of work

By Matthew Gavieta

As workers around the world adapted to a new normal amid a public health crisis, remote work took on a new meaning. However, questions about how to structure long-term telework arrangements remain. The current landscape of data reveals a tenuous relationship between well-being and telework. To secure a brighter future for our labor force, we must continue developing worker-centered technology policy and doing research on how to improve life at work.

Digital Policy Future of Work

Blog Post Jul 27, 2021

The time for US immigration reform is now

By Jeff Goldstein

The US is currently grappling with a multi-decade long trend of declining population rates leading to fewer and fewer workers. To meet the challenges of the future, US policymakers must manage declining population growth – and one of the best arrows in their economic policy quiver is comprehensive immigration reform.

Future of Work Macroeconomics

The post Conclusion, appendices, and acknowledgements appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While this report has focused on the technological changes that will impact geopolitics over the next decade, the recommendations contained within will be meaningless if the United States and allied nations ignore the most important ingredient in the success or failure of all endeavors: people. Developing a digitally fluent and resilient workforce that can meet the challenges of the GeoTech Decade will require private and public sectors to pursue several approaches. These include a broadened view of technical competencies and how they are acquired, improved alignment of skills and job requirements, incentives for employer-based training, and data collection to help assess the effectiveness of these investments and their effects on workers. Ensuring that people, especially people from underrepresented communities, are not left behind by the advance of technology—and that societies have the skilled workforces they need to innovate and prosper—will determine whether the GeoTech Decade lives up to its ambition.

From artificial intelligence (AI) to quantum computing, and for applications ranging from augmented reality to smart cities and communities,¹ the technologies that will shape the GeoTech Decade require specialized investments in the US workforce.² Shifting from the “findings and recommendations” format of the previous chapters, this closing chapter discusses key areas needing greater focus and investment from businesses, governments, educational institutions, and stakeholder organizations, as follows.

Create the workforce for the GeoTech Decade

Recognize the diverse competencies that characterize skilled technical workers

Diverse competencies include academic credentials, technical competencies in an industry, and technical competencies in a specific occupation, plus “soft skills” that make for reliable and collegial employees.³ Job descriptions should consider the value of all sources of relevant experience and ability.

Communicate the breadth of pathways for gaining skilled technical work 

Given the current focus on a college degree being a prerequisite to desirable, skilled technical jobs, the workforce should be better informed about the variety of skilled technical occupations, the different ways of acquiring credentials, e.g., college certificates, professional certifications, professional licenses, and digital badges and how such credentials allow more points of entry into desired occupations.

Strengthen skilled technical training and education

Secondary school: Career and technical education (CTE) programs⁴ enable the acquisition of STEM education combined with work experience that teaches technical skills relevant to specific professions. CTE programs can be enhanced through active participation and guidance provided by representatives from local businesses. This could help ensure that the skills training is better matched with employer needs and requirements. The P-TECH program, now operating schools in eleven US states, Australia, Morocco, and Taiwan, is another model for building regional workforces with the needed technical skills and for providing underserved youths with opportunities for gaining relevant technical skills.⁵

Post-secondary school: There are 936 public community colleges in the United States,⁶ representing a nationwide resource for improving the technical skills of the current and future workforce. According to a Community College Resource Center analysis, “6.7 million students were enrolled at community colleges in fall 2017, and nearly 10 million students enrolled at a community college at some point during the 2017-18 academic year. Yet, the overall percent of community college enrollees in 2014 that completed a college degree at a four-year institution within six years is 17 percent.”⁷ Increasing this completion rate through financial incentives and investments could increase the number and qualifications of the technically skilled workforce in the United States.

Non-college credentials: The value to the worker and the employer of non-college degree certification programs—apprenticeships, certifications, certificate programs—could be improved by better linking them to established, defined technical workforce competencies. Improved standards and data on the effectiveness of these credentials will help workers and employers determine the value of these credentials and enable more informed choices for skills training.

Alternative sources of skilled workers: A recent study⁸examined the prevailing practice of a four-year college degree being a prerequisite for skilled jobs. The analysis identified large populations of workers with suitable skills but who did not have a college degree. Of these, the analysis showed that twenty-nine million have skills that would enable them to transition to an occupation with a significantly higher wage. These results suggest that job descriptions should be carefully specified so as to reach the largest qualified talent pool.

Better align employer-based training with needs

Business incentives: Incentives for employers to invest in improving workforce technical skills should help a company remain competitive. The investments would align the employer’s needs for technically skilled workers and the training and education that is offered. One approach could be based on tax incentives for increasing investment in workforce skill development to increase productivity.”⁹

Technology development and training: Workforce organizations can play a role in effectively communicating, between employers and the workforce, issues concerning needed technical skills and the mechanisms and policies being used to manage these requirements. To accelerate identifying and acquiring future technical skills needed by the workforce, technology development programs could also create a training program for the skills associated with using the new technology in a product. This can shorten the link between technology development and the training of workers.

Acquire and analyze human capital development and management data

Human capital development and management data should address projections of the supply and demand for workers according to categories of technical skills, results of the search and hiring process, and how well the employer’s needs were satisfied. The data also should inform how well the training policies provided equitable access to skills training across the workforce.

These data should enable analyses of the expected value of different options for skills education and training for workers, the return on the investment of workforce training for businesses, and options for adjusting workforce training policies.

Foster lifelong learning

The pace at which advanced technology is changing the workplace and the skills needed to maintain a competitive economy makes lifelong learning imperative. Individuals should be able to guide their training and education throughout their working years.

To accomplish this on a national scale will require effort to craft incentives that motivate individuals to embrace this approach. Important elements may involve information on the value of continuing educational programs and the job opportunities that are enabled, funding mechanisms to lower the cost to the individual, and strategies developed with businesses that specify how continuing learning enhances an individual’s work prospects.

To guide individual choices, new tools can facilitate gathering and synthesizing the complex array of information on skills, occupations, training opportunities, and assessments of their value. The tools can also help the individual identify and secure funding from available sources, and help government funding sources be applied efficiently to this long-term challenge.

Equitable access to opportunity

The United States needs to ensure equitable access to opportunity during the GeoTech Decade. From access to affordable broadband to digital literacy, governments and the private sector need to make significant investments and work together to reduce barriers to full participation in the economy.

Access to affordable, high-speed Internet and devices to use it

Ensuring that all people can participate in the GeoTech Decade requires a commitment to equitable access to affordable, high-speed Internet. Millions do not have high-speed broadband, particularly in rural areas.¹⁰ What is more, many with access to high-speed broadband are still unable to afford the high cost of Internet and the devices needed to access it.¹¹ Lack of access and affordability perpetuates systemic inequities. 

While Congress has made significant investments in broadband since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, more remains to be done. The Emergency Broadband Benefit Program has helped low-income households afford broadband during the pandemic.

Acquiring digital literacy

Digital literacy, the ability to find, evaluate, utilize, and create information using digital technology, is becoming an essential skill for every individual. Digital literacy is an important element in eliminating a digital divide among nations and within a society. It complements affordable, high-speed Internet access by enabling people to develop and communicate local content, to communicate their issues and concerns, and to help others understand the context in which these issues occur.

Transcript Jun 23, 2021

Brian Deese on Biden’s vision for ‘a twenty-first-century American industrial strategy’

By Atlantic Council

National Economic Council Director Brian Deese spoke about how the Biden administration can strengthen US economic recovery by working with the private sector and global allies.

Economy & Business Future of Work

GeoTech Cues Aug 10, 2021

Contextualizing COVID-19 and its implications for the future of work

By Matthew Gavieta

As workers around the world adapted to a new normal amid a public health crisis, remote work took on a new meaning. However, questions about how to structure long-term telework arrangements remain. The current landscape of data reveals a tenuous relationship between well-being and telework. To secure a brighter future for our labor force, we must continue developing worker-centered technology policy and doing research on how to improve life at work.

Digital Policy Future of Work

Blog Post Jul 27, 2021

The time for US immigration reform is now

By Jeff Goldstein

The US is currently grappling with a multi-decade long trend of declining population rates leading to fewer and fewer workers. To meet the challenges of the future, US policymakers must manage declining population growth – and one of the best arrows in their economic policy quiver is comprehensive immigration reform.

Future of Work Macroeconomics

The post Future of work appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The growing commercial space industry enables ready access to advanced space capabilities for a broader group of actors. To maintain trusted, secure, and technically superior space operations, the United States must ensure it is a leading provider of needed space services and innovation in launch, on-board servicing, remote sensing, communications, and ground infrastructures. A robust commercial space industry not only enhances the resilience of the US national security space system by increasing space industrial base capacity, workforce, and responsiveness, but also further advances a dynamic innovative environment that can bolster US competitiveness across existing industries, while facilitating the development of new ones.

As smaller satellites become more capable, large constellations of government and commercial platforms could increase space mission assurance and deterrence by “eliminating mission critical, single-node vulnerabilities and distributing space operations across hosts, orbits, spectrum, and geography.”¹ Advances in commercial space also enable exploring our planet’s oceans, monitoring for climate change-related risks, and mapping of other parts of our solar system.

The fast-growing critical dependence on space for national security, the global economy, and public-benefit interests makes assured space operations essential for ensuring a more free, secure, and prosperous world.

Finding 6: The US commercial space industry can increase its role in supporting national security.

The National Space Strategy² includes four areas of emphasis: resilience, deterrence, foundational capabilities, and more conducive domestic and international environments. It envisions improved leverage of, and support for, the US commercial industry. The Defense Space Strategy Summary³ highlights that the rapidly growing commercial space industry is introducing new capabilities as well as new threats to US space operations. A main effort in this strategy is to cooperate with industry and other actors to leverage their capabilities.

“Space Policy Directive-2—Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space,” provides support for the US commercial space industry.⁴ In support of the overall policy of the executive branch to promote economic growth, protect national security, and encourage US leadership in space commerce, the directive requires reviews of the launch and reentry licensing for commercial space flight, the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, the Department of Commerce’s organization of its regulation of commercial space flight activities, radio frequency spectrum, and export licensing regulations.⁵

The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) report on the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) use of commercial satellites⁶ describes several potential benefits of including more responsive delivery of capabilities to space and increasing deterrence and resilience due to the larger number and distribution of commercial constellations of satellites.

Finding 6.1: Large constellations of small satellites are being developed.

The development of small satellites enables the proliferation of very large constellations of satellites. For example, several companies are currently planning constellations of communications satellites comprising an aggregate deployment of several thousand satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). In total, the communications capacities could exceed tens of terabytes. This enables low-latency, high-bandwidth communications to any region, bringing valuable educational opportunities to underserved populations, and supporting new data-intensive communications in advanced countries.⁷ Small Earth observation satellites are being deployed in constellations of hundreds of platforms by several companies. These can produce global coverage with revisit intervals ranging from minutes to hours. Several types of sensors are being deployed including electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and radio signal collection.⁸ Companies in the United States, Europe, Russia, and China are actively pursuing these new capabilities.⁹

The ability to image any area, and to communicate with any area, will become commercially available to any individual, group, or government. Coupled with access to cloud computing and big data analytics, innovations will occur in many fields, e.g., precise, real-time weather and soil condition data for farmers to increase yield, ship tracking to aid logistics, indicators of disease spread to inform a pandemic observation network, and the like.

Large constellations may also contribute to deterrence. The larger number of platforms operating in conjunction with major military satellites may make the entire constellation more resilient.

The commercial space industry is developing satellite servicing capabilities. This helps extend the operating life of each satellite, though the ability to operate near another satellite is viewed negatively by adversaries.

Finding 6.2: There is increasing focus on cybersecurity for commercial space systems.

The “Space Policy Directive 5”¹⁰ specifies the US policy for managing risks¹¹ to the growth and prosperity of its commercial space economy is to rely on “executive departments and agencies to foster practices within Government space operations and across the commercial space industry that protect space assets and their supporting infrastructure from cyber threats and ensure continuity of operations.” Several cybersecurity principles provide the foundation for these efforts, though the directive expects space system owners and operators to be responsible for implementing cybersecurity practices and does not address enforcement actions. No timeline for the development of regulations is provided.

Finding 6.3: The UN Outer Space Treaty (OST) requires interpretation to determine when emerging commercial space platforms become targets.

The growth in the commercial satellite industry will lead to lower-cost satellites with advanced sensors, communications, on-board computation, and security capability. Over time, each small satellite, when operated in large constellations, could be more useful for military purposes.

A key determinant in the application of the UN OST to the question of whether the military can use commercial satellites is “whether the commercial satellite is actively making a contribution to military action.”¹² For example, if the military is using a commercial communications satellite to relay its messages, the UN OST does not view the communications satellite as a military target. Full consideration of the treatment of dual-use commercial satellites is not settled and will evolve as more nations participate in the commercial space industry.¹³ Yet, because nations like China and Russia already target (terrestrial) commercial networks as part of their computer network exploitation campaigns, it stands to reason that they will not necessarily recognize a distinction between commercial and military satellite targets.

Finding 6.4: The development of constellations of small satellites beneficial to the military may require government support.

Commercially viable capabilities in small satellites are advancing, but may not be sufficient for some military needs at this time.  For example, the resolution of an electro-optical sensor for surveilling traffic is not useful for target identification, though it may be useful for tracking troop movements. A balanced policy would require the government to focus on the more exquisite capabilities that only it can provide, while relying on the commercial sector to meet other requirements.  The government can also do more to send a signal to the markets that it supports these constellations and their capabilities by purchasing commercial data and services, thereby helping to ensure a strong commercial industrial base.

Finding 6.5: Government support for commercial space activities can be strengthened.

The growth of the commercial space industry occurring in several major countries¹⁴ requires a review of US commercial space policy¹⁵ as the roles of government and commercial industry change in key areas. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is establishing a wholly commercial capability to land humans on the moon (from lunar orbit), in contrast with the prior approach of government control of human spaceflight.¹⁶ There are efforts to consolidate and streamline the regulatory framework and organizations for US commercial space capabilities.¹⁷ To support greater innovation and bolster US commercial space industries, recently proposed legislation identified ways to make the commercial space licensing process simpler, more timely, and more transparent.¹⁸ These efforts attempt to balance commercial interests against the government’s need to ensure the commercial space capabilities meet national security and foreign policy requirements. Such balancing may be less important as sensitive imagery becomes more available from foreign companies. To address urgent new requirements—e.g., on-orbit servicing of a space force, or continuous global observation in support of climate study, agriculture, and ocean systems—the government may require new policies to support increasing reliance on commercial space industries and new commercial space capabilities.

Approach 6: Accelerate the development and deployment of dual-use commercial satellites, including applications to Earth and space exploration.

The United States should use the emerging commercial space industry, and large constellations of small satellites, to enhance the resilience of national security space missions. This will require a deliberate strategy to guide commercial system developments, and this must be balanced with benefits that accrue to the public. The United States should, with its allies, examine how to interpret current treaties when considering the new commercial space capabilities. The United States, its allies, and private industry should implement global Earth and space observation capabilities.

Recommendation 6: Foster the development of commercial space technologies and develop a cross-agency strategy and approach to space that can enhance national security space operations and improve agriculture, ocean exploration, and climate change activities; align both civilian and military operations, and international treaties to support these uses.

Recommendation 6.1: Ensure federal investments in the commercial space industry deliver public benefits.

Congress should pass legislation that directs the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to lead an interagency initiative that develops an economic impact assessment of existing and future government investments in the US commercial space industry, as well as a public-private investment strategy for technology innovations and operating efficiencies that will ensure subsequent benefit to the public interest. Such benefits should contribute to global access to open data sets—via a space-based Internet, space-based cloud storage and computing—of Earth observation, global health, humanitarian applications, and other areas; it should also include suitable sharing of government-funded data collections among other government programs. A cross-agency group including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), relevant federal departments, private industry, and allied nations should develop the plans and partnerships for global Earth and space observation in support of environmental security.

Recommendation 6.2: Foster commercial space technologies of strategic importance and protect these from foreign acquisition.

Congress should direct a cross-agency group including NASA and the Department of Defense to conduct a joint review¹⁹ This does not address foreign acquisition of commercial space technologies of strategic importance of dual-use commercial space technologies and capabilities that are of strategic importance to national security space missions. The scope includes communications, on-orbit storage and computing, large constellations of small platforms, sensing, space situational awareness, satellite protection, launch, and on-orbit servicing. Congress should direct a streamlined licensing process and simplify regulations where appropriate. Such dual-use technologies should be reviewed for protection from foreign acquisition by the expanded authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)²⁰ and by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The broadened role delineated by the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) enables CFIUS to review noncontrolling foreign investments in critical technologies and critical infrastructure in the US space industrial base. Congress should direct an assessment of how the FIRRMA reforms have been applied and the resulting effect.

Recommendation 6.3: Harden the security of commercial space industry facilities and space assets.

The administration should designate the commercial space industry as a critical infrastructure sector and develop a sector-specific plan for its protection. The Department of Commerce should be assigned as the Sector-Specific Agency and should work with international standards-setting groups to harden select commercial space capabilities, e.g., protect communications against cyber threats.

The cybersecurity of both military and commercial spacecraft is a growing concern. Threat actors are devoting more attention to attacking both the software/IT supply chain as well as vulnerabilities in the cyber defenses on spacecraft. Large commercial mega-constellations of small satellites are performing an increasing range of business and communications functions, yet do not necessarily conform to high cybersecurity standards. The US government does not have standards for the design of cyber-secure commercial satellites, though it is introducing self-certification programs for commercial satellite providers.

The administration should extend the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity maturity standards, guidelines, and best practices to the space domain, covering the space, link, ground, and user segments. The cyber-resilient design principles should consider the following: “Intrusion detection and prevention leveraging signatures and machine learning to detect and block cyber intrusions onboard spacecraft; a supply chain risk management (SCRM) program to protect against malware inserted in parts and modules; software assurance methods within the software supply chain to reduce the likelihood of cyber weaknesses in flight software and firmware; logging onboard the spacecraft to verify legitimate operations and aid in forensic investigations after anomalies; root-of-trust to protect software and firmware integrity; a tamper-proof means to restore the spacecraft to a known good cyber-safe mode; and lightweight cryptographic solutions for use in small satellites.”²¹

Recommendation 6.4: Establish the conformance of emerging commercial space constellations to multinational agreements.

The United States should lead a conference to assess future developments in the commercial space industry with respect to the UN OST, the Artemis Accords,²² and other international agreements that may be constructed. The objective is to clarify the acceptable use of commercial space assets as these become of greater use in supporting militaries.

Commercial capabilities may, over time, provide essential portions of space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, refueling, data storage and processing, and maintenance. As new military space capabilities become possible, there is an increased risk that these will be interpreted as “making an effective contribution to military action” and thereby become legitimate targets. These capabilities may include imaging satellites, communications satellites, space networks, satellite maintenance vehicles, launch vehicles, and so forth. A key area to clarify is the legal and technical assessment of what qualifies as “making an effective contribution to military action” involving space technology.²³

Recommendation 6.5: Develop space technologies for mega-constellations of satellites that support monitoring the entire planet pervasively and persistently, at high resolution and communicate the information in near-real time.

The administration should develop autonomous space operations technologies for large-scale constellations. This program, led by the DoD, NASA, and other elements of the national security space enterprise, would use AI technologies to minimize or eliminate human requirements for satellite control, information collection, and information analysis; and increase the speed of the information-to-decision loop.

The administration should encourage commercial space companies to develop cost-effective technologies that increase the survivability of commercial satellites as the operating regions become more crowded or contested. This may enable commercial satellites to operate in a greater variety of conditions, thereby providing expanded value to the United States.

The administration should develop and conduct Challenge Prizes funding opportunities for autonomous satellite operations on single platforms, i.e., for applications where highly capable satellites autonomously manage their own complex taskings, and also work as part of a large collection of similarly autonomous satellites.

The administration should use the model of the NASA Tipping Point solicitation to develop the capability to continuously monitor the world’s oceans—in particular, using space-based sensors—for the impact of climate change and other issues of global importance. This program would be jointly managed by NASA, NSF, and DARPA with collaborations from the European Union (EU) and other participants. This multiyear initiative would help establish a global, real-time Earth oceans observation network and the supporting autonomous control, communications, and data analytics capabilities. In addition to space technologies, this program could also support the development of surface and underwater vehicles to perform this function. The Department of State should address the treaty implications of large numbers of remotely-piloted and autonomous surface and underwater vehicles and develop new international agreements where needed.

Transcript Jun 23, 2021

Brian Deese on Biden’s vision for ‘a twenty-first-century American industrial strategy’

By Atlantic Council

National Economic Council Director Brian Deese spoke about how the Biden administration can strengthen US economic recovery by working with the private sector and global allies.

Economy & Business Future of Work

GeoTech Cues Aug 10, 2021

Contextualizing COVID-19 and its implications for the future of work

By Matthew Gavieta

As workers around the world adapted to a new normal amid a public health crisis, remote work took on a new meaning. However, questions about how to structure long-term telework arrangements remain. The current landscape of data reveals a tenuous relationship between well-being and telework. To secure a brighter future for our labor force, we must continue developing worker-centered technology policy and doing research on how to improve life at work.

Digital Policy Future of Work

Blog Post Jul 27, 2021

The time for US immigration reform is now

By Jeff Goldstein

The US is currently grappling with a multi-decade long trend of declining population rates leading to fewer and fewer workers. To meet the challenges of the future, US policymakers must manage declining population growth – and one of the best arrows in their economic policy quiver is comprehensive immigration reform.

Future of Work Macroeconomics

The post Assured space operations for public benefit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted health and economic security, both directly and indirectly, for most of the planet. Inherent to this disruption are three systemic problems: (i) global and national leaders acted slowly to detect and contain the spread of the virus, (ii) global health organizations reacted slowly to contain the spread of the virus, and (iii) a mixture of factors caused the delayed response including late recognition of the threat and where it was circulating, slow incorporation of science and data into decision making, poor political will, and inconsistent messaging to citizens regarding the nature of the threat and precautions to take. The origin and spread of the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 also depended on a number of codependent factors—human encroachment on animal habitats, globalization and an interconnected world, and a global economy that ignored insufficient sanitation and public health standards. But, most importantly, it depended on a failure of adequate monitoring, data sharing, and early warning and mitigation systems.

Viruses and other pathogens know no borders, nor do they discriminate by race or class. Though nations may adopt their own strategies to enhance resilience and future planning, a more global approach to this interconnected system will be essential to keep all humans safe. Continuous global health protection builds upon a foundation of secure data and communications, rapid sharing of biological threat data across the globe, enhanced trust and confidence in the digital economy, and assured supply chains.

Finding 5: There is a need for a continuous biological surveillance, detection, and prevention capability.

The design of a pandemic surveillance, detection, and prevention system would require a multipronged approach, comprising global monitoring, early detection, rapid warning, and capable mitigation and prevention strategies. The system would perform the following main functions: biothreat agent recognition, mobilization of defenses, containing the spread of the biothreat agent, administration of therapeutic treatment, and the ability to recognize new pathogens and form specific neutralizing responses.

Much of the integrative assessments performed by the system would need to rely on a network capable of receiving data from multiple, decentralized information sources, and converting that information into indicators that can be aggregated and evaluated to support decision making at the individual, local community, and population level.¹ A global detection and response system could enable greater resilience and prevention, and decrease the potential that new outbreaks of pathogens lead to global pandemics.²

Finding 5.1: An early detection and warning system³ requires global data collection of pathogen-related indicators, sometimes requiring novel sources to address information gaps.

Early detection would require the funding of a global, interconnected system that relies on partnerships among national governments and regional partners. Where there are gaps in collecting and sharing preferred data, e.g., when a nation or region does not participate, alternative indicators would need to be developed.⁴

The development of novel, authenticated data sources is a key risk factor for pandemic warning systems. As seen at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, relying on government-provided information led to a delay in identifying the unusual pneumonia-like illness in Wuhan, China, and ultimately in releasing the genetic sequence of the virus.⁵ It cost lives, delayed warnings and the ability for others to detect the circulating virus, delayed containment and mitigation strategies (e.g., vaccine and therapeutic development), and enabled the virus to spread globally via human vectors.⁶

Authenticated data sources from different decentralized sources and edge devices could include both traditional (e.g., positive viral tests, hospitalization rates, excess death rates) and nontraditional sources of health information (e.g., passive monitoring of environment, wastewater, satellite data, human migration trends, market signals) that can be overlaid, combined, and aggregated to understand current public health conditions and to have predictive value.

Finding 5.2: An elevated capacity on the global stage is required.

The components of global capacity in a pandemic include the ability to quickly identify and sequence novel pathogens; to quickly share that information with the world; to rapidly ramp-up testing; to develop and approve targeted vaccines and therapeutics; to have medical supply chain, manufacturing, and distribution capabilities in place; to have sufficient capital health equipment, medical consumables, and healthcare personnel in place; and to provide access to healthcare and reliable health information to all those in need.

These specific functions for creating a comprehensive global alert and response system and coordinating actions, as well as supporting localized capacity strengthening,⁷ were made part of the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) updated 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR)⁸ and its pandemic preparedness plan.⁹ “To help countries review and, if necessary, strengthen their ability to detect, assess, and respond to public health events, WHO develops guidelines, technical materials, and training and fosters networks for sharing expertise and best practices. WHO’s help supports countries in meeting their commitments under the IHR to build capacity for all kinds of public health events.”¹⁰

To achieve the fullest potential of these approaches, there need to be investments on a global scale to support expanded detection, mitigation, and capacity-building strategies. These efforts should be conducted through public, private, and government partnerships based on mutual agreements to share data and report issues early. These should be multinational collaborations that would be able to overcome the limiting factors discussed in the next section. In developing these approaches, a priority is to strengthen transparency and accountability within the United Nations (UN) system, including at the WHO.¹¹

Finding 5.3: There are several limiting factors.

There often is a lack of trust among groups, institutions, and governments. Governments do not always trust other governments; countries do not always trust global health bodies; nationally, states do not always trust each other or the federal government; and individuals do not always trust governments or health entities or officials. This lack of trust is well-documented. According to the 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer,¹² “no institution is seen as both competent and ethical,” an opinion that includes government, business, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the media. In the statistical model Edelman provides, government is widely seen as the most unethical, and the least competent, institution of the four. According to the International Development Association of the World Bank Group, half of the global population does not trust government institutions.¹³ Similarly, both individual citizens and countries may lack trust in national and global health bodies.

Health institutions are concerned about sharing data on health outbreaks too early, as this could make them look underinformed, or to be “crying wolf” before the true measure of an outbreak is known.¹⁴ Governments may be incentivized to withhold information on outbreaks to maintain appearances of strength and ultimately to control medical supplies to keep their own people safe. Withholding immediate access to information can severely affect outcomes, such as the spread of the virus, allowing it to gain a foothold in other countries unaware. It also prevents the type of global and interdisciplinary cross-collaboration that has been so effective at advancing science, research and development (R&D), and progress toward solutions.